

GREEK SERIES • VOLUME 10

OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

ΠΥΡΡΩΝΕΙΟΙ ΥΠΟΤΥΠΩΣΕΙΣ

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Three Books on the Skeptical Way

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order




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The Greek text follows Mutschmann's Teubner of 1912

Set from the First Thousand Years of Greek, with corrections

Translated and composed with AI, edited by Christopher Hench
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Words the editor secludes are not printed; words he supplies
are printed without their brackets; *** marks a gap in the text,
and an asterisk standing alone a passage he marks as corrupt.
The lists of chapter titles with which each book opens are not printed,
and the margin keeps his section numbers, restarting each book.

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BOOK I

περὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω διαφορᾶς τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν

I.1 · THE THREE HIGHEST PHILOSOPHIES

Anyone who investigates something either discovers it, denies that it can be discovered, or keeps searching. So it is in philosophy. The dogmatists say they have found the truth, the Academics declare it cannot be apprehended, and the skeptics are still looking. Sextus will describe the skeptical way in outline, warning first that he affirms nothing about what follows, but reports how each thing appears to him now.

Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πράγμα ἢ εὔρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν 1

for-the-(ones) investigating some matter either a-discovery to-follow

εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὑρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ

(is)-likely or a-denial of-discovery and of-inapprehensibility an-admission or

ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως.

a-persistence of-investigation

διόπερ ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων 2

wherefore perhaps also in the-(things) according-to philosophy being-investigated

οἱ μὲν εὑρηκέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ'

the-(ones) indeed to-have-discovered the true said the-(ones) but

ἀπεφάναντο μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ

declared not possible to-be this to-be-apprehended the-(ones)

δὲ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν.

and still are-investigating

καὶ εὑρηκέναι μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἰδίως καλούμενοι 3

and to-have-discovered indeed they-seem the-(ones) specially being-called

δογματικοί, οἷον οἱ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπικούρου καὶ

dogmatists such-as the-(ones) about Aristotle and Epicurus and

τοὺς Στωικούς καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς δὲ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτων

the Stoics and others some that but about inapprehensible-(things)

ἀπεφήναντο οἱ περὶ Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ
they-declared the-(ones) about Clitomachus and Carneades and
 ἄλλοι Ἀκαδημαῖκοί, ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί.

other Academics they-investigate and the skeptics

- 4 ὅθεν εὐλόγως δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς
whence reasonably they-seem the highest philosophies three
 εἶναι, δογματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτική. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
to-be dogmatic Academic skeptical about indeed then the
 ἄλλων ἐτέροις ἀρμόσει λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς
others for-others it-will-be-fitting to-speak about and the skeptical
 ἀγωγῆς ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν,
way in-outline at the present we will-speak
 ἐκεῖνο προειπόντες, ὅτι περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν λεχθησομένων
that having-said-beforehand that about none of-the (things)-to-be-said
 διαβεβαιούμεθα ὡς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ
we-affirm as thus being altogether just-as
 λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς
we-say but according-to the now appearing to-us as-a-report
 ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἐκάστου.
we-announce about each

περὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς σκέψεως

I.2 · THE GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT

The skeptical philosophy has a general account and a special one. The general sets out the character of skepticism: its conception, its principles, its arguments, its criterion and its end, the modes of suspension, the use of the skeptical utterances, and how skepticism differs from the philosophies that stand next to it. The special argues against each part of philosophy. Sextus takes the general first, beginning with the names.

Τῆς σκεπτικῆς οὖν φιλοσοφίας ὁ μὲν λέγεται καθόλου 5
of-the skeptical then philosophy the indeed is-called general
 λόγος ὁ δὲ εἰδικός, καὶ καθόλου μὲν ἐν ᾧ τὸν
account the and specific and general indeed in which the
 χαρακτήρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐκτιθέμεθα, λέγοντες τίς
character of-the skepticism we-set-out saying what
 ἔννοια αὐτῆς καὶ τίνες ἀρχαὶ καὶ τίνες
(is)-the-conception of-it and what (are)-the-principles and what
 λόγοι, τί τε κριτήριον καὶ τί τέλος, καὶ τίνες
(are)-the-arguments what both (is)-the-criterion and what (is)-the-end and what
 οἱ τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς, καὶ πῶς παραλαμβάνομεν
(are)-the modes of-the suspension-of-judgment and how we-employ
 τὰς σκεπτικὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν τῆς σκέψεως
the skeptical utterances and the distinction of-the skepticism
 ἀπὸ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφιῶν·
from the lying-alongside it philosophies
 εἰδικὸς δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς καλουμένης 6
specific and in which against each part of-the being-called
 φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλέγομεν. περὶ τοῦ καθόλου δὴ πρῶτον
philosophy we-argue about the general indeed first
 διαλάβωμεν λόγου, ἀρξάμενοι τῆς ὑφηγήσεως ἀπὸ τῶν
let-us-treat account having-begun the exposition from the
 τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ὀνομάτων.
of-the skeptical way names

περὶ τῶν ὀνομασιῶν τῆς σκεπτικῆς

I.3 · THE NAMES OF THE SKEPTICAL WAY

The way is called inquiring, from its activity of searching and examining; suspensive, from the state that comes over the examiner afterward; and aporetic, either because it is at a loss about everything or because it has no resource for assent or denial. It is also called Pyrrhonian, because Pyrrho seems to have applied himself to skepticism more fully and more conspicuously than anyone before him.

- 7 Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγὴ καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ
the skeptical then way is-called indeed also inquiring
ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ
from the-activity the according-to the to-inquire and to-examine and
ἐφεκτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον
suspensive from the after the inquiry concerning the (one)-examining
γινομένου πάθους, καὶ ἀπορητικὴ ἥτοι ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ
arising feeling and aporetic either from the about
παντὸς ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, ὥς ἔνιοί φασιν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ
everything to-be-at-a-loss and to-inquire as some say or from the
ἀμυχανεῖν πρὸς συγκατάθεσιν ἢ ἄρνησιν, καὶ Πυρρώνειος
to-be-without-resource toward assent or denial and Pyrrhonian
ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικώτερον καὶ
from the to-appear to-us — Pyrrho more-bodily and
ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.
more-conspicuously than-the before him to-have-approached the skepticism

τί ἐστι σκέψις

1.4 · WHAT SKEPTICISM IS

Skepticism is the power of setting appearances and thoughts against one another in any manner whatever, so that the equal strength of the opposed matters and arguments brings first suspension of judgment and then unperturbedness. Sextus glosses each term in turn: power in the plain sense of being able, appearances as things sensed, opposed arguments as conflicting rather than contradictory, suspension as a standstill of the mind, unperturbedness as calm.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων 8
is and the skeptical power making-opposite of-appearing-(things)
 τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἷονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς
both and of-thought-(things) in whatever manner from which
 ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ
we-come through the in the opposed matters and
 λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν, τὸ
arguments equal-strength the indeed first to suspension-of-judgment the
 δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.
and after this to unperturbedness
 ‘δύναμιν’ μὲν οὖν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ 9
power indeed then it we-call not according-to the
 περίεργον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι· ‘φαινόμενα’
over-curious but simply according-to the to-be-able appearing-(things)
 δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διόπερ ἀντιδιαστέλλομεν
and we-take now the sensible-(things) wherefore we-set-in-contrast
 αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ ‘καθ' οἷονδήποτε τρόπον’
to-them the thought-(things) the and in whatever manner
 δύναται προσαρμόζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἀπλῶς τὸ
can be-fitted also to-the power so-that simply the
 τῆς δυνάμεως ὄνομα, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ
of-the power name as we-have-said we-may-employ and

τῷ ‘ἀντιθετικῇ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων’ ἐπεὶ γὰρ
to-the making-opposite of-appearing-(things) both and of-thought-(things) since for
 ποικίλως ἀντιτίθεμεν ταῦτα, ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις
variously we-oppose these either appearing-(things) to-appearing-(things)
 ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ ἀντιτιθέντες, ἵνα
or thought-(things) to-thought-(things) or alternately opposing so-that
 πᾶσαι αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἐμπεριέχωνται, λέγομεν ‘καθ’ οἷονδῆποτε
all the oppositions may-be-included we-say in whatever
 τρόπον’. ἢ ‘καθ’ οἷονδῆποτε τρόπον φαινομένων τε καὶ
manner or in whatever manner of-appearing-(things) both and
 νοουμένων’, ἵνα μὴ ζητῶμεν πῶς φαίνεται τὰ φαινόμενα
of-thought-(things) so-that not we-may-inquire how appears the appearing-(things)
 ἢ πῶς νοεῖται τὰ νοούμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς ταῦτα λαμβάνωμεν.
or how is-thought the thought-(things) but simply these we-may-take
 10 ‘ἀντικειμένους’ δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχὶ πάντως
opposed and arguments we-employ not-at-all altogether
 ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένων.
denial and affirmation but simply instead of-the conflicting
 ‘ἰσοσθένειαν’ δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν
equal-strength and we-call the according-to belief and disbelief
 ἰσότητα, ὥς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων
equality so-that no-one of-nothing to-be-set-before of-the conflicting
 λόγων ὥς πιστότερον. ‘ἐποχῇ’ δέ ἐστι στάσις
arguments as more-credible suspension-of-judgment and is a-standstill
 διανοίας δι’ ἣν οὔτε αἵρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν.
of-understanding through which neither we-take-away anything nor we-set-down
 ‘ἀταραξία’ δέ ἐστι ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης. πῶς
unperturbedness and is of-soul untroubledness and calm how
 δὲ τῇ ἐποχῇ συνεισέρχεται ἡ ἀταραξία, ἐν
and to-the suspension-of-judgment enters-together the unperturbedness in
 τοῖς περὶ τέλους ὑπομνήσομεν.
the-(books) about (the)-end we-shall-recall

περὶ τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ

I.5 • THE SKEPTIC

The Pyrrhonian philosopher needs no separate definition. He has already been defined along with the conception of the skeptical way, since he is simply the man who shares in that power.

Καὶ ὁ Πυρρώνειος δὲ φιλόσοφος δυνάμει τῇ τῆς 11
and the Pyrrhonian and philosopher in-power by-the of-the
σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐννοία συναποδέδοται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ
skeptical way conception has-been-defined-along-with is for the
μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως.
(one)-sharing-in this the power

περὶ ἀρχῶν τῆς σκέψεως

I.6 • THE PRINCIPLES OF SKEPTICISM

The causal principle of skepticism is the hope of becoming unperturbed. Men of great natural gifts, troubled by the unevenness of things and at a loss which side to assent to, began to inquire what is true and what false, expecting to be unperturbed once they had decided. Its constitutive principle is that to every argument an equal argument is opposed, for it is by this that we seem to end in holding no beliefs.

Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν φάμεν εἶναι 12
a-beginning and of-the skepticism causal indeed we-say to-be
τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτῆσειν· οἱ γὰρ μεγαλοφυεῖς τῶν
the hope of-the to-be-unperturbed the for great-natured of-the
ἀνθρώπων ταρασσόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι
men being-disturbed through the in the things
ἀνωμαλίαν, καὶ ἀποροῦντες τίσιιν αὐτῶν χρή μᾶλλον
unevenness and being-at-a-loss to-which of-them one-must rather

συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν, τί τε ἀληθές
assent came to the to-inquire what both true
 ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τί ψεῦδος, ὥς ἐκ τῆς
is in the things and what false so-that from the
 ἐπικρίσεως τούτων ἀταρακτῆσυντες. συστάσεως δὲ τῆς
deciding of-these being-about-to-be-unperturbed of-constitution and of-the
 σκεπτικῆς ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ
skepticism is a-beginning especially the to-every to-an-argument
 λόγον ἴσον ἀντικείμεναι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν
an-argument equal to-be-opposed from for this to-end-up
 δοκοῦμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.
we-seem in the not to-hold-beliefs

εἰ δογματίζει ὁ σκεπτικός

1.7 · DOES THE SKEPTIC HOLD BELIEFS?

The skeptic holds no beliefs, if belief means assent to something non-evident that the sciences investigate; he does assent to the feelings that an impression forces on him, and will not deny that he is warm. Nor does he hold a belief in using the skeptical utterances, since each of them cancels itself along with the rest. He states only what appears to him, and reports his own feeling without opinion.

- 13 Λέγομεν δὲ μὴ δογματίζειν τὸν σκεπτικὸν οὐ κατ'
we-say and not to-hold-beliefs the skeptic not according-to
 ἐκεῖνο τὸ σημανόμενον τοῦ δόγματος καθ' ὃ
that the meaning of-the belief according-to which
 δόγμα εἶναί φασί τινες κοινότερον τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινι
a-belief to-be say some more-commonly the to-approve-of some
 πράγματι (τοῖς γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν κατηναγκασμένοις
matter to-the for according-to impression compelled
 πάθεσι συγκατατίθεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἷον οὐκ ἂν εἴποι
feelings assents the skeptic such-as not — would-say

θερμαινόμενος ἢ ψυχόμενος ὅτι δοκῶ μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ
being-warmed or being-cooled that I-think not to-be-warmed or
 ψύχεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μὴ δογματίζειν λέγομεν καθ' ὃ δόγμα
to-be-cooled but not to-hold-beliefs we-say according-to which a-belief
 εἶναί φασί τινες τὴν τινι πράγματι τῶν κατὰ τὰς
to-be say some the to-some matter of-the according-to the
 ἐπιστήμας ζητουμένων ἀδήλων συγκατάθεσιν (οὐδενὶ
sciences being-investigated non-evident-(things) assent to-nothing
 γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων συγκατατίθεται ὁ Πυρρώνειος).

for of-the non-evident-(things) assents the Pyrrhonian
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ προφέρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰς 14
but not-even in the to-utter about the non-evident-(things) the
 σκεπτικὰς φωνάς, οἷον τὴν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' ἢ τὴν 'οὐδὲν
skeptical utterances such-as the nothing more or the nothing
 ὀρίζω' ἢ τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὕστερον λέξομεν
I-determine or some of-the others about which later we-shall-speak
 δογματίζει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ὡς ὑπάρχον τίθεται
does-he-hold-beliefs the indeed for (one)-holding-beliefs as existing sets-down
 τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκείνο ὃ λέγεται δογματίζειν, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς
the matter that which is-said to-hold-beliefs the and skeptic
 τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας οὐχ ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας·
the utterances sets-down these not as altogether existing
 ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἢ 'πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ' φωνὴ
he-supposes for that just-as the all is false utterance
 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐαυτὴν ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἢ
with the others also itself false to-be says and the
 'οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ἀληθές' ὁμοίως, οὕτως καὶ ἢ 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον'
nothing is true likewise thus also the nothing more
 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐαυτὴν φησι μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ
with the others also itself says not more to-be and

διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει. τὸ δ'
through this with-the others itself circumscribes-along-with the and
 αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν.
same also about the other skeptical utterances we-say

- 15 πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ
except but if the (one)-holding-beliefs sets-down as existing this which
 δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρειται
he-holds-beliefs the and skeptic the utterances of-himself utters
 ὡς δυνάμει ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ
as in-power by themselves to-be-circumscribed not — in the
 προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθεῖν. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον,
utterance of-these to-hold-beliefs he-would-be-said the and greatest
 ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον
in the utterance of-the utterances of-these the to-himself appearing
 λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως,
he-says and the feeling he-reports the of-himself without-opinion
 μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιούμενος.
nothing about the outside underlying-(things) affirming

εἰ αἵρεσιν ἔχει ὁ σκεπτικός

1.8 · DOES THE SKEPTIC HAVE A SCHOOL?

If a school means an inclination to many beliefs consistent with one another and with the appearances, and belief means assent to something non-evident, then the skeptic has no school. If it means following an argument that shows how to live rightly according to the appearances, then he does, for he follows an argument that shows him how to live by ancestral customs, the laws, the ways, and his own familiar feelings.

Ὅμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶσθαι εἰ αἵρεσιν 16

likewise and we-are-carried also in the to-be-asked if a-school
 ἔχει ὁ σκεπτικός. εἰ μὲν γάρ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι λέγει
 has the skeptic if indeed for someone a-school to-be says
 πρόσκλισιν δόγμασι πολλοῖς ἀκολουθίαν ἔχουσι πρὸς
 an-inclination to-beliefs many consistency having toward
 ἄλληλά τε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ λέγει δόγμα πράγματι
 one-another both and the appearing-(things) and says a-belief to-a-matter
 ἀδήλῳ συγκατάθεσιν, φήσομεν μὴ ἔχειν αἵρεσιν.
 non-evident assent we-shall-say not to-have a-school

εἰ δέ τις αἵρεσιν εἶναι φάσκει τὴν λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ 17

if and someone a-school to-be asserts the to-an-argument some according-to
 τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσαν ἀγωγὴν, ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου
 the appearing following way of-that the argument
 ὥς ἔστιν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ζῆν ὑποδεικνύοντος (τοῦ ὀρθῶς
 that it-is rightly to-seem to-live showing the rightly
 μὴ μόνον κατ' ἀρετὴν λαμβανομένου ἀλλ' ἀφελέστερον)
 not only according-to virtue being-taken but more-simply
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν δύνασθαι διατείνοντος, αἵρεσιν
 and to the to-suspend-judgment to-be-able extending a-school
 φάμεν ἔχειν· ἀκολουθοῦμεν γάρ τινι λόγῳ κατὰ τὸ
 we-say to-have we-follow for some argument according-to the
 φαινόμενον ὑποδεικνύντι ἡμῖν τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰ πάτρια
 appearing showing to-us the to-live toward the ancestral
 ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ οἰκεία πάθη.
 customs and the laws and the ways and the familiar feelings

εἰ φυσιολογεῖ ὁ σκεπτικός

I.9 · DOES THE SKEPTIC STUDY NATURE?

The same answer serves here. The skeptic does not study nature in order to declare anything about it with firm conviction, but he does take up natural philosophy in order to have an equal argument to oppose to every argument, and for the sake of unperturbedness. He goes over the logical and ethical parts of philosophy in the same spirit.

- 18 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγομεν καὶ ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν εἰ
similar-(things) and we-say also in the to-inquire whether
φυσιολογητέον τῷ σκεπτικῷ· ἔνεκα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μετὰ
one-must-study-nature for-the skeptic for-the-sake indeed for of-the with
βεβαίου πείσματος ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τίνος τῶν κατὰ
firm conviction to-declare about something of-the according-to
τὴν φυσιολογίαν δογματιζομένων οὐ φυσιολογοῦμεν, ἔνεκα
the study-of-nature being-held-as-belief not we-study-nature for-the-sake
δὲ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἔχειν ἀντιτιθέναι καὶ
and of-the to-every argument an-argument equal to-have to-oppose and
τῆς ἀταραξίας ἀπτόμεθα τῆς φυσιολογίας. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
of-the unperturbedness we-touch of-the study-of-nature thus and also
τὸ λογικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ ἠθικὸν τῆς λεγομένης φιλοσοφίας
the logical part and the ethical of-the being-called philosophy
ἐπερχόμεθα.
we-go-over

εἰ ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα οἱ σκεπτικοί

I.10 · DO THE SKEPTICS DO AWAY WITH APPEARANCES?

Those who say the skeptics abolish appearances have not listened. What an impression forces on us we do not overturn; that is the appearance. Honey appears sweet to us and we concede it, since we are sweetened; what we inquire about is whether it is also sweet in itself. When Sextus argues against the appearances he means to show the rashness of the dogmatists, not to take the appearances away.

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα οἱ σκεπτικοί 19

the and (ones)-saying that they-do-away-with the appearing-(things) the skeptics

ἀνήκοοι μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων·

deaf to-me they-seem to-be of-the among us being-said

τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ἀβουλήτῳ ἡμᾶς

the-(things) for according-to an-impression passive unwillingly us

ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν, ὥς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν

leading to assent not we-overturn as also before

ἐλέγομεν· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ φαινόμενα. ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν,

we-were-saying these and are the appearing-(things) when and we-inquire

εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν

whether such is the underlying-(thing) as-what-kind it-appears the indeed

ὅτι φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου

that it-appears we-grant we-inquire but not about the appearing

ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου· τοῦτο

but about that which is-said about the appearing this

δὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φαινομένου.

and differs from-the to-inquire about itself the appearing

οἶον φαίνεται μὲν ἡμῖν γλυκάζειν τὸ μέλι (τοῦτο 20

such-as it-appears indeed to-us to-be-sweet the honey this

συγχωροῦμεν· γλυκαζόμεθα γὰρ αἰσθητικῶς), εἰ δὲ

we-concede we-are-sweetened for perceptibly whether and

καὶ γλυκὺ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ζητοῦμεν.
also sweet it-is as-much-as regarding the argument we-inquire
 ὁ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦ
which not is the appearing but the about the
 φαινομένου λεγόμενον. ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄντικρυς κατὰ τῶν
appearing being-said if and also outright against the
 φαινομένων ἐρωτῶμεν λόγους, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν βουλόμενοι
of-appearing-(things) we-ask arguments not to-do-away-with wishing
 τὰ φαινόμενα τούτους ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύντες τὴν
the appearing-(things) these we-set-out but showing the
 τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν· εἰ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀπατεῶν
of-the dogmatists rashness if for such-a deceiver
 ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν
is the argument so-as also the appearing-(things) only not of-the
 ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὐ χρή ὑφορᾶσθαι
eyes of-us to-snatch-away how not one-must to-suspect
 αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις, ὥστε μὴ κατακολουθοῦντας
it in the non-evident-(things) so-as not following
 αὐτῷ προπετεῦεσθαι;
it to-be-rash

περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς

I.11 · THE CRITERION OF THE SKEPTICAL WAY

A criterion may mean a standard of what exists, which belongs to the refutative part, or a standard of action. The skeptic's criterion is the appearance, which is a passive and unwilling impression and so beyond dispute. Attending to appearances he lives without opinion by everyday observance, which has four parts: the guidance of nature, the compulsion of feelings, the tradition of laws and customs, and the teaching of the arts.

"Ὅτι δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις προσέχουμεν, δῆλον ἀπὸ τῶν 21
that and to-the appearing-(things) we-attend (is)-clear from the
 λεγομένων ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς.
(things)-said by-us about the criterion of-the skeptical way
 κριτήριον δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως
a-criterion and is-called in-two-ways the both for belief of-existence
 ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τῷ ἀντιρρητικῷ
or of-non-existence being-taken about which in the refutative
 λέξομεν λόγῳ, τό τε τοῦ πράσσειν, ᾧ προσέχοντες
we-shall-speak account the and of-the to-act to-which attending
 κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν πράσσομεν τὰ δ' οὐ,
according-to the life the-(things) indeed we-do the-(things) and not
 περὶ οὗ νῦν λέγομεν.
about which now we-speak

κριτήριον τοῖνυν φαμέν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς 22
a-criterion then we-say to-be of-the skeptical way
 τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν οὕτω καλοῦντες·
the appearing-(thing) in-power the impression thus calling
 ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητος
in a-passivity for and unwilling feeling lying uninvestigated
 ἐστιν. διὸ περὶ μὲν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τὸ
it-is wherefore about indeed the to-appear such-a or such-a the
 ὑποκείμενον οὐδεὶς ἴσως ἀμφισβητήσει, περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ
underlying-(thing) no-one perhaps will-dispute about and the whether
 τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὁποῖον φαίνεται ζητεῖται.
such it-is as-what-kind it-appears is-investigated

τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν 23
to-the appearing-(things) then attending according-to the everyday
 τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι
observance without-opinion we-live since not we-are-able inactive
 παντάπασιν εἶναι. ἔοικε δὲ αὕτη ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις
altogether to-be seems and this the everyday observance

τετραμερὴς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑφηγήσει
fourfold to-be and the indeed something to-have in guidance
 φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει
of-nature the and in necessity of-feelings the and in tradition
 νόμων τε καὶ ἔθων, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν,
of-laws both and of-customs the and in teaching of-arts
 ὑφηγήσει μὲν φυσικῇ

by-guidance indeed natural

- 24 καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοί ἐσμεν,
according-to which naturally perceptive and capable-of-thought we-are
 παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφήν ἡμᾶς
of-feelings and by-necessity according-to which hunger indeed to food us
 ὀδηγεῖ, δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἔθων δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει
leads thirst and to drink of-customs and and of-laws by-tradition
 καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὥς
according-to which the indeed to-be-pious we-adopt in-everyday-life as
 ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὥς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ
good the and to-be-impious as bad of-arts and by-teaching
 καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνενέργητοί ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν
according-to which not inactive we-are in which we-adopt
 τέχναις. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα φαμὲν ἀδοξάστως.
arts these and all we-say without-opinion

τί τὸ τέλος τῆς σκεπτικῆς

I.12 • THE END OF THE SKEPTICAL WAY

An end is that for the sake of which everything is done. The skeptic's end is unperturbedness in matters of opinion and moderate feeling in what is forced on him. He began by trying to decide between impressions, fell into a disagreement of equal strength, and suspended judgment; unperturbedness followed by chance, as the foam followed Apelles' thrown sponge. He is not wholly untroubled, but he is troubled less than other men.

- Τούτοις ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς 25
to-these consequent — would-be also about the end of-the
 σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διεξελθεῖν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὗ
skeptical way to-go-through is indeed then an-end that of-which
 χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς
for-the-sake all-things are-done or are-considered itself and of-nothing
 ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν. φαμέν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν
for-the-sake or the last of-the desired-(things) we-say and up-to now
 τέλος εἶναι τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν
an-end to-be of-the skeptic the in the-(things) according-to opinion
 ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν.
unperturbedness and in the-(things) compelled moderation-of-feeling
 ἀρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς φαντασίας 26
having-begun for to-philosophize for the the impressions
 ἐπικρῖναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν, τίνες μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες
to-decide-between and to-apprehend which indeed are true which
 δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι, ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῇ
and false so-that to-be-unperturbed he-fell into the of-equal-strength
 διαφωνίαν, ἣν ἐπικρῖναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχε·
disagreement which to-decide not being-able he-suspended-judgment
 ἐπισχόντι δὲ αὐτῷ τυχικῶς παρηκολούθησεν
to-(one)-having-suspended-judgment and to-him by-chance there-followed
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξία.
the in the-(things) matters-of-opinion unperturbedness
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ κακὸν 27
the indeed for (one)-opining something fine by-the nature or bad
 εἶναι ταρασσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ
to-be is-disturbed through all-(time) and when not is-present to-him
 τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν φύσει κακῶν
the fine to-be seeming-(things) by both the by-nature bad-(things)
 νομίζει ποινηλατῆσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὥς οἶεται·
he-thinks to-be-bounded and he-pursues the good-(things) as he-supposes

ἄπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει, διὰ τε
 which having-acquired to-more disturbances he-falls-into through both
 τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ φοβούμενος
 the against reason and immoderately to-be-lifted-up and fearing
 τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα πράσσει, ἵνα μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ τὰ
 the change all-things he-does so-that not he-may-lose the
 ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι.

good-(things) to-him seeming to-be

- 28 ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καλῶν
 the and (one)-not-determining about the-(things) toward the nature fine
 ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε διώκει συντόνως· διόπερ
 or bad neither flees anything nor pursues intensely wherefore
 ἀταρακτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν περὶ Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ ζωγράφου λέγεται,
 he-is-unperturbed which then about Apelles the painter is-said
 τοῦτο ὑπῆρξε τῷ σκεπτικῷ. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἵππον
 this belonged to-the skeptic they-say for that he a-horse
 γράφων καὶ τὸν ἀφρὸν τοῦ ἵππου μιμήσασθαι τῇ
 painting and the foam of-the horse to-imitate by-the
 γραφῇ βουληθεὶς οὕτως ἀπετύγχανεν ὥς ἀπειπεῖν καὶ
 painting having-wished thus was-failing that to-give-up and
 τὴν σπογγίαν εἰς ἣν ἀπέμασσε τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ γραφείου
 the sponge into which he-wiped-off the from the brush
 χρώματα προσρῖψαι τῇ εἰκόνι· τὴν δὲ προσαιψαμένην
 colors to-throw-at the picture the and having-touched
 ἵππου ἀφροῦ ποιῆσαι μίμημα.

of-a-horse of-foam to-make a-likeness

- 29 καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ οὖν ἥλπιζον μὲν τὴν ἀταραξίαν
 and the skeptics then were-hoping indeed the unperturbedness
 ἀναλήψεσθαι διὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν φαινομένων τε
 to-gain through the the unevenness of-the appearing-(things) both
 καὶ νοουμένων ἐπικρῖναι, μὴ δυνηθέντες δὲ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο
 and of-thought-(things) to-decide not having-been-able and to-do this

ἐπέσχον· ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἶον
they-suspended-judgment to-(ones)-having-suspended-judgment and to-them as-it-were
 τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιά σώματι.
by-chance the unperturbedness followed as a-shadow a-body
 οὐ μὴν ἀόχλητον πάντη τὸν σκεπτικὸν εἶναι νομίζομεν,
not indeed untroubled altogether the skeptic to-be we-think
 ἀλλ' ὀχλείσθαι φάμεν ὑπὸ τῶν κατηναγκασμένων· καὶ γὰρ
but to-be-troubled we-say by the compelled-(things) and for
 ῥιγοῦν ποτε ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ διψῆν καὶ τοιουτότροπά
to-shiver sometimes we-admit and to-be-thirsty and such-like
 τινα πάσχειν.

some to-suffer

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται δισσαῖς συνέχονται 30
but also in these the indeed laymen by-two are-held-fast
 περιστάσεων, ὑπὸ τε τῶν παθῶν αὐτῶν καὶ οὐχ ἧττον
circumstances by both the feelings themselves and not less
 ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰς περιστάσεις ταύτας κακὰς εἶναι φύσει δοκεῖν·
by the the circumstances these bad to-be by-nature to-seem
 ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὸ προσδοξάζειν ὅτι ἔστι κακὸν τούτων
the and skeptic the to-opine-besides that is bad of-these
 ἕκαστον ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν περιαιρῶν μετριώτερον καὶ
each as toward the nature stripping-away more-moderately also
 ἐν τούτοις ἀπαλλάσσει. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς
in these comes-off through this then in indeed the-(things)
 δοξαστοῖς ἀταραξίαν τέλος εἶναί φάμεν τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ,
matters-of-opinion unperturbedness an-end to-be we-say of-the skeptic
 ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπάθειαν. τινὲς δὲ
in and the-(things) compelled moderation-of-feeling some and
 τῶν δοκίμων σκεπτικῶν προσέθηκαν τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐν
of-the approved skeptics added to-these also the in
 ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἐποχήν.
the inquiries suspension-of-judgment

περὶ τῶν ὁλοσχερῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς

I.13 · THE GENERAL MODES OF SUSPENSION

Suspension arises through the opposition of things: appearances against appearances, as the tower that looks round from afar and square from near; thoughts against thoughts, as providence argued from the order of the heavens against the good faring ill; and thoughts against appearances, as Anaxagoras' black snow. Present things may also be opposed to past or future. Sextus will set out the modes, affirming nothing about their number or their force.

- 31 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ
 since and the unperturbedness to-follow we-were-saying to-the about
 πάντων ἐποχῇ, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη λέγειν ὅπως
 all-things suspension-of-judgment consequent — would-be to-say how
 ἡμῖν ἡ ἐποχὴ περιγίνεται. γίνεται τοίνυν αὕτη, ὡς
 for-us the suspension-of-judgment comes-about arises then this as
 ἂν ὁλοσχερέστερον εἴποι τις, διὰ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν
 — more-comprehensively might-say someone through the opposition of-the
 πραγμάτων. ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ ἢ φαινόμενα φαινομένοις
 matters we-oppose and either appearing-(things) to-appearing-(things)
 ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ, οἷον φαινόμενα
 or thought-(things) to-thought-(things) or alternately such-as appearing-(things)
 μὲν φαινομένοις,
 indeed to-appearing-(things)
- 32 ὅταν λέγωμεν ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται
 when we-say the same tower from-afar indeed appears
 στρογγύλος, ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος, νοούμενα δὲ
 round from-near-by and square thought-(things) and
 νοουμένοις, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι
 to-thought-(things) when against the (one)-establishing that is
 πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ
 providence from the order of-the heavenly-(things) we-oppose the

τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς
the indeed good to-fare-ill often the and bad
 εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τούτου συνάγωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν·
to-fare-well and through this we-conclude the not to-be providence
 νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ 33
thought-(things) and to-appearing-(things) as — Anaxagoras to-the
 κατασκευάζοντι λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ἀντετίθει, ὅτι
(one)-establishing white to-be the snow set-against that
 ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ μέλαν,
the snow water is frozen the and water is black
 καὶ ἡ χιὼν ἄρα μέλαινά ἐστιν. καθ' ἑτέραν δὲ
also the snow then black is according-to another and
 ἐπίνοιαν ἀντιτίθεμεν ὅτε μὲν παρόντα παροῦσιν, ὡς
conception we-oppose sometimes indeed present-(things) to-present-(things) as
 τὰ προειρημένα· ὅτε δὲ παρόντα παρεληλυθόσιν ἢ
the aforesaid sometimes and present-(things) to-past-(things) or
 μέλλουσιν, οἷον ὅταν τις ἡμᾶς ἐρωτήσει λόγον ὃν
to-future-(things) such-as when someone us should-ask an-argument which
 λῦσαι οὐ δυνάμεθα, φαμέν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι,
to-solve not we-are-able we-say to him that
 ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν εἰσηγησάμενον τὴν αἴρεσιν 34
just-as before the to-come-to-be the (one)-having-introduced the school
 ἣν μετέρχη, οὐδέπω ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν λόγος ὑγιὲς ὢν
which you-follow not-yet the according-to it argument sound being
 ἐφαίνετο, ὑπέκειτο μέντοι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, οὕτως
appeared it-subsisted however as toward the nature thus
 ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον τῷ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτηθέντι
it-is-possible also the opposed to-the by you asked
 νῦν λόγῳ ὑποκεῖσθαι μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, μηδέπω
now argument to-subsist indeed as toward the nature not-yet

δ' ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι, ὥστε οὐδέπω χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι
and to-us to-appear so-that not-yet one-must to-assent

ἡμᾶς τῷ δοκοῦντι νῦν ἰσχυρῶ εἶναι λόγῳ.

us to-the seeming now strong to-be argument

35 ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ταύτας ἀκριβέστερον ἡμῖν
on-behalf and of-the the oppositions these more-exactly to-us

ὑποπεσεῖν, καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ὑποθήσομαι δι' ὧν ἡ
to-fall-under also the modes I-shall-set-out through which the

ἐποχὴ συνάγεται, οὔτε περὶ τοῦ πλῆθους οὔτε
suspension-of-judgment is-brought-together neither about the number nor

περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν διαβεβαιούμενος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
about the power of-them affirming it-is-possible for

αὐτοὺς καὶ σαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ πλείους τῶν λεχθησομένων.
them both unsound to-be and more than-the (ones)-to-be-mentioned

περὶ τῶν δέκα τρόπων

I.14 · THE TEN MODES

The older skeptics hand down ten modes, also called arguments or patterns: the variation among animals, the differences among men, the different constitutions of the senses, circumstances, positions and distances and places, admixtures, quantities and preparations, relativity, frequent or rare encounters, and ways and customs and laws. Above them stand three, taken from the judge, from the thing judged, and from both, and these in turn come under relativity.

36 Παραδίδονται τοίνυν συνήθως παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαιοτέροις
are-handed-down then customarily among the more-ancient

σκεπτικοῖς τρόποι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἐποχὴ συνάγεται

skeptics modes through which the suspension-of-judgment to-be-brought-together

δοκεῖ, δέκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους

seems ten the in-number which and arguments and patterns

συνωνύμως καλοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ
synonymously they-call are and these first the according-to
 τὴν τῶν ζώων ἑξαλλαγὴν, δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν
the of-the animals variation second the according-to the of-the
 ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν, τρίτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους
men difference third the according-to the different
 τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς, τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς
of-the sense-organs constitutions fourth the according-to the
 περιστάσεις, πέμπτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ
circumstances fifth the according-to the positions and the
 διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμυξίας,
distances and the places sixth the according-to the admixtures
 ἑβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητος καὶ σκευασίας τῶν 37
seventh the according-to the quantities and preparations of-the
 ὑποκειμένων, ὄγδοος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, ἔννατος ὁ
underlying-(things) eighth the from the toward something ninth the
 παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις, δέκατος ὁ
according-to the continual or rare encounters tenth the
 παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ
according-to the ways and the customs and the laws and
 τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις.
the mythical beliefs and the dogmatic suppositions
 χρώμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς. τούτων δὲ 38
we-use and the order this by-convention of-these and
 ἐπαναβεβηκότες εἰσὶ τρόποι τρεῖς, ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος,
standing-above are modes three the from the (one)-judging
 ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου, ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ
the from the (thing)-judged the from both to-the indeed for from
 τοῦ κρίνοντος ὑποτάσσονται οἱ πρῶτοι τέσσαρες (τὸ γὰρ
the (one)-judging are-subordinated the first four the for
 κρίνον ἢ ζῶν ἐστὶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ ἔν τι
judging either an-animal is or a-man or a-sense or in some

περιστάσει), εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου ἀνάγονται ὁ
circumstance to and the from the (thing)-judged are-referred the
 ἕβδομος καὶ ὁ δέκατος, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον
seventh and the tenth to and the from both compounded
 ὁ πέμπτος καὶ ὁ ἕκτος καὶ ὁ ὄγδοος καὶ ὁ ἔννατος.
the fifth and the sixth and the eighth and the ninth
 39 πάλιν δὲ οἱ τρεῖς οὗτοι ἀνάγονται εἰς τὸν πρὸς τι,
again and the three these are-referred to the toward something
 ὥς εἶναι γενικώτατον μὲν τὸν πρὸς τι, εἰδικούς δὲ
so-as to-be most-generic indeed the toward something specific and
 τοὺς τρεῖς, ὑποβεβηκότας δὲ τοὺς δέκα. ταῦτα μὲν περὶ
the three subordinate and the ten these indeed about
 τῆς ποσότητος αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγομεν· περὶ
the number of-them according-to the plausible we-say about
 δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τάδε.
and the power these-(things)

ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν

I.15 • THE FIRST MODE: THE VARIATION AMONG ANIMALS

Different animals receive different impressions from the same things, since their births and their bodies differ. Sextus catalogs the varying eyes, ears, and tongues, and the foods that nourish one creature and kill another: perfume delights men and is unbearable to beetles, hemlock fattens quails. He then argues that a dog chooses, shuns, has an art and a virtue, and even reasons by Chrysippus' fifth indemonstrable. Being ourselves party to the disagreement, we suspend judgment.

40 Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν παρὰ
first we-said to-be an-argument according-to which along-with
 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
the difference of-the animals not the same from the same

ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ἔκ τε
fall-under impressions this and we-infer from both
 τῆς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἔκ τῆς περὶ
the about the births of-them difference and from the about
 τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παραλλαγῆς.

the constitutions of-the bodies variation
 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς γενέσεις, ὅτι τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν 41
about indeed then the births that of-the animals the-(ones) indeed
 χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεται τὰ δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς. καὶ
without mating come-to-be the-(ones) and from intercourse and
 τῶν μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἔκ πυρὸς
of-the indeed without mating coming-to-be the-(ones) indeed from fire
 γίνεται ὡς τὰ ἐν ταῖς καμίνοις φαινόμενα ζωῦφια,
come-to-be as the-(ones) in the furnaces appearing little-animals
 τὰ δ' ἐξ ὕδατος φθειρομένου ὡς κώνωπες, τὰ δ'
the-(ones) and from water being-corrupted as gnats the-(ones) and
 ἐξ οἴνου τρεπομένου ὡς σκνῖπες, τὰ δ' ἔκ γῆς ὡς
from wine turning as midges the-(ones) and from earth as
 *** τὰ δ' ἐξ ἱλύος ὡς βάτραχοι, τὰ δ' ἔκ
(lacuna) the-(ones) and from slime as frogs the-(ones) and from
 βορβόρου ὡς σκώληκες, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὄνων ὡς κάνθαροι
mud as worms the-(ones) and from asses as beetles
 τὰ δ' ἔκ λαχάνων ὡς κάμπαι, τὰ δ' ἔκ καρπῶν
the-(ones) and from vegetables as caterpillars the-(ones) and from fruits
 ὡς οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐρινεῶν ψῆγες, τὰ δ' ἔκ ζώων
as the-(ones) from the wild-figs gall-insects the-(ones) and from animals
 σηπομένων ὡς μέλισσαι ταύρων καὶ σφήκες ἵππων
rotting as bees of-bulls and wasps of-horses
 τῶν δ' ἔκ συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοιογενῶν ὡς 42
of-the-(ones) and from intercourse the-(ones) indeed from like-kinds as
 τὰ πλεῖστα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνομοιογενῶν ὡς ἡμίονοι.
the-(ones) most the-(ones) and from unlike-kinds as mules

πάλιν κοινῇ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ζωοτοκεῖται ὡς
 again in-common of-the animals the-(ones) indeed are-born-alive as
 ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ' ὠοτοκεῖται ὡς ὄρνιθες, τὰ δὲ
 men the-(ones) and are-born-from-eggs as birds the-(ones) and
 σαρκοτοκεῖται ὡς ἄρκτοι.
 are-born-as-flesh as bears

43 εἰκὸς οὖν τὰς περὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀνομοιότητας καὶ
 likely then the about the births dissimilarities and
 διαφορὰς μεγάλας ποιεῖν ἀντιπαθείας, τὸ ἀσύγκρατον καὶ
 differences great to-make antipathies the unblendable and
 ἀσυνάρμοστον καὶ μαχόμενον ἐκεῖθεν φερομένης.
 unharmonizable and conflicting from-there being-carried

44 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων μερῶν τοῦ
 but also the difference of-the most-important parts of-the
 σώματος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρίνειν καὶ
 body and especially of-the-(ones) toward the to-decide and
 πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκότων, μεγίστην δύναται ποιεῖν
 toward the to-perceive naturally-fitted greatest is-able to-make
 μάχην τῶν φαντασιῶν. οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ὠχρά φασιν
 conflict of-the impressions the at-any-rate jaundiced yellow they-say
 εἶναι τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ ὑπόσφαγμα
 to-be the to-us appearing white and the-(ones) blood-shot
 ἔχοντες αἰμωπά. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν
 having blood-red since then also of-the animals the-(ones) indeed
 ὠχροὺς ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμους τὰ δὲ
 yellow have the eyes the-(ones) and blood-shot the-(ones) and
 λευκανθίζοντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροιάν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι,
 whitish the-(ones) and another color having likely I-think
 διάφορον αὐτοῖς τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι.
 different for-them the of-the colors apprehension to-come-about

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνατενίσαντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον τῷ ἡλίῳ, εἴτα 45
but also having-gazed-fixedly for a-long time at-the sun then
 ἐγκύψαντες βιβλίῳ τὰ γράμματα χρυσοειδῆ δοκοῦμεν εἶναι
having-stooped over-a-book the letters gold-colored we-think to-be
 καὶ περιφερόμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζώων τινὰ φύσει
and being-carried-round since then also of-the animals some by-nature
 λαμπηδόνα ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχει καὶ φῶς λεπτομερές
a-brightness in the eyes have and a-light fine-grained
 τε καὶ εὐκίνητον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστέλλει, ὥς καὶ νυκτὸς
both and easily-moved from them sends-out so-as also by-night
 ὁρᾶν, δεόντως ἂν νομίζοιμεν ὅτι μὴ ὅμοια ἡμῖν τε
to-see fittingly — we-should-think that not alike to-us both
 καὶ κείνοις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποπίπτει.

and-to-those the outside-(things) fall-under
 καί γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἰῶ χαλκοῦ 46
and indeed the sorcerers smearing the lamp-wicks with-rust of-bronze
 καὶ θολῷ σηπίας ποιῶσιν ὅτε μὲν χαλκοῦς ὅτε
and with-the-ink of-a-cuttlefish make sometimes indeed bronze-colored sometimes
 δὲ μέλανας φαίνεσθαι τοὺς παρόντας διὰ τὴν βραχείαν
and black to-appear the (ones)-present through the slight
 τοῦ μυχθέντος παρασποράν. πολὺ δὴπου εὐλογώτερόν
of-the mixed sprinkling much doubtless more-reasonable
 ἐστὶ, χυμῶν διαφόρων ἀνακεκραμένων τῇ ὁράσει τῶν
it-is of-humors different having-been-blended in-the sight of-the
 ζώων, καὶ διαφόρους τῶν ὑποκειμένων

animals also different of-the underlying-(things)
 φαντασίας αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι. ὅταν τε παραθλίβωμεν τὸν 47
impressions for-them to-come-about when both we-press-aside the
 ὀφθαλμόν, ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ φαίνεται τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ
eye elongated and narrow appear the forms and the
 σχήματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὁρατῶν. εἰκὸς οὖν ὅτι ὅσα
shapes and the sizes of-the visible-(things) likely then that as-many

τῶν ζώων λοξὴν ἔχει τὴν κόρην καὶ προμήκη, καθάπερ
of-the animals slanting have the pupil and oblong just-as
 αἰγες αἰλουροι καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, διάφορα φαντάζεται τὰ
goats cats and the like-(ones) different imagine the
 ὑποκείμενα εἶναι, καὶ οὐχ οἷα τὰ περιφερῇ τὴν κόρην
underlying-(things) to-be and not such-as the round the pupil
 ἔχοντα ζῶα εἶναι αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνει.

having animals to-be them supposes

- 48 τὰ τε κάτοπτρα παρὰ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν ὅτε
the both mirrors according-to the different construction sometimes
 μὲν μικρότατα δείκνυσι τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα ὡς τὰ
indeed smallest show the outside underlying-(things) as the
 κοῖλα, ὅτε δ' ἐπιμήκη καὶ στενὰ ὡς τὰ κυρτά· τινὰ
concave sometimes and elongated and narrow as the convex some
 δὲ τὴν μὲν κεφαλὴν κάτω δείκνυσι τοῦ κατοπτριζομένου,
and the indeed head below show of-the (one)-being-mirrored
 τοὺς δὲ πόδας ἄνω.

the and feet above

- 49 ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγγείων τὰ μὲν
since then also of-the about the sight vessels the-(ones) indeed
 ἐξόφθαλμα κομιδῇ προπέπτωκεν ὑπὸ κυρτότητος, τὰ δὲ
protruding-eyed altogether have-jutted-forward by convexity the-(ones) and
 κοιλότερα ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἐν ὑπτίῳ πλάτει βέβηκεν, εἰκὸς
more-hollow are the-(ones) and in a-flat surface have-settled likely
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μῆτε ἴσα
also through this to-be-altered the impressions and neither equal
 τοῖς μεγέθεσι μῆτε ὅμοια ταῖς μορφαῖς ὁρᾶν τὰ αὐτὰ
in-the sizes nor alike in-the shapes to-see the same-(things)
 κύνας ἰχθύας λέοντας ἀνθρώπους πάρνοπας, ἀλλ' οἷαν
dogs fishes lions men locusts but such-as
 ἐκάστου ποιεῖ τύπωσιν ἢ δεχομένη τὸ φαινόμενον ὄψις.
of-each makes the-impress the receiving the appearing-(thing) sight

ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων λόγος· πῶς 50
the and same also about the other senses argument how
 γὰρ ἂν λεχθείη ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν
for — would-it-be-said alike to-be-moved according-to the touch
 τά τε ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ τὰ σαρκοφανῇ καὶ τὰ
the-(ones) both shell-covered and the-(ones) flesh-appearing and the-(ones)
 ἡκανθωμένα καὶ τὰ ἐπτερωμένα ἢ λελεπιδωμένα; πῶς
spined and the-(ones) feathered or scaled how
 δὲ ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τά τε
and alike to-apprehend according-to the hearing the-(ones) both
 στενώτατον ἔχοντα τὸν πόρον τὸν ἀκουστικὸν καὶ τὰ
narrowest having the passage the auditory and the-(ones)
 εὐρυτάτῳ τούτῳ κεχρημένα, ἢ τὰ τετριχωμένα τὰ
widest this having-used or the-(ones) haired the
 ὦτα καὶ τὰ ψιλὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα; ὅπου γε καὶ ἡμεῖς
ears and the-(ones) bare these having where indeed also we
 ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν παραβύσαντες
otherwise indeed are-moved according-to the hearing having-stopped-up
 τὰ ὦτα, ἄλλως δὲ ἢν ἀπλῶς αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.
the ears otherwise and if simply them we-use
 καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις δὲ διαφέροι ἂν παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων 51
and the smell and would-differ — along-with the of-the animals
 ἐξαλλαγήν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως μὲν κινούμεθα
variation if for also we otherwise indeed are-moved
 ἐμψυγέστες καὶ τοῦ φλέγματος πλεονάσαντος ἐν ἡμῖν, ἄλλως
having-been-chilled and of-the phlegm abounding in us otherwise
 δὲ ἢν τὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἡμῶν μέρη πλεονασμὸν
and if the-(parts) about the head of-us parts an-abundance
 αἵματος ὑποδέξεται, ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὰ εὐώδη τοῖς
of-blood should-receive turning-away-from the sweet-smelling-(things) to-the
 ἄλλοις δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ ὥσπερ πλήττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν
others seeming to-be and as-it-were to-be-struck by them

νομίζοντες, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν πλαδαρά
thinking since also of-the animals the-(ones) indeed moist
 τέ ἐστι φύσει καὶ φλεγματώδη, τὰ δὲ πολύαιμα
both are by-nature and phlegmatic the-(ones) and very-full-of-blood
 σφόδρα, τὰ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσαν καὶ πλεονάζουσιν ἔχοντα
exceedingly the-(ones) and prevailing and abounding having
 τὴν ξανθὴν χολὴν ἢ τὴν μέλαιναν, εὐλογον καὶ διὰ
the yellow bile or the black reasonable also through
 τοῦτο διάφορα ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι τὰ ὁσφρητά.
this different to-each of-them to-appear the smell-able-(things)

52 καὶ τὰ γευστὰ ὁμοίως τῶν μὲν τραχεῖαν καὶ
and the taste-able-(things) likewise of-the-(ones) indeed rough and
 ἄνικμον ἔχόντων τὴν γλῶσσαν τῶν δὲ ἔνυγρον σφόδρα,
dry having the tongue of-the-(ones) and moist exceedingly
 εἴγε καὶ ἡμεῖς ξηροτέραν ἐν πυρετοῖς τὴν γλῶτταν
if-indeed also we drier in fevers the tongue
 σχόντες γεώδη καὶ κακόχυμα ἢ πικρὰ τὰ προσφερόμενα
having earthy and ill-humored or bitter the (things)-offered
 εἶναι νομίζομεν, τοῦτο δὲ πάσχομεν καὶ παρὰ τὴν
to-be we-think this and we-experience also along-with the
 διάφορον ἐπικράτειαν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν χυμῶν εἶναι λεγομένων.
different prevalence of-the in us humors to-be being-said
 ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὰ ζῶα διάφορον τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον
since then also the animals different the tasting sense-organ
 ἔχει καὶ διαφόροις χυμοῖς πλεονάζον, διαφόρους ἂν καὶ
have and in-different humors abounding different — also
 κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν φαντασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων λαμβάνει.
according-to the taste impressions of-the underlying-(things) would-take

53 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τροφή ἀναδιδομένη ὅπου μὲν γίνεται
just-as for the same food being-distributed where indeed becomes
 φλέψι ὅπου δὲ ἀρτηρία ὅπου δὲ ὀστέον ὅπου δὲ νεῦρον
a-vein where and an-artery where and a-bone where and a-sinew

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν
and of-the others each along-with the difference of-the
 ὑποδεχομένων αὐτὴν μερῶν διάφορον ἐπιδεικνυμένη δύναμιν,
receiving it parts different showing power
 καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀναδιδομένον εἰς τὰ
and just-as the water one and single-formed being-distributed into the
 δένδρα ὅπου μὲν γίνεται φλοιὸς ὅπου δὲ κλάδος ὅπου δὲ
trees where indeed becomes bark where and a-branch where and
 καρπὸς καὶ ἤδη σῦκον καὶ ροῖα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον,
fruit and now a-fig and a-pomegranate and of-the others each
 καὶ καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ μουσουργοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 54
and just-as the of-the flute-player breath one and the same
 ἐμπνεόμενον τῷ αὐλῷ ὅπου μὲν γίνεται ὀξὺ ὅπου δὲ
being-blown into-the pipe where indeed becomes high where and
 βαρὺ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπέρεϊσις τῆς χειρὸς ἐπὶ τῆς λύρας ὅπου
low and the same pressure of-the hand upon the lyre where
 μὲν βαρὺν φθόγγον ποιεῖ ὅπου δὲ ὀξύν, οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ
indeed a-low note makes where and a-high thus likely also the
 ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα διάφορα θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διάφορον
outside underlying-(things) different to-be-viewed along-with the different
 κατασκευὴν τῶν τὰς φαντασίας ὑπομενόντων ζώων.
construction of-the the impressions undergoing animals
 ἐναργέστερον δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετῶν 55
more-evidently and the such is to-learn from the chosen-(things)
 τε καὶ φευκτῶν τοῖς ζώοις. μύρον γοῦν ἀνθρώποις
both and shunned-(things) by-the animals perfume at-any-rate to-men
 μὲν ἡδιστον φαίνεται, κανθάρους δὲ καὶ μελίσσαις
indeed most-pleasant appears to-beetles and and to-bees
 δυσανάσχετον· καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὠφελεῖ,
unbearable and the olive-oil the indeed men benefits
 σφήκας δὲ καὶ μελίσσας ἀναιρεῖ καταρραϊνόμενον· καὶ
wasps and and bees kills being-sprinkled-on and

τὸ θαλάττιον ὕδωρ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀηδές ἐστι πινόμενον
the sea water to-men indeed unpleasant is being-drunk

καὶ φαρμακῶδες, ἰχθύσι δὲ ἡδιστον καὶ πότιμον.

and drug-like to-fishes and most-pleasant and drinkable

56 σῦες τε ἡδιον βορβόρῳ λούονται δυσωδεστάτῳ

swine both more-pleasantly in-mud bathe most-foul-smelling

ἢ ὕδατι διειδεῖ καὶ καθαῶ. τῶν τε ζώων τὰ

than in-water clear and pure of-the both animals the-(ones)

μὲν ἐστι ποηφάγα τὰ δὲ θαμνοφάγα τὰ δὲ

indeed are grass-eating the-(ones) and shrub-eating the-(ones) and

ύληνόμα τὰ δὲ σπερμοφάγα τὰ δὲ σαρκοφάγα

wood-grazing the-(ones) and seed-eating the-(ones) and flesh-eating

τὰ δὲ γαλακτοφάγα, καὶ τὰ μὲν σεσηπιῖα χαίρει

the-(ones) and milk-eating and the-(ones) indeed in-rotted rejoice

τροφῇ τὰ δὲ νεαρᾶ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὠμῇ τὰ δὲ

food the-(ones) and in-fresh and the-(ones) indeed in-raw the-(ones) and

μαγειρικῶς ἐσκευασμένη. καὶ κοινῶς τὰ ἄλλοις ἡδέα

cook-fashion prepared and in-common the-(things) to-some pleasant

ἄλλοις ἐστὶν ἀηδὴ καὶ φευκτὰ καὶ θανάσιμα.

to-others are unpleasant and to-be-shunned and deadly

57 τὸ γοῦν κώνειον πιαίνει τοὺς ὀρτυγας καὶ ὁ ὑοσκύαμος

the at-any-rate hemlock fattens the quails and the henbane

τὰς ὕς, αἱ δὲ χαίρουσι καὶ σαλαμάνδρας ἐσθίουσαι,

the swine which indeed rejoice also salamanders eating

ὥσπερ οὖν ἔλαφοι τὰ ἰοβόλα ζῶα καὶ αἱ χελιδόνες

just-as deer the venomous animals and the swallows

κανθαριῖδας. οἱ τε μύρμηκες καὶ οἱ σκνίπες ἀνθρώποις

blister-beetles the both ants and the gnats to-men

μὲν ἀηδίας καὶ στρόφους ἐμποιοῦσι καταπινόμενοι· ἡ δὲ

indeed nausea and gripings produce being-swallowed the and

ἄρκτος ἦν ἄρρωστίᾳ τινὶ περιπέσῃ, τούτους καταλιχωμένη
bear if in-sickness some should-fall these licking-up
ῥώννυται.

is-strengthened

ἔχιδνα δὲ θιγόντος αὐτῆς μόνον φηγοῦ κλάδου καροῦται, 58

a-viper and having-touched of-it only of-an-oak a-branch is-stupefied

καθάπερ καὶ νυκτερὶς πλατάνου φύλλου. φεύγει δὲ

just-as and a-bat of-a-plane-tree a-leaf flees and

κριὸν μὲν ἐλέφας, λέων δὲ ἀλεκτρούνα, καὶ θραγμὸν

a-ram indeed an-elephant a-lion and a-cock and the-crunching

κυνάμων ἐρεικομένων τὰ θαλάττια κήτη, καὶ τίγρις ψόφον

of-beans being-bruised the sea monsters and a-tiger a-noise

τυμπάνου. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν·

of-a-drum and others and more than-these it-is-possible to-say

ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβειν δοκῶμεν,

but so-that not more than-the fitting to-dwell-on we-may-seem

εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μὲν ἔστιν ἀηδὴ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα, τὸ δὲ

if the same to-some indeed are unpleasant to-others and pleasant the and

ἡδὺ καὶ ἀηδὲς ἐν φαντασίᾳ κεῖται, διάφοροι γίνονται

pleasant and unpleasant in an-impression lies different come-about

τοῖς ζώοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φαντασίαι.

to-the animals from the underlying-(things) impressions

εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα ἀνόμοια φαίνεται παρὰ τὴν 59

if and the same things unlike appear along-with the

τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγήν, ὁποῖον μὲν ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται τὸ

of-the animals variation of-what-kind indeed to-us is-viewed the

ὑποκείμενον ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς

underlying-(thing) we-shall-be-able to-say of-what-kind and it-is toward

τὴν φύσιν ἐφέξομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ

the nature we-shall-suspend-judgment not-even for to-decide ourselves

δυνησόμεθα τὰς φαντασίας τὰς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν

shall-we-be-able the impressions the both ours and the of-the

ἄλλων ζώων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ
other animals a-part also ourselves of-the disagreement being and
 διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ
through this of-the (thing)-that-will-decide being-in-need rather than
 αὐτοὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενοι.

ourselves to-judge being-able

- 60 καὶ ἄλλως οὔτε ἀναποδείκτως δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς
and otherwise neither without-proof are-we-able to-prefer the
 ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις
our impressions to-the-(ones) among the irrational animals
 γινομένων οὔτε μετ' ἀποδείξεως. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ μὴ εἶναι
arising nor with proof besides for the-(fact) not to-be
 ἀπόδειξιν ἴσως, ὥς ὑπομήσομεν, αὐτὴ ἢ λεγομένη ἀπόδειξις
a-proof perhaps as we-shall-recall itself the being-called proof
 ἥτοι φαινομένη ἡμῖν ἔσται ἢ οὐ φαινομένη. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ
either appearing to-us will-be or not appearing and if indeed not
 φαινομένη, οὐδὲ μετὰ πεποιθήσεως αὐτὴν προοισόμεθα· εἰ
appearing not-even with confidence it we-shall-put-forward if
 δὲ φαινομένη ἡμῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων τοῖς ζώοις
and appearing to-us since about the appearing-(things) to-the animals
 ζητεῖται καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν φαίνεται ζώοις οὖσι, καὶ αὐτὴ
is-investigated also the proof to-us appears animals being also itself
 ζητηθήσεται εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς καθό ἔστι φαινομένη.
will-be-investigated whether it-is true in-so-far-as it-is appearing

- 61 ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου
absurd and the (thing)-investigated through the (thing)-investigated
 κατασκευάζειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστὸν καὶ
to-establish to-attempt since will-be the same credible and
 ἄπιστον, ὅπερ ἀμήχανον, πιστὸν μὲν ἢ βούλεται
incredible which impossible credible indeed in-so-far-as it-wishes
 ἀποδεικνύειν, ἄπιστον δὲ ἢ ἀποδείκνυται. οὐχ
to-prove incredible and in-so-far-as it-is-proved not

ἔξομεν ἄρα ἀπόδειξιν δι' ἧς προκρινοῦμεν τὰς ἐαυτῶν
we-shall-have then a-proof through which we-shall-prefer the of-ourselves
 φαντασίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις καλουμένοις ζώοις
impressions to-the-(ones) among the irrational being-called animals
 γινομένων. εἰ οὖν διάφοροι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι παρὰ
arising if then different come-about the impressions along-with
 τὴν τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγὴν, ὥς ἐπικρῖναι ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν,
the of-the animals variation which to-decide impossible it-is
 ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.

to-suspend-judgment (is)-necessary about the outside underlying-(things)
 Ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ συγκρίνομεν τὰ ἄλογα καλούμενα ζῶα 62
from abundance and also we-compare the irrational being-called animals
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ φαντασίαν· καὶ γὰρ καταπαίξιν
with-the men according-to impression and for to-mock-at
 τῶν δογματικῶν τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαιτολογούντων οὐκ
the dogmatists puffed-up and self-praising not
 ἀποδοκιμάζομεν μετὰ τοὺς πρακτικούς τῶν λόγων. οἱ
we-reject after the practical of-the arguments the
 μὲν οὖν ἡμέτεροι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἀπλῶς
indeed then our-(fellows) the multitude of-the irrational animals simply
 εἰώθασι συγκρίνειν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ·

have-been-accustomed to-compare with-the man
 ἐπεὶ δὲ εὐρησιλογοῦντες οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄνισον εἶναί φασι 63
since and quibbling the dogmatists unequal to-be say
 τὴν σύγκρισιν, ἡμεῖς ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἐπὶ πλέον
the comparison we from much the surplus at more
 παίζοντες ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ζώου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον, οἷον
playing upon one animal we-shall-set the argument such-as
 ἐπὶ κυνός, εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦ εὐτελεστάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι.
upon a-dog if it-seems the cheapest seeming to-be

- εὐρήσομεν γὰρ καὶ οὕτω μὴ λειπόμενα ἡμῶν τὰ ζῶα,
we-shall-find for also thus not falling-short of-us the animals
 περὶ ᾧ ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν πίστιν τῶν φαινομένων.
about which the argument as toward the credibility of-the appearing-(things)
 64 ὅτι τοῖνυν αἰσθήσει διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ ζῶον ἡμῶν, οἱ
that then in-perception differs this the animal from-us the
 δογματικοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὀσφρήσει μᾶλλον
dogmatists agree and for in-the smell more
 ἡμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, τὰ μὴ ὀρώμενα αὐτῷ θηρία διὰ
than-us it-apprehends the not being-seen by-it beasts through
 ταύτης ἀνιχνεύων καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς θᾶττον ἡμῶν
this tracking and with-the eyes more-quickly than-us
 ταῦτα ὀρῶν καὶ τῇ ἀκοῇ αἰσθανόμενος ὀξέως.
these seeing and in-the hearing perceiving keenly
 65 οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἔλθωμεν. τούτου δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστίν
therefore to the reason let-us-come of-this and the indeed is
 ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. ἴδωμεν οὖν πρότερον περὶ
internal the and uttered let-us-see then first about
 τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου. οὗτος τοῖνυν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῖν
the internal this then according-to the especially to-us
 ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς,
disagreeing now dogmatists the-(ones) from the Stoa
 ἐν τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν, τῇ αἰρέσει τῶν οἰκείων
in these seems to-be-tossed in-the choice of-the proper-(things)
 καὶ φυγῇ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, τῇ γνώσει τῶν εἰς τοῦτο
and in-flight of-the alien-(things) in-the knowledge of-the toward this
 συντεινουσῶν τεχνῶν, τῇ ἀντιλήψει τῶν κατὰ τὴν
tending arts in-the apprehension of-the according-to the
 οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη.
proper nature virtues and of-the-(ones) about the feelings

ὁ τοῖνυν κύων, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἔδοξε στήσαι 66

the then dog upon which the argument it-seemed-good to-set
 παραδείγματος ἔνεκα, αἵρεσιν ποιείται τῶν οἰκείων
of-an-example for-the-sake a-choice makes of-the proper-(things)
 καὶ φυγὴν τῶν βλαβερῶν, τὰ μὲν τροφίμα διώκων,
and a-flight of-the harmful-(things) the-(ones) indeed nourishing pursuing
 μάστιγος δὲ ἀναταθείσης ὑποχωρῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνην
a-whip and having-been-raised withdrawing but also an-art
 ἔχει ποριστικὴν τῶν οἰκείων, τὴν θηρευτικὴν.

he-has procuring of-the proper-(things) the hunting
 ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἐκτός· τῆς γέ τοι δικαιοσύνης 67

is and not-even of-virtue outside the at-least indeed justice
 οὔσης τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀποδοτικῆς ἐκάστω, ὁ κύων
being of-the according-to worth apportioning to-each the dog
 τοὺς μὲν οἰκείους γε καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντας σαίνων καὶ
the indeed proper-(ones) at-least and well doing fawning-on and
 φρουρῶν τοὺς δὲ ἀνοικείους καὶ ἀδικοῦντας ἀμυνόμενος
guarding the and alien-(ones) and wronging warding-off
 οὐκ ἔξω ἂν εἴη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

not outside — would-be of-the justice

εἰ δὲ ταύτην ἔχει, τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀντακολουθουσῶν καὶ 68

if and this he-has of-the virtues following-one-another also
 τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχει, ἃς οὐ φασιν ἔχειν τοὺς
the other virtues he-has which not they-say to-have the
 πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἱ σοφοί. καὶ ἄλκιμον δὲ αὐτὸν

many men the wise and brave and it
 ὄντα ὁρῶμεν ἐν ταῖς ἀμύναις καὶ συνετόν, ὥς καὶ
being we-see in the defenses and intelligent as also
 Ὅμηρος ἐμαρτύρησεν, ποιήσας τὸν Ὀδυσσεά πασι μὲν
Homer testified having-made — Odysseus by-all indeed
 τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀνθρώποις ἀγνώτα ὄντα ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ
the household men unrecognized being by only and

τοῦ Ἄργου ἐπιγνωσθέντα, μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τῆς
 — Argus recognized neither by the alteration the
 κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τὰνδρὸς ἀπατηθέντος τοῦ κυνός, μήτε
 according-to the body of-the-man having-been-deceived of-the dog nor
 ἐκστάντος τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας, ἣν μᾶλλον
 having-departed-from the apprehensive impression which more
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχων ἐφάνη.

than-the men having he-appeared

- 69 κατὰ δὲ τὸν Χρύσιππον τὸν μάλιστα συμπολεμοῦντα τοῖς
 according-to and — Chrysippus the especially warring-along-with the
 ἀλόγοις ζώοις καὶ τῆς αἰοιδίμου διαλεκτικῆς μετέχει. φησὶ
 irrational animals also of-the celebrated dialectic he-shares says
 γοῦν αὐτὸν ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐπιβάλλειν τῷ πέμπτῳ
 at-any-rate him the aforesaid man to-apply the fifth
 διὰ πλείονων ἀναποδείκτω, ὅταν ἐπὶ τρίοδον ἐλθὼν καὶ
 through more indemonstrable when at a-crossroads having-come and
 τὰς δύο ὁδοὺς ἰχνεύσας δι' ὧν οὐ διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον, τὴν
 the two roads having-tracked through which not went the beast the
 τρίτην μηδ' ἰχνεύσας εὐθέως ὁρμήσῃ δι' αὐτῆς. δυνάμει
 third not-even having-tracked immediately he-rushes through it in-power
 γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸν λογιζέσθαι φησιν ὁ ἀρχαῖος ἥτοι τῇδε ἢ
 for this him to-reason he-says the ancient either this-way or
 τῇδε ἢ τῇδε διῆλθε τὸ θηρίον· οὔτε δὲ τῇδε οὔτε τῇδε·
 this-way or this-way went the beast neither and this-way nor this-way

- 70 τῇδε ἄρα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικός τέ
 this-way then but also of-the of-himself feelings apprehensive both
 ἐστι καὶ παραμυθητικός· σκόλοπος γὰρ αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος
 he-is and consoling a-thorn for in-him having-been-fixed
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν τούτου ὁρμᾷ τῇ τοῦ ποδὸς πρὸς τὴν γῆν
 to the removal of-this he-rushes by-the of-the foot against the ground
 παρατρίψει καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀδόντων. ἔλκος τε εἰ ἔχει πον,
 rubbing and through the teeth a-wound both if he-has somewhere

ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ῥυπαρὰ ἔλκη δυσαλθῇ ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ καθαρὰ
since the indeed filthy wounds hard-to-heal are the and clean
 ῥαδίως θεραπεύεται, πράως ἀποψῆ τὸν γινόμενον ἰχώρα.
easily are-cured gently he-wipes-away the arising discharge
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Ἱπποκράτειον φυλάσσει μάλα καλῶς· ἐπεὶ 71
but also the Hippocratic he-observes very well since
 γὰρ ποδὸς ἄκος ἀκνησία, εἴ ποτε τραῦμα ἐν ποδὶ
for of-a-foot a-remedy (is)-immobility if ever a-wound in a-foot
 σχοίη, μετεωρίζει τοῦτον καὶ ὥς οἶόν τε ἄσκυλτον
he-should-get he-lifts-up this and as far-as possible unshaken
 τηρεῖ. ὀχλούμενός τε ὑπὸ χυμῶν ἀνοικείων πόαν ἐσθίει,
he-keeps being-troubled both by humors alien grass he-eats
 μεθ' ἧς ἀποβλύζων τὸ ἀνοικεῖον ὑγιαίνεται.
with which vomiting-out the alien he-is-healed
 εἰ τοίνυν ἐφάνη τὸ ζῶον, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν λόγον ἐστήσαμεν 72
if then appeared the animal upon which the argument we-set
 παραδείγματος ἕνεκα, καὶ αἰρούμενον τὰ οἰκεία καὶ
of-an-example for-the-sake both choosing the proper-(things) and
 τὰ ὀχληρὰ φεῦγον, τέχνην τε ἔχον ποριστικὴν
the troublesome-(things) fleeing an-art both having procuring
 τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ παθῶν ἀντιληπτικὸν καὶ
of-the proper-(things) and of-the of-himself feelings apprehensive and
 παραμυθητικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω ἀρετῆς, ἐν οἷς κεῖται ἡ
consoling and not outside of-virtue in which lies the
 τελειότης τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου λόγου, τέλειος ἂν εἴη κατὰ
perfection of-the internal reason perfect — would-be according-to
 τοῦτο ὁ κύων· ὅθεν μοι δοκοῦσί τινες τῶν κατὰ
this the dog whence to-me seem some of-the according-to
 φιλοσοφίαν ἑαυτοὺς σεμνῶναι τῇ τοῦ ζώου τούτου
philosophy themselves to-dignify by-the of-the animal of-this
 προσηγορίᾳ.
appellation

- 73 *περὶ δὲ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου τέως μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν*
about and the uttered speech for-now indeed not it-is
ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖν· τοῦτον γὰρ καὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ἔνιοι
necessary to-inquire this for also of-the dogmatists some
παρητήσαντο ὡς ἀντιπράττοντα τῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναλήψει,
declined as working-against to-the of-the virtue acquisition
διὸ καὶ παρὰ τὸν τῆς μαθήσεως χρόνον ἥσκησαν σιωπῇ·
wherefore also during the of-the learning time they-practiced silence
καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἐνεός, οὐδεὶς
and otherwise if by hypothesis there-should-be a-man mute no-one
φήσει αὐτὸν εἶναι ἄλογον. ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν,
will-say him to-be irrational so-that and also these-(things) we-may-pass-over
μάλιστα μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὰ ζῶα, περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ
especially indeed we-see the animals about which the argument also
ἀνθρωπίνας προφερόμενα φωνάς, ὡς κίττας καὶ ἄλλα τινά.
human uttering sounds as jays and others some
- 74 *ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐάσωμεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνίμεν τὰς*
so-that and also this we-may-let-go if also not we-understand the
φωνὰς τῶν ἀλόγων καλουμένων ζῶων, ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν
sounds of-the irrational being-called animals wholly not it-is
ἀπικὸς διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ταῦτα, ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴ συνιέναι· καὶ
unlikely to-converse indeed these us and not to-understand and
γὰρ τῆς τῶν βαρβάρων φωνῆς ἀκούοντες οὐ συνίμεν
for of-the of-the barbarians speech bearing not we-understand
ἀλλὰ μονοειδῇ ταύτην εἶναι δοκοῦμεν.
but single-formed this to-be we-think
- 75 *καὶ ἀκούομεν δὲ τῶν κυνῶν ἄλλην μὲν φωνὴν προϊεμένων*
and we-bear and of-the dogs another indeed sound uttering
ὅταν ἀμύνονται· τινας, ἄλλην δὲ ὅταν ὠρύονται, καὶ
when they-defend-against some another and when they-bowl and
ἄλλην ὅταν τύπνυνται, καὶ διάφορον ἐπ' αὐτῶν σαίνωσι. καὶ
another when they-are-struck and different whenever they-fawn and

ὅλως εἴ τις εἰς τοῦτο ἀτενίσειεν, εὖροι ἂν πολλὴν
wholly if someone to this should-look-hard he-would-find — much
 παραλλαγὴν τῆς φωνῆς παρὰ τούτῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
variation of-the sound in this both and in-the other
 ζώοις ἐν ταῖς διαφόροις περιστάσεσιν, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα
animals in the different circumstances so-that through these
 εἰκότως λέγοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ μετέχειν λόγου
reasonably it-might-be-said — also of-the uttered to-share speech
 τὰ καλούμενα ἄλογα ζῶα.

the-(ones) being-called irrational animals

εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λείπεται τῶν
if and neither in-exactness of-the senses falls-short of-the
 ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα μήτε τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ λόγῳ, ἐκ περιουσίας
men these nor in-the internal reason from abundance
 δὲ εἰπεῖν μηδὲ τῷ προφορικῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπιστότερα ἡμῶν
and to-say nor in-the uttered not — less-credible than-us
 εἴη κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας.

would-be according-to the impressions

καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἴσως ἰσάντας τὸν
and upon each and of-the irrational animals perhaps setting the
 λόγον ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύειν δυνατόν ἐστιν. οἷον γοῦν
argument these to-demonstrate possible it-is such-as at-any-rate
 τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τοὺς ὄρνιθας ἀγχινοῖα τε διαφέρειν
who not — would-say the birds in-shrewdness both to-excel
 καὶ τῷ προφορικῷ κεχρησθαι λόγῳ; οἳ γε οὐ μόνον
and in-the uttered to-have-used speech who indeed not only
 τὰ παρόντα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἐπίστανται καὶ ταῦτα
the present-(things) but also the (things)-to-be know and these
 τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις προδηλοῦσιν, ἄλλως τε
to-the-(ones) to-understand being-able they-foreshow otherwise both
 σημαίνοντες καὶ τῇ φωνῇ προαγορεύοντες.
signifying and by-the voice foretelling

76

77

78 Τὴν δὲ σύγκρισιν ἐποιησάμην, ὥς καὶ ἔμπροσθεν
the and comparison I-made as also before
 ἐπεσημηνάμην, ἐκ περιόντος, ἰκανῶς, ὥς οἶμαι, δείξας
I-indicated from abundance sufficiently as I-think having-shown
 ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεθα προκρίνειν τὰς ἡμετέρας φαντασίας τῶν
that not we-are-able to-prefer the our impressions to-the-(ones)
 παρὰ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις γινομένων. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν
among the irrational animals arising still but if not are
 ἀπιστότερα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν
less-credible the irrational animals than-us toward the judgment of-the
 φαντασιῶν, καὶ διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασίαι παρὰ τὴν τῶν
impressions and different come-about impressions along-with the of-the
 ζώων παραλλαγὴν, ὅποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων
animals variation of-what-kind indeed each of-the underlying-(things)
 ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δυνήσομαι λέγειν, ὅποῖον δὲ ἔστι τῇ
to-me appears I-shall-be-able to-say of-what-kind and it-is in-the
 φύσει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα ἐπέχειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι.
nature through the aforesaid-(things) to-suspend-judgment I-shall-be-compelled

ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν

1.16 • THE SECOND MODE: THE DIFFERENCES AMONG MEN

Grant that men are more credible than animals, and their differences from one another still bring in suspension. Bodies differ, as Scythian from Indian, and Sextus lists men who ate scorpions, drank hellebore, or shivered in the sun. Souls differ too, as the poets say and as the dogmatists' own quarrels show. To trust all men is impossible, to trust some sets the schools quarreling with no way to decide, and the dogmatists who prefer themselves are party to the dispute and beg the question.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος τοιοῦτός 79
and the indeed first of-the suspension-of-judgment mode such
 ἐστὶ, δεύτερον δὲ ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς
is second and we-said to-be the from the difference
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἵνα γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ
of-the men so-that for according-to hypothesis even should-concede
 τις πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τοὺς
someone more-credible to-be than-the irrational animals the
 ἀνθρώπους, εὐρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρα διαφορᾷ
men we-sball-find also as-far upon the our difference
 τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην. δύο τοῖνυν εἶναι λεγομένων
the suspension-of-judgment being-introduced two then to-be being-said
 ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος,
out-of which is-composed the man soul and body
 κατ' ἄμφω ταῦτα διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, οἷον κατὰ
according-to both these we-differ from-one-another such-as according-to
 σῶμα ταῖς τε μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἰδιοσυγκρισίαις.
body in-the both shapes and the individual-temperaments
 διαφέρει μὲν γὰρ κατὰ μορφήν σῶμα Σκύθου 80
differs indeed for according-to shape body of-a-Scythian
 Ἰνδοῦ σώματος, τὴν δὲ παραλλαγὴν ποιεῖ, καθάπερ
from-an-Indian's body the and variation makes just-as
 φασίν, ἡ διάφορος τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτεια. παρὰ δὲ
they-say the different of-the humors predominance along-with and
 τὴν διάφορον τῶν χυμῶν ἐπικράτειαν διάφοροι γίνονται
the different of-the humors predominance different become
 καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ
also the impressions just-as also in the first argument
 παρεστήσαμεν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει καὶ φυγῇ τῶν
we-established these-(things) surely also in the choice and flight of-the
 ἐκτὸς διαφορὰ πολλή κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστίν· ἄλλοις
outside-(things) difference much according-to them is in-other-(things)

γὰρ χαίρουσιν Ἴνδοι καὶ ἄλλοις οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς,
for rejoice Indians and in-other-(things) the-(ones) according-to us
 τὸ δὲ διαφόροις χαίρειν τοῦ παρηλλαγμένας ἀπὸ τῶν
the and in-different-(things) to-rejoice of-the varied from the
 ὑποκειμένων φαντασίας λαμβάνειν ἐστὶ μνηνυτικόν.
underlying-(things) impressions to-receive is indicative

- 81 κατὰ δὲ ἰδιοσυγκρισίας διαφέρομεν ὥς ἐνίους κρέα
according-to and individual-temperaments we-differ so-that some meats
 βόεια πετραίων ἰχθυδίων ῥᾶον πέττειν καὶ ὑπὸ Λεσβίου
beef than-rock little-fish more-easily to-digest and by Lesbian
 οἶναρίου εἰς χολέραν περιτρέπεσθαι. ἦν δέ, φασίν,
little-wine into cholera to-be-upset there-was and they-say
 γραῦς Ἀττικὴ τριάκοντα ὀλκὰς κωνείου ἀκινδύνως
an-old-woman Attic thirty drachms of-hemlock without-danger
 προσφερομένη, Λῦσις δὲ καὶ μηκωνείου τέσσαρας ὀλκὰς
taking Lysis and also of-poppy-juice four drachms
 ἀλύπως ἐλάμβανεν.
painlessly took

- 82 καὶ Δημοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοποιὸς ἐν ἡλίῳ
and Demophon indeed the of-Alexander steward in sun
 γινόμενος ἢ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἐρρίγου, ἐν σκιᾷ δὲ ἐθάλπετο,
being or in a-bath shivered in shade and was-warmed
 Ἀθηναγόρας δὲ ὁ Ἀργεῖος ὑπὸ σκορπίων καὶ φαλαγγίων
Athenagoras and the Argive by scorpions and venomous-spiders
 ἀλύπως ἐπλήσσετο, οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Ψυλλαεῖς οὐδ'
painlessly was-stung the-(ones) and being-called Psyllaeans not-even
 ὑπὸ ὄφεων ἢ ἀσπίδων δακνόμενοι βλάπτονται,
by snakes or asps being-bitten are-harmed

- 83 οἱ δὲ Τεντυρίται τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οὐ βλάπτονται πρὸς τῶν
the and Tentyritae of-the Egyptians not are-harmed by the
 κροκοδείλων. ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰθιοπῶν οἱ ἀντιπέραν τῆς
crocodiles but also of-Ethiopians the-(ones) opposite of

Μερόης παρὰ τὸν Ἀστάπουν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντες σκορπίους
Meroë beside the Astapus river dwelling scorpions
καὶ ὄφεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια ἀκινδύνως ἐσθίουσιν. καὶ
and snakes and the similar-(things) without-danger eat and
Ῥουφίνος δὲ ὁ ἐν Χαλκίδι πίνων ἐλλέβορον οὔτε ἤμει
Rufinus and the-(one) in Chalcis drinking bellebore neither vomited
οὔτε ὅλως ἐκαθαίρετο, ἀλλ' ὥς τι τῶν συνήθων
nor at-all was-purged but as something of-the customary-(things)
προσεφέρετο καὶ ἔπεσεν.

he-took and digested

Χρύσερμος δὲ ὁ Ἡροφίλειος εἴ ποτε πέπερι προσηνέγκατο, 84

Chrysermus and the Herophilean if ever pepper took

καρδιακῶς ἐκινδύνευεν. καὶ Σωτήριχος δὲ ὁ χειρουργὸς εἴ
with-heart-trouble was-endangered and Soterichus and the surgeon if
ποτε σιλούρων ἦσθετο κνίσσης, χολέρα ἠλίσκετο. Ἄνδρων δὲ
ever of-catfish perceived savor by-cholera was-seized Andron and
ὁ Ἀργεῖος οὕτως ἄδιψος ἦν ὥς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης
the Argive so thirstless was that even through the waterless Libya
ὁδεύειν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιζητοῦντα ποτόν. Τιβέριος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ
to-journey him not seeking drink Tiberius and — Caesar
ἐν σκοτῶι ἑώρα. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἱστορεῖ Θάσιόν τινα ᾧ
in darkness saw Aristotle and records a-Thasian certain to-whom
ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπου εἰδῶλον προηγέσθαι αὐτοῦ διὰ παντός.

it-seemed of-a-man a-phantom to-go-before him through all

τοσαύτης οὖν παραλλαγῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 85

so-great then variation being among the men

κατὰ τὰ σώματα, ἵνα ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν τῶν παρὰ
according-to the bodies so-that few-(things) out-of many the-(ones) among
τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων ἀρκεσθῶμεν εἰπόντες, εἰκός
the dogmatists lying we-may-be-content having-said likely
ἐστι καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων
it-is also according-to itself the soul to-differ from-one-another

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· τύπος γάρ τις ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα τῆς
the men an-impress for some is the body of-the
 ψυχῆς, ὥς καὶ ἡ φυσιогνωμονικὴ σοφία δείκνυσιν. τὸ δὲ
soul as also the physiognomic science shows the and
 μέγιστον δείγμα τῆς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
greatest proof of-the according-to the understanding of-the men
 πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου διαφορᾶς ἢ διαφωνίας τῶν παρὰ τοῖς
much and boundless difference the disagreement of-the among the
 δογματικοῖς λεγομένων περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τοῦ
dogmatists said-(things) about both the other-(things) and about the
 τίνα μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι προσήκει τίνα δὲ ἐκκλίνειν.
which-(things) indeed to-choose it-is-fitting which-(things) and to-avoid
 86 δεόντως οὖν καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ περὶ τούτων ἀπεφάναντο· ὁ
fittingly then also the poets about these declared —
 μὲν γὰρ Πίνδαρος φησιν
indeed for Pindar says

ἀελλοπόδων μὲν τιν' εὐφραίνουσιν ἵππων
of-storm-footed indeed some gladden horses
 τιμαί τε καὶ στέφανοι,
honors both and crowns
 τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοις θαλάμοις βιοτά·
others and in gold-rich chambers life

τέρπεται δὲ καί τις ἐπ' οἷδμ' ἄλιον

is-delighted and also someone upon a-swell briny

ναῖ θοᾷ διαμείβων.

in-a-ship swift traversing

ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς λέγει

the and poet says

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις.

another for indeed in-other man delights works

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τραγωδία μεστὴ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ λέγει

but also the tragedy full of-the such-(things) is it-says

γούν

at-any-rate

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτ' ὁ καλὸν ἔφυ σοφόν θ' ἅμα,

if to-all the-same beautiful was-by-nature wise and alike

οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις,

not there-was would disputed among-men strife

καὶ πάλιν

and again

δεινὸν γε ταῦτ' ὁ τοῖς μὲν ἀνδάνειν βροτῶν

strange indeed the-same to-the-(ones) indeed to-please of-mortals

τοῖς δ' ἔχθος εἶναι.

to-the-(ones) and hateful to-be

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ

since then the choice and the flight in pleasure

- 87 καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει
and displeasure is the and pleasure and the displeasure in perception
 κεῖται καὶ φαντασίᾳ, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν
lies and impression whenever the same-(things) the-(ones) indeed
 αἰρῶνται οἱ δὲ φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι
choose the-(ones) and flee it-follows us to-reason
 ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινεῦνται, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως
that not-even alike by the same-(things) they-are-moved since alike
 ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἤρουντο ἢ ἐξέκλινον. εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ
— the same-(things) they-would-choose or they-would-avoid if and the same-(things)
 διαφόρως κινεῖ παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
differently move along-with the difference of-the men
 εἰσάγοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐποχή,
would-be-introduced — reasonably also according-to this the suspension-of-judgment
 ὅ τι μὲν ἕκαστον φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὡς πρὸς
what ever indeed each appears of-the underlying-(things) as toward
 ἑκάστην διαφορὰν ἴσως λέγειν ἡμῶν δυναμένων, τί δὲ
each difference perhaps to-say us being-able what and
 ἔστι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν οὐχ οἷον τε ὄντων ἀποφύνασθαι.
it-is as toward the nature not able and being to-declare
- 88 ἥτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν ἢ τισίν.
either for all the men we-shall-trust or some
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ
but if indeed all both impossible-(things) we-shall-attempt and the
 ἀντικείμενα παραδεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν
opposite-(things) we-shall-admit if and some let-them-tell us
 τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς
to-whom it-is-necessary to-assent the indeed for Platonist
 λέξει ὅτι Πλάτῳ, ὁ Ἐπικούρειος δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ
will-say that to-Plato the Epicurean and to-Epicurus and

οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως στασιάζοντες

the others correspondingly and thus undecidably quarreling

αὖθις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν περιστήσουσιν.

again us into the suspension-of-judgment they-will-bring-round

ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι τοῖς πλείστοις δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι 89

the-(one) and saying that to-the most it-is-necessary to-assent

παιδαριώδές τι προοίεται, οὐδενὸς δυναμένου πάντας

childish something will-put-forward no-one being-able all

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διαλογίσασθαι τί τοῖς

the men to-go-over and to-reckon what to-the

πλείστοις ἀρέσκει, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν,

most pleases it-being-possible the in some nations

ἃ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴσμεν, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἡμῶν σπάνια

which we not know the-(things) indeed among us rare

τοῖς πλείοσι προσεῖναι τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς

to-the more to-belong the-(things) and of-us to-the many

συμβαίνοντα σπάνια ὑπάρχειν, ὥς τοὺς πολλοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ

happening rare to-be as the many indeed by

φαλαγγίων δακνομένους μὴ ἀλγεῖν, τινὰς δὲ σπανίως

venomous-spiders being-bitten not to-suffer-pain some and rarely

ἀλγεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων

to-suffer-pain and in the other the before said

ἰδιοσυγκρισίων τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ διὰ τὴν

individual-temperaments the analogue necessary then also through the

τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν εἰσάγεσθαι τὴν ἐποχὴν.

of-the men difference to-be-introduced the suspension-of-judgment

Ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαντοί τινες ὄντες οἱ δογματικοὶ φασὶ δεῖν 90

since and self-loving some being the dogmatists say it-is-necessary

τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς προκρίνειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει

than-the other men themselves to-prefer in the judgment

τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν ὅτι ἄτοπός ἐστιν

of-the matters we-know indeed that absurd is

ἡ ἀξίωσις αὐτῶν (μέρος γάρ εἰσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς
the claim of-them a-part for they-are also themselves of-the
 διαφωνίας· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτοὺς προκρίνοντας οὕτω κρίνωσι τὰ
disagreement and if themselves preferring thus they-judge the
 φαινόμενα, πρὶν ἄρξασθαι τῆς κρίσεως τὸ ζητούμενον
appearing-(things) before to-begin the judgment the (thing)-investigated
 συναρπάζουσιν, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτρέποντες),
they-beg to-themselves the judgment entrusting

ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς

1.17 · THE THIRD MODE: THE SENSES

Even one man's senses disagree. A painting shows recesses to the eye and none to the touch, honey is pleasant to the tongue and unpleasant to the eyes, rain water helps the eyes and roughens the lungs. An apple appears smooth, fragrant, sweet, and yellow, but it may be of one quality only and appear many, or have qualities no sense of ours can reach. So we suspend judgment about external things.

- 91 ὅμως δ' οὖν ἵνα καὶ ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν
nevertheless and then in-order-that even upon one man the
 λόγον ἱστάντες, οἷον τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὀνειροπολουμένου
argument setting such-as the among them dreamed-of
 σοφοῦ, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντῶμεν, τὸν τρίτον
wise-man to the suspension-of-judgment we-arrive the third
 τῇ τάξει τρόπον προχειρίζομεθα. τοῦτον δ' ἐλέγομεν τὸν
in-the order mode we-take-up this and we-said the
 ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρονται
from the difference of-the senses that and differ
 αἱ αἰσθήσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, πρόδηλον.
the senses toward one-another (is)-evident

αἱ γοῦν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὄψει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχὰς καὶ 92
the at-any-rate paintings to-the indeed sight seem recesses and
 ἐξοχὰς ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ. καὶ τὸ μέλι τῇ
projections to-have not however also to-the touch and the honey to-the
 μὲν γλώττῃ ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τινων, τοῖς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς
indeed tongue pleasant appears in some to-the and eyes
 ἀηδές· ἀδύνατον οὖν εἶπεν πότερον ἡδὺ ἐστίν
unpleasant impossible then it-is to-say whether pleasant it-is
 εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἀηδές. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μύρου ὁμοίως· τὴν μὲν
purely or unpleasant and in the perfume likewise the indeed
 γὰρ ὁσφρησιν εὐφραίνει, τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν ἀηδίζει.
for smell it-gladdens the and taste it-offends

τό τε εὐφόρβιον ἐπεὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀφθαλμοῖς λυπηρόν ἐστι 93
the both spurge since to-the indeed eyes painful is
 τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ σώματι παντὶ ἄλυπον, οὐχ ἔξομεν
to-the and other body whole painless not we-shall-be-able
 εἶπεν, πότερον ἄλυπὸν ἐστὶν εἰλικρινῶς τοῖς σώμασιν
to-say whether painless it-is purely to-the bodies
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἢ λυπηρόν. τό τε ὄμβριον
as-far upon the its-own nature or painful the both rain
 ὕδωρ ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμον, ἀρτηρίαν δὲ καὶ
water to-eyes indeed is beneficial windpipe and and
 πνεύμονα τραχύνει, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον, καίτοι τὴν
lung it-roughens just-as also the olive-oil although the
 ἐπιφάνειαν παρηγοροῦν. καὶ ἡ θαλαττία νάρκη τοῖς
surface soothing and the sea torpedo-fish to-the
 μὲν ἄκροις προστεθεῖσα ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ
indeed extremities being-applied to-be-numbed makes to-the and other
 σώματι ἀλύπως παρατίθεται. διόπερ ὁποῖον μὲν ἔστι
body painlessly is-laid-on wherefore of-what-kind indeed is

πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστον τούτων οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν,
toward the nature each of-these not we-shall-be-able to-say

ὁποῖον δὲ φαίνεται ἐκάστοτε δυνατόν εἰπεῖν.

of-what-kind and it-appears each-time possible to-say

94 καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω τούτων ἔνεστι λέγειν· ἀλλ’

and other-(things) and more than-these it-is-possible to-say but

ἵνα μὴ διατρίβωμεν, διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς

so-that not we-may-linger through the purpose of-the treatise

ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον. ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν

that (is)-to-be-said each of-the appearing to-us sensibles

ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον λεῖον εὐώδες

varied to-fall-under seems such-as the apple smooth fragrant

γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν πότερον ποτε ταύτας μόνας

sweet yellow non-evident then whether ever these only

ὄντως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μὲν ἔστιν, παρὰ

really it-has the qualities or single-qualified indeed it-is along-with

δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον

and the different constitution of-the sense-organs different

φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει

it-appears or also more indeed than-the appearing-(ones) it-has

ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν.

qualities to-us and not fall-under some of-them

95 μονόποιον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται λογίζεσθαι

single-qualified indeed for to-be this it-is-possible to-reason

ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ

out-of the-(things) before by-us said about the into the

σώματα ἀναδιδομένης τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ εἰς

bodies being-distributed food and the water the-(one) into

τὰ δένδρα ἀναδιδομένου καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ αὐλοῖς

the trees being-distributed and the breath the-(one) in-pipes

καὶ σύριγξι καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ὀργάνοις ἐμπνεομένου·

and reeds and the similar instruments being-blown

δύναται γὰρ καὶ τὸ μῆλον μονοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι, διάφορον
can for also the apple single-formed indeed to-be different

δὲ θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων
and to-be-observed along-with the difference of-the sense-organs

περὶ ᾧ γίνεται αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀντίληψις.
about which comes-about of-it the apprehension

πλείονας δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν ποιότητων ἔχειν 96
more and than-the appearing to-us qualities to-have

τὸ μῆλον ποιότητος δύνασθαι οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμεθα.
the apple qualities to-be-able thus we-reason

ἐννοήσωμέν τινα ἐκ γενετῆς ἀφήν μὲν ἔχοντα καὶ
let-us-conceive someone from birth touch indeed having and

ὄσφρησιν καὶ γεῦσιν, μήτε δὲ ἀκούοντα μήτε ὁρῶντα.
smell and taste neither and bearing nor seeing

οὗτος τοῖνυν ὑπολήψεται μήτε ὁρατόν τι εἶναι τὴν
this-(man) then will-suppose neither visible anything to-be the

ἀρχὴν μήτε ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ μόνα ἐκεῖνα τὰ τρία γένη
outset nor audible but only those the three kinds

τῶν ποιότητων ὑπάρχειν ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται.
of-the qualities to-exist which to-apprehend he-can

καὶ ἡμᾶς οὖν ἐνδέχεται τὰς πέντε μόνας αἰσθήσεις 97
and us then it-is-possible the five only senses

ἔχοντας μόνον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον
having only to-apprehend out-of the about the apple

ποιότητων, ὧν ἐσμεν ἀντιληπτικοί· ὑποκεῖσθαι δὲ
qualities of-which we-are apprehensive to-underlie and

ἄλλας οἰὸν τέ ἐστι ποιότητας, ὑποπιπτούσας ἑτέροις
other possible and it-is qualities falling-under to-other

αἰσθητηρίοις, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐ μετεσχήκαμεν, διὸ οὐδὲ
sense-organs of-which we not have-shared wherefore not-even

ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν.
we-apprehend the according-to them sensibles

- 98 ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο, φήσει τις, τὰς αἰσθήσεις
but the nature proportioned will-say someone the senses
 πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ποία φύσις, διαφωνίας τοσαύτης
to the sensibles what-kind-of nature disagreement so-great
 ἀνεπικρίτου παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὔσης περὶ τῆς
undecidable among the dogmatists being about the
 ὑπάρξεως τῆς κατ' αὐτήν; ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων αὐτὸ
existence the according-to it the-(one) for deciding itself
 τοῦτο εἰ ἔστι φύσις, εἰ μὲν ἰδιώτης εἴη, ἄπιστος
this whether there-is nature if indeed a-layman he-should-be untrustworthy
 ἔσται κατ' αὐτούς, φιλόσοφος δὲ ὢν μέρος ἔσται
he-will-be according-to them a-philosopher and being a-part he-will-be
 τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ κρινόμενος αὐτὸς ἀλλ' οὐ κριτής.
of-the disagreement and being-judged himself but not a-judge
- 99 πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνεχώρει καὶ ταύτας μόνas ὑποκεῖσθαι
nevertheless but if it-were-admissible both these only to-underlie
 παρὰ τῷ μήλῳ τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι
in the apple the qualities of-which to-apprehend
 δοκοῦμεν, καὶ πλείους τούτων, ἢ πάλιν μηδὲ τὰς ἡμῖν
we-seem and more than-these or again not-even the-(ones) to-us
 ὑποπιπτούσας, ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μήλον.
falling-under non-evident to-us it-will-be of-what-kind is the apple
 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν λόγος. τῶν
the and same also in the other sensibles argument the
 αἰσθήσεων μέντοι μὴ καταλαμβάνουσιν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐδὲ
senses however not apprehending the outside-(things) not-even
 ἡ διάνοια ταῦτα δύναται καταλαμβάνειν, σφαλλουσιν
the understanding these can to-apprehend misleading
 αὐτὴν τῶν ὁδηγῶν ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ περὶ
it the guides so-that also through this the argument the about
 τῶν ἐκτός ὑποκειμένων ἐποχὴ συνάγεσθαι δόξει.
the outside underlying-(things) suspension-of-judgment to-be-inferred will-seem

ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις

I.18 • THE FOURTH MODE: CIRCUMSTANCES

The fourth mode turns on the disposition a man is in: healthy or sick, awake or asleep, young or old, moving or resting, loving or bating, hungry or full, drunk or sober. The same water seems scalding hot poured on an inflamed spot and lukewarm to us; the same wine is sour after figs and sweet after nuts. Anyone who would decide is himself in some disposition, and criterion and proof wait on each other in a circle.

Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾷς ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἰστάντες τὸν λόγον, 100
so-that and also upon one each sense setting the argument
 ἢ καὶ ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἔχωμεν καταλήγειν
or also standing-away from-the senses we-may-be-able to-end-up
 εἰς τὴν ἐποχήν, παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ τὸν τέταρτον
into the suspension-of-judgment we-take-up also the fourth
 τρόπον αὐτῆς. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις
mode of-it is and this the along-with the circumstances
 καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις.
called circumstances calling us the dispositions
 θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν φαμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ
to-be-observed and it we-say in the according-to nature or along-with
 φύσιν ἔχειν, ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν, παρὰ τὰς
nature to-be in the to-be-awake or to-sleep along-with the
 ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν
ages along-with the to-move or to-rest along-with the to-hate
 ἢ φιλεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ
or to-love along-with the needy to-be or sated along-with
 τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ
the to-be-drunk or to-be-sober along-with the predispositions along-with the
 θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι, παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν.
to-be-confident or to-fear along-with the to-be-pained or to-rejoice

- 101 οἷον παρὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν
such-as along-with indeed the according-to nature or along-with nature
 ἔχειν ἀνόμοια ὑποπίπτει τὰ πράγματα, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν
to-be unlike fall-under the things since the-(ones) indeed
 φρενιτίζοντες καὶ οἱ θεοφορούμενοι δαιμόνων ἀκούειν
delirious and the-(ones) god-possessed spirits to-bear
 δοκοῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀποφορᾶς στύρακος
seem we and not likewise and exhalation of-storax
 ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ τινος τοιούτου καὶ ἄλλων πλειόνων
or frankincense or some such and others more
 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πολλάκις λέγουσιν, ἡμῶν μὴ αἰσθανομένων.
to-perceive often they-say us not perceiving
 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ φλεγμαίνουσι μὲν τόποις ἐπιχυθὲν ζεστόν
and the same water to-inflamed indeed places poured-on boiling
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἡμῖν δὲ χλιαρόν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἱμάτιον τοῖς
to-be seems to-us and lukewarm and the same cloak to-the-(ones)
 μὲν ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχουσι φαίνεται κιρρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὸ
indeed bloodshot-eye having appears tawny to-me and not and the
 αὐτὸ μέλι ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται γλυκύ, τοῖς δὲ ἰκτερικοῖς πικρόν.
same honey to-me indeed appears sweet to-the and jaundiced bitter
- 102 εἰ δέ τις λέγει ὅτι χυμῶν τινων παραπλοκὴ ἀνοικείους
if and someone says that of-humors certain blending alien
 φαντασίας ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ποιεῖ τοῖς παρὰ
impressions out-of the underlying-(things) makes to-the-(ones) along-with
 φύσιν ἔχουσιν, λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες
nature being (it-is)-to-be-said that since also the-(ones) healthy
 χυμοὺς ἔχουσιν ἀνακεκραμένους, δύνανται οὗτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς
humors have commingled can these the outside
 ὑποκείμενα, τοιαῦτα ὄντα τῇ φύσει ὅποια φαίνεται
underlying-(things) such being in-the nature of-what-kind they-appear

τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν λεγομένοις, ἑτεροῖα φαίνεσθαι
to-the-(ones) along-with nature to-be said otherwise to-appear
ποιεῖν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν.

to-make to-the healthy

τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις μὲν τοῖς χυμοῖς μεταβλητικὴν τῶν
the for to-those indeed the humors transforming of-the

103

ὑποκειμένων διδόναι δύναμιν, τούτοις δὲ μὴ, πλασματικόν
underlying-(things) to-give power to-these and not fictitious

ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες κατὰ φύσιν
is since also just-as the-(ones) healthy according-to nature

μὲν τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων ἔχουσι, παρὰ φύσιν
indeed the-(condition) of-the healthy have along-with nature

δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, οὕτω καὶ οἱ νοσούντες
and the-(condition) of-the sick thus also the-(ones) sick

παρὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων,
along-with nature indeed have the-(condition) of-the healthy

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν νοσούντων, ὥστε καὶ ἐκείνοις
according-to nature and the-(condition) of-the sick so-that to-those-also

πρὸς τι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι πιστευτέον.
toward something according-to nature being (it-is)-to-be-trusted

παρὰ δὲ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι διάφοροι γίνονται
along-with and the to-sleep or to-be-awake different become

104

φαντασίαι, ἐπεὶ ὥς καθ' ὕπνου φανταζόμεθα, οὐ
impressions since as in sleep we-imagine not

φανταζόμεθα ἐγρηγορότες, οὐδὲ ὥς φανταζόμεθα
we-imagine being-awake nor as we-imagine

ἐγρηγορότες, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φανταζόμεθα, ὥστε
being-awake also in the sleep we-imagine so-that

εἶναι αὐταῖς ἢ μὴ εἶναι γίνεται οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς
to-be for-them or not to-be comes-about not absolutely but toward

τι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὕπνου ἢ πρὸς ἐγρήγορσιν.
something toward for the in sleep or toward waking

εἰκότως οὖν καθ' ὕπνου ὁρώμεν ταῦτα ἃ ἔστιν
reasonably then in sleep we-see these which are
 ἀνύπαρκτα ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι, οὐ καθάπαξ ἀνύπαρκτα
non-existent in the to-be-awake not absolutely non-existent
 ὄντα· ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ὕπνου, ὥσπερ τὰ ὕπαρ ἔστιν
being exists for in sleep just-as the-(things) waking exist
 καὶ μὴ ἢ καθ' ὕπνου.
even-if not it-may-be in sleep

105 παρὰ δὲ τὰς ἡλικίας, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀήρ τοῖς μὲν γέρουσι
along-with and the ages that the same air to-the indeed old-men
 ψυχρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσιν εὐκρατος, καὶ τὸ
cold to-be seems to-the and in-their-prime well-tempered and the
 αὐτὸ χρῶμα τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται
same color to-the indeed older dim appears
 τοῖς δὲ ἀκμάζουσι κατακορές, καὶ φωνὴ ὁμοίως ἢ αὐτὴ
to-the and in-their-prime intense and voice likewise the same
 τοῖς μὲν ἀμαυρὰ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν τοῖς δ' ἐξάκουστος.
to-the indeed faint seems to-be to-the and audible

106 καὶ παρὰ τὰς αἰρέσεις δὲ καὶ φυγὰς ἀνομοίως κινούνται
and along-with the choices and also flights unlike are-moved
 οἱ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέροντες· παισὶ μὲν γάρ, εἰ
the-(ones) in-the ages differing to-children indeed for if
 τύχοι, σφαῖραι καὶ τροχοὶ διὰ σπουδῆς εἰσιν, οἱ
it-should-happen balls and hoops through eagerness are the-(ones)
 ἀκμάζοντες δὲ ἄλλα αἰροῦνται, καὶ ἄλλα οἱ γέροντες.
in-their-prime and other-(things) choose and other-(things) the old-men
 ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται ὅτι διάφοροι γίνονται φαντασῖαι ὑπὸ
out-of which is-inferred that different become impressions by
 τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους ἡλικίας.
the same underlying-(things) also along-with the different ages

παρὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρεμεῖν ἀνόμοια φαίνεται τὰ 107

along-with and the to-move or to-rest unlike appear the

πράγματα, ἐπεὶ ἅπερ ἐστῶτες ὁρῶμεν ἀτρεμοῦντα,

things since which-(things) standing we-see motionless

ταῦτα παραπλέοντες κινεῖσθαι δοκοῦμεν.

these sailing-past to-move we-think

παρὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν, ὅτι κρέα ὕεια τινὲς 108

along-with and the to-love or to-hate that meats pork some

μὲν ἀποστρέφονται καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ ἥδιστα

indeed turn-away in excess some and most-gladly

προσφέρονται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Μένανδρος ἔφη

take whence also — Menander said

οἷος δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι φαίνεται;

of-what-sort and also the look to-be he-appears

ἀφ' οὗ τοιούτος γέγονεν; οἷον θηρίον.

from which such he-has-become such-as a-beast

τὸ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν καὶ καλοὺς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ.

the nothing to-wrong also beautiful us makes

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐρωμέναις αἰσχροὺς ἔχοντες ὠραιότητας

many and also mistresses ugly having most-lovely

αὐτὰς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.

them to-be think

παρὰ δὲ τὸ πεινῆν ἢ κεκορέσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ 109

along-with and the to-hunger or to-be-sated that the same

ἔδεσμα τοῖς μὲν πεινώσιν ἥδιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ

food to-the indeed hungry most-pleasant to-be seems to-the and

κεκορεσμένοις ἀηδές. παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν,

sated unpleasant along-with and the to-be-drunk or to-be-sober

ὅτι ἄπερ νήφοντες αἰσχρὰ εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ταῦτα ἡμῖν
that which-(things) being-sober shameful to-be we-think these to-us
 μεθύουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται.

being-drunk not shameful appear

- 110 παρὰ δὲ τὰς προδιαθέσεις, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οἶνος τοῖς μὲν
along-with and the predispositions that the same wine to-the-(ones) indeed
 φοίνικας ἢ ἰσχάδας προφαγοῦσιν ὀξώδης φαίνεται, τοῖς
dates or dried-figs having-eaten-before sour appears to-the-(ones)
 δὲ κάρυα ἢ ἐρεβίνθους προσενεγκαμένοις ἡδὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ,
and nuts or chickpeas having-taken sweet to-be seems
 καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαλανείου παραστὰς τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσιόντας
and the of-the bath vestibule the-(ones) indeed from-outside entering
 θερμαίνει, ψύχει δὲ τοὺς ἐξιόντας, εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβουσιν.
warms chills and the-(ones) going-out if in it they-should-linger

- 111 παρὰ δὲ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα
along-with and the to-fear or to-be-confident that the same thing
 τῷ μὲν δειλῷ φοβερὸν καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, τῷ
to-the indeed cowardly fearful and terrible to-be seems to-the
 θαρραλεωτέρῳ δὲ οὐδαμῶς. παρὰ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ
more-confident and by-no-means along-with and the to-be-pained or
 χαίρειν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα τοῖς μὲν λυπουμένοις
to-rejoice that the same things to-the indeed grieving
 ἐστὶν ἐπαχθὴ τοῖς δὲ χαίρουσιν ἡδέα.
are burdensome to-the and rejoicing pleasant

- 112 Τοσαύτης οὖν οὔσης ἀνωμαλίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις,
so-great then being irregularity both along-with the dispositions
 καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐν ταῖς διαθέσεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων
and at-one-time otherwise in the dispositions of-the men
 γινομένων, ὁποῖον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐκάστω
coming-about of-what-kind indeed each of-the underlying-(things) to-each
 φαίνεται ῥάδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστιν οὐκέτι, ἐπεὶ
appears easy perhaps to-say of-what-kind and it-is no-longer since

καὶ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ ἐπικρίνων
 also undecidable is the irregularity the-(one) for deciding
 ταύτην ἥτοι ἔν τισι τῶν προειρημένων διαθέσεων ἐστιν
 this either in some of-the aforesaid dispositions is
 ἢ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶ διαθέσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 or in none the altogether is disposition the indeed then
 λέγειν ὅτι ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ διαθέσει τὸ σύνολόν ἐστιν, οἷον
 to-say that in no disposition the whole he-is such-as
 οὔτε ὑγιαίνει οὔτε νοσεῖ, οὔτε κινεῖται οὔτε ἡρμεῖ, οὔτε
 neither he-is-healthy nor he-is-sick nor he-moves nor he-rests nor
 ἐν τινι ἡλικίᾳ ἐστίν, ἀπήλλακται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 in some age he-is he-is-freed and also of-the other
 διαθέσεων, τελέως ἀπεμφαίνει. εἰ δὲ ἔν τινι διαθέσει ὦν
 dispositions completely is-absurd if and in some disposition being
 κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, μέρος ἔσται τῆς διαφωνίας,
 he-shall-judge the impressions a-part he-will-be of-the disagreement
 καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἰλικρινῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἔσται 113
 and otherwise not unbiased of-the outside underlying-(things) he-will-be
 κριτῆς διὰ τὸ τεθολῶσθαι ταῖς διαθέσεων ἐν αἷς ἔστιν·
 a-judge through the to-have-been-muddled by-the dispositions in which he-is
 οὔτε οὖν ὁ ἐρηγορῶς δύναται συγκρίνειν τὰς τῶν
 neither then the-(one) being-awake can to-compare the of-the
 καθευδόντων φαντασίας ταῖς τῶν ἐρηγορότων, οὔτε ὁ
 sleeping impressions with-the of-the waking nor the-(one)
 ὑγιαίνων τὰς τῶν νοσούντων ταῖς τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων·
 healthy the-(ones) of-the sick with-the of-the healthy
 τοῖς γὰρ παροῦσι καὶ κινουσιν ἡμᾶς κατὰ τὸ
 to-the-(things) for present and moving us according-to the
 παρὸν συγκατατιθέμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ παροῦσιν.
 present we-assent rather than to-the-(things) not present

- 114 καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων
and otherwise and undecidable is the of-the such
 φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλία. ὁ γὰρ προκρίνων φαντασίαν
impressions irregularity the-(one) for preferring impression
 φαντασίας καὶ περίστασιν περιστάσεως ἥτοι ἀκρίτως καὶ
to-impression and circumstance to-circumstance either without-judging and
 ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἢ κρίνων καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλ'
without proof this does or judging and proving but
 οὔτε ἄνευ τούτων (ἄπιστος γὰρ ἔσται), οὔτε σὺν τούτοις.
neither without these untrustworthy for he-will-be nor with these
 εἰ γὰρ κρινεῖ τὰς φαντασίας, πάντως κριτηρίῳ κρινεῖ.
if for he-shall-judge the impressions altogether by-a-criterion he-shall-judge
 115 τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἥτοι ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέξει ἢ ψευδές.
this then the criterion either true to-be he-will-say or false
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ψευδές, ἄπιστος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο
but if indeed false untrustworthy it-will-be if and true to-be this
 φήσῃ, ἥτοι ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως λέξει ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ τὸ
he-will-say either without proof he-will-say that true is the
 κριτήριον, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως,
criterion or with proof and if indeed without proof
 ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, πάντως δεήσει
untrustworthy he-will-be if and with proof altogether it-will-be-necessary
 καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄπιστος ἔσται. ἀληθῆ
also the proof true to-be since untrustworthy it-will-be true
 οὖν λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὴν εἰς πίστωσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου
then he-will-say the proof the-(one) for confirmation of-the criterion
 λαμβανομένην πότερον κεκρικῶς αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ κεκρικῶς;
being-taken whether having-judged it or not having-judged
 116 εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ κρίνας, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κρίνας,
if indeed for not having-judged untrustworthy he-will-be if and having-judged
 δηλὸν ὅτι κριτηρίῳ φήσῃ κεκρικῆναι, οὗ κριτηρίου
clear that by-a-criterion he-will-say to-have-judged of-which criterion

ζητήσομεν ἀποδείξιν, κακείνης κριτήριον. χρήζει γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ
we-shall-seek proof and-of-that a-criterion needs for always both
 ἢ ἀποδείξεις κριτηρίου, ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ, καὶ τὸ κριτήριον
the proof a-criterion so-that it-may-be-confirmed and the criterion
 ἀποδείξεως, ἵνα ἀληθὲς εἶναι δειχθῇ· καὶ οὔτε ἀπόδειξις
proof so-that true to-be it-may-be-shown and neither proof
 ὑγιὲς εἶναι δύναται μὴ προϋπάρχοντος κριτηρίου ἀληθοῦς,
sound to-be can not pre-existing criterion true
 οὔτε κριτήριον ἀληθὲς μὴ προπεπιστωμένης τῆς ἀποδείξεως.
nor criterion true not having-been-confirmed-first the proof
 καὶ οὕτως ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τό τε 117
and thus they-fall into the circular mode the both
 κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμφοτέρα εὐρίσκεται
criterion and the proof in which both are-found
 ἄπιστα· ἐκάτερον γὰρ τὴν θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον
untrustworthy each for the of-the-other credit awaiting
 ὁμοίως τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἄνευ
likewise to-the remaining is untrustworthy if then neither without
 ἀποδείξεως καὶ κριτηρίου μήτε σὺν τούτοις δύναται
proof and criterion nor with these can
 τις προκρῖναι φαντασίαν φαντασίας, ἀνεπίκριτοι ἔσονται
someone to-prefer impression to-impression undecidable will-be
 αἱ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους διαθέσεις διάφοροι γινόμεναι
the along-with the different dispositions different becoming
 φαντασίαι, ὥστε εἰσάγεται ἡ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς
impressions so-that is-introduced the about the nature of-the outside
 ὑποκειμένων ἐποχῇ καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
underlying-(things) suspension-of-judgment also as-far upon this the mode

ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους

I.19 · THE FIFTH MODE: POSITIONS, DISTANCES, AND PLACES

The same colonnade tapers from one end and is even from the middle, the same ship is small far off and large near by, the same tower round from afar and square close to. A lamp is dim in sunlight and bright in the dark, an oar bent in the water and straight out of it, a dove's neck a different color at each tilt. Since everything is seen at some distance and in some place, we suspend judgment.

- 118 Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ
fifth is argument the-(one) along-with the positions and the
 διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τούτων
distances and the places also for along-with of-these
 ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ
each the same things different appear such-as the
 αὐτὴ στοὰ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς ὀρωμένη μείουρος
same colonnade from indeed the other end being-seen tapering
 φαίνεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μέσου σύμμετρος πάντοθεν, καὶ τὸ
appears from and the middle symmetrical from-every-side and the
 αὐτὸ πλοῖον πόρρωθεν μὲν μικρὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὼς,
same boat from-afar indeed small appears and standing
 ἐγγύθεν δὲ μέγα καὶ κινούμενον, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος
from-near and large and moving and the same tower
 πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος.
from-afar indeed appears round from-near and square
- 119 ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ δὲ τοὺς τόπους ὅτι
these indeed along-with the distances along-with and the places that
 τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ἐν ἡλίῳ μὲν ἀμαυρὸν φαίνεται ἐν σκότῳ
the lamp light in sun indeed dim appears in darkness
 δὲ λαμπρόν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἔναλος μὲν κεκλασμένη
and bright and the same oar in-the-sea indeed bent

ξξαλος δὲ εὐθεία, καὶ τὸ ὦδὸν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὄρνιθι ἀπαλὸν ἐν
out-of-the-sea and straight and the egg in indeed the bird soft in
 ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ λυγγούριον ἐν μὲν λυγγὶ ὑγρὸν ἐν
air and hard and the lynx-stone in indeed lynx liquid in
 ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ τὸ κοράλιον ἐν θαλάττῃ μὲν ἀπαλὸν ἐν
air and hard and the coral in sea indeed soft in
 ἀέρι δὲ σκληρόν, καὶ φωνὴ ἀλλοία μὲν φαίνεται ἐν σύριγγι
air and hard and voice of-one-sort indeed appears in a-pipe
 γινομένη, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν αὐλῷ, ἀλλοία δὲ ἐν ἀέρι ἀπλῶς.
arising of-another and in a-flute of-another and in air simply
 παρὰ δὲ τὰς θέσεις ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ εἰκὼν ἐξυπτιαζομένη μὲν 120
along-with and the positions that the same picture tilted-back indeed
 λεία φαίνεται, ποσὼς δὲ ἐπινευομένη εἰσοχὰς καὶ ἐσοχὰς
smooth appears somewhat and inclined-forward recesses and projections
 ἔχειν δοκεῖ. καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς
to-have seems and the necks and of-the doves along-with the
 διαφόρους ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα.
different inclinations different appear according-to color
 ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἔν τινι θεωρεῖται καὶ 121
since then all the appearing-(things) in some are-observed and
 ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος καὶ κατὰ τινα θέσιν, ὧν
from some distance and according-to some position of-which
 ἕκαστον πολλὴν ποιεῖ παραλλαγὴν περὶ τὰς φαντασίας,
each much makes variation about the impressions
 ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, ἀναγκασθσόμεθα καὶ διὰ τοῦτου
as we-recalled we-shall-be-compelled also through this
 τοῦ τρόπου καταντᾶν εἰς ἐποχὴν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ
the mode to-arrive into suspension-of-judgment and for the-(one)
 βουλόμενος τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν προκρίνειν τινὰς
wisbing of-these the impressions to-prefer some
 ἀδυνάτοις ἐπιχειρήσει.
impossible-(things) he-will-attempt

- 122 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ποιήσεται τὴν
 if indeed for simply and without proof be-will-make the
 ἀπόφασιν, ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει βουλήσεται
 assertion untrustworthy be-will-be if and proof be-will-wish
 χρήσασθαι, εἰ μὲν ψευδῇ λέξει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἑαυτὸν
 to-use if indeed false be-will-say the proof to-be himself
 περιτρέψει, ἀληθῇ δὲ λέγων εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται
 be-will-overturn true and saying to-be the proof be-will-be-asked
 ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν εἶναι, κακείνης ἄλλην, ἐπεὶ
 a-proof of-the true it to-be and-of-that another since
 καὶ αὐτὴν ἀληθῇ εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
 also it true to-be it-is-necessary and up-to infinity
 ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστιν ἀπείρους ἀποδείξεις παραστήσαι·
 impossible and it-is infinite proofs to-produce
- 123 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνήσεται προκρίνειν
 therefore not-even with proof be-will-be-able to-prefer
 φαντασίαν φαντασίας. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μήτε
 impression to-impression if and neither without proof nor
 μετὰ ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸς ἔσται τις ἐπικρίνειν τὰς
 with proof able will-be someone to-decide the
 προειρημένας φαντασίας, συνάγεται ἡ ἐποχή,
 aforesaid impressions is-inferred the suspension-of-judgment
 ὁποῖον μὲν φαίνεται ἕκαστον κατὰ τήνδε τὴν θέσιν
 of-what-kind indeed appears each according-to this the position
 ἢ κατὰ τὸδε τὸ διάστημα ἢ ἐν τῷδε εἰπεῖν ἴσως
 or according-to this the distance or in this to-say perhaps
 δυναμένων ἡμῶν, ὁποῖον δέ ἐστιν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
 being-able us of-what-kind and it-is as toward the nature
 ἀδυνατούντων ἀποφαίνεσθαι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.
 being-unable to-declare through the aforesaid-(things)

ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας

I.20 • THE SIXTH MODE: ADMIXTURES

Nothing falls under our senses by itself but always with something else, so we can say what the mixture is like and not what the external thing is. Our color looks one way in warm air and another in cold; the voice changes with the air. Even setting the outside aside, the eye has its own coats and fluids and the ear its crooked passages, and perhaps the mind too adds a mixture of its own. So we suspend judgment.

Ἐκτος ἐστὶ τρόπος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας, καθ' 124
sixth is mode the-(one) along-with the admixtures according-to
ὄν συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καθ' ἑαυτὸ
which we-infer that since nothing of-the underlying-(things) by itself
ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ σύν τινι, ὅποιον μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ
to-us falls-under but with something of-what-kind indeed is the
μῖγμα ἔκ τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ ὧ συνθεωρεῖται
mixture out-of both the outside and the-(thing) with-which it-is-observed-together
τάχα δυνατόν εἰπεῖν, ὅποιον δέ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον
perhaps possible to-say of-what-kind and is the outside underlying-(thing)
εἰλικρινῶς οὐκ ἂν ἔχομεν λέγειν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν
purely not — we-should-be-able to-say that and nothing of-the
ἐκτὸς καθ' αὐτὸ ὑποπίπτει ἀλλὰ πάντως σύν τινι, καὶ
outside by itself falls-under but altogether with something and
ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ἄλλοιον θεωρεῖται, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι.
that along-with this of-another-kind is-observed evident I-think
τὸ γοῦν ἡμέτερον χρῶμα ἄλλοιον μὲν ὁράται ἐν ἀλεεινῷ 125
the at-any-rate our color of-one-kind indeed is-seen in warm
ἀέρι, ἄλλοιον δὲ ἐν ψυχρῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν
air of-another and in cold and not — we-should-be-able to-say
ὅποιον ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει τὸ χρῶμα ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅποιον σὺν
of-what-kind is in-the nature the color of-us but of-what-kind with

ἐκάστω τούτων θεωρεῖται. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φωνὴ ἄλλοία μὲν
each of-these it-is-observed and the same voice of-one-kind indeed
 φαίνεται σὺν λεπτῷ ἀέρι, ἄλλοία δὲ σὺν παχυμερεῖ, καὶ
appears with thin air of-another and with thick and
 τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν βαλανείῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ πληκτικώτερα μᾶλλον
the perfumes in a-bath and sun more-pungent more
 ἔστιν ἢ ἐν ἀέρι καταψύχρῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ὕδατος
are than in air chilly and the body by water
 μὲν περιεχόμενον κοῦφόν ἐστιν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀέρος βαρύν.
indeed surrounded light is by and air heavy

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ἵνα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἕξωθεν ἐπιμυξίας ἀποστῶμεν, οἱ
so-that and also the external admixture we-may-set-aside the
 ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ
eyes of-us have in themselves both coats and
 ὑγρά. τὰ οὖν ὁρατὰ ἐπεὶ μὴ ἄνευ τούτων θεωρεῖται,
fluids the then visible-(things) since not without these are-observed
 οὐ καταληφθήσεται πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· τοῦ γὰρ μίγματος
not will-be-apprehended toward exactness the for mixture
 ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἰκτερικοὶ
we-apprehend and through this the-(ones) indeed jaundiced
 πάντα ὠχρὰ ὁρώσιν, οἱ δ' ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες
all-(things) yellow see the-(ones) and bloodshot-eye having
 ὕφαιμα. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φωνὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄλλοία μὲν φαίνεται
blood-red and since the voice the same of-one-kind indeed appears
 ἐν ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις, ἄλλοία δὲ ἐν στενοῖς καὶ
in open places of-another and in narrow and
 ἐλικοειδέσι, καὶ ἄλλοία μὲν ἐν καθαρῷ ἀέρι, ἄλλοία
winding and of-one-kind indeed in clear air of-another
 δὲ ἐν τεθολωμένῳ, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ μὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἡμᾶς
and in muddied likely it-is not to-apprehend us
 εἰλικρινῶς τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ ὦτα σκολιόπορά ἐστι καὶ
purely the voice the for ears crooked-passaged are and

στενόπορα καὶ ἀτμώδεσιν ἀποφορήσεσιν, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
narrow-passaged and by-vaporous exhalations which indeed from the
 περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν φέρεσθαι λέγονται τόπων, τεθολωμένα.
about the head to-be-carried are-said places muddled
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μύξωτήρσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως 127
but also in the nostrils and in the of-the taste
 τόποις ὑλῶν ὑποκειμένων, μετ' ἐκείνων ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα
places matters underlying with those we-apprehend
 τῶν γευστῶν καὶ τῶν ὁσφρητῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰλικρινῶς.
the tastables and the smellables but not purely
 ὥστε διὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται
so-that through the admixtures the senses not apprehend
 ὅποια πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενά ἐστιν.
of-what-kind toward exactness the outside underlying-(things) are
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια, μάλιστα μὲν ἐπεὶ αἱ ὁδηγοὶ 128
but not-even the understanding especially indeed since the guiding
 αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεις σφάλλονται· ἴσως δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐπιμιξίαν
of-it senses err perhaps and also it admixture
 τινὰ ἰδίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
some own makes toward the-(things) by the senses
 ἀναγγελλόμενα· περὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς
reported about for each of-the places in which
 τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, χυμούς τινας
the ruling-part to-be think the dogmatists humors some
 ὑποκειμένους θεωροῦμεν, εἴτε περὶ ἐγκέφαλον εἴτε περὶ
underlying we-observe whether about brain or about
 καρδίαν εἴτε περὶ ὅτιδήποτε οὖν μέρος τοῦ ζῴου τοῦτο
heart or about whatever then part of-the animal this
 τίθεσθαι βούλοιτό τις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον
to-place might-wish someone and according-to this then the mode

ὁρῶμεν, ὅτι περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων
we-see that about the nature of-the outside underlying-(things)
 οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα.
nothing to-say having to-suspend-judgment we-are-compelled

ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων

I.21 • THE SEVENTH MODE: QUANTITIES AND PREPARATIONS

Goat's horn in shavings is white and black in the whole; silver filings are black apart and white together; sand is rough scattered and soft in a heap. Hellebore fine chokes and coarse does not; wine in measure strengthens and in excess paralyzes. Medicine is the clearest witness, where the smallest change of weight turns a remedy into a poison. So the nature of things escapes us and we suspend judgment.

- 129 Ἑβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας
seventh mode we-said to-be the along-with the quantities
 καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες
and preparations of-the underlying-(things) preparations calling
 κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις. ὅτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
generally the compositions that and also according-to this the
 τρόπον ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαζόμεθα περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν
mode to-suspend-judgment we-are-compelled about the nature of-the
 πραγμάτων, δῆλον. οἶον γοῦν τὰ ξέσματα τοῦ κέρατος
things (is)-clear such-as at-any-rate the shavings of-the horn
 τῆς αἰγὸς φαίνεται μὲν λευκὰ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ συνθέσεως
of-the goat appear indeed white simply and without composition
 θεωρούμενα, συντιθέμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ κέρατος ὑπάρξει
observed composed and in the of-the horn substance
 μέλανα θεωρεῖται. καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου τὰ ῥινήματα κατ'
black are-observed and of-the silver the filings by

ιδίαν μὲν ὄντα μέλανα φαίνεται, σὺν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς
themselves indeed being black appear with and the whole as
 λευκὰ ὑποπίπτει.

white fall-under

καὶ τῆς Ταυναρείας λίθου τὰ μὲν μέρη λευκὰ ὁράται 130
and of-the Taenarian stone the indeed parts white are-seen

ὅταν λεανθῇ, σὺν δὲ τῇ ὅλοσχερεὶ ξανθὰ φαίνεται. καὶ
when it-is-ground with and the whole yellow appear and

αἱ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐσκεδασμένοι ψάμμοι τραχεῖαι φαίνονται,
the from one-another scattered sands rough appear

ὡς σωρὸς δὲ συντεθεῖσαι ἀπαλῶς κινουσί τὴν αἴσθησιν.
as a-heap and heaped-together softly move the sense

καὶ ὁ ἐλλέβορος λεπτὸς μὲν καὶ χνοώδης προσφερόμενος
and the hellebore fine indeed and powdery taken

πνιγμὸν ἐπιφέρει, κρμινώδης δὲ ὢν οὐκέτι.
choking brings-on coarse and being no-longer

καὶ ὁ οἶνος σύμμετρος μὲν πινόμενος ρώννυσιν ἡμᾶς, 131
and the wine moderate indeed drunk strengthens us

πλείων δὲ λαμβανόμενος παραλύει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἡ τροφή
more and taken paralyzes the body and the food

παραπλησίως παρὰ τὴν ποσότητα διάφορον ἐπιδείκνυται
similarly along-with the quantity different displays

δύναμιν· πολλάκις γοῦν διὰ τὸ πολλὴν προσενεχθῆναι
power often at-any-rate through the much to-have-been-taken

καθαίρει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τε ἀπεισιῶν καὶ χολερικῶν παθῶν.
it-purges the body through both indigestions and choleric affections

ἔξομεν οὖν κἀνταῦθα λέγειν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κέρατος 132
we-shall-be-able then here-also to-say of-what-kind is of-the horn

τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ ὁποῖον τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λεπτομερῶν
the fine-(part) and of-what-kind the-(thing) out-of many fine-parts

συγκέκλειον, καὶ ὁποῖος μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ μικρομερὴς ἄργυρος
composed and of-what-kind indeed is the small-particled silver

ὅποῖος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρομερῶν συγκείμενος,
of-what-kind and the-(one) out-of many small-parted composed
 καὶ ὅποια μὲν ἡ ἀκαριαία Ταυναρεία λίθος ὅποια δὲ
and of-what-kind indeed the tiny Taenarian stone of-what-kind and
 ἡ ἐκ πολλῶν μικρῶν συγκειμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψάμμων
the-(one) out-of many small-(ones) composed and in the sands
 καὶ τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου καὶ τοῦ οἴνου καὶ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ πρὸς
and the hellebore and the wine and the food the toward
 τι, τὴν μέντοι φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκέτι
something the however nature of-the things by itself no-longer
 διὰ τὴν παρὰ τὰς συνθέσεις τῶν φαντασιῶν ἀνωμαλίαν.
through the along-with the compositions of-the impressions irregularity
 133 καθόλου γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα λυπηρὰ γίνεσθαι
generally for it-seems both the beneficial-(things) harmful to-become
 παρὰ τὴν κατὰ ποσότητα ἄμετρον αὐτῶν χρήσιν,
along-with the according-to quantity immoderate of-them use
 καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα ἐν τῷ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν
and the hurtful to-be seeming in the in excess
 παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἀκαριαῖα μὴ λυπεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ
to-be-taken in-tiny-amounts not to-harm witnesses and
 τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἱατρικὰς δυνάμεις
to-the argument especially the-(thing) in the medical powers
 θεωρούμενον, ἐν αἷς ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν μίξις τῶν
observed in which the indeed toward exactness mixture of-the
 ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων ὠφέλιμον ποιεῖ τὸ συντεθέν, ῥοπῆς δὲ
simple drugs beneficial makes the compound weight and
 βραχυτάτης ἐνίοτε παροραθείσης οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφέλιμον
 tiniest sometimes overlooked not only not beneficial
 ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερώτατον καὶ δηλητήριον πολλάκις.
but also most-hurtful and poisonous often

οὕτως ὁ κατὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας λόγος 134
thus the according-to the quantities and preparations argument
 συγχέει τὴν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ὕπαρξιν. διόπερ
confounds the of-the outside underlying-(things) existence wherefore
 εἰκότως ἂν καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς
reasonably — also this the mode into suspension-of-judgment us
 περιάγοι μὴ δυναμένους εἰλικρινῶς ἀποφύνασθαι περὶ
might-bring-round not being-able purely to-declare about
 τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων.
the nature of-the outside underlying-(things)

ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι

I.22 • THE EIGHTH MODE: RELATIVITY

Everything is relative, either to the judge or to the things observed with it, as right is to left. Sextus argues it several ways: things that differ are relative to what they differ from, genera and species are relative, sign and thing signified are relative, and like and equal are relative. Even the man who denies it confirms it, since he shows the claim to be relative to us and not universal. So we can say only how a thing appears in relation, and suspend judgment about its nature.

Ὅγδοός ἐστι τρόπος ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθ' 135
eighth is mode the-(one) from the toward something according-to
 ὃν συνάγομεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, περὶ
which we-infer that since all-(things) are toward something about
 τοῦ τίνα ἐστὶν ἀπολύτως καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
the what-(things) they-are absolutely and as toward the nature
 ἐφέξομεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα,
we-shall-suspend-judgment that and it-is-necessary to-know that here
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, τῷ ἔστι καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ
just-as also in others the is we-misuse instead-of the

‘φαίνεται’, δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες ‘πρὸς τι πάντα
appears in-effect this saying toward something all-(things)
 φαίνεται.’ τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς λέγεται, ἅπαξ μὲν ὡς πρὸς
appears this and doubly is-said once indeed as toward
 τὸ κρῖνον (τὸ γὰρ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον καὶ κρινόμενον πρὸς
the judging the for outside underlying-(thing) and being-judged toward
 τὸ κρῖνον φαίνεται), καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον πρὸς τὰ
the judging appears according-to another and manner toward the
 συνθεωρούμενα, ὡς τὸ δεξιὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀριστερόν.
observed-together as the right toward the left

136 ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογισάμεθα μὲν καὶ
that and all-(things) are toward something we-reasoned indeed also
 ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ
before such-as according-to the judging that toward this the
 ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν
animal and this the man and this the sense
 ἕκαστον φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν, κατὰ
each appears and toward such-a circumstance according-to
 δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα, ὅτι πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμειξίαν
and the observed-together that toward this the admixture
 καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν
and this the manner and the composition this and the
 ποσότητα καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.
quantity and the position each appears

137 καὶ ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς
and separately and it-is-possible to-infer that all-(things) are toward
 τι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· πότερον διαφέρει τῶν πρὸς
something this the manner whether differ from-the toward
 τι τὰ κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν οὐ διαφέρει,
something the-(things) according-to difference or not if indeed not they-differ
 καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ διαφέρει, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ
also they toward something are if and they-differ since everything the

διαφέρον πρὸς τι ἐστίν (λέγεται γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνο οὗ
differing toward something is it-is-said for toward that of-which
 διαφέρει), πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ διαφοράν.
it-differs toward something are the-(things) according-to difference
 τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνωτάτω γένη 138
of-the both existing-(things) the-(ones) indeed are highest genera
 κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ' ἔσχατα εἶδη, τὰ
according-to the dogmatists the-(ones) and lowest species the-(ones)
 δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη· πάντα δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τι·
and genera and species all and these are toward something
 πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι. ἔτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ
all-(things) then are toward something further of-the existing-(things) the-(ones)
 μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα, ὥς αὐτοὶ φασιν,
indeed are evident the-(ones) and non-evident as themselves they-say
 καὶ σημαίνοντα μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, σημαίνοντα δὲ ὑπὸ
and signifying indeed the appearing-(things) signified and by
 τῶν φαινομένων τὰ ἀδηλα· ὅψις γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς
the appearing-(things) the non-evident-(things) a-sight for according-to them
 τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα. τὸ δὲ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ
of-the non-evident-(things) the appearing-(things) the and signifying and the
 σημαίνον ἐστι πρὸς τι· πρὸς τι ἄρα ἐστὶ πάντα.
signified are toward something toward something then are all-(things)
 πρὸς τούτοις τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅμοια 139
in-addition-to these of-the existing-(things) the-(ones) indeed are like
 τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴσα τὰ δὲ ἀνισα·
the-(ones) and unlike and the-(ones) indeed equal the-(ones) and unequal
 ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ πρὸς τι· πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι.
these and are toward something all-(things) then are toward something
 καὶ ὁ λέγων δὲ μὴ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι βεβαιοῖ
and the-(one) saying and not all-(things) to-be toward something confirms
 τὸ πάντα εἶναι πρὸς τι· καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πάντα
the all-(things) to-be toward something also itself for the all-(things)

εἶναι πρὸς τι πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι δείκνυσι, καὶ οὐ
 to-be toward something toward us to-be he-shows and not
 καθόλου, δι' ὧν ἡμῖν ἐναντιοῦται.
 universally through which to-us he-opposes

- 140 πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω παριστάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ
 nevertheless but thus establishing us that all-(things) are
 πρὸς τι, δηλὸν ἐστὶ λοιπόν, ὅτι ὅποιον ἔστιν ἕκαστον
 toward something clear it-is finally that of-what-kind is each
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν καὶ εὐλικρινῶς
 of-the underlying-(things) according-to the its-own nature and purely
 λέγειν οὐ δυνησόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅποιον φαίνεται ἐν τῷ
 to-say not we-shall-be-able but of-what-kind it-appears in the
 πρὸς τι. ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν
 toward something which follows the about the nature of-the
 πραγμάτων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.
 things to-be-necessary us to-suspend-judgment

ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις

L23 · THE NINTH MODE: FREQUENT OR RARE ENCOUNTERS

The sun is far more astonishing than a comet, but we see it constantly and wonder at the comet instead. An earthquake alarms the man who has never felt one; the sea and human beauty strike us most when first seen. What is rare seems precious and what is common does not: water would outrank gold if it were scarce. So the same things seem astonishing or not with the frequency of our encounters, and we suspend judgment.

- 141 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους συγκυρήσεις
 about and the according-to the constant or rare occurrences
 τρόπου, ὃν ἕννατον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τῇ τάξει, τοιαῦτά τινα
 mode which ninth we-said to-be in-the order such some

διέξιμεν. ὁ ἥλιος πολλῶ δήπου ἐκπληκτικώτερός ἐστιν
we-shall-set-out the sun by-much surely more-astonishing is
 ἀστέρος κομήτου· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον συνεχῶς ὁρῶμεν,
than-a-star comet but since the indeed sun constantly we-see
 τὸν δὲ κομήτην ἀστέρα σπανίως, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ἀστέρι
the and comet star rarely at indeed the star
 ἐκπλησσομεθα ὥστε καὶ διοσημεῖαν αὐτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἐπὶ
we-are-astonished so-that even a-portent it to-be to-seem at
 δὲ τῷ ἡλίῳ οὐδαμῶς. ἐὰν μέντοι γε ἐννοήσωμεν τὸν ἥλιον
and the sun not-at-all if however at-least we-conceive the sun
 σπανίως μὲν φαινόμενον, σπανίως δὲ δυόμενον, καὶ πάντα
rarely indeed appearing rarely and setting and all-(things)
 μὲν ἀθρόως φωτίζοντα, πάντα δὲ ἐξαίφνης ἐπισκιάζεσθαι
indeed all-at-once lighting all-(things) and suddenly to-be-darkened
 ποιοῦντα, πολλὴν ἑκπληξιν ἐν τῷ πράγματι θεωρήσομεν.
making much astonishment in the thing we-shall-observe
 καὶ ὁ σεισμός δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θορυβεῖ τοὺς τε πρῶτον 142
and the earthquake and not alike alarms the-(ones) both first
 αὐτοῦ πειρωμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἔθει τούτου γεγενημένους.
of-it experiencing and the-(ones) in habit of-it having-become
 πόσῃ δὲ ἑκπληξιν ἀνθρώπῳ φέρει θάλασσα πρῶτον
how-great and astonishment to-a-man brings sea first
 ὀφθεῖσα. ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλος σώματος ἀνθρωπίνου πρῶτον
seen but also beauty of-a-body human first
 καὶ ἐξαίφνης θεωρούμενον συγκινεῖ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἢ εἰ ἐν
and suddenly observed stirs more us than if in
 ἔθει τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι γένοιτο. καὶ τὰ μὲν σπάνια τίμα
habit of-the to-be-seen it-should-become and the-(things) indeed rare precious
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ σύντροφα ἡμῶν καὶ εὖπορα οὐδαμῶς.
to-be seem the-(things) and familiar to-us and easy-to-get not-at-all

- 143 *ἐὰν γοῦν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ ὕδωρ σπανίζον, πόσῳ ἂν*
if at-any-rate we-conceive the water being-scarce by-how-much —
τῶν τιμίων εἶναι δοκούντων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἡμῖν
than-the precious to-be seeming all more-precious to-us
φανείη. ἢ ἐὰν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν τὸν χρυσὸν ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ τῆς
it-would-appear or if we-consider the gold simply upon the
γῆς ἐρριμμένον πολὺν παραπλησίως τοῖς λίθοις, τίνι
earth strewn much similarly to-the stones to-whom
δόξομεν ἔσεσθαι τοῦτον τίμιον ἢ κατάκλειστον οὕτως;
shall-we-seem to-be-going-to-be this precious or locked-up thus
- 144 *ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους*
since then the same things along-with the constant or rare
περιπτώσεις ὅτε μὲν ἐκπληκτικὰ ἢ τίμια, ὅτε δὲ
encounters at-one-time indeed astonishing or precious at-another and
οὐ τοιαῦτα εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιλογιζόμεθα ὅτι ὁποῖον μὲν
not such to-be seem we-reason that of-what-kind indeed
φαίνεται τούτων ἕκαστον μετὰ συνεχῶς περιπτώσεως ἢ
appears of-these each with constant encounter or
σπανίας ἴσως δυνησόμεθα λέγειν, ψιλῶς δὲ ὁποῖον ἔστιν
rare perhaps we-shall-be-able to-say baldly and of-what-kind is
ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων οὐκ ἔσμεν δυνατοὶ φάσκειν.
each of-the outside underlying-(things) not we-are able to-assert
καὶ διὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπέχομεν.
and through this then the mode about them we-suspend-judgment

ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους
καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις

I.24 · THE TENTH MODE: WAYS, CUSTOMS, AND LAWS

The tenth mode bears most on ethics. Sextus defines a way of life, a law, a custom, a mythical belief, and a dogmatic supposition, then sets each against itself and against the others: Roman law against Rhodian on a father's debts, Persian dress against Greek, Diogenes against Aristippus, Cronos devouring his children against our care for ours, Epicurus' unconcerned gods against our prayers. So much irregularity leaves us suspending judgment.

Δέκατος ἐστὶ τρόπος, ὃς καὶ μάλιστα συνέχει πρὸς τὰ 145

tenth is mode which also especially bears toward the
ἠθικά, ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ
ethical-(matters) the-(one) along-with the ways-of-life and the customs and
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς
the laws and the mythical beliefs and the dogmatic
ὑπολήψεις. ἀγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αἵρεσις βίου ἢ τινος
suppositions a-way-of-life indeed then is a-choice of-life or some
πράγματος περὶ ἓνα ἢ πολλοὺς γινομένη, οἷον περὶ
matter about one or many arising such-as about
Διογένην ἢ τοὺς Λάκωνας·

Diogenes or the Laconians

νόμος δέ ἐστιν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, 146

a-law and is written compact among the citizens
ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται, ἔθος δέ ἢ συνήθεια
which the-(one) transgressing is-punished a-custom and or usage
(οὐ διαφέρει γάρ) πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινὴ πράγματός
not it-differs for of-many men common of-a-matter
τινος παραδοχή, ἣν ὁ παραβὰς οὐ πάντως
some acceptance which the-(one) having-transgressed not altogether

κολάζεται, οἷον νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μοιχεύειν, ἔθος δὲ
is-punished such-as a-law is the not to-commit-adultery a-custom and
ἡμῖν τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.

to-us the not publicly with-a-woman to-consort

147 μυθικὴ δὲ πίστις ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἀγενήτων τε καὶ
mythical and belief is of-things unhappened both and
πεπλασμένων παραδοχή, οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλα τε καὶ τὰ
fabricated acceptance such-as are others both and the-(things)

περὶ τοῦ Κρόνου μυθεύμενα· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλοὺς εἰς
about the Cronos told-in-myth these for many into
πίστιν ἄγει. δογματικὴ δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παραδοχῇ
belief leads dogmatic and is supposition acceptance

πράγματος δι' ἀναλογισμοῦ ἢ τινος ἀποδείξεως
of-a-matter through reasoning or some proof

κρατύνεσθαι δοκοῦσα, οἷον ὅτι ἄτομα ἔστι τῶν ὄντων
to-be-confirmed seeming such-as that atoms are of-the existing-(things)
στοιχεῖα ἢ ὁμοιομερῇ ἢ ἐλάχιστα ἢ τινα ἄλλα.

elements or homoeomeries or minima or some others

148 ἀντιτίθεμεν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ὅτε μὲν ἑαυτῷ,
we-oppose and of-these each at-one-time indeed to-itself

ὅτε δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστω. οἷον ἔθος μὲν ἔθει
at-another and of-the others to-each such-as custom indeed to-custom

οὕτως· τινὲς τῶν Αἰθιοπῶν στίζουσι τὰ βρέφη, ἡμεῖς
thus some of-the Ethiopians tattoo the infants we

δ' οὐ· καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ποδήρει
and not and Persians indeed flower-dyed clothing and ankle-length

χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπρεπές· καὶ
to-use think seemingly to-be we and unseemly and

οἱ μὲν Ἰνδοὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ μίγνυνται, οἱ δὲ
the indeed Indians with-the women publicly consort the-(ones) and

πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι ἡγοῦνται.

most of-the others shameful this to-be consider

νόμον δὲ νόμῳ οὕτως ἀντιτίθμεν· παρὰ μὲν τοῖς 149
law and to-law thus we-oppose among indeed the
 Ῥωμαίοις ὁ τῆς πατρῶας ἀποστὰς οὐσίας οὐκ
Romans the-(one) the paternal having-renounced estate not
 ἀποδίδωσι τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς χρέα, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις
pays the of-the father debts among and the Rhodians
 πάντως ἀποδίδωσιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν Ταύροις τῆς Σκυθίας
altogether he-pays and among indeed Tauri of-the Scythia
 νόμος ἦν τοὺς ξένους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καλλιερεῖσθαι,
a-law there-was the strangers to-the Artemis to-be-sacrificed
 παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἀπείρηται πρὸς ἱερῷ φονεύεσθαι.
among and us a-man it-is-forbidden at a-temple to-be-slain
 ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀγωγῇ, ὅταν τὴν Διογένης ἀγωγὴν 150
way-of-life and to-way-of-life when the of-Diogenes way-of-life
 ἀντιτιθῶμεν τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἢ τὴν τῶν Λακωνῶν
we-oppose to-the of-the Aristippus or the of-the Laconians
 τῇ τῶν Ἰταλῶν. μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν πίστει μυθικῇ, ὅταν
to-the of-the Italians mythical and belief to-belief mythical when
 ὅπου μὲν λέγωμεν τὸν Δία μυθεύεσθαι πατέρα ἀνδρῶν
where indeed we-say — Zeus to-be-told-in-myth father of-men
 τε θεῶν τε, ὅπου δὲ τὸν Ὠκεανόν, λέγοντες
both of-gods and where and — Oceanus saying

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

Oceanus both of-gods origin and mother Tethys

δογματικὰς δὲ ὑπολήψεις ἀλλήλαις ἀντιτίθμεν,

dogmatic and suppositions to-one-another we-oppose

ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς μὲν εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, 151

when we-say the-(ones) indeed one to-be element to-declare

τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θνητὴν τὴν ψυχὴν,

the-(ones) and infinite and the-(ones) indeed mortal the soul

τοὺς δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν προνοία θεῶν
the-(ones) and immortal and the-(ones) indeed by-providence of-gods
 διοικεῖσθαι τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπρονοήτως.
to-be-governed the-(things) according-to us the-(ones) and without-providence
 152 τὸ ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀντιτίθμεν, οἷον νόμῳ μὲν,
the custom and to-the others we-oppose such-as to-law indeed
 ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι ἀρρενομιξίαις
when we-say among indeed Persians custom to-be male-unions
 χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο
to-use among and Romans to-be-forbidden by-law this
 πράττειν, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ μοιχεύειν ἀπειρῆσθαι,
to-do and among us indeed the to-commit-adultery to-be-forbidden
 παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις ἐν ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδοσθαι,
among and Massagetae in of-indifference custom to-have-been-handed-down
 ὡς Εὐδοξος ὁ Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περιόδου,
as Eudoxus the Cnidian records in the first of-the circuit
 καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἀπηγορευθῆναι μητράσι μίγνυσθαι,
and among us indeed to-be-forbidden with-mothers to-consort
 παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἔθος εἶναι μάλιστα οὕτω γαμεῖν.
among and the Persians custom to-be especially thus to-marry
 καὶ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσιν, ὃ παρ'
and among Egyptians and the sisters they-marry which among
 ἡμῖν ἀπείρηται νόμῳ.
us is-forbidden by-law

153 ἀγωγῇ δὲ ἔθος ἀντιτίθεται, ὅταν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ
to-way-of-life and custom is-opposed when the indeed many
 ἄνθρωποι ἀναχωροῦντες μινύωνται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν γυναιξίν,
men withdrawing consort with-the their-own wives
 ὁ δὲ Κράτης τῇ Ἱππαρχίᾳ δημοσίᾳ· καὶ ὁ μὲν Διογένης
— and Crates with Hipparchia publicly and — indeed Diogenes
 ἀπὸ ἐξωμῆδος περιήει, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς εἰώθαμεν.
in a-single-tunic went-about we and as we-are-accustomed

μυθικῇ δὲ πίστει, ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ μῦθοι ὅτι ὁ Κρόνος 154

to-mythical and belief when say the myths that — Cronos
κατήσθιεν αὐτοῦ τὰ τέκνα, ἔθους ὄντος ἡμῖν προνοεῖσθαι
devoured his-own the children a-custom being to-us to-provide-for
παίδων· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν συνήθεια ὡς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
children and among us indeed usage as good and
ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν σέβειν τοὺς θεούς, τιτρωσκόμενοι δὲ καὶ
free-from evils to-revere the gods being-wounded and and
φθονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται.

envying one-another by the poets they-are-brought-in
δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν ἡμῖν μὲν ἔθος ἢ παρὰ 155

to-dogmatic and supposition when to-us indeed a-custom it-is from
θεῶν αἰτεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει μὴ
gods to-ask the goods — and Epicurus says not
ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἡμῶν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν ὁ μὲν Ἀρίστιππος
to-concern-itself with-us the divine and when — indeed Aristippus
ἀδιάφορον ἡγήται τὸ γυναικεῖαν ἀμφιέννυσθαι στολήν,
indifferent considers the womanly to-put-on robe
ἡμεῖς δὲ αἰσχροὺς τοῦτο ἡγώμεθα εἶναι.

we and shameful this we-consider to-be
ἀγωγὴν δὲ ἀντιτίθεμεν νόμῳ μὲν, ὅταν νόμου ὄντος 156

way-of-life and we-oppose to-law indeed when a-law being
μὴ ἐξεῖναι τύπτειν ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον καὶ εὐγενῆ οἱ
not to-be-permitted to-strike a-man free and well-born the
παγκρατιασταὶ τύπτωσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῦ
pancratiasts strike one-another through the way-of-life of-the
κατ' αὐτοὺς βίου, καὶ ὅταν ἀπειρημένον τοῦ ἀνδροφονεῖν
according-to them life and when being-forbidden the to-kill-a-man
οἱ μονομάχαι ἀναιρῶσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.
the gladiators slay one-another through the same cause

- 157 μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀγωγῇ ἀντιτίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν
 mythical and belief to-way-of-life we-oppose when we-say
 ὅτι οἱ μὲν μῦθοι παρὰ τῇ Ὀμφάλῃ τὸν Ἡρακλέα λέγουσιν
 that the indeed myths at the Omphale — Heracles say

εἰριά τε ξαίνειν καὶ δουλοσύνης ἀνέχεσθαι
 wool both to-card and slavery to-endure

καὶ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι ἄπερ οὐδ' ἂν μετρίως προηρημένος
 and these to-do which not-even — moderately having-chosen
 ἐποίησεν ἄν τις, ἣ δὲ ἀγωγὴ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Ἡρακλέους
 would-have-done — someone the and way-of-life of-the life of-the Heracles
 ἦν γενναία.
 was noble

- 158 δογματικῇ δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀθληταὶ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ
 to-dogmatic and supposition when the indeed athletes as a-good
 τινος τῆς δόξης ἀντιποιούμενοι ἐπίπονον ἀγωγὴν βίου
 some the fame laying-claim-to laborious way of-life
 δι' αὐτὴν ἐπαναιρῶνται, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων
 through it take-up many and of-the philosophers
 φαῦλον εἶναι τὴν δόξαν δογματίζουσιν.
 worthless to-be the fame bold-beliefs

- 159 τὸν δὲ νόμον ἀντιτίθεμεν μυθικῇ μὲν πίστει, ὅταν οἱ
 the and law we-oppose to-mythical indeed belief when the
 μὲν ποιηταὶ εἰσάγωσι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ μοιχεύοντας καὶ
 indeed poets bring-in the gods both committing-adultery and
 ἀρρενομιξίαις χρωμένους, νόμος δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν κωλύει
 male-unions using a-law and among us forbids
 ταῦτα πράττειν, δογματικῇ
 these to-do to-dogmatic

δὲ ὑπολήψει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον 160

and supposition when the-(ones) indeed about Chrysippus indifferent
εἶναι λέγωσι τὸ μητράσιν ἢ ἀδελφαῖς μίγνυσθαι, ὃ δὲ
to-be say the with-mothers or sisters to-consort the and
νόμος ταῦτα κωλύη.

law these forbids

μυθικὴν δὲ πίστιν δογματικῇ ὑπολήψει ἀντιτίθεμεν, ὅταν 161

mythical and belief to-dogmatic supposition we-oppose when
οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ λέγωσι τὸν Δία κατελθόντα θνηταῖς
the indeed poets say — Zeus having-come-down with-mortal
γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀδύνατον
women to-consort among and the dogmatists impossible

τοῦτο εἶναι νομίζεται, καὶ ὃ μὲν ποιητὴς λέγει,

this to-be is-thought and the indeed poet says

ὅτι Ζεὺς διὰ τὸ πένθος τὸ ἐπὶ Σαρπηδὸν αἱματοέσσας 162

that Zeus through the grief the over Sarpedon bloody
ψεκάδας κατέχευεν ἔραζε, δόγμα μέντοι φιλοσόφων
drops poured-down to-the-ground a-belief however of-philosophers

ἢ ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ὅταν *** τὸν τῶν
is impassive to-be the divine and when (lacuna) the of-the

ἵπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν, ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα
hippocentaurs myth they-destroy of-non-existence an-example

τὸν ἵπποκενταυρον ἡμῖν φέροντες.

the hippocentaur to-us bringing

πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐνῆν καθ' ἐκάστην 163

many indeed then also other-(things) it-was-possible according-to each

τῶν προειρημένων ἀντιθέσεων λαμβάνειν παραδείγματα·

of-the aforesaid oppositions to-take examples

ὥς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτα ἀρκέσει. πλὴν τοσαύτης

as in a-brief and account these will-suffice nevertheless so-great

ἀνωμαλίας πραγμάτων καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου

irregularity of-things also through this the mode

δεικνυμένης, ὅποιον μὲν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ
being-shown of-what-kind indeed is the underlying-(thing) according-to
 τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἔξομεν λέγειν, ὅποιον δὲ φαίνεται
the nature not we-shall-be-able to-say of-what-kind and it-appears
 πρὸς τήνδε τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς τόνδε τὸν νόμον ἢ πρὸς
toward this the way-of-life or toward this the law or toward
 τόδε τὸ ἔθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτον
this the custom and of-the others each and through this
 οὖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων
then about the nature of-the outside underlying things
 ἐπέχων ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη. οὕτω μὲν οὖν διὰ τῶν
to-suspend-judgment us (is)-necessary thus indeed then through the
 δέκα τρόπων καταλήγομεν εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν.
ten modes we-end-up into the suspension-of-judgment

περὶ τῶν πέντε τρόπων

I.25 • THE FIVE MODES

The more recent skeptics hand down five: disagreement, the regress to infinity, relativity, hypothesis, and the circle. Sextus shows that anything proposed can be referred to them. Whatever is put forward is sensible or intelligible; the disagreement about it is either undecidable, and we suspend judgment, or decidable, and the judge is sensible or intelligible, which sends us to infinity or into a circle. Hypothesis is no escape, since the opposite may be hypothesized just as well.

164 οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι σκεπτικοὶ παραδιδόασιν τρόπους τῆς
the and more-recent skeptics hand-down modes of-the
 ἐποχῆς πέντε τούσδε, πρῶτον τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς
suspension-of-judgment five these first the from the
 διαφωνίας, δεύτερον τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα, τρίτον
disagreement second the into infinity throwing-out third

τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, τέταρτον τὸν ὑποθετικόν,
the from the toward something fourth the hypothetical
 πέμπτον τὸν διάλληλον.

fifth the circular

καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὃν περὶ 165
and the-(one) indeed from the disagreement is according-to which about
 τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν παρὰ
the proposed matter undecidable dissension among
 τε τῷ βίῳ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εὐρίσκομεν
both the common-life and among the philosophers we-find
 γεγεννημένην, δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἰρεῖσθαι τι ἢ
having-arisen through which not being-able to-choose anything or
 ἀποδοκιμάζω καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχὴν.

to-reject we-end-up into suspension-of-judgment

ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ 166
the-(one) and from the into infinity falling is in which
 τὸ φερόμενον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος
the-(thing) brought for proof of-the proposed matter
 πίστεως ἑτέρας χρήζειν λέγομεν, καὶ κεῖνο ἄλλης, καὶ
proof another to-need we-say and-that another and
 μέχρις ἀπείρου, ὥς μὴ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα
up-to infinity so-that not having us whence we-shall-begin
 τῆς κατασκευῆς τὴν ἐποχὴν ἀκολουθεῖν.

the establishment the suspension-of-judgment to-follow

ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι, καθὼς προειρήκαμεν, ἐν 167
the-(one) and from the toward something as we-have-said in
 ᾧ πρὸς μὲν τὸ κρίνον καὶ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα τοῖον
which toward indeed the judging and the observed-together such
 ἢ τοῖον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁποῖον δὲ ἔστι πρὸς
or such appears the underlying-(thing) of-what-kind and is toward
 τὴν φύσιν ἐπέχομεν.

the nature we-suspend-judgment

- 168 ὁ δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἔστιν ὅταν εἰς ἄπειρον
the-(one) and out-of hypothesis is when into infinity
 ἐκβαλλόμενοι οἱ δογματικοὶ ἀπὸ τινος ἄρξονται ὃ οὐ
being-thrown-out the dogmatists from something begin which not
 κατασκευάζουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀναποδείκτως κατὰ
they-establish but simply and without-proof according-to
 συγχώρησιν λαμβάνειν ἀξιούσιν.
concession to-take they-claim
- 169 ὁ δὲ διάλληλος τρόπος συνίσταται, ὅταν τὸ ὀφείλον τοῦ
the and circular mode arises when the-(thing) owing of-the
 ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρεῖαν ἔχη τῆς ἐκ
investigated matter to-be confirmatory need has of-the out-of
 τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως· ἔνθα μηδέτερον δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν
the investigated proof where neither being-able to-take
 πρὸς κατασκευὴν θατέρου, περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπέχομεν.
toward establishment of-the-other about both we-suspend-judgment
 ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον εἰς τούτους ἀνάγειν τοὺς
that and every the-(thing) investigated into these to-refer the
 τρόπους ἐνδέχεται, διὰ βραχέων ὑποδείζομεν οὕτως.
modes is-possible through few-(words) we-shall-show thus
- 170 τὸ προτεθὲν ἥτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν, ὅποιον δ'
the proposed-(thing) either sensible is or intelligible of-what-kind and
 ἂν ᾗ, διαπεφώνηται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνα
— it-may-be it-has-been-disputed the-(ones) indeed for the sensibles alone
 φασὶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, οἱ δὲ μόνα τὰ νοητά, οἱ δέ τινα
say to-be true the-(ones) and alone the intelligibles the-(ones) and some
 μὲν αἰσθητά, τινὰ δὲ νοητά. πότερον οὖν ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι
indeed sensible some and intelligible whether then decidable to-be
 φήσουσι τὴν διαφωνίαν ἢ ἀνεπικρίτον; εἰ μὲν ἀνεπικρίτον,
will-they-say the disagreement or undecidable if indeed undecidable
 λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ ἐπέχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνεπικρίτως
we-say that it-is-necessary to-suspend-judgment about for the undecidably

διαφωνουμένων οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ
disputed-(things) not possible and it-is to-declare if and
ἐπικριτήν, πόθεν ἐπικριθήσεται πυνθανόμεθα.

decidable whence it-will-be-decided we-ask

οἷον τὸ αἰσθητόν (ἐπὶ τούτου γὰρ προτέρου στήσομεν
such-as the sensible upon this for first we-shall-set
τὸν λόγον) πότερον ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ; εἰ μὲν
the argument whether by a-sensible or by an-intelligible if indeed
γὰρ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ζητοῦμεν,

for by a-sensible since about the sensibles we-inquire

καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλου δεῖσεται πρὸς πίστιν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο
also that another will-need for proof if and that-also
αἰσθητόν ἔσται, πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλου δεῖσεται τοῦ
sensible will-be again also itself another will-need the
πιστώσοντος, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρ᾽ ἀπείρου.

(thing)-that-will-confirm and this up-to infinity

εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ αἰσθητόν, 172
if and by an-intelligible to-be-decided it-will-be-necessary the sensible

ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεῖσεται καὶ τοῦτο
since also the intelligibles have-been-disputed will-need also this

νοητὸν ὃν κρίσεως τε καὶ πίστεως. πόθεν οὖν
intelligible being judgment both and proof whence then

πιστωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ νοητοῦ, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται
will-it-be-confirmed if indeed by an-intelligible into infinity it-will-fall

ὁμοίως· εἰ δ' ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ πρὸς μὲν τὴν πίστιν
likewise if and by a-sensible since for indeed the proof

τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητόν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ
of-the sensible was-taken an-intelligible for and the of-the

νοητοῦ πίστιν αἰσθητόν, ὁ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος.
intelligible proof a-sensible the circular is-introduced mode

- 173 εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φεύγων ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος ἡμῖν κατὰ
 if and these fleeing the-(one) disputing with-us according-to
 συγχώρησιν καὶ ἀναποδείκτως ἀξιώσει λαμβάνειν τι
 concession and without-proof should-claim to-take something
 πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ἑξῆς, ὁ ὑποθετικὸς εἰσαχθήσεται
 for proof of-the following the hypothetical will-be-introduced
 τρόπος, ἄπορος ὑπάρχων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος
 mode impassable being if indeed for the-(one) hypothesizing
 πιστός ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς ἀεὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὑποτιθέμενοι οὐκ
 trustworthy is we always the opposite hypothesizing not
 ἐσόμεθα ἀπιστότεροι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές τι ὑποτίθεται
 shall-be less-trustworthy and if indeed true something be-hypothesizes
 ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος, ὕποπτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καθ' ὑπόθεσιν
 the-(one) hypothesizing suspect it makes by hypothesis
 αὐτὸ λαμβάνων ἀλλὰ μὴ μετὰ κατασκευῆς· εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος,
 it taking but not with establishment if and false
 σαθρὰ ἔσται ἡ ὑποβάθρα τῶν κατασκευαζομένων.
 rotten will-be the foundation of-the (things)-established
- 174 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνύει τι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι πρὸς πίστιν,
 and if indeed accomplishes anything the to-hypothesize for proof
 αὐτὸ τὸ ζητούμενον ὑποτιθέσθω, καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν τι
 itself the investigated-(thing) let-him-hypothesize and not another something
 δι' οὗ δὴ κατασκευάσει τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ὁ
 through which indeed he-will-establish the matter about which the
 λόγος· εἰ δὲ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον,
 argument if and absurd it-is the to-hypothesize the investigated-(thing)
 ἄτοπον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκός.
 absurd will-be also the to-hypothesize the (thing)-standing-above
- 175 ὅτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τι ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά, δηλόν·
 that and also toward something are all the sensibles (is)-clear
 ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθανομένους. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι
 they-are for toward the perceivers evident then that

ὅπερ ἂν ἡμῖν προτεθῇ πρᾶγμα αἰσθητόν, εἰς τοὺς πέντε
whatever — to-us is-proposed matter sensible into the five
 τρόπους ἀνάγειν τοῦτο εὐμαρές ἐστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
modes to-refer this easy it-is likewise and also
 περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιλογιζόμεθα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνεπικρίτως
about the intelligible we-reason if indeed for undecidably
 διαπεφωνῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δοθήσεται ἡμῖν τὸ δεῖν
to-have-been-disputed it-should-be-said it-will-be-granted to-us the to-be-necessary
 ἐπέχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ.

to-suspend-judgment about it

εἰ δὲ ἐπικριθῆσεται ἡ διαφωνία, εἰ μὲν διὰ νοητοῦ, εἰς 176
if and will-be-decided the disagreement if indeed through an-intelligible into
 ἄπειρον ἐκβαλοῦμεν, εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον·
infinity we-shall-throw-out if and by a-sensible into the circular
 τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητόν πάλιν διαφωνούμενον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον
the for sensible again disputed and not being-able
 δι' αὐτοῦ ἐπικρίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν,
through itself to-be-decided through the into infinity falling
 τοῦ νοητοῦ δεῖσεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.
the intelligible will-need just-as also the intelligible the sensible

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνων τι πάλιν 177
through these and the-(one) out-of hypothesis taking something again
 ἄτοπος ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τί ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ· πρὸς
absurd will-be but also toward something are the intelligibles toward
 γὰρ τὸν νοῦν νοητὰ λέγεται, καὶ εἰ ἦν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον
for the mind intelligible they-are-called and if it-was in-the nature such
 ὅποιον λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν διεφωνήθη. ἀνήχθη οὖν
of-what-kind it-is-called not — it-would-have-been-disputed it-has-been-referred then
 καὶ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς τοὺς πέντε τρόπους, διόπερ ἀνάγκη περὶ
also the intelligible into the five modes wherefore (is)-necessary about
 τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος πάντως ἡμᾶς ἐπέχειν.
the proposed matter altogether us to-suspend-judgment

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις παραδιδόμενοι
such indeed also the among the more-recent handed-down
 πέντε τρόποι· οὓς ἐκτίθενται οὐκ ἐκβάλλοντες τοὺς δέκα
five modes which they-set-out not throwing-out the ten
 τρόπους, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποικιλώτερον καὶ διὰ τούτων
modes but for the more-variously also through these
 σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐλέγχειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν.
with those to-refute the of-the dogmatists rashness

τίνες οἱ δύο τρόποι

I.26 • THE TWO MODES

Two more modes are handed down. Everything apprehended seems apprehended either from itself or from something else; the skeptics urge that neither holds. Nothing is apprehended from itself, because the physicists' disagreement about both sensibles and intelligibles is undecidable. Nothing is apprehended from something else either, since that in turn needs another, which is the circle or the infinite regress. So an impasse is raised about everything.

- 178 Παραδιδόασι δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς ἑτέρους·
they-hand-down and also two modes of-suspension-of-judgment other
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἥτοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
since for everything the-(thing) apprehended either out-of itself
 καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρου, ὑπομμνήσκοντες ὅτι
to-be-apprehended seems or out-of another reminding that
 οὔτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι οὔτε ἐξ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνεται,
neither out-of itself anything nor out-of another is-apprehended
 τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσιν. καὶ ὅτι μὲν
the about all impasse to-introduce they-seem and that indeed
 οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεται, φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς
nothing out-of itself is-apprehended they-say (is)-clear out-of the

γεγεννημένης παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περί τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν
having-arisen among the physicists about both the sensibles
 καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀπάντων οἶμαι διαφωνίας, ἣ δὴ
and the intelligibles all I-think disagreement which indeed
 ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε αἰσθητῶ μήτε
undecidable is not being-able us neither a-sensible nor
 νοητῶ κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν
an-intelligible criterion to-use through the everything whatever —
 λάβωμεν διαπεφωνημένον, εἶναι ἄπιστον,
we-take disputed to-be untrustworthy
 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τι καταλαμβάνεσθαι 179
through and this not-even out-of another anything to-be-apprehended
 συγχωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ τι
they-concede if indeed for the-(thing) out-of which anything
 καταλαμβάνεται ἀεὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνεσθαι
is-apprehended always out-of another to-be-apprehended
 δεῖσει, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι
it-will-be-necessary into the circular or the infinite they-fall-into
 τρόπον. εἰ δὲ βούλοιτό τις λαβεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
mode if and should-wish someone to-take as out-of itself
 καταλαμβανόμενόν τι ἐξ οὗ καταλαμβάνεται
apprehended something out-of which is-apprehended
 ἕτερον, ἀντιπίπτει τὸ μηδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι
another stands-against the nothing out-of itself to-be-apprehended
 διὰ τὰ προειρημένα. τὸ δὲ μαχόμενον πῶς ἂν
through the aforesaid-(things) the-(thing) and conflicting how —
 δύναιτο καταληφθῆναι ἢ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀφ' ἑτέρου,
could to-be-apprehended either from itself or from another
 ἀποροῦμεν, τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ τῆς καταλήψεως
we-are-at-a-loss the criterion of-the truth or the apprehension
 μὴ φαινομένων, σημείων δὲ καὶ δῖχα ἀποδείξεως
not appearing signs and and apart-from proof

διατρεπομένων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς εἰσόμεθα. τοσαῦτα
being-overturned just-as in the following we-shall-learn so-much
 μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπὶ
indeed then also about the modes of-the suspension-of-judgment for
 τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.
the present will-suffice to-have-been-said

τίνες τρόποι τῆς τῶν αἰτιολογικῶν ἀνατροπῆς

I.27 · THE MODES AGAINST THE CAUSAL EXPLAINERS

Aenesidemus hands down eight modes exposing every dogmatic causal explanation as faulty: no confirmed support from appearances; one explanation chosen where many are equally open; causes assigned with no order; the unseen treated as working like the seen; explanation from one's own elements; admitting what suits the hypothesis and passing over what conflicts; causes that fight both appearances and the hypothesis itself; and the perplexing explained by the equally perplexing. These modes may combine, and even the five modes of suspension can serve against causal explanation.

180 Ὡσπερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς παραδίδομεν,
just-as and the modes of-the suspension-of-judgment we-hand-down
 οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενταί τινες, καθ' οὓς ἐν
so also modes set-out some according-to which in
 ταῖς κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις διαποροῦντες ἐφιστῶμεν
the according-to part causal-explanations raising-difficulties we-check
 τοὺς δογματικούς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις αὐτοὺς
the dogmatists through the especially on these them
 μέγα φρονεῖν. καὶ δὴ Αἰνησίδημος ὀκτὼ τρόπους
greatly to-pride-themselves and indeed Aenesidemus eight modes

παραδίδωσι καθ' οὗς οἶται πᾶσαν δογματικὴν
hands-down according-to which he-thinks every dogmatic
 αἰτιολογίαν ὡς μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφήνασθαι,
causal-explanation as faulty refuting to-declare

ὧν πρῶτον μὲν εἶναί φησι καθ' ὃν τὸ τῆς
of-which first indeed to-be he-says according-to which the of-the
 αἰτιολογίας γένος ἐν ἀφανέσιν ἀναστρεφόμενον οὐχ
causal-explanation class in unseen-(things) moving not
 ὁμολογουμένην ἔχει τὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιμαρτύρησιν·
agreed has the out-of the appearing-(things) confirmation
 δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃν πολλάκις εὐεπιφορίας οὔσης
second and according-to which often facility being
 διαβηλοῦς ὥστε πολυτρόπως αἰτιολογήσαι τὸ ζητούμενον,
abundant so-that in-many-ways to-explain the investigated-(thing)
 καθ' ἓνα μόνον τρόπον τοῦτό τινες αἰτιολογοῦσιν·
according-to one only way this some explain

τρίτον καθ' ὃν τῶν τεταγμένων γινομένων αἰτίας
third according-to which of-the orderly happening-(things) causes
 ἀποδιδόασιν οὐδεμίαν τάξιν ἐπιφανούσας· τέταρτον καθ'
they-assign no order displaying fourth according-to
 ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ
which the appearing-(things) having-taken as they-happen also the not
 φαινόμενα νομίζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατεληφέναι, τάχα μὲν
appearing-(things) they-think as they-happen to-have-apprehended perhaps indeed
 ὁμοίως τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων,
alike to-the appearing-(things) the unseen-(things) being-accomplished
 τάχα δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως·
perhaps and not alike but peculiarly

πέμπτον καθ' ὃν πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν κατὰ
fifth according-to which all so a-word to-say according-to
 τὰς ἰδίας τῶν στοιχείων ὑποθέσεις ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τινὰς
the own of-the elements hypotheses but not according-to some

κοινὰς καὶ ὁμολογουμένας ἐφόδους αἰτιολογοῦσιν· ἕκτον
common and agreed methods explain sixth
 καθ' ὃν πολλάκις τὰ μὲν φωρατὰ ταῖς ἰδίαις
according-to which often the-(things) indeed detectable by-the own
 ὑποθέσει παραλαμβάνουσιν, τὰ δὲ ἀντιπίπτοντα καὶ
hypotheses they-admit the-(things) and conflicting and
 τὴν ἴσην ἔχοντα πιθανότητα παραπέμπουσιν·
the equal having plausibility they-pass-over

184 ἔβδομον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ἀποδιδόασιν αἰτίας οὐ
seventh according-to which often they-assign causes not
 μόνον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσει
only to-the appearing-(things) but also to-the own hypotheses
 μαχομένας· ὄγδοον καθ' ὃν πολλάκις ὄντων ἀπόρων
conflicting eighth according-to which often being perplexing
 ὁμοίως τῶν τε φαίνεσθαι δοκούντων καὶ τῶν
alike the-(things) both to-appear seeming and the-(things)
 ἐπιζητουμένων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀπόρων περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως
inquired-into out-of the alike perplexing about the alike
 ἀπόρων ποιοῦνται τὰς διδασκαλίας.

perplexing they-make the teachings

185 οὐκ ἀδύνατον δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τινὰς ἐπιμίκτους
not impossible and he-says also according-to some mixed
 τρόπους, ἡρτημένους ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, διαπίπτειν
modes depending out-of the aforesaid-(ones) to-go-wrong
 ἐνίους ἐν ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις. τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πέντε τρόποι
some in the causal-explanations perhaps and — also the five modes
 τῆς ἐποχῆς ἀπαρκοῖεν πρὸς τὰς αἰτιολογίας. ἥτοι
of-the suspension-of-judgment would-suffice for the causal-explanations either
 γὰρ σύμφωνον πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἱρέσεις
for consistent with-all the according-to philosophy schools
 καὶ τῇ σκέψει καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις αἰτίαν ἐρεῖ τις
and the skepticism and the to-appearing-(things) a-cause will-state someone

ἢ οὐ. καὶ σύμφωνον μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τὰ
or not and consistent indeed perhaps not it-is-possible the-(things)
 τε γὰρ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα πάντα διαπεφώνηται.
both for appearing and the non-evident all have-been-disputed
 εἰ δὲ διάφωνον, ἀπαιτηθήσεται καὶ ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν, 186
if and inconsistent he-will-be-asked also of-this the cause
 καὶ φαινομένην μὲν φαινομένης ἢ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου
and an-appearing-(cause) indeed of-an-appearing or a-non-evident of-a-non-evident
 λαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπεσεῖται, ἐναλλάξ δὲ αἰτιολογῶν
taking into infinity he-will-fall alternately and explaining
 εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ἰστάμενος δέ που, ἢ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς
into the circular stopping and somewhere or as-far upon the
 εἰρημένοις λέξει τὴν αἰτίαν συνεστάναι, καὶ εἰσάγει
said-(things) he-will-say the cause to-stand and he-introduces
 τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀναιρῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ἢ ἐξ
the toward something destroying the-(thing) toward the nature or out-of
 ὑποθέσεως τι λαμβάνων ἐπισχεθήσεται. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ
hypothesis something taking he-will-be-checked it-is then also
 διὰ τούτων ἐλέγχειν ἴσως τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν ταῖς
through these to-refute perhaps the of-the dogmatists in the
 αἰτιολογίαις προπέτειαν.
causal-explanations rashness

περὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν

1.28 • THE SKEPTICAL UTTERANCES

In using the modes the skeptic utters certain phrases that indicate his disposition and his feeling: not more, nothing is to be determined, and others of the kind. Sextus will treat them next, beginning with not more.

- 187 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκάστῳ χρώμενοι τούτων τε καὶ τῶν τῆς
 since and each using of-these both and the of-the
 ἐποχῆς τρόπων ἐπιφθεγγόμεθα φωνάς τινας τῆς
 suspension-of-judgment modes we-utter phrases certain of-the
 σκεπτικῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθους μηνυτικᾶς,
 skeptical disposition and the about us feeling indicative
 οἷον λέγοντες ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ ‘οὐδὲν ὀριστέον’ καὶ ἄλλας
 such-as saying not more nothing (is)-to-be-determined and others
 τινάς, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐξῆς
 certain fitting — it-would-be also about these next
 διαλαβεῖν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘οὐ μᾶλλον.’
 to-treat let-us-begin and from the not more

περὶ τῆς ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ φωνῆς

I.29 • NOT MORE

Sextus uses not more and nothing more indifferently, against those who assign one to particular inquiries and the other to general. The phrase is elliptical: not more means not more this than that. Some skeptics use it as a question: why this more than that? It reports our feeling, that through the equal strength of opposed things we end in leaning to neither side, and it is uttered as it appears to us, not as certainly true.

- 188 Ταύτην τοῖνυν ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἔφην προφερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ
 this then at-one-time indeed as I-said we-utter at-another and
 οὕτως ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’. οὐ γὰρ ὥς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τὴν
 thus nothing more not for as some suppose the
 μὲν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς εἰδικαῖς ζητήσεσι παραλαμβάνομεν,
 indeed not more in the specific inquiries we-employ
 τὴν δὲ ‘οὐδὲν μᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς γενικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως
 the and nothing more in the general but indifferently

τήν τε 'οὐ μᾶλλον' καὶ τήν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' προφερόμεθα,
the both not more and the nothing more we-utter
 καὶ νῦν ὡς περὶ μιᾶς διαλεξόμεθα. ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὕτη
and now as about one we-shall-discuss is indeed then this
 ἡ φωνὴ ἐλλιπής. ὡς γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν 'διπλῇ', δυνάμει
the phrase elliptical as for when we-say double in-effect
 φαμὲν 'ἐστία διπλῇ', καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν 'πλατεῖα', δυνάμει
we-say a-hearth double and when we-say broad in-effect
 λέγομεν 'πλατεῖα ὁδός', οὕτως ὅταν εἰπωμεν 'οὐ μᾶλλον,'
we-say broad road so when we-say not more
 δυνάμει φαμὲν 'οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε,

in-effect we-say not more this than this
 ἄνω κάτω.' τινὲς μέντοι τῶν σκεπτικῶν παραλαμβάνουσιν 189
up down some however of-the skeptics employ
 ἀντὶ πύσματος τὸ 'οὐ' (ἀντὶ τοῦ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ
instead-of a-question the not instead-of the what more this than
 τόδε, τὸ τί παραλαμβάνοντες νῦν ἀντὶ αἰτίας), ἔν'
this the what taking now instead-of cause so-that
 ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον 'διὰ τί μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε;' σύνηθες
may-be the (thing)-said through what more this than this customary
 δέ ἐστι καὶ πύσμασι ἀντὶ ἀξιωματικῶν χρησθαι, οἷον
and it-is also questions instead-of propositions to-use such-as

τίς τὸν Διὸς σύλλεκτρον οὐκ οἶδε βροτῶν;
who the of-Zeus bedfellow not knows of-mortals

καὶ ἀξιόμασι ἀντὶ πυσμάτων, οἷον 'ζητῶ ποῦ οἰκεῖ
and propositions instead-of questions such-as I-seek where lives
 Δίων' καὶ 'πυνθάνομαι τίνος ἕνεκα χρὴ θαυμάζειν
Dion and I-ask of-what for-the-sake it-is-necessary to-admire

ἄνδρα ποιητήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τί ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ τί
a-man poet but also the what instead-of the through what
 παραλαμβάνεται παρὰ Μενάνδρω·
is-employed in Menander

τί γὰρ ἐγὼ κατελείπομην;
what for I was-left-behind

δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ 'οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε' καὶ πάθος
indicates and the not more this than this also feeling
 ἡμέτερον,
our

190 καθ' ὃ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων
according-to which through the equal-strength of-the opposed
 πραγμάτων εἰς ἀρρεψίαν καταλήγομεν, ἰσοσθένειαν μὲν
things into non-inclination we-end-up equal-strength indeed
 λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὴν ἰσότητα τὴν κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν
calling us the equality the in the apparent to-us
 πιθανόν, ἀντικείμενα δὲ κοινῶς τὰ μαχόμενα, ἀρρεψίαν
plausibility opposed-(things) and generally the conflicting-(things) non-inclination
 δὲ τὴν πρὸς μηδέτερον συγκατάθεσιν.
and the toward neither assent

191 ἢ γοῦν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' φωνὴ καὶ ἐμφαίνῃ χαρακτήρα
the at-any-rate nothing more phrase even-if shows a-character
 συγκαταθέσεως ἢ ἀρνήσεως, ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως αὐτῇ
of-assent or denial we not so it
 χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως αὐτὴν παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ
use but indifferently it we-employ and
 καταχρηστικῶς, ἥτοι ἀντὶ πύσματος ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν
loosely either instead-of a-question or instead-of the to-say
 'ἄγνοω τίτι μὲν τούτων χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι,
I-do-not-know to-which indeed of-these it-is-necessary to-assent

τίνι δὲ μή'. πρόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν δηλῶσαι τὸ φαινόμενον
to-which and not it-is-set-before for us to-show the appearing-(thing)
 ἡμῖν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φωνὴν δι' ἧς αὐτὸ δηλοῦμεν
to-us according-to and the phrase through which it we-show
 ἀδιαφοροῦμεν. καὶ κέينو δὲ χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὅτι
we-are-indifferent and-that and it-is-necessary to-know that
 προφερόμεθα τὴν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' φωνὴν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι
we-utter the nothing more phrase not affirming
 περὶ τοῦ πάντως ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ βεβαίαν, ἀλλὰ
about the altogether to-be it true and certain but
 κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς λέγοντες.
according-to the appearing to-us also about it saying

περὶ ἀφασίας

I.30 • NON-ASSERTION

Assertion is used broadly, of any statement that affirms or denies, and narrowly, of affirmation only. Non-assertion is the standing away from assertion in the broad sense, and so is a feeling of ours by which we neither affirm nor deny anything. We do not use it as though things were by nature such that we must never assert; we report only that this is what we feel now about the things under inquiry.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀφασίας λέγομεν τάδε. φάσις καλεῖται 192
about and the non-assertion we-say these assertion is-called
 διχῶς, κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως, κοινῶς μὲν ἢ δηλοῦσα
in-two-ways generally and specifically generally indeed the showing
 θέσιν ἢ ἄρσιν φωνή, οἷον 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐχ ἡμέρα
affirmation or negation phrase such-as day it-is not day
 ἔστιν,' ἰδίως δὲ ἢ δηλοῦσα θέσιν μόνον, καθ' ὃ
it-is specifically and the showing affirmation only according-to which
 σημαινόμενον τὰ ἀποφατικὰ οὐ καλοῦσι φάσεις. ἢ οὖν
sense the negative-(statements) not they-call assertions the then

ἀφασία ἀπόστασις ἐστὶ τῆς κοινῶς λεγομένης φάσεως,
non-assertion a-standing-off is of-the generally called assertion

ἢ ὑποτάσσεσθαι λέγομεν τὴν τε κατάφασιν καὶ
under-which to-be-ranged we-say the both affirmation and
 τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὥς εἶναι ἀφασίαν πάθος ἡμέτερον δι'
the negation so-that to-be non-assertion a-feeling our through
 ὃ οὔτε τιθέναι τι οὔτε ἀναιρεῖν φαμεν.
which neither to-affirm anything nor to-deny we-say

- 193 ὅθεν δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀφασίαν παραλαμβάνομεν
whence clear it-is that also the non-assertion we-employ
 οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων
not as toward the nature such being the things
 ὥστε πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἡμεῖς
so-that altogether non-assertion to-move but showing that we
 νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν, ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων
now when we-utter it upon these the investigated-(things)
 τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν. κακεῖνο χρὴ μνημονεύειν, ὅτι μηδὲν
this we-have-felt and-that it-is-necessary to-remember that nothing
 τιθέναι μηδὲ ἀναιρεῖν φαμεν τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἄδηλον
to-affirm nor to-deny we-say of-the according-to the non-evident
 δογματικῶς λεγομένων· τοῖς γὰρ κινουσιν ἡμᾶς παθητικῶς
dogmatically said-(things) to-the for moving us affectively
 καὶ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἄγουσιν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν εἵκομεν.
and compellingly leading into assent we-yield

περὶ τοῦ 'τάχα'· καὶ τοῦ 'ἔξεστι'·
καὶ τοῦ 'ἐνδέχεται'

1.31 · PERHAPS, IT IS PERMITTED, IT IS POSSIBLE

Perhaps, it is permitted, and it is possible, and their negatives, are used for brevity: not permitted stands for it is permitted not to be. Sextus does not quarrel about words or ask whether the phrases signify by nature; he uses them indifferently. That they indicate non-assertion is plain, since whoever says perhaps it is thereby allows perhaps it is not, by not affirming that it is.

Τὸ δὲ 'τάχα' καὶ 'οὐ τάχα' καὶ 'ἔξεστι' καὶ 'οὐκ ἔξεστι' 194
the and perhaps and not perhaps and it-is-permitted and not it-is-permitted
καὶ 'ἐνδέχεται' καὶ 'οὐκ ἐνδέχεται' παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ
and it-is-possible and not it-is-possible we-employ instead-of
τοῦ 'τάχα μὲν ἔστιν τάχα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν' καὶ 'ἔξεστι
the perhaps indeed it-is perhaps and not it-is and it-is-permitted
μὲν εἶναι ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ εἶναι' καὶ 'ἐνδέχεται μὲν
indeed to-be it-is-permitted and not to-be and it-is-possible indeed
εἶναι ἐνδέχεται δὲ μὴ εἶναι' ὥς παραλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς
to-be it-is-possible and not to-be so-that to-employ us
συντομίας χάριν τὸ 'μὴ ἐξεῖναι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἐξεῖναι
brevity for-the-sake the not to-be-permitted instead-of the to-be-permitted
μὴ εἶναι' καὶ τὸ 'μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἐνδέχεσθαι
not to-be and the not to-be-possible instead-of the to-be-possible
μὴ εἶναι' καὶ τὸ 'οὐ τάχα' ἀντὶ 'τοῦ τάχα μὴ εἶναι'.
not to-be and the not perhaps instead-of the perhaps not to-be
195
πάλιν δὲ ἐνταῦθα οὐ φωνομαχοῦμεν, οὐδὲ εἰ φύσει
again and here not we-quarrel-over-words nor whether by-nature
ταῦτα δηλοῦσιν αἱ φωναί, ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως
these show the phrases we-inquire but indifferently
αὐτάς, ὥς εἶπον, παραλαμβάνομεν. ὅτι μέντοι αὐταὶ αἱ
them as I-said we-employ that however these the

φωναὶ ἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικά, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ
 phrases of-non-assertion are indicative evident I-think the-(one)
 γοῦν λέγων 'τάχα ἔστιν' δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι
 at-any-rate saying perhaps it-is in-effect posits also the to-conflict
 δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, τὸ 'τάχα μὴ εἶναι', τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι
 seeming with-it the perhaps not to-be by-the not to-affirm
 περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτό. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔχει.
 about the to-be it likewise and also in the rest it-holds

περὶ τοῦ 'ἐπέχω'

I.32 · I SUSPEND JUDGMENT

I suspend judgment stands for I cannot say which of the things set before me to believe and which to disbelieve. It shows that they appear equal to us for belief and disbelief; whether they are equal we do not affirm. The word is named from the mind's being checked, so that through the equal strength of the things under inquiry we neither affirm nor deny.

196 Τὸ δὲ 'ἐπέχω' παραλαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔχω
 the and I-suspend-judgment we-employ instead-of the not I-am-able
 εἰπεῖν τίνι χρὴ τῶν προκειμένων πιστεῦσαι ἢ τίνι
 to-say to-which it-is-necessary of-the (things)-set-before to-believe or to-which
 ἀπιστῆσαι, δηλοῦντες ὅτι ἴσα ἡμῖν φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα
 to-disbelieve showing that equal to-us appear the things
 πρὸς πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἴσα ἐστίν, οὐ
 for belief and disbelief and whether indeed equal they-are not
 διαβεβαιούμεθα. τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅτε
 we-affirm the and appearing-(thing) to-us about them when
 ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει, λέγομεν. καὶ ἡ ἐποχὴ δὲ εἴρηται
 to-us falls-under we-say and the suspension-of-judgment and is-named

ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπέχεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥς μήτε τιθέναι τι
from the to-be-checked the understanding so-that neither to-affirm anything
 μήτε ἀναιρεῖν διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ζητουμένων.
nor to-deny through the equal-strength of-the investigated-(things)

περὶ τοῦ ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’

I.33 • I DETERMINE NOTHING

To determine is not merely to say something but to put forward a non-evident matter with assent. In that sense the skeptic determines nothing, not even the phrase I determine nothing, since it is not a dogmatic supposition but an indication of his feeling. Saying it, he says that he now feels so, and reports what appears to him about the things set before him rather than declaring it with confidence.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’ ταῦτα φαμέν. ὀρίζειν εἶναι 197
about and the nothing I-determine these we-say to-determine to-be
 νομίζομεν οὐχὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγειν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα
we-think not the simply to-say something but the matter
 ἄδηλον προφέρεισθαι μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν
non-evident to-put-forward with assent so for nothing
 ὀρίζων ὁ σκεπτικὸς τάχα εὑρεθήσεται, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ
determining the skeptic perhaps will-be-found not-even itself the
 ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’ οὐ γάρ ἐστι δογματικὴ ὑπόληψις, τουτέστιν
nothing I-determine not for it-is dogmatic supposition that-is
 ἀδήλως συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ πάθους ἡμετέρου
to-a-non-evident assent but a-phrase of-feeling our
 δηλωτική. ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’,
indicative when then says the skeptic nothing I-determine
 τοῦτό φησιν ‘ἐγὼ οὕτω πέπονθα νῦν ὥς μηδὲν τῶν
this he-says I so have-felt now so-that nothing of-the
 ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν τήνδε πεπτωκότων τιθέναι δογματικῶς
under the inquiry this having-fallen to-affirm dogmatically

ἢ ἀναιρεῖν. τοῦτο δέ φησι λέγων τὸ ἐαυτῷ φαινόμενον
 or to-deny this and he-says saying the to-himself appearing-(thing)
 περὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπαγγελτικῶς, οὐ δογματικῶς μετὰ
 about the (things)-set-before reportingly not dogmatically with
 πεποιθήσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὃ πάσχει διηγούμενος.
 confidence declaring but what he-feels recounting

περὶ τοῦ 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα'

I.34 · ALL THINGS ARE INDEFINITE

Indefiniteness is a feeling of the understanding by which we neither affirm nor deny anything about matters investigated dogmatically. When the skeptic says all things are indefinite, he means it appears so to him, and by all he means those non-evident matters he has surveyed, none of which surpasses its opposite in credibility. As one who says I walk means that he walks, so this phrase carries an unspoken as it appears to me.

198 Καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία δὲ πάθος διανοίας ἐστί, καθ'
 and the indefiniteness and a-feeling of-understanding is according-to
 ὃ οὔτε αἰρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν τῶν δογματικῶς
 which neither we-deny anything nor we-affirm of-the dogmatically
 ζητουμένων, τουτέστι τῶν ἀδήλων. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ ὁ
 investigated-(things) that-is the non-evident-(things) when then says the
 σκεπτικός 'πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα', τὸ μὲν 'ἔστι' λαμβάνει
 skeptic all-(things) are indefinite the indeed is he-takes
 ἀντὶ τοῦ 'φαίνεσθαι αὐτῷ', πάντα δὲ λέγει οὐ τὰ
 instead-of the to-appear to-him all-(things) and he-says not the
 ὄντα ἀλλ' ἅπερ διεξῆλθε τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς
 existing-(things) but which he-went-through of-the among the dogmatists

ζητουμένων ἀδήλων, ἀόριστα δὲ μὴ προύχοντα τῶν
investigated non-evident-(things) indefinite and not surpassing the
 ἀντικειμένων ἢ κοινῶς μαχομένων κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν.
opposed-(things) or generally conflicting in credibility or incredibility
 καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λέγων ‘περιπατῶ’ δυνάμει φησὶν ‘ἐγὼ 199
and just-as the-(one) saying I-walk in-effect says I
 περιπατῶ’, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ‘πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα’
walk so the-(one) saying all-(things) are indefinite
 συσσημαίνει ‘καθ’ ἡμᾶς’ ἢ ‘ὡς πρὸς ἐμὲ’ ἢ ‘ὡς
co-signifies according-to us either as toward me or as
 ἐμοὶ φαίνεται’, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον ‘ὅσα
to-me it-appears so-that to-be the (thing)-said such as-many-as
 ἐπῆλθον τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητουμένων, τοιαυτά
I-went-over of-the among the dogmatists investigated-(things) such
 μοι φαίνεται ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένου προύχειν
to-me appear so-that nothing of-them the conflicting to-surpass
 μοι δοκεῖν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν.’
to-me to-seem in credibility or incredibility

περὶ τοῦ ‘πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα’

I.35 • ALL THINGS ARE INAPPREHENSIBLE

The same holds when the skeptic says all things are inapprehensible. All means all the non-evident matters investigated dogmatically that he has surveyed, and to me is understood. He is not affirming that those matters are by nature inapprehensible, but reporting his own feeling: that so far he has apprehended none of them, because of the equal strength of the things opposed.

Οὕτω δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘πάντα ἐστὶν 200
thus and we-proceed also when we-say all-(things) are
 ἀκατάληπτα.’ καὶ γὰρ τὸ ‘πάντα’ ὁμοίως ἐξηγούμεθα καὶ
inapprehensible and for the all likewise we-explain and

τὸ 'έμοι' συνεκδεχόμεθα, ὥς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον
the to-me we-understand-with-it so-that to-be the (thing)-said such
 'πάντα ὅσα ἐφώδευσα τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων
all as-many-as I-surveyed of-the dogmatically investigated
 ἀδήλων φαίνεται μοι ἀκατάληπτα.' τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν
non-evident-(things) appear to-me inapprehensible this and is
 οὐ διαβεβαιουμένου περὶ τοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς
not affirming about the the among the dogmatists
 ζητούμενα φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὥς εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα,
investigated-(things) of-a-nature to-be such so-that to-be inapprehensible
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλοντος, καθ' ὃ, φησίν,
but the his-own feeling reporting according-to which he-says
 ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι ἄχρι νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἐκείνων ἐγὼ
I-suppose that until now nothing I-apprehended of-those I
 διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ
through the of-the opposed-(things) equal-strength whence also the-(things)
 εἰς περιτροπὴν φερόμενα πάντα ἀπάδοντα εἶναι δοκεῖ
for refutation brought all discordant to-be seem
 μοι τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπαγγελλομένων.
to-me with-the by us reported-(things)

περὶ τοῦ 'ἀκαταληπτῶ' καὶ 'οὐ καταλαμβάνω'

I.36 • I CANNOT APPREHEND, I DO NOT APPREHEND

I cannot apprehend and I do not apprehend indicate the same feeling as the phrases already discussed: the skeptic refrains, for the present, from affirming or denying anything about the non-evident matters under inquiry.

Καὶ ἡ ‘ἀκαταληπτῷ’ δὲ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ καταλαμβάνω’ φωνή 201
and the I-cannot-apprehend and and the not I-apprehend phrase
 πάθους οἰκείου ἐστὶ δηλωτική, καθ’ ὃ ἀφίσταται
of-a-feeling proper is indicative according-to which refrains
 ὁ σκεπτικὸς ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοῦ τιθέναι τι τῶν
the skeptic as for the present the to-affirm anything of-the
 ζητουμένων ἀδήλων ἢ ἀναιρεῖν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον ἐκ
investigated non-evident-(things) or to-deny as it-is clear out-of
 τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν.
the said-before by-us about the other phrases

περὶ τοῦ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι

I.37 · TO EVERY ARGUMENT AN EQUAL ARGUMENT IS OPPOSED

Every means every argument the skeptic has surveyed, and argument means one that establishes something dogmatically, in any manner. Equal means equal in credibility, opposed means conflicting, and as it appears to me is understood. The utterance is a report of human feeling, not a doctrine. Some deliver it as a precept, using the infinitive for the imperative, to keep the skeptic from being taken in and abandoning his inquiry.

Ὅταν δὲ λέγωμεν ‘παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται’, 202
when and we-say to-every argument an-argument equal is-opposed
 παντὶ μὲν λέγομεν τῷ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν διεξωδευμένῳ, λόγον
every indeed we-say the by us surveyed an-argument
 δέ φαμεν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸν κατασκευάζοντά
and we-say not simply but the-(one) establishing
 τι δογματικῶς, τουτέστι περὶ ἀδήλου, καὶ οὐ
something dogmatically that-is about a-non-evident-(thing) and not
 πάντως τὸν ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τὸν
altogether the-(one) out-of premises and conclusion but the-(one)

- ὅπωςοῦν κατασκευάζοντα. ἴσον' δέ φαμεν κατὰ πίστιν
in-any-way-whatever establishing equal and we-say in credibility
 ἢ ἀπιστίαν, τό τε ἀντίκειται λαμβάνομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ
or incredibility the and is-opposed we-take instead-of the
 'μάχεται' κοινῶς, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται συνεκδεχόμεθα.
conflicts generally and the as to-me it-appears we-understand-with-it
 203 ὅταν οὖν εἴπω 'παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἴσος ἀντίκειται',
when then I-say to-every argument an-argument equal is-opposed
 δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι 'παντὶ τῷ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ζητουμένῳ
in-effect this I-say to-every the by me investigated
 λόγῳ, ὃς κατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτερος λόγος
argument which establishes something dogmatically another argument
 κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν
establishing something dogmatically equal to-it in credibility
 καὶ ἀπιστίαν, ἀντικείμεθα φαίνεται μοι, ὡς εἶναι τὴν
and incredibility to-be-opposed appears to-me so-that to-be the
 τοῦ λόγου προφορὰν οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπείου
of-the argument utterance not dogmatic but of-human
 πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὃ ἐστὶ φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.
feeling a-report which is appearing to-the (one)-feeling
 204 προφέρονται δέ τινες καὶ οὕτω τὴν φωνὴν 'παντὶ λόγῳ
utter and some also thus the phrase to-every argument
 λόγον ἴσον ἀντικείμεθα, ἀξιούντες παραγγελματικῶς τοῦτο
an-argument equal to-be-opposed claiming as-a-precept this
 'παντὶ λόγῳ δογματικῶς τι κατασκευάζοντι λόγον
to-every argument dogmatically something establishing an-argument
 δογματικῶς ζητοῦντα, ἴσον κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν,
dogmatically inquiring equal in credibility and incredibility
 μαχόμενον αὐτῷ ἀντιτιθώμεν, ἵνα ὁ μὲν λόγος αὐτοῖς
conflicting with-it let-us-oppose so-that the indeed argument to-them

ἢ πρὸς τὸν σκεπτικόν, χρῶνται δὲ ἀπαρεμφάτῳ ἀντὶ
may-be toward the skeptic they-use and an-infinitive instead-of
 προστακτικοῦ, τῷ 'ἀντικεῖσθαι' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'ἀντιτιθῶμεν'.
an-imperative the to-be-opposed instead-of the let-us-oppose
 παραγγέλλουσι δὲ τοῦτο τῷ σκεπτικῷ, μή πως ὑπὸ 205
they-enjoin and this on-the skeptic lest somehow by
 τοῦ δογματικοῦ παρακρουσθεὶς ἀπείπῃ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ
the dogmatist having-been-deceived he-give-up the about it
 ζήτησιν, καὶ τῆς φαινομένης αὐτοῖς ἀταραξίας, ἣν
inquiry and the appearing to-them unperturbedness which
 νομίζουσι παρυφίστασθαι τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ,
they-think to-supervene on-the about all suspension-of-judgment
 καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, σφαλῇ προπετευσάμενος.
as before we-recalled he-fail having-been-rash

παραπήγματα ὑπὲρ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν

I.38 · NOTES ON THE SKEPTICAL UTTERANCES

First, we do not affirm that any of these phrases is true, since we say they can destroy themselves along with the things they are said about, as a purgative drug carries itself out with the humors. They are used indifferently, not strictly; they are said only of non-evident matters investigated dogmatically; and they report what appears to us. Every sophism brought against a skeptical phrase can be overturned from this.

Περὶ τοσούτων ἀρκέσει τῶν φωνῶν ὥς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει 206
about so-many it-will-suffice the phrases as in an-outline
 διεξελθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῶν εἰρημένων
to-go-through otherwise both and since out-of the now by-us said-(things)
 δυνατόν ἐστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν παραλελειμμένων.
possible it-is to-speak also about the omitted-(ones)

περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν ἐκεῖνο χρή
 about all for the skeptical phrases that it-is-necessary
 προειληφέναι, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθεῖς αὐτὰς εἶναι πάντως
 to-have-grasped-beforehand that about the true them to-be altogether
 οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς
 not we-affirm where at-least even by themselves them
 ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγομεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας ἐκείνους
 to-be-destroyed we-say to-be-able being-circumscribed-along-with those
 περὶ ὧν λέγονται, καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ τῶν φαρμάκων
 about which they-are-said just-as the purgative of-the drugs
 οὐ μόνον τοὺς χυμοὺς ὑπεξαιρεῖ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ
 not only the humors removes from-the body but
 καὶ ἑαυτὰ τοῖς χυμοῖς συνεξάγει.
 also themselves with-the humors carries-out-together

207 φαμέν δὲ καὶ ὥς οὐ κυρίως δηλοῦντες τὰ πράγματα,
 we-say and also that not strictly indicating the things
 ἐφ' ὧν παραλαμβάνονται, τίθεμεν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως
 upon which they-are-employed we-set them but indifferently
 καὶ εἰ βούλονται καταχρηστικῶς· οὔτε γὰρ πρέπει τῷ
 and if they-wish loosely neither for it-befits the
 σκεπτικῷ φωνομαχεῖν, ἄλλως τε ἡμῖν συνεργεῖ τὸ μηδὲ
 skeptic to-quarrel-over-words otherwise both us helps the not-even
 ταύτας τὰς φωνὰς εἰλικρινῶς σημαίνειν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 these the phrases purely to-signify to-be-said but
 πρὸς τι καὶ ὥς πρὸς τοὺς σκεπτικούς.
 toward something and as toward the skeptics

208 πρὸς τούτοις ἀκεῖνου δεῖ μεμνήσθαι, ὅτι οὐ περὶ
 in-addition-to these and-that it-is-necessary to-remember that not about
 πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων καθόλου φαμέν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 all the things universally we-say them but about
 τῶν ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, καὶ
 the non-evident-(things) and the dogmatically investigated-(things) and

ὅτι τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν φαμεν καὶ οὐχὶ διαβεβαιωτικῶς
that the appearing-(thing) to-us we-say and not affirmatively
 περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων ἀποφαινόμεθα·
about the nature of-the outside underlying-(things) we-declare
 ἐκ γὰρ τούτων πᾶν σόφισμα πρὸς φωνὴν ἐνεχθὲν
out-of for these every sophism against a-phrase brought
 σκεπτικὴν οἶομαι δύνασθαι διατρέπεσθαι.

skeptical I-think to-be-able to-be-overtaken

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ κριτήριον
since and the conception and the parts and the criterion
 καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς
and the end further and the modes of-the suspension-of-judgment
 ἐφοδεύσαντες, καὶ περὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν εἰπόντες,
having-surveyed and about the skeptical phrases having-spoken
 τὸν χαρακτήρα τῆς σκέψεως ἐμπεφανίκαμεν, ἀκόλουθον
the character of-the skepticism we-have-made-plain fitting
 ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῇ φιλοσοφῶν τὴν
we-consider to-be also of-the neighboring to-it philosophies the
 πρὸς αὐτὴν διάκρισιν συντόμως ἐπελθεῖν, ἵνα σαφέστερον
toward it distinction briefly to-go-over so-that more-clearly
 τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν ἀγωγὴν κατανοήσωμεν. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ
the suspensive way we-may-understand let-us-begin and from
 τῆς Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας.

the Heraclitean philosophy

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ὅτι διαφέρει ἡ σκεπτική ἀγωγή
τῆς Ἡρακλείτειου φιλοσοφίας

I.39 • SKEPTICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

Aenesidemus and his circle called the skeptical way a road to the philosophy of Heraclitus, on the ground that opposites must appear in the same thing before they can be said to belong to it. Sextus answers that their appearing so is no skeptical doctrine but something plain to everyone, so the road would run from common life as well. Worse, the skeptic attacks every Heraclitean doctrine, and a conflicting way is no road to the school it conflicts with.

