

GREEK SERIES • VOLUME 12

GORGias

PLATO

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ

Gorgias

Plato's Dialogue on Rhetoric and Justice

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation
preserving the original word order




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Volume 12 of the Canes Nobiles Greek interlinear texts

The Greek text follows Burnet's Oxford Plato

Set from the Perseus Digital Library, with corrections

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Words the editor secludes are not printed; words
he supplies are printed without their brackets.

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Callicles greets Socrates and Chaerephon with a proverb about taking one's share of war and battle, and Socrates asks whether, as the saying goes, they have come after the feast. Gorgias has just finished a display, and Callicles offers to have him repeat it at his house, but Socrates would rather Gorgias answer a question about what his art is and what it professes to teach. Chaerephon is sent to ask, and Polus, claiming Gorgias is tired, volunteers to answer instead and delivers a small speech about arts and experience.

CAL. πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω 447
of-war and of-battle they-say one-ought O Socrates thus
μεταλαγχάνειν.

to-take-a-share

SOC. ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν καὶ
but really as the-saying-goes after a-feast we-have-come and
ὕστεροῦμεν;

are-we-late

CAL. καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ
and very at-least an-elegant feast many for and fine-things
Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

Gorgias to-us a-little earlier displayed

SOC. τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκελεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε,
of-these however O Callicles responsible (is)-Chaerephon here
ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῆψαι.

in the-market-place having-compelled us to-linger

CHAE. οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. b
no matter O Socrates I for also will-cure-(it)

φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν
a-friend for to-me (is)-Gorgias so-that he-will-give-a-display to-us if indeed
δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, εἰς αὖθις.

it-seems-good now if and you-wish at another-time

CAL. τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεί Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι
what then O Chaerephon does-desire Socrates to-hear

Γοργίου;

Gorgias

CHAE. ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.
for this-very at-least indeed thing we-are-here

CAL. οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε· παρ'
therefore whenever you-wish to me to-come home-ward with
 ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.
me for Gorgias lodges and will-give-a-display to-you

c SOC. εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν
well you-say O Callicles but then would-be-be-willing —
 ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ
with-us to-converse I-wish for to-learn from him
 τίς ἢ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστίν
what (is)-the power of-the art of-the man and what is
 ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει τὴν δὲ ἄλλην
(that)-which he-professes both and teaches the and other
 ἐπιδείξιν εἰς αὐτίς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.
display at another-time as you say let-him-make

CAL. οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ
nothing (is)-like the him-himself to-ask O Socrates and
 γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν
for to-him one this was of-the display he-was-bidding at-any-rate
 νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων,
just-now to-ask whatever anyone wished of-the-ones inside being
 καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινέσθαι.
and to all he-said he-would-answer

SOC. ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.
truly well you-say O Chaerephon ask him

CHAE. τί ἔρωμαι;
what shall-I-ask

SOC. ὅστις ἐστίν.

who he-is

d

CHAE. πῶς λέγεις;

how do-you-mean

SOC. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός,

just-as — if he-happened being of-shoes a-craftsman

ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ

he-would-have-answered — surely to-you that (he-is)-a-shoemaker or not

μανθάνεις ὥς λέγω;

do-you-understand how I-mean

CHAE. μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ

I-understand and I-will-ask tell me O Gorgias truth

λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι

says Callicles here that you-profess to-answer whatever

ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

— anyone you asks

GOR. ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα

truly O Chaerephon and for just-now these very-things

ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν

I-was-professing and I-say that no-one me yet has-asked new

οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

anything for-many years

CHAE. ἦ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρινῇ, ὦ Γοργία.

truly surely then easily you-will-answer O Gorgias

GOR. πάρεστι τούτου πείραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

it-is-possible of-this a-trial O Chaerephon to-take

POL. νῆ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλη, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.

by Zeus if and at-least you-wish O Chaerephon of-me

Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ

Gorgias indeed for also to-be-tired to-me seems many-things

γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

for just-now he-has-gone-through

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CHAE. τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου
what then O Polus do-you-think you more-finely — than-Gorgias
 ἀποκρίνασθαι;

would-answer

b POL. τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;
what but (is)-this if for-you at-least adequately

CHAE. οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.
nothing but since you wish answer

POL. ἐρώτα.

ask

CHAE. ἐρωτῶ δὴ. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς
I-ask then if happened Gorgias knowledgeable being of-the
 τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τί ἂν αὐτὸν
art of-which-very the brother of-him Herodicus-(is) what — him
 ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;

would-we-name justly not what-very (we-name)-that-man

POL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

CHAE. ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν
a-physician then asserting him to-be well —
 ἐλέγομεν.

we-would-say

POL. ναί.

yes

CHAE. εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφώντος ἢ
if but at-least of-which-very Aristophon the (son)-of-Aglaophon or
 ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν
the brother of-him experienced he-were of-the-art what — him
 ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

rightly would-we-call

c POL. δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.
(it-is)-clear that a-painter

CHAE. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα
now but since of-what art knowledgeable he-is what

ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;

— calling him rightly would-we-call-(him)

POL. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν

O Chaerephon many arts among men there-are

ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπίρως ἠύρημένοι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ
from the experiences experientially discovered experience indeed for

ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία
makes — life our to-proceed according-to art inexperience

δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν
but according-to chance of-each and of-these partake

ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι·
different-men of-different-ones differently of-the and best the best

ὦν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης
of-whom also Gorgias is here and shares-in the finest

τῶν τεχνῶν.

of-the arts

II · GORGIAS ANSWERS FOR HIMSELF

Socrates observes that Polus has been trained to make speeches rather than to answer questions: asked what Gorgias' art is, he praised it instead of naming it. Gorgias answers that it is rhetoric, that he is a rhetor, and that he can make others rhetors too. Socrates asks him to keep to the short exchange of question and answer; Gorgias agrees to try, claims that no one can say the same things in fewer words than he, and promises that Socrates will say he has never heard anyone speak more briefly.

SOC. καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι d

well at-least O Gorgias appears Polus to-have-prepared-himself

εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

for speeches but for what he-promised to-Chaerephon not he-does

GOR. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

what especially O Socrates

SOC. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

the thing-asked not at-all to-me be-appears to-answer

GOR. ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

but you if you-wish ask him

SOC. οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,

no if yourself at-least to-you being-willing it-is to-answer

ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος

but much — more-gladly (I-would-ask)-you clear for to-me (is)-Polus

καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον

even from what he-has-said that the so-called rhetoric more

μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

he-has-practiced than to-converse

c POL. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

why indeed O Socrates

SOC. ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας

because O Polus when-asked by-Chaerephon of-what Gorgias

ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην

(is)-knowledgeable art you-praise indeed his the art

ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

as-if someone were-blaming-(it) what but it-is not you-answered

POL. οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἶη ἡ καλλίστη;

not for did-I-answer that it-was the finest

449 SOC. καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις ἡ

and very-much but no-one asks of-what-sort (roughly) the

Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν

of-Gorgias art-(is) but what and whom one-ought to-call —

Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν

Gorgias just-as the earlier-things to-you proposed Chaerephon

καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν

and to-him well and through short-(words) you-answered and now

οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἢ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρή
thus say what (is)-the art and what Gorgias to-call must
 ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε
we rather but O Gorgias yourself to-us say what you
 χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.
it-is-necessary to-call as of-what knowledgeable art

GOR. τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

— *of-rhetoric O Socrates*

SOC. ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν;

a-rhetor then must you to-call

GOR. ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι
a-good-(one) at-least O Socrates if indeed what at-least I-boast

εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

to-be as said Homer you-wish me to-call

SOC. ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

but I-wish

GOR. κάλει δή.

call-(me) then

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατόν εἶναι ποιεῖν;
therefore also others you shall-we-say able to-be to-make-(such)

GOR. ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε
I-profess at-least indeed these-things not only here

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

but also elsewhere

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν ἐθελήσας ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν
so then would-you-be-willing — O Gorgias just-as now

διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ'
we-converse to-continue the one-part asking the other

ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ
answering the but length of-the speeches this such-as even

Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰς αὖθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ,
Polus began for another-time to-put-aside but what you-promise

μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλῃσιν κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
not play-false but be-willing in short the thing-asked
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

to-answer

c GOR. εἰσὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
there-are indeed O Socrates some of-the answers
 ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὲν
necessary through long-(words) the speeches to-make not however
 ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ
but I-will-try at-least as through shortest-(words) and for
 αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν
again also this one is of-the-things-which I-say (that)-no-one —
 ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.
in shorter-(words) than-I the same-things could-say

SOC. τούτου μὲν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπιδείξιν
of-this indeed there-is-need O Gorgias and for-me a-display
 αὐτοῦ τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ
of-this-very thing make of-the short-speaking of-long-speaking but
 εἰς αὐθις.

for another-time

GOR. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου
but I-will-do-(so) and of-no-one you-will-say briefer-speaking
 ἀκούσαι.

to-have-beard

Gorgias says rhetoric is concerned with words, but Socrates points out that medicine, gymnastic, and every other art also deals in words about its own subject. Gorgias replies that the other arts work mainly with the hands, whereas rhetoric accomplishes everything through speech. Socrates distinguishes the arts that need little speech, like painting, from those like arithmetic and astronomy that work entirely through it, and shows that each of these can say what its words are about.

SOC. φέρε δὴ ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι d
come then of-rhetoric for you-say knowledgeable art to-be

καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἢ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί
and could-make — also another a-rhetor — rhetoric about what
τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὕσα; ὥσπερ ἢ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν
of-the things happens being just-as — weaving about the
τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἢ γάρ;
of-the garments making is-it-not for

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
therefore also — music (is)-about the of-the songs making

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις,
by — Hera O Gorgias I-admire at-least the answers

ὅτι ἀποκρίνη ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
that you-answer as possible — through shortest-(words)

GOR. πάννυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
very-much for I-think O Socrates fairly this to-do

SOC. εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ
well you-say come then for-me answer thus also about

τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;
— rhetoric about what of-the things it-is a-knowledge

e GOR. περὶ λόγους.

about words

SOC. ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦσι

of-what-sort these O Gorgias then (those)-which show

τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὥς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνουσιν;

the sick how — living they-might-be-healthy

GOR. οὐ.

no

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική

not then about all at-least the words — rhetoric

ἐστίν.

is

GOR. οὐ δῆτα.

not indeed

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

but indeed to-speak at-least it-makes (men)-able

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

therefore about what-very to-speak also to-think

GOR. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

450 SOC. ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν

so then which just-now we-were-mentioning — medicine about the

καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατούς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;

sick makes (men)-able to-be to-think and to-speak

GOR. ἀνάγκη.

(of)-necessity

SOC. καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.

also — medicine then as it-seems about words is

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;
those at-least about the diseases

GOR. μάλιστα.
most-certainly

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστική περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς
therefore also — gymnastic about words is those
 περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;
about good-condition both of-the bodies and bad-condition

GOR. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· b
and indeed also the other arts O Gorgias thus are
 ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἱ τυγχάνουσιν
each of-them about words is those which happen
 ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.
being about the matter of-which each is the art

GOR. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς
why then indeed ever the other arts not rhetorical
 καλεῖς, οὐσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς,
do-you-call being about words if-indeed this rhetoric you-call
 ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους;
which — is about words

GOR. ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ c
because O Socrates of-the indeed other arts about
 χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά
manual-work both and such actions so a-word to-say all
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον
is the knowledge — but of-rhetoric nothing is such
 χειρουργήμα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ
a-handiwork but all the action and the accomplishment through

λόγων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην
words is on-account-of these-things I the rhetorical art

ἄξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι.
claim to-be about words rightly speaking as I say

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἷαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν;
so then do-I-understand of-what-sort it you-wish to-call

τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν
soon but I-shall-know more-clearly but answer there-are for-us

τέχνη. ἧ γάρ;
arts is-it-not for

GOR. ναί.

yes

d SOC. πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία
of-all then I-think of-the arts of-some indeed working

τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔναι δὲ
the greater-part is and of-speech short they-need some but

οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ
of-none but the (work)-of-the art might-be-accomplished — even

διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι
through silence such-as painting and statue-making and others

πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ᾧ οὐ
many — such-ones to-me you-seem to-mean about which not

φῆς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι ἢ οὐ;
you-say — rhetoric to-be or not

GOR. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

certainly indeed then well you-take-(it) O Socrates

e SOC. ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἷ διὰ λόγου
others but at-least there-are of-the arts which through speech

πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς
everything accomplish and of-deed so a-word to-say either nothing

προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ
they-need-in-addition or a-little quite such-as — arithmetic and

λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι
calculation and geometry and checkers-playing at-least and others
 πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς
many arts of-which some nearly somewhat equal the
 λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ
words have to-the actions the but many more and —
 παράπαν πᾶσα ἢ πράξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων
altogether all the action and the effect for-them through words
 ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.
is — of-such-ones one to-me you-seem to-mean — rhetoric
 GOR. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

truth you-say
 SOC. ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι
but not-indeed of-these at-least any I-think you to-wish
 ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες,
rhetoric to-call not that by-the word thus you-said
 ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν,
that the through speech the effect having rhetoric is
 καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν
and might-take-(you)-up — someone if he-wished to-be-captious in
 τοῖς λόγοις, τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὦ Γοργία,
the words — arithmetic then rhetoric O Gorgias
 λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν
you-call but not I-think you either — arithmetic or —
 γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

geometry rhetoric to-call
 GOR. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως
rightly for you-think O Socrates and justly
 ὑπολαμβάνεις.
you-take-(it)

- b soc. ἔθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον.
come now also you the answer which I-asked complete
 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὕσα τούτων τις τῶν
since for rhetoric happens indeed being of-these one of-the
 τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ
arts which for-the most-part speech use happen and
 καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὕσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἢ περὶ τί ἐν
also others such being try to-say the about what in
 λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
words the effect having rhetoric is just-as — if someone
 με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινosoῦν τῶν
me should-ask of-the-things-which just-now I-was-saying about whatsoever of-the
 τεχνῶν· ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστίν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ’
arts O Socrates what is the arithmetic art I-would-say
 ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ
— to-him just-as you just-now that of-the-ones through speech one the
 κῦρος ἔχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ’
effect having and if me he-should-ask-again of-those about what I-would-say
 ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἂν
— that of-those about the even both and odd however-many —
 ἐκάτερα τυγχάνη ὄντα. εἰ δ’ αὖ ἔροιτο· τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν
each happen being if but again he-should-ask the but calculation
 τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν τῶν
what do-you-call an-art I-would-say — that also this is of-the-ones
 λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· ἢ περὶ τί;
by-speech the whole being-accomplished and if he-should-ask-again the-one about what
 εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ
I-would-say — just-as those in the assembly drafting-proposals that in-the
 μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει —
indeed other-respects just-as — arithmetic — calculation is
 περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν —
about the same for it-is the both even and the odd

διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα
it-differs but so-much that both toward themselves and toward each-other
 πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον
how they-stand in-quantity examines the odd and the even
 ἢ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ
— calculation and if someone — astronomy should-ask-about me
 λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, οἱ
saying that also this by-speech is-accomplished (in)-the all-things the
 δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν,
and words those of-the astronomy if he-should-say about what are-they
 ὦ Σώκρατες; εἴπομι' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φορὰν
O Socrates I-would-say — that about the of-the stars motion
 καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.
and of-sun and of-moon how toward each-other in-speed they-stand
 GOR. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
rightly at-least speaking you O Socrates

IV • THE GREATEST OF HUMAN GOODS

Gorgias says rhetoric deals with the greatest and best of human affairs. Socrates recalls the drinking song that ranks health, beauty, and honest wealth, and imagines the doctor, the trainer, and the money-maker each claiming to produce the greatest good. Gorgias answers that his good is freedom for oneself and rule over others in one's city, and that it consists in the power to persuade judges, councilors, and assemblies, which makes every other craftsman one's servant.

SOC. ἔθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ
come then also you O Gorgias happens indeed for indeed —
 ῥητορικὴ οὕσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων
rhetoric being of-the-ones by-speech the everything accomplishing
 τε καὶ κυρουμένων· ἢ γάρ;
both and effecting is-it-not for

GOR. ἔστι ταῦτα.

it-is these-things

SOC. λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; τί ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,

say then of-those about what what is this of-the things

περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

about which these — speeches are which — rhetoric uses

GOR. τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες,

the greatest of-the human affairs O Socrates

καὶ ἄριστα.

and best

e SOC. ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις

but O Gorgias disputable also this you-say

καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶμαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς

and nothing yet clear I-think for you to-have-heard in the

συμποσίοις ᾄδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ

drinking-parties singing men this — drinking-song in which

καταριθμούνται ᾄδοντες ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,

they-enumerate singing that to-be-healthy indeed best is

τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ

the and second beautiful to-become third and as says the

ποιητῆς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

poet of-the drinking-song the being-rich without-fraud

GOR. ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

I-have-heard-(it) for but to what-(end) this do-you-say

452 SOC. ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων

because if to-you for-instance should-stand-beside the craftsmen of-these-things

ὧν ἐπῆνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἱατρός τε καὶ

which praised the-one the drinking-song having-made a-physician both and

παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστῆς, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ

a-trainer and a-money-maker and should-say first indeed the

ἱατρός ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν

physician that O Socrates deceives you Gorgias not for is

ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
the of-this-man art about the greatest good for-the men
 ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή — εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν
but — mine if then him I should-ask you but who being
 ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἱατρός. τί οὖν λέγεις;
these-things do-you-say he-would-say — perhaps that a-physician what then do-you-mean
 ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; πῶς
truly the — of-your art work greatest is good how
 γὰρ οὐ, φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγεία; τί δ' ἐστὶν
for not he-would-say — perhaps O Socrates health what and is
 μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας; εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον
greater good for-men than-health if and again after this-man
 ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι θαυμάζοιμί τ᾽ αὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
the trainer should-say that I-would-wonder — O Socrates
 καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδείξειαι τῆς
also myself if to-you could Gorgias a-greater good display —
 αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποίμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς
of-his-own art than I — of-mine I-would-say — again also to
 τοῦτον· σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον;
this-man you but indeed who are O man and what — (is)-your work
 παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δὲ ἔργον μου ἐστὶν καλούς τε
a-trainer he-would-say — the and work of-me is beautiful both
 καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. μετὰ
and strong to-make the men (in)-the bodies after
 δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὥς ἐγᾶμαι
and the trainer would-say — the money-maker as I-think
 πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων· σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
quite despising all-(others) consider indeed O Socrates
 ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἢ παρὰ
whether to-you than-wealth appears anything greater good being either with
 Γοργία ἢ παρ' ἄλλω ὅτῳ οὖν. φαίμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν·
Gorgias or with another whomsoever we-would-say — then to him

τί δὲ δῆ; ἢ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; φαίη ἄν. τίς
what and indeed truly you of-this (are)-a-craftsman he-would-say — who
 ὤν; χρηματιστής. τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις
being a-money-maker what then do-you-judge you greatest for-men
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐρεῖ. καὶ
good to-be wealth we-shall-say how for not he-will-say and
 μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην
yet contends at-least Gorgias here the with himself art
 μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαίμεν ἂν
of-a-greater good cause to-be than — yours we-would-say —
 ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν.
we (it-is)-clear then that the-(question) after this he-would-ask —
 καὶ τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. ἴθι
and what is this — good let-answer Gorgias come
 οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων καὶ
then having-considered O Gorgias to-be-asked both by those-men and
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναί τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον
by me answer what is this which you-say you greatest
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.
good to-be for-the men and you a-craftsman to-be of-it

GOR. ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
what-very is O Socrates in truth (the)-greatest good
 καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
and cause at-once indeed of-freedom for-themselves the men
 ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.
at-once and of-the others to-rule in — his-own city for-each
 SOC. τί οὖν δῆ τοῦτο λέγεις;

what then indeed this do-you-mean

e GOR. τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν
the persuading I-at-least able — to-be by-the words both in
 δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ
a-law-court jurors and in a-council-chamber councilors and

ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί,
 in an-assembly assemblymen and in other gathering every
 ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ
 whatever — political gathering there-may-be and-yet by this
 τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον
 — power a-slave indeed you-will-have the physician a-slave
 δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ
 and the trainer the and money-maker this for-another
 ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ
 will-be-revealed making-money and not for-himself but for-you
 τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.
 the (one)-able to-speak and to-persuade the multitudes

V • TWO KINDS OF PERSUASION

Rhetoric, then, is a producer of persuasion. Socrates asks what kind of persuasion and about what, as one would ask what figures a painter paints, since arithmetic and every teaching art also persuade. Gorgias says it is the persuasion of law courts and crowds about the just and the unjust. Socrates distinguishes having learned from having believed, since belief can be false but knowledge cannot, and Gorgias agrees that rhetoric produces belief without knowledge, not teaching.

SOC. νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλώσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν 453
 now to-me you-seem to-have-shown O Gorgias most-nearly —
 ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγῇ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ἐγὼ
 rhetoric what art you-consider-(it) to-be and if anything I
 συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς ἐστίν ἡ ῥητορική,
 understand you-say that of-persuasion a-craftsman is — rhetoric
 καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο
 and the business of-it all and the sum in this

τελευτᾷ· ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλεόν τὴν ῥητορικὴν
ends or have-you anything to-say to more — rhetoric

δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;
to-be-able than persuasion in-the hearers in the soul to-make

GOR. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς
by-no-means O Socrates but to-me you-seem adequately

ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.
to-define it-is for this the sum of-it

- b SOC. ἀκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὥς
bear then O Gorgias I for well know that as
ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλω διαλέγεται
myself I-persuade if-indeed anyone else with-another converses
βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν,
wishing to-know this-very thing about which the argument is
καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἓνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.
also me to-be of-these one I-claim and also you

GOR. τί οὖν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;
what then indeed O Socrates

- c SOC. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ, ἥτις
I will-tell now I the from — rhetoric persuasion what
ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων
ever it-is which you mean and about what matters
ἐστὶν πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν
it-is persuasion clearly indeed well know that not I-know not however
ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν
but I-suspect at-least which I-think you to-mean and about what nothing
μέντοι ἦττον ἐρήσομαι σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν
however less I-will-ask you what ever you-mean the persuasion the
ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἔνεκα
from — rhetoric and about what it to-be of-what for-the-sake
δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύω σε ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω;
then myself suspecting you shall-I-ask but not myself say

οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προῖη ὥς
not of-you for-the-sake but of-the argument so-that thus it-may-proceed as
 μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται.
most — for-us evident it-may-make about what it-is-being-said
 σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικάως ἀνερωτᾶν σε ὥσπερ ἂν
consider for whether to-you I-seem justly to-question you just-as —
 εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστιν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ
if I-happened you asking who is of-the painters Zeuxis if
 μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικάως
to-me you-said that the-one the figures painting whether not — justly
 σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
you I-would-have-asked the-one the what-sort of-the figures painting and where
 GOR. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι d
then on-account-of this that also others are painters
 γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα;
painting other many figures
 GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς
if but at-least no-one else than Zeuxis painted well
 ἂν σοι ἀπεκρίναιτο;
— by-you it-would-have-been-answered

GOR. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

SOC. ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι
come then also about — rhetoric say whether to-you
 δοκεῖ πειθὼν ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ μόνῃ ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι;
it-seems persuasion to-make — rhetoric alone or also other arts

λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πράγμα,

I-mean but — the-following whoever teaches whatsoever matter

πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει ἢ οὐ;

whether what he-teaches he-persuades or not

GOR. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

not indeed O Socrates but of-all most he-persuades

e SOC. πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν

again then in-the-case-of the same arts let-us-speak

ὧνπερ νυνδὴ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα

of-which-very just-now — arithmetic not does-it-teach us how-many

ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;

are the (things)-of-the number and the arithmetical man

GOR. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;

therefore also it-persuades

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστιν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ;

of-persuasion then a-craftsman is also — arithmetic

GOR. φαίνεται.

it-appears

454 SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ

therefore if anyone asks us of-what-sort of-persuasion and about

τί, ἀποκρινόμεθα πού αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ

what we-shall-answer surely to-him that of-the teaching-(kind) of-that about

τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

the even both and the odd how-much it-is and the other

ἅς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδείξαι

which just-now we-were-mentioning arts all we-shall-be-able to-show

πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὐσας καὶ ᾧστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι ἢ οὐ;

of-persuasion craftsmen being and of-what and about what or not

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶν δημιουργός.

not then rhetoric alone of-persuasion is a-craftsman

GOR. ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

truth you-say

SOC. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, b

since therefore not alone it-produces this — work

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ

but also others justly just-as about the painter after

τοῦτο ἐπανερούμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα· ποίας δὲ πειθοῦς

this we-would-ask-again — the (one)-speaking of-what-sort then of-persuasion

καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν τέχνη; ἢ

and of-the about what persuasion — rhetoric is an-art or

οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

not does-it-seem to-you just to-be to-ask-again

GOR. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. ἀποκρίναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ

answer then O Gorgias since at-least also to-you it-seems

οὕτως.

so

GOR. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν

of-this therefore — persuasion I-speak O Socrates of-that in

τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι

the law-courts and in the other crowds just-as also just-now

ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

I-was-saying and about these-things which are just both and unjust

SOC. καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτευν ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὴν c

and I surely was-suspecting this you to-mean the persuasion

καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν

and about these-things O Gorgias but so-that not you-may-wonder if

καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ
 also a-little later such some-thing you I-ask which
 δοκεῖ μὲν ἄλλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ — ὅπερ γὰρ
 seems indeed clear to-be I but ask-again what-very for
 λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαίνεισθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ,
 I-say of-the in-order for-the-sake to-be-completed the argument I-ask
 οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες
 not of-you for-the-sake but so-that not we-become-accustomed suspecting
 προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ
 to-snatch-beforehand of-each-other the things-said but you — your-own
 κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς.
 according-to the hypothesis however — you-wish may-complete

GOR. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

and rightly at-least to-me you-seem to-do O Socrates

SOC. ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι
 come then also this let-us-examine do-you-call something

μεμαθηκέναι;

to-have-learned

GOR. καλῶ.

I-call-(it-so)

SOC. τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

what and to-have-believed

d GOR. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι

whether then the-same does-it-seem to-you to-be to-have-learned

καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

and to-have-believed and learning and belief or other something

GOR. οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

I-think indeed I-at-least O Socrates (something)-other

SOC. καλῶς γὰρ οἶε· γνώσῃ δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τις
well for you-think you-will-know and from-this if for someone
 σε ἔροιτο· ἄρ' ἔστιν τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς
you should-ask whether is there-any O Gorgias belief false
 καὶ ἀληθής; φαίης ἅν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.
and true you-would-say — as I think

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής;
what and knowledge is-there false and true

GOR. οὐδαμῶς.

by-no-means

SOC. δῆλον ἄρ' αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν.
(it-is)-clear then again that not the-same it-is

GOR. ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

truth you-say

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷόν τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν
but indeed the both at-least having-learned persuaded are
 καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

and the having-believed

GOR. ἔστι ταῦτα.

it-is these-things

SOC. βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν
do-you-wish then two kinds let-us-posit of-persuasion the one belief
 παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;
providing without the knowing the other knowledge

GOR. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε
which then — rhetoric persuasion makes in law-courts both
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ
and the other crowds about the just both and unjust from
ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;
which believing comes-about without the knowing or from which the knowing

GOR. δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.
(it-is)-clear surely O Socrates that from which the believing

455 SOC. ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν
— rhetoric then as it-seems of-persuasion a-craftsman is
πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε
of-the-believing-(kind) but not of-the-teaching-(kind) about the just both
καὶ ἄδικον.

and unjust

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε
nor then a-teacher the rhetor is of-law-courts both
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ
and of-the other crowds of-just-things both about and of-unjust but
πιστικὸς μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναίτο
a-persuader only not for surely a-crowd at-least — he-could
τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.
so-great in a-little time teach so great matters

GOR. οὐ δῆτα.

not indeed

Socrates asks what use the rhetor is when a city chooses doctors, shipwrights, or generals, since the expert is chosen in each case. Gorgias answers that Themistocles and Pericles, not craftsmen, gave Athens its walls and harbors, and that he himself has persuaded patients to take treatment when his doctor brother could not. Rhetoric can defeat any expert before a crowd, but like boxing it must be used justly, and the teacher is not to blame if a pupil misuses it.

SOC. φέρε δὴ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς b
 come then let-us-see what ever indeed we-mean about —
 ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι
 rhetoric I indeed for surely not-even myself yet am-able
 κατανοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἦ
 to-understand what I-mean whenever about of-physicians a-choice there-is
 τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου
 for-the city a-gathering or about shipwrights or about other
 τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς
 some craftsman class anything else than then the rhetorician
 οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἰρέσει τὸν
 not will-advise (it-is)-clear for that in each choice the
 τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ
 most-skilled one-must to-choose nor whenever of-walls about
 οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ
 building or of-harbors construction or of-dockyards but the
 ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι
 architects nor again whenever of-generals a-choice about
 ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως
 or of-a-disposition some against enemies or of-positions a-seizure
 συμβουλὴ ἦ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύουσιν,
 a-deliberation there-is but the skilled-in-generalship then will-advise
 οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα;
 the rhetoricians but not or how do-you-say O Gorgias — such-things

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους
since for yourself both you-say a-rhetor to-be and others
 ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ
to-make rhetoricians well it-is the-(things) — of-your art from
 σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν
you to-learn and me now consider also — your-(interest)
 σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον
to-be-furthering perhaps for even happens someone of-the-ones inside
 ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὥς ἐγώ τινας
being a-pupil of-you wishing to-become as I some
 σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν
nearly even many perceive who perhaps would-be-ashamed —
 σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ'
you to-question by me then being-questioned consider also by
 ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν
those to-be-questioned what for-us O Gorgias will-there-be if
 σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἰοί τε
with-you we-associate about what for-the city to-advise able —
 ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ
shall-we-be whether about just only and unjust or also about
 ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
what just-now Socrates was-saying try then them to-answer
 e GOR. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς
but I to-you will-try O Socrates clearly
 ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ
to-reveal the — of-rhetoric power whole yourself for
 καλῶς ὑφήγησά. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα
well you-led-the-way you-know for surely that the dockyards these
 καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ
and the walls the of-the-Athenians and the of-the harbors construction

ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ'
from the of-Themistocles advice have-come-about the-(rest) and

ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.
from the of-Pericles but not from the craftsmen

SOC. λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους·
are-said these-things O Gorgias about Themistocles

Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν
of-Pericles and also myself I-heard when he-was-advising us

περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.
about the through the-middle wall

GOR. καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ἢ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ 456
and whenever at-least some choice there-is of-those-which just-now you

ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορες εἰσιν οἱ
were-mentioning O Socrates you-see that the rhetors are the

συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.
(ones)-advising and the-ones carrying the resolutions about these-things

SOC. ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς
these-things also wondering-at O Gorgias long-since I-ask what

ποτε ἢ δύναμις ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαίμονιά γάρ τις
ever the power is — of-rhetoric divine for some

ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.
to-me-at-least it-appears (in)-the greatness thus (as-I)-consider

GOR. εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν b
if all-things at-least you-knew O Socrates that so a-word to-say

ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ ἔχει. μέγα
all the powers having-gathered-together under itself it-holds a-great

δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ. πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ
and to-you proof I-will-tell often for already I-at-least with the

ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἱατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα
brother and with the other physicians having-gone-in to one

τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν
of-the sick not willing either a-drug to-drink or to-cut

ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἱατροῦ
or to-cauterize to-submit to-the physician not being-able (with)-the physician
 πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ.
to-persuade I persuaded-(him) not by-other art than — by-rhetoric
 φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν
I-say and also into a-city wherever you-wish having-gone a-rhetorical
 ἄνδρα καὶ ἱατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν
man and a-physician if it-were-necessary by-speech to-contend in
 ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι
an-assembly or in other some gathering which-of-the-two must to-be-chosen
 ἱατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν
as-physician nowhere — would-appear the physician but would-be-chosen —
 τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε
the (one)-to-speak able if he-wished and if against other at-least
 δημιουργὸν ὄντινα οὖν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν
craftsman whomsoever he-should-contend he-would-persuade — himself
 ἐλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις οὖν οὐ
(them)-to-choose the rhetorician rather than another whoever not
 γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ
for there-is (anything)-about which not — more-persuasively would-speak the
 ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις οὖν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλῆθει.
rhetorician than another whoever of-the craftsmen in a-multitude
 457 ἢ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης·
the indeed then power so-great is and such of-the art
 δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ
one-must however O Socrates — rhetoric to-use just-as
 τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ
the other every contest-(skill) and for the other contest-(skill) not
 τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους,
of-this for-the-sake one-must against all to-use men
 ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν
because one-has-learned to-box both and to-fight-the-pancratium and in

ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ
 arms to-fight so-as stronger to-be both than-friends and
 ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν
 than-enemies not of-this for-the-sake the friends one-must to-strike
 οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία
 nor stab both and kill nor at-least by Zeus
 εἰάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα
 if someone to a-wrestling-school having-resorted well faring (in)-the body
 καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ
 and a-boxer having-become then the father strikes and
 τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ
 the mother or other some of-the relatives or of-the friends not
 τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
 of-this for-the-sake one-must the trainers and the in the
 ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
 arms teaching to-fight hate both and cast-out from
 τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως
 the cities those indeed for handed-(it)-over for the justly
 χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας,
 to-use these-things against the enemies and the wrongdoers
 ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες
 defending-themselves not beginning-(it) the-others but having-perverted-(it)
 χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχυρί καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς.
 use the strength and the art not rightly
 οὐκ οὖν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία b
 not-then the (ones)-having-taught (are)-wicked nor the art either to-blame
 οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι οἶμαι
 or wicked of-this for-the-sake is but the not using-(it) I-think
 ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς
 rightly the same indeed argument also about — rhetoric able
 μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς
 indeed for against all is the rhetor and about everything

λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυ
to-speak so-as more-persuasive to-be in the multitudes in-short
 περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου
about whatever — he-wishes but not-at-all any more of-this
 ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι —
for-the-sake one-must either the physicians the reputation to-take-away
 ὅτι δύναίτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι — οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους
because he-could — this do or the other
 δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ
craftsmen but justly also — rhetoric use just-as
 καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἶμαι ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾶτα
also the contest-(skill) if but I-think a-rhetorician having-become someone and-then
 ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα
by-this — power and the art does-wrong not the (one)-having-taught
 δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκείνος
one-must to-hate both and cast-out from the cities that-man
 μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίου χρεῖα παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως
indeed for for just use handed-(it)-over the-other but contrariwise
 χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ
uses-(it) the-one then not rightly using to-hate (is)-just and
 ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτευνᾶν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.
to-cast-out and to-kill but not the (one)-having-taught

VII • REFUTATION AMONG FRIENDS

Socrates says that many discussions end in anger because each side thinks the other is speaking out of envy toward it and contending for victory rather than seeking the truth. He would gladly be refuted, since to be rid of a false opinion is a greater good than to rid another of one, and he asks whether Gorgias is the same kind of man. Gorgias says he is but worries about detaining the audience; Chaerephon reports their clamor to hear more, Callicles says he has never enjoyed a discussion so much, and Gorgias agrees to continue.

soc. οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν d
I-think O Gorgias also you experienced to-be in-many
 λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ
discussions and to-have-observed in them — the-following that not
 ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι
easily they-are-able about what — they-undertake to-converse
 διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
having-defined-(them) to each-other and having-learned and having-taught
 ἑαυτοὺς, οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ
each-other thus to-break-up the meetings but if about
 του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον
something they-dispute and not says the one the other
 ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ
rightly to-speak or not clearly they-grow-angry both and out-of
 φθόνον οἶονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικούντας ἀλλ'
envy they-think the-(envy) of-themselves (them)-to-speak contending-for-victory but
 οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἔνιοί γε
not seeking the (thing)-set-before in the discussion and some at-least
 τελευτῶντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες
at-last most-shamefully depart having-reviled-(each-other)
 τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα
both and having-said and having-beard about their-own selves such-things
 οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν,
as even the (ones)-present to-be-vexed on-behalf-of their-own selves
 ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι.
that of-such men they-thought-fit bearers to-become
 τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ
of-what then for-the-sake do-I-say these-things because now to-me you-seem you not
 πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον
quite consistent-things to-say nor in-accord with-what at first
 ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε,
you-said about — rhetoric I-fear then to-refute you

μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν
lest me you-suppose not toward the matter contending-for-victory to-speak
τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.

