

GREEK SERIES • VOLUME 3

HAPPINESS AND PLEASURE

ARISTOTLE & EPICURUS

ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ
ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΕΝΟΙΚΕΑ
ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΑΙ
ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ

Happiness and Pleasure

Nicomachean Ethics I–III and X, with Epicurus on Pleasure

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation
preserving the original word order




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Volume 3 of the Canes Nobiles Greek interlinear texts

The Greek text follows Bywater's Oxford Aristotle
and von der Mühl's Teubner Epicurus

Set from the Perseus Digital Library and the First
Thousand Years of Greek, with corrections

Translated and composed with AL, edited by Christopher Hench
Artwork by Esther Steves

Words the editors seclude are not printed; words
they supply are printed without their brackets.

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ARISTOTLE

HOIKA NIKOMAXEIA

Nicomachean Ethics

BOOK I

I • EVERY ART AIMS AT SOME GOOD

Every art, inquiry, action, and choice aims at some good, and so the good has been well defined as what all things aim at. Ends differ: some are activities, and some are products beyond the activity, and where there are products they are better than the activities. Where one art falls under another — bridle-making under horsemanship — the end of the master art is the more choiceworthy of the two.

πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε
every art and every inquiry similarly and action both
καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς
and choice of-good some to-aim-at seems therefore well
ἀπεφάνησαν τὰ ἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις
they-declared the-good which all-things aim-at a-difference and some
φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ
appears of-the ends the-ones indeed for are activities the-others and
παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς
besides them products some of-which and there-are ends some besides the
πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.
actions in these better are-by-nature than-the activities the products
πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ
many and actions being and arts and sciences many
γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
come-to-be also the ends of-medicine indeed for health of-shipbuilding and
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.
a-ship of-generalship and victory of-household-management and wealth
ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν,
as-many-as and are of-the such-things under one certain capacity
καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι
just-as under the horsemanship bridle-making and as-many-as others

τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ
of-the equestrian instruments are this-one and also every military
 πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον
action under the generalship according-to the same indeed way
 ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν
others under others in all and the of-the master-arts
 τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά·
ends than-all are more-choiceworthy than-the-things under them
 τούτων γὰρ χάριν κακεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν
of-these for for-the-sake those-also are-pursued it-differs and nothing
 τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ
the activities themselves to-be the ends of-the actions or besides
 ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
these another thing just-as in the mentioned sciences

II • THE GOOD AT WHICH POLITICS AIMS

If there is an end we want for its own sake, that end is the good, and knowing it would help us as a mark helps archers. Aristotle asks which science studies it, and answers that it is the most authoritative one, which is politics: politics decides what is to be studied in a city and by whom. Its end therefore takes in the ends of all the others, and that end is the human good.

εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ
if indeed some end there-is of-the things-done which on-account-of itself
 βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα
we-wish the-other-things and on-account-of this and not all-things
 δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς
on-account-of another we-choose it-goes-on for thus at-least to
 ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον
infinity so-as to-be empty and vain the desire (is)-clear

ὥς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ
that this would be the-good and the best surely then also
 πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ γνώσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ
for the life the knowledge of-it great has weight and
 καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν
just-as archers a-mark having more would we-hit
 τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν
the right-thing if and so it-must-be-tried in-outline at-least to-grasp
 αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων.
it what ever it-is and of-which of-the sciences or capacities
 δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα
it-would-seem(-to-belong) and — of-the most-authoritative and most
 ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται· τίνος
master-like such and the political-science appears which
 γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας
for to-be needful of-the sciences in the cities and what-sort
 ἐκάστους μαθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει·
each-group to-learn and up-to what-point this-one ordains
 ὁρώμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
we-see and also the most-honored of-the capacities under this
 οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν·
being for-instance generalship household-management rhetoric
 χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
using and this-one the remaining of-the sciences further and
 νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι,
legislating what one-must do and from-what to-abstain
 τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ'
the of-this end it-includes would the of-the others so-that this
 ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ
would be the-human good if for even the-same it-is for-one
 καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως
and for-a-city greater at-least and more-complete the of-the city

φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ
 appears both to-attain and to-preserve welcome indeed for even
 ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.
 for-one alone nobler and also more-godlike for-a-nation and for-cities
 ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὕσα.
 the indeed then inquiry these aims-at political a-kind being

III · HOW MUCH PRECISION TO EXPECT

Noble and just things vary so much that they can look like matters of convention rather than of nature, so an account of them can only be given in outline. An educated man asks of each subject just the exactness its nature allows. A young man is not a fit hearer of politics — not because of his years but because he lives by feeling, and here the end is action rather than knowledge.

λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην
 it-would-be-said and — sufficiently if according-to the underlying matter
 διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ᾗασι τοῖς
 it-should-be-made-clear the for exactness not alike in all the
 λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις.
 accounts is-to-be-sought just-as nor in the things-manufactured
 τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται,
 the and noble and the just about which the political-science inquires
 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον
 much has variation and wandering so-as to-seem by-convention
 μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή· τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει
 only to-be by-nature and not such and a-certain wandering has
 καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ'
 also the-goods on-account-of the for-many to-befall harms from
 αὐτῶν· ἥδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἔτεροι
 them already for some perished on-account-of wealth others

δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ
and on-account-of courage welcome then about such-things and from
 τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τάληθες ἐνδείκνυσθαι,
such-things speaking roughly and in-outline the-truth to-indicate
 καὶ περὶ τῶν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας
and about the-things as for the most-part and from such-things speaking
 τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
such-things also to-conclude the same indeed way also
 ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου
to-receive (is)-needful each of-the things-said of-an-educated-man
 γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον
for it-is to so-much the-exactness to-seek in each
 γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται·
kind to as-much-as the of-the subject nature admits
 παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογούντος
similar for it-appears a-mathematician both speaking-persuasively
 ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.
to-accept and a-rhetorician demonstrations to-demand
 ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν
each-man and judges well what he-knows and of-these he-is
 ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος,
a-good judge in each indeed then the educated-man
 ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πάντων πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς
without-qualification and the about everything educated-man therefore of-the
 πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος
political-science not is a-fit hearer the young-man inexperienced
 γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων
for of-the in the life actions the arguments and from these
 καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς
and about these further and the passions inclined-to-follow
 ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος
being idly he-will-listen and unprofitably since the end

ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν
is not knowledge but action it-differs and nothing young in-the
 ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ
age or the character youthful not for because-of the time the
 ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν
deficiency but on-account-of the according-to passion to-live and to-pursue
 ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνώσις γίνεται,
each-thing to-the for such-men useless the knowledge becomes
 καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς
just-as to-the unrestrained to-those and according-to reason the
 ὀρέξεις ποιούμενοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη
desires making and acting very-profitable would be
 τὸ περὶ τούτων εἶδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς
the about these to-know and about indeed a-bearer and how
 ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροσιμάσθω ταῦτα.
one-must-receive and what we-propose let-this-be-said-in-preface these-things

IV · AGREED IN NAME, DISPUTED IN FACT

Almost everyone calls the highest good happiness, and treats living well and faring well as the same thing, but no one agrees about what happiness is. The many name something visible — pleasure, wealth, honor — and often name whatever they happen to lack. Aristotle warns that arguments from first principles and arguments toward them are different, and that we have to begin from what is known to us.

λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ
let-us-say and taking-up-again since every knowledge and
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν
choice of-good some reaches-for what it-is which we-say
 τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον
the political-science to-aim-at and what the of-all highest

τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
of-the attainable goods in-name indeed then nearly by the
 πλείστων ὁμολογείται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
most it-is-agreed the for happiness both the many
 καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ
and the refined say the and well to-live and the well
 πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ
to-fare the-same they-suppose with-the to-be-happy about
 δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ
and the happiness what it-is they-dispute and not
 ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν
alike the many with-the wise give-an-account the-ones indeed
 γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ
for of-the evident something and manifest such-as pleasure or
 πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο — πολλάκις δὲ καὶ
wealth or honor others and another-thing often and even
 ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος
the same-man a-different having-fallen-ill indeed for health being-poor
 δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα
and wealth being-conscious and to-themselves of-ignorance those great
 τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ'
something and beyond them saying they-admire some and
 ὥντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ
thought beside the many these goods another thing in itself
 εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ.
to-be which also for-these all the-cause is of-the to-be good
 ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιώτερον ἴσως
all indeed then to-examine the opinions rather-idle perhaps
 ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας
it-is enough and the most prevalent or seeming
 ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ
to-have some reason not let-it-escape and us that they-differ the

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ
from the principles arguments and the to the principles well for also
 ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν
 — Plato was-perplexed-at this and inquired whether from the
 ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ
principles or to the principles is the road just-as in the race-course
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον
from the judges to the turning-post or the-reverse one-must-begin
 μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ
indeed for from the things-known these and in-two-ways the-ones
 μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε
indeed for to-us the-others and without-qualification perhaps then for-us at-least
 ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθουσιν
one-must-begin from the to-us things-known therefore it-is-needful in-the habits
 ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ
to-have-been-trained nobly the-man about noble-things and just-things and
 ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἰκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ
generally the political-matters going-to-listen adequately a-principle for the
 ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ
that and if this should-appear sufficiently nothing he-will-need-besides the
 διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ
why the and such-a-man has or gets would principles easily to-whom
 δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·
and neither belongs of-these let-him-hear the of-Hesiod

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
this-man indeed (is)-best-of-all who himself all-things perceives
 ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
good and again that-man-also who well to-one-speaking listens

ὅς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέη μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
who and ever neither himself perceives nor of-another bearing
 ἐν θυμῷ βάλλεται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.
in heart lays-it-up this-one and in-turn (is)-a-useless man

V • THE THREE LIVES

The many take happiness to be pleasure and so choose the life of enjoyment, which Aristotle calls the life of grazing beasts. Cultivated men take it to be honor, but honor lies more in those who give it than in the man honored, and they want it for virtue — yet virtue too is incomplete, since a man may have it and sleep, or suffer the worst misfortunes. The money-making life is lived under compulsion, and wealth is not the good sought, being useful only for something else.

ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
we and let-us-speak from-where we-digressed the for good
 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων
and the happiness not unreasonably they-seem from the lives
 ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν·
to-conceive the indeed many and most-vulgar the pleasure
 διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι
therefore also the life they-love the of-enjoyment three for are
 μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς
chiefly the prominent-ones the both now mentioned and the political
 καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς
and third the contemplative the indeed then many altogether
 ἀνδραποδῶδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,
slavish appear of-cattle a-life choosing
 τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς
they-obtain and an-argument on-account-of the many of-those in the

ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ
positions-of-power to-feel-alike with-Sardanapallus the and refined and
 πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.
practical honor of-the for political life nearly this (is)-end
 φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ
it-appears and more-superficial to-be than-the thing-sought it-seems for
 ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν
in those honoring rather to-be than in the one-honored the-good
 δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.
and one's-own something and hard-to-take-away to-be we-divine
 ἔτι δ' εἰκόασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν
further and they-seem the honor to-pursue so-that they-may-believe
 ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων
themselves good to-be they-seek at-any-rate by the prudent
 τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ·
to-be-honored and among those-by-whom they-are-known and for virtue
 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.
(is)-clear then that according-to at-least these the virtue (is)-better
 τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου
perhaps and even more would someone end of-the political life
 ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ
this suppose it-appears and more-incomplete even this-one it-seems
 γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν
for to-be-possible even to-sleep having the virtue or to-be-inactive
 διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ
through life and besides these to-suffer-ill and to-fare-badly the
 μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαίμονισειεν,
greatest the-man and thus living no-one — would-call-happy
 εἰ μὴ θέσω διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλις·
if not a-thesis defending and about indeed these enough
 ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.
sufficiently for also in the popular-writings it-has-been-said about them

τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν
third and is the contemplative about which the examination in
 τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις
the things-following we-shall-make the and money-maker forced a-kind
 ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν·
is and the wealth (is)-clear that not the thing-sought good
 χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον
useful for and of-another for-the-sake therefore rather the earlier
 λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ
things-said ends someone would suppose on-account-of themselves for
 ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι
they-are-loved it-appears and not-even those although many arguments
 πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.
for them have-been-laid-down these indeed then let-be-dismissed

VI • AGAINST THE FORM OF THE GOOD

Friends of Aristotle introduced the theory of Forms, but truth comes first. The good is spoken of in every category — god and intellect, the virtues, the measured, the useful, the right moment — so it cannot be one universal thing. And a separate Good would be neither attainable nor acquirable by a man: no weaver or carpenter ever looks for it, and none would work better for having seen it.

τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι
the and universal better perhaps to-examine and to-work-through
 πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως
how it-is-spoken-of although uphill the such inquiry
 γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη.
being on-account-of the friendly men to-have-introduced the forms
 δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ
it-seems and would perhaps better to-be and to-be-necessary for the-saving

γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε
at-least of-the truth even the things-one's-own to-destroy otherwise both
 καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλιν ὅσιον
and philosophers being both for being dear (it-is)-pious
 προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν
to-prefer the truth those indeed having-brought-in the opinion
 ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
this not made forms in which the prior and posterior
 ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ
they-spoke-of wherefore not-even of-the numbers a-form they-set-up the
 δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ
and good is-spoken-of both in the what it-is and in the quality and
 ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία
in the in-relation-to something the and according-to itself and the substance
 πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι (παραφνάδι γὰρ
(is)-prior in-the nature than-the in-relation-to something an-offshoot for
 τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη
this resembles and an-accident of-the being so-that not would be
 κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς
common some over these form further and since the-good in-as-many-ways
 λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς
is-spoken-of as-the being and for in the what it-is-spoken-of such-as the god
 καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ
and the intellect and in the quality the virtues and in the quantity
 τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν
the measured and in the in-relation-to something the useful and in
 χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα),
time the-right-moment and in place a-dwelling and others such-like
 δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ
(is)-clear that not would be common something universal and one not for
 ἂν ἐλέγεται ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.
would be-spoken-of in all the categories but in one alone

ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ
further and since of-the things-under one form one also (is)-the-science also
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν
of-the goods all there-would-be — one some science now
 δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον
and there-are many even of-the-things under one category such-as
 καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγική ἐν νόσῳ δ'
of-the-right-moment in war indeed for generalship in sickness and
 ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρική ἐν πόνοις
medicine and of-the measured in nourishment indeed medicine in exertions
 δὲ γυμναστική. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ
and gymnastics one-would-be-perplexed and — someone what ever also
 βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ
they-mean to-say by-the-thing-itself if-indeed in both man-himself
 καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ
and in man one and the same account is the of-the
 ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ'
man in-so-far-as for man in-nothing they-will-differ if and
 οὕτως, οὐδ' ἦ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι
so nor in-so-far-as good but indeed nor by-the eternal to-be
 μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον
more good it-will-be if-indeed nor whiter the long-lasting
 τοῦ ἐφήμερου. πιθανώτερον δ' εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι
than-the day-long more-persuasively and seem the Pythagoreans
 λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ
to-speak about it placing in the of-the goods column the
 ἔν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ
one whom indeed also Speusippus to-have-followed seems but
 περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν
about indeed these another let-there-be account to-the and things-said
 ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς
a-dispute some appears-beneath on-account-of the not about every

ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν
good the arguments to-have-been-said to-be-called and according-to one
 εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ
form the-things in themselves pursued and loved the-others
 δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων
and productive of-these or preservative somehow or of-the opposites
 κωλυτικά διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.
preventive on-account-of these to-be-called also in-a-way different
 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν
(is)-clear then that in-two-ways are-called would the-goods and the-ones indeed
 καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν
in themselves the-others and on-account-of these having-separated then
 ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ
from the beneficial the-things in themselves let-us-consider whether
 λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη
they-are-called according-to one form in themselves and what-sort posit
 τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ
someone would or as-many-as even being-isolated are-pursued such-as the
 φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ
to-think and to-see and pleasures certain and honors these for if
 καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ
even on-account-of another thing we-pursue nevertheless among-the in themselves
 ἀγαθῶν θεῖη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς
goods would-posit someone — or not-even another anything except the
 ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν
form so-that idle will-be the form if and also these are of-the
 καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν
in themselves the of-the-good account in all them the same
 ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίᾳ
to-show-itself it-will-be-necessary just-as in snow and white-lead
 τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς
the of-the whiteness of-honor and also of-practical-wisdom and of-pleasure

ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθά.
different and diverging the accounts in-this-respect in-which (they-are)-goods
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.
not is then the good common something according-to one form
 ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
but how then is-it-called not for it-resembles the-things at-least from
 τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ
chance homonymous but surely at-least by-the from one to-be or
 πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;
toward one all to-contribute or rather according-to analogy
 ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν
as for in body sight in soul intellect and one indeed in
 ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν
another but perhaps these indeed must-be-left-aside the now to-work-out
 γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴῃ φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.
for about them of-another would be philosophy more-proper
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν
likewise and also about the form if for even there-is one
 τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν
something the in-common predicated good or separable
 αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴῃ πρακτὸν
itself something in itself (is)-clear that not would be attainable
 οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.
nor acquirable for-man now and such-a-thing something is-sought
 τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ
perhaps and to-someone it-seems would better to-be to-know it
 πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ
with-a-view-to the acquirable and attainable of-the goods as for
 παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῶν
a-pattern this having more we-shall-know also the for-us
 ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα
goods and-if we-know we-shall-attain them persuasiveness

μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις
indeed then some has the argument it-seems and with-the sciences
 διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τὸ
to-disagree all for of-good some aiming-at and the
 ἐνδεῆς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ.
lacking seeking leave-aside the knowledge of-it
 καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας
although an-aid so-great the craftsmen all
 ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον
to-be-ignorant-of and not-even to-seek (is)-not reasonable puzzling
 δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν
and also what will-be-benefited a-weaver or a-carpenter for the
 αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς
his-own craft knowing the itself this good or how
 ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν
more-skilled-in-medicine or more-skilled-in-generalship will-be the-man the form
 αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν
itself having-beheld it-appears indeed for not-even the health
 οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον
thus to-examine the physician but the of-a-man rather
 δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ
and perhaps the of-this-one in each-case for he-heals and about
 μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
indeed these to so-much let-it-have-been-said

The good is what is always chosen for itself and never for anything else, and only happiness meets that test; it is self-sufficient as well, and complete. To say what it is, Aristotle looks for the function of man: not life, which plants share, nor perception, which animals share, but the soul's activity in accordance with reason. The human good is that activity performed well, in a complete life — for one swallow does not make a spring.

πάλιν δ' ἐπανεέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί
again and let-us-return to the thing-sought good what
 ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει
ever would be it-appears indeed for different in a-different action
 καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς
and craft different for in medicine and generalship and the
 λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ
rest likewise what then of-each (is)-the-good or (that)-of-which
 χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν
for-the-sake the rest are-done this and in medicine indeed
 ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία,
(is)-health in generalship and victory in house-building and a-house
 ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει
in another and another in every and action and choice
 τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
the end of-this for for-the-sake the rest do
 πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος,
all so-that if some of-the attainable-things all there-is end
 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα.
this would be the attainable good if and more these
 μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφίκεται· τοῦτο δ'
passing-over indeed the argument to the-same has-come this and
 ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται
still more to-make-clear it-must-be-tried since and more appear

τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον
the ends of-these and we-choose some on-account-of another such-as
 πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δηλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι
wealth flutes and generally the instruments (is)-clear that not are
 πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.
all complete the and best complete something appears
 ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ
so-that if indeed there-is one thing only complete this would be the
 ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον
thing-sought if and more the most-complete of-these more-complete
 δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ
and we-call the in itself pursuable than-the on-account-of another and
 τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ
the never on-account-of another choiceworthy than-the both in themselves
 καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον
and on-account-of it choiceworthy and without-qualification indeed complete
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο.
the in itself choiceworthy always and never on-account-of another
 τοιοῦτον δ' ἢ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ
such and the happiness most to-be seems this for
 αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο,
we-choose always on-account-of itself and never on-account-of another
 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα
honor and also pleasure and intellect and every virtue we-choose
 μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ'
indeed also on-account-of themselves nothing for resulting we-choose
 ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
would each of-them we-choose and also of-the happiness
 χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν
for-the-sake through these supposing to-be-happy the
 δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως
and happiness no-one chooses of-these for-the-sake nor generally

δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ
on-account-of another it-appears and also from the self-sufficiency the same
 συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ.
to-follow the for complete good self-sufficient to-be seems
 τὸ δ' αὐταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον
the and self-sufficient we-call not for-him alone for-the living a-life
 μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ
solitary but also for-parents and for-children and for-a-wife and
 ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ
generally for-the friends and fellow-citizens since by-nature political the
 ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνουντι γὰρ
man of-these and must-be-taken a-limit some to-one-extending for
 ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς
to the parents and the descendants and of-the friends the
 φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθὺς
friends to infinity it-goes but this indeed later
 ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον
must-be-examined the and self-sufficient we-posit which being-isolated
 αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν
choice-worthy makes the life and of-nothing lacking such and the
 εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην
happiness we-think to-be further and of-all most-choice-worthy
 μὴ συναριθμουμένην — συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὥς
not being-counted-in being-counted-in and (is)-clear that
 αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ
more-choice-worthy with the least of-the goods an-excess
 γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ
for of-goods becomes the thing-added of-goods and the
 μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεί. τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται
greater (is)-more-choice-worthy always complete indeed something appears
 καὶ αὐταρκες ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος.
and self-sufficient the happiness of-the attainable-things being end

ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν
but perhaps the indeed happiness the best to-call
 ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθείται δ' ἐναργέστερον
agreed something appears it-is-wanted and more-clearly
 τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ
what it-is still to-be-said perhaps indeed happens — this if
 ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ
should-be-grasped the function of-the man just-as for for-a-flute-player
 καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν
and for-a-sculptor and for-every craftsman and generally of-whom
 ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν
there-is a-function some and an-action in the function seems the-good
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι
to-be and the well so it-seems would also for-man if-indeed there-is
 τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως
some function of-him whether then of-a-carpenter indeed and of-a-shoemaker
 ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν,
there-are functions some and actions of-a-man and none there-is
 ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ
but idle be-is-by-nature or just-as of-an-eye and of-a-hand and
 ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον,
of-a-foot and generally of-each of-the parts appears some function
 οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἂν
so also of-a-man beside all these would-posit someone —
 ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
a-function some what then indeed this would be ever the indeed for to-live
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.
common to-be appears even with-the plants is-sought and the peculiar
 ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν.
must-be-set-aside then the both nutritive and the growth-giving life

ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ
following and perceptive some would be it-appears and also this
 κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. λείπεται δὴ
common both to-a-horse and to-an-ox and to-every animal there-remains indeed
 πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν
active some of-the reason having of-this and the-one indeed
 ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.
as obedient to-reason the-other and as having and thinking
 διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
in-two-ways and also this being-spoken-of the according-to activity
 θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν
must-be-positd more-strictly for this seems to-be-called if and is
 ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ
the-function of-man of-soul an-activity according-to reason or not without
 λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε
reason the and same we-say function to-be in-the kind of-this-one
 καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
and of-this-one excellent just-as of-a-lyre-player and of-an-excellent
 κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
lyre-player and without-qualification indeed this in all-cases
 προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ
being-added the according-to the virtue superiority to the
 ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ
function of-a-lyre-player indeed for to-play-the-lyre of-an-excellent-one and the
 εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
well if and so the human good of-soul an-activity
 γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ
becomes according-to virtue if and more the virtues according-to
 τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείω.
the best and most-complete further and in a-life complete

μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ
one for swallow a-spring not makes nor one day so and
οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.
nor blessed and happy one day nor a-short time
περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως
let-it-be-outlined indeed then the-good in-this-way it-is-needful for perhaps
ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ'
to-sketch first then later to-fill-in it-seems and
ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς
would of-anyone to-be to-carry-forward and to-articulate the-things well
ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς
being in-the outline and the time of-the such-things a-discoverer
ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν
or a-helper good to-be whence also of-the arts have-come
αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνήσθαι
the advances of-anyone for to-add the thing-lacking to-remember
δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
and also the things-said-before one-must and the exactness not
ὁμοίως ἐν ᾧ πᾶσιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν
alike in all to-seek but in each-case according-to the
ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον
underlying matter and to so-much to as-much-as (is)-proper
τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως
to-the inquiry and for a-carpenter and a-geometer differently
ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη
seek the right-angle the-one indeed for to as-much-as (it-is)-useful
πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι θεατῆς
for the work the-other and what it-is or of-what-sort something a-beholder
γὰρ τὰληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
for of-the-truth the same indeed way also in the other-cases
ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται.
one-must-act so-that not the by-works than-the works more become

οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως,
 not must-be-demanded and nor the cause in all alike
 ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ
 but (it-is)-enough in some the that to-be-shown well such-as also
 περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν
 about the principles the and that (is)-first and a-principle of-the
 ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ'
 principles and the-ones indeed by-induction are-beheld the-others and
 αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως.
 by-perception the-others and by-habituatio some and others and otherwise
 μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἥ πεφύκασιν, καὶ
 to-pursue and one-must-try each in-the-way-that they-are-by-nature and
 σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
 one-must-be-earnest that they-be-defined well great for they-have
 ῥοπήν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ
 weight for the things-following it-seems for more than half
 τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι
 of-the whole to-be the beginning and many-things evident to-become
 δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.
 through it of-the things-sought

VIII • THE DEFINITION TESTED

A true account agrees with everything that is said about its subject. Calling happiness an activity of soul puts it among the goods of the soul, which are the goods most properly so called, and it explains why happiness is described as living well and faring well. It is pleasant in itself, since a lover of what is noble finds virtuous acts pleasant; but it still needs external goods, because noble action needs resources.

σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος
one-must-consider and about it not only from the conclusion
 καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
and from what the argument but also from the things-said
 περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ
about it with-the indeed for true all sings-in-tune the
 ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές.
facts with-the and false quickly is-out-of-tune the-truth
 νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν
having-been-divided indeed the goods three-ways and the-ones indeed
 ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ
external being-called the-others and about soul and body the about
 ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ
soul most-strictly we-call and most goods the and
 πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.
actions and the activities the of-soul about soul we-place
 ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν
so-that well would be-said according-to at-least this the opinion
 παλαιὰν οἶσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.
old being and agreed by those philosophizing
 ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ
rightly and also that actions certain are-called and activities the
 τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ
end so for of-the about soul goods it-becomes and not
 τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ
of-the external it-sings-in-tune and with-the account also the well to-live and
 τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὖζωία τις
the well to-fare the happy-man nearly for a-good-life a-kind
 εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
it-has-been-called and good-action it-appears and also the things-sought
 τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι.
the about the happiness all to-belong to-the thing-described

τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία
to-some indeed for virtue to-others and practical-wisdom to-others and wisdom
 τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς
a-kind to-be seems to-others and these or of-these some with pleasure
 ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν
or not without pleasure others and also the external prosperity
 συμπααραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ
take-in-besides of-these and the-ones indeed many and
 παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες·
ancient say the-others and few and famous men
 οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις,
neither and of-these (is-it)-likely to-miss in-the whole
 ἀλλ' ἓν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς
but one at-least thing or even the most to-get-right with-those
 μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν
indeed then saying the virtue or a-virtue some in-tune is
 ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.
the account of-this for is the according-to it activity
 διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον
it-differs and perhaps not little in possession or use the best
 ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἑξεί ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ
to-suppose and in a-state or an-activity the indeed for
 ἑξὶν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον
state it-is-possible nothing good to-accomplish while-present as
 τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ'
in-the man-sleeping or also otherwise somehow in-one-inactive the and
 ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ
activity not of-such-a-kind as he-will-act for from necessity and
 εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ
well he-will-act just-as and at-Olympia not the finest and
 ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων
strongest are-crowned but those competing of-these

γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν
for some win so also of-the in the life noble
 καγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.
and-good those acting rightly possessors become
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
is and also the life of-them in itself pleasant the indeed for
 ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς
to-take-pleasure (is)-of-the things-of-soul to-each and is pleasant toward
 ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ,
which he-is-called a-lover-of-such as a-horse indeed to-the horse-lover
 θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ
a-spectacle and to-the sight-lover the same and way also the
 δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν
just-things to-the justice-lover and generally the-things according-to virtue
 τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται
to-the virtue-lover for-the indeed then many the pleasant-things conflict
 διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις
on-account-of the not by-nature such to-be for-the and lovers-of-the-noble
 ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν
are pleasant the by-nature pleasant such and the according-to virtue
 πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς.
actions so-that both to-these they-are pleasant and in themselves
 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ
in-nothing indeed needs-besides the pleasure the life of-them as-if
 περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς
an-amulet some but has the pleasure in itself besides
 τοῖς εἰρημένοισι γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων
the things-said for not-even is good the-man not rejoicing
 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι
in-the noble actions neither for just anyone would call
 τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον
the-man not rejoicing in-the to-act-justly nor liberal

τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ
the-man not rejoicing in-the liberal actions likewise and
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ
also in the others if and so in themselves would be the
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδέϊαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε
according-to virtue actions pleasant but indeed also good at-least
καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς
and noble and most of-these each if-indeed well
κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὥς εἵπομεν.
judges about them the excellent-man he-judges and as we-said
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἢ εὐδαιμονία,
best then and noblest and most-pleasant the happiness
καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·
and not are-divided these according-to the Delian inscription

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
noblest the most-just best and to-be-healthy
ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.
most-pleasant and it-is-by-nature what someone loves the to-obtain

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις·
all for belong these to-the best activities
ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι
these and or one of-these the best we-say to-be
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὁμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς
the happiness it-appears and nevertheless also of-the external
ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ
goods needing-besides just-as we-said impossible for or
οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ
not easy the noble-things to-do unequipped being many
μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων
indeed for are-done just-as through instruments through friends

καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι
and wealth and political power of-some and being-deprived
 ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους·
they-stain the blessedness such-as good-birth good-children beauty
 οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης
not altogether for happy the-man in-the appearance utterly-ugly
 ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον,
or ill-born or solitary and childless still and perhaps less
 εἴ τω πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες
if to-someone utterly-bad children are or friends or good being
 τεθνήσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς
they-have-died just-as then we-said it-seems to-need-besides also the
 τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν
such well-being whence into the-same rank some the
 εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
good-fortune with-the happiness others and the virtue

IX · LEARNED, GIVEN, OR CHANCED UPON

Happiness may be a gift of the gods, but even if it comes through virtue and learning it is among the most divine things, as the prize and end of virtue. Aristotle prefers that account: it is better than leaving the greatest thing to chance, and anyone not maimed for virtue can win it by study and care. No animal and no child is called happy, since neither can act in this way; and happiness needs a complete life, as Priam's end shows.

ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν
whence also it-is-disputed whether it-is learnable or acquirable-by-habit
 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν
or also otherwise somehow acquirable-by-training or according-to some divine
 μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
dispensation or also through chance it-comes if indeed then also

ἄλλο τί ἐστὶ θεῶν δῶρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον
another anything is of-gods a-gift to-men (it-is)-reasonable
 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
also the happiness god-given to-be and most of-the
 ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσω βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως
human-things by-how-much (it-is)-best but this indeed perhaps
 ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οὐκείοτερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ
of-another would be inquiry more-proper it-appears and even-if if
 μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν
not god-sent it-is but through virtue and some learning
 ἢ ἀσκήσιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
or training it-comes of-the most-divine-things to-be the for of-the
 ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῶν
virtue prize and end best to-be appears and divine
 τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺκοινων· δυνατόν
something and blessed be and would also widely-shared possible
 γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν
for to-belong to-all those not maimed for virtue
 διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω
through some learning and care if and it-is thus
 βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν
better than the through chance to-be-happy (it-is)-reasonable to-stand
 οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα
so if-indeed the-things according-to nature as possible and most-nobly
 ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην
to-stand so are-by-nature likewise and also the-things according-to craft
 καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην.
and every cause and most the-things according-to the best
 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν
the and greatest and noblest to-entrust to-chance very
 πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
faulty would be evident and it-is also from the argument

τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ'
the thing-sought it-has-been-said for of-soul an-activity according-to
 ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν
virtue of-a-kind some of-the and remaining goods the-ones indeed
 ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα
to-be-present (is)-necessary the-others and helpful and useful
 πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ
are-by-nature instrumentally agreeing and these would be also
 τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον
with-the at beginning the for of-the political-science end best
 ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ
we-set-down this and greatest care makes of-the
 ποιούσ τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ
of-a-certain-kind some and good the citizens to-make and
 πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βούν οὔτε
doers of-the noble-things naturally then neither an-ox nor
 ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν
a-horse nor another of-the animals any happy we-call none
 γὰρ αὐτῶν οἶόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ
for of-them possible and to-share-in such an-activity through
 ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὐπω
this and the cause not-even a-child happy is not-yet
 γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ
for a-doer of-the such-things through the age those and
 λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ,
called-so through the hope are-called-blessed it-is-needful for
 ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου.
as we-said both of-virtue complete and of-a-life complete
 πολλάι γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ
many for changes happen and all-sorts-of fortunes through
 τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις
the life and it-is-possible the-man most flourishing into-great

συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς
calamities to-fall in old-age just-as in the Trojan-tales
 περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον
about Priam is-told the-man and such having-met-with
 τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.
fortunes and having-died wretchedly no-one calls-happy

X · CALL NO MAN HAPPY?

Solon said to look to the end, which raises the question whether a man can be called happy only once he is dead. Aristotle answers that happiness rests on activities in accordance with virtue, and those are the most lasting of all human things, so the happy man does not shift with fortune like a chameleon. Great misfortunes can mar his blessedness, but he will never become wretched, because he will never do what is hateful and base.

πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον
whether then not-even another any of-men must-be-called-happy
 ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν;
while ever he-lives according-to Solon and (is-it)-needful end to-see
 εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἄρα γε καὶ ἔστιν
if and indeed also it-must-be-posed so surely at-least also is-be
 εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς
happy then when he-has-died or this at-least (is)-utterly
 ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειαν
absurd otherwise both and for-us saying ourselves an-activity
 τίνα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα
some the happiness if and not we-call the dead-man
 εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλωνα τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα
happy nor Solon this means but that then
 ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὥς ἐκτὸς ἤδη
would someone safely call-blessed a-man as outside already

τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ
the evils being and the misfortunes has indeed also
 τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ
this a-dispute some it-seems for to-be something for-the
 τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
dead-man both evil and good if-indeed also for-the living not
 αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμιαί καὶ τέκνων καὶ
perceiving and such-as honors and dishonors and of-children and
 ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ
generally of-descendants successes both and misfortunes a-difficulty and
 καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι
also these provide for-the for blessedly having-lived until
 γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς
old-age and having-died according-to reason it-is-possible many
 μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐγγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν
changes to-happen concerning the descendants and the-ones indeed
 αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν,
of-them good to-be and to-obtain a-life the according-to worth
 τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δηλὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι
the-others and from the-opposite (is)-clear and that also in-the distances
 πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.
from the parents in-all-ways to-stand them it-is-possible
 ἄτοπον δὴ γίνουτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ
absurd indeed it-would-become — if should-change-along also the
 τεθνεῶς καὶ γίνουτο ὅτ' ἐν μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ'
dead-man and should-become at-one-time indeed happy again and
 ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον
wretched absurd and also the nothing even for some time
 συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐγγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ'
to-reach the-things of-the descendants to-the parents but
 ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν
one-must-return to the earlier thing-disputed perhaps for would

θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ
be-discerned also the now thing-sought from that if indeed the
 τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὥς
end to-see it-is-needful and then to-call-blessed each not as
 ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον,
being blessed but that before he-was how (is-it)-not absurd
 εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ
if when he-is happy not will-be-said-truly of him the
 ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν
fact through the not to-wish the living to-call-happy
 διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν
through the changes and through the enduring something the
 εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς
happiness to-have-supposed and in-no-way easily-changed the
 δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δηλον
and fortunes often to-come-round-again about the same-men (is)-clear
 γὰρ ὥς εἰ συνακολουθοῦμεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν
for that if we-should-follow the fortunes the same-man
 εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά
happy and again wretched we-shall-call often a-chameleon
 τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον.
a-kind the happy-man declaring and unsoundly founded
 ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;
or the indeed the fortunes to-follow (is)-in-no-way right
 οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται
not for in these the well or badly but needs-besides
 τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαί δ'
these the human life just-as we-said decisive and
 εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ'
are the according-to virtue activities of-the happiness the and
 ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν
opposite of-the opposite it-bears-witness and to-the account also the now

διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδέν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
thing-disputed about nothing for so belongs of-the human
 ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν·
works permanence as about the activities the according-to virtue
 μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν
more-lasting for even than-the sciences these seem
 εἶναι· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ
to-be of-these and themselves the most-honored (are)-most-lasting through
 τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς
the most and most-continuously to-live-out in them the
 μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ
blessed this for seems the-cause of-the not to-happen about
 αὐτὰς λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι,
them forgetting will-belong indeed the thing-sought to-the happy-man
 καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα
and he-will-be through life such always for or most
 πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ
of-all he-will-do and will-contemplate the-things according-to virtue and
 τὰς τύχας οἶσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἑμμελῶς
the fortunes he-will-bear most-nobly and in-every-way altogether harmoniously
 ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.
the-man at-least as truly good and four-square without blame
 πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει
many and happening by chance and differing in-magnitude
 καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ
and in-smallness the-ones indeed small of-the good-fortunes likewise and
 καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δηλὸν ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ροπήν τῆς ζωῆς,
also of-the opposites (is)-clear that not makes a-turning of-the life
 τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον
the-others and great and many happening indeed well more-blessed
 τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν,
the life will-make and for themselves to-adorn-besides are-by-nature

καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν
and the use of-them noble and excellent becomes the-reverse
 δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας
and happening it-crushes and it-mars the blessedness pains
 τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως
both for it-brings-on and it-impedes many activities nevertheless
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ
and even in these shines-through the noble when bears
 τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι'
someone easily many and great misfortunes not through
 ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ'
insensibility but noble being and great-souled if and
 εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, οὐδεὶς
are the activities decisive of-the life just-as we-said no-one
 ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει
would become of-the blessed wretched never for will-be-do
 τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν
the hateful and the base the-man for as truly good
 καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν
and sensible all we-think the fortunes gracefully to-bear
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν,
and from the things-at-hand always the noblest to-do
 καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
just-as also a-general good the present army
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
to-use in-the-most-warlike-way and a-shoemaker from the given
 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
hides the-finest shoe to-make the same and way
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας.
also the other craftsmen all

εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων,
 if and so wretched indeed never would-become — the happy-man
 οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.
 not indeed blessed at-least if into-Priam-like fortunes be-falls
 οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
 nor indeed shifting at-least and easily-changed neither for from the
 εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων
 happiness will-be-be-moved easily nor by the chance
 ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν
 misfortunes but by great and many from both the
 τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ,
 such-things not would be-become again happy in a-short time
 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν
 but if-indeed in a-long some and complete of-great and noble in
 αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα
 it having-become possessor what then prevents to-call happy
 τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς
 the-man according-to virtue complete acting and with-the external
 ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον
 goods sufficiently equipped not the chance time
 ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ
 but a-complete life or must-one-add and going-to-live so and
 τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν
 going-to-die according-to reason since the future (is)-unseen to-us
 ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ
 it-is the happiness and end and complete we-set-down in-every-way
 πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς
 altogether if and so blessed we-shall-call of-the living to-whom
 ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.
 belong and will-belong the things-said blessed and (as)-men
 καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.
 and about indeed these to so-much let-it-be-determined

To say that the fortunes of friends and descendants make no difference at all to the dead looks both unfriendly and contrary to what people believe. Aristotle allows that such things do reach the dead somehow, but so faintly and so slightly that they cannot make the unhappy happy, or take blessedness away from those who have it.

τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ
the and of-the descendants fortunes and of-the friends all the
μὲν μῆδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
indeed not-at-all to-contribute very unfriendly appears and to-the
δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς
opinions contrary many and also all-sorts-of having differences
τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων
of-the things-happening and the-ones indeed more reaching
τῶν δ' ἦττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ
the-others and less in each-case indeed to-distinguish long and
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ'
endless appears in-general and said and in-outline perhaps
ἂν ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν
would sufficiently it-stand if indeed just-as also of-the concerning oneself
ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ροπὴν πρὸς τὸν
misfortunes the-ones indeed have some weight and turning for the
βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ
life the-others and to-lighter-things seem so also the-things concerning
τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν
the friends alike all it-differs and of-the sufferings
ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ
each concerning the-living or the-dead to-happen much
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς
more than the lawless and terrible to-be-presupposed in the

τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην
tragedies or to-be-enacted one-must-reckon-in indeed also this
 τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ
the difference rather and perhaps the to-be-in-doubt about
 τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τις ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν
the departed whether of-any good they-share or of-the
 ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δικνεῖται πρὸς
opposites it-seems for from these if even it-reaches to
 αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφαιρόν
them anything-whatever whether good or the-contrary faint
 τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ
something and small either without-qualification or for-them to-be if and
 μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας
not so-great at-least and such-in-kind that not to-make happy
 τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.
those not being nor those being to-take-away the blessedness
 συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν
to-contribute indeed then something appear to-the departed
 αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι,
the successes of-the friends likewise and also the misfortunes
 τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας
such and also of-such-size that neither the happy
 μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
not happy to-make nor another of-the such-things anything

XII • PRAISED OR HONORED

We praise a thing by referring it to something else, which is why praise of the gods sounds ridiculous. Happiness is not praised but called blessed, as the gods are, so it belongs among the things honored rather than the things praised — and Eudoxus argued the same way about pleasure. Happiness is a first principle, since it is for its sake that we all do everything else.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
having-been-determined and these let-us-consider about the
 εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν
happiness whether of-the praiseworthy it-is or rather of-the
 τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.
honored (is)-clear for that of-the at-least capacities not it-is
 φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι
it-appears indeed everything the praiseworthy by-the of-a-kind some to-be
 καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον
and toward something somehow to-stand to-be-praised the for just-man
 καὶ τὸν ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν
and the brave-man and generally the good-man both and the
 ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα,
virtue we-praise on-account-of the actions and the works
 καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
and the strong-man and also the swift-runner and of-the others
 ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς
each by-the of-a-kind some to-be-by-nature and to-stand somehow toward
 ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
good something and excellent (is)-clear and this also from the
 περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς
concerning the gods praises ridiculous for they-appear to
 ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι
us being-referred this and happens through the to-come-about
 τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν. εἰ δ'
the praises through reference just-as we-said if and
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων
is the praise of-the such-things (is)-clear that of-the best
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον,
not there-is praise but greater something and better

καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν
just-as also appears the both for gods we-call-blessed
καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους.
and we-call-happy and of-the men the most-divine
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
likewise and also of-the goods no-one for the happiness
ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι
praises just-as the just but as more-divine something
καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς
and better he-calls-blessed seems and also Eudoxus well
συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ
to-have-pleaded about the first-prizes for-the pleasure the for
μὴ ἐπαινέσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν μνηύειν ᾧετο ὅτι
not to-be-praised of-the goods being to-show he-thought that
κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεόν
better it-is than-the praiseworthy such and to-be the god
καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι.
and the-good toward these for also the-other-things to-be-referred
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν
the indeed for praise (is)-of-the virtue does for of-the
καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων
noble-things from this the-others and encomia (are)-of-the works
ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ
likewise both of-the bodily and of-the psychical but
ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ
these indeed perhaps more-proper to-work-out for-those about the
ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
encomia having-labored for-us and (is)-clear from the things-said
ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ'
that is the happiness of-the honored and complete it-seems and
οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν
so to-stand also through the to-be a-principle of-this for for-the-sake

τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ
the remaining all all-of-us do the principle and also
 τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμὸν τι καὶ θείον τίθεμεν.
the cause of-the goods honored something and divine we-set-down

XIII · THE PARTS OF THE SOUL

Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue, the student of politics has to know something about the soul. One part is irrational and merely nutritive, shared by everything that grows and busiest in sleep. Another is irrational but listens to reason, as a child listens to a father — and the division of the virtues follows from this: wisdom and practical wisdom are virtues of thought, liberality and temperance virtues of character.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ'
since and is the happiness of-soul an-activity some according-to
 ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα γὰρ
virtue complete about virtue to-be-examined would (it)-be perhaps for
 οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
so — better also about the happiness we-would-discern
 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην
it-seems and also the according-to truth statesman about this
 μάλιστα πεπονήσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς
most to-have-labored he-wishes for the citizens good
 ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων
to-make and of-the laws obedient an-example and of-these
 ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας,
we-have the of-Cretans and of-Lacedaemonians lawgivers
 καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς
and if any others such have-arisen if and of-the
 πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὐτῇ, δηλον ὅτι γίνοιτ'
political-science is the inquiry this (is)-clear that would-happen

ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ
 — the investigation according-to the from beginning purpose about
 ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γὰρ
 virtue and to-be-examined human (is)-clear that also for
 τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
 the-good human we-were-seeking and the happiness
 ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ
 human virtue and we-mean human not the of-the
 σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
 body but the of-the soul and the happiness
 δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει,
 and of-soul an-activity we-call if and these so stand
 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ
 (is)-clear that it-is-needful the statesman to-know somehow the-things
 περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν
 about soul just-as also the-man eyes going-to-treat
 καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσω τιμιωτέρα καὶ
 and all the body and more by-how-much more-honored and
 βελτίων ἢ πολιτικῇ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ
 better the political-science than-the medicine of-the and physicians the
 χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος
 refined many-things busy-themselves-with about the of-the body
 γνῶσιν.

knowledge

θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον
 one-must-study indeed also for-the statesman about soul one-must-study
 δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ
 and of-these for-the-sake and to as-much-as sufficiently it-stands for the
 ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον
 things-sought the for to more to-work-out more-laborious
 ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς
 perhaps is than-the matters-before-us it-is-said and about it

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ
 also in the external discourses sufficiently some-things and
 χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ
 one-must-use them such-as the indeed irrational of-it to-be the
 δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ
 and reason having these and whether are-divided just-as
 τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ
 the of-the body parts and everything the divisible or in-the
 λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκῶτα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ
 account two they-are inseparable being-by-nature just-as in the
 περιφερεία τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς
 circumference the convex and the concave nothing it-matters for
 τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ
 the present of-the irrational and the-one indeed seems common and
 φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι·
 vegetative I-mean and the cause of-the to-be-nourished and to-grow
 τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς
 the such for capacity of-the soul in all the
 τρεφομένοις θεΐη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν
 things-nourished would-posit someone — even in the embryos the
 αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ
 same and this also in the full-grown (it-is)-more-reasonable for
 ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

than another some

ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη
 of-this indeed then common some virtue and not human
 φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ
 appears it-seems for in the sleeps to-be-active most the
 μόνον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ
 part this and the capacity this the and good and
 κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν
 bad least distinguishable in sleep whence they-say nothing

διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων·
to-differ the half of-the life the happy from-the wretched
 συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος
happens and this naturally an-inactivity for is the sleep
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν
of-the soul in-so-far-as it-is-called excellent and base except
 εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ δικνοῦνταιί τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
if not to a-small-degree and penetrate some of-the movements
 καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
and in-this-way better become the appearances of-the decent
 ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλιν, καὶ
than of-the ordinary but about indeed these enough and
 τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐάτεον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς
the nutritive must-be-let-alone since of-the human virtue
 ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς
without-share it-is-by-nature seems and also another some nature of-the
 ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ
soul irrational to-be sharing however somehow in-reason of-the
 γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ
for self-controlled and uncontrolled the reason and of-the soul the
 λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα
reason having we-praise rightly for and to the best
 παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ
it-summons appears and in them also another something beside
 τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ
the reason being-by-nature which fights and strains-against the
 λόγῳ.

reason

ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος
simply for just-as the paralyzed of-the body
 μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι τούναντίον
parts to the right when-men-choose to-move the-contrary

εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως·
to the left are-carried-aside also in the soul so
 ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν
to the-contrary for the impulses of-the uncontrolled but in
 τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ
the bodies indeed we-see the thing-carried-aside in and
 τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ
the soul not we-see perhaps and nothing less also
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον,
in the soul one-must-think to-be something beside the reason
 ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον,
opposing this and going-against how and different
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν,
nothing it-matters in-reason and also this appears to-share
 ὥσπερ εἶπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ
just-as we-said it-obey at-any-rate the reason the of-the
 ἐγκρατοῦς — ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ
self-controlled still and perhaps more-obedient is the of-the
 σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ
temperate and brave everything for speaks-with-one-voice with-the
 λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
reason appears indeed also the irrational twofold the-one indeed for
 φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν
vegetative in-no-way shares in-reason the-other and appetitive
 καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἥ κατήκοόν ἐστιν
and generally desiderative shares somehow in-so-far-as attentive it-is
 αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ
to-it and obedient so indeed also of-the father and
 τῶν φίλων φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν
of-the friends we-say to-have account and not just-as of-the
 μαθηματικῶν.
mathematical-things

ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ
that and it-is-persuaded somehow by reason the irrational shows also
 ἢ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις.
the admonition and every rebuke both and exhortation
 εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται
if and one-must also this to-say reason to-have twofold will-be
 καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ,
also the reason having the-one indeed strictly and in itself
 τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται
the-other and as of-the father listening something is-divided
 δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν
and also the virtue according-to the difference this we-call
 γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς,
for of-them the-ones indeed intellectual the-others and moral
 σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς,
wisdom indeed and understanding and practical-wisdom intellectual
 ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ
liberality and also temperance moral speaking for
 περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ'
about the character not we-say that (he-is)-wise or intelligent but
 ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν
that gentle or temperate we-praise and also the wise-man
 κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς
according-to the state of-the states and the praiseworthy virtues
 λέγομεν.
we-call

BOOK II

I · VIRTUE COMES BY HABIT

Intellectual virtue is got by teaching, moral virtue by habit — which is why its name is a slight variation on the word for habit. No moral virtue arises in us by nature: a stone thrown upward ten thousand times will not learn to rise. We get the virtues by first exercising them, as builders become builders by building, and this is why lawgivers make citizens good by habituating them.

διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
 twofold indeed the virtue being the-one indeed intellectual the-other
 δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας
 and moral the indeed intellectual the more-part from teaching
 ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας
 has both the origin and the growth wherefore experience
 δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἣ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν
 it-needs and time the and moral from habit comes-about whence
 καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ
 also the-name it-has-got a-little deflected from the habit from
 οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν
 which also (is)-clear that none of-the moral virtues by-nature in-us
 ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον
 arises nothing for of-the by-nature being otherwise is-habituated such-as
 ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω
 the stone by-nature downward being-carried not would be-habituated upward
 φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω
 to-be-carried not-even if ten-thousand-times it should-habituate someone upward
 ριπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως
 throwing nor the fire downward nor another anything of-the otherwise
 πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε
 being-by-nature otherwise would be-habituated neither then by-nature nor

παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν
contrary-to nature arise the virtues but being-by-nature indeed
 ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι
in-us to-receive them being-perfected and through the habit further
 ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων
whatever indeed by-nature to-us comes the capacities of-these
 πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν
first we-acquire later and the activities we-render
 (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
which-very-thing in the senses (is)-clear not for from the
 πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν,
often to-see or often to-bear the senses we-got
 ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν).
but the-reverse having we-used not having-used we-got
 τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ
the and virtues we-get having-acted first just-as
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας
also in the other arts what for it-is-needful having-learned
 ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες
to-do these doing we-learn such-as building
 οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ
builders they-become and playing-the-lyre lyre-players so indeed
 καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ
also the indeed just-things doing just we-become the and
 σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι.
temperate-things temperate the and brave-things brave
 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ
bears-witness and also the thing-happening in the cities the for
 νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ
lawgivers the citizens habituating make good and the
 μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ
indeed intention of-every lawgiver this is as-many-as and not

εὖ αὐτὸ ποιῶσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία
well it do go-wrong and differs in-this a-constitution
 πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ
from-a-constitution good from-bad further from the same and through
 τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως
the same both comes-to-be every virtue and is-destroyed likewise
 δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ
and also art from for the to-play-the-lyre both the good and bad
 γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ
become lyre-players analogously and also builders and the rest
 πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι
all from indeed for the well to-build good builders
 ἔσσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν,
they-will-be from and the badly bad if for not so it-stood
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν
nothing would-have been-needed of-the teacher but all would-have
 ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
become good or bad so indeed also in the virtues
 ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς
it-stands doing for the-things in the dealings the
 πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ
with the men we-become the-ones indeed just the-others and
 ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι
unjust doing and the-things in the terrors and being-habituated
 φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί.
to-fear or to-be-confident the-ones indeed brave the-others and cowardly
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ
likewise and also the-things about the appetites stand and the-things
 περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι
about the angers the-ones indeed for temperate and gentle
 γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ
become the-others and licentious and irascible the-ones indeed from

τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεισθαι, οἷ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
the in-this-way in them to-conduct-themselves the-others and from the
 οὕτωςί. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν
in-that-way and in-one indeed word from the like activities
 αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς
the states come-to-be therefore it-is-needful the activities of-a-certain-kind
 ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν
to-render according-to for the of-these differences follow
 αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς
the states not a-little then it-matters the thus or thus straightway
 ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπαν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.
from young to-be-habituated but very-greatly rather and the whole

II · DESTROYED BY EXCESS AND DEFECT

This inquiry aims not at knowledge but at becoming good, so it has to ask how we should act. Aristotle argues from what can be seen: too much exercise and too little both destroy strength, too much food and too little both destroy health, and proportionate amounts produce and preserve them. Courage and temperance work the same way — the man who flees everything becomes a coward, the man who fears nothing becomes rash.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά
since then the present treatise not of-contemplation for-the-sake
 ἐστίν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστίν
is just-as the others not for so-that we-may-know what is
 ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ
the virtue we-inquire but so-that good we-may-become since
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι
nothing would-have been benefit of-it (it-is)-necessary to-examine
 τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ
the-things about the actions how one-must-do them these for

εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ
are decisive also of-the of-what-kind to-become the states just-as
 εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν
we-have-said the indeed then according-to the right reason to-act
 κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω — ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ
(is)-common and let-it-be-assumed it-will-be-said and later about
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς
it both what is the right reason and how it-stands toward
 τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ
the other virtues that and let-it-be-agreed-beforehand that every the
 περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει
about the things-to-be-done account in-outline and not exactly ought
 λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν
to-be-said just-as also at the-beginning we-said that according-to the
 ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέου· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ
matter the accounts are-to-be-demanded the-things and in the actions and
 τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.
the expedient nothing fixed have just-as nor the healthful
 τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν
such and being the universal account still more the about the
 καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην
in particulars account not has the-exactness neither for under an-art
 οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς
nor under a-precept any it-falls it-is-needful and themselves
 ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
always those acting the-things toward the occasion to-look
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
just-as also in the medicine it-stands and the pilotage
 ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον
but although being such the present account one-must-try
 βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα
to-help first then this must-be-observed that the such-things

πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ
are-by-nature by deficiency and excess to-be-destroyed it-is-needful
 γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι)
for about the unseen the visible witnesses to-use
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν· τὰ τε
just-as in the strength and the health we-see the-things both
 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει
for excessive exercises and the deficient destroy
 τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ
the strength likewise and also the drinks and the foods more and
 ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ
less becoming destroy the health the and proportionate both
 ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ
make and increase and preserve so then also in temperance and
 ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα
courage it-stands and of-the other virtues the-man both for everything
 φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται,
fleeing and fearing and nothing withstanding a-coward becomes
 ὁ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων
the-man and nothing at-all fearing but toward everything walking
 θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων
(becomes)-rash likewise and also the-one indeed every pleasure enjoying
 καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν
and from-none abstaining (becomes)-licentious the-one and every
 φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθίρεται
fleeing just-as the boors insensible a-kind is-destroyed
 δὴ ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς
indeed the temperance and the courage by the excess
 καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται.
and the deficiency by and the mean is-preserved

ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ
but not only the origins and increases and the destructions
 ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ
from the same and by the same come-about but also
 αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
the activities in the same will-be and for in the
 ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς
other the more-evident so it-stands such-as in the
 ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφήν λαμβάνειν καὶ
strength it-comes for from the much food to-take and
 πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ
many labors to-endure and most would be-able these
 ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ
to-do the strong-man so and it-stands also in the virtues from
 τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες,
both for the to-abstain-from the pleasures we-become temperate
 καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
and having-become most we-are-able to-abstain-from them likewise
 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν
and also in the courage being-habituated for to-despise
 τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ
the fearful-things and to-withstand them we-become brave and
 γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.
having-become most we-shall-be-able to-withstand the fearful-things

III · PLEASURE AND PAIN AS THE SIGN

The pleasure or pain that follows an act is the sign of the state that produced it: the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and is glad to do so is temperate, the man who is vexed by it is licentious. Moral virtue is therefore concerned with pleasures and pains, which is why punishments work through them. Aristotle quotes Heraclitus for the difficulty: it is harder to fight pleasure than anger.

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην
a-sign and it-is-needful to-make of-the states the supervening
 ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος
pleasure or pain upon-the works the-man indeed for abstaining
 τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων,
from-the bodily pleasures and in-this very-thing rejoicing (is)-temperate
 ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων
the-man and being-vexed (is)-licentious and the-man indeed withstanding
 τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος,
the terrors and rejoicing or not being-pained at-least (is)-brave
 ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας
the-man and being-pained (is)-a-coward about pleasures for and pains
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ
is the moral virtue on-account-of indeed for the pleasure the
 φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν
base-things we-do on-account-of and the pain from-the noble-things
 ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ
we-abstain therefore it-is-needful to-have-been-trained somehow straightway from
 νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
youth as — Plato says so-as to-rejoice both and to-be-pained
 οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ
in-what one-must the for right education this is further and if
 αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ
the virtues are about actions and passions to-every and passion and
 πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
to-every action follows pleasure and pain also on-account-of this
 ἂν εἷη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μὴνύουσι δὲ
would be the virtue about pleasures and pains show and
 καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γὰρ τινές
also the corrections happening through these healings for certain
 εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι.
they-are the and healings through the opposites are-by-nature to-happen

ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρόην εἵπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὅφ'
further as also earlier we-said every of-soul state by
 οἷον πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς
what-sort-of-things is-by-nature to-become worse and better toward
 ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ
these and about these the nature has on-account-of pleasures and
 καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν,
also pains base-men become by-the to-pursue these and to-flee
 ἢ ἂς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ
either what not one-must or when not one-must or as not one-must or
 ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα.
in-however-many-ways otherwise by the reason are-defined the such-things
 διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ
therefore also they-define the virtues freedoms-from-feeling certain and
 ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς
stillnesses not well and because without-qualification they-speak but not as
 δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
one-must and as not one-must and when and whatever else is-added
 ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
it-is-assumed then the virtue to-be the such about pleasures and
 λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ, ἡ δὲ κακία τὸναντίον.
pains of-the best productive the and vice the-contrary
 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ὅτι περὶ τῶν
it-might-become and — to-us also from these evident that about the
 αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν
same-things three for being of-the toward the choices and three
 τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τῶν
of-the toward the avoidances noble expedient pleasant and of-the
 ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα
opposites shameful harmful painful about these indeed all
 ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικὸς ἐστίν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός,
the good-man (is)-apt-to-go-right he-is the and bad-man apt-to-go-wrong

μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς
most and about the pleasure common both for this to-the
 ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ·
animals and to-all the-things under the choice it-attends
 καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.
and for the noble and the expedient pleasant appears
 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν
further and from infancy in-all us it-has-been-bred-up therefore (it-is)-hard
 ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ.
to-rub-off this the passion dyed-into the life
 κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἷ μὲν μᾶλλον οἷ
we-measure and also the actions the-ones indeed more the-others
 δ' ἦττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον
and less by-pleasure and by-pain on-account-of this then (it-is)-necessary
 εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν
to-be about these the whole treatise not for a-small-matter
 εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι
for the actions well or badly to-rejoice and to-be-pained further
 δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ
and (it-is)-harder with-pleasure to-fight than with-anger just-as
 φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ
says Heraclitus about and the harder always both
 τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν
art comes-to-be and virtue and for the well (is)-better in
 τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας
this so-that also on-account-of this about pleasures and pains
 πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ·
(is)-all the treatise both for-the virtue and for-the political-science
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ
the-man indeed for well these using good will-be the-man
 δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς
and badly bad that indeed then is the virtue about pleasures

καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ
and pains and that from what-things it-comes-to-be by these both
 αὖξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι
it-is-increased and destroyed not in-the-same-way happening and that
 ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.
from what-things it-came-to-be about these also it-is-active let-it-have-been-said

IV · ACTING AS THE JUST MAN ACTS

It looks paradoxical that we become just by doing just acts, since anyone doing them would already be just. Aristotle answers that a product of an art is judged by itself, but a virtuous act is judged by the agent: he must act knowingly, choose the act for its own sake, and act from a firm and unchanging state. The many take refuge in theory and expect philosophizing to make them good, like patients who listen carefully to the doctor and do nothing he prescribes.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ
one-might-be-puzzled and — someone how we-say that it-is-needful
 τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ
the indeed just-things doing just to-become the and
 σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ
temperate-things temperate if for they-do the just-things and
 σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ
temperate-things already they-are just and temperate just-as if
 τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ
the grammatical-things and the musical-things (they-are)-grammarians and
 μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται
musicians or not-even in the arts so it-stands it-is-possible
 γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ
for grammatical something to-make also from chance and
 ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν
another having-prompted then indeed he-will-be a-grammarian if

καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο
 also grammatical something he-makes and grammatically this
 δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. ἔτι
 and is the according-to the in himself grammar further
 οὐδ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν·
 not-even alike it-is in both the arts and the virtues
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν
 the-things indeed for by the arts coming-to-be the well have in
 αὐτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ
 themselves it-suffices then these somehow being to-come-to-be the-things and
 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ,
 according-to the virtues coming-to-be not if themselves somehow are
 δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων
 justly or temperately are-done but also if the doer
 πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν
 somehow being acts first indeed if knowing then if
 προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ
 choosing and choosing on-account-of themselves the and
 τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ.
 third if also firmly and unchangeably being he-acts
 ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ
 these and toward indeed the the other arts to-have not
 συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς
 are-counted-in except itself the to-know toward and the the
 ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ'
 virtues the indeed to-know nothing or little avails the and
 ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ
 others not little but the whole avail which-very-things from the
 πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.
 often to-do the just-things and temperate-things come-about
 τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται,
 the-things indeed then deeds just and temperate are-called

ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων
whenever they-are such such-as — the just-man or the temperate-man
 πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
would-do just and also temperate is not the-man these
 πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ
doing but also so doing as the just and
 σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια
temperate do well then it-is-said that from the the just-things
 πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ
to-do the just-man comes-to-be and from the the temperate-things the
 σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ
temperate-man from and the not to-do these no-one would even
 μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν
be-likely to-become good but the many these indeed
 οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται
not do to and the theory taking-refuge they-think
 φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι
to-philosophize and so to-be-going-to-be excellent alike something
 ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν
doing to-the sick who of-the physicians listen indeed
 ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ
carefully they-do and nothing of-the things-prescribed just-as
 οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι,
then not those well will-have the body thus being-treated
 οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφῶντες.
nor these the soul thus philosophizing

Three things arise in the soul: passions, capacities, and states. The virtues are not passions, because we are not called good or bad for our feelings and are neither praised nor blamed for them, and because passions are not chosen. Nor are they capacities, which we have by nature. What is left is that the virtues are states.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν
 after and these what is the virtue must-be-considered since then
 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις
 the-things in the soul coming-to-be three are passions capacities
 ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν
 states of-these would something be the virtue I-mean and passions indeed
 ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος
 appetite anger fear confidence envy joy affection hatred
 πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη·
 longing emulation pity generally what-things follows pleasure or pain
 δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ὥς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον
 capacities and according-to which capable-of-feeling of-these we-are-called such-as
 καθ' ὥς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι·
 according-to which able to-be-angered or to-be-pained or to-pity
 ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ὥς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς,
 states and according-to which toward the passions we-stand well or badly
 οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνεμένως,
 such-as toward the to-be-angered if indeed violently or slackly
 κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα.
 badly we-stand if and moderately well likewise and also toward the-others
 πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι
 passions indeed then not are neither the virtues nor the vices because
 οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ
 not we-are-called according-to the passions excellent or base according-to

δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ
and the virtues and the vices we-are-called and because according-to
 μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ
indeed the passions neither are-we-praised nor are-we-blamed not for
 ἐπαινείται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ
is-praised the-man fearing nor the-man being-angered nor
 ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ
is-blamed the-man simply being-angered but the-man somehow according-to
 δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.
and the virtues and the vices we-are-praised or we-are-blamed
 ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ'
further we-are-angered indeed and we-fear without-choosing the and
 ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς
virtues choices certain or not without choice besides
 δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα,
and these according-to indeed the passions to-be-moved we-are-called
 κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ
according-to and the virtues and the vices not to-be-moved but
 διακείσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν·
to-be-disposed somehow through these and nor capacities they-are
 οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς
neither for good we-are-called by-the to-be-able to-feel simply
 οὔτε κακοί, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ
nor bad nor are-we-praised nor are-we-blamed further capable
 μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει·
indeed we-are by-nature good and or bad not we-become by-nature
 εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν
we-said and about this before if then neither passions are
 αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ
the virtues nor capacities it-remains states them to-be what
 τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.
thing indeed then it-is in-the genus the virtue has-been-said

Every virtue makes the thing that has it good and makes it do its work well, as the virtue of an eye makes the eye see well. In anything continuous one can take a larger part, a smaller, and an equal, and the mean wanted here is not the mean of the thing but the mean relative to us. Virtue is therefore a state of choice, lying in a mean relative to us and defined by reason — though some acts, such as adultery and murder, admit no mean at all.

δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔστις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
it-is-needful and not only so to-say that (it-is)-a-state but also
 ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ἡ
of-what-kind some it-must-be-said then that every virtue of-what ever it-is
 ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ
a-virtue itself both well being makes-complete and the function of-it well
 ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν
renders such-as the of-the eye virtue the both eye
 σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ
excellent makes and the function of-it by-the for of-the
 ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ
eye virtue well we-see likewise the of-the horse virtue
 ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν
a-horse both excellent makes and good to-run and to-carry
 τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μέναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ
the rider and to-await the enemy if indeed this in
 πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν
all-cases so stands also the of-the man virtue would-be —
 ἡ ἔστις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ
the state from which good a-man becomes and from which well
 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν
the his-own function he-will-render how and this will-be already indeed
 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ᾧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν
we-have-said further and also thus it-will-be evident if we-observe

ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ
of-what-kind some is the nature of-it in every indeed continuous
 καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ
and divisible it-is to-take the indeed more the and less the
 δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς
and equal and these either according-to itself the thing or toward
 ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.
us the and equal a-mean something of-excess and of-deficiency
 λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ'
I-mean and of-the indeed thing a-mean the equally distant from
 ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
each of-the extremes which-very-thing is one and the same
 πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει·
for-all toward us and what neither exceeds nor falls-short
 τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα
this and not one nor the-same for-all such-as if the ten
 πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ
many the and two few the six a-mean they-take according-to
 τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται·
the thing by-an-equal for it-exceeds both and is-exceeded
 τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
this and a-mean is according-to the arithmetic proportion
 τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ
the and toward us not so must-be-taken not for if for-someone
 δέκα μναὶ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς
ten minae to-eat (is)-much two and little the trainer
 ἕξ μνᾶς προστάζει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ
six minae will-prescribe it-is for perhaps also this much for-the
 ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
man-taking-it or little for-Milo indeed for (it-is)-little for-the and
 ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
man-beginning the exercises (it-is)-much likewise in running and

πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ
wrestling so indeed every expert the excess indeed and
 τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται,
the deficiency flees the and mean seeks and this he-chooses
 μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
a-mean and not the of-the thing but the toward us
 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς
if indeed every science so the work well completes toward
 τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν
the mean looking and to this leading the works whence
 εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ'
they-are-accustomed to-say-over the well being works that neither
 ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
to-take-away it-is nor to-add as the indeed excess and
 τῆς ἑλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης,
the deficiency destroying the well the and mean preserving
 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
the and good craftsmen as we-say toward this looking
 ἐργάζονται· ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
work the and virtue than-every art more-exact and
 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
better is just-as also the nature of-the mean would be
 στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη
aiming I-mean and the moral this for is about passions
 καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ
and actions in and these there-is excess and deficiency and the
 μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ
mean such-as both to-be-afraid and to-be-confident and to-desire and
 ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι
to-be-angered and to-pity and generally to-feel-pleasure and to-feel-pain
 ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε
it-is both more and less and both not well the and when

δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς
one-must and at what and toward whom and of-which for-the-sake and as
 δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
one-must (is)-a-mean both and best which-very-thing is of-the virtue
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
likewise and also about the actions there-is excess and
 ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις
deficiency and the mean the and virtue about passions and actions
 ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
is in which the indeed excess is-erred-in and the
 ἔλλειψις, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα
deficiency the and mean is-praised and goes-right these
 δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή,
and both of-the virtue a-mean some then is the virtue
 στοχαστικὴ γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν
aiming at-least being at-the mean further the indeed to-err
 πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
in-many-ways is the for evil of-the unlimited as the
 Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
Pythagoreans figured the and good of-the limited the
 δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ
and to-go-right in-one-way therefore also the indeed (is)-easy the and
 χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
(is)-hard easy indeed the to-miss the mark hard
 δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας
and the to-hit and on-account-of these then of-the indeed vice
 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·
the excess and the deficiency of-the and virtue the mean

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.
good indeed for in-one-way in-all-manner-of-ways and bad

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα
 is then the virtue a-state of-choice in a-mean being
 τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ
 the toward us defined by-reason and by-which would the
 φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν
 man-of-practical-wisdom define a-mean and of-two vices of-the indeed
 καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς
 by excess of-the and by deficiency and further by-the the-ones
 μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε
 indeed to-fall-short the-others and to-exceed of-the requisite both in
 τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον
 the passions and in the actions the and virtue the mean
 καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν
 both to-find and to-choose therefore according-to indeed the substance
 καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν
 and the account the the what it-was to-be stating a-mean is
 ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.
 the virtue according-to and the best and the well (it-is)-an-extreme
 οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν
 not every and admits action nor every passion the
 μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ
 mean some for straightway have-been-named involved with
 τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος,
 the badness such-as malice shamelessness envy
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα
 and in the actions adultery theft murder all
 γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα
 for these and the such-like are-called by-the themselves base
 εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις.
 to-be but not the excesses of-them nor the deficiencies

οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ
not it-is then ever about them to-go-right but always
 ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
to-err nor is-there the well or not well about the such-things
 ἐν τῷ ᾧ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ'
in the which one-must and when and as to-commit-adultery but
 ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν, ὅμοιον
simply the to-do any-of these to-err is alike
 οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ
then the to-claim also about the to-act-unjustly and to-be-cowardly and
 ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν·
to-be-licentious to-be a-mean and an-excess and a-deficiency
 ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης
there-will-be for so at-least of-excess and of-deficiency a-mean
 καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ
and of-excess an-excess and a-deficiency of-deficiency just-as and
 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις
of-temperance and of-courage not there-is an-excess and a-deficiency
 διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐκείνων
through the the mean to-be somehow an-extreme so nor of-those
 μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται
a-mean nor an-excess and a-deficiency but as ever it-is-done
 ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως
it-is-erred-in generally for neither of-excess and of-deficiency
 μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.
a-mean there-is nor of-a-mean an-excess and a-deficiency

The general account has to be fitted to particular cases, so Aristotle runs through the list. Courage lies between rashness and cowardice, temperance between licentiousness and insensibility, liberality between prodigality and illiberality, and so on through magnificence, greatness of soul, gentleness, truthfulness, ready wit, and friendliness. Several of the states have no name at all, and Aristotle coins names for the sake of clarity.

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
it-is-needful and this not only in-general to-be-said but also
 τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς
to-the in particulars to-fit in for the about the
 πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ'
actions accounts the indeed general more-common are the and
 ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἰ
about a-part truer about for the in particulars the
 πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον
actions being-necessary and about these to-agree must-be-taken
 οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ
then these from the diagram about indeed then fears and
 θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν
confidences courage (is)-a-mean of-the and exceeding the-one indeed
 τῇ ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ
in-the fearlessness (is)-nameless many and are nameless the-one
 δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλον θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ
and in the to-be-confident exceeding (is)-rash the-one and in the
 μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλον τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων
indeed to-fear exceeding in-the and to-be-confident falling-short
 δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας — οὐ πάσας, ἥττον
(is)-a-coward about pleasures and also pains not all less
 δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας — μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη,
and and about the pains a-mean indeed (is)-temperance

ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
an-excess and (is)-licentiousness falling-short and about the pleasures
 οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν
not altogether they-become therefore not-even a-name have-they-got
 οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δόσιν
nor the such-men let-them-be and insensible about and giving
 χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ
of-money and taking a-mean indeed (is)-liberality an-excess
 δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία.
and also a-deficiency prodigality and illiberality
 ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ
oppositely and in them they-exceed and they-fall-short the-one
 μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει
indeed for prodigal in indeed spending exceeds in and taking
 ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει
falls-short the-one and illiberal in indeed taking exceeds
 ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ
in and spending falls-short now indeed then in-outline and in
 κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ
summary we-speak being-content with-this very-thing later and
 ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα
more-exactly about them it-will-be-determined about and money
 καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια
also other dispositions there-are a-mean indeed (is)-magnificence
 (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν
the for magnificent-man differs from-a-liberal-man the-one indeed
 γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ
for about great-things the-other and about small-things an-excess and
 ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βανανσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια·
(is)-tastelessness and vulgarity a-deficiency and (is)-pettiness
 διαφέρουσι δ' αὖται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα,
they-differ and these from-the about the liberality

πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ
in-what-way and they-differ later it-will-be-said about and
 τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολή
honor and dishonor a-mean indeed (is)-greatness-of-soul an-excess
 δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
and vanity a-kind so-called a-deficiency and (is)-smallness-of-soul
 ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν
as and we-were-saying to-stand toward the magnificence the
 ἐλευθεριότητα, τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει
liberality by-the about small-things differing so stands
 τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν
a-certain-one also toward the greatness-of-soul about honor being
 μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὥς δεῖ
great itself about a-small being it-is for as one-must
 ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται
to-reach-for honor and more than one-must and less it-is-called
 δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ
and the-one indeed exceeding in-the desires honor-loving the-one
 δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος.
and falling-short unambitious the-one and middle (is)-nameless
 ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἢ τοῦ φιλοτίμου
nameless and also the dispositions except the of-the honor-loving-man
 φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας·
love-of-honor whence lay-claim the extremes to-the middle place
 καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν
and we and it-is indeed when the middle-man honor-loving we-call
 ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν
it-is and when unambitious and it-is indeed when we-praise the
 φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ'
honor-loving-man it-is and when the unambitious-man through what and
 αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ
cause this we-do in the following it-will-be-said now and

περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
about the remaining let-us-speak according-to the indicated way
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ
there-is and also about the anger an-excess and a-deficiency and
 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἄνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
a-mean nearly and nameless being they the middle
 πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
gentle calling the mean gentleness let-us-name of-the
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ
and extremes the-one indeed exceeding irascible let-him-be the and
 κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ'
vice irascibility the-one and falling-short unangry a-kind the and
 ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες,
deficiency want-of-anger there-are and also other three means
 ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι
having indeed some likeness to one-another differing
 δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ
and from-one-another all indeed for they-are about of-words and
 πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι
of-actions association they-differ and because the-one indeed is
 περὶ τἀληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου
about the-true the in them the-others and about the pleasant of-this
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.
and the indeed in amusement the and in all the-things in the life
 ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατιδῶμεν
it-must-be-said then also about these so-that more we-may-see
 ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ'
that in all-cases the mean (is)-praiseworthy the and extremes neither
 ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ
praiseworthy nor right but blameworthy they-are indeed then also
 τούτων τὰ πλείω ἄνωνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
of-these the more nameless it-must-be-tried and just-as also in

τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκα καὶ
the others ourselves to-coin-names of-clearness for-the-sake and
 τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν
of-the easy-to-follow about indeed then the true the indeed
 μέσος ἀληθὴς τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω,
middle-man truthful a-kind and the mean truthfulness let-it-be-called
 ἡ δὲ προσποιήσις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία
the and pretense the-one indeed toward the greater boastfulness
 καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον
and the-man having it a-boaster the and toward the less
 εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺν
self-deprecation and self-deprecating the-man having about and the pleasant
 τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ
the indeed in amusement the indeed middle-man ready-witted and the
 διάθεσις εὐτραπεία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ
disposition ready-wit the and excess buffoonery and the-man
 ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ
having it a-buffoon the and falling-short a-boor a-kind and
 ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺν τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ
the state boorishness about and the remaining pleasant the in the life
 ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης
the-one indeed as one-must pleasant being (is)-a-friend and the mean
 φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα,
friendliness the-one and exceeding if indeed of-nothing for-the-sake
 ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ'
obsequious if and of-advantage the his-own a-flatterer the-one and
 ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.
falling-short and in all-things disagreeable quarrelsome a-kind and peevish
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη
there-are and also in the feelings and about the passions
 μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται
means the for shame a-virtue indeed not is it-is-praised

δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται
and also the modest-man and for in these the-one indeed is-called
 μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα
middle the-other and exceeding as the abashed-man the-man everything
 αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος,
feeling-shame-at the-one and falling-short or at-nothing at-all (is)-shameless
 ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου
the-one and middle (is)-modest righteous-indignation and (is)-a-mean of-envy
 καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς
and of-malice they-are and about pain and pleasure the-ones
 ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
at the things-befalling the neighbors arising the-man indeed for
 νεμεσητικός λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν,
righteously-indignant is-pained at the undeservedly well faring
 ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλον τούτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται,
the-man and envious exceeding this-one at all-cases is-pained
 ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι
the-man and malicious so-much falls-short of-the to-be-pained
 ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καὶρὸς
that even to-rejoice but about indeed these also elsewhere an-opportunity
 ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται,
there-will-be about and justice since not simply it-is-called
 μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς
after these having-distinguished about each we-shall-say how
 μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.
means they-are likewise and also about the rational virtues

The two extremes are opposed to each other and to the mean, and the mean looks like one extreme when it is set beside the other: the brave man looks rash beside the coward and cowardly beside the rash man. The greatest contrariety is between the extremes themselves. Which extreme is more opposed to the mean depends partly on the thing and partly on us — we are drawn toward pleasure, so licentiousness is the more contrary to temperance.

τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν
three indeed dispositions being two indeed vices the-one indeed
 καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς
by excess the-other and by deficiency one and virtue
 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν
the mean all to-all are-opposed somehow the-ones indeed
 γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαί εἰσίν, ἡ
for extreme both to-the middle and to-one-another contrary are the
 δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ
and middle to-the extremes just-as for the equal toward indeed the
 ἕλαττον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἕλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι
less (is)-greater toward and the greater (is)-less so the middle
 ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς
states toward indeed the deficiencies exceed toward and the
 ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
excesses fall-short both in the passions and in-the actions
 ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς
the for brave-man toward indeed the coward rash appears toward
 δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
and the rash-man (appears)-a-coward likewise and also the temperate-man
 πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
toward indeed the insensible-man (appears)-licentious toward and the
 ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν
licentious-man (appears)-insensible the-one and liberal toward indeed the

ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος.
illiberal-man (appears)-prodigal toward and the prodigal (appears)-illiberal
 διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς
therefore also push-away the middle-man the extremes each toward
 ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν
each and they-call the brave-man the indeed coward rash
 ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.
the-one and rash a-coward and in the others analogously
 οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης
so and being-opposed to-one-another these greatest contrariety
 ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον·
is to-the extremes toward one-another than toward the middle
 πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ
further-off for these stand-apart from-one-another than from-the
 μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
middle just-as the great from-the small and the small
 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν
from-the great or both from-the equal further toward indeed
 τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ
the middle for-some extremes a-likeness some appears as for-the
 θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν
rashness toward the courage and for-the prodigality toward the
 ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη
liberality to-the and extremes toward one-another (there-is)-greatest
 ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
unlikeness the-things and most standing-apart from one-another
 ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον
contrary are-defined so-that also more contrary the-things more
 ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ'
standing-apart toward and the middle is-opposed more in
 ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή,
what-cases indeed the deficiency in what-cases and the excess

οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἢ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα,
such-as to-courage indeed not the rashness an-excess being
 ἀλλ' ἢ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ
but the cowardice a-deficiency being to-the and temperance not
 ἢ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή
the insensibility a-want being but the licentiousness an-excess
 οὔσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν
being through two and causes this happens one indeed
 τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
the from itself the thing by-the for nearer to-be
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο
and more-like the one extreme to-the middle not this
 ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
but the-contrary we-set-opposite rather such-as since more-like
 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον,
to-be seems to-the courage the rashness and nearer
 ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἢ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν·
more-unlike and the cowardice this rather we-set-opposite
 τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα
the-things for standing-apart more from-the middle more-contrary
 δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
seem to-be one indeed then cause this from itself the
 πράγματος· ἕτερα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ᾧ γὰρ
thing another and from us ourselves toward what for
 αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
we-ourselves more are-inclined somehow these more contrary
 τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς
to-the middle appear such-as we-ourselves more are-inclined toward
 τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν
the pleasures therefore more-prone we-are toward licentiousness
 ἢ πρὸς κοσμότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν,
than toward orderliness these then more contrary we-call

πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ
toward what the advance more happens and through this the
 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.
licentiousness an-excess being more-contrary is to-the temperance

IX · HOW TO HIT THE MEAN

It is hard work to be good, because in each case the mean is hard to find, as the center of a circle is not found by just anyone. Aristotle gives three rules: steer away from the more contrary extreme, as Calypso advises keeping the ship clear of the smoke and the wave; notice what you yourself are prone to and drag yourself the other way, as men straighten warped timber; and be most on guard against pleasure, which we never judge impartially.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ
that indeed then is the virtue the moral a-mean and how and
 ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
that (it-is)-a-mean of-two vices of-the indeed by excess of-the
 δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ
and by deficiency and that such it-is through the aiming
 τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν,
of-the mean to-be the in the passions and in the actions
 ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι.
sufficiently it-has-been-said therefore also a-task it-is excellent to-be
 ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ
in each-case for the mean to-take (is)-a-task such-as of-a-circle the
 μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν
center not of-anyone but of-the man-knowing so and also the indeed
 ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον
to-be-angered (is)-of-anyone and easy and the to-give money
 καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὔ
and to-spend the and to-whom and how-much and when and of-which

ἐνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ
for-the-sake and how no-longer of-anyone nor easy therefore the
 εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ
well both rare and praiseworthy and noble therefore it-is-needful
 τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν
the-man aiming-at of-the mean first indeed to-withdraw
 τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ
from-the more contrary just-as also — Calypso advises

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε
of-this indeed smoke and wave outside keep
 νῆα.
the-ship

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ
of-the for extremes the-one indeed is more-erring the-other
 δ' ἥττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν,
and less since then of-the mean to-hit (is)-supremely hard
 κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον
according-to the second they-say voyage the least must-be-taken
 τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν
of-the evils this and will-be most in-this the
 τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ᾧ καὶ
way which we-say to-look and it-is-needful toward what also
 αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα
ourselves prone we-are different-men for toward different-things
 πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς
we-are-by-nature this and will-be recognizable from the pleasure
 καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοῦναντίον
and the pain the arising about us into the-contrary
 δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ
and ourselves to-drag-away it-is-needful far for leading-away from-the

ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ
to-err into the mean we-shall-come which-very-thing those the
 διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ
warped of-the timbers straightening do in everything and
 μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ
most must-be-guarded-against the pleasant and the pleasure not for
 ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες
unbribed we-judge it which-very-thing then the elders-of-the-people
 ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς
felt toward — Helen this it-is-needful to-feel also us
 πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν·
toward the pleasure and in all-cases the of-those to-say-over utterance
 οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἦττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα.
so for it sending-away less we-shall-err
 ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὥς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα
these then doing as in summary to-say most
 δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως
we-shall-be-able of-the mean to-bit hard and perhaps
 τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον
this and especially in the in particulars not for (is-it)-easy
 διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
to-determine both how and with-whom and at what-sorts and how-much
 χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς
time one-must-be-angry and for we at-one-time indeed those
 ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πρᾶους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς
falling-short we-praise and gentle we-call at-another and those
 χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
being-harsh manly calling-them but the-man indeed
 μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὗτ' ἐπὶ τὸ
a-little of-the well deviating not is-blamed neither toward the
 μᾶλλον οὗτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἦττον, ὁ δὲ πλεόν· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ
more nor toward the less the-man and more this-man for not

λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς
escapes-notice the-man and up-to what-point and to how-much (is)-blameworthy
 οὐ ρᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
not (is-it)-easy in-the account to-define nor for another anything of-the
 αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ
things-perceived the and such-things in the in particulars and in the
 αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση
perception the judgment the indeed then so-much makes-clear that the middle
 ἕξις ἐν πᾶσι ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε
state in all-cases (is)-praiseworthy to-lean-away and it-is-needful at-one-time
 μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν·
indeed toward the excess at-another and toward the deficiency
 οὕτω γὰρ ρᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.
so for most-easily of-the mean and of-the well we-shall-bit

BOOK III

I • THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

Praise and blame attach to voluntary acts, pardon and pity to involuntary ones, so the distinction has to be drawn. Acts done under force or through ignorance are involuntary; but throwing cargo overboard in a storm, or obeying a tyrant to save one's parents and children, is a mixed case, more like a voluntary act, since the man chooses it at the time. Ignorance makes an act involuntary only when it is of the particulars and the agent regrets it; acts done from anger or appetite are voluntary.

τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθῃ τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ
the virtue indeed about passions both and actions being and
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων,
upon indeed the voluntary-acts praises and blames arising
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου,
upon and the involuntary pardon sometimes and also pity
τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι
the voluntary and the involuntary (is)-necessary perhaps to-define
τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς
for-those about virtue inquiring useful and also for-those
νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ
legislating toward both the honors and the punishments it-seems
δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα·
indeed involuntary to-be the-things by-force or through ignorance happening
βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὐσα
forced and (is)-that-of-which the origin (is)-from-without such being
ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων,
in which nothing contributes the doer or the sufferer
οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσει ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.
such-as if a-wind should-carry somewhere or men masters being
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μείζονων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ
as-many-things and through fear of-greater evils are-done or for

καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι
noble something such-as if a-tyrant should-order shameful something
 πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν
to-do master being of-parents and of-children and having-done-it indeed
 σώζονται μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν
they-would-be-saved not having-done-it and they-would-die a-dispute
 ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι
has whether involuntary they-are or voluntary such-a-thing and something
 συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς
happens also about the in the storms jettisons simply
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ'
indeed for no-one throws-away willingly for the-saving and
 αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.
of-himself and of-the rest all those sense having
 μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εἰκόασι δὲ
mixed indeed then are the such actions they-resemble and
 μᾶλλον ἐκούσιοις· αἰρεταὶ γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται,
more voluntary-acts choiceworthy for they-are then when they-are-done
 τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ
the and end of-the action according-to the occasion is and
 τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον.
the voluntary indeed and the involuntary when he-acts must-be-spoken-of
 πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ
he-acts and willingly and for the origin of-the to-move the instrumental
 μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὦν
parts in the such actions in him is of-what-things
 δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ
and in him (is)-the origin upon him also the to-act and
 μή. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια·
not voluntary indeed the such-things simply and perhaps involuntary
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ
no-one for would choose in itself of-the such-things anything for

ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινῶνται,
the actions and the such sometimes even they-are-praised
 ὅταν αἰσχρὸν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ
whenever shameful something or painful they-endure in-return-for
 μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ
great and noble if and the-reverse they-are-blamed the for
 αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου.
most-shameful to-endure for nothing noble or moderate (is)-of-a-base-man
 ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ',
in some-cases and praise indeed not arises pardon and
 ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν
whenever through such-things does someone what not one-must which the
 ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι.
human nature overstrains and no-one — would-endure
 ἕνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
some-things and perhaps not it-is-possible to-be-compelled but rather
 ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν
one-must-die having-suffered the most-terrible-things and for the
 Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα
of-Euripides Alcmaeon ridiculous appear the-things having-compelled
 μητροκτονήσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον
to-kill-a-mother it-is and hard sometimes to-decide what-sort
 ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον,
in-return-for what-sort must-be-chosen and what in-return-for what must-be-endured
 ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ
further and (it-is)-barder to-abide-by the things-decided as for for
 τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ'
the most-part are the-things indeed expected painful what and
 ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ
they-are-compelled shameful whence praises and blames arise about
 τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον
those having-been-compelled or not the-things indeed what-sort must-be-called

βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἦ καὶ
forced or simply indeed whenever ever the cause in the outside is and
 ὁ πράττων μὴδὲν συμβάλλεται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν
the doer nothing contributes what-things and in themselves indeed
 ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ
involuntary are now and also in-return-for these-things choiceworthy and the
 ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ
origin in the doer in themselves indeed involuntary are now and
 καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιοις·
also in-return-for these-things voluntary rather and they-resemble voluntary-acts
 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια.
the for actions (are)-in the in particulars these and (are)-voluntary
 ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι·
what-sorts and in-return-for what-sorts must-be-chosen not (is-it)-easy to-render
 πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ
many for differences there-are in the in particulars if
 δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια
and someone the pleasant-things and the noble-things should-say forced
 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ
to-be to-compel for outside being all-things would be for-him
 βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.
forced of-these for for-the-sake all-men all-things do
 καὶ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ
and the-ones indeed by-force and unwilling painfully the-others and
 διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ
through the pleasant and noble with pleasure ridiculous and the
 αἰτιασθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθὴρατον ὄντα
to-blame the things-outside but not himself easily-caught being
 ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ'
by the such-things and of-the indeed noble-things himself of-the and

αἰσχροῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὐ
shameful the pleasant-things it-seems indeed the forced to-be (that)-of-which
 ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
(is)-from-without the origin nothing contributing the man-forced
 τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον
the and through ignorance not voluntary indeed all is involuntary
 δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ λυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν
and the painful and in regret the-man for through ignorance
 πράξας ὅτι οὖν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει,
having-done anything-whatever nothing at-all being-annoyed at the action
 ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων,
willingly indeed not has-acted what at-least not he-knew nor again unwillingly
 μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν
not being-pained at-least of-the indeed through ignorance the-one indeed in
 μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ
regret unwilling seems the-one and not regretting since
 ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα
(is)-different let-him-be not willing since for it-differs better a-name
 ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν
to-have peculiar different and seems also the through ignorance to-act
 τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ
from-the being-ignorant the-man for being-drunk or being-angry not seems
 δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων,
through ignorance to-act but through something of-the things-said
 οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ
not knowing and but being-ignorant is-ignorant indeed then every the
 μοχθηρὸς ἂν δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὦν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ
wicked-man what one-must to-do and from-what one-must-abstain and
 διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται·
through the such error unjust and generally bad they-become
 τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ
the and involuntary means to-be-said not if someone is-ignorant-of the

συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ
expedient-things not for the in the choice ignorance (is)-cause of-the
 ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται
involuntary but of-the wickedness nor the universal they-are-blamed
 γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ
for through at-least this but the in particulars in which and
 περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ πράξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη·
about what the action in these for both pity and pardon
 ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
the-man for of-these something being-ignorant involuntarily acts
 ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς
perhaps then not worse to-define them what and how-many they-are who
 τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ
both indeed and what and about what or in what he-acts sometimes and
 καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας,
also with-what such-as an-instrument and for-the-sake of-what such-as of-safety
 καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
and how such-as gently or violently all indeed then these
 οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δηλὸν δ' ὥς οὐδὲ τὸν
no-one would be-ignorant-of not being-mad (is)-clear and that nor the
 πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσκειν
doer how for himself at-least what and he-does is-ignorant-of
 ἂν τις, οἷον φράζοντες φασιν ἔκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ
would someone such-as speaking they-say to-slip-out them or not
 εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά,
to-know that forbidden they-were just-as Aeschylus the mysteries
 ἢ δεῖξει βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὥς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην.
or to-show wishing to-let-fly as the-man the catapult
 οἰηθεῖν δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἢ
would-think and — someone also the son an-enemy to-be just-as —
 Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν
Merope and to-have-been-buttoned the pointed spear or the

λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείνειαι
stone a-pumice to-be and for safety having-given-drink would-kill
 ἄν· καὶ θίξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειρίζομενοι,
 — and to-touch wishing just-as the sparring-men
 πατάζειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐσης,
strikes would about all indeed these of-the ignorance being
 ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὃ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας
in which the action the-man of-these something having-been-ignorant-of
 ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις·
unwilling seems to-have-acted and especially in the most-decisive
 κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.
most-decisive and to-be seem in which the action and of-which for-the-sake
 τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου
of-the indeed according-to the such ignorance involuntary being-called
 ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.
further it-is-needful the action painful to-be and in regret
 ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον
being and involuntary the by-force and through ignorance the voluntary
 δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότες τὰ
seems would to-be (that)-of-which the origin (is)-in him knowing the-things
 καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται
in particulars in which the action perhaps for not well it-is-said
 ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν
involuntary to-be the-things through spirit or appetite first indeed
 γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ
for nothing further of-the other animals voluntarily will-act nor the
 παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν
children then whether nothing voluntarily we-do of-the-things
 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ
through appetite and spirit or the noble-things indeed voluntarily the
 δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
and shameful involuntarily or (is-it)-ridiculous of-one at-least cause being

ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως ἀκούσια φάναι ὦν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι·
absurd and perhaps involuntary to-call what-things one-must reach-for
 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν
it-is-needful and also to-be-angry at some-things and to-desire
 τινῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ
some-things such-as health and learning it-seems and also the-things
 μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
indeed involuntary painful to-be the-things and according-to appetite
 ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ
pleasant further and what does-it-matter by-the involuntary to-be the-things
 κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ
according-to reasoning or spirit erred-in to-be-avoided indeed for
 ἅμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα
both they-seem and not less human to-be the irrational
 πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ
passions so-that also the actions of-the man the from spirit
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.
and appetite absurd indeed the to-set-down involuntary these

II · CHOICE

Choice is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is chosen: children and animals act voluntarily and do not choose. It is not appetite, spirit, wish, or opinion — wish can be for impossible things such as immortality, and opinion ranges over everything, while choice is only about what is in our power. It is what has been deliberated on beforehand, as the word itself suggests: what is taken in preference to other things.

διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ
having-been-defined and both the voluntary and the involuntary about
 προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ
choice it-follows to-go-through most-proper for to-be it-seems

τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ
to-the virtue and more the characters to-judge than-the actions the
 προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'
choice indeed voluntary indeed appears not the-same and but
 ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ
over more (extends)-the voluntary of-the indeed for voluntary both
 παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ
children and the-other animals share in-choice and not and
 τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν
the-things sudden voluntary indeed we-call according-to choice
 δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν
and not those and calling it appetite or spirit or wish
 ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκόσιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ
or some opinion not seem rightly to-speak not for common (is)-the
 προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.
choice also to-the irrational-animals appetite and also spirit
 καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος
and the uncontrolled-man desiring indeed acts choosing
 δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν,
and not the self-controlled-man and the-reverse choosing indeed
 ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται,
desiring and not and to-choice indeed appetite is-opposed
 ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος
appetite and to-appetite not and the indeed appetite (is)-of-the-pleasant
 καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος.
and of-the-painful the choice and neither of-the-painful nor of-the-pleasant
 θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ
spirit and still less least for the-things through spirit according-to
 προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε,
choice to-be seem but indeed nor wish at-least
 καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι
although close appearing choice indeed for not is

τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
of-the impossible-things and if someone should-say to-choose he-seems
 ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
 — silly to-be wish and is also of-the impossible-things
 οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ
such-as of-immortality and the indeed wish is also about the-things
 μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα
in-no-way through oneself done would such-as an-actor some
 νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ'
to-win or an-athlete chooses and the such-things no-one but
 ὅσα οἶεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν
as-many-as he-thinks would-come-about — through himself further and the indeed
 βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν
wish of-the end is rather the and choice of-the-things
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
toward the end such-as to-be-healthy we-wish we-choose and
 δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ
through what we-shall-be-healthy and to-be-happy we-wish indeed and
 φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόξει· ὅλως γὰρ
we-say we-choose and to-say not it-fits generally for
 ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ
seems the choice about the-things in our-power to-be nor indeed
 δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
opinion would it-be the indeed for opinion seems about everything to-be
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ
and nothing less about the eternal-things and the impossible-things than
 τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ διαιρεῖται, οὐ
the-things in our-power and by-the false and true is-divided not
 τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.
by-the bad and good the choice and by-these rather

ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς.
generally indeed then with-opinion the-same perhaps not says anyone
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ
but nor with-a-particular-one by-the for to-choose the-good-things
 ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί· τινὲς ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν
or the bad-things of-a-certain-kind some we-are by-the and to-hold-opinions
 οὔ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν τι τῶν
not and we-choose indeed to-take or to-avoid something of-the
 τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστίν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ
such-things we-hold-opinion and what it-is or to-whom (it-is)-expedient or
 πῶς· λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν
how to-take and or to-avoid not at-all we-hold-opinion and the indeed
 προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ
choice is-praised by-the to-be of-what one-must rather than
 τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα
by-the rightly the and opinion by-the as truly and we-choose
 μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ
indeed what most we-know good being we-hold-opinion and what
 οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε
not at-all we-know they-seem and not the same to-choose both
 ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,
best and to-hold-opinion but some to-hold-opinion indeed better
 διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται
through vice and to-choose not what one-must if and comes-before
 δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ
opinion of-the choice or accompanies nothing it-matters not
 τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί.
this for we-inquire but whether the-same it-is with-opinion some
 τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων
what then or of-what-sort something is since of-the things-said
 οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ
nothing voluntary indeed then it-appears the and voluntary not

πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ
 all choiceworthy but surely at-least the thing-deliberated-beforehand the
 γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν
 for choice (is)-with reason and thought to-hint-at
 δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὥς ὄν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.
 and seems also the-name as being before others choiceworthy

III · DELIBERATION

No one deliberates about eternal things, or about what always happens the same way, or about chance, but only about what is in our power and can be brought about by acting. And we deliberate not about ends but about the means to them: having set the end, we ask how and through what it will come about, working backwards until we reach what is first in the order of doing. Choice is therefore deliberate desire of what is in our power.

βουλευόνται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν
 they-deliberate and whether about everything and everything deliberable
 ἔστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως
 is or about some-things not there-is deliberation it-must-be-said and perhaps
 βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ
 deliberable not about what would-deliberate — someone silly or
 μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ
 mad but about what-things the-man sense having about indeed
 τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου
 the eternal-things no-one deliberates such-as about the universe
 ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.
 or the diagonal and the side that (they-are)-incommensurable
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταυτὰ
 but nor about the-things in motion always and according-to the-same
 γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινα
 happening whether from necessity or also by-nature or through some

αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν
cause other such-as of-solstices and of-risings nor about the-things
 ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ
at-different-times differently such-as of-droughts and of-rains nor about
 τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ
the-things from chance such-as of-treasure discovery but nor about
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα
the human-things all such-as how would Scythians best
 πολιτεύονται οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. οὐ γὰρ
be-governed no-one of-Lacedaemonians deliberates not for
 γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ
comes-about would of-these anything through us we-deliberate and about
 τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά.
the-things in our-power and attainable these and also are what-remains
 αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι
causes for seem to-be nature and necessity and chance further
 δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων
and intellect and everything the through man of-the and men
 ἕκαστοι βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ
each-group deliberate about the-things through themselves attainable and
 περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ
about indeed the exact and self-sufficient of-the sciences not
 ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς
there-is deliberation such-as about letters not for we-besitate how
 γραπτέον). ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσάυτως
one-must-write but whatever comes-about through us not in-the-same-way
 δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ'
and always about these we-deliberate such-as about the-things according-to
 ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον
medicine and money-making and about pilotage more
 ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἥττον διηκριβώται, καὶ ἔτι
than gymnastics by-how-much less it-has-been-made-exact and further

περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας
about the remaining likewise more and also about the arts
 ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ
than the sciences more for about these we-hesitate the
 βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλοις δὲ
to-deliberate and (is)-in the-things as for the most-part unclear and
 πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους
how it-will-turn-out and in which (there-is)-indeterminacy advisers
 δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν
and we-take-along for the great-matters distrusting in-us
 αὐτοῖς ὥς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ
ourselves as not sufficient to-discern we-deliberate and not about
 τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
the ends but about the-things toward the ends
 οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ
neither for a-physician deliberates whether he-will-heal nor an-orator
 εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει,
whether he-will-persuade nor a-statesman whether good-order he-will-make
 οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι
nor of-the rest anyone about the end but having-set-down
 τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ
the end the how and through what it-will-be they-consider and through
 πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ
several indeed appearing to-come-about through what most-easily and
 κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς
most-nobly they-examine through one and being-accomplished how
 διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεινο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ
through this it-will-be and-that through what until ever they-come to
 τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. ὁ
the first cause which in the discovery last is the-man
 γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον
for deliberating seems to-inquire and to-analyze the stated

τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα (φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ
way just-as a-diagram it-appears and the indeed inquiry not
 πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικάι, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις
all to-be deliberation such-as the mathematical the and deliberation
 πᾶσα ζήτησις), καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι
(is)-all inquiry and the last in the analysis first to-be
 ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται,
in the coming-to-be and-if indeed an-impossible-thing they-meet they-desist
 οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε
such-as if money there-is-need these and not possible at-all
 πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν.
to-be-procured if and possible it-appears they-set-about to-act
 δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
possible and what through us comes-about would the-things for through
 τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν
the friends through us somehow are the for origin (is)-in
 ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὅτε δ'
us it-is-sought and at-one-time indeed the instruments at-another and
 ἡ χρειαὶ αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε
the use of-them likewise and also in the rest at-one-time
 μὲν δι' οὗ ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὲ,
indeed through what at-another and how or through what it-seems indeed
 καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων·
just-as it-has-been-said man to-be a-principle of-the actions
 ἡ δὲ βουλή περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ
the and deliberation (is)-about the-things for-himself attainable the and
 πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν
actions of-other-things for-the-sake not for would be deliberable
 τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ
the end but the-things toward the ends nor indeed the-things
 καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεται ὥς
in particulars such-as whether bread this or it-has-been-baked as

δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰὲν βουλεύσεται,
one-must of-perception for these if and always he-will-deliberate
 εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ
to infinity it-will-go deliberable and also choiceworthy (are)-the
 αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ
same except marked-off already the choiceworthy the for from
 τῆς βουλῆς κριθέν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ
the deliberation having-been-judged choiceworthy is he-stops for
 ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ
each-man seeking how he-will-act whenever to himself he-refers-back
 τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ
the origin and of-himself to the ruling-part this for (is)-the
 προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων
thing-choosing (is)-clear and this also from the ancient
 πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ
constitutions which Homer represented the for kings what
 προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ
they-had-chosen announced to-the people being and the choiceworthy
 βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
deliberable desirable of-the-things in our-power also the choice
 ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ
would be deliberative desire of-the-things in our-power from the
 βουλευσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν
to-have-deliberated for having-judged we-desire according-to the
 βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω,
deliberation the indeed then choice in-outline let-it-have-been-described
 καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
and about what-sorts it-is and that (it-is)-of-the-things toward the ends

Some say the object of wish is the good, others say it is the apparent good. Aristotle answers that without qualification it is the good, but that for each man it is what appears good to him — and for the excellent man what appears is what truly is, since he is the measure of it. For most people the deception comes through pleasure, which appears a good when it is not.

ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἶρηται, δοκεῖ
the and wish that indeed of-the end is it-has-been-said it-seems
 δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου
and to-some indeed of-the-good to-be to-others and of-the apparent
 ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι
good it-follows and for-those indeed wished the-good calling
 μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος
not to-be wished what wishes the-man not rightly choosing
 (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως
if for it-will-be wished also good it-was and if so
 ἔτυχεν, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν
it-happened bad for-those and again the apparent good
 βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστω τὸ
wished calling not to-be by-nature wished but for-each the
 δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλω φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
thing-seeming one-thing and to-another appears and if so it-happened
 τὰναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον
the-contraries if and indeed these not please surely it-must-be-said
 ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν,
simply indeed and according-to truth wished to-be the-good
 ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ
for-each and the thing-appearing for-the indeed then excellent-man the
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ
according-to truth to-be for-the and base-man the chance-thing just-as

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά
 also in the bodies to-those indeed well disposed healthful
 ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ'
 are the-things according-to truth such being to-those and
 ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
 sickly other-things likewise and also bitter and sweet and
 θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος
 hot and heavy and of-the others each-thing the excellent-man
 γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ
 for each-thing judges rightly and in each-case the-true to-him
 φαίνεται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξις ἰδιά ἐστὶ καλὰ
 appears according-to each for state peculiar are noble
 καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ
 and pleasant and differs most perhaps the excellent-man by-the
 τἀληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν
 the-true in each-case to-see just-as a-rule and measure of-them
 ὦν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε
 being in the many and the deception through the pleasure seems
 γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται οὖν
 to-happen not for being good it-appears they-choose then
 τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
 the pleasant as good the and pain as bad they-flee

V • VIRTUE AND VICE ARE IN OUR POWER

Where acting is in our power so is not acting, so virtue and vice are both voluntary; lawgivers assume this when they punish wrongdoers and double the penalty for the drunk. A man who has become unjust or licentious could once have avoided it and cannot now stop at will, as a thrown stone cannot be taken back. If someone objects that all pursue the apparent good and are not masters of how it appears, vice is still voluntary just as far as virtue is.

ὄντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ
being indeed wished indeed the end deliberable and also
 προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
choiceworthy the-things toward the end the about these actions
 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν
according-to choice would be and voluntary the and of-the
 ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ
virtues activities (are)-about these in our-power indeed also the
 ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
virtue likewise and also the vice in what-things for (is)-in our-power
 τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ
the to-act also the not to-act also in what-things the not also
 τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ
the yes so-that if the to-act noble being in our-power is also
 τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ
the not to-act in our-power will-be shameful being and if the not
 πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν
to-act noble being (is)-in our-power also the to-act shameful
 ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ
being (is)-in our-power if and (is)-in our-power the noble-things to-do and
 τὰ αἰσχροῦ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν
the shameful-things likewise and also the not to-do this and was
 τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ
the good and bad to-be in our-power then the decent and
 φαύλοισι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ'
base to-be the and to-say that no-one willingly (is)-wicked nor
 ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ.
unwilling blessed seems the-one indeed false the-other and true
 μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον.
blessed indeed for no-one (is)-unwilling the and wickedness (is)-voluntary

ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
or with-the at-least now things-said one-must-dispute and the
 ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν
man not must-be-called a-principle to-be nor a-begetter of-the
 πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ
actions just-as also of-children if and these appear and not
 ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν,
we-have to other principles to-refer beside the-ones in us
 ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
of-what-things also the principles (are)-in us also themselves (are)-in our-power
 καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ'
and voluntary to-these and it-seems to-be-witnessed both privately by
 ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ
individuals and by themselves the lawgivers they-punish for
 καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία
and take-vengeance-on those doing wicked-things as-many-as not by-force
 ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ
or through ignorance of-which not themselves (are)-causes those and the
 καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προτρέφοντες
noble-things doing they-honor as the-ones indeed going-to-encourage
 τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ
the-others and going-to-restrain although whatever neither in our-power is
 μὴθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ
nor voluntary no-one encourages to-do as nothing of
 ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ
use being the to-be-persuaded not to-be-hot or to-feel-pain or
 πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ
to-be-hungry or another anything-whatever of-the such-things nothing for
 ἥττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν
less we-shall-suffer them and for at itself the to-be-ignorant
 κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἷτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς
they-punish if a-cause to-be he-seems of-the ignorance such-as for-the

μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος
drunk double the penalties the for origin (is)-in him master
 γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.
for of-the not to-get-drunk this and (is)-cause of-the ignorance
 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ᾧ
and those being-ignorant-of something of-the-things in the laws what
 δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως
one-must to-know and not hard are they-punish likewise
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν
and also in the others whatever through carelessness to-be-ignorant
 δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ γὰρ
they-seem as upon them being the not to-be-ignorant of-the for
 ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε
to-have-taken-care (they-are)-masters but perhaps such he-is so-as
 μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ
not to-take-care but of-the such to-become themselves
 αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνεμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους
(are)-causes living loosely and of-the unjust or licentious
 εἶναι, οἳ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις
to-be the-ones indeed doing-mischief the-others and in drinking-bouts
 καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα
and the such-things passing-their-time the for about each-thing
 ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
activities such make this and (is)-clear from the
 μελετώντων πρὸς ἡγνινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι
men-training for any-whatever contest or action they-persist
 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν
for exercising the indeed then to-be-ignorant that from the to-be-active
 περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι
about each-thing the states come-to-be (is)-of-an-utterly insensible-man further
 δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι
and (it-is)-unreasonable the man-acting-unjustly not to-wish unjust to-be

ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις
 or the man-acting-licentiously licentious if and not being-ignorant someone
 πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν
 acts from what he-will-be unjust willingly unjust would be-be not indeed
 ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος.
 if at-least he-wishes unjust being he-will-cess and he-will-be just
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγίης. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
 nor for the man-being-ill (is)-healthy and if so it-happened
 ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς.
 willingly be-is-ill uncontrolledly living and disobeying the physicians
 τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ'
 then indeed then it-was-open to-him not to-be-ill having-let-it-go and
 οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν
 no-longer just-as nor to-one-having-thrown a-stone still it possible
 ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν· ἢ γὰρ
 to-take-back but nevertheless upon him (was)-the to-throw the for
 ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ
 origin (was)-in him so and also for-the unjust-man and for-the
 ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι,
 licentious-man from beginning indeed it-was-open such not to-become
 διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.
 therefore willing they-are having-become and no-longer it-is-possible not to-be
 οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ'
 not only and the of-the soul vices voluntary are but
 ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν τοῖς
 in-some-cases also the of-the body for-which also we-blame for-those
 μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι'
 indeed for through nature ugly no-one blames for-those and through
 ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν
 lack-of-exercise and carelessness likewise and also about weakness
 καὶ πῆρῳσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσαιε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ
 and maiming no-one for would reproach a-blind-man by-nature or

ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἐλέησαι· τῷ δ'
from disease or from a-blow but rather would-pity the-man and
 ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι.
from wine-bibbing or another licentiousness everyone — would-blame
 τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται,
of-the indeed about the body vices the-ones in our-power are-blamed
 αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
the-ones and not in our-power not if and so also in the others
 αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις
the blamed of-the vices in our-power would be if and someone
 λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς
should-say that all reach-for the apparent good of-the
 δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι,
and appearance not (are)-masters but of-what-sort ever each-man is
 τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος
such also the end appears to-him if indeed then each-man
 ἐαυτῷ τῆς ἑξέως ἐστὶ πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας
for-himself of-the state is somehow cause also of-the appearance
 ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος
he-will-be somehow himself cause if and not no-one for-himself (is)-cause
 τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
of-the to-do-evil but through ignorance of-the end these-things
 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι,
he-does through these thinking for-himself the best to-be
 ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι
the and of-the end desire not self-chosen but to-be-born
 δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ
it-is-needful just-as sight having by-which he-will-judge nobly and the
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ᾧ
according-to truth good he-will-choose and is well-endowed to-whom
 τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον,
this nobly is-by-nature the for greatest and noblest

καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ'
and what from another not possible at-all to-take nor to-learn but
 οἶον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς
as he-was-born such he-will-have and the well and the nobly
 τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.
this to-be-by-nature the complete and true would be good-endowment
 εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς
if indeed these are true what more the virtue than-the
 κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ
vice will-be voluntary for-both for alike for-the good-man
 καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαίνεται
and for-the bad-man the end by-nature or however appears
 καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
and lies the and remaining-things toward this referring
 πράττουσιν ὅπωςδὴποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει
they-do however whether indeed the end not by-nature
 ἐκάστω φαίνεται οἷονδὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν
to-each appears of-whatever-sort but something also beside him
 ἐστίν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ
is or the indeed end (is)-natural by-the and the remaining-things
 πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν,
to-do voluntarily the excellent-man the virtue voluntary is
 οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἢ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ
nothing less also the vice voluntary would be alike for
 καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
also for-the bad-man belongs the through himself in the actions
 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί
even if not in the end if then just-as it-is-said voluntary
 εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πως αὐτοί
are the virtues and for of-the states part-causes somehow ourselves

ἔσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε
we-are and by-the of-a-certain-kind some to-be the end of-such-a-kind
 τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.
we-set-down also the vices voluntary would be alike for
 κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
in-common indeed then about the virtues it-has-been-said by-us the both
 γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ'
genus in-outline that means they-are and that (they-are)-states by
 ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς,
what-things both they-come-to-be that of-these productive and in themselves
 καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ
and that (they-are)-in our-power and voluntary and so as ever the
 ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί
right reason should-prescribe not alike and the actions voluntary
 εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ
are and the states of-the indeed for actions from beginning until the
 τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων
end masters we-are knowing the-things in particulars of-the states
 δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ
and (we-are-masters)-of-the beginning in particulars and the addition not
 γνῶριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν
recognizable just-as in the illnesses but because in our-power
 ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.
it-was so or not so to-use through this (they-are)-voluntary
 ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἰπόμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
taking-up-again and about each let-us-say which they-are and
 περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ
about what-sorts and how at-the-same-time and it-will-be clear also
 πόσαι εἰσὶν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.
how-many they-are and first about courage

Courage is a mean concerning fear and confidence, but not concerning every fear. Poverty and disease are not what the brave man faces, and some things ought to be feared. The most fearful thing is death, and courage in the strict sense is shown in the noblest form of death, which is death in battle.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη
 that indeed then a-mean it-is about fears and confidences already
 φανερόν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά,
 evident it-has-become we-fear and (is)-clear that the fearful-things
 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον
 these and are as simply to-say evils therefore also the fear
 ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ
 they-define an-expectation of-evil we-fear indeed then all the
 κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ'
 evils such-as ill-repute poverty disease friendlessness death but
 οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ
 not about all seems the brave-man to-be some for even one-must
 φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν·
 to-fear and (it-is)-noble the and not (is)-shameful such-as ill-repute
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ
 the-man indeed for fearing (is)-decent and modest the-man and
 μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος
 not fearing (is)-shameless he-is-called and by some brave
 κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ·
 by transference he-has for something like to-the brave-man
 ἄφοβος γὰρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ
 fearless for a-kind also the brave-man poverty and perhaps not one-must
 φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας
 to-fear nor disease nor generally whatever not from vice

μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος
 nor through oneself but nor the-man about these fearless
 ἀνδρείος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι
 (is)-brave we-call and also this-man by likeness some
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι
 for in the warlike dangers cowardly being liberal
 εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν.
 are and toward of-money loss confidently they-stand
 οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται
 nor indeed if someone outrage toward children and wife fears
 ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ
 or envy or something of-the such-things a-coward is nor if
 θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρείος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν
 he-is-confident being-about to-be-whipped (is-he)-brave about what-sorts then
 τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθὲς
 of-the fearful-things (is)-the brave-man or about the greatest no-one
 γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερῶτατον δ' ὁ
 for (is)-more-enduring of-the terrors most-fearful and (is)-the
 θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ
 death an-end for and nothing still for-the dead-man seems
 οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ
 either good or bad to-be it-would-seem and — nor about
 θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ
 death the in every-case the brave-man to-be such-as at sea
 ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι
 or in-diseases in what-cases then or in the noblest such
 δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ
 and (are)-those in war in greatest for and noblest
 κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς
 danger agreeing and with-these are also the honors the in the
 πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ'
 cities and among the monarchs strictly indeed would-be-called

ἄν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ
 — brave the-man about the noble death fearless and
 ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα
 whatever death brings-on close-at-hand being such and especially
 τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ
 the-things in war not indeed but also at sea
 καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεής ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥς
 and in diseases fearless (is)-the brave-man not so and as
 οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν
 the seamen the-ones indeed for have-given-up the safety
 καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἷ δὲ
 and the death the such they-resent the-others and
 εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ
 of-good-hope are through the experience at-the-same-time and also
 ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν·
 they-play-the-man in what-cases there-is defense or (it-is)-noble the to-die
 ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.
 in the such and destructions neither belongs

VII • THE BRAVE MAN

The brave man fears what a man should fear and endures it as reason directs, for the sake of the noble — which is the end of virtue. On one side stands the rash man, usually a boaster pretending to a courage he has not got, who does not stay when the danger comes; on the other the coward, a man without hope, who fears everything. The brave are keen in the act and quiet before it.

τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
 the and fearful not for-all indeed (is)-the same we-call and something
 καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ
 also beyond man this indeed then to-everyone (is)-fearful to-the

γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει
at-least sense having the-things and according-to man differ
 μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
in-magnitude and by-the more and less likewise and also
 τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς
the things-inspiring-confidence the-man and brave undismayed as
 ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ
a-man he-will-fear indeed then also the such-things as one-must and
 καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος
also as the reason he-will-endure of-the noble for-the-sake this for (is)-end
 τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ
of-the virtue it-is and more and less these to-fear and
 ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν
further the-things not fearful as such to-fear it-happens and of-the
 ἁμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς
errors the-one indeed because what not one-must the-other and because not as
 δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως
one-must the-other and because not when or something of-the such-things likewise
 δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ
and also about the things-inspiring-confidence the-man indeed then what one-must
 καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ
and of-which for-the-sake enduring and fearing and as one-must
 καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν
and when likewise and also being-confident (is)-brave according-to worth
 γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
for and as ever the reason he-feels and acts the brave-man
 τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. †καὶ
end and of-every activity is the according-to the state and
 τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἢ ἀνδρεία καλόν. ‡ τοιούτων δὲ καὶ
for-the brave-man and the courage (is)-noble such indeed also
 τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὲ
the end is-defined for each-thing by-the end of-the-noble indeed

ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
for-the-sake the brave-man endures and does the-things according-to
 τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ
the courage of-the and exceeding the-one indeed in-the
 ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι
fearlessness (is)-nameless it-has-been-said and by-us in the earlier-parts that
 πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ
many are nameless he-would-be and — someone mad or
 ἀνάληγτος, εἰ μὴδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα,
insensible-to-pain if nothing he-should-fear neither earthquake nor waves
 καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτοῦς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
just-as they-say the Celts the-one and in-the to-be-confident
 ὑπερβάλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά θρασὺς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
exceeding about the fearful-things (is)-rash it-seems and also
 ἀλαζών εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὥς
a-boaster to-be the rash-man and a-pretender of-courage as
 γοῦν ἐκείνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται
at-any-rate that-man about the fearful-things stands this-man wishes
 φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμείται. διὸ καὶ
to-appear in what-things then he-is-able he-imitates therefore also
 εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
are the many of-them rash-cowards in these for
 θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ
playing-the-bold the fearful-things not they-endure the-one and in-the
 φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλον δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ
to-fear exceeding (is)-a-coward and for what not one-must
 καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
and as not one-must and all the such-things follow him
 ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις
he-falls-short and also in-the to-be-confident but in the pains
 ὑπερβάλλον μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δὴ τις
exceeding more conspicuous he-is despairing indeed a-kind

ὁ δειλὸς· πάντα γὰρ φοβείται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως·
the coward everything for he-fears the-one and brave oppositely
 τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταῦτα
the for to-be-confident (is)-of-a-man-of-good-hope about the-same-things
 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ
indeed then is the both coward and the rash-man and the
 ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
brave-man differently and they-stand toward them the-ones indeed for
 ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ
exceed and fall-short the-one and moderately stands and
 ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι
as one-must and the indeed rash (are)-headlong and willing
 πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ'
before the dangers in them and they-withdraw the-ones and
 ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
brave in the deeds (are)-keen before and quiet
 καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
just-as then it-has-been-said the courage a-mean is about
 θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερὰ, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι
things-inspiring-confidence and fearful-things in which it-has-been-said and because
 καλὸν αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μή.
(it-is)-noble he-chooses and endures or because (it-is)-shameful the not
 τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι
the and to-die fleeing poverty or love or something
 λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μάλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία
painful not (is)-of-a-brave-man but rather of-a-coward softness
 γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν
for the to-flee the toilsome-things and not because (it-is)-noble
 ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.
he-endures but fleeing an-evil

Five states resemble courage without being it. Citizen courage comes closest, since it acts from shame and the wish for honor, and Homer's Diomedes and Hector show it. The others are the courage of experience, of spirit, of good hope, and of ignorance. Professional soldiers run first once the danger outruns their reckoning, while citizen troops stand their ground and die.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ
 is indeed then the courage such-a-thing something they-are-called and
 καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ
 also other-kinds according-to five ways first indeed the
 πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν
 civic most for it-resembles they-seem for to-endure
 τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων
 the dangers the citizens through the-things from the laws
 ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδή καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς· καὶ διὰ
 penalties and the reproaches and through the honors and through
 τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ
 this bravest they-seem to-be among whom the cowards

ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ
 (are)-dishonored and the brave (are)-honored such and also
 Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα·
 Homer makes such-as — Diomedes and — Hector

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
 Polydamas on-me first reproach will-lay

καὶ
 and

Ἑκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
 Hector for one-day will-say among Trojans speaking
 Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμῷ.
 Tydeus-son by me

ὥμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη,
 it-has-been-made-like and this most to-the earlier stated
 ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ
 because through virtue it-comes-about through shame for and through
 καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ
 of-the-noble desire of-honor for and flight of-reproach shameful
 ὄντος. τάξει δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων
 being would-rank and — someone also those by the rulers
 ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό· χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι'
 being-compelled into the-same worse and by-how-much not through
 αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ
 shame but through fear it they-do and fleeing not

τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι,
the shameful but the painful they-compel for the masters
 ὥσπερ ὁ Ἥκτωρ

just-as — Hector

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσουντα νοήσω,
whom and ever I far-off of-battle cowering shall-see
 οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.
not for-him sure it-will-be to-escape dogs

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ
and those commanding and-if they-retreat striking the
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
same do and those before the trenches and the such-things
 παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ
drawing-them-up all for compel it-is-needful and not
 δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ
through necessity brave to-be but because (it-is)-noble it-seems and
 καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ
also the experience the about each-thing courage to-be whence also —
 Σωκράτης ᾤθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ
Socrates thought knowledge to-be the courage such and
 ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται·
others indeed in other-fields in the warlike-matters and the soldiers
 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα
it-seems for to-be many empty-alarms of-the war which most
 συνειρώκασι· οὗτοι φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι
they-have-observed these they-appear indeed brave because not know
 οἱ ἄλλοι οἳ ἐστίν· εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα
the others of-what-kind they-are then to-act and not to-suffer most
 δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις
they-are-able from the experience being-able to-use the arms

καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι
and such having of-what-sort ever would-be both toward the to-act
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις
and toward the not to-suffer strongest just-as then with-unarmed-men
ὥπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
armed-men fight and athletes with-laymen and for in the
τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρείοτατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν,
such contests not the bravest most-fit-to-fight are
ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.
but those most being-strong and the bodies best having
οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ
the soldiers and cowards become whenever overstrains
ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς
the danger and they-are-left-behind in-the numbers and in-the
παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ
equipment first for they-flee the and civic-troops
μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶ πὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη.
remaining die which-very-thing also-at the Hermaeum happened
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύγειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς
for-the indeed for (is)-shameful the to-flee and the death than-the
τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
such safety (is)-more-choiceworthy the-others and also from beginning
ἐκινδύνουν ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γινόντες δὲ φεύγουσι,
were-risking as stronger being having-recognized and they-flee
τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ'
the death more than-the shameful fearing the-one and
ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
brave not such and the spirit and toward the courage
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
they-bring brave for to-be seem also those through spirit
ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι
just-as the beasts against those having-wounded rushing because

καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 also the brave (are)-spirited most-impetuous for (is)-the spirit
 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος σθένος ἔμβαλε
 toward the dangers whence also Homer strength be-put
 θυμῷ καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμὺν δ' ἀνὰ
 in-spirit and might and spirit be-roused and keen and up
 ῥίνας μένος καὶ ἔξεσεν αἷμα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 nostrils might and boiled blood all for the such-things
 ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμὴν.
 seem to-signify the of-the spirit rousing and impulse
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ
 the-ones indeed then brave through the noble act the and
 θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ
 spirit works-with them the beasts and through pain through for
 τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ
 the to-have-been-struck or through the to-fear since if at-least in a-wood
 ᾗ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ'
 it-is not they-approach not indeed they-are brave through the by
 ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἔξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν,
 pain and spirit being-driven toward the danger to-rush
 οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορώνα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι
 nothing of-the terrors foreseeing since so at-least even the asses
 ἀνδρεῖοι εἰεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται
 brave would-be being-hungry being-beaten for not they-stand-away
 τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ
 from-the pasture and the adulterers and through the appetite daring-things
 πολλὰ δρῶσιν. φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν
 many do most-natural and seems the through the spirit
 εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα
 to-be and having-taken-on-besides choice and the of-which for-the-sake
 ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι,
 courage to-be and the men indeed being-angry indeed feel-pain

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι
taking-vengeance and feel-pleasure those and through these fighting
 μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς
fighters indeed not brave and not for through the noble nor as
 ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσὶ τι.
the reason but through passion closely-resembling and they-have something
 οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
nor indeed those of-good-hope being (are)-brave through for the
 πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς
often and many to-have-conquered they-are-confident in the
 κινδύνους· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ
dangers closely-alike and because both (are)-confident but the-ones
 μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι,
indeed brave through the earlier things-said (are)-confident
 οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἂν
the-others and through the to-think strongest to-be and nothing —
 παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες
would-suffer such and do also the men-getting-drunk of-good-hope
 γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
for they-become whenever and to-them not happens the such-things
 φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα
they-flee of-a-brave-man and it-was the fearful-things for-a-man being
 καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ
and appearing to-endure because (it-is)-noble and (it-is)-shameful the
 μῆ. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίους
not therefore also of-a-braver-man it-seems to-be the in the sudden
 φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδηλοῖς·
fears fearless and undisturbed to-be than in the foreseen
 ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς·
from a-state for more it-was because less from preparation
 τὰ προφανῇ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις
the foreseen indeed for even-if from calculation and reason someone

προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι
might-choose the-things and sudden according-to the state brave
 δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω
and appear also those being-ignorant and they-are not far
 τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσω ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν
from-the men-of-good-hope worse and by-how-much standing nothing
 ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ'
they-have those(-do) and therefore also they-remain some time those and
 ἡπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι,
having-been-deceived if they-recognize that (it-is)-other or they-suspect
 φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες
they-flee which-very-thing the Argives suffered having-fallen-in
 τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι
with-the Laconians as with-Sicyonians the both indeed brave
 εἵρηνται ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.
have-been-described of-what-sort some and those seeming brave

IX • COURAGE AND PAIN

Courage has more to do with what is fearful than with what gives confidence, and it is painful, which is why it is justly praised: enduring pain is harder than abstaining from pleasure. Its end is pleasant, but the surrounding circumstances hide that, as a boxer's crown is pleasant and the blows are not. The better a man is, the more he loses in dying — and he is no less brave for knowing it.

περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ
about confidences and also fears the courage being not alike about
 ἅμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ· ὁ γὰρ ἐν
both is but rather about the fearful-things the-man for in
 τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος
these undisturbed and about these as one-must standing (is)-brave

μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὲ τὰ
rather than the-man about the things-inspiring-confidence by-the indeed the
 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρείοι λέγονται. διὸ
painful-things to-endure as it-has-been-said brave they-are-called therefore
 καὶ ἐπὶ λυπον ἢ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται χαλεπώτερον
also painful the courage and justly it-is-praised (it-is)-harder
 γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ
for the painful-things to-endure than from-the pleasant to-abstain not
 μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος
indeed but it-would-seem — to-be the according-to the courage end
 ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλω δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον καὶ
pleasant by the surrounding-circumstances and to-be-obsured such-as also-in
 τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν
the gymnastic contests it-happens for-the for boxers the indeed
 τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί,
end (is)-pleasant of-which for-the-sake the crown and the honors
 τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινον, καὶ λυπηρόν,
the and to-be-struck (is)-grievous if-indeed (they-are)-of-flesh and painful
 καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν
and all the toil through and the many these to-be small
 ὄν τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
being the of-which for-the-sake nothing pleasant it-appears to-have if indeed
 τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
such it-is also the about the courage the indeed death
 καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
and the wounds (are)-painful to-the brave-man and unwilling it-will-be
 ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ.
he-will-endure and them because (it-is)-noble or because (it-is)-shameful the not
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν καὶ
and by-how-much ever more the virtue he-has whole and
 εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται. τῷ
happier he-is more at the death he-will-be-pained for-the

τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων
such-a-man for most to-live (is)-worth-while and this-man of-greatest
 ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν
goods is-deprived knowing (it-is)-painful and this but nothing
 ἦττον ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
less (is-be)-brave perhaps and even more because the in the war
 καλὸν ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς
noble instead-of those he-chooses not indeed in all the
 ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ
virtues the pleasantly to-be-active belongs except to as-much-as of-the
 τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς
end it-touches soldiers and nothing perhaps prevents not the
 τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους,
such-men best to-be but the less indeed brave
 ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς
another and good nothing having ready for these toward the
 κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
dangers and the life for small gains they-exchange
 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ'
about indeed then courage to so-much let-it-have-been-said what and
 ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
it-is not (is-it)-hard in-outline at-least to-grasp from the things-said

X • WHICH PLEASURES TEMPERANCE CONCERNS

Temperance is a mean concerning pleasures, but not the pleasures of the soul, and not those of sight, hearing, or smell: a man who delights in colors, or in songs, or in the scent of apples and roses is called neither temperate nor licentious. It concerns taste and touch, and chiefly touch, the sense we share with the other animals — which is why licentiousness is justly reproached, since it belongs to us not as men but as animals.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ
after and this about temperance let-us-speak they-seem for
 τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
of-the irrational parts these to-be the virtues that indeed then
 μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν·
a-mean it-is about pleasures the temperance it-has-been-said by-us
 ἥττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
less for and not alike it-is about the pains in the
 αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
same and also the licentiousness appears about what-sorts then of-the
 ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ
pleasures now let-us-mark-off let-them-have-been-divided indeed the of-soul
 καὶ αἱ σωματικάι, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἕκαστος
and the bodily such-as love-of-honor love-of-learning each
 γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος
for of-these rejoices in-what a-lover he-is nothing suffering
 τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς
the body but rather the thought those and about the
 τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται.
such pleasures neither temperate nor licentious are-called
 ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικάι εἰσιν·
likewise and nor those about the others whatever not bodily are
 τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
those for story-lovers and narrators and about the chance-things
 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
wearing-out the days chatters licentious and not
 λέγωμεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπούμενους ἐπὶ χρήμασι ἢ φίλοις. περὶ
we-call nor those being-pained over money or friends about
 δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ
and the bodily would-be — the temperance not all and
 οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψέως,
nor these those for rejoicing in-the-things through the sight

οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες
such-as in-colors and in-shapes and in-painting neither temperate
οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς
nor licentious are-called although it-would-seem — to-be also as
δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.
one-must to-rejoice also in-these and by excess and deficiency
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ
likewise and also in the-things about the bearing those for
ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς
excessively rejoicing in-songs or in-acting no-one
ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ
licentious calls nor those as one-must temperate nor
τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ
those about the smell except by accident those for
χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ρόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ
rejoicing of-apples or of-roses or of-incense in-smells not
λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων·
we-call licentious but rather those of-perfumes or of-disbes
χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων
they-rejoice for in-these the licentious because through these
ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι δ' ἂν
a-recollection comes to-them of-the objects-of-appetite would-see and —
τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν
someone also the others whenever they-are-hungry rejoicing in-the of-the
βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου·
foods smells the and in-such-things to-rejoice (is)-of-a-licentious-man
τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
for-this-man for objects-of-appetite these not there-is and nor in the
ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴν πλὴν
other animals according-to these the senses pleasure except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἰ
by accident nor for in-the smells of-the hares the

κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ
bounds rejoice but in-the eating the and perception the
 ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς ἀλλὰ
smell made nor the lion in-the voice of-the ox but
 τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾗσθητο,
in-the feeding that and near it-is through the voice he-perceived
 καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν
and to-rejoice indeed in-this he-appears likewise and nor having-seen
 ἢ ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει.
either a-stag or a-wild goat but because food he-will-have
 περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ
about the such and pleasures the temperance and the
 ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν
licentiousness are in-which also the remaining animals share whence
 ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν
slavish and beastlike they-appear these and are
 ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν
touch and taste they-appear and also the taste to a-small-degree
 ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν
or not-at-all to-use of-the for taste is the judgment of-the
 χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες
flavors which-very-thing do those the wines testing
 καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ
and the dishes seasoning not at-all and they-rejoice in-these or
 οὐχ οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται
not those at-least licentious but in-the enjoyment which comes-about
 πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς
all through touch and in foods and in drinks and in-the
 ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἡϋξαστό τις ὀψοφάγος
aphrodisiac things-so-called therefore also prayed someone a-gourmand
 ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὥς
being the throat for-himself longer than-a-crane's to-become as

ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ'
taking-pleasure in-the touch most-common indeed of-the senses according-to
 ἦν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος
which the licentiousness and it-would-seem — justly reproachable
 εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἥ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ'
to-be because not in-so-far-as men we-are it-belongs but
 ἥ ζῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν
in-so-far-as animals the indeed in-such-things to-rejoice and most to-cherish
 θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς
(is)-beastlike and for the most-liberal of-the through the touch
 ἡδονῶν ἀφῆρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ
pleasures have-been-taken-away such-as the in the gymnasiums through
 τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν
rubbing and the warming arising not for about all
 τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφῆ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρη.
the body (is)-the of-the licentious-man touch but about certain parts

XI · NATURAL AND ACQUIRED APPETITES

Some appetites are shared and natural, like the appetite for food, and few go wrong in these except by taking more than nature asks; such men are called belly-mad. In the appetites peculiar to individuals many go wrong in many ways. The licentious man is pained both when he fails to get what he wants and while he wants it, whereas the temperate man is not pained by the absence of what is pleasant.

τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ'
of-the and appetites the-ones indeed common seem to-be the-others and
 ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς
peculiar and acquired such-as the indeed of-the food (is)-natural everyone
 γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δὲ
for desires the man-in-need of-dry or of-liquid food at-times and

ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων·
of-both and of-a-bed says Homer the young-man and man-in-bis-prime
 τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν.
the and of-such-a-kind or of-such-another-kind no-longer everyone nor of-the same
 διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι
therefore it-appears our-own to-be not indeed but it-has at-least something
 καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια
also natural different for for-different-men are pleasant and some
 πᾶσι ἡδίων τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς
for-all more-pleasant than-the chance-things in indeed then the natural
 ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον·
appetites few go-wrong and toward one toward the more
 τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἄν ὑπερπλησθῇ,
the for to-eat the chance-things or to-drink until ever one-is-over-filled
 ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις
to-exceed is the according-to nature in-the amount a-filling-up
 γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται
for of-the want (is)-the natural appetite therefore are-called
 οὔτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὥς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν.
these belly-mad as beyond the requisite filling it
 τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ
such and become those excessively slavish about and
 τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν.
the peculiar of-the pleasures many and in-many-ways go-wrong
 τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς
of-the for lovers-of-such-things so-called either by-the to-rejoice in-what
 μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ,
not one-must or by-the more or as the many or not as one-must
 κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ
in all and the licentious exceed and for
 χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μωσῆς γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι
they-rejoice in-some in-which not one-must hateful for and if in-some

δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὡς
one-must to-rejoice of-the such-things more than one-must and or as
 οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολή
the many rejoice the indeed then about the pleasures excess
 ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δηλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ
that (is)-licentiousness and blameworthy (is)-clear about and the pains not
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ'
just-as in the courage by-the to-endure is-called temperate nor
 ἀκόλαστος τῷ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
licentious by-the not but the-one indeed licentious by-the to-be-pained
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ
more than one-must because of-the pleasant-things not he-attains and
 τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ
the pain and makes for-him the pleasure the-one and temperate by-the
 μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
not to-be-pained at-the absence and by-the to-abstain from-the pleasant
 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων
the-one indeed then licentious desires of-the pleasant-things all
 ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε
or of-the most and is-led by the appetite so-as
 ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται
instead-of the others these to-choose therefore also he-is-pained
 καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ
both failing and desiring with pain for (is)-the
 ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.
appetite absurd and it-resembles the through pleasure to-be-pained
 ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἥττον ἢ
falling-short and in-the-things about the pleasures and less than
 δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστίν
one-must rejoicing not at-all become not for human is
 ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει
the such insensibility and for the remaining animals distinguish

τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ
the foods and in-some indeed rejoice in-others and not if and
 τῷ μηδὲν ἔστιν ἡδὺν μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου,
for-someone nothing is pleasant nor differs one from-another
 πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ
far would be-be from-the man to-be not has-got and the
 τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ
such-a-man a-name through the not at-all to-occur the-one and
 σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται
temperate moderately indeed about these stands neither for takes-pleasure
 οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ'
in-what most the licentious-man but rather is-annoyed nor
 ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ'
at-all in-what not one-must nor violently in-such-a-thing in-any nor
 ἀπόντων λυπείται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον
being-absent is-be-pained nor desires or moderately nor more
 ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων
than one-must nor when not one-must nor at-all of-the such-things
 οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν
anything whatever and toward health are or toward good-condition
 ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέζεται μετρίως καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ
pleasant being of-these he-will-reach moderately and as one-must and
 τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ
of-the other pleasant-things not hindrances to-these being or beside
 τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων
the noble or beyond the substance the-man for so standing
 μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ
more cherishes the such pleasures than-the worth the-one
 δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
and temperate not such but as the right reason

Licentiousness is more voluntary than cowardice, because it works through pleasure, and pleasure does not drive a man out of himself as pain does. Appetite grows in a child, and has to be brought up under reason as the child is brought up under a tutor.

έκουσία δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ
 voluntary and more resembles the licentiousness than-the cowardice the-one
 μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν
 indeed for through pleasure the-other and through pain of-which the-one indeed
 αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι
 (is)-choice-worthy the-other and (is)-to-be-avoided and the indeed pain drives-out
 καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο
 and destroys the of-the man-having nature the and pleasure nothing such
 ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ
 does more indeed (is-it)-voluntary therefore also more-reproachable and
 γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ
 for to-be-habituated (is)-easier toward them many for in the life the
 τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν
 such-things and the habituations (are)-without-danger in and the fearful-things
 ἀνάπαλιν. δόξει δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι
 the-reverse it-would-seem and — not alike voluntary the cowardice to-be
 τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ
 to-the in particular-cases itself indeed for (is)-painless these and through
 λύπην ἐξίστησι, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα
 pain drives-out so-as even the arms to-throw-away and the-other-things
 ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ
 to-behave-shamefully therefore also seem forced to-be for-the and licentious-man
 ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι
 the-reverse the-things indeed in particulars (are)-voluntary for-one-desiring
 γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
 for and reaching-for the and whole less no-one for desires

ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς
 licentious to-be the and name of-the licentiousness also to the
 παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα.
 childish faults we-carry they-have for some likeness
 πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν
 which and from which-of-the-two is-named nothing toward the now
 διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ
 it-matters (is)-clear and that the later from the earlier not
 κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ
 badly and it-seems to-have-been-transferred to-have-been-chastened for it-is-needful
 τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,
 the-thing of-the shameful-things reaching-for and much increase having
 τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ'
 such and especially (is)-the appetite and the child according-to
 ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδιά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις
 appetite for they-live also the children and especially in these
 ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ
 (is)-the of-the pleasant desire if then not it-will-be obedient and under the
 ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἅπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις
 ruling-part to much it-will-go insatiable for (is)-the of-the pleasant desire
 καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια
 and from-every-quarter for-the senseless-man and the of-the appetite activity
 αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλοι καὶ σφοδραὶ ᾧσι, καὶ τὸν
 increases the kindred and-if great and violent they-are also the
 λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ
 reasoning they-knock-out therefore it-is-needful moderate to-be them and
 ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μὴθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι — τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
 few and to-the reason nothing to-be-opposed the and such
 εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον — ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα
 obedient we-call and chastened just-as and the child
 δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω
 it-is-needful according-to the command of-the tutor to-live so

καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ
also the appetitive-part according-to the reason therefore it-is-needful
 τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.
of-the temperate-man the appetitive-part to-agree with-the reason
 σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων
a-mark for of-both (is)-the noble and desires the temperate-man
 ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ
what-things one-must and as one-must and when so and orders also
 ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.
the reason these then by-us let-it-have-been-said about temperance

BOOK X

I • WHY PLEASURE MUST BE DISCUSSED

Pleasure is bound up with our nature, which is why the young are steered by pleasure and pain, and why the great thing for virtue of character is to enjoy and hate the right things. Some call pleasure the good, others call it utterly base — the second sometimes as a corrective, expecting that men pushed the other way will end at the middle. Aristotle answers that in matters of action words are trusted less than deeds, so a false argument here does real harm.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα
after and these about pleasure perhaps it-follows to-go-through most
 γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι
for it-seems to-have-been-made-akin to-the kind of-us therefore they-educate
 τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
the young steering by-pleasure and by-pain it-seems and also toward
 τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ
the of-the character virtue greatest to-be the to-rejoice in-what one-must
 καὶ μισεῖν ᾧ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
and to-hate what one-must extends for these through all the
 βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν
life weight having and power toward virtue both and the
 εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ
happy life the-things indeed for pleasant they-choose the-things
 δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν
and painful they-flee about and the such-things least —
 δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων
it-would-seem to-be-passed-over to-be otherwise both and much having
 ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν,
dispute the-ones indeed for the-good pleasure call
 οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως
the-others and from the-contrary utterly base the-ones indeed perhaps

πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον
having-been-persuaded so also to-be the-others and thinking better
 εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν
to-be toward the life of-us to-declare the pleasure of-the
 φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
base-things and if not it-is to-incline for the many toward
 αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς
it and to-be-slaves to-the pleasures therefore to-be-necessary to
 τοῦναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον.
the-contrary to-lead to-come for would so to the mean
 μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν
perhaps ever and not well this is-said the for about the-things
 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ
in the passions and the actions accounts less are trustworthy
 τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν
than-the deeds whenever then they-are-out-of-tune with-the-things according-to the
 αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν·
perception being-despised also the-truth they-destroy-besides
 ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁφθείς ποτ' ἐφίεμενος,
the-man for blaming the pleasure having-been-seen once reaching-for
 ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὥς τοιαύτην οἶσαν ἅπασαν·
to-lean seems toward it as such being all
 τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰκόασιν οὖν οἱ
the to-distinguish for not is of-the many they-seem then the
 ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι
true of-the accounts not only toward the to-know most-useful
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνωδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς
to-be but also toward the life in-tune for being with-the
 ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας
deeds they-are-believed therefore they-urge those understanding

ζῆν κατ' αὐτοῦς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλιν· τὰ
to-live according-to them of-the indeed then such-things enough the-things
 δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.
and said about the pleasure let-us-go-over

II • EUDOXUS AND HIS CRITICS

Eudoxus argued that pleasure is the good because all things aim at it, and his arguments were believed for his character rather than themselves, since he was thought exceptionally temperate. Plato answered that the pleasant life with practical wisdom is better than without it, so pleasure is not the good, because nothing added to the good makes it more choiceworthy. Aristotle grants the point but refuses the further claim that pleasure is no good at all.

Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθον ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ
Eudoxus indeed then the pleasure the-good thought to-be through the
 πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι
all-things to-see reaching-for it both rational and irrational in all
 δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
and to-be the choiceworthy the decent and the most (is)-best
 τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μινύειν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο
the indeed all-things toward the-same to-be-carried to-show that for-all this
 ἄριστον ὄν (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ
best being each-thing for the for-itself good to-find just-as
 καὶ τροφήν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐδ' πάντ' ἐφίεται,
also food the and for-all good and what all-things reach-for
 τάγαθον εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ
the-good to-be were-believed and the arguments through the of-the
 ἡθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτοῦς· διαφερόντως γὰρ
character virtue rather than through themselves exceedingly for
 ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὥς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει
he-seemed temperate to-be not indeed as a-friend of-the pleasure he-seemed

ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἦττον
these to-say but so to-stand according-to truth not less
 δ' ὥετ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην
and he-thought to-be evident from the contrary the for pain
 καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοῦναντίον
in itself for-all to-be-avoided to-be likewise indeed the-contrary
 αἰρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον
(is)-choiceworthy most and to-be choiceworthy what not through another
 μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως
nor of-another for-the-sake we-choose such and confessedly
 εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἔνεκα
to-be the pleasure no-one for asks of-what for-the-sake
 ἡδεται, ὥς καθ' αὐτὴν οὖσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.
he-takes-pleasure as in itself being choiceworthy the pleasure
 προστιθεμένην τε ὁτφοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον
being-added-to both to-anything-whatever of-the goods more-choiceworthy
 ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὐξεσθαι
to-make such-as to-the to-act-justly and to-be-temperate to-be-increased
 δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν
and the good by-itself it-resembles indeed this at-least the argument of-the
 ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν
goods it to-declare and nothing more than-another everything
 γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον.
for with another good (is)-more-choiceworthy than being-isolated
 τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν
by-such-a indeed argument also Plato refutes that not is
 ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον
pleasure the-good more-choiceworthy for to-be the pleasant life
 μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτόν κρεῖττον, οὐκ
with practical-wisdom than apart if and the mixed (is)-better not
 εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ
to-be the pleasure the-good of-nothing for having-been-added to-it

τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὥς οὐδ' ἄλλο
the-good more-choiceworthy to-become (is)-clear and that nor another
 οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ
anything the-good would be which with something of-the in itself
 ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ
goods more-choiceworthy becomes what then is such in-which
 καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ'
also we share such for is-sought those and
 ἐνιστάμενοι ὥς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν
objecting that not (is)-good what all-things reach-for perhaps nothing
 λέγουσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν. ὁ
say what for to-all seems these to-be we-say the-man
 δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.
and destroying this the belief not at-all more-credible-things will-say
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἂν τι
if indeed for the senseless-things reach-for them there-would-be — something
 λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν τι;
being-said if and also the intelligent-things how could-they-say would anything
 ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φανύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν
perhaps and also in the base-things there-is something natural good
 κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.
better than according-to themselves which reaches-for the proper good
 οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ
not it-seems and nor about the contrary well to-be-said not
 γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
for they-say if the pain an-evil is the pleasure good to-be
 ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ —
to-be-opposed for also an-evil to-an-evil and both to-the neither
 λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων
saying these not badly not indeed in at-least the things-said
 ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ
speaking-truly of-both for being of-the evils also to-be-avoided

ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ
it-was-necessary both to-be of-the neither and neither or
 ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν,
alike now and they-appear the-one indeed fleeing as an-evil
 τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
the-other and choosing as good so indeed also they-are-opposed

III · PLEASURE IS NOT A PROCESS

Some say pleasure is a coming-to-be, that pain is a want of the natural state and pleasure the filling of it. Aristotle answers that this fits only the pleasures of food: those of learning, of smell, of sights and sounds, and of memory and hope fill up no want. Pleasures differ in kind, since the just man's pleasure cannot be had by the unjust; and no one would choose a child's mind for life, so pleasure is not the good, though some pleasures are choiceworthy in themselves.

οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ
not indeed nor if not of-the qualities is the pleasure through
 τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι
this nor of-the goods nor for the of-the virtue activities
 ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν
qualities are nor the happiness they-say and the indeed
 ἀγαθὸν ὥρισθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι
good to-have-been-limited the and pleasure unlimited to-be because
 δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι
it-admits the more and less if indeed then from the to-take-pleasure
 τοῦτο κρίνουσιν, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
this they-judge also about the justice and the other
 ἀρετάς, καθ' ὥς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον
virtues according-to which evidently they-say more and less
 τοὺς ποιούς ὑπάρχειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς,
the of-such-kinds to-be-so and to-act according-to the virtues

ἔσται ταυτά· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι
it-will-be the-same just for they-are more and brave it-is
 δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.
and also to-act-justly and to-be-temperate more and less
 εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἷτιον, ἂν
if and by-the pleasures perhaps ever not they-say the cause if
 ὦσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί, καὶ τί κωλύει,
there-are the-ones indeed unmixed the-others and mixed and what prevents
 καθάπερ ὑγεία ὠρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
just-as health limited being admits the more and
 ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη συμμετρία ἐν
less so also the pleasure not for the same proportion in
 πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη
all-cases is nor in the same one some always but slackening
 διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.
it-persists until a-point and it-differs by-the more and less
 τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. τέλειόν
such indeed also the about the pleasure it-is-possible to-be complete
 τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
both the-good positing the and motions and the comings-to-be
 ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν
incomplete the pleasure a-motion and a-coming-to-be to-declare
 περὶ ὧνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκότα λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν.
they-try not well and they-seem to-speak nor to-be a-motion
 πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ
to-every for proper to-be seems speed and slowness and if not
 καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ
in itself such-as to-the of-the universe toward another to-the and pleasure
 τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως
of-these neither belongs to-be-pleased indeed for it-is quickly
 ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον,
just-as to-be-angered to-take-pleasure and not nor toward another

βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν
to-walk and also to-grow and all the such-things to-change
 μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν
indeed then into the pleasure quickly and slowly it-is to-be-active
 δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι.
and according-to it not it-is quickly I-mean and to-take-pleasure
 γένεσις τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ
a-coming-to-be and how would it-be it-seems for not from the chance-thing the
 τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι.
chance-thing to-come-about but from what it-comes-about into this to-be-dissolved
 καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά.
and of-what a-coming-to-be (is)-the pleasure of-this the pain (is)-destruction
 καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ
and they-say and the indeed pain a-want of-the according-to
 φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
nature to-be the and pleasure a-filling-up these and
 σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
bodily are the affections if indeed it-is of-the according-to nature
 ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ'
a-filling-up the pleasure in what the filling-up this
 ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ'
— also would-take-pleasure the body then not it-seems and nor
 ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν
is then the filling-up pleasure but happening indeed
 ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτο· ἂν τις, καὶ †τεμνόμενος†
a-filling-up one-would-take-pleasure — someone and being-cut
 λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ
is-pained the opinion and this seems to-have-arisen from the about
 τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους
the food pains and pleasures in-want for having-become
 καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο
and having-been-pained-beforehand to-take-pleasure in-the filling-up this

δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ
and not about all happens the pleasures painless for
 εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
are the both mathematical and of-the according-to the senses
 αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα
the through the smell and hearings and also sights
 πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὐταὶ γενέσεις
many and memories and hopes of-what then these comings-to-be
 ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν
will-be of-nothing for a-want has-arisen of-which comes-about would
 ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους
a-filling-up toward and those bringing-forward the reproachable
 τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα (οὐ
of-the pleasures says someone would that not are these pleasant not
 γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον
for if for-those badly disposed pleasant they-are one-must-think
 αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ
them also pleasant to-be except for-these just-as nor the-things
 τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ
for-the sick healthful or sweet or bitter nor again white
 τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν). ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις
the-things appearing to-the sore-eyed or so says someone
 ἂν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε
would that the indeed pleasures choiceworthy are not indeed from at-least
 τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ
these just-as also the to-be-rich for-one-having-betrayed and not and
 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὅτι οὖν φαγόντι· ἢ τῷ εἶδει
the to-be-healthy not indeed anything-whatever for-one-having-eaten or in-the form
 διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν
they-differ the pleasures different for the-ones from the noble-things
 τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχροῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν
from-the-ones from the shameful-things and not it-is to-take-pleasure the

τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ
of-the just-man not being just nor the of-the musician not
 ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
being musical likewise and also in the others
 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος
to-make-evident and seems also the friend different being from-the flatterer
 οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν
not being good the pleasure or different in-form the-one indeed
 γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν,
for toward the-good to-associate seems the-other and toward pleasure
 καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς
and the-one indeed is-reproached the-other and they-praise as toward
 ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παιδίον
different-things associating no-one both would choose to-live of-a-child
 διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδιά
understanding having through life taking-pleasure in what-things the children
 ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν
as possible and most nor to-rejoice doing something of-the
 αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε
most-shameful-things never being-about to-be-pained about many-things both
 σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρῃ ἡδονήν,
zeal we-would-make — even if none it-should-bring pleasure
 οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ
such-as to-see to-remember to-know the virtues to-have if and from
 ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα
necessity follow these pleasures nothing it-matters we-would-choose
 γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι
for — these even if not should-come from them pleasure that
 μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονή οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή,
indeed then neither the-good the pleasure nor every (is)-choiceworthy
 δηλὸν ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς
(is)-clear it-seems to-be also that there-are some choiceworthy in themselves

διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν
differing in-the form or from what-things the-things indeed then
 λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.
said about the pleasure and pain sufficiently let-it-have-been-said

IV · WHAT PLEASURE IS

Seeing is complete at any moment, and so is pleasure; it is therefore not a motion, since every motion takes time and aims at an end. Pleasure completes an activity, not as a state within it but as something supervening, like the bloom on those in their prime. No one is pleased continuously, since no human activity is continuous, and men reach for pleasure because they reach for life.

τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ'
what and it-is or of-what-sort something more-evident it-would-become
 ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ'
— from beginning for-those-taking-it-up it-seems for the indeed seeing over
 ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς
any-whatever time complete to-be not for it-is lacking of-nothing
 ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος·
which into later becoming will-complete of-it the form
 τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί,
to-such-a-thing and it-resembles also the pleasure a-whole for something it-is
 καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ
and over no time would-take someone — a-pleasure of-which over
 πλείῳ χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ
more time occurring will-be-completed the form therefore
 οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους
nor a-motion is in time for (is)-every motion and of-an-end
 τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ
some such-as the house-building and (is)-complete whenever it-makes what

ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ᾅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ
it-aims-at either in all indeed the time or in-this in and
 τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι
the parts and in-the time all (are)-incomplete and different
 τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων
in-the form from-the whole and from-one-another the for of-the stones
 σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται
putting-together (is)-different from-the of-the column fluting and these
 τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία
from-the of-the temple making and the indeed of-the temple (is)-complete
 (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον), ἡ δὲ τῆς
of-nothing for lacking toward the thing-proposed the and of-the
 κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα.
foundation and of-the triglyph (is)-incomplete of-a-part for each
 τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν χρόνῳ
in-the form then they-differ and not it-is in any-whatever time
 λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ᾅπαντι.
to-take a-motion complete in-the form but if-indeed in the whole
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν
likewise and also in walking and of-the rest if for is
 ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ'
the locomotion a-motion from-where to-where also of-this differences according-to
 εἶδη, πτήσις βάδις αἴσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ'
kinds flying walking leaping and the such-things not only and
 οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ
so but also in itself the walking the for from-where to-where
 οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ
(is)-not the same in the race-course and in the part and in another
 μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε
part and in another nor the to-traverse the line this
 καὶ αὐτήν· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
and-that not only for a-line does-it-pass-through but also in

τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἐτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν
a-place being in another and this-one than-that with exactness indeed
 οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν
then about motion in other-places it-has-been-said it-seems and not in
 ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ
all time complete to-be but the many (are)-incomplete and
 διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν.
differing in-the form if-indeed the from-where to-where (is)-form-making
 τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δηλον
of-the pleasure and in any-whatever time (is)-complete the form (is)-clear
 οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων
then that different both would they-be from-one-another and of-the wholes
 τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονῇ. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ
something and complete-things the pleasure it-would-seem and — this also
 ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι
from the not to-be-possible to-be-moved not in time to-take-pleasure
 δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δηλον
and the for in the now (is)-a-whole something from these and (is)-clear
 καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν
also that not well they-say a-motion or a-coming-to-be to-be the
 ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν
pleasure not for of-all-things these are-said but of-the divisible
 καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ
and not whole nor for of-seeing is a-coming-to-be nor
 στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ
of-a-point nor of-a-unit nor of-these any (is)-a-motion nor
 γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ
a-coming-to-be nor indeed of-pleasure a-whole for something of-perception and
 πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ
of-all toward the perceptible being-active completely and of-the well
 διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
disposed toward the noblest of-the-things under the perception

(τοιούτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν
such for most to-be seems the complete activity it
 δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω),
and to-call to-be-active or in which it-is nothing let-it-differ
 καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ
according-to each indeed best is the activity of-the
 ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν.
best disposed toward the strongest of-the-things under it
 αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ
this and would most-complete be and most-pleasant according-to every for
 αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν,
perception is pleasure likewise and also thought and contemplation
 ἡδίστη δ' ἢ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἢ τοῦ εὖ
most-pleasant and (is)-the most-complete most-complete and (is)-the of-the well
 ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ
being toward the most-excellent of-the-things under it completes
 δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε
and the activity the pleasure not the same and way both the
 ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαία
pleasure completes and the perceptible both and the perception excellent
 ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ υἰγεία καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ
being just-as nor the health and the physician alike a-cause is
 τοῦ υἰγιαίνειν. καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή,
of-the to-be-healthy according-to each and perception that arises pleasure
 δηλὸν (φαμέν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δηλὸν
(is)-clear we-say for sights and hearings to-be pleasant (is)-clear
 δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ
and also that most whenever both the perception is strongest and
 πρὸς τοιούτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ
toward such-an-object it-is-active such and being both the perceptible
 καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός
and the perceiver always there-will-be pleasure being-present

γε τοῦ τε ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν
at-least both the thing-acting and the thing-affected completes and the
 ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς
activity the pleasure not as the state being-present-within but as
 ἐπιγινόμενον τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.
supervening something end such-as for-the men-in-their-prime the bloom
 ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ
as-long-as ever then both the intelligible or perceptible is such-as one-must and
 τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ·
the thing-judging or contemplating will-be in the activity the pleasure
 ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
alike for being and toward one-another the same way
 ἔχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε
standing both the passive and the active the-same is-by-nature
 γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει;
to-come-about how then no-one continuously takes-pleasure or is-wearied
 πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ
all for the human-things are-unable continuously to-be-active not
 γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια
comes-about then nor pleasure it-follows for the activity some-things
 δὲ τέρπει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ
and delight new being later and not alike through
 ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ
the-same the indeed for first has-been-summoned the thought and
 διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ
intently about them is-active just-as in the sight those
 ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
gazing afterward and not such (is)-the activity but
 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι
neglected therefore also the pleasure is-dimmed to-reach-for
 δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθεῖν τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ
and the pleasure would-think someone — all-men because also of-the

ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ
to-live all reach-for the and life an-activity some is and
 ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ'
each-man about these and by-these is-active what also most
 ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη,
he-cherishes such-as the indeed musician by-the hearing about the songs
 ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα,
the and lover-of-learning by-the thought about the objects-of-contemplation
 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ
so and also of-the rest each-man the and pleasure completes
 τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὗ ὁρέγονται. εὐλόγως
the activities and the to-live indeed which they-reach-for reasonably
 οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἐκάστω τὸ
then also the pleasure they-reach-for it-completes for for-each the
 ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν
to-live choiceworthy being whether and through the pleasure the to-live
 αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ
we-choose or through the to-live the pleasure let-it-be-dismissed in the
 παρόντι. συνεζευχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ
present to-have-been-yoked-together indeed for these appear and
 χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται
separation not to-admit without both for activity not comes-about
 ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή.
pleasure every and activity completes the pleasure

Each activity is completed by its own pleasure, and that pleasure sharpens it: men become geometers by enjoying geometry. Pleasures from elsewhere get in the way, as flute-lovers cannot attend to an argument once they hear a flute. Since activities differ in worth, so do their pleasures; and what is pleasant is what appears so to the good man, as what is sweet is what tastes sweet to the healthy man and not to the feverish.

ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα
whence they-seem also in-the form to-differ the-things for different
 τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι (οὕτω γὰρ
in-the form by different-things we-think to-be-completed so for
 φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον
it-appears both the natural-things and the-things by craft such-as
 ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφή καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ οἰκία καὶ
animals and trees and a-painting and a-statue and a-house and
 σκεῦος). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας
a-vessel likewise and also the activities the differing
 τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι
in-the form by differing-things in-form to-be-completed they-differ
 δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐτὰι
and the of-the thought from-the according-to the senses and themselves
 ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
from-one-another according-to form and the completing indeed pleasures
 φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνωκειῶσθαι τῶν
it-would-appear and — this also from the to-have-been-made-akin of-the
 ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει
pleasures each to-the activity which it-completes it-increases-together
 γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα
for the activity the proper pleasure more for each-thing
 κρίνουνσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον
they-judge and work-out-exactly those with pleasure being-active such-as

γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ
geometers become those rejoicing in-the to-do-geometry and
 κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι
they-understand each-thing more likewise and also the lovers-of-music
 καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς
and lovers-of-building and of-the others each-group advance into
 τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· συναύξουσιν δὲ αἱ
the proper work rejoicing in-it they-increase-together and the
 ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύζοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ
pleasures the-things and increasing-together (are)-proper to-the different-things and
 τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει.
in-the form also the proper-things (are)-different in-the form
 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων
further and more this — would-appear from the the from other-things
 ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίου ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι
pleasures hindrances to-the activities to-be those for flute-loving
 ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν
are-unable to-the arguments to-attend if they-hear-close-by
 αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης
one-playing-the-flute more rejoicing in-flute-playing than-the present
 ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ
activity the according-to the flute-playing then pleasure the about
 τὸν λόγον ἐνεργεῖαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
the argument activity destroys likewise and this also in the
 ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ
others happens whenever at-the-same-time about two one-is-active the for
 ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν
pleasanter the other knocks-out and-if much it-differs according-to the
 ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν.
pleasure more so-as not-even to-be-active according-to the other
 διὸ χαίροντες ὅτῳ οὖν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν
therefore rejoicing in-anything-whatever violently not at-all we-do

ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιῶμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι,
another and other-things we-do in-others mildly being-pleased
 οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι
such-as also in the theaters those eating-sweets whenever bad
 οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ
the competitors are then most it they-do since and the
 μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἑξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας
indeed proper pleasure works-out-exactly the activities and longer-lasting
 καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριάι λυμαίνονται, δηλον
and better makes the-ones and alien mar (is)-clear
 ὥς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριάι ἡδοναὶ
that much they-stand-apart nearly for the alien pleasures
 ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς
do which-very-thing the proper pains they-destroy for the
 ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν
activities the proper pains such-as if for-someone the to-write
 ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ
(is)-unpleasant and painful or the to-reason the-one indeed for not
 γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὕσης τῆς ἐνεργείας.
writes the-other and not reasons painful being the activity
 συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν
it-happens indeed about the activity the-contrary from the
 οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
proper pleasures both and pains proper and are the-ones over the
 ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριάι ἡδοναὶ
activity in itself arising the-ones and alien pleasures
 εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν·
it-has-been-said that closely-resembling something to-the pain they-do
 φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν
they-destroy for except not alike differing and the
 ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικέα καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν
activities in-decency and in-badness and the-ones indeed choiceworthy

οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως
being the-others and to-be-avoided the-others and neither alike
 ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία
stand also the pleasures according-to each for activity a-proper
 ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ
pleasure there-is the indeed then to-the excellent proper (is)-decent the and
 τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν
to-the base (is)-wicked and for the appetites of-the indeed noble-things
 ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ
(are)-praiseworthy of-the and shameful-things (are)-blameworthy more-proper and
 ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν
to-the activities the in them pleasures than-the desires the-ones indeed
 γὰρ διωρισμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ
for distinguished are both in-the times and in-the nature the-others
 δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν
and close to-the activities and undistinguished so so-as to-have
 ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
a-dispute whether the-same is the activity as-the pleasure
 οὐ μὲν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις
not indeed it-seems at-least the pleasure thought to-be nor perception
 (ἄτοπον γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι
absurd for but through the not to-be-separated it-appears to-some
 ταυτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.
the-same just-as then the activities (are)-different also the pleasures
 διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ
it-differs and the sight from-touch in-purity and hearing and
 ὁσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί,
smell from-taste likewise indeed they-differ also the pleasures
 καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.
and of-these the-ones about the thought and both-kinds from-one-another
 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῳῷ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ
it-seems and to-be for-each animal also a-pleasure proper just-as also

ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δὲ
a-function the for according-to the activity and to each-man and
 θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ
observing this — would-appear different for of-a-horse (is)-pleasure and
 κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους
of-a-dog and of-a-man just-as Heraclitus says asses
 σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ
sweepings — would-choose rather than gold (is)-pleasanter for
 χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει
than-gold food for-asses the-ones indeed then of-the different-kinds in-the form
 διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον
differ in-form the-ones and of-the same undiffering (it-is)-reasonable
 εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων·
to-be they-vary and not a-little in at-least the men
 τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς
the-things for same some indeed delight others and pain and to-some
 μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά.
indeed painful and hateful are to-others and pleasant and lovable
 καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ
and in sweet-things and this happens not for the same
 δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν
seem to-the man-with-a-fever and to-the healthy-man nor hot
 εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
to-be to-the weak-man and to-the vigorous-man likewise and this also
 ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ᾗπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις
in other-cases happens it-seems and in all the such-things
 εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς
to-be the thing-appearing to-the excellent-man if and this well
 λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ
is-said just-as it-seems and is of-each-thing a-measure the
 ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθός, ἥ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν
virtue and the-good-man in-so-far-as such also pleasures is would

αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.
the-ones to-this-man appearing and pleasant-things in-which this-man rejoices
 τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν
the-things and to-this-man disagreeable if to-someone appear pleasant nothing
 θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων
(is)-surprising many for corruptions and impairments of-men
 γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω
occur pleasant and not are but to-these and so
 διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον
disposed the-ones indeed then confessedly shameful (is)-clear
 ὥς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις·
that not must-be-called pleasures to-be except for-the corrupted
 τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποῖαν ἢ τίνα φατέον
of-the and decent to-be seeming which-sort or which must-be-called
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις
of-the man to-be or from the activities (is)-clear these
 γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ
for follow the pleasures whether then one it-is or more the
 τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι
of-the complete and blessed man the-ones these completing
 ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγουντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ
pleasures strictly is-called would of-man pleasures to-be the-ones
 δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.
and remaining secondarily and in-a-far-lower-degree just-as the activities

VI • HAPPINESS IS NOT AMUSEMENT

Happiness is an activity chosen for its own sake, and acts of virtue are such acts. Amusements look like happiness because men in power spend their leisure on them, but power is not virtue, and children think whatever they value is best. It would be absurd for the end to be play, and to labor and suffer a whole life for the sake of playing; we play in order to work.

εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας
having-been-discussed and the-things about the virtues both and friendship
 καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν,
and pleasures (it)-remains about happiness in-outline to-go-through
 ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι
since end it we-set-down of-the human-things for-those-taking-up
 δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος.
indeed the things-said-before shorter would be the account
 εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι
we-said indeed that not it-is a-state and for for-the man-sleeping
 διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ
through life it-would-belong — of-plants living a-life and for-the
 δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει,
man-faring-badly the greatest-misfortunes if indeed these not please
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
but rather into an-activity some it-must-be-put just-as in the
 πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν
earlier-parts it-has-been-said of-the and activities the-ones indeed are
 ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς,
necessary and through other-things choiceworthy the-others and in themselves
 δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινὰ
(is)-clear that the happiness of-the in themselves choiceworthy some
 θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἢ
it-must-be-put and not of-the through another of-nothing for lacking (is)-the
 εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ
happiness but self-sufficient in themselves and are choiceworthy
 ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται
from which nothing is-sought beside the activity such
 δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ
and to-be seem the according-to virtue actions the-things for
 καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν.
noble and excellent to-do (are)-of-the through themselves choiceworthy

καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδέϊαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα
and of-the amusements and the pleasant not for through other-things
 αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ
them they-choose they-are-harmed for from them more than
 ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως.
they-are-benefited neglecting the bodies and the property
 καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν
they-take-refuge and in the such pastimes of-those
 εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις
called-happy the many therefore among the tyrants
 εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι·
are-esteemed those in the such pastimes ready-witted
 ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδέεις,
of-what for they-reach-for in these they-offer them themselves pleasant
 δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα
they-need and of-such-men it-seems indeed then conducive-to-happiness these
 εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν,
to-be through the those in positions-of-power in these to-pass-their-leisure
 οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
nothing and perhaps a-sign the such-men are not for in the
 δυναστεύειν ἢ ἀρετῇ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι
to-hold-power (is)-the virtue nor the intellect from which the excellent
 ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς
activities nor if untasting these being of-pleasure pure
 καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ
and liberal to the bodily they-take-refuge through
 τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
this these must-one-think more-choiceworthy to-be and for the
 παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται
children the-things among themselves honored best they-think

εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα
to-be reasonable indeed just-as to-children and to-men different-things
 φαίνεται τίμα, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπικεκῆσιν.
appear honorable so also to-base-men and to-decent-men
 καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμα καὶ ἡδέα
just-as then often it-has-been-said also honorable and pleasant
 ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἡ
are the-things to-the excellent-man such being to-each and the
 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ
according-to the proper state most-choiceworthy activity and to-the
 σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ
excellent-man indeed the according-to the virtue not in amusement
 ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
then (is)-the happiness and for (it-is)-absurd the end to-be
 παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
amusement and to-labor and to-suffer-hardship the life
 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου
whole of-the to-play for-the-sake everything for as to-say of-another
 ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
for-the-sake we-choose except the happiness end for this
 σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾷς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται
to-be-earnest and also to-toil of-amusement for-the-sake silly it-appears
 καὶ λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ'
and excessively childish to-play and so-that one-may-be-earnest according-to
 Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν
Anacharsis rightly to-stand it-seems a-rest for it-resembles
 ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως
the amusement being-unable and continuously to-toil of-rest
 δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ
they-need not indeed end the rest it-comes-about for
 ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ'
for-the-sake of-the activity it-seems and the happy life according-to

ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν
virtue to-be this and (is)-with earnestness but not in
 παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων
amusement better both we-call the earnest-things than-the laughable-things
 καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου
and with amusement and of-the better always both of-a-part
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ
and of-a-man more-excellent the activity the and of-the
 βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ
better (is)-superior and more-conducive-to-happiness already enjoys
 τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον
both would the bodily pleasures the chance-man and a-slave
 οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῃ
not less than-the best-man of-happiness and no-one to-a-slave
 μεταδίδωσι, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
gives-a-share if not also of-a-life not for in the such
 διαγωγαῖς ἢ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν
pastimes (is)-the happiness but in the according-to virtue
 ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.
activities just-as also earlier it-has-been-said

VII • THE LIFE OF CONTEMPLATION

If happiness is activity in accordance with the highest virtue, it will be the activity of the best thing in us, which is intellect. Contemplation is the most continuous of activities, the most self-sufficient — the wise man can do it by himself — and the only one loved for nothing beyond itself. It is a life above a man's own, lived not in so far as he is a man but in so far as something divine is present in him.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια,
if and is the happiness according-to virtue an-activity
 εὐλόγον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ
(it-is)-reasonable according-to the strongest this and would be of-the
 ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ
best whether indeed intellect this or another something which indeed
 κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν
according-to nature seems to-rule and to-lead and understanding to-have
 περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε
about noble-things and divine-things whether divine being also itself or
 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ
of-the-things in us the most-divine the of-this activity according-to
 τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ
the proper virtue would be the complete happiness that and it-is
 θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν
contemplative it-has-been-said agreeing and this would seem
 εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε
to-be both with-the earlier-writers and with-the true strongest both
 γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια (καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν
for this is the activity and for the intellect (is)-of-the-things
 ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστών, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς). ἔτι δὲ
in us and of-the knowable-things about which the intellect further and
 συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον
(it-is)-most-continuous to-contemplate for we-are-able continuously more
 ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν
than to-do anything-whatever we-think and to-be-necessary pleasure
 παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ'
to-have-been-mixed-in with-the happiness most-pleasant and of-the according-to
 ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως
virtue activities the according-to the wisdom confessedly
 ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν
is it-seems at-any-rate the philosophy wonderful pleasures to-have

καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι
in-purity and in-the steadfast (it-is)-reasonable and for-those knowing
 τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίων τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.
than-for-those seeking pleasanter the passing-of-time to-be
 ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ'
the and so-called self-sufficiency about the contemplative most
 ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ
would be of-the indeed for toward the to-live necessities both
 σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ
a-wise-man and a-just-man and the rest need with-the and
 τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δέεται
such-things sufficiently having-been-supplied the indeed just-man needs
 πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
toward whom he-will-act-justly and with whom likewise and also
 ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
the temperate-man and the brave-man and of-the others each
 ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ
the and wise-man even by himself being is-able to-contemplate and
 ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως
by-how-much ever wiser he-is more better and perhaps
 συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι
fellow-workers having but nevertheless (he-is)-most-self-sufficient it-would-seem
 τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ
both — this alone through itself to-be-loved nothing for
 ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν
from it comes-about beside the to-have-contemplated from and the
 πρακτικῶν ἢ πλείον ἢ ἕλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ
practical either more or less we-gain-besides beside
 τὴν πράξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι·
the action it-seems and the happiness in the leisure to-be
 ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν'
we-are-unleisured for so-that we-may-have-leisure and we-make-war so-that

εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς
peace we-may-keep of-the indeed then practical virtues in the
 πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ
political-matters or in the warlike-matters (is)-the activity the and
 περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
about these actions seem unleisured to-be the-ones indeed
 πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν
warlike and altogether no-one for chooses the to-make-war
 τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξα
of-the to-make-war for-the-sake nor prepares a-war he-would-seem
 γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους
for — altogether blood-thirsty a-kind to-be if the friends
 πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοντο· ἔστι
enemies he-should-make so-that battles and slaughters might-happen it-is
 δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ
and also the of-the statesman (activity)-unleisured and beside itself the
 πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν
to-take-part-in-politics gaining-besides powers and honors or the
 γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν
at-least happiness for-himself and for-the citizens different being
 τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὥς ἑτέραν οὖσαν.
from-the political-activity which also we-seek (is)-clear as different being
 εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ
if indeed of-the indeed according-to the virtues actions the political
 καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ'
and warlike in-nobility and in-magnitude excel these and
 ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς
(are)-unleisured and of-an-end some they-aim-at and not through themselves
 αἰρεταί· εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε
choiceworthy are the and of-the intellect activity in-earnestness both
 διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικῇ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς
to-differ seems contemplative being and beside itself of-no

ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκείαν (αὕτη δὲ
to-aim-at end and to-have the pleasure proper this and
 συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες δὴ καὶ
increases-together the activity and the self-sufficient indeed and
 σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ
leisurely and untiring as for-a-man and whatever else to-the
 μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
blessed-man is-assigned the-things according-to this the activity
 φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη
appear being the complete indeed happiness this would be
 ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές
of-man having-taken a-length of-life complete nothing for incomplete
 ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος
is of-the-things of-the happiness the and such-a-man would be a-life
 κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός
stronger than according-to man not for in-so-far-as a-man
 ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ
be-is so will-be-live but in-so-far-as divine something in him
 ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου,
is-present by-how-much and differs this from-the composite
 τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
by-so-much also the activity from-the according-to the other virtue
 εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ
if indeed divine (is)-the intellect toward the man also the
 κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ
according-to this life (is)-divine toward the human life not
 χρή δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν
one-must and according-to those advising human-things to-think
 ἀνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ'
a-man being nor mortal-things the mortal-man but to
 ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ
as-much-as it-is-possible to-make-immortal and everything to-do toward the

ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ
to-live according-to the strongest of-the-things in him if for even
 τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον
in-the bulk small it-is in-power and in-worth much more
 πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο,
than-all it-excels it-would-seem and — also to-be each-man this
 εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν,
if-indeed the sovereign and better absurd then it-would-become —
 εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ
if not the of-himself life he-should-choose but of-some other the
 λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον
thing-said both earlier will-fit also now the for proper
 ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ·
to-each in-the nature (is)-strongest and pleasantest is to-each
 καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ
and to-the man indeed the according-to the intellect life if-indeed
 τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.
this most (is)-man this-man then also (is)-happiest

VIII · THE SECOND LIFE, AND THE GODS

The life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary way, because its acts are human ones and need money, power, and opportunity. Contemplation needs almost none of that. Aristotle argues from the gods: no one can picture them making contracts or facing danger, and if they are alive and active, nothing is left them but contemplation. Solon and Anaxagoras agree that happiness needs only moderate means, and the wise man, dearest to the gods, is happiest.

δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ
secondarily and the according-to the other virtue the for according-to
 ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ
this activities (are)-human just-things for and brave-things and

τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν
the others the according-to the virtues toward one-another we-do
 ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίοις ἔν τε
in dealings and needs and in-actions of-all-kinds both in
 τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι
the passions preserving the fitting for-each these and to-be
 φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ
appear all human some and also to-follow from the
 σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνωκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν
body seems and many to-have-been-made-akin with-the passions
 ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις
the of-the character virtue it-has-been-yoked and also the practical-wisdom
 τῇ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ
with-the of-the character virtue and this with-the practical-wisdom if-indeed
 αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν
the indeed of-the practical-wisdom principles (are)-according-to the moral are
 ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
virtues the and right of-the moral (is)-according-to the practical-wisdom
 συνηρημέναι δ' αἰτῶνται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον
joined-together and these also with-the passions about the composite
 ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ
would be the and of-the composite virtues (are)-human and the
 βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ
life indeed the according-to these and the happiness the and of-the
 νοῦ κειχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω·
intellect (is)-separated so-much for about it let-it-have-been-said
 διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν.
to-work-out-in-detail for (is)-greater than-the thing-proposed it-is
 δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ
it-would-seem and — also of-the external equipment to a-small-degree or
 ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων
to a-less-degree to-need than-the moral of-the indeed for necessities

ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον
of-both (there-is)-need and from equal let-it-be even if more
 διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα·
labors about the body the statesman and whatever such-things
 μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρου· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ
a-little for — something it-might-differ toward and the activities much
 διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων
it-will-differ for-the indeed for liberal-man there-will-be-need of-money
 πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ δὴ εἰς
toward the to-do the liberal-acts and for-the just-man indeed for
 τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται
the requitals the for wishes (are)-unseen they-pretend
 δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ
and also those not just to-wish to-act-justly for-the
 ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν
brave-man and of-power if-indeed he-accomplishes something of-the-things
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ
according-to the virtue and for-the temperate-man of-opportunity how for
 δηλὸς ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται
evident will-be-be either this-man or of-the others any it-is-disputed
 τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ
and whether more-decisive of-the virtue (is)-the choice or the
 πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δηλὸν ὥς
actions as in both being the indeed complete (is)-clear that
 ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δέχεται,
in both would it-be toward and the actions of-many it-needs
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ᾧσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειονῶν.
and by-how-much ever greater they-are and nobler of-more
 τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν
for-the and man-contemplating of-none of-the such-things toward at-least the
 ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς
activity (is)-need but as to-say even hindrances they-are toward

γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἥ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι
at-least the contemplation in-so-far-as and a-man he-is and with-more
 συζῆ, αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν·
he-lives-together he-chooses the-things according-to the virtue to-do
 δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ
he-will-need then of-the such-things toward the to-live-as-a-man the
 δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια,
and complete happiness that contemplative a-kind is an-activity
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα
also from-this-point would appear the gods for most
 ὑπεilhάμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ
we-have-supposed blessed and happy to-be actions and
 ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας;
of-what-sort to-assign is-it-needful to-them whether the just
 ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας
or ridiculous will-they-appear making-contracts and deposits
 ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ***
restoring and whatever such-things but the brave (lacuna)
 ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν;
enduring the fearful-things and running-risks because (it-is)-noble
 ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ
or the liberal to-whom and will-they-give absurd and if
 καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ
also there-will-be for-them coinage or something such the and
 σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ
temperate what would they-be or vulgar (is)-the praise that not
 ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνουσι
they-have base appetites for-those-going-through and all-things appears
 ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.
would the-things about the actions small and unworthy of-gods

ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ
but indeed to-live at-least all have-supposed them and
 ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα.
to-be-active then not for indeed to-sleep just-as — Endymion
 τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ
for-the indeed living-being the to-act being-taken-away still and
 μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας; ὥστε ἡ
more the to-produce what remains except contemplation so-that the
 τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ
of-the god activity in-blessedness excelling contemplative
 ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη
would be and of-the human-things indeed the to-this most-akin
 εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν
(is)-most-conducive-to-happiness a-sign and also the not to-share
 τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας
the remaining animals in-happiness of-the such activity
 ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος
being-deprived completely for-the indeed for gods all the life
 μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς
(is)-blessed for-the and men to as-much-as a-likeness some of-the
 τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν
such activity belongs of-the and other animals none
 εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον
is-happy since in-no-way it-shares in-contemplation to as-much-as
 δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς
indeed extends the contemplation also the happiness and in-whom
 μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ
more belongs the to-contemplate also to-be-happy not by
 συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ'
accident but according-to the contemplation this for in
 αὐτὴν τιμιά. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
itself (is)-honorable so-that is would the happiness a-contemplation some

δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων ὄντι·
there-will-be-need and also of-the external well-being for-a-man being
 οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ
not for self-sufficient (is)-the nature toward the to-contemplate but
 δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν
it-is-needful also the body to-be-healthy and food and the remaining
 θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ
care to-be-present not indeed one-must-think at-least of-many and
 μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
great to-have-need the man-going-to-be-happy if not it-is-possible
 ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
without the external goods blessed to-be not for in the
 ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ
excess (is)-the self-sufficient nor the action possible and also
 μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ· καὶ
not ruling of-land and of-sea to-do the noble-things and
 γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ
for from moderate-means would-be-able — someone to-do according-to
 τὴν ἀρετὴν (τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται
the virtue this and it-is to-see clearly the for private-men
 τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν,
than-the potentates not less seem the decent-things to-do
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον)· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ
but even more enough and so-much to-be-present will-be for
 ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος.
the life happy of-the-man according-to the virtue being-active
 καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς,
and Solon and the happy perhaps declared well
 εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας
saying moderately with-the external-goods supplied having-done

δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως·
and the noblest-things as he-thought and having-lived temperately
 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κекτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ.
it-is-possible for moderate-means possessing to-do what one-must
 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην
it-seems and also Anaxagoras not rich nor a-potentate
 ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ
to-have-supposed the happy-man saying that not — he-would-wonder if
 τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι
someone strange should-appear to-the many these for judge
 τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αισθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν
by-the external-things of-these perceiving only to-agree
 δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκάσιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν
indeed with-the arguments seem the of-the wise opinions credit
 μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν
indeed then also the such-things have some the and true in
 τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται·
the practical-matters from the deeds and the life is-judged
 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα
in these for (is)-the sovereign to-look indeed the things-said-before
 χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων
one-must to the deeds and the life bringing-them and agreeing
 μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους
indeed with-the deeds they-must-be-accepted disagreeing and words
 ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον
they-must-be-supposed the-man and according-to intellect being-active and this
 θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος
tending and disposed best also most-god-beloved
 ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν
seems if for some care of-the human-things by gods
 γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε
happens just-as it-seems also it-would-be — reasonable to-rejoice both

αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη
 them in-the best and most-akin this and would be
 ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας
 the intellect and those loving most this and honoring-it
 ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ
 to-benefit-in-return as of-the-things dear to-them taking-care and
 ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
 rightly both and nobly acting that and all these
 τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος
 for-the wise-man most belong not (is)-unclear most-god-beloved
 ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε
 then the same and (it-is)-likely also happiest so-that
 καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.
 and-would so would-be the wise-man most happy

IX · FROM ETHICS TO LEGISLATION

Arguments are not enough to make men good. They can turn a generous young man toward virtue, but they cannot move the many, who obey fear rather than shame. Character has to be prepared beforehand by habit, as soil is prepared for seed, and that takes laws — paternal command has no force, and Sparta is almost alone in legislating for upbringing. Practicing politicians have not made statesmen even of their own sons, and the sophists who profess to teach politics are far from being able to teach it, so Aristotle proposes to examine legislation and the constitutions himself.

ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ
 surely then if about both these and the virtues further and also
 φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος
 friendship and pleasure sufficiently it-has-been-said in-the outlines end
 ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ
 to-have must-one-think the purpose or just-as it-is-said not

ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
it-is in the practicable-things end the to-have-contemplated each-thing and
 γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ
to-have-known but rather the to-do them nor indeed about
 ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον,
virtue (is)-enough the to-know but to-have and to-use one-must-try
 ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν
or if somehow otherwise good we-become if indeed then were
 οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς
the arguments self-sufficient toward the to-make decent many
 ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ
would wages and great justly they-would-earn according-to
 τὸν Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι·
— Theognis and it-would-be-necessary — these to-provide
 νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν
now and they-appear to-urge indeed and to-stir-up of-the
 νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἥθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ
young the liberal to-be-strong-enough a-character both well-born and
 ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχμιον ἐκ τῆς
as truly loving-the-noble to-make would possessed by the
 ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν
virtue the and many to-be-unable toward nobility-and-goodness
 προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ
to-urge not for they-are-by-nature by-shame to-obey but
 φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
by-fear nor to-abstain from-the base-things through the shameful
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας
but through the punishments by-passion for living the proper
 ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ
pleasures they-pursue and through what these will-be they-flee and

τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς
the opposing pains of-the and noble and as truly
 ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες.
pleasant not-even a-notion they-have untasting being
 τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ γὰρ
the indeed such-men what — argument would-reform not for
 οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ράδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἦθεσι
possible and or not easy the-things from old-time in-the characters
 κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστήσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ
gripped by-reason to-shift welcome and perhaps it-is if
 πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι,
of-all being-present through which decent we-seem to-become
 μεταλάβομεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ
we-should-get-a-share of-the virtue to-become and good they-think the-ones
 μὲν φύσει οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν
indeed by-nature the-others and by-habit the-others and by-teaching the indeed then
 τῆς φύσεως δηλὸν ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ
of-the nature (is)-clear that not in our-power it-belongs but through
 τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιον ὑπάρχει· ὁ
certain divine causes to-those as truly fortunate it-belongs the
 δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει,
and reason and the teaching perhaps ever not in all-men is-strong-enough
 ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιεργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ
but it-is-needful to-have-been-worked-beforehand by-the habits the of-the
 ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ
bearer soul toward the nobly to-rejoice and to-bate just-as
 γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου
earth the-one going-to-nourish the seed not for — he-would-listen-to a-word
 ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνέιη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
turning-him-away nor again would-he-understand the-man according-to passion

ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπείσαι;
living the-man and thus being how possible (it-is) to-persuade-otherwise
ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπέικειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ.
generally both not seems to-reason to-yield the passion but to-force
δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκείον τῆς
it-is-needful indeed the character to-be-present-beforehand somehow proper of-the
ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.
virtue loving the noble and being-annoyed-at the shameful
ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν
from young and of-training right to-obtain toward virtue (is)-hard
μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως
not under such having-been-reared laws the for temperately
καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως
and enduringly to-live (is)-not pleasant to-the many otherwise
τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν
both and to-young-men therefore by-laws it-is-needful to-have-been-ordered the
τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ
nurture and the pursuits not they-will-be for painful
συνήθη γενόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς
customary having-become not enough and perhaps young being of-nurture
καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας
and of-care to-obtain right but since also having-become-men
δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
one-must to-practice them and to-be-habituated and about these
δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον·
we-should-need — of-laws and generally indeed about all the life
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι
the for many by-necessity more than by-reason obey
καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἰονταί τινες τοὺς
and by-penalties than by-the noble therefore think some those
νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν
legislating to-be-necessary indeed to-summon to the virtue

καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων
and to-urge of-the noble for-the-sake as going-to-listen
 τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ
those decently by-the habits led-on disobeying and also
 ἀφνεστέροις οὔσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς
less-well-endowed being punishments both and penalties to-impose the-ones
 δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ πρὸς
and incurable altogether to-banish the-one indeed for decent-man toward
 τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον
the noble living to-the reason will-obey the-one and base-man
 ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον.
of-pleasure reaching-for by-pain to-be-chastened just-as a-beast-of-burden
 διὸ καὶ φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας
therefore also they-say to-be-necessary such to-become the pains
 αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
which most are-opposed to-the cherished pleasures
 εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν
if and then just-as it-has-been-said the man-going-to-be good
 τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἰθ' οὕτως
to-have-been-reared nobly it-is-needful and to-have-been-habituated then so
 ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα
in pursuits decent to-live and neither unwilling nor willing
 πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνονται ἂν βιουμένοις
to-do the base-things these and comes-about would for-those-living
 κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἡ
according-to some intelligence and an-order right having strength the
 μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ
indeed then paternal injunction not has the strong nor the
 ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως
compelling nor indeed generally the of-one man not a-king
 ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει
being or of-someone such the and law compelling has

δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν
power a-word being from some practical-wisdom and intellect and of-the
 μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς,
indeed men they-hate those opposing to-the impulses
 καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς
even-if rightly it they-do the and law not is burdensome
 τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει
ordering the decent in only and the of-Lacedaemonians city
 ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι
or with few the lawgiver care seems to-have-made
 τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείοσι τῶν
of-nurture both and of-pursuits in and the most of-the
 πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος
cities it-has-been-neglected about the such-things and lives each-man
 ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παιδῶν ἢ δ' ἀλόχου.
as he-wishes Cyclops-like laying-down-law for-children and for-a-wife
 κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν·
best indeed then the to-become a-common care and right
 κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν
in-common and being-neglected to-each-man it-would-seem — to-belong
 τοῖς σφετέρῳ τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι,
to-the his-own children and friends toward virtue to-contribute
 *** ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι
(lacuna) or to-choose at-least rather and — this to-be-able
 δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. αἱ
it-would-seem from the things-said a-legislator having-become the-ones
 μὲν γὰρ κοινὰ ἐπιμέλειαι δηλὸν ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται,
indeed for common cares (is)-clear that through laws come-about
 ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων γεγραμμένων δ'
decent and the through the excellent-men written and
 ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν
or unwritten nothing — it-would-seem to-differ nor through which

εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
one or many will-be-educated just-as nor in music or
 γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
gymnastics and of-the other pursuits just-as for in
 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἥθη, οὕτω καὶ
the cities prevail the customs and the characters so also
 ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
in households the paternal words and the habits and still more
 διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι
through the kinship and the benefits they-are-present-beforehand
 γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
for loving and obedient in-the nature further and also
 διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν,
they-differ the according-to each educations from-the common
 ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι
just-as in medicine in-general indeed for for-the man-with-a-fever
 συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὲς δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὁ
is-beneficial rest and fasting for-someone and perhaps not the-man
 τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθῃσιν.
and skilled-in-boxing perhaps not on-all the same fighting imposes
 ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
to-be-worked-out-exactly indeed it-would-seem — more the according-to each
 ἰδίᾳ τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου
peculiar the care becoming more for of-the suitable
 τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθεὶς μὲν ἂν ἄριστα καθ'
attains each-man but would-take-care indeed — best according-to
 ἑνὶ καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου
one both a-physician and a-trainer and every other the-man in-general
 εἰδώς, τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδ' (τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι
knowing what for-all or for-the such-men of-the common for the sciences
 λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσὶν). οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' ἑνὸς τινος οὐδὲν
are-called both and are not indeed but of-one some nothing

ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα,
perhaps prevents nobly to-take-care and unscientific being
 τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστω δι'
having-observed and exactly the-things happening in each-case through
 ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι
experience just-as also physicians some seem of-themselves best
 εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον
to-be to-another nothing — would-be-able to-help nothing and less
 ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ
perhaps for-the at-least man-wisbing skilled to-become and contemplative
 ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνο
to the universal one-must-proceed to-be it-would-seem — and-that
 γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ
must-be-known as it-is-possible it-has-been-said for that about this the
 ἐπιστήμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας
sciences perhaps and also for-the man-wisbing through care
 βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ
better to-make whether many or few a-legislator
 πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γηνοίμεθ' ἂν.
one-must-try to-become if through laws good we-should-become —
 ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ
whomever for then also the man-set-before-one to-dispose nobly not
 ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ
it-is of-the chance-man but if-indeed of-anyone of-the man-knowing just-as
 ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ
in medicine and of-the rest of-which there-is a-care some and
 φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς
practical-wisdom surely then after this must-be-examined from-where or how
 νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
a-legislator would-become — someone or just-as in the others
 παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μῶριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς
from the statesmen a-part for it-seemed of-the political-science

εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν
to-be or not alike it-appears in the political-science and of-the
 λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς
rest sciences both and capacities in indeed for the
 ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες
others the same appear both the capacities banding-on
 καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἱατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ
and being-active from them such-as physicians painters the
 δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί,
and political-matters they-profess indeed to-teach the sophists
 πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ
practices and of-them no-one but those taking-part-in-politics who
 δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ
they-would-seem would by-a-capacity some this to-do and by-experience
 μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες
rather than by-thought neither for writing nor speaking
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ
about the such-things do-they-appear although nobler it-was perhaps than
 λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς
speeches forensic both and deliberative nor again statesmen
 πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.
having-made the their-own sons or some others of-the friends
 εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν
reasonable and it-was if-indeed they-were-able neither for to-the cities
 ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι
better anything they-left would nor for-themselves to-belong
 προέλουντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ
would-choose — rather than-the such capacity nor indeed
 τοῖς φιλότατοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία
for-the dearest not indeed a-small-thing at-least it-seems the experience
 συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς
to-contribute nor for they-would-become — through the political

συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς
familiarity statesmen therefore for-those aiming about political-science
 εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ
to-know to-need-besides it-seems of-experience of-the and sophists those
 ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι.
professing exceedingly appear far to-be from-the to-teach
 ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν·
generally for not-even of-what-sort something it-is or about what-sorts they-know
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν,
not for — the same as-the rhetoric nor worse they-would-set-it-down
 οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι
nor — they-thought easy to-be the to-legislate for-one-collecting
 τοὺς εὐδοκμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς
the well-esteemed of-the laws to-pick-out for to-be the
 ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ
best just-as nor the picking-out being of-understanding and the
 κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῇ.
to-judge rightly (is)-greatest just-as in the-things according-to music
 οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ
the for experienced about each-thing judge rightly the works and
 δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις
through what or how it-is-accomplished they-understand and what-sorts with-what-sorts
 συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν
agree for-the and inexperienced (it-is)-welcome the not to-escape-notice
 εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς.
whether well or badly has-been-made the work just-as in painting
 οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· πῶς οὖν
the and laws of-the political-science to-works are-like how then
 ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς
from these a-legislator would-become — someone or the
 ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν
best to-judge not for they-appear nor physicians from the

συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ
treatises to-become although they-try at-least to-say not
 μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ
only the remedies but also how they-might-be-healed — and
 ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις·
how one-must to-treat each-kind having-distinguished the states
 ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ'
these and to-the indeed experienced useful to-be seem to-the and
 ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν
unscientific useless perhaps then also of-the laws and of-the
 πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι
constitutions the collections to-the indeed men-able to-contemplate
 καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις
and to-judge what nobly or the-contrary and what-sorts with-what-sorts
 ἀρμόττει εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα
fit useful would be to-the and without a-state the such-things
 διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ
going-through the indeed to-judge nobly not would belong if not
 ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν
then by-chance more-intelligent and toward these quickly —
 γένοντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον
they-would-become having-passed-over then the earlier-writers unexplored
 τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
the about the legislation ourselves to-examine rather
 βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς
(is)-better perhaps and generally indeed about a-constitution so-that within
 δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ.
(our)-power the about the human-affairs philosophy may-be-completed
 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς
first indeed then if something in part has-been-said nobly
 ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ
by the predecessors let-us-try to-go-over then from

τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει
the collected constitutions to-contemplate the what-sorts preserve
 καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν
and destroy the cities and the what-sorts each of-the
 πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ
constitutions and through what causes the-ones indeed nobly the-others
 δὲ τὸναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων
and the-contrary are-governed having-been-contemplated for these
 τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
quickly — more we-would-discern both what-sort-of constitution (is)-best
 καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι
and how each having-been-ordered and by-what laws and customs
 χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.
using let-us-speak then having-begun

EPICURUS

ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΕΝΟΙΚΕΑ

Letter to Menoeceus

Ἐπίκουρος Μενουκεῖ χαίρειν

I • PHILOSOPHIZE AT EVERY AGE

Epicurus writes to Menoeceus that no one is too young or too old for philosophy, since no one is too early or too late for the health of the soul. To say the season for it has not yet come, or that it has passed, is like saying the season for happiness has not come or has passed. The young man who philosophizes grows old still young in good things through gratitude for what has been, and the old man is young and old at once because he does not fear what is to come.

Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων
neither young anyone being let-him-delay to-philosophize nor old
ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδεὶς
being let-him-grow-weary philosophizing neither for too-early anyone
ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον.
is nor too-late for the according-to soul being-healthy
ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν
the-man and saying either not-yet of-the to-philosophize to-be-present the-season
ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὁμοίός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς
or to-have-passed the season like is to-the man-saying for
εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ παρῆναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. ὥστε
happiness either not to-be-present the season or no-longer to-be so-that
φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν
one-must-philosophize both for-a-young-man and for-an-old-man for-the-one indeed
ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν
so-that growing-old he-may-be-young in-the good-things through the gratitude of-the
γεγονότων, τῷ δὲ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ἢ
things-past for-the-other and so-that young at-once and old he-may-be
διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων· μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ
through the fearlessness of-the things-to-come to-practice then one-must the-things

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ποιούντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴπερ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα
making the happiness if-indeed being-present indeed it all-things
 ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δὲ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
we-have being-absent and everything we-do toward the this to-have

II · THE GODS, AND THE APPROACH TO DEATH

The first rule is to hold god to be an imperishable and blessed living being, and to attach nothing to him that is foreign to imperishability or blessedness. The gods exist, but not as most people believe them to be; the impious man is not the one who denies the gods of the many but the one who fastens the beliefs of the many onto them. The second rule follows: get used to thinking that death is nothing to us, since all good and evil lie in sensation.

- 123 Ἄ δέ σοι συνεχῶς παρήγγελλον, ταῦτα καὶ πράττε καὶ
what and to-you continually I-was-enjoining these both do and
 μελέτα, στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταῦτ' εἶναι διαλαμβάνων.
practice elements of-the nobly to-live these to-be determining
 Πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶν ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον
first indeed the god a-living-being imperishable and blessed
 νομίζων, ὥς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν
considering as the common of-the god notion was-outlined nothing
 μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος
either of-the imperishability foreign or of-the blessedness
 ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ
unsuited to-him attach everything and the to-preserve of-him
 δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν
being-able the with imperishability blessedness about him
 δοῶσαι. θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν· ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν
believe gods indeed for there-are evident for of-them is
 ἡ γνῶσις· οἷους δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ
the knowledge of-what-sort and them the many consider not

εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἷους νομίζουσιν.

they-are not for they-preserve them of-what-sort they-consider

ἀσεβῆς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν,

impious and (is)-not the-man the of-the many gods abolishing

ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων.

but the-man the of-the many opinions to-gods attaching

οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν

not for preconceptions are but suppositions false the of-the

πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις. ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι†

many about gods declarations whence the greatest harms

αἷται τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλεια. ταῖς

causes to-the bad from gods are-brought-on and benefits to-the

γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους

for own being-at-home through all excellences the like-men

ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.

they-accept everything the not such as alien considering

Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι

accustom-yourself and in the to-consider nothing to us to-be

τὸν θάνατον· ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει·

the death since every good and evil (is)-in perception

στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. ὅθεν γνῶσις

a-deprivation and is of-perception the death whence a-knowledge

ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν

right of-the nothing to-be to us the death enjoyable

ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα

makes the of-the life mortality not unlimited adding

χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον.

time but the of-the immortality taking-away longing

There is nothing terrible in living for a man who has genuinely grasped that there is nothing terrible in not living, so fearing death for its approach is empty. While we exist death is not present, and when it is present we do not exist. The wise man neither begs off living nor fears not living. The future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours; and of the appetites some are natural and some empty, and of the natural some are necessary.

125 οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατειληφότεν
 nothing for is in the to-live terrible for-the-man having-grasped
 γνησίως τὸ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. ὥστε
 genuinely the nothing to-be in the not to-live terrible so-that
 μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει
 (is)-empty the-man saying to-fear the death not because it-will-pain
 παρών, ἀλλ' ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. ὁ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ
 being-present but because it-pains being-about-to-come what for being-present not
 ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενοι κενῶς λυπεῖ. τὸ φρικωδέστατον
 troubles being-expected emptily pains the most-shuddering
 οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδήπερ
 then of-the evils the death (is)-nothing to us since-indeed
 ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν, ὅταν δὲ
 whenever indeed we are the death not is-present whenever and
 ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τότε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς
 the death is-present then we not are neither then to the
 ζῶντάς ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδήπερ περὶ
 living is-it nor to the dead since-indeed about
 οὓς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἱ δ' οὐκέτι εἰσίν. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ
 whom indeed not it-is the-others and no-longer are but the many
 τὸν θάνατον ὅτε μὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν φεύγουσιν,
 the death at-one-time indeed as greatest of-the evils flee
 ὅτε δὲ ὡς ἀνάπαυσιν τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν κακῶν αἰροῦνται.
 at-another and as a-rest of-the in the to-live evils they-choose

ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ 126

the and wise-man neither begs-off the to-live nor fears the not

ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται τὸ ζῆν οὔτε δοξάζει

to-live neither for to-him is-offensive the to-live nor does-he-suppose

κακὸν εἶναί τι τὸ μὴ ζῆν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σιτίον οὐ

an-evil to-be something the not to-live just-as and the food not

τὸ πλεῖον πάντως ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἰρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ

the more altogether but the most-pleasant he-chooses so also

χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται.

time not the longest but the most-pleasant he-reaps

Ὁ δὲ παραγγέλλων τὸν μὲν νέον καλῶς ζῆν, τὸν δὲ

the and man-enjoining the indeed young-man nobly to-live the and

γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν, εὐήθης ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον διὰ

old-man nobly to-make-an-end simple is not only through

τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν

the of-the life welcomeness but also through the the same

εἶναι μελέτην τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν.

to-be practice of-the nobly to-live and of-the nobly to-die

πολὺ δὲ χείρων καὶ ὁ λέγων καλὸν μὲν μὴ φῦναι,

much and worse also the-man saying (it-is)-noble indeed not to-be-born

φύντα δ' ὅπως ὥκιστα πύλας Ἄϊδαο περήσαι.

having-been-born and how most-swiftly the-gates of-Hades to-pass

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεπειθὼς τοῦτό φησιν, πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται 127

if indeed for being-convinced this he-says how not does-be-depart

ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν; ἐν ἐτοιμῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴπερ

from the to-live in readiness for for-him this is if-indeed

ἦν βεβουλευμένον αὐτῷ βεβαίως· εἰ δὲ μωκώμενος,

it-was resolved by-him firmly if and mocking

μάταιος ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις. Μνημονευτέον δὲ

(he-is)-empty in the-things not admitting-it one-must-remember and

ὥς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε πάντως ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐχ

that the future (is)-neither altogether ours nor altogether not

ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον
ours so-that neither altogether we-may-wait-for-it as going-to-be
 μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον.
nor we-may-despair as altogether not going-to-be
 Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί,
one-must-reckon and that of-the appetites the-ones indeed are natural
 αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι,
the-others and empty and of-the natural the-ones indeed (are)-necessary
 αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν
the-others and natural only of-the and necessary the-ones indeed
 πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
for happiness are necessary the-others and for the
 τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
of-the body freedom-from-trouble the-others and for itself the to-live

IV · PLEASURE, AND THE SOBER REASONING

Pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life, but not every pleasure is to be chosen: we pass over pleasures when more trouble follows, and take on pains when greater pleasure follows. Self-sufficiency is a great good, since those who need luxury least enjoy it most, and the pleasure that is the end is not the prodigal's but freedom from pain in body and trouble in soul. What makes life pleasant is not drinking-bouts but sober reasoning — and practical wisdom, which Epicurus here calls more honorable even than philosophy.

128 τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν
of-these for unerring contemplation every choice and avoidance
 ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος υἰγίαν καὶ τὴν
to-refer knows to the of-the body health and the
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν
of-the soul freedom-from-disturbance since this of-the blessedly to-live

ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως
is end of-this for for-the-sake everything we-do so-that
 μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο
neither we-may-feel-pain nor we-may-be-alarmed whenever and once this
 περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών,
about us comes-about is-dissolved all the of-the soul storm
 οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζώου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι
not having the living-creature to-walk as toward lacking something
 καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος
and to-seek another by-which the of-the soul and of-the body
 ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρεῖαν ἔχομεν,
good will-be-filled-up then for of-pleasure need we-have
 ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρῆναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν
whenever from the not to-be-present the pleasure we-feel-pain whenever
 δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα.
and not we-feel-pain no-longer of-the pleasure we-need
 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν 129
and through this the pleasure a-beginning and end we-call
 εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ
to-be of-the blessedly to-live this for good first and
 συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης
inborn we-recognized and from this we-begin of-every
 αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι
choice and avoidance and to this we-come-back as by-a-rule
 τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντας. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν
by-the feeling every good judging and since a-first good
 τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
this and inborn through this also not every pleasure
 αἰρούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν,
we-choose but there-is when many pleasures we-pass-by
 ὅταν πλείον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἔπεται· καὶ
whenever more for-us the disagreeable from these follows and

130

πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὴν
many pains than-pleasures better we-consider whenever
 μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθεῖ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι
a-greater for-us pleasure accompanies a-long time having-endured
 τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχει
the pains every then pleasure through the a-nature to-have
 οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἰρετή· καθάπερ καὶ
proper (is)-good not every however (is)-choiceworthy just-as also
 ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ αἰεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα.
pain every (is)-an-evil not every and always to-be-avoided being-by-nature
 τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων
by-the however measuring-together and of-advantages and of-disadvantages
 βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει. χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ
by-looking these all to-judge is-fitting we-use for the-one
 μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατὰ τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ
indeed good according-to certain times as an-evil the-other and
 κακῷ τοῦμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ.
evil the-reverse as a-good
 Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ
and the self-sufficiency and good great we-consider not
 ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ
so-that always with-the few we-may-use but so-that if not
 ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ, τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι
we-have the many with-the few we-may-be-content having-been-persuaded
 γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα
genuinely that most-pleasantly of-extravagance they-enjoy those least
 ταύτης δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν
of-this needing and that the indeed natural all easily-got
 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον, ὅτι τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην
is the and empty hard-to-get that and plain flavors equal
 πολυτελεῖ διαίτη τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν,
to-an-extravagant diet the pleasure bring-on

ὅταν ᾗπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ, καὶ μᾶζα 131
whenever all the paining according-to want is-removed both barley-cake
 καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν
and water the highest render pleasure whenever
 ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν
being-in-want someone them takes the to-accustom-oneself then
 ἐν ταῖς ἀπλάϊς καὶ οὐ πολυτελέσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγείας ἐστὶ
in the simple and not extravagant diets both of-health is
 συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις
productive and toward the necessary of-the life uses
 ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῖς πολυτελέσιν ἐκ
unshrinking makes the man and to-the extravagant-things from
 διαλειμμάτων προσερχομένοις κρεῖττον ἡμᾶς διατίθῃσι καὶ
intervals coming-to-them better us it-disposes and
 πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει. Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν
toward the fortune fearless it-prepares whenever then we-say
 ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς
pleasure end to-be not the of-the prodigal pleasures and the
 ἐν ἀπολαύσει κεμέναις λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ
in enjoyment lying we-mean as some being-ignorant and
 οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
not agreeing or badly taking-it consider but the
 μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταραττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν·
neither to-feel-pain in body nor to-be-disturbed in soul
 οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνεύροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις 132
not for drinking-bouts and revels continuous nor enjoyments
 παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα
of-boys and of-women nor of-fish and of-the other-things whatever
 φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ
brings an-extravagant table the pleasant begets life but
 νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἰρέσεως
a-sober reasoning and the causes searching-out of-every choice

καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλείστος
and avoidance and the opinions driving-out from which the-greatest
τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.

the souls seizes tumult

Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
of-these and all a-beginning and the greatest good

φρόνησις. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει
(is)-practical-wisdom therefore also than-philosophy more-honorable is

φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί,
practical-wisdom from which the remaining all have-sprung virtues

διδάσκουσα ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως
teaching that not it-is-possible pleasantly to-live without the prudently

καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως
and nobly and justly nor prudently and nobly and justly

ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ
without the pleasantly they-have-grown-together for the virtues with-the

ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον.

to-live pleasantly and the to-live pleasantly from-these is inseparable

V · FORTUNE, AND THE LIFE OF A GOD AMONG MEN

Epicurus asks who could be better than the man who holds pious beliefs about the gods, is fearless about death, and has reckoned out the end that nature sets. He would rather follow the myth about the gods than serve the destiny of the natural philosophers, since the myth at least leaves room for hope. Chance is no god and no unstable cause: better to fail with good reasoning than to succeed without it. Practice these things and you will live as a god among men.

- 133 Ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν
since whom do-you-think to-be better than-the-man both about gods
ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως
pious-things believing and about death through all fearlessly

ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος, καὶ
standing and the of-the nature having-reckoned-out end and
 τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρασ ὥς ἔστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε
the indeed of-the goods limit that it-is easily-filled-up both
 καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὥς
and easily-got determining the and of-the evils that
 ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς; τὴν δὲ ὑπό τινων
either times or pains it-has short the and by some
 δεσπότιν εἰσαγομένην πάντων †ἀγγέλλοντος *** (λέγει
mistress being-brought-in of-all announcing (lacuna) he-says
 ἐν ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι ᾧ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην, ᾧ
in other-places to-come-about what-things indeed by necessity what-things
 δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ᾧ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν
and from chance what-things and beside us through the the indeed
 ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν,
necessity unaccountable to-be the and chance unstable to-see
 τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτόν καὶ
the and beside us masterless which also the blameworthy and
 τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν) —
the contrary to-accompany is-by-nature
 ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ 134
since better it-was the about gods myth to-follow than
 τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
the of-the natural-philosophers destiny to-serve the-one indeed for
 ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἢ
a-hope of-deprecation sketches of-gods through honor the-other
 δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην — τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε
and inexorable has the necessity the and fortune neither
 θεὸν ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν ὑπολαμβάνων — οὐθὲν γὰρ
a-god as the many consider supposing nothing for
 ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται ἀβέβαιον οὔτε αἰτίαν — οὐκ
disorderly by-a-god is-done unstable nor a-cause not

οἶεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ
be-thinks indeed for good or an-evil from this toward the
 μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων
blessedly to-live for-men to-be-given beginnings however of-great
 ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι —
goods or evils by this to-be-supplied

135 κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως
better to-be considering with-good-reasoning to-fare-ill than without-reasoning
 εὐτυχεῖν — βέλτιον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς
to-fare-well better for in the actions the nobly
 κριθέν μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθέν
having-been-judged not to-be-set-right than the not nobly having-been-judged
 ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην.
to-be-set-right through this

Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῇ μελέτα πρὸς
these then and the-things to-these akin practice toward
 σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πρὸς τε τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ,
yourself by-day and by-night toward both the like-man to-yourself
 καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ
and never either waking or dreaming will-you-be-disturbed you-will-live
 δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ
and as a-god among men nothing for resembles a-mortal
 ζῳῷ ζῶν ἀνθρώπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.
creature living a-man among immortal goods

EPICURUS

KYPIAI ΔΟΞΑΙ

The Principal Doctrines

The first eight Doctrines set out the Epicurean cure. The gods are untroubled and trouble no one; death is nothing to us, because what has been dissolved has no sensation; pleasure has a limit, the removal of all that pains; and pain in the flesh does not last. Virtue and pleasure are inseparable, and no pleasure is evil in itself. The parenthesis after the first Doctrine is an ancient note, not Epicurus' own.

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει 1
the blessed and imperishable neither itself troubles has
 οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι
nor to-another provides so-that neither by-angers nor by-favors
 συνέχεται ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. (ἐν ἄλλοις
is-held in what-is-weak for all the such in other-places
 δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοῦς, οὓς μὲν κατ'
and he-says the gods by-reason contemplable some indeed according-to
 ἀριθμὸν ὑφ'εστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδεῖαν ἐκ τῆς
number subsisting others and according-to likeness-of-form from the
 συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
continuous inflow of-the like images to the same
 ἀποτετελεσμένων, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς.)
perfected man-shaped

Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν 2
the death (is)-nothing to us that-which for has-been-dissolved
 ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
is-without-sensation that-which and being-without-sensation (is)-nothing to us

Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγούντος 3
the-limit of-the magnitude of-the pleasures the of-all the paining
 ὑπεξάρσεις. ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ' ὃν
removal wherever and ever the pleasing may-be-present for which

ἂν χρόνον ἤ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ
ever time it-may-be not there-is the paining or grieving or
 τὸ συναμφότερον.
the both-together

- 4 Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ
not lasts-long the paining continuously in the flesh but the
 μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον
indeed extreme the shortest time is-present that and merely
 ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας
exceeding the pleasing in flesh not many days
 συμμένει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν πλεονάζον
persists the and long-lasting of-the illnesses in-excess
 ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.
have the pleasing in the flesh rather-than the paining

- 5 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς
not it-is-possible pleasantly to-live without the prudently and nobly
 καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ
and justly nor prudently and nobly and justly without
 τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι
the pleasantly to-whom and this not belongs not it-is-possible
 τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.
this-man pleasantly to-live

- 6 Ὅθεν τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν
for-the-sake of-the to-be-confident from men there-was according-to nature
 ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ποτε τοῦτο
of-office and kingship good from which ever at-any-time this
 οἶός τ' ἢ παρασκευάζεσθαι.
possible and one-may-be to-procure

Ἐνδοξοὶ καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ 7
famous and admired some wished to-become the from
 ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε
men security thus thinking to-secure so-that
 εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς
if indeed safe the of-the such-men life they-obtained the of-the
 φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλὴς, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὐ ἕνεκα
nature good if and not safe not they-have which for-the-sake-of
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.
from the-beginning according-to the of-the nature proper they-reached-out
 Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν 8
no pleasure in itself (is)-evil but the of-certain pleasures
 ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν
productive-things many-times-greater bring-on the disturbances than-the
 ἡδονῶν.
pleasures

II • DOCTRINES 9–18

If every pleasure could be concentrated, pleasures would not differ at all. Natural science is needed, since the fears of what is above us, of death, and of pain cannot be dissolved without knowing the universe. Security among men is no benefit while those fears remain; the purest comes from withdrawal from the many. Natural wealth is limited, the just life most untroubled, and pleasure in the flesh, once want is removed, only varies.

Εἰ κατεπυκνούτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον 9
if were-condensed every pleasure both in-time and about whole
 τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως,
the aggregate it-belonged or the most-sovereign parts of-the nature
 οὐκ ἂν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.
not would ever they-differed from-one-another the pleasures

- 10 Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς
if the-things producing of-the about the prodigals pleasures dissolved the
 φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ
fears of-the mind the-ones both about things-aloft and of-death and
 ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ
of-pains further both the limit of-the appetites they-taught not
 ἂν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμβαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν
— ever we-would-have what thing we-might-blame in-them from-every-quarter
 ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγούν.
being-filled-up of-the pleasures and from-no-quarter neither the paining
- 11 Εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ
if in-nothing us the of-the things-aloft suspicions troubled and
 αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦ τι,
the-ones about death lest ever toward us it-may-be anything
 ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων
further both the not to-understand the limits of-the pains
 καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας.
and of-the appetites not — we-should-need-besides natural-science
- 12 Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύνειν ὑπὲρ τῶν
not it-was-possible the-thing frightening to-dissolve about the
 κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος
most-sovereign-matters not knowing what (is)-the of-the universe
 φύσις, ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς
nature but suspecting something of-the-things according-to the
 μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους
myths so-that not it-was-possible without natural-science unmixed
 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.
the pleasures to-receive

Οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν 13
no benefit it-was the according-to men security

κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστῶτων καὶ
to-procure of-the from-above suspect-things standing and
τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.
of-the-things under earth and simply of-the-things in the infinite

Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς 14
of-the security the from men having-come-about up-to a-point

δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστέρα γίνεται
by-power both supporting and by-abundance purer becomes
ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.
the from the quiet and withdrawal of-the many security

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥριστα καὶ εὐπόριστός 15
the of-the nature wealth both has-been-limited and easily-got

ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.
is the and of-the empty opinions into infinity falls-away

Βραχέα σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα 16
in-small-measure for-a-wise-man fortune interferes the and greatest

καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διάκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν
and most-sovereign-matters the reasoning has-arranged and through the
συνεχῇ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.
continuous time of-the life it-arranges and it-will-arrange

Ὁ δίκαιος βίος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ' ἄδικος πλείστης 17
the just life (is)-most-untroubled the and unjust of-greatest

ταραχῆς γέμων.
trouble full

Οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' 18
not is-increased in the flesh the pleasure whenever once the according-to

ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται· τῆς δὲ
want paining is-removed but only it-is-varied of-the and

διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ
 mind the limit the according-to the pleasure begot the
 τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις,
 both of-these themselves reckoning and of-the-things kindred to-these
 ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ.
 whatever the greatest fears prepared for-the mind

III · DOCTRINES 19–24

Infinite time holds no more pleasure than finite time, once reason has measured out the limits of pleasure. The flesh takes those limits to be infinite; the mind, having reckoned out the end and limit of the flesh and dispelled the fears about eternity, produced the complete life and needed no more time. The last of these Doctrines defends the senses: throw out one perception and you throw out the criterion altogether.