- 210 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη διαφέρει τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀγωγῆς,
that indeed then this differs from-the our way
πρόδηλον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος περὶ πολλῶν
(is)-evident — indeed for Heraclitus about many
ἀδήλων ἀποφαίνεται δογματικῶς, ἡμεῖς δ' οὐχί,
non-evident-(things) declares dogmatically we and not
καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδῆμον
just-as has-been-said since and the-(ones) about — Aenesidemus
ἔλεγον ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν
said a-road to-be the skeptical way to the
Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγῖται τοῦ τάναντία
Heraclitean philosophy because precedes the the-opposites
περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι,
about the same to-exist the the-opposites about the same to-appear
καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ
and the indeed skeptics to-appear say the opposites about the
αὐτό, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτειοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν
same the and Heracliteans from this also to the to-exist
αὐτὰ μετέρχονται, φαμὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὅτι τὸ τὰ ἐναντία
them they-pass-on we-say to these that the the opposites

περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι οὐ δόγμα ἐστὶ τῶν σκεπτικῶν
about the same to-appear not a-belief is of-the skeptics
 ἀλλὰ πράγμα οὐ μόνον τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς
but a-thing not only to-the skeptics but also to-the
 ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑποπίπτον·
other philosophers and all men falling-under
 οὐδεὶς γοῦν τολμήσαι ἂν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μέλι οὐ γλυκάζει 211
no-one at-any-rate would-venture — to-say that the honey not sweetens
 τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας ἢ ὅτι τοὺς ἰκτερικοὺς οὐ πικράζει,
the healthy or that the jaundiced not embitters
 ὥστε ἀπὸ κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεως ἄρχονται οἱ
so-that from a-common of-the men preconception begin the
 Ἡρακλείτειοι, καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἴσως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
Heracliteans just-as also we perhaps and also the other
 φιλοσοφίαι. διόπερ εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τινος τῶν σκεπτικῶς
philosophies wherefore if indeed from some of-the skeptically
 λεγομένων ἐλάβανον τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείσθαι,
said-(things) they-took the the-opposites about the same to-underlie
 οἷον τοῦ ‘πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα’ ἢ τοῦ ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’ ἢ
such-as the all-(things) are inapprehensible or the nothing I-determine or
 τινος τῶν παραπλησιῶν, ἴσως ἂν συνήγον ὃ λέγουσιν·
some of-the similar-(ones) perhaps — they-would-infer what they-say
 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
since and starting-points they-have not only to-us but also to-the other
 φιλοσόφοις καὶ τῷ βίῳ ὑποπιπτούσας, τί μᾶλλον τὴν
philosophers and to-the common-life falling-under why rather the
 ἡμετέραν ἀγωγὴν ἢ ἐκάστην τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφιῶν ἢ καὶ
our way than each of-the other philosophies or even
 τὸν βίον ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι
the common-life a-road to the Heraclitean philosophy to-be
 λέγοι τις ἂν, ἐπειδὴ πάντες κοιναῖς ὕλαις κεχρήμεθα;
would-say someone — since all common materials we-have-used

212 μήποτε δὲ οὐ μόνον οὐ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς
perhaps and not only not helps toward the knowledge of-the
 Ἡρακλειτείου φιλοσοφίας ἢ σκεπτική ἀγωγή, ἀλλὰ καὶ
Heraclitean philosophy the skeptical way but even
 ἀποσυνεργεῖ, εἶγε ὁ σκεπτικὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ
binders if-indeed the skeptic all the-(things) by
 τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου δογματιζόμενα ὡς προπετῶς λεγόμενα
— Heraclitus held-as-belief as rashly said
 διαβάλλει, ἐναντιούμενος μὲν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει, ἐναντιούμενος
he-attacks opposing indeed the conflagration opposing
 δὲ τῷ τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ
and the the opposites about the same to-exist and upon
 παντὸς δόγματος τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου τὴν μὲν δογματικὴν
every belief — Heraclitus the indeed dogmatic
 προπέτειαν διασύρων, τὸ δὲ ‘οὐ καταλαμβάνω’ καὶ τὸ
rashness deriding the and not I-apprehend and the
 ‘οὐδὲν ὀρίζω’ ἐπιφθεγγόμενος, ὡς ἔφην ἔμπροσθεν· ὅπερ
nothing I-determine uttering as I-said before which
 μάχεται τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι τὸ τὴν
conflicts with-the Heracliteans absurd and it-is the the
 μαχομένην ἀγωγὴν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν τῆς αἰρέσεως ἐκείνης
conflicting way a-road to-be to-say of-the school that
 ἢ μάχεται· ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν
with-which it-conflicts absurd then the the skeptical way
 ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλειτεῖον φιλοσοφίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι λέγειν.
to the Heraclitean philosophy a-road to-be to-say

τῖνι διαφέρει ἡ σκεπτική ἀγωγή
τῆς Δημοκριτείου φιλοσοφίας

I.40 · SKEPTICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRITUS

Democritus is said to share the skeptics' material, since from honey appearing sweet to some and bitter to others he concluded that it is neither, and so used the phrase not more. But he uses it to mean that neither is so, and the skeptic to mean not knowing whether both or neither is. The difference is clearest when Democritus says that atoms and void exist in truth, that is, in reality.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἡ Δημοκρίτειος φιλοσοφία λέγεται κοινωνίαν ἔχειν 213
but also the Democritean philosophy is-said community to-have
πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ τῇ αὐτῇ ὕλῃ ἡμῖν κεχρησθαι
with the skepticism since it-seems the same material as-us to-have-used
ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μέλι τοῖς δὲ
from for the to-some indeed sweet to-appear the honey to-others and
πικρὸν τὸν Δημόκριτον ἐπιλογίζεσθαι φασὶ τὸ μήτε γλυκὺ
bitter — Democritus to-reason they-say the neither sweet
αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε πικρὸν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι
it to-be nor bitter and through this to-utter
τὴν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ φωνὴν σκεπτικὴν οὖσαν. διαφόρως μέντοι
the not more phrase skeptical being differently however
χρῶνται τῇ ‘οὐ μᾶλλον’ φωνῇ οἱ τε σκεπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ
use the not more phrase the both skeptics and the-(ones)
ἀπὸ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου· ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ μηδέτερον
from — Democritus those indeed for upon the neither
εἶναι τάττουσι τὴν φωνήν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν,
to-be they-assign the phrase we and for the to-not-know
πότερον ἀμφοτέρα ἢ οὐδέτερόν τι ἔστι τῶν φαινομένων.
whether both or neither some is of-the appearing-(things)

- 214 ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν διαφέρομεν, προδηλοτάτη
so-that also according-to this indeed we-differ most-evident
 δὲ γίνεται ἡ διάκρισις ὅταν ὁ Δημόκριτος λέγῃ ‘ἐτεῇ
and becomes the distinction when — Democritus says in-truth
 δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν’. ‘ἐτεῇ’ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ
and atoms and void in-truth indeed for he-says instead-of the
 ‘ἀληθείᾳ’. κατ’ ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὑφεστάναι λέγων τὰς τε
in-reality according-to truth and to-subsist saying the both
 ἀτόμους καὶ τὸ κενὸν ὅτι διενήνοχεν ἡμῶν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
atoms and the void that he-differs from-us if even from the
 ἀνωμαλίας τῶν φαινομένων ἄρχεται, περιττὸν οἶμαι λέγειν.
irregularity of-the appearing-(things) he-begins superfluous I-think to-say

τίνι διαφέρει τῆς Κυρηναϊκῆς ἡ σκέψις

1.41 • SKEPTICISM AND THE CYRENAIC WAY

Some say the Cyrenaic way is the same as skepticism, since it too holds that only the feelings are apprehended. It differs in its end, which is pleasure and the smooth motion of the flesh, where ours is unperturbedness: the one who holds pleasure to be the end suffers disturbance whether it is present or absent. And the Cyrenaics declare that external things have a nature that cannot be apprehended, where we suspend judgment.

- 215 Φασὶ δέ τινες ὅτι ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγή ἡ αὐτή
they-say and some that the Cyrenaic way the same
 ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει, ἐπειδὴ κακείνη τὰ πάθη μόνα φησὶ
is to-the skepticism since and-that the feelings alone says
 καταλαμβάνεσθαι. διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνη μὲν
to-be-apprehended it-differs and from-it since that indeed
 τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν τέλος
the pleasure and the smooth of-the flesh motion an-end

εἶναι λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν, ἣ ἐναντιοῦται
to-be says we and the unperturbedness to-which is-opposed
τὸ κατ' ἐκείνους τέλος· καὶ γὰρ παρούσης τῆς ἡδονῆς
the according-to them end and for being-present the pleasure
καὶ μὴ παρούσης ταραχὰς ὑπομένει ὁ διαβεβαιούμενος
and not being-present disturbances undergoes the-(one) affirming
τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ὥς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ τέλους
an-end to-be the pleasure as in the about the end
ἐπελογισάμην. εἴτα ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐπέχομεν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ
I-reasoned then we indeed we-suspend-judgment as-far upon the
λόγῳ περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ Κυρηναῖκοι
argument about the outside underlying-(things) the and Cyrenaics
ἀποφαίνονται φύσιν αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἀκατάληπτον.
declare a-nature them to-have inapprehensible

τίνι διαφέρει τῆς Πρωταγορείου ἀγωγῆς ἡ σκέψις

I.42 · SKEPTICISM AND THE WAY OF PROTAGORAS

Protagoras makes man the measure of all things, positing only what appears to each, and so seems to share ground with the Pyrrhonians. But he holds that matter is in flux, that its losses are made good by additions, that the senses are altered with age and condition, and that the principles of all appearances lie in matter, so that it can be everything that appears to anyone. These are non-evident claims, and we suspend judgment about them.

Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας δὲ βούλεται πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι 216
and — Protagoras and wishes of-all things to-be
μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὥς ἔστιν, τῶν
measure the man of-the indeed being-(things) as they-are of-the
δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, 'μέτρον' μὲν λέγων τὸ
and not being-(things) as not they-are measure indeed calling the

κριτήριον, 'χρημάτων' δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει
criterion of-things and the matters so-that in-effect
 φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
to-assert of-all matters criterion to-be the man
 τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς
of-the indeed being-(things) as they-are of-the and not being-(things) as
 οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω
not they-are and through this he-positis the appearing-(things) to-each
 μόνα, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τι.
alone and thus he-introduces the toward something

217 διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ κοινωνίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνεῖους.
wherefore also he-seems community to-have with the Pyrrhoneans
 διαφέρει δὲ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰσόμεθα τὴν διαφοράν,
he-differs and from-them and we-shall-know the difference
 ἐξαπλώσαντες συμμέτρως τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ.
having-unfolded moderately the (thing)-seeming to Protagoras
 φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὕλην ρευστὴν εἶναι, ρεούσης δὲ αὐτῆς
says then the man the matter in-flux to-be flowing and it
 συνεχῶς προσθέσεις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀποφορήσεων γίνεσθαι καὶ
continuously additions instead-of the losses to-happen and
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοσμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παρὰ τε
the senses to-be-rearranged both and to-be-altered along-with both
 τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευὰς τῶν σωμάτων.
the ages and along-with the other constitutions of-the bodies

218 λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντων τῶν φαινομένων
he-says and also the reasons of-all the appearing-(things)
 ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δύνασθαι τὴν ὕλην ὅσον
to-underlie in the matter so-that to-be-able the matter as-far
 ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἶναι ὅσα πᾶσι φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ
upon itself all-(things) to-be as-many-as to-all appear the and
 ἀνθρώπους ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς
men at-one-time other-(things) to-apprehend along-with the

διαφόρους αὐτῶν διαθέσεις· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν
different of-them dispositions the-(one) indeed for according-to nature
 ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καταλαμβάνειν ᾧ τοῖς
being those of-the in the matter to-apprehend which to-the-(ones)
 κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι φαίνεσθαι δύναται, τὸν δὲ παρὰ
according-to nature being to-appear can the-(one) and along-with
 φύσιν ᾧ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν.

nature which to-the-(ones) along-with nature

καὶ ἤδη παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπνοῦν ἢ 219
and further along-with the ages and according-to the to-sleep or
 ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος τῶν διαθέσεων
to-be-awake and according-to each kind of-the dispositions
 ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. γίνεται τοῦνυν κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν
the same account becomes then according-to him of-the
 ὄντων κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ
existing-(things) criterion the man all-(things) for the-(things)
 φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ
appearing to-the men also are the-(things) and to-no-one
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἔστιν. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι
of-the men appearing not-even are we-see then that
 καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν ὕλην ρευστὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τοῦ
also about the the matter in-flux to-be and about the
 τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι
the reasons of-the appearing-(things) all in it to-underlie
 δογματίζει, ἀδήλων ὄντων καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφεκτῶν.
he-holds-beliefs non-evident being and for-us to-be-suspended-on

τῖνι διαφέρει τῆς Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας ἢ σκέψις

I.43 • SKEPTICISM AND THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY

Sextus distinguishes each Academy from skepticism. Plato assents to ideas and providence, or at least inclines to them as more plausible, and so leaves the skeptical character. The New Academy affirms that all things are inapprehensible and ranks impressions as plausible, tested, and undistracted; the skeptic holds impressions equal and follows common life undogmatically. Arcesilaus comes nearest, though some call him a Platonist underneath; Philo limits inapprehensibility to the Stoic criterion, and Antiochus moves the Stoa into the Academy.

- 220 Φασὶ μέντοι τινὲς ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἢ αὐτὴ
they-say however some that the Academic philosophy the same
 ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει· διόπερ ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἶη καὶ περὶ
is to-the skepticism wherefore fitting — it-would-be also about
 τούτου διεξελθεῖν. Ἀκαδημαῖαι δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὥς φασιν
this to-go-through Academies and have-been as they-say
 οἱ πλείους, τρεῖς, μία μὲν καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἢ τῶν
the majority three one indeed and most-ancient the of-the-(ones)
 περὶ Πλάτωνα, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ μέση ἢ τῶν περὶ
about Plato second and and middle the of-the-(ones) about
 Ἀρκεσίλαον τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέμωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα
Arcesilaus the pupil of-Polemo third and and new
 ἢ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον· ἔτιοι δὲ καὶ
the of-the-(ones) about Carneades and Clitomachus some and also
 τετάρτην προστιθέασιν τὴν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Χαρμίδαν,
a-fourth add the about Philo and Charmidas
 τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν περὶ Ἀντίοχον.
some and also a-fifth reckon the about Antiochus
- 221 ἀρξάμενοι τοῖνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἴδωμεν τὴν πρὸς
having-begun then from the ancient let-us-see the toward
 ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν τῶν εἰρημένων φιλοσοφιῶν. τὸν Πλάτωνα
us difference of-the mentioned philosophies — Plato

οὖν οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ
 then the-(ones) indeed dogmatic said to-be the-(ones) and
 ἀπορητικόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τι ἀπορητικόν, κατὰ
 aporetic the-(ones) and in indeed something aporetic in
 δέ τι δογματικόν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς γυμναστικοῖς
 and something dogmatic in indeed for the gymnastic
 λόγοις, ἔνθα ὁ Σωκράτης εἰσάγεται ἥτοι παίζων πρὸς
 accounts where — Socrates is-brought-in either jesting with
 τινας ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος πρὸς σοφιστάς, γυμναστικόν τε
 some or contending against sophists gymnastic both
 καὶ ἀπορητικόν φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτήρα, δογματικὸν
 and aporetic they-say to-have him a-character dogmatic
 δέ, ἔνθα σπουδάζων ἀποφαίνεται ἥτοι διὰ Σωκράτους
 and where being-serious he-declares either through Socrates
 ἢ Τιμαίου ἢ τινος τῶν τοιούτων.

or Timaeus or some of-the such-(men)

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν δογματικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λεγόντων, ἢ 222
 about indeed then the-(ones) dogmatic him to-be saying or
 κατὰ μὲν τι δογματικόν, κατὰ δέ τι ἀπορητικόν,
 in indeed something dogmatic in and something aporetic
 περισσὸν ἂν εἶη λέγειν νῦν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσι
 superfluous — it-would-be to-speak now they for agree
 τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφοράν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ ἔστιν
 the toward us difference about and the whether he-is
 εἰλικρινῶς σκεπτικὸς πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι
 purely skeptical more-fully indeed in the commentaries
 διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν κατὰ
 we-treat now and as in an-outline we-say according-to
 τοὺς περὶ Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησιδήμον (οὗτοι γὰρ
 the-(ones) about Menodotus and Aenesidemus these for
 μάλιστα ταύτης προέστησαν τῆς στάσεως), ὅτι ὅταν ὁ
 especially of-this championed the position that when —

Πλάτων ἀποφαίνεται περὶ ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι

Plato declares about ideas or about the providence to-be

ἢ περὶ τοῦ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ

or about the the virtuous life more-choiceeworthy to-be than-the

μετὰ κακιῶν, εἴτε ὥς ὑπάρχουσι τούτοις συγκατατίθεται,

with vices whether as existing to-these be-assents

δογματίζει, εἴτε ὥς πιθανώτεροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ

he-holds-beliefs or as more-plausible be-inclines since

προκρίνει τι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, ἐκπέφευγε τὸν

he-prefers something in credibility or incredibility he-has-escaped the

σκεπτικὸν χαρακτήρα· ὥς γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστιν

skeptical character that for also this to-us is

ἀλλότριον, ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον.

foreign out-of the before said-(things) (is)-evident

223 εἰ δέ τινα καὶ σκεπτικῶς προφέρεται, ὅταν, ὥς φασί,

if and some-(things) also skeptically he-utters when as they-say

γυμνάζεται, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται σκεπτικός· ὁ

he-exercises not on-account-of this he-will-be skeptical the-(one)

γὰρ περὶ ἐνὸς δογματίζων, ἢ προκρίνων φαντασίαν

for about one-(thing) (one)-holding-beliefs or preferring impression

φαντασίας ὅλως κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ἢ ἀποφαινόμενος

to-impression at-all in credibility or incredibility or declaring

περί τινος τῶν ἀδήλων, τοῦ δογματικοῦ γίνεται

about some of-the non-evident-(things) of-the dogmatic becomes

χαρακτήρος, ὥς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Τίμων διὰ τῶν περὶ

character as shows also — Timon through the about

Ξενοφάνους αὐτῷ λεγομένων.

Xenophanes by-him said-(things)

ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐπαινέσας, ὥς καὶ τοὺς σίλλους 224
in many-(places) for him having-praised so-that even the Silloi
 αὐτῷ ἀναθεῖναι, ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ὀδυρόμενον καὶ λέγοντα
to-him to-dedicate he-made him lamenting and saying

ὥς καὶ ἐγὼν ὄφελον πυκινοῦ νόου ἀντιβολῆσαι
that also I would-that of-shrewd mind to-have-met
 ἀμφοτερόβλεπτος· δολίῃ δ' ὁδῷ ἐξαπατήθην
looking-both-ways by-a-deceitful and road I-was-deceived
 πρεσβυγενὴς ἔτ' ἐὼν καὶ ἀμενθήριτος ἀπάσης
old-born still being and unmindful of-all
 σκεπτοσύνης. ὅππῃ γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι,
skepticism wherever for my mind I-would-draw
 εἰς ἓν ταυτό τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο· πᾶν δ' ἐὼν αἰεὶ
into one the-same and everything was-resolved everything and being always
 πάντῃ ἀνελκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσταθ' ὁμοίην.
everywhere drawn-back one into nature stood alike

διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν καὶ ὑπάτυφον αὐτὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ
through this at-any-rate also half-conceited him he-calls and not
 τέλειον ἄτυφον, δι' ᾧ φησι
completely free-of-conceit through which he-says

Ξεινοφάνης ὑπάτυφος, ὁμηραπάτης ἐπισκώπτης,
Xenophanes half-conceited of-Homer's-deceit mocker
 εἰ τὸν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων θεὸν ἐπλάσατ' ἴσον ἀπάντῃ,
if the from men god he-fashioned equal everywhere
 ἀτρεμῇ ἀσκηθῇ νοερώτερον ἢ νόημα.
unshaken unbarmed more-intelligent than thought

ὑπάτυφον μὲν γὰρ εἶπε τὸν κατὰ τι ἄτυφον,
half-conceited indeed for he-called the-(one) in some free-of-conceit
 ὁμηραπάτης δὲ ἐπισκώπτῃν, ἐπεὶ τὴν παρ' Ὀμήρῳ ἀπάτην
of-Homer's-deceit and a-mocker since the in Homer deceit
 διέσυρεν.

he-derided

225 ἔδογματίζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων
he-held-beliefs and — Xenophanes against the of-the other
 ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν
men preconceptions one to-be the all and the god
 συμφυῇ τοῖς πᾶσιν, εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῇ καὶ ἀπαθῇ
cognate with-the all to-be and spherical and impassive
 καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν· ὅθεν καὶ ῥάδιον τὴν
and unchangeable and rational whence also easy the
 Ξενοφάνους πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαφορὰν ἐπιδεικνύναι. πλὴν ἀλλ'
of-Xenophanes toward us difference to-show nevertheless but
 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόδηλον, ὅτι κἂν περὶ τινων
out-of the said-(things) (is)-evident that even-if about some-(things)
 ἐπαπορῇ ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τισι φαίνεται ἢ περὶ
he-raises-difficulties — Plato but since in some he-appears either about
 ὑπάρξεως ἀποφαινόμενος πραγμάτων ἀδήλων ἢ προκρίνων
existence declaring of-things non-evident or preferring
 ἄδηλα κατὰ πίστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σκεπτικός.

non-evident-(things) in credibility not — he-would-be skeptical

226 Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας, εἰ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι
the-(ones) and from the new Academy if even inapprehensible to-be
 πάντα φασί, διαφέρουσι τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ'
all-(things) they-say they-differ from-the skeptics perhaps indeed also in
 αὐτὸ τὸ λέγειν πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα (διαβιβαιοῦνται γὰρ
itself the to-say all-(things) to-be inapprehensible they-affirm for
 περὶ τούτου, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ καταληφθῆναί
about this the and skeptic to-be-possible also to-be-apprehended

τινα προσδοκᾷ), διαφέρουσι δὲ ἡμῶν προδήλως ἐν τῇ
some-(things) expects they-differ and from-us evidently in the
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν κρίσει. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τί
of-the goods and the evils judgment good for something
 φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καὶ κακὸν οὐχ ὥς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ
they-say to-be the Academics and evil not as we but
 μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν
with the to-be-persuaded that plausible it-is more what they-call
 εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ
to-be good to-exist than the opposite and in the evil
 ὁμοίως, ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν εἶναι λεγόντων οὐδὲν
likewise us good something or evil to-be saying not-at-all
 μετὰ τοῦ πιθανόν εἶναι νομίζειν ὃ φάμεν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστως
with the plausible to-be to-think what we-say but undogmatically
 ἐπομένων τῷ βίῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἀνενέργητοι ὦμεν.
following the common-life so-that not inactive we-may-be
 τὰς τε φαντασίας ἡμεῖς μὲν ἴσας λέγομεν εἶναι κατὰ 227
the both impressions we indeed equal say to-be in
 πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐκείνοι δὲ τὰς
credibility or incredibility as-far upon the argument those and the-(ones)
 μὲν πιθανὰς εἶναί φασι τὰς δὲ ἀπιθάνους. καὶ τῶν
indeed plausible to-be say the-(ones) and implausible and of-the
 πιθανῶν δὲ λέγουσι διαφοράς· τὰς μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ
plausible and they-speak-of differences the-(ones) indeed for itself
 μόνον πιθανὰς ὑπάρχειν ἡγοῦνται, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ
only plausible to-be they-consider the-(ones) and plausible and
 διεξωδευμένας, τὰς δὲ πιθανὰς καὶ περιωδευμένας καὶ
examined the-(ones) and plausible and tested and
 ἀπερισπάστους. οἷον ἐν οἴκῳ σκοτεινῷ ποσῶς κειμένον
undistracted such-as in a-house dark somehow lying

σχοινίου ἐσπειραμένου πιθανὴ ἀπλῶς φαντασία γίνεται
a-cord coiled plausible simply impression comes-about

ἀπὸ τούτου ὡς ἀπὸ ὄφεως τῷ ἀθρόως ἐπείσελθόντι·

from this as from a-snake to-the suddenly having-entered

228 τῷ μέντοι περισκοπήσαντι ἀκριβῶς καὶ διεξοδεύσαντι

to-the however having-examined carefully and having-gone-through

τὰ περὶ αὐτό, οἷον ὅτι οὐ κινεῖται, ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα τοῖόν

the-(things) about it such-as that not it-moves that the color such

ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, φαίνεται σχοινίον κατὰ

is and of-the others each appears a-cord according-to

τὴν φαντασίαν τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην. ἡ δὲ καὶ

the impression the plausible and tested the and also

ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία τοιάδε ἐστίν. λέγεται ὁ Ἡρακλῆς

undistracted impression such is is-said — Heracles

ἀποθανοῦσαν τὴν Ἄλκηστιν αὖθις ἐξ Ἅιδου ἀναγαγεῖν

having-died — Alcestis again out-of Hades to-have-brought-up

καὶ δεῖξαι τῷ Ἀδμήτῳ, ὃς πιθανὴν μὲν ἐλάμβανε

and to-have-shown — to-Admetus who plausible indeed received

φαντασίαν τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος καὶ περιωδευμένην· ἐπεὶ μέντοι

an-impression of-the Alcestis and tested since however

ᾗδει ὅτι τέθνηκεν, περιεσπᾶτο αὐτοῦ ἡ διάνοια ἀπὸ

he-knew that she-had-died was-distracted his the understanding from

τῆς συγκαταθέσεως καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἔκλινεν. ***

the assent and toward disbelief inclined (lacuna)

229 προκρίνουσιν οὖν οἱ ἐκ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας τῆς μὲν

they-prefer then the-(ones) from the new Academy than-the indeed

πιθανῆς ἀπλῶς τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην φαντασίαν,

plausible simply the plausible and tested impression

ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τούτων τὴν πιθανὴν καὶ περιωδευμένην καὶ

than-both and these the plausible and tested and

ἀπερίσπαστον. εἰ δὲ καὶ πείθεσθαι τισιν οἷ τε

undistracted if and also to-be-persuaded in-some-things the-(ones) both

ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λέγουσι,
from the Academy and the-(ones) from the skepticism say
 πρόδηλος καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτο διαφορὰ τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν.
evident also the in this difference of-the philosophies
 τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι λέγεται διαφόρως, τό τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν 230
the for to-be-persuaded is-said in-different-ways the both not to-resist
 ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἔπεσθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς προσκλίσεως καὶ
but simply to-follow without vehement inclination and
 προσπαθείας, ὡς ὁ παῖς πείθεσθαι λέγεται τῷ παιδαγωγῷ·
attachment as the child to-obey is-said the tutor
 ἅπαξ δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἰρέσεως καὶ οἷον ἐν συμπαθείας κατὰ
once and the with choice and as-it-were sympathy in
 τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι συγκατατίθεσθαι τι, ὡς ὁ
the vehemently to-wish to-assent to-something as the
 ἄσωτος πείθεται τῷ δαπανητικῶς βιοῦν ἀξιούντι. διόπερ
profligate obeys the-(one) extravagantly to-live urging wherefore
 ἐπειδὴ οἱ μὲν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον
since the-(ones) indeed about Carneades and Clitomachus
 μετὰ προσκλίσεως σφοδρᾶς πείθεσθαι τε καὶ πιθανὸν
with inclination vehement to-be-persuaded both and plausible
 εἶναί τί φασιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἴκειν ἄνευ
to-be something say we and in the simply to-yield without
 προσπαθείας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν αὐτῶν διαφέρομεν.
attachment also in this — from-them we-would-differ
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ τέλος διαφέρομεν τῆς νέας 231
but also in the toward the end we-differ from-the new
 Ἀκαδημίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι λέγοντες
Academy the indeed for according-to it to-be-ordered saying
 ἄνδρες τῷ πιθανῷ προσχρῶνται κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἡμεῖς
men the plausible make-use-of in the life we
 δὲ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πάθεσιν
and the laws and the customs and the natural feelings

- ἐπόμενοι βιοῦμεν ἀδοξάστως. καὶ πλείω δ' ἂν εἴπομεν
following we-live undogmatically and more and — we-would-say
 πρὸς τὴν διάκρισιν, εἰ μὴ τῆς συντομίας ἐστοχαζόμεθα.
toward the distinction if not the brevity we-were-aiming-at
 232 Ὅ μέντοι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν
— however Arcesilaus whom of-the middle Academy we-said
 εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς
to-be leader and founder entirely to-me seems with-the
 Πυρρωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγους, ὥς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν
Pyrrhonian to-share arguments so-that one to-be almost
 τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν· οὔτε
the according-to him way and the ours neither
 γὰρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας τινὸς ἀποφαινόμενος
for about existence or non-existence of-anything declaring
 εὑρίσκεται, οὔτε κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν προκρίνει τι
is-found nor in credibility or incredibility he-prefers anything
 ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχει. καὶ τέλος
one to-another but about all he-suspends-judgment and an-end
 μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἣ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὴν
indeed to-be the suspension-of-judgment with-which to-come-in-together the
 ἀταραξίαν ἡμεῖς ἐφάσκομεν.
unperturbedness we said
 233 λέγει δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ μέρος
he-says and also goods indeed to-be the according-to part
 ἐποχάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος συγκαταθέσεις.
suspensions-of-judgment evils and the according-to part assents
 ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ
except if not should-say someone that we indeed according-to the
 φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς,
appearing to-us these say and not affirmatively

ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι
he and as toward the nature so-that also good indeed to-be
 αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν ἐποχήν, κακὸν δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν.
him to-say the suspension-of-judgment evil and the assent
 εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις πιστεύειν, 234
if and it-is-necessary also the about him said-(things) to-believe
 φασὶν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόχειρον Πυρρώνειος ἐφαίνετο
they-say that according-to indeed the surface Pyrrhonean he-appeared
 εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δογματικὸς ἦν· καὶ ἐπεὶ
to-be according-to and the truth dogmatic he-was and since
 τῶν ἐταίρων ἀπόπειραν ἐλάμβανε διὰ τῆς ἀπορητικῆς,
of-the companions a-trial he-made through the aporetic-(method)
 εἰ εὐφυῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν Πλατωνικῶν
whether aptly they-are for the reception of-the Platonic
 δογμάτων, δόξαι αὐτὸν ἀπορητικὸν εἶναι, τοῖς μέντοι
beliefs to-have-seemed him aporetic to-be to-the however
 γε εὐφύεσι τῶν ἐταίρων τὰ Πλάτωνος παρεγχειρεῖν.
at-least apt of-the companions the-(beliefs) of-Plato he-imparted
 ἔνθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστωνα εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ
whence also — Ariston said about him

πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὀπίθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος,
in-front Plato behind Pyrrho in-the-middle Diodorus

διὰ τὸ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τῇ κατὰ τὸν
through the to-make-use-of the dialectic the according-to —
 Διόδωρον, εἶναι δὲ ἄντικρυς Πλατωνικόν.
Diodorus to-be and outright Platonic
 Οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ 235
the-(ones) and about Philo say as-far indeed upon the Stoic
 κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα
criterion that-is the apprehensive impression inapprehensible

εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων
to-be the things as-far and upon the nature of-the things
 αὐτῶν, καταληπτά. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοᾶν
themselves apprehensible but also — Antiochus the Stoa
 μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὥς καὶ εἰρήσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ
transferred into the Academy so-that even to-have-been-said of him
 ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ
that in the-Academy he-philosophizes the Stoic-(beliefs) he-showed for
 ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κείμενα τὰ τῶν Στωικῶν δόγματα. ὥς
that in Plato lie the of-the Stoics beliefs so-that
 πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διαφορὰν πρὸς
evident to-be the of-the skeptical way difference toward
 τε τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τὴν πέμπτην καλουμένην Ἀκαδημίαν.
both the fourth and the fifth called Academy

εἰ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐμπειρία ἢ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει

1.44 • SKEPTICISM AND MEDICAL EMPIRICISM

If the Empiric school of medicine affirms that non-evident things cannot be apprehended, it is not the same as skepticism and the skeptic should not take it up. He would sooner follow the Method, which alone does not presume to say whether non-evident things are apprehensible, but follows the appearances and takes what seems expedient from them. As thirst leads the skeptic to drink, so constriction leads the Methodic physician to relax it.

236 Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσει
since and also the Empiric the in the medicine school
 τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τὴν σκεπτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν,
the same to-be say some the skeptical philosophy
 γνωστέον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς
(it-is)-to-be-known that if-indeed the Empiric-school that about the

ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιοῦται, οὔτε ἡ
 inapprehensibility of-the non-evident-(things) affirms neither the
 αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει οὔτε ἀρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν
 same it-is to-the skepticism nor would-befit — the skeptic the
 αἴρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην
 school that to-take-up rather and the called
 μέθοδον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύναιτο ἂν μετιέναι.

Method as to-me it-seems he-could — to-follow

αὕτη γὰρ μόνη τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν αἱρέσεων περὶ μὲν τῶν 237

this for alone of-the in medicine schools about indeed the
 ἀδήλων δοκεῖ μὴ προπετεῦσθαι, πότερον καταληπτὰ

non-evident-(things) seems not to-be-rash whether apprehensible

ἐστὶν ἢ ἀκατάληπτα λέγειν αὐθαδειαζομένη, τοῖς δὲ

they-are or inapprehensible to-say presuming the and

φαινομένοις ἐπομένη ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὸ συμφέρειν

to-appearing-(things) following from these it-takes the to-be-expedient

δοκοῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀκολουθίαν. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ

seeming according-to the of-the skeptics practice we-said for

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ὁ βίος ὁ κοινός, ᾧ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς

in the before-(passages) that the life the common which also the skeptic

χρήται, τετραμερὴς ἐστὶν, τὸ μὲν τι ἔχων ἐν ὑφήγησει

uses fourfold is the-(part) indeed one having in guidance

φύσεως, τὸ δ' ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν παραδόσει

of-nature the-(part) and in necessity of-feelings the-(part) and in tradition

νόμων τε καὶ ἔθων, τὸ δ' ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν.

of-laws both and customs the-(part) and in teaching of-arts

ὥσπερ οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῶν παθῶν ὁ σκεπτικὸς 238

just-as then according-to the necessity of-the feelings the skeptic

ὑπὸ μὲν δίψους ἐπὶ ποτὸν ὁδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ λιμοῦ ἐπὶ

by indeed thirst to drink is-led by and hunger to

τροφήν, καὶ ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ

food and to something of-the others likewise so also the

μεθοδικὸς ἰατρὸς ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα
Methodic physician by the feelings to the appropriate-(remedies)
 ὀδηγεῖται, ὑπὸ μὲν στεγνώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν χαλύνωσιν, ὡς
is-led by indeed constriction to the relaxation as
 καταφεύγει τις ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ ψύχους ἐπιτεταμένον
takes-refuge someone from the through cold intense
 πυκνώσεως ἐπὶ ἀλέαν, ὑπὸ δὲ ρύσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτῆς,
condensation to warmth by and flux to the checking of-it
 ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν βαλανείῳ ἰδρώτι πολλῶ περιρρέομενοι
as also the-(ones) in a-bath with-sweat much streaming
 καὶ ἐκλύομενοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν αὐτοῦ παραγίνονται καὶ
and fainting to the checking of-it come and
 διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὸν ψυχρὸν ἀέρα καταφεύγουσιν. ὅτι δὲ
through this to the cold air they-take-refuge that and
 καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀλλότρια ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι
also the-(things) by-nature alien to the removal of-them to-go
 καταναγκάζει, πρόδηλον, ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ κύων σκόλοπος
compels (is)-evident where at-least even the dog a-thorn
 αὐτῷ καταπαγέντος ἐπὶ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτοῦ παραγίνεται.
in-him having-been-fixed to the removal of-it comes
 239 καὶ ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγων ἐκβαίνω τὸν
and so-that not according-to each speaking I-may-overstep the
 ὑποτυπωτικὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς, πάντα οἶμαι τὰ
outline manner of-the treatise all I-think the-(things)
 ὑπὸ τῶν μεθοδικῶν οὕτω λεγόμενα ὑποτάσσεσθαι δύνασθαι
by the Methodics thus said to-be-subsumed to-be-able
 τῇ ἐκ τῶν παθῶν ἀνάγκῃ, τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν
under-the out-of the feelings necessity the both according-to nature
 καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστόν
and the contrary-to nature in-addition-to the also the undogmatic

τε καὶ ἀδιάφορον τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κοινὸν
both and indifferent of-the use of-the names common
 εἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν.

to-be of-the ways

ὥς γὰρ ὁ σκεπτικὸς ἀδοξάστως χρήται τῇ 'οὐδὲν ὀρίζω' 240

as for the skeptic undogmatically uses the nothing I-determine

φωνῇ καὶ τῇ 'οὐδὲν καταλαμβάνω,' καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν,

phrase and the nothing I-apprehend just-as we-have-said

οὕτω καὶ ὁ μεθοδικὸς 'κοινότητα' λέγει καὶ 'διήκειν' καὶ

so also the Methodic commonality says and to-pervade and

τὰ παραπλήσια ἀπεριέργως. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐνδείξεως

the similar-(terms) without-fuss so and also the of-the indication

ὄνομα ἀδοξάστως παραλαμβάνει ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν

name undogmatically he-employs instead-of the from the

φαινομένων παθῶν τῶν τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν παρὰ

appearing affections the both according-to nature and the contrary-to

φύσιν ὀδηγήσεως ἐπὶ τὰ κατάλληλα εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὥς καὶ

nature guidance to the appropriate to-be seeming as also

ἐπὶ δίψους καὶ ἐπὶ λιμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπεμύνησκον.

in thirst and in hunger and the others I-was-recalling

ὅθεν οἰκειότητά τινα ἔχειν τὴν ἀγωγὴν τὴν κατὰ ἱατρικὴν 241

whence affinity some to-have the way the in medicine

τῶν μεθοδικῶν πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν, μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων

of-the Methodics toward the skepticism more than-the other

κατὰ ἱατρικὴν αἱρέσεων (καὶ ὥς πρὸς σύγκρισιν ἐκείνων,

in medicine schools and as for comparison with-those

οὐχ ἀπλῶς), ῥητέον ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων

not simply (it-is)-to-be-said out-of these and the similar-(things)

τούτοις τεκμαιρομένους.

to-these inferring

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν παρακείσθαι δοκούντων τῇ
so-much also about the-(ones) to-lie-beside seeming the
 κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικούς ἀγωγῇ διεξελθόντες, ἐν τούτοις
according-to the skeptics way having-gone-through in these
 ἀπαρτίζομεν τὸν τε καθόλου τῆς σκέψεως λόγον καὶ τὸ
we-complete the both general of-the skepticism account and the
 πρῶτον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.
first of-the Outlines treatise

εἰ δύναται ζητεῖν ὁ σκεπτικός
περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς

II.1 • CAN THE SKEPTIC INQUIRE INTO DOGMATIC CLAIMS?

The objection runs that the skeptic either apprehends what the dogmatists say, and so cannot be at a loss, or does not, and so cannot speak of it. Sextus answers that on the dogmatists' own account of apprehension the objection destroys their own disputes; and that whoever declares a non-evident matter must have apprehended it either self-evidently, which no disputed matter is, or by inquiry, which requires the apprehension it was to produce. Conception, not apprehension, is what inquiry needs.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς 1
since and the inquiry the toward the dogmatists
μετήλθομεν, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς καλουμένης
we-have-taken-up each of-the parts of-the called
φιλοσοφίας συντόμως καὶ ὑποτυπωτικῶς ἐφοδεύσωμεν,
philosophy briefly and in-outline let-us-survey
πρότερον ἀποκρινάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀεὶ θρυλοῦντας
first having-answered to the-(ones) always harping
ὥς μήτε ζητεῖν μήτε νοεῖν ὅλως οἷός τέ ἐστιν ὁ
that neither to-inquire nor to-conceive at-all able and is the
σκεπτικός περὶ τῶν δογματιζομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς.
skeptical about the held-as-belief-(things) among them
φασὶ γὰρ ὥς ἥτοι καταλαμβάνει ὁ σκεπτικός τὰ 2
they-say for that either apprehends the skeptic the-(things)
ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν λεγόμενα ἢ οὐ καταλαμβάνει· καὶ
by the dogmatists said or not he-apprehends and
εἰ μὲν καταλαμβάνει, πῶς ἂν ἀποροῇ περὶ ᾧ
if indeed he-apprehends how — could-be-be-at-a-loss about which

κατειληφέναι λέγει; εἰ δ' οὐ καταλαμβάνει, ἄρα περὶ ᾧν
to-have-apprehended he-says if and not he-apprehends then about which
 οὐ κατείληφεν οὐδὲ οἶδε λέγειν.

not he-has-apprehended not-even he-knows to-speak

- 3 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδώς, εἰ τύχοι, τί ἐστι
just-as for the-(one) not knowing if it-should-happen what is
 τὸ * καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου ἢ τὸ διὰ δύο
the (corrupt) according-to which being-removed or the through two
 τροπικῶν * θεώρημα, οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν τι δύναται
hypotheticals (corrupt) theorem not-even to-say anything is-able
 περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ὁ μὴ γινώσκων ἕκαστον τῶν
about them so the-(one) not knowing each of-the
 λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς οὐ δύναται ζητεῖν πρὸς
said-(things) among the dogmatists not is-able to-inquire with
 αὐτοὺς περὶ ᾧν οὐκ οἶδεν. οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δύναται ζητεῖν
them about which not he-knows by-no-means then is-able to-inquire
 ὁ σκεπτικὸς περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς.
the skeptic about the said-(things) among the dogmatists

- 4 οἱ δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντες ἀποκρινάσθωσαν ἡμῖν, πῶς
the-(ones) indeed these saying let-them-answer us how
 λέγουσι νῦν τὸ καταλαμβάνειν, πότερον τὸ νοεῖν ἀπλῶς
they-mean now the to-apprehend whether the to-conceive simply
 ἄνευ τοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκείνων περὶ ᾧν
without the also about the existence of-those about which
 ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους διαβεβαιοῦσθαι, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ νοεῖν
we-make the arguments to-affirm or with the to-conceive
 καὶ τὸ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἐκείνων τιθέναι περὶ ᾧν διαλεγόμεθα.
also the the existence of-those to-posit about which we-discuss
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ καταλαμβάνειν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ
if indeed for to-apprehend to-be they-say in the account the
 καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατατίθεσθαι, τῆς καταληπτικῆς
to-an-apprehensive impression to-assent the apprehensive

φαντασίας οὔσης ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 impression being from an-existing-(thing) according-to itself the
 ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένης καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένης, οἷα
 existing-(thing) stamped-in and sealed-in such-as
 οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ
 not — could-come-about from not an-existing-(thing) not-even they
 βουλήσονται τάχα μὴ δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἃ
 will-wish perhaps not to-be-able to-inquire about those which
 μὴ κατελήφασιν οὕτως.

not they-have-apprehended thus

οἷον γοῦν ὅταν ὁ Στωικὸς πρὸς τὸν Ἐπικούρειον 5
 such-as at-any-rate when the Stoic with the Epicurean
 ζητῇ λέγοντα ὅτι διήρηται ἡ οὐσία ἢ ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὐ
 inquires saying that is-divided the substance or that the god not
 προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ἢ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, πότερον
 provides-for the in the-world or that the pleasure a-good whether
 κατείληφεν ἢ οὐ κατείληφεν; καὶ εἰ μὲν κατείληφεν,
 he-has-apprehended or not he-has-apprehended and if indeed he-has-apprehended
 ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ λέγων ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖ τὴν Στοάν· εἰ δ'
 to-exist them saying utterly he-destroys the Stoa if and
 οὐ κατείληφεν, οὐ δύναται τι πρὸς αὐτὰ λέγειν.

not he-has-apprehended not he-is-able anything against them to-say

τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων 6
 the and similar-(things) also to the-(ones) from the other
 αἱρέσεων ἀναγομένους λεκτέον, ὅταν τι ζητεῖν περὶ
 schools derived (is)-to-be-said when something to-inquire about
 τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις αὐτῶν ἐθέλωσιν. ὥστε
 the-(things) seeming to-the other-minded of-them they-wish so-that
 οὐ δύνανται περὶ τινος ζητεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. μᾶλλον
 not they-are-able about anything to-inquire with one-another rather
 δέ, εἰ χρή μὴ ληρεῖν, συγχυθήσεται μὲν αὐτῶν
 and if it-is-necessary not to-talk-nonsense will-be-confounded indeed of-them

ἅπαντα ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἡ δογματική, συντόνως δὲ
 all so a-word to-say the dogmatic-(philosophy) vigorously and
 προσαχθήσεται ἡ σκεπτική φιλοσοφία, διδομένου τοῦ μὴ
 will-be-advanced the skeptical philosophy being-granted the not
 δύνασθαι ζητεῖν περὶ τοῦ μὴ οὕτως κατειλημμένου.
 to-be-able to-inquire about the-(thing) not thus apprehended

7 ὁ γὰρ περὶ τινος ἀδήλου πράγματος ἀποφαινόμενός τε
 the-(one) for about some non-evident matter declaring both
 καὶ δογματίζων ἤτοι κατειληφώς αὐτὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ
 and (one)-holding-beliefs either having-apprehended it to-declare about
 αὐτοῦ λέξει ἢ μὴ κατειληφώς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ κατειληφώς,
 it be-will-say or not having-apprehended but if indeed not having-apprehended
 ἄπιστος ἔσται· εἰ δὲ κατειληφώς, ἤτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐξ
 untrustworthy be-will-be if and having-apprehended either at-once and out-of
 ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὼν αὐτῷ τοῦτο
 itself and according-to evidence having-fallen-under to-him this
 λέξει κατειληφέναι ἢ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης καὶ ζητήσεως.
 be-will-say to-have-apprehended or through some search and inquiry

8 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ περιπτωτικῶς κατ' ἐνάργειαν
 but if indeed out-of itself by-encounter according-to evidence
 λέγοι ὑποπεσεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ κατειληφθαι τὸ
 be-should-say to-have-fallen-under to-him and to-have-been-apprehended the
 ἀδελον, οὕτως ἂν οὐδὲ ἀδελον εἶη ἀλλὰ
 non-evident-(thing) thus — not-even non-evident it-would-be but
 πᾶσι ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον καὶ ὁμολογούμενον καὶ
 to-all in equal-(measure) appearing and agreed and
 μὴ διαπεφωνημένον. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀδελων
 not disputed about each and of-the non-evident-(things)
 ἀνήνυτος γέγονε παρ' αὐτοῖς διαφωνία· οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
 endless has-arisen among them disagreement not then out-of itself
 καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν ὑποπεσὼν αὐτῷ κατειληφώς ἂν
 and according-to evidence having-fallen-under to-him having-apprehended —

εἴη τὸ ἀδῆλον ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ
would-be the non-evident-(thing) the-(one) about the existence of-it
 διαβεβαιούμενός τε καὶ ἀποφαινόμενος δογματικός.
affirming both and declaring dogmatist
 εἰ δὲ διὰ τινος ἐρεύνης, πῶς οἶός τε ἦν ζητεῖν πρὸ 9
if and through some search how able and was-he to-inquire before
 τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἀκριβῶς αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην
the to-apprehend exactly it according-to the proposed
 ὑπόθεσιν; τῆς μὲν γὰρ ζητήσεως χρηζούσης τοῦ πρότερον
hypothesis the indeed for inquiry needing the first
 ἀκριβῶς κατειληφθαι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτω
exactly to-have-been-apprehended the (thing)-about to-be-inquired-into and so
 ζητεῖσθαι, τῆς δὲ καταλήψεως τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος
to-be-inquired-into the and apprehension of-the investigated matter
 δεομένης πάλιν αὐτῆς τοῦ προεζητηθῆαι πάντως
needing again itself the to-have-been-inquired-into-first altogether
 αὐτό, κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀδύνατον
it according-to the circular mode of-the impasse impossible
 αὐτοῖς γίνεται καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων καὶ
for-them becomes both the to-inquire about the non-evident-(things) and
 τὸ δογματίζειν, ἥν τε ἀπὸ τῆς καταλήψεως ἄρχεσθαι
the to-hold-beliefs whether both from the apprehension to-begin
 βούλωνται τινες, μεταγόντων ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν
they-wish some leading-away us them to the to-be-necessary
 αὐτὸ προεζητηκέναι πρὸ τοῦ κατειληφέναι, ἥν τε
it to-have-inquired-into-first before the to-have-apprehended whether both
 ἀπὸ τῆς ζητήσεως, ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ζητεῖν
from the inquiry to the to-be-necessary before the to-inquire
 κατειληφέναι τὸ μέλλον ζητεῖσθαι, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μήτε
to-have-apprehended the (thing)-about to-be-inquired-into so-that through these neither
 καταλαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τι τῶν ἀδῆλων
to-apprehend them to-be-able anything of-the non-evident-(things)

μήτε ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαβεβαιωτικῶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. ἐξ ὧν
 nor to-declare affirmatively about them out-of which
 ἀναιρεῖσθαι μὲν τὴν δογματικὴν εὐρεσιλογίαν αὐτόθεν,
 to-be-destroyed indeed the dogmatic inventiveness at-once
 οἶμαι, συμβήσεται, τὴν ἐφεκτικὴν δὲ εἰσάγεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν.
 I-think it-will-follow the suspensive and to-be-introduced philosophy

- 10 εἰ δὲ φήσουσι μὴ τοιαύτην κατάληψιν ἡγεῖσθαι ζητήσεως
 if and they-will-say not such apprehension to-precede inquiry
 προσήκειν, νόησιν δὲ ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον τοῖς
 to-be-fitting conception and simply not it-is impossible for-the-(ones)
 ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν ἀδύλων ζητεῖν.
 suspending-judgment about the existence of-the non-evident-(things) to-inquire
 νοήσεως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπείργεται ὁ σκεπτικός, οἶμαι, ἀπὸ τε τῶν
 conception for not is-debarred-from the skeptic I-think from both the
 παθητικῶς ὑποπιπτόντων καὶ κατ' ἐνάργειαν φαινομένων
 passively falling-under and according-to evidence appearing
 αὐτῷ λόγων γινομένης καὶ μὴ πάντως εἰσαγούσης τὴν
 to-him arguments arising and not altogether introducing the
 ὑπαρξιν τῶν νοουμένων· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ ὑπάρχοντα
 existence of-the conceived-(things) not for only the existing-(things)
 νοοῦμεν, ὥς φασιν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα. ὅθεν καὶ
 we-conceive as they-say but already also the non-existent-(things) whence both
 ζητῶν καὶ νοῶν ἐν τῇ σκεπτικῇ διαθέσει μένει ὁ ἐφεκτικός·
 inquiring and conceiving in the skeptical disposition remains the suspender
 ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ὑποπίπτουσιν
 that for to-the according-to impression passive falling-under
 αὐτῷ, καθὼς φαίνεται αὐτῷ, συγκατατίθεται, δεδῆλωται.
 to-him in-so-far-as it-appears to-him he-assents has-been-shown

- 11 ὅρα δὲ μὴ καὶ νῦν οἱ δογματικοὶ ζητήσεως ἀπείργονται.
 see and lest also now the dogmatists from-inquiry are-debarred
 οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἀγνοεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὥς ἔχει πρὸς τὴν
 not for to-the-(ones) to-not-know the things as they-are toward the

φύσιν ὁμολογοῦσι τὸ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνακόλουθον,
nature agreeing the to-inquire still about them inconsistent
 τοῖς δ' ἐπ' ἀκριβὲς οἰομένοις ταῦτα γινώσκειν· οἷς
to-the-(ones) and to exactness thinking these to-know to-whom
 μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πέρας ἤδη πάρεστιν ἡ ζήτησις, ὡς
indeed for at an-end already is-present the inquiry as
 ὑπειλήφασιν, οἷς δὲ τὸ δι' ὃ πᾶσα συνίσταται
they-have-supposed to-whom and the through which every is-constituted
 ζήτησις ἀκμὴν ὑπάρχει, τὸ νομίζειν ὡς οὐχ εἰρήκασιν.
inquiry still exists the to-think that not they-have-found
 Οὐκοῦν ζητητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶ περὶ ἐκάστου μέρους τῆς 12
therefore (it-is)-to-be-inquired by-us is about each part of-the
 καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας συντόμως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ
called philosophy briefly for the present and
 ἐπεὶ πολλὴ γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς διαφωνία περὶ
since much has-arisen among the dogmatists disagreement about
 τῶν μερῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τῶν μὲν ἓν, τῶν
the parts of-the philosophy of-the-(ones) indeed one of-the-(ones)
 δὲ δύο, τῶν δὲ τρία εἶναι λεγόντων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ
and two of-the-(ones) and three to-be saying about which not
 ἂν εἴη προσήκον πλείω νῦν διεξιέναι, τὴν δόξαν
— it-would-be fitting more now to-go-through the opinion
 τῶν δοκούντων τελειότερον ἀνεστράφθαι κατὰ τὸ ἴσον
of-the-(ones) seeming more-completely to-have-handled in the equal
 ἐκθέμενοι κατ' αὐτὴν προσάξομεν τὸν λόγον.
having-set-out according-to it we-shall-advance the argument

πόθεν ἀρκτέον τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ζητήσεως

II.2 · WHERE THE INQUIRY SHOULD BEGIN

The Stoics and others divide philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics, and begin their teaching with logic, though there is much dissension about where to begin. Following them undogmatically, and because what is said in all three parts needs judgment and a criterion, and the account of the criterion belongs to logic, Sextus begins with the criterion and the logical part.

- 13 Οἱ Στωικοὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τρία μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας
the Stoics then and others some three parts of-the philosophy
εἶναι λέγουσι, λογικὸν φυσικὸν ἠθικόν· καὶ ἄρχονται γε
to-be say logical physical ethical and they-begin at-least
τῆς διδασκαλίας ἀπὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ, καίτοι πολλῆς καὶ περὶ
the teaching from the logical although much also about
τοῦ πόθεν ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ στάσεως γεγενημένης. οἷς
the whence to-begin it-is-necessary dissension having-arisen whom
ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδοξάστως, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ μέρεσι
having-followed undogmatically since the-(things) in the three parts
λεγόμενα κρίσεως χρήζει καὶ κριτηρίου, ὃ δὲ περὶ κριτηρίου
said judgment need and a-criterion the and about criterion
λόγος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τῷ λογικῷ μέρει, ἀρξώμεθα
account to-be-included seems in-the logical part let-us-begin
ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγου καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους,
from the about criterion account and the logical part

περὶ κριτηρίου

II.3 · THE CRITERION

A criterion is either the standard by which existence and non-existence are judged or the one we attend to in living; the second was treated earlier, and the first, the criterion of truth, is the subject now. It is said in three ways: generally, of any measure of apprehension such as sight; specifically, of a technical measure such as a rule; and most specifically, of a measure of a non-evident matter. The logical criterion is threefold: by which, man; through which, sense or understanding; and according to which, the impression.

ἐκείνο προειπόντες, ὅτι κριτήριον μὲν λέγεται τό τε 14
that having-said-first that criterion indeed is-called the-(thing) both
ᾧ κρίνεσθαι φασιν ὕπαρξιν καὶ ἀνπαρξίαν καὶ τὸ
by-which to-be-judged they-say existence and non-existence and the-(thing)
ᾧ προσέχοντες βιοῦμεν, πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν νῦν περὶ τοῦ
which attending-to we-live it-is-set-before and us now about the
κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι λεγομένου διαλαβεῖν· περὶ
criterion of-the truth to-be called to-treat about
γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον σημαινόμενον ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς
for the according-to the other sense in the about the
σκέψεως λόγῳ διεξήλθομεν.
skepticism account we-went-through

Τὸ κριτήριον τοίνυν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν λέγεται 15
the criterion then about which the account is is-said
τριχῶς, κοινῶς ἰδίως ἰδιαίτατα, κοινῶς μὲν πᾶν
in-three-ways generally specifically most-specifically generally indeed every
μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ
measure of-apprehension according-to which sense also
τὰ φυσικὰ οὕτω προσαγορεύεται κριτήρια, ὡς ὅρασις·
the natural thus are-called criteria as sight
ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικὸν ὡς κανὼν
specifically and every measure of-apprehension technical as a-rule

καὶ διαβήτης· ἰδιαίτατα δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως
 and a-compass most-specifically and every measure of-apprehension
 ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικά
 of-a-non-evident matter according-to which the indeed everyday-(ones)
 οὐ λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικά καὶ ἅπερ οἱ
 not are-called criteria alone and the logical and which the
 δογματικοὶ φέρουσι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν.
 dogmatists bring for the of-the truth judgment

- 16 φαμὲν οὖν προηγουμένως περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ κριτηρίου
 we-say then primarily about the logical criterion
 διεξιέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγεται ἂν τριχῶς,
 to-go-through but also the logical criterion might-be-said — in-three-ways
 τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅ, οἷον ὑφ'
 the by which and the through which and the according-to which such-as by
 οὗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἥτοι αἰσθησις ἢ διάνοια,
 which indeed man through which and either sense or understanding
 καθ' ὃ δὲ ἡ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ
 according-to which and the application of-the impression according-to which the
 ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλει κρίνειν διὰ τίνος τῶν προειρημένων.
 man applies-himself to-judge through some of-the aforesaid

- 17 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀρμόζον ἦν ἴσως προειπεῖν, ἵνα
 these indeed then fitting it-was perhaps to-say-first so-that
 ἐννοήσωμεν, περὶ οὗ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος· λοιπὸν δὲ
 we-may-conceive about which to-us is the account for-the-rest and
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησην χωρῶμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας
 to the refutation let-us-proceed the against the-(ones) saying
 προπετῶς κατεληφέναι τὸ κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀπὸ
 rashly to-have-apprehended the criterion of-the truth from
 τῆς διαφωνίας ἀρξάμενοι.
 the disagreement having-begun

εἰ ὑπάρχει τι κριτήριον ἀληθείας

II.4 · IS THERE A CRITERION OF TRUTH?

Some declare there is a criterion, some deny it, and we suspend judgment. Is the disagreement decidable? If not, suspension follows at once. If so, by what shall it be judged, since we have no agreed criterion? To settle the dispute we need an agreed criterion, and to have one the dispute must first be settled; proof needs a proved criterion and the criterion a judged proof. Sextus will take the by which, the through which, and the according to which in turn.

Τῶν διαλαβόντων τοίνυν περὶ κριτηρίου οἱ μὲν 18
of-the-(ones) having-treated then about criterion the-(ones) indeed
 εἶναι τοῦτο ἀπεφώνησαν, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές,
to-be this declared as the Stoics and others some
 οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Κορίνθιος
the-(ones) and not to-be as others both and the Corinthian
 Ξενιάδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, λέγων
Xeniades and Xenophanes the Colophonian saying

δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται·
seeming and upon all is-wrought

ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπέσχομεν, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.
we and we-suspended-judgment whether it-is or not it-is
 ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἥτοι ἐπικριτὴν εἶναι φήσουσιν ἢ 19
this then the disagreement either decidable to-be they-will-say or
 ἀνεπίκριτον· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, αὐτόθεν δώσουσι τὸ
undecidable and if indeed undecidable at-once they-will-grant the
 δεῖν ἐπεχεῖν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτὴν, τίνι κριθήσεται
to-be-necessary to-suspend-judgment if and decidable by-what it-will-be-judged

λεγέτωσαν, μήτε κριτήριον ὁμολογούμενον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων,
let-them-say neither criterion agreed us having
 μήθ' ὅλως εἰ ἔστιν εἰδόντων ἀλλὰ ζητούντων.

nor at-all whether it-is knowing but inquiring

20 καὶ ἄλλως, ἵνα ἡ γενομένη περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνία
and otherwise so-that the arisen about the criterion disagreement

ἐπικριθῇ, δεῖ κριτήριον ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ὁμολογημένον,
may-be-decided it-is-necessary a-criterion us to-have agreed

δι' οὗ δυνησόμεθα κρίνειν αὐτήν· καὶ ἵνα κριτήριον
through which we-shall-be-able to-judge it and so-that a-criterion

ὁμολογούμενον ἔχωμεν, δεῖ πρότερον ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν
agreed we-may-have it-is-necessary first to-be-decided the

περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου διαφωνίαν. οὕτω δὲ εἰς τὸν διάλληλον
about the criterion disagreement thus and into the circular

ἐμπίπτοντος τρόπον τοῦ λόγου, ἄπορος ἡ εὔρεσις τοῦ
falling mode the argument impossible the discovery of-the

κριτηρίου γίνεται, μήτε ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἡμῶν ἐόντων
criterion becomes neither out-of hypothesis us allowing

αὐτοὺς κριτήριον λαμβάνειν, ἐάν τε κριτηρίῳ τὸ κριτήριον
them a-criterion to-take if and by-a-criterion the criterion

κρίνειν ἐθέλωσιν, εἰς ἀπειρίαν αὐτοὺς ἐκβαλλόντων. ἀλλὰ
to-judge they-wish into infinity them throwing-out but

καί, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις δεῖται κριτηρίου ἀποδεδειγμένου,
also since the indeed proof needs a-criterion proved

τὸ δὲ κριτήριον ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον
the and criterion a-proof judged into the circular

ἐκβάλλονται τρόπον.

they-are-thrown-out mode

21 Οἰόμενοι οὖν ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι δεικνύναι τὴν τῶν
thinking then sufficient also these to-be to-show the of-the

δογματικῶν προπέτειαν κατὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου
dogmatists rashness in the about the criterion

λόγον, ἵνα καὶ ποικίλως αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν,
account so-that also in-varied-ways them to-refute we-may-be-able
 οὐκ ἄτοπον προσκαρτερῆσαι τῷ τόπῳ. οὐ μὲν ἐκάστη
not absurd to-dwell-on the topic not however with-each
 τῶν περὶ κριτηρίου δοξῶν ἀμιλληθῆναι προαιρούμεθα
of-the about criterion opinions to-contend we-purpose
 εἰδικῶς (ἀμύθητος γὰρ ἡ διαφωνία γέγονεν, καὶ οὕτως
specifically untold for the disagreement has-arisen and thus
 εἰς ἀμέθοδον καὶ ἡμᾶς λόγον ἐμπεσεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται),
into unmethodical also us an-account to-fall necessary it-will-be
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κριτήριον περὶ οὗ ζητοῦμεν τρισσὸν εἶναι
but since the criterion about which we-inquire threefold to-be
 δοκεῖ, τό τε ὑφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ τὸ καθ'
seems the both by which and the through which and the according-to
 ὅ, ἕκαστον τούτων ἐπελθόντες ἐν μέρει τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν
which each of-these having-gone-over in turn the inapprehensibility
 αὐτοῦ παραστήσομεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμέθοδος ἅμα καὶ
of-it we-shall-establish thus for methodical at-once and
 τέλειος ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσται. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑφ'
complete for-us the account will-be let-us-begin and from the by
 οὗ· δοκεῖ γάρ πως συναπορεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ τὰ λοιπά.
which it-seems for somehow to-be-perplexed-along-with with-this also the rest

περὶ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ

II.5 · THE BY WHICH: MAN AS JUDGE

If man is the judge of things, he is not only inapprehensible but inconceivable: Democritus' definition makes the dog a man and no man a man, Epicurus' makes whichever sex goes unpointed-at no man at all, and the definition by reason and knowledge excludes either the imperfect or the perfect. Even granting the conception, man is composed of body and soul, neither apprehended. And granting that man judges, no criterion shows it must be man, or which man, since each claim to superior judgment invites a wiser judge, without end.

- 22 Ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοίνυν δοκεῖ μοι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις
the man then seems to-me as-far upon the said-(things)
 ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐ μόνον ἀκατάληπτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ
by the dogmatists not only inapprehensible but also
 ἀνεπινόητος εἶναι. ἀκούομεν γοῦν τοῦ παρὰ Πλάτωνι
inconceivable to-be we-hear at-any-rate the in Plato
 Σωκράτους διαρρηδὴν ὁμολογοῦντος μὴ εἰδέναι, πότερον
Socrates expressly confessing not to-know whether
 ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. παριστάναι τε βουλόμενοι
a-man he-is or another something to-set-out and wishing
 τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ πρώτον μὲν διαφωνοῦσιν, εἶτα καὶ
the conception of-it first indeed they-disagree then also
 ἀσύνητα λέγουσιν.
unintelligible-(things) they-say

- 23 ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημόκριτός φησιν ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες
— indeed for Democritus says that man is what all
 ἴσμεν. ὅσον δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὐ γνωσόμεθα τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
we-know as-far and upon this not we-shall-know the man
 ἐπεὶ καὶ κύνα ἴσμεν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο ἔσται καὶ ὁ κύων
since also a-dog we-know and because-of this will-be also the dog
 ἄνθρωπος. τινάς τε ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἴσμεν· διὸ οὐκ ἔσονται
man some and men not we-know wherefore not they-will-be

ἄνθρωποι. μᾶλλον δέ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ταύτῃ, οὐδεὶς ἔσται
men rather and as-far upon the conception this no-one will-be
 ἄνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μὲν φησι δεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων
a-man if for he indeed says to-be-necessary by all
 γινώσκεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδένα δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἴσασιν
to-be-known the man no and man know
 πάντες ἄνθρωποι, οὐδεὶς ἔσται κατ' αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπος.
all men no-one will-be according-to him man
 καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ σοφίζόμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν 24
and that these not quibbling we-say out-of the with him
 ἀκολουθίας φαίνεται. μόνα γὰρ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχειν
consistency it-appears alone for according-to truth to-exist
 φησὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ τὸ κενόν, ἅπερ φησὶν
says the man the atoms and the void which he-says
 οὐ μόνον τοῖς ζώοις ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρίμασιν
not only to-the animals but also to-all the compounds
 ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἐπινοήσομεν
to-belong so-that as-far indeed upon these not we-shall-conceive
 τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ιδιότητα, ἐπεὶδὴ κοινὰ πάντων ἐστίν.
the of-the man peculiarity since common of-all they-are
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὑπόκειται παρὰ ταῦτα· οὐκ ἄρα
but not-even another anything underlies besides these not then
 ἔξομεν δι' οὗ τὸν ἄνθρωπον διακρίναί τε ἀπὸ τῶν
we-shall-have through which the man to-distinguish both from the
 ἄλλων ζώων καὶ ἐλικρινῶς νοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.
other animals and purely to-conceive we-shall-be-able
 ὁ δ' Ἐπικουρός φησιν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ τοιουτοῦν 25
— and Epicurus says man to-be the such-a
 μὴ ὡς μετὰ ἐμψυχίας. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δέ, ἐπεὶ
shape with animation and according-to him and since
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος δείξει ἐμφανίζεται, ὁ μὴ δεικνύμενος
the man by-pointing is-indicated the-(one) not being-pointed-at

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εἰ μὲν γυναῖκα δείκνυσί τις,
 not is a-man and if indeed a-woman points-at someone
 ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ ἄνδρα, ἢ γυνή
 the male not will-be a-man if and a-male the woman
 ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔσται. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ
 a-man not will-be the and same we-shall-attempt also
 ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν περιστάσεων ἃς ἴσμεν ἐκ τοῦ
 from the difference of-the circumstances which we-know out-of the
 τετάρτου τρόπου τῆς ἐποχῆς.
 fourth mode of-the suspension-of-judgment

- 26 ἄλλοι δὲ ἔφασκον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν,
 others and said man to-be an-animal rational mortal
 νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν δείκνυται ἐν τῷ
 of-mind and knowledge receptive since then it-is-shown in the
 πρώτῳ τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπῳ, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι ζῶον
 first of-the suspension-of-judgment mode that nothing is an-animal
 ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά ἐστι πάντα
 irrational but both of-mind and knowledge receptive are all
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένοις, οὐ γνωσόμεθα, τί
 as-far upon the by them said-(things) not we-shall-know what
 ποτε λέγουσιν.
 ever they-mean

- 27 τά τε κείμενα ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ συμβεβηκότα ἥτοι κατ'
 the both lying in the definition attributes either in
 ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν ἢ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐνέργειαν,
 actuality they-mean or in-potentiality if indeed then in actuality
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἤδη τελείαν
 not is a-man the-(one) not knowledge already complete
 ἀνεληφώς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τέλειος ὢν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ
 having-received and in the reason perfect being and in itself
 τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν καθεστώς· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεία θνητόν
 the to-die being-set this for the in-actuality mortal

ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ὁ
 is if and in-potentiality not will-be a-man neither the-(one)
 τὸν λόγον ἔχων τέλειον οὔτε ὁ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην
 the reason having perfect nor the-(one) mind and knowledge
 ἀνειληφώς· τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον. καὶ
 having-received this and than-the former is more-absurd and
 ταύτῃ ἄρα ἀσύστατος πέφηνεν ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
 in-this-way then untenable has-appeared the conception of-the man
 ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων, ὅταν ἀποφαίνεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι 28
 — for Plato when declares the man to-be
 ζῶον ἄπτερον δίπουν πλατυνύχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς
 an-animal wingless two-footed flat-nailed of-knowledge political
 δεκτικόν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀξιῶι διαβεβαιωτικῶς τοῦτο
 receptive not-even himself he-claims affirmatively this
 ἐκτίθεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔν τί ἐστι τῶν
 to-set-out if for also the man one something is of-the
 κατ' αὐτὸν γινομένων μὲν, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄντων,
 according-to him becoming indeed really and never being
 ἀδύνατον δὲ περὶ τῶν μηδέποτε ὄντων διαβεβαιωτικῶς
 impossible and about the never being affirmatively
 ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιώσει
 to-declare according-to him not-even — Plato will-claim
 τὸν ὅρον ἐκτίθεσθαι δοκεῖν ὡς διαβεβαιούμενος, ἀλλ'
 the definition to-set-out to-seem as affirming but
 ὥσπερ εἴωθεν κατὰ τὸ πιθανὸν λέγων.
 just-as he-is-accustomed according-to the plausible speaking
 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοῦμεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, ὅτι ἐπινοεῖσθαι 29
 if however also we-should-grant by concession that to-be-conceived
 δύναται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀκατάληπτος εὔρεθήσεται. συνέστηκε
 can the man inapprehensible he-will-be-found he-is-composed

- μὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα
indeed for out-of soul and body neither and the body
 καταλαμβάνεται τάχα οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄρα.
is-apprehended perhaps nor the soul not-even the man then
 30 καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ σῶμα οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν·
and that indeed the body not is-apprehended (is)-clear from-this
 τὰ συμβεβηκότα τινὶ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐκείνου ᾧ
the attributes to-something other are than-that to-which
 συμβέβηκεν. ὅταν οὖν χρῶμα ἢ τι παραπλήσιον
they-belong when then color or something similar
 ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτῃ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ σώματι εἰκὸς ἡμῖν
to-us falls-under the attributes to-the body likely to-us
 ὑποπίπτειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. τό γέ τοι σῶμα
to-fall-under but not itself the body the at-least indeed body
 τριχῇ διαστατὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν· ὀφείλομεν οὖν τὸ μῆκος
threefold extended to-be they-say we-ought then the length
 καὶ τὸ πλάτος καὶ τὸ βάθος καταλαμβάνειν, ἵνα τὸ σῶμα
and the breadth and the depth to-apprehend so-that the body
 καταλάβωμεν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπέπιπτεν, ἐγνώσκομεν
we-may-apprehend if for this to-us fell-under we-would-recognize
 ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑπάργυρα χρυσία. οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα ἄρα.
— also the silver-cored gold-pieces not-even the body then
 31 ἵνα δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀμφισβήτησιν παρῶμεν,
so-that and also the about the body dispute we-may-pass-over
 πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος εὐρίσκεται ἀκατάληπτος διὰ τὸ
again the man is-found inapprehensible through the
 ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν. ὅτι δὲ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν
inapprehensible to-be the soul that and inapprehensible is
 αὕτη, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς διαλαβόντων, ἵνα
it (is)-clear from-this of-the-(ones) about soul having-treated so-that
 τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν, οἱ μὲν
the much and endless battle we-may-omit the-(ones) indeed

μή εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον
not to-be the soul said as the-(ones) about the Messenian

Δικαίαρχον, οἱ δὲ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον.

Dicaearchus the-(ones) and to-be the-(ones) and suspended-judgment

ταύτην οὖν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον εἶναι

32

this then the disagreement if indeed undecidable to-be

λέξουσιν οἱ δογματικοί, δώσουσιν αὐτόθεν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς

will-say the dogmatists they-will-grant at-once the of-the soul

ἀκαταληψίαν, εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτὴν, τίνι ἐπικρινούσιν αὐτὴν

inapprehensibility if and decidable by-what they-will-decide it

εἰπάτωσαν. αἰσθήσει μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τὸ νοητὴν

let-them-say by-sense indeed for not they-are-able through the intelligible

ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγεσθαι· εἰ δὲ λέξουσιν ὅτι διανοία,

by them to-be to-be-said if and they-will-say that by-understanding

ἐροῦμεν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια,

we-shall-say that since of-the soul the most-non-evident is the understanding

ὡς δεικνύουσιν οἱ περὶ μὲν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ψυχῆς

as show the-(ones) about indeed the existence of-the soul

ὁμοφωνοῦντες, περὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας διαφερόμενοι, εἰ τῇ

agreeing about and the understanding differing if by-the

διανοία τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθέλουσι καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ

33

understanding the soul they-wish to-apprehend and the about

αὐτῆς διαφωνίαν ἐπικρίνειν, τῷ μᾶλλον ζητούμενῳ τὸ ἥττον

it disagreement to-decide by-the more investigated the less

ζητούμενον ἐπικρίνειν τε καὶ βεβαιοῦν ἐθελήσουσιν, ὅπερ

investigated to-decide both and to-confirm they-will-wish which

ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῖνον ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ περὶ τῆς

absurd not-even by-the understanding then will-be-decided the about the

ψυχῆς διαφωνία. οὐδενὶ ἄρα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀκατάληπτός

soul disagreement by-nothing then if and this also inapprehensible

ἐστιν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καταλαμβάνοιτ' ἄν.

it-is whence not-even the man could-be-apprehended —

- 34 Ἵνα δὲ καὶ δώμεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
so-that and also we-may-grant that is-apprehended the man
 μήποτε οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο δεῖξαι, ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρίνεσθαι
perhaps not — it-would-be-possible to-show that by him to-be-judged
 δεῖ τὰ πράγματα. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ὅτι ὑπ'
it-is-necessary the things the-(one) for saying that by
 ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἥτοι ἄνευ
man it-is-necessary to-be-judged the things either without
 ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέξει ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. οὔτε δὲ μετὰ
proof this will-say or with proof neither and with
 ἀποδείξεως· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ
proof it-is-necessary for the proof true to-be and
 κεκρυσμένην, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὸ τινος κεκρυσμένην. ἐπεὶ
judged through and this also by something judged since
 οὐδ' οὐκ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ὁμολογουμένως, ὑφ' οὗ κριθῆναι
then not we-are-able to-say by-agreement by which to-be-judged
 δυνήσεται αὐτὴ ἢ ἀπόδειξις (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸ κριτήριον τὸ
will-be-able itself the proof we-inquire for the criterion the
 ὑφ' οὗ), οὐ δυνήσομεθα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπικρίνειν, διὰ δὲ
by which not we-shall-be-able the proof to-decide through and
 τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ κριτήριον, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀποδεικνύναι.
this not-even the criterion about which the account to-prove
- 35 εἰ δὲ ἀναποδείκτως λεχθήσεται, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
if and without-proof it-will-be-said that by the man
 δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ἄπιστον ἔσται, ὥστε
it-is-necessary to-be-judged the things untrustworthy it-will-be so-that
 οὐχ ἔξομεν διαβεβαιουῖσθαι, ὅτι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον
not we-shall-be-able to-affirm that the by which criterion
 ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὑπὸ τίνος δὲ καὶ κριθήσεται, ὅτι
is the man by what and also will-it-be-judged that
 τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κριτήριον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ
the by which criterion the man is not for surely

ἀκρίτως τοῦτο λέγοντες πιστευθήσονται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
without-judgment this saying they-will-be-believed but if indeed
 ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπασθήσεται.
by man the (thing)-investigated will-be-begged
 εἰ δ' ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ζώου, πῶς ἐκείνο πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ 36
if and by another animal how that for the judgment the
 ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ κριτήριον παραλαμβάνεται; εἰ μὲν
man to-be the criterion is-employed if indeed
 γὰρ ἀκρίτως, οὐ πιστευθήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κρίσεως,
for without-judgment not it-will-be-believed if and with judgment
 πάλιν ἐκείνο ὑπό τινος ὀφείλει κριθῆναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ'
again that by something ought to-be-judged but if indeed by
 ἑαυτοῦ, μένει ἡ αὐτὴ ἀτοπία (τὸ ζητούμενον γὰρ διὰ
itself remains the same absurdity the (thing)-investigated for through
 τοῦ ζητουμένου κριθήσεται). εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ
the (thing)-investigated will-be-judged if and by man the
 διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος· εἰ δὲ ὑπό τινος παρὰ ταῦτα
circular is-introduced mode if and by some besides these
 ἄλλου, πάλιν ἐκείνου τὸ κριτήριον ἀπαιτήσομεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ,
other again of-that the criterion we-shall-demand the by which
 καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄρα οὐχ ἔξομεν
and up-to infinity and through this then not we-shall-be-able
 λέγειν, ὥς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου δεῖ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα.
to-say that by man it-is-necessary to-be-judged the things
 Ἔστω δὲ καὶ πεπιστώσθω τὸ δεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 37
let-it-be and also let-it-be-granted the to-be-necessary by the man
 κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα. οὐκοῦν, ἐπεὶ πολλὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
to-be-judged the things therefore since much of-the men
 ἐστὶ διαφορά, πρότερον οἱ δογματικοὶ συμφωνησάτωσαν,
is difference first the dogmatists let-them-agree
 ὅτι τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δεῖ προσέχειν, εἴθ' οὕτω καὶ
that this the man it-is-necessary to-attend then so also

ἡμᾶς αὐτῷ συγκατατίθεσθαι κελεύεωσαν. εἰ δ' ἔστ' ἂν
 us him to-assent let-them-bid if and as-long —
 ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλη — τοῦτο δὴ
 water and flows and trees tall flourish this indeed
 τὸ τοῦ λόγου — περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνήσουσιν, πῶς ἡμᾶς
 the of-the saying about him they-will-disagree how us
 ἐπείγουσι προπετῶς τινι συγκατατίθεσθαι;

they-urge rashly someone to-assent

38 ἦν γὰρ καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τῷ σοφῷ πιστευτέον, ἐρωτήσομεν
 if for also they-say that the wise-man (it-is)-to-be-believed we-shall-ask
 αὐτούς, ποίῳ σοφῷ. πότερον τῷ κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον
 them what-kind-of wise-man whether the according-to Epicurus
 ἢ τῷ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἢ τῷ Κυρηναϊκῷ ἢ τῷ
 or the according-to the Stoics or the Cyrenaic or the
 Κυνικῷ; οὐχ ἔξουσι γὰρ συμφώνως εἰπεῖν.

Cynic not they-will-be-able for in-agreement to-say

39 εἰ δὲ ἀξιώσει τις ἡμᾶς τῆς περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ζητήσεως
 if and should-claim someone us the about the wise-man inquiry
 ἀποστάντας ἀπλῶς τῷ συνετωτέρῳ τῶν ὄντων
 having-desisted-from simply the more-intelligent of-the existing-(ones)
 ἀπάντων πιστεύειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τίς
 all to-believe first indeed also about the who
 συνετωτέρος ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαφωνήσουσιν, εἴτα καὶ
 more-intelligent is than-the others they-will-disagree then even-if
 δοθῇ συμφώνως δύνασθαι ληφθῆναι, τίς ἐστὶ τῶν
 it-should-be-granted agreedly to-be-able to-be-taken who is of-the
 τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων συνετώτερος, οὐδ'
 both existing-(ones) and of-the having-been more-intelligent not-even
 οὕτως ἔσται πίστεως οὗτος ἄξιος.

thus will-be of-belief be worthy

ἐπεὶ γὰρ πολλὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειρός ἐστιν ἐπίτασις
since for much and almost infinite is intensification
 τε καὶ ἄνεσις κατὰ σύνεσιν, φάμεν ὅτι τούτου τοῦ
both and relaxation in intelligence we-say that than-this the
 ἀνθρώπου ὃν λέγομεν εἶναι τῶν γεγονότων τε καὶ ὄντων
man whom we-say to-be of-the having-been both and being
 συνετώτερον, ἕτερον συνετώτερον ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι.
more-intelligent another more-intelligent it-is-possible to-come-to-be
 ὥσπερ οὖν τῷ νῦν εἶναι λεγομένῳ φρονιμωτέρῳ τῶν
just-as then the now to-be said wiser than-the
 τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ
both existing-(ones) and the having-been through the intelligence of-him
 πιστεύειν ἀξιούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐσομένῳ
to-believe we-are-asked so also the after him being-going-to-be
 συνεωτέρῳ τούτου μᾶλλον χρή πιστεύειν. καὶ ἐκείνου
more-intelligent than-this rather it-is-necessary to-believe and that-one
 γενομένου πάλιν ἄλλον ἐλπίζειν χρή συνεωτέρον
having-come-to-be again another to-expect it-is-necessary more-intelligent
 αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι, καὶ ἐκείνου ἄλλον, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
than-him to-be-going-to-come-to-be and-of-that another and up-to infinity
 καὶ ἄδηλον, πότερον ποτε συμφωνήσουσιν ἀλλήλοις
and non-evident whether ever they-will-agree with-one-another
 οὗτοι ἢ διάφωνα λέξουσιν. διόπερ, καὶ τῶν γεγονότων
these or discordant they-will-say wherefore even-if of-the having-come-to-be
 τε καὶ ὄντων συνεωτέρος εἶναι ὁμολογηθῇ τις, ἐπεὶ οὐκ
both and being more-intelligent to-be should-be-agreed someone since not
 ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ὅτι οὐδείς ἔσται τούτου
we-are-able to-say affirmatively that no-one will-be than-this
 ἀγχινούτερος (ἄδηλον γάρ), ἀεὶ δεήσει τὴν τοῦ
shrewder non-evident for always it-will-be-necessary the of-the

40

41

μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου συνεωτέρου κρίσιν περιμένειν καὶ
 after these being-going-to-be more-intelligent judgment to-await and
 μηδέποτε συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ κρείττονι.

never to-assent to-the better

- 42 ἵνα δὲ καὶ κατὰ συγχώρησιν δώμεν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τοῦ
 so-that and also by concession we-may-grant that no-one than-the
 ὑποτιθεμένου συνετοῦ συνεωτέρου οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε
 hypothesized intelligent-(man) more-intelligent neither is nor
 ἐγένετο οὔτε ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὥς πιστεύειν αὐτῷ προσήκει. ἐπεὶ
 came-to-be nor will-be not-even so to-believe him it-is-fitting since
 γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ συνετοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων
 for especially the intelligent love in the of-the matters
 κατασκευῇ τοῖς σαθοῖς παριστάμενοι πράγμασιν ὑγιῇ καὶ
 construction the-(ones) unsound championing matters sound and
 ἀληθῇ ταῦτα δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν, ὅταν τι λέγῃ οὗτος ὁ
 true these to-seem to-be to-make when something says this the
 ἀγχίνους, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα πότερόν ποτε, ὥς ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα
 sbrewd-(man) not we-shall-know whether ever as is the matter
 φύσει, οὕτω λέγει, ἢ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον ὥς ἀληθές
 by-nature so he-speaks or false it being as true
 παρίσθησι καὶ ἡμᾶς πείθει φρονεῖν ὥς περὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἅτε
 he-represents and us he-persuades to-think as about true-(thing) inasmuch
 δὴ συνεωτέρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὑπάρχων καὶ
 indeed more-intelligent than-the men all being and
 διὰ τοῦτο ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλέγχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος. οὐδὲ τούτῳ
 through this by us to-be-refuted not being-able not-even to-this
 τοῖνυν συγκαταθησόμεθα ὥς ἀληθῶς τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντι,
 then we-shall-assent as truly the things judging
 διὰ τὸ οἶόν τε μὲν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀληθῇ λέγειν, οἶεσθαι δ'
 through the possible and indeed to-be him true to-speak to-think and
 ὅτι δι' ὑπερβολὴν ἀγχινοίας τὰ ψευδῇ τῶν πραγμάτων
 that through excess of-sbrewdness the false-(things) of-the matters

ὥς ἀληθῇ βουλόμενος παριστᾶν ἅ φησι λέγει. διὰ ταῦτα
as true wishing to-represent what he-says he-speaks through these
 μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν ἀπάντων ἀγχνουστάτῳ δοκοῦντι
indeed then not-even to-the of-the all shrewdest seeming
 ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων χρή πιστεύειν.
to-be in the judgment of-the matters it-is-necessary to-believe
 Εἰ δὲ φήσῃ τις, ὅτι τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συμφωνίᾳ χρή
if and should-say someone that the of-the many agreement it-is-necessary
 προσέχειν, λέξομεν ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι μάταιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
to-attend we-shall-say that this is vain first indeed for
 σπάνιον ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται ἓνα
rare perhaps is the true and through this it-is-possible one
 τῶν πολλῶν φρονιμώτερον εἶναι. εἴτα καὶ παντὶ κριτηρίῳ
than-the many wiser to-be then also to-every criterion
 πλείους ἀντιδοξοῦσι τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ συμφωνούντων·
more dissent than-the according-to it agreeing
 οἱ γὰρ ὅποιονοῦν ἀπολιπόντες κριτήριον ἕτερον τοῦ
the-(ones) for whatever-kind having-left criterion another than-the
 συμφωνεῖσθαι δοκοῦντος παρά τισιν ἀντιδοξοῦσί τε αὐτῷ
to-be-agreed-on seeming among some dissent both from-it
 καὶ κατὰ πολὺ πλείους εἰσὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ συμφωνούντων.
and by much more are than-the about it agreeing
 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, οἱ συμφωνοῦντες ἥτοι ἐν διαφόροις
apart and these the-(ones) agreeing either in different
 εἰσὶ διαθέσεις ἢ ἐν μιᾷ. ἐν διαφόροις μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς
are dispositions or in one in different indeed then by-no-means
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ
as-far upon the (thing)-said how for — the same-(things)
 ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ ἐν μιᾷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ εἰς ὁ
would-they-say about it if and in one since also the one the-(one)
 λέγων ἕτερόν τι μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες
saying another something one has disposition also these all

43

44

- οἱ συμφωνοῦντες μίαν, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς διαθέσεσιν αἷς
the-(ones) agreeing one as-far upon the dispositions which
 προσέχομεν οὐδὲ κατὰ πλήθος εὑρίσκεται διαφορά τις.
we-attend-to not-even according-to number is-found difference any
- 45 διόπερ οὐ χρὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσέχειν μᾶλλον ἢ
wherefore not it-is-necessary to-the many to-attend rather than
 τῷ ἐνί, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι, καθάπερ
to-the one in-addition-to the also inapprehensible to-be just-as
 ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς σκέψεως ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὴν
in the fourth mode of-the skepticism we-recalled the
 κατὰ πλήθος τῶν κρίσεων, ἀπείρων τῶν κατὰ μέρος
according-to number of-the judgments infinite the according-to part
 ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ ἡμῶν μὴ δυναμένων ἀπάντων
men being and us not being-able of-all
 αὐτῶν τὰς κρίσεις ἐπελθεῖν καὶ ἀποφύνασθαι, τί μὲν
them the judgments to-go-over and to-declare what indeed
 οἱ πλείους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ἀποφαίνονται, τί
the more of-the men all declare what
 δὲ οἱ ἐλάττους. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἄτοπος ἡ κατὰ
and the fewer and in this then absurd the according-to
 τὸ πλήθος πρόκρισις τῶν κρινόντων.
the number preference of-the judges
- 46 Εἰ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει προσέξομεν, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν
if and not-even to-the number we-shall-attend not we-shall-find
 οὐδένα ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι τοσαῦτα
no-one by which will-be-judged the things although so-much
 κατὰ συγχώρησιν δόντες. διόπερ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων
by concession having-granted wherefore out-of all these
 ἀκατάληπτον εὑρίσκεται τὸ κριτήριον ὑφ' οὗ κριθήσεται
inapprehensible is-found the criterion by which will-be-judged
 τὰ πράγματα.
the things

Συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων, 47
being-circumscribed-along and with-this also the other criteria
 ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἥτοι μέρος ἢ πάθος ἢ ἐνέργημα ἐστὶ
since each of-them either a-part or a-feeling or an-activity is
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀκόλουθον μὲν ἦν ἴσως ἐπὶ τι τῶν
of-the man fitting indeed it-was perhaps to something of-the
 ἐξῆς προΐεναι τῷ λόγῳ, ὥς καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἱκανῶς
following to-advance the account as also about those sufficiently
 εἰρημένων ἐν τούτοις· ἵνα δὲ μὴδὲ τὴν εἰδικὴν ὥς
having-been-said in these so-that and not-even the specific as
 πρὸς ἕκαστον ἀντίρρησιν φεύγειν δοκῶμεν, ὀλίγα καὶ
toward each refutation to-avoid we-may-seem few-(things) also
 περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου λέξομεν. πρότερον δὲ περὶ
about them out-of addition we-shall-say first and about
 τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ δι' οὗ καλουμένου διαλεξόμεθα.
the criterion the through which called we-shall-discuss

περὶ τοῦ δι' οὗ

II.6 · THE THROUGH WHICH: SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING

If man is the judge, he must judge through sense, understanding, or both. Whether the senses even apprehend anything cannot be decided, and even granting that they do, they conflict: the same honey bitter and sweet, the same water scalding and lukewarm, the same tower round and square. Turning to understanding, whether it even exists is disputed, since Gorgias denies it, and understandings differ, Gorgias's holding that nothing exists and Heraclitus's that everything does. So no criterion can judge between senses, between understandings, or between both, and each route begs the question or runs in a circle.

48 Πολλή μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄπειρος σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ γέγονε
much indeed then and infinite almost the about it has-arisen
 διαφωνία παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς· ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τοῦ
disagreement among the dogmatists we and again the
 ἐμμεθόδου προνοοῦμενοι φαμὲν ὅτι, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς
methodical taking-thought-for we-say that since according-to them
 ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲν
man is the by which are-judged the things nothing
 δὲ οὗτος ἔχει ἂν δι' οὗ κρίνεται δυνήσεται (καθάπερ
and he would-have — through which to-judge he-will-be-able just-as
 καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν) ἢ αἴσθησιν καὶ διάνοιαν, ἐὰν
also they agree than sense and understanding if
 δείξωμεν, ὅτι οὔτε δι' αἰσθήσεως μόνης δύναται κρίνεται
we-show that neither through sense alone he-is-able to-judge
 οὔτε διὰ μόνης τῆς διανοίας οὔτε δι' ἀμφοτέρων
nor through alone the understanding nor through both
 αὐτῶν, συντόμως πρὸς ἀπάσας τὰς κατὰ μέρος δόξας
of-them briefly against all the according-to part opinions
 εἰρήκαμεν· πᾶσαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας
we-have-spoken all for seem to the three these
 ἀναφέρεσθαι στάσεις.

to-be-referred positions

49 ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.
let-us-begin and from the senses
 Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τινὲς μὲν κενοπαθεῖν τὰς αἰσθήσεις φασὶν
therefore since some indeed to-be-empty-affected the senses say
 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκεῖσθαι ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσιν),
nothing for to-underlie of-which to-apprehend they-seem
 οἱ δὲ πάντα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὑφ' ὧν οἴονται κινεῖσθαι
the-(ones) and all-(things) to-underlie by which they-think to-be-moved
 λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ
say the-(ones) and the-(things) indeed to-underlie the-(things) and not

ὑποκείσθαι, τίνι συγκαταθησόμεθα οὐχ ἔξομεν· οὔτε γὰρ
to-underlie to-which we-shall-assent not we-shall-be-able neither for
 τῇ αἰσθήσει τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικρινοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ περὶ αὐτῆς
by-the sense the disagreement we-shall-decide since about it
 ζητοῦμεν, πότερον κενοπαθεῖ ἢ ἀληθῶς καταλαμβάνει,
we-inquire whether it-is-empty-affected or truly it-apprehends
 οὔτε ἐτέρῳ τινί, ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι κριτήριον δι'
nor by-another something since not-even there-is another any criterion through
 οὗ χρὴ κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν.
which it-is-necessary to-judge according-to the proposed hypothesis
 ἀνεπίκριτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται, πότερον 50
undecidable then and inapprehensible it-will-be whether
 κενοπαθεῖ ἢ αἰσθῆσις ἢ καταλαμβάνει τι· ᾧ
is-empty-affected the sense or apprehends something with-which
 συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἡμᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ
comes-in-together the not to-be-necessary us to-the sense alone
 προσέχειν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων, περὶ ἧς οὐκ
to-attend in the judgment of-the things about which not
 ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καταλαμβάνει τι.
we-are-able to-say whether even the outset it-apprehends anything
 ἀλλ' ἔστω κατὰ συγχώρησιν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀντιληπτικὰς 51
but let-it-be by concession the senses apprehensive
 εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥττον καὶ οὕτως ἄπιστοι εὐρεθήσονται
to-be nothing for less also thus untrustworthy they-will-be-found
 πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων. αἱ
for the judgment of-the outside underlying things the
 γοῦν αἰσθήσεις ὑπεναντίως κινούνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτός,
at-any-rate senses contrarily are-moved by the outside-(things)
 οἷον ἢ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέλιτος ὅτε μὲν
such-as the taste by the same honey at-one-time indeed
 πικράζεται, ὅτε δὲ γλυκάζεται, καὶ ἢ ὄρασις τὸ αὐτὸ
is-embittered at-another and is-sweetened and the sight the same

χρῶμα ὅτ' ἐμὲν αἰμωπόν, ὅτ' ἐμὲν λευκὸν εἶναι
color at-one-time indeed blood-red at-another and white to-be

δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἡ ὁσφρησις ἑαυτῇ συμφωνεῖ.

thinks but not-even the smell with-itself agrees

52 τὸ γοῦν μύρον ὃ ἐμὲν κεφαλαλγικὸς ἀηδὲς εἶναι

the at-any-rate perfume the-(one) indeed headache-prone unpleasant to-be

φησιν, ὃ δ' ἐμὲν οὕτως ἔχων ἡδύ. καὶ οἱ θεόληπτοι δ' εἰ

says the-(one) and not so being pleasant and the god-possessed and
and the delirious to-bear seem some conversing

αὐτοῖς, ὧν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐπακούομεν. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὕδωρ

with-them whom we not we-bear and the same water

τοῖς ἐμὲν φλεγμαίνουσιν ἀηδὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ δι'

to-the-(ones) indeed inflamed unpleasant to-be seems through

ὑπερβολὴν θερμότητος, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις χλιαρόν.

excess of-heat to-the and others lukewarm

53 πότερον οὖν πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φήσῃ

whether then all the impressions true to-be will-say

τις, ἢ τάσδε ἐμὲν ἀληθεῖς, τάσδε δ' ψευδεῖς, ἢ καὶ

someone or these indeed true those and false or also

ψευδεῖς ἀπάσας, εἰπεῖν ἀμήχανον, μηδὲν ἡμῶν ἐχόντων

false all to-say impossible no us having

κριτήριον ὡμολογημένον δι' οὗ κρινούμεν ὃ προκρίνεται

criterion agreed through which we-shall-judge what to-prefer

μέλλομεν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἀποδείξεως εὐπορούντων ἀληθοῦς

we-intend but not-even proof having true

τε καὶ κεκριμένης, διὰ τὸ μέχρι νῦν ζητεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς

both and judged through the until now to-be-sought the of-the

ἀληθείας κριτήριον, δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν ἀληθὴ ἀπόδειξιν

truth criterion through which also the true proof

ἐπικρίνεσθαι προσήκει.

to-be-decided it-is-fitting

διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἀξιῶν τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν 54
through these also the-(one) claiming to-the-(ones) indeed according-to nature
 ἔχουσιν πιστεύειν, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις
being to-believe to-the-(ones) and contrary-to nature disposed
 μηδαμῶς, ἄτοπος ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως τοῦτο
by-no-means absurd will-be neither for without-proof this
 λέγων πιστευθήσεται, οὔτε ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῆ καὶ κεκριμένην
saying will-be-be-believed nor a-proof true and judged
 ἔξει διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.

will-be-have through the aforesaid-(things)

εἰ μέντοι καὶ συγχωρήσειέ τις τὰς μὲν τῶν κατὰ 55
if however also should-concede someone the indeed of-the-(ones) according-to
 φύσιν ἐχόντων φαντασίας εἶναι πιστάς, τὰς δὲ τῶν
nature being impressions to-be trustworthy the-(ones) and of-the-(ones)
 παρὰ φύσιν διακειμένων ἀπίστους, καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατος
contrary-to nature disposed untrustworthy also thus impossible
 εὔρεθήσεται ἢ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μόνων κρίσις τῶν ἐκτὸς
will-be-found the through the senses alone judgment of-the outside
 ὑποκειμένων. ἢ ὅρασις γοῦν καὶ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα
underlying-(things) the sight at-any-rate even the according-to nature being
 τὸν αὐτὸν πύργον ὅτε μὲν στρογγύλον, ὅτε δὲ
the same tower at-one-time indeed round at-another and
 τετράγωνον εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τὰ αὐτὰ σιτία ἐπὶ μὲν
square to-be says and the taste the same foods in indeed
 τῶν κεκορεσμένων ἀηδῆ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πεινώντων ἡδέα φησὶν
the sated unpleasant in and the hungry pleasant says
 εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ παραπλησίως τῆς αὐτῆς φωνῆς νυκτὸς
to-be and the hearing similarly the same voice by-night
 μὲν ὥς εὐμεγέθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἡμέρας δὲ ὥς ἀμαυρᾶς,
indeed as loud perceives by-day and as faint

- 56 καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν δυσώδη ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
and the smell in indeed the many foul-smelling in and the
 βυρσοδεψῶν οὐδαμῶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
tanners by-no-means the same-(things) to-be seems and the same
 ἀφ' ἡ εἰσιόντων μὲν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον θερμαίνεται
touch entering indeed us into the bath is-warmed
 ὑπὸ τῆς παραστάδος, ἐξιόντων δὲ ψύχεται. διόπερ ἐπεὶ καὶ
by the vestibule going-out and is-chilled wherefore since even
 κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἑαυταῖς μάχονται,
according-to nature being the senses with-themselves conflict
 καὶ ἡ διαφωνία ἐστὶν ἀνεπίκριτος, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔχομεν
and the disagreement is undecidable since not we-have
 ὠμολογημένον κριτήριον, δι' οὗ κρίνεσθαι δύνανται,
agreed criterion through which to-be-decided they-can
 τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη. καὶ ἄλλα δὲ
the same impasses to-follow (it-is)-necessary and others and
 πλείω μεταφέρειν πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευὴν ἐνδέχεται
more to-transfer for the of-this establishment it-is-possible
 ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς
out-of the aforesaid-(things) by-us about the of-the suspension-of-judgment
 τρόπων. διόπερ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀληθὲς ἴσως τὸ τὴν
modes wherefore not — would-be true perhaps the the
 αἴσθησιν μόνην δύνασθαι κρίνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα.
sense alone to-be-able to-judge the outside underlying-(things)
- 57 Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν μετέλθωμεν τῷ λόγῳ. οἱ
therefore to the understanding let-us-pass with-the account the-(ones)
 τοῖνυν ἀξιούντες τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ προσέχειν ἐν τῇ
then claiming to-the understanding alone to-attend in the
 κρίσει τῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔξουσιν
judgment of-the things first indeed that not they-will-be-able
 δεικνύναι, ὅτι καταληπτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι διάνοιαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ
to-show that apprehensible is the to-be understanding since for —

μὲν Γοργίας οὐδὲν εἶναι φάσκων οὐδὲ διάνοιαν εἶναί φησι,
indeed Gorgias nothing to-be asserting not-even understanding to-be says
 τινὲς δὲ ταύτην ἀποφαίνονται ὑπάρχειν, πῶς οὖν ἐπικρινούσιν
some and it declare to-exist how then will-they-decide
 τὴν διαφωνίαν; οὔτε γὰρ διανοία, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζητούμενον
the disagreement neither for by-understanding since the (thing)-investigated
 συναρπάσουσιν, οὔτε ἄλλω τινί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο εἶναί
they-will-beg nor by-another something nothing for other to-be
 φασιν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν νῦν ὑποκειμένην, δι' οὗ
they-say according-to the hypothesis the now underlying through which
 κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα. ἀνεπὶκρίτον ἄρα καὶ ἀκατάληπτον
are-judged the things undecidable then and inapprehensible
 ἔσται, πότερον ἔστι διάνοια ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὧ
it-will-be whether there-is understanding or not there-is with-which
 συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν μόνῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ προσέχειν
comes-in-together the not to-be-necessary alone to-the understanding to-attend
 ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων κρίσει, τῇ μηδέπω κατειλημμένη.
in the of-the things judgment the not-yet apprehended
 ἀλλὰ κατειλήφθω ἢ διάνοια, καὶ ὠμολογήσθω τὸ 58
but let-it-be-apprehended the understanding and let-it-be-agreed the
 εἶναι ταύτην καθ' ὑπόθεσιν· λέγω ὅτι οὐ δύναται κρίναι
to-be it by hypothesis I-say that not it-can to-judge
 τὰ πράγματα. εἰ γὰρ μὴδ' ἐαυτὴν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾷ, ἀλλὰ
the things if for not-even itself exactly it-sees but
 διαφωνεῖ περὶ τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς
it-disagrees about both the substance of-itself and the manner of-the
 γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, πῶς ἂν δυνηθεῖ
generation and the place in which it-is how — could-it
 τῶν ἄλλων τι ἀκριβῶς καταλαμβάνειν;
of-the others anything exactly to-apprehend

- 59 διδομένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν κριτικὴν εἶναι τῶν
being-granted and also the the understanding judging to-be of-the
 πραγμάτων, οὐχ εὐρήσομεν πῶς κατ' αὐτὴν κρινοῦμεν.
things not we-shall-find how according-to it we-shall-judge
 πολλῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ διάνοιαν διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ
much for being the in understanding difference since
 ἑτέρα μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ Γοργίου διάνοια, καθ' ἣν φησι μηδὲν
one indeed is the of-Gorgias understanding according-to which he-says nothing
 εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ Ἡρακλείτου, καθ' ἣν λέγει πάντα
to-be another and the of-Heraclitus according-to which he-says all-(things)
 εἶναι, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ τῶν λεγόντων τάδε μὲν εἶναι τάδε
to-be another and the of-the-(ones) saying these indeed to-be those
 δὲ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπικρίνωμεν τὴν τῶν διανοιῶν διαφορὰν
and not to-be how we-shall-decide the of-the understandings difference
 οὐχ ἔξομεν, οὐδὲ δυνησόμεθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦδε
not we-shall-be-able nor we-shall-be-able to-say that to-the indeed of-this
 διανοίᾳ κατακολουθεῖν προσήκει, τῇ τοῦδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
understanding to-follow it-is-fitting to-the of-that and by-no-means
- 60 ἥν τε γὰρ διανοίᾳ τινὶ κρίνειν τολμῶμεν, τῆς
if both for by-an-understanding some to-judge we-dare of-the
 διαφωνίας μέρει συγκατατιθέμενοι τὸ ζητούμενον
disagreement to-a-part assenting the (thing)-investigated
 συναρπάσομεν· ἥν τε ἑτέρῳ τινί, ψευσόμεθα ὅτι μόνῃ
we-shall-beg if and by-another something we-shall-lie that alone
 τῇ διανοίᾳ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.
by-the understanding it-is-necessary to-judge the things
- 61 λοιπὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ ῥηθέντων
for-the-rest out-of the about the criterion the by which said-(things)
 δεικνύναι δυνησόμεθα, ὅτι μήτε τὴν ἀγχιουστέραν τῶν
to-show we-shall-be-able that neither the shrewder than-the
 ἄλλων διάνοιαν εὐρεῖν δυνάμεθα, ὅτι τε ἂν εὕρωμεν
others understanding to-find we-are-able that and — we-should-find

τῶν τε γεγενημένων καὶ οὐσῶν διανοιῶν ἀγχινουστέραν
than-the both having-been and being understandings shrewder
 διάνοιαν, ἐπεὶ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, εἰ πάλιν ταύτης ἑτέρα
understanding since non-evident it-is whether again than-this another
 ἔσται ἀγχινουστέρα, οὐ δεῖ προσέχειν αὐτῇ,
will-be shrewder not it-is-necessary to-attend to-it
 ὅτι τε καὶ ὑποθώμεθα διάνοιαν ἧς ἐντρεχεστέρα 62
that and even-if we-should-suppose an-understanding than-which quicker
 οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα τῷ δι'
not — could-come-to-be not we-shall-assent to-the-(one) through
 αὐτῆς κρίνοντι, εὐλαβούμενοι μὴ ψευδῇ τινα λόγον
it judging fearing lest false some argument
 προφερόμενος διὰ τὸ ὀξύτατης διανοίας μετεσχηκέναι
uttering through the keenest understanding to-have-partaken
 δύναται ἡμᾶς πείθειν ὅτι ἔστιν ἀληθής. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ
he-can us to-persuade that it-is true therefore not-even
 τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνῃ δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα.
by-the understanding alone it-is-necessary to-judge the things
 Λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι δι' ἀμφοτέρων. ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν 63
it-remains to-say that through both which again is
 ἀδύνατον· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐχ ὁδηγοῦσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὴν
impossible not only for not guide the senses the
 διάνοιαν πρὸς κατάληψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντιοῦνται αὐτῇ.
understanding toward apprehension but also they-oppose it
 ἀμέλει γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ μέλι τοῖσδε μὲν πικρὸν τοῖσδε δὲ
indeed at-any-rate out-of the the honey to-these indeed bitter to-those and
 γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι ὃ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἔφη μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ
sweet to-appear — indeed Democritus said neither sweet it
 εἶναι μήτε πικρὸν, ὃ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
to-be nor bitter — and Heraclitus both and in the
 ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. οὕτως
other senses both and sensibles the same account thus

ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὀρωμένη ἢ διάνοια διάφορά τε καὶ
 from the senses setting-out the understanding different both and
 μαχόμενα ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἀναγκάζεται. τοῦτο δὲ ἀλλότριόν
 conflicting to-declare is-compelled this and foreign
 ἐστὶ κριτηρίου καταληπτικοῦ. εἴτα καὶ κεῖνο λεκτέον·

is to-a-criterion apprehensive then that-also (is)-to-be-said

- 64 ἤτοι πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς πάντων διανοαῖς
 either with-all the senses and the of-all understandings
 κρινούσι τὰ πράγματα ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσαις
 they-will-judge the things or with-some but if indeed with-all
 λέξει τις, ἀδύνατα ἀξιώσει τοσαύτης μάχης ἐν ταῖς
 will-say someone impossible-(things) he-will-claim so-great conflict in the
 αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς ἐμφαινομένης, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 senses and the understandings appearing otherwise both and
 ἐπεὶ τῆς Γοργίου διανοίας ἀπόφασίς ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖν
 since of-the Gorgias understanding a-negation is the not to-be-necessary
 μήτε αἰσθήσει μήτε διανοία προσέχειν, περιτραπήσεται
 neither to-sense nor to-understanding to-attend will-be-overtaken
 ὁ λόγος. εἰ δὲ τισίν, πῶς κρινούσιν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς
 the argument if and with-some how will-they-judge that to-these indeed the
 αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇδε τῇ διανοία προσέχειν δεῖ, ταῖσδε
 senses and to-this the understanding to-attend it-is-necessary to-those
 δὲ οὐ, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ὡμολογημένον, δι' οὗ
 and not not having a-criterion agreed through which
 τὰς διαφόρους αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ διανοίας ἐπικρινούσιν;
 the different senses both and understandings they-will-decide
 65 ἢν δὲ λέγωσω, ὅτι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας τῇ
 if and they-say that the senses and the understandings by-the
 διανοία καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι κρινοῦμεν, *** τιὸ δὲ
 understanding and by-the senses we-shall-judge (lacuna) to-some and

μή, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζουσιν· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰ
not the (thing)-investigated they-beg about for the whether
δύναται τις διὰ τούτων κρίνειν ζητοῦμεν.

can someone through these to-judge we-inquire

εἶτα καὶ κεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅτι ἤτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τε 66

then that-also (is)-to-be-said that either with-the senses the both

αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας κρινούσιν, ἢ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς
senses and the understandings they-will-judge or with-the understandings the

τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι τὰς
both senses and the understandings or with-the both senses the

αἰσθήσεις καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς τὰς διανοίας, ἢ ταῖς μὲν
senses and with-the understandings the understandings or with-the indeed

αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας, τῇ δὲ διανοία τὰς αἰσθήσεις.
senses the understandings with-the and understanding the senses

εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀμφοτέρω
if indeed then with-the senses or with-the understanding both

κρίνειν ἐβέλησουσιν, οὐκέτι δι' αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας
to-judge they-will-wish no-longer through sense and understanding

κρινούσιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑνὸς τούτων, ὅπερ ἂν ἔλωνται· καὶ
they-will-judge but through one of-these whichever — they-choose and

παρακολουθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς αἱ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημέναι ἀπορίαι.
will-follow them the before said impasses

εἰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ 67

if and with-the senses the senses and with-the understanding

τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσιν, ἐπειδὴ μάχονται καὶ αἰσθήσεις
the understandings they-will-decide since conflict both senses

αἰσθήσεσι καὶ διάνοιαι διανοαῖς, ἥντινα ἂν λάβωσιν
with-senses and understandings with-understandings whichever — they-take

ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν
from the conflicting senses for the judgment of-the

ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσουσιν· μέρος
other senses the (thing)-investigated they-will-beg a-part

γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας ὡς πιστὸν ἤδη λήψονται πρὸς τὴν
for of-the disagreement as trustworthy already they-will-take for the
 τῶν ἐπ' ἴσης αὐτῷ ζητουμένων ἐπίκρισιν.

of-the on equal-(terms) with-it investigated-(things) decision

- 68 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διανοιῶν λόγος. εἰ δὲ ταῖς
the and same also in the understandings argument if and with-the
 μὲν αἰσθήσεσι τὰς διανοίας ἐπικρινούσι, τῇ διανοίᾳ
indeed senses the understandings they-will-decide with-the understanding
 δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὁ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται τρόπος,
and the senses the circular is-found mode
 καθ' ὃν, ἵνα μὲν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπικριθῶσι, δεῖ
according-to which so-that indeed the senses may-be-decided it-is-necessary
 προκεκρίσθαι τὰς διανοίας, ἵνα δὲ αἱ διάνοιαι
to-have-been-judged-first the understandings so-that and the understandings
 δοκιμασθῶσι, χρή προδιευκρινεῖσθαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις.
may-be-tested it-is-necessary to-be-sifted-first the senses

- 69 ἐπεὶ οὖν μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τὰ ὁμογενῆ κριτήρια
since then neither by the same-kind the same-kind criteria
 δύναται ἐπικρίνεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ ἐνὸς γένους ἀμφοτέρα τὰ
can to-be-decided nor by one kind both the
 γένη μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἐναλλάξ, οὐ δυνησόμεθα
kinds nor by the other-kind alternately not we-shall-be-able
 προκρίνειν διάνοιαν διανοίας ἢ αἴσθησιν αἰσθήσεως, διὰ
to-prefer understanding to-understanding or sense to-sense through
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔξομεν διὰ τίνος κρινούμεν· εἰ γὰρ μήτε
and this not-even we-shall-be-able through what we-shall-judge if for neither
 πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς κρίνειν δυνησόμεθα,
with-all the senses and the understandings to-judge we-shall-be-able
 μήτε εἰσόμεθα ποίαις μὲν δεῖ κρίνειν, ποίαις δὲ μή,
nor we-shall-know with-which indeed it-is-necessary to-judge with-which and not

οὐχ ἔξομεν δι' οὗ κρινοῦμεν τὰ πράγματα. ὥστε καὶ
 not we-shall-have through which we-shall-judge the things so-that also
 διὰ ταῦτα ἀνύπαρκτον ἂν εἴη τὸ κριτήριον τὸ δι' οὗ.
 through these non-existent — would-be the criterion the through which

περὶ τοῦ καθ' ὅ

II.7 · THE ACCORDING TO WHICH: THE IMPRESSION

The impression is inconceivable, since no imprint can be made in breath; if conceived, it is inapprehensible, being an affection of a ruling part that is not apprehended. Grant it apprehended, and the mind still meets only the senses' own affections, not the external thing, and cannot know whether they resemble it, as a man who has not seen Socrates cannot judge his likeness. Nor can we decide which impressions to trust without another impression, and so to infinity.