(for)-the evident to-become but toward you

458 ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ
I then if indeed also you are of-the men of-whom-very also
ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτώην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐώην

I gladly — you would-question-thoroughly if but not I-would-let-(it)-be

ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων
— I but of-whom am of-those gladly indeed — being-refuted

εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων εἴ
if anything not true I-say gladly and — refuting if

τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν
anyone anything not true should-say not less-gladly however

ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν
being-refuted than refuting a-greater for it good

ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι
I-consider by-as-much-as a-greater good it-is oneself to-be-rid

κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι
of-evil the greatest than another to-rid nothing for I-think

τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς περὶ
so-great an-evil to-be for-a-man as opinion false about

ᾧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὢν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς
what happens now for-us the discussion being if indeed then also you say

τοιούτου εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρήναι
such to-be let-us-converse if but also it-seems-good to-be-necessary

εἶναι, ἐώμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.
to-let-(it)-be let-us-let-(it) now go and let-us-break-up the discussion

c GOR. ἀλλὰ φημί μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς
but I-say indeed I-at-least O Socrates also myself

τοιούτου εἶναι οἶον σὺ ὑφηγῇ· ἴσως μέντοι χρήν ἐννοεῖν
such to-be as you lead-the-way perhaps however one-ought to-consider

καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ
 also the (wish)-of-the (ones)-present long-ago for surely before even
 ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ
 you came I to-the (ones)-present many-things displayed and
 νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἣν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν
 now perhaps far we-shall-draw-(it)-out if we-converse to-consider
 οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχομεν
 then one-must also the (wish)-of-these lest some of-them we-detain
 βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

wishing something also else to-do

CHAE. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ
 the indeed clamor O Gorgias both and Socrates yourselves
 ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἐάν
 you-hear of-these — men wishing to-hear if
 τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη
 anything you-say to-me and then also myself not may-there-come so-great
 ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων
 business so-that such discussions and thus being-conducted
 ἀφεμένῳ προϋργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.

having-let-go more-pressing something to-be else to-do

CAL. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς d
 by the gods O Chaerephon and indeed truly also myself
 πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε
 at-many already discussions having-been-present not I-know if ever
 ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κὰν τὴν
 I-was-delighted thus as now so-that to-me-at-least even-if the
 ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

day whole you-are-willing to-converse you-will-gratify

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν
 but indeed O Callicles — at-least my-(part) nothing
 κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

prevents if-indeed is-willing Gorgias

e GOR. αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ
 shameful then (for)-the rest O Socrates it-becomes me
 γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι
 at-least not to-be-willing myself having-invited-(people) to-ask whatever
 τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ
 anyone wishes but if it-seems-good to-these converse both and
 ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.
 ask whatever you-wish

VIII · DOES THE RHETOR KNOW JUSTICE?

Socrates draws out Gorgias' claim that the rhetor is more persuasive than the doctor before a crowd, that is, among people who do not know. So the ignorant man is more persuasive than the expert among the ignorant, and rhetoric needs no knowledge of its subjects, only a device for seeming to know. Socrates then asks whether the rhetor stands in the same relation to the just and the unjust, and whether a pupil must already know these before coming to Gorgias.

SOC. ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
 hear then O Gorgias what I-wonder-at in the things-said
 ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ
 by you perhaps for surely you rightly speaking I not
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι,
 rightly understand-(it) a-rhetorician you-say to-make able — to-be
 ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μαθάνειν;
 if anyone wishes from you to-learn
 GOR. ναί.

yes

459 SOC. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ
 therefore about all-things so-as in a-crowd persuasive to-be not
 διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;
 teaching but persuading

GOR. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

certainly indeed then

SOC. ἔλεγες τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ
you-were-saying surely just-now that even about the healthful than-the
 ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

physician more-persuasive will-be the rhetor

GOR. καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

and for I-was-saying-(so) in at-least a-crowd

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ
therefore the in a-crowd this is among the not
 εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ
knowing not for surely among at-least the knowing than-the physician
 πιθανώτερος ἔσται.

more-persuasive he-will-be

GOR. ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

truth you-say

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ
therefore if-indeed than-the physician more-persuasive he-will-be than-the
 εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίνεταί;

knowing-(one) more-persuasive he-becomes

GOR. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκ ἱατρός γε ὢν ἢ γάρ;

not a-physician at-least being is-it-not for

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν
the-one and not a-physician at-least surely (is)-unknowing of-what
 ὁ ἱατρός ἐπιστήμων.

the physician (is)-knowing

GOR. δηλὸν ὅτι.

(it-is)-clear that

b

SOC. ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ
the-one not knowing then than-the knowing among not
 εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ
knowing more-persuasive will-be whenever the rhetor than-the physician
 πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;
more-persuasive is this follows or other something

GOR. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.
this here at-least follows

c SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως
therefore also about the other all arts likewise
 ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα
is-(so) the rhetor and — rhetoric themselves indeed the matters
 οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ
not-at-all there-is-need it to-know how they-are a-device but
 τινα πειθοῦς ἡρύκηναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι
some of-persuasion to-have-discovered so-as to-appear to-the not knowing
 μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδόντων.
more to-know than-the knowing

GOR. οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ
therefore much ease O Socrates arises not
 μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν
having-learned the other arts but one this in-nothing
 ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;
to-be-inferior to-the craftsmen

460 SOC. εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν
whether indeed is-inferior or not is-inferior the rhetor to-the
 ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα,
others on-account-of the thus being presently we-shall-examine
 εἴαν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ. νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον
if at-all for-us pertinent-to the-argument it-is now but this first
 σκεψόμεθα, ἅρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον
let-us-examine then be-happens about the just and the unjust

καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως
and the shameful and the fine and good and bad thus
 ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα
being the rhetorician as about the healthful and about the other-things
 ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν
of-which the other arts-(are) themselves indeed not knowing what good
 ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ
or what bad is or what fine or what shameful or just or
 ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν
unjust persuasion but about them having-contrived so-as to-seem
 εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ
to-know not knowing among not knowing more than-the knowing or
 ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι
(is-it)-necessary to-know and must knowing-beforehand these-things to-come
 παρὰ σέ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ
to you the (one)-about to-learn — rhetoric if but
 μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν
not you the — of-rhetoric teacher of-these indeed nothing
 διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον — οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —
will-teach the (one)-coming not for (is-it)-your work
 ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ
you-will-make but among the many to-seem to-know him —
 τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ
such-things not knowing and to-seem good to-be not being or —
 παράπαν οὐχ οἶός τε ἔση αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν,
altogether not able — will-you-be him to-teach — rhetoric
 ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ
if not be-knows-beforehand about these-things the truth or how —
 τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες,
such-things are O Gorgias and by Zeus just-as just-now you-said
 ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμὶς ἐστίν.
having-uncovered — of-rhetoric say what ever the power is

Gorgias says that a pupil who does not know justice will learn it from him. Socrates argues that whoever has learned justice is just, and the just man never wishes to do wrong, so the rhetor can never use his art unjustly. But Gorgias had said earlier that a rhetor might misuse it and that the teacher was not to blame, and at the start that rhetoric is about the just and the unjust. The statements do not agree, and Socrates says that how they really stand would take no small sitting to examine properly.

GOR. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ
but I indeed think O Socrates if be-happens not
εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.
knowing also these-things from me be-will-learn

SOC. ἔχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα
hold-(on) then well for you-say if-indeed a-rhetorician you someone
ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
make (it-is)-necessary him to-know the just-things and the unjust-things
ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.
either before at-least or later having-learned-(them) from you

b GOR. πάννυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός,
what then the-one the carpentry-matters having-learned (is)-a-carpenter
ἢ οὐ;
or not

GOR. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;
therefore also the-one the musical-matters (is)-musical

GOR. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός; καὶ τᾶλλα
and the-one the medical-matters (is)-a-medical-(man) and the-other-things
 οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα
thus according-to the same account the-one having-learned each-thing
 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;
such is as the knowledge each-one produces

GOR. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια
therefore according-to this — account also the-one the just-things
 μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;
having-learned (is)-just

GOR. πάντως δήπου.
altogether surely

SOC. ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.
the and just just-things surely does

GOR. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ
therefore (it-is)-necessary the rhetorician just to-be the and
 δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;
just to-wish just-things to-do

GOR. φαίνεται γε.
it-appears at-least

SOC. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.
never then will-wish the at-least just to-do-wrong

GOR. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity

SOC. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον
the and rhetorician (it-is)-necessary from the argument just
 εἶναι.
to-be

GOR. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

never then will-wish the rhetorician to-do-wrong

GOR. οὐ φαίνεται γέ.

not it-appears at-least

- d SOC. μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρηταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρήται καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τη ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρήται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;
- GOR. ἐρρήθη.

it-was-said

- e SOC. νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;
- GOR. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο
and in the first at-least O Gorgias discussions it-was-said
 ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ
that — rhetoric about discourses was not those of-the even and
 περιπτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἥ γάρ;
odd but those of-the just and unjust is-it-not for
 GOR. ναί.

yes
 SOC. ἐγὼ τοῖνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον
I therefore you then these-things saying supposed
 ὥς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πράγμα, ὃ
that never — would-be — rhetoric an-unjust thing which
 γ' αἰὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ
at-least always about justice the discourses makes when
 δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ
but a-little later you-were-saying that the rhetor — rhetoric
 καὶ ἀδίκως χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ
even unjustly might-use thus having-wondered and having-considered not
 συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι
to-be-in-accord the things-said those I-spoke the words that
 εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ,
if indeed a-gain you-considered to-be the being-refuted just-as I
 ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν χαίρειν.
worth-while it-would-be to-converse if but not to-let-(it) go
 ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπούμενων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς
later but we examining you-see indeed also yourself
 ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως
that again it-is-agreed the rhetorician unable to-be unjustly
 χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν
to-use — rhetoric and to-be-willing to-do-wrong these-things then

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ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης
how ever they-stand by the dog O Gorgias not of-a-little
 συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.
sitting-together is-(the-work) so-as adequately to-examine-thoroughly

X • POLUS INTERVENES

Polus protests that Gorgias was only shamed into conceding that a rhetor must know justice, and that leading him into such questions is boorish. Socrates welcomes correction, since we acquire companions and sons to set us right when we stumble, and offers to retract anything if Polus will only avoid long speeches. Polus asks whether he may not speak as much as he likes; Socrates grants that Athens allows free speech but says he may leave rather than listen, and invites Polus to question or answer.

c POL. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
what and O Socrates thus also you about — rhetoric
 δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἶει — ὅτι Γοργίας ἡσχύνθη
do-you-believe just-as now you-say or do-you-think that Gorgias was-ashamed
 σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ
before-you not to-concede-further the rhetorical man — —
 καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἶδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ἐὰν
also the just-things to-know and the fine and the good and if
 μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα
not he-comes these-things knowing to him himself to-teach-(him) then
 ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν
from this perhaps — admission contrary something resulted in
 τοῖς λόγοις — τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ
the arguments this which indeed you-love yourself having-led-(him) to
 τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα — ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ
such questions since whom do-you-think will-deny —

οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; —

— also himself to-understand the just-things and others to-teach

ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους.

but to — such-things to-lead much boorishness is the arguments

SOC. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα d

O finest Polus but surely on-purpose we-acquire

ἐταίρους καὶ υἱέις, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι

companions and sons so-that when ourselves older having-become

σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε

we-stumble being-present you the younger may-set-right

ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν

our — life both in deeds and in words and now

εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα,

if in-anything I and Gorgias in the arguments stumble

σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου — δίκαιος δ' εἶ — καὶ ἐγὼ

you being-present set-(it)-right entitled and you-are and I

ἐθέλω τῶν ὠμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς

am-willing of-the things-agreed if anything to-you seems not well

ὠμολογήσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι

to-have-been-agreed to-retract whatever — you wish if for-me

ἐν μόνον φυλάττης.

one-thing only you-keep

POL. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

what this do-you-mean

SOC. τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξης, ἥ τὸ

the long-speaking O Polus if you-restrain which at

πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

first you-attempted to-use

POL. τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν

what and not will-it-be-permitted to-me to-say as-much-as —

βούλωμαι;

I-wish

e SOC. δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε
terrible-things however you-would-suffer O best-(of-men) if to-Athens
 ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ
having-come where — of-Greece greatest is liberty of-the
 λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσῃς.
speaking then you here of-this alone should-fail

462 ἀλλὰ ἀντίθεσ τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ
but set-against-(it) surely you at-length speaking and not being-willing the
 ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι,
thing-asked to-answer not terrible-things — in-turn I would-suffer
 εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ
if not it-will-be-permitted to-me to-go-away and not to-listen to-you but if
 τι κήδη τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι
at-all you-care for-the argument the (one)-said and to-set-right
 αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι
it you-wish just-as just-now I-was-saying having-retracted whatever
 σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος,
to-you seems-good in — turn asking both and being-asked
 ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς
just-as I both and Gorgias refute both and be-refuted you-say
 γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὐ;
for surely also you to-understand what-very Gorgias-(does) or not

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε ὅτι
therefore also you bid-(people) yourself to-ask each-time whatever
 ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
— anyone wishes as knowing-(how) to-answer

POL. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

certainly indeed then

SOC. καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.
and now indeed of-these whichever you-wish do ask or answer

XI · RHETORIC IS A KNACK, NOT AN ART

Asked what art rhetoric is, Socrates says it is no art at all but a kind of experience that produces gratification and pleasure, as cookery is; both are parts of one pursuit he calls flattery, which has many parts, beautification and sophistic among them. Rhetoric is an image of a part of politics, and it is shameful, since he calls what is bad shameful. Gorgias confesses he does not understand, and asks Socrates to leave Polus be and explain to him.

POL. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες·
but I-will-do these-things and to-me answer O Socrates
 ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς,
since Gorgias to-be-at-a-loss to-you seems about — rhetoric
 σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;
you it what do-you-say to-be

SOC. ἄρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;
then do-you-ask what art I-say-(it) to-be

POL. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ
none to-me-at-least it-seems O Polus so at-least to you
 τάληθῃ εἰρησθαι.
the-truth to-be-told

POL. ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
but what to-you seems — rhetoric to-be

- c SOC. πρᾶγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ
a-thing which you-say you to-have-made an-art in the
 συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγων.
treatise which I lately read
 POL. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
what this do-you-mean
 SOC. ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.
an-experience I-at-least some
 POL. ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
an-experience then to-you seems — rhetoric to-be
 SOC. ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.
to-me-at-least if not something you other say
 POL. τίνος ἐμπειρία;
of-what an-experience
 SOC. χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.
of-gratification some and of-pleasure of-production
 POL. οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι
therefore fine to-you seems — rhetoric to-be to-gratify
 οἶόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;
able — to-be men
 d SOC. τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ
what and O Polus already have-you-learned from me what I-say
 αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ
it to-be so-that the-(thing) after this you-ask whether not
 καλὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;
fine to-me it-seems to-be
 POL. οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι;
not for have-I-learned that an-experience some it you-say to-be
 SOC. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν
do-you-wish then since you-honor the gratifying a-small
 τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;
something to-me to-gratify

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ask now me cookery what to-me seems art to-be

POL. ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;

I-ask then what art (is)-cookery

SOC. οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

none O Polus

POL. ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.

but what say

SOC. φημὶ δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις.

I-say then an-experience some

POL. τίς; φάθι.

what say

SOC. φημὶ δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. e

I-say then of-gratification and of-pleasure of-production O Polus

POL. ταυτὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ;

the-same then is cookery and rhetoric

SOC. οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως

by-no-means at-least but of-the same indeed pursuit

μόριον.

a-part

POL. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

of-what do-you-mean this

SOC. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ 463

(I-fear)-lest too-boorish it-be the truth to-say I-hesitate

γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οὔηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν

for of-Gorgias for-the-sake to-speak lest he-think me to-be-ridiculing

τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἢ

— *his-own pursuit I but if indeed this is* —

ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα — καὶ γὰρ

rhetoric which Gorgias pursues not I-know and for

ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί
just-now from the discussion nothing to-us evident became what
 ποτε οὗτος ἡγείται — ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν,
ever this-man considers-(it) what but I call — rhetoric
 πράγματός τινός ἐστι μῦθον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.
of-a-thing some is a-part of-none of-the fine-(ones)

GOR. τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῆς.

of-what O Socrates say in-no-way me be-asbamed-before

- b SOC. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα
it-seems therefore to-me O Gorgias to-be some pursuit
 τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
artful indeed not of-a-soul but shrewd and bold and
 φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ
by-nature clever to-deal-with the men I-call and of-it
 ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακεῖαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς
I the sum flattery of-this to-me there-seem the
 ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μέρη εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ
pursuit many indeed also other parts to-be one and also —
 ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος,
cookery which seems indeed to-be an-art as but — my account
 οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μῦθον καὶ
not it-is an-art but an-experience and a-routine of-this a-part also
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν
— rhetoric I call and — at-least beautification and —
 σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μέρη ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν.
sophistic four these parts over four things
 εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ
if then wishes Polus to-inquire let-him-inquire not for
 πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μῦθον εἶναι
yet he-has-learned what-sort I-say I of-the flattery part to-be
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος,
— rhetoric but him I-am-unnoticed-by not-yet having-answered

ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ
he but asks-further whether not fine I-consider-(it) to-be I but to-him
 οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι
not will-answer first whether fine or shameful I-consider
 εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν.
to-be — rhetoric before — first I-answer what it-is
 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα
not for (it-is)-just O Polus but if-indeed you-wish to-learn ask
 ὁποῖον μόνιον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.
what-sort part of-the flattery I-say to-be — rhetoric
 POL. ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόνιον.

I-ask then and answer what-sort part
 SOC. ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένους; ἔστιν γὰρ d
so then — would-you-understand (me)-having-answered is for
 ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου
— rhetoric according-to — my account of-political-(art) of-a-part
 εἰδῶλον.

an-image

POL. τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;
what then fine or shameful do-you-say it to-be
 SOC. αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε — τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ καλῷ —
shameful I-at-least the for bad-things shameful I-call
 ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ
since one-must to-you to-answer as already knowing what I
 λέγω.

mean

GOR. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς
by — Zeus O Socrates but I not-even myself
 συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.
understand what you-mean

e SOC. εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω,
reasonably at-least O Gorgias nothing for yet clear I-say

Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

Polus but here young is and sharp

GOR. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις
but this-man indeed let-be to-me but say how you-mean

πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

of-political-(art) of-a-part an-image to-be — rhetoric

XII • THE FOUR ARTS AND THEIR COUNTERFEITS

Socrates first separates a seeming good condition of body and soul from a real one, then lays out two arts, politics for the soul and the nameless care of the body, each with two parts: legislation and justice for the soul, gymnastic and medicine for the body. Flattery has slipped beneath each part and pretends to be it, aiming at pleasure without regard for the best; it is not an art but an experience, since it can give no account of what it does. Cookery counterfeits medicine, beautification gymnastic, sophistic legislation, and rhetoric justice. Socrates asks pardon for the length of his answer, since Polus could not use a short one.

464 SOC. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται
but I will-try to-explain what at-least to-me appears

εἶναι ἢ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, Πῶλος
to-be — rhetoric if but not it-happens being this Polus

ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;
here will-refute-(me) body surely do-you-call something and soul

GOR. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
how for not

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου
therefore also of-these do-you-think some to-be of-each

εὐεξίαν;

good-condition

GOR. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον
what and a-seeming indeed good-condition being but not such-as
 τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα,
the-following I-mean many seem well to-be (in)-the bodies
 οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν,
whom not — easily would-perceive anyone that not well they-are
 ἀλλ' ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

but except a-physician both and of-the gymnastic-trainers someone

GOR. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

truth you-say

SOC. τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, b
 — *such-thing I-say both in body to-be and in soul*
 ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν,
which makes indeed to-seem well to-be the body and the soul
 ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

it-is but none the-more

GOR. ἔστι ταῦτα.

it-is these-things

SOC. φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ c
come then to-you if I-am-able more-clearly I-will-show what
 λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντων τοῖν πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν
I-mean two being the things two I-say arts the
 μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι
one over the soul political I-call the-one and over body
 μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μίᾱς δὲ οὕσης
one indeed thus to-name not I-am-able for-you one but being
 τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μέρη λέγω, τὴν μὲν
the of-the body care two parts I-say the one
 γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ
gymnastic the other medicine of-the and political in-place

μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ
 indeed — of-gymnastic — legislation counterpart and —
 ἱατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις,
 to-medicine the justice they-share indeed truly with-each-other
 ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἐκότεραι τούτων, ἣ τε
 inasmuch-as about the same being each-pair of-these the both
 ἱατρικῇ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ·
 medicine — with-gymnastic and the justice — with-legislation
 ὁμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ
 nevertheless but they-differ somewhat from-each-other four then
 τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν
 these being and always toward the best tending
 τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ
 the-ones indeed the body the-others and the soul the flattering-(art)
 αἰσθομένη — οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη —
 having-perceived-(it) not having-known I-say but having-guessed
 τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν
 four-ways itself having-divided having-slipped under each of-the
 μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδν, καὶ τοῦ
 parts pretends to-be this what-very it-slipped-under and of-the
 μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται
 indeed best nothing it-cares by-the but ever pleasantest it-bunts
 τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι.
 the folly and deceives so-that it-seems of-most worth to-be
 ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδκεν, καὶ
 under indeed then — medicine — cookery has-slipped and
 προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ'
 pretends the best foods for-the body to-know so-that
 εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ
 if it-were-necessary among children to-contend a-cook both and
 ἱατρον, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες,
 a-physician or among men so senseless as the children

πότερος ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν,
which-of-the-two understands about the good foods and bad
 ὁ ἱατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῶ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν.
the physician or the cook by-hunger — would-die the physician
 κολακεῖαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ 465
flattery indeed then it I-call and shameful I-say to-be —
 τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε — τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω — ὅτι
such-thing O Polus this for to you I-say because
 τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν
at-the pleasant it-aims without the best an-art but it
 οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα
not I-say to-be but an-experience because not it-has account any
 ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὅποι' ἄττα τὴν
of-that-to-which it-applies what it-applies of-what-sort they in-their
 φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.
nature are so-that the cause of-each not to-be-able to-state
 ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πράγμα·
I but an-art not call whatever — is an-irrational thing
 τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.
these-things but about if you-dispute I-am-willing to-submit an-account
 τῇ μὲν οὖν ἱατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἢ ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεῖα b
under-the indeed then medicine as I-say the culinary flattery
 ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
lies — and under-gymnastic in the same manner this
 ἢ κομμωτικῇ, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννής
— beautification mischievous both and deceitful and ignoble
 καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι
and illiberal by-shapes and by-colors and by-smoothness
 καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος
and by-garments deceiving so-as to-make alien beauty
 ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς
(men)-drawing-on of-the own-(beauty) the-(one) through — gymnastic

ἀμελεῖν. ἔν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ
to-neglect so-that then not I-speak-at-length I-am-willing to-you to-say just-as
 οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσῃς — ὅτι
the geometers already for — perhaps you-might-follow that
 ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς
what beautification-(is) to gymnastic this sophistic-(is) to
 νομοθετικὴν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο
legislation and that what cookery-(is) to medicine this
 ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε
rhetoric-(is) to justice what-very however I-say they-stand-apart
 μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν
indeed thus by-nature inasmuch-as but near being they-are-mixed-up in
 τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ
the same and about the-same-things sophists and rhetors and not
 ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι
they-have what they-shall-do either themselves with-themselves or the other
 ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι
men with-these and for — if not the soul over-the body
 ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο
presided but it over-itself and not by this were-observed
 καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ
and were-distinguished the both cookery and the medicine but itself
 τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς
the body judged weighing-(them) by-the gratifications the toward
 αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ᾔην, ὧ
itself the-(saying) — of-Anaxagoras — much-(in-force) would-be O
 φίλε Πῶλε — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος — ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα
friend Polus you for in-these (are)-experienced together — all
 χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν
things would-be-mixed-up in the same undistinguished being the
 τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν
both medical and healthful and cookery-(matters) what indeed then

ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον
I say — rhetoric to-be you-have-heard the-counterpart
 ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν
of-cookery in soul as that in body perhaps indeed then
 ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔων μακροὺς λόγους
a-strange-thing I-have-done that you not allowing long speeches
 λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν
to-make myself a-lengthy speech have-stretched-out worthy indeed then
 ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχεία
for-me pardon to-have it-is speaking for me briefly
 οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι
not you-understood nor to-use the answer which to-you
 ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως.
I-answered at-all able — you-were but you-needed a-narrative

XIII · DO RHETORS HAVE POWER?

Polus asks whether good rhetors are really regarded as flatterers, worthless in their cities, when like tyrants they kill, exile, and confiscate whomever they please. Socrates answers that rhetors and tyrants have the least power in their cities, if having power is a good for the one who has it: they do what seems best to them but not what they wish, and doing what seems best without sense is bad. Polus calls this outrageous; Socrates dares him to refute it, and Polus agrees to answer questions so as to learn what he means.

ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι
if indeed then also I you answering not have what
 χρῆσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με
I-am-to-use stretch-out also you a-speech if but I-have let me

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χρησθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτη τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ
use-(it) just for and now this — answer if
 τι ἔχεις χρησθαι, χρῶ.

in-any-way you-can use use-(it)

POL. τί οὖν φής; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἢ ῥητορική;
what then do-you-say flattery seems to-you to-be — rhetoric

SOC. κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ
of-flattery indeed then I-at-least said a-part but not
 μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;
do-you-remember so-old being O Polus what soon will-you-do

POL. ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
so then do-they-seem to-you as flatterers in the cities

φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;
worthless to-be-considered the good rhetors

b SOC. ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις;
a-question this do-you-ask or of-a-speech some a-beginning do-you-say

POL. ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.
I-ask I-at-least

SOC. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
not-even to-be-considered to-me-at-least they-seem

POL. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς
how not to-be-considered not greatest do-they-have-power in the
 πόλεσιν;
cities

SOC. οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι
no if the having-power at-least you-mean a-good something to-be
 τῷ δυναμένῳ.
for-the (one)-having-power

POL. ἀλλὰ μὲν λέγω γε.
but indeed I-mean-(it) at-least

SOC. ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
the-least therefore to-me they-seem of-those in the city
 δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

to-have-power the rhetors

POL. τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτευνάσιν τε
what and not just-as the tyrants do-they-kill both
 ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ
whomever — they-wish and take-away property and
 ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
cast-out from the cities whomever — it-seems-good to-them

SOC. νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου
by the dog I-am-in-doubt truly O Polus at each
 ὦν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ
of-the-things-which you-say whether yourself these-things you-say and
 γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

an-opinion of-your-own you-are-declaring or me you-are-asking

POL. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

but I-at-least you am-asking

SOC. εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;
well O friend then two at-once me do-you-ask

POL. πῶς δύο;

how two

SOC. οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· ἦ οὐχὶ
not just-now thus somehow you-were-saying is-it-not not
 ἀποκτευνάσιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὕς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ
do-they-kill the rhetors whomever — they-wish just-as
 οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν
the tyrants and property take-away and drive-out
 ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

from the cities whomever — it-seems-good to-them

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

- e SOC. λέγω τοῖνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ ἐρωτήματα,
I-say therefore to-you that two these are the questions
καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημὶ γάρ,
and I-will-answer at-least you to both I-say for
ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους
O Polus I both the rhetors and the tyrants
δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ
to-have-power indeed in the cities the-least just-as just-now
ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,
I-was-saying nothing for to-do of-what they-wish so a-word to-say
ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι.
to-do however whatever — to-them seems best to-be
- POL. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
therefore this is the great having-power
- SOC. οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.
no as at-least says Polus
- POL. ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
I not say-(so) I-say indeed then I-at-least
- SOC. μὰ τὸν — οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφησ
by the not you at-least since the great having-power you-said
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
good to-be for-the (one)-having-power
- POL. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.
I-say-(so) for then
- SOC. ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ
good then do-you-think to-be if anyone does these-things which
ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο
— seem to-him best to-be sense not having and this
καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι;
do-you-call you great to-have-power
- POL. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
not I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ 467
 therefore you-will-prove the rhetors sense having and
 τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας;
 an-art — rhetoric but not flattery me having-refuted
 εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν
 if but me you-let unrefuted the rhetors the (ones)-doing in
 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν
 the cities what seems-good to-them and the tyrants nothing
 ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ
 good this will-have-gained the but power is as you
 φῆς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ
 say a-good the but doing without sense what seems-good also you
 ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὐ;
 agree bad to-be or not

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι
 how — then the rhetors great could-have-power or the tyrants
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου
 in the cities if not Socrates is-refuted by Polus
 ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
 that they-do what they-wish

POL. οὗτος ἀνὴρ —

this man

SOC. οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μὲν ἔλεγε.
 not I-say to-do them what they-wish but me refute

POL. οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς
 not just-now were-you-agreeing (them)-to-do what seems to-them
 βέλτιστα εἶναι;
 best to-be

SOC. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
 and for now I-agree

b

POL. οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;
not then do-they-do what they-wish

SOC. οὐ φημι.
not I-say

POL. ποιούντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
doing what seems-good to-them

SOC. φημί.
I-say-(so)

POL. σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
outrageous-things at-least you-say and monstrous O Socrates

c SOC. μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε
do-not revile O excellent Polus so-that I-may-address you
κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπιδείξον
after your-(own-style) but if indeed you-can me to-question show
ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.
that I-lie if but not yourself answer

POL. ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι
but I-am-willing to-answer so-that also I-may-know what
λέγεις.
you-mean

XIV · WHAT WE WISH AND WHAT WE DO

People who take medicine or sail on trade wish not the drinking or the sailing but the health or the wealth for whose sake they act. Things are good, bad, or in between, and the intermediate things such as walking or killing are done for the sake of the good. So whoever kills or exiles someone thinking it better for himself, when it is in fact worse, does what seems good to him but not what he wishes, and has no great power.