- 19 Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσῃν ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ
 the infinite time equal has the pleasure and the
 πεπερασμένος, εἴαν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ
 limited if someone of-it the limits measures-out
 τῷ λογισμῷ.
 by-the reasoning
- 20 Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα,
 the indeed flesh received the limits of-the pleasure (as)-infinite
 καὶν ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια
 and-would infinite it time have-prepared the and mind
 τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν
 of-the of-the flesh end and limit having-taken the
 ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα
 reckoning and the about the eternity fears having-dispelled
 τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου
 the complete life prepared and nothing further of-the infinite

χρόνου προσεδεήθη· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐδ' ἡνίκα
time did-it-need but neither did-it-flee the pleasure nor when
 τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν,
the departure from the to-live the circumstances prepared
 ὥς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν.
as falling-short in-anything of-the best life did-it-make-an-end

Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὥς εὐπόριστόν 21
the-man the limits of-the life having-discerned knows how easily-got
 ἐστὶ τὸ τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ
is the-thing the paining according-to want removing and
 τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῇ καθιστάν· ὥστε οὐδὲν
the-thing the whole life complete making so-that in-nothing
 προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κекτημένων.
does-be-need-besides matters contests possessing

Τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν 22
the subsisting one-must end to-reckon-out and all the
 ἐνάργειαν, ἐφ' ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν· εἰ δὲ μή,
evidence to which the things-opined we-refer if and not
 πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά.
everything of-indecision and of-confusion will-be full

Εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἔξεις οὐδ' ἄς 23
if you-fight with-all the senses not you-will-have even which
 ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν
ever you-may-say of-them to-be-falsified toward what making the
 ἀναγωγὴν κρίνης.
referring you-may-judge

Εἴ τιν' ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθῆσιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις 24
if any you-will-throw-out simply perception and not you-will-distinguish
 τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη
the thing-opined according-to the awaiting and the present already

κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν
according-to the perception and the feelings and every imaginative
 ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς
application of-the mind you-will-confound also the remaining
 αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν
perceptions by-the empty opinion so-that the criterion whole
 ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς
you-will-throw-out if and you-will-confirm also the awaiting whole in the
 δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν *** οὐκ
opinionative notions and the not the attestation (lacuna) not
 ἔκλειψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον, ὥστε τετηρηκῶς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν
you-will-leave-out the thing-falsified so-that having-kept you-will-be every
 ἀμφισβήτησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.
dispute and every judgment of-the rightly or not rightly

IV • DOCTRINES 25–33

Refer everything you do to the end that nature sets, or your actions will not follow your words. Of the appetites some are natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, some neither — and an ancient note illustrates the three by drink in thirst, by costly food, and by crowns and statues. Of all that wisdom provides for a blessed life the greatest by far is friendship; and justice is a compact of mutual advantage, holding only among those able to make one.

- 25 Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον
if not at every occasion you-will-refer each
 τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ
of-the things-done to the end of-the nature but
 προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος
you-will-turn-aside-first whether an-avoidance or a-pursuit making

εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονται σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ
toward another something not will-be for-you with-the words the
πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

actions consistent

Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ 26

of-the appetites as-many-as not to paining lead-back if not
συμπληρωθῶσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλ' εὐδιάχυτον τὴν
they-be-filled-up not are necessary but easily-dissolved the
ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσπόριστοι ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ
longing they-have whenever hard-to-get or of-harm productive
δόξωσιν εἶναι.

they-seem to-be

ᾧ ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου 27

of-what-things the wisdom provides for the of-the whole life
μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτήσις.
blessedness much (the)-greatest is the of-the friendship possession

Ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν 28

the same judgment to-be-confident both made about the nothing
αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μὴδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς
eternal to-be terrible or long-lasting and the in themselves
τοῖς ὥρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλία μάλιστα κατεῖδε
the limited-things security by-friendship most it-discerned
συντελουμένην.

being-accomplished

Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ 29

of-the appetites the-ones indeed are natural and necessary the-others
δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε
and natural and not necessary the-others and neither natural nor
ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. (φυσικὰς
necessary but beside an-empty opinion arising natural

καὶ ἀναγκαίᾳς ἡγείται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνας
and necessary considers — Epicurus the-ones of-pain
 ἀπολυνούσας, ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψους· φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίᾳς
releasing as drink upon thirst natural and not necessary
 δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαιρουμένας
and the-ones varying only the pleasure not removing
 δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα, ὡς πολυτελεῖ σιτία· οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτε
and the ache as costly foods neither and natural nor
 ἀναγκαίᾳς, ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις.)
necessary as crowns and of-statues dedications

- 30 Ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγούν δὲ
in which of-the natural appetites not to paining and
 ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ
leading-back if not they-be-accomplished there-is the eagerness
 σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὐταὶ γίνονται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ
intense beside an-empty opinion these arise and not beside
 τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ
the of-themselves nature not are-they-dissolved but beside the of-the
 ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.
man vain-conceit

- 31 Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος
the of-the nature just is a-token of-the advantageous
 εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.
toward the not to-harm one-another nor to-be-harmed

- 32 Ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιέσθαι τὰς
whatever of-the animals not was-able compacts to-make the-ones
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς
about the not to-harm one-another nor to-be-harmed toward
 ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν
these nothing was just or unjust likewise and also of-the

ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας
 nations whatever not was-able or not was-willing the compacts
 ποιείσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.
 to-make the-ones about the not to-harm nor to-be-harmed

Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς 33
 not was-there something in itself justice but in the
 μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὅπηλίκους δήποτε αἰεὶ
 with one-another gatherings in how-large-soever ever always
 τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.
 places a-compact some about the not to-harm or to-be-harmed

V · DOCTRINES 34-40

Injustice is not an evil in itself but in the fear of not escaping those set over such things, and no one who breaks the compact can be sure of escaping notice to the end. Justice is the same for everyone in general, but differs with country and circumstance, and when circumstances change what was just stops being just. The collection closes with those who secured confidence from their neighbors and so lived most pleasantly together.

Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ 34
 the injustice not in itself (is)-an-evil but in the according-to
 τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν
 the suspicion fear whether not be-will-escape-notice the about the
 τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.
 such-matters set-over punishers

Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιῶντα ὧν 35
 not it-is-possible the-man secretly something doing of-what-things
 συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν
 they-agreed toward one-another toward the not to-harm
 μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει,
 nor to-be-harmed to-trust that be-will-escape-notice

κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνη.
even-if ten-thousand-times for the present he-escapes-notice
 μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ
until for the-end (it-is)-unclear whether even
 λήσει.
he-will-escape-notice

- 36 Κατὰ μὲν κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό,
according-to indeed the-common for-all the just (is)-the same
 συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
advantageous for something it-was in the toward one-another
 κοινωνία· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων
association according-to and the particular of-a-country and of-however-many
 δήποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον
soever causes not for-all does-it-follow the same just
 εἶναι.
to-be

- 37 Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς
the indeed thing-attested that it-is-advantageous in the
 χρείαῖς τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων
needs of-the toward one-another association of-the things-held
 εἶναι δίκαιων, ἔχει τὸ ἐν τοῦ δικαίου χώρα εἶναι,
to-be just has the in of-the just place to-be
 εἴαν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται εἴαν τε μὴ τὸ
whether both the same for-all it-turn-out whether both not the
 αὐτό. εἴαν δὲ νόμον θῇται τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνει δὲ
same if and a-law lays-down someone not it-turn-out and
 κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας,
according-to the advantage of-the toward one-another association
 οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. κἂν
no-longer this the of-the just nature has and-if
 μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον
it-shifts the according-to the just advantage a-time

δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττη, οὐδὲν ἥττον
and some into the preconception it-fits nothing less
 ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς
that the time it-was just for-those not by-utterances
 κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ πράγματα
empty themselves confounding but to the facts
 βλέπουσιν.

looking

Ἐνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων
where not new having-become the surrounding
 πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἀρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν
circumstances it-appeared not fitting into the preconception
 τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ
the things-held just upon themselves the deeds not
 ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια. ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν
were these just where and new having-become the
 πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια
circumstances no-longer it-was-advantageous the same just-things
 κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια, ὅτε
laid-down there then at-that-time indeed they-were just when
 συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν
it-was-advantageous for the toward one-another association of-the
 συμπολιτευομένων· ὕστερον δ' οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε
fellow-citizens later and not they-were still just when
 μὴ συνέφερεν.

not it-was-advantageous

Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα
the-man the not being-confident from the outside-things best
 συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα
having-organized this-man the indeed possible-ones kindred
 κατεσκευάσατο, τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά
made the-ones and not possible not alien

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39

γε· ὅσα δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος
at-least as-many-as and not-even this able he-was unmixed
 ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα τοῦτ' ἐλυσιτέλει
he-became and he-fenced-off whatever this it-profitd
 πράττειν.

to-do

40 Ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα
as-many-as the power had of-the the to-be-confident most
 ἐκ τῶν ὁμορούντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὗτοι καὶ ἐβίωσαν
from the neighboring-men to-provide these both lived
 μετ' ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα
with one-another most-pleasantly the surest pledge
 ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ
having and fullest intimacy having-received not
 ὠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος
they-lamented as toward pity the of-the man-having-died
 προκαταστροφὴν.

untimely-end

EPICURUS

ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ

The Vatican Sayings

Seven of these fourteen Sayings repeat Principal Doctrines almost word for word, and the thirteenth is identical to Doctrine 27. The rest are new: necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under necessity; and remember that you were born mortal with a limited span, yet rose in your reasoning about nature to the infinite and to eternity. We are born once, and life is wasted by putting things off.

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει 1
the blessed and imperishable neither itself troubles has
 οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει, οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται.
nor to-another provides nor by-angers nor by-favors is-held
 ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
in weakness for all the such-things

Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν 2
the death (is)-nothing to us that-which for has-been-dissolved
 ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
is-without-sensation that-which and being-without-sensation (is)-nothing to us

Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον 3
not lasts-long the paining in the flesh but the indeed extreme
 τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ ὑπερτεῖνον
the shortest time is-present the and middle the exceeding
 τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ὑπάρχει, αἱ
the pleasing in flesh not many days lasts the
 δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ
and long-lasting of-the illnesses in-excess have in the
 σαρκὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἢ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.
flesh the pleasing than the paining

- 4 Πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος· ἡ γὰρ σύντονον
every pain (is)-easily-despised the-one for intense
 ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον, ἡ δὲ
having the suffering short has the time the-one and
 χρονίζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον.
lasting-long about the flesh feeble has the pain
- 5 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς
not it-is-possible pleasantly to-live without the prudently and nobly
 καὶ δικαίως· ὅπου δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστιν
and justly where and this not belongs not it-is-possible
 ἡδέως ζῆν.
pleasantly to-live
- 6 Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιῶντα, ὧν
not it-is-possible the-man secretly something doing of-what-things
 συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ
they-agreed toward one-another toward the not to-harm nor
 βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις
to-be-harmed to-trust that he-will-escape-notice even-if ten-thousand-times
 ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνη· μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς
for the present he-escapes-notice until for the-end
 ἄδηλον εἰ λήσει.
(it-is)-unclear whether he-will-escape-notice
- 7 Ἀδικοῦντα λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον, πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν
one-doing-wrong to-escape-notice indeed (is)-difficult confidence and to-take
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον.
about the to-escape-notice (is)-impossible

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν. 8

the of-the nature wealth has-been-limited and easily-got is
 ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει καὶ ἔστι
the and of-the empty opinions into infinity falls-away and is
 δυσπόριστος.
hard-to-get

Κακὸν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης. 9

an-evil (is)-necessity but no necessity to-live with necessity

Μέμνησο ὅτι θνητὸς ὢν τῇ φύσει καὶ λαβὼν χρόνον 10

remember that mortal being in-the nature and having-taken a-time
 ὥρισμένον ἀνέβης τοῖς περὶ φύσεως διαλογισμοῖς ἐπὶ
limited you-went-up by-the about nature reasonings to
 τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ κατεῖδες τὰ τ' ἐόντα
the infinity and the eternity and you-discerned the-things both being
 τὰ τ' ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.

the-things and going-to-be before and being

Τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ 11

of-the most men the indeed resting grows-numb the

δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

and being-moved rages

Ὁ δίκαιος βίος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος πλείστης 12

the just life (is)-most-untroubled the and unjust of-greatest

ταραχῆς γέμων.

trouble full

Ὡν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου 13

of-what-things the wisdom provides for the of-the whole life

μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

blessedness much (the)-greatest is the of-the friendship possession

- 14 Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ, δις δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι· δεῖ δὲ
we-have-been-born once twice and not it-is-possible to-come-to-be it-is-necessary and
 τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτι εἶναι· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον κύριος
for-the eternity no-longer to-be you and not being of-the tomorrow master
 ἀναβάλλη τὸν καιρόν· ὁ δὲ βίος μελλησμῶ παραπόλλυται
put-off the occasion the and life by-delay is-wasted
 καὶ εἰς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἀσχολούμενος ἀποθνήσκει.
and one each of-us being-busy dies

II • SAYINGS 15–28

No one chooses an evil while seeing it as an evil; he is lured to it as to a good. It is not the young man who is to be called blessed but the old man who has lived nobly, since the young is still shifted about by fortune while the old has anchored in old age as in a harbor. Nature is not to be forced but persuaded, and poverty measured by nature's end is great wealth.

- 15 Ἦθη ὥσπερ τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια τιμῶμεν, ἅν τε
characters just-as the of-us ourselves own we-honor whether both
 χρηστὰ ἔχωμεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλούμενα, ἅν
good we-have and by the men envied wether
 τε μή· οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν πέλας, ἅν ἐπιεικεῖς ᾧσιν.
both not so one-must also the of-the neighbors if fitting they-are
- 16 Οὐδεὶς βλέπων τὸ κακὸν αἰρεῖται αὐτό, ἀλλὰ δελεασθεὶς
no-one seeing the evil chooses it but having-been-lured
 ὡς ἀγαθῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὸ μείζον
as by-a-good being it and not having-looked toward the greater
 αὐτοῦ κακὸν ἐθηρεύθη.
than-it evil he-was-caught

- Οὐ νέος μακαριστός, ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκώς 17
not a-young-man (is)-to-be-called-blessed but an-old-man having-lived
 καλῶς· ὁ γὰρ νέος ἀκμὴν πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης
nobly the for young-man in-his-prime much by the fortune
 ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι
shifting-in-mind wanders the and old-man just-as in a-harbor
 τῷ γήρᾳ καθώρμικεν τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα
in-the old-age has-anchored the-things earlier despaired-of
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι.
of-the goods in-a-safe having-shut-up gratitude
- Ἀφαιρουμένης προσόψεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ συναναστροφῆς 18
being-taken-away sight and company and intercourse
 ἐκλύεται τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος.
is-dissolved the erotic passion
- Τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ γέρων τήμερον γεγένηται. 19
of-the past unmindful good an-old-man today has-become
- Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, 20
of-the appetites the-ones indeed are natural and necessary
 αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, αἱ δὲ οὔτε
the-others and natural indeed not necessary and the-ones and neither
 φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.
natural nor necessary but beside an-empty opinion arising
- Οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ 21
not one-must-force the nature but one-must-persuade we-shall-persuade and
 τὰς ἀναγκαῖας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τὰς τε φυσικὰς
the necessary appetites fulfilling the-ones both natural
 ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.
if not they-harm the-ones and harmful sharply refuting

- 22 Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν
the infinite time and the limited equal has the
 ἡδονήν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ
pleasure if someone rightly of-it the limits measures-out
 τῷ λογισμῷ.
by-the reasoning
- 23 Πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἵληφεν
every friendship through itself (is)-choiceworthy a-beginning and it-has-taken
 ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.
from the advantage
- 24 Ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν,
dreams not obtained a-nature divine nor a-prophetic power
 ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδώλων.
but they-come-about by an-impact of-images
- 25 Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ
the poverty being-measured by-the of-the nature end great is
 πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.
wealth wealth and not being-limited great is poverty
- 26 Δεῖ διαλαβεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ πολὺς λόγος καὶ ὁ βραχὺς
it-is-necessary to-determine that both the long discourse and the short
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνει.
toward the same tends
- 27 Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις
in indeed the other pursuits scarcely
 τελειωθείσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας
for-those-having-been-completed the fruit comes in and of-philosophy
 συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνόν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν
runs-together with-the knowledge the delightful not for after learning
 ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μάθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.
(comes)-enjoyment but at-once learning and enjoyment

Οὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς 28
 neither the ready for friendship nor the hesitant
 δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινδυνεύσαι χάριν,
 must-one-approve it-is-necessary and also to-run-risk for-the-sake(-of-it)
 χάριν φιλίας.
 for-the-sake of-friendship

III • SAYINGS 29–42

Epicurus says he would rather speak frankly as a natural philosopher, prophesying what is good for all men even if no one is going to understand, than court the applause of the many. Against everything else it is possible to procure safety, but because of death we all live in a city without walls. The flesh cries out only not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold — and a man who has these and expects to keep them could contend with Zeus for happiness.

Παρρησία γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολόγῳ χρησιμωδεῖν 29
 with-frankness for I-at-least using natural-philosophic to-prophesy
 τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ βουλοίμην,
 the-things advantageous to-all men rather — I-should-wish
 καὶ μὴδεὶς μέλλῃ συνήσειν, ἢ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς
 even-if no-one is-going to-understand than assenting to-the
 δόξαις καρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν
 opinions to-reap the thick falling from the
 πολλῶν ἔπαινον.
 many praise

Ἐτοιμάζονταί τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὐ 30
 prepare some through life the-things toward the life not
 συνορῶντες ὥς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν θανάσιμον ἐγκέχυται τὸ τῆς
 perceiving that into-all us deadly has-been-poured the of-the
 γενέσεως φάρμακον.
 birth drug

- 31 Πρὸς μὲν τᾶλλα δυνατόν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι,
against indeed the-other-things (it-is)-possible safety to-provide
 χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον
because-of and death all men a-city unvalled
 οἰκοῦμεν.
we-inhabit
- 32 Ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί.
the of-the wise-man reverence good great for-the man-revering is
- 33 Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ
of-flesh cry the not to-be-hungry the not to-be-thirsty the not
 ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξει καὶ
to-be-cold these for having someone and hoping to-have even
 Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιο.
with-Zeus about happiness he-might-contend
- 34 Οὐχ οὕτως χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρεῖας παρὰ τῶν φίλων
not so need we-have of-the service from the friends
 ὥς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρεῖας.
as of-the confidence the about the service
- 35 Οὐ δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων
not one-must to-spoil the-things present of-the absent
 ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων
by-appetite but to-reckon that also these of-the things-prayed-for
 ἦν.
were
- 36 Ὁ Ἐπικούρου βίος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος ἔνεκεν
the of-Epicurus life with-the of-the others being-compared for-the-sake
 ἡμερότητος καὶ αὐταρκειᾶς μῦθος ἂν νομισθεῖη.
of-gentleness and of-self-sufficiency a-fable — it-might-be-thought

Ἀσθενὴς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ 37

weak the nature is toward the evil not toward the
ἀγαθόν· ἡδοναῖς μὲν γὰρ σώζεται, ἀλγηδόσι δὲ διαλύεται.
good by-pleasures indeed for it-is-saved by-pains and it-is-dissolved

Μικρὸς παντάπασιν, ὧ πολλὰι αἰτίαι εὐλογοὶ εἰς 38

small altogether (is-he)-to-whom many causes reasonable for
ἐξαγωγὴν βίου.
a-leading-out of-life

Οὔθ' ὁ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος 39

neither the-man the service seeking through all (is)-a-friend
οὔθ' ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει
nor the-man never joining the-one indeed for peddles
τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ
by-the favor the return the-other and cuts-off the about
τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν.

the future good-hope

Ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν 40

the-man saying everything by necessity to-come-about nothing to-charge
ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι·
has against-the man-saying not everything by necessity to-come-about
αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό φησι κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι.

this for very-thing he-says by necessity to-come-about

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ 41

to-laugh at-once one-must and to-philosophize and to-manage-a-household and
τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς
the remaining familiar-concerns to-use and in-no-way to-cease the
ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

from the right philosophy utterances sending-forth

- 42 Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
the same time both of-the-birth of-the greatest good and
 ἀπολαύσεως.
of-the-enjoyment

IV • SAYINGS 43–56

The wise man shut up to bare necessities knows better how to give a share than to take one, and natural science makes men unpretentious and self-sufficient rather than showy. In the forty-seventh Saying Epicurus addresses Fortune: he has forestalled her, blocked her every stealthy entry, and will surrender himself neither to her nor to any circumstance. Friendship dances round the inhabited world, calling all of us to wake to blessedness.

- 43 Φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδικα μὲν ἀσεβές, δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν·
to-love-money unjust-ways indeed (is)-impious just-ways and (is)-shameful
 ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς φείδεσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.
unfitting for sordidly to-be-sparing even with the just
- 44 Ὁ σοφὸς εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκλεισθεὶς μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται
the wise-man into the necessities having-been-shut-up more knows-how
 μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν· τηλικούτον αὐταρκείας
to-give-a-share than to-take-a-share so-great of-self-sufficiency
 εὔρε θησαυρόν.
be-found a-treasure
- 45 Οὐ κόμπου οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικούς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον
not of-boasting nor of-voice productive-of nor the much-fought-over
 παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδεῖαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία
among the many learning displaying natural-science
 παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ' ἀσοβάρους καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ
prepares but unpretentious and self-sufficient and upon

τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα
the own goods not upon the-things of-the circumstances greatly
 φρονοῦντας.

priding-themselves

Τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν 46
the base habits just-as men wicked a-long
 χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντας τελείως ἐκδιώκομεν.

time greatly having-harmed completely we-drive-out

Προκατείλημμαι σε, ὦ Τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σὴν 47
I-have-forestalled you O Fortune and every the your

παρείσδυσιν ἐνέφραξα. καὶ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλῃ οὐδεμιᾷ
stealthy-entry I-have-blocked and neither to-you nor to-another to-any

περιστάσει δώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδότους· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμᾶς
circumstance shall-we-give ourselves surrendered but whenever us

τὸ χρεὼν ἐξάγῃ, μέγα προσπτύσαντες τῷ ζῆν καὶ τοῖς
the necessity leads-out greatly having-spat-upon the to-live and the-things

αὐτῷ κενῶς περιπλαττομένοις ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ
to-it empty clinging we-shall-go from the to-live with

καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὥς εὖ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

a-noble paean crying-out how well by-us it-has-been-lived

Πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑστέραν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιεῖν, 48

to-try the later than-the earlier better to-make

ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ ᾶμεν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐπὶ πέρας ἔλθωμεν,

as-long-as ever on a-road we-are whenever and to an-end we-come

ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι.

evenly to-rejoice

Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων 49

not it-was the-thing frightening to-dissolve about the most-sovereign-matters

μὴ εἰδότας τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύοντάς

not knowing what (is)-the of-the universe nature but suspecting

τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ
something of-the-things according-to the myths so-that not it-was without
 φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.
natural-science unmixed the pleasures to-receive

- 50 Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ ποιητικὰ
no pleasure in itself (is)-evil but the-things producing
 ἐνίων πολλαπλασίους ὀχλήσεις ἐπιφέρει τῶν
of-some(-pleasures) many-times-greater disturbances bring-on than-the
 ἡδονῶν.
pleasures

- 51 Πυνθάνομαί σου τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον
I-learn from-you the according-to flesh motion too-abundantly
 διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισίων ἔντευξιν. σὺν δὲ ὅταν
to-be-disposed toward the of-sexual-pleasures intercourse you and whenever
 μήτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύης μήτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθει
neither the laws you-dissolve nor the-things nobly by-custom
 κείμενα κινήσῃ μήτε τῶν πλησίον τινὰ λυπῆς μήτε τὴν
established you-disturb nor of-the neighbors anyone you-grieve nor the
 σάρκα καταξαίνης μήτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκης, χρῶ
flesh you-tear-down nor the necessities you-use-up use
 ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. ἀμήχανον μέντοι γε
as you-wish the of-yourself choice impossible however at-least
 τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τινι τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδίσια
the not — by-one at-least some of-these to-be-held sexual-pleasures
 γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὦνησεν, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.
for never benefited (it-is)-welcome and if not it-harmed

- 52 Ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ
the friendship dances-around the inhabited-world proclaiming indeed
 πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν.
to-all us to-rouse-ourselves toward the blessedness

Οὐδενὶ φθονητέον· ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιοι φθόνου, 53
at-no-one must-one-be-envious good-men for not (are)-worthy of-envy
 πονηροὶ δὲ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον εὐτυχῶσι. τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον
wicked-men and by-how-much ever more they-prosper by-so-much more
 αὐτοῖς λυμαίνονται.
themselves they-spoil

Οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν· 54
not to-pretend one-must to-philosophize but really to-philosophize
 οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ
not for we-need-besides of-the to-seem to-be-healthy but of-the
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν.
according-to truth to-be-healthy

Θεραπευτέον τὰς συμφοράς τῇ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων χάριτι 55
one-must-treat the misfortunes by-the of-the things-being-lost gratitude
 καὶ τῷ γινώσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπρακτον ποιῆσαι τὸ
and by-the to-know that not it-is undone to-make the
 γεγονός.
thing-done

Ἄλγעי μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος ἢ 56
feels-pain indeed the wise-man not more being-racked than
 στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου.
being-racked the friend

V · SAYINGS 57–70

It is not the belly that is insatiable, as most people say, but a false opinion about the belly's unlimited filling. Everyone leaves life as though he had just been born. Where parents are angry with their children, resisting is pointless if the anger is deserved, and if it is not, it is ridiculous to feed it with anger of one's own rather than change it by other and fair-minded means. It is empty to ask the gods for what a man can supply for himself.

- 57 Ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ
the life of-him all through distrust will-be-confounded and
 ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.
overthrown will-be
- 58 Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικά
one-must-release oneself from the about the routine and political
 δεσμωτηρίου.
prison
- 59 Ἄπληστον οὐ γαστήρ. ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί φασιν,
insatiable (is)-not a-belly just-as the many say
 ἀλλὰ δόξα ψευδὴς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῆς γαστροῦ ἀορίστου
but an-opinion false about the of-the belly unlimited
 πληρώματος.
filling
- 60 Πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.
everyone as just-now born from the to-live departs
- 61 Καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίον ὄψις, τῆς πρώτης συγγενείας
most-beautiful also the of-the neighbors sight of-the first kinship
 ὁμονοούσης ἢ πολλὴν εἰς τοῦτο ποιουμένης σπουδῇ.
being-of-one-mind or much toward this making zeal
- 62 Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δέον ὀργαὶ γίνονται τοῖς γεννήσασιν
if for according-to the fitting angers arise for-the begetters
 πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα, μάταιον δῆπουθέν ἐστι τὸ ἀντιτείνειν καὶ
toward the offspring vain doubtless is the to-resist and
 μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμης τυχεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ
not to-beg pardon to-obtain if and not according-to the
 δέον ἀλλὰ ἀλογώτερον, γελοῖον πάντως τὸ προσεκκαίειν
fitting but more-unreasonably (it-is)-ridiculous altogether the to-inflame-further

τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμοκατοχοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν μεταθεῖναι
the unreasonableness one-nursing-anger and not to-seek to-alter-it
 κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους εὐγνωμονοῦντα.

by other ways being-fair-minded

Ἔστι καὶ ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης, ἧς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος 63

there-is also in thriftiness a-purity of-which the man-unreflecting

παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι.

closely-resembling something suffers to-the through unlimitedness falling-away

Ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔπαινον αὐτόματον, 64

to-follow one-must the from the others praise unbidden

ἡμᾶς δὲ γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἱατρείαν.

us and to-be-engaged about the of-us healing

Μάταιόν ἐστι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖσθαι ἃ τις ἑαυτῷ 65

vain it-is from gods to-ask what-things someone for-himself

χορηγῆσαι ἱκανός ἐστι.

to-supply sufficient is

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες. 66

let-us-feel-with the friends not lamenting but caring

Ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλὰ 67

a-free life not is-able to-acquire money much

διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ ράδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων

through the the matter not easy to-be apart-from servitude of-crowds

ἢ δυναστών, ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ δαιτυλεία πάντα κέκτηται· ἂν

or of-potentates but in-continual abundance everything it-has-acquired if

δέ που καὶ τύχη χρημάτων πολλῶν, καὶ ταῦτα

and somewhere even it-happens-upon money much also these

ράδιως ἂν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὐνοίαν διαμετρήσαι.

easily would into the of-the neighbor goodwill measure-out

Οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν ᾧ ὀλίγον τὸ ἱκανόν.

nothing (is)-enough for-whom little the enough

68

- 69 Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῶον εἰς
the of-the soul thanklessness greedy made the creature into
 ἄπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων.
infinity of-the in diet embellishments
- 70 Μηδέν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθείη ὃ φόβον παρέξει σοι, εἰ
nothing by-you in life let-it-be-done which fear will-furnish for-you if
 γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον.
it-shall-be-known to-the neighbor

VI • SAYINGS 71–81

Put this question to every appetite: what will happen to me if what it seeks is accomplished, and what if it is not? In a learned discussion the man who is beaten gains more, by what he has learned. The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom. The last Saying closes the collection: neither the greatest wealth nor honor and admiration among the many dissolves the soul's disturbance or begets any joy worth mentioning.

- 71 Πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα
toward all the appetites one-must-apply the question
 τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν
this what for-me will-come-about if is-accomplished the according-to the
 ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον, καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;
appetite thing-sought and what if not it-is-accomplished
- 72 Οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν
no benefit it-was the according-to men security
 παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων ὄντων καὶ τῶν
to-provide of-the from-above suspect being and of-the-things
 ὑποκάτω καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.
beneath and simply of-the-things in the infinite

Καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ 73
and the to-have-come-about certain pains about body is-profitable
 πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν.

toward a-guarding of-the like-kind

Ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει πλείον ἤνυσεν ὁ ἡττηθείς. καθ' 74
in a-learned discussion more gained the man-defeated according-to
 ὃ προσέμαθεν.

what he-learned-besides

Εἰς τὰ παρωχηκότα ἀγαθὰ ἀχάριστος φωνὴ ἢ λέγουσα 75
toward the past goods thankless utterance the saying

Τέλος ὄρα μακροῦ βίου.

end look-at of-a-long life

Τοιοῦτος εἶ γηράσκων ὁποῖον ἐγὼ παραινῶ, καὶ 76
such you-are growing-old of-what-sort I advise and

διέγνωκας ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐαυτῷ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ
you-have-discerned of-what-sort it-is the for-oneself to-have-philosophized and
 οἶον τὸ τῇ Ἑλλάδι· συγχαίρω σοι.

of-what-sort the for-the Greece I-rejoice-with you

Τῆς αὐταρκείας καρπὸς μέγιστος ἐλευθερία. 77

of-the self-sufficiency fruit (the)-greatest (is)-freedom

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται 78
the noble-man about wisdom and friendship most is-engaged

ὦν τὸ μὲν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

of-which the one is a-mortal good the other (is)-immortal

Ὁ ἀτάραχος ἐαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος. 79

the untroubled-man for-himself and for-another (is)-undisturbing

80 Γενναίῳ σωτηρίας μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις καὶ
for-a-noble-man of-safety a-part (is)-of-the age watching and
 φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
guarding of-the-things everything defiling according-to the appetites
 τὰς οἰστρώδεις.
the maddening

81 Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον
not dissolves the of-the soul disturbance nor the worth-mentioning
 ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ'
does-it-beget joy neither wealth being the greatest nor
 ἢ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὔτ' ἄλλο
the among the many honor and admiration nor another
 τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας.
anything of-the-things beside the unlimited causes