ἴδωμεν οὖν ἐξῆς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι 70
 let-us-see then next about the criterion according-to which to-be-judged
 λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα. πρῶτον τοίνυν ἐκείνο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν
 they-say the things first then that it-is to-say
 περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι *** ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία.
 about it that (lacuna) inconceivable is the impression
 λέγουσι γὰρ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ. ἐπεὶ οὖν
 they-say for an-impression to-be an-imprint in the-ruling-part since then
 ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἢ λεπτομερέστερόν
 the soul and the ruling-part breath is or finer-particled
 τι πνεύματος, ὡς φασίν, οὐ δυνήσεται τις τύπωσιν
 something than-breath as they-say not will-be-able someone an-imprint
 ἐπινοεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε κατ' εἰσοχὴν καὶ ἐξοχὴν, ὡς ἐπὶ
 to-conceive in it neither according-to hollow and relief as in
 τῶν σφραγίδων ὁρῶμεν, οὔτε κατὰ τὴν τερατολογουμένην
 the seals we-see nor according-to the fabled

ἑτεροιωτικήν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μνήμην τοσούτων ἀναδέξαιτο
 alternative-(kind) not for — memory of-so-many it-could-receive
 θεωρημάτων ὅσα συνίστησι τέχνην, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγνομέναις
 theorems as-many-as constitute an-art in the supervening
 ἑτεροιώσει τῶν προϋποκειμένων ἀπαλειφομένων.

alterations the pre-existing being-wiped-out

- 71 εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναιτο ἡ φαντασία,
 if however also to-be-conceived could the impression
 ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικοῦ,
 inapprehensible it-will-be since for an-affection it-is of-the-ruling-part
 τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, ὥς ἐδείξαμεν, οὐδὲ
 the and ruling-part not is-apprehended as we-showed not-even
 τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ καταληψόμεθα.
 the affection of-it we-shall-apprehend

- 72 εἴτα εἰ καὶ δοίμεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται ἡ φαντασία,
 then if also we-should-grant that is-apprehended the impression
 οὐ δύναται κρίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ
 not it-can to-be-judged according-to it the things not for
 δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς ἐκτὸς καὶ δι' αὐτῆς
 through itself applies-itself to-the outside-(things) also through it
 φαντασιούται ἡ διάνοια, ὥς φασίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν
 receives-impressions the understanding as they-say but through the
 αἰσθήσεων, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα
 senses the and senses the indeed outside underlying-(things)
 οὐ καταλαμβάνουσιν, μόνον δέ, εἰ ἄρα, τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη.
 not apprehend only and if then the their-own affections
 καὶ ἡ φαντασία οὖν τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσται,
 and the impression then of-the affection of-the sense will-be
 ὅπερ διαφέρει τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό
 which differs from-the outside underlying-(thing) not for the same

ἐστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαι με καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ
is the honey with-the to-be-sweetened me and the wormwood with-the
πικράζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει.

to-be-embittered but it-differs

εἰ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, 73

if and differs this the affection from-the outside underlying-(thing)

ἢ φαντασία ἔσται οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλ'

the impression will-be not of-the outside underlying-(thing) but

ἐτέρου τινὸς διαφέροντος αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταύτην

of-another something differing from-it if then according-to this

κρίνει ἢ διάνοια, φαύλως κρίνει καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ

judges the understanding badly it-judges and not according-to the

ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ ἄτοπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν

underlying-(thing) wherefore absurd it-is the according-to the impression

τὰ ἐκτὸς κρίνεσθαι λέγειν.

the outside-(things) to-be-judged to-say

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ καταλαμβάνει 74

but not-even this it-is to-say that the soul apprehends

διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν παθῶν τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα, διὰ

through the sensory affections the outside underlying-(things) through

τὸ ὅμοια τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῖς ἐκτὸς

the like the affections of-the senses to-be to-the outside

ὑποκειμένοις. πόθεν γὰρ εἴσεται ἢ διάνοια, εἰ ὅμοιά

underlying-(things) whence for will-know the understanding whether like

ἐστὶ τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, μήτε αὐτὴ

are the affections of-the senses to-the sensibles neither itself

τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐντυγχάνουσα, μήτε τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῇ

with-the outside-(things) meeting nor of-the senses to-it

τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν δηλουσῶν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη, καθάπερ

the nature of-them showing but the their-own affections just-as

ἐκ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἐποχῆς ἐπελογισάμην.

out-of the modes of-the suspension-of-judgment I-reasoned

- 75 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν μὲν Σωκράτην, εἰκόνα δὲ
just-as for the-(one) not-knowing indeed Socrates a-likeness and
 τούτου θεασάμενος οὐκ οἶδεν, εἰ ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἢ εἰκὼν
of-him having-seen not knows whether like is the likeness
 τῷ Σωκράτει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ διάνοια τὰ μὲν πάθη τῶν
— to-Socrates so also the understanding the indeed affections of-the
 αἰσθήσεων ἐποπτεύουσα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς μὴ θεωροῦσα,
senses surveying the and outside-(things) not observing
 οὐδὲ εἰ ὁμοία ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθη τοῖς
not-even whether like are the of-the senses affections to-the
 ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις εἴσεται. οὐδὲ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἄρα
outside underlying-(things) will-know not-even according-to likeness then
 δυνήσεται ταῦτα κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν.
it-will-be-able these to-judge according-to the impression
- 76 ἀλλὰ δώμεν κατὰ συγχώρησιν, πρὸς τῷ ἐπινοεῖσθαι
but let-us-grant by concession in-addition-to the to-be-conceived
 τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἔτι καὶ ἐπιδεκτικὴν
the impression also to-be-apprehended further also capable
 εἶναι τοῦ κρίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ πράγματα, καίτοι
to-be the to-be-judged according-to it the things although
 τοῦ λόγου πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπομνήσαντος. οὐκοῦν
the argument every the opposite having-suggested therefore
 ἥτοι πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ πιστεύσομεν καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν
either every impression we-shall-trust and according-to it
 ἐπικρινούμεν, ἢ τι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσῃ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
we-shall-decide or some but if indeed every (it-is)-clear that also
 τῇ Ξενιάδου φαντασίᾳ πιστεύσομεν, καθ' ἣν ἔλεγε
the of-Xeniades impression we-shall-trust according-to which he-said
 πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀπίστους εἶναι, καὶ περιτραπήσεται
all the impressions untrustworthy to-be and will-be-overtaken

ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ὥστε
the argument into the not to-be all the impressions such-that
 καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς κρίνεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ πράγματα.
also according-to them to-be-judged to-be-able the things
 εἰ δέ τισιν, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν ὅτι ταῖσδε μὲν ταῖς 77
if and some how shall-we-decide that to-these indeed the
 φαντασίαις πιστεύειν προσήκει, ταῖσδε δὲ ἀπιστεῖν; εἰ
impressions to-trust it-is-fitting those and to-distrust if
 μὲν γὰρ ἄνευ φαντασίας, δώσουσιν, ὅτι παρέλκει ἡ
indeed for without impression they-will-grant that is-superfluous the
 φαντασία πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, εἴγε χωρὶς αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι
impression for the to-judge if-indeed apart-from it to-be-judged
 δύνασθαι πράγματά τινα λέξουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ φαντασίας,
to-be-able things some they-will-say if and with impression
 πῶς λήψονται τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν παραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς
how will-they-take the impression which they-employ for
 τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φαντασιῶν κρίσιν;
the of-the other impressions judgment
 ἢ πάλιν αὐτοῖς ἄλλης φαντασίας δεήσει πρὸς τὴν 78
or again for-them another impression it-will-be-necessary for the
 κρίσιν τῆς ἐτέρας φαντασίας, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐκείνης κρίσιν
judgment of-the other impression and for the of-that judgment
 ἄλλης, καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἅπειρα ἐπικρῖναι·
another and into infinity impossible and infinite-(things) to-decide
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα εὑρεῖν, ποίαις μὲν φαντασίαις ὡς κριτηρίοις
impossible then to-find which indeed impressions as criteria
 δεῖ χρῆσθαι, ποίαις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν, κἂν δώμεν
it-is-necessary to-use which and by-no-means since then even-if we-grant
 ὅτι κατὰ τὰς φαντασίας δεῖ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα,
that according-to the impressions it-is-necessary to-judge the things
 ἐκατέρωθεν περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πᾶσι
from-both-sides is-overtaken the argument both out-of the all

πιστεύειν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τισὶ μὲν πιστεύειν ὡς κριτηρίοις, τισὶ
to-trust and out-of the some indeed to-trust as criteria some
 δὲ ἀπιστεῖν, συνάγεται τὸ μὴ δεῖν τὰς φαντασίας πρὸς
and to-distrust is-inferred the not to-be-necessary the impressions for
 τὴν κρίσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς κριτήρια παραλαμβάνειν.
the judgment of-the things as criteria to-employ

- 79 Ταῦτα μὲν ἀρκεῖ νῦν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ
these indeed it-suffices now to-say as in an-outline also
 πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον καθ' ὃ κρίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα
against the criterion according-to which to-be-judged the things
 ἐλέγετο. εἰδέναι δὲ χρή, ὅτι οὐ πρόκειται ἡμῖν
was-said to-know and it-is-necessary that not it-is-proposed to-us
 ἀποφίνασθαι, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον τῆς
to-declare that non-existent is the criterion of-the
 ἀληθείας (τοῦτο γὰρ δογματικόν). ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οἱ δογματικοὶ
truth this for dogmatic but since the dogmatists
 πιθανῶς δοκοῦσι κατεσκευακέναι, ὅτι ἔστι τι κριτήριον
plausibly seem to-have-established that there-is some criterion
 ἀληθείας, ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς πιθανοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι λόγους
of-truth we to-them plausible seeming to-be arguments
 ἀντεθήκαμεν, οὔτε ὅτι ἀληθεῖς εἰσι διαβεβαιούμενοι οὔτε
we-have-opposed neither that true they-are affirming nor
 ὅτι πιθανώτεροι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν φαινομένην
that more-plausible than-the opposite-(ones) but through the apparent
 ἴσην πιθανότητα τούτων τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν παρὰ
equal plausibility of-these both the arguments and the among
 τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων τὴν ἐποχὴν συνάγοντες.
the dogmatists lying the suspension-of-judgment inferring

περὶ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ἀληθείας

II.8 • THE TRUE AND TRUTH

Even granting a criterion, it is useless if, on the dogmatists' own showing, truth does not exist and the true is unreal. They distinguish the two in substance, since the true is an incorporeal proposition and truth a body; in composition, since the true is simple and truth is made of many cognitions; and in power, since truth depends on knowledge and belongs only to the virtuous man. Sextus attacks the true, and truth falls with it.

Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίμεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναί τι τῆς 80
 if however also we-should-grant by hypothesis to-be some of-the
 ἀληθείας κριτήριον, ἄχρηστον εὐρίσκεται καὶ μάταιον,
 truth criterion useless it-is-found and vain
 ἐὰν ὑπομνήσωμεν ὅτι, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ
 if we-recall that as-far upon the said-(things) by
 τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀνύπαρκτος μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀλήθεια,
 the dogmatists non-existent indeed is the truth
 ἀνυπόστατον δὲ τὸ ἀληθές.

unreal and the true
 ὑπομνησκομεν δὲ οὕτως. λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας 81
 we-recall and thus is-said to-differ from-the truth
 τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσία συστάσει δυνάμει· οὐσία
 the true in-three-ways in-substance in-composition in-power in-substance
 μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν (ἀξίωμα γὰρ
 indeed since the indeed true incorporeal is a-proposition for
 ἐστὶ καὶ λεκτόν), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα (ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη
 it-is and an-expressible the and truth a-body it-is for knowledge
 πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον
 of-all true-(things) declarative the and knowledge somehow being

ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πὼς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῇ, τὸ
ruling-part just-as also the somehow being hand a-fist the

δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα· ἔστι γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα)·

and ruling-part a-body it-is for according-to them breath

82 συστάσει δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀπλοῦν τί ἐστιν,

in-composition and since the indeed true simple something is

οἷον 'ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι', ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀληθῶν

such-as I am-conversing the and truth out-of many true

γνώσεων συνίσταται·

cognitions is-composed

83 δυνάμει δέ, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἐπιστήμης ἔχεται, τὸ

in-power and since the indeed truth knowledge depends-on the

δὲ ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως. διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ

and true not altogether wherefore the indeed truth in only

σπουδαίῳ φασὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐν φαύλῳ·

excellent-(man) they-say to-be the and true also in the-bad-man

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαῦλον ἀληθὲς τι εἰπεῖν. ταῦτα

it-is-possible for the bad-man true something to-say these

μὲν οἱ δογματικοί.

indeed the dogmatists

84 ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τῆς κατὰ τὴν συγγραφὴν προαιρέσεως

we and again the in the treatise purpose

στοχαζόμενοι πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἀληθὲς νῦν τοὺς λόγους

aiming-at toward only the true now the arguments

ποιησόμεθα, ἐπεὶ συμπεριγράφεται τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια,

we-shall-make since is-circumscribed-along with-this also the truth

σύστημα τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν γνώσεως εἶναι λεγομένη. πάλιν

a-system of-the of-the true-(things) cognition to-be being-said again

δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι καθολικώτεροι, δι'

and since of-the arguments the-(ones) indeed are more-general through

ᾧ αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κινουμέν, οἱ

which itself the existence of-the true we-attack the-(ones)

δὲ εἰδικοί, δι' ὧν δείκνυμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν φωνῇ τὸ
and specific through which we-show that not in speech the
 ἀληθὲς ἢ ἐν λεκτῷ ἢ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας, τοὺς
true or in an-expressible or in the motion of-the understanding the
 καθολικωτέρους ἐκθέσθαι μόνους ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖν
more-general-(ones) to-set-out only as for the present to-suffice
 ἡγούμεθα. ὥσπερ γὰρ τείχους θεμελίῳ κατενεχθέντι
we-consider just-as for of-a-wall foundation having-been-brought-down
 καὶ τὰ ὑπερκείμενα πάντα συγκαταφέρεται, οὕτω τῇ τοῦ
also the lying-above all are-brought-down-together so the of-the
 ἀληθοῦς ὑποστάσει διατρεπομένη καὶ αἱ κατὰ μέρος
true existence being-overturned also the according-to part
 τῶν δογματικῶν εὐρεσιλογίαι συμπεριγράφονται.
of-the dogmatists inventions are-circumscribed-along

εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει ἀληθές

II.9 • IS ANYTHING TRUE BY NATURE?

The dispute whether anything is true cannot be decided: the man who asserts it will be disbelieved without proof, and if he offers one, driven into a circle or an infinite regress. The something, most generic of all, is either false, so everything is false; or true, so everything is true; or both, so nothing is true by nature; or neither, so the true's existence is non-evident. Nor are true things only apparent, only non-evident, or some of each, since each option is overturned or needs a criterion that needs another; so nothing is true, the criterion is useless even if granted, and suspension follows.

Διαφωνίας τοίνυν οὔσης περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρὰ τοῖς
disagreement then being about the true among the
 δογματικοῖς, ἐπεὶ τινες μὲν φασιν εἶναί τι ἀληθές,
dogmatists since some indeed say to-be something true

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τινὲς δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφωνίαν
some and nothing to-be true not it-is-possible the disagreement
 ἐπικρῖναι, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λέγων εἶναί τι ἀληθές οὔτε ἄνευ
to-decide since the-(one) saying to-be something true neither without
 ἀποδείξεως τοῦτο λέγων πιστευθήσεται διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν·
proof this saying will-be-believed through the disagreement
 ἦν τε καὶ ἀπόδειξιν βούληται φέρειν, ἦν μὲν ψευδῇ
if both also a-proof he-wishes to-bring if indeed false
 ταύτην εἶναι συνομολογήσῃ, ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἀληθῇ δὲ τὴν
it to-be he-concedes untrustworthy he-will-be true and the
 ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι λέγων εἰς τὸν διάλληλόν τε ἐμπίπτει λόγον
proof to-be saying into the circular both he-falls argument
 καὶ ἀπόδειξιν αἰτηθήσεται τοῦ ἀληθῆ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ
and a-proof he-will-be-asked the true it to-be and
 ἐκείνης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα
of-that another and up-to infinity impossible and infinite-(things)
 ἀποδείξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα γινῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.
to-prove impossible then to-know also that there-is something true
 86 καὶ μὴν τό 'τί', ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον,
and indeed the something which they-say to-be of-all most-generic
 ἥτοι ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὸς ἐστὶν ἢ οὔτε ψευδὸς οὔτε ἀληθές, ἢ καὶ
either true or false is or neither false nor true or both
 ψευδὸς καὶ ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν ψευδὸς αὐτὸ εἶναι φήσουσιν,
false and true if indeed then false it to-be they-will-say
 ὁμολογήσουσιν, ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῇ. ὥσπερ γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ
they-will-admit that all-(things) are false just-as for since the
 ζῶον ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ζῶα τὰ κατὰ μέρος
animal animate is also all the animals the according-to part
 ἔμψυχά ἐστιν, οὕτως, εἰ τὸ γενικώτατον πάντων (τό 'τί')
animate are so if the most-generic of-all the something
 ψευδὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔσται ψευδῇ καὶ
false is also all the according-to part will-be false and

οὐδὲν ἀληθές. ᾧ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ψεῦδος·
nothing true with-which is-brought-in-together the nothing to-be false
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ 'πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ' καὶ τὸ 'ἔστι τι
also for itself the all-(things) are false and the there-is something
ψεῦδος' τῶν πάντων καθεστὼς ψεῦδος ἔσται. εἰ δὲ ἀληθές
false of-the all being false will-be if and true
ἐστὶ τό 'τι', πάντα ἔσται ἀληθῆ· ᾧ συνεισάγεται
is the something all-(things) will-be true with-which is-brought-in-together
πάλιν τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, εἴγε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τι
again the nothing to-be true if-indeed also itself this something
ὑπάρχον (λέγω δὲ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές) ἀληθές ἐστιν.
being I-mean and the nothing to-be true true is
εἰ δὲ καὶ ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ ἀληθὲς τό 'τι', ἕκαστον τῶν 87
if and both false is and true the something each of-the
κατὰ μέρος καὶ ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ ἀληθές. ἐξ οὗ
according-to part both false will-be and true out-of which
συνάγεται τὸ μηδὲν φύσει εἶναι ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ φύσιν
is-inferred the nothing by-nature to-be true the-(thing) for a-nature
ἔχον τοιαύτην ὥστε ἀληθὲς εἶναι, πάντως οὐκ ἂν εἴη
having such so-that true to-be altogether not — would-be
ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν οὔτε ἀληθές τό 'τι',
false if and neither false is nor true the something
ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους μήτε ψευδῆ
it-is-agreed that also all the in part neither false
μήτε ἀληθῆ εἶναι λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔσται ἀληθῆ. καὶ διὰ
nor true to-be said not will-be true and through
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν ἔσται, εἰ ἔστιν ἀληθές.
these indeed then non-evident to-us it-will-be whether there-is true
πρὸς τούτοις ἤτοι φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ, 88
in-addition-to these either appearing are only the true-(things)
ἢ ἀδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀδηλά
or non-evident only or of-the true-(things) the-(ones) indeed non-evident

ἐστι, τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν
are the-(ones) and appearing none and of-these is
 ἀληθές, ὥς δείξομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν
true as we-shall-show nothing then is true if indeed
 οὖν φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ, ἥτοι πάντα τὰ
then appearing only are the true-(things) either all the
 φαινόμενα λέξουσιν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἢ τινά. καὶ εἰ μὲν
appearing-(things) they-will-say to-be true or some and if indeed
 πάντα, περιτρέπεται ὁ λόγος· φαίνεται γάρ τισι τὸ
all is-overturned the argument it-appears for to-some the
 μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές. εἰ δέ τινα, ἀνεπικρίτως μὲν οὐ
nothing to-be true if and some undecidably indeed not
 δύναται τις λέγειν, ὅτι τάδε μὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τάδε
can someone to-say that these indeed are true those
 δὲ ψευδῆ, κριτηρίῳ δὲ χρώμενος ἥτοι φαινόμενον εἶναι
and false a-criterion and using either appearing to-be
 λέξει τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ ἄδηλον μὲν
be-will-say this the criterion or non-evident and non-evident indeed
 οὐδαμῶς· μόνα γὰρ ὑπόκειται νῦν ἀληθῆ τὰ φαινόμενα.
by-no-means only for are-assumed now true the appearing-(things)
 89 εἰ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἐπεὶ ζητεῖται, τίνα μὲν φαινόμενά
if and appearing since it-is-investigated which indeed appearing-(things)
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τίνα δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον
are true which and false also the taken
 φαινόμενον πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῶν φαινομένων πάλιν ἑτέρου
appearing-(thing) for the judgment of-the appearing-(things) again another
 δεήσεται κριτηρίου φαινομένου, κακῆνιο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις
will-need criterion appearing and-that another and up-to
 ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἄπειρα ἐπικρίνειν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα
infinity impossible and infinite-(things) to-decide impossible then
 καταλαβεῖν, εἰ φαινόμενά ἐστι μόνον τὰ ἀληθῆ.
to-apprehend whether appearing are only the true-(things)

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ λέγων τὰ ἄδηλα μόνον εἶναι 90
likewise and also the-(one) saying the non-evident-(things) only to-be
 ἀληθῆ πάντα μὲν οὐ λέξει εἶναι ἀληθῆ (οὐ γὰρ καὶ τὸ
true all indeed not will-say to-be true not for also the
 ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέξει ἢ τὸ
even to-be the stars true to-be he-will-say or the
 περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν). εἰ δέ τινα, τίνι κρινοῦμεν,
odd them to-be if and some by-what shall-we-judge
 ὅτι τάδε μὲν τὰ ἄδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ;
that these indeed the non-evident-(things) are true those and false
 φαινομένῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ἀδήλῳ,
by-an-appearing-(thing) indeed for by-no-means if and by-a-non-evident-(thing)
 ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν, τίνα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ
since we-inquire which of-the non-evident-(things) are true and
 τίνα ψευδῆ, δεήσεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἄδηλον ἀδήλου
which false will-need also this the non-evident-(thing) a-non-evident
 ἐτέρου τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος αὐτό, κακείνο ἄλλου, καὶ μέχρις
another the (thing)-that-will-decide it and-that another and up-to
 ἀπείρου. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἄδηλα μόνον ἐστὶ τὰληθῆ.
infinity wherefore not-even non-evident only are the-true-(things)
 λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, 91
it-remains to-say that of-the true-(things) the-(ones) indeed are appearing
 τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον. ἤτοι γὰρ
the-(ones) and non-evident is and also this absurd either for
 πάντα τὰ τε φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄδηλά ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ,
all the both appearing-(things) and the non-evident-(things) are true
 ἢ τινα φαινόμενα καὶ τινα ἄδηλα. εἰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, πάλιν
or some appearing and some non-evident if indeed then all again
 περιτραπήσεται ὁ λόγος, ἀληθοῦς εἶναι διδομένου καὶ τοῦ
will-be-overtaken the argument true to-be being-granted also the

μηδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές, λεχθήσεται τε ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ἀρτίους

nothing to-be true will-be-said and true also the even

εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περιττοὺς τούτους ὑπάρχειν.

to-be the stars and the odd them to-be

92 εἰ δέ τινα τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τινα τῶν ἀδήλων

if and some of-the appearing-(things) and some of-the non-evident-(things)

ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς ἐπικρινούμεν, ὅτι τῶν φαινομένων τάδε

are true how shall-we-decide that of-the appearing-(things) these

μέν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τάδε δὲ ψευδῆ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ διὰ

indeed are true those and false if indeed for through

φαινομένου, εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλεται ὁ λόγος· εἰ δὲ δι'

an-appearing-(thing) into infinity is-thrown-out the argument if and through

ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἀδηλα δεῖται κρίσεως,

a-non-evident-(thing) since also the non-evident-(things) need judgment

πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ ἀδηλον διὰ τίνος κριθήσεται; εἰ μὲν

again this the non-evident-(thing) through what will-be-judged if indeed

γὰρ διὰ φαινομένου, ὁ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται τρόπος,

for through an-appearing-(thing) the circular is-found mode

εἰ δὲ δι' ἀδήλου, ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων.

if and through a-non-evident-(thing) the-(one) into infinity throwing-out

93 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων λεκτέον· ὁ μὲν

likewise and also about the non-evident-(things) (it-is)-to-be-said the-(one) indeed

γὰρ ἀδήλω τινὶ κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν εἰς ἄπειρον

for by-a-non-evident-(thing) some to-judge them attempting into infinity

ἐκβάλλεται, ὁ δὲ φαινομένῳ ἢ αἰὲν φαινόμενον

is-thrown-out the-(one) and by-an-appearing-(thing) either always an-appearing-(thing)

προσλαμβάνων εἰς ἄπειρον, ἢ ἐπὶ ἀδηλον μεταβαίνων

taking-in-addition into infinity or to a-non-evident-(thing) passing-over

εἰς τὸν διάλληλον. ψεῦδος ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν τῶν ἀληθῶν

into the circular false then is the to-say of-the true-(things)

τὰ μὲν εἶναι φαινόμενα τὰ δὲ ἀδηλα.

the-(ones) indeed to-be appearing the-(ones) and non-evident

εἰ οὖν μήτε τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστιν ἀληθὴ μήτε τὰ ἄδηλα
if then neither the appearing-(things) are true nor the non-evident-(things)
 μόνα, μήτε τινὰ μὲν φαινόμενα, τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, οὐδέν
alone nor some indeed appearing some and non-evident nothing
 ἐστιν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κριτήριον
is true if and nothing is true the and criterion
 δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς χρησιμεύειν, ἄχρηστον
seems for the judgment of-the true to-be-useful useless
 καὶ μάταιόν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον, καὶν δῶμεν αὐτῷ κατὰ
and vain is the criterion even-if we-grant to-it by
 συγχώρησιν ἔχειν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν. καὶ εἴγε ἐφεκτέον
concession to-have some existence and if-indeed (it-is)-to-be-suspended
 περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοὺς
about the whether there-is something true consequent it-is the-(ones)
 λέγοντας ὡς διαλεκτικὴ ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ψευδῶν καὶ
saying that dialectic is a-science of-false-(things) and
 ἀληθῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων προπετεῦσθαι.
true-(things) and neither to-be-rash

Ἀπόρου δὲ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας φανέντος, οὔτε περὶ 95
impassable and the criterion of-the truth having-appeared neither about
 τῶν ἐναργῶν εἶναι δοκούντων, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ
the self-evident to-be seeming as-far upon the said-(things) by
 τῶν δογματικῶν, ἔτι οἷόν τέ ἐστι δισχυρίζεσθαι, οὔτε περὶ
the dogmatists still possible and it-is to-insist nor about
 τῶν ἀδῆλων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν ταῦτα
the non-evident-(things) since for from the self-evident-(things) these
 καταλαμβάνειν οἱ δογματικοὶ νομίζουνσιν, ἐὰν ἐπέχειν
to-apprehend the dogmatists think if to-suspend-judgment
 περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν καλουμένων ἀναγκαζώμεθα, πῶς ἂν
about the self-evident called we-are-compelled how —
 περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμήσαιμεν;
about the non-evident-(things) to-declare should-we-dare

- 96 ἐκ πολλοῦ δὲ τοῦ περιόντος καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄδηλα
out-of much and the surplus also against the non-evident
 τῶν πραγμάτων ἰδίως ἐνστησόμεθα. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα
of-the things specifically we-shall-object and since these
 διὰ σημείου τε καὶ ἀποδείξεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ
through sign both and proof to-be-apprehended and
 κρατύνεσθαι δοκεῖ, διὰ βραχέων ὑπομνήσομεν, ὅτι καὶ
to-be-confirmed seems through few-(words) we-shall-recall that also
 περὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν
about the sign and about the proof to-suspend-judgment
 προσήκει. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ σημείου· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις
it-is-fitting let-us-begin and from sign also for the proof
 τῷ γένει σημείων εἶναι δοκεῖ.
in-the genus a-sign to-be seems

περὶ σημείου

II.10 • THE SIGN

Things are evident, absolutely non-evident, temporarily non-evident, or non-evident by nature. The evident need no sign and the absolutely non-evident admit none; the temporarily non-evident are reached by recollective signs, the naturally non-evident by indicative ones. A recollective sign has been observed together with what it signifies, as smoke with fire; an indicative sign is said to reveal by its own nature, as bodily motions reveal the soul. Sextus argues only against the indicative sign, which is the dogmatists' invention.

- 97 Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς τὰ
of-the things then according-to the dogmatists the-(ones)
 μὲν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων
indeed are evident the-(ones) and non-evident and of-the non-evident-(ones)
 τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα,
the-(ones) indeed absolutely non-evident the-(ones) and for a-time non-evident

τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα. καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ
the-(ones) and by-nature non-evident and evident indeed to-be they-say the-(things)
 ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνώσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἡμέραν
out-of themselves into knowledge to-us coming such-as is the day
 εἶναι, καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα, ἃ μὴ πέφυκεν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν
to-be absolutely and non-evident which not are-fitted into the our
 πίπτειν κατάληψιν, ὥς τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας,
to-fall apprehension as the even to-be the stars
 πρὸς καιρὸν δὲ ἄδηλα ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντα ἐναργῇ παρά 98
for a-time and non-evident which the nature having self-evident owing-to
 τινος ἕξωθεν περιστάσεις κατὰ καιρὸν ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται,
some external circumstances for a-time to-us are-made-non-evident
 ὥς ἐμοὶ νῦν ἢ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα
as to-me now the of-the Athenians city by-nature and non-evident
 τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν
the-(things) not having a-nature under the our to-fall
 ἐνάργειαν, ὥς οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ
evidence as the intelligible pores these for never out-of
 ἑαυτῶν φαίνονται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, ἐξ ἑτέρων καταλαμβάνεσθαι
themselves appear but if then out-of others to-be-apprehended
 ἂν νομισθεῖεν, οἷον τῶν ἰδρώτων ἢ τινος παραπλησίον.
— would-be-thought such-as the sweats or some similar
 τὰ μὲν οὖν πρόδηλα μὴ δεῖσθαι σημείου φασίν· 99
the-(ones) indeed then evident not to-need a-sign they-say
 ἐξ ἑαυτῶν γὰρ αὐτὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
out-of themselves for them to-be-apprehended but not-even
 τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδηλα ἅτε δὴ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν
the-(ones) absolutely non-evident inasmuch indeed not-even the outset
 καταλαμβανόμενα. τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα καὶ
being-apprehended the-(ones) and for a-time non-evident and
 τὰ φύσει ἄδηλα διὰ σημείων μὲν καταλαμβάνεσθαι,
the-(ones) by-nature non-evident through signs indeed to-be-apprehended

οὐ μὴν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν
 not however through the same but the-(ones) indeed for a-time
 ἄδηλα διὰ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα
 non-evident through the recollective-(ones) the-(ones) and by-nature non-evident
 διὰ τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν.

through the indicative-(ones)

100 τῶν οὖν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ὑπομνηστικά κατ'
 of-the then signs the-(ones) indeed are recollective according-to
 αὐτοῦς, τὰ δ' ἐνδεικτικά. καὶ ὑπομνηστικὸν μὲν
 them the-(ones) and indicative and recollective indeed
 σημεῖον καλοῦσιν ὃ συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ
 a-sign they-call which having-been-observed-along-with the thing-signified
 δι' ἐναργείας ἅμα τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν, ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου,
 through evidence together with-the to-fall-under that being-non-evident
 ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ
 leads us into recollection of-the having-been-observed-along-with it
 καὶ νῦν ἐναργῶς μὴ ὑποπίπτοντος, ὥς ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ
 and now evidently not falling-under as it-is in the
 καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός.

smoke and the fire

101 ἐνδεικτικὸν δέ ἐστι σημεῖον, ὥς φασιν, ὃ μὴ
 indicative and is a-sign as they-say which not
 συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἀλλ'
 having-been-observed-along-with the thing-signified through evidence but
 ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς σημαίνει τὸ
 out-of the own nature and constitution signifies the-(thing)
 οὗ ἔστι σημεῖον, ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεις
 of-which it-is a-sign just-as the about the body motions
 σημειᾷ εἰσι τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅθεν καὶ ὀρίζονται τοῦτο τὸ
 signs are of-the soul whence also they-define this the

σημείον οὕτως 'σημείον ἐστὶν ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιῇ
sign thus a-sign is indicative a-proposition in a-sound
 συννημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος.'
conditional antecedent revelatory of-the consequent
 διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν σημείων διαφορᾶς, ὥς ἔφαμεν, 102
twofold then being of-the signs difference as we-said
 οὐ πρὸς πᾶν σημείον ἀντιλέγομεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνον τὸ
not against every sign we-argue but against only the
 ἐνδεικτικὸν ὥς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν πεπλάσθαι δοκοῦν.
indicative as by the dogmatists to-have-been-fabricated seeming
 τὸ γὰρ ὑπομνηστικὸν πεπίστευται ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου, ἐπεὶ
the for recollective is-trusted by the common-life since
 καπνὸν ἰδὼν τις σημειοῦται πῦρ καὶ οὐλὴν θεασάμενος
smoke having-seen someone infers-as-a-sign fire and a-scar having-seen
 τραῦμα γεγενῆσθαι λέγει. ὅθεν οὐ μόνον οὐ μαχόμεθα τῷ
a-wound to-have-happened he-says whence not only not we-conflict with-the
 βίῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ συναγωνιζόμεθα, τῷ μὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
common-life but also we-fight-along-with the-(thing) indeed by it
 πεπιστευμένῳ ἀδοξάστως συγκατατιθέμενοι, τοῖς δ'
trusted undogmatically assenting the-(things) and
 ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ἰδίως ἀναπλαττομένοις ἀνθιστάμενοι.
by the dogmatists privately fabricated opposing
 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἤρμοζεν ἴσως προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς 103
these indeed then it-was-fitting perhaps to-say-first for the
 σαφηνείας τοῦ ζητουμένου· λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν
clarity of-the (thing)-investigated for-the-rest and to the refutation
 χωρῶμεν, οὐκ ἀνύπαρκτον δεῖξαι τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημείον
let-us-proceed not non-existent to-show the indicative sign
 πάντως ἐσπουδακότες, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαινομένην ἰσοσθένειαν
altogether being-eager but the appearing equal-strength

τῶν φερομένων λόγων πρὸς τε τὴν ὑπαρξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ
 of-the brought arguments toward both the existence of-it and
 τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν ὑπομνήσκοντες.
 the non-existence recalling

εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν

II.11 • IS THERE AN INDICATIVE SIGN?

The Stoics define a sign as the antecedent in a sound conditional, revelatory of the consequent. But it is unclear whether there is any expressible; a proposition is made of parts that never coexist; Philo, Diodorus, and two further schools disagree about the sound conditional; and a sign, being relative, is apprehended with what it signifies and cannot reveal it. Nor can signs be all evident, all non-evident, or some of each. Yet arguments against the sign, if they prove anything, are signs; with plausible arguments on both sides, the sign no more exists than not.

104 Τὸ σημεῖον τοῦνυν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις περὶ
 the sign then as-far upon the said-(things) about
 αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς, ἀνεπινώητόν ἐστιν. αὐτίκα
 it among the dogmatists inconceivable is for-instance
 γοῦν οἱ ἀκριβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ διεληφέναι δοκοῦντες,
 at-any-rate the-(ones) exactly about it to-have-treated seeming
 οἱ Στωικοί, βουλόμενοι παραστήσαι τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ
 the Stoics wishing to-present the conception of-the
 σημείου, φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ
 sign say a-sign to-be a-proposition in a-sound conditional
 προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος. καὶ τὸ μὲν
 antecedent revelatory of-the consequent and the indeed
 ἀξίωμά φασιν εἶναι λεκτὸν αὐτοτελὲς ἀπόφαντον ὅσον
 proposition they-say to-be an-expressible self-complete assertoric as-far

ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, ὑγιὲς δὲ συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ
upon itself sound and conditional the-(one) not beginning from
ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος.

a-true-(thing) and ending in a-false-(thing)

τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον ἥτοι ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει 105
the for conditional either begins from a-true-(thing) and ends

ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν', ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ
in a-true-(thing) such-as if day it-is light it-is or it-begins from

ψεῦδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, οἷον 'εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ,
a-false-(thing) and ends in a-false-(thing) such-as if flies the earth

πτερωτή ἔστιν ἡ γῆ,' ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ
winged is the earth or it-begins from a-true-(thing) and ends in

ψεῦδος, οἷον 'εἰ ἔστιν ἡ γῆ, πέταται ἡ γῆ,' ἢ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ
a-false-(thing) such-as if exists the earth flies the earth or it-begins from

ψεῦδους καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ ἀληθές, οἷον 'εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν
a-false-(thing) and ends in a-true-(thing) such-as if flies the earth exists

ἡ γῆ'. τούτων δὲ μόνον τὸ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ
the earth of-these and only the-(one) from a-true-(thing) beginning and

λήγον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος μοχθηρὸν εἶναί φασιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὑγιή.
ending in a-false-(thing) faulty to-be they-say the and others sound

προκαθηγούμενον δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐν συνημμένῳ 106
antecedent and they-call the-(thing) in a-conditional

ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές

beginning from a-true-(thing) and ending in a-true-(thing)

ἡγούμενον. ἐκκαλυπτικὸν δὲ ἔστι τοῦ λήγοντος, ἐπεὶ τὸ

antecedent revelatory and it-is of-the consequent since the

'γάλα ἔχει αὕτη' τοῦ 'κεκύηκεν αὕτη' δηλωτικὸν

milk has this-woman of-the she-has-conceived this-woman indicative

εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ 'εἰ γάλα ἔχει αὕτη,

to-be seems in this the conditional if milk has this-woman

κεκύηκεν αὕτη'.

she-has-conceived this-woman

- 107 ταῦτα μὲν οὗτοι· ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν πρῶτον, ὅτι ἄδηλόν
these indeed these-(men) we and say first that non-evident
 ἔστιν, εἰ ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν δογματικῶν
it-is whether there-is any expressible since for of-the dogmatists
 οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι φασὶ μὴ εἶναί τι λεκτόν, οἱ δὲ
the-(ones) indeed Epicureans say not to-be any expressible the-(ones) and
 Στωικοὶ εἶναι, ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ Στωικοὶ εἶναί τι λεκτόν,
Stoics to-be when say the Stoics to-be some expressible
 ἥτοι μόνῃ φάσει χρῶνται ἢ καὶ ἀποδείξει. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φάσει,
either bare assertion they-use or also proof but if indeed assertion
 ἀντιθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν,
will-oppose them the Epicureans an-assertion the saying
 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τι λεκτόν· εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξιν παραλήψονται,
that not there-is any expressible if and a-proof they-will-employ
 ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν συνέστηκε λεκτῶν ἢ ἀποδείξεις, ἐκ
since out-of propositions is-composed expressibles the proof out-of
 τῶν λεκτῶν δὲ συνεστῶσα οὐ δυνήσεται πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ
the expressibles and being-composed not will-be-able for proof the
 λεκτὸν εἶναι παραλαμβάνεσθαι (ὁ γὰρ μὴ διδούς εἶναι
an-expressible to-be to-be-employed the-(one) for not granting to-be
 λεκτὸν πῶς συγχωρήσει σύστημα λεκτῶν ὑπάρχειν;
an-expressible how will-concede a-system of-expressibles to-exist
- 108 — διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου τοῖνυν τὸ ζητούμενον πιστοῦσθαι
through the (thing)-investigated then the (thing)-investigated to-confirm
 βούλεται ὁ ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ συστήματος τῶν
wishes the-(one) out-of the existence of-the system of-the
 λεκτῶν εἶναί τι λεκτόν πειρώμενος κατασκευάζειν. εἰ οὖν
expressibles to-be some expressible attempting to-establish if then
 μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως ἐνδέχεται παριστᾶν
neither simply nor through proof it-is-possible to-establish

ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν, ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστι τι λεκτόν.

that there-is some expressible non-evident it-is that there-is some expressible

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα.

likewise and also whether there-is a-proposition

λεκτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀξίωμα. μήποτε δὲ καὶ εἰ

an-expressible for is the proposition perhaps and also if

καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἶναί τι λεκτὸν δοθείη, τὸ ἀξίωμα

by hypothesis to-be some expressible should-be-granted the proposition

ἀνύπαρκτον εὑρίσκεται, συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λεκτῶν μὴ

non-existent is-found being-composed out-of expressibles not

συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις. οἷον γοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα

co-existing with-one-another such-as at-any-rate in the if day

ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν, ὅτε λέγω τὸ 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν', οὐδέπω

it-is light it-is when I-say the day it-is not-yet

ἔστι τὸ 'φῶς ἔστιν', καὶ ὅτε λέγω τὸ 'φῶς ἔστιν', οὐκέτι

is the light it-is and when I-say the light it-is no-longer

ἔστι τὸ 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν'. εἰ οὖν τὰ μὲν συγκείμενα ἔκ

is the day it-is if then the-(things) indeed composed out-of

τινῶν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν μὴ συνυπαρχόντων ἀλλήλοις

some impossible to-exist not co-existing with-one-another

τῶν μερῶν αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τὸ

the parts of-them the-(things) and out-of which is-composed the

ἀξίωμα οὐ συνυπάρχει ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸ ἀξίωμα.

proposition not co-exists with-one-another not will-exist the proposition

ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον

so-that and also these we-may-pass-over the sound conditional

ἀκατάληπτον εὑρεθίσεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Φίλων φησὶν ὑγιὲς

inapprehensible will-be-found — indeed for Philo says sound

εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ

to-be a-conditional the-(one) not beginning from a-true-(thing) and

λήγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, οἷον ἡμέρας οὔσης καὶ ἐμοῦ διαλεγομένου

ending in a-false-(thing) such-as day being and me conversing

109

110

τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι', ὁ δὲ Διόδωρος, ὃ μήτε
the if day it-is I am-conversing — and Diodorus which neither
 ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ
was-possible nor is-possible beginning from a-true-(tbing) to-end in
 ψεύδος· καθ' ὃν τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον συνημμένον ψεῦδος
a-false-(tbing) according-to whom the indeed said conditional false
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρας μὲν οὔσης ἐμοῦ δὲ σιωπήσαντος
to-be seems since day indeed being me and having-been-silent
 ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος καταλήξει,

from a-true-(tbing) having-begun in a-false-(tbing) it-will-end

- 111 ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων
that and true if not there-are indivisible of-the existing-(tbing)s
 στοιχεῖα, ἔστιν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα· ἀεὶ γὰρ
elements there-are indivisible of-the existing-(tbing)s elements always for
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμερῇ τῶν
from a-false-(tbing) beginning the not there-are indivisible of-the
 ὄντων στοιχεῖα' εἰς ἀληθές καταλήξει κατ' αὐτὸν
existing-(tbing)s elements in a-true-(tbing) it-will-end according-to him
 τὸ 'ἔστιν ἀμερῇ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα'. οἱ δὲ τὴν
the there-are indivisible of-the existing-(tbing)s elements the-(ones) and the
 συνάρτησιν εἰσάγοντες ὑγιές εἶναί φασι συνημμένον, ὅταν τὸ
connection introducing sound to-be say a-conditional when the
 ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντι μάχεται τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ
opposite to-the in it consequent conflicts with-the in it
 ἡγούμενῳ· καθ' οὓς τὰ μὲν εἰρημένα συνημμένα ἔσται
antecedent according-to whom the indeed said conditionals will-be
 μοχθηρά, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀληθές 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.
faulty that and true if day it-is day it-is

- 112 οἱ δὲ τῇ ἐμφάσει κρίνοντές φασιν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι
the-(ones) and by-the implication judging say that true is
 συνημμένον οὐδ' τὸ λήγον ἐν τῷ ἡγούμενῳ περιέχεται
a-conditional of-which the consequent in the antecedent is-contained

δυνάμει· καθ' οὓς τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστι' καὶ
potentially according-to whom the if day it-is day it-is and
 πᾶν τὸ διαφορούμενον συνημμένον ἴσως ψεῦδος ἔσται·
every the differentiated conditional perhaps false will-be
 αὐτὸ γάρ τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχεσθαι ἀμήχανον. ταύτην 113
itself for something in itself to-be-contained impossible this
 τοίνυν τὴν διαφωνίαν ἐπικριθῆναι ἀμήχανον ἴσως εἶναι
then the disagreement to-be-decided impossible perhaps to-be
 δόξει. οὔτε γὰρ ἀναποδείκτως προκρίνοντές τινα τῶν
it-will-seem neither for without-proof preferring some of-the
 στάσεων τῶν προειρημένων πιστοὶ ἐσόμεθα οὔτε μετὰ
positions of-the aforesaid trustworthy we-shall-be nor with
 ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὑγιὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅταν
proof also for the proof sound to-be seems when
 ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς συμπλοκῇ τὸ
follows the through the premises of-it combination the
 συμπέρασμα αὐτῆς ὡς λήγον ἡγουμένῳ, οἷον οὕτως 'εἰ
conclusion of-it as consequent to-antecedent such-as thus if
 ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς
day it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is light
 ἄρα ἔστιν. εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι
then it-is if-indeed day it-is light it-is and day it-is
 καὶ φῶς ἔστιν'.
and light it-is

ζητουμένου δὲ περὶ τοῦ πῶς κρινοῦμεν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν 114
being-investigated and about the how we-shall-judge the consequence
 τοῦ λήγοντος πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὃ διάλληλος εὑρίσκεται
of-the consequent toward the antecedent the circular is-found
 τρόπος. ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀποδειχθῇ,
mode so-that indeed for the judgment of-the conditional may-be-proved
 τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῖς λήμμασι τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς
the conclusion to-the premises of-the proof follows as

- προειρήκαμεν· ἵνα δὲ πάλιν τοῦτο πιστευθῇ, δεῖ τὸ
we-have-said-before so-that and again this may-be-believed it-is-necessary the
 συνημμένον καὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐπικεκρίσθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
conditional and the consequence to-have-been-decided which absurd
 115 ἀκατάληπτον ἄρα τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον. ἀλλὰ καὶ
inapprehensible then the sound conditional but also
 τὸ προκαθηγούμενον ἄπορόν ἐστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
the antecedent perplexing is the indeed for
 προκαθηγούμενον, ὥς φασιν, ἐστὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τοιούτῳ
antecedent as they-say is the antecedent in such
 συνημμένῳ, ὃ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγει ἐπὶ
a-conditional which begins from a-true-(thing) and ends in
 ἀληθές.
a-true-(thing)
 116 εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ σημεῖον,
if and revelatory is of-the consequent the sign
 ἥτοι πρόδηλόν ἐστι τὸ λήγον ἢ ἄδηλον. εἰ μὲν οὖν
either evident is the consequent or non-evident if indeed then
 πρόδηλον, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος δεῖσεται, ἀλλὰ
evident not-even the (thing)-that-will-reveal it-will-need but
 συγκαταληφθήσεται αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται αὐτοῦ σημειωτόν,
will-be-apprehended-together with-it and not will-be of-it a-thing-signified
 διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο τούτου σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ
wherefore not-even that of-this a-sign if and non-evident since
 περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διαπεφώνηται ἀνεπικρίτως, ποῖα
about the non-evident-(things) it-has-been-disputed undecidably which
 μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀληθῇ ποῖα δὲ ψευδῇ, καὶ ὅλως εἰ
indeed are of-them true which and false and at-all whether
 ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, ἄδηλον ἔσται, εἰ εἰς ἀληθές
there-is any of-them true non-evident it-will-be whether in a-true-(thing)

λήγει τὸ συνημμένον. ᾧ συνεισέρχεται καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον
ends the conditional with-which comes-in-together also the non-evident
εἶναι εἰ προκαθηγείται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον.

to-be whether is-antecedent the in it antecedent

ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπωμεν, οὐ δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικὸν 117
so-that and also these we-may-pass-over not it-can revelatory

εἶναι τοῦ λήγοντος, εἴγε πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ σημειωτὸν
to-be of-the consequent if-indeed toward the sign is the thing-signified

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς
and through this is-apprehended-together with-it the-(things) for toward

τι ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται· καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ δεξιὸν
something with-one-another are-apprehended-together and just-as the right

πρὸ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ὡς δεξιὸν ἀριστεροῦ καταληφθῆναι οὐ
before the left as right of-left to-be-apprehended not

δύναται, οὐδὲ ἀνάπαλιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς
can nor conversely and in the other the toward

τι παραπλησίως, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον πρὸ τοῦ
something similarly so not-even the sign before the

σημειωτοῦ ὡς σημειωτοῦ καταληφθῆναι δυνατόν ἐσται.
thing-signified as of-a-thing-signified to-be-apprehended possible will-be

εἰ δ' οὐ προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, 118
if and not is-apprehended-before the sign the thing-signified

οὐδὲ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν αὐτοῦ δύναται ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἅμα
not-even revelatory of-it it-can to-be the-(thing) together

αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ μετ' αὐτὸ καταλαμβάνομένου. οὐκοῦν καὶ
with-it and not after it being-apprehended therefore also

ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινότερον λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων
as-far upon the more-commonly said-(things) by the other-minded

ἀνεπινώτόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ
inconceivable is the sign both for toward something and

ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, πρὸς ᾧ φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι,
revelatory of-the thing-signified toward which they-say it to-be
 τοῦτο εἶναι λέγουσιν.

this to-be they-say

- 119 ὅθεν εἰ μὲν πρὸς τι ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ,
whence if indeed toward something it-is and toward the thing-signified
 συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι πάντως ὀφείλει τῷ σημειωτῷ,
to-be-apprehended-together altogether it-ought with-the thing-signified
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τῷ δεξιῷ καὶ τὸ ἄνω τῷ
just-as the left with-the right and the up with-the
 κάτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τι. εἰ δὲ ἐκκαλυπτικόν
down and the others the toward something if and revelatory
 ἐστὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ πάντως
it-is of-the thing-signified to-be-apprehended-before it altogether
 ὀφείλει, ἵνα προεπιγνωσθὲν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἀγάγῃ
it-ought so-that having-been-known-beforehand into conception us it-may-lead
 τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνωσκομένου πράγματος.

of-the out-of it being-known thing

- 120 ἀδύνατον δὲ ἐννοῆσαι πρᾶγμα μὴ δυνάμενον πρὸ ἐκείνου
impossible and to-conceive a-thing not being-able before that
 γνωσθῆναι, οὗ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀνάγκην ἔχει·
to-be-known which to-be-apprehended-before necessity it-has
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐπινοεῖν τι καὶ πρὸς τι ὄν καὶ
impossible then to-conceive something both toward something being and
 ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχον πρὸς ᾧ νοεῖται. τὸ δὲ
revelatory of-that being toward which it-is-conceived the and
 σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τι φασὶν εἶναι καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικόν
sign both toward something they-say to-be and revelatory
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ· ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι τὸ σημεῖον.
of-the thing-signified impossible then it-is to-conceive the sign

Πρὸς τούτοις καὶ κεῖνο λεκτέον. διαφωνία γέγονε 121
in-addition-to these that-also (is)-to-be-said disagreement has-arisen
 παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τῶν μὲν λεγόντων εἶναι
among the-(ones) before us of-the-(ones) indeed saying to-be
 τι σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικόν, τῶν δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον
some sign indicative of-the-(ones) and no to-be sign
 ἐνδεικτικὸν φασκόντων. ὁ λέγων οὖν εἶναι τι
indicative asserting the-(one) saying then to-be some
 σημεῖον ἐνδεικτικὸν ἥτοι ἀπλῶς ἐρεῖ καὶ ἀναποδείκτως,
sign indicative either simply will-say and without-proof
 ψιλῇ φάσει χρώμενος, ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
bare assertion using or with proof but if indeed
 φάσει μόνῃ χρήσεται, ἄπιστος ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξαι
assertion alone he-will-use untrustworthy he-will-be if and to-prove
 βουλήσεται, τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάσει.
he-will-wish the (thing)-investigated he-will-beg
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημεῖον εἶναι λέγεται, 122
since for the proof in-the genus a-sign to-be is-said
 ἀμφισβητουμένου τοῦ πότερον ἔστι τι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ
being-disputed the whether there-is any sign or not
 ἔστω, ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται καὶ περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστω
there-is dispute there-will-be also about the whether there-is
 ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐδαμῶς, ὥσπερ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ζητουμένου
proof or by-no-means just-as by hypothesis being-investigated
 εἰ ἔστι ζῶον, ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν
whether there-is an-animal it-is-investigated also about the whether there-is
 ἄνθρωπος· ζῶον γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ
a-man an-animal for the man absurd and the
 ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ἐπ' ἴσης ζητουμένου ἢ δι'
(thing)-investigated through the on equal-(terms) investigated or through

ἑαυτοῦ ἀποδεικνύναι· οὐδὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως ἄρα δυνήσεται
 itself to-prove not-even through proof then will-be-able
 τις διαβεβαιουῖσθαι, ὅτι ἔστι σημεῖον.

someone to-affirm that there-is a-sign

- 123 εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπλῶς μήτε μετὰ ἀποδείξεως οἷόν τέ ἐστι
 if and neither simply nor with proof possible and it-is
 περὶ τοῦ σημείου διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἀδύνατόν
 about the sign affirmatively to-declare impossible
 ἔστι περὶ αὐτοῦ καταληπτικὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιήσασθαι· εἰ
 it-is about it apprehensive a-declaration to-make if
 δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνεται μετὰ ἀκριβείας τὸ σημεῖον, οὐδὲ
 and not is-apprehended with exactness the sign not-even
 σημαντικὸν εἶναι λεχθήσεται τινος ἅτε δὴ μὴδὲ
 significant to-be will-be-said of-anything inasmuch indeed not-even
 αὐτὸ ὁμολογούμενον· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ σημεῖον ἔσται.
 itself agreed through and this not-even a-sign it-will-be
 ὅθεν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν ἀνύπαρκτον
 whence also according-to this the reasoning non-existent
 ἔσται τὸ σημεῖον καὶ ἀνεπινόητον.

will-be the sign and inconceivable

- 124 Ἐτι μέντοι κακὲν ῥητέον. ἤτοι φαινόμενα μόνον ἐστὶ
 further however that-also (is)-to-be-said either appearing only are
 τὰ σημεία ἢ ἄδηλα μόνον, ἢ τῶν σημείων τὰ μέν
 the signs or non-evident only or of-the signs the-(ones) indeed
 ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν
 are appearing the-(ones) and non-evident none and of-these is
 ὑγίης· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι σημεῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄδηλα οὐκ ἔστι
 sound not then there-is a-sign that indeed then non-evident not are
 πάντα τὰ σημεία, ἐντεῦθεν δέκνυται. τὸ ἄδηλον οὐκ
 all the signs from-this is-shown the non-evident-(thing) not
 ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται, ὥς οἱ δογματικοὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ δι'
 out-of itself appears as the dogmatists say but through

ἑτέρου ὑποπίπτει. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν, εἰ ἄδηλον εἶη,
another it-falls-under also the sign then if non-evident it-should-be
 ἑτέρου δεῖσεται σημείου ἀδήλου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι
another will-need sign non-evident since nothing appearing is
 σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, καὶ κεῖνο ἄλλου,
a-sign according-to the proposed hypothesis and-that another
 καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἅπειρα σημεία λαμβάνειν·
and up-to infinity impossible and infinite signs to-take
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον καταληφθῆναι ἄδηλον ὄν. διὰ
impossible then the sign to-be-apprehended non-evident being through
 δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔσται, μὴ δυνάμενον σημαίνειν
and this also non-existent it-will-be not being-able to-signify
 τι καὶ σημεῖον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι.
anything and a-sign to-be through the not to-be-apprehended
 εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰ σημεία φαινόμενά ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τι
if and all the signs appearing are since both toward something
 ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ πρὸς τῷ σημειωτῷ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς
is the sign and toward the thing-signified the-(things) and toward
 τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, τὰ σημειωτὰ
something are-apprehended-together with-one-another the-(things) things-signified
 εἶναι λεγόμενα σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις καταλαμβανόμενα
to-be said with the appearing-(things) being-apprehended
 φαινόμενα ἔσται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἅμα ὑποπιπτόντων τοῦ τε
appearing will-be just-as for together falling-under the both
 δεξιῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ δεξιὸν τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ
right and the left not more the right than-the left
 ἢ τὸ ἀριστερὸν τοῦ δεξιῦ φαίνεσθαι λέγεται, οὕτω
or the left than-the right to-appear is-said so
 συγκαταλαμβανομένων τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ
being-apprehended-together the both sign and the thing-signified
 οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ σημεῖον ἢ τὸ σημειωτὸν φαίνεσθαι ῥητέον.
not more the sign or the thing-signified to-appear (is)-to-be-said

- 126 εἰ δὲ φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημειωτὸν ἔσται
if and appearing is the thing-signified not-even a-thing-signified it-will-be
 μὴ δεόμενον τοῦ σημαίνοντος αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκκαλύψοντος.
not needing the (thing)-that-will-signify it and that-will-reveal
 ὅθεν ὥσπερ ἀναιρουμένου δεξιῶ οὐδὲ ἀριστερὸν ἔστιν,
whence just-as being-destroyed right not-even left there-is
 οὕτως ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ σημειωτοῦ οὐδὲ σημεῖον εἶναι
so being-destroyed the thing-signified not-even a-sign to-be
 δύναται, ὥστε ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ
can so-that non-existent is-found the sign if-indeed
 φαινόμενα μόνα εἶναι λέγοι τις τὰ σημεία.
appearing only to-be should-say someone the signs
- 127 λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι τῶν σημείων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα,
it-remains to-say that of-the signs the-(ones) indeed are appearing
 τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα· καὶ οὕτως δὲ αἱ ἀπορίαι μένουσιν.
the-(ones) and non-evident and thus and the impasses remain
 τῶν τε γὰρ φαινομένων σημείων τὰ σημειωτὰ εἶναι
of-the both for appearing signs the-(things) things-signified to-be
 λεγόμενα φαινόμενα ἔσται, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν, καὶ μὴ
said appearing will-be as we-have-said-before and not
 δεόμενα τοῦ σημαίνοντος οὐδὲ σημειωτὰ ὅλως ὑπάρξει,
needing the (thing)-that-will-signify not-even things-signified at-all will-be
 ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα σημεία ἔσται, μηδὲν σημαίνοντα·
whence not-even those signs will-be nothing signifying
- 128 τὰ τε ἄδηλα σημεία χρήζοντα τῶν ἐκκαλυφόντων
the both non-evident signs needing the (things)-that-will-reveal
 αὐτά, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπὸ ἀδήλων σημαίνεσθαι λέγεται, εἰς
them if indeed by non-evident-(things) to-be-signified is-said into
 ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτοντος τοῦ λόγου ἀκατάληπτα εὐρίσκεται
infinity falling the argument inapprehensible are-found
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνύπαρκτα, ὥς προειρήκαμεν· ἐὰν δὲ
and through this non-existent as we-have-said-before if and

ὑπὸ φαινομένων, φαινόμενα ἔσται σὺν τοῖς φαινομένοις
by appearing-(things) appearing they-will-be with the appearing
 αὐτῶν σημείοις καταλαμβανόμενα, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
of-them signs being-apprehended through and this also
 ἀνύπαρκτα. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί τι πρᾶγμα, ὃ καὶ
non-existent impossible for to-be any thing which both
 ἄδηλόν ἐστι φύσει καὶ φαινόμενον, τὰ δὲ σημεία περὶ
non-evident is by-nature and appearing the and signs about
 ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἄδηλα ὑποτεθέντα, φαινόμενα
which is the argument non-evident having-been-supposed appearing
 εὐρέθη κατὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν τοῦ λόγου.

were-found according-to the overturning of-the argument
 εἰ οὖν μήτε πάντα τὰ σημεία φαινόμενά ἐστι μήτε πάντα 129

if then neither all the signs appearing are nor all
 ἄδηλα, μήτε τῶν σημείων τινὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινόμενα,
non-evident nor of-the signs some indeed are appearing
 τινὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὥς καὶ
some and non-evident and besides these nothing there-is as also
 αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἀνύπαρκτα ἔσται τὰ λεγόμενα σημεία.

themselves say non-existent will-be the called signs
 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀρκέσει νῦν εἰρήσθαι 130

these indeed then few out-of many it-will-suffice now to-have-been-said
 πρὸς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι σημείου ἐνδεικτικόν· ἐξῆς δὲ
for a-reminder the not to-be sign indicative next and
 καὶ τὰς ὑπομνήσεις τοῦ εἶναι τι σημείου ἐκθησόμεθα, ἵνα
also the reminders the to-be some sign we-shall-set-out so-that
 τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν ἀντικειμένων λόγων παραστήσωμεν.
the equal-strength of-the opposed arguments we-may-establish
 ἥτοι οὖν σημαίνουσιν τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου φωναὶ
either then signify something the against the sign phrases

φερόμεναι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄσημοί εἰσιν,
brought or nothing they-signify and if indeed meaningless they-are
πὼς ἂν κινήσειαν τὴν ὑπαρξιν τοῦ σημείου;

how — could-they-shake the existence of-the sign

- 131 εἰ δὲ σημαίνουσί τι, ἔστι σημείον. ἔτι ἤτοι
if and they-signify something there-is a-sign further either
ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου ἢ
demonstrative are the arguments the against the sign or
οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐκ
not demonstrative but if indeed not demonstrative not
ἀποδεικνύουσι τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημείον· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, ἐπεὶ
they-prove the not to-be a-sign if and demonstrative since
ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῷ γένει σημείον ἔστιν, ἐκκαλυπτική οὐσα τοῦ
the proof in-the genus a-sign is revelatory being of-the
συμπεράσματος, ἔσται σημείον. ὅθεν καὶ συνερωτᾶται
conclusion there-will-be a-sign whence also is-put-together
λόγος τοιοῦτος· εἰ ἔστι τι σημείον, ἔστι σημείον, καὶ εἰ
an-argument such if there-is any sign there-is a-sign and if
μὴ ἔστι σημείον, ἔστι σημείον· τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι σημείον
not there-is a-sign there-is a-sign the for not to-be a-sign
δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἢ δὴ ἔστι σημείον, δέικνυται. ἤτοι
through proof which indeed is a-sign is-shown either
δὲ ἔστι σημείον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημείον· ἔστιν ἄρα σημείον.
and there-is a-sign or not there-is a-sign there-is then a-sign
- 132 τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ παράκειται τοιοῦτος λόγος. εἰ οὐκ
with-this and the argument stands-beside such an-argument if not
ἔστι τι σημείον, οὐκ ἔστι σημείον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι σημείον
there-is any sign not there-is a-sign and if there-is a-sign
ὅ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ σημείον εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι σημείον.
which they-say the dogmatists a-sign to-be not there-is a-sign
τὸ γὰρ σημείον περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν
the for sign about which the argument according-to the conception

αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικόν
of-it both toward something to-be said and revelatory
 τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, ἀνύπαρκτον εὐρίσκεται, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν.
of-the thing-signified non-existent is-found as we-established
 ἤτοι δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον· οὐκ ἄρα
either and there-is a-sign or not there-is a-sign not then
 ἔστι σημεῖον. καὶ περὶ τῶν φωνῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ
there-is a-sign and about the phrases and the about the
 σημείου αὐτοὶ ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ δογματικοί, πότερον
sign themselves let-them-answer the dogmatists whether
 σημαίνουσί τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
they-signify something or nothing they-signify if indeed for
 οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν, οὐ πιστοῦται τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον· εἰ δὲ
nothing they-signify not is-confirmed the to-be a-sign if and
 σημαίνουσιν, ἀκολουθήσει αὐταῖς τὸ σημειωτόν. τοῦτο δὲ
they-signify will-follow them the thing-signified this and
 ἦν τὸ εἶναί τι σημεῖον· ᾧ ἔπεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον,
was the to-be some sign with-which follows the not to-be a-sign
 ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου περιτροπὴν.
as we-recalled according-to the of-the argument overturning
 Πλὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω πιθανῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σημεῖον
nevertheless but thus plausible both toward the to-be a-sign
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι λόγων φερομένων, οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι
and toward the not to-be arguments being-brought not more to-be
 σημεῖον ἢ μὴ εἶναι ῥητέον.
a-sign than not to-be (is)-to-be-said

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περὶ ἀποδείξεως

II.12 · PROOF

If we suspend judgment about the sign we must do so about proof, since a proof is a sign and relative and revelatory of its conclusion. Sextus sets out what the dogmatists mean: a proof is an argument that by inference reveals a non-evident conclusion from agreed premises. He distinguishes premises from conclusion, conclusive arguments from inconclusive, true from merely conclusive, and demonstrative from not, ending with those that reveal a non-evident conclusion, as sweat reveals pores.

- 134 Φανερόν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις
clear indeed then out-of these that not-even the proof
 ὁμολογούμενον τι πρᾶγμα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ σημείου
agreed some thing is if for about the sign
 ἐπέχομεν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δὲ σημείον τί ἐστι, καὶ
we-suspend-judgment and the proof and a-sign some is also
 περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ γὰρ
about the proof to-suspend-judgment (it-is)-necessary and for
 εὐρήσομεν τοὺς περὶ τοῦ σημείου λόγους ἡρωτημένους
we-shall-find the about the sign arguments put
 ἐφαρμόζεσθαι δυναμένους καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως,
to-be-applied being-able also against the proof
 ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτική τοῦ
since both toward something to-be it-seems and revelatory of-the
 συμπεράσματος, οἷς ἡκολούθει τὰ πρὸς τὸ σημείον
conclusion to-which followed the-(things) toward the sign
 ἡμῖν εἰρημένα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα.
by-us said almost all

εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἰδίως περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν, συντόμως 135

if and it-is-necessary also specifically about proof to-speak briefly

ἐπελεύσομαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον, πρότερον σαφηνίσαι

I-shall-go-over the about it account first to-clarify

πειραθεὶς διὰ βραχέων, τί φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

having-tried through few-(words) what they-say to-be the proof

Ἔστιν οὖν, ὥς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι'

is then as they-say the proof an-argument through

ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν

agreed premises by inference a-conclusion

ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. σαφέστερον δὲ ὃ λέγουσιν ἔσται διὰ

revealing non-evident clearer and what they-say will-be through

τούτων. λόγος ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς·

these an-argument is a-system out-of premises and a-conclusion

τούτου δὲ λήμματα μὲν εἶναι λέγεται τὰ πρὸς 136

of-this and premises indeed to-be are-said the-(things) for

κατασκευὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος συμφώνως λαμβανόμενα

establishment of-the conclusion by-agreement taken

ἀξιώματα, ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων

propositions conclusion and the out-of the premises

κατασκευαζόμενον ἀξίωμα. οἶον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ 'εἰ

established proposition such-as in this the argument if

ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα

day it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is light then

ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν 'φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν' συμπεράσμα' ἐστι, τὰ δὲ

it-is the indeed light then it-is a-conclusion is the and

λοιπὰ λήμματα.

remaining premises

τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ 137

of-the and arguments the-(ones) indeed are conclusive the-(ones) and

ἀσυνακτοί, συνακτικοὶ μὲν, ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον τὸ

inconclusive conclusive indeed when the conditional the-(one)

ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν τοῦ λόγου λημμάτων
beginning indeed from the through the of-the argument premises
 συμπεπλεγμένου, λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν αὐτοῦ, ὑγιὲς
conjunction ending and in the conclusion of-it sound
 ἦ, οἷον ὁ προειρημένος λόγος συνακτικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ
is such-as the aforesaid argument conclusive is since
 τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ταύτῃ ‘ἡμέρα
the through the premises of-it conjunction this day
 ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν’ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ‘φῶς
it-is and if day it-is light it-is follows the light
 ἔστιν’ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα
it-is in this the conditional day it-is and if day
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.’ ἀσύνακτοι δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες.
it-is light it-is inconclusive and the-(ones) not so being
 138 τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς οἱ δὲ
of-the and conclusive-(ones) the-(ones) indeed are true the-(ones) and
 οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀληθεῖς μὲν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον τὸ συνημμένον
not true true indeed when not only the conditional
 ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς,
out-of the of-the premises conjunction and the conclusion
 ὡς προειρήκαμεν, ὑγιὲς ἦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ
as we-have-said-before sound is but also the conclusion and
 τὸ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς
the through the premises of-it conjunction true
 ὑπάρχει, ὃ ἐστὶν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἀληθὲς
is which is antecedent in the conditional true
 δὲ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐστὶ τὸ πάντα ἔχον ἀληθῆ, ὡς
and conjunction is the-(one) all having true as
 τὸ ‘ἡμέρα ἔστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν.’
the day it-is and if day it-is light it-is

οὐκ ἀληθεῖς δὲ οἱ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντες. ὁ γὰρ
 not true and the-(ones) not so being the for
 τοιοῦτος λόγος 'εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ
 such argument if night it-is darkness it-is but indeed night
 ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν' συνακτικὸς μὲν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ
 it-is darkness then it-is conclusive indeed is since the
 συνημμένον τοῦτο ὑγιές ἔστιν 'νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι,
 conditional this sound is night it-is and if night it-is
 σκότος ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν', οὐ μέντοι ἀληθής. τὸ
 darkness it-is darkness then it-is not however true the
 γὰρ ἡγούμενον συμπεπλεγμένον ψεῦδος ἔστι, τὸ 'νύξ ἔστι,
 for antecedent conjunction false is the night it-is
 καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστι,' ψεῦδος ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ
 and if night it-is darkness it-is a-false-(thing) having in itself the
 'νύξ ἔστιν.' ψεῦδος γὰρ ἔστι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ ἔχον ἐν
 night it-is false for is a-conjunction the-(one) having in
 ἑαυτῷ ψεῦδος. ἔνθεν καὶ ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναί φασι τὸν
 itself a-false-(thing) whence also true an-argument to-be they-say the-(one)
 δι' ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα συμπεράσμα.
 through true premises true inferring a-conclusion
 πάλιν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν
 again and of-the true arguments the-(ones) indeed are
 ἀποδεικτικοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ
 demonstrative the-(ones) and not demonstrative and demonstrative
 μὲν οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἁδηλόν τι συνάγοντες, οὐκ
 indeed the-(ones) through evident-(things) non-evident something inferring not
 ἀποδεικτικοὶ δὲ οἱ μὴ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος
 demonstrative and the-(ones) not such such-as the indeed such
 λόγος 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν·
 argument if day it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is
 φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικός· τὸ γὰρ φῶς
 light then it-is not is demonstrative the for light

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εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ συμπέρασμα, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν.

to-be which is of-it conclusion evident is

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ἰδρῶτες ρέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας,

the and such if sweats flow through the surface

εἰςὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἰδρῶτες ρέουσι διὰ τῆς

there-are intelligible pores but indeed sweats flow through the

ἐπιφανείας· εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι' ἀποδεικτικός ἐστι, τὸ

surface there-are then intelligible pores demonstrative is the

συμπέρασμα ἔχων ἄδηλον, τὸ 'εἰσὶν ἄρα νοητοὶ πόροι'.

conclusion having non-evident the there-are then intelligible pores

141 τῶν δὲ ἄδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς

of-the and non-evident something inferring-(ones) the-(ones) indeed by-way-of-approach

μόνον ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα,

only lead us through the premises to the conclusion

οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. οἶον

the-(ones) and by-way-of-approach at-once and revelatorily such-as

ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν οἱ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ μνήμης ἡρτῆσθαι

by-way-of-approach indeed the-(ones) out-of belief and memory to-depend

δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ τίς σοι εἶπεν

seeming such-as is the such if someone to-you said

ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὕτοσὶ δὲ ὁ

that will-be-rich this-man will-be-rich this-man this-one and the

θεὸς (δείκνυμι δὲ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὸν Δία) εἰπέ σοι ὅτι

god I-point-to and by hypothesis — Zeus said to-you that

πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος'· συγκατατιθέμεθα

will-be-rich this-man will-be-rich then this-man we-assent

γὰρ τῷ συμπεράσματι οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τῶν λημμάτων

for to-the conclusion not so-much through the of-the premises

ἀνάγκην ὥς πιστεύοντες τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάσει.

necessity as trusting the of-the god declaration

οἱ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐφοδευτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς 142
the-(ones) and not only by-way-of-approach but also revelatorily
 ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ρέουσι
lead us to the conclusion as the such if flow
 διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι. ἀλλὰ μὴν
through the surface sweats there-are intelligible pores but indeed
 τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα· τὸ γὰρ ρεῖν τοὺς ἰδρῶτας
the first the second then the for to-flow the sweats
 ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ πόρου εἶναι, διὰ τὸ προειληφθαι
revelatory is the pores to-be through the to-have-been-assumed
 ὅτι διὰ ναστοῦ σώματος ὑγρὸν οὐ δύναται φέρεσθαι.
that through solid body liquid not can to-be-carried
 ἢ οὖν ἀπόδειξις καὶ λόγος εἶναι ὀφείλει καὶ συνακτικὸς καὶ 143
the then proof both an-argument to-be ought and conclusive and
 ἀληθὴς καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ
true and non-evident having a-conclusion being-revealed by
 τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι λέγεται
the power of-the premises and through this to-be is-said
 ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ
proof an-argument through agreed premises by
 συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. διὰ τούτων μὲν
inference a-conclusion revealing non-evident through these indeed
 οὖν σαφηνίζειν εἰώθασι τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως.
then to-clarify they-are-accustomed the conception of-the proof

εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις

II.13 · IS THERE PROOF? THE ARGUMENT ITSELF

An argument is made of parts that never coexist, so it can hardly be said to exist; and a conclusive argument is judged by a consequence that has been disputed undecidably. The dialecticians call an argument inconclusive through disconnection, deficiency, faulty form, or redundancy. Sextus shows that the first three cannot be told from conclusive arguments without an agreed judgment of the conditional, and turns to redundancy, which will make the Stoic indemonstrables inconclusive too.

144 Ὅτι δὲ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὧν
 that and non-existent is the proof from themselves which
 λέγουσιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν, ἕκαστον τῶν περιεχομένων
 they-say to-reason possible each of-the contained-(things)
 ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ διατρέποντα. οἷον γοῦν ὁ λόγος σύγκειται
 in the conception overturning such-as at-any-rate the argument is-composed
 ἐξ ἀξιωμαίων, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα πράγματα οὐ δύναται
 out-of propositions the and composite things not can
 ὑπάρχειν, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις
 to-exist if not the-(things) out-of which it-is-composed with-one-another
 συνυπάρχη, ὥς πρόδηλον ἀπὸ κλίνης καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων,
 co-exist as (is)-evident from a-bed and the similar-(things)
 τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ λόγου ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνυπάρχει. ὅτε γὰρ
 the and parts of-the argument with-one-another not co-exist when for
 λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον λῆμμα, οὐδέπω ὑπάρχει οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον
 we-say the first premise not-yet exists neither the other
 λῆμμα οὔτε ἡ ἐπιφορά· ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερόν φαμεν, τὸ μὲν
 premise nor the conclusion when and the second we-say the indeed
 πρότερον λῆμμα οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ ἐπιφορά οὐδέπω
 former premise no-longer exists the and conclusion not-yet
 ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν προφερόμεθα, τὰ λήμματα
 is when and the conclusion we-utter the premises

αὐτῆς οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν. οὐ συνυπάρχει ἄρα ἀλλήλοις
of-it no-longer subsist not co-exist then with-one-another
 τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχειν δόξει.
the parts of-the argument whence not-even the argument to-exist will-seem
 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτός 145
apart and these the conclusive argument inapprehensible
 ἔστιν· εἰ γὰρ οὗτος κρίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ συνημμένου
is if for this is-judged from the of-the conditional
 ἀκολουθίας, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνημμένον ἀκολουθία
consequence the and according-to the conditional consequence
 ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται καὶ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκατάληπτος,
undecidably has-been-disputed and is perhaps inapprehensible
 ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ σημείου λόγῳ ὑπεμνήσαμεν, καὶ ὁ
as in the about sign account we-recalled also the
 συνακτικὸς λόγος ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται.
conclusive argument inapprehensible will-be
 οἷ γε μὴν διαλεκτικοί φασιν ἀσύννακτον λόγον 146
the-(ones) at-least indeed dialecticians say inconclusive an-argument
 γίνεσθαι ἢτοι παρὰ διάρτησιν ἢ παρὰ ἔλλειψιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ
to-become either through disconnection or through deficiency or through the
 κατὰ μοχθηρὸν ἠρωτῆσθαι σχῆμα ἢ κατὰ παρολκίν. οἷον
in a-faulty to-have-been-put form or through redundancy such-as
 κατὰ διάρτησιν μὲν, ὅταν μὴ ἔχῃ τὰ λήμματα ἀκολουθίαν
through disconnection indeed when not have the premises consequence
 πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος 'εἰ ἡμέρα
toward one-another both and the conclusion as the such if day
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πωλοῦνται·
it-is light it-is but indeed wheat in the-market are-sold
 Δίων ἄρα περιπατεῖ. παρὰ δὲ παρολκίν, ὅταν εὐρίσκηται 147
Dion then walks through and redundancy when is-found
 λήμμα παρέλκον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου συναγωγὴν, οἷον 'εἰ
a-premise superfluous for the of-the argument inference such-as if

ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
day it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is but also
 Δίων περιπατεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν· παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρᾷ
Dion walks light then it-is through and the in a-faulty
 ἡρωτησθαι σχήματι, ὅταν μὴ ᾖ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου
to-have-been-put form when not is the form of-the argument
 συνακτικόν, οἷον ὄντων συλλογιστικῶν, ὡς φασί, τούτων
conclusive such-as being syllogistic as they-say these
 ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα
if day it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is light then
 ἔστιν’, ‘εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ
it-is if day it-is light it-is not and light it-is not
 ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν’, ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστιν οὗτος ‘εἰ ἡμέρα
then day it-is the argument inconclusive is this if day
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν’.
it-is light it-is but indeed light it-is day then it-is
 148 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ συνημμένον ἐντὸς τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ
since for promises the conditional within the in it
 ἡγουμένου εἶναι καὶ τὸ λήγον, εἰκότως τοῦ ἡγουμένου
antecedent to-be also the consequent reasonably the antecedent
 προσλαμβανομένου ἐπάγεται καὶ τὸ λήγον, καὶ τοῦ
being-assumed is-brought-in also the consequent and the
 λήγοντος ἀνηρημένου ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον· εἰ γὰρ
consequent having-been-destroyed is-destroyed also the antecedent if for
 ἦν τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὸ λήγον. τοῦ δὲ λήγοντος
was the antecedent was would also the consequent the and consequent
 προσλαμβανομένου οὐ πάντως τίθεται καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον·
being-assumed not altogether is-positied also the antecedent
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπισχνέιτο τὸ συνημμένον τῷ λήγοντι ἀκολουθεῖν
not-even for promised the conditional to-the consequent to-follow
 τὸ ἡγούμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡγουμένῳ τὸ λήγον μόνον.
the antecedent but to-the antecedent the consequent only

διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ὁ μὲν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ
through this then the-(one) indeed out-of a-conditional and the
 ἡγουμένου τὸ λήγον συνάγων συλλογιστικὸς εἶναι λέγεται,
antecedent the consequent inferring syllogistic to-be is-said
 καὶ ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ
and the-(one) out-of a-conditional and the opposite of-the
 λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ συνάγων· ὁ δὲ
consequent the opposite to-the antecedent inferring the-(one) and
 ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ λήγοντος τὸ ἡγούμενον συνάγων
out-of a-conditional and the consequent the antecedent inferring
 ἀσύννακτος, ὡς ὁ προειρημένος, παρὸ καὶ ἀληθῶν ὄντων
inconclusive as the aforesaid wherefore also true being
 τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγει, ὅταν λυχνιαίου
the premises of-it false it-infers when lamp
 φωτὸς ὄντος νυκτὸς λέγεται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
light being by-night is-said the indeed for if day it-is
 φῶς ἔστι συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ ἄλλα μὴν φῶς
light it-is conditional true is and the but indeed light
 ἔστι πρόσληψις, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν ἐπιφορὰ ψευδής.
it-is assumption the and day then it-is conclusion false
 κατὰ παράλειψιν δέ ἐστι μοχθηρὸς λόγος, ἐν ᾧ
through omission and is faulty an-argument in which
 παραλείπεται τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν συναγωγὴν τοῦ
is-omitted something of-the for the inference of-the
 συμπεράσματος χρησιμεύοντων· οἶον ὑγιоῦς ὄντος, ὡς
conclusion useful-(things) such-as sound being as
 οἰονται, τοῦ λόγου τούτου ἥτοι ἀγαθὸς ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ
they-think the argument this either good is the wealth or
 κακὸς ἢ ἀδιάφορος· οὔτε δὲ κακὸς ἐστιν οὔτε ἀδιάφορος·
bad or indifferent neither and bad it-is nor indifferent
 ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν, φαῦλός ἐστι παρὰ ἔλλειψιν οὔτος ὁ
good then it-is faulty is through deficiency this the

149

150

λόγος ἤτοι ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακός· οὐκ ἔστι
argument either good is the wealth or bad not is
 δὲ κακός· ἀγαθὸς ἄρα ἐστίν'.

and bad good then it-is

- 151 ἐὰν οὖν δείξω ὅτι οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν ἀσυνάκτων
if then I-show that no difference of-the inconclusive-(ones)
 διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνακτικῶν,
to-be-distinguished can according-to them from the conclusive-(ones)
 ἔδειξα ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος,
I-have-shown that inapprehensible is the conclusive argument
 ὡς περιττὰς εἶναι τὰς κατὰ διαλεκτικὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς
so-that superfluous to-be the according-to dialectic among them
 φερομένας ἀπειρολογίας. δείκνυμι δὲ οὕτως.
carried endless-discussions I-show and thus

- 152 Ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος ἐλέγετο ἐγνωρίσθαι ἐκ
the through disconnection inconclusive argument was-said to-be-recognized out-of
 τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν τὰ λήμματα αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλληλά
the not to-have consequence the premises of-it toward one-another
 τε καὶ τὴν ἐπιφοράν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς ἀκολουθίας
both and the conclusion since then of-the knowledge of-the consequence
 ταύτης δεῖ προηγέσθαι τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ συνημμένου,
this it-is-necessary to-precede the judgment of-the conditional
 ἀνεπίκριτον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον, ὡς ἐπελογισάμην,
undecidable and is the conditional as I-reasoned
 ἀδιάκριτος ἔσται καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτος λόγος.
indistinguishable will-be also the through disconnection inconclusive argument
 153 καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέγων κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀσύνακτον εἶναι τινα
and for the-(one) saying through disconnection inconclusive to-be some
 λόγον, φάσιν μὲν προφερόμενος μόνην ἀντιτιθεμένην
argument an-assertion indeed uttering only opposed
 αὐτῷ φάσιν ἔξει τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ προειρημένῃ·
to-himself an-assertion he-will-have the opposed to-the aforesaid

ἀποδεικνὺς δὲ διὰ λόγου ἀκούσεται, ὅτι δεῖ
proving and through an-argument he-will-bear that it-is-necessary
 τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρότερον συνακτικὸν εἶναι, εἰθ'
the argument this first conclusive to-be then
 οὕτως ἀποδεικνύειν, ὅτι ἀσυνάρτητα τὰ λήμματα τοῦ
so to-prove that disconnected the premises of-the
 διηρηθῆσθαι λεγομένου λόγου. οὐ γνωσόμεθα δὲ εἰ
to-have-been-disconnected said argument not we-shall-know and whether
 ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικός, μὴ ἔχοντες συνημμένου σύμφωνον
it-is demonstrative not having of-a-conditional agreed
 κρίσιν, ἣ κρινοῦμεν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ διὰ
judgment by-which we-shall-judge whether follows to-the through
 τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα.
the premises of-the argument conjunction the conclusion
 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐχ ἔξομεν διακρίνειν τῶν
and according-to this then not we-shall-be-able to-distinguish from-the
 συνακτικῶν τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν μοχθηρὸν εἶναι λεγόμενον.
conclusive-(ones) the-(one) through disconnection faulty to-be said
 τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι 154
the and same we-shall-say against the-(one) saying faulty to-be
 λόγον τινὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν φαύλῳ σχήματι ἠρωτηθῆσθαι.
an-argument some through the in a-bad form to-have-been-put
 ὃ γὰρ κατασκευάζων ὅτι μοχθηρόν τι σχῆμά ἐστιν,
the-(one) for establishing that faulty some form is
 οὐχ ἔξει ὁμολογούμενον συνακτικὸν λόγον δι' οὗ
not will-have agreed conclusive an-argument through which
 δυνήσεται συνάγειν ὃ φησιν.
he-will-be-able to-infer what he-says
 δυνάμει δὲ ἀντειρήκαμεν διὰ τούτων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς 155
in-force and we-have-argued-against through these also against the-(ones)
 πειρωμένους παρ' ἑλλειψιν ἀσυνάκτους λόγους εἶναι
attempting through deficiency inconclusive arguments to-be

δεικνύναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐντελής καὶ ἀπηρτισμένος ἀδιάκριτός
to-show if for the complete and finished indistinguishable
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἐλλιπὴς ἄδηλος ἔσται. καὶ ἔτι ὁ διὰ
is also the deficient non-evident will-be and further the-(one) through
 λόγου δεικνύναι τινὰ ἐλλιπῇ βουλόμενος λόγον, μὴ
an-argument to-show some deficient wishing argument not
 ἔχων συνημμένου κρίσει ὠμολογημένην, δι' ἧς κρίνειν
having of-a-conditional judgment agreed through which to-judge
 δυνήσεται τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένου λόγου,
be-will-be-able the consequence of-the by him said argument
 οὐ δυνήσεται κεκριμένως καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἐλλιπὴς ἐστίν.
not will-be-able judgedly and rightly to-say that deficient it-is
 156 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κατὰ παρολκὴν λεγόμενος εἶναι μοχθηρὸς
but also the-(one) through redundancy said to-be faulty
 ἀδιάκριτός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν. ὅσον γὰρ ἐπὶ
indistinguishable is from the demonstrative-(ones) as-far for upon
 τῇ παρολκῇ καὶ οἱ θρυλούμενοι παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς
the redundancy also the harped-on among the Stoics
 ἀναπόδεικτοι ἀσύνακτοι εὔρεθήσονται, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων
indemonstrables inconclusive will-be-found which being-destroyed
 ἡ πᾶσα διαλεκτικὴ ἀνατρέπεται· οὗτοι γὰρ εἰσιν οὓς
the whole dialectic is-overtaken these for are which
 φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν
they-say of-proof indeed not to-need for the of-themselves
 σύστασιν, ἀποδεικτικούς δὲ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τοῦ καὶ τοὺς
establishment demonstrative and to-be through the also the
 ἄλλους συνάγει λόγους. ὅτι δὲ παρέλκουσιν, ἔσται σαφές
other to-infer arguments that and they-are-redundant will-be clear
 ἐκθεμένων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους καὶ οὕτως ὃ φάμεν
having-set-out us the indemonstrables and thus what we-say
 ἐπιλογιζομένων.
reasoning

Five indemonstrables are set out, to which the rest are referred. Sextus argues that each is redundant. If it is agreed that light follows day, the argument it is day, therefore it is light suffices, and the conditional adds nothing; if it is not agreed, the conditional will not be granted. The same holds for the other four, and for the categorical syllogisms of the Peripatetics, where Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal needs no universal premise.

Πολλοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀναποδείκτους ὀνειροπολοῦσιν, πέντε 157
 many indeed then indemonstrables they-dream-up five
 δὲ τούτους μάλιστα ἐκτίθενται, εἰς οὓς οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες
 and these especially they-set-out into which the remaining all
 ἀναφέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, πρῶτον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ
 to-be-referred seem first the out-of a-conditional and
 τοῦ ἡγουμένου τὸ λήγον συνάγοντα, οἷον 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,
 the antecedent the consequent inferring such-as if day it-is
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὲν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν'.
 light it-is but indeed day it-is light then it-is
 δεύτερον τὸν ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ
 second the out-of a-conditional and the opposite of-the
 λήγοντος τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου συνάγοντα, οἷον
 consequent the opposite of-the antecedent inferring such-as
 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ φῶς·
 if day it-is light it-is not is and light
 οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'. τρίτον τὸν ἐξ ἀποφατικοῦ 158
 not then day it-is third the out-of a-negative
 συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τὸ
 of-a-conjunction and one of-the out-of the conjunction the
 ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον 'οὐχὶ ἡμέρα
 opposite of-the remaining inferring such-as not day
 ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν'.
 it-is and night it-is day and it-is not then night it-is

τέταρτον τὸν ἐκ διεξευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐπεξευγμένων
fourth the out-of a-disjunctive and one of-the disjoined-(terms)

τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ συνάγοντα, οἷον ἥτοι ἡμέρα
the opposite of-the remaining inferring such-as either day

ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν.
it-is or night it-is day and it-is not then night it-is

πέμπτον τὸν ἐκ διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἑνὸς
fifth the out-of a-disjunctive and the opposite of-one

τῶν ἐπεξευγμένων τὸ λοιπὸν συνάγοντα, οἷον ἥτοι ἡμέρα
of-the disjoined-(terms) the remaining inferring such-as either day

ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν.
it-is or night it-is not and night it-is day then it-is

159 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ θρυλούμενοι ἀναπόδεικτοι, πάντες
these indeed then are the harped-on indemonstrables all

δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀσύνακτοι εἶναι κατὰ παρολκῆν. αὐτίκα
and to-me seem inconclusive to-be through redundancy at-once

γούν, ἵνα ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀρξώμεθα, ἥτοι ὁμολογεῖται
at-any-rate so-that from the first we-may-begin either it-is-agreed

ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ 'φῶς ἔστιν' τῷ 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν' ἡγουμένῳ
that follows the light it-is to-the day it-is antecedent

αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν' συνημμένῳ, ἢ ἀδηλόν
itself in the if day it-is light it-is conditional or non-evident

ἔστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ συνημμένον
it-is but if indeed non-evident it-is not we-shall-grant the conditional

ὡς ὁμολογούμενον· εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὄντος τοῦ
as agreed if and evident it-is that being the

'ἡμέρα ἔστιν' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ τὸ 'φῶς ἔστιν,' εἰπόντων
day it-is out-of necessity will-be also the light it-is having-said

ἡμῶν ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν, συνάγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς ἔστιν, ὡς
us that day it-is is-inferred also the light it-is so-that

ἀρκεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν,
to-suffice the such argument day it-is light then it-is
 καὶ παρέλκει τὸ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν' συνημμένον.
and to-be-superfluous the if day it-is light it-is conditional
 ὁμοίως δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναποδείκτου. ἤτοι 160
likewise and we-proceed also in the second indemonstrable either
 γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος μὴ ὄντος εἶναι τὸ ἡγούμενον,
for it-is-possible the consequent not being to-be the antecedent
 ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς
or not it-is-possible but if indeed it-is-possible not will-be sound
 τὸ συνημμένον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι
the conditional if and not it-is-possible together with-the to-be-positd
 τὸ 'οὐχὶ τὸ λήγον' τίθεται καὶ τὸ 'οὐχὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον',
the not the consequent is-positd also the not the antecedent
 καὶ παρέλκει πάλιν τὸ συνημμένον, τῆς συνερωτήσεως
and is-superfluous again the conditional the questioning
 τοιαύτης γινομένης 'οὐχὶ φῶς ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.
such becoming not light it-is not then day it-is
 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀναποδείκτου. 161
the and same argument also in the third indemonstrable
 ἤτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐν
either for evident it-is that not it-is-possible the-(things) in
 τῇ συμπλοκῇ συννυπάρξαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ
the conjunction to-co-exist with-one-another or non-evident and if
 μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς·
indeed non-evident not we-shall-grant the negative of-the conjunction
 εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, ἅμα τῷ τεθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀναιρεῖται
if and evident together with-the to-be-positd the other is-destroyed
 τὸ λοιπόν, καὶ παρέλκει τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς,
the remaining and is-superfluous the negative of-the conjunction
 οὕτως ἡμῶν ἐρωτώντων ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν'.
thus us asking day it-is not then night it-is

162 τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ
the and similar-(things) we-say also in the fourth and
 ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου ἀναποδείκτου. ἥτοι γὰρ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν,
in the fifth indemonstrable either for evident it-is
 ὅτι ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος
that in the disjunctive the indeed true is the and false
 μετὰ μάχης τελείας, ὅπερ ἐπαγγέλλεται τὸ διεξευγμένον, ἢ
with conflict complete which promises the disjunctive or
 ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄδηλον, οὐ δώσομεν τὸ διεξευγμένον·
non-evident and if indeed non-evident not we-shall-grant the disjunctive
 εἰ δὲ πρόδηλον, τεθέντος ἑνὸς ἀπ' αὐτῶν φανερόν
if and evident having-been-posed one of them evident
 ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος ἑνὸς
it-is that the remaining not is and having-been-destroyed one
 πρόδηλον ὅτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔστιν, ὥς ἀρκεῖν συνερωτᾶν
evident that the remaining is so-that to-suffice to-question
 οὕτως 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα νύξ ἔστιν', 'οὐχὶ ἡμέρα
thus day it-is not then night it-is not day
 ἔστιν, νύξ ἄρα ἔστιν', καὶ παρέλκειν τὸ διεξευγμένον.
it-is night then it-is and to-be-superfluous the disjunctive

163 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγειν ἔνεστι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν
similar-(things) and to-say it-is-possible also about the categorical
 καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν, οἷς μάλιστα χρῶνται οἱ
called syllogisms which especially use the-(ones)
 ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. οἷον γοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ
from the Peripatos such-as at-any-rate in this the argument
 'τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ καλὸν δὲ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα
the just beautiful the beautiful and good the just then
 ἀγαθόν' ὁμολογεῖται καὶ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ καλὸν
good it-is-agreed and evident it-is that the beautiful
 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἔστιν ἄδηλον. ἀλλ' εἰ
good is or it-is-disputed and is non-evident but if

μὲν ἀδηλόν ἐστιν, οὐ δοθήσεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου
indeed non-evident it-is not it-will-be-granted in the of-the argument
 συνερώτησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ συνάξει ὁ συλλογισμός·
questioning and through this not will-conclude the syllogism
 εἰ δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν ᾗ καλόν,
if and evident it-is that everything whatever — is beautiful
 τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἅμα τῷ λεχθῆναι
this altogether also good is together with-the to-be-said
 ὅτι τόδε τι καλόν ἐστι συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
that this something beautiful is is-brought-in-together also the good
 αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὥς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην συνερώτησιν ‘τὸ
it to-be so-that to-suffice the such questioning the
 δίκαιον καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον ἄρα ἀγαθόν’, καὶ παρέλκειν
just beautiful the just then good and to-be-superfluous
 τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα ἐν ᾧ τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐλέγετο.
the other premise in which the beautiful good to-be was-said
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος,
likewise and also in the such argument Socrates a-man
 πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶν,’ εἰ μὲν
every man an-animal Socrates then an-animal if indeed
 οὐκ ἐστι πρόδηλον αὐτόθεν, ὅτι πᾶν ὃ τι περ ἂν
not is evident at-once that everything what ever indeed —
 ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ ζῶν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται
is a-man this also an-animal is not is-agreed
 ἢ καθόλου πρότασις, οὐδὲ δώσομεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ
the universal premise nor we-shall-grant it in the
 συνερωτήσει. εἰ δὲ ἔπεται τῷ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ καὶ
questioning if and follows to-the a-man to-be the also
 ζῶν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀληθὴς ἐστιν
an-animal him to-be and through this true is
 ὁμολογουμένως ἢ ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν’ πρότασις, ἅμα
by-agreement the every man an-animal premise together

164

165

τῷ λεχθῆναι ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος συνεισάγεται
with-the to-be-said that Socrates a-man is-brought-in-together
 καὶ τὸ ζῶον αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥς ἀρκεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην
also the an-animal him to-be so-that to-suffice the such
 συνερῳτίσιν ‘Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον,’
questioning Socrates a-man Socrates then an-animal
 καὶ παρέλκειν τὴν ‘πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον’ πρότασιν.
and to-be-superfluous the every man an-animal premise

166 παραπλησίαις δὲ μεθόδοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρώτων
similar and methods also in the other first
 κατηγορικῶν λόγων χρῆσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ
categorical arguments to-use possible it-is so-that not
 νῦν ἐνδιατρίβωμεν. Πλὴν ἐπεὶ παρέλκουσιν οὗτοι οἱ
now we-may-linger nevertheless since are-superfluous these the
 λόγοι ἐν οἷς τὴν ὑποβάθραν τῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ
arguments in which the foundation of-the syllogisms the
 διαλεκτικοὶ τίθενται, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ παρολκῇ διατρέπεται
dialecticians place as-far upon the redundancy is-overtuned
 πᾶσα ἡ διαλεκτική, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν διακρίναι τοὺς
all the dialectic not being-able us to-distinguish the
 παρέλκοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυνάκτους λόγους ἀπὸ τῶν
superfluous and through this inconclusive arguments from the
 συνακτικῶν καλουμένων συλλογισμῶν.
conclusive called syllogisms

167 εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἀρέσκει τισὶ λόγους μονολημμάτους εἶναι, οὐκ
if and not it-pleases some arguments single-premised to-be not
 εἰσὶν ἀξιοπιστότεροι Ἀντιπάτρου, ὃς οὐδὲ τοὺς τοιούτους
they-are more-credible than-Antipater who not-even the such
 λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζει.
arguments rejects

Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τοῖς
through these indeed then undecidable is the among the
 διαλεκτικοῖς συνακτικὸς καλούμενος λόγος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ
dialecticians conclusive called argument but also the
 ἀληθὴς λόγος ἀνεύρετός ἐστι διὰ τε τὰ προειρημένα καὶ
true argument undiscoverable is through both the aforesaid-(things) and
 ἐπεὶ πάντως ὀφείλει εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα
since altogether it-ought in a-true-(thing) to-end the for conclusion
 τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λεγόμενον ἥτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον.
the true to-be said either apparent is or non-evident

II.15 • NOTHING NON-EVIDENT IS REVEALED BY THE EVIDENT

A conclusion is evident or non-evident. If evident it needs no revealing; if non-evident it is inapprehensible, and so is the argument's truth. And since the consequent is relative to the antecedent, and relatives are apprehended together, evident premises make the conclusion evident, so nothing non-evident is ever inferred from what is evident. Neither generic nor specific proof can be posited, and no third thing can be conceived.