SOC. *πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο*
whether then to-you seem the men this
βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐ
to-wish which — they-do each-time or that of-which
ἔνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ
for-the-sake they-do this which they-do such-as the-ones the
φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν
drugs drinking from the physicians whether to-you do-they-seem
τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ
this to-wish what-very they-do to-drink the drug and
ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν;
to-suffer-pain or that the being-healthy of-which for-the-sake they-drink
 POL. *δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.*

d

(it-is)-clear that the being-healthy
 SOC. *οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν*
therefore also the sailing both and the other money-making
χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν
making-money not this is what they-wish which they-do
ἐκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ
each-time who for wishes to-sail both and to-run-risks and
πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὐ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν,
troubles to-have but that I-think of-which for-the-sake they-sail
πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν.
to-be-rich of-wealth for for-the-sake they-sail
 POL. *πάνυ γε.*

certainly at-least
 SOC. *ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τις τι*
anything else then thus also about all-things if anyone anything
πράττει ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει,
does for-the-sake of-something not this he-wishes which he-does
ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα πράττει;
but that of-which for-the-sake he-does-(it)

e

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν
so then is-there anything of-the things which not either good
 γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξύ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
at-least is or bad or between these neither good nor
 κακόν;

bad

POL. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

great necessity O Socrates

SOC. οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν
therefore you-say to-be good indeed wisdom both and health
 καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τὰναντία
and wealth and the-other-things — such-things bad and the-opposites
 τούτων;

of-these

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

468 SOC. τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις,
the and neither good nor bad then such-things do-you-mean
 ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ
which sometimes indeed partake of-the good sometimes and of-the
 κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν
bad sometimes and of-neither such-as to-sit and to-walk
 καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἶον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ
and to-run and to-sail and such-as again stones and sticks and
 τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα
the-other-things — such-things not these do-you-mean or other some-things
 καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά;

do-you-call the neither good nor bad

POL. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

no but these

SOC. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν
whether then the intermediate these for-the-sake of-the good

πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;
do-they-do whenever they-do-(them) or the-good-things (for)-the between

POL. τὰ μεταξὺ δῆπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
the between surely (for)-the good

b

SOC. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν
the good then pursuing both we-walk whenever

βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν
we-walk thinking better to-be and the opposite we-stand

ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ οὐ;
whenever we-stand of-the same for-the-sake the good or not

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν, καὶ
therefore also we-kill if anyone we-kill and

ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον
we-cast-out and we-take-away property thinking better

εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;
to-be for-us these-things to-do than not

POL. πάννυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
for-the-sake then of-the good all these-things do the

ποιοῦντες.
doers

POL. φημί.
I-say-(so)

c SOC. οὐκοῦν ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν,
therefore we-agreed what for-the-sake of-something we-do
 μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα
not those-things to-wish but that of-which for-the-sake these-things
 ποιοῦμεν;

we-do

POL. μάλιστα.

most-certainly

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
not then to-slaughter we-wish nor to-cast-out from
 τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως,
the cities nor property to-take-away simply thus
 ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἦ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν
but if indeed beneficial are these-things we-wish to-do
 αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ
them harmful but being not we-wish the for good-things
 βουλόμεθα, ὥς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ
we-wish as say you the but neither good nor bad not
 βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ
we-wish nor the bad is-it-not for truth to-you do-I-seem
 λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἦ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;

to-say O Polus or not why not do-you-answer

POL. ἀληθῆ.

truth

d SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει
therefore if-indeed these-things we-agree if anyone kills
 τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα,
anyone or casts-(him)-out from a-city or takes-away property
 εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι
whether a-tyrant being or a-rhetor thinking better to-be

αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ᾧ
for-himself it-happens but being worse this-man surely does what
 δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ γάρ;

seems-good to-him is-it-not for

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ᾧ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα
so then also what he-wishes if-indeed happen these-things
 κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;

bad being why not do-you-answer

POL. ἀλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ᾧ βούλεται.

but not to-me he-seems to-do what he-wishes

SOC. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν
is-there then any-way-in-which — such-man great has-power in
 τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν
the city this if-indeed is the great having-power a-good
 τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

something according-to — your admission

POL. οὐκ ἔστιν.

not there-is

SOC. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον
truth then I was-saying saying that it-is-possible a-man
 ποιῶντα ἐν πόλει ᾧ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι
doing in a-city what seems-good to-him not great to-have-power
 μηδὲ ποιεῖν ᾧ βούλεται.

nor to-do what he-wishes

Polus asks whether Socrates would not accept the freedom to do as he liked and envy those who kill and confiscate at will. Socrates says the unjust killer is wretched and pitiable, the just killer unenviable, and that doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering it. A man with a dagger in the crowded marketplace can kill anyone he pleases, yet Polus agrees that is not great power, since he is punished. Killing is better done justly and worse unjustly; Polus says a child could refute that.

POL. ὥς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναι
as-if indeed you O Socrates not — would-accept to-be-permitted
σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ
for-you to-do whatever seems-good to-you in the city rather than
μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν
not nor you-envy whenever you-see anyone either having-killed whom
ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα.
it-seemed-good to-him or having-taken-away property or having-imprisoned

SOC. δικάως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;
justly do-you-mean or unjustly

469 POL. ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν;
whichever — he-does not either-way enviable is-it

SOC. εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.
bush O Polus

POL. τί δῆ;
why indeed

SOC. ὅτι οὐ χρή οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε
because not one-ought either the unenviable to-envy or
τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.
the wretched but to-pity

POL. τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω
what and thus to-you does-it-seem to-be about whom I speak
τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
of-the men

SOC. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

POL. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνουσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ,

whoever then kills whomever — it-seems-good to-him

δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;

justly killing wretched seems to-you to-be and pitiable

SOC. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

not to-me-at-least nor however enviable

POL. οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

not just-now wretched were-you-saying (him)-to-be

SOC. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν b

the-one unjustly at-least O comrade having-killed and pitiable

γε πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωντον.

at-least besides the-one but justly unenviable

POL. ἦ που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε

truly surely the-one at-least dying unjustly pitiable both

καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

and wretched is

SOC. ἥττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἥττον ἢ

less than the-one killing O Polus and less than

ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

the-one justly dying

POL. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

how indeed O Socrates

SOC. οὕτως, ὥς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ

thus since greatest of-the evils happens being the

ἀδικεῖν.

doing-wrong

POL. ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον;

truly for (is)-this greatest not the being-wronged greater

SOC. ἥκιστα γε.

least at-least

POL. σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
you then would-wish — to-be-wronged rather than to-do-wrong

c SOC. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον
I-would-wish indeed — I-at-least neither if but necessary
 εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι
it-were to-do-wrong or to-be-wronged I-would-choose — rather to-be-wronged
 ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

than to-do-wrong

POL. σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;
you then to-be-tyrant not — would-accept

SOC. οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.
no if the being-tyrant at-least you-mean what-very I-(do)

POL. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν
but I-at-least this mean what-very just-now to-be-permitted in
 τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ
the city whatever — seems-good to-him to-do this both
 ἀποκτενύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ
killing and casting-out and everything doing according-to
 τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

— *his opinion*

d SOC. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.
O blessed-man me indeed speaking (in)-the argument take-bold-of
 εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης
if for I in the-market-place full having-taken under my-arm
 ἐγχειρίδιον λέγομι πρὸς σέ ὅτι ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύνάμεις τις
a-dagger should-say to you that O Polus to-me a-power some
 καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασίᾳ ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ
and tyranny wonderful just-now has-accrued if for then to-me
 δόξῃ τινα τούτων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα
it-seems-good any of-these — men whom you see immediately
 μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ.
quite to-be-necessary to-die will-be-dead this-one whomever — it-seems-good

κἂν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι
and-if any it-seems-good to-me (in)-the head of-them to-be-broken
 δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον
to-be-necessary broken he-will-be immediately quite and-if the-cloak
 διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται — οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι
to-be-torn torn it-will-be so great I have-power
 ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει, εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαμι τὸ
in this — city if then disbelieving to-you I-should-show the
 ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες,
dagger perhaps — you-would-say having-seen-(it) that O Socrates
 οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη
thus indeed all — great could-have-power since even might-be-burned
 οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε
a-house in-this — way whichever to-you should-seem-good and the at-least
 Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα
of-the-Athenians dockyards and the triremes and the ships all
 καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ
both the public and the private but not then this is the
 μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;
great having-power the doing what seems-good to-him or does-it-seem to-you
 POL. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

not indeed thus at-least

SOC. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην 470
can-you then say on-account-of what you-blame — such

δύναμιν;

power

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. τί δῆ; λέγε.

why indeed say

POL. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιουσθαί
because necessary the-one thus acting to-be-punished
ἐστιν.

it-is

SOC. τὸ δὲ ζημιουσθαι οὐ κακόν;
the and to-be-punished (is-it)-not an-evil

POL. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

b SOC. οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν
therefore O wonderful-man again in-turn to-you it-appears if
μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπεται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν,
indeed to-(one)-doing what seems-good follows the beneficially doing
ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα
good both to-be and this as it-seems is the great
δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. σκεψώμεθα
having-power if but not bad and small to-have-power let-us-examine
δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι
and also this anything else do-we-agree sometimes indeed better to-be
ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτείνουσι τε καὶ
these-things to-do which just-now we-were-mentioning to-kill both and
ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ;
to-drive-out men and to-take-away property sometimes but not

POL. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ'
this indeed truly as it-seems both from you and from
ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

me is-agreed

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ
when then you say better to-be these-things to-do say
τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζῃ.

what boundary you-define

POL. σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίναι τοῦτο.

you indeed then O Socrates answer this

SOC. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ
I indeed therefore say O Polus if to-you from me
ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικάως τις ταῦτα
more-pleasant it-is to-hear whenever indeed justly anyone these-things
ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

does better to-be whenever but unjustly worse

POL. χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξει, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ

hard at-least you to-refute O Socrates but not

κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

even a-child you could-refute that not truth you-say

SOC. πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἴσην δὲ

much then I to-the child gratitude will-have equal and

καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξης φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ

also to-you if me you-refute and rid of-nonsense but

μὴ κάμης φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

do-not weary a-friendly man benefiting but refute

XVI • ARCHELAUS OF MACEDON

Polus cites Archelaus, who rules Macedon, and asks whether he is happy. Socrates says he cannot know, having never met the man, and would not call even the Great King happy without knowing his education and justice; the fine and good man or woman is happy, the unjust and wicked wretched. Polus recounts how Archelaus, born to a slave woman and with no claim to the throne, murdered his uncle Alcetas, his cousin Alexander, and his seven-year-old brother, and asks whether any Athenian, Socrates first, would rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus.

d POL. ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ
but indeed O Socrates not-at-all at-least you it-is-necessary
 παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόωην
by-old matters to-refute the for yesterday and the-day-before
 γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδείξαι
having-happened these-things sufficient you to-refute are and to-show
 ὥς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.
that many doing-wrong men happy are

SOC. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

the what-sort these

POL. Ἀρχέλαον δῆπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὀρᾶς
Archelaus surely this the (son)-of-Perdiccas do-you-see

ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

ruling Macedonia

SOC. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

if but not but I-bear at-least

POL. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

happy then to-you does-he-seem to-be or wretched

SOC. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ

not I-know O Polus not for yet I-have-associated-with the

ἀνδρί.

man

e POL. τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ

what and having-associated-with-(him) — would-you-know otherwise but

αὐτόθεν οὐ γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαίμονεϊ;

from-here not do-you-know that he-is-happy

SOC. μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

by Zeus not indeed

POL. δῆλον δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα

(it-is)-clear then O Socrates that not-even the great king

γινώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

to-know you-will-say happy being

SOC. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως
and truth at-least I-shall-say not for I-know of-education how
ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

he-stands and of-justice

POL. τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;
what and in this the whole happiness is

SOC. ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
as at-least I say O Polus the indeed for fine
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν
and good man and woman happy to-be I-say the
δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

but unjust and wicked wretched

POL. ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν 471
wretched then this is — Archelaus according-to — your

λόγον;

account

SOC. εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

if-indeed at-least O friend (he-is)-unjust

POL. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσήκε 6
but indeed truly how not unjust to-whom at-least belonged

μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὅντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἡ
indeed of-the rule nothing which now he-holds being from a-woman who

ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ
was a-slave of-Alcetas the of-Perdiccas brother and according-to

μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δούλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο
indeed the just a-slave he-was of-Alcetas and if he-wished

τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν
the just-things to-do he-would-be-a-slave — to-Alcetas and would-be

εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως
happy according-to — your account now but wonderfully

ὥς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς
how wretched he-has-become since the greatest-wrongs he-has-done who

γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον
at-least first indeed this very — master and uncle
 μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας
having-sent-for as about-to-restore the rule which Perdiccas
 αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε
from-him had-taken having-entertained and having-made-drunk him both
 καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν
and the son of-him Alexander cousin of-himself nearly
 ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἄμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν
of-the-same-age having-thrown-(them) into a-wagon by-night having-led-(them)-out
 ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἡφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα
slaughtered both and made-away-with both and these-wrongs
 ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ
having-done he-failed-to-notice himself most-wretched having-become and not
 μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν
it-repented him but a-little later the brother the
 γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπτέτη, οὗ ἡ
legitimate — of-Perdiccas son a-child of-about seven-years to-whom the
 ἀρχὴ ἐγίνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων
rule was-coming according-to the just not he-wished happy
 γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν
to-become justly having-reared-(him) and having-restored the rule
 ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας
to-that-one but into a-well having-thrown-(him) and having-drowned-(him)
 πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χήνα ἔφη διώκοντα
to the mother of-him Cleopatra a-geese he-said chasing
 ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα
he-fell-in and died accordingly now inasmuch-as greatest-wrongs
 ἡδικηκώς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων
having-done of-those in Macedonia most-wretched he-is of-all
 Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν
Macedonians but not happiest and perhaps there-is

ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος
someone of-the-Athenians from you beginning who-would-accept — any-other
 ὅστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.
whatsoever of-the-Macedonians to-become rather than Archelaus

XVII • TWO KINDS OF REFUTATION

Socrates says Polus is refuting him as men do in the law courts, by producing many respectable witnesses, whereas the only witness worth having is the opponent himself. He will count Polus alone as his witness and let the rest go. The disputed points are whether an unjust man can be happy, and whether he is more wretched when punished or when he escapes; Socrates holds that the wrongdoer who goes unpunished is the most wretched of all.

SOC. καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ
and at the-beginning of-the discussion O Polus I-at-least
 σε ἐπῆνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν
you praised because to-me you-seem well in — rhetoric
 πεπαιδευσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο
to-have-been-educated the but conversing to-have-neglected and now anything
 τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ
else this is the argument by-which me even — a-child could-refute and
 ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὥς σὺ οἶε, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ,
I by you now as you think have-been-refuted by-this — argument
 φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ;
asserting the (one)-doing-wrong not happy to-be whence good-sir
 καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῆς.
and indeed nothing at-least to-you of-these I-concede which you say
 POL. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. e
not for you-are-willing since it-seems at-least to-you as I say

472 soc. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
 O blessed-man rhetorically for me you-attempt to-refute
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ
 just-as those in the law-courts thinking to-refute and for
 ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν
 there the one-side the other-side seem to-refute whenever for-the
 λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχονται καὶ
 statements which — they-make witnesses many they-produce and
 εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τὰναντία λέγων ἓνα τινὰ παρέχεται
 reputable the-one but the-opposite saying a-single someone produces
 ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς
 or none this but — refutation of-nothing worth is toward
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη
 the truth sometimes for — even might-be-falsely-witnessed-against
 τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναι τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ
 someone by many and seeming to-be somebody and now about
 ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα
 what you say nearly to-you all will-agree the-same-things
 Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας
 Athenians and the foreigners if you-wish against me witnesses
 παρασχέσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν
 to-produce that not truth I-say will-bear-witness for-you if
 μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ'
 indeed you-wish Nicias the (son)-of-Niceratus and the brothers with
 αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ
 him whose the tripods the in-a-row standing are in the
 Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου,
 (temple)-of-Dionysus if and you-wish Aristocrates the (son)-of-Scellius
 οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα,
 whose again is in of-Pythian-(Apollo) this — fine offering

ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἢ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια
 if and you-wish the of-Pericles whole house or other family
 ἣντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι.

whichever — you-wish of-those here to-choose

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ
 but I to-you one being not agree not for me you

ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ
 compel but false-witnesses many against me

παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ
 having-produced you-attempt to-cast-out me from the property and

τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἓνα ὄντα μάρτυρα
 the truth I but if not you yourself one being as-witness

παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι
 produce agreeing about what I-say nothing I-think

ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ
 worthy of-account for-me to-have-been-accomplished about what — for-us the

λόγος ἦ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ
 discussion is I-think and nor for-you if not I for-you bear-witness

εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν
 one being alone the and others all these to-go

ἐᾶς. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὥς σύ τε
 you-let there-is indeed then this some manner of-refutation as you both

οἶε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ
 think and others many there-is but also another which I in-turn

οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ
 think having-set-(them) then beside each-other let-us-examine whether

τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ
 at-all they-will-differ from-each-other and for also happen (the-things)-about

ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν
 which we-dispute not at-all small being but nearly

τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε
 somewhat these-things about which to-know both (is)-finest not to-know and

αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἢ γινώσκειν
most-shameful the for sum of-them is either to-know
 ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα
or to-be-ignorant who both happy is and who not for-instance
 πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῇ οἶόν
first about which now the discussion is you consider possible
 τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα,
— to-be a-blessed man doing-wrong both and unjust being
 εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ.
if-indeed Archelaus unjust indeed you-consider to-be happy but
 ἄλλο τι ὥς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα;
anything else (than)-as thus you thinking are-we-to-understand

POL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν.

I but say (it)-impossible one indeed this we-dispute

εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἂρ', ἂν τυγχάνη
well doing-wrong but indeed happy will-be-be whether if he-meets-with
 δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;
justice both and punishment

POL. ἡκιστα γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

least at-least since thus at-least — most-wretched he-would-be

e SOC. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν,
but if then not he-meets-with justice the (one)-doing-wrong
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;

according-to — your account happy he-will-be

POL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ
according-to but at-least — my opinion O Polus the
 ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος,
(one)-doing-wrong both and the unjust altogether indeed (is)-wretched

ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη
more-wretched however if not he-pays penalty nor meets-with
 τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῶ δίκην καὶ
punishment doing-wrong less but wretched if he-pays penalty and
 τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
meets-with justice from gods both and men

POL. ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.

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strange-things at-least O Socrates you-attempt to-say
 SOC. πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταῦτά
I-will-try but at-least also you to-make O comrade the-same-things
 ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ᾧ
as-I to-say a-friend for you I-consider now indeed then (what)-in-which
 διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστιν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που
we-differ these are consider and also you I-said I surely
 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.
in the earlier-(discussion) the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged worse to-be

POL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

you but the being-wronged

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ
and the (ones)-doing-wrong wretched I-said to-be I and
 ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

I-was-refuted by you

POL. ναιὶ μὰ Δία.

yes by Zeus

SOC. ὥς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Πῶλε.

b

as you at-least think O Polus

POL. ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.

truth at-least thinking

SOC. ἴσως. σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας,
perhaps you but at-least (call)-happy in-turn the (ones)-doing-wrong
ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

if not they-pay penalty

POL. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. ἐγὼ δέ γε αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ
I but at-least them most-wretched say the but
διδόντας δίκην ἦττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

paying penalty less do-you-wish also this to-refute

POL. ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
but still this than-that harder is O Socrates
ἐξελέγξαι.

to-refute

SOC. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς
not indeed O Polus but impossible the for true
οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

never is-refuted

XVIII • THE TYRANT CAUGHT

Polus describes a man caught plotting tyranny, racked, castrated, blinded, made to watch his wife and children mutilated, and finally crucified, and asks whether he is happier than one who escapes and rules. Socrates replies that neither is happy but the escaped tyrant is more wretched, and that laughing is not refuting. Though he once could not put a vote, he will put this one to Polus alone, holding that all men, Polus included, think doing wrong worse than suffering it; Polus denies it.

c POL. πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι
how do-you-mean if doing-wrong a-man is-caught at-tyranny
ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται
aiming and having-been-caught is-racked and is-castrated

καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ
and the eyes has-burned-out and other many and
 μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτὸς τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ
great and all-kinds-of mutilations himself both having-suffered and
 τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον
— his-own having-seen-(suffer) children both and wife at-the last
 ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται
is-crucified or is-tarred-and-burned this-man happier will-be
 ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ
than if having-escaped as-tyrant he-is-established and ruling in the
 πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ
city lives-out doing whatever — he-wishes envied being and
 εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων;
counted-happy by the citizens and the other foreigners
 ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;
these-things do-you-say impossible to-be to-refute

SOC. μορμολύττη αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις·
you-are-raising-bogeys again O noble Polus and not you-are-refuting
 ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν.
just-now but you-were-calling-witnesses nevertheless but remind me a-little
 ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες;
if unjustly aiming at-tyranny you-said

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος
happier indeed therefore never will-be either
 αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε
of-them neither the (one)-having-achieved the tyranny unjustly nor
 ὁ διδοὺς δίκην — δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίωιν εὐδαιμονέστερος
the (one)-paying penalty of-two for wretched-men happier
 μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶη — ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων
indeed not — could-(either)-be more-wretched however (is)-the (one)-escaping

καὶ τυραννέουσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο
and having-become-tyrant what (is)-this O Polus are-you-laughing another
 αὐ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τις τι εἴπῃ,
again this kind of-refutation is whenever anyone something says
 καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή;
to-laugh-at-(him) to-refute but not

POL. οὐκ οἶει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
not do-you-think to-have-been-refuted O Socrates whenever such-things
 λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα
you-say which no-one — would-assert of-men since ask any
 τουτωνί.
of-these-here

474 SOC. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσιν
O Polus not I-am of-the politicians and last-year
 βουλευέιν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε
to-serve-on-the-council having-been-allotted when the tribe held-the-prytany
 καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζεῖν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ
and it-was-necessary me to-put-the-vote laughter I-provided and
 οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζεῖν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε
not I-knew-how to-put-the-vote not then even now me bid
 ἐπιψηφίζεῖν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχῃς τούτων
to-put-the-vote to-the (ones)-present but if not you-have than-these
 βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ
a-better refutation which-very just-now I was-saying to-me in —
 μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἶον ἐγὼ οἶμαι
turn hand-over and make-trial of-the refutation such-as I think
 δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦν ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχεσθαι
ought to-be I for of-what — I-say one indeed to-produce
 μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος
witness I-know-how him toward whom — for-me the discussion
 ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζεῖν
is the but many I-let go and one to-put-the-vote-to

ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν εἰ
I-know-how with-the but many not-even I-converse see then whether
 ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος
you-will-be-willing in — turn to-give refutation answering
 τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ
the things-asked I for indeed think both me and you
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι
and the other men the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged
 κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.
worse to-consider and the not paying penalty than-the paying
 POL. ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων
I but at-least (think)-neither me nor other of-men
 οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;
any-one since you would-accept — rather to-be-wronged than to-do-wrong
 SOC. καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.
and you at-least — and the others all
 POL. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος
of-much at-least it-lacks but neither I nor you nor other
 οὐδεὶς.
any-one

XIX • THE FINE AND THE SHAMEFUL

Polus says suffering wrong is worse but doing wrong is more shameful. Socrates has him agree that fine things are called fine for their pleasure or their benefit, and shameful things for their pain or their evil. Since doing wrong is more shameful, it must exceed suffering wrong in pain or in evil; it is not more painful, so it exceeds in evil, and is therefore worse. Polus admits that neither he nor anyone would prefer to do wrong rather than to suffer it.

SOC. οὐκ οὐν ἀποκρινῇ;
not-then will-you-answer

C

POL. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ'
certainly indeed then and for I-desire to-know what ever
 ἐρεῖς.

you-will-say

SOC. λέγε δὴ μοι, ἥν' εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
tell then me so-that you-may-know just-as — if from the-beginning
 σε ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι,
you I-were-asking which-of-the-two seems to-you O Polus worse to-be
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

the doing-wrong or the being-wronged

POL. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.
the being-wronged to-me-at-least

SOC. τί δὲ δὴ; αἷσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ
what and indeed more-shameful which-of-the-two the doing-wrong or the
 ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.

being-wronged answer

POL. τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
the doing-wrong

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἷσχιον.
therefore also worse if-indeed more-shameful

POL. ἥκιστα γε.
least at-least

d SOC. μανθάνω· οὐ ταῦτόν ἡγῇ σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλόν
I-understand not the-same you-consider you as it-seems fine
 τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροτόν.

both and good and bad and shameful

POL. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ
what and (of)-this the fine-things all such-as both bodies and
 χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς
colors and shapes and sounds and pursuits to

οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἷον πρῶτον
nothing looking do-you-call each-time fine such-as first
 τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις
the bodies the fine not either according-to the use do-you-say
 καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο,
fine to-be for what — each useful is for this
 ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν
or according-to pleasure some if in the being-viewed to-rejoice
 ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν
it-makes the viewers have-you anything outside these to-say
 περὶ σώματος κάλλους;
about a-body's beauty

POL. οὐκ ἔχω.

not I-have

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ
therefore also the-other-things all thus both shapes and
 χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν
colors either on-account-of pleasure some or on-account-of benefit
 ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;
or on-account-of both fine you-call

POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
not also the sounds and the according-to — music
 πάντα ὡσαύτως;

all-things likewise

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ
and indeed the-things at-least according-to the laws and the
 ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά,
pursuits not surely outside these are the fine-ones
 τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.
of-the either beneficial to-be or pleasant or both

475 POL. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
not to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως;
therefore also the of-the studies beauty likewise

POL. πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
certainly at-least and well at-least now you-define O Socrates
 ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.
by-pleasure both and by-good defining the fine

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχροὺν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ κακῷ;
therefore the shameful by-the opposite by-pain both and by-evil

POL. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity

SOC. ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ τῷ
whenever then of-two fine-things the-one finer is either in-the
 ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἐστίν,
one of-these or in-both exceeding finer it-is
 ἥτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.
either in-pleasure or in-benefit or in-both

POL. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

b SOC. καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰσχρον
and whenever and indeed of-two shameful-things the one more-shameful
 ἢ, ἥτοι λύπη ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ
is either in-pain or in-evil exceeding more-shameful it-will-be or not
 ἀνάγκη;
(is-it)-necessary

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
come then how was-it-said just-now about the doing-wrong and
 ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι,
being-wronged not were-you-saying the indeed being-wronged worse to-be
 τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχίον;

the but doing-wrong more-shameful

POL. ἔλεγον.

I-was-saying-(so)

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
therefore if-indeed more-shameful the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged
 ἢτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχίον
either more-painful it-is and in-pain exceeding more-shameful
 ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;
 — *it-would-be or in-evil or in-both not also this (is)-necessary*

POL. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

how for not

SOC. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ
first indeed truly let-us-examine then in-pain exceeds the
 ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες
doing-wrong the being-wronged and feel-pain more the (ones)-doing-wrong
 ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

than the (ones)-being-wronged

POL. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

by-no-means O Socrates this at-least

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει.

not then in-pain at-least it-exceeds

POL. οὐ δῆτα.

not indeed

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
therefore if not in-pain in-both indeed not — any-longer
 ὑπερβάλλοι.

it-could-exceed

POL. οὐ φαίνεται.
not it-appears

SOC. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται.
therefore in-the other it-remains

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. τῷ κακῷ.
in-the evil

POL. ἔοικεν.
it-seems

SOC. οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη
therefore in-evil exceeding the doing-wrong worse — would-be
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
than-the being-wronged

POL. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι.
(it-is)-clear indeed that

d SOC. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων
anything else then by indeed the many men
 καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ
and by you was-it-agreed with-us in the earlier time
 αἰσχίον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
more-shameful to-be the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.
now but at-least worse it-has-appeared

POL. ἔοικε.
it-seems

- SOC. δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχιον e
would-you-accept — then you rather the worse and the more-shameful
 ἀντὶ τοῦ ἥττον; μὴ ὅκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν
instead-of the less do-not hesitate to-answer O Polus nothing
 γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ
for you-will-be-harmed but nobly to-the argument as to-a-physician
 παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ᾧ ἐρωτῶ.
submitting-(yourself) answer and either say-yes or not to-what I-ask
- POL. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες.
but not — I-would-accept O Socrates
- SOC. ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;
another and any of-men
- POL. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
not to-me it-seems according-to at-least this — argument
- SOC. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ
truth then I was-saying that neither — I nor — you
 οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν
nor other any of-men would-accept — rather to-do-wrong
 ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.
than to-be-wronged worse for it-happens being
- POL. φαίνεται.
it-appears

XX • BEING PUNISHED IS BEING TREATED JUSTLY

Socrates turns to the second point disputed: whether a wrongdoer's paying the penalty is the greatest of evils, as Polus thought, or whether not paying it is the greater evil, as Socrates thought. Whatever a doer does, a sufferer suffers in the same way: to punish justly is to do just things, so the man punished suffers just things, and just things are fine and therefore good. The one who pays the penalty is benefited, becoming better in soul and being freed from its vice.

476 SOC. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον
you-see then O Polus the refutation beside the refutation
 παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν
being-set that in-no-way it-resembles-(it) but with-you indeed
 οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ
the others all agree except me for-me but you
 ἐξαρκεῖς εἰς ὦν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ
suffice one being alone both agreeing and bearing-witness and
 ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. καὶ
I you alone putting-the-vote-to the others let go and
 τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ
this indeed for-us thus let-it-stand after this and about which
 τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα
the second-(time) we-disputed let-us-examine the (one)-doing-wrong
 διδόναι δίκην ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ
to-pay penalty then the-greatest of-the evils is as you
 ᾧ, ἢ μείζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὥς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾧμην.
thought or greater the not to-pay as in-turn I thought
 σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι
let-us-examine and in-this-way the paying penalty and the being-punished
 δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;
justly (one)-doing-wrong then the same do-you-call
 POL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

b SOC. ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὥς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα
can-you then say that not the at-least just-things all
 καλὰ ἐστίν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.
fine are in so-far-as just and having-examined-thoroughly say
 POL. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

but to-me it-seems-(so) O Socrates

SOC. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη
consider then also this then if anyone anything does (it-is)-necessary
 τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος;
something to-be also suffering by this — doer

POL. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον
then this suffering what the doer does and such
 οἶον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει,
as does the doer I-mean and — the-following if anyone strikes
 ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
(it-is)-necessary something to-be-struck

POL. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity

SOC. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ
and if violently he-strikes or quickly the striker thus also
 τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;
the (thing)-struck to-be-struck

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἶον ἂν
such then an-experience for-the (one)-struck is as —
 τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
the striker does

POL. πάννυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
therefore also if burns anyone (it-is)-necessary something to-be-burned

POL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
how for not

SOC. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι
and if violently at-least be-burns or painfully thus to-be-burned

τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάη;

the (tbing)-burned as — the burner burns

POL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται

therefore also if cuts anything the same account is-cut

γάρ τι.

for something

POL. ναί.

yes

d SOC. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν,
and if great at-least or deep the cut or painful

τοιούτου τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον

such a-cut is-cut the (tbing)-cut as the cutter

τέμνει;

cuts

POL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον,

in-sum then see whether you-agree what just-now I-was-saying

περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιῶν, τοιούτου τὸ πάσχον

about all-things as — does the doer such the sufferer

πάσχειν.

to-suffer

POL. ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

but I-agree

SOC. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον

these-things then being-agreed the penalty to-pay whether

πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖν;

to-suffer something is or to-do

POL. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

(of)-necessity O Socrates to-suffer

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος;

therefore by some doer

POL. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὑπό γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

how for not by at-least the (one)-punishing

SOC. ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;

the and rightly punishing justly punishes

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὔ;

just-things doing or not

POL. δίκαια.

just-things

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδούς δίκαια πάσχει;

therefore the (one)-being-punished penalty paying just-things suffers

POL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμολόγηται;

the and just-things surely fine have-been-agreed

POL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλὰ, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ

of-these then the one does fine-things the other suffers-(them) the

κολαζόμενος.

(one)-being-punished

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλὰ, ἀγαθὰ; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα. 477

therefore if-indeed fine good either for pleasant or beneficial

POL. ἀνάγκη.

(of)-necessity

SOC. ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;
good-things then suffers the (one)-penalty paying

POL. ἔοικεν.
it-seems

SOC. ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;
he-is-benefited then

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων
then which-very I suppose the benefit better
 τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;
(in)-the soul he-becomes if-indeed justly he-is-punished

POL. εἰκός γε.
likely at-least

SOC. κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
of-vice then of-soul is-rid the (one)-penalty paying

POL. ναί.
yes

XXI • THE GREATEST EVIL

Property, body, and soul each have a badness: poverty, disease, and injustice. The badness of soul is the most shameful, and since it is not the most painful, it must exceed the others in harm. Injustice and the rest of the soul's wickedness are therefore the greatest evil there is. Money-making frees us from poverty and medicine from disease; wrongdoers are taken to the judges, who punish with a kind of justice.

SOC. ἄρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε b
so then of-the greatest is-be-rid evil in-this-way

δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν
and consider in of-property (the)-condition of-a-man badness
 ἄλλην τιὰ ἐνορᾶς ἢ πενίαν;
other any do-you-see-in-(it) than poverty

POL. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
no but poverty

SOC. τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις
what and in of-body (the)-condition badness — would-you-say
 ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
weakness to-be and disease and ugliness and — such-things

POL. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι;
therefore also in soul wickedness do-you-consider some to-be

POL. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not

SOC. ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ
this then not injustice do-you-call and ignorance and
 δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
cowardice and — such-things

POL. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν c
therefore of-property and of-body and of-soul three
 ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;
being three you-have-named wickednesses poverty disease injustice

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ
which then of-these — wickednesses (is)-most-shameful not the
 ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;
injustice and in-sum the of-the soul wickedness

POL. πολὺ γε.
by-much at-least

SOC. εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;
if indeed most-shameful also worst

POL. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
how O Socrates do-you-mean

SOC. ὡδὶ· ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον ἥτοι λύπην μεγίστην
thus always the most-shameful either pain greatest
 παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν
affording or harm or both most-shameful is from the
 ὁμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.
things-agreed in the earlier-(discussion)

POL. μάλιστα.
most-certainly

d SOC. αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία
most-shameful and (is)-injustice and the-whole of-soul wickedness
 νυνδὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν;
just-now has-been-agreed by-us

POL. ὁμολόγηται γάρ.
it-has-been-agreed for

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαιρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον
therefore either most-distressing it-is and in-distress exceeding
 αἰσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφότερα;
most-shameful of-these it-is or in-harm or both

POL. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν
so then more-painful is-it than-the being-poor and being-ill

τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
the unjust to-be and intemperate and cowardly and ignorant

POL. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.
not to-me-at-least it-seems O Socrates from these-things at-least

SOC. ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὥς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῶ θαυμασίῳ
by-a-prodigious some then how great harm and evil astonishing

ὑπερβάλλουσα τὰλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχιστόν
exceeding the-other-things the of-the soul wickedness most-shameful

ἐστὶ πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος.
is of-all since not in-pain at-least as — your account-(says)

POL. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον
but indeed surely the at-least in-greatest harm exceeding

μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.
greatest — evil would-be of-the things

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς
the injustice then and the intemperance and the other of-soul

πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακὸν ἐστίν;
wickedness greatest of-the things evil is

POL. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;
what then art of-poverty rids not money-making

POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. τίς δὲ νόσον; οὐκ ἰατρική;
what and of-disease not medicine

478 POL. ἀνάγκη.

(of)-necessity

SOC. τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς,
what and of-wickedness and of-injustice if not thus you-find-a-way
 ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνος τοὺς κάμνοντας
in-this-way consider where do-we-lead and to whom the (ones)-ailing
 τὰ σώματα;

(in)-the bodies

POL. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

to the physicians O Socrates

SOC. ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;
where and the (ones)-doing-wrong and the (ones)-behaving-intemperately

POL. παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;

to the judges do-you-mean

SOC. οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;

therefore penalty about-to-pay

POL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὲς χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ
so then not justice some using do-they-punish the
 ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;

rightly punishing

POL. δῆλον δῆ.

(it-is)-clear indeed

Justice frees the soul from intemperance and injustice as medicine frees the body from disease, and it is the finest of the three because the most beneficial. Being treated is not pleasant, but being freed of a great evil is worth the pain; happiest is the man who never falls ill, and the man who is treated is better off than the one who keeps his disease. The wrongdoer who escapes punishment lives worst of all, like a patient who fears the knife and avoids the doctor.

SOC. χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ b
money-making indeed then of-poverty rids medicine

δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.

and of-disease justice and of-intemperance and of-injustice

POL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

what then of-these finest is

POL. τίνων λέγεις;

of-what do-you-mean

SOC. χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.

of-money-making of-medicine of-justice

POL. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

by-much excels O Socrates the justice

SOC. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ
therefore again either pleasure the-most it-makes or benefit or

ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

both if-indeed finest it-is

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν
so then the being-treated-medically pleasant is and do-they-rejoice

οἱ ἰατρυνόμενοι;

the (ones)-being-treated

POL. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
not to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;
but beneficial at-least is-it-not for

c POL. ναί.
yes

SOC. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ
of-a-great for evil one-is-rid so-that it-profits
ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγῆδόνα καὶ ὑγιῇ εἶναι.
to-endure the pain and healthy to-be

POL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
how for not

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος
so then thus — as-regards body happiest

ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μὴδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;
a-man would-be being-treated or not-even being-ill in-the-first-place

POL. δῆλον ὅτι μὴδὲ κάμνων.
(it-is)-clear that not-even being-ill

SOC. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὥς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ,
not for this was happiness as it-seems of-evil a-riddance

ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴδὲ κτήσις.
but in-the first-place not-even acquisition

POL. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

d SOC. τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοι κακὸν εἴτ'
what and more-wretched which-of-the-two of-two having evil whether

ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος
in body or in soul the (one)-being-treated and being-rid

τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;
of-the evil or the (one)-not being-treated having-(it) but

POL. φαίνεται μοι ὃ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.
it-appears to-me the (one)-not being-treated

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην δίδοναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ
therefore the penalty to-pay of-the-greatest evil a-riddance
 ἦν, πονηρίας;

was of-wickedness

POL. ἦν γάρ.

it-was for

SOC. σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ
it-makes-temperate for surely and more-just it-makes and
 ἱατρικὴ γίνεταί πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.

medicine becomes for-wickedness the justice

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν c
happiest indeed then (is)-the (one)-not having vice
 ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

in soul since this greatest of-the evils appeared

POL. δῆλον δή.

(it-is)-clear indeed

SOC. δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

second and surely the (one)-being-rid

POL. ἔοικεν.

it-seems

SOC. οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος
this and was the (one)-being-admonished both and being-rebuked

καὶ δίκην δίδους.

and penalty paying

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.
worst then lives the (one)-having-(it) and not being-rid

POL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

479 SOC. οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα
therefore this-man happens being who — the greatest-wrongs
 ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξεται ὥστε
doing and using the-greatest injustice contrives so-as
 μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι,
neither to-be-admonished nor to-be-punished nor penalty to-pay
 ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
just-as you say Archelaus to-have-arranged and the other
 τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;
tyrants and rhetors and potentates

POL. ἔοικε.

it-seems

b SOC. σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὧ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ
nearly for surely these O best-(of-men) the same
 διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις
having-accomplished are just-as — if someone by-the greatest
 νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην
diseases being-gripped should-contrive not to-pay penalty
 τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ
for-the about the body faults to-the physicians nor
 ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἀνὴρ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ
to-be-treated fearing as-if a-child the being-burned and
 τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγυνόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτως;
the being-cut because painful or not does-it-seem also to-you so

POL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

Those who flee punishment see its pain but are blind to its benefit, not knowing how much more wretched it is to live with an unsound soul than an unsound body. Socrates reckons up the results: injustice is the greatest evil, paying the penalty frees one from it, and not paying it leaves the evil in place. Doing wrong is the second greatest evil, and doing wrong without being punished is the first, which is what he claimed against Polus' praise of Archelaus.

SOC. ἀγνοῶν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια c
not-knowing at-least as it-seems of-what-sort is the health
καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν
and excellence of-body they-are-likely for from the now by-us
ὠμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην
things-agreed such some-thing to-do also the-ones the penalty
φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ
fleeing O Polus the painful of-it to-see-clearly toward but
τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσω ἀθλιώτερόν
the beneficial blindly to-be and not-to-know by-how-much more-wretched
ἐστὶ μὴ ὑγιούς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν,
it-is than-(with)-not healthy body with-not healthy soul to-dwell
ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν
but with-a-rotten and unjust and unholy whence also everything
ποιούσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι
they-do so-that penalty not to-pay nor to-be-rid
τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ
of-the greatest evil both property procuring and
φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὥς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ
friends and so-that — they-may-be as most-persuasive to-speak if but
ἡμεῖς ἀληθῇ ὠμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἂρ' αἰσθάνη τὰ
we truth have-agreed O Polus whether do-you-perceive the
συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;
things-resulting from the argument or do-you-wish let-us-reckon-up them

POL. εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ.

if to-you at-least it-seems-good

d SOC. ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἢ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ
so then does-it-result (the)-greatest evil the injustice and the
 ἀδικεῖν;

doing-wrong

POL. φαίνεται γε.

it-appears at-least

SOC. καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ
and indeed a-riddance at-least appeared of-this — evil the
 δίκην διδόναι;

penalty to-pay

POL. κινδυνεύει.

it-is-likely

SOC. τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;
the but at-least not to-pay (is)-a-persistence of-the evil

POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
second then is of-the evils in-magnitude the doing-wrong

τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε
the but (one)-doing-wrong not to-pay penalty of-all greatest both
 καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

and first of-evils is-by-nature

POL. ἔοικεν.

it-seems

e SOC. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν
so then not about this O friend did-we-dispute you indeed
 τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα
— Archelaus counting-happy the-(one) the greatest-wrongs doing
 δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦναντίον οἰόμενος,
penalty no paying I but the-opposite thinking

εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισούν μὴ δίδωσι
whether Archelaus or other of-men whoever not pays
 δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως
penalty doing-wrong for-this-man to-be-fitting wretched to-be beyond
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ
the other men and always the (one)-doing-wrong than-the
 ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα
(one)-being-wronged more-wretched to-be and the (one)-not paying
 δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;
penalty than-the (one)-paying not these were the by me things-said
 POL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο;
therefore it-has-been-demonstrated that truth was-said

POL. φαίνεται.
it-appears

XXIV · THE RIGHT USE OF RHETORIC

If all this is true, what use is rhetoric? A man must guard above all against doing wrong, and if he or a friend does wrong, he must hasten to the judge as to a doctor. Rhetoric is useless for defending injustice, unless one uses it to accuse oneself and one's friends and bring the wrong to light so that it may be cured. Conversely, to harm an enemy one would help him escape punishment and live as long as possible in his wickedness.

SOC. εἰεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἢ μεγάλη 480
well if then indeed these-things (are)-true O Polus what the great
 χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν
use is — of-rhetoric one-must indeed for indeed from the

νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἐαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν
 now things-agreed (a-man)-himself himself most guard
 ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσει, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
 so-that not he-will-do-wrong as sufficient evil about-to-have (is-it)-not for
 POL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

- b SOC. εἰ δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις
 if but at-least he-does-wrong either himself or other anyone
 ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα ἰέναι ἐκέῖσε ὅπου ὡς
 of-whom — he-cares-for him willingly to-go there where as
 τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ
 quickly-as-possible he-will-pay penalty to the judge just-as
 παρὰ τὸν ἱατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρομισθὲν
 to the physician hastening so-that not having-become-chronic
 τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσει καὶ
 the disease of-the injustice festering the soul it-will-make and
 ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἶπερ τὰ πρότερον
 incurable or how do-we-say O Polus if-indeed the earlier
 μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις
 remain for-us agreements not (is-it)-necessary these-things with-those
 οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;
 thus indeed to-accord otherwise but not
 POL. τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

what for indeed are-we-to-say O Socrates

- c SOC. ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς
 for indeed then the defending on-behalf-of the injustice —
 αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης
 one's-own or of-parents or of-companions or of-children or of-fatherland doing-wrong
 οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις
 not (is)-useful at-all — rhetoric to-us O Polus if not if someone
 ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τούναντίον — κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα
 should-suppose for the-opposite to-accuse to-be-necessary most-of-all

μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅς
indeed oneself then and also the relatives and the others whoever
 ἂν αἰεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι
— ever of-the friends happens doing-wrong and not to-conceal-(it)
 ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην
but into the open to-bring the wrongdoing so-that he-may-pay penalty
 καὶ ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ
and healthy may-become to-compel both oneself and the others not
 ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως
to-play-the-coward but to-submit having-shut-the-eyes well and bravely
 ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν
just-as to-cut and to-burn to-a-physician the good and fine
 διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν γε
pursuing not reckoning the painful if indeed at-least
 πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδικηκῶς ἦ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν
of-blows worthy-(wrongs) having-done he-is to-strike-(him) submitting if
 δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ
but of-imprisonment to-bind-(him) if but of-a-fine paying-(it) if but
 φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν
of-exile going-into-exile if but of-death dying himself
 πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων
first being accuser both of-himself and of-the other relatives
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων
and for this using — rhetoric so-that — manifest
 τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου
the wrongdoings becoming they-may-be-rid of-the greatest
 κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;
evil injustice are-we-to-say thus or not are-we-to-say O Polus
 POL. ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ^c
strange indeed O Socrates to-me-at-least it-seems with-the however
 ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
earlier-(things) perhaps for-you it-agrees

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἢ καὶκεῖνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη
therefore either also-those (are)-to-be-undone or these (it-is)-necessary

συμβαίνειν;

to-follow

POL. ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

yes this at-least thus is

- 481 SOC. τούναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ
the-opposite but at-least again having-turned-about if then one-must
τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντιν οὖν, ἐὰν
someone badly to-treat whether an-enemy or whomever provided
μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ — τοῦτο μὲν
only not himself be-is-wronged by the enemy this indeed
γὰρ εὐλαβητέον — ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ
for (is)-to-be-guarded-against if but another wrongs the enemy in-every
τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως
way (it-is)-to-be-contrived both acting and speaking so-that
μὴ δῶ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ
not be-pay penalty nor come before the judge if but
ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην
be-comes (it-is)-to-be-devised how — be-may-escape and not pay penalty
ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον ἢ ἥρπακὸς πολὺ, μὴ
the enemy but whether gold he-is having-plundered much not
ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκη καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ
be-restore this but having-(it) he-spend both on himself and
εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάντε αὖ θανάτου
on — his-own-(people) unjustly and godlessly or-whether again of-death
ἄξια ἡδικηκὼς ἦ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα
worthy-(wrongs) having-done he-is so-that not he-will-die most-of-all
μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὢν, εἰ δὲ
indeed never but immortal he-will-be wicked being if but
μή, ὅπως ὡς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὢν. ἐπὶ
not so-that as long-as-possible time he-will-live such being for

τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος
 — such-things to-me-at-least seems O Polus — rhetoric useful
 εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς
 to-be since to-the at-least not intending to-do-wrong not great any
 μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις
 to-me seems the use of-it to-be if indeed even there-is any
 χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα.
 use as in at-least the earlier-(discussion) nowhere it-appeared being

XXV · CALLICLES AND THE TWO LOVES

Callicles asks Chaerephon whether Socrates is serious or joking, and then asks Socrates himself, since if he means it human life is turned upside down. Socrates answers that each of them is in love twice over, he with Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles with the Athenian people and the son of Pyrilampes. Callicles cannot contradict his beloveds and shifts with the assembly; Socrates' beloved philosophy always says the same thing, and unless Callicles refutes her he will be at odds with himself all his life.

CAL. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης
 tell me O Chaerephon is-serious (in)-these-things Socrates
 ἢ παίζει;
 or is-be-joking

CHAE. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν·
 to-me indeed be-seems O Callicles prodigiously to-be-serious
 οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.
 nothing however (is)-like the him-himself to-ask

CAL. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, c
 by the gods but I-desire-(to) tell me O Socrates
 πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ
 whether you are-we-to-take now being-serious or joking if

μὲν γὰρ σπουδάξεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα
indeed for you-are-serious both and happen these-things true being
 ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν
which you-say anything else than our — life overturned —
 εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν,
would-be of-the men and all the opposite-things we-do
 ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;
as it-seems than what one-ought

- d soc. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος,
O Callicles if not some there-were for-the men experience
 τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά
for-some indeed other some for-others and other some the same but
 τις ἡμῶν ἰδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν
some-one of-us private some experienced experience than the others not —
 ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πάθημα.
it-would-be easy to-show to-the other — his-own experience
 λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν
I-say and having-considered that I both and you now happen
 ταυτὸν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἐκάτερος,
the-same something having-experienced being-lovers two being of-two each
 ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ
I indeed of-Alcibiades both the (son)-of-Cleinias and of-philosophy you
 δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους.
and of-two of-the both of-the-Athenians people and of-the (son)-of-Pyrrilampes
 αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι
I-perceive then you each-time although being clever whatever
 ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ
— says your — darling and however — he-says it-is not
 δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου.
being-able to-contradict but up and down being-turned-about
 ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, εἴαν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
in both the assembly if anything you saying the people

ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῆ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις
the of-the-Athenians not says thus to-be being-turned-about you-say
 ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν
what that-one wishes and toward the of-Pyrrilampes youth
 τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας.

the beautiful this such other-things you-have-experienced

τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμάσιν τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ 482

to-the for of-the darlings counsels both and words not

οἷός τ' εἰ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τις σου λέγοντος

able — you-are to-oppose so-that if someone you saying

ἐκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὥς ἄτοπά

each-time what on-account-of these you-say should-wonder how strange

ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν,

they-are perhaps you-would-say — to-him if you-wished the-truth to-say

ὅτι εἰ μὴ τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν

that if not someone stops — your darlings from-these —

λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύσῃ ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν

words not-even you will-stop ever these-things saying consider therefore

καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ

also from me to-be-necessary other such-things to-hear and do-not

θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ

wonder that I these-things say but — philosophy —

ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε

my darling stop these-things saying she-says for O dear

ἐταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἐτέρων

comrade what now from-me you-hear and to-me she-is than-the other

παιδικῶν πολὺ ἥττον ἐμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος

darlings much less capricious the indeed for son-of-Cleinias

οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία αἰ

this at-different-times of-different is words — but philosophy always

τῶν αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ

of-the same she-says and what you now wonder-at you-were-present and

καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ
 also yourself at-the-things-said either then her refute what-very
 ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὥς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην
 just-now I-was-saying that not the doing-wrong is and doing-wrong penalty
 μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις
 not paying of-all the-worst of-evils or if this you-leave
 ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι
 unrefuted by the dog the of-the-Egyptians god not with-you
 ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν
 will-agree Callicles O Callicles but will-be-discordant in
 ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν
 all the life and-yet I-at-least think O best-(of-men) even the
 λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν,
 lyre for-me better to-be out-of-tune both and to-be-discordant
 καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοῖν, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους
 and a-chorus for-which I-might-be-choregus and most men
 μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ εἶνα
 not to-agree with-me but opposite-things to-say rather than one
 ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαντῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.
 being me with-myself dissonant to-be and opposite-things to-say

XXVI · NATURE AND CONVENTION

Callicles says Polus was shamed into conceding that doing wrong is more shameful, because Socrates trades on the conflict between nature and law. By nature suffering wrong is worse and fit only for a slave; laws are made by the weak majority to frighten the strong, who by nature deserve more. Xerxes and his father made war by nature's justice, and a man of sufficient nature will shake off our spells and laws like a lion and stand revealed as master, as Pindar's ode shows.

CAL. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὥς d
 O Socrates you-seem to-play-the-youth in the arguments as
 ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταῦτ' ὅν
 truly a-mob-orator being and now these-things you-barangue the-same
 παθόντος Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγορεῖ πρὸς
 having-suffered Polus experience which-very of-Gorgias he-accused before
 σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ,
 you to-have-suffered he-said for surely Gorgias being-asked by you
 ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ
 if should-come to him not understanding the just-things the-one
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν
 — rhetoric wishing to-learn whether would-teach him
 ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν
 — Gorgias to-have-been-ashamed he and to-have-said he-would-teach
 διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν
 on-account-of the custom of-the men because they-would-be-indignant —
 εἴ τις μὴ φαίη — διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν
 if anyone not should-say-(so) on-account-of indeed this — admission
 ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ
 to-have-been-compelled opposite-things he to-himself to-say you and this
 τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν — καὶ σου καταγελᾶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν
 very-thing to-love and at-you to-laugh as at-least to-me to-seem
 ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταῦτ' ὅν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν.
 rightly then now but again himself the-same this he-has-suffered
 καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι
 and I-at-least on this very-thing not admire Polus that to-you
 συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχίον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
 he-conceded the doing-wrong more-shameful to-be than-the being-wronged
 ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ
 from this for again the admission himself by you
 συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ
 having-been-tripped-up in the arguments he-was-muzzled being-ashamed what

ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα
he-meant to-say you for in reality O Socrates to such-things
 ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν
lead vulgar and mob-oratorical asserting the truth
 διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλὰ, νόμῳ δέ.

to-pursue which by-nature indeed not are fine by-law but

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ὥς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντίῳ ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἧ τε
for the most-part and these-things opposite to-each-other are the both
 φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ
nature and the law if then anyone is-asbamed and not dares
 λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὲ
to-say what-very he-thinks he-is-compelled opposite-things to-say which indeed
 καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς
also you this — clever-trick having-observed do-mischief in the
 λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν
arguments if indeed anyone according-to law speaks according-to nature
 ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ
questioning-in-reply if but the (things)-of-the nature the (things)-of-the
 νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ
law just-as for-instance in these-matters the doing-wrong both and the
 ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πῶλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἷσχιον λέγοντος,
being-wronged Polus the according-to law more-shameful saying
 σὺ τὸν λόγον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ
you the argument were-pursuing according-to nature by-nature indeed for
 πᾶν αἷσχίον ἐστὶν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
everything more-shameful is what-very also worse the being-wronged
 νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν
by-law but the doing-wrong not-even for of-a-man this at-least is
 τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινὸς ᾧ
the experience the being-wronged but of-a-slave some for-whom
 κρεῖττόν ἐστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ
better it-is to-be-dead than to-live whoever being-wronged and

προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν
being-trampled-on not able — is he-himself himself to-help
 μηδὲ ἄλλω οὐ ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ τιθέμενοι
nor another for-whom — he-cares but I-think the (ones)-laying-down
 τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί.
the laws the weak men are and the many
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε c
for themselves then and the for-themselves advantageous the both
 νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς
laws they-lay-down and the praises they-praise and the
 ψόγους ψέγουσιν· ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν
blames they-blame frightening the more-robust of-the
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν
men and able being more to-have so-that not than-them
 πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ
more they-may-have they-say that shameful and unjust (is)-the
 πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν
having-more and this is the doing-wrong the more than-the
 ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον
others to-seek to-have they-are-content for I-think themselves if the equal
 ἔχωσιν φαιδρότεροι ὄντες. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν
they-have inferior being on-account-of these-things indeed by-law indeed
 τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν
this unjust and shameful is-called the more to-seek to-have
 τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε
than-the many and doing-wrong it they-call the but at-least
 οἶμαι φύσις αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν
I-think nature itself shows it that just it-is the
 ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον
superior than-the worse more to-have and the more-able
 τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλοῶν ὅτι οὕτως
than-the less-able it-shows and these-things in-many-places that thus

ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν
it-is both among the other animals and of-the men in
 ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον
the-whole — cities and the races that thus the just
 κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον
has-been-judged the stronger (over)-the weaker to-rule and more
 ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν
to-have since by-what-sort-of justice using Xerxes against —
 Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ
Greece marched or the father of-him against Scythians or
 ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὗτοι
other countless — one could such-things mention but I-think these
 κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν,
according-to nature the (nature)-of-the just these-things do
 καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως,
and yes by Zeus according-to law at-least the (law)-of-the nature
 οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα·
not however perhaps according-to this which we lay-down
 484 πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους
molding the best and most-robust
 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας,
of-us ourselves from youth taking-(them) just-as lions
 κατεπᾶδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες
charming both and bewitching we-enslave-(them) saying
 ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ
that the equal one-must to-have and this is the fine and the
 δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων
just if but at-least I-think a-nature sufficient there-comes-to-be having
 ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρηξας
a-man all these-things having-shaken-off and having-broken-through
 καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ
and having-escaped having-trampled the our writings and

μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν
 trickeries and charms and laws the against nature
 ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ
 all having-risen-up he-stands-revealed master our the
 δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον.
 slave and there shines-forth the of-the nature just
 δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι
 it-seems and to-me also Pindar what-very I say to-show
 ἐν τῷ ᾠσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι —
 in the ode in which he-says that

XXVII • PHILOSOPHY IS FOR THE YOUNG

Callicles says philosophy is charming in a youth but ruinous if pursued into manhood, since it leaves a man ignorant of laws, business, and human character and ridiculous in public affairs. Quoting Euripides' Zethus, he tells Socrates that he neglects what he should attend to and could not defend himself if dragged into court by a worthless accuser. He urges him to give up refuting and practice the fine music of affairs.

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς

law the of-all king

θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

of-mortals both and of-immortals

οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησίν,

this and indeed he-says

ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον

leads making-just the most-violent

ὑπερτάτῃ χειρὶ τεκμαίρομαι

with-highest hand I-judge

ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλῆος, ἐπεὶ — ἀπριάτας —

by-the-deeds of-Heracles since unbought

c λέγει οὕτω πως — τὸ γὰρ ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι — λέγει

he-says thus somehow the for ode not I-know he-says

δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἤλάσατο

but that neither having-bought nor giving — Geryon he-drove-off

τὰς βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς

the cattle as this being the just by-nature both cattle

καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ

and the-other possessions to-be all of-the better both and

κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

stronger the (possessions)-of-the worse both and weaker

d τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσῃ δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ

the indeed then truth thus stands you-will-know and if to

τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία

the greater-things you-go having-let-go now philosophy philosophy

γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ

for surely is O Socrates a-charming-thing if anyone of-it

μετρίως αἴληται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ
moderately takes-hold in the youth if but further than-the
 δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ
proper one-lingers-(in-it) (it-is)-the-ruin of-the men if for even
 πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ,
quite well-endowed one-be and far-on (in)-the age one-philosophizes
 ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστὶν ὧν χρὴ
a-necessity of-all inexperienced to-have-become it-is of-which one-must
 ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κάγαθόν καὶ εὐδόκιμον
experienced to-be the (one)-about fine and-good and reputable
 ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίνονται
to-be a-man and for of-the laws inexperienced they-become
 τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ
of-those throughout the city and of-the words which one-must
 χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
using to-deal in the dealings with-the men
 καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
both privately and publicly and of-the pleasures both and desires
 τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν
the human and in-sum of-the characters altogether
 ἄπειροι γίνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν
inexperienced they-become when then they-come into some private
 ἢ πολιτικὴν πράξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ
or political action ridiculous they-become just-as
 γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας
at-least I-think the statesmen when in-turn into — your
 διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν.
pursuits they-come and the discussions ridiculous are

συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν
it-happens for the-(saying) — of-Euripides brilliant both is
 ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
each in this and to this he-presses

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
allotting the greatest of-the-day to-this part
 ἢν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν.
where himself than-himself happens best being

485 ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ
where but — worthless he-is thence he-flees and reviles
 τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ,
this the but other he-praises out-of-goodwill — toward-himself
 ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ
thinking thus he-himself himself to-praise but I-think the
 ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν
most-right is of-both to-partake of-philosophy indeed
 ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν
as-much-as of-education for-the-sake fine to-partake and not shameful
 μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος
for-a-youth being to-philosophize when but already older
 ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
being a-man still philosophizes ridiculous O Socrates
 τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς
the thing becomes and I-at-least most-similarly am-affected toward
 τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ
the philosophizing as toward the (ones)-lispng and
 παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει
playing whenever indeed for a-little-child I-see for-whom still it-is-fitting
 διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ
to-converse thus lisping and playing I-rejoice both and

χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρόπον τῇ τοῦ
charming to-me it-appears and liberal and befitting the of-the
 παιδίου ἡλικία, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου
little-child age whenever but clearly conversing a-small-boy
 ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνίᾳ μου
I-bear bitter some to-me seems thing to-be and it-pains my
 τὰ ὦτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν
— ears and to-me it-seems slavish some-thing to-be whenever
 δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὀρά,
but a-man hears anyone lisping or playing sees
 καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἀνάνδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον.
ridiculous it-appears and unmanly and of-blows worthy
 ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς d
the-same then I-at-least this am-affected also toward the
 φιλοσοφούντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὀρών
philosophizing in a-young indeed for youth seeing
 φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρόπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι
philosophy I-admire and to-befit to-me it-seems and I-consider
 ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ
free some to-be this — man the but
 μὴ φιλοσοφούντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς
not philosophizing illiberal and never of-any
 ἀξιόσποντα· ἐαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος·
going-to-deem-worthy himself either fine or noble thing
 ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφούντα καὶ
whenever but indeed an-older-man I-see still philosophizing and
 μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὧ
not getting-free of-blows to-me seems already to-need O
 Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
Socrates this — man what for just-now I-was-saying it-befalls
 τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἄν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ
this — man even-if quite well-endowed he-be unmanly

γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς,
to-become fleeing the centers of-the city and the market-places
 ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι,
in which said the poet the men conspicuous to-become
 καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μεираκίων
having-sunk-down and the remaining life to-live-out with youths
 ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ
in a-corner (with)-three or four whispering free but
 καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ
and great and adequate never to-utter I but O
 Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς· κινδυνεύω
Socrates toward you fairly am-disposed in-a-friendly-way I-am-likely
 οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα
then to-have-experienced now what-very — Zethus toward — Amphion
 ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὐπερ ἐμνήσθην.
the (Zethus)-of-Euripides whom I-mentioned

486 καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν,
and for to-me such some-things come toward you to-say
 οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες,
such-as that-one toward the brother that you-neglect O Socrates
 ὦν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν
what must you to-care-for and a-nature of-soul thus noble
 μεираκιῶδει τινὶ διατρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὔτ' ἂν δίκης
with-a-youthful some you-disfigure shape and neither — of-justice
 βουλαῖσι προσθεῖν ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν
to-the-counsels you-would-contribute — rightly a-word nor a-likely —
 καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν
and persuasive — you-would-grasp nor on-behalf-of another a-vigorous
 βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες — καί
counsel you-would-counsel and-yet O friend Socrates and
 μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ —
with-me not-at-all be-annoyed out-of-goodwill for I-will-speak — toward-you

οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὥς ἐγὼ σέ
not shameful does-it-seem to-you to-be thus to-be as I you
 οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας
think to-be and the others the far ever (into)-philosophy
 ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου
driving now for if someone you having-seized or another
 ὅτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι,
whomsoever of-the such-men to the prison should-lead-off
 φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
asserting (you)-to-do-wrong nothing doing-wrong you-know that not —
 ἔχους ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ
you-would-have what you-should-do with-yourself but you-would-be-dizzy — and
 χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον
gape not having what you-should-say and into the law-court
 ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ,
having-gone-up an-accuser having-met-with quite worthless and depraved
 ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
you-would-die — if he-wished death for-you to-propose-as-penalty
 καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἥτις c
and-yet how wise this is O Socrates which-(art)
 εὐφυῇ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν
well-endowed having-taken art a-man has-made worse neither himself
 αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων
for-himself being-able to-help nor to-save-out from the greatest
 κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν
dangers either himself or other any-one by but the
 ἐχθρῶν περισπᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον
enemies to-be-stripped of-all the property simply and dishonored
 ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον
to-live in the city — and such-a-man if anything even more-boorish
 εἰρησθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην.
to-be-said is-permitted on the-cheek striking not to-pay penalty

ἀλλ' ὦγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων
but good-sir by-me be-persuaded cease and from-refuting of-affairs
 δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
and fine-music practice and practice whence you-will-seem to-be-prudent
 ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι
to-others the subtleties these having-left whether nonsense one-must to-say
 εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις·
they-are or prattlings from which in-empty you-will-dwell halls
 ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ'
emulating not refuting men the small-things these but
 οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ.
those-to-whom there-is both livelihood and reputation and other many goods

XXVIII • THE TOUCHSTONE

Socrates says that if his soul were golden he would rejoice to find a touchstone, and he has found one in Callicles, who has the knowledge, goodwill, and frankness to test him where Gorgias and Polus were too bashful. Whatever Callicles agrees to will be settled. He asks Callicles to keep admonishing him, to show him what a man should be and what he should pursue and how far, and to say again what he and Pindar mean by the justice of nature, the stronger taking and ruling and having more.

soc. εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλίκεις,
if golden having I-happened the soul O Callicles
 οὐκ ἂν οἶε με ἄσμενον εὔρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν
not — do-you-think me gladly to-find of-these some of-the
 λίθων ἧ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς
stones by-which they-test the gold the best to
 ἧντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν
which I-was-going having-applied it if to-me should-agree

ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι
that-(stone) well to-have-been-tended the soul well to-know that

ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν με δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

CAL. πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

to what indeed this do-you-ask O Socrates

SOC. ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοιούτῳ

I to-you will-tell now I-think I you having-met-with such

ἐρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέναι.

a-godsend to-have-met-with

CAL. τί δὴ;

why indeed

SOC. εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ᾧ 487

well I-know that whatever to-me you agree about which —

ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ

my soul opines these-things now are the-very truth I-consider

γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς

for that the (one)-about to-test sufficiently soul about rightly

τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα

both living and not three then must to-have which you all

ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὖνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ

have knowledge both and goodwill and frankness I for

πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἱ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἰοί τέ εἶσιν βασανίζειν

many meet who me not able — are to-test

διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σὺ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ

on-account-of the not wise being just-as you others but wise

μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν

indeed are not are-willing but to-me to-tell the truth

διὰ τὸ μὴ κηδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σὺ· τῶν δὲ ξένων

on-account-of the not caring for-me just-as you the-two and foreigners

τῶδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῶν μὲν καὶ φίλων

these Gorgias both and Polus wise indeed and friends

ἐστὸν ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω
are of-mine too-deficient but in-frankness and too-bashful
 μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὧς γε εἰς τοσοῦτον
more than-the proper how for not who at-least to so-much
 αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ
of-shame have-come that on-account-of the being-asbamed dares
 ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον
each of-them himself to-himself opposite-things to-say before
 πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων.
many men and that-(too) about the greatest-matters
 σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν·
you but these-things all have which the others not have
 πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν
you-have-been-educated both for sufficiently as many — would-say
 Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ εὖνους. τίτι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι;
of-the-Athenians and to-me you-are well-disposed what evidence do-I-use
 ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
I to-you will-tell I-know you I O Callicles four
 ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον
being partners having-become of-wisdom you both and Teisander
 τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ
the Aphidnaean and Andron the (son)-of-Androtion and
 Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα
Nausicydes the Cholargian and once of-you I overheard
 βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη,
deliberating up-to what-point the wisdom to-be-practiced was
 καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα,
and I-know that prevailed among you the-following some opinion
 μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ
not to-be-eager to the precision to-philosophize but
 εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ
to-take-care you-exhorted each-other so-that not beyond the

δέοντος σοφώτεροι γινόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.

proper wiser having-become you-will-unawares be-ruined

ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλευόντος

since then you I-hear the-same-things to-me advising

ἄπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν μοι τεκμήριον

what-very — to-your-own closest-companions sufficient for-me evidence

ἐστίν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε

it-is that as truly to-me well-disposed you-are and indeed that at-least

οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φῆς

such-as to-speak-frankly and not to-be-asbamed yourself both you-say

καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι.

and the speech which a-little earlier you-made agrees with-you

ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνὶ ἐάν τι

it-stands indeed thus (it-is)-clear that these-things about now if anything

σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσης μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'

you in the arguments agree with-me tested this

ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ

now will-be sufficiently by me both and you and no-longer it

δείξει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε

will-be-necessary to another test to-refer not for — ever

αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὔτ' αἰσχύνης

it you-would-have-conceded you either of-wisdom by-lack or of-shame

περιουσία, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατών ἐμὲ συγχωρήσας ἄν· φίλος

by-excess nor again deceiving me you-would-concede — a-friend

γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἢ ἐμῇ

for to-me you-are as also yourself you-say in reality then — my

καὶ ἢ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας.

and — your agreement completion now will-have of-the truth

πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἢ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ 488

of-all and finest is the inquiry O Callicles about

τούτων ὧν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρή

these-things for-which you indeed me reproached of-what-sort some-one must

εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ
to-be the man and what to-pursue and up-to what-point both
 πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ
older and younger being I for if anything not
 ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο
rightly I-do in the life — my-own well know this
 ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν,
that not willingly I-err but by-ignorance — my you then
 ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς
just-as you-began to-admonish me do-not desist but sufficiently
 μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἔστιν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ
to-me show what is this which (is)-to-be-pursued by-me and
 τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν
in-what manner I-might-acquire — it and if me you-catch now
 μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ
indeed to-you having-agreed in but the later time not
 ταῦτα πράττοντα ἅπερ ὁμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ
the-same-things doing what-very I-agreed quite me consider
 βλάκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσης ὕστερον, ὥς
a-dolt to-be and no-longer ever me admonish afterward as
 μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε πῶς
of-nothing worthy being from the-beginning and for-me take-up-again how
 φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ
you-say the just to-stand both you and Pindar the according-to
 φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων
nature to-carry-off by-force the stronger the (things)-of-the weaker
 καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν
and to-rule the better over-the worse and more to-have
 τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις
the superior than-the worse-man surely-not something else do-you-say
 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;
the just to-be or rightly do-I-remember

CAL. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.
but these-things I-was-saying both then and now I-say

XXIX · THE STRONGER AND THE BETTER

Socrates asks whether the stronger, the better, and the mightier are the same, and Callicles says they are. Then the many, being stronger by nature than the one, lay down the laws, and their laws are the laws of the better. Since the many think that having an equal share is just and doing wrong more shameful than suffering it, these things hold by nature and not by law alone, and Callicles is likely wrong to accuse Socrates of playing law against nature.