καὶ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ διὰ 168
and appearing indeed by-no-means not for — it-would-need the through
 τῶν λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι δι' ἑαυτοῦ προσπίπτον καὶ
the premises to-be-revealed through itself falling-on and
 οὐχ ἥττον τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ φαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον,
not less than-the premises of-it appearing if and non-evident
 ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδῆλων ἀνεπικρίτως διαπεφώνηται,
since about the non-evident-(things) undecidably it-has-been-disputed
 καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν, διόπερ καὶ ἀκατάληπτά
just-as before we-recalled wherefore also inapprehensible
 ἐστίν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
they-are inapprehensible will-be also the conclusion of-the true

εἶναι λεγομένου λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτόν
to-be said argument if and also this inapprehensible
 ἐστίν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα, πότερον ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ συναγόμενον
is not we-shall-know whether true is the inferred-(thing)
 ἢ ψεῦδος. ἀγνοήσομεν οὖν, πότερον ἀληθὴς ἐστίν ὁ λόγος
or false we-shall-not-know then whether true is the argument
 ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἀνέυρετος ἔσται ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος.
or false and undiscoverable will-be the true argument

169 ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρώμεν, ὁ διὰ προδήλων
so-that and also these we-may-pass-over the-(one) through evident-(things)
 ἄδηλον συνάγων ἀνέυρετός ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔπεται τῇ
non-evident inferring undiscoverable is if for follows to-the
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ ἢ ἐπιφορά, τὸ
through the premises of-it conjunction the conclusion the-(thing)
 δ' ἐπόμενον καὶ τὸ λήγον πρὸς τι ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς
and following and the consequent toward something is and toward
 τὸ ἡγούμενον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται
the antecedent the-(things) and toward something are-apprehended-together
 ἀλλήλοις, ὥς παρεστήσαμεν, εἰ μὲν ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὸ
with-one-another as we-established if indeed non-evident is the
 συμπέρασμα, ἄδηλα ἔσται καὶ τὰ λήμματα, εἰ δὲ
conclusion non-evident will-be also the premises if and
 πρόδηλά ἐστι τὰ λήμματα, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ
evident are the premises evident will-be also the
 συμπέρασμα ἅτε συγκαταλαμβανόμενον αὐτοῖς προδήλοις
conclusion inasmuch being-apprehended-together with-them evident
 οὖσιν, ὥς μηκέτι ἐκ προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγεσθαι.

170 διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐκκαλύπτεται ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων
being so-that no-longer out-of evident-(things) non-evident to-be-inferred
 ἢ ἐπιφορά, ἥτοι ἄδηλος οὖσα καὶ μὴ καταλαμβανομένη,
the conclusion either non-evident being and not being-apprehended

ἢ πρόδηλος καὶ μὴ δεομένη τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος. εἰ τοίνυν
or evident and not needing the (thing)-that-will-reveal if then
 ἢ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι λέγεται κατὰ συναγωγὴν,
the proof an-argument to-be is-said by inference
 τουτέστι συνακτικός, διὰ τινων ὁμολογουμένως ἀληθῶν
that-is conclusive through some by-agreement true-(things)
 ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον, ὑπεμνήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι
a-conclusion revealing non-evident we-recalled and we that
 οὔτε λόγος τις ἔστιν οὔτε συνακτικός οὔτε ἀληθής οὔτε
neither an-argument any there-is nor conclusive nor true nor
 διὰ τινων προδήλων ἄδηλον συνάγων οὔτε ἐκκαλυπτικός
through some evident-(things) non-evident inferring nor revelatory
 τοῦ συμπεράσματος, φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν
of-the conclusion evident it-is that unreal is
 ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

the proof

Καὶ κατ' ἐκείνην δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ
and according-to that and the approach non-existent or
 καὶ ἀνεπιωρότητον εὐρήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὁ γὰρ
even inconceivable we-shall-find the proof the-(one) for
 λέγων εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἥτοι γενικὴν τίθῃσιν ἀπόδειξιν ἢ
saying to-be proof either generic posits proof or
 εἰδικὴν τινα· ἀλλ' οὔτε τὴν γενικὴν οὔτε εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν
specific some but neither the generic nor specific proof
 τιθέναι δυνατόν, ὥς ὑπομνήσομεν· παρὰ δὲ ταύτας ἄλλο
to-posit possible as we-shall-recall besides and these another
 τι νοεῖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· οὐκ ἄρα δύνάται τις ὥς
something to-conceive not it-is-possible not then can someone as
 ὑπάρχουσαν τιθέναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.
existing to-posit the proof

171

- 172 ἡ μὲν οὖν γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις ἀνυπόστατός ἐστι διὰ τὰδε.
the indeed then generic proof unreal is through these
 ἥτοι ἔχει λήμματά τινα καὶ τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ
either it-has premises some and some conclusion or not it-has and
 εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ λήμματά τινα
if indeed not it-has not-even a-proof it-is if and premises some
 ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τινα, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὕτω
it-has and a-conclusion some since everything the proved so
 καὶ ἀποδεικνύον ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, εἰδικὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις·
also proving in part is specific will-be proof
 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εἰδική.
not then there-is any generic proof but not-even specific
- 173 ἥτοι γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύστημα
either for the out-of the premises and the conclusion system
 ἀπόδειξιν ἐροῦσιν, ἢ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον·
proof they-will-call or the system of-the premises only
 οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ὥς παραστήσω·
neither and of-these is proof as I-shall-establish
 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις.
not then there-is specific proof
- 174 τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς
the indeed then system the out-of the premises and the
 ἐπιφορᾶς οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μέρος τι
conclusion not is proof first indeed because a-part some
 ἔχουσα ἀδηλον, τουτέστι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ἀδηλος ἔσται, ὅπερ
having non-evident that-is the conclusion non-evident it-will-be which
 ἄτοπον· εἰ γὰρ ἀδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, αὐτὴ δεήσεται τοῦ
absurd if for non-evident is the proof itself will-need the
 ἀποδείξοντος αὐτὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐτέρων ἔσται ἀποδεικτική.
(thing)-that-will-prove it rather than of-others it-will-be demonstrative

εἶτα καὶ ἐπεὶ πρὸς τι φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ 175
then also since toward something they-say to-be the proof and
 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφοράν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἑτέροις
toward the conclusion the-(things) and toward something alongside others
 νοεῖται, ὥς αὐτοὶ φασιν, ἕτερον εἶναι δεῖ τὸ
are-conceived as themselves say other to-be it-is-necessary the
 ἀποδεικνύμενον τῆς ἀποδείξεως· εἰ οὖν τὸ συμπέρασμα
proved-(thing) than-the proof if then the conclusion
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον, οὐ νοηθήσεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις σὺν
is the proved-(thing) not will-be-conceived the proof with
 τῷ συμπεράσματι. καὶ γὰρ ἥτοι συμβάλλεται τι πρὸς
the conclusion and for either contributes something toward
 τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' εἰ
the proof of-itself the conclusion or by-no-means but if
 μὲν συμβάλλεται, ἑαυτοῦ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτικόν, εἰ δὲ οὐ
indeed it-contributes of-itself it-will-be revelatory if and not
 συμβάλλεται ἀλλὰ παρέλκει, οὐδὲ μέρος τῆς ἀποδείξεως
it-contributes but is-superfluous not-even a-part of-the proof
 ἔσται, ἐπεὶ κακείνην κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐροῦμεν εἶναι μοχθηράν.
it-will-be since that-also through redundancy we-shall-say to-be faulty
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξις ἂν 176
but not-even the system of-the premises only a-proof —
 εἶη· τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον 'εἰ ἡμέρα
would-be someone for — would-say the thus said if day
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν' ἢ λόγον
it-is light it-is but indeed day it-is either an-argument
 εἶναι ἢ διάνοιαν ὅλως ἀπαρτίζεν; οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ
to-be or an-understanding at-all to-complete not then not-even the
 σύστημα τῶν λημμάτων μόνον ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν. οὐδὲ ἡ
system of-the premises only a-proof is nor the
 εἰδικὴ ἄρα ἀπόδειξις ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἡ εἰδικὴ
specific then proof existence has if and neither the specific

ἀπόδειξις ὑφέστηκε μήτε ἡ γενική, παρὰ δὲ ταύτας οὐκ
proof subsists nor the generic besides and these not
 ἔστιν ἐννοεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
it-is to-conceive a-proof unreal is the proof

II.16 · PROOF CANNOT BE CONCEIVED OR ESTABLISHED

A proof would be evident revealing evident, non-evident revealing non-evident, non-evident revealing evident, or evident revealing non-evident, and none can be conceived. Besides, proof is disputed, and what is disputed is non-evident and needs a proof, which needs another to infinity. It cannot be shown by a sign, since the sign needs a proof, nor by a criterion, since the criterion needs one too. So whether there is proof is inapprehensible.

- 177 Ἐτι ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἀνυπόστατον τῆς ἀποδείξεως
further out-of these the unreality of-the proof
 ἔνεστιν ὑπομνησκειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἥτοι
it-is-possible to-recall if for there-is proof either
 φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἐκκαλυπτική ἢ ἄδηλος
appearing of-an-appearing-(thing) is revelatory or non-evident
 ἀδήλου ἢ ἄδηλος φαινομένου ἢ φαινομένη
of-a-non-evident-(thing) or non-evident of-an-appearing-(thing) or appearing
 ἀδήλου· οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων ἐκκαλυπτική δύναται
of-a-non-evident-(thing) none and of-these revelatory can
 ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ἀνεπινοήτος ἄρα ἐστίν.
to-be-conceived inconceivable then it-is
- 178 εἰ μὲν γὰρ φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐκκαλυπτική ἐστιν,
if indeed for appearing of-an-appearing-(thing) revelatory it-is
 ἔσται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ἅμα φαινόμενόν τε καὶ ἄδηλον,
will-be the revealed-(thing) at-once appearing both and non-evident
 φαινόμενον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπετέθη, ἄδηλον δέ,
appearing indeed since such to-be it-was-supposed non-evident and

ἐπεὶ δέεται τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποπίπτει
 since it-needs the (thing)-that-will-reveal and not out-of itself falls-under
 ἡμῖν σαφῶς. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλος ἀδήλου, αὐτὴ δεήσεται
 to-us clearly if and non-evident of-a-non-evident-(thing) itself will-need
 τοῦ ἐκκαλύψοντος αὐτὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἐκκαλυπτική
 the (thing)-that-will-reveal it and not will-be revelatory
 ἐτέρων, ὅπερ ἀφέστηκε τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀποδείξεως.
 of-others which stands-apart from-the conception of-the proof
 διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἄδηλος προδήλου δύναται
 through and these not-even non-evident of-an-evident-(thing) can
 εἶναι ἀπόδειξις· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου·
 to-be proof but not-even evident of-a-non-evident-(thing)
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι
 since for toward something it-is the-(things) and toward something
 ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεται, συγκαταλαμβανόμενον
 with-one-another are-apprehended-together being-apprehended-together
 τῇ προδήλῳ ἀποδείξει τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι λεγόμενον
 with-the evident proof the to-be-proved said
 πρόδηλον ἔσται, ὥς περιτρέπεσθαι τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ
 evident will-be so-that to-be-overturned the argument and not
 εὑρίσκεσθαι πρόδηλον αὐτὴν ἀδήλου ἀποδεικτικὴν.
 to-be-found evident it of-a-non-evident-(thing) demonstrative
 εἰ οὖν μήτε φαινομένη φαινομένου ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις
 if then neither appearing of-an-appearing-(thing) is the proof
 μήτε ἄδηλος ἀδήλου μήτε ἄδηλος προδήλου
 nor non-evident of-a-non-evident-(thing) nor non-evident of-an-evident-(thing)
 μήτε πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν
 nor evident of-a-non-evident-(thing) besides and these nothing
 εἶναι λέγουσιν, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.
 to-be they-say (it-is)-to-be-said nothing to-be the proof

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- 180 *Πρὸς* *τούτοις* *κάκεινο* *λεκτέον*. *διαπεφώνηται* *περὶ* *τῆς*
in-addition-to *these* *that-also* *(is)-to-be-said* *it-has-been-disputed* *about* *the*
ἀποδείξεως. *οἱ* *μὲν* *γὰρ* *μηδὲ* *εἶναι* *λέγουσιν* *αὐτήν*,
proof *the-(ones)* *indeed* *for* *not-even* *to-be* *say* *it*
ὥς *οἱ* *μηδὲν* *ὅλως* *εἶναι* *φάσκοντες*, *οἱ* *δὲ* *εἶναι*,
as *the-(ones)* *nothing* *at-all* *to-be* *asserting* *the-(ones)* *and* *to-be*
ὥς *οἱ* *πολλοὶ* *τῶν* *δογματικῶν*. *ἡμεῖς* *δὲ* *μὴ* *μᾶλλον* *εἶναι*
as *the* *many* *of-the* *dogmatists* *we* *and* *not* *more* *to-be*
αὐτήν *ἢ* *μὴ* *εἶναι* *φαμέν*.
it *than* *not* *to-be* *we-say*
- 181 *καὶ* *ἄλλως* *ἢ* *ἀπόδειξις* *δόγμα* *πάντως* *περιέχει*, *περὶ*
and *otherwise* *the* *proof* *a-belief* *altogether* *contains* *about*
παντὸς *δὲ* *δόγματος* *διαπεφωνήκασιν*, *ὥστε* *περὶ* *πάσης*
every *and* *belief* *they-have-disputed* *so-that* *about* *every*
ἀποδείξεως *ἀνάγκη* *εἶναι* *διαφωνίαν*. *εἰ* *γὰρ* *τῆς*
proof *(it-is)-necessary* *to-be* *disagreement* *if* *for* *the*
ἀποδείξεως *τοῦ* *εἶναι* *κενὸν* *λόγου* *ἔνεκεν* *ὁμολογουμένης*
proof *the* *to-be* *void* *argument* *for-the-sake* *being-agreed*
καὶ *τὸ* *εἶναι* *κενὸν* *συνομολογεῖται*, *δήλον* *ὅτι* *οἱ*
also *the* *to-be* *void* *is-agreed-together* *clear* *that* *the-(ones)*
ἀμφισβητοῦντες *περὶ* *τοῦ* *εἶναι* *κενὸν* *καὶ* *περὶ* *τῆς*
disputing *about* *the* *to-be* *void* *also* *about* *the*
ἀποδείξεως *αὐτοῦ* *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν*. *καὶ* *περὶ* *τῶν* *ἄλλων*
proof *of-it* *dispute* *and* *about* *the* *other*
δογμάτων, *ὧν* *εἰσιν* *αἱ* *ἀποδείξεις*, *ὁ* *αὐτὸς* *λόγος*. *πᾶσα*
beliefs *of-which* *are* *the* *proofs* *the* *same* *argument* *every*
τοῖνυν *ἀπόδειξις* *ἀμφισβητεῖται* *καὶ* *ἐν* *διαφωνίᾳ* *ἐστίν*.
then *proof* *is-disputed* *and* *in* *disagreement* *is*
- 182 *ἐπεὶ* *οὖν* *ἄδηλός* *ἐστίν* *ἢ* *ἀπόδειξις* *διὰ* *τὴν* *διαφωνίαν* *τὴν*
since *then* *non-evident* *is* *the* *proof* *through* *the* *disagreement* *the*
περὶ *αὐτῆς* (*τὰ* *γὰρ* *διάφωνα*, *καθὸ* *διαπεφώνηται*,
about *it* *the-(things)* *for* *disputed* *in-so-far-as* *they-have-been-disputed*

ἄδηλά ἐστιν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς προὔπτος ἀλλ' ἐξ
non-evident are not it-is out-of itself manifest but out-of
 ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει ἡμῖν συνίστασθαι. ἢ οὖν ἀπόδειξις
proof it-ought to-us to-be-established the then proof
 δι' ἧς κατασκευάζεται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὁμολογουμένη μὲν
through which is-established the proof agreed indeed
 καὶ προὔπτος οὐκ ἔσται (ζητοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν εἰ ἔστιν
and manifest not will-be we-inquire for now whether there-is
 ἀπόδειξις ὅλως), διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ ἄδηλος οὐσα
proof at-all disputed and and non-evident being
 δεῖσεται ἀποδείξεως ἄλλης, κακείνη ἄλλης, καὶ μέχρῃς
will-need proof another and-that another and up-to
 ἀπείρου. ἀδύνατον δὲ ἅπειρα ἀποδείξαι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα
infinity impossible and infinite-(things) to-prove impossible then
 παραστήσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

to-establish that there-is proof

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ σημείου δύναται ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι. ζητουμένου 183
but not-even through a-sign it-can to-be-revealed being-investigated
 γὰρ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημεῖον, καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοῦ σημείου
for the whether there-is a-sign and proof the sign
 δεομένου πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρξιν, ὃ δι' ἀλλήλων
needing for the its-own existence the through one-another
 εὑρίσκεται τρόπος, τῆς μὲν ἀποδείξεως σημείου δεομένης,
is-found mode the indeed proof a-sign needing
 τοῦ δὲ σημείου πάλιν ἀποδείξεως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. διὰ
the and sign again proof which absurd through
 δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἐπικρῖναι δυνατόν ἐστι τὴν περὶ τῆς
and these not-even to-decide possible it-is the about the
 ἀποδείξεως διαφωνίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήζει μὲν κριτηρίου ἢ
proof disagreement since needs indeed a-criterion the
 ἐπὶ κρισις, ζητήσεως δὲ οὔσης περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον,
decision inquiry and being about the whether there-is a-criterion

ὥς παρεστήσαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείξεως τοῦ κριτηρίου

as we-established and through this proof the criterion

δεομένου τῆς δεικνύουσης ὅτι ἔστι τι κριτήριον, ὃ

needing the showing that there-is some criterion the

διάλληλος τρόπος τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρίσκεται πάλιν.

circular mode of-the impasse is-found again

184 εἰ οὖν μήτε δι' ἀποδείξεως μήτε διὰ σημείου μήτε

if then neither through proof nor through a-sign nor

διὰ κριτηρίου ἔστιν ὑπομνῆσαι ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλ'

through a-criterion it-is to-suggest that there-is proof but

οὐδ' ἐξ ἐαυτῆς πρόδηλός ἐστιν, ὥς παρεστήσαμεν,

not-even out-of itself evident it-is as we-established

ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο

inapprehensible it-will-be whether there-is proof through and this

καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις· νενόηται μὲν γὰρ

also non-existent will-be the proof it-has-been-conceived indeed for

σὺν τῷ ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο

with the to-prove to-prove and not — could-(it)

μὴ καταλαμβανομένη. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.

not being-apprehended wherefore not-even a-proof it-will-be

II.17 • THE DOGMATISTS' REVERSAL ANSWERED

The dogmatists reply that the arguments against proof are either demonstrative, and so establish proof by reversal, or not, and prove nothing. Sextus answers that they are only plausible to us, and like purgative drugs carry themselves out with the rest. Their reversal argument is unsound: if the first conditional is sound the second cannot be, and if the second is granted the disjunction fails. With plausible arguments on both sides, proof no more exists than not.

Ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν 185
these indeed as in an-outline also against the proof
 ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ τοῦναντίον
it-will-suffice to-have-been-said the and dogmatists the-opposite
 κατασκευάζοντές φασιν, ὅτι ἤτοι ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ
establishing say that either demonstrative are the against
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἠρωτημένοι λόγοι ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί· καὶ
the proof put arguments or not demonstrative and
 εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί, οὐ δύνανται δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐκ
if indeed not demonstrative not they-can to-show that not
 ἔστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσιν, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι
there-is the proof if and demonstrative they-are themselves these
 τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκ περιτροπῆς εἰσάγουσιν.
the existence of-the proof out-of reversal introduce
 ὅθεν καὶ τοιοῦτον συνερωτῶσι λόγον· ‘εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, 186
whence also such they-put-together an-argument if there-is proof
 ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις·
there-is proof if not there-is proof there-is proof
 ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἔστιν ἄρα
either and there-is proof or not there-is proof there-is then
 ἀπόδειξις’. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦτον ἐρωτῶσι
proof from and the same force also this they-put
 τὸν λόγον· ‘τὸ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἐπόμενον οὐ μόνον
the argument the-(thing) to-the opposites following not only
 ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ἀντίκειται δὲ ταῦτα
true is but also necessary are-opposed and these
 ἀλλήλοις ‘ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις — οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις’, ὧν
to-one-another there-is proof not there-is proof of-which
 ἑκατέρῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις’.
to-each follows the to-be proof there-is then proof

- 187 ἔνεστι μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιλέγειν, οἷον γοῦν,
it-is-possible indeed then against these to-argue such-as at-any-rate
 ἐπεὶ μὴ νομίζομέν τινα λόγον εἶναι ἀποδεικτικόν, καὶ
since not we-think any argument to-be demonstrative also
 τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους οὐ πάντως φαμέν
the against the proof arguments not altogether we-say
 ἀποδεικτικούς εἶναι ἀλλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν πιθανούς· οἱ
demonstrative to-be but to-appear to-us plausible the-(ones)
 δὲ πιθανοὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί. εἰ δὲ
and plausible not out-of necessity are demonstrative if and
 ἄρα καὶ ἀποδεικτικοί εἰσιν (ὅπερ οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα)
then also demonstrative they-are which not we-affirm
 πάντως καὶ ἀληθεῖς. ἀληθεῖς δέ εἰσι λόγοι δι' ἀληθῶν
altogether also true true and are arguments through true-(things)
 ἀληθῆς συνάγοντες· οὐκοῦν ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ
a-true-(thing) inferring therefore true is of-them the
 ἐπιφορά. ἦν δέ γε αὕτη 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόδειξις'.
conclusion was and at-least this not there-is then proof
 ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' ἐκ περιτροπῆς.
true then is the not there-is proof out-of reversal
- 188 δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα
can and the arguments just-as also the purgative drugs
 ταῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἐαυτὰ συνεξάγει,
with-the in the body underlying matters themselves carry-out-together
 οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς
so also themselves with-the other arguments the demonstrative
 εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἐαυτοὺς συμπεριγράφειν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ
to-be said also themselves to-circumscribe-along this for not
 ἔστιν ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ αὕτη ἡ 'οὐδέν ἐστιν
is absurd since also the phrase this the nothing is
 ἀληθές' οὐ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
true not only of-the others each destroys but also

εαυτήν ἐκείνοις συμπεριτρέπει. ὁ τε λόγος οὗτος δύναται
itself with-those overturns-along the both argument this can
 δείκνυσθαι ἀσύνακτος· εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις·
to-be-shown inconclusive if there-is proof there-is proof
 εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ
if not there-is proof is proof either and there-is or
 οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν ἄρα, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν, ὥς δὲ
not there-is there-is then and through more indeed as and
 πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀρκούντως διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.
for the present sufficiently through this the argument
 εἰ ὑγιὲς ἐστι τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο· εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν
if sound is the conditional this if there-is proof there-is
 ἀπόδειξις, δεῖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος,
proof it-is-necessary the opposite of-the in it consequent
 τουτέστι τὸ ‘οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις’, μάχεσθαι τῷ ‘ἔστιν
that-is the not there-is proof to-conflict with-the there-is
 ἀπόδειξις’. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συνημμένου τὸ ἡγούμενον.
proof this for is of-the conditional the antecedent
 ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς συνημμένον ὑγιὲς
impossible and it-is according-to them a-conditional sound
 εἶναι ἐκ μαχομένων ἀξιωμαίων συνεστώς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
to-be out-of conflicting propositions composed the indeed for
 συνημμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένου
conditional promises being the in it antecedent
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ λήγον, τὰ δὲ μαχόμενα τουναντίον, ὄντος
to-be also the consequent the and conflicting-(things) the-opposite being
 τοῦ ἐτέρου αὐτῶν ὁποιοῦδήποτε ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν
the other of-them whichever impossible to-be the remaining
 ὑπάρχειν. ὄντος ἄρα ὑγιούς τοῦδε τοῦ συνημμένου· εἰ ἔστιν
to-exist being then sound of-this the conditional if there-is

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- ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' οὐ δύναται ὑγιὲς εἶναι τοῦτο
proof there-is proof not can sound to-be this
 τὸ συνημμένον 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.'
the conditional if not there-is proof there-is proof
 190 πάλιν δ' αὖ συγχωρούντων ἡμῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ὑγιὲς εἶναι
again and in-turn conceding us by hypothesis sound to-be
 τόδε τὸ συνημμένον 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις',
this the conditional if not there-is proof there-is proof
 δύναται συνυπάρχειν τὸ 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' τῷ 'οὐκ ἔστιν
it-can to-co-exist the if there-is proof with-the not there-is
 ἀπόδειξις'. εἰ δὲ δύναται αὐτῷ συνυπάρχειν, οὐ μάχεται αὐτῷ.
proof if and it-can with-it to-co-exist not it-conflicts with-it
 ἐν ἄρα τῷ 'εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' συνημμένῳ οὐ
in then the if there-is proof there-is proof conditional not
 μάχεται τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγοντος τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ
conflicts the opposite of-the in it consequent with-the in it
 ἡγουμένῳ, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται ὑγιὲς πάλιν τοῦτο τὸ συνημμένον,
antecedent so-that not will-be sound again this the conditional
 191 ἐκεῖνου κατὰ συγχώρησιν ὡς ὑγιοῦς τιθεμένου, μὴ μαχομένου
that by concession as sound being-positd not conflicting
 δὲ τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις' τῷ 'ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις'. οὐδὲ τὸ
and the not there-is proof with-the there-is proof not-even the
 διεξευγμένον ὑγιὲς ἔσται τὸ 'ἢτοι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν
disjunctive sound will-be the either there-is proof or not there-is
 ἀπόδειξις'. τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς διεξευγμένον ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν τῶν
proof the for sound disjunctive promises one of-the
 ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγιὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ψεῦδος
in it sound to-be the and remaining or the remaining-(ones) false
 ἢ ψευδῇ μετὰ μάχης. ἢ εἴπερ ὑγιὲς ἐστι τὸ διεξευγμένον,
or false with conflict or if-indeed sound is the disjunctive
 πάλιν φαῦλον εὐρίσκεται τὸ 'εἰ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν
again faulty is-found the if not there-is proof there-is

ἀπόδειξις' συνημμένον, ἐκ μαχομένων συνεστώς. οὐκοῦν
proof conditional out-of conflicting composed therefore
 ἀσύμφωνά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀλλήλων ἀναιρετικά τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
discordant both is and of-one-another destructive the in the argument
 τῷ προειρημένῳ λήμματα· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὲς ὁ λόγος.
the aforesaid premises wherefore not is sound the argument
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ τι τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις
but not-even that follows something to-the opposites
 δύνανται δεικνύναι, μὴ ἔχοντες κριτήριον ἀκολουθίας, ὡς
they-can to-show not having a-criterion of-consequence as
 ἐπελογισάμεθα.

we-reasoned

Ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ περιουσίας λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ πιθανοὶ μὲν εἰσιν
these and out-of abundance we-say if for plausible indeed are
 οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγοι (ἔστωσαν γάρ), πιθαναὶ
the for the proof arguments let-them-be for plausible
 δὲ καὶ αἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν λεγόμεναι ἐπιχειρήσεις,
and also the against the proof said attempts
 ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, μὴ
to-suspend-judgment (it-is)-necessary also about the proof not
 μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ μὴ εἶναι λέγοντας.
more to-be proof than not to-be saying

περὶ συλλογισμῶν

II.18 · SYLLOGISMS

The syllogisms fall with proof, and the argument from redundancy already told against them. Sextus adds a separate objection. The premise every man is an animal is confirmed inductively from Socrates, Plato, and the rest, and then used to infer that Socrates is an animal, so the universal and the particular each wait on the other. The same circle appears in the hypothetical arguments, where the conditional and the observed coexistence confirm each other.

193 Διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν θρυλουμένων συλλογισμῶν ἴσως περιττόν
wherefore also about the harped-on syllogisms perhaps superfluous
 ἔστιν διεξιέναι, τοῦτο μὲν συμπεριτρεπομένων αὐτῶν τῇ
it-is to-go-through this indeed being-overtaken-along them with-the
 ὑπάρξει τῆς ἀποδείξεως (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκείνης μὴ οὔσης
existence of-the proof clear for that that not being
 οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος χώραν ἔχει), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
not-even demonstrative argument place has this and also
 δυνάμει διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν λελεγμένων ἀντειρηκότων
in-force through the before by-us said-(things) having-argued-against
 ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτε περὶ τῆς παρολκῆς διαλεγόμενοι
us against them when about the redundancy discoursing
 μέθοδόν τινα ἐλέγομεν δι' ἧς ἐνδέχεται δεικνύναι, ὅτι
a-method some we-said through which it-is-possible to-show that
 πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ λόγοι τῶν τε Στωικῶν καὶ τῶν
all the demonstrative arguments of-the both Stoics and the
 Περιπατητικῶν ἀσύνακτοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες.

Peripatetics inconclusive happen being
 194 ἔξ ἐπιμέτρου δὲ οὐ χεῖρον ἴσως καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ αὐτῶν
out-of addition and not worse perhaps also separately about them
 διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ μάλιστα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς μέγα φρονοῦσιν.
to-treat since especially in them greatly they-pride-themselves
 πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι λέγειν τὸ ἀνυπόστατον αὐτῶν
many indeed then it-is-possible to-say the unreality of-them
 ὑπομνησκοντας· ὥς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει δὲ ἀρκεῖ τῇδε τῇ
reminding as in an-outline and it-suffices this the
 μεθόδῳ χρῆσθαι κατὰ αὐτῶν. λέξω δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ
method to-use against them I-shall-speak and also now about
 τῶν ἀναποδείκτων· τούτων γὰρ ἀναιρουμένων καὶ οἱ
the indemonstrables these for being-destroyed also the

λοιποὶ σύμπαντες λόγοι διατρέπονται, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ
remaining all arguments are-overturned the proof of-the
 συνάγειν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

to-infer from them having

Ἡ πρότασις τοίνυν αὕτη 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν' ἐκ
the premise then this every man an-animal out-of

195

τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βεβαιοῦται· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ
the according-to part inductively is-confirmed out-of for the

Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον ὄντα καὶ ζῶν εἶναι, καὶ Πλάτωνα
Socrates a-man being also an-animal to-be and Plato

ὁμοίως καὶ Δίωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ μέρος, δυνατόν
likewise and Dion and each of-the according-to part possible

εἶναι δοκεῖ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν
to-be it-seems to-affirm also that every man an-animal

ἐστίν, ὥς εἰ κὰν ἓν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντιούμενον
is so-that if even one something of-the according-to part opposed

φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγιὴς ἡ καθόλου πρότασις,
should-appear to-the others not is sound the universal premise

οἷον γοῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν πλείστα τῶν ζῶων τὴν κάτω
such-as at-any-rate since the indeed most of-the animals the lower

γένυν κινεῖ, μόνος δὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος τὴν ἄνω, οὐκ ἔστιν
jaw moves alone and the crocodile the upper not is

ἀληθὴς ἡ 'πᾶν ζῶον τὴν κάτω γένυν κινεῖ' πρότασις.
true the every animal the lower jaw moves premise

ὅταν οὖν λέγωσι 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, Σωκράτης δ'
when then they-say every man an-animal Socrates and

196

ἄνθρωπος, Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον', ἐκ τῆς καθόλου
a-man Socrates then an-animal out-of the universal

προτάσεως τῆς 'πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον' τὴν κατὰ μέρος
premise the every man an-animal the according-to part

πρότασιν συνάγειν βουλόμενοι, τὴν 'Σωκράτης ἄρα ζῶον',
premise to-infer wishing the Socrates then an-animal

ἡ δὴ βεβαιωτικὴ τῆς καθολικῆς προτάσεως ἐστὶ
which indeed confirmatory of-the universal premise is
 κατὰ τὸν ἐπαγωγικὸν τρόπον, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, εἰς τὸν
according-to the inductive manner as we-recalled into the
 διάλληλον ἐπίπτουσι λόγον, τὴν μὲν καθολικὴν πρότασιν
circular they-fall argument the indeed universal premise
 δι' ἐκάστης τῶν κατὰ μέρος ***

through each of-the according-to part (lacuna)
 197 ἐκ τῆς καθολικῆς συλλογιστικῶς. παραπλησίως δὲ
out-of the universal syllogistically similarly and
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου Ὡκράτης ἄνθρωπος,
also in the such argument Socrates a-man
 οὐδεὶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος τετράπους, Ὡκράτης ἄρα οὐκ
no and man four-footed Socrates then not
 ἐστὶ τετράπους' τὴν μὲν οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος τετράπους'
is four-footed the indeed no man four-footed
 πρότασιν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπαγωγικῶς βουλόμενοι
premise out-of the according-to part inductively wishing
 βεβαιοῦν, ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐκ τῆς οὐδεὶς
to-confirm each and of-the according-to part out-of the no
 ἄνθρωπος τετράπους' συλλογίζεσθαι θέλοντες, τῇ κατὰ
man four-footed to-infer wishing the according-to
 τὸν διάλληλον ἀπορίᾳ περιπίπτουσι.
the circular impasse they-fall-into

198 ὁμοίως δὲ ἐφοδευτέον καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς
likewise and (it-is)-to-be-gone-over also the remaining of-the among the
 Περιπατητικοῖς λεγομένων ἀναποδείκτων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
Peripatetics called indemonstrables but also the
 τοιούτους 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν'. τό τε γὰρ 'εἰ ἡμέρα
such if day it-is light it-is the both for if day
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνακτικόν ἐστιν, ὡς φασί, τοῦ 'φῶς ἔστι', τό
it-is light it-is conclusive is as they-say of-the light it-is the

τε 'φῶς ἔστι' μετὰ τοῦ 'ἡμέρα ἔστι' βεβαιωτικόν ἐστι τοῦ 'εἰ
and light is with the day it-is confirmatory is of-the if
ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν'. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιὲς ἐνομίσθη τὸ
day it-is light it-is not for — sound would-have-been-thought the
προειρημένον συνημμένον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τεθεώρητο
aforesaid conditional to-be if not first it-had-been-observed
συνυπάρχον ἀεὶ τὸ 'φῶς ἔστι' τῷ 'ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.

co-existing always the light it-is with-the day it-is
εἰ οὖν δεῖ προκατεληφέναι, ὅτι ἡμέρας οὔσης πάντως 199
if then it-is-necessary to-have-grasped-beforehand that day being altogether
ἔστι καὶ φῶς, εἰς τὸ συνθεῖναι τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι'
there-is also light for the to-compose the if day it-is light it-is
συνημμένον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ συνημμένου τούτου συνάγεται
conditional through and the conditional this is-inferred
τὸ ὅτι ἡμέρας οὔσης φῶς ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν συνύπαρξιν τοῦ
the that day being light it-is the indeed co-existence of-the
ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ φῶς εἶναι συνάγοντος τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα
day to-be and of-the light to-be inferring the if day
ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένου ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ προκειμένῳ
it-is light it-is conditional as-far upon the proposed
ἀναποδείκτω, τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τῆς συνυπάρξεως τῶν
indemonstrable the and conditional the co-existence of-the
προειρημένων βεβαιούσης, κἀνταῦθα ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος
aforesaid-(things) confirming here-also the circular mode
τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνατρέπει τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λόγου.

of-the impasse overturns the existence of-the argument
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς 200
likewise and also in the such argument if day it-is light
ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'. ἐκ μὲν
it-is not and light it-is not then day it-is out-of indeed
γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἄνευ φωτὸς ἡμέραν θεωρεῖσθαι ὑγιὲς ἂν εἶναι
for the not without light day to-be-observed sound — to-be

νομισθείη τὸ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνημμένον, ὥς
 would-be-thought the if day it-is light it-is conditional so-that
 εἶγε καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἡμέρα μὲν φανείη ποτέ, φῶς δὲ
 if-indeed by hypothesis day indeed should-appear ever light and
 μή, ψεῦδος ἂν λεχθείη τὸ συνημμένον εἶναι· ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ
 not false — would-be-said the conditional to-be as-far and upon
 τῷ προειρημένῳ ἀναποδείκτω τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἡμέραν φωτὸς
 the aforesaid indemonstrable the not to-be day light
 μὴ ὄντος διὰ τοῦ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι' συνάγεται,
 not being through the if day it-is light it-is is-inferred
 ὥστε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βεβαίωσιν χρήζει
 so-that each of-them for the its-own confirmation needs
 τοῦ τὸ ἕτερον βεβαίως εἰληφθαι, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ
 the the other securely to-have-been-taken so-that through it
 πιστὸν γένηται κατὰ τὸν διάλληλον τρόπον.
 trustworthy it-may-become according-to the circular mode

201 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν
 but also out-of the not to-be-able with-one-another to-co-exist
 τινά, οἷον ἡμέραν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ νύκτα, τό τε
 some such-as day if it-should-happen and night the both
 ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τὸ 'οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ
 negative of-the conjunction the not day it-is and night
 ἔστι', καὶ τὸ διεξευγμένον, τὸ 'ἢτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ
 it-is and the disjunctive the either day it-is or night
 ἔστιν', ὑγιῇ νομίζοιτο ἂν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν
 it-is sound would-be-thought — to-be but the not to-co-exist
 αὐτὰ βεβαιῶσθαι νομίζουσι διὰ τε τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς
 them to-be-confirmed they-think through both the negative of-the
 συμπλοκῆς καὶ τοῦ διεξευγμένου, λέγοντες 'οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι
 conjunction and the disjunctive saying not day it-is
 καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν'.
 and night it-is but indeed night it-is not then day it-is

ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· οὐκ
either day it-is or night it-is but indeed night it-is not
 ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἢ ‘οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν’.
then day it-is or not and night it-is day then it-is
 ὅθεν ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν 202
whence we again reason that if indeed for the
 βεβαίωσιν τοῦ διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς
confirmation of-the disjunctive and the of-the conjunction
 ἀποφατικοῦ χρῆζομεν τοῦ προκατειληφέναι, ὅτι τὰ ἐν
negative we-need the to-have-grasped-beforehand that the in
 αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀξιιώματά ἐστιν ἀσυνύπαρκτα, τὸ δὲ
them contained propositions are incapable-of-co-existing the and
 ἀσυνύπαρκτα ταῦτα εἶναι συνάγειν δοκοῦσι διὰ τε τοῦ
incapable-of-co-existing these to-be to-infer they-seem through both the
 διεξευγμένου καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀποφατικοῦ, ὃ δι’
disjunctive and the of-the conjunction negative the through
 ἀλλήλων εἰσάγεται τρόπος, μὴ δυναμένων ἡμῶν μήτε τοῖς
one-another is-introduced mode not being-able us neither the
 προειρημένοις τροπικοῖς πιστεύειν ἄνευ τοῦ τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον
aforesaid mode-premises to-trust without the the incompatibility
 τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχομένων ἀξιωμάτων καταλαβεῖν, μήτε
of-the in them contained propositions to-apprehend nor
 τὸ ἀσυνύπαρκτον αὐτῶν διαβεβαιουῖσθαι πρὸ τῆς τῶν
the incompatibility of-them to-affirm before the of-the
 συλλογισμῶν διὰ τῶν τροπικῶν συνερωτήσεως.
syllogisms through the mode-premises questioning
 διόπερ οὐκ ἔχοντες, πόθεν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς πίστεως διὰ τὸ 203
wherefore not having whence we-shall-begin the proof through the
 παλίνδρομον, λέξομεν μήτε τὸν τρίτον μήτε τὸν τέταρτον
running-back we-shall-say neither the third nor the fourth

μήτε τὸν πέμπτον τῶν ἀναποδείκτων ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις
 nor the fifth of-the indemonstrables as-far upon these
 ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν.

existence to-have

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ συλλογισμῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος
 so-much indeed also about syllogisms for the present
 ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι.

it-will-suffice to-have-been-said

περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς

II.19 • INDUCTION

Induction is easily set aside. To confirm the universal from the particulars, one must review either all of them or some. If some, the induction is insecure, since an omitted particular may oppose the universal. If all, the labor is impossible, for the particulars are infinite and unbounded. Either way the induction is shaken.

204 Εὐπαράιτητον δὲ εἶναι νομίζω καὶ τὸν περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς
 easily-set-aside and to-be I-think also the about induction
 τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πιστοῦσθαι
 manner since for from the according-to part to-confirm
 βούλονται δι' αὐτῆς τὸ καθόλου, ἥτοι πάντα ἐπιόντες τὰ
 they-wish through it the universal either all going-over the
 κατὰ μέρος τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν ἢ τινά. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τινά,
 according-to part this they-will-do or some but if indeed some
 ἀβέβαιος ἔσται ἡ ἐπαγωγή, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐναντιοῦσθαι
 insecure will-be the induction it-being-possible the to-be-opposed
 τῷ καθόλου τινὰ τῶν παραλειπομένων κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ
 to-the universal some of-the omitted according-to part in the
 ἐπαγωγῇ· εἰ δὲ πάντα, ἀδύνατα μοχθήσουσιν, ἀπείρων
 induction if and all impossible-(things) they-will-labor-at infinite

ὄντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀπεριορίστων. ὥσθ' οὕτως
being the according-to part and unbounded so-that thus
 ἐκατέρωθεν, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει σαλεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν.
from-both-sides I-think it-happens to-be-shaken the induction

περὶ ὄρων

II.20 · DEFINITIONS

Definitions are said to be necessary either for apprehension or for teaching, and they are neither. A man who does not know the thing cannot define it, and one who knows it has apprehended it already. Definitions are judged from the particulars they cover, which are infinite. And they roll obscurity over the plainest matter, as when a man asks a rational mortal animal whether he has met a broad-nailed laughing animal riding a whinnying one.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ περὶ ὄρων δὴ τεχνολογία μέγα 205
but also on the about definitions indeed technical-treatment greatly
 φρονοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοί, ἣν τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς
they-pride-themselves the dogmatists which to-the logical part of-the
 καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας ἐγκαταλέγουσιν. φέρε οὖν καὶ περὶ
called philosophy they-assign come then also about
 ὄρων ὀλίγα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἵπωμεν.
definitions few-(things) for the present let-us-say
 Πρὸς πολλὰ τοίνυν χρησιμεύειν τοὺς ὄρους τῶν
for many-(things) then to-be-useful the definitions of-the
 δογματικῶν δοκούντων, δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω κεφάλαια ἃ
dogmatists thinking two the highest heads which
 περιληπτικὰ
comprehensive

- 206 πάσης λέγουσιν ἀναγκαιότητος αὐτῶν ἴσως εὐρήσεις· ἢ
of-all they-say necessity of-them perhaps you-will-find either
 γὰρ ὡς πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ ὡς πρὸς διδασκαλίαν ἐν
for as for apprehension or as for teaching in
 πᾶσι παραδεικνύουσι τοὺς ὅρους ἀναγκαίους. ἐὰν οὖν
all they-display the definitions necessary if then
 ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων χρησιμεύουσι,
we-recall that for neither of-these they-are-useful
 περιτρέψομεν, οἶμαι, πᾶσαν τὴν γεγεννημένην περὶ αὐτῶν
we-shall-overturn I-think all the arisen about them
 παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ματαιοπονίαν.
among the dogmatists vain-labor
- 207 εὐθέως οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀγνοῶν τὸ ὀριστὸν οὐχ οἷός
immediately then if the-(one) indeed not-knowing the definiendum not able
 τέ ἐστι τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον αὐτῷ ὀρίσασθαι, ὁ
and is the not known to-him to-define the-(one)
 δὲ γινώσκων, εἴθ' ὀριζόμενος οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ὅρου τὸ
and knowing then defining not out-of the definition the
 ὀριστὸν κατείληφεν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προκατελημμένῳ τούτῳ τὸν
definiendum has-apprehended but upon already-apprehended this the
 ὅρον ἐπισυντέθεικεν, πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν πραγμάτων
definition he-has-added-on for apprehension of-the things
 ὁ ὅρος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖος. καὶ γὰρ ἐπεὶ πάντα μὲν
the definition not is necessary and for since all-(things) indeed
 ὀρίζεσθαι θέλοντες καθάπαξ οὐδὲν ὀρισόμεθα διὰ τὴν εἰς
to-define wishing absolutely nothing we-shall-define through the into
 ἄπειρον ἔκπτωσιν, τινὰ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ δίχα
infinity falling some and to-be-apprehended also apart-from
 τῶν ὅρων ὁμολογοῦντες οὐκ ἀναγκαίους πρὸς κατάληψιν
the definitions admitting not necessary for apprehension
 τοὺς ὅρους ἀποφαίνομεν, καθ' ὃν τρόπον τὰ
the definitions we-declare according-to which manner the-(things)

μὴ ὀρισθέντα κατελήφθη, δυναμένων ἡμῶν πάντα χωρὶς
not defined were-apprehended being-able us all-(things) apart-from
 τῶν ὄρων καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ καθάπαξ
the definitions to-apprehend or absolutely
 οὐδὲν ὀρισόμεθα ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαίους τοὺς ὄρους ἀποφανοῦμεν. 208
nothing we-shall-define or not necessary the definitions we-shall-declare
 διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πρὸς διδασκαλίαν αὐτοὺς εὔρομεν
through and these not-even for teaching them would-we-find
 ἂν ἀναγκαίους· ὥς γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος τὸ πρᾶγμα γνούς
— necessary as for the-(one) first the thing having-known
 ἔγνω τοῦτο χωρὶς ὄρου, κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον καὶ
knew this apart-from a-definition according-to the similar also
 ὁ διδασκόμενος αὐτὸ δύναται χωρὶς ὄρου διδαχθῆναι.
the-(one) being-taught it can apart-from a-definition to-be-taught
 ἔτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀριστῶν ἐπικρίνουσι τοὺς ὄρους, καὶ φασι 209
further from the definienda they-judge the definitions and they-say
 μοχθηροὺς ὄρους εἶναι τοὺς περιέχοντάς τι τῶν
faulty definitions to-be the-(ones) containing something of-the
 μὴ προσόντων τοῖς ὀριστοῖς, ἥτοι πᾶσιν ἢ τισίν. διόπερ
not belonging to-the definienda either to-all or to-some wherefore
 ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικόν
when says someone the man to-be an-animal rational
 ἀθάνατον ἢ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν γραμματικόν, ὅπου
immortal or an-animal rational mortal literate where
 μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἀθανάτου, ὅπου δὲ τινῶν
indeed no being man immortal where and some
 μὴ γραμματικῶν ὄντων, φασὶ μοχθηρὸν εἶναι τὸν ὄρον.
not literate being they-say faulty to-be the definition
 τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀνεπίκριτοί εἰσιν οἱ ὄροι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν 210
perhaps and also undecidable are the definitions through the infinity
 τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἐξ ὧν ἐπικρίνεσθαι ὀφείλουσιν· εἴτα
of-the according-to part out-of which to-be-judged they-ought then

οὐκ ἂν καταληπτικοί τε καὶ διδακτικοὶ τούτων εἶεν ἔξ
not — apprehensive both and instructive of-these they-would-be out-of
 ὧν ἐπικρίνονται δηλονότι προεπεγνωσμένων, εἴγε ἄρα, καὶ
which they-are-judged clearly known-beforehand if-indeed then also
 προκατειλημμένων. πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γελοῖον τὸ λέγειν
already-apprehended how and not — would-it-be ridiculous the to-say
 ὡς οἱ ὅροι χρησιμεύουσι πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ διδασκαλίαν ἢ
that the definitions are-useful for apprehension or teaching or
 σαφήνειαν ὅλως, ἀσάφειαν ἡμῖν ἐπεισκευκλουντες τοσαύτην;
clarity at-all obscurity to-us rolling-in so-great
 211 οἶον γοῦν, ἵνα τι καὶ παίξωμεν, εἴ τις
for-instance at-any-rate so-that something also we-may-play if someone
 παρά του βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι εἰ ἀπήντηται αὐτῷ
from someone wishing to-learn whether has-met him
 ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ ἵππου ὀχούμενος καὶ κύνα ἐφελκόμενος,
a-man on a-horse riding and a-dog dragging-along
 τὴν ἐρώτησιν οὕτω ποιήσαιο ὥς ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν,
the question thus should-make O animal rational mortal
 νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, ἀπήντητό σοι ζῶον
of-mind and of-knowledge receptive has-met you an-animal
 γελαστικὸν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτικόν,
capable-of-laughter broad-nailed of-knowledge political receptive
 ζῳῷ θνητῷ χρεμετιστικῷ τὰ σφαιρώματα ἐφηδρακός,
on-an-animal mortal whimmying the rump seated
 ἐφελκόμενον ζῶον τετράπουν ὑλακτικόν; πῶς οὐκ
dragging-along an-animal four-footed barking how not
 ἂν εἴη καταγέλαστος, εἰς ἀφασίαν οὕτω γνωρίμου
— would-be ridiculous into speechlessness so familiar
 πράγματος ἐμβαλὼν τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοὺς ὅρους;
a-matter having-thrown the man because-of the definitions
 οὐκοῦν ἄχρηστον εἶναι τὸν ὅρον ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτοις λεκτέον,
therefore useless to-be the definition so-far-as upon these must-be-said

εἴτ' οὖν λόγος εἶναι λέγοιτο διὰ βραχείας ὑπομνήσεως 212
whether then account to-be it-should-be-said through a-brief reminder
 εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡμᾶς ἄγων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ταῖς φωναῖς
to a-conception us leading of-the ranged-under the words
 πραγμάτων, ὡς δῆλόν γε (οὐ γάρ;) ἐκ τῶν μικρῶ
things as clear indeed not for from the-things a-little
 πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων, εἴτε λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν
before by-us said or-whether account the-one the what it-was
 εἶναι δηλῶν, εἴτε ὁ βούλεται τις. καὶ γὰρ τί ἐστίν
to-be showing or-whether what wishes anyone and for what is
 ὁ ὅρος βουλόμενοι παριστᾶν εἰς ἀνήνυτον ἐμπίπτουσι
the definition wishing to-establish into an-endless they-fall
 διαφωνίαν, ἣν διὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς γραφῆς παρήμι
disagreement which because-of the plan of-the writing I-pass-over
 νῦν, εἴγε καὶ δοκεῖ διατρέπειν τοὺς ὅρους ὅσα ἐν τούτοις
now if-indeed also it-seems to-overturn the definitions whatever in these
 περὶ τοῦ ἄχρηστον εἶναι τὸν ὅρον ἐλέγομεν. Τοσαῦτα
concerning the useless to-be the definition we-were-saying so-much
 μὲν καὶ περὶ ὅρων ἀπόχρη μοι νῦν λελέχθαι.
indeed also concerning definitions it-suffices for-me now to-have-been-said

περὶ διαιρέσεως

II.21 • DIVISION

Some dogmatists call dialectic the science of syllogism, induction, definition, and division. Having discussed the rest, Sextus turns to division. It is said to occur in four ways: a name into what it signifies, a whole into parts, a genus into species, and a species into particulars. He undertakes to show that there is no science of any of them.

213 Ἐπεὶ δέ τινες τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν διαλεκτικὴν εἶναι φασιν
 since but some of-the dogmatists the dialectic to-be say
 ἐπιστήμην συλλογιστικὴν ἐπαγωγικὴν ὀριστικὴν διαιρετικὴν,
 a-science syllogistic inductive definitional divisional
 διελέχθημεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ἤδη, μετὰ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου
 we-have-discussed and we already after the concerning the criterion
 καὶ τοῦ σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγους, περί τε
 and the sign and the proof accounts concerning and
 συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ περὶ ὄρων, οὐκ ἄτοπον
 syllogisms and induction and concerning definitions not out-of-place
 ἡγούμεθα εἶναι καὶ περὶ διαιρέσεως βραχέα διαλαβεῖν.
 we-consider to-be also concerning division briefly to-treat
 γίνεσθαι τοῖνυν τὴν διαίρεσιν φασι τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ
 to-come-about now the division they-say in-four-ways either for
 ὄνομα εἰς σημαίνοντα διαιρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλον εἰς μέρη ἢ γένος
 a-name into things-signified is-divided or a-whole into parts or a-genus
 εἰς εἶδη ἢ εἶδος εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὅτι δὲ οὐδενὸς
 into species or a-species into the according-to each that and of-none
 τούτων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη διαιρετική, ῥάδιον ἴσως ἐπελθεῖν.
 of-these there-is a-science divisional easy perhaps to-go-over

περὶ τῆς ὀνόματος εἰς σημαίνοντα διαιρέσεως

II.22 · DIVIDING A NAME INTO ITS MEANINGS

Sciences are said to be of what holds by nature, not by convention, since a science wants a firm and unchanging object. Names signify by convention, not by nature, or Greeks and barbarians would understand alike; and what they signify is up to us, who may always give other names. So there can be no science of dividing a name into its meanings, nor the science of signifiers and signified that some take dialectic to be.

Εὐθέως οὖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν φύσει φασὶν εἶναι, 214
immediately then the sciences of-the-things by-nature they-say to-be
 τῶν θέσει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ εἰκότως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
of-the-things by-convention but by-no-means and reasonably the indeed for
 ἐπιστήμη βέβαιόν τι καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον πρᾶγμα εἶναι
science firm something and unchangeable a-thing to-be
 θέλει, τὰ δὲ θέσει ῥαδίαν ἔχει καὶ εὐμετάπτωτον
wants the-things but by-convention an-easy have and readily-changing
 τὴν μεταβολήν, ταῖς ἐναλλαγαῖς τῶν θέσεων, αἶ εἰσιν
the alteration by-the interchanges of-the conventions which are
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐτεροιοῦμενα. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ὀνόματα θέσει
up-to us being-made-other since then the names by-convention
 σημαίνει καὶ οὐ φύσει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν συνίεσαν πάντα
signify and not by-nature all for — would-understand all
 τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα, ὁμοίως Ἑλληνές
the-things by the utterances signified alike Greeks
 τε καὶ βάρβαροι, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὰ
both and barbarians besides the-fact also up-to us to-be the-things
 σημαινόμενα οἷς ἂν βουλώμεθα ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἑτέροις
signified with-which — we-may-wish names and others
 ἀεὶ δηλοῦν τε καὶ σημαίνειν), πῶς ἂν δυνατόν εἴη
always to-indicate both and to-signify how — possible would-be
 διαιρετικὴν ὀνόματος εἰς σημαινόμενα ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;
divisional of-a-name into things-signified a-science to-be
 ἢ πῶς ἐπιστήμη σημαινόντων τε καὶ σημαινομένων, ὥς
or how a-science of-things-signifying both and of-things-signified as
 οἴονται τινες, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ δύναιτ' ἂν ὑπάρχειν;
think some the dialectic could — exist

περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους

II.23 • WHOLE AND PART

Ten is said to divide into one, two, three, and four; but as soon as the first part is taken away the ten is no longer there, and each further subtraction is made from something else. And if the parts of ten are all contained in it, then nine, eight, seven, and the rest are contained too, which with the ten itself make fifty-five. The same follows for magnitudes, so a whole cannot be divided into its parts.

- 215 Περὶ δὲ ὅλου καὶ μέρους διαλεξόμεθα μὲν καὶ ἐν
concerning but a-whole and a-part we-shall-discuss indeed also in
 τοῖς φυσικοῖς δὴ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος περὶ
the physical so called for but the present concerning
 τῆς λεγομένης διαιρέσεως τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ
the so-called division of-the whole into the parts of-it
 τάδε λεκτέον. ὅταν λέγῃ τις διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα
these-things must-be-said when says someone is-divided the ten
 εἰς μονάδα καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, οὐ διαιρεῖται
into a-unit and two and three and four not is-divided
 εἰς ταῦτα ἢ δεκάς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς
into these the ten together for with-the the first of-it
 ἀρθῆναι μέρος, ἵνα κατὰ συγχώρησιν νῦν τοῦτο
being-taken-away part so-that by concession now this
 δώμεν, οἶον τὴν μονάδα, οὐκέτι ὑπόκειται ἢ δεκάς,
we-may-grant for-instance the unit no-longer remains the ten
 ἀλλ' ἐννέα καὶ ὅλως ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν δεκάδα.
but nine and generally another something beside the ten
- 216 ἢ οὖν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀφαίρεσις τε καὶ διαίρεσις οὐκ ἀπὸ
the then of-the remaining subtraction both and division not from
 τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τινων ἄλλων, καθ' ἐκάστην
the ten comes-about but from some others at each

ἀφαίρεσιν ἑτεροιοιμένων. τάχα οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὅλον
subtraction being-made-other perhaps then not it-is-possible the whole
 διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι αὐτοῦ μέρη. καὶ γὰρ εἰ
to-divide into the-things said to-be its parts and for if
 διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον εἰς μέρη, φιλεῖ τὰ μέρη ἐμπεριέχεσθαι
is-divided the whole into parts tends the parts to-be-contained
 τῷ ὅλῳ πρὸ τῆς διαιρέσεως, οὐ περιέχεται δὲ ἴσως.
in-the whole before the division not they-are-contained but perhaps
 οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος στήσωμεν πάλιν τὸν
for-instance at-any-rate so-that on the ten we-may-set again the
 λόγον, τῆς δεκάδος μέρος φασὶ πάντως εἶναι τὰ ἐννέα.
argument of-the ten a-part they-say certainly to-be the nine
 διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐννέα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὀκτὼ ὁμοίως.
it-is-divided for into one and nine but also the eight likewise
 διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς ὀκτὼ καὶ δύο. καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ ὁμοίως
it-is-divided for into eight and two and the seven likewise
 καὶ ἕξ καὶ πέντε καὶ τέσσαρα καὶ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν.
and six and five and four and three and two and one
 εἰ οὖν ταῦτα πάντα ἐν τῇ δεκάδι περιέχεται καὶ συντιθέμενα 217
if then these all in the ten are-contained and being-added-together
 μετ' αὐτῆς πεντεκαιπεντήκοντα γίνεται, ἐν τοῖς δέκα
with it fifty-five make in the ten
 περιέχεται πεντεκαιπεντήκοντα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν
are-contained fifty-five which-very-thing absurd therefore
 οὔτε περιέχεται ἐν τῇ δεκάδι τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτῆς εἶναι
neither are-contained in the ten the-things said its to-be
 μέρη, οὔτε ἡ δεκάς εἰς ἐκεῖνα διαιρεῖσθαι δύναται ὥς
parts nor the ten into those to-be-divided is-able as
 ὅλον εἰς μέρη, ἃ μηδὲ ὅλως ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖται.
a-whole into parts which not-even at-all in it are-observed

- 218 τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπαντήσεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν,
the but same-things will-meet-us also in-the-case-of the magnitudes
 ὅταν τὸ δεκάπηχυ μέγεθος, εἰ τύχοι, διαιρεῖν ἐθέλοι
when the ten-cubit magnitude if it-should-happen to-divide should-wish
 τις. οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὖν ἴσως διαιρεῖν οὐδὲ ὅλον εἰς μέρη.
someone not it-is-possible then perhaps to-divide not-even a-whole into parts

περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν

II.24 • GENERA AND SPECIES

If genera and species are concepts, the arguments against the ruling part and the impression overturn them. If they have a substance of their own, the species share their genus neither whole, since one thing cannot be wholly in many, nor in part, or man would be only part of an animal and each genus cut to infinity. Nor can a genus be both, one, or neither of its species' opposed qualities, nor all of them potentially, and 'man' proves no common appellation of Dion and Theon.

- 219 Οὐκοῦν ὁ περὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὑπολείπεται
therefore the concerning the genera and the species remains
 λόγος, περὶ οὗ πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις διαλεξόμεθα,
account concerning which more-fully indeed in other-places we-shall-discuss
 ὥς ἐν συντόμῳ δὲ νῦν ταῦτα λέξομεν. εἰ μὲν ἐννοήματα
as in brief but now these-things we-shall-say if indeed concepts
 εἶναι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη λέγουσιν, αἱ κατὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ
to-be the genera and the species they-say the against the ruling-part
 καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐπιχειρήσεις αὐτοὺς διατρέπουσιν· εἰ
and the impression arguments them overturn if
 δὲ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῖς ἀπολείπουσιν, τί πρὸς τοῦτο
but a-proper substance to-them they-allow what to this
 ἐροῦσιν;
will-they-say

εἰ ἔστι τὰ γένη, ἥτοι τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὅσα τὰ εἶδη, ἥ 220
 if there-are the genera either as-many they-are as the species or
 ἓν ἐστι κοινὸν πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ λεγομένων εἶναι
 one is common of-all the species of-it said to-be
 γένος. εἰ μὲν οὖν τοσαῦτά ἐστι τὰ γένη ὅσα τὰ εἶδη
 genus if indeed then as-many are the genera as the species
 αὐτῶν, οὐκέτ' ἂν εἴη κοινὸν γένος, ὃ εἰς αὐτὰ
 of-them no-longer — would-there-be a-common genus which into them
 διαιρεθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἓν εἶναι λέγοιτο ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς
 will-be-divided if but one to-be it-should-be-said in all the
 εἶδεσιν αὐτοῦ γένος, ἥτοι ὅλου αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον εἶδος
 species of-it genus either of-the-whole of-it each species
 αὐτοῦ μετέχει ἢ μέρους αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅλου μὲν οὐδαμῶς·
 of-it partakes or of-a-part of-it but of-the-whole indeed by-no-means
 ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐστιν ἓν τι ὑπάρχον ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ
 impossible for it-is one something existing in one-thing and
 ἄλλῳ κατὰ ταὐτὸ περιέχεσθαι οὕτως ὥς ὅλον ἐν ἐκάστῳ
 another in the-same to-be-contained thus so-as whole in each
 θεωρεῖσθαι τῶν ἐν οἷς εἶναι λέγεται. εἰ δὲ μέρους,
 to-be-observed of-the-things in which to-be it-is-said if but of-a-part
 πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθήσει τῷ εἶδει τὸ γένος πᾶν, ὥς
 first indeed not will-follow the species the genus whole as
 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ζῶον ἀλλὰ
 they-suppose nor the man will-be an-animal but
 μέρος ζώου, οἷον οὐσία, οὔτε δὲ ἔμψυχος οὔτε αἰσθητική.
 a-part of-an-animal such-as substance neither but animate nor sentient
 εἴτα μέντοι καὶ ἥτοι ταύτου λέγοιτο ἂν μετεσχηκέναι 221
 then moreover also either of-the-same it-would-be-said — to-have-partaken
 πάντα τὰ εἶδη μέρους τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐτέρου καὶ ἐτέρου.
 all the species part of-the genus of-them or of-one and of-another
 ἀλλὰ ταύτου μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα.
 but of-the-same indeed not it-is-possible because-of the-things said-before

εἰ δὲ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου, οὔτε ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις ἔσται τὰ εἶδη
 if but of-one and of-another neither like one-another will-be the species
 κατὰ γένος, ὅπερ οὐ προσδέχονται, ἄπειρόν τε ἔσται
 in genus which-very-thing not they-will-accept infinite and will-be
 γένος ἕκαστον εἰς ἄπειρα τεμνόμενον (οὐ μόνον τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ
 genus each into infinities being-cut not only the species but
 καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτοῖς μετὰ τῶν εἰδῶν
 also the according-to each in which also themselves with the species
 αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶον
 of-it it-is-observed not for only a-man but also an-animal
 ὁ Δίων εἶναι λέγεται). εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, οὐδὲ κατὰ
 — Dion to-be is-said if but these-things absurd neither according-to
 μέρος μετέσχκε τὰ εἶδη τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἐνὸς ὄντος.

222

εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅλου μετέσχηκεν ἕκαστον εἶδος τοῦ
 if but neither of-the-whole has-partaken each species of-the
 γένους μήτε μέρους αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν εἶναι
 genus nor of-a-part of-it how — could-it-be-said one to-be
 γένος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσιν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ
 genus in all the species of-it so-as also into them
 διαιρεῖσθαι; τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις λέγειν μὴ οὐχὶ
 to-be-divided perhaps not — would-be-able anyone to-say not not
 ἀναπλάσσωσιν τινὰς εἰδωλοποιήσεις, αἱ ταῖς ἐκείνων
 fabricating certain phantom-makings which by-the of-those
 αὐτῶν ἀνεπικρίτους διαφωνίας κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς
 same-men undecidable disagreements according-to the skeptical
 ἐφόδους περιτραπήσονται.

modes-of-attack will-be-overtaken

223

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ κεῖνο λεκτέον. τὰ εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα
 besides and these that-too must-be-said the species such or such
 ἔσθιν· τούτων τὰ γένη ἥτοι καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, ἢ τοῖα μὲν
 are of-these the genera either both such and such or such indeed

τοῖα δὲ οὐ, ἢ οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα. οἶον ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν
such but not or neither such nor such for-instance since of-the somethings
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ
some indeed are bodies some but incorporeal and some indeed true
 τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καὶ ἔνια μὲν λευκά, εἰ τύχοι, ἔνια δὲ
some but false and some indeed white if it-should-happen some but
 μέλανα, καὶ ἔνια μὲν μέγιστα ἔνια δὲ σμικρότατα, καὶ τὰ
black and some indeed greatest some but smallest and the
 ἄλλα ὁμοίως, τὸ τι λόγου ἔνεκεν, ὃ φασιν εἶναι
others likewise the something of-argument for-the-sake which say to-be
 τινες γενικώτατον, ἢ πάντα ἔσται ἢ τὰ ἕτερα ἢ οὐδέν.
some the-most-generic either all will-be or the others or none
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸ τι, οὐδὲ τὸ γένος, 224
but if indeed nothing is at-all the something nor the genus
 πέρας ἔχει ἢ ζήτησις. εἰ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ῥηθείη, πρὸς
an-end has the inquiry if but all-things to-be it-should-be-said besides
 τῷ ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ
the-fact impossible to-be the-thing said both the species and
 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ δεήσει πάντα εἶναι.
the according-to each in which it-is it-will-be-necessary all-things to-be
 ὥς γάρ, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῶον, ὥς φασίν, οὐσία ἐστὶν ἔμφυχος
as for since the animal as they-say a-substance is animate
 αἰσθητική, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία εἶναι
sentient each of-the species of-it both a-substance to-be
 λέγεται καὶ ἔμφυχος καὶ αἰσθητική, οὕτως εἰ τὸ γένος καὶ
is-said and animate and sentient so if the genus both
 σῶμά ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ψευδὲς καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ μέλαν,
a-body is and incorporeal and false and true and black
 εἰ τύχοι, καὶ λευκὸν καὶ σμικρότατον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ
if it-should-happen and white and smallest and greatest and

τὰλλα πάντα, ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον
the-rest all each of-the species and of-the according-to each
 πάντα ἔσται· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. ψεῦδος οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.
all-things will-be which-very-thing not is-observed false then also this
 225 εἰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα μόνα ἐστί, τούτων τὸ γένος τῶν λοιπῶν οὐκ
if but the others only it-is of-these the genus of-the rest not
 ἔσται γένος, οἷον εἰ σῶμα τὸ τί, τῶν ἀσωμάτων,
will-be a-genus for-instance if a-body the something of-the incorporeals
 καὶ εἰ λογικὸν τὸ ζῶον, τῶν ἀλόγων, ὥς μήτε ἀσώματόν
and if rational the animal of-the irrational so-that neither incorporeal
 τι εἶναι ζῶον μήτε ἄλογον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
anything to-be an-animal nor irrational and in-the-case-of the others
 ὁμοίως· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκοῦν οὔτε καὶ τοῖον καὶ τοῖον
likewise which-very-thing absurd therefore neither both such and such
 τὸ γένος, οὔτε τοῖον μὲν τοῖον δὲ οὔ, οὔτε μὴν οὔτε τοῖον
the genus nor such indeed such but not nor indeed neither such
 οὔτε τοῖον δύναται εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ
nor such can be if but this neither is-there at-all the
 γένος. εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι δυνάμει πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ γένος,
genus if but should-say someone that potentially all-things is the genus
 λέξομεν, ὥς τὸ δυνάμει τι ὄν δεῖ τι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ
we-shall-say that the-thing potentially something being must something also actually
 εἶναι, οἷον οὐ δύναται τις γραμματικὸς εἶναι εἰ μὴ καὶ
be for-instance not is-able anyone a-grammarian to-be if not also
 ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τὸ γένος οὖν εἰ δυνάμει πάντα ἐστίν, ἐρωτῶμεν
actually and the genus then if potentially all-things is we-ask
 αὐτοὺς τί ἐστὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ οὕτω μένουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ
them what it-is actually and thus remain the same
 ἀπορίαι. τὰναντία μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι οὐ δύναται.
difficulties the-opposites indeed for all actually to-be not can

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐνεργεία τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον, 226

but neither some indeed also actually some but potentially only
οἶον σῶμα μὲν ἐνεργεία, δυνάμει δὲ ἀσώματον. δυνάμει
for-instance a-body indeed actually potentially but incorporeal potentially
γάρ ἐστιν ὃ οἶόν τέ ἐστιν ἐνεργεία ὑποστῆναι, τὸ
for is that-which possible and is actually to-subsist the
δὲ σῶμα ἐνεργεία ὃν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἀσώματον γενέσθαι
but body actually being impossible it-is incorporeal to-become
κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ὥστε εἰ λόγου χάριν σῶμά τι
in actuality so-that if of-argument for-the-sake a-body something
ἔστιν ἐνεργεία, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματον δυνάμει, καὶ τὸ
is actually not it-is incorporeal potentially and the
ἀνάπαλιν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ γένος τὰ μὲν
reverse therefore not it-is-possible the genus some-things indeed
ἐνεργεία εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅλως
actually to-be some-things but potentially only if but nothing at-all
ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία, οὐδὲ ὑφέστηκεν. οὐκοῦν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ
it-is actually neither does-it-subsist therefore nothing is the
γένος, ὃ διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ εἶδη λέγουσιν.

genus which to-divide into the species they-say

ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο θεάσασθαι ἄξιον. ὥσπερ γάρ, ἐπεὶ ὁ 227

further also this to-observe worth just-as for since the
αὐτός ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Πάρις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ
same is Alexander and Paris not it-is-possible the
μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος περιπατεῖ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ Πάρις
indeed Alexander walks true to-be the but Paris
περιπατεῖ ψεῦδος, οὕτως εἰ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἀνθρωπῶν
walks false so if the same is the a-man
εἶναι Θέωνι καὶ Δίῳ, εἰς σύνταξιν ἀξιώματος ἀγομένη
to-be for-Theon and for-Dion into the-construction of-a-proposition brought
ἢ ἀνθρώπου προσηγορία ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπ'
the man appellation either true or false in-the-case-of

ἀμφοτέρων ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα. οὐ θεωρεῖται δὲ τοῦτο·

both will-make the proposition not is-observed but this

τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Δίωνος καθημένου Θεώνος δὲ περιπατοῦντος

the indeed for Dion sitting Theon but walking

τὸ ‘ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ’ ἐφ’ οὗ μὲν λεγόμενον

the man walks in-the-case-of which indeed said

ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἐφ’ οὗ δὲ ψεύδος. οὐκ ἄρα κοινή

true is in-the-case-of which but false not therefore common

ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ‘ἄνθρωπος’ προσηγορία, οὐδὲ ἡ αὕτη

is of-both the man appellation nor the same

ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἰδία ἐκατέρου.

for-both but if at-all proper to-each

περὶ κοινῶν συμβεβηκότων

II.25 • COMMON ACCIDENTS

If one and the same sight has happened to Dion and to Theon, and Dion perishes while Theon lives and sees, then either the dead man's sight remains indestructible or the same sight has both perished and not perished. Both are absurd, so Theon's sight is not the same as Dion's but proper to each. The same argument holds for breathing.

228 Παραπλήσια δὲ λέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν

similar-things and are-said also concerning the common

συμβεβηκότων. εἰ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συμβέβηκε Δίωνι

accidents if for one and the same has-happened to-Dion

τε καὶ Θεῶνι τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἐὰν καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν φθαρῇ μὲν

both and to-Theon the seeing if by hypothesis should-perish indeed

Δίῳν, Θεῶν δὲ περιῇ καὶ ὁρᾶ, ἥτοι τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ

Dion Theon but should-survive and should-see either the sight of-the

ἐφθαρμένου Δίωνος ἄφθαρτον μένειν ἐροῦσιν, ὅπερ

perished Dion indestructible to-remain they-will-say which-very-thing

ἀπεμφαίνει, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ὄρασις ἐφθάρθαι τε καὶ μὴ
is-absurd or the same sight to-have-perished both and not
ἐφθάρθαι λέξουσιν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ
to-have-perished they-will-say which-very-thing absurd not therefore the
Θέωνος ὄρασις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ Δίῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα,
of-Theon sight the same is to-the of-Dion but if at-all
ἰδία ἑκατέρου. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταῦτόν συμβέβηκε Δίῳ τε καὶ
proper to-each and for if the-same has-happened to-Dion both and
Θέῳ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἐν Θέῳ ἀναπνοὴν
to-Theon the breathing not it-is-possible the in Theon breath
εἶναι, τὴν ἐν Δίῳ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τοῦ μὲν
to-be the in Dion but not to-be it-is-possible but the one
φθαρέντος τοῦ δὲ περιόντος· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστίν.
having-perished the other surviving not therefore the same is
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον νῦν ἀρκέσει
concerning indeed then these to so-much now it-will-suffice
συντόμως λελέχθαι.
briefly to-have-been-said

περὶ σοφισμάτων

II.26 · SOPHISMS

Those who exalt dialectic say it is needed to solve sophisms, defining one as an argument plausibly framed toward a false, unclear, or unacceptable conclusion. Sextus argues the solution comes from experience of appearances, not dialectical rules, and that the dialectician cannot even distinguish a sophism from an argument that only seems properly framed. He extends this to ambiguity: everyday experience, not dialectic, teaches even children to resolve useful ambiguities, while the dialectician busied with ambiguities of no such use must himself suspend judgment. Here he closes the *Outlines'* second book.

- 229 Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως καὶ τῷ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων
not out-of-place and perhaps also the concerning the sophisms
 ἐπιστῆσαι λόγῳ διὰ βραχέων, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὴν τούτων
to-dwell-on account through few-words since also for the of-these
 διάλυσιν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν οἱ
solution necessary to-be say the dialectic those
 σεμνύνοντες αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ τῶν τε ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν
who-exalt it if for the both true and false
 λόγων, φασίν, ἐστὶν αὕτη διαγνωστική, ψευδεῖς δὲ λόγοι
arguments they-say is this discriminative false and arguments
 καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, καὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη διακριτικὴ
also the sophisms also of-these — it-would-be discerning
 λυμαινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν φαινομέναις πιθανότησιν.
damaging the truth by-apparent plausibilities
 ὅθεν ὡς βοηθοῦντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ σαλεύοντι τῷ βίῳ
whence as helping the dialecticians tossing the life
 καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις
both the conception and the differences and the solutions
 δὴ τῶν σοφισμάτων μετὰ σπουδῆς ἡμᾶς πειρῶνται
indeed of-the sophisms with earnestness us they-try
 διδάσκειν, λέγοντες σόφισμα εἶναι λόγον πιθανὸν καὶ
to-teach saying a-sophism to-be an-argument plausible and
 δεδολιευμένον ὥστε προσδέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἥτοι ψευδῇ
craftily-framed so-as to-accept the conclusion either false
 ἢ ὁμοιωμένην ψευδεῖ ἢ ἄδηλον ἢ ἄλλως ἀπρόσδεκτον,
or resembling a-falsehood or non-evident or otherwise unacceptable
 230 οἶον ψευδῇ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ σοφίσματος ἔχει
for-instance false indeed as in-the-case-of this the sophism it-runs
 ‘οὐδεὶς δίδωσι κατηγορήμα πιεῖν· κατηγορήμα δέ ἐστι τὸ
no-one gives a-predicate to-drink a-predicate but is the
 ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν· οὐδεὶς ἄρα δίδωσιν ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν’, ἔτι δὲ
wormwood to-drink no-one therefore gives wormwood to-drink further and

ὅμοιον ψευδεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ὃ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε
resembling a-falsehood as in-the-case-of this what neither was-possible nor
 ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄτοπον· οὔτε δὲ ἐνεδέχετο οὔτε
is-possible this not is absurd neither but was-possible nor
 ἐνδέχεται τὸ ὃ ἱατρός, καθὼς ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει· οὐκ
is-possible the the doctor in-so-far-as a-doctor he-is kills not
 ἄρα ἄτοπὸν ἐστι τὸ ὃ ἱατρός, καθὼς ἱατρός ἐστι, φονεύει’.

therefore absurd is the the doctor in-so-far-as a-doctor he-is kills

ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον οὕτως· οὐχὶ καὶ ἠρώτηκά τί σε 231

further and non-evident thus not both I-have-asked something you

πρῶτον, καὶ οὐχὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν· ἠρώτηκα δέ

first and not the stars even are I-have-asked but

τί σε πρῶτον· οἱ ἄρα ἀστέρες ἄρτιοί εἰσιν’. ἔτι

something you first the therefore stars even are further

δὲ ἀπρόσδεκτον ἄλλως, ὡς οἱ λεγόμενοι σολοικίζοντες

and unacceptable otherwise as the so-called solecizing

λόγοι, οἷον ὃ βλέπεις, ἔστιν· βλέπεις δὲ φρενιτικόν·

arguments for-instance what you-see exists you-see but a-delirious-man

ἔστιν ἄρα φρενιτικόν’. ὃ ὁράς, ἔστιν· ὁράς δὲ

exists therefore a-delirious-man what you-behold exists you-behold but

φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον· ἔστιν ἄρα φλεγμαίνοντα τόπον’.

inflamed a-place exists therefore inflamed a-place

εἴτα μέντοι καὶ τὰς ἐπιλύσεις αὐτῶν παριστᾶν ἐπιχειροῦσι, 232

then moreover also the solutions of-them to-present they-attempt

λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σοφίσματος, ὅτι ἄλλο

saying in-the-case-of indeed the first sophism that one-thing

διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συγκεχώρηται καὶ ἄλλο ἐπενήνεκται.

through the premises has-been-granted and another has-been-inferred

συγκεχώρηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ πίνεσθαι κατηγορήμα, καὶ εἶναι

has-been-granted for the not to-be-drunk a-predicate and to-be

κατηγορήμα τὸ ἀψίνθιον πίνειν, οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀψίνθιον.

a-predicate the wormwood to-drink not itself the wormwood

διὸ δέον ἐπιφέρειν 'οὐδεὶς ἄρα πίνει τὸ ἀψίνθιον
wherefore it-being-necessary to-infer no-one therefore drinks the wormwood
 πίνειν', ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἐπενήνεκται 'οὐδεὶς ἄρα
to-drink which-very-thing is true has-been-inferred no-one therefore
 ἀψίνθιον πίνει', ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, οὐ συναγόμενον
wormwood drinks which-very-thing is false not following
 ἐκ τῶν συγκεχωρημένων λημμάτων.

from the granted premises

233 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτι δοκεῖ μὲν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος
in-the-case-of and the second that it-seems indeed to a-falsehood
 ἀπάγειν ὡς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους ὀκνεῖν αὐτῷ
to-lead so-as to-make the inattentive to-hesitate to-it
 συγκατατίθεσθαι, συνάγει δὲ ἀληθές, τὸ 'οὐκ ἄρα ἄτοπόν
to-assent it-infers but a-truth the not therefore absurd
 ἐστὶ τὸ ὁ ἱατρός, καθὼς ἱατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει'. οὐδὲν
is the the doctor in-so-far-as a-doctor he-is kills no
 γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἄτοπόν ἐστίν, ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστὶ τὸ 'ὁ ἱατρός,
for proposition absurd is a-proposition but is the the doctor
 καθὼς ἱατρός ἐστὶ, φονεύει'. διὸ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον.
in-so-far-as a-doctor he-is kills wherefore neither this absurd
 ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγῇ, φασίν,

the and to the non-evident reduction they-say

234 ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γένους τῶν μεταπιπτόντων ἐστίν. μηδενὸς γὰρ
that from the class of-the shifting-arguments it-is nothing for
 προηρωτημένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀποφατικὸν
having-been-asked-beforehand according-to the hypothesis the negative
 τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἀληθὲς γίνεται, ψευδοῦς τῆς συμπλοκῆς
of-the conjunction true becomes false the conjunction
 οὔσης παρὰ τὸ ἐμπεπλέχθαι ψεῦδος τὸ 'ἠρώτηκά
being because-of the having-been-conjoined a-falsehood the I-have-asked
 τί σε πρῶτον' ἐν αὐτῇ. μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθῆναι τὸ
something you first in it after but the being-asked the

ἀποφατικὸν τῆς συμπλοκῆς, τῆς προσλήψεως ἀληθοῦς
 negative of-the conjunction the assumption true
 γενομένης ἡρώτηκα δέ τί σε πρῶτον, διὰ τὸ
 having-been-asked I-have-asked but something you first because-of the
 ἡρωτῆσθαι πρὸ τῆς προσλήψεως τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τῆς
 having-been-asked before the assumption the negative of-the
 συμπλοκῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς συμπλοκῆς πρότασις
 conjunction the of-the negative of-the conjunction premise
 γίνεται ψευδῆς τοῦ ἐν τῷ συμπεπλεγμένῳ ψεύδους
 becomes false the in the conjunction falsehood
 γενομένου ἀληθοῦς· ὥς μηδέποτε δύνασθαι συναχθῆναι
 having-been-asked true so-that never to-be-able to-be-inferred
 τὸ συμπέρασμα μὴ συνυπάρχοντος τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ τῆς
 the conclusion not co-existing the negative of-the
 συμπλοκῆς τῇ προσλήψει.
 conjunction with-the assumption

τοὺς δὲ τελευταίους, φασὶν ἔνιοι, τοὺς σολοικίζοντας 235
 the but last say some the solecizing
 λόγους, ἀτόπως ἐπάγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν.
 arguments absurdly to-be-inferred contrary-to the usage
 Τοιαῦτα μὲν οὖν τινες διαλεκτικοὶ φασὶ περὶ σοφισμάτων
 such-things indeed then some dialecticians say concerning sophisms
 (καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄλλα λέγουσιν). ταῦτα δὲ τὰς μὲν
 and for others other-things say these-things but the indeed
 τῶν εἰκαιωτέρων ἀκοὰς ἴσως δύναται γαργαλίζειν, περιττὰ
 of-the rather-thoughtless ears perhaps can tickle superfluous
 δέ ἐστι καὶ μάτην αὐτοῖς πεπονημένα. καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν
 but they-are and in-vain by-them labored-over and this possible
 μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἤδη λελεγμένων ἡμῖν ὁρᾶν·
 indeed perhaps also from the-things already said by-us to-see
 ὑπεμνήσαμεν γάρ, ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος
 we-recalled for that not can the true and the false

κατὰ τοὺς διαλεκτικούς καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ποικίλως τε
according-to the dialecticians be-apprehended variously both
 ἄλλως καὶ τῷ τὰ μαρτύρια τῆς συλλογιστικῆς δυνάμεως
otherwise and by-the the witnesses of-the syllogistic power
 αὐτῶν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους διατρέπεσθαι
of-them the proof and the indemonstrables being-overtaken
 λόγους.

arguments

236 εἰς δὲ τὸν προκείμενον τρόπον ἰδίως καὶ ἄλλα μὲν
for but the present topic specifically also other-things indeed
 πολλὰ λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ὥς δὲ ἐν συντόμῳ νῦν τόδε λεκτέον.
many to-say it-is-possible as but in brief now this must-be-said
 ὅσα μὲν σοφίσματα ἰδίως ἢ διαλεκτικὴ δύνασθαι δοκεῖ
whatever indeed sophisms specifically the dialectic to-be-able seems
 διελέγχειν, τούτων ἢ διάλυσιν ἄχρηστος ἐστίν· ὅσων
to-refute of-these the solution useless is of-whatever
 δὲ ἢ διάλυσιν χρησιμεύει, ταῦτα ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικός
but the solution is-useful these the indeed dialectician
 οὐκ ἂν διαλύσειεν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν
not — could-solve those but in each art the in the
 πραγμάτων παρακολούθησιν ἐσχηκότες.

things familiarity who-have-gained

237 εὐθέως γοῦν, ἵνα ἐνὸς ἢ δευτέρου μνησθῶμεν
immediately at-any-rate so-that of-one or a-second we-may-mention
 παραδείγματος, ἐρωτηθέντος τοιούτου σοφίσματος 'κατὰ
example having-been-put such-a sophism in
 τὰς νόσους ἐν ταῖς παρακαμαῖς τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαίταν
the diseases in the remissions the both varied diet
 καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον· ἐπὶ πάσης δὲ τυπώσεως
and the wine must-be-approved in every but form
 νόσου πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου πάντως γίνεται
of-disease before the first three-day-period certainly occurs

παρακμή· ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρὸ τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου
a-remission necessary therefore before the first three-day-period
 τὴν τε ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ὡς τὸ πολὺ
the both varied diet and the wine as the most-part
 παραλαμβάνειν· ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι
to-employ the indeed dialectician nothing — to-say would-have
 πρὸς διάλυσιν τοῦ λόγου, καίτοι χρησίμην οὖσαν,
toward the-solution of-the argument although useful being
 ὁ δὲ ἰατρὸς διαλύσεται τὸ σόφισμα, εἰδὼς ὅτι παρακμή 238
the but doctor will-solve the sophism knowing that remission
 λέγεται διχῶς, ἥ τε τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος καὶ ἡ
is-said in-two-ways the-one both of-the whole disease and the
 ἐκάστης ἐπιτάσεως μερικῆς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς ῥοπή πρὸς
of-each intensification particular from the peak turn toward
 τὸ κρεῖσσον, καὶ πρὸ μὲν τῆς πρώτης διατρίτου ὡς τὸ
the better and before indeed the first three-day-period as the
 πολὺ γίνεται παρακμή ἢ τῆς ἐπιτάσεως τῆς μερικῆς, τὴν
most-part occurs a-remission the of-the intensification the particular the
 δὲ ποικίλην δίαιταν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ δοκιμάζομεν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ
but varied diet not in this we-approve but in the
 παρακμῇ τοῦ ὅλου νοσήματος. ὅθεν καὶ διηρητῆσθαι λέξει
remission of-the whole disease whence also to-be-disjointed he-will-say
 τὰ λήμματα τοῦ λόγου, ἑτέρας μὲν παρακμῆς ἐν τῷ
the premises of-the argument one indeed remission in the
 προτέρῳ λήμματι λαμβανομένης, τουτέστι τῆς τοῦ ὅλου
former premise being-taken that-is the of-the whole
 πάθους, ἑτέρας δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ, τουτέστι τῆς μερικῆς.
affection another but in the second that-is the particular
 πάλιν τε ἐπὶ τινος πυρέσσοντος κατὰ πύκνωσιν 239
again and in-the-case-of someone feverish by constriction
 ἐπιτεταμένην ἐρωτηθέντος τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου ἅ τ' ἐναντία
intensified having-been-put the such-an argument the opposites

τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματά ἐστιν· ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ
of-the opposites remedies are opposite but to-the underlying
 πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν· κατάλληλον ἄρα τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ
burning the cold suitable therefore to-the underlying
 πυρώσει τὸ ψυχρόν· ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς ἡσυχάσει, ὁ δὲ
burning the cold the indeed dialectician will-be-silent the but
 ἱατρός,

doctor

- 240 εἰδὼς τίνα μὲν ἐστὶν προηγουμένως προσεχῇ πάθη, τίνα
knowing which indeed are primarily proximate affections which
 δὲ συμπτώματα τούτων, ἐρεῖ μὴ ἐπὶ τῶν συμπτωμάτων
but symptoms of-these will-say not upon the symptoms
 προκόπτει τὸν λόγον (ἀμέλει γοῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐπίχυσιν
to-proceed the argument indeed at-any-rate at the pouring-on
 τοῦ ψυχροῦ πλείονα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πύρωσιν)
of-the cold greater to-become it-happens the burning
 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν προσεχῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν στέγνωσιν
but upon the proximate affections and the indeed constriction
 εἶναι προσεχῇ, ἥτις οὐ τὴν πύκνωσιν ἀλλὰ τὸν χαλαστικὸν
to-be proximate which not the condensation but the relaxing
 τρόπον τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπακολουθούσης
manner of-the treatment demands the but of-the consequent
 θερμασίας οὐ προηγουμένως προσεχές, ὅθεν μὴδὲ τὸ
beat not primarily proximate whence nor the
 κατάλληλον εἶναι δοκοῦν αὐτῇ.

suitable to-be seeming to-it

- 241 καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφίσμασι τοῖς χρησίμως
and thus indeed in-the-case-of the sophisms the-ones usefully
 ἀπαιτοῦσι τὴν διάλυσιν οὐδὲν ἔξει λέγειν ὁ διαλεκτικός,
demanding the solution nothing will-have to-say the dialectician
 ἐρωτήσας δὲ ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους 'εἰ οὐχὶ καὶ καλὰ
having-put but to-us such arguments if not both fine

κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις, κέρατα ἔχεις· οὐχὶ δὲ
 horns you-have and horns you-have horns you-have not but
 καλὰ κέρατα ἔχεις καὶ κέρατα ἔχεις·
 fine horns you-have and horns you-have
 κέρατα ἄρα ἔχεις· ἔει κινεῖταιί τι, ἥτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι 242
 horns therefore you-have if moves anything either in which it-is
 τόπῳ κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν
 place it-moves or in which not it-is neither but in which it-is
 (μένει γάρ), οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐνεργοίη
 it-stays for nor in which not it-is how for — could-act
 τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐν ᾧ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔστιν;)
 anything in that in which not-even the beginning it-is
 οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖταιί τι· ἥτοι τὸ ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ 243
 not therefore moves anything either the being comes-to-be or the not
 ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄν οὐ γίνεται (ἔστι γάρ)· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 being the indeed then being not comes-to-be it-is for but neither
 τὸ μὴ ὄν· (τὸ μὲν γὰρ γινόμενον πάσχει τι, τὸ δὲ
 the not being the indeed for coming-to-be undergoes something the but
 μὴ ὄν οὐ πάσχει)· οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεται·
 not being not undergoes nothing therefore comes-to-be
 ἥ χιών ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός· μέλαν δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστίν· μέλαινα 244
 the snow water is frozen black but the water is black
 ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ χιών· καὶ τοιοῦτους τινὰς ἀθροίσας ὕθλους
 therefore is the snow and such some having-collected drivels
 συνάγει τὰς ὀφρῦς, καὶ προχειρίζεται τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, καὶ
 he-draws-together the brows and takes-up the dialectic and
 πάνυ σεμνῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ κατασκευάζειν ἡμῖν δι' ἀποδείξεων
 very solemnly he-attempts to-establish for-us through proofs
 συλλογιστικῶν, ὅτι γίνεταιί τι, καὶ ὅτι κινεῖταιί τι, καὶ
 syllogistic that comes-to-be something and that moves something and
 ὅτι ἡ χιών ἐστὶ λευκή, καὶ ὅτι κέρατα οὐκ ἔχομεν, καίτοι
 that the snow is white and that horns not we-have although

γε ἄρκοῦντος ἴσως τοῦ τὴν ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῖς ἀντιτιθέναι
indeed sufficing perhaps the the evidence to-them to-oppose
 πρὸς τὸ θραύεσθαι τὴν διαβεβαιωτικὴν θέσιν διὰ τῆς
for the shattering the confident position through the
 ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἰσοσθενοῦς αὐτῶν ἀντιμαρτυρήσεως.
from the of-appearing-(things) of-equal-strength of-them counter-testimony
 ταῦτά τοι καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς φιλόσοφος τις τὸν κατὰ
these-things you-know also having-been-asked a-philosopher a-certain the against
 τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν περιεπάτησεν, καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸν
the motion argument keeping-silent walked-about and the in the
 βίον ἄνθρωποι πεζὰς τε καὶ διαποντίους στέλλονται πορείας
life men on-foot both and overseas set-out-on journeys
 κατασκευάζουσιν τε ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ παιδοποιῶνται
they-build and ships and houses and beget-children
 τῶν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ἀμελοῦντες λόγων.
the against the motion and becoming disregarding arguments
 245 φέρεται δὲ καὶ Ἡροφίλου τοῦ ἱατροῦ χαρίεν τι
is-reported and also of-Herophilus the doctor charming a
 ἀπομνημόνευμα· συνεχρόνισε γὰρ οὗτος Διοδώρῳ, ὃς
anecdote was-a-contemporary for this-man with-Diodorus who
 ἐναπειροκαλῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ λόγους διεξήει
showing-bad-taste in-the dialectic arguments he-would-run-through
 σοφιστικούς κατὰ τε ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τῆς κινήσεως.
sophistical against both other-things many and the motion
 ὥς οὖν ἐκβαλὼν ποτε ὤμον ὁ Διόδωρος ἦκε
so then having-dislocated once a-shoulder — Diodorus came
 θεραπευθῆσόμενος ὥς τὸν Ἡρόφιλον, ἐχαριεντίσατο ἐκείνος
to-be-treated to — Herophilus jested that-man
 πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων ἥτοι ἐν ᾧ ἦν τόπῳ ὁ ὤμος ὢν
to him saying either in which it-was place the shoulder being
 ἐκπέπτωκεν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἦν
has-slipped-out or in which not it-was neither but in which it-was

οὔτε ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐκπέπτωκεν', ὥς τὸν
 nor in which not it-was not therefore it-has-slipped-out so-that the
 σοφιστὴν λιπαρεῖν ἔαν μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, τὴν
 sophist to-beg to-let-go indeed the such arguments the
 δὲ ἐξ ἱατρικῆς ἀρμόζουσαν αὐτῷ προσάγειν θεραπείαν.
 but from medicine fitting for-him to-apply treatment
 ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, τὸ ἐμπείρως τε καὶ ἀδοξάστως κατὰ 246
 it-suffices for I-think the experientially both and without-belief according-to
 τὰς κοινὰς τηρήσεις τε καὶ προλήψεις βιοῦν, περὶ τῶν
 the common observances both and preconceptions to-live concerning the-things
 ἐκ δογματικῆς περιεργίας καὶ μάλιστα ἔξω τῆς βιωτικῆς
 from dogmatic over-curiosity and especially outside the of-daily-life
 χρείας λεγομένων ἐπέχοντας. εἰ οὖν ὅσα μὲν εὐχρήστως
 need said suspending-judgment if then whatever indeed usefully
 ἂν ἐπιλυθεῖ, ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν διαλύσαιτο ἢ διαλεκτική,
 — could-be-solved these not — could-solve the dialectic
 ὅσα δὲ ἐπιλύεσθαι δοίη τις ἂν ἴσως ὑπ' αὐτῆς
 whatever but to-be-solved might-grant someone — perhaps by it
 σοφίσματα, τούτων ἢ διάλυσις ἄχρηστός ἐστιν, ἄχρηστός
 sophisms of-these the solution useless is useless
 ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν τῶν σοφισμάτων ἢ διαλεκτική.
 is with-respect-to the solving of-the sophisms the dialectic
 Καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς λεγομένων 247
 and from themselves but the-things among the dialecticians said
 ὁρμώμενός τις οὕτως ἂν συντόμως ὑπομνήσειε περιττὰ
 starting someone thus — briefly might-point-out superfluous
 εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν σοφισμάτων παρ' αὐτοῖς δὴ
 to-be the-things concerning the sophisms among them indeed
 τεχνολογούμενα. ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικὴν φασιν
 systematized to the art the dialectic they-say
 ὠρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γινῶναι
 to-have-turned the dialecticians not simply for-the-sake-of the knowing

τί ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ
what from what follows but primarily for-the-sake-of
 τοῦ δι' ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ
the through demonstrative arguments the true and the false
 κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι· λέγουσι γοῦν εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν
to-judge knowing-how they-say at-any-rate to-be the dialectic
 ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

a-science of-true and of-false and of-neither

248 ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αὐτοὶ φασιν ἀληθῆ λόγον εἶναι τὸν δι'
since then they-themselves say true an-argument to-be the-one through
 ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἀληθὲς συνάγοντα συμπέρασμα, ἅμα
true premises a-true inferring conclusion as-soon-as
 τῷ ἐρωτηθῆναι λόγον ψεῦδος ἔχοντα τὸ συμπέρασμα
the being-put an-argument false having the conclusion
 εἰσόμεθα ὅτι ψευδὴς ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα
we-shall-know that false it-is and not we-shall-assent
 αὐτῷ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἥτοι μὴ εἶναι
to-it necessity for also itself the argument either not to-be
 συνακτικὸν ἢ μηδὲ τὰ λήμματα ἔχειν ἀληθῆ.

conclusive or not the premises to-have true

249 καὶ τοῦτο δηλον ἐκ τῶνδε. ἥτοι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ
and this clear from these either follows the in the
 λόγῳ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ
argument false conclusion the through the premises of-it
 συμπλοκῇ ἢ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ,
conjunction or not follows but if indeed not it-follows
 οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς λόγος ἔσται· λέγουσι γὰρ συνακτικὸν
neither conclusive argument will-be they-say for conclusive
 γίνεσθαι λόγον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων
to-become an-argument when follows the through the premises
 αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ,
of-it conjunction the in it conclusion if but it-follows

ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκὴν εἶναι
necessity also the through the premises conjunction to-be
 ψευδῇ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας· φασὶ γὰρ
false according-to the of-them those systems they-say for
 ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ψευδεῖ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ, ἀληθεῖ δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
that the false a-falsehood indeed follows a-truth but by-no-means
 ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὴ συνακτικὸς ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς λόγος κατὰ 250
that but the not conclusive or not true argument according-to
 αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἐστίν, δηλὸν ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν
them neither demonstrative is clear from the-things before
 εἰρημένων. εἰ τοίνυν ἐρωτηθέντος λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ψεῦδος ἐστι
said if then having-been-put an-argument in which false is
 τὸ συμπέρασμα, αὐτόθεν γινώσκουμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς
the conclusion at-once we-know that not is true
 οὐδὲ συνακτικὸς ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ συμπέρασμα ἔχειν ψευδές,
nor conclusive the argument from the conclusion having false
 οὐ συγκαταθησόμεθα αὐτῷ, κἂν μὴ γινώσκουμεν παρὰ τί
not we-shall-assent to-it even-if not we-know because-of what
 τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἔχει. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτι ἀληθὴ ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ
the deceptiveness it-has just-as for not that true are the-things by
 τῶν ψηφοπαικτῶν γινόμενα συγκατατιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴσμεν
the conjurers done we-assent but we-know
 ὅτι ἀπατῶσιν, κἂν μὴ γινώσκουμεν ὅπως ἀπατῶσιν, οὕτως
that they-deceive even-if not we-know how they-deceive so
 οὐδὲ τοῖς ψευδέσι μὲν, πιθανοῖς δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσι λόγοις
neither the false indeed plausible but to-be seeming arguments
 πειθόμεθα, κἂν μὴ γινώσκουμεν ὅπως παραλογίζονται.
we-are-persuaded even-if not we-know how they-reason-falsely
 ἢ ἐπεὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἀπάγειν τὸ σόφισμά 251
or since not only to a-falsehood to-lead the sophism
 φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἀτοπίας, κοινότερον οὕτω
they-say but also to other absurdities more-generally thus

συνερωτητέον. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος λόγος ἥτοι ἐπὶ τι
one-must-argue the put argument either to something
 ἀπρόσδεκτον ἡμᾶς ἄγει ἢ ἐπὶ τι τοιούτον ὥς χρῆναι
unacceptable us leads or to something such that it-is-right
 αὐτὸ προσδέχεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἀτόπως
it to-accept but if indeed the second not absurdly
 αὐτῷ συγκαταθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τι ἀπρόσδεκτον, οὐχ
to-it we-shall-assent if but to something unacceptable not
 ἡμᾶς τῇ ἀτοπία δεήσει συγκατατίθεσθαι προπετῶς
us to-the absurdity it-will-be-necessary to-assent rashly
 διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ
because-of the plausibility but them to-withdraw from-the
 λόγου τοῦ τοῖς ἀτόποις ἀναγκάζοντος συγκατατίθεσθαι,
argument the-one the absurdities compelling to-assent
 εἴγε μὴ ληρεῖν παιδαριωδῶς, ἀλλὰ τἀληθῆ ζητεῖν,
if-indeed not to-talk-nonsense childishly but the-truth to-seek
 ὥς ὑπισχνούνται, προήρηνται.
as they-profess they-have-chosen

252 ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ὁδὸς εἴη ἐπὶ τινα κρημνὸν φέρουσα,
just-as for if a-road there-should-be to a cliff leading
 οὐκ ὠθοῦμεν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν κρημνὸν διὰ τὸ ὁδὸν
not we-push ourselves into the cliff because-of the a-road
 τινα εἶναι φέρουσιν ἐπ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεθα τῆς
some to-be leading to it but we-withdraw from-the
 ὁδοῦ διὰ τὸν κρημνόν, οὕτω καὶ εἰ λόγος εἴη
road because-of the cliff so also if an-argument there-should-be
 ἐπὶ τι ὁμολογουμένως ἄτοπον ἡμᾶς ἀπάγων, οὐχί
to something admittedly absurd us leading not
 τῷ ἀτόπῳ συγκαταθησόμεθα διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ'
to-the absurdity we-shall-assent because-of the argument but
 ἀποστησόμεθα τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν.
we-shall-withdraw from-the argument because-of the absurdity

ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν συνερωτᾶται λόγος, καθ' ἐκάστην 253
when then thus to-us is-put an-argument at each
 πρότασιν ἐφέξομεν, εἴτα τοῦ ὅλου συνερωτηθέντος
premise we-shall-suspend-judgment then the whole having-been-put
 λόγου τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα ἐπάξομεν. καὶ εἴγε οἱ
argument the-things to-us seeming we-shall-bring-forward and if-indeed those
 περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον δογματικοὶ ἐν τῇ συνερωτήσει τοῦ
about — Chrysippus dogmatists in the putting of-the
 σωρίτου προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου φασὶ δεῖν ἵστασθαι
sorites advancing the argument say it-is-necessary to-halt
 καὶ ἐπέχειν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωσιν εἰς ἀτοπίαν, πολὺ
and to-suspend-judgment so-that not they-may-fall into absurdity much
 δήπου μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμῖν ἀρμόζον εἶη σκεπτικοῖς
surely more — for-us fitting it-would-be skeptics
 οὖσιν, ὑποπτεύουσιν ἀτοπίαν, μὴ προπίπτειν κατὰ τὰς
being suspecting absurdity not to-fall-forward at the
 συνερωτήσεις τῶν λημμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐπέχειν καθ'
puttings of-the premises but to-suspend-judgment at
 ἕκαστον ἕως τῆς ὅλης συνερωτήσεως τοῦ λόγου.
each until the whole putting of-the argument
 καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀδοξάστως ἀπὸ τῆς βιωτικῆς τηρήσεως 254
and we indeed without-belief from the everyday observance
 ὀρμώμενοι τοὺς ἀπατηλοὺς οὕτως ἐκκλίνομεν λόγους, οἱ
starting the deceptive thus avoid arguments the
 δογματικοὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτως ἔξουσι διακρίναι τὸ σόφισμα ἀπὸ
dogmatists but unable will-be to-distinguish the sophism from
 τοῦ δεόντως δοκοῦντος ἐρωτᾶσθαι λόγου, εἴγε χρή
the properly seeming to-be-put argument if-indeed it-is-necessary
 δογματικῶς αὐτοὺς ἐπικρίναι, καὶ ὅτι συνακτικόν ἐστι τὸ
dogmatically them to-decide both that conclusive is the

σχῆμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅτι τὰ λήμματά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ ἢ
form of-the argument and that the premises are true or
 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.
not so it-is

255 ὑπεμνήσαμεν γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς συνακτικούς
we-recalled for before that neither the conclusive
 λόγους δύνανται καταλαμβάνειν οὔτε ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι
arguments they-can apprehend nor true to-be anything
 κρίνειν οἰοί τέ εἰσι, μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν
to-judge able and they-are neither a-criterion nor a-proof
 ὁμολογουμένως ἔχοντες, ὥς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὑπ'
admittedly having as from the-things said by
 αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεμνήσαμεν. παρέλκει οὖν ὅσον ἐπὶ
them those we-recalled is-superfluous then so-far-as upon
 τούτοις ἢ θρυλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς περὶ τῶν
these the much-talked-of among the dialecticians concerning the
 σοφισμάτων τεχνολογία.
sophisms system

256 Παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαστολῆς τῶν ἀμφιβολιῶν
similar-things and also in-the-case-of the distinguishing of-the ambiguities
 λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀμφιβολία λέξις ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω
we-say if for the ambiguity an-expression is two or more
 σημαίνουσα καὶ αἱ λέξεις σημαίνουνσι θέσει, ὅσας μὲν
signifying and the expressions signify by-convention whatever indeed
 χρησίμῳ ἐστὶν ἀμφιβολίας διαλύεσθαι, τουτέστι τὰς ἔν
useful it-is ambiguities to-resolve that-is the-ones in
 τινι τῶν ἐμπειριῶν, ταύτας οἱ καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην
some of-the experiences these those in each art
 ἐγγεγυμνασμένοι διαλύονται, τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ
trained will-resolve the experience having themselves

τῆς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεποιημένης θετικῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων
of-the by them made conventional use of-the names
 κατὰ τῶν σημαιομένων, ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικὸς οὐδαμῶς,
for the things-signified the but dialectician by-no-means
 οἶον ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφιβολίας 'ἐν ταῖς 257
for-instance as in-the-case-of this the ambiguity in the
 παρακμαῖς τὴν ποικίλην δίαιταν καὶ τὸν οἶνον δοκιμαστέον'.
remissions the varied diet and the wine must-be-approved
 ἤδη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἄχρι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὀρώμεν
already and also in the life even also the children we-see
 διαστελλομένους ἀμφιβολίας, ὧν ἡ διαστολὴ χρησιμεύειν
distinguishing ambiguities of-which the distinguishing to-be-useful
 αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ. εἰ γοῦν τις ὁμωνύμους οἰκέτας ἔχων
to-them seems if at-any-rate someone same-named servants having
 κελεύει παῖδιον κληθῆναι αὐτῷ τὸν Μάνην, εἰ τύχοι
should-order a-boy to-be-called for-him — Manes if it-should-happen
 (τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦνομα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἔστω κοινόν), πεύσεται
this for the-name to-the servants let-be common will-ask
 ὁ παῖς ποῖον. καὶ εἰ πλείονας καὶ διαφόρους τις οἶνους
the boy which-one and if several and different someone wines
 ἔχων λέγοι τῷ παιδίῳ 'ἔγχεόν μοι τοῦ οἴνου πιεῖν',
having should-say to-the boy pour for-me some-of-the wine to-drink
 ὁμοίως ὁ παῖς πεύσεται ποίου.
likewise the boy will-ask which
 οὕτως ἡ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐμπειρία τοῦ χρησίμου τὴν διαστολὴν 258
thus the in each-case experience of-the useful the distinction
 εἰσάγει. ὅσαι μέντοι μὴ ἐν τινι τῶν βιωτικῶν ἐμπειριῶν
introduces whatever however not in some of-the everyday experiences
 εἰσιν ἀμφιβολίαι, ἀλλ' ἐν δογματικαῖς οἵησσι κεῖνται καὶ
are ambiguities but in dogmatic conceits lie and
 εἰσὶν ἴσως ἄχρηστοι πρὸς τὸ ἀδοξάστως βιοῦν, περὶ
are perhaps useless for the without-belief living concerning

ταύτας ἰδίως ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχων ἀναγκασθήσεται
these specifically the dialectician occupying-himself will-be-compelled
 καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ὁμοίως ἐπέχειν κατὰ τὰς σκεπτικὰς
also in them likewise to-suspend-judgment according-to the skeptical
 ἐφόδους, καθὸ πράγμασιν ἀδήλοις καὶ ἀκαταλήπτοις
modes-of-attack in-so-far-as to-things non-evident and inapprehensible
 ἢ καὶ ἀνυποστάτοις ἴσως εἰσὶ συνεζυγμένα.

or even unreal perhaps they-are yoked

259 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ εἰσαυθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δέ
but concerning indeed these also hereafter we-shall-discuss if but
 τις δογματικὸς πρὸς τι τούτων ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειροίη,
some dogmatist against something of-these to-argue should-attempt
 κρατυνεῖ τὸν σκεπτικὸν λόγον, ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρωθεν
he-will-strengthen the skeptical argument from the on-both-sides
 ἐπιχειρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνεπικρίτου διαφωνίας τὴν περὶ
argumentation and the undecidable disagreement the concerning
 τῶν ζητουμένων ἐποχὴν καὶ αὐτὸς βεβαιῶν.
the-things investigated suspension-of-judgment also himself confirming
 Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν εἰπόντες αὐτοῦ που
so-much also concerning ambiguities having-said here somewhere
 περιγράφομεν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα.
we-conclude also the second of-the Outlines treatise

BOOK III

III.1 • THE LOGICAL PART CONCLUDED

So much for the logical part of what is called philosophy, treated as an outline requires.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λογικοῦ μέρους τῆς λεγομένης 1
concerning indeed then the logical part of-the so-called
φιλοσοφίας ὡς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει τοιαῦτα ἀρκούντως λέγεται
philosophy as in outline such-things sufficiently might-be-said
ἄν·

περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους

III.2 • THE PHYSICAL PART

Sextus turns to the physical part in the same manner of composition. He will not argue against each of the dogmatists' claims topic by topic, but will try to unsettle the more general ones, with which the rest are circumscribed. He begins with the discussion of principles.

Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς συγγραφῆς καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν 1
according-to and the same manner of-the composition also the physical
μέρος αὐτῆς ἐπιόντες οὐ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων
part of-it going-over not against each of-the-things said
αὐτοῖς κατὰ τόπον ἀντερούμεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθολικώτερα
by-them in topic we-shall-argue but the more-general

κινεῖν ἐπιχειρήσομεν, οἷς συμπεριγράφεται καὶ τὰ
 to-unsettle we-shall-attempt with-which are-circumscribed also the
 λοιπά. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγου.
 rest let-us-begin and from the concerning principles account

περὶ ἀρχῶν δραστικῶν

III.3 · EFFICIENT PRINCIPLES

Most agree that some principles are material and some efficient. Sextus begins with the efficient, since these are said to be the more authoritative of the two.

- 1 Καὶ ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις συμφέωνηται τῶν
 and since among the most it-is-agreed of-the
 ἀρχῶν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δραστικάς, ἀπὸ τῶν
 principles some indeed material to-be some but efficient from the
 δραστικῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου ποιησόμεθα· ταύτας γὰρ
 efficient the beginning of-the account we-shall-make these for
 καὶ κυριωτέρας τῶν ὑλικῶν φασιν εἶναι.
 also more-authoritative than-the material they-say to-be

περὶ θεοῦ

III.4 · GOD

Following life without belief, we say there are gods and revere them; what follows targets the dogmatists' rashness. They disagree whether god is body or incorporeal, human-shaped or not, in place or not, so no conception of him can be had from them. His existence is not evident, since they would then agree, and it cannot be proved through the evident or the non-evident, which falls into infinity. Nor does he exercise providence: not over all, since the world is full of vice, and over some or none he is weak or grudging, so his existence is inapprehensible and those who affirm it are driven to impiety.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ θεὸν εἶναι δραστικώτατον αἴτιον οἱ πλείους 2
 therefore since god to-be the-most-efficient cause the majority
 ἀπεφάναντο, πρότερον περὶ θεοῦ σκοπήσωμεν, ἐκεῖνο
 have-declared first concerning god let-us-consider that
 προειπόντες, ὅτι τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως
 having-said-first that the indeed life following without-belief
 φαμέν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν
 we-say to-be gods and we-revere gods and exercise-providence
 αὐτοὺς φαμεν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν τῶν δογματικῶν
 them we-say against but the rashness of-the dogmatists
 τάδε λέγομεν.

these-things we-say
 Τῶν ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν
 of-the conceived by-us things the substances to-conceive
 ὀφείλομεν, οἷον εἰ σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματα. ἀλλὰ
 we-ought for-instance whether bodies they-are or incorporeal but
 καὶ τὰ εἶδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις ἵππον ἐννοῆσαι δύναιτο
 also the forms not for — anyone a-horse to-conceive could
 μὴ οὐχὶ πρότερον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἵππου μαθῶν. τό τε
 not not first the form of-the horse having-learned the and
 ἐννοοῦμενον ἐννοεῖσθαι· που ὀφείλει.

thing-conceived to-be-conceived somewhere ought
 ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν δογματικῶν οἱ μὲν σῶμά φασιν εἶναι 3
 since then of-the dogmatists some indeed a-body say to-be
 τὸν θεόν, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωποειδῆ,
 the god some but incorporeal and some indeed human-shaped
 οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τόπῳ, οἱ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τῶν
 some but not and some indeed in place some but not and of-the-ones
 ἐν τόπῳ οἱ μὲν ἐντὸς κόσμου, οἱ δὲ ἐκτός, πῶς
 in place some indeed inside the-world some but outside how
 δυνησόμεθα ἐννοῖαν θεοῦ λαμβάνειν μήτε οὐσίαν ἔχοντες
 shall-we-be-able a-conception of-god to-get neither substance having

αὐτοῦ ὁμολογουμένην μήτε εἶδος μήτε τόπον ἐν ᾧ
of-him agreed nor form nor place in which
 εἷη; πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὁμολογησάτωσάν τε καὶ
he-might-be first for they let-them-agree both and
 συμφωνησάτωσαν, ὅτι τοιόσδε ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἴτα ἡμῖν
let-them-concur that such is the god then for-us
 αὐτὸν ὑποτυπώσαντες οὕτως ἀξιούτωσαν ἡμᾶς ἔννοιαν
him having-sketched so let-them-require us a-conception
 θεοῦ λαμβάνειν. ἐς ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνοῦσιν, τί
of-god to-get in so-far-as but undecidably they-disagree what
 νοήσομεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογουμένως παρ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔχομεν.
shall-conceive we by-agreement from them not we-have

- 4 ἀλλ' ἀφθαρτόν τι, φασί, καὶ μακάριον ἐννοήσας, τὸν
but imperishable something they-say and blessed having-conceived the
 θεὸν εἶναι τοῦτο νόμιζε. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν εὔηθες· ὥσπερ
god to-be this consider this and is silly just-as
 γὰρ ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὸν Δίωνα οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ
for the not knowing — Dion nor the accidents of-him
 ὡς Δίῳ δύναται νοεῖν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν οὐσίαν
as of-Dion can conceive so since not we-know the substance
 τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ μαθεῖν τε καὶ
of-the god nor the accidents of-him to-learn both and
 ἐννοῆσαι δυνησόμεθα.
to-conceive shall-we-be-able

- 5 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εἰπάτωσαν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστὶ τὸ μακάριον,
apart and from-these let-them-tell us what is the blessed
 πρότερον τὸ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ ἀρετὴν καὶ προνοοῦμενον
whether the-thing acting according-to virtue and exercising-providence-over
 τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ τεταγμένων, ἢ τὸ ἀνεργεῖν καὶ
the-things under itself ordered or the-thing inactive and
 μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχον μήτε ἑτέρῳ παρέχον· καὶ γὰρ
neither itself troubles having nor to-another furnishing and for

καὶ περὶ τούτου διαφωνήσαντες ἀνεπικρίτως ἀνεννόητον
also concerning this having-disagreed undecidably inconceivable
ἡμῖν πεποιήκασιν τὸ μακάριον, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν θεόν.

to-us they-have-made the blessed because-of and this also the god

Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐπινοῇται ὁ θεός, ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη περὶ 6

so-that and also may-be-conceived the god to-suspend-judgment necessity concerning

τοῦ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. τὸ

the whether there-is or not there-is so-far-as upon the dogmatists the

γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν πρόδηλον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ

for to-be the god evident indeed not is if for from itself

προσέπιπτεν, συνεφώνησαν ἂν οἱ δογματικοί, τίς ἐστι καὶ

it-fell-upon-(us) they-would-have-agreed — the dogmatists who he-is and

ποδαπὸς καὶ ποῦ· ἢ ἀνεπίκριτος δὲ διαφωνία πεποιήκεν

of-what-kind and where the undecidable but disagreement has-made

αὐτὸν ἄδηλον ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ ἀποδείξεως δεόμενον.

him non-evident to-us to-be to-seem and of-proof needing

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀποδεικνύων ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἤτοι διὰ 7

the indeed then demonstrating that there-is a-god either through

προδήλου τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσιν ἢ δι' ἀδήλου. διὰ

something-evident this demonstrates or through something-non-evident through

προδήλου μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἦν πρόδηλον τὸ

something-evident indeed then by-no-means if for were evident the

ἀποδεικνύον ὅτι ἔστι θεός, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνυόμενον πρὸς τῷ

demonstrating that there-is a-god since the thing-demonstrated with the

ἀποδεικνύντι νοεῖται, διὸ καὶ συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ,

demonstrating is-conceived wherefore also is-apprehended-together-with it

καθὼς καὶ παρεστήσαμεν, πρόδηλον ἔσται καὶ τὸ εἶναι θεόν,

just-as also we-established evident will-be also the to-be a-god

συγκαταλαμβανόμενον τῷ ἀποδεικνύντι αὐτὸ προδήλῳ ὄντι.

apprehended-together-with the demonstrating it evident being

οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ πρόδηλον, ὥς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ ἀποδείκνυται
not is but evident as we-recalled nor is-demonstrated

ἄρα διὰ προδήλου. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου.

therefore through something-evident but neither through something-non-evident

8 τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ εἶναι θεόν,

the for non-evident the-thing demonstrative of-the to-be a-god

ἀποδείξεως χρῆζον, εἰ μὲν διὰ προδήλου λέγοιτο

of-proof needing if indeed through something-evident it-should-be-said

ἀποδείκνυσθαι, οὐκέτι ἄδηλον ἔσται ἀλλὰ πρόδηλον. οὐκ

to-be-proved no-longer non-evident it-will-be but evident not

ἄρα τὸ ἀποδεικτικὸν αὐτοῦ ἄδηλον διὰ προδήλου

therefore the demonstrative of-it non-evident through something-evident

ἀποδείκνυται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ δι' ἀδήλου· εἰς ἄπειρον

is-proved but neither through something-non-evident into infinity

γὰρ ἐκπεσεῖται ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, αἰτούντων ἡμῶν αἰεὶ

for will-fall the-one this saying demanding we always

ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ φερομένου ἀδήλου πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ

a-proof of-the adduced non-evident-(thing) for the-proof of-the

προεκκειμένου. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξ ἑτέρου δύναται ἀποδείκνυσθαι

one-set-out-before not therefore from another can be-proved

τὸ εἶναι θεόν.

the to-be a-god

9 εἰ δὲ μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶ πρόδηλον μήτε ἐξ ἑτέρου

if but neither from itself it-is evident nor from another

ἀποδείκνυται, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται εἰ ἔστι θεός.

is-proved inapprehensible it-will-be whether there-is a-god

Ἐτι καὶ τοῦτο λεκτέον. ὁ λέγων εἶναι θεὸν ἥτοι

further also this must-be-said the-one saying to-be a-god either

προνοεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ φησὶν ἢ οὐ

to-exercise-providence him over-the-things in the-world says or not

προνοεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὲν προνοεῖν, ἥτοι πάντων ἢ

to-exercise-providence and if indeed to-exercise-providence either over-all or

τινων. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάντων προνοίει, οὐκ ἦν
over-some but if indeed over-all he-exercised-providence not there-would-be
 ἂν οὔτε κακόν τι οὔτε κακία ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ· κακίας
 — *neither evil any nor vice in the world of-vice*
 δὲ πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι λέγουσιν· οὐκ ἄρα πάντων
but all-things full to-be they-say not therefore over-all
 προνοεῖν λεχθήσεται ὁ θεός.

to-exercise-providence will-be-said the god
 εἰ δέ τινων προνοεῖ, διὰ τί τῶνδε μὲν
if but over-some he-exercises-providence because-of what over-these indeed
 προνοεῖ, τῶνδε δὲ οὔ; ἥτοι γὰρ καὶ βούλεται καὶ
he-exercises-providence over-those but not either for both he-wishes and
 δύναται πάντων προνοεῖν, ἢ βούλεται μὲν, οὐ δύναται
is-able over-all to-exercise-providence or he-wishes indeed not is-able
 δέ, ἢ δύναται μὲν, οὐ βούλεται δέ, ἢ οὔτε βούλεται οὔτε
but or he-is-able indeed not wishes but or neither he-wishes nor
 δύναται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἡβούλετο καὶ ἡδύνατο, πάντων
is-able but if indeed both he-wished and was-able over-all
 ἂν προνοίει· οὐ προνοεῖ δὲ πάντων διὰ
 — *he-would-exercise-providence not he-exercises-providence but over-all because-of*
 τὰ προειρημένα· οὐκ ἄρα καὶ βούλεται καὶ δύναται
the-things said-before not therefore both he-wishes and is-able
 πάντων προνοεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται μὲν, οὐ δύναται δέ,
over-all to-exercise-providence if but he-wishes indeed not is-able but
 ἀσθενέστερός ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν οὐ δύναται
weaker he-is than-the cause because-of which not he-is-able
 προνοεῖν ὧν οὐ προνοεῖ.

to-exercise-providence of-those not he-exercises-providence
 ἔστι δὲ παρὰ τὴν θεοῦ ἐπίνοιαν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον εἶναι
it-is but contrary-to the of-god conception the weaker to-be
 τινος αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δύναται μὲν πάντων προνοεῖν,
than-something him if but he-is-able indeed over-all to-exercise-providence

οὐ βούλεται δέ, βάσκανος ἂν εἶναι νομισθείη. εἰ δὲ οὔτε
not wishes but grudging — to-be he-would-be-thought if but neither
 βούλεται οὔτε δύναται, καὶ βάσκανός ἐστι καὶ ἀσθενής,
he-wishes nor is-able both grudging he-is and weak
 ὅπερ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβούντων ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα
which-very-thing to-say concerning god of-the-impious is not therefore
 προνοεῖ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὁ θεός. εἰ δὲ οὐδενὸς
exercises-providence over-the-things in the-world the god if but of-nothing
 πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀποτέλεσμα,
providence he-takes nor is-there of-him a-work nor an-effect
 οὐχ ἔξει τις εἰπεῖν, πόθεν καταλαμβάνεται ὅτι
not will-be-able anyone to-say whence it-is-apprehended that
 ἔστι θεός, εἴγε μήτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ φαίνεται μήτε δι'
there-is a-god if-indeed neither from himself he-appears nor through
 ἀποτελεσμάτων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
effects any is-apprehended and because-of these-things
 ἄρα ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν εἰ ἔστι θεός.
therefore inapprehensible it-is whether there-is a-god
 12 ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι ἴσως ἀσεβεῖν
from and these we-conclude that perhaps to-be-impious
 ἀναγκάζονται οἱ διαβεβαιωτικῶς λέγοντες εἶναι θεόν.
are-compelled those confidently saying to-be a-god
 πάντων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν προνοεῖν λέγοντες κακῶν
over-all indeed for him to-exercise-providence saying of-evils
 αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσιν, τινῶν δὲ ἢ καὶ μηδενὸς
the-cause the god to-be they-will-say over-some but or even over-none
 προνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἥτοι βάσκανον τὸν θεὸν
to-exercise-providence him saying either grudging the god
 ἢ ἀσθενῇ λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται, ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν
or weak to-say they-will-be-compelled these-things and is
 ἀσεβούντων προδήλως.
of-the-impious plainly

περὶ αἰτίου

III.5 · CAUSE

So that the dogmatists may not accuse him of blasphemy for want of a substantive reply, Sextus raises difficulties about the efficient cause in general. Their conceptions of a cause are discordant and strange, and their disagreement has made its existence undiscoverable. Most of them distinguish sustaining, joint, and auxiliary causes, and some make present things causes of future ones while others deny it, since a cause is relative to its effect and cannot precede it.

Ἵνα δὲ μὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς βλασφημεῖν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν οἱ 13
so-that and not also us to-blaspheme they-may-attempt the
δογματικοὶ δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦ πραγματικῶς ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν,
dogmatists through want of-the substantively to-us replying
κοινότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνεργητικοῦ αἰτίου διαπορήσομεν,
more-generally concerning the efficient cause we-shall-raise-difficulties
πρότερον ἐπιστῆσαι πειραθέντες τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίᾳ.
first to-attend having-tried to-the of-the cause conception
ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν
so-far-as indeed then upon the-things said by the dogmatists
οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοῆσαί τις τὸ αἷτιον δύναιτο, εἴγε πρὸς
not-even — to-conceive anyone the cause could if-indeed besides
τῷ διαφώνους καὶ ἀλλοκότους ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου
the-fact discordant and strange conceptions of-the cause
ἀποδίδοσθαι ἔτι καὶ ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν
being-given further also existence of-it they-have-made
ἀνεύρετον διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν.
undiscoverable because-of the concerning it disagreement
οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον τὸ αἷτιον εἶναί φασιν. 14
some indeed for a-body some but incorporeal the cause to-be say
δόξαι δ' ἂν αἷτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ' αὐτοὺς
it-would-seem but — a-cause to-be more-generally according-to them

δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον ὡς
because-of which acting comes-about the effect for-instance as
 ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χεῖσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ
the sun or the of-the sun beat of-the melting the wax or
 τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασι,
of-the melting of-the wax and for in this they-have-disagreed
 οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον φάσκοντες,
some indeed of-appellations a-cause to-be the cause asserting
 οἷον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἷον τοῦ
for-instance the melting some but of-predicates for-instance the
 χεῖσθαι. διό, καθάπερ εἶπον, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ
to-melt wherefore just-as I-said more-generally — would-be the
 αἴτιον τοῦτο δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα.
cause this because-of which acting comes-about the effect

- 15 τούτων δὲ τῶν αἰτίων οἱ μὲν πλείους ἡγοῦνται τὰ
of-these and the causes the indeed majority hold some
 μὲν συνεκτικὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ συνεργά,
indeed sustaining to-be some but joint-causes some but auxiliary
 καὶ συνεκτικὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὧν παρόντων πάρεστι
and sustaining indeed to-be of-which present is-present
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ αἰρομένων αἴρεται καὶ μειουμένων
the effect and removed it-is-removed and diminished
 μειοῦται (οὕτω γὰρ τὴν περίθεσιν τῆς στραγγάλης
it-is-diminished so for the putting-on of-the noose
 αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ πνιγμοῦ), συναίτιον δὲ ὃ τὴν
a-cause to-be they-say of-the strangling a-joint-cause but that-which the
 ἴσην εἰσφέρειται δύναμιν ἐτέρῳ συναιτίῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι
equal contributes power to-another joint-cause for the being
 τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα (οὕτω γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐλκόντων τὸ
the effect so for each of-the drawing the
 ἄροτρον βοῶν αἴτιον εἶναί φασι τῆς ὀλκῆς τοῦ ἀρότρου),
plow oxen a-cause to-be they-say of-the drawing of-the plow

συνεργὸν δὲ ὁ βραχεῖαν εἰσφέρεται δύναμιν καὶ πρὸς
auxiliary but that-which slight contributes power and for
 τὸ μετὰ ῥαστώνης ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἷον
the with ease being the effect for-instance
 ὅταν δυοῖν βάρος τι βασταζόντων μόλις τρίτος τις
when two a-weight some carrying with-difficulty a-third someone
 προσελθὼν συγκουφίσῃ τοῦτο.

coming-up helps-lift it
 ἔνιοι μέντοι καὶ παρόντα μελλόντων αἷτια ἔφασαν εἶναι, 16
some however also present-things of-future-things causes said to-be
 ὥς τὰ προκαταρκτικά, οἷον τὴν ἐπιτεταμένην ἡλίωσιν
as the antecedent for-instance the intense sun-exposure
 πυρετοῦ. τινὲς δὲ ταῦτα παρητήσαντο, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἷτιον
of-fever some but these rejected since the cause
 πρὸς τι ὑπάρχον καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ὃν οὐ
relative-to something being and relative-to the effect being not
 δύναται προηγεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ὥς αἷτιον. ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ
can precede it as a-cause in and the concerning
 αὐτῶν διαπορήσει τοιάδε λέγομεν.
them raising-of-difficulties such-things we-say

εἴ ἐστι τὶ τινὸς αἷτιον

III.6 • IS ANYTHING THE CAUSE OF ANYTHING?

It is plausible that there is a cause: without one there could be no growth, decay, generation, or motion, and anything would come from anything, horses from mice. Even the man who denies causes must give a cause for denying them. It is equally plausible that there is none: cause and effect can be conceived only through each other, the reason for asserting a cause runs to infinity, and a cause can act neither before, with, nor after its effect. Judgment is therefore suspended.

17 Πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐξήσις
plausible it-is to-be the cause how for — increase
 γένοιτο, μείωσις, γένεσις, φθορά, καθόλου κίνησις, τῶν
could-come-about decrease generation destruction in-general motion of-the
 φυσικῶν τε καὶ ψυχικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἕκαστον, ἡ τοῦ
physical both and psychical effects each the of-the
 παντὸς κόσμου διοίκησης, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, εἰ μὴ κατὰ
whole world governance the other-things all if not according-to
 τινα αἰτίαν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μηδὲν τούτων ὡς πρὸς τὴν
some cause and for if none of-these as in-relation-to the
 φύσιν ὑπάρχει, λέξομεν ὅτι διὰ τινα αἰτίαν πάντως
nature exists we-shall-say that because-of some cause certainly
 φαίνεται ἡμῖν τοιαῦτα, ὅποια οὐκ ἐστίν.
appear to-us such as not they-are

18 ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα ἐκ πάντων καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἂν ἦν μὴ
but also all-things from all-things and as it-chanced — would-be not
 οὔσης αἰτίας. οἶον ἵπποι μὲν ἐκ μυῶν, εἰ τύχοι,
being a-cause for-instance horses indeed from mice if it-should-happen
 γεννηθήσονται, ἐλέφαντες δὲ ἐκ μυρμήκων· καὶ ἐν μὲν
will-be-born elephants but from ants and in indeed
 ταῖς Αἰγυπτίαις Θήβαις ὄμβροι ποτὲ ἐξαίσιοι καὶ χιόνες
the Egyptian Thebes rains sometimes violent and snows
 ἂν ἐγίνοντο, τὰ δὲ νότια ὄμβρων οὐ μετείχεν, εἰ
— would-occur the but southern-regions of-rains not would-share if
 μὴ αἰτία τις ἦν, δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν νότιά ἐστι
not a-cause some there-were because-of which the indeed southern-regions are
 δυσχεύμερα, αὐχμηρὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἑῶ.
storm-swept parched but the-regions toward the dawn

19 καὶ περιτρέπεται δὲ ὁ λέγων μηδὲν αἷτιον εἶναι· εἰ μὲν
and is-overtuned and the-one saying nothing a-cause to-be if indeed
 γὰρ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς αἰτίας τοῦτό φησι λέγειν, ἄπιστος
for simply and without some cause this he-says to-say unconvincing

ἔσται· εἰ δὲ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν, βουλόμενος ἀναιρεῖν τὸ αἷτιον
he-will-be if but because-of some cause wishing to-abolish the cause
 τίθησιν, ἀποδιδόσθω αἰτίαν δι' ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν αἷτιον.
he-posit let-him-give a-cause because-of which not there-is a-cause
 Διὰ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πιθανόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον·
because-of these-things indeed then plausible it-is to-be the cause
 ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναί τινός τι αἷτιον πιθανόν 20
that but also the saying not to-be of-anything any cause plausible
 ἐστὶ, φανερόν ἐσται λόγους ἡμῶν ἐκθεμένων ὀλίγους ἀπὸ
is clear will-be arguments we setting-out a-few out-of
 πολλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος πρὸς τὴν τούτου ὑπόμνησιν.
many for the present toward the of-this reminder
 οἷον γοῦν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον ἐννοῆσαι πρὶν
for-instance at-any-rate impossible it-is the cause to-conceive before
 τὸ ἀποτελεσμα τούτου καταλαβεῖν ὡς ἀποτελεσμα αὐτοῦ·
the effect of-it to-apprehend as an-effect of-it
 τότε γὰρ γνωρίζομεν, ὅτι αἷτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος,
then for we-recognize that a-cause it-is of-the effect
 ὅταν ἐκείνο ὡς ἀποτελεσμα καταλαμβάνομεν.
when that as an-effect we-apprehend
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποτελεσμα τοῦ αἷτιου ὡς ἀποτελεσμα 21
but neither the effect of-the cause as an-effect
 αὐτοῦ καταλαβεῖν δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ καταλάβωμεν τὸ
of-it to-apprehend can-we if not we-apprehend the
 αἷτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ὡς αἷτιον αὐτοῦ· τότε γὰρ καὶ
cause of-the effect as a-cause of-it then for also
 ὅτι ἀποτελεσμά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν
that an-effect it-is of-it to-know we-seem when
 τὸ αἷτιον αὐτοῦ ὡς αἷτιον αὐτοῦ καταλάβωμεν.
the cause of-it as a-cause of-it we-apprehend

- 22 εἰ οὖν, ἵνα μὲν ἐννοήσωμεν τὸ αἷτιον, δεῖ
 if then in-order-that indeed we-may-conceive the cause it-is-necessary
 προεπιγινῶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἵνα δὲ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα
 to-know-beforehand the effect in-order-that but the effect
 γινῶμεν, ὡς ἔφην, δεῖ προεπίστασθαι τὸ αἷτιον, ὁ
 we-may-know as I-said it-is-necessary to-know-beforehand the cause the
 διάλληλος τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπος ἄμφω δείκνυσιν ἀνεπινώητα,
 circular of-the difficulty mode both shows inconceivable
 μήτε τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου μήτε τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος
 neither the cause as a-cause nor the effect
 ὡς ἀποτελέσματος ἐπινοεῖσθαι δυναμένου· ἐκατέρου γὰρ
 as an-effect to-be-conceived being-able each for
 αὐτῶν δεομένου τῆς παρὰ θατέρου πίστεως, οὐχ ἔξομεν
 of-them needing the from the-other warrant not we-shall-have
 ἀπὸ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀρξόμεθα τῆς ἐννοίας. διόπερ οὐδὲ
 from which of-them we-shall-begin the conception wherefore neither
 ἀποφαίνεσθαι δυνησόμεθα, ὅτι ἔστι τι τινὸς αἷτιον.
 to-declare shall-we-be-able that there-is something of-something a-cause
- 23 ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐννοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ αἷτιον συγχωρήσῃ
 in-order-that but also to-be-conceived to-be-able the cause should-concede
 τις, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖν διὰ τὴν
 someone inapprehensible — to-be it-would-be-thought because-of the
 διαφωνίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τι τινὸς
 disagreement those indeed for say to-be something of-something
 αἷτιον, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἐπέσχον. ὅς γὰρ
 a-cause those but not to-be those but suspended-judgment who for
 φησιν εἶναι τι τινὸς αἷτιον, ἥτοι ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπὸ
 says to-be something of-something a-cause either simply and from
 μηδεμιᾶς ὁρμώμενος αἰτίας εὐλόγου τοῦτό φησι λέγειν,
 no starting cause reasonable this he-says to-say
 ἢ διὰ τινος αἰτίας ἐπὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν ταύτην ἰέναι
 or because-of some causes to the assent this to-come

λέξει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἔσται πιστότερος τοῦ
he-will-say and if indeed simply not he-will-be more-convincing than-the
λέγοντος ἀπλῶς μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ αἰτίας
one-saying simply nothing to-be of-anything a-cause if but causes
λέξει δι' ἃς εἶναι τὸ τινὸς αἴτιον νομίζει, τὸ
he-will-say because-of which to-be something of-something a-cause he-thinks the
ζητούμενον διὰ τοῦ ζητουμένου παριστᾶν ἐπιχειρήσει·
thing-sought through the (thing)-investigated establishing he-will-attempt
ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τινὸς αἴτιον,
seeking for we whether there-is something of-something a-cause
αὐτὸς ὡς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον αἴτιον εἶναι φησίν.
he-himself as a-cause being of-the being a-cause a-cause to-be he-says
καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ αἰτίου ζητοῦμεν, 24
and otherwise since concerning the existence of-the cause we-inquire
δείξει πάντως αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι τι
it-will-be-necessary certainly him also of-the cause of-the being something
αἴτιον αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, κακένης ἄλλην, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου.
a-cause a-cause to-furnish and-of-that another and up-to infinity
ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀπείρους αἰτίας παρασχεῖν· ἀδύνατον ἄρα
impossible but infinite causes to-furnish impossible therefore
διαβεβαιωτικῶς ἀποφῆναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τινὸς αἴτιον.
confidently to-declare that there-is something of-something a-cause
πρὸς τούτοις ἥτοι ὄν καὶ ὑφεστὼς ἤδη αἴτιον τὸ 25
besides these either being and subsisting already a-cause the
αἴτιον ποιεῖ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἢ μὴ ὄν αἴτιον. καὶ μὴ
cause produces the effect or not being a-cause and not
ὄν μὲν οὐδαμῶς· εἰ δὲ ὄν, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρότερον
being indeed by-no-means if but being it-is-necessary it first
ὑποστῆναι καὶ προγενέσθαι αἴτιον, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐπάγειν τὸ
to-subsist and to-become-beforehand a-cause then so to-bring-on the
ἀποτέλεσμα, ὅπερ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγεται
effect which-very-thing by it to-be-effected is-said

ὄντος ἤδη αἰτίου. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὸ αἷτιον
being already a-cause but since relative-to something is the cause
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, σαφὲς ὅτι μὴ δύναται τούτου
and relative-to the effect clear that not it-can of-it
 ὡς αἷτιον προὔποσθῆναι· οὐδὲ ὃν ἄρα αἷτιον τὸ αἷτιον
as a-cause subsist-beforehand neither being therefore a-cause the cause
 ἀποτελεῖν δύναται τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν αἷτιον.
to-effect can the-thing of-which it-is a-cause

- 26 εἰ δὲ μήτε μὴ ὃν αἷτιον ἀποτελεῖ τι μήτε ὃν, οὐδὲ
if but neither not being a-cause effects anything nor being neither
 ἀποτελεῖ τι· διὸ οὐδὲ αἷτιον ἔσται· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ
it-effects anything wherefore neither a-cause will-it-be without for the
 ἀποτελεῖν τι τὸ αἷτιον οὐ δύναται ὡς αἷτιον νοεῖσθαι.
effecting something the cause not can as a-cause be-conceived
 ὅθεν κακὲν λέγουσί τινες· τὸ αἷτιον ἤτοι συννφίστασθαι
whence that-too say some the cause either to-subsist-together
 δεῖ τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ἢ προὔφιστασθαι τούτου ἢ
it-must with-the effect or to-subsist-before it or
 εἶναι μετὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀποτέλεσμα. τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν,
to-be after the coming-about of-the-effect the indeed then to-say
 ὅτι τὸ αἷτιον εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἄγεται μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν
that the cause into existence is-brought after the generation
 τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦ. ἀλλ'
of-the effect of-it perhaps also ridiculous it-may-be but
 οὐδὲ προὔφιστασθαι δύναται τούτου· πρὸς αὐτὸ γὰρ
neither to-subsist-before can-it it in-relation-to it for
 νοεῖσθαι λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι φασὶν αὐτοί,
to-be-conceived it-is-said the-things and relative-to something say they-themselves
- 27 καθὼς πρὸς τι ἐστίν, συννπάρχειν καὶ συννοεῖσθαι
in-so-far-as relative-to something it-is to-co-exist and to-be-conceived-together
 ἀλλήλοισι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συννφίστασθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀποτελεσματικὸν
with-one-another but neither to-subsist-together if for productive

αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον ὑπὸ ὄντος ἤδη γίνεσθαι
of-it it-is the but coming-about by being already to-come-about
 χρή, πρότερον δεῖ τὸ αἷτιον γενέσθαι αἷτιον, εἴθ'
it-must first it-must the cause to-become a-cause then
 οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸ ἀποτελεσμα. εἰ οὖν τὸ αἷτιον μήτε
so to-produce the effect if then the cause neither
 προϋφίσταται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ μήτε συνυφίσταται
subsists-before the effect of-it nor subsists-together
 τούτῳ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποτελεσμα πρὸ αὐτοῦ γίνεται,
with-it but neither the effect before it comes-about
 μήποτε οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεως ὅλως μετέχει.

perhaps neither of-existence at-all does-it-partake
 σαφὲς δὲ ἴσως ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ ἐπίνοια τοῦ αἷτιου 28
clear and perhaps that also through these the conception of-the cause
 πάλιν περιτρέπεται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἷτιον ὥς μὲν πρὸς τι οὐ
again is-overtuned if for the cause as indeed relative-to something not
 δύναται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ προεπινοηθῆναι, ἵνα
can the effect of-it be-conceived-before in-order-that
 δὲ ὥς αἷτιον τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ νοηθῇ, δεῖ
but as a-cause of-the effect of-it it-may-be-conceived it-must
 αὐτὸ προεπινοεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον
it be-conceived-before the effect of-it impossible
 δὲ προεπινοηθῆναί τι ἐκείνου οὐ προεπινοηθῆναι οὐ
but to-be-conceived-before anything that which to-be-conceived-before not
 δύναται, ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοηθῆναι τὸ αἷτιον.

it-can impossible it-is to-conceive the cause
 Ἐκ τούτων οὖν λοιπὸν ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ πιθανοὶ μὲν 29
from these then finally we-conclude that if plausible indeed
 εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι καθ' οὓς ὑπεμνήσαμεν ὥς χρή λέγειν αἷτιον
are the arguments by which we-recalled that one-must say a-cause
 εἶναι, πιθανοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ παριστάντες, ὅτι μὴ προσήκει
to-be plausible but also the-ones establishing that not it-is-fitting

αἴτιον εἶναι τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων προκρίνειν τινὰς
a-cause to-be anything to-declare and of-these to-prefer some
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, μήτε σημεῖον μήτε κριτήριον μήτε ἀπόδειξιν
not it-is-possible neither a-sign nor a-criterion nor a-proof
ὁμολογουμένως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν παρεστήσαμεν,
admittedly we having as before we-established
ἐπέχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ
to-suspend-judgment necessity also concerning the existence of-the
αἰτίου, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τι αἴτιον λέγοντας
cause not more to-be than not to-be anything a-cause saying
ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.
so-far-as upon the-things said by the dogmatists

περὶ ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν

III.7 · MATERIAL PRINCIPLES

That the material principles cannot be apprehended is plain from the disagreement about them: earth for Pherecydes, water for Thales, the unlimited for Anaximander, air for Anaximenes and Diogenes, fire for Hippasus, the four elements for Empedocles and the Stoics, a fifth revolving body for Aristotle, atoms for Democritus and Epicurus, homoeomeries for Anaxagoras, partless bodies, unjointed masses, numbers, limits, qualities. We can assent to all, which is impossible, or to some, which cannot be decided.

- 30 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δραστηκῆς τοσαῦτα νῦν ἀρκέσει
concerning indeed then the efficient so-much now it-will-suffice
λελέχθαι· συντόμως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν
to-have-been-said briefly and also concerning the material
καλουμένων ἀρχῶν λεκτέον. ὅτι τοῖνυν αὐταί εἰσιν
so-called principles must-be-said that then these are
ἀκατάληπτοι, ῥάδιον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν
inapprehensible easy to-see-at-once from the concerning them

γεγεννημένης διαφωνίας παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς. Φερεκύδης
arisen disagreement among the dogmatists Phercydes

μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν,
indeed for the Syrian earth said the of-all to-be principle

Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστής
Thales but the Milesian water Anaximander but the pupil

τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ
of-this-man the unlimited Anaximenes but and Diogenes the

Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἴππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ,
Apollonian air Hippasus but the Metapontine fire

Ξενοφάνης δὲ ὁ Κολοφώνιος γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, Οἰνοπίδης δὲ
Xenophanes but the Colophonian earth and water Oenopides but

ὁ Χίος πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα, Ἴππων δὲ ὁ Ῥηγῖνος πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ,
the Chian fire and air Hippon but the Rhegian fire and water

Ὀνομάκριτος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν.
Onomacritus but in the Orphic-poems fire and water and earth

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς πῦρ ἀέρα 31
those but about — Empedocles and the Stoics fire air

ὕδωρ γῆν — περὶ γὰρ τῆς τερατολογουμένης ἀποίου
water earth concerning for the fabled quality-less

παρά τισιν ὕλης, ἣν οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ καταλαμβάνειν
among some matter which not-even they-themselves to-apprehend

διαβεβαιοῦνται, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην
confidently-claim what need even to-say those but about Aristotle

τὸν Περιπατητικὸν πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν
the Peripatetic fire air water earth the revolving

σῶμα,

body

Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ 32
Democritus but and Epicurus atoms Anaxagoras but

ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὁμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς
the Clazomenian homoeomeries Diodorus but the-one surnamed

Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῇ σώματα, Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ
Cronus minimal and partless bodies Heraclides but the
 Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ Βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους,
Pontic and Asclepiades the Bithynian unjointed masses
 οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μαθηματικοὶ
those but about Pythagoras the numbers the but mathematicians
 τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς
the limits of-the bodies Strato but the natural-philosopher
 τὰς ποιότητας.
the qualities

- 33 τοσαύτης τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι πλείονος διαφωνίας γεγενημένης
so-great then and still greater disagreement having-arisen
 περὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἥτοι πάσαις
concerning the material principles among them either to-all
 συγκαταθησόμεθα ταῖς κειμέναις στάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις
we-shall-assent the stated positions and the others
 ἢ τισίν. ἀλλὰ πάσαις μὲν οὐ δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου
or to-some but to-all indeed not possible not for surely
 δυνησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην συγκατατίθεσθαι,
we-shall-be-able and those about Asclepiades to-assent
 θραυστὰ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγουσι καὶ ποιά, καὶ τοῖς
breakable to-be the elements saying and qualified and those
 περὶ Δημόκριτον, ἅτομα ταῦτα εἶναι φάσκουσι καὶ ἄποια,
about Democritus atoms these to-be asserting and quality-less
 καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ποιότητα
and those about Anaxagoras every sensible quality
 περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν.
in the homoeomeries leaving

- 34 εἰ δέ τινα στάσιν τῶν ἄλλων προκρινοῦμεν, ἥτοι ἀπλῶς
if but some position than-the others we-shall-prefer either simply
 καὶ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως προκρινοῦμεν ἢ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως.
and without proof we-shall-prefer or with proof

ἄνευ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεως οὐ συνθησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ
without indeed then proof not we-shall-agree if but with
 ἀποδείξεως, ἀληθὴ δὲ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ἀληθὴς δὲ οὐκ
proof true it-must the proof be true but not
 ἂν δοθείη μὴ οὐχὶ κεκριμένη κριτηρίῳ ἀληθεῖ, ἀληθὲς
— would-be-granted not not judged by-a-criterion true true
 δὲ κριτήριον εἶναι δέικνυται δι' ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.
but a-criterion to-be is-shown through a-proof judged
 εἰ τοῖνυν, ἵνα μὲν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἢ προκρίνουσά τινα 35
if then in-order-that indeed the proof the-one preferring some
 στάσιν ἀληθὴς εἶναι δειχθῇ, δεῖ τὸ κριτήριον αὐτῆς
position true to-be may-be-shown it-must the criterion of-it
 ἀποδεδείχθαι, ἵνα δὲ τὸ κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῇ, δεῖ
have-been-proved in-order-that but the criterion may-be-proved it-must
 τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προκεκρίσθαι, ὃ διάλληλος εὐρίσκεται
the proof of-it have-been-preferred the circular is-found
 τρόπος, ὃς οὐκ ἔασει προβαίνειν τὸν λόγον, τῆς μὲν
mode which not will-allow to-advance the argument the indeed
 ἀποδείξεως ἀεὶ κριτηρίου δεομένης ἀποδεδειγμένου, τοῦ
proof always a-criterion needing proved the
 κριτηρίου δὲ ἀποδείξεως κεκριμένης.
criterion but a-proof judged
 εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ κριτήριον κριτηρίῳ κρίνειν καὶ τὴν 36
if but always the criterion by-a-criterion to-judge and the
 ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδείξει ἀποδεικνύναι βούλοιτό τις, εἰς
proof by-a-proof to-prove should-wish someone into
 ἄπειρον ἐκβληθήσεται. εἰ τοῖνυν μήτε πάσαις ταῖς περὶ
infinity he-will-be-cast if then neither all the concerning
 στοιχείων στάσεσι δυνάμεθα συγκατατίθεσθαι μήτε τινὶ
elements positions we-can assent nor to-any
 τούτων, ἐπέχειν προσήκει περὶ αὐτῶν.
of-these to-suspend-judgment it-is-fitting concerning them

37 Δυνατὸν μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτων μόνων
possible indeed then perhaps it-is also through these alone
 ὑπομνήσκειν τὴν τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀρχῶν
to-point-out the of-the elements and of-the material principles
 ἀκαταληψίαν· ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφέστερον τοὺς
inapprehensibility in-order-that but also more-amply the
 δογματικούς ἐλέγχειν ἔχωμεν, ἐνδιατρίψωμεν συμμέτρως
dogmatists to-refute we-may-be-able let-us-dwell moderately
 τῷ τόπῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ πολλαὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειροί τινές εἰσιν
on-the topic and since many and almost countless some are
 αἱ περὶ στοιχείων δόξαι, καθὼς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, τὸ μὲν
the concerning elements opinions as we-recalled the indeed
 πρὸς ἐκάστην λέγειν εἰδικῶς νῦν παραιτησόμεθα διὰ
against each to-speak specifically now we-shall-decline because-of
 τὸν χαρακτήρα τῆς συγγραφῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πρὸς πάσας
the character of-the composition potentially but against all
 ἀντεροῦμεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἢν ἄν τις εἴπῃ περὶ στοιχείων
we-shall-argue since for whatever — anyone may-state concerning elements
 στάσιν, ἥτοι ἐπὶ σώματα κατενεχθήσεται ἢ ἐπὶ ἀσώματα,
position either to bodies will-come-down or to incorporeals
 ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα ὑπομνήσαι, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ
to-suffice we-consider to-point-out that inapprehensible indeed are the
 σώματα, ἀκατάληπτα δὲ τὰ ἀσώματα· διὰ γὰρ τούτου
bodies inapprehensible but the incorporeals through for this
 σαφές ἐσται, ὅτι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτα.
clear it-will-be that also the elements are inapprehensible

εἰ καταληπτὰ τὰ σώματα

III.8 · ARE BODIES APPREHENSIBLE?

A body is said to be what can act and be acted on, but cause and thing acted on are both inapprehensible. Others make it what is extended three ways with resistance, which is then either nothing beyond length, breadth, depth, and resistance, falling with them, or something more; limits, Sextus argues, subsist neither by themselves nor in bodies, and he proves it from the difficulties of contact. Resistance, touch, and body are each shown inapprehensible in turn, and so is the incorporeal, grasped by neither sense nor reason.

Σῶμα τοίνυν λέγουσιν εἶναι τινες ὁ οἶόν τε ποιεῖν 38
a-body then say to-be some that-which able and to-act
 ἢ πάσχειν. ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀκατάληπτόν
or to-be-acted-on so-far-as but upon this the conception inapprehensible
 ἔστι τοῦτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι, καθὼς
is this the indeed for cause inapprehensible is as
 ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔστι τι αἴτιον,
we-recalled not being-able and to-say whether there-is any cause
 οὐδὲ εἰ ἔστι τι πάσχον εἰπεῖν δυνάμεθα· τὸ
neither whether there-is anything being-acted-on to-say can-we the-thing
 γὰρ πάσχον πάντως ὑπὸ αἰτίου πάσχει. ἀκαταλήπτου δὲ
for being-acted-on certainly by a-cause is-acted-on inapprehensible but
 ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος, διὰ ταῦτα
being both the cause and the thing-acted-on because-of these-things
 ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ σῶμα.
inapprehensible will-be also the body

τινὲς δὲ σῶμα εἶναι λέγουσι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν 39
some but a-body to-be say that-which in-three-ways extended
 μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας. σημεῖον μὲν γὰρ φασιν οὐ μέρος οὐθέν,
with resistance a-point indeed for they-say of-which a-part none
 γραμμὴν δὲ μήκος ἀπλατές, ἐπιφάνειαν δὲ μήκος μετὰ
a-line and length breadthless a-surface and length with

πλάτους· ὅταν δὲ αὕτη καὶ βάθος προσλάβῃ καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν,
breadth when and this also depth takes-on and resistance

σῶμα εἶναι, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, συνεστὼς
a-body to-be concerning which now is for-us the account composed

ἐκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας.
of both length and breadth and depth and resistance

40 εὐμαρῆς μέντοι καὶ ὁ πρὸς τούτους λόγος. τὸ γὰρ σῶμα
easy however also the against these argument the for body

ἤτοι οὐδὲν παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι λέξουσιν ἢ ἕτερόν τι
either nothing beside these to-be they-will-say or another something

παρὰ τὴν συνέλευσιν τῶν προειρημένων. καὶ ἔξωθεν
beside the combination of-the-things said-before and apart-from

μὲν τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τοῦ βάθους καὶ
indeed the length both and the breadth and the depth and

τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτά
the resistance nothing — would-be the body if but these

ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, ἐὰν δείξῃ τις, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστιν,
is the body if should-show someone that non-existent they-are

ἀναιροῦν ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὰ γὰρ ὅλα συναναίρειται
be-would-abolish — also the body the for wholes are-abolished-together

τοῖς ἐαυτῶν πᾶσι μέρεσιν. ποικίλως μὲν οὖν ἔστι
with-the their-own all parts variously indeed then it-is-possible

ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἀρκέσει λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ ἔστι
these to-refute the but now it-will-suffice to-say that if there-are

τὰ πέρατα, ἤτοι γραμμαὶ εἰσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι ἢ σώματα.
the limits either lines they-are or surfaces or bodies

41 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφάνειάν τινα ἢ γραμμὴν εἶναι λέγοι τις, καὶ
if indeed then a-surface some or a-line to-be should-say someone and

τῶν προειρημένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι
of-the-things said-before each either by itself to-subsist

δύνασθαι λεχθήσεται ἢ μόνον περὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις σώμασι
to-be-able will-be-said or only in the so-called bodies

θεωρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ὑπάρχουσιν ἤτοι
to-be-observed but by itself indeed existing either
 γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν ὀνειροπολεῖν ἴσως εὐήθες. εἰ δὲ περὶ
a-line or a-surface to-dream-up perhaps silly if but in
 τοῖς σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι λέγοιτο μόνον καὶ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ
the bodies to-be-observed it-should-be-said only and not by itself
 ὑφεστάναι τούτων ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται
to-subsist of-these each first indeed at-once it-will-be-granted
 τὸ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγενῆσθαι τὰ σώματα (ἐχρῆν
the not from them to-have-come-about the bodies it-would-have-been-necessary
 γάρ, οἶμαι, ταῦτα πρότερον ὑπόστασιν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐσχηκέναι,
for I-think these first existence by themselves to-have-had
 καὶ οὕτω συνελθόντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ σώματα),
and so coming-together to-have-made the bodies
 εἴτα οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις σώμασιν ὑφέστηκεν. καὶ τοῦτο 42
then neither in the so-called bodies does-it-subsist and this
 διὰ πλείονων μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπομνησκειν, ἀρκέσει δὲ νῦν
through more indeed it-is-possible to-point-out it-will-suffice but now
 τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀφῆς ἀπορούμενα λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπτεται
the-things from the contact raised-as-difficulties to-say if for touch
 ἀλλήλων τὰ παρατιθέμενα σώματα, τοῖς πέρασιν αὐτῶν,
one-another the juxtaposed bodies by-the limits of-them
 οἷον ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις, ψαύει ἀλλήλων. αἱ οὖν ἐπιφάνειαι
that-is by-the surfaces they-touch one-another the then surfaces
 ὅλαι μὲν δι' ὅλων ἀλλήλαις οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται κατὰ
whole indeed through wholes with-one-another not will-be-united in
 τὴν ἀφήν, ἐπεὶ σύγχυσις ἔσται ἢ ἀφή καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς
the contact since a-fusion will-be the contact and the separation
 τῶν ἀπομένων διασπασμός· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται.
of-the touching-things a-tearing-apart which-very-thing not is-observed

43 εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσιν ἢ ἐπιφάνεια ἄπτεται τῆς
 if but with-some indeed parts the surface touches the
 τοῦ παρατιθεμένου αὐτῇ σώματος ἐπιφανείας, ἄλλοις δὲ
 of-the juxtaposed to-it body surface with-others but
 συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας, οὐκ ἔσται
 it-is-united with-the body of-which it-is the-limit not it-will-be
 ἀβαθὴς, διαφόρων τῶν αὐτῆς μερῶν νοουμένων κατὰ βάθος,
 depthless different the of-it parts being-conceived in depth
 τοῦ μὲν τοῦ παρατιθεμένου ἀπτομένου, τοῦ δὲ καθ' ὃ
 the-one indeed the juxtaposed touching the-other but by which
 συνήνωται τῷ σώματι οὗ ἐστι πέρας. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ
 it-is-united with-the body of-which it-is the-limit not therefore not-even
 περὶ σώματι θεωρῆσαι δύναται τις μήκος καὶ πλάτος
 in a-body to-observe can anyone length and breadth
 ἀβαθές, ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἐπιφάνειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο ἐπιφανειῶν
 depthless whence neither a-surface likewise and also two surfaces
 καθ' ὑπόθεσιν παρατιθεμένων ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὰ πέρατα
 by hypothesis juxtaposed to-one-another at the limits
 αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ λήγουσι, κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον αὐτῶν μήκος
 of-them into which they-end in the so-called of-them length
 εἶναι, τουτέστι κατὰ γραμμάς, αἱ γραμμὰι αὐται, δι' ὧν
 to-be that-is at lines the lines these through which
 ἄπτεσθαι λέγονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐχ ἐνωθήσονται
 to-touch are-said one-another the surfaces not will-be-united
 μὲν ἀλλήλαις (συγχυθεῖεν γὰρ αὖν). εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη
 indeed with-one-another they-would-be-fused for — if but each
 αὐτῶν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τοῖς κατὰ πλάτος ἄπτεται τῆς
 of-them with-some indeed parts the-ones in breadth touches the
 παρατιθεμένης αὐτῇ γραμμῆς, ἄλλοις δὲ συνήνωται τῇ
 juxtaposed to-it line with-others but it-is-united with-the
 ἐπιφανείᾳ ἧς ἐστι πέρας, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπλατῆς, ὅθεν
 surface of-which it-is the-limit not it-will-be breadthless whence

οὐδὲ γραμμῇ. εἰ δὲ μήτε γραμμῇ ἔστιν ἐν σώματι μήτε
neither a-line if but neither a-line there-is in a-body nor

ἐπιφάνεια, οὐδὲ μῆκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος ἔσται ἐν σώματι.
a-surface neither length or breadth or depth will-be in a-body

εἰ δέ τις σώματα εἶναι λέγοι τὰ πέρατα, σύντομος
if but someone bodies to-be should-say the limits brief

44

ἔσται ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρίσις. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος
will-be the to him answer if for the length

σῶμα ἐστίν, δεήσει τοῦτο εἰς τὰς τρεῖς αὐτοῦ
a-body is it-will-be-necessary this into the three of-it

μερίζεσθαι διαστάσεις, ὧν ἐκάστη σῶμα οὖσα πάλιν
to-be-divided dimensions of-which each a-body being again

αὐτὴ διαιρεθήσεται εἰς διαστάσεις ἄλλας τρεῖς, αἱ ἔσονται
itself will-be-divided into dimensions other three which will-be

σώματα, καὶ ἐκεῖναι εἰς ἄλλας ὁμοίως, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρῃς
bodies and those into others likewise and this up-to

ἀπείρου, ὥς ἀπειρομέγεθες γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα
infinity so-that of-infinite-magnitude to-become the body into infinities

μεριζόμενον· ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐδὲ σώματα ἄρα εἰσὶν
being-divided which-very-thing absurd neither bodies therefore are

αἱ προειρημέναι διαστάσεις. εἰ δὲ μήτε σώματά εἰσι
the aforesaid dimensions if but neither bodies they-are

μήτε γραμμαι ἢ ἐπιφάνειαι, οὐδὲ εἶναι νομισθήσονται.
nor lines or surfaces neither to-be will-they-be-thought

Ἀκατάληπτος δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. αὕτη γὰρ εἴπερ
inapprehensible and is also the resistance this for if-indeed

45

καταλαμβάνεται, ἀφῇ καταλαμβάνοιτο ἄν. ἐὰν οὖν
is-apprehended by-touch it-would-be-apprehended — if then

δείξωμεν, ὅτι ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀφή, σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι
we-show that inapprehensible is the touch clear it-will-be that

οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν. ὅτι δὲ
not possible and it-is to-be-apprehended the resistance that and

ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν ἡ ἀφή, διὰ τούτων ἐπιλογιζόμεθα.

inapprehensible is the touch through these we-conclude

τὰ ἀπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἥτοι μέρεσιν ἀλλήλων ἄπτεται

the-things touching one-another either with-parts of-one-another touch

ἢ ὅλα ὄλων. ὅλα μὲν οὖν ὄλων οὐδαμῶς· ἐνωθήσεται

or wholes of-wholes wholes indeed then of-wholes by-no-means they-will-be-united

γὰρ οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι

for so and not they-will-touch one-another but neither with-parts

μερῶν· τὰ γὰρ μέρη αὐτῶν ὥς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα

of-parts the for parts of-them as indeed in-relation-to the wholes

μέρη ἐστίν, ὥς δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέρη ἑαυτῶν ὅλα. ταῦτα

parts are as but in-relation-to the parts of-themselves wholes these

οὖν τὰ ὅλα, ἃ ἐστιν ἐτέρων μέρη, ὅλα μὲν ὄλων οὐχ

then the wholes which are of-others parts wholes indeed of-wholes not

46 ἄψεται διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν·

will-touch because-of the-things said-before but neither with-parts of-parts

καὶ γὰρ τὰ τούτων μέρη ὥς πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν μέρη

and for the of-these parts as in-relation-to the of-themselves parts

ὅλα ὄντα οὐτε ὅλα ὄλων ἄψεται οὐτε μέρεσι μερῶν.

wholes being neither wholes of-wholes will-touch nor with-parts of-parts

εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ὁλότητα μήτε κατὰ μέρη γινομένην

if but neither according-to wholeness nor according-to parts occurring

ἀφήν καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀκατάληπτος ἔσται ἡ ἀφή. διὰ

contact we-apprehend inapprehensible will-be the touch because-of

δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα· εἰ γὰρ

and this also the resistance whence also the body if for

οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις καὶ τὴν

nothing is this beside the three dimensions and the

ἀντιτυπίαν, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον τούτων ἕκαστον,

resistance we-showed and inapprehensible of-these each

καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτον.

also the body will-be inapprehensible

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τοῦ σώματος,

thus indeed then so-far-as upon the conception of-the body

ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, εἰ ἔστι τι σῶμα·

inapprehensible it-is whether there-is any body

λεκτέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ προκείμενον. τῶν ὄντων τὰ 47

must-be-said and also this for the matter-in-hand of-the existing-things some

μὲν φασιν εἶναι αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά, καὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ

indeed they-say to-be sensible some but intelligible and some indeed by-the

διανοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τὰς

understanding to-be-apprehended some but by-the senses and the

μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διάνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς

indeed senses simply-affected to-be the but understanding from the

τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως ἐπὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν νοητῶν

of-the sensibles apprehension to the apprehension of-the intelligibles

ἵεναι. εἰ οὖν ἔστι τι σῶμα, ἥτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν.

to-pass if then there-is any body either sensible it-is or intelligible

καὶ αἰσθητόν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν· κατὰ γὰρ συναθροισμὸν μήκους

and sensible indeed not it-is by for an-aggregation of-length

καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ χρώματος καὶ

and depth and breadth and resistance and color and

ἄλλων τινῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, σὺν οἷς θεωρεῖται·

other some to-be-apprehended it-seems with which it-is-observed

αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἶναι λέγονται παρ' αὐτοῖς.

the but senses simply-affected to-be are-said among them

*** εἰ δὲ νοητόν εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, δεῖ τι 48

(lacuna) if but intelligible to-be is-said the body it-must something

πάντως ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητόν,

certainly to-exist in the nature of-the things sensible

ἀφ' οὗ ἢ τῶν σωμάτων νοητῶν ὄντων ἔσται νόησις.

from which the of-the bodies intelligible being will-be conception

οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὧν

nothing but is beside the body and the incorporeal of-which

τὸ μὲν ἀσώματον αὐτόθεν νοητόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ
the indeed incorporeal at-once intelligible is the but body not
 αἰσθητόν, ὥς ὑπεμνήσαμεν. μὴ ὄντος οὖν ἐν τῇ φύσει
sensible as we-recalled not being then in the nature
 τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθητοῦ τινος ἀφ' οὗ ἡ νόσις ἔσται
of-the things sensible any from which the conception will-be
 τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔσται τὸ σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μήτε
of-the body neither intelligible will-be the body if but neither
 αἰσθητόν ἐστι μήτε νοητόν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι,
sensible it-is nor intelligible beside and these nothing is
 λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα.
must-be-said so-far-as upon the argument nothing to-be the body

- 49 διὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡμεῖς ἀντιτιθέντες τοὺς κατὰ τοῦ
because-of these-things then we opposing the against the
 σώματος λόγους τῷ φαίνεσθαι ὑπάρχον τὸ σῶμα,
body arguments to-the appearing existing the body
 συνάγομεν τὴν περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχὴν.
we-infer the concerning the body suspension-of-judgment
 Τῇ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταληψία συνεισάγεται καὶ τὸ
with-the and of-the body inapprehensibility is-brought-in also the
 ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ ἀσώματον. αἱ γὰρ στερήσεις τῶν
inapprehensible to-be the incorporeal the for privations of-the
 ἕξεων νοοῦνται στερήσεις, οἷον ὁράσεως τυφλότης καὶ
states are-conceived privations for-instance of-sight blindness and
 ἀκοῆς κωφότης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως.
of-hearing deafness and in-the-case-of the others similarly
 διόπερ ἵνα στήρησιν καταλάβωμεν, δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν
wherefore in-order-that a-privation we-may-apprehend it-must the state
 ἡμᾶς προκατεληφέναι, ἧς λέγεται στήρησις εἶναι ἡ
us to-have-apprehended-first of-which is-said a-privation to-be the
 στήρησις· ἀνευνόητος γάρ τις ὢν τῆς ὁράσεως οὐκ
privation without-a-conception for someone being of sight not

ἂν δύναιτο λέγειν, ὅτι ὄρασιν ὁδε οὐκ ἔχει, ὅπερ
— could say that sight this-man not has which-very-thing
ἐστὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.

is the blind to-be

εἰ οὖν στέρησις σώματός ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, τῶν δὲ 50

if then a-privation of-body is the incorporeal the and

ἔξεων μὴ καταλαμβανομένων ἀδύνατον τὰς στερήσεις

states not being-apprehended impossible the privations

αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ σῶμα

of-them to-be-apprehended and it-has-been-shown that the body

ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον.

inapprehensible is inapprehensible will-be also the incorporeal

καὶ γὰρ ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν. εἴτε δὲ αἰσθητόν

and for either sensible it-is or intelligible whether and sensible

ἐστίν, ἀκατάληπτόν ἐστι διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν

it-is inapprehensible it-is because-of the difference of-the

ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν

animals and the men and the senses and the

περιστάσεων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ

circumstances and because-of the admixtures and the rest

τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν

of-the-things said-before by-us in the-passages concerning the

δέκα τρόπων εἴτε νοητόν, μὴ διδομένης αὐτόθεν τῆς

ten modes or-whether intelligible not being-granted at-once the

τῶν αἰσθητῶν καταλήψεως, ἀφ' ἧς ὀρμώμενοι τοῖς

of-the sensibles apprehension from which starting the

νοητοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν δοκοῦμεν, οὐδὲ ἢ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτόθεν

intelligibles to-grasp we-seem neither the of-the intelligibles at-once

κατάληψις δοθήσεται, διόπερ οὐδὲ ἢ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου.

apprehension will-be-granted wherefore neither the of-the incorporeal

- 51 ὁ τε φάσκων καταλαμβάνειν τὸ ἀσώματον ἥτοι
the-one and asserting to-apprehend the incorporeal either
 αἰσθήσει τοῦτο παραστήσει καταλαμβάνειν ἢ διὰ λόγου.
by-sense this will-maintain to-apprehend or through reason
 καὶ αἰσθήσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις κατὰ
and by-sense indeed by-no-means since the indeed senses by
 ἐπείρεισιν καὶ νύξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δοκοῦσι τῶν αἰσθητῶν,
pressure and impact to-apprehend seem the sensibles
 οἶον ἢ ὄρασις, ἐάν τε κατὰ ἔντασιν γίνηται κώνου,
for-instance the sight whether both by the-tension it-comes-about of-a-cone
 ἐάν τε κατὰ εἰδώλων ἀποκρίσεις τε καὶ ἐπικρίσεις, ἐάν
whether or by of-images emissions both and impressions whether
 τε κατ' ἀκτίνων ἢ χρωμάτων ἀποχύσεις, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ δέ,
or by of-rays or of-colors effluences and the hearing and
 ἥν τε ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀήρ, ἥν τε τὰ μόρια τῆς φωνῆς
whether both the struck air whether or the particles of-the voice
 φέρεται περὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ πλήττη τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα
are-carried about the ears and strike the auditory breath
 ὥστε τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῆς φωνῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ
so-as the perception of-the voice to-produce but also the
 ὀδοὶ τῇ ῥίνι καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ αὖ τῇ γλώττῃ προσπίπτουσιν,
smells on-the nose and the flavors again on-the tongue fall
 καὶ τὰ τὴν ἀφήν κινοῦντα ὁμοίως τῇ ἀφῇ.
and the-things the touch moving likewise on-the touch
- 52 τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα ἐπείρεισιν τοιαύτην ὑπομένειν οὐχ οἷα
the but incorporeals pressure such to-undergo not able
 τέ ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τῇ αἰσθήσει ταῦτα
and are so-that not — could by-the sense these
 καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διὰ λόγου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
to-be-apprehended but neither through reason if indeed for
 λεκτὸν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀσώματος, ὡς οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν,
a-sayable is the reason and incorporeal as the Stoics say

ὁ λέγων διὰ λόγου καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τὸ
the-one saying through reason to-be-apprehended the incorporeals the
ζητούμενον συναρπάζει. ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν, εἰ δύναται
thing-sought steals seeking for we whether can
τι ἀσώματον καταλαμβάνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀσώματόν
anything incorporeal to-be-apprehended he-himself incorporeal
τι λαβὼν ἀπλῶς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν
something having-taken simply through this the apprehension of-the
ἀσωμάτων ποιεῖσθαι θέλει. καίτοι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴπερ
incorporeals to-make wishes although itself the reason if-indeed
ἀσώματός ἐστι, τῆς τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ μοίρας.
incorporeal is of-the of-the things-sought is class
πῶς οὖν ἀποδείξει τις, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο τὸ ἀσώματον 53
how then will-show anyone that first this the incorporeal
καταλαμβάνεται (φημὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον); εἰ μὲν γὰρ δι'
is-apprehended I-mean and the argument if indeed for through
ἄλλου ἀσωμάτου, κακείνου ζητήσομεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς
another incorporeal of-that-too we-shall-seek the proof of-the
καταλήψεως, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ διὰ σώματος,
apprehension and up-to infinity if but through a-body
ζητεῖται καὶ περὶ τῆς καταλήψεως τῶν σωμάτων·
it-is-sought also concerning the apprehension of-the bodies
διὰ τίνος οὖν δείξομεν, ὅτι καταλαμβάνεται τὸ σῶμα
through what then shall-we-show that is-apprehended the body
τὸ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἀσωμάτου λόγος
the for proof of-the apprehension of-the incorporeal argument
λαμβάνόμενον; εἰ μὲν διὰ σώματος, εἰς ἄπειρον
being-taken if indeed through a-body into infinity
ἐκβαλλόμεθα· εἰ δὲ δι' ἀσωμάτου, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον
we-are-cast if but through an-incorporeal into the circular
τρόπον ἐκπίπτομεν. μένοντος οὖν οὕτως ἀκαταλήπτου
mode we-fall remaining then thus inapprehensible

τοῦ λόγου, εἴπερ ἀσώματός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο τις
the argument if-indeed incorporeal it-is not — could anyone
 λέγειν δι' αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀσώματον.

say through it to-be-apprehended the incorporeal

54 εἰ δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν σωμάτων

if but a-body is the argument since also concerning the bodies

διαπεφώνηται, πότερον καταλαμβάνεται ἢ οὔ, διὰ τὴν
it-has-been-disputed whether they-are-apprehended or not because-of the

λεγομένην συνεχῇ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, ὥς μηδὲ τὴν 'τόδε' δείξιν
so-called continuous flux of-them so-that not-even the this pointing-out

ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἶναι νομίζεσθαι, παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων
to-admit nor to-be to-be-thought wherefore also — Plato

γινόμενα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀπορῶ
becoming indeed being but never calls the bodies I-am-at-a-loss

πῶς ἐπικριθήσεται ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου διαφωνία,
how will-be-decided the concerning the incorporeal disagreement

μήτε σῶματι μήτε ἀσωμάτῳ ταύτην ὁρῶν ἐπικρίνεσθαι
neither by-a-body nor by-an-incorporeal this seeing to-be-decided

δυναμένην διὰ τὰς μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημέναις ἀτοπίαις.
able because-of the a-little before said absurdities

οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ λόγῳ δυνατόν ἐστι καταλαμβάνειν τὰ ἀσώματα.
therefore neither by-reason possible it-is to-apprehend the incorporeals

55 εἰ δὲ μήτε αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει μήτε διὰ λόγου

if but neither to-sense it-falls nor through reason

καταλαμβάνεται, οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως καταλαμβάνοιτο.

it-is-apprehended neither — at-all would-it-be-apprehended

Εἰ τοίνυν μήτε περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σώματος μήτε
if then neither concerning the existence of-the body nor

περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οἰόν τέ ἐστι διαβεβαιώσασθαι,
concerning the incorporeals possible and it-is to-affirm

καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἐφεκτέον, τάχα δὲ
also concerning the elements it-is to-be-suspended perhaps and

καὶ περὶ τῶν μετὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, εἴγε τούτων τὰ
 also concerning the-things after the elements if-indeed of-these some
 μὲν σώματα, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, καὶ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων
 indeed bodies some but incorporeals and concerning both
 ἡπόρηται. πλὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν τε δραστικῶν
 it-has-been-raised-as-a-difficulty nevertheless but the both efficient
 ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἐφεκτῶν οὐσῶν
 principles and the material because-of these-things to-be-suspended being
 ἄπορός ἐστιν ὁ περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγος.
 without-resource is the concerning principles argument

περὶ κράσεως

III.9 · BLENDING

Compounds cannot arise by contact, already ruled out, so Sextus turns to blending. Things blended are said to consist of substance and quality: if neither mixes, no single perception could result; if only qualities lie beside one another while substances mix, that contradicts perception; if only qualities mix, that is impossible, since a quality's existence lies in its substance. If both fully interpenetrate, the hemlock-in-water measure turns absurd: the whole mixture would have to be reckoned as both twenty cups and only two. No manner of blending is therefore conceivable.

Ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλίπη τις, πῶς ἄρα 56
 in-order-that and even these-things should-pass-over someone how then
 καὶ γίνεσθαί φασι τὰ συγκρίματα ἐκ τῶν πρώτων
 also to-come-about do-they-say the compounds from the first
 στοιχείων, μήτε θίξεως καὶ ἀφῆς ὑπαρχούσης μήτε
 elements neither touching and contact existing nor
 κράσεως ἢ μίξεως ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν
 blending or mixture at-all that indeed for nothing is
 ἡ ἀφή, μικρῶ πρόσθεν ὑπέμνησα, ὅτε περὶ τῆς
 the contact a-little before I-pointed-out when concerning the

ὑποστάσεως τοῦ σώματος διελεγόμην· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ
existence of-the body I-was-discussing that but neither the
 τρόπος τῆς κράσεως ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπ’
manner of-the blending so-far-as upon the-things said by
 αὐτῶν δυνατός ἐστι, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιστήσω. πολλὰ μὲν
them possible is through few-words I-shall-show many-things indeed
 γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ
for are-said concerning blending and almost endless concerning
 τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς
the present inquiry are among the dogmatists
 στάσεις· ὅθεν εὐθέως ἅμα τῇ ἀνεπικρίτῳ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ
positions whence at-once together with-the undecidable disagreement also
 τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τοῦ σκέμματος συνάγοιτ’ ἄν. ἡμεῖς δὲ
the inapprehensibility of-the inquiry could-be-inferred — we but
 νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀντίρρῃσιν παραιτησάμενοι
now the against each of-them rebuttal declining
 διὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῆς συγγραφῆς, τάδε λέξειν ἐπὶ
because-of the plan of-the composition these-things to-say for
 τοῦ παρόντος ἀποχρώντως ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
the present sufficiently we-suppose

- 57 Τὰ κιρνάμενα ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιότητων συγκεῖσθαι φασίν.
the-things blended of substance and qualities to-be-composed they-say
 ἥτοι οὖν τὰς μὲν οὐσίας αὐτῶν μίγνυσθαι φήσει τις, τὰς
either then the indeed substances of-them to-be-mixed will-say someone the
 δὲ ποιότητος μηδαμῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν ποιότητος ἀναμίγνυσθαι,
but qualities by-no-means or the indeed qualities to-be-mixed-together
 μηκέτι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας, ἢ μητέτερον ἀναμίγνυσθαι θατέρω,
no-longer but the substances or neither to-be-mixed-together with-the-other
 ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἐνοῦσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὔτε
or both to-be-united with-one-another but if indeed neither
 αἱ ποιότητες οὔτε αἱ οὐσῖαι ἀναμίγνυνται ἀλλήλοις,
the qualities nor the substances are-mixed-together with-one-another

ἀνεπινόητος ἔσται ἢ κρᾶσις· πῶς γὰρ μία αἴσθησις ἀπὸ
inconceivable will-be the blending how for one perception from
 τῶν κίρναμένων γίνεσθαι συμβήσεται, εἴγε κατὰ μηδὲν
the-things blended to-come-about will-it-happen if-indeed in none
 τῶν προειρημένων μίγνυται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κιννάμενα;
of-the-things said-before are-mixed with-one-another the-things blended

εἰ δὲ αἱ μὲν ποιότητες ἀπλῶς παρακεῖσθαι λεχθεῖεν
if but the indeed qualities simply to-lie-beside should-be-said
 ἀλλήλαις, αἱ δὲ οὐσίαι μίγνυσθαι, καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη
one-another the but substances to-be-mixed also so absurd — would-be
 τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ κεχωρισμένων τῶν ποιότητων τῶν
the-thing said not for separated the qualities the-ones

ἐν ταῖς κράσεσιν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὥς μιᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν
in the blendings we-perceive but as of-one from the-things
 κίρναμένων ἀποτελουμένης αἰσθανόμεθα. εἰ δὲ τὰς μὲν
blended being-produced we-perceive if but the indeed
 ποιότητος μίγνυσθαι λέγοι τις, τὰς δὲ οὐσίας μηδαμῶς,
qualities to-be-mixed should-say someone the but substances by-no-means

ἀδύνατα λέξει· ἢ γὰρ τῶν ποιότητων ὑπόστασις ἐν
impossible-things he-will-say the for of-the qualities existence in
 ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, διόπερ γελοῖον ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ὥς αἱ
the substances is wherefore ridiculous — it-would-be to-say that the
 μὲν ποιότητες χωρισθεῖσαι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἰδίᾳ μίγνυνται
indeed qualities separated from-the substances by-themselves are-mixed

που ἀλλήλαις, ἅποιοι δὲ αἱ οὐσίαι χωρὶς ὑπολείπονται.
somewhere with-one-another quality-less but the substances apart are-left
 λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κίρναμένων καὶ
it-remains to-say that both the qualities of-the-things blended and
 αἱ οὐσίαι χωροῦσι δι' ἀλλήλων καὶ μίγνύμεναι τὴν κρᾶσιν
the substances pass through one-another and being-mixed the blending
 ἀποτελοῦσιν. ὃ τῶν προειρημένων ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτερον·
produce which than-the-things said-before is more-absurd

58

59

ἀδύνατος γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη κρᾶσις. οἷον γοῦν ἐὰν
impossible for is the such blending for-instance at-any-rate if
 δέκα κοτύλαις ὕδατος κωνείου χυλοῦ κοτύλη μιχθῇ,
ten cups of-water of-hemlock of-juice a-cup should-be-mixed
 παντὶ τῷ ὕδατι συνανακίρνασθαι ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ κώνειον· εἰ
with-all the water to-be-blended-together — would-be-said the hemlock if
 γοῦν καί τι βραχύτατον μέρος τοῦ μίγματος λάβοι τις,
at-any-rate even some very-small part of-the mixture should-take someone
 εὕρήσει πεπληρωμένον αὐτὸ τῆς τοῦ κωνείου δυνάμεως.
be-will-find filled it with-the of-the hemlock power
 60 εἰ δὲ ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος
if but is-mixed-in the hemlock with-every part of-the water
 καὶ παρεκτείνεται αὐτῷ ὅλον ὅλῳ κατὰ τε τὴν τῶν
and is-extended-alongside it whole with-whole according-to both the of-the
 οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ποιότητων αὐτῶν δι' ἀλλήλων δίοδον,
substances and of-the qualities of-them through one-another passage
 ἢ οὕτως ἡ κρᾶσις γένηται, τὰ δὲ παρεκτεινόμενα
so-that thus the blending may-come-about the-things and extended-alongside
 ἀλλήλοις καθ' ἅπαν μέρος τὸν ἴσον ἐπέχει τόπον, διὸ
one-another in every part the same occupy place wherefore
 καὶ ἴσα ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἴση ἔσται ἡ κοτύλη τοῦ κωνείου
also equal to-one-another they-are equal will-be the cup of-the hemlock
 ταῖς δέκα κοτύλαις τοῦ ὕδατος, ὥς εἴκοσι κοτύλας
to-the ten cups of-the water so-that twenty cups
 ὀφείλειν εἶναι τὸ μίγμα ἢ δύο μόναις, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇδε τῇ
ought to-be the mixture or two only so-far-as upon this the
 ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως· καὶ κοτύλης πάλιν
hypothesis of-the manner of-the blending and a-cup again
 ὕδατος ταῖς εἴκοσι κοτύλαις ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς
of-water to-the twenty cups so-far-as upon the reasoning of-the
 ὑποθέσεως ἐπεμβληθείσης τεσσαράκοντα κοτυλῶν ὀφείλει τὸ
hypothesis being-added forty cups ought the

μέτρον εἶναι ἢ πάλιν δύο μόνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν κοτύλην
measure to-be or again two only since also the cup
 εἴκοσι κοτύλας ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν, ὅσαις παρεκτείνεται,
twenty cups it-is-possible to-conceive with-which it-is-extended-alongside
 καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι κοτύλας μίαν, ἣ συνεξισοῦνται.
and the twenty cups one with-which they-are-equated
 δυνατόν δὲ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν κοτύλην ἐπεμβάλλοντα καὶ 61
possible and so by one cup adding and
 ὁμοίως συλλογιζόμενον συνάγειν, ὅτι αἱ εἴκοσι ὁρώμεναι
likewise reasoning to-infer that the twenty seen
 τοῦ μίγματος κοτύλαι δισμύριαί που καὶ πρὸς ὀφείλουσιν
of-the mixture cups twenty-thousand about and more ought
 εἶναι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κράσεως,
to-be so-far-as upon the hypothesis of-the manner of-the blending
 αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ δύο μόναι· ὅπερ ἀπεμφάσεως
the and same also two only which-very-thing of-absurdity
 ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπεν. οὐκοῦν ἄτοπός ἐστι καὶ αὕτη
excess not has-left therefore absurd is also this
 ἡ ὑπόθεσις τῆς κράσεως.
the hypothesis of-the blending
 εἰ δὲ οὔτε τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων μιγνυμένων ἀλλήλαις οὔτε 62
if but neither the substances alone being-mixed with-one-another nor
 τῶν ποιότητων μόνων οὔτε ἀμφοτέρων οὔτε οὐθετέρου
the qualities alone nor both nor neither
 δύναται γίνεσθαι κράσις, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν οἶόν τέ
can come-about blending beside and these nothing possible and
 ἐστὶν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀνεπινόητος ὁ τρόπος τῆς τε κράσεως
it-is to-conceive inconceivable the manner of-the both blending
 καὶ ὅλως τῆς μίξεως ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε κατὰ θίξιν
and generally of-the mixture is wherefore if neither by touching
 παρατιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μήτε
juxtaposed to-one-another the so-called elements nor

ἀνακιννώμενα ἢ μινύμενα ποιητικὰ τῶν συγκριμάτων εἶναι
being-blended or being-mixed productive of-the compounds to-be
 δύναται, ἀνεπινόητός ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς
can inconceivable is the according-to the dogmatists
 φυσιολογία καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.
natural-science and so-far-as upon this the argument

περὶ κινήσεως

III.10 · MOTION

The dogmatists' natural science requires motion, since compounds must arise by some motion of the elements and of the efficient principle. If Sextus can show that no kind of motion is agreed, then even granting everything else, their whole physical argument has been traversed in vain.

- 63 Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἦν ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ περὶ
besides and the-things said-before it-was to-dwell-on the concerning
 τῶν κινήσεων λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἀδύνατος ἂν εἶναι νομισθεῖν
the motions argument and that impossible — to-be would-be-thought
 ἡ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς φυσιολογία. πάντως γὰρ
the according-to the dogmatists natural-science certainly for
 κατὰ τινα κίνησιν τῶν τε στοιχείων καὶ τῆς
according-to some motion of-the both elements and of-the
 δραστηκῆς ἀρχῆς ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. ἐὰν
efficient principle ought to-come-about the compounds if
 οὖν ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι μηδὲν εἶδος κινήσεως ὁμολογεῖται,
then we-point-out that no kind of-motion is-agreed
 σαφὲς ἔσται ὅτι καὶ διδομένων καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τῶν
clear it-will-be that even being-granted by hypothesis the-things

προειρημένων ἀπάντων μάτην ὁ καλούμενος φυσικὸς
 said-before all in-vain the so-called physical
 λόγος τοῖς δογματικοῖς διεξώδευται.
 argument by-the dogmatists has-been-traversed

περὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως

III.11 • MOTION IN PLACE

Six kinds of motion are named: local transition, change, increase, decrease, generation, and destruction. Sextus treats transition first, by which something passes from place to place, wholly as a walker does or partly as a turning sphere. Some hold that motion exists, Parmenides and Melissus deny it, and the skeptics say it is no more than it is not. Dogmatists point to evident facts; opponents reply that nothing can move itself or another, and that a moving thing has no coherent place. The skeptics suspend judgment on whether motion exists.

Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐντελέστερον περὶ κινήσεως 64
 they-say then those seeming more-completely concerning motion
 διειληφέναι ἕξ εἶδη ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, τοπικὴν μετάβασιν,
 to-have-treated six kinds of-it to-be local transition
 φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, αὔξησιν, μείωσιν, γένεσιν, φθοράν.
 natural change increase decrease generation destruction
 ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκάστω τῶν προειρημένων εἰδῶν τῆς κινήσεως
 we then on-each of-the said-before kinds of-the motion
 κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπιστήσομεν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοπικῆς μεταβάσεως
 by itself shall-dwell from the local transition
 ἀρξάμενοι. ἔστιν οὖν αὕτη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς καθ'
 having-begun is then this according-to the dogmatists by
 ἣν τόπον ἐκ τόπου μετέρχεται τὸ κινούμενον ἥτοι
 which place from place passes the thing-moved either
 καθ' ὁλότητα ἢ κατὰ μέρος, καθ' ὅλον μὲν ὥς
 according-to wholeness or according-to part according-to whole indeed as

- ἐπὶ τῶν περιπατούντων, κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ
in-the-case-of those walking according-to part but as in-the-case-of
 τῆς περὶ κέντρω κινουμένης σφαίρας· ὅλης γὰρ αὐτῆς
the about a-center moving sphere whole for of-it
 μενούσης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη τοὺς τόπους ἀμείβει.
remaining in the same place the parts the places changes
- 65 τρεῖς δέ, οἶμαι, γεγόνασιν αἱ ἀνωτάτω περὶ κινήσεως
three and I-think have-been the highest concerning motion
 στάσεις. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βίος καί τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων
positions the indeed for ordinary-life and some of-the philosophers
 εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ εἶναι δὲ Παρμενίδης
to-be motion suppose not to-be but Parmenides
 τε καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, μὴ μᾶλλον δὲ εἶναι
both and Melissus and others some not more but to-be
 ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἔφασαν οἱ σκεπτικοί· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ
than not to-be said the skeptics so-far-as indeed for upon
 τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ
the to-appearing-(things) to-seem to-be motion so-far-as but upon the
 φιλοσόφῳ λόγῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐκθέμενοι τὴν
philosophical argument not to-exist we then setting-out the
 ἀντίρρησιν τῶν τε εἶναι κίνησιν ὑπολαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν
rebuttal of-those both to-be motion supposing and of-those
 μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν ἀποφαινομένων, ἐὰν τὴν διαφωνίαν
nothing to-be motion declaring if the disagreement
 εὕρισκωμεν ἰσοσθενῇ, μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν
we-find of-equal-strength not more to-be than not to-be motion
 λέγειν ἀναγκασθυσόμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις.
to-say we-shall-be-compelled so-far-as upon the-things said
- 66 ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν λεγόντων.
let-us-begin and from those to-exist it saying

Οὗτοι δὴ τῇ ἐναργείᾳ μάλιστα ἐπερείδονται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ
these indeed on-the evidence especially rely if for not
 ἔστι, φασί, κίνησις, πῶς μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς
is they-say motion how indeed from risings to settings
 ὁ ἥλιος φέρεται, πῶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἔτους ὥρας ποιεῖ,
the sun is-carried how but the of-the year seasons does-it-make
 παρὰ τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνεγγισμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀφ'
according-to the toward us approaches of-it and the from
 ἡμῶν ἀποστάσεις γιγνομένας; ἢ πῶς νῆες ἀπὸ λιμένων
us withdrawals occurring or how ships from harbors
 ἀναχθεῖσαι καταίρουσιν ἐπὶ λιμένας ἄλλους πάμπολυ τῶν
having-set-out put-in at harbors other very-far from-the
 προτέρων ἀφεστῶτας; τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὁ τὴν κίνησιν
former distant what and manner the-one the motion
 ἀναιρῶν πρόεισι τῆς οἰκίας καὶ αὐθις ἀναστρέφει; ταῦτα
abolishing goes-out of-the house and again returns these-things
 δὴ τελέως ἀναντίρρητα εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν
indeed completely irrefutable to-be wherefore also of-the Cynics
 τις ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον οὐδὲν
someone having-been-asked the against the motion argument nothing
 ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβάδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς
answered stood-up but and walked in-deed and through the
 ἐναργείας παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρκτή ἐστίν ἡ κίνησις.
evidence establishing that real is the motion
 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτω δυσωπεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τοὺς τῆς
these indeed then so to-shame attempt those of-the
 ἐναντίας αὐτοῖς στάσεως ὄντας·
opposite to-them position being
 οἱ δὲ τὴν ὑπαρξιν τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρῶντες λόγοις
those but the existence of-the motion abolishing arguments
 ἐπιχειροῦσι τοιούτοις. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἥτοι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ
attempt such if moves anything either by itself

κινείται ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρου, ***
it-is-moved or by another but if indeed by another (lacuna)
 τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινεῖσθαι ἥτοι ἀναιτίως
the-thing for said by another to-be-moved either causelessly
 κινήσεται ἢ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν. ἀναιτίως μὲν οὐδέν φασι
will-be-moved or according-to some cause causelessly indeed nothing they-say
 γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τινα αἰτίαν κινείται, ἡ αἰτία, καθ'
comes-about if but according-to some cause it-is-moved the cause according-to
 ἣν κινείται, κινήτικη αὐτοῦ γενήσεται, ὅθεν εἰς ἄπειρον
whicb it-is-moved productive-of-motion of-it will-become whence into infinity
 ἐκπίπτει κατὰ τὴν μικρῶ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην ἐπιβολήν.
it-falls according-to the a-little before said approach

68 ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ τὸ κινοῦν ἐνεργεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργοῦν
otherwise both and if the moving acts the and acting
 κινείται, καὶ κεῖνο δεῖσεται κινουντος ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
is-moved that-too will-need a-mover another and the second
 τρίτου, καὶ μέχρι ἀπείρου, ὥς ἀναρχον γίνεσθαι τὴν
a-third and up-to infinity so-that beginningless to-become the
 κίνησιν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον
motion whicb-very-thing absurd not therefore every the thing-moved
 ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινείται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν
by another is-moved but neither by itself since for every
 τὸ κινοῦν ἥτοι προωθοῦν κινεῖ ἢ ἐπισπώμενον ἢ ἀνωθοῦν
the moving either pushing-forward moves or drawing-after or pushing-up
 ἢ ἐνθλίβον, δεήσει τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τινα
or pressing-in it-will-be-necessary the itself moving according-to some
 τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.
of-the said-before manners itself to-move

69 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν προωστικῶς ἑαυτὸ κινεῖ, ἔσται ἐξόπισθεν
but if indeed by-pushing-forward itself it-moves it-will-be behind
 ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ δὲ ἐπισπαστικῶς, ἔμπροσθεν, εἰ δὲ ἀνωστικῶς,
itself if but by-drawing-after in-front if but by-pushing-up

ὑποκάτω, εἰ δὲ ἐνθλιπτικῶς, ἐπάνω. ἀδύνατον δὲ αὐτό τι
underneath if but by-pressing-in above impossible but itself anything
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐπάνω εἶναι ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ ὑποκάτω ἢ ὀπίσω·
of-itself above to-be or in-front or underneath or behind
 ἀδύνατον ἄρα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὑφ'
impossible therefore by itself anything to-be-moved if but neither by
 ἑαυτοῦ τι κινεῖται μήτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου, οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι.
itself anything is-moved nor by another neither is-moved anything
 εἰ δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν καταφεύγει, 70
if but someone to the impulse and the choice should-take-refuge
 ὑπομνηστέον αὐτὸν τῆς περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν διαφωνίας,
must-be-reminded him of-the concerning the up-to us disagreement
 καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίκριτος αὕτη καθέστηκεν, κριτήριον ἡμῶν
and that undecidable this stands a-criterion we
 τῆς ἀληθείας ἄχρι νυν οὐχ εὐρηκότων.
of-the truth until now not having-found
 Ἔτι κακέينو λεκτέον. εἰ κινεῖται τι, ἥτοι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι 71
further that-too must-be-said if moves anything either in which it-is
 τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν·
place it-is-moved or in which not it-is neither but in which it-is
 μένει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ
it-stays for in it if-indeed in it it-is nor in which not
 ἔστιν· ὅπου γὰρ τι μὴ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ δρᾶσαί τι οὐδὲ
it-is where for anything not it-is there neither to-do anything nor
 παθεῖν δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα κινεῖται τι. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος
to-suffer can not therefore moves anything this and the argument
 ἔστι μὴν Διοδώρου τοῦ Κρόνου, πολλῶν δὲ ἀντιρρήσεων
is indeed of-Diodorus the Cronus many but rebuttals
 τετύχηκεν, ὧν τὰς πληκτικωτέρας διὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς
it-has-met of-which the more-striking because-of the manner of-the
 συγγραφῆς ἐκθυσόμεθα μετὰ τῆς φαινομένης ἡμῖν ἐπικρίσεως.
composition we-shall-set-out with the appearing to-us judgment

72 φασὶν οὖν τινες, ὅτι δύναται τι ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπω
they-say then some that can anything in which it-is place
 κινεῖσθαι· τὰς γοῦν περὶ τοῖς κέντροις περιδινουμένας
to-be-moved the at-any-rate about the centers whirling
 σφαίρας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μενούσας τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι. πρὸς οὓς
spheres in the same remaining place to-be-moved against whom
 μεταφέρειν χρή τὸν λόγον ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν τῆς
to-transfer one-must the argument onto each of-the parts of-the
 σφαίρας, καὶ ὑπομνήσκοντας, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ
sphere and pointing-out that so-far-as upon the argument
 μηδὲ κατὰ μέρη κινεῖται, συνάγειν ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ
neither according-to parts it-is-moved to-infer that neither in which
 ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται τι.
it-is place is-moved anything

73 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, ὅτι τὸ
the and same we-shall-do also against those saying that the
 κινούμενον δυεῖν ἔχεται τόπων, τοῦ τε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι καὶ
thing-moved of-two takes-hold places the both in which it-is and
 τοῦ εἰς ὃν φέρεται. πευσόμεθα γὰρ αὐτῶν, πότε φέρεται
the into which it-is-carried we-shall-ask for them when is-carried
 τὸ κινούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπου εἰς τὸν ἕτερον,
the thing-moved from the in which it-is place into the other
 ἄρα ὅτε ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν ἢ ὅτε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ.
surely when in the first place it-is or when in the second
 ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τόπῳ ἔστιν, οὐ μετέρχεται
but when indeed in the first place it-is not it-passes
 εἰς τὸν δεύτερον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔστιν· ὅτε δὲ
into the second still for in the first it-is when but
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ, οὐ μετέρχεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.
not it-is in this not it-passes from it

πρὸς τῷ καὶ συναρπάζεσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ 74
besides the-fact also being-stolen the thing-sought in which for
 μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δήπου
not it-is neither to-act in it can-it not for surely
 φέρεσθαι εἰς τινα τόπον συγχωρήσει τις ἐκεῖνο ἀπλῶς
to-be-carried into some place will-concede anyone that simply
 ὃ μὴ δίδωσι κινεῖσθαι.

which not be-grants to-be-moved

τινὲς μέντοι καὶ ἐκεῖνο φασίν· τόπος λέγεται διχῶς, ὁ 75
some however that-too say place is-said in-two-ways the-one
 μὲν ἐν πλάτει, οἷον ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ οἰκία, ὁ δὲ πρὸς
indeed in breadth for-instance as of-me the house the-one but with
 ἀκρίβειαν, ὡς λόγου χάριν ὁ περιτετυπωκώς μου τὴν
exactness as of-argument for-the-sake the molded-around of-me the
 ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος ἀήρ. λέγεται οὖν ἐν τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι
surface of-the body air is-said then in place to-be-moved
 τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ
the thing-moved not in the with exactness but in the in
 πλάτος. πρὸς οὓς ἔνεστιν ὑποδιαιροῦντας τὸν ἐν πλάτει
breadth against whom it-is-possible subdividing the in breadth
 τόπον λέγειν, ὅτι τούτου ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἔστι κυρίως τὸ κινεῖσθαι
place to-say that of-this in which indeed is strictly the to-be-moved
 λεγόμενον σῶμα, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν αὐτοῦ τόπῳ,
said body as in the with exactness of-it place
 ἐν ᾧ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κατὰ
in which but not it-is as in the remaining parts of-the in
 πλάτος τόπου· εἰτα συνάγοντας, ὅτι μήτε ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ
breadth place then inferring that neither in which it-is place
 κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται μήτε ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι,
to-be-moved anything can nor in which not it-is to-conclude
 ὅτι μηδὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πλάτος καταχρηστικῶς λεγομένῳ τόπῳ
that neither in the in breadth loosely so-called place

- κινεῖσθαι τι δύναται· συστατικὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τό τε
to-be-moved anything can constitutive for are of-it the both
 ἐν ᾧ ἔστι πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ
in which it-is with exactness and in which with exactness not
 ἔστιν, ὧν ἐν οὐθετέρῳ κινεῖσθαι τι δύνασθαι δέδεικται.
it-is of-which in neither to-be-moved anything to-be-able has-been-shown
- 76 Ἐρωτητέον δὲ κακέινον τὸν λόγον. εἰ κινεῖταιί τι, ἥτοι
must-be-put and that-too the argument if moves anything either
 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ ἅθρουν
according-to the prior prior it-is-moved or according-to whole
 μεριστὸν διάστημα· οὔτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον
a-divisible interval neither but according-to the prior prior
 δύναταιί τι κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἅθρουν μεριστὸν
can anything be-moved nor according-to the whole divisible
 διάστημα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐδὲ κινεῖταιί τι ἄρα. ὅτι μὲν
interval as we-shall-show neither moves anything therefore that indeed
 οὐδὲν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεταιί τι
then according-to the prior prior not it-is-possible anything
 κινεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν δῆλον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνονται
to-be-moved at-once clear if indeed for into infinity are-cut
 τὰ σώματα καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἷς κινεῖσθαι
the bodies and the places and the times in-which to-be-moved
 λέγεται τὰ σώματα, οὐ γενήσεται κίνησις, ἀδυνάτου ὄντος
are-said the bodies not will-come-about motion impossible being
 τοῦ πρώτον τι ἐν ἀπείροις εὑρεθῆναι, ἀφ' οὗ
the first something among infinites to-be-found from which
 πρώτου κινήσεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενον.
first will-move the-thing to-be-moved said
- 77 εἰ δὲ εἰς ἀμερὲς καταλήγει τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ ἕκαστον
if but into a-partless end the-things said-before and each
 τῶν κινουμένων ὁμοίως τὸ πρῶτον ἀμερὲς τοῦ τόπου τῷ
of-the things-moved likewise the first partless of-the place in-the

πρώτη ἑαυτοῦ ἀμερεῖ μετέρχεται χρόνῳ, πάντα τὰ
first of-itself partless passes time all the-things
 κινούμενα ἔστιν ἰσοταχῇ, οἷον ὁ ταχύτατος ἵππος καὶ
moved are equal-in-speed for-instance the swiftest horse and
 ἡ χελώνη· ὅπερ τοῦ προτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποπώτερον.
the tortoise which-very-thing than-the former is more-absurd
 οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ πρότερον πρότερον γίνεται ἡ
not therefore according-to the prior prior comes-about the
 κίνησις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα.
motion but neither according-to the whole divisible interval
 εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥς φασιν, μαρτυρεῖσθαι 78
if for from the of-appearing-(things) as they-say to-be-attested
 τὰ ἀδηλα χρεῖ, ἐπεὶ, ἵνα τις ἀνύσῃ
the non-evident-(things) it-is-necessary since in-order-that someone may-complete
 σταδιαῖον διάστημα, δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀνύσαι τὸ
a-stade-long distance it-is-necessary first him to-complete the
 πρῶτον τοῦ σταδίου μέρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δεύτερον καὶ
first of-the stade part and the second second and
 τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὸ
the others likewise so also every the thing-moved according-to the
 πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖσθαι προσήκει, ἐπεὶ τοί γε εἰ
prior prior to-be-moved it-is-fitting since indeed at-least if
 ἀθρόως διέναι τὸ κινούμενον λέγοιτο πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ
all-at-once to-traverse the thing-moved should-be-said all the parts of-the
 τόπου ἐν ᾧ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται, ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ἔσται τοῖς
place in which to-be-moved it-is-said in all at-once it-will-be the
 μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν εἴη μέρος, τὸ δὲ
parts of-it and if the indeed cold should-be part the but
 θερμὸν τοῦ δι' οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ τὸ μὲν,
hot of-the-place through which it-makes the motion or the indeed
 εἰ τύχοι, μέλαν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν ὥστε καὶ χρώζειν τὰ
if it-should-happen black the but white so-that also to-color the-things

- ἐντυγχάνοντα δύνασθαι, τὸ κινούμενον ἔσται θερμόν τε
meeting-it to-be-able the thing-moved will-be hot both
 ἅμα καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
at-once and cold and black and white which-very-thing absurd
 79 εἶτα καὶ πόσον ἀθρόως διέξεισι τόπον τὸ κινούμενον,
then also how-much all-at-once traverses place the thing-moved
 εἰπάτωσαν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τοῦτον εἶναι φήσουσιν,
let-them-say if indeed for indeterminate this to-be they-will-say
 προσδέξονται τι κινεῖσθαι διὰ πάσης τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως·
they-will-admit something to-be-moved through all the earth all-at-once
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φεύγουσιν, ὀρισάτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ
if but this they-avoid let-them-define for-us the size of-the
 τόπου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὀρίζειν τὸν
place the indeed for with exactness to-attempt to-define the
 τόπον, οὐ πλέον διάστημα οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον
place than-which more distance not-even by the smallest-bit
 δυνήσεται διελθεῖν τὸ κινούμενον ἀθρόως, πρὸς τῷ
will-be-able to-traverse the thing-moved all-at-once besides the-fact
 ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ προπετὲς ἢ καὶ γελοῖον ἴσως εἶναι, εἰς
arbitrary and rash or even ridiculous perhaps to-be into
 τὴν ἀρχῇθεν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτει· πάντα γὰρ ἔσται ἰσοταχῇ,
the original difficulty it-falls all-things for will-be equal-in-speed
 εἴγε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὁμοίως κατὰ περιωρισμένους τόπους
if-indeed each of-them likewise over delimited places
 τὰς μεταβάσεις τῶν κινήσεων ποιεῖται.
the transitions of-the motions makes
 80 εἰ δὲ φήσουσιν, ὅτι μικρὸν μὲν, οὐ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν
if but they-will-say that a-small indeed not with exactness
 δὲ περιωρισμένον τόπον ἀθρόως κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον,
but delimited place all-at-once moves the thing-moved
 ἐνέσται ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν σωριτικὴν ἀπορίαν ἀεὶ
it-will-be-possible for-us according-to the sorites difficulty always

τῷ ὑποτεθέντι μεγέθει ἀκαριαῖον προστιθέναι μέγεθος
to-the supposed size a-tiny to-add size
 τόπου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ στήσονται που τοιαύτην ποιουμένων
of-place if indeed for they-will-halt somewhere such making
 ἡμῶν συνερώτησιν, πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἀκριβῆ περιορισμὸν
we a-questioning again into the exact delimitation
 καὶ τὴν τερατείαν ἐκείνην ἐμπεσοῦνται· εἰ δὲ προσήσονται
and the absurdity that they-will-fall if but they-will-accept
 τὴν παραύξησιν, ἀναγκάσομεν αὐτοὺς συγχωρεῖν ἀθρόως
the increase we-shall-compel them to-concede all-at-once
 τι δύνασθαι κινηθῆναι διὰ τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς γῆς
something to-be-able to-be-moved through the extent of-the earth
 ἀπάσης. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν διάστημα
whole so-that neither according-to a-whole divisible interval
 κινεῖται τὰ κινεῖσθαι λεγόμενα.

move the-things to-be-moved said

εἰ δὲ μήτε κατὰ ἄθρουν μεριστὸν τόπον μήτε κατὰ
if but neither according-to a-whole divisible place nor according-to
 τὸ πρότερον πρότερον κινεῖται τι, οὐδὲ κινεῖται τι.
the prior prior moves anything neither moves anything
 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω τούτων φασὶν οἱ τὴν
these-things indeed then and still more than-these say those the
 μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν ἀναιροῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ μήτε τοὺς
transitional motion abolishing we but neither the
 λόγους τούτους μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾧ κατακολουθοῦντες
arguments these nor the appearing-(thing) which following
 εἰσάγουσι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς κινήσεως, δυνάμενοι διατρέπειν,
they-introduce the existence of-the motion being-able to-overturn
 ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιθέσει τῶν τε φαινομένων καὶ τῶν λόγων,
so-far-as upon the opposition of-the both of-appearing-(things) and the arguments
 ἐπέχομεν περὶ τοῦ πότερον ἔστι κίνησις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.
we-suspend-judgment concerning the whether there-is motion or not there-is

81

περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως

III.12 • INCREASE AND DECREASE

Evidence seems to establish increase and decrease, and the arguments to overturn them. What grows must subsist and grow larger, but the substance never stands still: matter flows away and other matter enters, so what is called growth is a wholesale alteration, as calling a three-cubit stick grown when a ten-cubit one is brought would be false. And since decrease is by subtraction and increase by addition, and there is neither, there is neither increase nor decrease.