SOC. πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; c
whether and the same better do-you-call you and stronger
οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε
nor for surely then able — I-was to-learn from-you what ever
λέγοις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
you-might-mean whether the mightier stronger you-call and
δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρας, οἷόν
must to-listen to-the mightier the weaker such-as
μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὥς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις
to-me you-seem also then to-show that the great cities
ἐπὶ τὰς μικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι
against the small according-to the by-nature just go because
κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεροι, ὥς τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ
stronger they-are and mightier as the stronger and the
ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτ' ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν
mightier and better the-same being or is-it-possible better indeed
εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι,
to-be inferior but and weaker and stronger indeed to-be
μοχθηρότερον δέ ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ
more-depraved but or the same definition is of-the better and

τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ
of-the stronger this for-me very-thing clearly define the-same or
 ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

other is the stronger and the better and the mightier

CAL. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

but I to-you clearly say that the-same it-is

SOC. οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ

therefore the many than-the one stronger are according-to

φύσιν; οἱ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί,

nature who indeed also the laws lay-down over the one

ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

just-as also you just-now were-saying

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

how for not

SOC. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειπτόνων

the of-the many then ordinances the (customs)-of-the stronger

ἐστίν.

are

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

e SOC. οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους

therefore the (customs)-of-the better the for stronger

βελτίους πολὺ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

(are)-better by-much according-to — your account

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά,

therefore the of-these customs (are)-according-to nature fine

κρειπτόνων γε ὄντων;

stronger at-least being

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι αὖ
 so then the many think thus as just-now again
 σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ
 you were-saying just to-be the equal to-have and more-shameful the
 ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως
 doing-wrong than-the being-wronged is-it these-things or not and take-care-that
 μὴ ἀλώσῃ ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυρόμενος. νομίζουσιν,
 not you-be-caught here you again being-ashamed do-they-think
 ἢ οὐ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεόν δίκαιον
 or not the many the equal to-have but not the more just
 εἶναι, καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ
 to-be and more-shameful the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged do-not
 φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν
 grudge me to-answer this Callicles so-that if
 μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε
 with-me you-agree I-may-be-confirmed now by you inasmuch-as
 ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγινῶναι ὁμολογηκόςτος.
 a-competent man to-discern having-agreed

CAL. ἀλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.
 but the at-least many think thus

SOC. οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
 not by-law then only it-is more-shameful the doing-wrong than-the
 ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει·
 being-wronged nor just the equal to-have but also by-nature
 ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῇ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ
 so-that you-are-likely not truth to-say in the earlier-(speech) nor
 ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος
 rightly me to-accuse saying that opposite is the law
 καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοῦς κακουργῶ ἐν
 and the nature which indeed also I having-recognized do-mischief in

τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν
the arguments if indeed anyone according-to nature speaks to the
 νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.
law leading-(him) if but anyone according-to law to the nature

XXX · SHOES AND CLOAKS

Callicles says he never meant the physically stronger but the more prudent, who should rule and have more than the worse. Socrates supposes a crowd with food and drink in common and one physician among them, more prudent about these things than the rest: he should distribute the food but must not consume more of it, and if he happens to be the weakest of all he gets the least. He asks whether the best weaver should have the largest cloak, the shoemaker the most shoes, and the farmer the most seed, and Callicles complains that Socrates always says the same things.

c CAL. οὐτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ
this-here man not will-stop talking-nonsense tell me O
 Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικούτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων,
Socrates not are-you-asbamed so-old being words hunting
 καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος;
and if anyone in-a-phrase errs a-godsend this making
 ἐμὲ γὰρ οἶε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι
me for do-you-think other something to-mean by-the stronger to-be
 ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταυτόν φημι
than the better not long-since to-you do-I-say that the-same I-say
 εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρείττον; ἢ οἶε με λέγειν,
to-be the better and the stronger or do-you-think me to-mean
 ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων
if a-rabble be-gathered of-slaves and of-all-kinds-of men

μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ
of-nothing worthy except perhaps in-the body to-be-strong and
 οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμμος;

these say these-very things to-be customs

SOC. εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

well O wisest Callicles thus do-you-mean

CAL. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

certainly indeed then

SOC. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλοι τοπάζω d

but I indeed O wonderful-man even myself long-since guess

τοιούτον τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ

such some-thing you to-mean by-the stronger and I-ask-again

γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἶδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ

longing clearly to-know what you-mean not for surely you

γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἢ τοῦ ενός, οὐδὲ τοὺς

at-least the two better consider than-the one nor —

σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ

your slaves better than-you because mightier they-are than

σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς

you but again from the-beginning say what ever you-mean the

βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε

better since not the mightier and O wonderful-man

πραϊότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

more-gently me instruct so-that not I-may-leave-school from you

CAL. εἰρωνεύη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

you-are-being-ironical O Socrates

SOC. μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος

by — Zethus O Callicles whom you using

πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας

much just-now were-ironical toward me but come say whom

λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

do-you-say the better to-be

CAL. τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

the superior I-at-least

SOC. ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ

you-see then that you yourself words say you-make-clear but

οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον

nothing not will-you-say the better and stronger whether

τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

the more-prudent you-mean or others some

CAL. ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

but yes by Zeus these I-mean and strongly at-least

490 SOC. πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων

often then one prudent-man than-ten-thousand not being-prudent

κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν

stronger is according-to — your account and this-man to-rule

δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν

must the others to-be-ruled and more to-have the ruler than-the

ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ

ruled this for to-me you-seem to-wish to-say and

οὐ ῥήματι θηρεύω — εἰ ὁ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

not at-a-word I-hunt if the one than-the ten-thousand (is)-stronger

CAL. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ

but these are what I-say this for I-think I

τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον

the just to-be by-nature the better being and more-prudent

καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

both to-rule and more to-have than-the worse

b SOC. ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ

hold then there what ever again now do-you-mean if in the

αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄθροοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἥ

same-(place) we-are just-as now many together and to-us there-be

ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί,

in common much food and drink we-are and of-all-kinds

οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν
the-ones indeed strong the-others but weak one and of-us
 ἢ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὢν, ἢ δέ, οἷον
is more-prudent about these-things a-physician being he-is and as
 εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος,
(is)-likely than-some indeed stronger than-others but weaker
 ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν, βελτίων καὶ
anything else than this-man more-prudent than-us being better and
 κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;
stronger will-be for these-things

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἢ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλεον ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, c
truly then of-these — foods more than-us is-to-be-had by-him
 ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκείνον δεῖ
because better he-is or in-the indeed ruling all-things that-man must
 νέμειν, ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρησθαι
to-distribute in the but consuming both them and using-up
 εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει
for — his-own body not (is-he)-to-have-more if not he-is-going
 ζημιουῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλεον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον
to-be-harmed but than-some indeed more than-others but less
 ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων
is-to-be-had if but he-happens of-all weakest being of-all
 ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὡγαθέ;
least for-the best-man O Callicles not thus good-sir
 CAL. περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· d
about food you-speak and drinks and physicians and nonsense
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.
I but not these-things mean

SOC. πότερον οὐ τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; φάθι
whether not the more-prudent better do-you-mean say-yes

ἢ μή.

or not

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

but not the better more to-be-necessary to-have

CAL. οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

not of-food at-least nor of-drinks

SOC. μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν

I-understand but perhaps of-cloaks and must the

ύφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλείστα καὶ

most-skilled-in-weaving the-largest cloak to-have and the-most and

κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιμέναι;

the-finest wearing go-about

CAL. ποίων ἱματίων;

what-sort-of cloaks

e SOC. ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν

but as-to shoes (it-is)-clear that must to-have-more the

φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον

most-prudent as-to these and best the shoemaker

ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλείστα ὑποδεδεμένον

perhaps the-largest must shoes and the-most having-on

περιπατεῖν.

to-walk-about

CAL. ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

what-sort-of shoes

you-talk-nonsense continually

SOC. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἶον

but if not — such-things you-mean perhaps — the-following such-as

γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ

a-farming man about land prudent both and fine and

ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων

good this-man indeed perhaps must to-have-more of-the seeds

καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

and as the-most seed to-use on — his-own land

CAL. ὥς ἀεὶ ταῦτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

how always the-same-things you-say O Socrates

SOC. οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν

not only at-least O Callicles but also about the

αὐτῶν.

same-things

XXXI · RULING ONESELF

Callicles finally says the stronger are those prudent and brave in the city's affairs, who should rule and have more than the ruled. Socrates notes that Callicles has defined the better three ways, as the mightier, the more prudent, and the braver. He then asks whether these rulers should also rule themselves, being temperate and masters of their own pleasures, and Callicles scoffs that Socrates means the simpletons.

CAL. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ 491

by the gods simply at-least always cobblers both and

κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύη,

fullers and cooks mentioning and physicians not-at-all you-stop

ὥς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

as-if about these for-us being the discussion

SOC. οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ

therefore you will-say about what-things the stronger both and

φρονιμώτερος πλεον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε

more-prudent more having justly has-more or neither

ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

me suggesting will-you-endure nor yourself will-say

- b CAL. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς
but I-at-least even long-since say first indeed the
 κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους,
stronger who they-are not shoemakers I-mean nor cooks
 ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι
but who — in the of-the city affairs prudent
 ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον
are in-whatever — manner well it-might-be-managed and not only
 φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν
prudent but also brave able being what — they-conceive
 ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.
to-accomplish and not grow-weary through softness of-the soul
- c SOC. ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὥς οὐ ταῦτ' αὖ
you-see O best Callicles how not the-same-things you both
 ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς αἰεὶ
of-me accuse and I of-you you indeed for me say always
 ταῦτ' αὖ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφη μοι ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοῦναντίον, ὅτι
the-same-things to-say and blame me I but of-you the-opposite that
 οὐδέποτε ταῦτ' αὖ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τότε
never the-same-things you-say about the same-things but at-one-time
 μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους
indeed the better both and stronger the mightier
 ὠρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν
you-defined again but the more-prudent now but again other
 τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ
something you-come having braver some by you are-called the
 κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι
stronger and the better but good-sir having-said be-done-with-it
 τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.
whom ever you-mean the better both and stronger and as-to what

CAL. ἀλλ' εἰρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλεόν ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

SOC. τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τί; ἢ τι ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;

being-ruled

CAL. πῶς λέγεις;

how do-you-mean

SOC. ἓνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

CAL. πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

how of-himself ruling do-you-mean

SOC. οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῇ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ruling of-those in himself

CAL. ὥς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.

how sweet you-are the simpletons you-mean the temperate

SOC. πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγω.

this I-mean

Callicles states his creed frankly: the man who would live rightly should let his desires grow as large as possible and be able to serve them through courage and prudence. The many, unable to do this, praise temperance and justice out of their own unmanliness. For kings' sons and men able by nature to win rule, nothing is more shameful or worse than temperance and justice, since they would bring the law, talk, and censure of the many upon themselves as a master; luxury, intemperance, and freedom, if they have backing, are virtue and happiness.

492 CAL. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν
 very at-least strongly O Socrates since how —
 εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὅτῳ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
 happy could-become a-man being-a-slave to-anyone but this
 ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι
 is the according-to nature fine and just which I to-you
 νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὁρθῶς βιωσόμενον
 now speaking-frankly say that must the-one rightly going-to-live
 τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὥς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ
 the indeed desires — his-own allow as greatest to-be and
 μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὥς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι
 not chastise-(them) these but as greatest being sufficient to-be
 ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι
 to-serve through courage and prudence and to-fill-up
 ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι
 of-whatever — ever the desire arises but this I-think
 τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους
 for-the many not (is)-possible whence they-blame the such-men
 δι' αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ
 through shame concealing — their-own incapacity and
 αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς
 shameful indeed they-say to-be the intemperance what-very in the

πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν
earlier-(speech) I was-saying enslaving the better in-the nature
 ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς
men and themselves not being-able to-procure for-the
 ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν
pleasures fulfillment they-praise the temperance and the
 δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ ὅσοις
justice on-account-of — their-own unmanliness since to-as-many-as
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς
from the-beginning it-befell either of-kings sons to-be or themselves
 τῇ φύσει ἰκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ
by-the nature able to-procure rule some or tyranny or
 δυναστείαν, τί ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον εἴη
lordship what — in truth more-shameful and worse would-be
 σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς
than-temperance and justice for-these — men for-whom
 ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν
being-permitted to-enjoy the goods and nothing in-the-way
 ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν
being themselves upon-themselves a-master would-bring the of-the
 πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον;
many men law both and talk and censure
 ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ
or how not — wretched having-become would-they-be by the fine-thing the
 τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες
of-the justice and of-the temperance nothing more allotting
 τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες
to-the friends — their-own than to-the enemies and that-too ruling
 ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῆς
in — their-own city but in truth O Socrates which you-say
 σὺ διώκειν, ᾧδ' ἔχει· τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία,
you to-pursue thus it-stands luxury and intemperance and freedom

ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία,
 if support they-have this is virtue both and happiness
 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ
 the but other these-things are the adornments the against
 φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.
 nature conventions of-men nonsense and of-nothing worth

XXXIII · THE LEAKY JARS

Socrates praises Callicles' frankness and asks whether the desires are not to be chastised but served; Callicles agrees, and adds that the stones and the dead would otherwise be happiest. Socrates recalls a wise man's saying that the body is a tomb, and a clever tale-teller's image of the part of the soul where the desires live as a leaky jar, which the uninitiated in Hades fill with a sieve. He offers a second image, one man's jars sound and full while the other's are cracked and must be filled night and day, and asks whether Callicles concedes that the orderly life is better.

d soc. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχῃ τῷ λόγῳ
 not ignobly at-least O Callicles you-go-through the argument
 παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι
 speaking-frankly clearly for you now say what the others
 διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. δέομαι οὖν
 think indeed to-say but not are-willing I-beg then
 ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον
 I of-you in-no way to-slacken so-that in reality evident
 γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας
 it-may-become how one-must-live and to-me say the indeed desires
 φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι,
 you-say not (are)-to-be-chastised if is-going anyone such-as he-ought to-be

έῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν
allowing but them as greatest fulfillment for-them from-somewhere
 γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;
at-least or-other to-provide and this to-be — virtue
 CAL. φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

I-say these-things I
 SOC. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαιμόνες
not then rightly are-said the of-nothing needing happy
 εἶναι.

to-be
 CAL. οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι
the stones for — thus at-least and the dead happiest
 εἶεν.

would-be
 SOC. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ
but indeed truly even as at-least you say terrible (is)-the
 βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμι ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν
life not for surely would-I-wonder — if Euripides truth in
 τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων —
these-(lines) says saying

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,
who and knows if the living indeed is to-be-dead
 τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
the being-dead and to-live

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε 493
and we in reality perhaps are-dead already for from-someone I-at-least
 καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν
even heard of-the wise that now we are-dead and the indeed
 σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῶν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμῶ
body is for-us a-tomb of-the and soul this in which desires

εἰςὶ τυγχάνει ὃν οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω
are happens being such-as to-be-swayed and to-shift up
 κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως
down and this then some telling-a-tale clever man perhaps
 Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ
a-Sicilian some or Italian playing with-the name on-account-of
 τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ
the credulous both and persuadable named a-jar the and
 ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους, τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ
senseless uninitiated of-the and senseless this of-the soul where
 αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν,
the desires are the intemperate of-it and not water-tight
 ὥς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν
as pierced would-be a-jar on-account-of the insatiability
 ἀπεικάσας. τοῦναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκληις,
having-likened-(it) the-opposite then this-man to-you O Callicles
 ἐνδείκνυται ὥς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου — τὸ αἰδὲς δὴ λέγων —
shows that of-those in Hades the unseen indeed meaning
 οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν, οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς
these most-wretched — would-be the uninitiated and would-carry into
 τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ
the pierced jar water with-another such pierced
 κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὥς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ
sieve the and sieve then he-means as said the-one to me
 λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν
speaking the soul to-be the and soul to-a-sieve he-likened
 τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὥς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην
the of-the senseless as pierced inasmuch-as not being-able
 στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπεικῶς
to-hold-water through unbelief both and forgetfulness these-things fairly
 μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαι
indeed are somewhat — strange they-show however what I wish

σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ᾧ, πείσαι
to-you having-shown if somehow able — I-am to-persuade-(you)
 μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος
to-change instead-of the insatiably and intemperately being
 βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ
life the orderly and with-the ever present-things sufficiently and
 ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω
adequately being life to-choose but whether do-I-persuade
 τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσθαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς
at-all you also to-change-your-mind happier to-be the
 κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ
orderly than-the intemperate or not-even if other many
 τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;
such-things I-tell-in-tale not-at-all any more will-you-change
 CAL. τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ᾧ Σώκρατες.

this more-truly you-have-said O Socrates
 SOC. φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ c
come then another to-you image let-me-tell from the same
 γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις
school as-the present-(one) consider for whether the-following you-mean
 περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ
about the life of-each of-the both temperate and of-the
 ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ
intemperate such-as if of-two men for-each jars many
 εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν
there-were and for-the indeed one sound and full the one
 οἶνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ
of-wine the other of-honey the other of-milk and others many
 πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων
of-many-things streams but scarce and hard-to-get of-each of-these
 εἶη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα·
there-were and with many toils and hard-ones procured

494 ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχτεύοι μήτε
the indeed then one having-filled-(them) neither would-channel-in nor
 τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ
anything would-worry but for-the-sake of-these quiet would-keep for-the
 δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνῳ, δυνατὰ
but other the indeed streams just-as also for-that-one possible
 μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα
indeed to-procure hard but the and vessels pierced
 καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν
and rotten he-would-be-compelled and always both night and day
 πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἄρα
to-fill them or the utmost would-suffer pains then
 τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ
such of-each being the life do-you-say the (life)-of-the
 ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμοῦ;
intemperate happier to-be than the (life)-of-the orderly
 πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμον
do-I-persuade at-all you these-things saying to-concede the orderly
 βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;
life than-the intemperate superior to-be or not do-I-persuade

XXXIV · THE LIFE OF THE ITCHING MAN

Callicles says the pleasant life is one of constant inflow. Socrates asks whether a man who could scratch himself forever would live happily, and Callicles, refusing to be shamed, says yes. Socrates presses on to the life of the catamite, and Callicles accuses him of dragging the argument into vulgarity. Socrates asks whether pleasant and good are the same or whether some pleasures are not good, and Callicles maintains they are the same.

CAL. οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ b
not you-persuade O Socrates for-the indeed for having-filled

ἐκεῖνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ
that-man no-longer there-is pleasure any but this is what
 νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ,
just-now I was-saying the just-as a-stone to-live when one-has-filled
 μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ
neither rejoicing any-longer nor being-pained but in this
 ἔστιν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὥς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.
is the pleasantly living in the as most-as-possible flowing-in

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ
therefore (it-is)-necessary at-least if much flows-in much also
 τὸ ἀπὶ τὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς
the going-out to-be and large some the holes to-be for-the
 ἐκροαῖς;
outflows

CAL. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ
of-a-stone-curlew some again you life mean but not of-a-corpse
 οὐδὲ λίθου. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἶον
nor of-a-stone and to-me say — the-following do-you-mean such-as
 πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;
to-hunger and hungering to-eat

CAL. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;
and to-thirst at-least and thirsting to-drink

CAL. λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ
I-mean-(it) and the other desires all having and
 δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.
being-able fulfilling-(them) rejoicing happily to-live

SOC. εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως
well-done O best-(of-men) continue for just-as you-began and see-that
 μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι.
not you-be-ashamed must and as it-seems not-even I to-be-ashamed
 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ
and first indeed say whether also (one)-having-the-itch and
 κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνησθαι, κνόμενον
itching without-stint having (the-power)-of-the scratching scratching
 διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.
finishing-out the life happily it-is-possible to-live

d CAL. ὥς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
how strange you-are O Socrates and simply a-mob-orator

SOC. τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ
accordingly O Callicles Polus indeed and Gorgias both
 ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς
I-dumbfounded and to-be-ashamed I-made you but not — will-be-dumbfounded
 οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.
nor — will-be-ashamed brave for you-are but answer only

CAL. φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνόμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιώναι.
I-say therefore even the (one)-scratching pleasantly — would-live

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
therefore if-indeed pleasantly also happily

CAL. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

e SOC. πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ — ἢ ἔτι τί
whether if the head only he-itches or still what
 σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, εἴαν τις σε
you shall-I-ask see O Callicles what you-will-answer if anyone you
 τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων
the (things)-connected with-these in-order all asks and of-these
 τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, οὗτος
such being (the)-sum the of-the catamites life this-(is)

οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις
not terrible and shameful and wretched or these will-you-dare
 λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;
to-say happy to-be if without-stint they-have what they-need
 CAL. οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς
not are-you-ashamed to such-things leading O Socrates the
 λόγους;

arguments

SOC. ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος 495
truly for I lead-(them) there O noble-man or that-man
 ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν
who — says without-restraint thus the (ones)-rejoicing however —
 χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζεται τῶν ἡδονῶν
they-rejoice happy to-be and not distinguishes of-the pleasures
 ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον
what-sort (are)-good and bad but still even now say whether
 φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν
you-say to-be the same pleasant and good or to-be something of-the
 ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;
pleasant-things which not is good

CAL. ἵνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ ὁ λόγος,
so-that indeed for-me not inconsistent may-be the argument
 ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.
if other I-say (it)-to-be the same I-say (it)-to-be
 SOC. διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ
you-are-spoiling O Callicles the first statements and
 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἰκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις,
not — any-longer with me sufficiently the things-that-are you-could-examine
 εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.

if-indeed contrary-to the things-seeming to-yourself you-will-speak

CAL. καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

and for you O Socrates

b

SOC. οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
 not therefore rightly I-act either I if-indeed I-do this
 οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ
 or you but O blessed-man consider whether not this is the
 ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ
 good the in-every-way rejoicing these both for the just-now
 αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα,
 hinted-at many and shameful-things appear resulting
 εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
 if this thus is and others many

CAL. ὥς σύ γε οἶε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 as you at-least think O Socrates

SOC. σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;
 you but in reality O Callicles these-things do-you-maintain

CAL. ἔγωγε.
 I-at-least

XXXV • PLEASURE AND GOOD ARE NOT THE SAME

Callicles agrees that knowledge and courage differ from pleasure, and that faring well and faring badly are opposites that a man cannot have or lose at once, as with health and disease. But hunger is painful and eating while hungry is pleasant, so a man can be pained and pleased at the same time and stops both together. Faring well and badly cannot coincide, so pleasure is not the good. Gorgias urges Callicles to keep answering.

c SOC. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὥς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;
 let-us-attack then the argument as you being-serious

CAL. πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
 certainly at-least strongly

SOC. ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε·
come then for-me since thus it-seems-good distinguish these

ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;
knowledge surely do-you-call something

CAL. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ
not also courage just-now were-you-saying some to-be with
 ἐπιστήμης;
knowledge

CAL. ἔλεγον γάρ.
I-was-saying-(so) for

SOC. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὥς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς
anything else then (than)-as different the courage from-the
 ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;
knowledge two these were-you-saying

CAL. σφόδρα γε.
strongly at-least

SOC. τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτον ἢ ἕτερον;
what and pleasure and knowledge the-same or different

CAL. ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.
different surely O wisest you

SOC. ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;
truly also courage different from-pleasure

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
how for not

SOC. φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη
come then (see)-that we-shall-remember these-things that Callicles said
 Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτον εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην
the-Acharnian pleasant indeed and good the-same to-be knowledge
 δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.
but and courage both from-each-other and from-the good different

CAL. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἄλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ
Socrates but at-least for-us the-(man) from-Alopece not

ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

agrees-to these-things or does-be-agree

e SOC. οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς,
not be-agrees I-think and at-least not-even Callicles

ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς
whenever he-himself himself views rightly tell for me the

εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοῦναντίον
well faring to-the badly faring not the-opposite

ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

do-you-consider condition to-have-undergone

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις,
so then if-indeed opposite are these to-each-other

ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει
(it-is)-necessary about them to-hold just-as about health it-holds

καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ
and disease not for at-once surely is-healthy both and is-sick the

ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.
man nor at-once is-rid of-health both and of-disease

CAL. πῶς λέγεις;

how do-you-mean

496 SOC. οἷον περὶ οὗτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν
such-as about whatever you-wish of-the body having-taken-separately

σκοῦπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα
consider is-sick surely a-man (in)-the-eyes for-which the-name

ὀφθαλμία;

(is)-ophthalmia

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

SOC. οὐ δῆπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;
not surely also is-be-healthy at-least at-once (in)-the same

CAL. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.
not in-any-way-whatever

SOC. τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἄρα
what and whenever of-the ophthalmia he-is-rid then
 τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ
at-that-time also of-the health is-be-rid of-the eyes and
 τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;
at-last at-once of-both has-be-been-rid

CAL. ἥκιστα γε.
least at-least

SOC. θαυμάσιον γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίνεται ἢ γάρ;
strange for I-think and irrational it-becomes is-it-not for

CAL. σφόδρα γε.
strongly at-least

SOC. ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ
but in turn I-think each both he-takes and
 ἀπολλύει;

loses

CAL. φημί.
I-say-(so)

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;
therefore also strength and weakness likewise

CAL. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτήτα;
and speed and slowness

CAL. πάννυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἦ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὰναντία
truly also the-good-things and the happiness and the-opposites
 τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ
of-these evils both and wretchedness in turn does-he-take and
 ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;
in turn is-he-rid of-each

CAL. πάντως δήπου.

altogether surely

c SOC. ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται
if we-find then some-things of-which at-once both is-rid
 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ
a-man and at-once has-(them) (it-is)-clear that these at-least not
 ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν
— would-be the both good and the bad do-we-agree
 ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
these-things and well very having-considered answer

CAL. ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὥς ὁμολογῶ.

but prodigiously how I-agree

SOC. ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν
come then to the earlier things-agreed the hungering
 ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ
were-you-saying whether pleasant or distressing to-be itself I-mean the
 πεινῆν.
hungering

d CAL. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ λέγω.
distressing I-at-least the however hungering to-eat pleasant I-call

SOC. μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἡ
I-understand but then the at-least hungering itself (is)-distressing or
 οὐχί;
not

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

therefore also the thirsting

CAL. σφόδρα γε.

strongly at-least

SOC. πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν

whether then still more shall-I-ask or do-you-agree all

ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;

want and desire distressing to-be

CAL. ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

I-agree but do-not ask

SOC. εἰεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺν

well thirsting and indeed to-drink anything else than pleasant

φῆς εἶναι;

do-you-say to-be

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον

therefore of-this which you-mean the indeed thirsting-(part) being-pained

δήπου ἐστίν;

surely is

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωςίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονῆς;

the and drinking (is)-a-filling both of-the want and a-pleasure

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

therefore in the drinking to-rejoice you-say

CAL. μάλιστα.

most-certainly

SOC. διψῶντά γε.

thirsting at-least

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. λυπούμενον;

being-pained

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. αἰσθάνη οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν

do-you-perceive then the result that being-pained to-rejoice

λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο

you-say at-once whenever thirsting to-drink you-say or not at-once this

γίνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε

happens in the same place and time whether of-soul or

σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

of-body you-wish nothing for I-think it-differs is-it these-things or not

CAL. ἔστιν.

it-is

497 SOC. ἀλλὰ μὲν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα

but indeed well at-least faring badly to-fare at-once

ἀδύνατον φῆς εἶναι.

impossible you-say to-be

CAL. φημὶ γάρ.

I-say-(so) for

SOC. ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατόν ὡμολόγηκας.

being-distressed but at-least to-rejoice possible you-have-agreed

CAL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ

not then the rejoicing is well faring nor the

ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ

being-distressed badly so-that different becomes the pleasant from-the

ἀγαθοῦ.

good

CAL. οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

not I-know what-things you-are-quibbling O Socrates

SOC. οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόωθί γε b

you-know but you-are-coy O Callicles and go-forward at-least

ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ἵνα εἰδῆς ὥς σοφὸς ὢν με
still to the front so-that you-may-know how wise being me

νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπανται
you-admonish not at-once thirsting both each of-us has-ceased

καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

and at-once being-pleased through the drinking

CAL. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

not I-know what you-mean

GOR. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν

by-no-means O Callicles but answer also for-our

ἔνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

sake so-that may-be-completed the arguments

CAL. ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ

but always such is Socrates O Gorgias small-things

καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

and of-little worth he-asks and refutes

GOR. ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ

but what to-you does-it-matter altogether not yours (is)-this —

τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι

honor O Callicles but submit to-Socrates to-refute

ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

however — he-wishes

CAL. ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, c

ask then you the small both and narrow-things these

ἐπεὶ περ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.

since to-Gorgias it-seems-good thus

SOC. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα
happy you-are O Callicles that the great-(mysteries)
 μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾧμην θεμιτὸν
you-were-initiated-into before the small I but not I-thought lawful
 εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα
(it)-to-be whence then you-left-off answer whether not at-once
 παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.
ceases thirsting each of-us and being-pleased

CAL. φημί.
I-say-(so)

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
therefore also hungering and of-the other desires and
 ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
pleasures at-once he-ceases

CAL. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

XXXVI • GOOD MEN AND BAD FEEL ALIKE

Callicles calls the prudent and brave good and the senseless and cowardly bad. Fools and cowards rejoice and grieve as much as the prudent and brave, or more, when an enemy withdraws or advances. If good men are good by the presence of goods, and pleasures are the goods, then the bad who rejoice are good and the coward more so; the results contradict his claim that pleasant and good are the same.

d SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
therefore also of-the pains and of-the pleasures at-once he-ceases
 CAL. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα
but indeed of-the good-things at-least and evils not at-once
 παύεται, ὥς σὺ ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;
he-ceases as you were-agreeing now but not do-you-agree

CAL. ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δῆ;
I-at-least what then indeed

SOC. ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεταί, ὦ φίλε, τάγαθὰ τοῖς
that not the same become O friend the-good-things with-the
 ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιανοῖς. τῶν μὲν
pleasant-things nor the evils with-the distressing-things of-the-one indeed
 γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὥς ἐτέρων ὄντων·
for at-once he-ceases of-the-other but not as different being
 πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ
how then the-same — could-be the pleasant-things with-the good-things or
 τὰ ἀνιανὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; εἰ δὲ βούλη, καὶ τῆδε
the distressing-things with-the evils if but you-wish also in-this-way
 ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι·
examine I-think for for-you not-even in-this-way (it)-to-be-consistent
 ἄθροι δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς
consider and the good not of-good-things by-presence good
 καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;
do-you-call just-as the beautiful in-whom — beauty is-present

CAL. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλοὺς;
what and good men do-you-call senseless and cowardly
 οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους
not for just-now at-least but the brave and prudent
 ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;
you-were-saying or not these good do-you-call

CAL. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;
what and a-child senseless rejoicing ever have-you-seen

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἄνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;
a-man but not-yet have-you-seen senseless rejoicing

CAL. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

I-think I-at-least but what (is)-this

498 SOC. οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

nothing but answer

CAL. εἶδον.

I-have-seen

SOC. τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;
what and sense having being-pained and rejoicing

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. πότεροι δὲ μάλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ
which and more rejoice and are-pained the

φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

prudent or the senseless

CAL. οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν.

I-think I-at-least not much at-all to-differ

SOC. ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες
but suffices even this in war and ever have-you-seen

ἄνδρα δειλόν;

a-man cowardly

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

SOC. τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν
what then departing the enemies which to-you seemed

μάλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

more to-rejoice the cowardly or the brave

- CAL. ἀμφοτέροι ἔμοιγε· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. b
both to-me-at-least if but not nearly-alike at-least
- SOC. οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;
nothing it-differs do-they-rejoice but at-any-rate also the cowardly
- CAL. σφόδρα γε.
strongly at-least
- SOC. καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὥς ἔοικεν.
also the senseless as it-seems
- CAL. ναί.
yes
- SOC. προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ
approaching and the cowardly only are-they-pained or also the
 ἀνδρεῖοι;
brave
- CAL. ἀμφοτέροι.
both
- SOC. ἄρα ὁμοίως;
then alike
- CAL. μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.
more perhaps the cowardly
- SOC. ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;
departing and not more do-they-rejoice
- CAL. ἴσως.
perhaps
- SOC. οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες c
therefore are-pained indeed and rejoice both the senseless
 καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως,
and the prudent and the cowardly and the brave nearly-alike
 ὥς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;
as you say more but the cowardly than-the brave
- CAL. φημί.
I-say-(so)

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί,
but indeed the at-least prudent and the brave (are)-good

οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

the but cowardly and senseless bad

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
nearly-alike then rejoice and are-pained the good

καὶ οἱ κακοί;

and the bad

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ
so then nearly-alike are good and bad the

ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν
good both and the bad or even still more good are

οἱ κακοί;

the bad

d CAL. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.

but by Zeus not I-know what you-mean

SOC. οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ
not do-you-know that the good of-good-things you-say by-presence

εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι
to-be good and bad and of-evils the and good-things to-be

τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

the pleasures evils and the distresses

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί,
therefore to-the rejoicing are-present the-good-things the pleasures

εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;

if-indeed they-rejoice

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

therefore good-things being-present good are the (ones)-rejoicing

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ

what and to-the being-distressed not are-present the evils the

λῦπαι;

pains

CAL. πάρεστιν.

they-are-present

SOC. κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς

of-evils but at-least by-presence you-say you to-be bad the

κακοὺς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς;

bad or no-longer do-you-say-(so)

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἀγαθὸν ἄρα οἷ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἷ

good then (are)-those-who — rejoice bad and those-who

ἂν ἀνιῶνται;

— *are-distressed*

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οἷ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἷ δ' ἥττον ἥττον,

those indeed at-least (rejoicing)-more (are)-more those and less less

οἷ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

those and nearly-alike nearly-alike

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς
therefore you-say nearly-alike to-rejoice and to-be-pained the
 φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς
prudent and the senseless and the cowardly and the
 ἀνδρείους, ἣ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;
brave or even more still the cowardly

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

499 SOC. συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ
reckon-up then in-common with me what for-us results from
 τῶν ὠμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν
the things-agreed both twice for surely and thrice they-say fine
 εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν
(it)-to-be the fine-things to-say both and to-examine good
 μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;
indeed to-be the prudent and brave we-say is-it-not for

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
bad and the senseless and cowardly

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
good and again the rejoicing

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
bad and the (one)-being-distressed

CAL. ἀνάγκη.

(of)-necessity

SOC. ἀνιάσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν
to-be-distressed and also to-rejoice the good and bad

ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
alike perhaps and even more the bad

CAL. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ b
therefore alike becomes bad and good with-the good

ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ
or even more good the bad not these-things result also

τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, εἴαν τις ταῦτα φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ
the earlier those if anyone the-same says pleasant-things both and
ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
good to-be not these-things (are)-necessary O Callicles

XXXVII · BETTER AND WORSE PLEASURES

Callicles says he has been humoring Socrates and never thought all pleasures equal. Socrates cries out at being treated like a child but accepts the concession: good pleasures are the beneficial ones and bad the harmful. Since everything is done for the sake of the good, the pleasant is to be pursued for the good and not the reverse, and picking out which pleasures are good needs an expert.

CAL. πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν,
long-since surely you I-listen-to O Socrates conceding

ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κὰν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ότιοῦν,
pondering that even-if playing anyone to-you grants anything-whatever

τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ σὺ
of-this gladly you-bold as the youths as-if indeed you

οἶε ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντιν' οὐκ ἡγεῖσθαι

think me or also another whomsoever of-men not to-consider

τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

the some better pleasures the others worse

c SOC. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκεις, ὥς πανοῦργος εἶ καὶ μοι

oh oh O Callicles how a-rogue you-are and me

ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων

as-if a-child you-treat at-one-time indeed the same-things asserting

οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι

thus to-be at-another-time and otherwise deceiving me and-yet

οὐκ ᾧμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι

not I-thought at-least at the-beginning by you willingly —

ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὥς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ

going-to-be-deceived as being a-friend now but I-was-deceived and

ὥς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ

as it-seems (it-is)-necessary for-me according-to the old saying the

παρὸν εἶ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ

present well to-make and this to-accept the (thing)-given from

σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δῆ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί

you it-is and indeed as it-seems what now you-say that pleasures

τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἢ γάρ;

some are the some good the others bad is-it-not for

d CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ

so then good indeed (are)-the beneficial bad and the

βλαβεραί;

harmful

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι,
beneficial and at-least (are)-the good something producing

κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακὸν τι;

bad and the bad something

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα e
so then the following do-you-mean such-as according-to the body

ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς,
which just-now we-were-mentioning in the eating and drinking pleasures

ἧ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι,
truly then of-these the some health producing in the body

ἧ ἰσχὺν ἧ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὐταὶ μὲν
or strength or other some excellence of-the body these indeed

ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων κακαί;

(are)-good the others the-opposites of-these bad

CAL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ
therefore also pains likewise the some good are the

δὲ ποιηραί;

others bad

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

how for not

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ
therefore the indeed good both pleasures and pains both

αἰρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;

are-to-be-chosen — and to-be-done

CAL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. τὰς δὲ ποιηρὰς οὐ;

the but bad not

CAL. δῆλον δή.

(it-is)-clear indeed

500 SOC. ἔνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν
for-the-sake for surely of-the good-things all-things to-us seemed
 πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα
to-be-done to-be if you-remember to-me both and to-Polus then
 καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν
also to-you does-it-seem-good thus (the)-end to-be of-all the
 πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα δεῖν πάντα
actions the good and of-that for-the-sake to-be-necessary all
 τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων;
the-other-things to-be-done but not that (for)-the others
 σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;
a-fellow-voter with-us are-you also you in third-(place)

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἔνεκα δεῖ καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ
of-the good-things then for-the-sake must both the-other-things and the
 ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
pleasant-things to-do but not the-good-things (for)-the pleasant-things

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ
so then of-every man is-it to-pick-out what-sort good
 τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ
of-the pleasant-things are and what-sort bad or of-a-skilled-man there-is-need
 εἰς ἕκαστον;
for each

CAL. τεχνικοῦ.

of-a-skilled-man

Socrates recalls his division of pursuits into those that aim at pleasure without knowledge and those that know the good, and begs Callicles not to answer in jest, since the question is how one should live: the political life to which Callicles calls him or the life in philosophy. Cookery and medicine differ because medicine can give an account of what it does; the same distinction holds for the soul, and pleasing crowds without regard to their good is flattery.

SOC. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ b
 let-us-recall then what again I to Polus and
 Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
 Gorgias happened saying I-was-saying for again if you-remember
 ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 that there-were provisions the some as-far-as pleasure this-very thing
 μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ
 only providing ignorant-of but the better and the
 χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γινώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν·
 worse the others knowing what both (is)-good and what bad
 καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν
 and I-was-placing among-the indeed about the pleasures — cookery
 ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν
 an-experience but not an-art among-the and about the good —
 ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκεις,
 medicine an-art and by (Zeus)-of-Friendship O Callicles
 μήτε αὐτὸς οἶου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι
 neither yourself think to-be-necessary toward me to-play nor whatever
 ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ'
 — you-chance-upon contrary-to the (things)-you-think answer nor
 αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος·
 again the (things)-from me thus receive as (from-one)-playing
 ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ
 you-see for that about this for-us are the arguments (about)-which

τί ἂν μάλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων
what — more would-be-serious anyone even small sense having
 ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον
a-man than this in-what must manner to-live whether
 ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα
to which you call me the of-the man indeed these-things
 πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν
doing speaking both in the assembly and rhetoric
 ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς
practicing and engaging-in-politics in-this — manner in-which you
 νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ
now engage-in-politics or this — life the-one in philosophy and
 τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν
what ever is this from-that differing perhaps then best
 ἐστίν, ὥς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους
it-is as just-now I attempted to-distinguish having-distinguished
 δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτῳ διττῷ
and also having-agreed with-each-other whether there-are these two
 τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρειτον ἀλλήλοις καὶ
— lives to-examine what both they-differ from-each-other and
 ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὐπω οἴσθα τί λέγω.
which is-to-be-lived of-them perhaps then not-yet you-know what I-mean
 CAL. οὐ δῆτα.

not indeed

- e SOC. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὠμολογήκαμεν
but I to-you more-clearly will-tell since we-have-agreed
 ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι
I both and you to-be indeed something good to-be and something
 ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐκατέρου δὲ
pleasant different and the pleasant from-the good of-each and
 αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως,
of-them a-practice some to-be and a-provision of-the acquisition

τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — αὐτὸ
the one of-the pleasant a-hunt the other of-the good this-very
 δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφης;
and to-me thing first either assent-to or not do-you-assent
 CAL. οὕτως φημί.

thus I-say
 SOC. ἴθι δὴ, ἂ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί 501
come then what also to these I was-saying agree-with
 μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον
me whether then to-you I-seemed at-that-time truth to-say I-was-saying
 δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι
and surely that — indeed cookery not to-me seems an-art to-be
 ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου
but an-experience the but medicine-(does) saying that the one of-this
 οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκειπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν
which it-tends both the nature has-examined and the cause
 ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ
of-what it-does and an-account is-able of-these of-each to-give —
 ἰατρική· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ
medicine the but other of-the pleasure toward which the care for-it
 ἐστὶν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι
is entire quite artlessly to it goes neither at-all
 τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως
the nature having-examined of-the pleasure nor the cause irrationally
 τε παντάπασιν ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησάμενη,
both altogether so a-word to-say nothing having-reckoned
 τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
by-routine and experience a-memory only preserving of-the accustomed
 γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ'
to-happen by-which indeed also it-procures the pleasures these-things
 οὖν πρῶτον σκοπεῖ εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἰκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ
then first consider whether it-seems to-you sufficiently to-be-said and

εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι,
(there)-to-be some also about soul such other pursuits
 αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου
the some artful forethought some having of-the best
 περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγοροῦσαι,
about the soul the others of-this indeed making-light
 ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς
having-considered but again just-as there the pleasure only of-the
 ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ
soul in-what — for-it way it-might-come-about whichever but either
 βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοποῦμεναι οὔτε
better or worse of-the pleasures neither examining nor
 μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον
being-a-care to-them other than to-gratify only whether better
 εἴτε χείρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε
or worse to-me indeed for O Callicles they-seem both
 εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακεῖαν εἶναι καὶ
to-be and I-at-least say — such-thing flattery to-be both
 περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἂν τις
about body and about soul and about other of-whatever — anyone
 τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός
the pleasure tends without-examining being of-the better
 τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι
both and of-the worse you but indeed whether do-you-agree
 ἡμῶν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης;
with-us about these-things (in)-the same opinion or do-you-dissent
 CAL. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς
not I-at-least but I-concede so-that for-you both may-be-completed
 ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.
the argument and to-Gorgias here I-may-gratify

SOC. πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ d
 whether and about indeed one soul is-there this about

δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

but two and many not is-there

CAL. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

no but both about two and about many

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν

therefore also in-a-mass at-once to-gratify it-is-possible not-at-all

σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

considering the best

CAL. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

I-think I-at-least

XXXIX • THE ARTS OF PLEASURE

Flute-playing, cithara-playing in the contests, choral training, and the composing of dithyrambs pursue only our pleasure, as Cinesias does; his father Meles did not aim even at the pleasantest, since his singing pained his hearers. Even tragedy, solemn and wonderful as it is, seeks to gratify its spectators rather than to say what is unpleasant but beneficial. Strip poetry of melody, rhythm, and meter, and speeches remain, spoken to a great crowd, so poetry is a kind of public oratory and the poets play the rhetor in the theaters.

SOC. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ e
 can-you then say which are the pursuits the

τοῦτο ποιῶσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος,
 (ones)-this doing rather but if you-wish me asking

ἣ μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἣ δ' ἂν

which indeed — to-you seems of-these to-be say-yes which but —

μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν.

not do-not say-yes first and let-us-examine — flute-playing

οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν
not does-it-seem to-you such some to-be O Callicles the
 ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;
pleasure of-us only to-pursue other and nothing to-care-for
 CAL. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαῖδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ
therefore also — the-following all such-as — cithara-playing
 ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι;
the in the contests

CAL. ναί.

yes

502 SOC. τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων
what and the of-the choruses training and the of-the dithyrambs
 ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡ γῆ
composition not such some to-you does-it-appear or do-you-consider
 τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ
at-all to-care Cinesias the (son)-of-Meles that he-will-say
 τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίνουιντο,
something such whereby — the hearers better might-become
 ἢ ὅτι μέλλει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

or (only)-what is-going to-gratify the crowd of-the spectators

CAL. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε
(it-is)-clear indeed this at-least O Socrates Cinesias at-least
 πέρι.

concerning

SOC. τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον
what and the father of-him Meles truly toward the best
 βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ
looking did-be-seem to-you to-sing-to-the-cithara or that-man indeed not-even
 πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ
toward the pleasantest he-pained for singing the spectators but

δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ
indeed consider not — both cithara-singing does-it-seem to-you all and
ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ἡϋρῆσθαι;
the of-the dithyrambs composition of-pleasure for-the-sake to-have-been-invented
CAL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς b
what and indeed the solemn this and wonderful the of-the
τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς
tragedy composition upon what is-it-in-earnest whether is of-it
τὸ ἐπιχειρήμα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς
the undertaking and the seriousness as to-you it-seems to-gratify the
θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἔάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ
spectators only or also to-strive-hard if anything to-them pleasant
μὲν ἢ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ
indeed is and gratifying bad but that this indeed not
ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ
it-will-say if but anything happens unpleasant and beneficial this but
καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾄσεται, ἔάντε χαίρωσιν ἔάντε μὴ; ποτέρως
both it-will-say and will-sing whether they-rejoice or not in-which-way
σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποίησις;

to-you does-it-seem to-have-been-arranged the of-the tragedies composition
CAL. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν c
(it-is)-clear indeed this at-least O Socrates that toward the
ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.

pleasure rather it-has-set-out and the gratifying the spectators
SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ
therefore — such-thing O Callicles we-said just-now

κολακεῖαν εἶναι;

flattery to-be

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. φέρε δῆ, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης
come then if anyone should-strip-off from-the poetry all

τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι
the both melody and the rhythm and the meter anything else

ἢ λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

than speeches do-they-become the remainder

CAL. ἀνάγκη.

(of)-necessity

SOC. οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολλὸν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται
therefore to a-great crowd and people these are-spoken

οἱ λόγοι;

the speeches

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστίν ἢ ποιητική.

public-oratory then a-kind-of is — poetry

d CAL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

SOC. οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν

therefore rhetorical public-oratory — it-would-be or not to-play-the-rhetor

δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

do-they-seem to-you the poets in the theaters

CAL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

Socrates asks whether the rhetors who address the Athenian people aim at the citizens' improvement or only at gratifying them. Callicles allows that some care for the citizens, but cannot name a living rhetor who has made them better. He offers Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles; Socrates replies that if virtue is filling desires they were good men, but if it is fulfilling only the desires that improve a man, he knows no such statesman.

SOC. νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ἠύρηκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς
 now then we have-found a-rhetoric some toward
 δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
 a-people such as of-children both together and of-women and
 ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνν ἀγάμεθα·
 of-men and of-slaves and of-free which not at-all we-admire
 κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φάμεν εἶναι.
 flattering for it we-say to-be

CAL. πάνν γε.
 certainly at-least

SOC. εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ 503
 well what and the toward the of-the-Athenians people rhetoric
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους τοὺς τῶν
 and the other the in the cities peoples the of-the
 ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν; πότερόν σοι
 free men what ever for-us this is whether to-you
 δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου
 do-they-seem toward the best always to-speak the rhetors at-this
 στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσσονται διὰ
 aiming that the citizens as best-as-possible will-be on-account-of
 τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς
 — their-own speeches or also these toward the gratifying the
 πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν
 citizens having-set-out and for-the-sake of-the private-(interest) — their-own

ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς
making-light of-the common as with-children they-deal with-the
 δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε
peoples to-gratify them trying only whether but at-least
 βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
better they-will-be or worse through these-things not-at-all they-care
 CAL. οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ
not simple any-longer this you-ask there-are indeed for
 οἱ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν,
those-who caring-for the citizens say what they-say
 εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἷους σὺ λέγεις.
there-are but also such-as you mean

- b SOC. ἔξαρκεί. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν
it-suffices if for even this is twofold the indeed one-(part)
 που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ
surely of-this flattery — would-be and shameful public-oratory the
 δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται
but other fine the providing that as best-as-possible
 ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα
will-be of-the citizens the souls and to-fight-through saying
 τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται
the best-things whether more-pleasant or more-unpleasant they-will-be
 τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν
to-the hearers but not ever you this have-seen —
 ῥητορικὴν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν,
rhetoric or if any you-can of-the rhetors such name
 τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;
why not also to-me him have-you-told who be-is
 CAL. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε
but by Zeus not I-can I-at-least to-you name of-the at-least
 νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.
present rhetors anyone

SOC. τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν δι'
what and of-the old-ones can-you any name on-account-of
 ὄντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ
whom the-credit have the-Athenians better to-have-become since
 ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους
that-man began to-speak-in-public in the former time worse
 ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστὶν οὗτος.

being I indeed for not know who is this-man

CAL. τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
what and Themistocles not do-you-hear a-man good
 γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ
to-have-been and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles this-one
 τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

— *lately having-died whom also you have-heard*

SOC. εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες
if is at-least O Callicles which formerly you were-saying
 ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς
virtue true the the desires to-fill-up both —
 αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ
one's-own and those of-the others if but not this but what-very
 ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν —
in the later argument we-were-compelled we to-agree
 ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιουσι
that those indeed of-the desires being-fulfilled better make
 τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μή.
the man these indeed to-satisfy those but worse not
 τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἴη — τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ
this and an-art some would-be such a-man of-these any
 οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

not I-know I-at-least how I-should-name

CAL. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις.

but if you-seek well you-will-find-(one)

Every craftsman arranges his materials toward a form, so that the whole becomes ordered. Order and arrangement make a house or a ship good; in the body they are called health and strength, and in the soul lawfulness and law, that is, justice and temperance. The true rhetor would aim all his speeches at bringing justice and temperance into his citizens' souls, and would no more indulge a sick soul than a doctor lets a sick patient eat what he likes.

e soc. ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτωςι ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις
 let-us-see then in-this-way calmly examining whether anyone
 τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ
 of-these such has-been come for the good man and
 ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἂ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ
 toward the best speaking whatever — he-says anything else (than)-not
 εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ
 at-random will-be-speak but looking toward something just-as
 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον
 also the other all craftsmen toward — their-own work
 ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἀλλ' ὅπως
 each not at-random selecting applies but so-that
 ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται.
 — form some for-him may-have this which he-works-at

504 οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους,
 for-instance if you-wish to-look-at the painters the builders
 τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα
 the shipwrights the other all craftsmen whichever
 βούλει αὐτῶν, ὥς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθῃσιν
 you-wish of-them how into order some each each-thing puts
 ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ
 whatever — he-puts and compels the one to-the other
 πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται
 fitting both to-be and to-harmonize until — the whole is-composed

τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἱ τε δὴ
an-ordered both and arranged thing and the both indeed
 ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὗς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ
other craftsmen and those-whom just-now we-were-mentioning the about the
 σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα
body trainers both and physicians arrange surely the body
 καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;
and put-in-order do-we-agree thus this to-be or not
 CAL. ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

let-be this so
 SOC. τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστή ἂν
of-order then and of-arrangement having-got a-house good —
 εἶη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;
would-be of-disorder but bad

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;
therefore also a-ship likewise

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;
and indeed also the bodies we-say the ours

CAL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. τί δ' ἡ ψυχὴ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ
what and the soul of-disorder having-got will-it-be good or
 τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
of-order both and of-arrangement some

CAL. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.
(of)-necessity from the earlier-(things) also this to-agree-to

SOC. τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς
what then name is-there in the body for-the from the

τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

order both and the arrangement arising

CAL. ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

health and strength perhaps you-mean

c SOC. ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ

I-at-least what and in-turn for-the in the soul arising

ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρώ εὐρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν

from the order and the arrangement try to-find and to-say

ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.

just-as there the name

CAL. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

why and not yourself say-(it) O Socrates

SOC. ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν

but if to-you more-pleasant it-is I will-say you and if indeed

σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ

to-you I-seem I well to-speak say-yes if but not refute and do-not

ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν

give-in to-me for it-seems for-the indeed of-the body orders

ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται

the-name to-be healthy from which in it the health arises

καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

and the other excellence of-the body is-it these-things or not is-it

CAL. ἔστιν.

it-is

d SOC. ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν

for-the but at-least of-the soul orders and arrangements lawful

τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμοι· ταῦτα

both and law whence also law-abiding they-become and orderly these

δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς ἢ οὐ;

and are justice both and temperance do-you-say-(so) or not

CAL. ἔστω.

let-it-be

SOC. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκείνος, ὁ e
therefore toward these-things looking the rhetor that-one the
 τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει
skilled both and good both the speeches will-apply
 ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας,
to-the souls which — he-speaks and the actions all
 καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι δίδῳ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῇται,
and a-gift if any he-gives he-will-give and if any he-takes-away
 ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως
he-will-take-away toward this always the mind having so-that
 ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς
— his for-the citizens justice indeed in the souls
 γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν
may-arise injustice and may-be-removed and temperance indeed
 ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
may-be-engendered intemperance and may-be-removed and the other
 ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπύῃ. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;
excellence may-be-engendered vice and may-depart do-you-concede or not

CAL. συγχωρῶ.

I-concede

SOC. τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι
what for (is)-the-use O Callicles to-a-body at-least ailing
 καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ
and wretchedly disposed foods many to-give and the
 ἡδίστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ'
pleasanteest or drinks or other whatever which not will-benefit it (in)-any
 ὅτι πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον
way more than the-opposite according at-least to-the just account
 καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;
even less is-it these-things

505 CAL. ἔστω.

let-it-be

SOC. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν
not for I-think it-profits with wretchedness of-body to-live
 ἀνθρώπων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ
for-a-man (of)-necessity for thus also to-live wretchedly or not
 οὕτως;

so

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἶον
therefore also the desires to-fill-up such-as
 πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν,
hungering to-eat as-much-as he-wishes or thirsting to-drink
 ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῷσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὥς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα
(one)-being-healthy indeed allow the physicians for the most-part (one)-ailing
 δὲ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῷσιν ἐμπύμπλασθαι ὦν
but so a-word to-say never do-they-allow to-be-filled with-what
 ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;
he-desires do-you-concede this at-least also you

CAL. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

b SOC. περὶ δὲ ψυχῇν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος;
about and soul O best-(of-men) not the same manner
 ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ
as-long-as indeed — wicked it-is senseless both being and
 ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ
intemperate and unjust and unholy to-restrain it one-must
 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ
from-the desires and not to-permit other things to-do than
 ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται φῆς ἢ οὐ;
from which better it-will-be do-you-say-(so) or not

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

thus for surely for-itself (it-is)-better for-the soul

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

therefore the restraining is from what it-desires to-chastise

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ

the being-chastised then for-the soul better is than the

ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾧ.

intemperance just-as you just-now thought

XLII • CALLICLES WITHDRAWS

Callicles refuses to go on answering and says he has only been obliging Gorgias. Socrates observes that Callicles will not endure being benefited by chastisement, the very thing under discussion, and that a story must not be left without a head. Gorgias asks him to finish alone, and Socrates agrees to go through the argument himself, inviting anyone to take hold of him if he seems to speak falsely.

CAL. οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον

not I-know what-things you-mean O Socrates but another

τινὰ ἐρώτα.

some-one ask

SOC. οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς

this man not endures being-benefited and himself

τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

this suffering about which the argument is being-chastised

CAL. οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδέν ὦν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ
nor at-least to-me it-is-a-care at-all of-what you say and
 ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

these-things to-you for-Gorgias' sake I-answered

SOC. εἰεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον
well what then indeed shall-we-do midway the argument
 καταλύομεν;

do-we-break-off

CAL. αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.

yourself you-will-know

d SOC. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι
but not-even the tales they-say midway lawful it-is
 καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ
to-leave but having-put-on a-head so-that not without
 κεφαλῆς περιῇ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα
a-head it-go-about answer then also the remaining-things so-that
 ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

for-us the argument a-head may-get

CAL. ὥς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ,
how violent you-are O Socrates if but by-me you-are-persuaded
 ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ
you-will-let go this — argument or also with-another someone
 διαλέξῃ.

you-will-converse

SOC. τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν
who then other is-willing not for surely unfinished at-least the
 λόγον καταλίπωμεν.

argument let-us-leave

CAL. αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ
yourself and not — could-you go-through the argument either
 λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

speaking by yourself or answering yourself

SOC. ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ e
so-that for-me the-(saying) — of-Epicharmus may-come-true what before
 τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ
this two men were-saying one being sufficient I-may-become but
 κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν,
it-is-likely most-necessary to-be thus if however we-shall-do-(it)
 οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς
I-think I-at-least to-be-necessary all of-us contentiously to-be toward
 τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί
the knowing the truth what it-is about what we-speak and what
 ψεύδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασιν φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό.
falsehood common for good for-all evident to-become it
 δίεμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ 506
I-will-go-through indeed then the argument I as — to-me it-seems
 ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν
to-stand if but to-any of-you not the (things)-that-are I-seem to-grant
 ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ
to-myself one-must to-take-hold and refute nor for
 τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ'
surely I-at-least knowing say what I-say but I-seek in-common with
 ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τι φαίνεται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν
you so-that if something appears to-say the (one)-disputing
 ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα,
with-me I first will-concede I-say however these-things
 εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ
if it-seems-good to-be-necessary to-be-carried-through the argument if but not
 βούλεσθε, ἐώμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.
you-wish let-us-let-(it) now go and let-us-depart
 GOR. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω b
but to-me indeed not it-seems O Socrates to-be-necessary yet
 ἀπίεναί, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι
to-depart but to-go-through you the argument it-appears and to-me

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς
also to-the others to-seem-(so) I-wish for I-at-least even myself
ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

to-hear you yourself going-through the remaining-things

c SOC. ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν
but indeed truly O Gorgias even myself gladly indeed —

Καλλικλῆϊ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ
with-Callicles here still would-be-conversing until to-him the —

Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου·
of-Amphion I-had-rendered speech in-return-for the-(speech) — of-Zetbus

ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι
since but you O Callicles not are-willing to-help-carry-through

τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνουν, εἴαν
the argument but then to-me at-least listening take-hold if

τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με εἰάν ἐξελέγχῃς,
anything to-you I-seem not well to-say and me if you-refute

οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος
not I-will-be-annoyed with-you just-as you with-me but greatest

εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ.

benefactor with me you-will-be-recorded

CAL. λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

speak good-sir yourself and finish

XLIII • THE TEMPERATE SOUL

Socrates resumes from the beginning: the pleasant is done for the sake of the good, and each thing is good by the presence of an excellence that comes from order. A soul with its proper order is temperate, and the temperate man does what is fitting toward gods and men, so he is also just, holy, brave, and happy; the intemperate man is wretched. The wise say that heaven and earth, gods and men are held together by fellowship and justice; Callicles, who would practice greed, has overlooked the great power of geometrical equality. If so, doing wrong is worse than being wronged, and the true rhetorician must be just.