- 82 Τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεως τε
the and same using reasoning also concerning increase both
 καὶ περὶ μειώσεως ἐπέχομεν· ἡ γὰρ ἐνάργεια δοκεῖ
and concerning decrease we-suspend-judgment the for evidence seems
 τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν, ἣν οἱ λόγοι διατρέπειν
the existence of-them to-introduce which the arguments to-overturn
 δοκοῦσιν. ἢ θέασαι γοῦν· τὸ αὐξόμενον ὄν καὶ ὑφεστὼς
seem or consider at-any-rate the growing-thing being and subsisting
 εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδιδόναι προσήκει, ὥς εἴγε ἐτέρῳ
into size to-increase it-is-fitting so-that if-indeed to-one-thing
 προσθέσεως γενομένης ἕτερον ἠϋξηκέναι τις λέγοι,
an-addition having-been-made another to-have-grown someone should-say
 ψεύσεται. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ οὐσία οὐδέποτε ἔστηκεν, ἀλλ'
he-will-speak-falsely since then the substance never stands-still but
 ἀεὶ ῥεῖ τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἐπεισκρίνεται, τὸ
always flows both and one in-place-of another enters-in the-thing
 ἠϋξηκέναι λεγόμενον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν προτέραν οὐσίαν καὶ
to-have-grown said not has the former substance and
 μετὰ ταύτης ἄλλην τὴν προστεθεισαν ἀλλ' ὅλην ἑτέραν.
with it another the added but wholly other

ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ, λόγου χάριν, ξύλου τριπήχεος ὄντος 83
just-as then if of-argument for-the-sake a-stick three-cubit being
 δεκάπηχυ ἕτερον ἀγαγών τις ηὔξηκέναι τὸ τρίπηχυ
a-ten-cubit another having-brought someone to-have-grown the three-cubit
 λέγοι, ψεύσεται διὰ τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦτο
should-say he-will-speak-falsely because-of the wholly other to-be this
 ἐκείνου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ αὔξεσθαι λεγόμενον,
than-that so also in-the-case-of every the-thing to-grow said
 τῆς προτέρας ὕλης ἀπορρεούσης καὶ ἐτέρας ἐπεισιούσης, εἰ
the former matter flowing-away and other entering-in if
 προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον, οὐκ ἂν αὔξησιν
is-added the-thing to-be-added said not — growth
 τις εἴποι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅλου ἐτεροίωσιν.
anyone would-say the such to-be but from whole an-alteration
 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ τῆς μειώσεως λόγος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ 84
the and same also concerning the decrease argument the-thing for not
 ὑφεστὼς ὅλως πῶς ἂν μεμειῶσθαι λέγοιτο; πρὸς δὲ
subsisting at-all how — to-have-been-decreased could-it-be-said besides and
 τούτοις, εἰ ἡ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ
these if the indeed decrease comes-about by subtraction the but
 αὔξησις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν οὔτε ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε
increase by addition nothing and is neither subtraction nor
 πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἡ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ αὔξησις ἔστι τι.
addition therefore neither the decrease nor the increase is anything

περὶ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ προσθέσεως

III.13 · SUBTRACTION AND ADDITION

If something is subtracted from something, it is equal from equal, greater from less, or less from greater. Not equal from equal, since the container must exceed the contained; not greater from less, which is absurd; not less from greater, for then six would contain five, four, three, two, and one, fifteen in all. Nor can a unit be taken from a ten, whether from the whole or from the remaining nine. Addition fails too: a cup is added neither to itself, nor to the four cups, nor to their sum.

- 85 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται.
that and nothing is subtraction from-this they-conclude
 εἰ ἀφαιρείται τι ἀπὸ τινος, ἥτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ
if is-subtracted something from something either the equal from the
 ἴσου ἀφαιρείται ἢ τὸ μείζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ
equal is-subtracted or the greater from the lesser or
 τὸ ἔλασσον ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν
the lesser from the greater according-to none but of-the
 τρόπων τούτων ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, ὥς παραστήσομεν·
manners these subtraction comes-about as we-shall-establish
 ἀδύνατος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφαίρεσις. ὅτι δὲ κατ' οὐδένα
impossible therefore is the subtraction that and according-to none
 τῶν προειρημένων τρόπων ἡ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, δῆλον
of-the said-before ways the subtraction comes-about clear
 ἐντεῦθεν. τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπὸ τινος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι
from-this the-thing subtracted from something to-be-contained
 χρὴ πρὸ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τῷ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείται.
it-is-necessary before the subtraction in-that from which it-is-subtracted
- 86 οὐτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται, οἶον τὰ ἕξ
neither but the equal in the equal is-contained for-instance the six
 ἐν τοῖς ἕξι· μείζον γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ περιέχον τοῦ
in the six greater for to-be it-is-necessary the containing than-the

περιεχομένου καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρεῖται τι τοῦ
 contained and the-thing from which is-subtracted something than-the
 ἀφαιρουμένου, ἵνα μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπολείπηται τι
 thing-subtracted so-that after the subtraction there-may-remain something
 τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρειν δοκεῖ τῆς παντελοῦς ἄρσεως ἢ
 in-this for to-differ seems from-the complete removal the
 ἀφαίρεσις· οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ, οἷον τὰ
 subtraction nor the greater in the smaller for-instance the
 ἕξ ἐν τοῖς πέντε· ἀπεμφαίνει γάρ.

six in the five it-is-absurd for
 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ μείζονι. εἰ γὰρ 87
 because-of and this neither the lesser in the greater if for
 ἐν τοῖς ἕξ περιέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλείοσιν ἐλάσσονα,
 in the six is-contained the five as in more fewer
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς πέντε περισχεθήσεται τὰ τέσσαρα καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 also in the five will-be-contained the four and in the
 τέτταρσι τὰ τρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ τὰ δύο καὶ ἐν τούτοις
 four the three and in the three the two and in these
 τὸ ἓν. ἕξει οὖν τὰ ἕξ πέντε τέσσαρα τρία δύο ἓν, ὧν
 the one will-have then the six five four three two one of-which
 συντεθέντων γίνεταί ὁ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀριθμός, ὃς ἐν τῷ
 added-together comes-about the fifteen number which in the
 ἕξ περιέχεσθαι συνάγεται διδομένου τοῦ τὸ ἔλασσον ἐν τῷ
 six to-be-contained is-inferred being-granted the the lesser in the
 μείζονι περιέχεσθαι. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ πεντεκαίδεκα
 greater to-be-contained likewise and also in the fifteen
 τῷ ἐν τῷ ἕξ ἐμπεριεχομένῳ ὁ τριακοντακαιπέντε ἀριθμός
 the-one in the six contained the thirty-five number
 περιέχεται καὶ κατὰ ὑπόβασιν ἄπειροι. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν
 is-contained and by descent infinite absurd but the saying

ἀπείρους ἀριθμούς ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ ἕξ ἀριθμῷ· ἄτοπον
infinite numbers to-be-contained in-the six number absurd

ἄρα καὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μείζονι περιέχεται τὸ ἔλασσον.
therefore also the saying that in the greater is-contained the lesser

88 εἰ οὖν χρὴ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον ἀπό τινος περιέχεσθαι
if then it-is-necessary the-thing subtracted from something to-be-contained

ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφαιρείσθαι μέλλει, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν
in that from which to-be-subtracted it-is-about neither but the equal in

τῷ ἴσῳ περιέχεται οὔτε τὸ μείζον ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ οὔτε τὸ
the equal is-contained nor the greater in the smaller nor the

μικρότερον ἐν τῷ μείζονι, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπό τινος.
smaller in the greater neither is-subtracted anything from anything

Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπό τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ
and indeed if is-subtracted something from something either a-whole from

ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους
a-whole is-subtracted or a-part from a-part or a-whole from a-part

ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου.
or a-part from a-whole

or a-part from a-whole

89 ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρείσθαι λέγειν ἥτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ
a-whole indeed then to-be-subtracted to-say either from a-whole or from

μέρους ἀπεμφαίνει προδήλως. λείπεται δὲ λέγειν τὸ μέρος
a-part is-absurd plainly it-remains then to-say the part

ἀφαιρείσθαι ἥτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους· ὅπερ
to-be-subtracted either from a-whole or from a-part which-very-thing

ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οἶον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν
is absurd for-instance at-any-rate so-that on numbers we-may-set

τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφούς ἔνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ
the argument the clarity for-the-sake-of let-there-be a-ten and from

ταύτης ἀφαιρείσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς. αὕτη οὖν ἡ μονὰς
it to-be-subtracted let-be-said a-unit this then the unit

οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρείσθαι δύναται οὔτε
neither from the-whole the ten to-be-subtracted can nor

neither from the-whole the ten to-be-subtracted can nor

ἀπὸ τοῦ λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι τῆς
from the remaining part of-the ten that-is the
 ἐννεάδος, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.

nine as I-shall-establish therefore neither is-it-subtracted

εἰ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος,
if for the unit from the-whole is-subtracted the ten

90

ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκάς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα
since the ten neither another something is beside the ten

μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ' ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν
units nor any of-the units but the assemblage of-all

τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ ἐκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει
the units from each unit to-be-subtracted ought

ἡ μονάς, ἵνα ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρῇται τῆς δεκάδος.
the unit so-that from the-whole it-may-be-subtracted the ten

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι·
certainly indeed then from a-unit nothing can be-subtracted

ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ
indivisible for are the units and because-of this not

ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως.
will-be-subtracted the unit from the ten thus

εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίῃ τις ἀπὸ ἐκάστης τῶν μονάδων
if but even should-grant someone from each of-the units

91

ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἔξει μέρη ἡ μονάς, δέκα
to-be-subtracted the unit ten will-have parts the unit ten

δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκάς ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ δέκα ἕτερα
and having parts a-ten it-will-be but also since ten other

μέρη ἀπολέλειπται, ἀφ' ὧν ἀφήρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος
parts are-left from which have-been-subtracted the of-the unit

λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι. ἄτοπον δὲ
so-called ten parts will-be the ten twenty absurd but

λέγειν τὸ ἐν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ
to-say the one ten to-be and the ten twenty and the

ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτοὺς διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ
indivisible according-to them to-be-divided absurd therefore the

λέγειν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.

saying from the-whole the ten to-be-subtracted the unit

92 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ
but neither from the remaining nine is-subtracted the

μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει
unit the-thing indeed for from which something is-subtracted not remains

ὁλόκληρον, ἡ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς
entire the but nine after the subtraction of-that the

μονάδος ὁλόκληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐννεὰς οὐδέν
unit entire remains and otherwise since the nine nothing

ἔστι παρὰ τὰς ἐννέα μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς
is beside the nine units if indeed from the-whole of-it

λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται,
it-should-be-said to-be-subtracted the unit of-a-nine a-subtraction it-will-be

εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννέα, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ
if but from a-part of-the nine if indeed from the eight the

αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος,
same absurdities will-follow if but from the last unit

διαιετην εἶναι φήσουσι τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
divisible to-be they-will-say the unit which-very-thing absurd

93 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς. εἰ
therefore neither from the nine is-subtracted the unit if

δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε ἀπὸ
but neither from the-whole the ten it-is-subtracted nor from

μέρους αὐτῆς, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
a-part of-it neither a-part from a-whole or a-part to-be-subtracted

δύναται. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται
can if then neither a-whole from a-whole anything is-subtracted

μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μήτε μέρος
nor a-part from a-whole nor a-whole from a-part nor a-part
ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται τι ἀπὸ τινος.

from a-part neither is-subtracted anything from anything

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς 94

but also the addition of-the impossible-things to-be among them

ὑπέιληπται. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἥτοι ἑαυτῷ

has-been-supposed the-thing for added they-say either to-itself

προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἔξ ἀμφοῖν

is-added or to-the pre-existing or to-the-thing out-of both

συνεστῶτι. τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ

composed of-these but none is sound therefore neither

προστίθεται τι τινί. οἶον γοῦν ἔστω τι

is-added anything to-anything for-instance at-any-rate let-there-be some

τετρακοτυλιαῖον πλήθος, καὶ προστιθέσθω κοτύλη. ζητῶ

four-cup quantity and let-be-added a-cup I-ask

τίνι προστίθεται. ἑαυτῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναται, ἐπεὶ τὸ

to-what it-is-added to-itself indeed for not it-can since the-thing

μὲν προστιθέμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ᾧ προστίθεται,

indeed added other is than-that to-which it-is-added

οὐδὲν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

nothing and than-itself other is

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἔξ ἀμφοῖν, τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ 95

but neither to-the-thing out-of both the four-cup and

τῆς κοτύλης· πῶς γὰρ ἂν προστεθείη τι τῷ μηδέπω

the cup how for — could-be-added anything to-that not-yet

ᾶντι; καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ καὶ τῇ κοτύλῃ

being and otherwise if to-the four-cup and the cup

μίννυται ἢ κοτύλῃ ἢ προστιθεμένη, ἑξακοτυλιαῖον

is-mixed the cup the-one added six-cup

ἔσται πλῆθος ἀπὸ τοῦ τετρακοτυλιαίου καὶ τῆς κοτύλης
will-be the-quantity from the four-cup and the cup
 καὶ τῆς προστιθεμένης κοτύλης.

and the added cup

- 96 εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ προστίθεται ἡ κοτύλη,
if but to-the-alone the four-cup is-added the cup
 ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεκτεινόμενόν τι ἴσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ
since the-thing extended-alongside something equal is to-that to-which
 παρεκτείνεται, τῷ τετρακοτυλιαίῳ πλήθει ἡ κοτύλη
it-is-extended-alongside to-the four-cup quantity the cup
 παρεκτεινομένη διπλασιάσει τὸ τετρακοτυλιαῖον ὥς γίνεσθαι
being-extended-alongside will-double the four-cup so-that to-become
 τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος ὁκτῶ κοτυλῶν· ὅπερ οὐ θεωρεῖται. εἰ
the whole quantity eight cups which-very-thing not is-observed if
 οὐδὲν μήτε ἐαυτῷ προστίθεται τὸ προστίθεσθαι λεγόμενον
then neither to-itself is-added the-thing to-be-added said
 μήτε τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ μήτε τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων,
nor to-the pre-existing nor to-the-thing out-of both of-these
 παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ προστίθεται οὐδὲν οὐδενί.
beside and these nothing is neither is-added anything to-anything

περὶ μεταθέσεως

III.14 • TRANSPOSITION

With addition, subtraction, and local motion canceled, transposition falls with them, since it is a subtraction from one place and an addition to another by transit.

- 97 Τῇ δὲ τῆς προσθέσεως καὶ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς
with-the and of-the addition and the subtraction and the
 τοπικῆς κινήσεως ὑποστάσει συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ
local motion existence is-canceled-along also the

μετάθεσις (αὕτη γὰρ ἀπὸ τινος μὲν ἐστὶν ἀφαίρεσις
transposition this for from something indeed is a-subtraction
 τινὶ δὲ πρόσθεσις μεταβατικῶς),
to-something but an-addition by-transition

περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους

III.15 • WHOLE AND PART

A whole seems to arise by the assembly of its parts and to cease when one is taken away. But a whole is either other than its parts or the parts themselves. It is not other, since nothing is left when the parts are removed; and if it is the parts, it is a name only. Nor are there parts, since they are parts neither of the whole, nor of one another, nor of themselves.

Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν 98
and the whole and and the part by indeed for assemblage
 καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ'
and addition of-the parts the whole to-come-about seems by
 ἀφαίρεσιν δέ τινος ἢ τινων παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλου εἶναι.
subtraction but of-something or of-some-things to-cease the whole to-be
 καὶ ἄλλως δέ, εἰ ἔστι τι ὅλον, ἥτοι ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ
and otherwise and if there-is any whole either other it-is beside
 τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν.
the parts of-it or themselves the parts of-it the whole are
 ἕτερον μὲν οὖν τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται τὸ ὅλον εἶναι. 99
other indeed then than-the parts in-no-way appears the whole to-be
 ἀμέλει γοῦν ἀναιρουμένων τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται,
indeed at-any-rate being-removed the parts nothing is-left
 ἵνα ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα λογισώμεθα τὸ ὅλον. εἰ δὲ
so-that other something beside these we-may-reckon the whole if but
 αὐτὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, ὄνομα ἔσται μόνον τὸ ὅλον καὶ
themselves the parts the whole are a-name will-be only the whole and

προσηγορία κενή, ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδίαν οὐχ ἔξει, καθάπερ
an-appellation empty existence and its-own not it-will-have just-as

οὐδὲ διάστασις ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὰ διεστώτα οὐδὲ
neither a-separation is anything beside the-things separated nor
 δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ δεδοκωμένα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ὅλον.
a-roofing beside the-things roofed not therefore is any whole

100 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέρη. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μέρη, ἥτοι τοῦ ὅλου ταῦτά ἐστι
but neither parts if for there-are parts either of-the whole these are
 μέρη ἢ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον. οὔτε δὲ τοῦ ὅλου, ἐπεὶ
parts or of-one-another or of-itself each neither but of-the whole since
 μηδὲ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ μέρη (καὶ ἄλλως τὰ μέρη οὕτως
not-even is anything beside the parts and otherwise the parts so

ἔσται μέρη ἑαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν συμπληρωτικὸν
will-be parts of-themselves since each of-the parts complotive
 εἶναι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου), οὔτε ἀλλήλων, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέρος
to-be is-said of-the whole nor of-one-another since the part
 ἐμπεριέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐ ἔστι μέρος, καὶ ἄτοπόν
to-be-contained seems in that of-which it-is a-part and absurd
 ἔστι λέγειν τὴν χεῖρα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν τῷ ποδὶ περιέχεσθαι.
it-is to-say the hand if it-should-happen in the foot to-be-contained

101 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἕκαστον ἑαυτοῦ μέρος ἔσται· διὰ γὰρ τὴν
but neither each of-itself a-part will-be because-of for the
 περιοχὴν ἔσται τι ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον. εἰ οὖν
containment will-be something than-itself greater and lesser if then
 μήτε τοῦ ὅλου μήτε ἑαυτῶν μήτε ἀλλήλων μέρη ἐστὶ τὰ
neither of-the whole nor of-themselves nor of-one-another parts are the-things
 λεγόμενα εἶναι μέρη, οὐδενός ἐστι μέρη. εἰ δὲ μηδενός ἐστι
said to-be parts of-nothing they-are parts if but of-nothing they-are
 μέρη, οὐδὲ ἔστι μέρη· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τι ἀλλήλοις
parts neither are-there parts the-things for relative-to something with-one-another

συναναιρείται. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄλλως εἰρήσθω κατὰ
are-abolished-together these-things indeed then incidentally let-them-have-been-said by
 παρέκβασιν, ἐπειδὴ ἅπαξ ὅλου καὶ μέρους ἐπεμνήσθημεν.
digression since once of-whole and of-part we-made-mention

περὶ φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς

III.16 • NATURAL CHANGE

What changes is body or incorporeal, and both have been made hopeless; it changes by the activity of a cause, and cause has been overturned. What is not cannot change, and what is cannot change in so far as it is without becoming what it is not. There is no time in which change happens, since past and future are not present and the present is partless. And change is neither sensible nor intelligible.

Ἄνυπόστατον δὲ εἶναι λέγουσί τινες καὶ τὴν καλουμένην 102
unreal and to-be say some also the so-called
 φυσικὴν μεταβολήν, λόγοις ἐπιχειροῦντες τοιούτοις.
natural change with-arguments arguing such
 εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλον
if changes anything either a-body is the changing-thing
 ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἡπόρηται·
or incorporeal each but of-these has-been-raised-as-a-difficulty
 ἄπορος ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λόγος.
without-resource therefore will-be also the concerning the change argument
 εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, κατὰ τινας ἐνεργείας αἰτίου καὶ 103
if changes anything by some activities of-a-cause and
 πάσχον μεταβάλλει. *** διατρέπεται γὰρ ἡ τοῦ αἰτίου
being-acted-on it-changes (lacuna) is-overturned for the of-the cause
 ὑπόστασις· ᾧ τὸ πάσχον συμπεριτρέπεται μὴ ἔχον
existence with-which the thing-acted-on is-overturned-along not having
 ὑπὸ ὅτου πάθῃ. οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει τι ἄρα.
by what it-may-be-acted-on neither changes anything therefore

- 104 εἰ μεταβάλλει τι, ἥτοι τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει ἢ τὸ μὴ
if changes anything either the being changes or the not
 ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι καὶ οὔτε
being the indeed then not being unreal is and neither
 πάσχειν τι οὔτε δρᾶν δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν
to-be-acted-on anything nor to-act can so-that neither change
 ἐπιδέχεται. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει, ἥτοι καθὸ ὄν
does-it-admit if but the being changes either in-so-far-as being
 ἐστι μεταβάλλει ἢ καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν.
it-is it-changes or in-so-far-as not being it-is
- 105 καθὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ
in-so-far-as indeed then not being it-is not it-changes neither for
 οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστι μεταβάλλει, ἕτερον
not being it-is if but in-so-far-as being it-is it-changes other
 ἔστι τοῦ ὄν εἶναι, τουτέστιν οὐκ ὄν ἔσται. ἄτοπον
it-is than-the being to-be that-is not being it-will-be absurd
 δὲ τὸ λέγειν τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν γίνεσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ
but the saying the being not being to-become not therefore neither
 τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν μεταβάλλει μήτε
the being changes if but neither the being changes nor
 τὸ μὴ ὄν, παρὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστι, λείπεται λέγειν
the not being beside these and nothing is it-remains to-say
 ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει. ἔτι καὶ ταῦτά φασί τινες.
that nothing changes further also these-things say some
- 106 τὸ μεταβάλλον ἔν τινι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλειν ὀφείλει· οὔτε
the changing-thing in some time to-change ought neither
 δὲ ἐν τῷ παρωχηκότι χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι οὔτε ἐν
but in the past time changes anything nor in
 τῷ μέλλοντι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐνεστώτι, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ
the future but neither in the present as we-shall-show not
 ἄρα μεταβάλλει τι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ παρεληλυθότι ἢ
therefore changes anything in indeed then the past or

μέλλοντι χρόνῳ οὐδὲν μεταβάλλει· τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερος
future time nothing changes of-these for neither

ἐνέστηκεν, ἀδύνατον δέ ἐστι δρᾶν τι ἢ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ
is-present impossible and it-is to-act anything or to-be-acted-on in the
μὴ ὄντι καὶ ἐνεστηκότι χρόνῳ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι.
not being and present time but neither in the present

ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν, 107
the for present time perhaps indeed even non-existent is

ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο νῦν ὑπερθώμεθα, ἀμερὴς ἐστίν· ἀδύνατον δέ
so-that but this now we-may-postpone partless it-is impossible and
ἐστίν ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ νομίζειν τὸν σίδηρον, εἰ τύχοι,
it-is in a-partless time to-suppose the iron if it-should-happen

τῆς σκληρότητος εἰς μαλακότητα μεταβάλλειν ἢ τῶν
from hardness into softness to-change or of-the

ἄλλων μεταβολῶν ἐκάστην γίνεσθαι· παρατάσεως γὰρ
other changes each to-come-about extension for

αὗται φαίνονται χρήζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι
these appear to-need if then neither in the past

χρόνῳ μεταβάλλει τι μήτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι μήτε ἐν
time changes anything nor in the future nor in

τῷ ἐνεστῶτι, οὐδὲ μεταβάλλειν τι ῥητέον.

the present neither to-change anything must-it-be-said

πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστι τις μεταβολή, ἥτοι *** αἰσθήσεις 108
besides these if there-is any change either (lacuna) senses

ἀπλοπαθεῖς εἰσιν, ἢ δὲ μεταβολή συμνημόνευσιν ἔχειν
simply-affected are the but change joint-remembrance to-have

δοκεῖ τοῦ τε ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλειν
seems of-that both out-of which it-changes and into which to-change

λέγεται· εἰ δὲ νοητή ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν
it-is-said if but intelligible it-is since concerning the existence of-the

νοητῶν ἀνεπικρίτος γέγονε παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς διαφωνία,
intelligibles undecidable has-arisen among the ancients disagreement

καθάπερ ἤδη πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν
 just-as already often we-have-recalled nothing we-shall-be-able
 λέγειν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς μεταβολῆς.
 to-say neither concerning the existence of-the change

περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς

III.17 · GENERATION AND DESTRUCTION

Generation and destruction fall with addition, subtraction, and natural change, since nine comes from ten by subtracting a unit and rust arises from bronze by change. Neither being nor not-being can come to be or perish, since either would then become the other, which is absurd. If Socrates be born, it was either when he already was, and so born twice, or when he was not, and he both was and was not; his death admits the same dilemma.

- 109 Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ
 is-overturned-along indeed then both the generation and the destruction
 τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ·
 with-the addition and the subtraction and the natural change
 χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἄν τι οὔτε φθαρείη,
 apart for from-these neither could-come-about — anything nor could-perish
 οἶον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν,
 for-instance at-any-rate from the ten perishing as they-say
 ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ
 a-nine to-come-about happens by subtraction of-a-unit and
 τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν
 the ten from the nine perishing by addition
 τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου
 of-the unit and the rust from the bronze perishing
 κατὰ μεταβολήν. ὥστε ἀναιρουμένων τῶν προειρημένων
 by change so-that being-abolished the said-before

κινήσεων ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν
motions to-be-abolished both the generation and the destruction

ἴσως ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον τινες κακεῖνα φασίν.

perhaps necessity none but the-less some those-things-too say

εἰ ἐγεννήθη Σωκράτης, ἥτοι ὅτε οὐκ ἦν Σωκράτης ἐγένετο 110

if was-born Socrates either when not was Socrates be-came-to-be

Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτε ἦν ἤδη Σωκράτης. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτε ἦν

Socrates or when was already Socrates but if indeed when he-was

ἤδη γεγενῆσθαι λέγοιτο, δις ἂν εἴη γεγεννημένος· εἰ

already to-have-been-born it-should-be-said twice — he-would-be born if

δὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, ἅμα καὶ ἦν Σωκράτης καὶ οὐκ ἦν. ἦν

but when not he-was at-once both was Socrates and not was he-was

μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἦν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

indeed by-the having-come-to-be not he-was but according-to the hypothesis

καὶ εἰ ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης, ἥτοι ὅτε ἔζη ἀπέθανεν 111

and if died Socrates either when he-was-living he-died

ἢ ὅτε ἀπέθανεν. καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἔζη, οὐκ ἀπέθανεν,

or when he-had-died and when indeed he-was-living not he-died

ἐπεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν καὶ ἔζη καὶ ἐτεθνήκει· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ

since the same-man — both was-living and had-died but neither

ὅτε ἀπέθανεν, ἐπεὶ δις ἂν εἴη τεθνηκώς. οὐκ ἄρα

when he-had-died since twice — he-would-be dead not therefore

ἀπέθανε Σωκράτης. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον οἶόν τέ

died Socrates this and the argument possible and

ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἐκάστου τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢ φθεῖρεσθαι

it-is in-the-case-of each of-the-things to-come-about or to-perish

λεγομένων ἰστάντα ἀναιρεῖν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν.

said setting to-abolish the generation and the destruction

ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ γίνεταί τι, ἥτοι τὸ 112

some and also thus argue if comes-to-be anything either the

ὄν γίνεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται· τῷ γὰρ

being comes-to-be or the not being neither but the not being comes-to-be to-the for

μη ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβεβηκέναι δύναται, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι.

not being nothing to-have-happened can so-that neither the coming-to-be
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ὄν, ἥτοι καθὸ ὄν
 but neither the being if for comes-to-be the being either in-so-far-as being
 ἐστὶ γίνεται ἢ καθὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐστίν. καθὸ μὲν οὖν οὐκ
 it-is it-comes-to-be or in-so-far-as not being it-is in-so-far-as indeed then not
 ὄν ἐστίν, οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ καθὸ ὄν ἐστὶ γίνεται, ἐπεὶ
 being it-is not it-comes-to-be if but in-so-far-as being it-is it-comes-to-be since
 τὸ γινόμενον ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου φασὶ γίνεσθαι, ἕτερον
 the-thing coming-to-be other out-of another they-say to-come-to-be other
 ἔσται τοῦ ὄντος τὸ γινόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν.
 will-be than-the being the-thing coming-to-be which-very-thing is not being
 τὸ ἄρα γινόμενον οὐκ ὄν ἐσται, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει.
 the-thing therefore coming-to-be not being will-be which-very-thing is-absurd

113 εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν γίνεται μήτε τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ γίνεται
 if then neither the not being comes-to-be nor the being neither comes-to-be
 τι. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ φθείρεται. εἰ γὰρ φθείρεται
 anything according-to the same and neither perishes if for perishes
 τι, ἥτοι τὸ ὄν φθείρεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν
 anything either the being perishes or the not being the indeed then
 οὐκ ὄν οὐ φθείρεται· πᾶσχειν γάρ τι δεῖ

not being not perishes to-be-acted-on for something it-is-necessary
 τὸ φθειρόμενον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. ἥτοι γὰρ μένον ἐν
 the-thing perishing but neither the being either for remaining in
 τῷ ὄν εἶναι φθείρεται ἢ μὴ μένον. καὶ εἰ μὲν μένον
 the being to-be it-perishes or not remaining and if indeed remaining
 ἐν τῷ ὄν εἶναι, ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα καὶ ὄν καὶ οὐκ ὄν.
 in the being to-be will-be the same at-once both being and not being

114 ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ φθείρεται καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ
 since for not it-perishes in-so-far-as not being it-is but in-so-far-as
 ὄν ἐστίν, καθὸ μὲν ἐφθάρθαι λέγεται, ἕτερον ἔσται
 being it-is in-so-far-as indeed to-have-perished it-is-said other it-will-be

τοῦ ὄντος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ὄν, καθὼ δὲ μένον
than-the being and because-of this not being in-so-far-as but remaining
 ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθείρεσθαι λέγεται, ὃν ἔσται. ἄτοπον δὲ
in the being to-perish it-is-said being it-will-be absurd but
 τὸ λέγειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὄν καὶ οὐκ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα
the saying the same to-be both being and not being not therefore
 μένον ἐν τῷ εἶναι φθίρεται τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μένον
remaining in the being perishes the being if but not remaining
 ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ ὄν φθίρεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι
in the being the being perishes but into the not to-be
 περιστάται πρῶτον, εἴθ' οὕτως φθίρεται, οὐκέτι τὸ ὄν,
it-changes-round first then so it-perishes no-longer the being
 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν φθίρεται· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον εἶναι
but the not being perishes which-very-thing impossible to-be
 ὑπεμνήσαμεν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ὄν φθίρεται μήτε τὸ μὴ
we-recalled if then neither the being perishes nor the not
 ὄν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ φθίρεταί τι.
being beside and these nothing is neither perishes anything
 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὥς ἐν ὑποτυπώσει καὶ περὶ τῶν κινήσεων
these-things indeed then as in outline also concerning the motions
 ἀρκέσει λελέχθαι, οἷς ἔπεται τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ
it-will-suffice to-have-been-said on-which follows the non-existent to-be and
 ἀνεπινόητον τὴν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς φυσιολογίαν.
inconceivable the according-to the dogmatists natural-science

περὶ μονῆς

III.18 · REST

What moves does not rest, and on the dogmatists' own account every body is continuously in flux, dispersing and accreting, so that Plato calls bodies becomings rather than beings and Heraclitus likens matter to a river. What is said to rest is held together and so acted on, and there is no cause, so nothing rests. Nor can an incorporeal rest, since being acted on belongs to bodies. Sextus turns next to place and time.

115 Ἐπομένως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
next and also concerning the as in-relation-to the nature
 μονῆς ἡπόρησάν τινες λέγοντες, ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον
rest have-raised-difficulties some saying that the thing-moved
 οὐ μένει, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα διαρκῶς κινεῖται κατὰ τὰς
not rests every and body continuously is-moved according-to the
 τῶν δογματικῶν ὑπολήψεις, ῥευστὴν εἶναι λεγόντων
of-the dogmatists suppositions in-flux to-be saying
 τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀεὶ διαφορήσεις τε καὶ προσθέσεις
the substance and always dispersals both and accretions
 ποιουμένην, ὡς τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα μηδὲ ὄντα λέγειν τὰ
making so-that — indeed Plato not-even beings to-call the
 σώματα ἀλλὰ γινόμενα μᾶλλον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ Ἡράκλειτον
bodies but becomings rather to-call — but Heraclitus
 ὀξεῖα ποταμοῦ ῥύσει τὴν εὐκνησίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ὕλης
to-the-swift of-a-river flow the easy-motion of-the our matter
 ἀπεικάζειν. οὐδὲν ἄρα σῶμα μένει.
to-likened no therefore body rests

116 τό γε μὴν λεγόμενον μένειν συνέχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ
the-thing at-least indeed said to-rest to-be-held-together seems by
 τῶν περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ συνεχόμενον πάσχει· οὐδὲν δὲ
the-things around it the-thing and held-together is-acted-on nothing but

ἔστι πάσχον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ αἴτιον, ὥς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐδὲ
is being-acted-on since not-even a-cause as we-recalled neither
μένει τι ἄρα. ἐρωτῶσι δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

rests anything therefore put and some also this the argument

τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πάσχον κινεῖται· τὸ
the-thing resting is-acted-on the-thing and acted-on is-moved the-thing
ἄρα μένειν λεγόμενον κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ κινεῖται, οὐ μένει.

therefore to-rest said is-moved if but it-is-moved not it-rests

ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον

117

from and these clear it-is that neither the incorporeal

ἐνδέχεται μένειν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μένον πάσχει, τὸ δὲ

it-is-possible to-rest if for the-thing resting is-acted-on the and

πάσχειν σωμάτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον, εἴπερ ἄρα, καὶ οὐχὶ

being-acted-on of-bodies is proper if-indeed at-all and not

ἀσωμάτων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον οὔτε πάσχειν δύναται

of-incorporeals nothing and incorporeal neither to-be-acted-on can

οὔτε μένειν, οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει.

nor to-rest nothing therefore rests

Τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ μονῆς εἰρήσθω. ἐπεὶ δὲ

118

so-much indeed also concerning rest let-it-have-been-said since and

ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἄνευ τόπου ἢ χρόνου

each of-the-things said-before not without place or time

ἐπινοεῖται, μετιτέον ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ τούτων σκέψιν· ἐὰν γὰρ

is-conceived one-must-pass to the concerning these inquiry if for

ταῦτα δείξῃ τις ἀνυπόστατα, ἀνυπόστατον ἔσται καὶ

these should-show someone unreal unreal will-be also

διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου.

because-of these of-those each let-us-begin and from the place

περὶ τόπου

III.19 • PLACE

Place is spoken of loosely, as my city, and strictly, as what exactly surrounds me; the strict sense is in question. Those who posit it appeal to the evidence: the parts of place, our being in different places, and the ancients' chaos. Those who abolish it turn against the Stoic place, an interval occupied by body, and the Peripatetic, the limit of the container, and void and room fall with them. The arguments abash the skeptics and the evidence shames them, so they suspend judgment.

- 119 Τόπος τοῖνυν λέγεται διχῶς, κυρίως καὶ καταχρηστικῶς,
place then is-said in-two-ways strictly and loosely
 καταχρηστικῶς μὲν ὁ ἐν πλάτει, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἢ πόλις,
loosely indeed the in breadth as of-me the city
 κυρίως δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν κατέχων, ὑφ' οὗ περιέχομαι
strictly but the with exactness containing by which I-am-surrounded
 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν. ζητοῦμεν οὖν περὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ πρὸς
with exactness we-inquire then concerning the place the-one with
 ἀκρίβειαν. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔθεσαν, οἱ δὲ ἀνείλον,
exactness this and some indeed posited some but abolished
 οἱ δὲ ἐπέσχον περὶ αὐτοῦ.
some but suspended-judgment concerning it

- 120 ὧν οἱ μὲν ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τὴν
of-whom those indeed to-exist it asserting to the
 ἐνάργειαν καταφεύγουσιν. τίς γὰρ ἄν, φασί, λέξειε μὴ
evidence take-refuge who for — they-say would-say not
 εἶναι τόπον ὁρῶν τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου, οἷον τὰ δεξιὰ
to-be place seeing the parts of-the place such-as the right
 τὰ ἀριστερά, τὰ ἄνω τὰ κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν ὀπίσω, καὶ
the left the above the below in-front behind and
 ἄλλοτε ἄλλαχού γινόμενος, βλέπων τε, ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ
at-different-times in-different-places coming-to-be seeing and that where the

ύφηγητῆς ὁ ἐμὸς διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι,
teacher the my was-discoursing here I now discourse
 τόπον τε διάφορον καταλαμβάνων τῶν κούφων φύσει
a-place and different apprehending of-the-things light by-nature
 καὶ τῶν φύσει βαρέων,
and of-the-things by-nature heavy

ἔτι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούων λεγόντων ἦτοι μὲν γὰρ 121
further also of-the ancients hearing saying assuredly indeed for
 πρῶτα χάος ἐγένετο. εἶναι γὰρ φασι χάος τὸν τόπον ἀπὸ
first chaos came-to-be to-be for they-say chaos the place from
 τοῦ χωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένων. εἵγε
the containing it to-be of-the-things in it coming-to-be if-indeed
 μὴν ἔστι τι σῶμα, φασίν, ἔστι καὶ ὁ τόπος· ἄνευ γὰρ
indeed there-is any body they-say there-is also the place without for
 τούτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ
this not — would-be the body and if there-is the by which also
 τὸ ἐξ οὗ, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος·
the out-of which there-is also the in which which-very-thing is the place
 τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις.
the and first in each the therefore second in both

οἱ δὲ ἀναιροῦντες τὸν τόπον οὔτε τὰ μέρη τοῦ τόπου 122
those but abolishing the place neither the parts of-the place
 διδόασιν εἶναι· μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν τόπον παρὰ τὰ
they-grant to-be nothing for to-be the place beside the
 τούτου μέρη, καὶ τὸν συνάγειν πειρώμενον, ὅτι ἔστιν
of-it parts and the-one to-infer trying that there-is
 ὁ τόπος ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ὡς ὄντα λαμβάνειν, τὸ
the place from the the parts of-it as being to-take the
 ζητούμενον δι' ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευάζειν βούλεσθαι. ὁμοίως
thing-sought through itself to-establish to-wish likewise
 δὲ ληρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι τι
and to-talk-nonsense also those in some place to-come-about something

ἢ γεγονέναι φάσκοντας, ὅλως μὴ διδομένου τοῦ τόπου.

or to-have-come-about asserting at-all not being-granted the place

συναρπάξιν δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕπαρξιν

to-steal and them also the of-the body existence

μὴ διδομένην αὐτόθεν· καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ

not being-granted at-once and the out-of which and the by which

δείκνυσθαι ἀνύπαρκτα παραπλησίως τῷ τόπῳ.

to-be-shown non-existent similarly to-the place

123 τὸν τε Ἡσίοδον μὴ ἀξιόχρεον εἶναι κριτὴν τῶν κατὰ

— and Hesiod not competent to-be a-judge of-the-things in

φιλοσοφίαν. καὶ οὕτω διακρούμενοι τὰ εἰς κατασκευὴν

philosophy and thus pushing-aside the-things for the-establishment

φερόμενα τοῦ εἶναι τόπον, ἤδη καὶ ποικιλώτερον

adduced of-the to-be place now also more-elaborately

κατασκευάζουσιν, ὅτι ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, ταῖς ἐμβριθεστέραις

they-establish that non-existent it-is the weightier

εἶναι δοκούσαις τῶν δογματικῶν στάσεσι περὶ τοῦ

to-be seeming of-the dogmatists positions concerning the

τόπου προσχρώμενοι, τῇ τε τῶν Στωικῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν

place employing the both of-the Stoics and the of-the

Περιπατητικῶν, τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

Peripatetics the manner this

124 Οἱ Στωικοὶ φασὶ κενὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ οἶόν τε ὑπὸ

the Stoics say void indeed to-be the-thing possible and by

ὄντος κατέχεσθαι μὴ κατεχόμενον δέ, ἢ διάστημα ἔρημον

a-being to-be-occupied not being-occupied but or an-interval empty

σώματος, ἢ διάστημα ἀκαθεκτούμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τόπον

of-body or an-interval unoccupied by a-body place

δὲ διάστημα ὑπὸ ὄντος κατεχόμενον καὶ ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ

but an-interval by a-being occupied and equated to-the

κατέχοντι αὐτόν, νῦν ὃν καλοῦντες τὸ σῶμα, χώραν δὲ

occupying it now a-being calling the body room but

διάστημα κατὰ μὲν τι κατεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος
an-interval in indeed some-respect occupied by a-body
κατὰ δέ τι ἀκαθεκτούμενον, ἐνίων χώραν εἰπόντων
in but some-respect unoccupied some room having-called
εἶναι τὸν τόπον τοῦ μεγάλου σώματος, ὥς ἐν μεγέθει
to-be the place of-the great body as in magnitude
τὴν διαφορὰν εἶναι τοῦ τε τόπου καὶ τῆς χώρας.
the difference to-be of-the both place and the room
λέγεται οὖν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ διάστημα ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενον 125
it-is-said then that since an-interval by a-body occupied
φασιν εἶναι τὸν τόπον, πῶς καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι
they-say to-be the place how also do-they-say it to-be
διάστημα; πότερον τὸ μῆκος τοῦ σώματος ἢ τὸ πλάτος
an-interval whether the length of-the body or the breadth
ἢ τὸ βάθος μόνον ἢ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ
or the depth alone or the three dimensions if indeed for
μίαν διάστασιν, οὐκ ἐξισάζεται ὁ τόπος τῷ οὐδὲ τόπος
one dimension not is-equated the place to-that of-which a-place
ἐστίν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ μέρος τοῦ περιεχομένου τὸ περιέχον
it-is besides the-fact also a-part of-the contained the containing
εἶναι, ὃ παντάπασιν ἀπεμφαίνει.
to-be which utterly is-absurd
εἰ δὲ αἱ τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐπεὶ οὔτε κενὸν ὑπόκειται ἐν τῷ 126
if but the three dimensions since neither void underlies in the
λεγομένῳ τόπῳ οὔτε ἄλλο σῶμα διάστασιν ἔχον, μόνον
so-called place nor another body a-dimension having only
δὲ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ λεγόμενον εἶναι σῶμα οὐ συνέστηκεν
but the in place said to-be body not is-composed
ἐκ τῶν διαστάσεων (ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο μῆκος καὶ πλάτος
of the dimensions is for this length and breadth
καὶ βάθος καὶ ἀντιτυπία, ἣ δὴ συμβεβηκέναι λέγεται
and depth and resistance which indeed to-have-happened is-said

ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις), αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται
to-the dimensions the said-before itself the body will-be
 ἑαυτοῦ τόπος, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον,
of-itself a-place and the same containing and contained
 ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις διάστασις τόπου
which-very-thing absurd not therefore is any dimension of-a-place
 ὑποκειμένου. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ τόπος.

underlying because-of and this neither is anything the place
 127 ἔρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ διπλαῖ αἱ διαστάσεις οὐ
is-put and also this the argument since double the dimensions not
 θεωροῦνται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι λεγομένων,
are-observed in each of-the-things in place to-be said
 ἀλλ' ἐν μῆκος καὶ ἐν πλάτος καὶ ἐν βάθος, πότερον
but one length and one breadth and one depth whether
 μόνου τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις αἷται ἢ μόνου
of-the-alone the body are the dimensions these or of-the-alone
 τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μόνου τοῦ τόπου,
the place or of-both but if indeed of-the-alone the place
 οὐχ ἔξει τὸ σῶμα ἴδιον μῆκος οὐδὲ πλάτος οὐδὲ βάθος
not will-have the body its-own length nor breadth nor depth
 οὐθέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.
none so-that neither a-body will-be the body which-very-thing absurd

128 εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπεὶ τὸ κενὸν οὐδεμίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ
if but of-both since the void no existence has beside
 τὰς διαστάσεις, εἰ αἱ διαστάσεις αἱ τοῦ κενοῦ ὑπόκεινται
the dimensions if the dimensions the of-the void underlie
 ἐν τῷ σώματι συστατικαὶ οὐσαι αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ
in the body constitutive being of-it of-the body the
 τοῦ κενοῦ συστατικὰ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔσται συστατικά.
of-the void constitutive also of-the body will-be constitutive
 περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῆς ἀντιτυπίας οὐκ ἔστι
concerning indeed for the existence of-the resistance not it-is

διαβεβαιώσασθαι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν· μόνων
to-affirm just-as before we-recalled of-the-alone
 δὲ τῶν διαστάσεων φαινομένων κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον σῶμα,
and the dimensions appearing in the so-called body
 αἴπερ εἰσὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τῷ κενῷ, κενὸν ἔσται
which-very-things are of-the void and the same to-the void void will-be
 τὸ σῶμα· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ μόνου τοῦ σώματος
the body which-very-thing absurd if but of-the-alone the body
 εἰσιν αἱ διαστάσεις, οὐδεμία ἔσται διάστασις τόπου, διόπερ
are the dimensions no will-be dimension of-a-place wherefore
 οὐδὲ ὁ τόπος. εἰ τοίνυν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν προειρημένων
neither the place if then according-to none of-the said-before
 τρόπων εὐρίσκεται τόπου διάστασις, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.
manners is-found of-a-place a-dimension neither is-there the place
 πρὸς τούτοις λέγεται, ὅτι ὅτε ἔπεισι τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα 129
besides these it-is-said that when comes-upon the void the body
 καὶ γίνεται τόπος, ἥτοι ὑπομένει τὸ κενὸν ἢ ὑποχωρεῖ
and comes-about a-place either remains the void or withdraws
 ἢ φθείρεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ
or perishes but if indeed it-remains the same will-be both
 πλήρες καὶ κενόν· εἰ δὲ ὑποχωρεῖ κινούμενον μεταβατικῶς
full and void if but it-withdraws being-moved by-transition
 ἢ φθείρεται μεταβάλλον, σῶμα ἔσται τὸ κενόν· σώματος
or perishes changing a-body will-be the void of-a-body
 γὰρ ἰδιά ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν
for proper are these the affections absurd but the same to-call
 κενὸν καὶ πλήρες, ἢ ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τὸ κενόν. ἄτοπον
void and full or that a-body is the void absurd
 ἄρα τὸ λέγειν οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος
therefore the saying possible and to-be the void by a-body
 κατασχεθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον.
to-be-occupied and to-become a-place

130 διὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἀνυπόστατον εὐρίσκεται,
because-of and these-things also the void unreal is-found
 εἶγε μὴ δυνατόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ κατασχεθῆναι ὑπὸ σώματος
if-indeed not possible it-is it to-be-occupied by a-body
 καὶ γενέσθαι τόπον· ἐλέγετο γὰρ κενὸν εἶναι ὃ
and to-become a-place it-was-said for void to-be that-which
 οἶόν τε ὑπὸ σώματος κατασχεθῆναι. συμπεριτρέπεται δὲ
possible and by a-body to-be-occupied is-overtaken-along and
 τούτοις καὶ ἡ χώρα· εἴτε γὰρ ὁ μέγας τόπος ἐστὶ
with-these also the room whether for the great place is
 χώρα, συμπεριγράφεται τῷ τόπῳ, εἴτε ἡ κατὰ μέν
room it-is-canceled-along with-the place or-whether the in indeed
 τι ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχομένη, κατὰ δέ τι κενὴ
some-respect by a-body occupied in but some-respect empty
 διάστασις, ἀμφοτέροις συναναιρεῖται.
dimension with-both it-is-abolished-along

131 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔτι πλείω πρὸς τὴν στάσιν τῶν
these-things indeed then and still more against the position of-the
 Στωικῶν περὶ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοί
Stoics concerning the place are-said the but Peripatetics
 φασὶν εἶναι τόπον τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὼς
say to-be place the limit of-the containing in-so-far-as
 περιέχει, ὥς ἐμοῦ τόπον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ ἀέρος
it-contains so-that of-me the-place to-be the surface of-the air
 τὴν περιτετυπωμένην τῷ ἐμῷ σώματι. ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο
the-one molded-around the my body but if-indeed this
 ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅτε γὰρ
is the place the same both will-be and not will-be when for
 μέλλει ἔν τινι τόπῳ γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, καθὼς μὲν οὐδὲν
is-about in some place to-come-to-be the body in-so-far-as indeed nothing
 δύναται γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι, δεῖ προϋπάρχειν
can come-to-be in the not existing it-is-necessary to-pre-exist

τὸν τόπον, ἵνα οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ γένηται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ
the place so-that thus in it may-come-to-be the body and
 διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ὁ τόπος πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ
because-of this will-be the place before in it to-come-to-be the
 ἐν τῷ τόπῳ σῶμα. καθὼς δὲ περιτυπουμενῆς τῆς τοῦ
in the place body in-so-far-as but being-molded-around the of-the
 περιέχοντος ἐπιφανείας τῷ περιεχομένῳ ἀποτελεῖται, οὐ
containing surface to-the contained it-is-produced not
 δύναται ὑποστῆναι ὁ τόπος πρὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι
can subsist the place before the in it coming-to-be
 τὸ σῶμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται τότε. ἄτοπον δὲ
the body and because-of this not it-will-be then absurd but
 τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ εἶναί τι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα
the same to-say both to-be something and not to-be not therefore
 ἐστὶ τόπος τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὼς περιέχει.

is place the limit of-the containing in-so-far-as it-contains
 πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ ἐστὶ τι ὁ τόπος, ἥτοι γεννητός ἐστιν 132
besides these if is anything the place either generated it-is
 ἢ ἀγέννητος. ἀγέννητος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστίν· περιτυπούμενος
or ungenerated ungenerated indeed then not it-is being-molded-around
 γάρ, φασίν, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματι ἀποτελεῖται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
for they-say to-the in it body it-is-produced but neither
 γεννητός· εἰ γάρ ἐστι γεννητός, ἥτοι ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ
generated if for it-is generated either when in place is
 τὸ σῶμα, τότε γίνεται ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἤδη λέγεται
the body then comes-about the place in which already it-is-said
 εἶναι τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ ὅτε οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν αὐτῷ.

to-be the-thing in place or when not it-is in it
 οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ 133
neither but when in it it-is is for already of-the in it
 σώματος ὁ τόπος) οὔτε ὅτε οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴγε
body the place nor when not it-is in it if-indeed

περιτυποῦται μὲν, ὡς φασίν, τῷ περιεχομένῳ τὸ περιέχον
is-molded-around indeed as they-say to-the contained the containing
 καὶ οὕτω γίνεται τόπος, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν
and so comes-about a-place to-that but not in it being nothing
 δύναται περιτυπωθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μήτε ὅτε ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ
can be-molded-around if but neither when in place is the
 σῶμα, μήτε ὅτε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ, γίνεται ὁ τόπος,
body nor when not it-is in it comes-about the place
 παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐπινοεῖν, οὐδὲ γεννητός ἐστιν ὁ
beside and these nothing is to-conceive neither generated is the
 τόπος. εἰ δὲ μήτε γεννητός ἐστι μήτε ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.
place if but neither generated it-is nor ungenerated neither is-it
 134 κοινότερον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δύναται λέγεσθαι. εἴ ἐστὶ τι ὁ
more-generally and also these-things can be-said if is anything the
 τόπος, ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων
place either a-body it-is or incorporeal each but of-these
 ἀπορεῖται, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα ἐστὶν
is-in-difficulty as we-recalled also the place therefore is
 ἄπορος. ὁ τόπος πρὸς τῷ σώματι νοεῖται, οὗ ἐστὶ
without-resource the place in-relation-to the body is-conceived of-which it-is
 τόπος· ἄπορος δέ ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ
a-place without-resource and is the concerning the existence of-the
 σώματος λόγος· καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἄρα. ὁ τόπος
body argument also the concerning the place therefore the place
 ἐκάστου αἰδίδιος μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν, γίνεσθαι δὲ λεγόμενος
of-each-thing eternal indeed not is to-come-about but said
 ἀνυπόστατος εὐρίσκεται γενέσεως μὴ ὑπαρχούσης.

135 Ὑνεστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τὸν
it-is-possible and also other-things more to-say but so-that not the
 λόγον μηκύνωμεν, ἐκείνο ἐπακτέον, ὅτι τοὺς σκεπτικούς
account we-lengthen that must-be-added that the skeptics

ἐντρέπουσι μὲν οἱ λόγοι, δυσωπεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐνάργεια.
abash indeed the arguments shames but also the evidence
 διόπερ οὐθετέρῳ προστιθέμεθα ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις
wherefore to-neither do-we-attach-ourselves so-far-as upon the-things said
 ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπέχουμεν περὶ τοῦ τόπου.
by the dogmatists but we-suspend-judgment concerning the place

περὶ χρόνου

III.20 · TIME

Time seems something on the appearances and unreal on the arguments. It is called the interval of the whole's motion, the motion itself, the number of prior and posterior in motion, the measure of motion and rest, and, by Epicurus, an accident of accidents; Aenesidemus makes it a body, others incorporeal. These positions conflict, and time is then shown neither limited nor unlimited, neither divisible nor indivisible, its three parts unreal, and neither generated nor ungenerated.

Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσῃ 136
the and same we-experience also in the concerning the time inquiry
 ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι
so-far-as indeed for upon the to-appearing-(things) seems something to-be
 ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις
the time so-far-as but upon the-things concerning it said
 ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται. χρόνον γὰρ εἶναί φασιν οἱ μὲν
unreal it-appears time for to-be say some indeed
 διάστημα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου κινήσεως (ὅλον δὲ λέγω τὸν
an-interval of-the of-the whole motion whole and I-mean the
 κόσμον), οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ κόσμου, Ἀριστοτέλης
world some but itself the motion of-the world Aristotle

δέ, ἢ ὥς τινες Πλάτων, ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου
and or as some-(say) Plato a-number of-the in motion prior

καὶ ὑστέρου, Στράτων δέ, ἢ ὥς τινες Ἀριστοτέλης,
and posterior Strato and or as some-(say) Aristotle

137 μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς, Ἐπικούρος δέ, καθὼς
a-measure of-motion and of-rest Epicurus and as

Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων φησί, σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων,
Demetrius the Laconian says an-accident of-accidents

παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι
attendant on-days both and nights and hours and feelings

καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσει καὶ μοναῖς.
and freedom-from-feelings and motions and rests

138 κατ' οὐσίαν τε οἱ μὲν σῶμα αὐτὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, ὥς
according-to substance and some indeed a-body it said to-be as

οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησιδήμον (μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφέρειν τοῦ
those about — Aenesidemus in-nothing for it to-differ from-the

ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος), οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον. ἤτοι
being and the first body some but incorporeal either

οὐδ' ἅσαι αἱ στάσεις αὐταὶ εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, ἢ ἅσαι ψευδεῖς,
then all the positions these are true or all false

ἢ τινὲς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τινὲς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε δὲ ἅσαι
or some indeed true some but false neither but all

ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν δύναται (μάχονται γὰρ αἱ πλείους)
true to-be can conflict for the most

οὔτε ἅσαι ψευδεῖς εἶναι δοθήσονται ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν.
nor all false to-be will-be-granted by the dogmatists

139 καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ δοθείη ψεῦδος μὲν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα
and otherwise if it-should-be-granted false indeed to-be the a-body

εἶναι τὸν χρόνον, ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἀσώματος ἐστίν,
to-be the time false and also the that incorporeal it-is

αὐτόθεν δοθήσεται ἢ τοῦ χρόνου ἀνπαρξία· παρὰ γὰρ
at-once will-be-granted the of-the time non-existence beside for

ταῦτα οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται ἕτερον. οὔτε τίνες μὲν εἰσιν
these nothing to-be can other neither which indeed are
 ἀληθεῖς, τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς δυνατὸν καταλαβεῖν διὰ τε
true which but false possible to-apprehend because-of both
 τὴν ἰσοσθενῇ διαφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν κατὰ
the equal-strength disagreement and the difficulty the according-to
 τὸ κριτήριόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα
the criterion both and the proof so-that because-of these-things
 οὐδὲν ἔξομεν περὶ χρόνου διαβεβαιώσασθαι.

nothing we-shall-be-able concerning time to-affirm

εἴτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως ἢ καὶ μονῆς ὁ χρόνος

140

then since not without motion or also rest the time

ὑφεστάναι δοκεῖ, τῆς κινήσεως ἀναιρουμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ
to-subsist seems the motion being-abolished likewise and

καὶ τῆς μονῆς, ἀναιρεῖται ὁ χρόνος. οὐδὲν δὲ ἥττον καὶ
also the rest is-abolished the time none but the-less also

τάδε φασί τινες κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου. εἰ ἔστι τι

these-things say some against the time if there-is any

χρόνος, ἥτοι πεπέρασται ἢ ἄπειρός ἐστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν

141

time either it-is-limited or unlimited it-is but if indeed

πεπέρασται, ἀπὸ τίνος χρόνου ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς τινα χρόνον
it-is-limited from some time it-began and into some time

λήξει· διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν

it-will-end because-of and this there-was once time when not there-was

χρόνος (πρὸ τοῦ ἄρξασθαι αὐτόν), καὶ ἔσται ποτὲ

time before the beginning it and there-will-be once

χρόνος ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος (μετὰ τὸ λῆξαι αὐτόν)·

time when not there-will-be time after the ending it

ὅπερ ἄτοπον. οὐ τοῖνυν πεπέρασται ὁ χρόνος.

which-very-thing absurd not then it-is-limited the time

142 εἰ δὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ λέγεται
 if but unlimited it-is since the indeed some of-it is-called
 παρωχικός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστώς, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, ὁ μέλλον καὶ
 past the but present the but future the future and
 ὁ παρωχικῶς ἦτοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὐκ εἰσὶν,
 the past either are or not are but if not they-are
 μόνου τοῦ ἐνεστώτος ὑπολειπομένου, ὅς ἐστιν ἀκαριαῖος,
 alone the present remaining which is momentary
 πεπερασμένος ἔσται ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν αἱ
 limited will-be the time and there-will-follow the
 ἀρχῇθεν ἀπορίαι· εἰ δὲ ὁ παρωχικῶς ἔστι καὶ ὁ μέλλον
 original difficulties if but the past is and the future
 ἔστιν, ἐνεστώς ἔσται ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ λέγειν
 is present will-be each of-them absurd but the saying
 ἐνεστώτα τὸν παρωχικότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον·
 present the past and the future time
 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἄπειρός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἄπειρος
 therefore neither unlimited is the time if but neither unlimited
 μήτε πεπερασμένος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως χρόνος.
 nor limited neither is-there at-all time

143 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἦτοι μεριστός ἐστιν ἢ
 besides these if there-is the time either divisible it-is or
 ἀμέριστος· ἀμέριστος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ
 indivisible indivisible indeed then not it-is it-is-divided for
 εἰς τε τὸν ἐνεστώτα καὶ εἰς τὸν παρωχικότα καὶ εἰς
 into both the present and into the past and into
 τὸν μέλλοντα, ὥς αὐτοὶ φασιν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός.
 the future as they-themselves say but neither divisible
 ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μεριστῶν καταμετρεῖται ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ
 each for of-the divisibles is-measured by some of-itself
 μέρους, καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος τοῦ μετρούμενου γινομένου τοῦ
 part at each part of-the measured coming-to-be the

μετροῦντος, ὡς ὅταν δακτύλῳ πῆχυν μετρώμεν. ὁ δὲ χρόνος
measuring as when with-a-finger a-cubit we-measure the but time
 οὐ δύναται καταμετρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος ἑαυτοῦ μέρους. εἰ γὰρ
not can be-measured by some of-itself part if for
 ὁ ἐνεστὼς λόγου χάριν καταμετρεῖ τὸν παρωχημένον,
the present of-argument for-the-sake measures the past
 ἔσται κατὰ τὸν παρωχηκότα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρωχηκός,
it-will-be alongside the past and because-of this past
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὁμοίως μέλλων. καὶ ὁ
and in-the-case-of the future likewise future and the
 μέλλων εἰ καταμετροίη τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνεστὼς ἔσται καὶ
future if should-measure the others present will-be and
 παρωχηκός, καὶ ὁ παρωχηκὼς παραπλησίως μέλλων ἔσται
past and the past similarly future will-be
 καὶ ἐνεστὼς· ὅπερ ἀπεμφαίνει. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός
and present which-very-thing is-absurd therefore neither divisible
 ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ ἔστιν.
it-is if but neither indivisible nor divisible neither is-it
 ὅ τε χρόνος λέγεται τριμερὴς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν
the and time is-said three-parted to-be and the-one indeed
 παρωχηκός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστὼς, τὸ δὲ μέλλων. ὦν ὁ
past the-one but present the-one but future of-which the
 μὲν παρωχηκός καὶ ὁ μέλλων οὐκ εἰσὶν· εἰ γὰρ εἰσὶ νῦν
indeed past and the future not are if for are now
 ὅ τε παρωχηκός καὶ ὁ μέλλων χρόνος, ἔσται ἐνεστὼς
the both past and the future time will-be present
 ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ ἐνεστὼς· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ
each of-them but neither the present if for there-is the
 ἐνεστὼς χρόνος, ἥτοι ἀμέριστός ἐστιν ἢ μεριστός. ἀμέριστος
present time either indivisible it-is or divisible indivisible
 μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι χρόνῳ λέγεται
indeed then not it-is in for the present time are-said

τὰ μεταβάλλοντα μεταβάλλειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐν ἀμερεῖ χρόνῳ
the-things changing to-change nothing but in a-partless time
 μεταβάλλει, οἷον ὁ σίδηρος εἰς μαλακότητα ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
changes for-instance the iron into softness or of-the others
 ἕκαστον. ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμέριστος ὁ ἐνεστὼς χρόνος.

each so-that not is indivisible the present time
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεριστός· εἰς ἐνεστῶτας μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν
but neither divisible into presents indeed for not —
 μερισθείη, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὀξεῖαν ῥύσιν τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ
it-could-be-divided since because-of the swift flow of-the-things in the-world
 ἀνεπινοήτως ὁ ἐνεστὼς εἰς παρωχηκότα μεταβάλλειν
imperceptibly the present into past to-change
 λέγεται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς παρωχηκότα καὶ μέλλοντα· ἔσται
is-said but neither into past and future it-will-be
 γὰρ οὕτως ἀνύπαρκτος, τὸ μὲν τι μηκέτι ὄν ἔχων
for so non-existent the-one indeed some no-longer being having
 μέρος ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μηδέπω ὄν.

part of-itself the-other but not-yet being
 ὅθεν οὐδὲ τέλος τοῦ παρωχημένου καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
whence neither an-end of-the past and a-beginning of-the
 μέλλοντος εἶναι δύναται ὁ ἐνεστὼς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔσται καὶ
future to-be can the present since both it-will-be and
 οὐκ ἔσται. ἔσται μὲν ὡς ἐνεστὼς, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ ἐπεὶ
not will-be it-will-be indeed as present not it-will-be but since
 μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ μεριστός ἐστιν. εἰ
not are its the parts therefore neither divisible it-is if
 δὲ μήτε ἀμέριστος ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεστὼς μήτε μεριστός, οὐδὲ
but neither indivisible is the present nor divisible neither
 ἔστιν. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος μηδὲ τοῦ παρωχημένου
is-it not being and the present nor the past

μηδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὐδέ ἐστὶ τι χρόνος· τὸ γὰρ
 nor the future neither is anything time the-thing for
 ἐξ ἀνυπάρκτων συνεστὼς ἀνυπαρκτὸν ἐστίν.

out-of non-existents composed non-existent is

Λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ χρόνου κακείνος ὁ λόγος. εἰ ἔστι 147

is-said against the time that-too the argument if there-is

χρόνος, ἥτοι γενητὸς ἐστὶ καὶ φθαρτὸς ἢ ἀγένητος καὶ
 time either generated it-is and perishable or ungenerated and

ἄφθαρτος. ἀγένητος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄφθαρτος οὐκ ἐστίν,
 imperishable ungenerated indeed then and imperishable not it-is

εἴγε αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν παρωχηκέναι λέγεται καὶ μηκέτι
 if-indeed of-it the-one indeed to-have-passed is-said and no-longer

εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μέλλειν καὶ μηδέπω εἶναι.

to-be the-other but to-be-about-to-be and not-yet to-be

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς. τὰ γὰρ γινόμενα ἔκ 148

but neither generated and perishable the-things for coming-to-be out-of

τινος ὄντος γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα εἰς
 some being to-come-to-be it-is-necessary and the-things perishing into

τι ὃν φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν δογματικῶν αὐτῶν
 some being to-perish according-to the of-the dogmatists themselves

ὑποθέσεις. εἰ οὖν εἰς τὸν παρωχημένον φθίρεται, εἰς οὐκ
 hypotheses if then into the past it-perishes into not

ὃν φθίρεται, καὶ εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεται, ἐξ

being it-perishes and if out-of the future it-comes-to-be out-of

οὐκ ὄντος γίνεται· οὐθέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ἄτοπον

not being it-comes-to-be neither for of-them is absurd

δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος γίνεσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ

but the saying anything out-of not being to-come-to-be or into the

μὴ ὃν φθείρεσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ἐστίν

not being to-perish not therefore generated and perishable is

ὁ χρόνος. εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι μήτε
the time if but neither ungenerated and imperishable it-is nor
 γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτός, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔστιν.

generated and perishable neither at-all is-it

149 Πρὸς τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ
besides these since everything the-thing coming-to-be in time
 γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ, εἰ γίνεται ὁ χρόνος, ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται.
to-come-to-be seems if comes-to-be the time in time it-comes-to-be
 ἦτοι οὖν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται ἢ ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ. ἀλλ'
either then itself in itself comes-to-be or one in another but
 εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.
if indeed itself in itself the same both will-be and not will-be
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τι γίνεταί τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ
since for the-thing in which something comes-to-be than-the-thing in it
 γιγνομένου ὀφείλει προϋπάρχειν, ὁ γιγνόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ
coming-to-be ought to-pre-exist the coming-to-be in itself
 χρόνος, εἰ μὲν γίνεται, οὐδέπω ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
time if indeed it-comes-to-be not-yet it-is if but in itself
 γίνεται, ἤδη ἔστιν. ὥστε οὐδὲ γίνεται ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
it-comes-to-be already it-is so-that neither does-it-come-to-be in itself

150 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἕτερος. εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐνεστὼς ἐν τῷ
but neither in another one if for the present in the
 μέλλοντι γίνεταί, μέλλον ἔσται ὁ ἐνεστὼς, καὶ εἰ ἐν
future comes-to-be future will-be the present and if in
 τῷ παρωχικότι, παρωχικῶς. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ
the past past the and same-things must-be-said also
 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρόνων. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἕτερος χρόνος ἐν
concerning the other times so-that neither one time in
 ἑτέρῳ γίνεται χρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γίνεται
another comes-to-be time if but neither itself in itself comes-to-be
 μήτε ἕτερος ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ γενητός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος.
nor one in another neither generated is the time

ἐδείκνυτο δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἀγέννητός ἐστιν. μήτε οὖν γενητὸς
it-was-shown and that neither ungenerated it-is neither then generated
 ὦν μήτε ἀγέννητος οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν
being nor ungenerated neither at-all is-it each for of-the
 ὄντων ἥτοι γενητὸν ἢ ἀγέννητον εἶναι προσήκει.
beings either generated or ungenerated to-be it-is-fitting

περὶ ἀριθμοῦ

III.21 • NUMBER

Since time is not observed without number, Sextus adds a short treatment of number. We count without belief and hear that number is something; the dogmatists' over-curiosity has stirred up argument against even this. The Pythagoreans make numbers the elements of the world, non-evident, incorporeal, and observed in everything, and themselves prove that number is not the things numbered. Sextus argues, on the unit and the dyad, that it is nothing besides them, and closes the physical part.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ χρόνος δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι, οὐκ 151
since and the time seems not without number to-be-observed not
 ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ βραχέα διεξελθεῖν.
 — *it-would-be out-of-place also concerning number briefly to-go-through*
 ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν
so-far-as indeed for upon the custom also without-belief to-count
 τι φαμὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν
something we-say and a-number to-be something we-hear the but of-the
 δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τοῦτου κεκίνηκε λόγον.
dogmatists over-curiosity also the against this has-stirred-up argument
 αὐτίκα γοῦν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ στοιχεῖα τοῦ 152
at-once at-any-rate those from — Pythagoras also elements of-the
 κόσμου τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι λέγουσιν. φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι τὰ
world the numbers to-be say they-say at-any-rate that the

φαινόμενα ἔκ τινος συνέστηκεν, ἀπλᾶ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ
appearing-(things) out-of something are-composed simple and to-be it-is-necessary
 τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἄδηλα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα. τῶν δὲ
the elements non-evident therefore are the elements of-the and
 ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα, ὡς οἱ ἀτμοὶ καὶ οἱ ὄγκοι,
non-evident-(things) some indeed are bodies as the vapors and the masses
 τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ὡς σχήματα καὶ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀριθμοί. ὧν
some but incorporeal as shapes and forms and numbers of-which
 τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα, συνεστῶτα ἔκ τε μήκους
the indeed bodies are composite composed of both length
 καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους. οὐ
and breadth and depth and resistance or also weight not
 μόνον ἄρα ἄδηλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσώματά ἐστὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα.
only therefore non-evident but also incorporeal are the elements
 153 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἕκαστον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔχει
but also of-the incorporeals each observed-in-addition has
 τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἢ γὰρ ἓν ἐστὶν ἢ δύο ἢ πλείω. δι' ὧν
the number either for one it-is or two or more through which
 συνάγεται, ὅτι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ ἄδηλοι
it-is-inferred that the elements of-the beings are the non-evident
 καὶ ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ
and incorporeal and in-all-things observed-in-addition numbers and not
 ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἢ τε μονὰς καὶ ἢ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς
simply but the both unit and the by compounding of-the
 μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος δυάς, ἥς κατὰ μετουσίαν
unit coming-about indefinite dyad of-which by participation
 αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίνονται δυάδες δυάδες.
the according-to part come-about dyads dyads

154 ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς,
out-of these for also the other to-come-about numbers
 τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον
the-ones observed-in-addition in-the countables and the world

κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸν
to-be-constructed they-say the indeed for point the
 τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς
of-the unit to-hold the-account the and line the of-the
 δυάδος (δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξύ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν
dyad two for points between to-be-observed this the
 δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος (ρύσιν γὰρ εἶναί φασι
and surface the of-the triad a-flow for to-be they-say
 τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ' ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ πλαγίου
of-the line into breadth to another point from the-side
 κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ
lying the and body the of-the tetrad a-rising for
 γίνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπὶ τι σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον.
to-come-about of-the surface to some point lying-above
 καὶ οὕτω τὰ τε σώματα καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον
and thus the both bodies and the-whole the world
 ἀνειδωλοποιούσιν, ὅντινα καὶ διοικεῖσθαι φασι κατὰ
they-form-into-images which also to-be-governed they-say according-to
 ἀρμονικοὺς λόγους, τὸν τε διὰ τεσσάρων, ὅς ἐστιν
harmonic ratios the-one both through four which is
 ἐπίτριτος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸν διὰ
four-to-three as stands to the six the eight and the-one through
 πέντε, ὅς ἐστιν ἡμιόλιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ἕξ τὰ ἐννέα,
five which is three-to-two as stands to the six the nine
 καὶ τὸν διὰ πασῶν, ὅς ἐστι διπλάσιος, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς
and the-one through all which is double as stands to
 τὰ ἕξ τὰ δώδεκα.

the six the twelve

ταῦτά τε οὖν ὀνειροπολοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν
these-things both then they-dream-up and that other something is
 ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι
the number beside the countables they-establish saying that

155

156

εἰ τὸ ζῶον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι,
if the animal according-to the its-own account is if it-should-happen
 ἔν, τὸ φυτόν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐστὶ ζῶον, οὐκ ἔσται ἔν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ
one the plant since not it-is an-animal not will-be one is but also
 τὸ φυτὸν ἔν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῶον, ὡς ζῶον, ἔν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ
the plant one not therefore the animal as an-animal one is but
 κατὰ τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὗ
according-to something other observed-in-addition from-outside to-it of-which
 μετέχει ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸ ἔν. καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ
partakes each and becomes through it one and if the countables
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμητοὶ καὶ
are the number since men are the countables and
 βόες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ ἵπποι, ἄνθρωποι καὶ βόες καὶ
oxen if it-should-happen and horses men and oxen and
 ἵπποι ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμός, καὶ λευκὸς ἀριθμὸς καὶ μέλας καὶ
horses will-be the number and white a-number and black and
 γενειήτης, εἰ τύχοιεν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες οἱ μετρούμενοι.
bearded if they-should-happen such being the things-measured
 157 ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτοπα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ἐστὶν ὁ
these-things and are absurd not therefore the countables are the
 ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ' ἣν
number but its-own existence it-has beside these by which
 καὶ ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ ἔστι στοιχείον.
also it-is-observed-in-addition in-the countables and is an-element
 Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων, ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἐστὶ
thus then they having-inferred that number not is
 τὰ ἀριθμητὰ, παρεισηλθεν ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία.
the countables came-in the against the number difficulty
 λέγεται γάρ, ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμός, ἥτοι αὐτὰ τὰ
it-is-said for that if there-is number either themselves the
 ἀριθμητὰ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα
countables are the number or other something beside these

ἔξωθεν· οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός,
from-outside neither but themselves the countables are the number
 ὡς ἀπέδειξαν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ
as showed the Pythagoreans nor other something beside
 ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμός.
these as we-shall-point-out nothing therefore is the number
 ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔξωθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ
that and nothing from-outside is beside the countables the
 ἀριθμός, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος τὸν λόγον
number we-shall-establish on the unit the argument
 στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἔνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι
having-set of-clear teaching for-the-sake if for there-is something
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἢ μονάς, ἧς μετέχον ἕκαστον τῶν
by itself the unit of-which partaking each of-the-things
 μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἓν, ἥτοι μία ἔσται αὐτὴ ἢ
partaking of-it becomes one either one will-be itself the
 μονὰς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστίν. ἀλλ'
unit or as-many as the-things partaking of-it are but
 εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον
if indeed one it-is whether of-the-whole of-it partakes each
 τῶν μετέχειν αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ
of-the-things to-partake of-it said or of-a-part of-it if
 μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἷς
indeed for the-whole has the unit if it-should-happen the one
 ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτι ἔσται μονὰς ἧς μετέξει ὁ εἷς ἵππος
man no-longer will-there-be a-unit of-which will-partake the one horse
 ἢ ὁ εἷς κύων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι
or the one dog or of-the others each which we-say to-be
 ἓν, ὥσπερ καὶ πολλῶν ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων,
one just-as also many being-supposed naked men

- 159 ἐνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἐνὸς ἀμφιασασμένου, γυμνοὶ
 one and being a-cloak and this one having-put-on naked
 μενοῦσιν οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου. εἰ δὲ μέρους αὐτῆς
 will-remain the rest and without a-cloak if but of-a-part of-it
 μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἔξει μέρος τι ἢ μονάς,
 partakes each first indeed will-have a-part some the unit
 καὶ ἄπειρά γε ἔξει μέρη, εἰς ᾧ διαιρεῖται ὅπερ
 and infinite indeed it-will-have parts into which it-is-divided which-very-thing
 ἄτοπον. εἴτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἢ δυάς, οὐκ ἐστι
 absurd then as the part of-the ten such-as the two not is
 δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ
 a-ten so neither the part of-the unit will-be a-unit because-of
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μετέχει τι τῆς μονάδος. ὥστε οὐκ ἐστι
 and this neither will-partake anything of-the unit so-that not is
 μία ἢ μονὰς ἧς μετέχειν λέγεται τὰ κατὰ μέρος.
 one the unit of-which to-partake are-said the-things according-to part
 160 εἰ δὲ ἰσάριθμοι τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς, ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται τὸ ἔν,
 if but equal-in-number to-the countables of which is-said the one
 αἱ μονάδες εἰσὶν, ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν
 the units are of-which by participation each of-the-things
 κατὰ μέρος λέγεται ἔν, ἄπειροι ἔσονται αἱ μετεχόμεναι
 according-to part is-said one infinite will-be the participated-in
 μονάδες. καὶ αὗται ἥτοι μετέχουσιν ἐπαναβεβηκυίας
 units and these either partake of-a-higher
 μονάδος ἢ μονάδων ἰσαριθμῶν αὐταῖς (καὶ διὰ
 unit or of-units equal-in-number to-themselves and because-of
 τοῦτό εἰσι μονάδες) ἢ οὐ μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τινος
 this they-are units or not they-partake but without any
 μετοχῆς μονάδες εἰσὶν.
 participation units they-are

*** εἰ μὲν γὰρ χωρὶς μετοχῆς μονάδες εἶναι δύνανται 161

(lacuna) if indeed for without participation units to-be can
 αὐται, δυνήσεται καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς
 these will-be-able also of-the sensibles each without
 μονάδος μετοχῆς ἐν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτόθεν περιτρέπεται
 of-a-unit participation one to-be and at-once is-overtaken
 ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὴν θεωρεῖσθαι λεγομένη μονάς. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ
 the by itself to-be-observed said unit if but from
 μετοχῆς κακεῖναι μονάδες εἰσὶν, ἥτοι μᾶς μετέχουσι
 participation those-too units are either of-one partake
 πᾶσαι ἢ μία ἐκάστη ἰδίας. καὶ εἰ μὲν πᾶσαι μᾶς, ἥτοι
 all or one each of-its-own and if indeed all of-one either
 κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστη ἢ ὅλης λεχθήσεται μετέχειν, καὶ
 according-to part each or of-the-whole will-be-said to-partake and
 μένουσιν αἱ ἀρχῆθεν ἀτοπίαι.
 remain the original absurdities

εἰ δὲ ἐκάστη ἰδίας, καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μονάδων ἐκάστη 162

if but each of-its-own also of-those the units on-each
 μονάδα ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθεωρουμέναις
 a-unit to-be-observed-in-addition it-must and on-the observed-in-addition
 ἐκεῖναις ἄλλας, καὶ μέχρις ἀπείρου. εἰ οὖν ἵνα
 those others and up-to infinity if then so-that
 καταλάβωμεν, ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες καθ' ἑαυτὰς μονάδες,
 we-may-apprehend that there-are some by themselves units
 ὧν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἓν,
 of-which by participation each of-the beings is one
 δεῖ κατεληφέναι ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους νοητὰς μονάδας,
 it-must to-have-apprehended infinitely infinite intelligible units
 ἀδύνατον δὲ καταλαβεῖν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρους μονάδας
 impossible but to-apprehend infinitely infinite units
 νοητὰς, ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀποφύνασθαι, ὅτι εἰσὶ
 intelligible impossible therefore it-is to-declare that there-are

τινες νοηταὶ μονάδες καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν
some intelligible units and each of-the beings is one
 κατὰ μετοχὴν ἰδίας μονάδος γινόμενον ἓν.

by participation of-its-own unit becoming one

163 ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι τοσαῦταί εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες
absurd therefore the saying that as-many are the units

ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἢ
as the-things partaking of-them if but neither one is the

καθ' ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ
by itself so-called unit nor as-many as the-things

μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ'
partaking of-it are neither is at-all a-unit by

ἑαυτήν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος
itself likewise and neither of-the other numbers each

καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ ἔνεστιν ἐπὶ πάντων
by itself will-be to-use for it-is-possible on all

τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς
the numbers the argument exemplarily now on the

μονάδος ἡρωτημένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐστιν ὁ
unit put but if neither by itself is the

ἀριθμός, ὥς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ
number as we-recalled nor themselves the countables the

ἀριθμός ἐστιν, ὥς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ
number is as those from Pythagoras established beside

δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἶναι ἀριθμὸν.

and these nothing is must-be-said neither to-be number

164 Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαι φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα
how and even to-come-about do-they-say out-of the unit the two

οἱ ἔξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ
those from-outside something thinking to-be the number beside the

ἀριθμητὰ; ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἐτέρα μονάδι, ἥτοι
countables when for we-combine a-unit with-another unit either

προστίθεται τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἔξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται τι
 is-added something to-the units from-outside or is-subtracted something
 ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται.
 from them or neither is-added something nor is-subtracted
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεται τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ
 but if indeed neither is-added something nor is-subtracted not
 ἔσται дуάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὔσαι αἱ μονάδες
 will-there-be a-two neither for apart from-one-another being the units
 εἶχον τὴν δυάδα ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
 had the two observed-in-addition in-them according-to the own
 αὐτῶν λόγον, οὔτε νῦν τι αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν προσγέγονεν,
 of-them account nor now anything to-them from-outside has-been-added
 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀφήρηται κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥστε 165
 just-as neither has-been-subtracted according-to the hypothesis so-that
 οὐκ ἔσται дуάς ἢ σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν
 not will-be a-two the combination of-the unit with the
 μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἔξωθέν τινος
 unit neither subtraction nor addition from-outside any
 γινομένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται
 occurring if but subtraction occurs not only not will-there-be
 дуάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ προστίθεται
 a-two but also will-be-diminished the units if but is-added
 αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν ἢ дуάς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται
 to-them from-outside the two so-that out-of the units may-come-about
 дуάς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται. ὑπόκειται
 a-two the two seeming to-be four will-be it-underlies
 γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονάς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἔξωθεν
 for a-unit and another unit to-which being-added from-outside
 дуάδος ὁ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.
 a-two the four number would-be-produced —

- 166 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν τῶν
the and same argument also in-the-case-of the other numbers the-ones
 κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λεγομένων. εἰ οὖν μήτε κατὰ
by combination to-be-produced said if then neither by
 ἀφαίρεσιν μήτε κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἄνευ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ
subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction and
 προσθέσεως γίνονται οἱ σύνθετοι λεγόμενοι εἶναι ἀριθμοὶ
addition come-about the composite said to-be numbers
 ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, ἀσύστατός ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις τοῦ
out-of the higher-ones unfounded is the generation of-the
 κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ εἶναι λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ.
by itself and beside the countables to-be said number
 ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀγέννητοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ κατὰ σύνθεσιν
that and neither ungenerated happen being the by combination
 ἀριθμοί, δηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ συντίθεσθαι τε αὐτοὺς καὶ
numbers make-clear they-themselves to-be-combined both them and
 γίνεσθαι φάσκοντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπαναβεβηκότων, οἷον τῆς
to-come-about asserting out-of the higher-ones such-as the
 τε μονάδος καὶ δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου.
both unit and two the indefinite
- 167 οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὑφέστηκε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμός. εἰ δὲ
therefore not does-subsist by itself the number if but
 μήτε κατ' ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς
neither by itself the number is-observed nor in the
 ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς
countables has the existence neither is anything the number
 ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργαῖς ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν
so-far-as upon the over-curiosities the-ones by the dogmatists
 εἰσηνευγμέναις. τοσαῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ
introduced so-much indeed also concerning the physical

καλουμένου τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρους ἀρκούντως ὥς ἐν
so-called of-the philosophy part sufficiently as in
 ὑποτυπώσει λελέχθω.
outline let-it-have-been-said

περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας

III.22 · THE ETHICAL PART OF PHILOSOPHY

There remains the ethical part, which is taken to be concerned with distinguishing the fine, the bad, and the indifferent. Sextus will treat it summarily, and begins by inquiring into the existence of goods, evils, and indifferents, setting out the conception of each first.

Λέιπεται δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν, ὅπερ δοκεῖ περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν 168
there-remains and the ethical which seems about the distinguishing
 τῶν τε καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων καταγίγνεσθαι.
of-the both fine and bad and indifferent to-be-occupied-with
 ἵνα οὖν κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλάβωμεν,
so-that then summarily also concerning this we-may-treat
 περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
concerning the existence of-the both good-things and bad-things and
 ἀδιαφόρων ζητήσωμεν, τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐκάστου προεκθέμενοι.
indifferent-things let-us-inquire the conception of-each having-set-out-first

περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων

III.23 • GOODS, EVILS, AND INDIFFERENTS

The Stoics call a good benefit or not other than benefit, meaning by benefit virtue and excellent action, and by not other than benefit the excellent man and the friend. Sextus reports their whole-and-part reasoning about this, and the three senses each of good and of indifferent. He then argues that naming what is beneficial, choiceworthy, or conducive to happiness states only an accident of the good and not its essence, so that the most approved dogmatists fall into truceless war over what the good is and differ likewise about the bad; none has brought us to a conception of any of the three.

- 169 Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον
 say then the Stoics good to-be benefit or not other
 ὠφελείας, ὠφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
 than-benefit benefit indeed calling the virtue and the
 σπουδαίαν πράξιν, οὐχ ἕτερον δὲ ὠφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον
 excellent action not other but than-benefit the excellent
 ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον
 man and the friend the indeed for virtue somehow being-disposed
 ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πράξις ἐνέργειά
 ruling-part being and the excellent action an-activity
 τις οὕσα κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, ὃ δὲ
 a being according-to virtue outright is benefit the but
 σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας.
 excellent man and the friend not other than-benefit
- 170 μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶν ὠφέλεια, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν
 a-part indeed for of-the excellent-man is benefit the ruling-part
 αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχουσα· τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν
 of-him being the and wholes neither the same as-the parts
 εἶναι λέγουσιν (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος χεῖρ), οὔτε ἕτερα
 to-be they-say not for is the man a-hand nor other

παρὰ τὰ μέρη (οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν).

beside the parts not without for the parts it-subsists

διόπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν τὸν

wherefore not other than-the parts the wholes they-say whence the

σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ

excellent-man a-whole being as toward the ruling-part of-himself which

ἔφασαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἶναι λέγουσιν.

they-said benefit not other than-benefit to-be they-say

ἐντεῦθεν καὶ τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν φασὶ λέγεσθαι.

from-this also in-three-ways the good they-say to-be-said

καθ' ἓνα μὲν γὰρ τρόπον φασὶν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ

171

according-to one indeed for manner they-say to-be good the by which

ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀρετή,

it-is-possible to-be-benefited which indeed most-primary is and virtue

καθ' ἕτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὡς

according-to another but according-to which it-happens to-be-benefited as

ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, κατὰ τρίτον δὲ

the virtue and the according-to virtue actions according-to a-third but

τρόπον τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ

manner the-thing able and to-benefit this and both virtue to-be and

τὴν κατὰ ἀρετὴν πράξιν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ τὸν φίλον,

the according-to virtue action and the excellent-man and the friend

θεοὺς τε καὶ σπουδαίους δαίμονας, ὡς τὸ μὲν δεύτερον

gods both and excellent spirits so-that the indeed second

σημαινόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐμπεριληπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου

thing-signified of-the good inclusive to-be of-the first

σημαινομένου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ πρώτου.

thing-signified the but third of-the second and of-the first

τινὲς δὲ φασὶν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετόν,

172

some and say good to-be the through itself choiceworthy

ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ συλλαμβάνον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ τὸ

others but the-thing contributing toward happiness or the-thing

συμπληρωτικόν· εὐδαιμονία δέ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ Στωικοί
completive happiness and is as the Stoics
 φασιν, εὐροια βίου.

say a-good-flow of-life

Τοιαῦτα μὲν τινα εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγεται.
such-things indeed some toward the conception of-the good are-said

173 εἴτε δὲ τὸ ὠφελοῦν εἴτε τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἵρετόν εἴτε
whether and the benefiting or the through itself choiceworthy or
 τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγαθόν τις εἶναι λέγοι,
the contributing toward happiness good someone to-be should-say
 οὐχὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρίστησιν, ἀλλὰ τι τῶν
not what is the good he-establishes but something of-the
 συμβεβηκότων αὐτῷ λέγει. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάταιον. ἦτοι γὰρ
accidents to-it he-states which is pointless either for
 μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συμβέβηκε τὰ προειρημένα ἢ καὶ
to-the-alone the good has-happened the-things said-before or also
 ἑτέροις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καὶ ἑτέροις, οὐκ ἐστὶ χαρακτηριστικά
to-others but if indeed also to-others not are characteristic
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινοποιούμενα· εἰ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ,
of-the good being-shared if but to-the-alone the good
 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν·

not it-is-possible us from these to-conceive the good

174 ὥς γὰρ ὁ ἀνευνόητος ἵππου οὔτε τὸ χρεμετίζειν
as for the-one without-a-conception of-a-horse neither the neighing
 τί ἐστὶν οἶδεν, οὔτε διὰ τούτου δύναται εἰς ἔννοιαν
what it-is knows nor through this can to a-conception
 ἔλθεῖν ἵππου, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἵππῳ χρεμετίζοντι ἐντύχοι,
come of-a-horse if not first a-horse neighing he-should-meet
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητῶν τί
so also the-one because-of the not knowing the good seeking what
 ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, οὐ δύναται γινώσκειν τὸ ἰδίως αὐτῷ καὶ
is good not can know the-thing specially to-it and

μόνῳ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆσαι
alone belonging so-that through it the good itself to-conceive
 δυνηθῇ. πρότερον γὰρ δεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ
he-may-be-able first for it-is-necessary to-learn the itself of-the
 ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴθ' οὕτω συνεῖναι ὅτι ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι
good nature then so to-understand that it-benefits and that
 δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι καὶ ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν.

through itself choiceworthy it-is and that of-happiness productive

ὅτι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἐστὶν ἱκανὰ μηνῦσαι 175

that and the said-before accidents not are sufficient to-reveal

τὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δηλοῦσιν ἔργῳ οἱ
the conception and the nature of-the good make-clear in-fact the

δογματικοί. ὥς μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν
dogmatists that indeed for benefits the good and that choiceworthy

ἐστὶ, παρὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται τὸ οἰονεῖ ἀγαστόν, καὶ
it-is wherefore also good it-has-been-called the-thing as-it-were admirable and

ὅτι εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, πάντες ἴσως συγχωροῦσιν·
that of-happiness it-is productive all perhaps concede

ἐρωτώμενοι δέ, τί ἐστὶν ᾧ ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν, εἰς
being-asked but what is that-to-which these have-happened into

ἄσπειστον ἐμπίπτουσι πόλεμον, οἱ μὲν ἀρετὴν λέγοντες, οἱ
truceless they-fall war some indeed virtue saying some

δὲ ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ ἀλυπίαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι. καίτοι εἰ ἐκ
but pleasure some but freedom-from-pain some but another thing although if from

τῶν προειρημένων ὄρων ἐδείκνυτο τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό,
the said-before definitions it-were-shown what is the good itself

οὐκ ἂν ἐστασίαζον ὥς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τούτου φύσεως.
not — they-would-quarrel as being-unknown the of-it nature

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν διαφέρονται περὶ τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 176

thus indeed then they-differ concerning the conception of-the good

οἱ δοκιμώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν δογματικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ
the most-approved seeming to-be of-the dogmatists likewise and

διηνέχθησαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, λέγοντες κακὸν εἶναι
they-disagreed also concerning the bad saying bad to-be
 βλάβην ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον βλάβης, οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ φευκτόν,
harm or not other than-harm some but the through itself to-be-avoided
 οἱ δὲ τὸ κακοδαμονίας ποιητικόν. δι' ὧν οὐχὶ τὴν
some but the-thing of-unhappiness productive through which not the
 οὐσίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἴσως
substance of-the bad but some of-the accidents perhaps
 αὐτῷ φάσκοντες εἰς τὴν προειρημένην ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀπορίαν.
to-it asserting into the said-before they-fall difficulty

177 Τὸ δὲ ἀδιάφορόν φασι λέγεσθαι μὲν τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα
the and indifferent they-say to-be-said indeed in-three-ways according-to one
 μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὃ μήτε ὀρμὴ μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷόν
indeed manner toward which neither impulse nor aversion arises such-as
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς
is the even to-be the stars or the on the head
 τρίχας· καθ' ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ὃ ὀρμὴ μὲν ἢ ἀφορμὴ
hairs according-to another but toward which impulse indeed or aversion
 γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυεῖν
arises not more but toward this than that as in-the-case-of two
 τετραδράχμων ἀπαραλλάκτων, ὅταν δέῃ τὸ ἕτερον
four-drachma-pieces indistinguishable when it-is-necessary the one
 αὐτῶν αἰρεῖσθαι· ὀρμὴ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι
of-them to-choose impulse indeed for arises toward the choosing
 τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὸδε ἢ τὸδε· κατὰ
the one of-them not more but toward this than that according-to
 τρίτον δὲ τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ μήτε πρὸς
a-third and manner they-say indifferent to-be the-thing neither toward
 εὐδαιμονίαν μὴτε πρὸς κακοδαμονίαν συμβαλλόμενον, ὥς
happiness nor toward unhappiness contributing as
 ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον· ὧ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν εὖ,
health wealth that-which for it-is-possible at-one-time indeed well

ὅτ' ἐδὲ κακῶς χρῆσασθαι, τοῦτο ἀδιάφορον εἶναι φασιν,
at-another but badly to-use this indifferent to-be they-say
 περὶ οὗ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς διαλαμβάνειν λέγουσιν.

concerning which especially in the ethics to-treat they-say

τίνα μέντοι καὶ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας δεῖ

what however also concerning this the conception it-is-necessary

φρονεῖν, ὅλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ τε
to-think clear from the-things said by-us concerning both
 ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

goods and bads

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν σαφές ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέστησαν ἡμᾶς

thus indeed then clear it-is that not they-brought us

τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν προειρημένων ἐκάστου· οὐδὲν δὲ

to-the conception of-the-things said-before of-each nothing and

ἀπεικὸς πεπόνθασιν ἐν ἀνυποστάτοις τάχα πράγμασι

unlikely have-they-suffered in unreal perhaps things

σφαλλόμενοι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἢ

going-askay that for nothing by nature is good or

κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον, ἐντεῦθεν τινες ἐπιλογίζονται.

bad or indifferent from-this some conclude

εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον

III.24 • IS ANYTHING GOOD OR BAD BY NATURE?

What is by nature warming warms everyone, as fire does, and what is by nature chilling chills everyone, as snow does; nothing called good moves everyone as good. Laymen, Peripatetics, Stoics, and the parties over pleasure all differ, and without an agreed criterion suspension follows. Some add that the good is neither the choosing nor the thing chosen, since that is neither outside us nor, on the dogmatists' own account, in body or soul.