SOC. ἀκούε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. d
hear then from the-beginning me taking-up the argument
 ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστίν; — οὐ ταυτόν,
then the pleasant and the good the same is not the-same
 ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. — πότερον δὲ τὸ
as I and Callicles agreed whether and the
 ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα
pleasant for-the-sake of-the good is-to-be-done or the good for-the-sake
 τοῦ ἡδέος; — τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. — ἡδὺ δέ
of-the pleasant the pleasant for-the-sake of-the good pleasant and
 ἐστίν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ
is this at-whose presence we-are-pleased good and
 οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; — πάνυ γε. — ἀλλὰ μὴν
at-whose presence good we-are certainly at-least but indeed
 ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσ'
good at-least we-are both we and the-other-things all as-many-as
 ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; — ἔμοιγε
good are excellence some having-come-to-be-present to-me-at-least
 δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. — ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ
it-seems necessary to-be O Callicles but indeed truly
 ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ
the at-least excellence of-each both of-vessel and of-body and
 ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα
of-soul again and of-animal every not by-the haphazard most-finely
 παραγίνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἣτις
comes-to-be-present but by-order and by-rightness and by-art which
 ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδεται αὐτῶν· ἄρα ἔστιν ταῦτα; — ἐγὼ μὲν
to-each has-been-assigned of-them then is-it these-things I indeed
 γάρ φημι. — τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον
for say-(so) by-order then ordered and arranged
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; — φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. — κόσμος
is the excellence of-each I-would-say — I-at-least an-arrangement

τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστω ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν
 some then having-come-to-be in each the of-each proper good
 παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; — ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. — καὶ
 renders each of-the things to-me-at-least it-seems and
 ψυχῇ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς
 a-soul then arrangement having — its-own (is)-better than-the
 ἀκοσμήτου; — ἀνάγκη. — ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε κόσμον
 unarranged (of)-necessity but indeed the at-least arrangement
 ἔχουσα κοσμία; — πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; —
 having (is)-orderly how for not is-it-likely

507 ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; — πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. — ἡ ἄρα
 the and at-least orderly (is)-temperate great necessity the then
 σώφρων ψυχῇ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα
 temperate soul (is)-good I indeed not have beyond these-things
 ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.
 other-things to-say O friend Callicles you but if you-have teach-(me)
 CAL. λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

speak good-sir

b SOC. λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦναντίον
 I-say then that if the temperate good is the the-opposite
 τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἐστίν· ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ
 to-the temperate having-suffered bad is was and this —
 ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. — πάνν γε. — καὶ μὴν
 senseless both and intemperate certainly at-least and indeed
 ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ
 the at-least temperate the fitting-things would-do — both toward
 θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ
 gods and toward men not for — would-be-be-temperate
 τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων; — ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι
 the not fitting-things doing (of)-necessity these-things to-be
 οὕτω. — καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα
 so and indeed toward indeed men the fitting-things

πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν
doing just-things — he-would-do toward and gods holy-things the-one
 δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ
and the just-things and holy-things doing (of)-necessity just and
 ὅσιον εἶναι. — ἔστι ταῦτα. — καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν
holy to-be it-is these-things and indeed truly also brave
 γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε
at-least (of)-necessity not for indeed of-a-temperate man it-is either
 διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ
to-pursue or to-flee what not is-fitting but what be-ought
 καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
both things and men and pleasures and pains
 φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ·
to-flee and to-pursue and enduring to-hold-out where be-ought
 ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥστερ
so-that great necessity O Callicles the temperate-man just-as
 διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν
we-went-through just being and brave and holy a-good
 ἄνδρα εἶναι τελῶς, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς
man to-be completely the and good well both and finely
 πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν
to-do whatever — he-does the and well doing blessed
 τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς
both and happy to-be the and wicked and badly
 πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως
doing wretched this and — would-be the-one oppositely
 ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῆνεις.
being to-the temperate the intemperate whom you were-praising
 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ d
I indeed then these-things thus lay-down and say these-things true
 εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθὴ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὥς ἔοικεν,
to-be if and they-are true the (one)-wishing as it-seems

εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον,
 happy to-be temperance indeed (is)-to-be-pursued and to-be-practiced
 ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὥς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ
 intemperance and to-be-fled as he-has feet each of-us and
 παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι,
 (it-is)-to-be-arranged most-of-all indeed nothing to-need of-the being-chastised
 εἰδὲν δὲ δεηθῆναι ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ
 if but he-needs-(it) either himself or another one of-the household either
 ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ
 a-private-man or a-city (is)-to-be-imposed penalty and (he-is)-to-be-chastised if
 μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς
 he-is-going happy to-be this to-me-at-least seems the mark
 εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο
 to-be toward which looking one-must to-live and all-things to this
 τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
 — his-own straining and the (things)-of-the city so-that
 δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι
 justice will-be-present and temperance to-the blessed going
 ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους
 to-be so to-act not desires allowing intemperate
 εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν,
 to-be and these attempting to-fill an-endless evil
 ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλῆς
 a-robber's life living neither for — to-another man dear
 ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος,
 — would-be — such-man nor to-a-god to-have-fellowship for (he-is)-unable
 ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἐνὶ κοινωνίᾳ, φιλίᾳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη.
 in-whom and not there-is fellowship friendship not — would-be
 508 φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ
 say and the wise O Callicles both heaven and earth and
 θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν
 gods and men the fellowship to-hold-together and friendship

καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ
and orderliness and temperance and justice and the
ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, οὐκ
whole this on-account-of these-things a-cosmos they-call O comrade not
ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν
disorder nor intemperance you but to-me seem not to-apply
τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθεν
the mind to-these-things and that-(too) wise being but it-has-escaped
σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν
you that the equality the geometrical both among gods and among
ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν.
men great has-power you but greed think one-must practice
γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. εἰεν ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος
of-geometry for you-are-careless well either to-be-refuted then this
ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης
— argument for-us is that not of-justice and of-temperance
κτήσει εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι, ἢ
by-possession happy (are)-the happy of-vice and the wretched or
εἰ οὗτος ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα.
if this true is (it-is)-to-be-examined what the consequences
τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ'
the earlier those O Callicles result all upon
οἷς σύ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι
which you me asked whether being-serious I-was-speaking saying that
κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱός καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν
to-be-accused it-would-be both oneself and son and companion if
τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ
in-anything he-does-wrong and — rhetoric for this (is)-to-be-used and
ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὧς συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθὴ ἄρα ἦν,
what Polus through-shame you-thought to-concede true then were
τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὥσπερ αἰσχίον
the being the doing-wrong than-the being-wronged by-how-much more-shameful

τοσούτω· κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν
by-so-much worse and the (one)-going rightly a-rhetorician
 ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων,
to-be just then must to-be and knowledgeable of-the just-things
 ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογήσαι.
which again Gorgias said Polus through shame to-have-conceded

XLIV · THE REPROACH EXAMINED

Socrates examines Callicles' reproach that he cannot defend himself or his friends and can be struck, robbed, banished, or killed at anyone's pleasure. He holds that being struck, cut, or robbed unjustly is not the most shameful thing; doing these things is worse and more shameful for the wrongdoer than for the wronged. These conclusions are bound with arguments of iron and adamant unless Callicles or someone more vigorous looses them; and since injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer, the most shameful helplessness is to be unable to ward off from oneself and one's friends that greatest harm, and each lesser one in its degree.

d τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἔχόντων σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ
these-things and thus being let-us-examine what ever is what
 σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὐ, ὥς ἄρα ἐγὼ
you me reproach-with then well it-is-said or not that then I
 οὐχ οἰός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἑμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων
not able — am to-help either myself or of-the friends
 οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων
anyone nor of-the household nor to-save-out from the greatest
 κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι
dangers I-am but at the-(mercy) of-(anyone)-wishing just-as the dishonored
 τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄντε τύπτειν βούλῃται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ
of-the (one)-willing whether to-strike he-wishes the vigorous indeed
 τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρῃς, ἐάντε χρήματα
this the-(phrase) — of-your speech on the-cheek or property

ἀφαιρείσθαι, ἔαντε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἔαντε, τὸ
to-take-away or to-cast-out from the city or the
 ἔσχατον, ἀποκτείνειν καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ
last to-kill and thus to-be-disposed of-all indeed
 αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς
most-shameful is as — your argument-(says) the but indeed mine
 ὅστις, πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι
which often indeed already has-been-said nothing but prevents also still
 λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης
to-be-said not I-say O Callicles the being-struck on the-cheek
 ἀδίκως αἰσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ
unjustly most-shameful to-be nor at-least the being-cut either the
 σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ
body — mine or the purse but the striking both me
 καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ
and — mine unjustly and cutting both more-shameful and worse and
 κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ
stealing at-least at-once and enslaving and house-breaking and
 συλλήβδην ὅτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι
in-sum whatever wrongdoing both me and — mine for-the wrongdoer
 καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.
both worse and more-shameful to-be than for-me the (one)-wronged
 ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω
these-things for-us above there in the earlier arguments thus
 φανέντα, ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ
having-appeared as I say are-held-fast and bound even if
 ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνους
somewhat-boorish something to-say it-is by-iron and adamant
 λόγοις, ὥς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτως, οὐς σὺ εἰ μὴ
arguments as at-any-rate — it-would-seem in-this-way which you if not
 λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄλλως
you-loose or than-you someone more-vigorous not possible — otherwise

λέγοντα ἢ ὥς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε
speaking than as I now say well to-speak since to-me-at-least
 ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως
the same account is always that I these-things not know how
 ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὦν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς
they-are that however of-whom I have-met just-as now no-one
 οἶός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ
able — is otherwise speaking not — ridiculous to-be I
 μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει
indeed then again lay-down these-things thus to-be if but thus it-is
 καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ
and greatest of-the evils is the injustice for-the wrongdoer and
 ἔτι τούτου μείζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα
still than-this greater greatest being if possible — the doing-wrong
 μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος
not to-pay penalty what — help not being-able a-man
 βοηθεῖν ἐαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη;
to-render to-himself ridiculous — in truth would-be-be
 ὦρα οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν
then not this-one which will-avert the greatest of-us
 βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην
harm but great necessity this to-be the most-shameful
 βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ
help not to-be-able to-help either himself or — his-own
 φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου
friends both and household second and the of-the second
 κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως·
evil and third the of-the third and the-other-things thus
 ὥς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
as of-each evil the-magnitude is-by-nature so also (the)-finess

τοῦ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ
of-the able to-be for each to-help and (the)-shame of-the
 μή. ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκευς;
not then otherwise than thus is-it O Callicles
 CAL. οὐκ ἄλλως.
not otherwise

XLV · MAKING ONESELF LIKE THE RULER

To avoid being wronged one needs power, and to avoid doing wrong one needs power and an art. The surest protection against being wronged is to be oneself the ruler in the city, or even tyrant, or a partisan of the existing regime; and a savage, uneducated tyrant befriends only those like himself. So the young man who would be safe must accustom himself from youth to rejoice and grieve at the same things as his master; he will not be wronged and will have great power, but he will be able to do the greatest wrong unpunished, and so suffer the greatest evil, a soul maimed by imitating his master.

SOC. δυοῖν οὖν ὄντων, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μείζον d
two then being the doing-wrong both and being-wronged greater
 μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
indeed we-say evil the doing-wrong less and the being-wronged
 τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ,
what then — having-provided a-man could-help himself
 ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν τε
so-as both the benefits these to-have the both
 ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
from the not doing-wrong and the from the not being-wronged
 πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὥδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν
whether power or will thus and I-mean whether if

μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν
not he-wishes to-be-wronged not will-he-be-wronged or if power

παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;
he-provides of-the not being-wronged not will-he-be-wronged

CAL. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

(it-is)-clear indeed this at-least that if power

e SOC. τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται
what and indeed of-the doing-wrong whether if not he-wishes

ἀδικεῖν, ἰκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει — ἢ καὶ
to-do-wrong sufficient this is not for he-will-do-wrong or also
 ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι,
for this must power some and art to-provide

ὥς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; τί
as if not he-learns them and practices he-will-do-wrong why

οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
not this-very at-least to-me thing did-you-answer O Callicles

πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν
whether to-you do-we-seem rightly to-have-been-compelled to-agree in

τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα
the earlier arguments I both and Polus or not when

ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας
we-agreed no-one wishing to-do-wrong but unwillingly

τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;
the doing-wrong all to-do-wrong

510 CAL. ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα
let-be for-you this O Socrates so so-that

διαπεράνῃς τὸν λόγον.
you-may-carry-through the argument

SOC. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ
also for this then as it-seems is-to-be-provided —

δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.
power some and art so-that not we-may-do-wrong

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν
what then ever is (the)-art of-the provision of-the in-nothing
 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ
being-wronged or as least-as-possible consider whether to-you it-seems which-very
 ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν
to-me to-me indeed for it-seems this either oneself to-rule to-be-necessary
 ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας
in the city or even to-be-tyrant or of-the existing government
 ἐταῖρον εἶναι.

a-comrade to-be

CAL. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, b
you-see O Socrates how I ready am to-praise
 ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς
if anything well you-say this to-me you-seem quite well
 εἰρηκέναι.

to-have-said

SOC. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος
consider then also this whether to-you I-seem well to-say a-friend
 μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκάστω εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα,
to-me seems each to-each to-be as possible — most-of-all
 ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ
whom-very the ancients both and wise say the like to-the
 ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;

like not also to-you

CAL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ c
therefore where a-tyrant is ruling savage and
 ἀπαιδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων
uneducated if someone than-this-man in the city much better

εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ
were would-fear surely — him the tyrant and to-this-man with
 ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;
all (bis) mind not — ever could-be a-friend become
 CAL. ἔστι ταῦτα.

it-is these-things

SOC. οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν
nor at-least if someone much worse were nor would
 οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ
this-man would-despise for — him the tyrant and not
 ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.
— ever as toward a-friend would-be-serious

CAL. καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

also these-things (are)-true

d SOC. λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ
there-remains then that-man alone worthy of-account a-friend —
 τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοίηθης ὢν, ταῦτ' αὖ ψέγων καὶ
to-such-a-man who — of-like-character being the-same-things blaming and
 ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλη ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι.
praising is-willing to-be-ruled and to-be-subject to-the ruler
 οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς
this-man great in this — city will-have-power this-man no-one
 χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
with-impunity will-wrong not thus is-it

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων,
if then someone should-consider in this — city of-the young
 τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με
in-what — way I great might-have-power and no-one me
 ἀδικοῦ; αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθύς ἐκ
might-wrong this as it-seems for-him (the)-road is straightway from

νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ
youth to-accustom himself at-the same-things to-rejoice and to-be-vexed as-the
 δεσπότη, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος
master and to-arrange so-that as much-as-possible like
 ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;
he-will-be to-that-man not so

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα
therefore for-this-man the indeed not being-wronged and great
 δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει
to-have-power as — your argument-(says) in the city
 διαπεπράζεται.
will-have-been-achieved

CAL. πάνν γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ
so then also the not doing-wrong or of-much it-lacks if-indeed
 ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ
like he-will-be to-the ruler being unjust and with this-man
 μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὕτως
great will-have-power but I-think I-at-least quite the-opposite in-this-way
 ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶν τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα
the provision will-be for-him for the able — to-be as most-as-possible
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἢ γάρ;
to-do-wrong and doing-wrong not to-pay penalty is-it-not for

CAL. φαίνεται.

it-appears

- 511 soc. οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ
 therefore the greatest for-him evil will-belong depraved
 ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν
 being (in)-the soul and maimed on-account-of the imitation
 τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.
 of-the master and power

XLVI · THE PILOT'S MODESTY

Callicles objects that the tyrant's imitator can kill the man who refuses to imitate; Socrates answers that he will kill a good man, being wicked himself. Callicles urges the arts that save life, such as forensic rhetoric, but swimming saves lives too, and so does the pilot's art, which brings a man home from Egypt for two drachmas and does not boast, since the pilot knows he has made no passenger better in body or soul and that a life is not worth saving for a man with an incurable soul.

- CAL. οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
 not I-know how you-twist each-time the arguments up
 καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ
 and down O Socrates or not do-you-know that this —
 μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν
 imitator the not imitating that-man will-kill if
 βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα.
 he-wishes and will-take-away the possessions
- b soc. οἶδα, ὡγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί,
 I-know good Callicles if not deaf at-least I-am
 καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν
 both from-you hearing-(it) and from-Polus just-now often and from-the
 ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ
 others nearly all those in the city but also you to-me

ἀκούε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μὲν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς
 listen that he-will-kill indeed if he-wishes but wicked
 ὦν καλὸν κάγαθὸν ὄντα.

being (a-man)-fine and-good being

CAL. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

therefore this indeed also (is)-the provoking-thing

SOC. οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ c

not sense at-least (for-one)-having as the argument signifies or

οἶει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὥς

do-you-think to-be-necessary this to-provide-for a-man as

πλείστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας

longest-(possible) time to-live and to-practice the arts these

αἱ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ

which us always from the dangers save just-as also

ἦν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν

(that)-which you bid me to-practice — rhetoric the in

τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσιν;

the law-courts saving

CAL. ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

yes by Zeus rightly at-least you advising

SOC. τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἢ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη

what and O best-(of-men) truly also the of-the swimming knowledge

σεμνή τις σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

august some to-you does-it-seem to-be

CAL. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

by Zeus not to-me-at-least

SOC. καὶ μὴν σώζει γέ καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς 512

and indeed saves at-least also this from death the

ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἷς τι τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὗ δέ

men whenever into some such they-fall where there-is-need

ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ μικρὰ

of-this — knowledge if but this to-you seems small

εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι μείζω ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικήν,
to-be I to-you a-greater than-this will-tell — steersmanship
 ἥ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα
which not only the souls saves but also the bodies
 καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ
and the property from the utmost dangers just-as
 ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ
— rhetoric and this indeed unassuming is and
 κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν
orderly and not gives-itself-airs posturing as-if a-grand
 τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά διαπραξαμένη τῇ
something accomplishing but the-same-things having-accomplished as-the
 δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δὺ
forensic-(art) if indeed from Aegina hither it-saves-(you) I-think two
 ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου,
obols it-charges if but from Egypt or from the Pontus
 ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα
if a-very-great-deal (for)-this — great benefaction having-saved
 ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα
what just-now I-was-mentioning both oneself and children and property
 καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς
and wives having-disembarked-(them) into the harbor two drachmas
 ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα
it-charges and himself the (one)-having the art and these-things
 διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν
having-accomplished having-disembarked beside the sea and the
 ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι λογιῆσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι
ship walks-about in a-modest bearing to-reckon for I-think
 ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἀδελόν ἐστιν οὐσινὰς τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν
he-knows-how that uncertain it-is whom both he-has-benefited of-the
 συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὐσινὰς
fellow-voyagers not having-allowed to-be-drowned and whom

ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν
he-has-harmed knowing that in-nothing them better he-disembarked
 ἢ οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχάς.
than such-as they-embarked either (in)-the bodies or the souls
 λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις b
he-reckons then that not if indeed someone by-great and incurable
 νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη,
diseases in the body being-gripped not was-drowned
 οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν
this-man indeed wretched is because not he-died and in-nothing
 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ
by him has-been-benefited if but someone then in the than-the
 σώματος τιμωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ
body more-precious the soul many diseases has and
 ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει,
incurable for-this-man and (life)-is-to-be-lived — and this-man he-will-benefit
 ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἑάντε ἄλλοθεν
whether from the-sea or from a-law-court or from-elsewhere
 ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν
from-whenever he-saves-(him) but he-knows that not better it-is to-live
 τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.
for-the depraved man badly for necessity it-is to-live

XLVII • THE LOVE OF THE PEOPLE

The engineer sometimes saves whole cities, yet Callicles despises him and would neither give his daughter to the engineer's son nor take the engineer's daughter himself, though by his own standard of saving he has no grounds to scorn him. If what matters is not saving but living well, the truly manly man should let living long go and consider how to live best the time he has. If Callicles must become like the Athenian people to have power, he should ask whether that profits him. Callicles admits that Socrates somehow seems to speak well but says he is not quite persuaded, and Socrates says the love of the people in his soul is what resists.

c διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν
on-account-of these-things not custom it-is to-give-himself-airs the
 κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε,
steersman although saving us nor at-least O wonderful-man
 τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου,
the engineer who neither than-a-general not to-say than-a-steersman
 οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν·
nor than-other any less sometimes is-able to-save
 πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώξει. μὴ σοι
cities for there-are (times)-when whole he-saves surely-not to-you
 δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο
does-he-seem on-a-par-with the forensic-man to-be and-yet if he-wished
 λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα,
to-say O Callicles what-very you exalting the business
 καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν
he-would-overwhelm — you with-the words saying and exhorting
 ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὥς οὐδὲν
to the being-necessary to-become engineers that nothing
 τᾶλλά ἐστιν ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν
the-other-things are sufficient for for-him the argument but you none
 ἥττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου,
the-less him despise and the art the of-that-man
 καὶ ὥς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ
and as in reproach you-would-call-(him) — an-engineer and to-the
 ὑεὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλεις, οὔτ' ἂν
son of-him neither — to-give a-daughter you-would-be-willing nor —
 αὐτὸς λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν
yourself to-take the (daughter)-of-that-man and-yet from which-(grounds)
 τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ
— your-own you-praise by-what just reason the engineer

καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἷδ'
do-you-despise and the others whom just-now I-was-mentioning I-know
 ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων.
that you-would-say — better to-be and from better-(people)
 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ^e
the but better if not it-is what I say but this-very thing
 ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σώζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα
is virtue the saving oneself and — one's-own (things)-being
 ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται
of-what-sort one happens ridiculous for-you the blame becomes
 καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὅσαι
both of-engineer and of-physician and of-the other arts as-many-as
 τοῦ σώζειν ἔνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ
of-the saving for-the-sake have-been-made but O blessed-man see whether
 ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἢ τὸ σώζειν
other something the noble and the good is than the saving
 τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ
both and being-saved perhaps for this indeed the living for-however-long
 χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐάτεον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ
time by-the at-least as truly man is-to-be-let-go — and not
 φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ
life-(is)-to-be-clung-to but having-entrusted about these-things to-the god and
 πιστεῦσαντα ταῖς γυναιξιν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἰς
having-believed the women that the fated-(lot) not-even — one
 ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον τί' ἂν τρόπον
could-escape the-(thing) after this (is)-to-be-examined in-what — way
 τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίῃ,
this which he-is-going time to-live as best he-might-live
 ἄρα ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ ἐν ἣ ἂν οἰκῇ, ⁵¹³
whether assimilating himself to-the constitution this in which — he-dwells
 καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ
and now too then must you as most-like-as-possible to-become to-the

δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι καὶ
people the of-the-Athenians if you-are-going to-this dear to-be and
 μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ
great to-have-power in the city this see whether for-you it-profits
 καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ
and for-me lest — O strange-man we-suffer what-very they-say
 τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν
(of)-the-women the moon drawing-down the Thessalian-women with
 τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως
the dearest-things the choice for-us will-be of-this — power
 τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶει ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων
the in the city if but to-you you-think whomever of-men
 παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα
will-hand-over an-art some such which you will-make great
 δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ
to-have-power in the city this unlike being to-the constitution
 εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ
whether for the better or for the worse as to-me it-seems not
 ὀρθῶς βουλεύη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι
rightly you-plan O Callicles not for an-imitator must (you)-to-be
 ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον
but by-nature like to-these if you-are-going anything genuine
 ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναι
to-work-out toward friendship with-the of-the-Athenians people and yes
 μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις
by Zeus with-the (son)-of-Pyrrilampes at-least besides whoever then you to-these
 ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὥς ἐπιθυμῆς
most-like will-work-out this-man you will-make as you-desire
 πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ
a-statesman to-be a-statesman and a-rhetorician — by-their-own for
 ἦθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ
character (when)-are-spoken the words each-(people) rejoice by-the but

ἄλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη
alien they-are-vexed if not something you other say O dear
κεφαλή. λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

head do-we-say anything to these-things O Callicles

CAL. οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εἰς λέγειν, ὦ
not I-know in-what to-me manner you-seem well to-speak O

Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνν
Socrates I-have-suffered but the of-the many experience not quite
σοι πείθομαι.

by-you I-am-persuaded

SOC. ὁ δῆμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ d
the of-the-people for love O Callicles being in the soul

τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις βέλτιον ταῦτα
— yours resists me but if often better these-same
ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν ὅτι

things we-examine-thoroughly you-will-be-persuaded remember and then that
δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν,
two we-said to-be the provisions for the each to-tend

καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὀμιλεῖν, τὴν
both body and soul one indeed toward pleasure to-deal the
ἐτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ
other and toward the best not indulging but

διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

fighting-it-out not these were what then we-were-defining

CAL. πάνν γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
therefore the indeed one the toward pleasure ignoble and

οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεῖα τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἡ γάρ;
nothing other than flattery happens being is-it-not for

CAL. ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.

let-it-be if you-wish for-you so

SOC. ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο,
the but at-least other how as best-as-possible will-be this
 εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχῇ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;
whether body happens being or soul which we-tend
 CAL. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

XLVIII · EXAMINING THE CANDIDATE

Before undertaking public building we would ask whether we knew the art and could show buildings we had made; before practicing medicine publicly we would ask whom we had cured. So too before politics: Socrates asks Callicles, who is just entering public life, whom he has made better as a private citizen. Callicles calls him contentious.

514 SOC. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν τῇ πόλει
so then thus is-it-to-be-attempted by-us — the city
 καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
and the citizens to-tend as best-as-possible them the
 πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς
citizens making without for indeed this as in the
 ἔμπροσθεν ἠύρισκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν
earlier-(discussion) we-were-finding (there-is)-no use other benefaction
 οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἢ διάνοια ἢ
any to-apply if not fine and-good the mind is
 τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν
of-those intending either property much to-receive or rule
 τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν. φῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;
over-some or other power whatever are-we-to-say thus it-is
 CAL. πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.
certainly at-least if to-you more-pleasant

SOC. εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ b
 if then we-were-calling-on each-other O Callicles publicly
 πράζοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά,
 about-to-do of-the political affairs for the building-works
 ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα
 either of-walls or of-dockyards or of-temples for the greatest
 οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι
 buildings whether would-it-be-necessary — us to-examine
 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα
 us ourselves and to-scrutinize first indeed whether we-understand
 τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ
 the art or not we-understand the (art-)of-building and from
 τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ;
 whom we-learned-(it) would-it-be-necessary — or not

CAL. πάννυ γε.
 certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα c
 therefore second again this whether any ever building
 ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον
 we-have-built privately either of-the friends for-one or our
 αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν·
 own and this — building fine or ugly is
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡύρισκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν
 and if indeed we-were-finding examining teachers both of-us
 ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα
 good and reputable having-been and buildings
 πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὠκοδομημένα
 many indeed and fine with the teachers built
 ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων
 by-us many and also private of-ours after from-the teachers
 ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἔχόντων
 we-parted thus indeed being-disposed sense (of-men)-having

ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον
it-would-be — to-go to the public works if but neither a-teacher
 εἵχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν
we-had of-us ourselves to-show buildings and either none
 ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὴ ἀνόητον ἦν
or many and of-nothing worth thus indeed senseless it-would-be
 δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν
surely to-attempt the public works and to-call-on
 ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὐ;
each-other to them are-we-to-say these-things rightly to-be-said or not
 CAL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

e SOC. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἅλλα καὶ εἰ
therefore thus all-things the both other-things and-even if
 ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὥς
having-attempted to-practice-publicly we-were-calling-on each-other as
 ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σέ
competent physicians being we-would-have-examined surely — I both you
 καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει
and you me come by the-gods himself and — Socrates how is-be
 τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην
(in)-the body toward health or already anyone else through Socrates
 ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ
has-been-rid of-disease either slave or free and I think about
 σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡύρισκομεν δι'
you other such-things I-would-examine and if not we-were-finding through
 ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων
us anyone better having-become (in)-the body either of-the foreigners
 μήτε τῶν ἀστών, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ᾧ
or of-the townsmen either man or woman by Zeus O
 Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς
Callicles not ridiculous — would-it-be in truth to

τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας
so-much of-folly to-come men so-that before as-private-men
 πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι
many-things indeed however we-chanced to-do many-things and to-set-right
 καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο
and to-exercise sufficiently the art the saying indeed this
 ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς
in the jar the pottery to-attempt to-learn and ourselves
 τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν;
both to-practice-publicly to-attempt and others such to-call-on
 οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;
not senseless to-you does-it-seem — to-be thus to-act

CAL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς
now but O best of-men since you indeed yourself
 ἄρτι ἄρχῃ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ
just-now are-beginning to-do the of-the city affairs me and
 παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα
you-call-on and reproach because not I-do-(them) not shall-we-examine
 ἀλλήλους, φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίῳ πεποιήκεν
each-other come Callicles already anyone better has-be-made
 τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἀδίκος
of-the citizens is-there anyone-who formerly wicked being unjust
 τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε
both and intemperate and senseless through Callicles fine both
 καγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;
and-good has-become either foreigner or townsman or slave or free
 λέγε μοι, εἰάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί
tell me if anyone you these-things scrutinizes O Callicles what
 ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίῳ πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ
will-you-say whom will-you-say better to-have-made a-man by-the

συνουσία τῇ σῇ; ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι
 association — yours do-you-hesitate to-answer if-indeed there-is any
 ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;
 work of-yours still (as)-a-private-man before to-practice-publicly attempting
 CAL. φιλόνομος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
 contentious you-are O Socrates

XLIX · DID PERICLES MAKE THE ATHENIANS BETTER?

If Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles were good statesmen, they must have made the citizens better. Yet the Athenians, who voted Pericles no shameful sentence while they were still worse, condemned him for theft at the end of his life once he had made them good; a keeper of asses, horses, or oxen who received them tame and returned them wilder would be judged bad, and men are animals too. Cimon was ostracized, Themistocles exiled, and Miltiades nearly thrown into the pit; good charioteers do not fall out of the car after they have trained their horses. So no man in this city is known to have been good at politics.

c SOC. ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικία γε ἔρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς
 but not from-contentiousness at-least I-ask but as truly
 βουλόμενος εἶδέναι ὅντιν' ποτε τρόπον οἶε δεῖν
 wishing to-know in-what ever way you-think one-ought
 πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν
 to-engage-in-politics among us or of-other something then will-you-take-care for-us
 ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι
 having-come to the of-the city affairs than how as best-as-possible
 οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο
 the citizens we-may-be or not often already have-we-agreed this
 δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν
 to-be-necessary to-do the political man have-we-agreed
 ἢ οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ
 or not answer we-have-agreed I on-behalf-of you

ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα
will-answer if therefore this must the good man
 παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ
to-provide — for-his-own city now to-me having-recalled say
 περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω πρότερον ἔλεγες,
about those — men whom a-little earlier you-were-mentioning
 εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς
whether still to-you they-seem good citizens to-have-been Pericles
 καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.
and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles

CAL. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους
therefore if-indeed good (it-is)-clear that each of-them better
 ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ
was-making the citizens instead-of worse was-he-making-(them) or
 οὐ;

not

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
therefore when Pericles began to-speak in the assembly
 χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;
worse were the Athenians than when — at-the-last he-was-speaking

CAL. ἴσως.

perhaps

SOC. οὐκ ἴσως δῆ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν
not perhaps indeed O best-(of-men) but (of)-necessity from the
 ὠμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης.
things-agreed if-indeed good at-least was that-man a-citizen

CAL. τί οὖν δῆ;

what then indeed

SOC. οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ
nothing but this to-me say in-addition to-this whether
 λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ
are-said the-Athenians through Pericles better to-have-become or
 πᾶν τοῦναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ
all the-opposite to-have-been-corrupted by that-man these-things for
 ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιθέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς
I-at-least hear Pericles to-have-made the-Athenians idle
 καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν
and cowardly and talkative and money-loving into pay-taking
 πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

first having-brought-(them)

CAL. τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ
from-those (with)-the ears broken you-hear these-things O
 Σώκρατες.

Socrates

516 SOC. ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ
but these-things no-longer I-hear but I-know clearly both I
 καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠὺδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ
and you that at indeed first was-in-good-repute Pericles and
 οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
no shameful sentence they-voted-against him the-Athenians
 ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ ἐγεγόνεσαν
when worse they-were when but fine and-good they-had-become
 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν
by him at the-end of-the life — of-Pericles for-theft
 αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν,
him they-condemned almost and even to-death they-sentenced-(him)
 δῆλον ὅτι ὥς πονηροῦ ὄντος.
(it-is)-clear that as wicked being

CAL. τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;
what then on-this account bad was Pericles

SOC. ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν b
of-asses at-any-rate — a-keeper and of-horses and of-oxen

τοιούτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν
such being bad — would-seem to-be if having-received-(them)
 μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας
not kicking him nor butting nor biting

ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα.
he-rendered-(them) these-things all doing through wildness

ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισιν
or not does-it-seem to-you bad to-be a-keeper whoever
 ὅτουσιν ζώου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ
of-whatever animal who — having-received-(them) tamer renders-(them)
 ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; δοκεῖ ἢ οὐ;
wilder than he-received-(them) does-it-seem or not

CAL. πάνν γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.
certainly at-least so-that you I-may-gratify

SOC. καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον
and this therefore to-me grant answering whether
 καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ;
also the man one of-the animals is or not

CAL. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
how for not

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;
therefore of-men Pericles was-taking-care

CAL. ναί.
yes

SOC. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, c
what then not ought they as just-now we-were-agreeing

δικαιοτέρους γεγενέσθαι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου,
more-just to-have-become instead-of more-unjust by that-man

εἴπερ ἐκείνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;
if-indeed that-man was-taking-care of-them good being (in)-the political-matters

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν οἷ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί, ὡς ἔφη Ὀμηρος· σὺ

therefore the at-least just (are)-gentle as said Homer you

δὲ τί φής; οὐχ οὕτως;

but what do-you-say not thus

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὲν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ

but indeed wilder at-least them be-rendered than

οἷους παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν

such-as he-received-(them) and that-(too) toward himself whom least —

ἐβούλετο.

he-would-have-wished

CAL. βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

do-you-wish with-you I-should-agree

SOC. εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

if I-seem at-least to-you truth to-say

CAL. ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

let-be then these-things

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ

therefore if-indeed wilder more-unjust both and

χείρους;

worse

d CAL. ἔστω.

let-it-be

SOC. οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ

not then good (in)-the political-matters Pericles was from

τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

this — argument

CAL. οὐ σύ γε φής.

not you at-least say-(so)

SOC. μὰ Δι' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὠμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ
by Zeus nor at-least you from what you-were-agreeing again and
 λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὔτοι
tell me about Cimon not did-they-ostracize him these
 οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς
whom he-was-tending so-that of-him for-ten years not they-might-hear the
 φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτά ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
voice and to-Themistocles these-same things they-did and with-exile
 προσεζήμωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ
they-punished-(him)-besides Miltiades and the (victor)-at-Marathon into the
 βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν
pit to-throw they-voted and if not on-account-of the
 πρῦτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; καίτοι οὔτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες
prytanis he-would-have-fallen-in — and-yet these if they-were men
 ἀγαθοί, ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον.
good as you say not — ever these-things they-would-have-suffered
 οὐκ οἶ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ
not-then the at-least good charioteers at first indeed not
 ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν
fall-out from the teams when but they-have-tended
 τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότε
the horses and themselves better have-become charioteers then
 ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν
fall-out not it-is these-things either in charioteering or in
 ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;
other work any or does-it-seem to-you
 CAL. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

not to-me-at-least

SOC. ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι
true then as it-seems the earlier arguments were that
 οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικά
no-one we know man good to-have-been (in)-the political-matters

ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὁμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα,
in this — city you but were-agreeing of-the at-least present no-one
 τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας·
of-the however earlier and you-preferred these — men
 οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ
these but were-revealed on an-equality with-the present being so-that if
 οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο —
these rhetors were neither the true rhetoric they-were-using
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.
not for — they-would-have-fallen-out nor the flattering-(kind)

L · SERVANTS OF THE CITY

Socrates does not deny that the old statesmen were better servants, supplying ships, walls, and dockyards, but they no more changed the citizens' desires than the present ones do. There are two kinds of care for the body: the servant's, which supplies what it wants, and the doctor's and trainer's, which know what is good for it. Callicles praises the old statesmen as one might praise Thearion the baker and Mithaecus the cookery writer for stuffing men's bodies; the statesmen filled the city with harbors and walls without temperance or justice, and when the sickness comes the advisers then present will be blamed while Pericles and his fellows are praised.

- b CAL. ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή
but however of-much at-least it-lacks O Socrates that
 ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσθαι οἷα
ever anyone of-the present-men works such should-work such-as
 τούτων ὅστις βούλει ἐργασταί.
of-these whomever you-wish has-worked
- c SOC. ὦ δαμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε
O wonderful-man not-even I blame these as at-least
 διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν
servants to-be of-a-city but to-me they-seem than-the at-least present

διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν
more-serviceable to-have-been and more able — to-procure
 τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς
for-the city what it-desired but for to-change-over the
 ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ
desires and not to-give-way persuading and compelling toward
 τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς
this whereby they-were-going better to-be the citizens so
 ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνου· ὅπερ μόνον
a-word to-say in-nothing from-these differed those what-very alone
 ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ
(the)-work is of-a-good citizen ships and also walls and
 νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ
dockyards and other many such-things even I with-you agree
 δεινότερους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν
cleverer to-be those than-these to-procure a-thing then
 γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ
ridiculous we-do I both and you in the arguments in all
 γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς
for the time in-which we-converse not-at-all we-cease to
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι
the same always being-carried-round and not-knowing of-each-other what
 λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι καὶ
we-mean I at-any-rate you often think to-have-agreed and
 ἐγνωκέναι ὥς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις ἡ πραγματεία ἔστιν
to-have-recognized that then twofold this some the business is
 καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα
both about the body and about the soul and the indeed one
 διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν
serviceable is by-which possible to-be to-procure if indeed
 πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν
are-hungry the bodies of-us food if but are-thirsty drinks if

δὲ ῥιγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' ὧν
but are-cold cloaks bedding shoes other-things of-which
 ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ
come bodies into desire and on-purpose to-you through
 τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς.
the same images I-speak so-that more-easily you-may-understand

518 τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ
of-these for a-provider to-be either a-retailer being or
 ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ
a-merchant or a-craftsman of-some of-these-very things a-baker or
 ὀψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν
a-cook or a-weaver or a-shoemaker or a-tanner nothing
 θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς
wonderful is being such to-seem both to-himself and to-the
 ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει ὅτι
others a-tender to-be of-body to-every the not knowing that
 ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ
there-is some beside these all an-art gymnastic both and
 ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε ἐστὶν σώματος θεραπεία,
medicine which indeed in reality at-least is of-body care
 ἣνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν
which-very also it-befits over-these to-rule over-all the arts
 καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι
and to-use the of-these works on-account-of the knowing what
 χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν
good and bad of-the foods or drinks is for excellence
 σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν.
of-body the but others all these to-be-ignorant-(of-it)

b διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς
wherefore indeed also these indeed slavish both and serviceable
 καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς
and illiberal to-be about of-body (the)-business the

ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ
other arts the but gymnastic and medicine according-to
 τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτ' αὖν ταῦτα ὅτι
the just mistresses to-be of-these the-same then these-things that
 ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν, τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν
it-is also about soul at-one-time indeed to-me you-seem to-understand
 ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἦκει
what I-mean and you-agree as knowing what I mean you-come
 δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ
but a-little later saying that men fine and-good
 γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ
have-become citizens in the city and when I ask
 οἷτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεισθαι ἀνθρώπους
who you-seem to-me most-like to-put-forward men
 περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ
in the political-matters just-as — if about the gymnastic-matters me
 ἐρωτῶντος οἷτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωμάτων
asking who good have-become or are of-bodies
 θεραπευταί, ἔλεγες μοι πάννυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ
tenders you-would-be-telling me quite being-in-earnest Thearion the
 ἄρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς
baker and Mithaecus the-one the cookery having-written
 τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι
the Sicilian and Sarambus the retailer that these
 θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους
wonderful have-become of-bodies tenders the one loaves
 θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψιον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. ἴσως
wonderful providing the other relish the other wine perhaps
 ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε,
— then you-would-be-indignant if to-you I-said I that man
 ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις
you-understand nothing about gymnastic servants to-me you-mention

καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαίοντας
and of-desires providers men not understanding
καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷ, ἂν οὕτω τύχῳσιν,
fine and-good anything about them who if thus they-chance
ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
having-stuffed and having-fattened the bodies of-the men
ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς
being-praised by them will-destroy-besides their also the
ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς
old flesh they and again through inexperience not the
ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς
feast-givers will-blame of-the diseases responsible to-be and of-the
ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἷ ἂν αὐτοῖς
loss of-the old flesh but whoever — for-them
τύχῳσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν
chance then being-present and advising something whenever
δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ
indeed to-them comes the then surfeit disease bringing a-long
ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα,
later time inasmuch-as without the healthful having-come-about
τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν,
these they-will-blame and censure and harm some do-(them)
ἂν οἰοί τ' ὧσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους
if able — they-are the but former those and responsible
τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσιν. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
for-the evils they-will-eulogize and you now O Callicles
ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζῃ· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἷ
most-like to-this are-doing you-eulogize men who
τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐχῶντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν.
these have-feasted regaling-(them) with-what they-desired

καὶ φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ 519
and they-say great the city to-have-made them that but
οἶδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ
it-is-swollen and festering it-is through those — old-ones not
αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων
they-perceive without for temperance and justice with-harbors
καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν
and dockyards and walls and tributes and such nonsense
ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη
they-have-filled the city whenever then comes the onset this
τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους,
of-the weakness the then present they-will-blame advisers
Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν,
Themistocles but and Cimon and Pericles they-will-eulogize
τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν
the responsible for-the evils of-you and perhaps they-will-lay-hold if
μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ
not you-take-care and — of-my companion Alcibiades whenever also
τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ
the old-things they-lose-besides in-addition-to what they-acquired not
αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι
responsible being for-the evils but perhaps jointly-responsible and-yet
ἐγώ γε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω
I-at-least a-senseless thing even now see happening and hear
τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ
of-the old men concerning I-perceive for whenever the
πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζεται ὥς
city one of-the political men handles as
ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτοῦντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὥς δεινὰ
doing-wrong being-indignant and complaining how terrible-things

πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα
they-suffer many and good-things for-the city having-done then
 ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος.
unjustly by it they-perish as the of-these account-(goes)

LI · THE SOPHISTS AND THEIR PUPILS

Socrates says a city's leader can never be destroyed unjustly by the city he leads, any more than a teacher of virtue can complain that the pupils he made good have cheated him of his fee. Callicles calls such people worthless; Socrates replies that sophist and rhetor are close kin and that the sophist is in fact the finer. Only a man who makes people good could safely give his service for nothing, since only in that case does the benefited man wish to return the benefit.

c τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψευδός ἐστιν· προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδ'
the but whole a-falsehood is a-leader for of-a-city not
 ἂν εἰς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως
 — *one ever unjustly could-perish by the-very — city*
 ἥς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε
of-which he-is-leader it-is-likely for the-same to-be as-many-as both
 πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ
statesmen pretend to-be and as-many-as sophists and
 γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον
for the sophists in-the-other-things wise being this strange
 ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι
do a-thing asserting for of-virtue teachers
 εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι
to-be often they-accuse the pupils that they-wrong
 σφᾶς, τοὺς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν
them the both fees withholding and other thanks
 οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ τούτου
not rendering well having-been-treated by them and than-this

τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους
— argument what — more-irrational would-be a-thing men

ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν
good and just having-become having-been-rid indeed of-injustice

ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου,σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν
by the teacher having-got and justice to-do-wrong

τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον
by-this which not they-have not does-it-seem to-you this strange

εἶναι, ᾧ ἑταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας,
to-be O comrade as truly to-harangue me you-have-compelled

ὦ Καλλίκεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

O Callicles not being-willing to-answer

CAL. σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι
you and not — able — would-be to-speak if not someone to-you

ἀποκρίνοιτο;

should-answer

SOC. ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, c
I-seem-(so) at-least now at-any-rate lengthy I-stretch-out of-the speeches

ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὦγαθέ, εἰπὲ
since to-me not you-are-willing to-answer but good-sir say

πρὸς Φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν
by (Zeus)-of-Friendship not does-it-seem to-you irrational to-be good

φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ'
asserting to-have-made someone to-blame this-man that by

ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὦν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;
himself good having-become both and being then wicked be-is

CAL. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων
therefore do-you-hear such-things saying the (ones)-asserting

παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

to-educate men into virtue

- 520 CAL. ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων περὶ
I-at-least but what — would-you-say of-men concerning
οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;
of-nothing worthy
- b SOC. τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἷ φάσκοντες
what and — about those would-you-say who asserting
προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὥς
to-be-leaders of-the city and to-care how as
βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν,
best-as-possible it-will-be again it they-accuse whenever they-chance
ὥς πονηροτάτης; οἶει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων;
as most-wicked do-you-think at-all to-differ these from-those
ταυτόν, ὦ μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς
the-same O blessed-man is sophist and rhetor or near
τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον·
something and nearly-alike just-as I was-saying to Polus
σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἶει
you but through ignorance the one all-fine something you-think
εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ
to-be — rhetoric the other you-despise in but truth
κάλλιον ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ
finer is sophistic than-rhetoric by-as-much-as legislation
δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς· μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ
than-judicature and gymnastic than-medicine for-alone and I-at-least even
ᾧμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν
thought for-the public-speakers both and sophists not to-be-possible
μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν,
to-blame this — thing which themselves they-teach
ὥς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ
as wicked it-is toward them or by-the same argument this

ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν
at-once also themselves to-accuse that in-nothing they-have-benefited
 οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
those-whom they-say to-benefit not thus is-it

CAL. πάνυ γε.

c

certainly at-least
 SOC. καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὥς
and to-give-away at-least surely the benefaction without pay as
 τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.
(is)-the likely for-alone these it-was-possible if-indeed truth they-were-saying
 ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον ταχὺς
other indeed for benefaction someone having-been-benefited such-as swift
 γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν
having-become through a-trainer perhaps — would-withhold the
 χάριν, εἰ προοίτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ
thanks if should-give-(it)-away to-him the trainer and not
 συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ
having-agreed with-him a-fee as much-as-possible at-once imparting the
 τάχους λαμβάνει τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ βραδυτῇ
swiftness he-should-receive the money not for indeed by-the slowness
 οἶμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία· ἣ γάρ;
I-think do-wrong the men but by-injustice is-it-not for
 CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν,
therefore if someone this-very thing removes — injustice
 οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ
nothing terrible for-him lest-ever he-be-wronged but for-(him)-alone
 ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι
(it-is)-safe this — benefaction to-give-away if-indeed in reality
 δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως;
could anyone good to-make-(men) not so

CAL. φημί.

I-say-(so)

SOC. διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας
on-account-of these-things then as it-seems the indeed other
 συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἶον
counsels to-counsel taking money such-as
 οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.
of-building concerning or of-the other arts (is)-nothing shameful

e CAL. ἔοικέ γε.

it-seems at-least

SOC. περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἄν
about but at-least this — action in-what-ever —
 τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ
anyone way as best-as-possible might-be and best — his-own
 οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρόν νενόμισται μὴ φάναί
house might-manage or city shameful it-is-held not to-say-yes
 συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῶ. ἢ γάρ;
to-counsel if not someone to-him money gives is-it-not for

CAL. ναί.

yes

SOC. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη
(it-is)-clear for that this responsible is that alone this
 τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ'
of-the benefactions the well treated to-desire makes in-return
 εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ
well to-do so-that fine seems the sign to-be if well
 ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ
having-done this — benefaction in-return well he-will-be-treated if
 δὲ μὴ, οὐ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;
but not is-it these-things thus being

521 CAL. ἔστιν.

it-is

Callicles says Socrates should serve the city as a flatterer, or else anyone may kill him. Socrates replies that he alone attempts the true political art, since he speaks for the best and not for pleasure; if brought to court he would fare like a doctor accused by a cook before a jury of children. He would not mind dying for lack of flattering rhetoric, since only injustice is to be feared, and he offers to tell why.

SOC. ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν
 to which-of-the-two then me do-you-call-on — care
 τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι
 of-the city define for-me the-(one) of-the contending
 Ἀθηναίους ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ
 with-the-Athenians so-that as best-as-possible they-will-be as a-physician or
 ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; τὰληθῆ
 as (one)-about-to-serve and toward gratification about-to-associate the-truth
 μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω
 to-me tell O Callicles just for you-are just-as you-began
 παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ
 to-speak-frankly toward me to-continue what you-think saying and
 νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ.
 now well and nobly speak

CAL. λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.

I-say therefore that as (one)-about-to-serve

SOC. κολακεύονται ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς. b

(one)-about-to-flatter then me O most-noble you-call-on

CAL. εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες·

if to-you Mysian at-least more-pleasant to-call-(it) O Socrates

ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις —

since if not these-things at-least you-will-do

c SOC. μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἶρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με
do-not say what often you-have-said that will-kill me
 ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός
the (one)-wishing so-that not again also I say that wicked
 γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μὴδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι
at-least being (me)-good being nor that he-will-take-away if anything
 ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος
I-have so-that not again I say that but having-taken-(it)-away
 οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως
not he-will-have what be-shall-do with-them but just-as me unjustly
 ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ
he-took-(it)-from thus also having-taken-(it) unjustly he-will-use-(it) if and
 ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.
unjustly shamefully if and shamefully badly

CAL. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μὴδ' ἂν
how to-me you-seem O Socrates to-trust not-even —
 ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὥς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν
one of-these-things would-suffer as dwelling out-of-the-way and not —
 εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνν ἴσως μοχθηροῦ
would-be-brought into a-law-court by quite perhaps a-depraved
 ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.
man and worthless

d SOC. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι
senseless then I-am O Callicles as truly if not I-think
 ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινούν ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο
in this — city anyone-whatever — whatever be-might-chance this
 παθεῖν. τὸδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον
to-suffer this however well I-know that if-indeed I-go into a-law-court
 περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς
about of-these-things any running-risk which you mention wicked some
 μ' ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων — οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικούντ'
me will-be the (one)-bringing-in no-one for — good not doing-wrong

ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι — καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι.

a-man would-bring-in and nothing at-least strange if I-should-die
 βούλει σοι εἶπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

do-you-wish to-you I-should-tell on-account-of what these-things I-expect

CAL. πάνυ γε.

certainly at-least

SOC. οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, e

I-think with few of-Athenians so-that not I-say alone

ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν

to-undertake the as truly political art and to-do

τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς

the political-things alone of-the present-men inasmuch-as then not toward

χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ

gratification saying the speeches which I-say each-time but

πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων

toward the best not toward the pleasantest and not being-willing

ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι

to-do what you recommend the subtleties these not I-shall-have what

λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἦκει λόγος

I-shall-say in the law-court the same and to-me comes account

ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν

which-very to Polus I-was-saying I-shall-be-judged for as among

παιδίῳ ἰατρὸς ἂν κρινόιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.

children a-physician — would-be-judged accusing-(him) a-cook

σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος 522

consider for what — would-plead — such-(a) man

ἐν τούτοις ληφθεῖς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι

among these caught if him should-accuse someone saying that

ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ

O children many to-you and evil-things this has-done man both

αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμνων τε

yourselves and the youngest of-you be-corrupts cutting both

καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ,
and burning and reducing and choking to-be-at-a-loss he-makes-(you)
 πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν ἀναγκάζων,
bitterest drinks giving and to-hunger and to-thirst compelling
 οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡνώχουν
not just-as I many and pleasant and all-kinds-of-things used-to-feast
 ὑμᾶς· τί ἂν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
you what — do-you-think in this — evil caught
 ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι ταῦτα
a-physician to-have to-say or if he-should-say the truth that these-things
 πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς, πόσον τι
all I was-doing O children healthfully how-much something
 οἶει ἂν ἀναβοῇσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;
do-you-think — would-shout-out — such judges not loudly
 CAL. ἴσως· οἶεσθαί γε χρή.

perhaps to-think-(so) at-least one-must

- b SOC. οὐκοῦν οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεισθαι
therefore do-you-think in every difficulty — him would-be-held
 ὅτι χρή εἰπεῖν;
what he-must to-say

CAL. πάννυ γε.

certainly at-least

- c SOC. τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν
such however also I know that fate I-would-suffer —
 εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἅς ἐκπεπόρικα
having-gone into a-law-court neither for pleasures which I-have-procured
 ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἅς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας
I-shall-have to-them to-mention which these benefactions and benefits
 νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς
consider I but neither the (ones)-procuring envy nor those-for-whom
 πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τις με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν
it-is-procured and-if — anyone me either the-younger says to-corrupt

ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα
to-be-at-a-loss making-(them) or the older to-revile saying
 πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς
bitter words either privately or publicly neither the truth
 ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ
I-shall-have to-say that justly all these-things I say and
 πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε
do — your-(interest) indeed this O men judges nor
 ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.
other anything so-that perhaps whatever — I-may-chance this I-shall-suffer
 CAL. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος
does-it-seem then to-you O Socrates well to-be a-man
 ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ
in a-city thus disposed and unable being himself
 βοηθεῖν;

to-help

SOC. εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, d
if that at-least one-thing for-him should-belong O Callicles
 ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ,
which you often have-agreed if having-helped he-were himself
 μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε
neither toward men nor toward gods unjust anything either
 εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας ἑαυτῷ
having-said or having-done this for of-the help for-oneself
 πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ
often by-us has-been-agreed strongest to-be if indeed then me
 τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἑμαυτῷ
someone should-refute this — help unable being for-myself
 καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ
and for-another to-render I-would-be-ashamed — both among many and
 ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ
among few being-refuted and alone by one and if

διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν·
through this — inability I-should-die I-would-be-indignant —
 εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία τελευτώην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα
if but of-flattering rhetoric by-lack I-should-die I-at-least well know
 ὅτι ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν
that easily you-would-see — me bearing the death itself indeed
 γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν
for the dying no-one fears whoever not altogether
 ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται·
irrational both and unmanly is the but doing-wrong he-fears
 πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου
with-many for wrongdoings laden (in)-the soul into Hades
 ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει,
to-arrive of-all the-extreme of-evils is if but you-wish
 σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.
to-you I how this thus is am-willing an-account to-tell
 CAL. ἀλλ' ἐπεῖπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ
but since-indeed at-least also the-other-things you-have-finished also
 τοῦτο πέρανον.
this finish

LIII • THE JUDGMENT OF THE DEAD

Socrates tells what he takes for a true account: under Cronus the just went to the Isles of the Blessed and the unjust to Tartarus, but because they were judged alive and clothed, with witnesses to help them, the judgments went wrong. Zeus therefore took away foreknowledge of death and ordered that the dead be judged naked, soul to soul, by his sons Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus at the crossroads where the two roads part.

soc. ἄκουε δῆ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν
bear then as-they-say a-very fine account which you indeed
 ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ
will-consider a-myth as I think I but an-account as true
 γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ
for being to-you I-will-tell what I-am-going to-tell just-as for
 Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ
Homer says they-divided the rule — Zeus and —
 Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
Poseidon and — Pluto when from the father
 παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ
they-received-(it) there-was then a-law this about men in-the-time
 Κρόνου, καὶ αἰὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν
of-Cronus and always and now still is among gods of-the
 ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ
men the-one indeed justly the life having-passed-through and
 ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα
holily when he-dies to of-the-blessed the-islands departing
 οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως
to-dwell in all happiness free-from evils the-one and unjustly
 καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον,
and godlessly to the of-the retribution both and justice prison
 ὃ δῆ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ
which indeed Tartarus they-call to-go of-these and (the)-judges
 ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
in-the-time of-Cronus and still recently — Zeus the rule
 ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες
holding living were of-the-living on-that — day judging
 ἥ μὲλλοιεν τελευτᾶν κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο.
on-which they-were-about to-die badly then the judgments were-decided

c ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων
 — both then Pluto and the overseers the from of-the-blessed the-islands
 ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῶέν σφιν ἄνθρωποι
 coming were-saying to — Zeus that kept-coming to-them men
 ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς· ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω
 in-each-direction unworthy said then — Zeus but I he-said will-stop
 τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται.
 this happening now indeed for badly the judgments are-judged
 ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται ζῶντες γὰρ
 clothed for he-said the (ones)-being-judged are-judged alive for
 κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες
 they-are-judged many then said and he souls wicked having
 ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους,
 clothed-in are bodies both beautiful and lineages and wealth
 καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾗ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες,
 and when the judgment is come for-them many witnesses
 μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό
 about-to-testify that justly they-have-lived the then judges by
 τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι
 both these are-dazzled and at-once also themselves clothed
 δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὠτα
 judge before the soul — their-own eyes and ears
 καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς
 and the-whole — body having-veiled these-things indeed for-them
 πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα
 all in-the-way become both — their-own garments
 καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, πανστέον
 and those of-the (ones)-being-judged first indeed then he-said to-be-stopped
 ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προῖσασι.
 it-is (their)-foreknowing — the death now for they-foreknow
 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεὶ ὅπως ἂν
 this indeed then and already has-been-told — to-Prometheus so-that —

παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων
he-may-stop-(it) from-them then naked they-must-be-judged of-all
 τούτων· τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν
these-things dead for (they)-must to-be-judged and the judge
 δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν
must naked to-be dead with-the-very — soul the-very —
 ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἑξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον
soul beholding suddenly having-died each-(one) bereft
 πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς
of-all the kinsmen and having-left-behind upon the earth
 πάντα ἐκείνους τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ.
all that — adornment so-that just the judgment may-be
 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς
I indeed then these-things having-recognized earlier than you
 ἐποιοσάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἑμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας,
made judges sons of-myself two indeed from — Asia
 Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης,
Minos both and Rhadamanthys one and from — Europe
 Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ
Aeacus these then when they-die will-judge in the
 λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὸν ὁδῶ, ἡ
meadow at the crossroads from which lead the-two roads the-one
 μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς
indeed to of-the-blessed the-islands the-other and to Tartarus and the-ones
 μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς
indeed from — Asia Rhadamanthys will-judge the-ones and from —
 Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν,
Europe Aeacus to-Minos and precedence I-will-give to-judge-in-appeal
 εἰάν ἀπορητόν τι τῶν ἑτέρων, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἡ
if are-at-a-loss at-all the-two others so-that as most-just the
 κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
judgment may-be about the journey for-the men

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Death is the parting of soul and body, and each keeps the marks of its life: a fat man's corpse is fat and a whipped man's is scarred. So too the soul, stripped of its body, shows all it has suffered through its pursuits. Rhadamanthys, seeing the soul of the Great King or another ruler scourged and crooked with perjury and injustice, sends it away to prison to suffer what befits it, either to be cured or to serve as an example to others.

- b ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς πιστεύω
these are O Callicles what I having-heard believe
 ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι
true to-be and from these — accounts the-following something
 λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὦν, ὥς ἐμοὶ
I-reckon to-result the death happens being as to-me
 δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσιν, τῆς ψυχῆς
it-seems nothing other than of-two things a-separation of-the soul
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον
and of-the body from each-other when but they-have-been-separated
 ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ πολὺ ἥττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει
then from each-other not much less each of-them keeps
 τὴν ἑξὶν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό
the condition — its-own which-very also when lived the man the
 τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ
both body the nature — its-own and the treatments and
 τὰ παθήματα ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τις μέγα ἦν τὸ
the sufferings evident all such-as if of-someone great was the
 σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ
body by-nature or by-nurture or both living of-this-man also
 ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχὺς, παχὺς καὶ
when he-dies the corpse (is)-great and if fat fat also
 ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετῆδευε
(when)-he-has-died and the-other-things thus and if again he-practiced

κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας
wearing-long-hair long-haired of-this-man also the corpse a-whipped-scoundrel
 αὐτὸς εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἵχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν
again if anyone was and traces had of-the blows scars on
 τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν,
the body either from whips or other wounds living
 καὶ τεθνεώτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ
also (when)-he-has-died the body it-is-possible to-see these-things having or
 κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζώντος,
broken if of-anyone were limbs or distorted living
 καὶ τεθνεώτος ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα.

also (when)-he-has-died these-same things (are)-evident

ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκευάστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, 525
in-one and word of-what-sort to-be had-been-prepared the body living
 ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ
evident these-things also (when)-he-has-died either all or the most
 ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον. ταῦτ' οὖν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ
for some time the-same indeed to-me seems this then also about
 τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὧς Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν
the soul to-be O Callicles evident all-things are in
 τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε τῆς
the soul when it-is-stripped of-the body the both (things)-of-the
 φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν
nature and the sufferings which on-account-of the pursuit
 ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

of-each thing acquired in the soul the man

ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀφίκονται παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ
when then they-arrive before the judge the-ones indeed from
 τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους ἐκείνους
— Asia before — Rhadamanthys — Rhadamanthys those
 ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου
having-made-stand views of-each the soul not knowing whose

ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος

it-is but often of-the great king having-laid-hold

ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν

or of-other whomsoever king or potentate he-perceives nothing

ὕγιες ὃν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν

sound being of-the soul but thoroughly-scourged and of-scars

μεστήν ὑπὸ ἐπιρκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας,

full from perjuries and injustice

b ἃ ἐκάστη ἡ πράξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν,

whic each the action of-him has-stamped upon the soul

καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν

and all-things crooked from falsehood and imposture and nothing

εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ

straight on-account-of the without truth having-been-reared and from

ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν

license and luxury and insolence and incontinence of-the

πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος γέμουσαν

actions with-disproportion both and ugliness laden

τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν

the soul he-sees having-seen and dishonorably this he-sends-away

εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἱ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ

straight to-the prison whither it-is-going having-come to-endure the

προσέκοντα πάθῃ. προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι,

fitting sufferings it-befits and every-one the in punishment being

ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ

by another rightly being-punished either better to-become and

δύνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι

to-be-benefited or an-example to-the others to-become so-that others

ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους

seeing (him)-suffering what — he-suffers fearing better

γίγνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην

may-become there-are and the-ones indeed being-benefited both and penalty

διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι οἱ ἄν ἰάσιμα
 paying by gods both and men these who — curable
 ἁμαρτήματα ἀμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ
 faults commit nevertheless but through pains and
 ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν
 agonies comes for-them the benefit both here and in
 Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
 Hades not for possible — otherwise of-injustice to-be-rid

LV · THE INCURABLE

Those who commit the greatest crimes become incurable and hang in Hades as spectacles for others, and most of them are tyrants, kings, and potentates, since license breeds the worst wrongs; Archelaus will be among them if Polus speaks truly. Homer shows only kings punished forever, and no private man like Thersites. Good men do arise among the powerful, such as Aristides, and are much to be admired, but they are few.

οἱ δ' ἄν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ c
 those but — the utmost-wrongs commit and on-account-of —
 τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γίνονται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ
 such wrongdoings incurable become from these the
 παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι
 examples come and these themselves indeed no-longer
 ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται
 are-benefited at-all inasmuch-as incurable being others but are-benefited
 οἱ τούτους ὀρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα
 the-ones these seeing on-account-of the faults the greatest
 καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν αἰὲν
 and most-agonizing and most-fearful sufferings suffering for-the ever
 χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου
 time simply as-examples bung-up there in Hades

ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις
in the prison for-the ever of-the unjust arriving
 θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὦν ἐγὼ φημι ἓνα καὶ
spectacles and admonitions of-whom I say one also
 Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις
Archelaus will-be if truth says Polus and another whoever
 ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι
— such a-tyrant is I-think and also the many to-be
 τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων
of-these — examples from tyrants and kings
 καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων
and potentates and the (affairs)-of-the cities having-managed
 γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ
having-come these for on-account-of the license greatest and
 ἀνοσιώτατα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις
most-unholy faults commit bears-witness and to-these
 καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
also Homer kings for and potentates that-poet has-represented
 τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον
the-ones in Hades for-the ever time being-punished Tantalus
 καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θεροσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος
and Sisyphus and Tityus Thersites but and if anyone else
 πονηρὸς ᾖ ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλας τιμωρίας
wicked was a-private-man no-one has-represented by-great punishments
 συνεχόμενον ὥς ἀνίατον — οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν αὐτῷ·
being-held as incurable not for I-think it-was-permitted to-him
 διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν —
wherefore also happier he-was than those-to-whom it-was-permitted
 ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ
but for O Callicles from the powerful are also the
 σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὲν καλύει καὶ
exceedingly wicked becoming men nothing however prevents also

ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε
among these good men arising and exceedingly at-least
 ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
worthy to-admire the (ones)-arising hard for O Callicles
 καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
and of-much praise worthy in great license of-the doing-wrong
 γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιώναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι·
having-come justly to-live-through few but there-are — such-(men)
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται
since both here and elsewhere there-have-been I-think and also there-will-be
 καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως
fine and-good (in)-this — virtue the (virtue)-of-the justly
 διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγμος
managing what — anyone entrusts one and even quite reputable
 γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ
has-been even among the other Greeks Aristides the
 Λυσισμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται
(son)-of-Lysimachus the but many O best-(of-men) bad become
 τῶν δυναστῶν. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθς
of-the potentates what-very then I-was-saying when — Rhadamanthys
 ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ
that-one such some-one takes other indeed about him not
 οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὦντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός
he-knows anything either who or of-whom-(sprung) that but wicked
 τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον,
some-one and this having-perceived he-sends-away to Tartarus
 ἐπισημνιάμενος, ἐάντε ἰάσιμος ἐάντε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι·
having-marked-(him) whether curable or incurable he-seems to-be
 ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει.
the-one and thither having-arrived the fitting-things suffers

The judge admires the soul that has lived holily, especially a philosopher's, and sends it to the Isles of the Blessed. Socrates says he is persuaded by these accounts and will try to present his soul to the judge as healthy as he can; he calls on Callicles to join him, since before Aeacus Callicles will gape and reel as Socrates would in an Athenian court. After all these arguments only one stands firm: that doing wrong is to be feared more than suffering it, and that rhetoric and every action should serve justice. The life to which Callicles calls him is worth nothing.

- d ἐνίστε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ'
sometimes and another having-looked-upon holily having-lived and with
 ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν,
truth of-a-man private or other some most-of-all indeed
 ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος
I-at-least say O Callicles of-a-philosopher — his-own having-done
 καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε
and not having-meddled in the life he-admires-(it) both
 καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ
and to of-the-blessed the-islands sends-(it)-away these-same and things also
 ὁ Αἰακός — ἐκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει —
— Aeacus each of-these a-rod holding judges
 ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν
— and Minos overseeing sits alone holding a-golden
 σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν
scepter as says Odysseus the (Odysseus)-of-Homer to-have-seen
 αὐτὸν —
him

χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσαν.
a-golden scepter holding giving-judgment to-the-dead

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τε τούτων τῶν λόγων e
I indeed then O Callicles by both these — accounts
 πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς
am-persuaded and I-consider how I-shall-present to-the judge as
 ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν χαίρειν οὖν ἑάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς
healthiest-as-possible the soul to-go then having-let the honors the
 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν πειράσομαι
of-the many men the truth practicing I-shall-try
 τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ
in reality as — I-am-able best being both to-live and
 ἐπειδὴν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς
when I-die to-die I-call-on and also the
 ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ
others all men as-far-as much-as I-am-able and
 δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν
indeed also you I-call-on-in-return to this — life and the
 ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε
contest this which I say instead-of all the here
 ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔση
contests to-be and I-reproach you that not able — you-will-be
 σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις
yourself to-help whenever the trial for-you comes and the judgment
 ᾗν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
which just-now I was-speaking-of
 ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν, τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, 527
but having-come before the judge the — of-Aegina son
 ἐπειδὴν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγη, χασμῆσθαι καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις
when you having-seized he-leads you-will-gape and will-be-dizzy
 οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσῃ
no less than I here you there and you perhaps will-strike
 τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακίει.
someone even on the-cheek dishonorably and in-every-way will-trample-on

b τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ
perhaps and then these-things a-myth to-you seem to-be-told as-if
 γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν
an-old-wife's and you-despise them and nothing at-least —
 ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πη ζητοῦντες
would-be wonderful to-despise these if anywhere seeking
 εἶχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ
we-were-able than-them better and truer to-find now but
 ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οὔπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν
you-see that three being you who-very wisest are of-the
 νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε
present Greeks you both and Polus and Gorgias not are-able
 ἀποδείξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον,
to-demonstrate that one-must other some life to-live than this
 ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις
which-very also there appears advantageous but in so-many
 λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ
arguments the others being-refuted alone this remains-steady
 ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ
the argument that to-be-guarded-against it-is the doing-wrong rather than
 τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον
the being-wronged and of-everything more by-a-man is-to-be-practiced
 οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ
not the seeming to-be good but the being both privately
 καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνηται,
and publicly if but anyone in any-respect bad becomes
 κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι
to-be-chastised he-is and this second good after the being
 δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ
just the becoming and being-chastised paying penalty and
 πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς
all flattery both the about oneself and the about the

ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ
 others both about few and about many is-to-be-fled and
 τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰεί, καὶ τῇ
 — rhetoric thus is-to-be-used for the just always and —
 ἄλλη πάσῃ πράξει.

other every action

ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἱ ἀφικόμενος d
 by-me then being-persuaded follow thither where having-arrived
 εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος
 you-will-be-happy both living and having-died as the argument
 σημαίνει. καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου
 signifies and allow someone you to-despise as senseless
 καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε
 and to-trample-on if he-wishes and yes by Zeus you at-least
 θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν· οὐδὲν
 confidently (allow-him)-to-strike the dishonoring this blow nothing
 γὰρ δεινὸν πείσῃ, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καλὸς καγαθός,
 for terrible you-will-suffer if in reality you-are fine and-good
 ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν. καῖπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε
 practicing virtue and-then thus in-common having-practiced then
 ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς,
 at-last if it-seems-good to-be-necessary we-shall-apply-ourselves to-the political-matters
 ἢ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους
 or whatever — thing to-us seems-good then we-shall-deliberate better
 ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε
 being to-deliberate than now shameful for being at-least
 ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τι
 as now we-appear to-be then to-play-the-youth as-if something
 ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν,
 being to-whom never the-same seem about the same
 καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων — εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν
 and these-things about the greatest to so-much we-have-come

ἀπαιδευσίας — ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσώμεθα
of-ignorance as then a-guide the argument let-us-use
 τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ
the now having-appeared which to-us signifies that this —
 τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν
manner (is)-best of-the life both the justice and the
 ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ
other virtue practicing both to-live and to-be-dead this
 οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνον,
then let-us-follow and the others let-us-call-on not that-one
 ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς
in-which you trusting me you-call-on he-is for of-nothing
 ἄξιος ὦ Καλλίκλεις.
worthy O Callicles