- 179 Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαῖνον πᾶσι φαίνεται ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ
the fire by-nature warming to-all appears warming and the
 χιών φύσει ψύχουσα πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτική, καὶ πάντα
snow by-nature chilling to-all appears chilling and all
 τὰ φύσει κινούμενα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ τοὺς κατὰ
the-things by-nature moving alike all move those according-to
 φύσιν, ὡς φασίν, ἔχοντας. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων
nature as they-say being-disposed none but of-the so-called
 ἀγαθῶν πάντας κινεῖ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐκ
goods all moves as good as we-shall-point-out not
 ἄρα ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων
therefore is-there by-nature good that and none of-the so-called
 ἀγαθῶν πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, δῆλον, φασίν.
goods all alike moves clear they-say
- 180 ἵνα γὰρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας παρῶμεν, ὧν οἱ μὲν εὐεξίαν
so-that for the laymen we-may-pass-over of-whom some indeed good-condition
 σώματος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λαγνεύειν, οἱ
of-body a-good to-be think some but the wenching some
 δὲ τὸ ἀδηφαγεῖν, οἱ δὲ οἰνοφλυγίαν, οἱ δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι
but the gorging some but drunkenness some but the using
 κύβοις, οἱ δὲ πλεονεξίαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χείρω τινὰ τούτων,
dice some but greed some but even worse things than-these
 αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων τινὲς μὲν τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι
of-the-very the philosophers some indeed three kinds say to-be
 ἀγαθῶν, ὡς οἱ Περιπατητικοί· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι
of-goods as the Peripatetics of-these for some indeed to-be
 περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ὡς ὑγίειαν
about soul as the virtues some but about body as health
 καὶ τὰ ἐοικότα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς φίλους, πλοῦτον,
and the-things like-it some but external as friends wealth

τὰ παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ 181
the similar-things those but from the Stoa a-three-kind indeed also
 αὐτοί φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι
they-themselves say to-be of-goods of-these for some indeed to-be
 περὶ ψυχὴν ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον
about soul as the virtues some but external as the excellent-man
 καὶ τὸν φίλον, τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτός, οἷον τὸν
and the friend some but neither about soul nor external such-as the
 σπουδαῖον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν· τὰ μέντοι περὶ σῶμα, ἃ
excellent-man as toward himself the-things however about body which
 φασιν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ φασιν ἀγαθὰ.
say those from the Peripatos goods to-be not say goods
 ἔτιοι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡσπάσαντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακὸν
some and the pleasure embraced as a-good some but an-evil
 αὐτὴν ἀντικρὺς εἶναι φασιν, ὥστε καὶ τίνα τῶν ἐκ
it outright to-be say so-that even one of-the-men from
 φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγγασθαι ‘μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν.’
philosophy cried-out may-I-go-mad rather than may-I-feel-pleasure
 εἰ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν φύσει κινουῦντα πάντα ὁμοίως 182
if then the-things indeed by-nature moving all alike
 κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως
move at but the so-called goods not all alike
 κινούμεθα, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθόν. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε πάσαις
we-are-moved nothing is by-nature good and for neither all
 ταῖς προεκειμέναις στάσεσι πιστεύειν ἐνδέχεται διὰ
the set-out-before positions to-trust is-it-possible because-of
 τὴν μάχην οὔτε τινί. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ὅτι τῇδε μὲν
the conflict nor any the-one for saying that this indeed
 πιστευτέον τῇ στάσει, τῇδε δὲ οὐδαμῶς, ἐναντιουμένους
must-be-trusted the position that but by-no-means opposing
 τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἀντιδοξούντων λόγους αὐτῷ ἔχων, μέρος
the from the dissenters arguments to-him having a-part

γίνεται τῆς διαφωνίας, καὶ τοῦ κρινούντος αὐτὸς δεῖσεται
becomes of-the disagreement and the one-to-decide himself will-need
 διὰ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρους κρινεῖ.
because-of this with the others but not others he-will-judge
 μήτε οὖν κριτηρίου ὄντος ὁμολογουμένου μήτε ἀποδείξεως
neither then a-criterion being agreed nor a-proof
 διὰ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον καὶ περὶ τούτων διαφωνίαν,
because-of the undecidable also concerning these disagreement
 εἰς τὴν ἐποχὴν καταντήσῃ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ
into the suspension-of-judgment he-will-arrive and because-of this not
 ἕξει διαβεβαιουῖσθαι, τί ἐστὶ τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.
he-will-be-able to-affirm what is the by-nature good

183 Ἐτι καὶ ἐκεῖνο λέγουσί τινες, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢτοι τὸ
further that-too say some that good is either the
 αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ αἰρούμεθα. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰρεῖσθαι
choosing itself or that which we-choose the indeed then choosing
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
not is good according-to the own account not for —
 ἐσπεύδομεν τυχεῖν ἐκείνου ὃ αἰρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν
we-would-hasten to-obtain that which we-choose so-that not we-may-fall-out
 τοῦ ἔτι αὐτὸ αἰρεῖσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἦν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι
of-the still it choosing for-instance if a-good were the seeking-after
 ποτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπεύδομεν ποτοῦ τυχεῖν· ἀπολαύσαντες
drink not — we-would-hasten drink to-obtain having-enjoyed
 γὰρ τούτου τῆς ἀντιποιήσεως αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλαττόμεθα. καὶ
for it the seeking-after of-it we-are-freed and
 ἐπὶ τοῦ πεινῆν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶν
in-the-case-of the being-hungry likewise and in-the-case-of the being-in-love
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν
and the others not therefore the choosing through itself choiceworthy
 ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ ὀχληρόν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πεινῶν
is if not at-least also troublesome and for the-one hungering

σπεύδει μετασχεῖν τροφῆς, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ
hastens to-partake of-food so-that he-may-be-freed of-the from the
 πεινῆν ὀχλήσεως, καὶ ὁ ἐρῶν ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ διψῶν.
being-hungry distress and the-one loving likewise and the-one thirsting
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ αἰρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἥτοι
but neither the choiceworthy is the good this for either 184
 ἔξωθεν ἐστὶν ἡμῶν ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔξωθεν
outside is us or about us but if indeed outside
 ἡμῶν, ἥτοι ποιεῖ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀστείαν κίνησιν καὶ
us either it-produces in us agreeable motion and
 ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν πάθος, ἢ οὐδαμῶς
acceptable a-state and admirable a-feeling or in-no-way
 ἡμᾶς διατίθῃσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀγαστόν,
us does-it-dispose and if indeed not it-is to-us admirable
 οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἔσται οὔτε ἐπάξεται ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι
neither good will-it-be nor will-it-draw us toward the choosing
 αὐτὸ οὔτε ὅλως αἰρετὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ γίνεται τι περὶ
it nor at-all choiceworthy will-it-be if but comes-about some in
 ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτὸς προσηνὲς κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν
us from the external pleasant state and welcome
 πάθος, οὐχὶ δι' ἑαυτὸ αἰρετὸν ἔσται τὸ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ
feeling not through itself choiceworthy will-be the external but
 διὰ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ γινομένην διάθεσιν.
because-of the in us at it arising disposition
 ὥστε οὐ δύναται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐκτὸς εἶναι. ἀλλ' 185
so-that not can the-thing through itself choiceworthy external be but
 οὐδὲ περὶ ἡμᾶς. ἥτοι γὰρ περὶ σῶμα εἶναι λέγεται μόνον ἢ
neither about us either for about body to-be it-is-said only or
 περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην ἢ περὶ ἀμφοτέρω. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν περὶ σῶμα
about soul only or about both but if indeed about body
 μόνον, ἐκφεύξεται τὴν γνώσιν ἡμῶν. ψυχῆς γὰρ αἱ γνώσεις
only it-will-escape the knowledge of-us of-soul for the knowings

εἶναι λέγονται, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄλογον εἶναί φασιν ὅσον ἐφ'
to-be are-said the but body irrational to-be they-say so-far-as upon
 ἑαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς διατείνειν λέγοιτο, τῇ
itself if but also as-far-as the soul to-extend it-should-be-said by-the
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλήψει καὶ τῷ ταύτης ἀγαστῷ πάθει δοκοίη
of-the soul apprehension and by-the of-it admiring feeling it-would-seem
 ἂν αἰρετὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κρινόμενον ὡς αἰρετὸν τῇ
— choiceworthy to-be the-thing for judged as choiceworthy by-the
 διανοίᾳ κρίνεται κατὰ αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀλόγῳ σώματι.
understanding is-judged according-to them and not by-an-irrational body
 186 λείπεται λέγειν, ὅτι περὶ ψυχὴν μόνην τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν.
it-remains to-say that about soul only the good is
 καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ λέγουσιν ἀδύνατόν
and this but from what the dogmatists say impossible
 ἐστίν. ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ
is the for soul perhaps indeed even non-existent is if but
 καὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν οὐ καταλαμβάνεται,
also it-exists so-far-as upon what they-say not it-is-apprehended
 καθὼς ἐπελογισάμην ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγῳ. πῶς
as I-concluded in the concerning the-criterion account how
 δ' ἂν θαρροίη τις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τι γίνεσθαι λέγειν,
and — would-dare anyone in that something to-come-about to-say
 ὃ μὴ καταλαμβάνει;
which not he-apprehends

187 ἵνα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παραλείπωμεν, πῶς ἄρα καὶ λέγουσιν
so-that and even these-things we-may-pass-over how then even do-they-say
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι; εἰ γοῦν ὁ Ἐπικουρος
in the soul the good to-come-about if at-any-rate — Epicurus
 ἐν ἡδονῇ τίθεται τὸ τέλος καὶ φησι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
in pleasure places the end and says the soul since also
 πάντα, ἐξ ἀτόμων συνεστάναι, πῶς ἐν ἀτόμων σωρῷ
all-things out-of atoms to-be-composed how in of-atoms a-beap

δυνατὸν ἡδονὴν γίνεσθαι καὶ συγκατάθεσιν ἢ κρίσιν τοῦ
 possible pleasure to-come-about and assent or judgment that
 τόδε μὲν αἰρετὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν, τόδε δὲ φευκτὸν
 this indeed choiceworthy to-be and good that but to-be-avoided
 καὶ κακόν, ἀμήχανον εἰπεῖν.
 and bad impossible to-say

τί ἐστὶν ἡ λεγομένη τέχνη περὶ βίον

III.25 · THE ART OF LIVING

The Stoics make the goods of the soul certain arts, and an art a system of apprehensions held in the ruling part; but in a fluid breath, moved as a whole at every impression, no store of apprehensions can be laid up, and Plato's blended soul is nonsense. So nothing is good, bad, or indifferent by nature: what some call bad others pursue as good, the preferred and dispreferred are disputed, and for courage, pleasure, and toil nature can be cited on either side.

Πάλιν οἱ Στωικοὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ φασιν εἶναι τέχνας 188
 again the Stoics about soul goods say to-be arts
 τινάς, τὰς ἀρετάς· τέχνην δὲ εἶναί φασι σύστημα
 certain the virtues an-art and to-be they-say a-system
 ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις
 out-of apprehensions exercised-together the and apprehensions
 γίνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ,
 to-come-about in the ruling-part how then in the ruling-part
 πνεύματι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχοντι, ἐναπόθεσις γίνεται
 breath according-to them existing a-storing-up comes-about
 καταλήψεων καὶ ἀθροισμὸς τοσούτων ὥς γενέσθαι τέχνην,
 of-apprehensions and an-accumulation of-so-many so-as to-become an-art
 οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐννοῆσαι, τῆς ἐπιγνομένης τυπώσεως ἀεὶ τὴν
 not possible and to-conceive the supervening impression always the

πρὸ αὐτῆς ἀπαλειφούσης, ἐπεὶ χυτόν τέ ἐστι τὸ πνεῦμα
before it wiping-out since fluid and is the breath

καὶ ἐξ ὅλου κινεῖσθαι λέγεται καθ' ἐκάστην τύπωσιν.

and from the-whole to-be-moved it-is-said at each impression

189 τὸ γὰρ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνειδωλοποίησιν λέγειν ἐπιδεκτικὴν
the for the of-Plato image-making to-say receptive

εἶναι δύνασθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φημὶ δὲ τὴν κράσιν τῆς

to-be to-be-able of-the good I-mean and the blending of-the

ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως

indivisible and divisible substance and of-the of-the-other nature

καὶ ταυτοῦ, ἢ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τέλεον ληρώδης ἐστιν. ὅθεν

and of-the-same or the numbers utterly nonsensical is whence

οὐδὲ περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ἀγαθόν.

neither about soul to-be can the good

190 εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, μήτε ἐκτὸς

if but neither the choosing itself good is nor outside

ὑπόκειται τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, μήτε περὶ σῶμά

underlies the-thing through itself choiceworthy nor about body

ἐστι μήτε περὶ ψυχὴν, ὡς ἐπελογισάμην, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔστι

it-is nor about soul as I-concluded neither at-all is-there

τι φύσει ἀγαθόν. Διὰ δὲ τὰ προειρημένα οὐδὲ

anything by-nature good because-of and the-things said-before neither

κακόν τι ἔστι φύσει. τὰ γὰρ ἑτέροις δοκοῦντα

bad anything is-there by-nature the-things for to-some seeming

εἶναι κακά, ταῦτα ἕτεροι διώκουσιν ὡς ἀγαθὰ, οἷον

to-be bad these others pursue as goods such-as

ἀσέλγειαν ἀδικίαν φιλαργυρίαν ἀκρασίαν, τὰ ἐοικότα.

licentiousness injustice avarice incontinence the-things like-them

ὅθεν εἰ τὰ μὲν φύσει πάντας ὁμοίως πέφυκε

whence if the-things indeed by-nature all alike are-naturally-disposed

κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα εἶναι κακὰ οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως
to-move the-things but said to-be bad not all alike

κινεῖ, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει κακόν.

move nothing is by-nature bad

Ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἀδιάφορόν ἐστὶ τι φύσει διὰ τὴν 191

likewise and neither indifferent is anything by-nature because-of the

περὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων διαφωνίαν. οἷον γοῦν οἱ

concerning the indifferents disagreement for-instance at-any-rate the

μὲν Στωικοὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα

indeed Stoics of-the indifferents say some indeed preferred

εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δὲ οὔτε προηγμένα οὔτε

to-be some but dispreferred some but neither preferred nor

ἀποπροηγμένα, προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἱκανὴν ἀξίαν ἔχοντα

dispreferred preferred indeed the-things sufficient value having

ὡς ὑγίειαν πλοῦτον, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἱκανὴν

as health wealth dispreferred but the-things not sufficient

ἔχοντα ἀξίαν ὡς πενίαν νόσον, μήτε δὲ προηγμένα μήτε

having value as poverty disease neither and preferred nor

ἀποπροηγμένα ὡς τὸ ἐκτείνειν ἢ συγκαμψαὶ τὸν δάκτυλον.

dispreferred as the stretching-out or bending the finger

τινὲς δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φύσει προηγμένον ἢ 192

some but none of-the indifferents by-nature preferred or

ἀποπροηγμένον εἶναι λέγουσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων

dispreferred to-be say each for of-the indifferents

παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ὅτ' ἐμὲν προηγμένον

because-of the different circumstances at-one-time indeed preferred

φαίνεσθαι, ὅτ' ἐμὲν ἀποπροηγμένον. εἰ γοῦν, φασίν, οἱ

to-appear at-another but dispreferred if at-any-rate they-say the

μὲν πλούσιοι ἐπιβουλεύονται ὑπὸ τυράννου οἱ δὲ πένητες

indeed rich should-be-plotted-against by a-tyrant the but poor

εἰρηνεύουντο, πᾶς ἂν ἔλοιτο εἶναι πένης μᾶλλον ἢ
should-be-left-in-peace everyone — would-choose to-be poor rather than
 πλούσιος, ὥς ἀποπροηγμένον γίνεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον.

rich so-that dispreferred to-become the wealth

193 ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀδιαφόρων οἱ μὲν
so-that since each of-the so-called indifferents some indeed
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ἅπαντες δ' ἂν ὁμοίως
good to-be say some but bad all but — alike
 ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, εἶγε ἀδιάφορον ἦν
indifferent it would-think to-be if-indeed indifferent it-were
 φύσει, οὐδέν ἐστι φύσει ἀδιάφορον.

by-nature nothing is by-nature indifferent

Οὕτως καὶ εἴ τις φύσει αἰρετὴν εἶναι λέγοι τὴν
thus also if someone by-nature choiceworthy to-be should-say the
 ἀνδρείαν διὰ τὸ τοὺς λέοντας φυσικῶς τολμᾶν
courage because-of the the lions naturally to-be-bold
 καὶ ἀνδρῖζεσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ ταύρους, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ
and to-act-manfully to-seem and bulls if it-should-happen and
 ἀνθρώπους τινὰς καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας, λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐπὶ
men some and cocks we-say that so-far-as upon
 τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δειλία τῶν φύσει αἰρετῶν ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ
this also the cowardice of-the-things by-nature choiceworthy is since
 ἔλαφοι καὶ λαγῶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείονα ζῶα φυσικῶς ἐπ'
deer and hares and other many animals naturally toward
 αὐτὴν ὀρμᾶ. καὶ οἱ πλείστοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δειλοὶ
it are-impelled and the most and of-the men cowardly
 θεωροῦνται· σπανίως μὲν γάρ τις ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἑαυτὸν
are-observed rarely indeed for someone for country himself
 ἐπέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον βλακευσάμενος ἢ ἄλλως θερμόν
has-given-up to death having-played-the-coward or otherwise hot

τι τυφωθεὶς ἔδοξε τις διαπράττεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πλείστος
something being-puffed-up seemed someone to-accomplish the but greatest

ὄμιλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκκλίνει.

crowd of-the men all the such-things avoids

ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει
whence also the Epicureans to-show think by-nature

194

αἰρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῶα φασιν ἅμα

choice-worthy to-be the pleasure the for animals they-say as-soon-as

τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα, ὁρμᾶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν

the being-born unperverted being to-be-impelled indeed toward the

ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνειν δὲ ἀλγηδόνας.

pleasure to-avoid but pains

καὶ πρὸς τούτους δὲ ἔστι λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ ποιητικὸν 195

and against these and it-is-possible to-say that the-thing productive

κακοῦ οὐκ ἂν εἴη φύσει ἀγαθόν· ἡ δέ γε ἡδονὴ κακῶν

of-evil not — would-be by-nature good the and indeed pleasure of-evils

ἔστι ποιητική· πάσῃ γὰρ ἡδονῇ παραπέπηγεν ἀλγηδών, ἥ

is productive to-every for pleasure is-fastened-alongside pain which

ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς φύσει κακόν. οἷον γοῦν ἥδεται

is according-to them by-nature bad for-instance at-any-rate takes-pleasure

ὁ μέθυσος ἐμφορούμενος οἴνου καὶ ὁ γαστρίμαργος τροφῆς,

the drunkard filling-himself with-wine and the glutton with-food

καὶ ὁ λάγνος ἀφροδισίοις ἀμέτρως χρώμενος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα

and the lecher sexual-pleasures immoderately using but these

καὶ πενίας καὶ νόσων ἐστὶ ποιητικά, ἅπερ ἀλγεῖνά ἐστι

both of-poverty and of-diseases are productive which-very-things painful are

καὶ κακά, ὥς φασίν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή.

and bad as they-say not therefore by-nature good is the pleasure

παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει 196

similarly and also the-thing productive of-good not is by-nature

κακόν, ἡδονὰς δὲ ἀποτελοῦσιν ἀλγηδόνες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμας

bad pleasures and produce pains and for sciences

ἀναλαμβάνομεν μὲν πονοῦντες, καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἐρωμένης
we-acquire indeed toiling and of-wealth and of-a-beloved
 οὕτως ἐγκρατὴς γίνεται τις, καὶ ὑγίειαν περιποιοῦσιν αἱ
thus master becomes someone and health procure the
 ἀλγηδόνες. οὐκ ἄρα ὁ πόνος φύσει κακόν. καὶ γὰρ
pains not therefore the toil by-nature bad and for
 εἰ φύσει ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονή, φαῦλον δὲ ὁ πόνος,
if by-nature good indeed were the pleasure bad but the toil
 πάντες ἂν ὁμοίως διέκειντο περὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς ἐλέγομεν·
all — alike would-be-disposed toward them as we-were-saying
 ὁρώμεν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν μὲν πόνον καὶ
we-see but many of-the philosophers the indeed toil and
 τὴν καρτερίαν αἰρουμένους, τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.
the endurance choosing the pleasure but despising
 197 ὁμοίως δ' ἂν περιτρέποντο καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐνάρετον βίον
likewise and — would-be-overturned also those the virtuous life
 φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγοντες, ἐκ τοῦ τινὰς τῶν σοφῶν τὸν
by-nature good to-be saying from the some of-the wise the
 μεθ' ἡδονῆς αἰρεῖσθαι βίον, ὥς ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις
with pleasure choosing life so-that from the among them those
 διαφωνίας τὸ φύσει τι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι διατρέπεσθαι.
disagreement the by-nature anything such or such to-be to-be-overturned

Turning to what is held shameful, unlawful, or pious, Sextus finds the same irregularity. Male intercourse is unlawful here, unremarkable among the Germans and Thebans, and indifferent to the Cynics and the Stoics. Public coupling is shameful here and not among some Indians or to Crates; prostitution is a reproach here and a distinction in Egypt; tattooing marks newborns among Egyptians and Sarmatians, and ear-rings mark nobility among Syrians. A robe becoming to Persians shamed Plato but not Aristippus; marrying one's mother or sister, obscene conduct, eating human flesh, and human blood at an altar are all unlawful here yet practiced or excused elsewhere.

Οὐκ ἄτοπον δ' ἂν ἴσως εἴη πρὸς τούτοις καὶ 198
 not out-of-place and — perhaps it-would-be besides these also
 εἰδικώτερον ἐπιστῆσαι διὰ βραχέων ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι
 more-specifically to-attend through few-words to-the suppositions
 ταῖς περὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυρῶν, ἀθέσμων
 the-ones concerning shameful-things and not shameful-things unlawful-things
 τε καὶ οὐ τοιούτων καὶ νόμων καὶ ἔθων καὶ τῆς
 both and not such and laws and customs and the
 εἰς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς κατοικομένους
 toward gods piety and the concerning the departed
 ὁσιότητος καὶ τῶν ἑοικότων· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω περὶ
 holiness and the-things like-them and for thus concerning
 τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πολλὴν εὐρήσομεν ἀνωμαλίαν.
 the-things to-be-done or not much we-shall-find irregularity
 οἶον γοῦν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχυρόν, μᾶλλον δὲ 199
 for-instance at-any-rate among us indeed shameful rather and
 καὶ παράνομον νενόμισται τὸ τῆς ἀρρενομιξίας, παρὰ
 even unlawful is-held the of-the intercourse-with-males among
 Γερμανοῖς δέ, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ αἰσχυρόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν τι
 Germans but as they-say not shameful but as one something

τῶν συνήθων. λέγεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ Θηβαίοις τὸ παλαιὸν
of-the customary-things it-is-said and also among Thebans in old-times
 οὐκ αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τὸν Μηριόνην
not shameful this to-be to-have-seemed and — Meriones
 τὸν Κρήτα οὕτω κεκλησθαί φασι δι' ἔμφασιν τοῦ
the Cretan so to-have-been-called they-say through allusion to-the
 Κρητῶν ἔθους, καὶ τὴν Ἀχιλλέως πρὸς Πάτροκλον
of-the-Cretans custom and the of-Achilles toward Patroclus
 διάπυρον φιλίαν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνάγουσί τινας.

ardent friendship to this refer some

200 καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς
and what wonder when indeed even those from the Cynic
 φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτιέα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην
philosophy and those about the Citian Zeno and Cleanthes
 καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀδιάφορον τοῦτο εἶναί φασιν; καὶ τὸ
and Chrysippus indifferent this to-be say and the
 δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι, καίτοι παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχρὸν
in-public with-a-woman coupling although among us shameful
 εἶναι δοκοῦν, παρὰ τισι τῶν Ἰνδῶν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι
to-be seeming among some of-the Indians not shameful to-be
 νομίζεται· μίγνυνται γοῦν ἀδιαφόρως δημοσίᾳ, καθάπερ
is-held they-couple at-any-rate indifferently in-public just-as
 καὶ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Κράτητος ἀκηκόαμεν.

also concerning the philosopher Crates we-have-beard

201 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑταιρεῖν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν
but also the the women to-prostitute-themselves among us indeed
 αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπονεῖδιστον, παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν
shameful is and reproachful among but many of-the
 Αἰγυπτίων εὐκλέες· φασὶ γοῦν, ὅτι αἱ πλείστοις συνιοῦσαι
Egyptians glorious they-say at-any-rate that those with-most consorting
 καὶ κόσμον ἔχουσι περισφύριον, σύνθημα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς
also an-ornament have an-anklet a-token of-the among them

σεμνολογήματος. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ κόραι πρὸ τῶν
boast among some and of-them the girls before the
γάμων τὴν προῖκα ἐξ ἐταιρήσεως συνάγουσαι γαμοῦνται.
marriages the dowry from prostitution gathering are-married
καὶ τοὺς Στωικοὺς δὲ ὁρῶμεν οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγοντας
and the Stoics and we-see not out-of-place to-be saying
τὸ ἐταῖρα συνοικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἐταίρας ἐργασίας διαζῆν.
the with-a-courtesan living or the from a-courtesan's earnings living
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐστίχθαι παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄτιμον 202
but also the to-be-tattooed among us indeed shameful and dishonorable
εἶναι δοκεῖ, πολλοὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σαρματῶν στίζουσι
to-be seems many but of-Egyptians and of-Sarmatians tattoo
τὰ γεννώμενα.
the new-born
τό τε ἐλλόβια ἔχειν τοὺς ἄρρενας παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν αἰσχρὸν 203
the and ear-rings to-have the males among us indeed shameful
ἐστὶ, παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥσπερ καὶ Σύροις,
is among some but of-the barbarians as also to-Syrians
εὐγενείας ἐστὶ σύνθημα. τινὲς δὲ ἐπιτείνοντες τὸ σύνθημα
of-noble-birth is a-token some and intensifying the token
τῆς εὐγενείας, καὶ τὰς ῥίνας τῶν παίδων τιτρώσκοντες
of-the noble-birth also the noses of-the children piercing
κρίκους ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀργυρέους ἢ χρυσοὺς ἀπαρτῶσιν, ὃ
rings from them silver or gold they-hang-on which
παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειέ τις,
among us not — would-do anyone
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀνθοβαφῇ καὶ ποδήρῃ τις ἄρρην ἐνταῦθα ἂν 204
just-as neither flower-dyed and ankle-length anyone male here —
ἀμφιέσαιτο ἐσθῆτα, καίτοι παρὰ Πέρσiais εὐπρεπεστάτου
would-put-on clothing although among Persians most-becoming
τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν αἰσχροῦ τούτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι. καὶ παρὰ
the among us shameful this seeming to-be and at

Διονυσίῳ δὲ τῷ τῆς Συκελίας τυράννῳ τοιαύτης ἐσθήτος
Dionysius and the of-the Sicily tyrant such clothing
 Πλάτῳ καὶ Ἀριστίπῳ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις προσενεχθείσης
to-Plato and to-Aristippus the philosophers having-been-offered
 ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἀπεπέμψατο, εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην
— indeed Plato sent-it-away saying not — I-could
 θήλυν ἐνδύειν στολὴν ἄρρην πεφυκώς, ὁ δὲ Ἀρίστιππος
a-woman's to-put-on robe male being-born — but Aristippus
 προσήκατο, φήσας καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν οὐς ἢ γε
accepted-it saying even for in bacchic-revels being she at-least
 σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται. οὕτω καὶ τῶν σοφῶν ὧ
chaste not will-be-corrupted so also of-the wise to-one
 μὲν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν, ὧ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἐδόκει τοῦτο εἶναι.
indeed not shameful to-another but shameful seemed this to-be
 205 ἄθεσμον τέ ἐστι παρ' ἡμῖν μητέρα ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἰδίαν γαμεῖν·
unlawful and is among us a-mother or a-sister one's-own to-marry
 Πέρσαι δὲ καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ σοφίαν ἀσκεῖν δοκοῦντες,
Persians but and especially of-them those wisdom to-practice seeming
 οἱ Μάγοι, γαμοῦσι τὰς μητέρας, καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι τὰς ἀδελφὰς
the Magi marry the mothers and Egyptians the sisters
 ἄγονται πρὸς γάμον, καὶ ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς φησιν, Ζεὺς Ἥρην
take to marriage and as the poet says Zeus Hera
 προσέειπε κασιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων
addressed sister wife and but also the Citian Zeno
 φησὶ μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μόνον τῆς μητρὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ
says not out-of-place to-be the part of-the mother with-the of-himself
 μορίῳ τρῆναι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος
part to-rub just-as neither another any part of-the body
 αὐτῆς τῇ χειρὶ τρῆναι φαῦλον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι. καὶ
of-her with-the hand to-rub bad — would-say anyone to-be and
 ὁ Χρύσιππος δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δογματίζει τὸν τε πατέρα
the Chrysippus and in the Republic he-holds-beliefs the both father

- ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς παιδοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ
from the daughter to-beget-children and the mother from the
 παιδὸς καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ
son and the brother from the sister Plato and even
 καθολικώτερον κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν ἀπεφῆνατο.
more-generally common to-be the women must declared
 τό τε αἰσχροργεῖν ἐπάρατον ὃν παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ Ζήνων 206
the and obscene-conduct accursed being among us — Zeno
 οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει· καὶ ἄλλους δὲ ὡς ἀγαθῷ τινι τοῦτω
not does-reject and others and as a-good some this
 χρησθαι τῷ κακῷ πυνθανόμεθα.
to-use the evil we-learn
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωπεῖων γεύεσθαι σαρκῶν παρ' ἡμῖν 207
but also the human tasting flesh among us
 μὲν ἄθεσμον, παρ' ὅλοις δὲ βαρβάροις ἔθνεσιν ἀδιάφορόν
indeed unlawful among whole but barbarian nations indifferent
 ἐστίν. καὶ τί δεῖ τοὺς βαρβάρους λέγειν, ὅπου καὶ ὁ
it-is and what need the barbarians to-mention when even —
 Τυδεὺς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τοῦ πολεμίου λέγεται φαγεῖν, καὶ
Tydeus the brain of-the enemy is-said to-have-eaten and
 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶναί φασι τὸ σάρκας
those from the Stoa not out-of-place to-be say the flesh
 τινὰ ἐσθίειν ἄλλων τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ;
someone eating of-other both men and of-himself
 τό τε ἀνθρωπεῖα μαιίνειν αἵματι βωμὸν θεοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν 208
the and with-human defiling blood an-altar of-a-god among us
 μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄθεσμον, Λάκωνες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ
indeed the many unlawful Laconians but at the altar
 τῆς Ὀρθωσίας Ἀρτέμιδος μαστίζονται πικρῶς ὑπὲρ
of-the Orthosian Artemis are-scourged bitterly for-the-sake-of
 τοῦ πολλὴν αἵματος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τῆς θεοῦ γενέσθαι
the much of-blood on the altar of-the goddess coming-about

ῥύσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπόν τινες,
a-flow but also to-the Cronus sacrifice a-man some
 καθάπερ καὶ Σκύθαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς ξένους· ἡμεῖς δὲ
just-as also Scythians to-the Artemis the strangers we but
 χραίνεσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ δοκοῦμεν ἀνθρώπου φόνῳ.
to-be-defiled the temples think of-a-man by-the-slaying

III.27 · LAW, CUSTOM, AND THE JUST

Sextus extends the irregularity to law and custom. Adultery, deemed indifferent by some, is punished here; law demands children's care for fathers, though Scythians kill their aged, and myth tells of Cronus and Zeus doing violence within their own family. Murder and striking free men are punished, yet gladiators and athletes who kill or strike win honor. One wife is commanded here, many permitted among Thracians and Gaetulians. Brigandage, theft, and cowardice are punished here but honored or excused elsewhere, as with Hermes, the Laconians, and Archilochus, and philosophers disagree even over the gods.

209 τούς γε μὴν μοιχοὺς κολάζει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος, παρὰ δέ
the at-least indeed adulterers punishes among us law among but
 τισιν ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι ταῖς τῶν ἑτέρων γυναιξὶ μίγνυσθαι·
some indifferent it-is with-the of-the others wives coupling
 καὶ φιλοσόφων δέ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ
and of-philosophers and some say indifferent to-be the
 ἄλλοτρία γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι.
with-another's wife coupling

210 τοὺς πατέρας τε ὑπὸ τῶν παιδῶν ἐπιμελείας ἀξιοῦσθαι
the fathers and by the children of-care to-be-deemed-worthy
 κελεύει παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος· οἱ Σκύθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη
commands among us law the Scythians but beyond the sixty years
 γενομένους αὐτοὺς ἀποσφάττουσιν. καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, εἴγε
having-become them slaughter and what wonder if-indeed

ὁ μὲν Κρόνος τῇ ἄρπῃ τὰ αἰδοῖα ἐξέτεμε τοῦ πατρός,
— indeed Cronus with-the sickle the genitals cut-off of-the father

ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς τὸν Κρόνον κατεταρτάρωσεν, ἣ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ μετὰ
— but Zeus — Cronus cast-into-Tartarus — and Athena with

Ἥρας καὶ Ποσειδῶνος τὸν πατέρα δεσμεύειν ἐπεχείρησεν;
Hera and Poseidon the father to-bind attempted

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ὁ Κρόνος ἀναιρεῖν ἔκρινεν,
but also the of-himself children — Cronus to-destroy decided

καὶ ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίοις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀκρίτων
and — Solon for-Athenians the concerning the uncondemned 211

νόμον ἔθετο, καθ' ὃν φονεύειν ἐκάστῳ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ
law laid-down by which to-kill to-each the his-own

παῖδα ἐπέτρεψεν· παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας φονεύειν
child he-permitted among us but the the children killing

ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι. οἳ τε Ῥωμαίων νομοθέται τοὺς
forbid the laws the and of-Romans lawgivers the

παῖδας ὑποχειρίους καὶ δούλους τῶν πατέρων κελεύουσιν
children subject and slaves of-the fathers command

εἶναι, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν παιδῶν μὴ κυριεύειν τοὺς
to-be and the property of-the children not to-own the

παῖδας ἀλλὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐλευθερίας οἱ παῖδες
children but the fathers until — of-freedom the children

τύχῳσι κατὰ τοὺς ἀργυρωνήτους· παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ ὥς
obtain like the bought-slaves among others but as

τυραννικὸν τοῦτο ἐκβέβληται.
tyrannical this has-been-rejected

νόμος τέ ἐστι τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους κολάζεσθαι· οἱ μονομάχαι 212
law and is the murderers to-be-punished the gladiators

δὲ φονεύοντες πολλάκις καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ
but killing often even honor obtain but also

τὸ τύπτειν ἐλευθέρους οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν· οἱ ἀθληταὶ δὲ
the striking free-men the laws prevent the athletes but

τύπτοντες ἐλευθέρους ἄνδρας, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀναιροῦντες,
striking free men often and even killing

τιμῶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιοῦνται.

honors and crowns are-deemed-worthy

213 νόμος τε παρ' ἡμῖν κελεύει μᾶ συννοικεῖν ἕκαστον,

law and among us commands with-one to-live each

Θρακῶν δὲ καὶ Γαιτούλων (Λιβύων δὲ ἔθνος τοῦτο)

of-Thracians but and of-Gaetulians of-Libyans and a-nation this

πολλαῖς ἕκαστος συννοικεῖ.

with-many each lives

214 τό τε ληστεύειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν παράνομον καὶ ἄδικόν ἐστι,

the and brigandage among us indeed unlawful and unjust is

παρὰ δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων οὐκ ἄτοπον. φασὶ δέ, ὅτι

among but many of-the barbarians not out-of-place they-say and that

καὶ εὐκλεές τοῦτο οἱ Κίλικες ἐνόμιζον εἶναι, ὥς καὶ τοὺς

even glorious this the Cilicians considered to-be so-that even those

ἐν ληστεία τελευτήσαντας τιμῆς ἀξίους εἶναι δοκεῖν. καὶ ὁ

in brigandage having-died of-honor worthy to-be to-seem and —

Νέστωρ δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, μετὰ τὸ φιλοφρονήσασθαι

Nestor and in the poet after the welcoming

τοὺς περὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς

those about — Telemachus says to them

ἦ μαιψιδίως ἀλάλησθε

surely idly do-you-wander

οἷά τε ληιστῆρες;

like indeed pirates

καίτοι εἰ ἄτοπον ἦν τὸ ληστεύειν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως
 although if out-of-place it-were the brigandage not would so
 αὐτοὺς φιλοφρονησάμενος διὰ τὸ ὑποπτεύειν, μὴ ἄρα
 them having-welcomed because-of the suspecting lest then
 τοιοῦτοί τινες εἶεν.

such some they-might-be

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κλέπτειν παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν ἄδικον καὶ
 but also the stealing among us indeed unjust and
 παράνομόν ἐστιν· οἱ δὲ καὶ κλεπτίστατον εἶναι θεὸν
 unlawful is those but even most-thievish to-be a-god
 λέγοντες τὸν Ἑρμῆν οὐκ ἄδικον τοῦτο νομίζεσθαι ποιοῦσιν
 saying — Hermes not unjust this to-be-held make
 (πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη κακός;). φασὶ δέ τινες, ὅτι
 how for — a-god would-be bad say and some that
 καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τοὺς κλέψαντας ἐκόλαζον οὐ διὰ τὸ
 also the Laconians those having-stolen punished not because-of the
 κεκλοφέναι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πεφωρᾶσθαι.

having-stolen but because-of the having-been-caught

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ὁ ῥύβασπις ἀνὴρ κολάζεται παρὰ
 but also the coward and the shield-throwing man is-punished among
 πολλοῖς νόμῳ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῷ παιδί ἐπὶ
 many by-law wherefore also the the shield to-the son to
 πόλεμον ἐξιόντι διδοῦσα Λάκαινα 'σὺ' ἔφη, 'τέκνον, ἢ
 war going-out giving Laconian-woman you said child either
 ταύταν ἢ ἐπὶ ταύταν'. Ἀρχίλοχος δέ, ὥσπερ σεμνυνόμενος
 this or upon this Archilochus and as-if boasting

ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν ἀσπίδα ῥύψας φυγεῖν, ἐν τοῖς
 to-us at the the shield having-thrown-away to-have-fled in the
 ποιήμασι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φησὶν
 poems about himself says

ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαῖων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ
 in-the-shield indeed of-the-Saians someone glories which beside a-bush
 ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων,
 armor blameless I-left not willing
 αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος.
 myself but I-escaped of-death the-end

- 217 αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες καὶ ἐχώλεον τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν
 the and Amazons even crippled the males of-the-things by them
 γεννωμένων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν ἀνδρεῖον αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι
 born for-the-sake-of the nothing manly them to-do
 δύνασθαι, περὶ πόλεμον δὲ ἔσχον αὐταί, τοῦ ἐναντίου
 to-be-able for war and held they-themselves the opposite
 παρ' ἡμῖν καλῶς ἔχειν νενομισμένου. καὶ ἡ μήτηρ δὲ τῶν
 among us well to-be being-held and the mother and of-the
 θεῶν προσίεται τοὺς θηλυδρίας, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω κρίνασα
 gods admits the effeminates not would so having-judged
 ἡ θεός, εἴγε φύσει φαῦλον ἦν τὸ μὴ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.
 the goddess if-indeed by-nature bad it-were the not manly to-be
- 218 οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ
 so also the-things concerning the just and unjust and
 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καλοῦ πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει.
 the according-to the courage fine much irregularity have
 Καὶ τὰ περὶ εὐσεβείας δὲ καὶ θεῶν θεραπέας
 and the-things concerning piety now and of-gods worship
 πεπλήρωται πολλῆς διαφωνίας. θεοὺς γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοί
 are-filled with-much disagreement gods for the indeed many

φασιν εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Διαγόραν
say to-be some but not to-be as those about Diagoras
 τὸν Μήλιον καὶ Θεόδωρον καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον. καὶ
the Melian and Theodorus and Critias the Athenian and
 τῶν εἶναι θεοὺς ἀποφηναμένων οἱ μὲν τοὺς πατρίους
of-those to-be gods having-declared some indeed the ancestral
 νομίζουσι θεούς, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δογματικαῖς αἵρέσεσιν
believe-in gods some but those in the dogmatic schools
 ἀναπλασσομένους, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν ἀσώματον εἶπεν
fabricated as Aristotle indeed incorporeal said
 εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ πέρας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, Στωικοὶ δὲ
to-be the god and the-limit of-the heaven Stoics but
 πνεῦμα διήκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν, Ἐπικούρου δὲ
a-breath pervading even through the repulsive-things Epicurus but
 ἀνθρωπόμορφον, Ξενοφάνης δὲ σφαῖραν ἀπαθῆ.
man-shaped Xenophanes but a-sphere impassive

III.28 · PIETY AND DIET

Some hold that the gods exercise providence and some, with Epicurus, that the blessed neither has troubles nor gives them; some make god one and some many, even dog-faced and hawk-shaped. No one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, though pigs go to Heracles and Asclepius; others offer a man to Cronus, a cat to Horus, a beetle to Thetis. A Jew or an Egyptian priest would die before eating pork, while a Libyan holds mutton most unlawful; and the dead are buried, embalmed, burned, or fed to fish, dogs, and vultures.

καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, οἱ 219
and some indeed to-exercise-providence over-the-things concerning us some
 δὲ μὴ προνοεῖν· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὁ
but not to-exercise-providence the for blessed and imperishable —

Ἐπίκουρός φησι μήτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε ἑτέροις

Epicurus says neither itself troubles to-have nor to-others

παρέχειν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον οἱ μὲν ἔνα

to-furnish whence also of-those in the life some indeed one

φασὶν εἶναι θεόν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς

say to-be god some but many and different in-the

μορφαῖς, ὥς καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ὑπολήψεις

shapes so-as even into the of-the Egyptians suppositions

ἐμπίπτειν, κυνοπροσώπους καὶ ἱερακομόρφους καὶ βόας

to-fall dog-faced and hawk-shaped and oxen

καὶ κροκοδείλους καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ νομιζόντων τοὺς θεούς.

and crocodiles and what for not believing the gods

220 ὅθεν καὶ τὰ περὶ θυσίων καὶ τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς

whence also the-things concerning sacrifices and the concerning the gods

θρησκείας ὅλως πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν ἔχει· ἃ γὰρ

worship generally much irregularity have the-things-which for

ἔν τισιν ἱεροῖς νομίζεται ὅσα, ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέροις ἀνόσια.

in some rites are-held holy these in others unholy

καίτοι εἰ φύσει τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν

although if by-nature the holy and the unholy were not —

τοῦτο ἐνομίσθη. οἶον γοῦν Σαράπιδι χοῖρον οὐκ

this would-have-been-held for-instance at-any-rate to-Sarapis a-pig not

ἂν θύσειέ τις, Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῷ θύουσιν.

— would-sacrifice anyone to-Heracles but and to-Asclepius they-sacrifice

πρόβατον Ἰσιδι θύειν ἄθεσμον, τῇ μητρὶ μέντοι

a-sheep to-Isis to-sacrifice unlawful to-the mother however

λεγομένη τῶν θεῶν καὶ θεοῖς ἄλλοις καλλιερεῖται.

so-called of-the gods and to-gods other it-is-sacrificed-auspiciously

221 *** τῷ Κρόνῳ θύουσιν ἄνθρωπον, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις

(lacuna) to-the Cronus they-sacrifice a-man which to-the most

ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζεται. αἴλουρον ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῷ

impious to-be is-held a-cat in Alexandria to-the

ὦρῳ θύουσι, καὶ Θέτιδι σίλφην· ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐκ
Horus they-sacrifice and to-Thetis a-beetle which among us not
 ἂν ποιήσεί τις. ἵππον τῷ Ποσειδῶνι καλλιερούσιν·
 — *would-do anyone a-horse to-the Poseidon they-sacrifice-auspiciously*
 Ἀπόλλωνι δέ, ἐξαιρέτως τῷ Διδυμαίῳ, τὸ ζῶον ἀπεχθές.
to-Apollo but especially the Didymean the animal hateful
 αἰγας Ἀρτέμιδι θύειν εὐσεβές, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀσκληπιῷ.
goats to-Artemis to-sacrifice pious but not to-Asclepius
 καὶ ἄλλα δὲ τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῇ λέγειν ἔχων ἐῶ, 222
and other-things and to-these similar very-many to-say being-able I-let-go
 τῆς συντομίας στοχαζόμενος. εἰ μέντοι τι ἦν ὅσιον
the brevity aiming-at if however any there-were holy
 φύσει θῦμα καὶ ἀνόσιον, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομίζετο.
by-nature sacrifice and unholy among all — alike it-would-be-held
 Παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ
similar-things and to-these it-is-possible to-find also the-things in the
 κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν τῶν ἀνθρώπων θρησκεία περὶ τοὺς
according-to the diet of-the men observance concerning the
 θεούς.

gods
 Ἰουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἱερεὺς Αἰγύπτιος θάπτον ἂν ἀποθάνοι 223
a-few indeed for or a-priest Egyptian sooner — would-die
 ἢ χοίρειον φάγοι, Λίβυς δὲ προβατείου γεύσασθαι κρέως
than pork would-eat a-Libyan but of-mutton to-taste flesh
 τῶν ἀθεσμοτάτων εἶναι δοκεῖ, Σύρων δέ τινες περιστερᾶς,
of-the most-unlawful to-be seems of-Syrians and some of-a-dove
 ἄλλοι δὲ ἱερείων. ἰχθῦς τε ἐν τισὶ μὲν ἱεροῖς θέμις
others but of-sacrificial-victims fish and in some indeed rites lawful
 ἐσθιέν, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἀσεβές. Αἰγυπτίων τε τῶν σοφῶν εἶναι
to-eat in others but impious of-Egyptians and the wise to-be

νενομισμένων οἱ μὲν κεφαλὴν ζώου φαγεῖν ἀνίερρον εἶναι
being-held some indeed a-head of-an-animal to-eat unholy to-be
 νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὠμοπλάτην, οἱ δὲ πόδα, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τι.
think some but a-shoulder-blade some but a-foot some but another thing

224 κρόμμυον δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις προσενέγκαιτο τῶν καθιερουμένων
an-onion but not — anyone would-offer of-those consecrated

τῷ κατὰ Πηλούσιον Κασίῳ Δί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἱερεὺς τῆς
to-the at Pelusium Casian Zeus just-as neither a-priest of-the
 κατὰ Λιβύην Ἀφροδίτης σκόρδου γεύσαιτο ἂν. ἀπέχονται
in Libya Aphrodite of-garlic would-taste — they-abstain
 δὲ ἐν οἷς μὲν ἱεροῖς μίνθης, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἡδυσόμου, ἐν οἷς δὲ
and in which indeed rites from-mint in which but from-spearmint in which but
 σελίνου. ἔνιοι δὲ θᾶπτον ἂν τὰς κεφαλὰς φαγεῖν φασὶ τῶν
from-celery some but sooner — the heads to-eat they-say of-the
 πατέρων ἢ κνάμους. ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑτέροις ταῦτα ἀδιάφορα.
fathers than beans but among others these indifferent

225 κυνείων τε γεύσασθαι δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ἀνίερρον εἶναι,
of-dog-flesh and to-taste think we unholy to-be
 Θρακῶν δὲ ἔνιοι κυνοφαγεῖν ἰστοροῦνται. ἴσως δὲ καὶ
of-Thracians but some to-eat-dogs are-recorded perhaps and also
 παρ' Ἑλλήσι τοῦτο ἦν σύνηθες· διόπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἀπὸ
among Greeks this was customary wherefore also Diocles from
 τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας ὀρμώμενος τισὶ τῶν
the-things among the Asclepiads starting to-some of-the
 πασχόντων σκυλάκεια δίδοσθαι κελεύει κρέα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ
patients puppy to-be-given orders flesh some but even
 ἀνθρώπων σάρκας, ὡς ἔφην, ἀδιαφόρως ἐσθίουσιν, ὅπερ
of-men flesh as I-said indifferently eat which
 ἀνίερρον παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι νενόμισται.
unholy among us to-be is-held

καίτοι εἴγε ἦν φύσει τὰ τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τῶν 226
 although if-indeed there-were by-nature the-things of-the observance and of-the
 ἀθέσμων, παρὰ πᾶσιν ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνομιζέτο.

unlawful among all — alike it-would-be-held

Παραπλήσια δὲ ἔστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς
 similar-things and it-is to-say also concerning the toward
 τοὺς κατοιχομένους ὁσιότητος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὀλοκλήρως

the departed holiness those indeed for wholly

περιστεύλαντες τοὺς ἀποθανόντας γῇ καλύπτουσιν,
 having-wrapped the dead with-earth cover

ἀσεβὲς εἶναι νομίζοντες ἡλίῳ δεικνύειν αὐτούς· Αἰγύπτιοι
 impious to-be thinking to-the-sun to-show them Egyptians

δὲ τὰ ἔντερα ἐξελόντες ταριχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ σὺν
 but the entrails having-taken-out embalm them and with

ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ γῆς ἔχουσιν.

themselves above earth keep

Αἰθιοπῶν δὲ οἱ ἰχθυοφάγοι εἰς τὰς λίμνας ἐμβάλλουσιν 227
 of-Ethiopians and the fish-eaters into the lakes throw

αὐτούς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων βρωθησομένους· Ὑρκανοὶ δὲ
 them by the fish to-be-eaten Hyrcanians and

κυσὶν αὐτοὺς ἐκτίθενται βοράν, Ἰνδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν.
 to-dogs them expose as-food of-Indians and some to-vultures

Τρωγλοδύτας δὲ φασιν ἐπὶ τινα γεώλοφον ἄγειν τὸν
 Troglodytes and they-say to a billock to-lead the

ἀποθανόντα, εἰτα δεσμεύσαντας αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν πρὸς
 dead-man then having-bound of-him the head to

τοὺς πόδας λίθοις βάλλειν μετὰ γέλωτος, εἰθ' ὅταν
 the feet with-stones to-pelt with laughter then when

χώσωσιν αὐτὸν τοῖς βαλλομένοις ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι.

they-have-buried him with-the things-thrown to-depart

- 228 τινὲς δὲ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας
some and barbarians those indeed beyond sixty years having-become
 θύσαντες ἐσθίουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νεότητι ἀποθανόντας
having-sacrificed eat those but in youth having-died
 γῇ κρύπτουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καίουσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας·
with-earth they-hide some but burn the deceased
 ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀναλαβόντες αὐτῶν τὰ ὀστέα κηδεύουσιν,
of-whom some indeed having-collected of-them the bones bury
 οἱ δὲ ἀφροντίστως καταλείπουσιν ἐρριμμένα. Πέρσας
some but heedlessly leave cast-away Persians
 δέ φασιν ἀνασκολοπίζειν τοὺς ἀποθανόντας καὶ νύτρω
and they-say to-impale the dead and with-natron
 ταριχεύειν, εἴθ' οὕτω τελαμῶσι συνειλεῖν. ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσον
to-embalm then so in-bandages to-wrap others and how-much
 πένθος ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσασιν ὑπομένουσιν ὀρώμεν.
mourning for the deceased endure we-see

III.29 • DEATH, AND WHAT IS HELD TERRIBLE

Some think death terrible and to be avoided and some do not. Euripides asks who knows whether living is dying and dying is reckoned life below, and bids us lament the newborn and send the dead from the house with blessing. Better never to be born, another verse says; we know of Cleobis and Biton from Herodotus, and some Thracians sit around a newborn and weep. So death is not terrible by nature, and the argument transfers to everything else, since unknown nations may disagree.

- 229 καὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ φευκτὸν
and the death and itself some indeed terrible and to-be-avoided
 εἶναι νομίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης
to-be think some but not such — at-any-rate Euripides

φησὶν τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,
says who and knows whether the living indeed is to-die

τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

the dying but to-live below is-reckoned

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δέ φησιν ὅ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς·
and — Epicurus and says the death nothing to us

τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν
the-thing for dissolved is-without-sensation the-thing and without-sensation

οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς εἴπερ συνεστήκαμεν
nothing to us they-say and also that if-indeed we-are-composed

ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁ δὲ θάνατος διάλυσίς ἐστι
of soul and body the and death a-dissolution is

ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὅτε μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ
of-soul and body when indeed we are not is the

θάνατος (οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα), ὅτε δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἔστιν,
death not for we-are-dissolved when but the death is

οὐκ ἐσμέν ἡμεῖς· τῷ γὰρ μηκέτι τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς
not are we by-the for no-longer the composition being of-the

ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν.

soul and the body neither we are

ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν 230

— and Heraclitus says that both the living and the dying

καὶ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ
both in the living for-us is and in the being-dead when indeed for

ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθάφθαι,
we live the souls of-us to-be-dead and in us to-be-buried

ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ
when but we die the souls to-come-back-to-life and

ζῆν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τοῦ ζῆν
to-live some and even better to-be the dying than-the living
 ἡμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. ὁ γοῦν Εὐριπίδης φησὶν
for-us suppose — at-any-rate Euripides says

ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους
it-were-necessary for us an-assembly making
 τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν, εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
the-one born to-lament into how-many he-comes evils
 τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ κακῶν πεπαυμένον
the-one but in-turn having-died and of-evils having-ceased
 χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.
rejoicing blessing to-send-forth from-the-house

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπολήψεως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται·
from and the same supposition also these-things have-been-said

ἀρχὴν μὲν μὴ φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον,
at-all indeed not to-be-born for-earth-dwellers best
 μῆδ' ἐσιδεῖν ἀνγὰς ὀξέος ἡελίου,
nor to-behold the-rays of-the-piercing sun

φύντα δ' ὅπως ὥκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι καὶ
having-been-born but as quickest the-gates of-Hades to-pass and
 κεῖσθαι πολλὴν γαῖαν ἐφεισάμενον. καὶ τὰ περὶ
to-lie much earth having-heaped-on and the-things about
 Κλέοβιν δὲ καὶ Βίτωνα ἴσμεν, ἃ φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος
Cleobis and and Biton we-know which tells — Herodotus
 ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱερείας λόγῳ.
in the concerning the Argive priestess account

ἱστοροῦνται δὲ καὶ Θρακῶν ἔνιοι περικαθεσθέντες τὸν 232
are-recorded and also of-Thracians some sitting-around the-one
 γεννηθέντα θρηνεῖν. οὐδὲ ὁ θάνατος οὖν τῶν φύσει
born to-lament neither the death then of-the-things by-nature
 δεινῶν εἶναι νομίζοιτο ἄν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν τῶν
terrible to-be would-be-thought — just-as neither the living of-the-things
 φύσει καλῶν. οὐδὲ τῶν προειρημένων τι ἐστὶ φύσει
by-nature fine neither of-the-things said-before any is by-nature
 τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, νομιστὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ πρὸς τι.
such or such matters-of-custom but all and relative-to something
 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως μεταφέρειν 233
the same and manner of-the argument to-transfer
 ἔστι καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστον τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ μὴ ἐξεθέμεθα
it-is-possible also to each of-the others which not we-set-out
 νῦν διὰ τὴν συντομίαν τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ
now because-of the brevity of-the discussion if but also concerning
 τινων μὴ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν αὐτόθεν ἀνωμαλίαν, λεκτέον,
some not we-are-able to-state at-once irregularity it-must-be-said
 ὅτι ἔν τισιν ἔθνεσιν ἀγνοοῦμένοις ἡμῶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ
that in some nations unknown to-us it-is-possible also
 περὶ τούτων εἶναι διαφωνίαν.
concerning these to-be disagreement
 ὥς οὖν εἰ μὴ ἐγινώσκομεν, εἰ τύχοι, τὸ περὶ τοῦ 234
as then if not we-knew if it-should-happen the concerning the
 τὰς ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔθος, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς
the sisters marrying of-the Egyptians custom not — rightly
 διεβεβαιούμεθα ὁμολογούμενον παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ
we-would-affirm agreed among all to-be the not
 δεῖν ἀδελφὰς γαμεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
must sisters to-marry so neither concerning the matters
 ἐκεῖνων, ἐν οἷς οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσιν ἡμῶν ἀνωμαλῖαι,
those in which not fall-under to-us irregularities

διαβεβαιουῖσθαι προσήκει μὴ εἶναι διαφωνίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς,
to-affirm is-it-fitting not to-be disagreement in them
 ἐνδεχομένου, καθάπερ ἔφην, τοῦ παρά τισιν ἔθνεσι τῶν
it-being-possible just-as I-said the among some nations of-the-ones
 ἡμῶν μὴ γνωσκομένων τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφωνίαν.
to-us not known the concerning them to-be disagreement

III.30 · WHAT THE SKEPTIC GAINS

Seeing so much irregularity, the skeptic suspends judgment about whether anything is good or bad by nature, and follows everyday observance without belief. He is unaffected in matters of opinion and moderately affected in what is forced on him, since the added opinion that what he suffers is bad by nature is itself worse than the suffering. Whoever holds that anything is good or bad by nature is tormented when what he thinks bad is present, and gripped by conceit and fear of losing what he thinks good.

235 Ὅ τοίνυν σκεπτικὸς τὴν τοσαύτην ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν
the then skeptic the so-great irregularity of-the
 πραγμάτων ὁρῶν ἐπέχει μὲν περὶ τοῦ φύσει
things seeing suspends-judgment indeed concerning the by-nature
 τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον εἶναι, καὶ
anything good or bad or at-all to-be-done to-be and-in
 τούτῳ τῆς δογματικῆς ἀφιστάμενος προπετείας, ἔπεται
this the dogmatic withdrawing-from rashness he-follows
 δὲ ἀδοξάστως τῇ βιωτικῇ τηρήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
but without-belief the everyday observance and because-of this
 ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
in indeed the matters-of-opinion unaffected remains in but the
 κατηναγκασμένοις μετριοπαθεῖ.
things-forced-on-him is-moderately-affected

ὥς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικὸς πάσχει, μὴ προσδοξάζων 236

as indeed for a-man perceptive be-is-affected not adding-the-opinion

δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ πάσχει κακὸν ἐστὶ φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ.

but that this which he-suffers bad is by-nature be-is-moderately-affected

τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ

the for adding-the-opinion anything such worse is even itself

τοῦ πάσχειν, ὥς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο

the suffering so-that sometimes those indeed being-cut or another

τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστῶτας διὰ

any such suffering bear-it those but standing-by because-of

τὴν περὶ τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὥς φαύλου λειποψυχεῖν.

the about the thing-happening opinion as bad faint

ὁ μέντοι γε ὑποθέμενος τὸ φύσει τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ 237

the-one however at-least having-supposed the by-nature anything good or

κακὸν ἢ ὅλως πρακτέον ἢ μὴ πρακτέον εἶναι ταρασσεται

bad or at-all to-be-done or not to-be-done to-be is-troubled

ποικίλως. καὶ γὰρ παρόντων αὐτῷ τούτων ἂ νομίζει

in-many-ways and for being-present to-him these which he-thinks

φύσει κακὰ εἶναι ποινηλατεῖσθαι δοκεῖ, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων

by-nature bad to-be to-be-tormented he-seems and of-the seeming

ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ γινόμενος ἐγκρατὴς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ τύφου

goods to-him becoming master by both the conceit

καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀποβολὴν αὐτῶν φόβου, εὐλαβούμενος

and the about the loss of-them fear guarding

μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς νομιζομένοις παρ' αὐτῷ

lest again in the by-nature bad held by him

γένηται, ταραχαῖς οὐχὶ ταῖς τυχούσαις περιπίπτει·

he-become troubles not the ordinary he-falls-into

τοὺς γὰρ ἀναπόβλητα εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ λέγοντας ἐφέξομεν 238

those for not-to-be-lost to-be the goods saying we-shall-check

ἐκ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν. ὅθεν

from the difficulty the according-to the disagreement whence

ἐπιλογιζόμεθα, ὅτι εἰ τὸ κακοῦ ποιητικὸν κακὸν ἐστὶ
we-conclude that if the-thing of-evil productive bad is
καὶ φευκτόν, ἢ δὲ πεποιθήσις τοῦ τάδε μὲν εἶναι φύσει
and to-be-avoided the and conviction that these indeed to-be by-nature
ἀγαθά, τάδε δὲ κακὰ ταραχὰς ποιεῖ, κακὸν ἐστὶ καὶ
goods those but bad troubles produces bad is and
φευκτὸν τὸ ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ πεποιθέναι φαῦλόν τι ἢ
to-be-avoided the supposing and being-convinced bad anything or
ἀγαθὸν ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν εἶναι.
good as in-relation-to the nature to-be
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκεῖ λελέχθαι
these-things indeed then for the present it-suffices to-have-been-said
περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀδιαφόρων·
concerning goods and bads and indifferents

εἰ ἔστι τέχνη περὶ βίον

III.31 • IS THERE AN ART OF LIVING?

If such an art concerns goods, evils, and indifferents, it falls with them, and the dogmatists disagree over it. An art requires apprehension, and the apprehensive impression cannot be found, since the Stoics' definition of it moves in a circle. Nor has the art any proper work: what its holders do is common to laymen, and they would never dare carry out the precepts Zeno and Chrysippus record, such as incest, cannibalism, and eating one's dead parents.

239 Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὅτι οὐδὲ τέχνη τις
clear and from the-things said-before that neither an-art any
ἂν εἴη περὶ τὸν βίον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοιαύτη τέχνη,
— there-would-be concerning the life if for there-is such an-art
περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν
about the study of-the both goods and the evils and the

ἀδιαφόρων ἔχει· διὸ τούτων ἀνυπάρχτων ὄντων
indifferents it-is-concerned wherefore these non-existent being
 ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη. καὶ ἄλλως,
non-existent is also the concerning the life art and otherwise
 ἐπεὶ μὴ ὁμοφώνως μίαν ἀπολείπουσι πάντες οἱ δογματικοὶ
since not with-one-voice one they-leave all the dogmatists
 τέχνην περὶ βίον, ἀλλ' ἄλλοι ἄλλην ὑποτίθενται,
art concerning life but some another suppose
 ὑποπίπτουσι τῇ διαφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας λόγῳ,
they-fall-under the disagreement and the from the disagreement argument
 ὃν ἡρώτησα ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λελεγμένοις ἡμῖν.
which I-put in the-things concerning the-good said by-us
 εἰ μέντοι καὶ μίαν εἶναι πάντες λέγουεν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν 240
if however even one to-be all should-say by hypothesis
 τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, οἷον τὴν αἰδοῖμον φρόνησιν,
the concerning the life art such-as the celebrated prudence
 ἣτις ὄνειροπολεῖται μὲν παρὰ Στωικοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ
which is-dreamed-of indeed among Stoics more and
 πληκτικωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν
more-striking than-the others to-be seems even so none
 ἥττον ἀτοπίαι παρακολουθήσουσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ φρόνησις
the-less absurdities will-follow since for prudence
 ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἶχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ
is a-virtue the and virtue alone had the wise-man the
 Στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοὶ οὐχ
Stoics not being wise not
 ἔξουσι τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην. ὅλως τε, ἐπεὶ μὴ 241
they-will-have the concerning the life art generally and since not
 δύναται κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστῆναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν
can according-to them subsist an-art neither concerning the
 βίον ἔσται τέχνη τις ὅσον ἐφ' οἷς λέγουσιν. οἷον
life will-there-be an-art any so-far-as upon what they-say for-instance

γοῦν τέχνην εἶναί φασι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων,
at-any-rate an-art to-be they-say a-system out-of apprehensions
 κατάληψιν δὲ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν.
apprehension and to-an-apprehensive impression assent
 ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ
undiscoverable but is the apprehensive impression neither for
 πᾶσα φαντασία καταληπτικὴ ἐστιν, οὔτε ποία τίς ἐστιν
every impression apprehensive is nor of-what-kind which is
 ἀπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ἐπιγνωσθῆναι
from the impressions the apprehensive impression to-be-recognized
 δύναται, ἐπεὶ μήτε πάσῃ φαντασίᾳ δυνάμεθα κρίνειν ἀπλῶς,
can since neither by-every impression we-can judge simply
 τίς μὲν ἐστὶ καταληπτικὴ, τίς δὲ οὐ τοιαύτη, χρήζοντές τε
which indeed is apprehensive which but not such needing and
 καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ποία τίς
an-apprehensive impression for the recognition of-the of-what-kind which
 ἐστὶν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλόμεθα,
is the apprehensive impression into infinity we-are-cast
 εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς λαμβανομένης ὡς καταληπτικῆς
for recognition of-the taken as apprehensive
 φαντασίας καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλην αἰτούμενοι.
impression an-apprehensive impression another demanding
 242 ταῦτά τοι καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς καταληπτικῆς
these-things you-know also the Stoics in the of-the apprehensive
 φαντασίας ἐννοίας ἀποδόσει οὐχ ὑγιῶς φέρονται·
impression conception rendering not soundly are-carried
 καταληπτικὴν μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀπὸ
apprehensive indeed for impression saying the from
 ὑπάρχοντος γινομένην, ὑπάρχον δὲ εἶναι λέγοντες ὃ
an-existing-thing arising existing and to-be saying that-which
 οἶόν τε κινεῖν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, εἰς τὸν διάλληλον
able and to-move an-apprehensive impression into the circular

ἐμπίπτουσι τῆς ἀπορίας τρόπον. εἰ τοίνυν, ἵνα μὲν
 they-fall of-the difficulty mode if then in-order-that indeed
 περὶ τὸν βίον ἥ τις τέχνη, δεῖ πρότερον
 concerning the life there-may-be some art it-must first
 εἶναι τέχνην, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ τέχνη, κατάληψιν
 to-be an-art in-order-that but may-subsist an-art apprehension
 προῦφεστάναι, ἵνα δὲ ὑποστῇ κατάληψις, καταληπτικῇ
 to-have-pre-existed in-order-that but may-subsist apprehension to-an-apprehensive
 φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν κατελῆφθαι, ἀνεύρετος δέ ἐστιν
 impression assent to-have-been-apprehended undiscoverable but is
 ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸν
 the apprehensive impression undiscoverable is the concerning the
 βίον τέχνη.

Ἔτι κακείνο λέγεται. πᾶσα τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἰδίως ὑπ' αὐτῆς 243
 further that-too is-said every art out-of the specially by it
 ἀποδιδόμενων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν
 rendered works to-be-apprehended seems nothing and is
 ἴδιον ἔργον τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔργον
 proper work of-the concerning the life art which for — a-work
 εἶναι ταύτης λέγῃ τις, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὐρίσκεται καὶ τῶν
 to-be of-it should-say anyone this common is-found also of-the
 ἰδιωτῶν, οἷον τὸ τιμᾶν γονεῖς, τὸ παραθήκας ἀποδιδόναι,
 laymen such-as the to-honor parents the deposits to-return
 τὰ ἄλλα πάντα. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.
 the others all not therefore is any concerning the life art
 οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ φρονίμης διαθέσεως φαίνεσθαι
 neither for out-of the from a-prudent disposition appearing
 γινόμενόν τι ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου ἢ ποιούμενον (ὥς φασί
 coming-about something by the prudent-man or being-done as say
 τινες) ἐπιγνωσόμεθα, ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως ἔργον ἐστίν.
 some shall-we-recognize that of-the prudence a-work is

- 244 αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις ἀκατάληπτός ἐστι, μήτε ἐξ
 itself for the prudent disposition inapprehensible is neither out-of
 αὐτῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων
 itself simply and at-once appearing nor out-of the works
 αὐτῆς· κοινὰ γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. τό τε
 of-it common for are these also of-the laymen the and
 λέγειν, ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν
 saying that by-the evenness of-the actions we-apprehend
 τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγομένων
 the-one having the concerning the life art of-those-overstating
 ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ
 is the of-men nature and praying rather than
 τὰλθῆ λέγοντων· τοίος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων
 the-truth saying such for a-mind is of-earthly
 ἀνθρώπων οἷον ἐπ' ἡμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
 men as upon a-day brings the-father of-men both of-gods and
- 245 Λέιπεται λέγειν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται
 it-remains to-say that out-of those the works is-apprehended
 ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἅπερ ἀναγράφουσιν ἐν ταῖς
 the concerning the life art which they-record in the
 βίβλοις· ὧν πολλῶν καὶ παραπλησίων ἀλλήλοις ὄντων
 books of-which many and similar to-one-another being
 ὀλίγα ἐκθήσομαι παραδείγματος χάριν. οἷον γοῦν ὁ
 a-few I-shall-set-out of-an-example for-the-sake for-instance at-any-rate the
 αἰρεσιάρχης αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς φησι περὶ
 head-of-the-school of-them Zeno in the discourses says concerning
 παιδων ἀγωγῆς ἄλλα τε ὅμοια καὶ τάδε 'διαμηρίζει
 of-children upbringing others both similar and these to-couple
 μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἥσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ, μηδὲ
 nothing more nor less with-boys or not with-boys nor
 θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐν παιδικοῖς ἢ
 with-females or with-males not for it-differs among boys or

μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
not boys nor with-females or with-males but the-same-things
πρέπει τε καὶ πρόποντά ἐστιν'.

are-fitting both and fitting are

περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς οἰσιότητος ὁ αὐτὸς 246
concerning and the toward the parents holiness the same

ἀνὴρ φησιν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἰοκάστην καὶ τὸν
man says with-reference-to the-things about — Jocasta and —

Οἰδίποδα, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δεινὸν τρίβειν τὴν μητέρα. 'καὶ εἰ
Oedipus that not it-was terrible to-rub the mother and if

μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν ἕτερόν τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος τρύψας
indeed being-sick another some part of-the body having-rubbed

ταῖς χερσὶν ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἕτερα μέρη
with-the hands he-benefited nothing shameful if but other parts

τρύψας εὐφραίνει, ὀδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ παῖδας
having-rubbed he-gladdened her-in-pain having-stopped and children

ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ἐποίησεν, αἰσχρόν·' τούτοις δὲ
from the mother noble made shameful with-these and

ὁμογνῶμονεῖ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος· ἐν γοῦν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
agrees also — Chrysippus in at-any-rate the Republic

φησὶ 'δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτω διεξάγειν, καθάπερ
he-says it-seems and to-me also these-things thus to-manage just-as

καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοῖς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν
also now not badly among many it-is-customary so-that even the

μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς
mother from the son to-bear-children and the father from the

θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς ὁμομητρίας'.

daughter and the brother-by-the-same-mother from the sister-by-the-same-mother

καὶ συνεχῶς καὶ τὸ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς 247
and continually also the eating-human-flesh in the same

συντάγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐπεισάγει· φησὶ γοῦν 'καὶ ἐὰν τῶν
treatises to-us he-introduces he-says at-any-rate and if of-the

ζώντων ἀποκοπῇ τι μέρος πρὸς τροφήν χρήσιμον, μήτε
living should-be-cut-off some part for food useful neither
κατορύττειν αὐτὸ μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ
to-bury it nor otherwise to-throw-away to-consume but
αὐτό, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕτερον μέρος γένηται.
it so-that out-of the our-own another part may-come-about
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν
in and the-(books) concerning the duty concerning the of-the
γονέων ταφῆς ῥητῶς φησιν ἄπογενομένων δὲ τῶν
parents burial expressly he-says having-died and the
γονέων ταφαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς ἀπλουστάταις, ὥς ἂν τοῦ
parents burials one-must-use the simplest since — the
σώματος, καθάπερ οὐύχων ἢ ὀδόντων ἢ τριχῶν, οὐδὲν
body just-as nails or teeth or hair nothing
ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιστροφῆς ἢ πολυωρίας
being to us and neither attention or care
προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων
needing we such any wherefore also useful
μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῇ χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ
indeed being the flesh for-food they-will-use them just-as
καὶ τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος,
also of-the own parts for-instance a-foot having-been-cut-off
ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις· ἀχρείων
it-was-fitting to-use it and the like-parts useless
δὲ ὄντων ἢ κατορύξαντες ἐάσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες
but being either having-buried they-will-leave or having-burned
τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ρίψαντες οὐδεμίαν
the ash they-will-let-go or farther having-thrown no
αὐτῶν ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.
of-them attention will-they-make just-as of-a-nail or of-hair

τοιαῦτα μὲν πλείστα ὅσα λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι·
such-things indeed very-many as-many-as say the philosophers
 ἅπερ οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν διαπράττεσθαι, εἴγε μὴ
whicb-very-things not — they-would-dare to-carry-out if-indeed not
 παρὰ Κύκλωψιν ἢ Λαιστρυγόσι πολιτεύοιντο. εἰ δὲ
among Cyclopes or Laestrygonians they-should-be-citizens if but
 τούτων μὲν ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἰσιν, ἃ
of-these indeed inactive altogether they-are the-things-which
 δὲ πράττουσι, κοινὰ καὶ τῶν ιδιωτῶν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν ἴδιον
but they-do common and of-the laymen are no proper
 ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν ἔχειν ὑποπτευομένων τὴν περὶ τὸν
work is of-those to-have suspected the concerning the
 βίον τέχνην. εἰ οὖν αἱ μὲν τέχναι πάντως ὀφείλουσιν
life art if then the indeed arts certainly ought
 ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καταλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴδιον
out-of the proper works to-be-apprehended no but proper
 ἔργον ὁράται τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον λεγομένης τέχνης, οὐ
work is-seen of-the concerning the life so-called art not
 καταλαμβάνεται αὕτη. διόπερ οὐδὲ διαβεβαιουῖσθαι περὶ
is-apprehended it wherefore neither to-affirm concerning
 αὐτῆς δύναται τις, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπαρκτή.
it can anyone that it-is existent

εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

III.32 · DOES THE ART OF LIVING ARISE IN MEN?

If it arises in men, it does so by nature or by learning and teaching. Not by nature: not in so far as they are not men, which is nothing; and if in so far as they are men, all men would be prudent, virtuous, and wise, whereas most are said to be bad. And since an art is called a system of apprehensions exercised together, the dogmatists themselves make it acquired by experience and learning.

- 250 Καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεται ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον
and indeed if arises in men the concerning the life
 τέχνη, ἥτοι φύσει ἐγγίνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ
art either by-nature arises-in them or through learning and
 διδασκαλίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φύσει, ἥτοι καθὼ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι
teaching but if indeed by-nature either in-so-far-as they-are men
 ἐγγίνετο ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἢ καθὼ
would-arise-in — them the concerning the life art or in-so-far-as
 οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. καθὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι,
not they-are men in-so-far-as indeed then not they-are men
 οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐκ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι. εἰ δὲ καθὼ
by-no-means neither for not are-they men if but in-so-far-as
 εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρξεν ἂν ἡ φρόνησις,
they-are men to-all men would-belong — the prudence
 ὥς πάντας εἶναι φρονίμους τε καὶ ἐναρέτους καὶ σοφούς.
so-that all to-be prudent both and virtuous and wise
- 251 φαύλους δὲ τοὺς πλείστους λέγουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ
bad but the most they-say therefore neither
 καθὼ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ὑπάρξειεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ περὶ
in-so-far-as they-are men would-belong — to-them the concerning
 τὸν βίον τέχνη. οὐδὲ φύσει ἄρα. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπειδὴ
the life art neither by-nature therefore and otherwise since
 τὴν τέχνην σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων εἶναι βούλονται
the art a-system out-of apprehensions to-be they-wish
 συγγεγυμνασμένων, διὰ πείρας τέ τινος καὶ μαθήσεως
exercised-together through experience both some and learning
 ἐμφαίνουσι μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι τὰς τε ἄλλας τέχνας
they-indicate rather to-be-acquired the both other arts
 καὶ ταύτην περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος.
and this concerning which the account

εἰ διδακτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη

III.33 · IS THE ART OF LIVING TEACHABLE?

Nor is it acquired by teaching and learning. For teaching to exist, three things must first be agreed: the thing taught, the teacher and the learner, and the manner of learning. None of them subsists, and so there is no teaching.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διδασκαλία καὶ μαθήσει ἀναλαμβάνεται. 252

but neither by-teaching and learning is-it-acquired

ἵνα γὰρ ὑπόστασιν ἔχῃ ταῦτα, δεῖ

in-order-that for existence it-may-have these it-is-necessary

τρία προωμολογησθαι, τὸ διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τὸν

three to-have-been-agreed-beforehand the taught thing the

διδάσκοντα καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα, τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως.

teacher and the learner the manner of-the learning

οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὑφέστηκεν· οὐδὲ ἡ διδασκαλία ἄρα.

none but of-these subsists neither the teaching therefore

εἰ ἔστι τι διδασκόμενον

III.34 · IS THERE ANYTHING TAUGHT?

What is taught is true or false. If false it is nothing, and there is no teaching of what does not exist; if true, truth has been shown unreal. Again, what is taught is apparent or non-evident: the apparent needs no teaching, since it appears alike to all, and the non-evident is inapprehensible. It is body or incorporeal, and each of these is apparent or non-evident; it is what is or what is not, and neither is taught.

Οἷον γοῦν τὸ διδασκόμενον ἥτοι ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ 253

for-instance at-any-rate the-thing taught either true is or

ψεῦδος· καὶ εἰ μὲν ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο· ἀνύπαρκτον

false and if indeed false not — it-would-be-taught non-existent

γάρ φασιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀνυπάρκτων δὲ οὐκ ἂν
for they-say to-be the false of-non-existents and not —
 εἶη διδασκαλία. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγοιτο·
there-would-be teaching but neither if true to-be it-should-be-said
 ὅτι γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές, ὑπεμνήσαμεν ἐν
that for non-existent is the true we-recalled in
 τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ψεῦδος μήτε τὸ
the-(books) concerning the-criterion if then neither the false nor the
 ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα διδακτὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν
true is-taught beside and these teachable nothing is
 (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἀδιδάκτων ὄντων τοὺς ἀπόρους
not for indeed these unteachable being the doubtful-things
 μόνους διδάσκειν ἐρεῖ τις), οὐδέν διδάσκεται.
alone to-be-taught will-say anyone nothing is-taught

254 τό τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα ἥτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστιν
the and taught thing either apparent is
 ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔσται
or non-evident but if indeed apparent it-is not it-will-be
 διδασκαλίας δεόμενον· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως
of-teaching needing the-things for apparent to-all alike
 φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄδηλα διὰ τὴν
appear if but non-evident since the non-evident-(things) because-of the
 ἀνεπίκριτον περὶ αὐτῶν διαφωνίαν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν,
undecidable concerning them disagreement inapprehensible are
 ὥς πολλάκις ὑπεμνήσαμεν, οὐκ ἔσται διδακτόν· ὃ
as often we-have-recalled not it-will-be teachable that-which
 γὰρ μὴ καταλαμβάνει τις, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο διδάσκειν ἢ
for not apprehends anyone how — this to-teach or
 μαρθάνειν δύναιτο; εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον μήτε τὸ
to-learn could-be if but neither the apparent nor the
 ἄδηλον διδάσκεται, οὐδέν διδάσκεται.
non-evident is-taught nothing is-taught

ἔτι τὸ διδασκόμενον ἥτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον, 255

further the-thing taught either a-body is or incorporeal
 ἑκάτερον δὲ αὐτῶν ἥτοι φαινόμενον ἢ ἀδηλούμενον ὄν
 each and of-them either apparent or non-evident being
 οὐ δύναται διδάσκεσθαι κατὰ τὸν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν
 not can be-taught according-to the a-little before by-us
 εἰρημένον λόγον.

stated argument

οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεταιί τι. πρὸς τούτοις ἥτοι τὸ ὄν 256

not therefore is-taught anything besides these either the being
 διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν οὐ διδάσκεται
 is-taught or the not being the indeed then not being not is-taught
 εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν δοκοῦσιν
 if for is-taught the not being since of-the true-things seem
 εἶναι αἱ διδασκαλῖαι, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀληθὲς δὲ
 to-be the teachings true will-be the not being true and
 ὄν καὶ ὑπάρξει· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἶναί φασιν ὃ ὑπάρχει
 being also it-will-exist true for to-be they-say that-which exists
 καὶ ἀντίκειται τι. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι λέγειν ὑπάρχειν
 and is-opposed to-something absurd and is to-say to-exist
 τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τὸ μὴ ὄν.

the not being not therefore is-taught the not being

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τὸ ὄν, ἥτοι καθὼ 257

but neither the being if for is-taught the being either in-so-far-as
 ὄν ἐστι διδάσκεται ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν,
 being it-is it-is-taught or according-to another something but if indeed
 καθὼ ἐστι ὄν, ἔστι διδακτόν, τῶν ὄντων ἔσται, διὰ
 in-so-far-as it-is being it-is teachable of-the beings it-will-be because-of
 δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ διδακτόν· τὰς γὰρ διδασκαλίας ἐκ τινῶν
 and this neither teachable the for teachings out-of some
 ὁμολογουμένων καὶ ἀδιδάκτων γίνεσθαι προσήκει. οὐκ
 agreed and untaught to-come-about it-is-fitting not

ἄρα τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστι διδακτόν ἐστιν. καὶ μὴν
therefore the being in-so-far-as being it-is teachable is and indeed
οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι.

neither according-to another something

258 τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὃ
the for being not has another any accident to-it which
μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ὄν καθὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὐ
not being is so-that if the being in-so-far-as being it-is not
διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκείνο
is-taught neither according-to another something will-it-be-taught that
γὰρ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὄν ἐστιν.
for what ever at-all is accident to-it being is
καὶ ἄλλως, εἴτε φαινόμενον εἴη τὸ ὄν ὃ λέξουσιν
and otherwise whether apparent should-be the being which they-will-say
διδάσκεσθαι, εἴτε ἄδηλον, ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἀπορίαις
to-be-taught or-whether non-evident to-the stated difficulties
ὑποπίπτουν ἀδίδακτον ἔσται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται
falling-under unteachable it-will-be if but neither the being is-taught
μήτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἐστι τὸ διδασκόμενον.
nor the not being nothing is the-thing taught

εἰ ἔστιν ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων

III.35 · IS THERE A TEACHER AND A LEARNER?

Teacher and learner fall with the thing taught, and are perplexed on their own account. Either an expert teaches an expert, which is needless, or a non-expert a non-expert, as one blind man cannot guide another, or a non-expert an expert, which is absurd, or an expert a non-expert, which is impossible, since no one is born an expert or made one by a single theorem. Nor can the learner, a non-expert, apprehend the theorems, any more than a man born blind grasps colors.

Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ὃ τε διδάσκων καὶ ὁ 259
is-overturned-along indeed then with-this the both teacher and the
 μανθάνων, οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον καὶ κατὰ ἰδίαν ἀποροῦνται.
learner nothing but less also according-to their-own they-are-puzzled-over
 ἦτοι γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
either for the expert the expert teaches or the non-expert the
 ἄτεχνον ἢ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον.
non-expert or the non-expert the expert or the expert the non-expert
 ὁ μὲν οὖν τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην οὐ διδάσκει· οὐθέτερος
the indeed then expert the expert not teaches neither
 γὰρ αὐτῶν, καθότι ἐστὶ τεχνίτης, δεῖται μαθήσεως. ἀλλ'
for of-them in-so-far-as he-is expert needs of-learning but
 οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν ἄτεχνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τυφλὸν ὁδηγεῖν
neither the non-expert the non-expert just-as neither a-blind-man to-guide
 δύναται τυφλός. οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην·
can a-blind-man neither the non-expert the expert
 γελοῖον γάρ. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον· 260
ridiculous for it-remains to-say that the expert the non-expert
 ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ὅλως γὰρ ὑποστῆναι
which also itself of-the impossible-things is at-all for to-subsist
 τεχνίτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι λέγεται, ἐπεὶ μήτε αὐτοφυῶς
an-expert impossible to-be is-said since neither naturally
 τις καὶ ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι τεχνίτης ὑφιστάμενος
anyone and at-the-same-time with-the being-born an-expert subsisting
 βλέπεται μήτε ἐξ ἀτέχνου γίνεται τις τεχνίτης. ἦτοι
is-seen nor out-of a-non-expert becomes anyone an-expert either
 γὰρ ἐν θεωρήματι καὶ μία κατάληψις δύναται ποιῆσαι τὸν
for one theorem and one apprehension can make the
 ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην ἢ οὐδαμῶς.
non-expert an-expert or in-no-way

261 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κατάληψις μία τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην
 but if indeed apprehension one the non-expert an-expert
 ἀπεργάζεται, πρῶτον μὲν ἐνέσται λέγειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι
 makes first indeed it-will-be-possible to-say that not is
 σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἢ τέχνη· ὁ γὰρ μηδὲν ὅλως
 a-system out-of apprehensions the art the-one for nothing at-all
 εἰδώς, εἰ ἐν θεωρήματι διδαχθείη τέχνης, τεχνίτης ἂν οὕτω
 knowing if one a-theorem should-be-taught of-an-art an-expert — thus
 λέγοιτο εἶναι. εἶτα καὶ ἐὰν λέγῃ τις, ὥς ὁ τινὰ
 would-be-said to-be then also if should-say someone that the-one some
 θεωρήματα τέχνης ἀνειληφώς καὶ προσδεόμενος ἐνὸς ἔτι
 theorems of-an-art having-taken-up and still-needing one yet
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὦν ἄτεχνος, ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ προσλάβῃ,
 and because-of this being a-non-expert if the one that should-take-on
 τεχνίτης ἐξ ἀτέχνου ἀποτελεῖται ἐκ καταλήψεως μᾶς,
 an-expert out-of a-non-expert is-made out-of apprehension one
 ἀποκληρωτικὸν λέξει.
 arbitrary he-will-say

262 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο δεῖξαι τινα
 in for the according-to part not — he-could show anyone
 ἄτεχνον μὲν ἔτι, τεχνίτην δὲ ἐσόμενον, ἐὰν ἔν τι θεωρήματι
 a-non-expert indeed still an-expert but about-to-be if one some theorem
 προσλάβῃ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἐξαρίθμησιν τῶν θεωρημάτων
 he-should-take-on not for surely the enumeration of-the theorems
 ἐκάστης τέχνης ἐπίσταται τις, ὥστε ἀπαριθμησάμενος τὰ
 of-each art knows anyone so-as having-counted-out the
 ἐγνωσμένα θεωρήματα, πόσα λείπεται πρὸς τὸν πλήρη
 known theorems how-many are-left toward the full
 τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς τέχνης ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν ἔχειν. οὐκοῦν
 of-the theorems of-the art number to-say to-be-able therefore
 ἐνὸς θεωρήματος γνώσις οὐ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄτεχνον τεχνίτην.
 of-one theorem knowledge not makes the non-expert an-expert

εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀληθές, ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ 263
 if but this is true since not all all-at-once the
 θεωρήματα τῶν τεχνῶν ἀναλαμβάνει τις, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα,
 theorems of-the arts takes-up anyone but if-indeed at-all
 κατὰ ἓν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τις καὶ τοῦτο καθ' ὑπόθεσιν
 according-to one each so-that someone even this according-to supposition
 διδῶ, ὁ κατὰ ἓν θεώρημα τῆς τέχνης ἀναλαμβάνειν
 may-grant the-one according-to one theorem of-the art to-take-up
 λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν τεχνίτης γένοιτο· ὑπεμνησκομεν γάρ,
 said not — an-expert would-become we-were-recalling for
 ὅτι οὐ δύναται θεωρήματος ἑνὸς γνώσις τὸν ἄτεχνον
 that not can of-a-theorem one knowledge the non-expert
 ποιῆσαι τεχνίτην. οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀτέχνου τοῖνυν γίνεται τις
 make an-expert neither out-of a-non-expert therefore becomes anyone
 τεχνίτης. ὥστε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φαίνεται ἀνυπόστατος
 an-expert so-that also because-of these-things appears unreal
 εἶναι ὁ τεχνίτης. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ διδάσκων.
 to-be the expert because-of and this also the teacher
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ μανθάνειν λεγόμενος, ἄτεχνος ὢν, δύναται τὰ 264
 but neither the-one to-learn said a-non-expert being can the
 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα, ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος, μανθάνειν τε
 of-the art theorems of-which he-is non-expert to-learn both
 καὶ καταλαμβάνειν. ὥς γὰρ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς πηρός, εἰς ὅσον
 and to-apprehend as for the-one from birth blind to so-far-as
 ἐστὶ πηρός, οὐκ ἂν λάβοι χρωμάτων ἀντίληψιν, οὐδὲ ὁ
 he-is blind not — would-take of-colors apprehension neither the-one
 ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς ὁμοίως φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἄτεχνος
 from birth deaf likewise of-sound so neither the non-expert
 καταλάβοι ἂν τὰ τῆς τέχνης θεωρήματα ἧς ἐστιν ἄτεχνος.
 would-apprehend — the of-the art theorems of-which he-is non-expert
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς εἴη τεχνίτης τε καὶ ἄτεχνος
 and for — thus the same-man would-be expert both and non-expert

τῶν αὐτῶν, ἄτεχνος μὲν ἐπεὶ οὕτως ὑπόκειται, τεχνίτης
in-the same-things non-expert indeed since so he-is-assumed expert

δὲ ἐπεὶ κατάληψιν ἔχει τῶν τῆς τέχνης θεωρημάτων.

but since apprehension he-has of-the of-the art theorems

265 ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν ἄτεχνον διδάσκει. εἰ δὲ μήτε

so-that neither the expert the non-expert teaches if but neither

ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάσκει μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν

the expert the expert teaches nor the non-expert the

ἄτεχνον μήτε ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν τεχνίτην μήτε ὁ τεχνίτης

non-expert nor the non-expert the expert nor the expert

τὸν ἄτεχνον, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὔτε ὁ

the non-expert besides and these nothing there-is neither the

διδάσκων ἔστιν οὔτε ὁ διδασκόμενος.

teacher exists nor the learner

εἰ ἔστι τις μαθήσεως τρόπος

III.36 • IS THERE A MANNER OF LEARNING?

With neither learner nor teacher the manner of teaching is superfluous, and perplexed too. Teaching is by evidence or by discourse: not by evidence, since what is shown appears to all; not by discourse, which signifies either nothing, or by nature, which Greeks and barbarians disprove, or by convention, which only reminds those who already know the words. Applied to the art of living, the imprudent cannot apprehend what the prudent says, so the art arises neither by teaching nor by nature.

265 Μὴ ὄντος δὲ μήτε τοῦ μανθάνοντος μήτε τοῦ διδάσκοντος

not being and neither the learner nor the teacher

καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας παρέλκει.

also the manner of-the teaching is-superfluous

Οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον καὶ οὗτος διὰ τούτων ἀπορεῖται. ὁ
nothing but less also this through these-things is-puzzled-over the
 γὰρ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας ἦτοι ἐναργεῖα γίνεται ἢ
for manner of-the teaching either by-evidence comes-about or
 λόγῳ· οὔτε δὲ ἐναργεῖα γίνεται οὔτε λόγῳ, καθάπερ
by-discourse neither and by-evidence comes-about nor by-discourse just-as
 παραστήσομεν· οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος ἄρα τῆς μαθήσεώς ἐστιν
we-shall-show neither the manner therefore of-the learning is
 εὔπορος. ἐναργεῖα μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται διδασκαλία, ἐπεὶ
easy by-evidence indeed then not comes-about teaching since
 τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνάργεια. τὸ δὲ δεικνύμενον
of-the things-shown is the evidence the-thing and shown
 πᾶσιν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον, ἥ
to-all is apparent the-thing and apparent in-so-far-as
 φαίνεται, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ ληπτόν· τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι
it-appears to-all is graspable the-thing and in-common to-all
 ληπτὸν ἀδίδακτον· οὐκ ἄρα τι ἐναργεῖα διδακτόν
graspable unteachable not therefore anything by-evidence teachable
 ἐστίν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ διδάσκεται τι.

is and indeed neither by-discourse is-taught anything
 οὗτος γὰρ ἦτοι σημαίνει τι ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ
this for either signifies something or nothing signifies but
 μηδὲν μὲν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδασκαλικός. εἰ
nothing indeed signifying neither will-it-be of-anything instructive if
 δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἦτοι φύσει σημαίνει τι ἢ θέσει.
but it-signifies something either by-nature it-signifies something or by-convention
 καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας
and by-nature indeed not it-signifies because-of the-fact not all
 πάντων ἀκούοντας συνιέναι, οἷον Ἑλλήνας βαρβάρων καὶ
of-all hearing to-understand as Greeks of-barbarians and
 βαρβάρους Ἑλλήνων.
barbarians of-Greeks

266

267

- 268 θέσει δὲ εἰ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες
by-convention but if it-signifies clear that those indeed having-grasped-beforehand
 καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμέναι ἀντιλήψονται τούτων,
of which the words are appointed will-apprehend these
 οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἅπερ ἡγνόουν, ἀλλὰ
not from them being-taught the-very-things-which they-did-not-know but
 ἀναμνησκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦτα ἅπερ
being-reminded and renewing these-things the-very-things-which
 ᾗδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρήζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοουμένων
they-had-known those but needing the of-the unknown-things
 μαθήσεως καὶ μὴ εἰδότες, καθ' ὧν εἰσιν αἱ λέξεις
learning and not knowing of which are the words
 τεταγμέναι, οὐδενὸς ἀντίληψιν ἔξουσιν.
appointed of-nothing apprehension will-have
- 269 διόπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ὑποστῆναι δύναιτο
wherefore neither the manner of-the learning to-subsist could
 ἂν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκων κατάληψιν τῶν θεωρημάτων τῆς
— and for the teacher apprehension of-the theorems of-the
 διδασκομένης τέχνης ἐμποιεῖν ὀφείλει τῷ μανθάνοντι, ἵνα
taught art to-produce ought in-the learner so-that
 οὕτως ἐκεῖνος τὸ σύστημα τούτων καταλαβὼν τεχνίτης
thus he the system of-these having-apprehended an-expert
 γένηται. οὐδὲν δέ ἐστι κατάληψις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
may-become nothing and is apprehension as in the foregoing
 ὑπεμνήσαμεν· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας
we-recalled therefore neither the manner of-the teaching
 ὑφεστάναι δύναται. εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι
to-subsist can if but neither the-thing taught exists
 μήτε ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μανθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς
nor the teacher and the learner nor the manner of-the
 μαθήσεως, οὔτε μάθησις ἔστιν οὔτε διδασκαλία.
learning neither learning exists nor teaching

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κοινότερον ἐπικεχέιρηται περὶ μαθήσεως 270
these-things indeed then more-generally has-been-argued concerning learning
 καὶ διδασκαλίας· ἔνεστι δὲ ἀπορεῖν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
and teaching it-is-possible and to-raise-difficulties thus also about the
 λεγομένης περὶ βίον εἶναι τέχνης. οἷον γοῦν τὸ μὲν
said concerning life to-be art for-instance at-any-rate the indeed
 διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα, τουτέστι τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀνυπόστατον
taught thing that-is the prudence unreal
 ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· ἀνυπόστατος δέ ἐστι καὶ
we-showed in the foregoing unreal and is also
 ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ὁ μαθάνων. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν
the teacher and the learner either for the prudent the
 φρόνιμον διδάξει τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην ἢ ὁ ἄφρων
prudent will-teach the concerning the life art or the imprudent
 τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος
the imprudent or the imprudent the prudent or the prudent
 τὸν ἄφρονα· οὐδεὶς δὲ τούτων οὐδένα διδάσκει· οὐκ ἄρα
the imprudent none and of-these anyone teaches not therefore
 διδάσκεται ἢ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λεγομένη τέχνη.
is-taught the concerning the life to-be said art
 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως περιττὸν καὶ λέγειν· 271
and concerning indeed the others perhaps superfluous even to-speak
 εἰ δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα διδάσκει τὴν φρόνησιν,
if but the prudent the imprudent teaches the prudence
 ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
the and prudence knowledge is of-goods and evils and
 οὐτετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγνοίαν
of-neither-things the imprudent not having the prudence ignorance
 ἔχει τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐτετέρων, ἀγνοίαν δὲ
has of-the goods and evils and of-neither-things ignorance and
 τούτων ἔχων πάντως διδάσκοντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φρονίμου
of-these having altogether teaching him the prudent

τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν
the goods and evils and neither-things will-hear only the
 λεγομένων, οὐ γνώσεται δὲ ταῦτα. εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο
things-said not will-know but these if for he-should-apprehend
 αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἀφροσύνη
them in imprudence being-established will-be also the imprudence
 τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων θεωρητική.
of-the both goods and evils and of-neither-things contemplative

272 οὐχὶ δέ γε τούτων κατὰ αὐτοὺς ἡ ἀφροσύνη
not and indeed of-these according-to them the imprudence
 θεωρητικὴ καθέστηκεν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄφρων ἔσται φρόνιμος. ὁ
contemplative has-become since the imprudent will-be prudent the
 ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου
therefore imprudent not apprehends the-things by the prudent
 λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως
said or done according-to the of-the prudence

λόγον. μὴ ἀντιλαμβανόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἂν διδάσκειτο ὑπ'
principle not apprehending and not — he-would-be-taught by
 αὐτοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπεὶ μήτε ἐναργεῖα μήτε διὰ λόγου
him otherwise both and since neither by-evidence nor through discourse
 δύναται διδάσκεσθαι, καθὰ προειρήκαμεν. πλὴν ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε
he-can be-taught as we-have-said-before however but if neither
 διὰ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας ἐγγίνεται τινι ἢ περὶ
through learning and teaching arises in-anyone the concerning
 τὸν βίον λεγομένη τέχνη μήτε φύσει, ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ἡ
the life said art nor by-nature undiscoverable is the
 παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένη τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον.
among the philosophers much-talked-of art concerning the life

273 Εἰ μέντοι καὶ δοίῃ τις ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος
if however even should-grant someone out-of much the abundance
 ἐγγίνεσθαι τινι τὴν ὀνειροπολουμένην τέχνην περὶ
to-arise in-someone the dreamed-of art concerning

τὸν βίον, βλαβερὰ καὶ ταραχῆς αἰτία φανήσεται μᾶλλον
the life harmful and of-disturbance a-cause it-will-appear rather
 τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν ἢ ὠφέλιμος.
to-those having it than beneficial

εἰ ὠφελεῖ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτήν

III.37 · DOES THE ART OF LIVING BENEFIT ITS POSSESSOR?

Grant the art out of abundance, and it will prove harmful rather than beneficial. The wise man is called self-controlled either because no bad impulse arises in him, which is no more control than a eunuch's chastity, or because he masters his impulses by reason, in which case wisdom has not helped him and he is more wretched than those called bad: impelled he is disturbed, restrained he holds the evil in himself. So the dogmatists' ethics is vain, and the Outlines close here.

Αὐτίκα γοῦν, ἵνα παραδείγματος ἕνεκεν ὀλίγα ἀπὸ 273
for-instance at-any-rate so-that of-an-example for-the-sake a-few-things out-of
 πολλῶν εἴπωμεν, ὠφελεῖν ἂν δοκοίη τὸν σοφὸν ἢ περὶ
many we-may-say to-benefit — would-seem the wise-man the concerning
 τὸν βίον τέχνη ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρεχομένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς
the life art mastery to-him furnishing in the toward
 τὸ καλὸν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς.
the noble impulses and in the from the evil aversions
 ὁ οὖν λεγόμενος κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐγκρατὴς σοφὸς ἦτοι 274
the then said according-to them master wise-man either
 κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατὴς, καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ
according-to this is-said master in-so-far-as in no
 γίνεται ὁρμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ
comes-to-be impulse the toward the evil and aversion the from

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἣ καθόσον εἶχε μὲν φαύλας ὁρμὰς καὶ
the good or in-so-far-as he-had indeed bad impulses and
 ἀφορμάς, περιεκράτει δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ.

aversions he-mastered but them by-the reason

275 ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσειςιν οὐκ

but according-to indeed the not to-come-to-be in bad judgments not

ἂν εἴη ἐγκρατής· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσῃ οὐδ' οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ ὥς

— *he-would-be master not for he-will-master what not he-has and as*

οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον ἐγκρατῇ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια

not — would-call anyone the eunuch master in-regard-to sexual-pleasures

καὶ τὸν κακοστομαχοῦντα πρὸς ἐδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν

and the-one having-a-bad-stomach in-regard-to of-foods enjoyment

(οὐδ' ὅλως γὰρ ἐπιζήτησις αὐτοῖς γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων,

not-even at-all for craving in-them arises for-the such-things

ἵνα καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστῶσι τῆς ἐπιζητήσεως), τῷ

so-that also masterfully they-might-rise-against the craving in-the

αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῇ ρήτέον διὰ

same manner neither the wise-man master must-one-call because-of

τὸ μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πάθος οὐδ' ἔσται ἐγκρατής.

the not to-grow in him feeling of-which he-will-be master

276 εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῇ

if but according-to this they-will-claim him to-be master

καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσειςιν, περιγίνεται

in-so-far-as he-comes-to-be indeed in bad judgments he-prevails-over

δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσιν, ὅτι οὐδὲν

but them by-the reason first indeed they-will-grant that nothing

ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἢ φρόνησις, ἀκμὴν ἐν ταραχαῖς ὄντα

benefited him the prudence still in disturbances being

καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἴτα καὶ κακοδαιμονέστερος τῶν

and of-help needing then also more-wretched than-those

φαύλων λεγομένων εὐρίσκεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμᾷ ἐπὶ

bad called he-is-found if indeed for he-is-impelled toward

τι, πάντως ταρασσεται, εἰ δὲ περικρατεῖ τῷ λόγῳ,
something altogether he-is-disturbed if but he-prevails by-the reason
 συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον
he-holds-in in himself the evil and because-of this more
 ταρασσεται τοῦ φαύλου ἐκείνου μηκέτι τοῦτο πάσχοντος·
he-is-disturbed than-the bad-man that no-longer this suffering

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὀρμῇ, ταρασσεται, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει τῶν
if indeed for he-is-impelled he-is-disturbed if but he-attains the
 ἐπιθυμιῶν, παύεται τῆς ταραχῆς. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατὴς
desires he-ceases from-the disturbance not therefore master
 γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· ἢ εἴπερ
becomes so-far-as depends-on the prudence the wise-man or if-indeed
 γίνεται, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κακοδαιμονέστατος, διόπερ
he-becomes of-all men he-is most-wretched wherefore
 οὐκ ὠφέλειαν, ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν αὐτῷ μεγίστην ἢ περὶ τὸν
not benefit but disturbance to-him greatest the concerning the
 βίον παρέσχε τέχνη. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομίζων ἔχειν τὴν περὶ
life furnished art that and the-one believing to-have the concerning
 τὸν βίον τέχνην καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπεγνωκέναι, τίνα
the life art and through it to-have-come-to-know which-things
 τέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τίνα φαῦλα,
both are good as toward the nature and which-things bad
 ταρασσεται σφόδρα καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτῷ παρόντων καὶ
is-disturbed exceedingly both the goods to-him being-present and
 τῶν κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὑπεμνήσαμεν.

the evils in the foregoing we-recalled
 λεκτέον οὖν, ὅτι εἰ μήτε ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ
one-must-say then that if neither the of-the goods both and evils and
 ἀδιαφόρων ὑπόστασις ὁμολογεῖται, ἢ τε περὶ τὸν βίον
indifferents reality is-agreed the and concerning the life
 τέχνη τάχα μὲν καὶ ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑφεστάναι
art perhaps indeed even unreal is if but even to-subsist

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δοθείη καθ' ὑπόθεσιν, οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς
it-should-be-granted according-to supposition no benefit to-those
 ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν παρέχει, τοῦναντίον δὲ ταραχὰς αὐτοῖς ἐμποιεῖ
having it it-furnishes on-the-contrary and disturbances in-them it-produces
 μέγιστας, μάτην ὠφρυῶσθαι δοκοῖεν ἂν οἱ δογματικοὶ
greatest in-vain to-have-raised-their-brows would-seem — the dogmatists
 καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἠθικῷ μέρει τῆς καλουμένης φιλοσοφίας.
and-in the said ethical part of-the so-called philosophy

- 279 Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου συμμέτρως ὥς
so-much also concerning the ethical topic in-due-measure as
 ἐν ὑποτυπώσει διεξελθόντες, ἐνταῦθα περιγράφομεν καὶ
in an-outline having-gone-through here we-bring-to-a-close both
 τὸ τρίτον σύνταγμα καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῶν Πυρρωνείων
the third treatise and the whole of-the Pyrrhonist
 ὑποτυπώσεων σπουδάσμα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπιπλέοντες·
outlines undertaking this adding-in-conclusion

διὰ τί ὁ σκεπτικὸς ἐνίοτε ἀμυδρὸν
 ταῖς πιθανότησιν ἐρωτᾷ ἐπιτηδεύει λόγους

III.38 · WHY THE SKEPTIC SOMETIMES ARGUES WEAKLY

Because he loves his fellow men, the skeptic wishes to cure the dogmatists' conceit and rashness by argument. As physicians match the strength of a remedy to the ailment, he propounds arguments of differing force, weighty ones for those severely afflicted and slighter ones for those whose conceit is superficial and easily cured. So he does not shrink from arguments that look faint, and uses them on purpose, since they often suffice for what he has in hand.

- 280 Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλόανθρωπος εἶναι τὴν τῶν
the skeptic because-of the benevolent to-be the of-the
 δογματικῶν οἷσιν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύναμιν
dogmatists conceit both and rashness according-to his-power

ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σωματικῶν
to-heal by-argument wishes just-as then the of-the bodily
 παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα,
feelings physicians differing according-to magnitude have remedies
 καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων
and to-those indeed severely having-suffered the severe of-these
 προσάγουσι, τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κουφότερα, καὶ ὁ
they-apply to-those but lightly the lighter also the
 σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους,
skeptic so differing propounds according-to strength arguments
 καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζει
and the indeed weighty and vigorously to-demolish
 δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος
able the of-the conceit of-the dogmatists ailment
 ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρᾷ τῇ προπετείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρήται,
in-the-case-of those by-vehement the rashness afflicted he-uses
 τοῖς δὲ κουφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον
the but lighter in-the-case-of those superficial and easily-cured
 ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κουφοτέρων
having the of-the conceit ailment and by lighter
 πιθανότητων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὅτε
plausibilities to-be-demolished able wherefore at-one-time
 μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖς πιθανότησιν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ
indeed weighty in-the plausibilities at-another-time but even
 ἁμυνωτέροις φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συνερωτᾶν
fainter appearing not he-besitates arguments to-propound
 ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως ὀρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὥς ἀρκοῦντας
the-one from the skepticism setting-out on-purpose as sufficing
 αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.
for-him often toward the accomplishing the thing-proposed

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