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Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle & Plutarch

ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ
ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΦΙΛΙΑΣ

Nicomachean Ethics

Books IV–IX, with Plutarch on Having Many Friends

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with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order




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The Greek text follows Bywater's Oxford
Aristotle and Bernardakis' Teubner Plutarch

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Words the editors seclude are not printed; words they supply are printed without their brackets; † marks a passage the editors hold corrupt.

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ARISTOTLE

ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

Nicomachean Ethics

BOOK IV

I · LIBERALITY

Liberality is the mean about money, praised more in giving than in taking. The liberal man gives to the right people, in the right amounts, and gladly, and does not take from the wrong sources. Prodigality exceeds in giving and is easily cured; illiberality falls short in giving and exceeds in taking, is incurable, and takes many forms, from the stingy and the cheeseparing to the sordid lender and the robber.

λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ
let-us-speak and next about liberality it-seems indeed to-be the
περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ
about money mean is-praised for the liberal-man not
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ
in the warlike-matters nor in which the temperate-man nor again
ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν,
in the judgments but about giving of-money and taking
μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων
more and in the giving money and we-call all whose
ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ
the worth by-currency is-measured are and also the prodigality and
ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ
the illiberality about money excesses and deficiencies and
τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον
the indeed illiberality we-attach always to-those more
ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν
than one-should about money being-serious the but prodigality
ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ
we-apply sometimes combining(-them) the for uncontrolled and
εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ
on licentiousness spending prodigals we-call therefore also

φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας
most-base they-seem to-be many for at-once vices
ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ
they-have not indeed properly they-are-so-called means for
ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν
prodigal to-be the-man one evil having the to-destroy the
οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ
substance prodigal for the-man through himself being-ruined it-seems
δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
and ruin a-kind-of of-himself to-be also the of-the substance destruction
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος.
since the to-live through these being
οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. ὧν δ' ἐστὶ
so indeed the prodigality we-understand of-what-things and there-is
χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ
use it-is-possible these to-use both well and badly the
πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται
wealth and is of-the useful-things each and best uses
ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ
the-man having the about this virtue and wealth indeed
χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν·
will-use best the-man having the about the money virtue
οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ
this-man and is the liberal-man use and to-be seems
χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ
of-money spending and giving the and taking and the keeping
κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ
acquisition rather therefore more is of-the liberal-man the
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ
to-give to-whom one-should than to-take from-where one-should and not
λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ
to-take from-where not one-should of-the for virtue more the well

ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον
to-do than the well to-be-treated and the noble-things to-do more
ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν
than the shameful-things not to-do not unclear and that the indeed
δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ
giving follows the well to-do and the noble-things to-do the and
λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
taking the well to-be-treated or not to-act-shamefully and the gratitude to-the
διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.
one-giving not to-the not one-taking also the praise and more
καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον
also easier and the not to-take than-the to-give the for one's-own less
προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ
they-give-up rather than not they-take the another's and
ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες
liberal and are-called those giving those and not taking
οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς
not for liberality are-praised but not less for
δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ.
justice those and taking not-even are-praised at-all
φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς·
are-loved and nearly most the liberal of-those from virtue
ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
useful for this and in the giving the and according-to virtue
πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν
actions noble and of-the noble for-the-sake and the liberal-man then
δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ
will-give of-the noble for-the-sake and rightly to-whom for one-should
καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ
and as-much-as and when and the-other-things as-many-as follow the right
δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν
giving and these-things pleasantly or without-pain the for according-to virtue

ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς
(is)-pleasant or painless least and painful the-man and giving
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν᾽
to-whom not one-should or not of-the noble for-the-sake but through some
ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται.
other cause not liberal but other some will-be-called
οὐδ᾽ ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν τὰ χρήματα
nor the-man painfully rather for would-choose — the money
τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται
than-the noble action this and not of-a-liberal-man nor will-be-take
δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ
and from-where not one-should not for is of-the-man not valuing the
χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ᾽ αἰτητικός·
money the such taking not — he-would-be and nor given-to-asking
οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι.
not for is of-the-man well doing readily to-be-benefited
ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,
from-where and one-should he-will-take for-instance from the his-own possessions
οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι.
not as noble but as necessary so-that he-may-have to-give
οὐδ᾽ ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων
nor will-he-neglect the own wishing at-least through these
τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
some to-help nor to-the chance-comers will-be-give so-that he-may-have
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου
to-give to-whom one-should and when and where (it-is)-noble of-a-liberal-man
δ᾽ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε
and it-is very-much also the to-exceed in the giving so-as
καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν
to-leave for-himself less the for not to-look to himself
ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται·
(is)-of-a-liberal-man according-to the substance and the liberality is-spoken-of

οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν
not for in the amount of-the things-given the liberal but in
τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν.
the of-the giver state this and according-to the substance gives
οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω
nothing indeed prevents more-liberal to-be the-man the less
διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι
giving if from less he-give more-liberal and to-be
δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν
seem those not having-acquired but having-inherited the
οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι
substance inexperienced both for of-the want and all love
μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
more the their-own works just-as the parents and the poets
πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα
to-be-rich and not easy the liberal-man neither acquisitive being
μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ
nor retentive free-giving but and not valuing for themselves
τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται
the money but for-the-sake of-the giving therefore also is-reproached
τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.
the fortune that those most worthy being least are-rich
συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ'
happens and not unreasonably this not for possible — money
ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ
to-have not taking-care that he-may-have just-as nor in-the-case-of
τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ'
the other-things not however he-will-give at-least to-whom not one-should nor
ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
when not one-should nor as-many-as other such-things not for —

ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
any-longer he-would-act according-to the liberality and on these
ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν.
having-spent not — he-would-have for what one-should to-spend
ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
just-as for has-been-said liberal is the-man according-to the
οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
substance spending and on what one-should the-man and exceeding
ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ
(is)-prodigal therefore the tyrants not we-call prodigal the
γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι
for amount of-the possessions not seems easy to-be by-the gifts
καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ
and by-the expenditures to-exceed of-the liberality indeed
μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ
a-mean being concerning of-money giving and taking the
ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα
liberal-man both will-give and will-spend on what one-should and as-much-as
δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ
one-should alike in small-things and great and these pleasantly and
λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς
will-take and from-where one-should and as-much-as one-should of-the virtue
γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς
for concerning both being a-mean he-will-do both as
δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ
one-should follows for the decent giving the such taking the and
μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα
not such contrary is the indeed then following come-to-be together
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ
in the same the and contrary clear that not if and contrary-to
τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν,
the right and the well holding it-happen to-him to-spend

λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
he-will-be-pained moderately and also as one-should of-the virtue for
καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
both to-take-pleasure and to-be-pained at what one-should and as one-should
καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
also easy-to-deal-with and is the liberal-man in money
δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα,
he-can for to-be-wronged not valuing at-least the money
καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ
and more vexed if anything needful not he-spent than
λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ
pained if not needful anything he-spent and — with-Simonides
οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει·
not pleased the and prodigal also in these errs
οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε
neither for does-he-take-pleasure at what one-should nor as one-should nor
λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον. εἴρηται
is-pained it-will-be and to-(us)-going-on clearer it-has-been-said
δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία
indeed by-us that excesses and deficiencies are the prodigality
καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ
and the illiberality and in two in giving and taking also
τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
the spending for under the giving we-place the indeed then
ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ
prodigality in-the to-give and not to-take exceeds in-the
δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν
and to-take falls-short the and illiberality in-the to-give indeed
ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.
falls-short in-the to-take and exceeds except in small-things
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ
the indeed then of-the prodigality not at-all are-combined not for

ῥᾴδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ
easy from-nowhere taking to-all to-give quickly for
ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ
fails the substance the private-persons giving who-indeed also
δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν
seem prodigal to-be since the at-least such-man would-seem —
οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου.
not by-a-little better to-be than-the illiberal-man
εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς
easily-cured both for he-is and by the age and by the
ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ
want and to the mean he-can to-come he-has for the-traits
τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον
of-the liberal-man both for he-gives and not takes neither
δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ
but as one-should nor well if indeed this he-should-be-habituated or
πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει
somehow otherwise he-should-change would-be — liberal he-will-give
γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.
for to-whom one-should and not will-take from-where not one-should
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ
therefore also he-seems not to-be base the character not for
μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ
of-a-wicked-man nor of-an-ignoble-man the to-exceed giving and
μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
not taking of-a-fool but the-man and this the way
ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά
prodigal much seems better than-the illiberal-man to-be through
τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ
both the things-said and that the-one indeed benefits many the-other
δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων,
and no-one but not-even himself but the many of-the prodigals

καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ
just-as has-been-said also take from-where not one-should and
εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ
are in this illiberal acquisitive and they-become through
τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν
the to-wish indeed to-spend easily but this to-do
μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.
not to-be-able quickly for fail them the means
ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ
they-are-compelled then from-elsewhere to-provide at-the-same-time and also
διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ
through the nothing of-the noble to-care-for carelessly and
πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς
from-everywhere they-take to-give for they-desire the and how
ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
or from-where nothing to-them matters therefore not-even liberal
αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα,
the gifts of-them are not for noble nor of-this for-the-sake
οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους
nor as one-should but sometimes whom it-should to-be-poor these
πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν
rich they-make and to-the indeed moderate the characters nothing
ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι
— would-they-give to-the but flatterers or some other pleasure providing
πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς
much therefore also licentious of-them are the many easily
γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι,
for spending also on the licentious-pleasures lavish they-are
καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς
and through the not toward the noble to-live toward the pleasures
ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος
they-turn-aside the indeed then prodigal untutored having-become

εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον
into these passes obtaining and care to the mean
καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ'
and to the right would-arrive — the but illiberality incurable both
ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους
is seems for the old-age and every incapacity illiberal
ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας·
to-make and more-innate to-the men than-the prodigality
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί.
the for many money-loving more than given-to-giving
καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ
also extends and over much and many-formed it-is many for
τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα,
ways seem of-the illiberality to-be in two for being
τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως,
the both deficiency of-the giving and the excess of-the taking
οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται,
not to-all entire comes but sometimes is-separated
καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει
and some indeed in-the taking exceed others and in-the giving
ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον
fall-short the indeed for in the such names such-as
φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
misers stingy skinflints all in-the giving fall-short
τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν,
of-the and others'-things not they-aim nor wish to-take
οἳ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
some indeed through a-certain decency and caution of-the shameful-things
(δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν,
seem for some or say at-least through this to-keep(-it)
ἵνα μή ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων
so-that not ever they-be-compelled shameful something to-do of-these

δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται
and also the cumin-splitter and every the such(-man) has-been-named
δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἷ δ'
and from the excess of-the nothing — to-give others and
αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον
again through fear keep-away of-the others'-things as not easy
αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους
himself indeed the of-others to-take the and his-own others
μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι.
not it-pleases then them the neither to-take nor to-give
οἷ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν
others and again in the taking exceed by-the from-everywhere
λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας
to-take and everything such-as those the illiberal trades
ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ
plying brothel-keepers and all the such and
τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι
usurers in small-sums and at high(-interest) all for these
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ.
from-where not one-should take and as-much-as not one-should
κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
common and in them the sordid-greed appears all for
ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν.
for-the-sake of-gain and that small reproaches endure
τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας,
the for the great-things not from-where and one-should taking
μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς
nor what one-should not we-call illiberal such-as the
τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ
tyrants cities sacking and temples robbing but
πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι
wicked rather and impious and unjust the however

κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων
gambler and the clothes-stealer and the robber of-the illiberal
εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι
are sordidly-greedy for of-gain for for-the-sake both
πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἳ μὲν
are-busy and reproaches endure and the-ones indeed
κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἳ
dangers the greatest for-the-sake of-the gain the-others
δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι.
and from the friends gain to-whom one-should to-give
ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι
both indeed from-where not one-should to-gain wishing
αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις
(are)-sordidly-greedy and all indeed the such takings
ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία
(are)-illiberal fittingly and to-the liberality illiberality
ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας,
opposite is-said greater both for is evil than-the prodigality
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
and more toward this they-err than in-the-way-of the
λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
said prodigality about indeed then liberality and the
ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
opposed vices so-much let-be-said

Magnificence is fitting expenditure on a great scale, and its possessor is like an expert who sees what is fitting. It shows in what is spent on the gods, on a trireme, a chorus, or a public feast, and in a man's house and gifts. Its excess is vulgarity, which spends lavishly where it should not, to show off; its deficiency is niggardliness, which spoils the great thing for a trifle.

δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας
it-would-seem and — fitting to-be also about magnificence
διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ
to-go-through it-seems for also it about money a virtue
εἶναι· οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας
to-be not just-as and the liberality extends over all
τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον·
the in money actions but over the expensive only
ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει.
in these and it-surpasses than-the liberality in-scale
καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει
just-as for the-name itself suggests in scale
πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ
fitting spending it-is the and scale relative to-something not
γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
for the same expense for-a-trierarch and for-a-head-of-an-embassy
τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ
the fitting indeed relative-to himself and in which and about

ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν
which the-man and in small-things or in moderate according-to worth
δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ
spending not is-called magnificent such-as the(-line)

πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ,
often I-gave to-a-wanderer

ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
but the-man in great-things thus the indeed for magnificent-man
ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής.
(is)-liberal the but liberal-man not-at-all more magnificent
τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια
of-the such and state the indeed deficiency niggardliness
καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
is-called the and excess vulgarity and tastelessness and
ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ
as-many-as such not exceeding in-the scale about
ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ
what one-should but in what not one-should and as not one-should
λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ
showing-off later and about them we-will-speak the but
μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται
magnificent-man an-expert resembles the fitting for he-can
θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
to-discern and to-spend great-sums tastefully just-as for in
ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν
the-beginning we-said the state by-the activities is-defined and by-what
ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ
it-is-of the indeed of-the magnificent-man expenditures (are)-great and
πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
fitting such indeed also the works so for will-be great

δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς
expense and fitting to-the work so-that the indeed work of-the
δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ
expense worthy must to-be the and expense of-the work or even
ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
to-exceed(-it) will-spend and the such-sums the magnificent-man
τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
of-the noble for-the-sake common for this to-the virtues
καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία
and further gladly and lavishly the for exact-reckoning
μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,
(is)-niggardly and how finest and most-fitting
σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
he-would-consider — rather than for-how-much and how for-least
ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ
necessary indeed also liberal the magnificent-man to-be also
γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
for the liberal-man will-spend what one-should and as one-should
ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
in these and the great of-the magnificent-man such-as greatness
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
about these the liberality being and from the equal
δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ
expense the work he-will-make more-magnificent not for
ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ
the same excellence of-a-possession and of-a-work possession indeed for the
πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ
of-most worth (is)-most-valuable such-as gold work and the
μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,
great and noble of-the for such the contemplation (is)-admirable
τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,
the and magnificent (is)-admirable and is of-a-work excellence

μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων
magnificence in scale are and of-the expenditures
οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα
such-as we-call the honorable such-as the concerning gods offerings
καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ
and buildings and sacrifices likewise and also concerning all the
δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά
divine and as-many-as toward the public objects-of-honorable-ambition
ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς
are such-as if anywhere to-equip-a-chorus they-think one-must splendidly
ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν.
or to-fit-out-a-trireme or even to-feast the city
ἐν ἅπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα
in all and just-as has-been-said also to the agent
ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ
is-referred the who being and of-what being-at-hand worthy for
δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
they-must of-these to-be and not only to-the work but also
τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
to-the doer to-befit therefore a-poor-man indeed not — would-be
μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει
magnificent not for there-is from which much he-will-spend
πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
fittingly the-man and attempting(-it) (is)-a-fool contrary-to the worth
γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει
for and the due according-to virtue and the rightly(-done) it-befits
δὲ οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν
and those-for-whom such-things are-already-there through themselves or the
προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι
ancestors or those-with-whom to-them there-is-a-share and to-the well-born
καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
and to-the famous and as-many-as such all for these-things

μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος
greatness have and dignity most indeed then such
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν
(is)-the magnificent-man and in the such expenditures
ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ
the magnificence just-as has-been-said greatest for and
ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον
most-honored of-the and private-ones as-many-as once-for-all happen such-as
γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα
a-wedding and if anything such and if about something the whole
πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ
city is-earnest or those in dignity and about of-strangers and
ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ
receptions and send-offs and gifts and return-gifts not
γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
for on himself lavish the magnificent-man but on the
κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.
public-things the and gifts to-the offerings have something similar
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
of-a-magnificent-man and also a-house to-furnish suitably
τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ
to-the wealth an-ornament for a-kind-of also this and about
ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων
these-things rather to-spend as-many-as long-lasting of-the works
(κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ
finest for these-things and in each the fitting not for
ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ
the-same-things suit gods and men nor in temple and
τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ
tomb and since of-the expenditures each great in the
γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ
kind and most-magnificent absolutely indeed the in great

μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ
great here and the in these great and differs the
ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν
in the work great from-the in the expense ball indeed
γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ
for the finest or oil-flask magnificence has of-a-child's
δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ
gift the but of-this price (is)-small and mean through
τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,
this it-is of-the magnificent-man in whatever — he-does kind
μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον)
magnificently to-do the for such not easily-surpassed
καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
and having according-to worth of-the expense such indeed then
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος
(is)-the magnificent-man the-man and exceeding and vulgar
τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
in-the contrary-to the right to-spend exceeds just-as has-been-said
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει
in for the small of-the expenditures much he-spends
καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς
and makes-a-show out-of tune such-as club-members like-a-wedding
ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ
feasting and for-comedians equipping-a-chorus in the entrance
πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ
purple bringing-in just-as the at-Megara and all the
τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον
such-things he-will-do not of-the noble for-the-sake but the wealth
ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι,
displaying and through these-things thinking to-be-admired
καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν,
and where indeed one-should much to-spend little spending

οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα
where and little much the and niggardly-man about everything
ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν
will-fall-short and the greatest-sums having-spent in a-trifle the noble
ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν
will-lose and what ever — he-does delaying and considering how —
ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ'
least he-might-spend and these-things lamenting and everything
οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις
thinking greater to-do than one-should are indeed then the states
αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ
these vices not however reproaches at-least they-bring through the
μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
neither harmful to-the neighbor to-be nor very unseemly

III · GREATNESS OF SOUL

The great-souled man thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them; the small-souled man thinks himself worthy of less than he is, and the vain man of more. His concern is honor, and since he deserves the greatest he must be good in every virtue, so that greatness of soul is a kind of crown of the virtues. Aristotle describes his bearing: slow to act, ashamed to receive benefits, open in hatred and love, and deep-voiced.

ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος
the and greatness-of-soul about great-things indeed even from the name
ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν·
it-seems to-be about what-sort and it-is first let-us-grasp
διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν
it-makes-a-difference and nothing the state or the-man according-to the state
σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν
to-examine seems indeed great-souled to-be the-man of-great-things himself

ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ
deeming-worthy worthy being the-man for not according-to worth it
ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ'
doing (is)-a-fool of-the and according-to virtue no-one (is)-a-fool nor
ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ
senseless great-souled indeed then (is)-the-man described the-man
γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων,
for of-small-things worthy and of-these deeming-worthy himself (is)-temperate
μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ
great-souled but not in greatness for the greatness-of-soul just-as
καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι
also the beauty in a-large body the small and (are)-neat
καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν
and well-proportioned beautiful but not the-man and of-great-things himself
ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ
deeming-worthy unworthy being (is)-vain the-man and of-greater-things than
ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος
worthy not every(-one) (is)-vain the-man and of-lesser-things than worthy
μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε
(is)-small-souled if both of-great-things if and of-moderate if and
καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ.
even of-small-things worthy being still of-lesser-things himself he-deems-worthy
καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν
and most — would-seem(-so) the-man of-great-things worthy what for —
ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος
would-he-do if not of-so-much he-were worthy is indeed the great-souled-man
τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ
in-the indeed greatness an-extreme in-the but as one-should a-mean of-the for
κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ
according-to worth himself he-deems-worthy the-others and exceed and
ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν,
fall-short if indeed of-great-things himself he-deems-worthy worthy being

καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη. ἡ
and most of-the greatest about one most — he-would-be the
δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ
and worth is-spoken-of with-reference-to the external goods greatest and
τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽
this — we-would-set which to-the gods we-render and which most
ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον·
aim-at those in dignity and the for the noblest-deeds prize
τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
such and (is)-the honor greatest for indeed this of-the external
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
goods about honors indeed and dishonors the great-souled-man is
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
as one-should also without and argument appear the great-souled
περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
about honor to-be of-honor for most they-deem-worthy themselves
κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς
according-to worth and the and small-souled-man falls-short both in-relation-to
ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα.
himself and in-relation-to the of-the great-souled-man claim
ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν
the and vain-man in-relation-to himself indeed exceeds not however the
γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων
at-least great-souled-man the and great-souled-man if-indeed of-the greatest
ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος,
worthy best — would-be of-greater for always the better(-man) (is)-worthy
καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον
and of-the-greatest the best the as truly then great-souled-man
δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν
must good to-be and would-seem — to-be of-a-great-souled-man the in
ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
each virtue great in-no-way and — it-would-befit a-great-souled-man

φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα
to-flee swinging-the-arms nor to-do-wrong of-what for for-the-sake
πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ'
will-be-do shameful-things to-whom at-least nothing (is)-great in particulars and
ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος
to-one-examining utterly ridiculous would-appear — the great-souled-man
μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος
not good being not he-would-be and — nor of-honor worthy base
ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
being of-the virtue for prize (is)-the honor and is-rendered to-the
ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος
good it-seems indeed then the greatness-of-soul as-it-were ornament
τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ
a-kind-of to-be of-the virtues greater for them it-makes and not
γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
comes-to-be without those through this hard in-the truth
μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
great-souled to-be not for possible — without nobility-and-goodness
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός
most indeed then about honors and dishonors the great-souled-man
ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων
is and at indeed the great and by the excellent
μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ
moderately he-will-be-pleased as of-the his-own obtaining or even
ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία
of-less of-virtue for complete not — could-be worthy
τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς
honor not however but he-will-accept(-it) at-least by-the not to-have they
μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων
greater to-him to-render the and from the chance-comers
καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων
and on small-grounds utterly he-will-despise not for of-these

ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως
(he-is)-worthy likewise and also dishonor not for it-will-be justly
περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ
about him most indeed then is just-as has-been-said the
μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον
great-souled-man about honors not however but also about wealth
καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
and power and all good-fortune and misfortune moderately
ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
he-will-be-disposed however — it-happen and neither fortunate overjoyed
ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν
will-he-be nor unfortunate overpained not-even for about honor
οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ
so is-he-disposed as greatest being the for powers and
ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν
the wealth through the honor are choiceworthy those at-any-rate
ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ
having them to-be-honored through them wish to-whom and
καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα.
even the honor small is to-him also the-other-things
διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα
therefore disdainful they-seem to-be seem and also the goods-of-fortune
συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς
to-contribute toward greatness-of-soul the for well-born
ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν
are-deemed-worthy of-honor and those being-powerful or being-rich in
ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ
superiority for the and in-good superior all (is)-more-honored therefore
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ
also the such-things more-great-souled make they-are-honored for by
τινῶν· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ
some in truth but the good-man alone (is)-to-be-honored to-whom

δ᾽ ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνευ
and both belong more is-deemed-worthy of-honor those but without
ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς
virtue the such goods having neither justly themselves
μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ
of-great-things deem-worthy nor rightly great-souled are-called without
γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ
for virtue complete not is these-things disdainful and also
ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ
insolent also those the such having goods become without
γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ
for virtue not easy to-bear gracefully the goods-of-fortune not
δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν
being-able and to-bear and thinking than-the others to-surpass
ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι
them indeed they-despise themselves but what ever — they-chance
πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι
do they-imitate for the great-souled-man not like
ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν
being this and they-do in what they-can the indeed then
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων.
according-to virtue not they-do they-despise but the others
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
the indeed for great-souled-man justly despises he-judges
γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
for truly the but many at-random not is and
μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
a-petty-danger-seeker nor a-lover-of-danger through the few-things to-honor
μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδ�ὴς τοῦ βίου
a-great-danger-taker but and whenever he-runs-risk unsparing of-the life
ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν,
as not worthy being at-all-costs to-live and such-as well to-do

εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ
being-benefited but is-ashamed the indeed for of-one-superior the
δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ
but of-one-inferior and apt-to-repay with-more so for
οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς.
to-him will-owe-besides the one-who-began and will-be well treated
δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν
they-seem and also to-remember whom — they-have-done well from-whom
δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ
but — they-have-received not inferior for the one-treated well than-the
ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως
one-who-did(-it) he-wishes and to-be-superior and the-ones indeed gladly
ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν
to-hear the-others but unpleasantly therefore also — Thetis not to-mention
τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
the benefits — to-Zeus nor the Laconians to the
Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ
Athenians but what they-had-received well of-a-great-souled-man and also
τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ
the of-nothing to-be-in-need or scarcely to-serve but eagerly and
πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι,
toward indeed those in dignity and good-fortunes great to-be
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν
toward but the middling moderate the-ones indeed for to-surpass
χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις
(is)-hard and lofty the-others and easy and over those
μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς
indeed to-be-lofty not ill-bred among but the humble
φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς
vulgar just-as against the weak to-use-strength and to
τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν
the honored-things not to-go or where hold-first-place others and idle

εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον,
to-be and a-delayer but except where honor great or work
καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.
and of-few indeed a-doer of-great but and famous
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον (τὸ
necessary and also open-in-hatred to-be and open-in-friendship the
γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας
for to-conceal(-them) (is)-of-a-fearful-man and to-neglect the truth
μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς
more than the opinion and to-speak and to-act openly
(παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ
outspoken for through the contemptuous to-be and
ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι᾽ εἰρωνείαν πρὸς τοὺς
truthful except as-much-as not through irony toward the
πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
many and in-dependence-on another not to-be-able to-live but except
φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ
a-friend slavish for(-it-is) therefore also all the flatterers (are)-servile
καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ
and the humble flatterers nor given-to-admiration nothing for
μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου
great to-him is nor bearing-grudges not for of-a-great-souled-man
τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
the to-remember especially both and wrongs but rather
παρορᾶν. οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ
to-overlook nor a-gossip neither for about himself will-he-speak
οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ᾽
nor about another neither for that he-be-praised is-it-a-care to-him nor
ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ
that the others be-blamed nor again given-to-praise is-he therefore
οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι᾽ ὕβριν.
nor evil-speaking not-even of-the enemies if not through insolence

καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ
and about necessary-things or small least given-to-lament and
δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα.
given-to-begging of-one-taking-seriously for so to-be-disposed about these-things
καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
and such-as to-possess rather the noble and unprofitable-things than-the
καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ
profitable and useful of-the-self-sufficient for more and
κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
movement and slow of-the great-souled-man seems to-be and voice
βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ
deep and speech steady not for hurried the-man about
ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος·
few-things being-serious nor intense the-man nothing great thinking
ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν
the and shrillness and the haste through these such indeed
οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος,
then (is)-the great-souled-man the-man and falling-short (is)-small-souled
ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
the-man and exceeding vain not bad indeed then they-seem
εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.
to-be not-even these not for evil-doers are mistaken but
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ
the indeed for small-souled-man worthy being of-goods himself deprives
ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
of-what worthy he-is and seems evil to-have some from the not
ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν·
to-deem-worthy himself of-the goods and to-be-ignorant-of and himself
ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ
he-would-desire for — of-what worthy he-was goods at-least being not
μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
however fools at-least the such seem to-be but rather

ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν·
retiring the such and opinion seems even worse to-make
ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ
each for aim-at the-things according-to worth they-stand-aloof and
καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων
even from-the actions the noble and the pursuits
ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.
as unworthy being likewise and also from-the external goods
οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ᾽
the but vain (are)-fools and themselves ignorant-of and that
ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν,
conspicuously not for worthy being the honorable-things they-attempt
εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι
then they-are-exposed and with-clothing adorn-themselves and with-bearing
καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ
and with-the such-things and wish the goods-of-fortune also
φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ
manifest to-be their and they-speak about them as through
τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ
these going-to-be-honored is-opposed and to-the greatness-of-soul
ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται
the small-souledness more than-the vanity both for it-occurs
μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ
more and worse is the indeed then greatness-of-soul about
τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
honor is great just-as has-been-said

IV · AMBITION AND ITS LACK

A nameless virtue concerned with moderate and small honors stands to greatness of soul as liberality stands to magnificence. Men can desire honor more than they should, or less, and we sometimes praise the ambitious man as manly and the unambitious man as moderate, and sometimes blame each. Because the mean has no name, the extremes seem to dispute the middle ground between them.

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
seems and also about this to-be virtue a just-as in the
πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἣ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν
first(-discussions) was-said which would-seem — similarly to-stand
πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς
toward the greatness-of-soul just-as also the liberality toward
τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου
the magnificence both for these from-the indeed great
ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς
stand-apart about but the moderate and small dispose us
ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης
as one-should just-as and in taking and giving of-money a-mean
ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει
there-is and excess both and deficiency so also in of-honor desire
τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ
the more than one-should and less and the from-where one-should
καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον
and as one-should the both for ambitious-man we-blame as more
ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν
than one-should and from-where not one-should the honor aiming-at the
τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον
and unambitious-man as not-even for the noble-things choosing
τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς
to-be-honored there-are and times-when the ambitious-man we-praise as

ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ
manly and noble-loving the and unambitious-man as moderate and
σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ'
temperate just-as also in the first(-discussions) we-said clear and
ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
that in-many-senses the lover-of-such being-said not to the same
φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ
we-apply always the ambitious but praising indeed to the
μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.
more than the many blaming and to the more than one-should
ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν
nameless and being the mean as unclaimed seem
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
to-dispute(-it) the extremes in what and there-is excess and
ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ
deficiency also the mean they-desire and the honor both
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
more than one-should and less it-is-possible indeed also as one-should
ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν
is-praised and then the state this a-mean being about honor
ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν
nameless it-appears and in-relation-to indeed the ambition
ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία,
unambitiousness in-relation-to and the unambitiousness ambition
πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ'
in-relation-to both and both somehow seems and this
εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ'
to-be also about the other virtues to-be-opposed and here
οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.
the extremes appear through the not to-have-been-named the middle(-man)

V · GENTLENESS

Gentleness is the mean about anger, though the name leans toward the deficiency, which is nameless, perhaps a kind of inirascibility, and is thought slavish. The excess, irascibility, takes several forms: the irascible man quickly flares and quickly cools, the hot-tempered man is angry at everything, the sulky man nurses his anger, and the harsh man is not reconciled without revenge. How far and how long anger is right cannot easily be fixed in words.

πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ
gentleness and is a-mean about angers nameless and being the
μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα
mean nearly and also the extremes to the mean the gentleness
φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν.
we-apply toward the deficiency inclining nameless being
ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
the and excess irascibility a-kind-of might-be-called — the indeed for
πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα.
passion is anger the and things-producing(-it) many and differing
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
the indeed then at what one-should and with-whom one-should being-angry
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται·
further and also as one-should and when and how-much time is-praised
πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται.
gentle indeed this-man — would-be if-indeed the gentleness is-praised
βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι
wishes for the gentle-man unperturbed to-be and not to-be-led
ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ
by the passion but as — the reason ordains so both at
τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· ἁμαρτάνειν
these and for so-long time to-be-angry to-err
δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς
and he-seems rather toward the deficiency not for vengeful

ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις,
the gentle-man but rather forgiving the and deficiency
εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται.
whether inirascibility some is or what ever indeed ever is-blamed
οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
those for not being-angry at what one-should foolish seem to-be
καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ
and those not as one-should nor when nor with-whom one-should he-seems
γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε
for not to-perceive nor to-be-pained not being-angry and
οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι
not to-be apt-to-defend-himself the and being-insulted to-endure
καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ
and the one's-own to-overlook (is)-slavish the and excess
κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ
in all-respects indeed occurs both for with-whom not one-should and
ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον,
at what not one-should and more than one-should and quicker
καὶ πλείω χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ
and longer time not however all at-least to-the same-man
ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ
belongs not for — could to-be the for evil even itself
ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν
destroys and-if entire it-be unbearable becomes the indeed
οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
then irascible quickly indeed get-angry and with-whom not one-should
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ
and at what not one-should and more than one-should they-stop but
ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς
quickly which also best they-have happens and to-them

τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν
this because not they-restrain the anger but they-retaliate
ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται.
in-which manifest they-are through the quickness then they-stop
ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι
by-excess and are the hot-tempered quick and toward everything irascible
καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι,
and at everything whence also the-name the and sulky hard-to-reconcile
καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν.
and long time are-angry they-restrain for the spirit
παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει
a-stop and comes whenever he-retaliates the for revenge stops
τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ
from-the anger pleasure instead-of the pain producing this and
μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς
not happening the weight they-have through for the not manifest
εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι
to-be nor persuades them anyone in himself and to-digest
τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς
the anger of-time there-is-need are and the such to-themselves
ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν
most-troublesome and to-the most friends bad-tempered and we-call
τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον
those at what both not one-should being-angry and more
ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους
than one-should and longer time and not being-reconciled
ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον
without revenge or punishment to-the gentleness and rather
τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται·
the excess we-oppose both for more-often it-occurs
ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν
more-human for the to-take-revenge and for the to-live-together

οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται,
the bad-tempered (are)-worse which and also in the earlier(-discussions) has-been-said
καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς
also from the things-being-said (is)-clear not for easy to-determine the how
καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον,
and with-whom and at what-sort and how-much time one-must-be-angry
καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει.
and the up-to what-point rightly acts one or errs
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ'
the-man indeed for a-little deviating not is-blamed either
ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς
toward the more or toward the less sometimes for those
ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς
falling-short we-praise and gentle we-call(-them) and those
χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ
being-angry manly as able to-rule the-man
δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον
indeed how-far and how deviating (is)-blameworthy not easy
τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ
in-the account to-render in for the in particulars and-in the
αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι
perception (lies)-the judgment but the at-least so-much (is)-clear that
ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ
the indeed middle state (is)-praiseworthy according-to which with-whom one-should
ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα
we-are-angry and at what one-should and as one-should and all
τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ
the such-things the and excesses and deficiencies (are)-blameworthy and
ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον,
to a-little indeed occurring slightly to more and more

ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως
to much and very-much clear then that the middle state
ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
one-must-hold-to the indeed then about the anger states let-have-been-spoken-of

VI · THE FRIENDLY MANNER

In company some men praise everything to please and never oppose; others oppose everything and care nothing for giving pain. The mean, which has no name, resembles friendship without the affection: its possessor accepts and objects as he should, with an eye to what is noble and advantageous, and treats strangers and intimates, the distinguished and the ordinary, each as is fitting.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
in and the social-intercourse and the living-together and words and
πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ
deeds to-share some indeed obsequious seem to-be those
πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ᾽
everything for pleasure praising and nothing opposing but
οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ
thinking one-must painless to-those meeting(-them) to-be those and from
ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν
contrary to-these against everything opposing and of-the to-pain
οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται.
not-even anything caring surly and quarrelsome are-called
ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ
that indeed then the mentioned states blameworthy are not unclear and
ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ
that the middle of-these (is)-praiseworthy according-to which one-will-accept what
δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ᾽
one-should and as one-should likewise and also will-object name and

οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος
not has-been-assigned to-it any it-resembles and most friendship such
γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα
for is the-man according-to the middle state such-as we-mean
λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει
to-call the decent friend the to-feel-affection adding differs
δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν
and from-the friendship that without passion it-is and the to-feel-affection
οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν
for-those-with-whom he-associates not for by-the to-love or to-hate
ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.
he-accepts each-thing as one-should but by-the such to-be
ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ
alike for toward strangers and acquaintances and intimates and
ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει·
non-intimates it he-will-do except also in each-case as befits
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν,
not for alike it-is-fitting of-intimates and of-strangers to-take-thought
οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ
nor again to-pain in-general indeed then it-has-been-said that as one-should
ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον
he-will-associate referring and to the noble and the expedient
στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ
he-will-aim at-the not to-pain or to-give-pleasure he-seems indeed for about
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας·
pleasures and pains to-be the in the social-intercourse arising
τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν
of-these and as-many-as indeed to-him it-is not noble or harmful
συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ
to-give-pleasure he-will-object and will-choose to-pain and-if to-the
ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ
doer and disgrace it-bring and this not small or

βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ
harm the and opposition small pain not he-will-accept but
δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι
will-object differently and he-will-associate with-those in dignities
καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως
and with-the chance-comers and more or less with-acquaintances likewise
δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων
and also according-to the other differences to-each rendering
τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν,
the fitting and in itself indeed choosing the to-give-pleasure
λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ
to-pain but avoiding to-the and results if they-be
μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι.
greater following I-mean and the noble and the expedient
καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει.
and of-pleasure and for-the-sake the later great small he-will-pain
ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ
the indeed then middle(-man) such is not has-been-named but of-the
δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος
and one-giving-pleasure the-one indeed the pleasant to-be aiming-at
μὴ διά τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις
not through any other (is)-obsequious the-other and that benefit some
αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
to-himself may-come in money and as-many-as through money
κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι
(is)-a-flatterer the-man and at-everything objecting it-has-been-said that
δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα
(is)-surly and quarrelsome to-be-opposed and appear the extremes
ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.
to-each-other through the nameless to-be the mean

Near the same field lies the mean between boastfulness and irony. The boaster claims more than he has, for reputation or for gain, and the ironical man disowns what he has, as Socrates did. The truthful man, whom Aristotle praises, owns what he is, in life and in speech, where nothing hangs on it; he leans toward understatement, which is in better taste.

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας καὶ
about the same-things and nearly is also the of-the boastfulness and
εἰρωνείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ
irony mean nameless and also it not worse and
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν
also the such to-go-over better both for — we-would-know
τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ
the-things about the character in each having-gone-through and
μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων
means to-be the virtues we-would-believe — in all
οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν
so it-being seeing in indeed the living-together those indeed
πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ
with-a-view-to pleasure and pain associating have-been-discussed about
δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως
and those being-truthful both and lying let-us-speak alike
ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὴ
in words and deeds and the pretension seems indeed
ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ
the indeed boaster apt-to-claim the creditable to-be both not
ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων
belonging and greater than belong the and ironical-man
ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,
conversely to-deny the things-belonging or less to-make(-them)

ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ
the and middle(-man) straightforward a-kind-of being truthful both
τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι
in-the life and in-the speech the things-belonging acknowledging to-be
περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ
about himself and neither greater nor less it-is-possible and
τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηδενός.
of-these each both for-the-sake of-something to-do and of-nothing
ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ
each and such-as he-is such-things says and does and
οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ
so lives if not of-something for-the-sake he-act in itself and
τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν
the indeed falsehood (is)-base and blameworthy the and truth noble
καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν
and praiseworthy so and also the indeed truthful-man middle being
ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί,
(is)-praiseworthy the and lying both indeed (are)-blameworthy
μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον
more but the boaster about each and let-us-speak first
δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς
and about the truthful-man not for about the-man in the
ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ
agreements being-truthful we-speak nor as-many-as to injustice or
δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς),
justice tend of-another for — would-be these-things virtue
ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ
but in what nothing such being-at-stake both in speech
καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε
and in life he-is-truthful by-the the state such to-be would-seem
δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν
and — the such-man decent to-be the for truth-lover even in

οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει
what not matters being-truthful will-be-truthful also in what matters
ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ
still more as for shameful the falsehood he-will-shun which
γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός.
at-least also in itself he-shunned the and such-man (is)-praiseworthy
ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει·
toward the less and rather than-the truth he-inclines
ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
in-better-taste for it-appears through the offensive the exaggerations
εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
to-be the-man and greater than-the things-belonging claiming
μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε
of-nothing for-the-sake a-base-man indeed resembles not for — he-would-delight
τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ
in-the falsehood futile but he-appears rather than bad if
δ' ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
and for-the-sake of-something the-one indeed of-reputation or of-honor not very
ψεκτός, †ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών,† ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα
blameworthy as the boaster the-other and of-money or as-many-things-as
εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν
into money more-unseemly not in the capacity and is
ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ
the boaster but in the choice according-to the state for and
τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)· ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ
by-the such to-be a-boaster he-is just-as also a-liar the-one
μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος
indeed in-the falsehood itself delighting the-other and reputation desiring
ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ
or gain those indeed then of-reputation for-the-sake boasting the
τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
such-things claim for which praise or congratulation

οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ
those and of-gain of-which also enjoyment there-is for-the neighbors and
διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν.
to-escape-notice it-is-possible not being(-so) such-as a-seer wise a-physician
διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
through this the most claim the such-things and
ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ'
boast are for in them the things-mentioned the and
εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ
ironical toward the less speaking more-gracious indeed the
ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν,
characters appear not for of-gain for-the-sake they-seem to-speak
ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ
but avoiding the pompous most and also these the
ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ
creditable disown such-as also Socrates did those
δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ
and the small and obvious humbugs are-called and
εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται,
more-contemptible are and sometimes boastfulness it-appears
οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
such-as the of-the Laconians dress both for the excess and
ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι
the excessive deficiency (are)-boastful those and moderately using
τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ
the irony and about the-things not very obtrusive and obvious
εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ
being-ironical gracious appear to-be-opposed and the
ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.
boaster appears to-the truthful-man worse for(-he-is)

Life includes rest, and in rest there is a fitting way of joking and of listening to jokes. The buffoon will say anything for a laugh and spare no one, while the boor contributes nothing and takes offense at everything. The witty man jokes with tact; Aristotle contrasts the obscenity of the old comedy with the innuendo of the new, and says that the law forbids some kinds of abuse.

οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
there-being and also rest in the life and in this
διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία
pastime with play there-seems also here to-be intercourse
τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
a tasteful and what-sort one-should to-say and how likewise and also
ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων
to-hear it-will-differ and also the among such to-speak or such
ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή
to-hear clear and that also about these-things there-is excess
τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ
both and deficiency of-the mean those indeed then in-the ridiculous
ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί,
exceeding buffoons seem to-be and vulgar
γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι
hankering at-all-costs after-the joke and rather aiming
τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ
at-the laughter to-cause than at-the to-say seemly-things and not
λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες
to-pain the one-mocked those and neither themselves — saying
μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι
anything funny with-those and saying(-it) annoyed boorish
καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες
and stiff seem to-be those and tastefully joking

εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ
witty are-called as-it-were nimble of-the for
ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
character the such seem movements to-be just-as and the
σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη.
bodies from the movements are-judged so also the characters
ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων
abounding and the ridiculous and the most delighting
τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ
in-the play and in-the to-jest more than one-should even the
βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι
buffoons witty are-called as gracious that
δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.
but they-differ and not a-little from the things-said (is)-clear
τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ'
to-the middle and state proper also the tact is of-the and
ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ
tactful-man it-is such-things to-say and to-hear as to-the decent
καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ
and liberal-man befit there-are for some-things fitting for-the
τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ
such-man to-say in of-play the-way and to-hear and the of-the
ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ
liberal-man play differs from-that of-the slavish-man and
πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ
of-an-educated and of-an-uneducated might-see and — one also from
τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς
the comedies the old and the new to-the-ones
μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον
indeed for was funny the obscenity to-the-others and rather
ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς
the innuendo differ and not a-little these with-respect-to

εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον
decorum whether then the well jesting one-must-define
τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν
by-the to-say not unbecoming-things to-a-liberal-man or by-the not to-pain
τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον
the hearer or even to-delight(-him) or even the at-least such
ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ.
(is)-indefinite another-thing for to-another hateful both and pleasant
τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων,
such-things and also he-will-hear what for he-endures hearing
ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ
these also to-make he-seems not indeed every(-jest) he-will-make the for
σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια
jest abuse a-kind-of is the and lawgivers some-things
λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν.
to-abuse forbid they-ought(-to-forbid) and perhaps also to-jest
ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον
the indeed gracious and liberal-man so will-be-disposed as-it-were
νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν,
a-law being to-himself such indeed then the middle(-man) is
εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος
whether tactful or witty he-is-called the and buffoon
ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν
weaker is than-the joke and neither himself nor the
ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
others sparing if laughter he-will-cause and such-things saying
ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν
of-which none — would-say the gracious-man some and not-even —
ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος·
would-hear the and boor for the such intercourse (is)-useless
οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ
nothing for contributing at-everything he-is-annoyed seems and the

ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς
rest and the play in the life to-be necessary three
οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι
then the described in the life means are and all
περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι
about of-words some and of-deeds sharing they-differ
δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ
and that the-one indeed about truth is the-others and about
τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς
the pleasant of-these and about the pleasure the-one indeed in the
παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.
plays the-other and in the in the other life intercourse

IX · SHAME

Shame is more like a passion than a state: it is a fear of disrepute and shows in the body, as fear does. It suits the young, who live by passion and are kept from many wrongs by it, but a decent older man should feel none, since he should do nothing disgraceful. Self-control, likewise, is not a virtue but a mixed thing, as will be shown later.

περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·
about and sense-of-shame as some virtue not it-is-fitting to-speak
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος
a-passion for rather it-resembles than a-state it-is-defined at-any-rate fear
τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ
a-kind-of of-disrepute and it-turns-out to-the about the terrible-things fear
παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ
similar blush for those being-ashamed those and
τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί
the death fearing turn-pale bodily indeed appear

πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ
somehow to-be both which-very-thing seems of-a-passion rather than
ἕξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ
of-a-state to-be not to-every and age the passion befits but
τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας
to-the young we-think for it-is-needful those of-that-age modest
εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς
to-be through the by-passion living many-things to-err by the
αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων
sense-of-shame but to-be-restrained and we-praise of-the indeed young
τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι
the modest an-older-man but no-one — would-praise because
αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν
bashful nothing for we-think it-is-needful him to-do
ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ
at which is shame not-even for of-a-decent-man is the
αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον
shame if-indeed it-arises at the base-things not for one-must-do
τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ
the such-things if and are the-ones indeed in truth shameful
τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα
the-others and according-to opinion nothing it-makes-a-difference neither
γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ
for (are)-to-be-done so-that not one-must-be-ashamed of-a-base-man and also
τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν.
the to-be such as to-do any of-the shameful-things
τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων
the and so to-be-disposed so-that if he-should-do any of-the such-things
αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ
to-be-ashamed and through this to-think decent to-be (is)-absurd at
τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε
the voluntary-acts for the sense-of-shame willingly and the decent-man never

πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
will-do the base-things would-be and — the sense-of-shame on hypothesis
ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
decent if for he-should-do he-would-be-ashamed — not is and this
περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ
about the virtues if and the shamelessness (is)-base and the not
αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ
to-be-ashamed the shameful-things to-do not-at-all more the-man the
τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ'
such-things doing to-be-ashamed (is)-decent not is and not-even
ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ
the self-control a-virtue but a-kind-of mixed(-state) it-will-be-shown and
περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.
about it in the later(-books) now and about justice let-us-speak

BOOK V

I · JUSTICE IN TWO SENSES

Justice is the state from which men do just things, but both justice and injustice are spoken of in many senses. The unjust man is the lawless man and the grasping, unequal one. The laws aim at the common advantage and command the acts of every virtue, so that justice in this sense is complete virtue toward another, and neither evening nor morning star is so admirable.

περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε
about and justice and injustice one-must-consider about what-sort both
τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ
they-happen being actions and what-sort-of mean is the
δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις
justice and the just of-what-things (is)-a-mean the and inquiry
ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις.
for-us let-be according-to the same method as-the things-said-before
ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν
we-see indeed all the such state meaning to-call
δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ'
justice from which apt-to-do of-the just-things they-are and from
ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
which they-act-justly and wish the just-things the same and
τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται
way also about injustice from which they-act-unjustly and wish
τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω
the unjust-things therefore also for-us first as in outline let-be-assumed
ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν
these-things nor for the same does-it-hold way in-the-case-of both the
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις
sciences and capacities and in-the-case-of the states a-capacity

μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι,
indeed for and science seems of-the contraries the same to-be
ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ
a-state but the contrary of-the contraries not such-as from the health not
πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν
are-done the contrary-things but the healthy-things only we-say
γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων.
for healthily to-walk whenever one-walks as — the healthy-man
πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς
often indeed then is-recognized the contrary state from its
ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν
contrary often and the states from the subjects if
τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ
both for the good-condition be manifest also the bad-condition manifest
γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ
becomes and from the things-in-good-condition the good-condition and
ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία
from this the things-in-good-condition if for is the good-condition
πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα
firmness of-flesh necessary also the bad-condition to-be flabbiness
σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί.
of-flesh and the wholesome the productive of-firmness in flesh
ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς
it-follows and as for the most-part if the-one in-many-senses
λέγηται, καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ
be-said also the-other in-many-senses to-be-said such-as if the
δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ
just also the unjust it-seems and in-many-senses to-be-said the
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν
justice and the injustice but through the close to-be the
ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
equivocation of-them escapes-notice and not just-as in-the-case-of the

πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον, (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν
far-apart (it-is)-clear rather the for difference great the in the
ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ᾗ τε ὑπὸ
form such-as that is-called key equivocally the(-bone) both under
τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων καὶ ᾗ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.
the neck of-the animals and that-with-which the doors they-lock
εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ
let-it-be-taken indeed the unjust-man in-how-many-senses is-said seems indeed the
τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος,
both lawless-man unjust to-be and the grasping-man and unequal(-man)
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ
so-that clear that also just will-be the both lawful-man and the
ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
equal(-man) the indeed just then (is)-the lawful and the equal the
δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης
and unjust the lawless and the unequal since and grasping
ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα
the unjust-man about the-goods he-will-be not all but about as-many-as
εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά,
good-fortune and misfortune which are indeed absolutely always goods
τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται
for-a-particular-person but not always the and men these pray-for
καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς
and pursue one-should and not but to-pray indeed the absolutely
ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς
goods also for-themselves goods to-be to-choose and the for-themselves
ἀγαθά. ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ
goods the and unjust-man not always the more chooses but also
τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ
the less in-the-case-of the absolutely evils but because seems

καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ
also the lesser evil good somehow to-be of-the and good
ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι.
is the graspingness through this he-seems grasping to-be
ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ'
he-is and unequal this for includes(-it) and (is)-common since and
ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον
the lawless-man unjust was the and lawful-man just clear
ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ
that all the lawful-things are in-a-sense just the both for
ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον
things-defined by the legislative-art lawful are and each
τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ
of-these just to-be we-say the and laws pronounce about
ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν
all-things aiming-at either the in-common advantage for-all
ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ
or for-the best or for-the authorities or according-to other some
τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν
way such so-that in-one indeed sense just we-call
τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων
the productive and preservative of-happiness and of-the parts
αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος
of-it for-the political community commands and the law
καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν
also the of-the brave-man works to-do such-as not to-leave the
τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ
ranks nor to-flee nor to-throw-away the arms and the of-the
σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ
temperate-man such-as not to-commit-adultery nor to-commit-outrage and the
τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ
of-the gentle-man such-as not to-strike nor to-speak-evil likewise and

καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν
also according-to the other virtues and wickednesses the-ones indeed
κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος
bidding the-others and forbidding rightly indeed the(-law) laid-down
ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν
rightly worse and the(-one) hastily-made this indeed then
ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς
the justice virtue indeed is complete but not absolutely
ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη
but in-relation-to another and through this often the-greatest
τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος
of-the virtues to-be seems the justice and neither evening-star
οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν
nor morning-star so admirable and quoting-the-proverb we-say

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι
in and justice in-sum every virtue is

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς
and complete most virtue because of-the complete virtue
χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ
the-use it-is complete and it-is because the-man having it also
πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον
toward another can the virtue to-use but not only
καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ
by himself many for in indeed the private-affairs the virtue
δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ
can to-use in but the toward another are-unable and
διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα
through this well seems to-be the — of-Bias that office the-man
δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.
will-show toward another for and in community already the ruler

διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι
through and the same this also another's good seems to-be
ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν·
the justice alone of-the virtues because toward another it-is
ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ
for-another for the advantageous-things it-does either a-ruler or
κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ
a-partner worst indeed then (is)-the-man both toward himself and
πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ
toward the friends using the wickedness best but not
ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο
the-man toward himself the virtue but toward another this
γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος
for task (is)-hard this indeed then the justice not part
ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος
of-virtue but whole virtue is nor the opposite injustice part
κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ
of-vice but whole vice in-what and differs the virtue and the
δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
justice this clear from the things-said it-is indeed for
ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν πρὸς
the same the but to-be not the same but in-so-far-as indeed toward
ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.
another (it-is)-justice in-so-far-as and such state absolutely virtue

There is also a particular injustice, shown when a man takes more than his share through gain, as the adulterer who seeks profit is unjust and the one who follows his appetite is licentious. Particular justice has two kinds: one in the distribution of honors and wealth among citizens, and one that corrects transactions, both voluntary, such as sale and loan, and involuntary, such as theft and assault.

ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι
we-seek but at-least the in part of-virtue justice there-is
γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
for a-kind as we-say likewise and also about injustice the in
μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας
part a-sign and that there-is according-to indeed for the other
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ'
wickednesses the-man acting acts-unjustly indeed takes-more but
οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν
not-at-all such-as the-man having-thrown-away the shield through cowardice
ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας
or badly having-spoken through bad-temper or not having-helped
χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις
with-money through illiberality whenever but he-takes-more often
κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ
according-to none of-the such but indeed nor according-to
πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ)
all according-to wickedness but at-least some we-blame(-him) for
καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος
and according-to injustice there-is then other an injustice as part
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ
of-the whole and unjust a-kind-of in part of-the whole unjust the
παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὃ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα
contrary-to the law further if the-one indeed of-the to-gain for-the-sake

μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς
commits-adultery and gaining(-by-it) the-other and paying-in-addition
καὶ ζημιούμενος δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος
and losing through appetite this-one indeed licentious
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ᾽ ἄδικος,
would-seem — to-be rather than grasping(-man) that-one and unjust
ἀκόλαστος δ᾽ οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν.
licentious but not clear then that through the to-gain
ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ
further about indeed the-other all unjust-acts occurs the
ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν,
reference to some wickedness always such-as if he-committed-adultery
ἐπ᾽ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν,
to licentiousness if he-deserted the comrade-beside-him to cowardice
εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ᾽ ὀργήν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμίαν
if he-struck to anger if but he-gained to no
μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι
wickedness but except to injustice so-that manifest that there-is
τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι
an injustice beside the whole another in part synonymous because
ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς
the definition (is)-in the same genus both for in the toward
ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν
another have the force but the-one indeed about honor
ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι
or money or safety or if by-some we-could one name
περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
to-include these all and through pleasure the from the
κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
gain the-other and about all-things about which the excellent-man

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι
that indeed then there-are the justices more(-than-one) and that there-is
τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ
a also other beside the whole virtue (is)-clear what and also
ποία τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε
what-sort a(-one) one-must-grasp has-been-distinguished indeed the unjust the both
παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ
lawless and the unequal the and just the both lawful and
τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη
the equal according-to indeed then the lawless the earlier mentioned
ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ
injustice is since and the unfair and the lawless (are)-not
ταὐτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον
the-same but different as part to whole the indeed for unfair
ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ
all (is)-lawless the but lawless not all unfair also the
ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν
unjust and the injustice not the-same but different from-those the-ones indeed
ὡς μέρη τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς
as parts the-others and as wholes a-part for this the injustice of-the
ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.
whole injustice likewise and also the justice of-the justice
ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει
so-that also about the in part justice and about the in part
ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως.
injustice one-must-speak and the just and unjust in-the-same-way
ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη
the indeed then according-to the whole virtue ranked justice
καὶ ἀδικία, ἧ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς
and injustice the-one indeed of-the whole virtue being the-use toward
ἄλλον ἧ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ
another the-other and of-the vice let-be-set-aside also the just and

καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον·
and the unjust the according-to these (is)-manifest how one-must-distinguish
σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης
nearly for the many of-the lawful-things the(-ones) from the whole
ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν
virtue commanded are according-to each for virtue
προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ
commands to-live and according-to each wickedness forbids the
νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων
law the and productive of-the whole virtue are of-the lawful-things
ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.
as-many-as have-been-enacted about education the for the common(-good)
περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς
about and the according-to individual education according-to which absolutely
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας,
a-man good is whether of-the political-science it-is or of-another
ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ
later one-must-determine not for perhaps the-same for-a-man both good
εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης
to-be and for-a-citizen every of-the and in part justice
καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν
and of-the according-to it just one indeed is kind the in
ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα
the distributions of-honor or of-money or of-the other-things as-many-as
μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
divisible to-those sharing in-the constitution in these for
ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ
it-is-possible both unequal to-have and equal one than-another one and
τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο·
the in the transactions corrective of-this and parts two
τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ
of-the for transactions the-ones indeed voluntary are the-others

δ᾽ ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ
and involuntary voluntary indeed the following such-as sale purchase
δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια
loan surety loan-for-use deposit hire voluntary
δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων
and they-are-called because the origin of-the transactions these
ἑκούσιος), τῶν δ᾽ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ
(is)-voluntary of-the and involuntary the-ones indeed clandestine such-as theft
μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία
adultery poisoning procuring enticement-of-slaves assassination
ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς
false-witness the-others and violent such-as assault imprisonment
θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.
murder robbery maiming abuse insult

III · DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The just is an equal and a mean, and so it involves at least four terms: two persons and two shares. In distribution all agree it goes by worth, though democrats call worth freedom, oligarchs wealth, others birth, and aristocrats virtue. The just is thus a proportion, which the mathematicians call geometrical, and the unjust is what violates it.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὅ τ᾽ ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον,
since and the-man both unjust (is)-unequal and the unjust unequal
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ
(is)-clear that also a-mean some there-is of-the unequal this and is
τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ
the equal in whatever-kind for action there-is the more and the
ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ
less there-is also the equal if then the unjust (is)-unequal the

δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ
just (is)-equal which-very-thing also without argument seems to-all since
δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. ἔστι
and the equal (is)-a-mean the just a-mean some — would-be it-is
δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον
and the equal in least two necessary therefore the just
μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν,
a-mean both and equal to-be and relative-to something and for-some-persons
καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
and in-so-far-as indeed a-mean between-some-things these and are
πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ
more and less in-so-far-as and equal of-two in-so-far-as and
δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
just for-some-persons necessary then the just in least
εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο
to-be four for-whom both for just it-happens being two
ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται
are and in which the things two and the same will-be
ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς,
equality for-whom and in which as for those are-related the in which
οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν,
so those-also are-related if for not equal not equal-things they-will-have
ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ
but from-this the fights and the complaints whenever either not
ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται.
equal-things equals or not equals equal-things have and are-assigned
ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον
further from the according-to worth this (is)-clear the for just
ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ
in the distributions agree all according-to worth some
δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες,
must to-be the however worth not the same they-mean all

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ
but the indeed democrats freedom the and oligarchs
πλοῦτον, οἱ δ᾽ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν.
wealth others and good-birth the and aristocrats virtue
ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ
is then the just proportional something the for proportional not
μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ·
only is of-abstract number peculiar but generally of-number
ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν
the for proportion equality is of-ratios and in four
ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον.
at-least the indeed then discrete that in four (is)-clear
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς
but also the continuous the for one as two it-uses and twice
λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ
it-mentions such-as as the — of-A to the — of-B so the —
β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ᾽
of-B to the — of-C twice then the — of-B has-been-mentioned so-that
ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι
if the — of-B be-set-down twice four will-be the proportionals is
δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος
and also the just in four at-least and the ratio
ὁ αὐτός· διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἅ.
the same is-divided for likewise for-whom both and what-things
ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν
it-will-be then as the A term to the B so the C to the
δ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν
D and alternately then as the A to the C the B to the
δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ
D so-that also the whole to the whole which-very-thing the distribution
συνδυάζει, κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα
couples and-if so it-be-combined justly it-couples the then

τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν
of-the A term with-the C and the of-the B with-the D coupling the in
διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ δ'
distribution just is and a-mean the just this is the and
ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ
unjust the contrary-to the proportional the for proportional (is)-a-mean the
δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν
and just (is)-proportional call and the such proportion
γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ
geometrical the mathematicians in for the geometrical
συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον
it-happens also the whole to the whole which-very-thing each
πρὸς ἑκάτερον. ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ
to each is and not continuous this the proportion not for
γίνεται εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον
comes-to-be one in-number term for-whom and what the indeed then just
τοῦτο, τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
this the proportional the and unjust the contrary-to the proportional
γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ
becomes then the-one indeed more the-other and less which-very-thing
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν
also in-the-case-of the works happens the indeed for acting-unjustly
πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
more has the and being-wronged less of-the good
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ
in-the-case-of and the evil the-reverse in of-good for account
γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν· ἔστι
becomes the lesser evil compared-with the greater evil is
γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος,
for the lesser evil more choiceworthy than-the greater

τὸ δ' αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν
the and choiceworthy (is)-good and the more (is)-greater the indeed
οὖν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.
then one form of-the just this is

IV · CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

Corrective justice, in transactions, follows arithmetical proportion: the law looks only at the harm and treats the parties as equals. The judge restores equality by taking from the gain and adding to the loss, like dividing a line in two, as if the just were the bisected and the judge a bisector. The names loss and gain come from voluntary exchange.

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς
the and remaining one the corrective which arises in the
συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο
transactions both the voluntary and the involuntary this
δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν
and the just another form has than-the before the indeed
γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν
for distributive just of-the common(-goods) always according-to the
ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
proportion is the stated and for from money
κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον
common if be-made the distribution it-will-be according-to the ratio
τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ
the same which have to one-another the contributions and
τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ
the unjust the opposed to-the just this the contrary-to the
ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ
proportional is the and in the transactions just is

μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ
indeed equal something and the unjust unequal but not according-to
τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.
the proportion that but according-to the arithmetical
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν
nothing for does-it-differ whether a-decent-man a-base-man defrauded
ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ
or a-base-man a-decent-man nor whether committed-adultery a-decent-man or
φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον
a-base-man but to of-the harm the difference only
βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ
looks the law and treats(-them) as equals if the-one indeed acts-unjustly
ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται.
the-other and is-wronged and if harmed the-other and has-been-harmed
ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ
so-that the unjust this unequal being to-equalize tries the
δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ
judge and for whenever the-one indeed has-been-struck the-other and
πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ
has-struck or also kills the-other and dies are-divided the
πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ
suffering and the action into unequal-parts but he-tries by-the
ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς
penalty to-equalize taking-away from-the gain is-said for as
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν
simply to-speak in-the-case-of the such(-cases) even if not for-some
οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ
appropriate a-name be the gain such-as to-the-man having-struck and
ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ
the loss to-the-man having-suffered but when at-least is-measured the
πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε
suffering is-called the-one indeed loss the-other and gain so-that

τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
of-the indeed more and less the equal (is)-a-mean the and
κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον
gain and the loss the-one indeed more the-other and less
ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ'
in-opposite-ways the indeed of-the good more of-the evil and
ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον
less (is)-gain the and contrary loss between-which was a-mean
τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν
the equal which we-say to-be just so-that the corrective
δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.
just — would-be the mean of-loss and of-gain
διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν
therefore also whenever they-dispute to the judge
καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν
they-have-recourse the and to the judge to-go to-go is
ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον
to the just the for judge means to-be as-it-were
δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
just ensouled and they-seek a-judge intermediate and
καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι,
call some(-people) mediators as if of-the mean they-hit
τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον,
of-the just they-will-hit a-mean then something the just
εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ
if-indeed also the judge the and judge restores-equality and
ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον
just-as a-line into unequal-parts having-been-cut by-what the greater
τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ
segment than-the half exceeds this he-has-taken-away and to-the
ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ
lesser segment added whenever and in-two is-divided

τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὑτοῦ ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ
the whole then they-say they-have the their-own when they-get the
ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος
equal the and equal mean is of-the greater and lesser
κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
according-to the arithmetical proportion through this also
ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
it-is-named just because in-two it-is just-as — if one
εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ
were-to-call(-it) bisected and the judge bisector whenever for
δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ
of-two equal-things is-taken-away from the-one to the-other and
προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη
is-added by-two these exceeds the-other if for was-taken-away
μέν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν.
indeed not was-added and by-one — only it-would-exceed
τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἑνί.
than-the mean then by-one and the mean from which was-taken-away by-one
τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ
by-this then we-shall-know what both to-take-away one-must from the-man
πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι·
more having and what to-add to-the-man less having
ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ
by-what indeed for the mean exceeds this to-add one-must
τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ
to-the-man less having by-what and it-is-exceeded to-take-away from
τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ
the greatest equal the-lines on which AA BB CC to-one-another from
τῆς αα ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ
the AA let-be-taken-away the AE and let-be-added to-the CC the(-line)
ἐφ' ᾧ γδ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει τῷ γδ
on which CD so-that whole the DCC than-the EA exceeds by-the CD

καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα
and by-the CZ than-the then BB by-the CD have-come and the names
ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἑκουσίου
these the both loss and the gain from the voluntary
ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ κερδαίνειν
exchange the indeed for more to-have than the his-own to-gain
λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον
is-called the and less than-the at the-start to-lose such-as
ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν
in the to-buy and selling and in as-many-as other(-cases) license
δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον
has-given the law whenever and neither more nor less
ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν φασὶν
but the-very-things the through themselves come-about the their-own they-say
ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους
they-have and neither to-lose nor to-gain so-that of-a-gain
τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ
a-kind and of-a-loss a-mean the just is of-the-things contrary-to
τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.
the voluntary the equal to-have both before and after

The Pythagoreans defined justice as reciprocity, but simple reciprocity fits neither kind of justice. In exchange, though, proportionate reciprocity holds the city together, which is why the Graces have a shrine. The builder's and the shoemaker's work must be equated, and money, set up by convention, measures all things by need. Just action is a mean between doing and suffering injustice.

δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον,
seems and to-some also the reciprocal to-be simply just
ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ
just-as the Pythagoreans said they-defined for simply the
δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς
just (as)-the reciprocal to-another the but reciprocal
οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ
not fits neither on the distributive just nor on
τὸ διορθωτικόν — καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν
the corrective although they-mean at-least this to-say
καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον·
also the of-Rhadamanthys just

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο
if — he-should-suffer the-things — he-did justice — straight would-be

— πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν,
in-many-cases for it-disagrees such-as if office holding he-struck
οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
not must he-be-struck-in-return and if an-official he-struck not to-be-struck
μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ
only he-must but also to-be-punished further the voluntary and the
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς
involuntary differs much but in indeed the associations the

ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
of-exchange holds-together the such just the reciprocal
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν
according-to proportion and not according-to equality by-the to-do-in-return
γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς
for proportionately holds-together the city either for the badly
ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή,
they-seek(-to-return) if and not slavery it-seems to-be or the well if and not
μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ
exchange not takes-place by-the exchange and they-hold-together therefore
καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν᾽ ἀνταπόδοσις
also of-the-Graces a-shrine prominent they-make so-that requital
ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ
there-be this for (is)-peculiar of-grace to-serve-in-return for one-must
τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον.
to-the-man having-shown-grace and again oneself to-begin showing-grace
ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ
makes and the requital the according-to proportion the by
διάμετρον σύζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ᾽
diagonal conjunction a-builder on which A a-shoemaker on
ᾧ β, οἰκία ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ᾽ ᾧ δ.
which B a-house on which C a-shoe on which D
δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ
must then receive the builder from the shoemaker the
ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ.
of-that-man work and himself to-that-man give-in-return the his-own
ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον,
if then first there-be the according-to the proportion equal
εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ
then the reciprocal come-about there-will-be the thing-said if
δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει
and not not (it-is)-equal nor does-it-hold-together nothing for prevents

κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν
better to-be the of-the-one work than the of-the-other must then
ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
these be-equalized it-is and this also in-the-case-of the other
τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὃ ἐποίει τὸ
arts they-would-be-destroyed for — if not what produced the
ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε
acting(-party) both so-much and of-such-kind and the being-acted-on received
τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν
this and so-much and of-this-kind not for from two physicians
γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως
arises an-association but from a-physician and a-farmer and generally
ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
from-different-people and not equal but these must be-equalized
διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή.
therefore all-things comparable must somehow be of-which there-is exchange
ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα
for which the currency has-come and becomes in-a-way a-mean all-things
γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
for it-measures so-that both the excess and the deficiency
πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ.
how-many — indeed shoes (are)-equal to-a-house or to-food
δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ
must therefore as a-builder to a-shoemaker so-many
ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ
shoes to a-house or food if for not this not
ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη
there-will-be exchange nor association this and if not equal it-should-be
πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι,
somehow not will-be must then by-one some(-thing) all-things be-measured
ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ
just-as was-said before this and is in indeed truth

ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ
the need which all-things holds-together if for nothing they-needed or not
ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· οἷον δ'
alike either not there-will-be exchange or not the same as-it-were and
ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·
a-representative of-the need the currency has-become by agreement
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει
and through this the-name has currency because not by-nature
ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι
but by-convention it-is and in our-power to-change(-it) and to-make(-it)
ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε
useless there-will-be indeed reciprocity whenever it-is-equalized so-that
ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου
as farmer to shoemaker the work the of-the shoemaker
πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ
to the of-the farmer into a-figure but of-proportion not one-must
ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς
bring(-them) when they-have-exchanged if and not both will-have the
ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν.
excesses the one extreme but when they-have the their-own
οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται
thus (they-are)-equals and partners because this the equality can
ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς α, τροφὴ γ, σκυτοτόμος β,
in their-case come-about farmer A food C shoemaker B
τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν
the work of-him the equalized D if and so not it-were-possible
ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ
to-be-reciprocal not — there-would-be association that and the
χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ
need holds-together just-as one something being shows that when not
ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ
in need they-are of-one-another either both or one-of-the-two not

ἀλλάττονται, †ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον
they-exchange as when what has he-himself needs one such-as
οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγήν.† δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι.
wine giving of-corn export must then this be-equalized
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι
for and the future exchange if now nothing he-needs that
ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν·
there-will-be(-one) if he-need the currency as-it-were (a)-surety is for-us
δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν
must for for-the-man bringing-it there-be(-power) to-get suffers indeed
οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως
then also this the same not for always equal is-worth nevertheless
δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι·
and it-tends to-stay(-steady) more therefore must all-things have-been-priced
οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ
so for always there-will-be exchange if and this association the
δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε
indeed currency just-as a-measure commensurate making(-them) equalizes neither
γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ
for — not being exchange association would-there-be nor exchange
ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας.
equality not being nor equality not being commensurability
τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα
in indeed then truth (it-is)-impossible the-things so-much differing
σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται
commensurate to-become in-relation-to but the need it-is-possible
ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως·
sufficiently one indeed some(-thing) must there-be this and by convention
διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα·
therefore currency it-is-called this for all-things makes commensurate
μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη
are-measured for all-things by-currency a-house A minae ten B a-bed

γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ
C the A of-the B half if five minae worth the house or equal the
δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι
and bed a-tenth part the C of-the B (it-is)-clear therefore how-many
κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ
beds (are)-equal to-a-house that five that and so the exchange
ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν
was before the currency existed (is)-clear it-differs for nothing-at-all
ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
whether beds five for a-house or as-much-as the five beds
τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.
what indeed then the unjust and what the just is has-been-said
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον
being-distinguished and these (it-is)-clear that the just-action a-mean
ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
is between-the to-act-unjustly and being-wronged the-one indeed for
πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη
(is)-more to-have the-other and less is the and justice
μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις
a-mean a-kind-of is not the same but way as-the other
ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων.
virtues but because of-a-mean it-is the and injustice of-the extremes
καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται
and the indeed justice is according-to which the just-man is-said
πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς
(to-be)-a-doer by choice of-the just and a-distributor
καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ
both for-himself in-relation-to another and for-another in-relation-to another not
οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ
so as-to of-the indeed choiceworthy more to-himself less and
τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου
to-the neighbor of-the harmful and the-reverse but of-the equal

τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς
the according-to proportion likewise and also for-another in-relation-to
ἄλλον. ἡ δ᾽ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
another the and injustice contrariwise of-the unjust this and is
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ
excess and deficiency of-the beneficial or harmful contrary-to
τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία,
the proportional therefore excess and deficiency (is)-the injustice
ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ μὲν
because of-excess and of-deficiency it-is in-the-case-of himself indeed
ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ
of-excess indeed of-the absolutely beneficial of-deficiency and of-the
βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως,
harmful in-the-case-of and the others the indeed whole likewise
τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ
the but contrary-to the proportional in-whichever-way it-happens of-the and
ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον
unjust-act the indeed less to-be-wronged is the and greater
τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς
the to-act-unjustly about indeed then justice and injustice what
ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
of-each is the nature let-it-have-been-said in-this the way
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.
likewise and also about just and unjust in-general

A man can act unjustly without yet being unjust. Justice in the strict sense is political: it exists among free and equal partners living under law, so we let reason rule and not a man, and the ruler, as guardian of the just, is paid in honor. A master's and a father's justice are only analogous, since there is no injustice toward what is one's own.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ
since and it-is-possible acting-unjustly not-yet unjust to-be the(-man)
ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην
what-sort-of unjust-acts committing already unjust is in-each
ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν
injustice such-as a-thief or an-adulterer or a-robber or thus indeed
οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς
not-at-all will-it-differ also for — might-have-intercourse with-a-woman knowing
τὸ ᾧ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ
the with-whom but not through choice the-origin(-being) but
διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον
through passion acts-unjustly indeed then unjust but not he-is such-as
οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ·
not a-thief he-stole but nor an-adulterer he-committed-adultery but
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει
likewise and also in-the-case-of the others how indeed then is-related
τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ
the reciprocal to the just has-been-said before must
δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς
and not escape-notice that the thing-sought is both the absolutely
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ
just and the political just this and is among
κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ
partners of-life for the to-be self-sufficiency free and

ἴσων ἢ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν· ὥστε
equal either according-to proportion or according-to number so-that
ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ
for-whom not is this not there-is for-these toward one-another the
πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα.
political just but some just and by similarity
ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος
there-is for justice for-whom also law (is)-toward themselves law
δ᾽, ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου
and among whom injustice the for justice (is)-the-judgment of-the just
καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
and of-the unjust among whom and injustice also the to-act-unjustly
ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία),
among these among whom but the to-act-unjustly not in-all injustice
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν,
this and is the more to-oneself to-assign of-the absolutely goods
ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν. διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν
less and of-the absolutely evils therefore not we-allow to-rule
ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ
a-man but the reason because for-himself this he-does and
γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ
becomes a-tyrant is and the ruler a-guardian of-the just if
δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον
and of-the just also of-the equal since and nothing to-him more
εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
to-be(-his) seems if-indeed (he-is)-just not for he-assigns more of-the
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν·
absolutely good to-himself if not to himself proportional it-is
διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν
therefore for-another he-labors and through this another's to-be they-say
ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)·
good the justice just-as was-said also before

μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας·
a-reward then some must-be-given this and (is)-honor and privilege
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.
for-whomever and not sufficient the such-things these become tyrants
τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις
the and of-a-master just and the of-a-father not the-same as-these
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ
but similar not for there-is injustice toward the his-own absolutely the
δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ,
and chattel and the child until — it-be of-an-age and be-separated
ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν·
(is)-as-it-were a-part of-himself himself and no-one chooses to-harm
διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ
therefore not there-is injustice toward oneself nor then unjust nor
δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς
just the political according-to law for it-was and among whom
ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης
it-was-natural to-be law these and were for-whom there-belongs equality
τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι
of-the to-rule and being-ruled therefore more toward a-wife is
δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
justice than toward children and chattels this for is the
οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.
household just different and also this from-the political

Political justice is partly natural, with the same force everywhere, and partly legal, indifferent until it is laid down, as with ransom at a mina or sacrifice to Brasidas. Some think all justice is convention because it changes, whereas fire burns alike here and in Persia; but even what is natural can change, as the right hand is stronger though men may become ambidextrous.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ
of-the and political just the-one indeed natural is the-other
δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον
and legal natural indeed the(-one) everywhere the same having
δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
force and not by-the to-seem or not legal and which from the-start
μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται,
indeed not-at-all differs (whether)-thus or otherwise whenever but they-lay-it-down
διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ
it-differs such-as the a-mina to-ransom(-at) or the a-goat to-sacrifice but
μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα
not two sheep further all-that in-the-case-of the according-to particulars
νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη.
they-legislate such-as the to-sacrifice to-Brasidas and the decree-like-things
δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει
it-seems and to-some to-be all such because the indeed by-nature
ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ
(is)-unchangeable and everywhere the same has force just-as
τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια
the fire both here and among Persians burns the but just-things
κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ'
changing they-see this but not is so (the-case) but
ἔστιν ὡς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς,
it-is in-a-way although among at-least the gods perhaps not-at-all

παρ᾽ ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι
among us but there-is indeed something also by-nature changeable however
πᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ φύσει.
all but nevertheless is the-one indeed by-nature the-other and not by-nature
ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν,
what-sort and (is)-by-nature of-the-things admitting also otherwise to-be
καὶ ποῖον οὖ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω
and what-sort not but legal and by-convention if-indeed both
κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς
(are)-changeable alike (is)-clear and in-the-case-of the others the same
ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι
will-fit distinction by-nature for the right(-hand) (is)-stronger although
ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ
it-is-possible all ambidextrous to-become the and according-to
συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς
convention and the advantage of-the just-things like are the
μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα,
measures not for everywhere equal the wine and corn measures
ἀλλ᾽ οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν,
but where indeed they-buy (they-are)-larger where and they-sell
ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια
smaller likewise and also the not natural but human just-things
οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον
not the-same everywhere since not-even the constitutions but one only
πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ
everywhere according-to nature the best of-the and just-things and
νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα
lawful-things each as the universals to the according-to particulars
ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἕκαστον
is-related the indeed for things-done (are)-many of-those and each
ἕν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον
(is)-one universal for differs and the unjust-act and the unjust

καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ
and the just-act and the just unjust indeed for is by-the
φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά
nature or by-ordinance itself and this whenever it-is-done an-unjust-act
ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως
is before and to-be-done not-yet but unjust likewise
δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ
and also a-just-act is-called and rather just-doing the
κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος.
common(-term) just-act and the correction of-the unjust-act
καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ
in each and of-them what-kinds both of-forms and how-many and
περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
about what-sorts they-happen being later one-must-consider

VIII · VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY WRONGS

Whether an act is unjust depends on its being voluntary. Of the harms done in dealings, those done in ignorance are mistakes or misfortunes; those done knowingly but without deliberation, in anger, are unjust acts, though their doer is not yet unjust; those done from choice make a man unjust and wicked. Some involuntary acts are pardonable and some are not.

ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων,
being and the just-things and unjust-things the(-ones) mentioned
ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ
acts-unjustly indeed and acts-justly whenever willingly one them
πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ
does whenever but unwillingly neither he-acts-unjustly nor acts-justly
ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε
but except according-to accident for-whom for it-happens

δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
just to-be or unjust they-do an-unjust-act and and
δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν
a-just-act are-defined by-the voluntary and involuntary whenever
γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα
for voluntary it-be it-is-blamed at-the-same-time and also an-unjust-act
τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα
then it-is so-that there-will-be something unjust indeed an-unjust-act
δ' οὔπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον
but not-yet if not the voluntariness be-added I-call and voluntary
μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν
indeed just-as also before has-been-said what — one of-the-things
ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε
in his-own-power being knowing and not being-ignorant does neither
ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ
whom nor with-what nor of-what for-the-sake such-as whom he-strikes and
τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ
with-what and of-what for-the-sake and-of-those each not according-to
συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα
accident nor by-force just-as if one having-taken the hand
αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)·
of-him should-strike another not willingly not for in his-power(-it-was)
ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ'
it-is-possible and the(-man) being-struck father to-be the(-striker) and
ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι
that indeed a-man or of-the present-people one to-know that
δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω
but father to-be-ignorant likewise and the such-thing let-it-be-determined
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.
also in-the-case-of the of-which for-the-sake and about the action whole

τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ
the indeed being-unknown or not being-unknown indeed not in his-power
δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει
but being or by-force (is)-involuntary many for also of-the-things by-nature
ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν
belonging knowingly both we-do and we-undergo of-which
οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν
none either voluntary or involuntary is such-as the to-grow-old
ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ
or dying it-is and likewise in-the-case-of the unjust-things and
τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν
the just-things also the according-to accident also for — the
παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν
deposit might-return one involuntarily and through fear whom
οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ
neither just-things to-do nor to-act-justly must-one-say but except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον
according-to accident likewise and also the-man being-compelled
καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ
and unwilling the deposit not returning according-to
συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν.
accident one-must-say to-act-unjustly and the unjust-things to-do
τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ
of-the and voluntary-acts the(-ones) indeed having-chosen we-do the-others
δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι,
and not having-chosen having-chosen indeed all-that having-deliberated-beforehand
ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν
unchosen and all-that undeliberated three indeed being
βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας
harms of-the in the associations the(-ones) indeed with ignorance
ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ
mistakes are whenever neither whom nor what nor with-what

μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν
nor of-which for-the-sake he-supposed he-acts either for not to-throw
ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη,
or not with-this or not this-man or not of-this for-the-sake he-thought
ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα
but it-happened not of-which for-the-sake he-thought such-as not so-that
τρώσῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ.
he-might-wound but so-that he-might-prick or not whom or not with-what
ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται,
whenever indeed then contrary-to-reasonable-expectation the harm comes-about
ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ
(it-is)-a-misadventure whenever and not contrary-to-reasonable-expectation without but
κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν
vice a-mistake he-makes-a-mistake indeed for whenever the origin in
αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ᾽ ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν
himself is of-the cause he-is-unfortunate and whenever (it-is)-from-outside whenever
δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον
and knowingly indeed not having-deliberated-beforehand but (it-is)-an-unjust-act such-as
ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ
all-that both through anger and other passions all-that (are)-necessary or
φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες
natural happen to-the men these for harming
καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ
and making-mistakes they-act-unjustly indeed and unjust-acts they-are not
μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ
however yet (they-are)-unjust through these nor wicked not for
διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,
through wickedness (is)-the harm whenever but from choice
ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ
(he-is)-unjust and depraved therefore rightly the(-acts) from anger
οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
not from malice-aforethought are-judged not for begins the-man in-anger

ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ
acting but the-man having-angered(-him) further and not-even about the
γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ
to-happen or not is-it-disputed but about the justice at
φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν
apparent for injustice the anger is not for just-as in
τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν
the transactions about the to-happen they-dispute of-which
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ
necessarily the one to-be depraved if not through forgetfulness it
δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ
they-do but agreeing about the fact about but
τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας
the which-way just they-dispute the-man but having-plotted
οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὔ.
not is-ignorant so-that the-one indeed thinks to-be-wronged the-other but not
ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ
if but from choice he-harms he-acts-unjustly and according-to
ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν
these already the unjust-acts the-man acting-unjustly (is)-unjust whenever
παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ
contrary-to the proportional it-be or contrary-to the equal likewise and
καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ
also just whenever having-chosen he-acts-justly he-acts-justly
δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ
but if only willingly he-acts of-the and involuntary-acts the-ones
μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα
indeed are pardonable the-others but not pardonable all-that
μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν
indeed for not only being-ignorant but also through ignorance
ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν,
they-make-mistakes(-in) (are)-pardonable all-that and not through ignorance

ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ᾽
but being-ignorant indeed through passion and neither natural nor
ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.
human not pardonable

IX · CAN ONE BE WRONGED WILLINGLY?

Aristotle tests Euripides' line about killing a willing mother and concludes that no one is wronged voluntarily, though one may be harmed so. In an unjust distribution it is the distributor who acts unjustly, not the receiver. Men think justice easy because the acts are easy, but doing them from the right disposition is not, any more than prescribing medicine is.

ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ
might-be-puzzled and — one whether adequately it-has-been-determined about
τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν
the to-be-wronged and acting-unjustly first indeed whether it-is(-possible)
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως
just-as Euripides has-said saying strangely

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.
mother I-killed — my brief (is)-the-tale
ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;
willing willing or not willing not willing

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ
whether for as truly it-is(-possible) willingly to-be-wronged or
οὐ ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν
not but (is-it)-involuntary all just-as also the to-act-unjustly all
ἑκούσιον; καὶ ᾆρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ἢ τὸ μὲν
(is)-voluntary and whether all (is)-thus or that-way or the-one indeed

ἑκούσιον τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
voluntary the-other and involuntary likewise and also in-the-case-of
τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον·
the to-be-justly-treated the for to-act-justly all (is)-voluntary
ὥστ᾽ εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον, τό τ᾽
so-that (it-is)-reasonable to-be-opposed likewise in each(-case) the both
ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι.
being-wronged and being-justly-treated either voluntary or involuntary to-be
ἄτοπον δ᾽ ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν
strange but — it-would-seem also in-the-case-of the to-be-justly-treated if all
ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἑκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε
(is)-voluntary some for are-justly-treated not willingly then also this
διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς
might-be-puzzled-over — one whether the-man the unjust having-suffered
ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν,
is-wronged every(-one) or just-as also in-the-case-of the to-do
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
(so)-also in-the-case-of the to-suffer it-is according-to accident
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων·
for it-is-possible in both(-cases) to-partake of-the just-things
ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ
likewise and (it-is)-clear that also in-the-case-of the unjust-things not for
ταὐτὸν τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ
the-same (is)-the unjust-things to-do with-the to-act-unjustly nor the
ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
unjust-things to-suffer with-the to-be-wronged likewise and also in-the-case-of
τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι
the to-act-justly and being-justly-treated (it-is)-impossible for to-be-wronged
μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.
not someone-acting-unjustly or to-be-justly-treated not someone-acting-justly

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα τινά,
if but is simply the to-act-unjustly the to-harm willingly someone
τὸ δ' ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς, ὁ
the and willingly (is)-knowing both whom and with-what and how the
δ' ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκὼν τ' ἂν
and uncontrolled-man willingly harms himself himself willingly both —
ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι
he-would-be-wronged and-also it-would-be-possible himself himself to-wrong is
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται
and also this one of-the-things puzzled-over whether it-is-possible
αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν
himself himself to-wrong further willingly — one through lack-of-control
ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ'
by another might-be-harmed (who-acts)-willingly so-that it-would-be — willingly
ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον
to-be-wronged or not correct the definition but one-must-add
τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς τὸ
to-the to-harm knowing both whom and with-what and how the
παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις
contrary-to the of-that-man wish is-harmed indeed then one
ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών·
willingly and unjust-things suffers is-wronged but no-one willingly
οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ
no-one for wishes(-it) not-even the uncontrolled-man but contrary-to
τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ
the wish he-acts neither for wishes no-one what
μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ
not he-thinks to-be excellent the-man and uncontrolled not what

οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς,
he-thinks one-must do he-does the-man but the his-own giving
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει
just-as Homer says to-have-given — Glaucus — to-Diomedes

χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,
golden for-bronze hundred-oxen-worth for-nine-oxen-worth

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι
not is-wronged in his-power for is the to-give the but to-be-wronged
οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ
(is)-not in his-power but the(-one) acting-unjustly must be-present about
μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.
indeed then the to-be-wronged that (it-is)-not voluntary (it-is)-clear
ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ'
further and of-what we-chose-beforehand two remain to-say whether ever
ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ
acts-unjustly the-man having-assigned contrary-to the worth the more or
ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ
the-man having(-it) and whether it-is(-possible) himself himself to-wrong if
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ
for is-possible the earlier stated and the distributor acts-unjustly
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ
but not the-man having the more if one more than-himself to-another
νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ
assigns knowingly and willingly this-man himself himself wrongs which-very-thing
δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός
seem the moderate-men to-do the for decent-man apt-to-take-less
ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
is or not-even this (is)-simple of-another for good if it-happens
πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται
he-gets-more such-as of-reputation or of-the absolutely noble further it-is-solved

κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
according-to the definition of-the to-act-unjustly nothing for contrary-to
τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε
the his-own he-suffers wish so-that not he-is-wronged through at-least
τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ
this but if-indeed is-harmed only (it-is)-evident and that also the
διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ
distributor acts-unjustly but not the-man the more having always not
γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ τὸ
for the(-man)-to-whom the unjust belongs acts-unjustly but to-whom the
ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως,
willingly this to-do this and (is)-whence the origin of-the action
ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι.
which is in the distributor but not in the receiver
ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν
further since in-many-senses the to-do is-said and there-is(-a-sense)
ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης
as the lifeless-things kill and the hand and the servant
ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
(when-a-master)-has-ordered not acts-unjustly indeed does but the unjust-things
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ
further if indeed being-ignorant he-judged not acts-unjustly according-to the
νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ᾽ ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς
legal just nor unjust the judgment is it-is but in-a-way
ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον·
unjust different for (is)-the legal just and the primary
εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ
if but knowing he-judged unjustly he-gets-more also himself either
χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ
of-favor or of-revenge just-as then also if one were-to-share of-the
ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον
unjust-act also the-man for these-reasons having-judged unjustly more

ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν
has and for in that(-case) the land having-awarded not land
ἀλλ᾽ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται
but money he-got the but men in their-power think
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον.
to-be the to-act-unjustly therefore also the just to-be easy
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ
the but not is(-so) to-lie-with indeed for with-the(-wife) of-the
γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ
neighbor and to-strike the neighbor and to-give with-the hand
τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ
the money (is)-easy and in their-power but the in-a-certain-way
ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς.
being-disposed these-things to-do neither (is)-easy nor in their-power
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν
likewise and also the to-know the just-things and the unjust-things nothing
οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ
they-think wise to-be because about what the laws speak not
χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
hard to-understand but not these are the just-things but except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς
according-to accident but how done and how
νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ
distributed (are)-just-things this indeed (is)-a-greater task than the
ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἑλλέβορον
healthy-things to-know since there-too honey and wine and hellebore
καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ
and cautery and surgery to-know (is)-easy but how one-must
νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
assign(-them) for health and to-whom and when so-great a-task
ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι᾽ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου
as a-physician to-be through very and this also of-the just-man

οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ
they-think to-be no less the to-act-unjustly because not less the
δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων·
just-man but also more could — each to-do of-these
καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
and for to-lie-with a-woman and to-strike and the brave-man
τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ᾽ ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν.
the shield to-throw-away and having-turned in either-direction to-run
ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί,
but the to-be-a-coward and to-act-unjustly not the these-things to-do is
πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα
except according-to accident but the in-a-certain-way being-disposed
ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν
these-things to-do just-as also the to-practice-medicine and the to-heal
οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν
not the to-cut or not to-cut or to-drug or not to-drug
ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις
is but the in-a-certain-way are and the just-things among these
οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν
who share of-the absolutely goods have and excess in
τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ
these and deficiency for-the(-ones) indeed for not is excess
αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ᾽ οὐδὲν μόριον
of-them such-as perhaps for-the gods for-the(-others) and nothing a-particle
ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει,
(is)-beneficial for-the incurably bad but all-things harm
τοῖς δὲ μέχρι του· διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
for-the(-others) and up-to a-point through this human is

The equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice. Law must speak universally, and where a case falls outside the universal, equity corrects the law as the lawgiver would have done had he been there. It is like the leaden rule of Lesbian builders, which bends to the shape of the stone. The equitable man takes less than his due even when the law is on his side.

περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν
about and equity and the equitable how is-related the indeed
ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
equity to justice the and equitable to the just
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ'
next is to-speak neither for as the-same absolutely nor
ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις· καὶ ὁτὲ
as different in-the genus does-it-appear to-those-examining and at-one-time
μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε
indeed the equitable we-praise and a-man the such so-that
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ
also to the other(-virtues) praising we-transfer(-it) instead-of the
ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ
good the more-equitable that (it-is)-better showing at-another-time
δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς
and the argument to-those-following it-appears strange if the equitable
παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ
contrary-to the just something being praiseworthy is either for the
δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο·
just (is)-not excellent or the equitable not just if other
ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία
or if both (are)-excellent the-same they-are the indeed then difficulty
σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δ'
roughly arises through these-things about the equitable they-are and

ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς·
all in-a-way some correct and nothing contrary to-themselves
τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,
the both for equitable than-just some being better is just
καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.
and not as another some genus being better is than-the just
ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν
the-same then (are)-just and equitable and both excellent
ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι
being better (is)-the equitable causes and the difficulty that
τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ,
the equitable just indeed is not the according-to law though
ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν
but a-correction of-legal justice the-cause and (is)-that the indeed
νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς
law (is)-universal all about some-things but not possible — rightly
εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου,
to-speak universally in which then (it-is)-necessary indeed to-speak universally
μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ
not possible — but rightly the as for the most-part takes the
νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν
law not being-ignorant-of the error and it-is none
ἧττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ'
the-less correct the for error (is)-not in the law nor
ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν·
in the lawgiver but in the nature of-the thing is
εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν
at-once for such the of-the practical-things matter is when then
λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου
speaks indeed the law universally happens and(-a-case) on this
παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ
contrary-to the universal then rightly it-is where omits the

νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ
lawgiver and erred absolutely having-spoken to-correct the
ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ
omission which also the lawgiver himself — would-have-said there
παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν.
being-present and if he-had-known would-have-legislated
διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ
therefore just indeed it-is and better than-some just not than-the
ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος.
absolute though but than-the through the absolute(-statement) error
καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα
and this is the nature the of-the equitable a-correction
νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον
of-law where it-falls-short through the universality this for (is)-the-cause
καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων
also of-the not all-things according-to law to-be that about some-things
ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ
(it-is)-impossible to-lay-down a-law so-that of-a-decree there-is-need of-the
γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ
for indefinite indefinite also the rule is just-as also
τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ
of-the Lesbian building the leaden rule to for the
σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ
shape of-the stone it-shifts and not remains the rule and(-so)
τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ
the decree to the facts what indeed then is the
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον.
equitable and that (it-is)-just and than-some better just (is)-clear
φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν· ὁ
evident and from this also the equitable-man who is the(-man)
γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ
for of-the such-things apt-to-choose and to-do and the(-man)

μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ
not strict-in-justice to the worse but apt-to-take-less although
ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη
having the law (on-his-side)-as-helper equitable is and the state this
ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.
equity justice a-kind-of being and not different some state

XI · WRONGING ONESELF

Can a man wrong himself? The suicide wrongs the city, which therefore punishes him, but not himself, since no one is wronged willingly and justice needs more than one person. Both doing and suffering injustice are bad, but doing it is worse, because it involves vice. Only by metaphor is there justice between the parts of one's own soul.

πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ
whether and it-is-possible oneself to-wrong or not (is)-evident from
τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ
the things-said the-ones indeed for are of-the just-things the
κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ
according-to every virtue by the law ordained such-as not
κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει,
it-commands to-kill oneself the law what and not it-commands
ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ
it-forbids further whenever contrary-to the law he-harms not
ἀντιβλάπτων ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς
retaliating willingly he-acts-unjustly willingly and (is)-the(-man) knowing
καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων
both whom and with-what the(-man) and through anger himself slaughtering
ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ
willingly this does contrary-to the right reason which not allows the
νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν
law he-acts-unjustly then but whom (is-it)-not the city himself

δ' οὔ; ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών. διὸ
and not willingly for he-suffers is-wronged and no-one willingly therefore
καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ
also the city penalizes and a-certain dishonor attaches to-the(-man)
ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ'
himself having-destroyed as the city wronging further according-to
ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος,
which (he-is)-unjust only the-man acting-unjustly and not wholly base
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου·
not it-is-possible to-wrong himself this for (is)-different from-that
ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός,
it-is for in-a-way the unjust(-man) thus wicked just-as the coward
οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην
not as whole having the wickedness so-that not-even according-to this
ἀδικεῖ)· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι
does-he-act-unjustly at-the-same-time for — to-the same would-be taken-away
καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ
and added the same-thing this but (is)-impossible but always
ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.
in more(-than-one) necessarily is the just and the unjust
ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον·
further and (it-is)-voluntary both and from choice and prior
ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ
the(-man) for because he-suffered and the same doing-in-return not seems
ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὑτόν, ταὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει
to-act-unjustly himself but himself the-same at-the-same-time both suffers
καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ
and does further would-be — willingly to-be-wronged in-addition and
τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ,
to-these without of-the in part unjust-acts no-one acts-unjustly
μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ
commits-adultery and no-one with-the(-wife) his-own nor breaks-through

τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται
the his-own wall nor steals the his-own generally and is-solved
τὸ αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ
the himself to-wrong also according-to the definition the about
τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν
the voluntarily being-wronged (it-is)-evident and also that both indeed
φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ
(are)-base both the to-be-wronged and the to-act-unjustly the-one indeed for
ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ
less the-other and more to-have is than-the mean and just-as
ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)·
healthy indeed in medicine fit and in gymnastics
ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν
but nevertheless worse (is)-the to-act-unjustly the indeed for to-act-unjustly
μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας
(is)-with vice and blameworthy and (with)-vice either the complete
καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ
and absolute or near(-it) not for all the voluntary (is)-with
ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
injustice the but to-be-wronged (is)-without vice and injustice
καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον, κατὰ
in itself indeed then the to-be-wronged (is)-less base according-to
συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν
accident but nothing prevents (it)-greater to-be an-evil but not-at-all
μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μεῖζω νόσον
cares(-for-this) the art but pleurisy it-calls a-greater disease
προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
than-a-stumble although might-become — at-times the-other according-to
συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ
accident if (to-one)-having-stumbled through the to-fall it-happened by
τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ
the enemy to-be-captured or to-die by metaphor but

καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
and similarity there-is not for-oneself toward himself justice but
τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν
of-the(-parts) of-himself for-some not every but justice but the of-master
ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ
or the of-household in these for the accounts is-set-apart the
λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς ἃ δὴ
reason having part of-the soul from the irrational to which indeed
βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις
they-look also it-seems to-be injustice toward oneself because in these
ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ
it-is-possible to-suffer something contrary-to the their-own desires just-as
οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι
then for-ruler and for-ruled to-be toward one-another a-justice some
καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
also for-these about indeed then justice and the other
τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
the moral virtues let-it-be-determined in-the way this

BOOK VI

I · WHAT THE RIGHT REASON IS

We have said that one must choose the mean as the right reason prescribes. This is true but not clear: it is like telling a sick man to take whatever the art of medicine prescribes. For the states of the soul, too, Aristotle must define what the right reason is, and what standard fixes it.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον
since and we-happen earlier to-have-said that one-must the mean
αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ
choose not the excess nor the deficiency the and
μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.
mean is as the reason the right says this let-us-analyze
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
in all for the mentioned states just-as also in-the-case-of
τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ
the others there-is some target toward which looking the-man
τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος
the reason having tightens and loosens and some there-is standard
τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
of-the means which between we-say to-be the excess and
τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ
the deficiency being according-to the right reason it-is and the
μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν
indeed to-say thus true indeed not-at-all but clear and for in
ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ᾽
the other pursuits about whatever there-is science this
ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ
true indeed to-say that neither more nor less one-must
πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ
labor nor be-slack but the intermediate-things and as the

ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη
right reason this but only having — one nothing — would-know
πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,
more such-as what-sort one-must apply to the body
εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ
if one should-say that whatever the medical-art prescribes and as the-man
ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ
this having therefore one-must also about the of-the soul states not
μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ᾽ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
only truly to-be this stated but also determined
τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.
what is the right reason and of-this what (is)-the-standard

II · THOUGHT AND DESIRE

The rational soul has two parts: one contemplates what cannot be otherwise, the other calculates about what can. Three things in the soul govern action and truth: perception, intellect, and desire. Choice is deliberate desire, so good choice needs true reasoning and right desire; and no one chooses the past, for, as Agathon says, even god cannot make undone what is done.

τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ
the indeed of-the soul virtues having-divided the-ones indeed to-be of-the
ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
character we-said the-others and of-the intellect about indeed then the
ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
moral we-have-gone-through about but the rest about soul
πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν
first having-spoken let-us-speak thus before indeed then
ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ
it-was-said two to-be parts of-the soul the both reason having and the

ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
irrational now and about the reason having the same way
διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν
one-must-divide and let-it-be-assumed two the reason having one indeed
ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ
with-which we-contemplate the such of-the things-that-are whose the principles
μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα·
not admit otherwise to-be one and with-which the variable
πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων
toward for the in-the genus different also of-the of-the soul parts
ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ
different in-the genus (is)-the to each naturally-adapted if-indeed
καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει
according-to likeness some and kinship the knowledge belongs
αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ
to-them let-be-called and of-these the-one indeed scientific the-other
δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν,
and calculative the for to-deliberate and to-calculate (are)-the-same
οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.
no-one and deliberates about the not admitting otherwise to-be
ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
so-that the calculative is one some part of-the reason having
ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη
one-must-grasp then of-each of-these what the best state this
γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ
for (is)-the-virtue of-each the and virtue (is-relative)-to the work the
οἰκεῖον. τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως
proper three indeed are in the soul the(-things) controlling action
καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις
and truth perception intellect desire of-these and the perception
οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν
of-no origin action (it-is)-clear and from-the the beasts perception

μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν
indeed to-have in-action and not to-share is and what in
διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις
thought (are)-affirmation and denial this in desire (are)-pursuit
καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική,
and avoidance so-that since the moral virtue (is)-a-state concerned-with-choice
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα
the and choice (is)-desire deliberate must on-account-of these
μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ
indeed the both reasoning true be and the desire right if-indeed
ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι
the choice (is-to-be)-excellent and the same-things the-one indeed assert
τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια
the-other and pursue this indeed then the thought and the truth
πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ
practical of-the but contemplative thought and not practical nor
ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο
productive the well and badly the-true is and false this
γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ
for is of-every intellectual(-part) the-work of-the but practical and
διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
intellectual truth in-agreement being with-the desire the right
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις — ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ'
of-action indeed then origin (is)-choice whence the motion but
οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα — προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ
not of-which for-the-sake of-choice and desire and reasoning the
ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ'
for-the-sake of-something therefore neither without intellect and thought nor
ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
without a-moral is state the choice good-action for and the
ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια
contrary in action without thought and character not is thought

δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·
and itself nothing moves but the for-the-sake of-something and practical
αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
this for also the productive rules for-the-sake for of-something makes
πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι
every the-man making and not an-end absolutely but relative-to something
καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία
and of-something the thing-made but the thing-done the for good-action
τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς
(is)-an-end the and desire (is)-of-this therefore either desiderative intellect
ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ
(is)-the choice or desire intellectual and the such origin
ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς
(is)-man not is and choosable nothing past such-as no-one
προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ
chooses Ilion to-have-sacked nor for deliberates about
τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ
the past but about the future and possible the
δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
and past not admits not to-have-happened therefore rightly Agathon

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
alone for of-this even god is-deprived
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ᾽ ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.
undone to-make whatever-things — have-been done

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.
of-both indeed the intellectual parts truth (is)-the work
καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται
according-to which then most states will-attain-truth each these
ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.
(are-the)-virtues of-both

The soul attains truth in five ways: art, science, practical wisdom, wisdom, and intellect. Science concerns what is necessary and so eternal; it can be taught, and teaching proceeds either by induction or by syllogism. Science is therefore a demonstrative state, and a man knows scientifically when he is convinced of its principles.

ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω
having-begun then from-the-top about them again let-us-speak let-there-be
δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ
indeed (the-states)-by-which attains-truth the soul by-the to-affirm or
ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη
to-deny five in-the number these and are art
ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ
science practical-wisdom wisdom intellect by-supposition for and
δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί
by-opinion it-is-possible to-be-deceived science indeed then what
ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ
is from-this (is)-evident if one-must speak-precisely and not
ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ
follow the similarities all for we-suppose what
ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα
we-know not-even to-admit otherwise to-be the but admitting
ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἴ
otherwise whenever outside the to-contemplate they-come it-escapes-us whether
ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον
they-are or not of necessity then is the object-of-science eternal
ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ
then the for of necessity being absolutely all (are)-eternal the
δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα
and eternal-things (are)-ungenerated and imperishable further teachable all

ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ
science seems to-be and the object-of-science learnable from
προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν
things-known-before and (proceeds)-all teaching just-as also in
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς,
the Analytics we-say the-one indeed for (is)-through induction
ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι
the-other and by-syllogism the indeed indeed induction a-principle is
καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.
also of-the universal the and syllogism (is)-from the universals
εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι
there-are then principles from which the syllogism(-proceeds) of-which not there-is
συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
a-syllogism induction then the indeed then science is
ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν
a-state demonstrative and whatever other-things we-add-in-definition in
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι
the Analytics whenever for in-a-way one-believes and known
αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ
to-him are the principles he-knows if for not more than-the
συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.
conclusion according-to accident he-will-have the science
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
about indeed then science let-it-be-determined in-the way this

What can be otherwise includes things made and things done, and making differs from doing. Art is a productive state joined with true reasoning, concerned with bringing into being things whose origin lies in the maker, not in the thing made. Art and chance concern the same things; as Agathon says, art loved chance and chance art.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν
of-the and admitting otherwise to-be there-is something both made
καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν
and done different and is making and action we-trust
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ
and about them also the exoteric discussions so-that also the
μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου
with reason state practical different is from-the with reason
ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε
productive state therefore nor are-they-included by one-another neither
γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ
for the action (is)-making nor the making action is since
δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις
and the building art some is and what-precisely (is)-a-state some
μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις
with reason productive and none either art is which
οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ
not with reason productive state is nor such-a-state which not
τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
(is)-an-art the-same — would-be art and state with reason true
ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ
productive is and art all about coming-into-being and the
τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν
to-contrive and to-consider how — may-come-into-being something of-the-things

ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ
admitting both to-be and not to-be and whose the origin (is)-in the
ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ
maker but not in the thing-made neither for of-the-things of
ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν
necessity being or coming-into-being the art is nor of-the-things
κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ
according-to nature in themselves for have these the origin since
δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως
and making and action (are)-different necessarily the art of-making
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά
but not of-action to-be and in-a-way some about the same-things
ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
are the chance and the art just-as also Agathon says

τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.
art chance has-loved and chance art

ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
the indeed then art just-as has-been-said (is)-a-state some with reason
ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου
true productive is the and lack-of-art the-contrary with reason
ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
false productive state about the admitting otherwise to-be

The practically wise man deliberates well about what is good for himself, not in part but for living well as a whole. Practical wisdom is not science, since its object can be otherwise, nor art, since action is not making; it is a true state concerned with action about human goods, as in Pericles. Temperance preserves it, for pleasure and pain corrupt our grasp of the end.

περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας
about and practical-wisdom so — we-may-grasp(-it) having-considered whom
λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι
we-call the practically-wise it-seems indeed of-a-practically-wise-man to-be
τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
the to-be-able well to-deliberate about the for-himself good and
συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς
advantageous-things not in part such-as what-sort for health for
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι
strength but what-sort for the well living generally a-sign and (is)-that
καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος
also the in something practically-wise we-call(-them) whenever to end
τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη.
some excellent well they-calculate in-matters-of-which not is an-art
ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.
so-that also generally — would-be practically-wise the-man deliberative
βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ
deliberates and no-one about the-things impossible otherwise to-be nor
τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη
of-the not admitting(-it) for-him to-do so-that if-indeed science
μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως
indeed (is)-with demonstration of-which and the principles admit otherwise
ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ
to-be of-these not is demonstration all for admit also

ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ
otherwise to-be and not it-is-possible to-deliberate about the-things of
ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ
necessity being not — would-be the practical-wisdom science nor
τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως
art science indeed because admits the thing-done otherwise
ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.
to-be art and because different (is)-the genus of-action and of-making
λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν
it-remains then it to-be a-state true with reason practical
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως
about the for-man good and bad-things of-the indeed for making
ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ
different (is)-the end of-the but action not — would-be is for
αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς
itself the good-action an-end through this Pericles and the
τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ
such practically-wise we-think to-be because the for-themselves good
καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους
and the for-the men they-are-able to-see to-be and such
ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ
we-consider the household-managers and the statesmen whence also
τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς
the temperance by-this we-call the name as
σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν.
preserving the practical-wisdom it-preserves and the such supposition
οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ
not for every supposition destroys nor perverts the
ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ
pleasant and painful such-as that the triangle two right-angles has or
οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
not has but the(-ones) about the thing-done the indeed for principles

τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ
of-the practical-things (are)-the of-which for-the-sake the practical-things to-the but
διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή,
corrupted(-man) through pleasure or pain at-once not appears the-principle
οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι
nor (that)-one-must of-this for-the-sake nor because-of this choose
πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.
all-things and do is for the vice destructive of-the-principle
ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ
so-that necessarily the practical-wisdom a-state to-be with reason true
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης
about the human goods practical but further of-art
μέν ἐστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν
indeed there-is a-virtue of-practical-wisdom but not there-is and in
μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ
indeed art the-man willingly erring (is)-preferable in-the-case-of
δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
but practical-wisdom less just-as also in-the-case-of the virtues
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ'
(it-is)-clear then that a-virtue some it-is and not an-art of-two and
ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου
being parts of-the soul of-the reason having of-the-one
ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ
— would-be the-virtue of-the opining(-part) the both for opinion (is)-about
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν
the admitting otherwise to-be and the practical-wisdom but further
οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη
not-even (is-it)-a-state with reason only a-sign and (is)-that forgetting
μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.
indeed of-the such a-state there-is of-practical-wisdom but not there-is

Science is a supposition about universals reached by demonstration, but the first principles from which it starts cannot themselves be grasped by science, by art, or by practical wisdom, nor yet by wisdom, which demonstrates some things. What remains is that intellect grasps the principles.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ
since and the science about the universals is supposition and
τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν
of-the-things of necessity being there-are and principles of-the demonstrable
καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη),
and of-all science with reasoning for (is)-the science
τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε
of-the principle of-the object-of-science neither — science would-it-be nor
τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν,
art nor practical-wisdom the indeed for object-of-science (is)-demonstrable
αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
these and happen being about the-things admitting otherwise
ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ
to-be nor indeed wisdom of-these is of-the for wise-man
περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς
about some-things to-have demonstration it-is if indeed (the-states)-by-which
ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ
we-attain-truth and never are-deceived about the-things not
ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ
admitting or also admitting otherwise to-be science and
φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν
practical-wisdom is and wisdom and intellect of-these and the

τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν
three none can be I-mean and three practical-wisdom
ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.
science wisdom it-remains intellect to-be of-the principles

VII · WISDOM

We call Pheidias and Polycleitus wise for exactness in their arts, but some men are wise without qualification. Wisdom is intellect joined with science, of the most honorable things, and so is not political science, since man is not the best thing in the cosmos. Anaxagoras and Thales were wise but not practically wise; practical wisdom deals with particulars.

τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς
the and wisdom in — the arts to-the most-exact in-the
τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ
arts we-ascribe such-as Pheidias (as)-a-sculptor wise and
Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
Polycleitus (as)-a-maker-of-statues here indeed then nothing else
σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι
meaning-by the wisdom than that excellence of-art it-is to-be
δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο
and some wise we-think generally not in part nor (in)-other
τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
something wise just-as Homer says in the Margites

τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα
him and neither then a-digger the-gods made nor a-plowman
οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.
nor otherwise in-anything wise

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ
so-that (it-is)-clear that most-exact — of-the sciences would-be the
σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
wisdom must then the wise-man not only the-things from the principles
εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
know but also about the principles attain-truth so-that would-be — the
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
wisdom intellect and science just-as a-head having science
τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν
of-the most-honorable-things strange for if one the political-science or the
φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον
practical-wisdom most-excellent thinks to-be if not the best
τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
of-the-things in the universe man is if indeed healthy indeed
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ
and good (is)-different for-men and for-fish the but white and
εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν,
straight (is)-the-same always also the wise the-same all — would-say
φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ
practically-wise but different the for about itself particulars the(-faculty) well
θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά.
observing it-says to-be practically-wise and to-this it-will-entrust them
διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα
therefore also of-the beasts some practically-wise they-say to-be all-that
περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.
about the their-own life having appear a-power of-forethought
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
(it-is)-evident and also that not — would-be the wisdom and the political-science
ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς
the same if for the(-knowledge) about the beneficial-things the for-themselves
ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία
they-will-call wisdom many will-be wisdoms not for (there-is)-one

περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ
about the of-all good the animals but a-different about
ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων.
each if not also medicine (is)-one about all the things-that-are
εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων,
if and (it-be-said)-that best (is)-man of-the other animals
οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα
nothing it-matters also for than-man other-things much more-divine
τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος
in-the nature such-as most-visible at-least (those)-from which the universe
συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία
is-composed from indeed the things-said (it-is)-clear that the wisdom
ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ
is both science and intellect of-the most-honorable-things by-the
φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους
nature therefore Anaxagoras and Thales and the such
σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν
wise indeed practically-wise but not they-say to-be when they-see(-them)
ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν
ignorant-of the advantageous-things for-themselves and extraordinary indeed
καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς
and wonderful and difficult and divine-things to-know them
φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.
they-say useless but because not the human goods they-seek
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν
the but practical-wisdom (is)-about the human-things and about which
ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα
it-is-possible to-deliberate of-the for practically-wise-man most
τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ'
this work to-be we-say the well deliberating deliberates and
οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων
no-one about the-things impossible otherwise to-be nor of-whatever-things

μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ'
not an-end some there-is and this a-practicable good the and
ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν
absolutely good-at-deliberating (is)-the(-man) of-the best for-man of-the
πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
practicable-things apt-to-aim according-to the calculation
οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
nor is the practical-wisdom of-the universals only but one-must
καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ
also the according-to particulars know (it-is)-practical for the
δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι
and action (is)-about the according-to particulars therefore also some
οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
not knowing (than)-others knowing (are)-more-practical and in the
ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα
other(-fields) the experienced(-ones) if for one-should-know that the light
εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ,
(are)-digestible meats and healthy what-sort but (are)-light should-be-ignorant-of
οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια
not he-will-produce health but the(-man) knowing that the chicken
ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική·
healthy will-produce(-it) more the but practical-wisdom (is)-practical
ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ'
so-that one-must both have or this(-one) more there-would-be and
ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.
— some also here master-art

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state, but their being differs: the master form is legislative, the other deliberative and judicial. Practical wisdom concerning oneself is thought the real kind, though one's good cannot be had without household and city. The young can be mathematicians but not practically wise, since this needs experience of particulars.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν
is and also the political-science and the practical-wisdom the same indeed
ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν
state the however being not the-same for-them of-the and about a-city
ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ
the-one indeed as master-art (is)-practical-wisdom legislative the-other
δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική·
and as the according-to particulars the common has name political
αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα
this and (is)-practical and deliberative the for decree
πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον
(is)-to-be-done as the last-thing therefore to-engage-in-politics these only
λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι.
they-say alone for act these just-as the manual-laborers
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν
seems and also practical-wisdom most to-be the(-one) about himself
καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις·
and one and has this the common name practical-wisdom
ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία
of-those and the-one indeed household-management the-other and legislation
ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ
the-other and political and of-this the-one indeed deliberative
ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως
the-other and judicial a-kind indeed then some — would-be of-knowledge

τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ
the for-oneself knowing but it-has difference much and it-seems
ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος
the(-man) the-things about himself knowing and occupied-with practically-wise
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης
to-be the but statesmen busybodies therefore Euripides

πῶς δ᾽ ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
how and — could-I-be-wise to-whom it-was-possible free-of-trouble
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
among the many numbered of-the-army
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
an-equal-share to-have
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον…
the for extraordinary and something doing more

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο
they-seek for the for-themselves good and they-think this
δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ
(that)-one-must do from this then the opinion has-come the
τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ
these practically-wise to-be although perhaps not is-possible the one's-own
εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ
well without household-management nor without a-constitution further and the
αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον
his-own how one-must manage (is)-unclear and one-must-consider a-sign
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ
and is of-the said also why geometers indeed young and
μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ᾽
mathematicians they-become and wise (in)-the such-things practically-wise but
οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά
not seems to-become(-one) the-cause and (is)-that also of-the according-to particulars

ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας,
is the practical-wisdom which become known from experience
νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ
a-young-man but experienced not is length for of-time produces
τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ
the experience since also this — one might-consider through what indeed
μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς
a-mathematician indeed a-boy may-become — wise but or a-natural-philosopher
οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ
not or (is-it)-that the indeed through abstraction are of-the and the
ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν
principles (come)-from experience and the-latter indeed not are-convinced-of
οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;
the young but they-say(-them) of-the but the what (it)-is not unclear
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ
further the error (is)-either about the universal in the
βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ
to-deliberate or about the according-to particular either for
ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ
that all the heavy waters (are)-base or that this
βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη,
(is)-heavy that and the practical-wisdom (is)-not science
φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ
(it-is)-evident of-the for last is just-as has-been-said the for
πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν
thing-done (is)-such it-is-opposed indeed indeed to-the intellect the indeed
γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
for intellect (is)-of-the definitions of-which not is reason the and (is)-of-the
ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ
last of-which not is science but perception not
ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι
the(-perception) of-the proper-objects but (the-sort)-by-which we-perceive that

τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη
the last (figure)-is-a-triangle it-will-stop for there-also but this
μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.
rather (is)-perception than practical-wisdom of-that but another form

IX · EXCELLENCE IN DELIBERATION

Excellence in deliberation is not science, since men do not inquire into what they know, nor skill in guessing, nor quick wit, nor opinion. It is a correctness of deliberation: reaching what is good, by the right means, at the right time, and with a view to the end of which practical wisdom is the true supposition.

τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ
the to-inquire and and the to-deliberate differ the for
βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ
to-deliberate (an)-inquiring a-kind is one-must and grasp also about
εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ
excellence-in-deliberation what it-is whether science some or opinion or
εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν·
skill-in-guessing or other some genus science indeed indeed not it-is
οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία
not for they-inquire about what they-know the but excellence-in-deliberation
βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.
(is)-deliberation a-kind the and deliberating(-man) inquires and calculates
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ
but further not-even (is-it)-skill-in-guessing without both for reasoning and
ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον,
quick something (is)-the skill-in-guessing they-deliberate but a-long time
καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,
and they-say to-act indeed one-must quickly the(-things) deliberated
βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ
to-deliberate but slowly further the quick-wit (is)-different and the

εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ
excellence-in-deliberation is and skill-in-guessing a-kind-of the quick-wit nor
δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ
indeed (is-it)-opinion the excellence-in-deliberation any but since the(-man)
μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς
indeed badly deliberating errs the(-man) and well rightly
βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν,
deliberates (it-is)-clear that correctness some the excellence-in-deliberation is
οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν
neither of-science but nor of-opinion of-science indeed for not there-is
ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια·
correctness nor for error of-opinion and correctness (is)-truth
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν.
at-the-same-time and also has-been-determined already all of-which opinion is
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα
but further not without reasoning the excellence-in-deliberation of-thought then
λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα
it-remains(-a-correctness) this for (is)-not-yet assertion and for the opinion
οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος,
(is)-not inquiry but assertion some already the and deliberating(-man)
ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι
whether — well or — also badly deliberates inquires something
καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία
and calculates but correctness some is the excellence-in-deliberation
βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ
of-deliberation therefore the deliberation must-be-inquired-into first what and
περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ
about what since and the correctness (is)-in-more-senses (it-is)-clear that not
πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται
every(-kind) the for uncontrolled(-man) and the base(-man) what he-proposes
†ἰδεῖν† ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἕσται
to-see from his calculation will-attain so-that rightly he-will-have

βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν
deliberated evil but great having-got seems and good
τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης
something the well to-have-deliberated the for such correctness
βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ'
of-deliberation (is)-excellence-in-deliberation the of-good apt-to-attain but
ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν
it-is-possible also this by-false syllogism to-attain and what indeed
δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον
one-must do to-attain through what but not but false the middle
ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ'
term to-be so-that not-even this yet (is)-excellence-in-deliberation according-to
ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.
which what one-must indeed one-attains not however through what one-should
ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν
further it-is-possible a-long time deliberating to-attain the-other
δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ'
and quickly so not-even that yet (is)-excellence-in-deliberation but
ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
correctness the according-to the beneficial both what one-must and how
καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ
and when further it-is-possible also absolutely well to-have-deliberated and
πρός τι τέλος. ἢ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ
toward some end the-one indeed indeed absolutely the(-one) toward the
τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τι
end the absolute succeeding some and the(-one) toward some
τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ
end if indeed of-the practically-wise the well to-have-deliberated the
εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον
excellence-in-deliberation would-be — correctness the according-to the advantageous
πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.
toward the end of-which the practical-wisdom true supposition is

X · UNDERSTANDING

Understanding, by which we call men intelligent, is neither science nor opinion in general. It concerns the same matters as practical wisdom, but where practical wisdom commands, understanding only judges. It is using opinion to judge well what someone else says, and the word comes from its use for learning.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς
are and also the understanding and the good-understanding according-to which
λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ
we-call(-men) understanding and of-good-understanding neither wholly the same
ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε
with-science or opinion all for — would-be men-of-understanding nor
τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ
some one of-the according-to part sciences such-as the medicine about
ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ
healthy-things the geometry about magnitudes neither for about the always
ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν
being and unchangeable the understanding is nor about the-things
γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις
coming-to-be of-whatever-sort but about which might-be-puzzled — one
καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει
and deliberate therefore about the same-things indeed as-the practical-wisdom
ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν
it-is not is and the same understanding and practical-wisdom the indeed
γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν
for practical-wisdom commanding is what for one-must do
ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.
or not the end of-it is the but understanding (is)-judging only
ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ
the-same for (are)-understanding and good-understanding and men-of-understanding

καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε
and of-good-understanding it-is and neither the to-have the practical-wisdom nor
τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται
the to-acquire the understanding but just-as the to-learn is-called
συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι
to-understand when one-uses the science so in the to-use
τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς
the opinion for the to-judge about these-things about which the practical-wisdom
ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ
is when-another speaks and to-judge rightly the for well with-the
καλῶς τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις,
rightly (is)-the same and from-this has-come the-name the understanding
καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ
according-to which (men-are)-of-good-understanding from the(-understanding) in the
μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.
to-learn we-call for the to-learn to-understand often

XI · JUDGMENT AND INTELLECT

Judgment is the right discrimination of the equitable, and sympathetic judgment is its right discrimination in pardon. These states, with understanding, practical wisdom, and intellect, all concern ultimates and particulars. They seem natural and come with age, so we must attend to the undemonstrated sayings of experienced men, since experience gives them an eye to see.

ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας
the and so-called judgment according-to which (men)-sympathetic-in-judgment
καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις
and to-have we-say judgment the of-the equitable is judging
ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν
right a-sign and the for equitable-man most we-say

εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἕνια
to-be sympathetic-in-judgment and equitable the to-have about some-things
συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ
sympathetic-judgment the and sympathetic-judgment judgment is judging
τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
of-the equitable right right and (is)-the(-judgment) of-the true
εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν
are and all the states reasonably to the-same tending we-speak-of
γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ
for judgment and understanding and practical-wisdom and intellect to
τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ
the same-men attributing judgment to-have and intellect already and
φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται
practically-wise and men-of-understanding all for the capacities these
τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν
of-the ultimates are and of-the according-to particulars and in indeed
τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς
the judging being about which the practically-wise-man (is)-understanding
καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ
and good-in-judgment or sympathetic-in-judgment the for equitable-things common
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι
of-the goods all are in the toward another are
δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ
and of-the according-to particulars and of-the ultimates all the
πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν
things-to-be-done and for the practically-wise-man one-must know
αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά,
them and the understanding and the judgment (are)-about the things-to-be-done
ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ'
these and (are)-ultimates and the intellect (is)-of-the ultimates in
ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
both-directions and for of-the first terms and of-the ultimates

νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς
intellect is and not reasoning and the-one indeed according-to the
ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν
demonstrations of-the unchangeable terms and first the-other and in
ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς
the practical(-reasonings) of-the ultimate and variable and of-the
ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται·
other premise principles for of-the of-which for-the-sake these
ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν
(are)-from the according-to particulars for the universals of-these then
ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.
to-have one-must perception this and is intellect
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
therefore also natural seem to-be these and by-nature wise indeed
οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον
no-one judgment but to-have and understanding and intellect a-sign
δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ
and (is)-that also the ages we-think to-follow(-them) and this the
ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης.
age intellect has and judgment as the nature (the)-cause being
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ
so-that one-must attend-to of-the experienced and older or
φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον
practically-wise the undemonstrated sayings and opinions not less
τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας
than-the demonstrations through for the to-have from the experience
ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις
an-eye they-see rightly what indeed then is the practical-wisdom
καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ
and the wisdom and about what each happens being and
ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.
that of-a-different of-the soul part virtue (is)-each has-been-said

What use are wisdom and practical wisdom, if wisdom studies nothing that makes a man happy and practical wisdom does not make us more able to act? Both are choiceworthy in themselves; wisdom makes happiness not as medicine makes health but as health does; virtue makes the aim right and practical wisdom the means. Cleverness serves good and bad ends alike, so one cannot be practically wise without being good.

διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.
might-raise-the-difficulty and — one about them in-what useful they-are
ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
the indeed for wisdom nothing will-contemplate from which will-be happy
ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
a-man of-no for is(-it) coming-to-be the and practical-wisdom
τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς;
this indeed has but of-what for-the-sake is-there-need-of it
εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ
if-indeed the indeed practical-wisdom is the(-state) about the just-things and
καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ
noble-things and good-things for-man these and are what of-the
ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι
good it-is man to-do in-nothing and more-able-to-act
τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ
by-the to-know them are-we if-indeed states the virtues are just-as
οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ
neither the healthy-things nor the vigorous-things (that-is)-whatever not by-the
ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ
to-produce but by-the from the state being are-so-called in-nothing for
πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν
more-able-to-act by-the to-have the medical and gymnastic(-arts)
ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον
are-we if but not of-these for-the-sake practically-wise one-must-call(-a-man)

ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν
but of-the to-become(-good) to-the being excellent nothing —
εἴη χρήσιμος· ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν
would-be useful further and not-even to-the not having(-it) nothing
γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι,
for will-it-matter themselves to-have(-it) or to-others having(-it) to-listen
ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν·
sufficiently and it-would-be — for-us just-as also about the health
βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν.
wishing for to-be-healthy nevertheless not we-learn medicine
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς
in-addition and to-these strange — to-be would-seem if inferior to-the
σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει
wisdom being more-authoritative than-it it-will-be the for producing rules
καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον·
and commands about each about indeed these-things one-must-speak
νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. πρῶτον
now indeed for difficulties-have-been-raised about them only first
μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς
indeed then let-us-say that in themselves necessarily choiceworthy they
εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ
to-be virtues at-least being each of-each the part even
εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι
if not they-produce anything neither of-them then also they-produce
μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια,
indeed not as the medicine but health but as the health
οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης
so the wisdom happiness a-part for being of-the whole
ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ †τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.†
virtue by-the to-be-possessed it-makes and by-the being-active happy
ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
further the work is-achieved according-to the practical-wisdom and

τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ
the moral virtue the indeed for virtue the target makes
ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ
right the and practical-wisdom the(-means) toward this of-the and
τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ
fourth part of-the soul not there-is virtue such of-the
θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.
nutritive nothing for in its-power (is)-to-do or not to-do
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν
about and the in-nothing being more-able-to-act through the
φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν
practical-wisdom of-the noble and just-things a-little from-further-back
ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ
one-must-begin taking starting-point this just-as for also
τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους
the just-things we-say doing some-men not-yet just
εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα
to-be such-as the(-men) the(-things) by the laws ordained
ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν
doing either unwillingly or through ignorance or through other
τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ
something and not through themselves although they-do at-least what
δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν,
one-ought and all-that one-must the excellent-man so as it-seems
ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ'
it-is-possible the in-what-way being-disposed to-do each-thing so-as
εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν
to-be good I-mean and such-as through choice and themselves
ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν
for-the-sake of-the done(-acts) the indeed then choice right
ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε
makes the virtue the but all-that of-that for-the-sake are-naturally-adapted

πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας
to-be-done not is(-the-province) of-the virtue but of-another
δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ᾽ ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ
capacity one-must-speak but dwelling-on(-it) more-clearly about
αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη
them there-is indeed a-capacity which they-call cleverness this
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν
and is such so-as the toward the proposed target
συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ.
tending to-be-able these-things to-do and to-hit it
ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ
if indeed then the target be noble praiseworthy it-is if but
φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ
base (it-is)-villainy therefore also the practically-wise clever and
πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ
villainous we-say to-be is and the practical-wisdom not the
δύναμις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις
capacity but not without the capacity this the but state
τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς,
by-the eye this comes-to-be of-the soul not without virtue
ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν
as has-been-said both and is clear the for syllogisms of-the
πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ
things-to-be-done a-starting-point having are since such (is)-the
τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου
end and the best whatever being let-it-be for of-argument
χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ
for-the-sake the chance-thing this and if not to-the good-man not
φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι
appears perverts for the wickedness and to-be-deceived

ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι
makes(-us) about the practical starting-points so-that (it-is)-evident that
ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.
(it-is)-impossible practically-wise to-be not being good

XIII · NATURAL AND STRICT VIRTUE

Natural virtue is like a strong body moving without sight, harmful without intellect; strict virtue needs practical wisdom. Socrates was right that virtue is not without practical wisdom, wrong that it is practical wisdom. The virtues are therefore not separable. Practical wisdom does not rule over wisdom, any more than medicine rules over health.

σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ
one-must-consider indeed again also about virtue also for the virtue
παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα —
similarly is-related as the practical-wisdom to the cleverness
οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ — οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
not the-same indeed like but so also the natural virtue to
τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν
the strict(-virtue) to-all for it-seems the-several of-the characters to-belong
φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι
by-nature in-a-way both for just and temperate and brave
καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν
and the-rest we-are straightway from birth but nevertheless we-seek
ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον
other something the strictly good and the such-things in-another
τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
way to-belong both for in-children and in-beasts the natural
ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.
belong states but without intellect harmful they-appear being

πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ
except so-much seems to-be-seen that just-as for-a-body strong
ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ
without sight moving it-happens to-stumble heavily through
τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
the not to-have sight so also here if but it-take-on intellect
ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται
in the to-act it-differs the and state like being then will-be
κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο
strictly virtue so-that just-as in-the-case-of the opinionative(-part) two
ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
are forms cleverness and practical-wisdom so also in-the-case-of the
ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ
moral(-part) two are the-one indeed virtue natural the-other and the
κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.
strict(-virtue) and of-these the strict not comes-to-be without practical-wisdom
διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις
therefore some say all the virtues forms-of-practical-wisdom
εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ'
to-be and Socrates in-the-one indeed rightly inquired in-the-other but
ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας
erred that indeed for forms-of-practical-wisdom he-thought to-be all
τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς
the virtues he-erred that but not without practical-wisdom well
ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν
he-said a-sign and also for now all when they-define the
ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ
virtue add the state having-named(-it) and to what-things
ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
it-is the(-state) according-to the right reason right and (is)-the(-reason)
κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως
according-to the practical-wisdom they-seem indeed to-divine somehow

ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν
all that the such state virtue is the according-to the
φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ
practical-wisdom one-must but a-little shift(-ground) it-is for not only the
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις
according-to the right reason but the with the right reason state
ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς
virtue is right and reason about the such-things the practical-wisdom
ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι
is Socrates indeed then reasons the virtues thought to-be
(ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον
sciences for to-be all we but (say)-with reason (it-is)-clear
οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως
then from the things-said that not possible — good to-be strictly
ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.
without practical-wisdom nor practically-wise without the moral virtue
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη
but also the argument in-this-way might-be-refuted — by-which might-argue
τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
one — that are-separated from-one-another the virtues not for the same-man
εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ'
(is)-best-endowed for all so-that the-one indeed already the-other but
οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς
not-yet having-acquired he-will-be this for in-respect-of indeed the natural
ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ
virtues is-possible in-respect-of which but absolutely is-called good not
ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ
is-possible at-the-same-time for with-the practical-wisdom one being-present
πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι
all will-be-present (it-is)-clear and even if not practical it-were that
ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι,
there-would-be-need — of-it through the of-the part virtue to-be

καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ'
and that not will-be the choice right without practical-wisdom nor
ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς
without virtue the-one indeed for the end the-other and the-things toward
τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ'
the end makes(-us) do but further not-even sovereign at-least
ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
is(-it) over-the wisdom nor over-the better part just-as nor
τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
over-the health the medicine not for it-uses it but sees
ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ
how it-may-come-about of-that then for-the-sake it-commands but not
ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν
to-that further (it-is)-like even if one the political-science should-say to-rule
τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.
the gods because it-commands about all the(-things) in the city

BOOK VII

I · THREE THINGS TO AVOID

In character there are three things to avoid: vice, lack of control, and brutishness. Opposite them stand virtue, self-control, and a superhuman virtue, heroic and divine, such as Homer's Priam saw in Hector. Aristotle will set out the appearances, work through the difficulties, and keep the reputable opinions where he can, beginning with what is said of self-control.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν,
after and these-things one-must-say another making beginning
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη,
that of-the(-things) about the characters to-be-avoided three are kinds
κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ
vice lack-of-control brutishness the and contraries to-the indeed two
δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν
(are)-clear the-one indeed for virtue the-other and self-control
καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι
we-call to and the brutishness most — would-fit
λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν,
to-speak-of the above us virtue heroic a-kind and divine
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν
just-as Homer about — Hector has-made saying —
Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,
Priam that exceedingly he-was good

οὐδὲ ἐῴκει
nor did-he-seem
ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
of-a-man at-least mortal the-son to-be but of-a-god

ὥστ᾽ εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ
so-that if just-as they-say from men become gods
δι᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι
through of-virtue excess such some — would-be (it-is)-clear that
ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
the to-the brutish opposed state also for just-as neither
θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ᾽ ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽
of-a-beast is vice nor virtue so neither of-a-god but
ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ᾽ ἕτερόν τι γένος
the-one indeed (is)-more-honorable than-virtue the-other and different some kind
κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ
of-vice since and (it-is)-rare also the divine man to-be just-as
οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι
the Laconians are-accustomed to-address(-one) who whenever they-admire
σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης
exceedingly someone godlike a-man they-say so also the brutish(-man)
ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
among the men (is)-rare most and among the
βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ᾽ ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους
barbarians it-is it-comes-about and some(-cases) also through diseases
καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
and maimings and the(-men) through vice and of-the men
ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς
exceeding so we-call-by-the-ill-name but about indeed the
διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν,
disposition the such later one-must-make some mention
περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας
about and vice it-has-been-spoken before about and lack-of-control
καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας
and softness and luxury one-must-speak and about self-control
καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ
and endurance neither for as about the same states with-the

ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ'
virtue and the wickedness each of-them one-must-suppose nor
ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
as a-different kind one-must and just-as in-the-case-of the others
τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας
setting-out the appearances and first having-gone-through-the-difficulties
οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ
so to-prove most indeed all the reputable-opinions about
ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα·
these the passions if but not the most and most-authoritative
ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ
if for are-resolved both the difficulties and are-left the
ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
reputable-opinions proved — it-would-be sufficiently
δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
it-seems indeed the both self-control and endurance of-the excellent
καὶ ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
and praiseworthy-things to-be the and lack-of-control both and softness of-the
φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ
base and blameworthy-things and the same-man (is)-self-controlled and
ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ
apt-to-abide-by the calculation and uncontrolled and apt-to-abandon the
λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει
calculation and the indeed uncontrolled-man knowing that base-things he-does
διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ
through passion the and self-controlled-man knowing that base (are)-the
ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα
appetites not follows(-them) because-of the reason and the temperate-man
μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἷ μὲν
indeed self-controlled and enduring the-one and such some indeed
πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ
all temperate others and not and the licentious-man uncontrolled and

τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἳ δ' ἑτέρους
the uncontrolled-man licentious confusedly others and different
εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν
to-be they-say the and practically-wise-man at-one-time indeed not they-say
ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας
to-be-possible to-be uncontrolled at-another and some practically-wise being
καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ
and clever uncontrolled to-be further uncontrolled they-are-called both in-anger
καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
and in-honor and in-gain the indeed then things-said these are

II · THE PUZZLES

How can a man who knows act without control? Socrates said he cannot, since no one acts against what he thinks best except through ignorance; others say it is opinion, not knowledge, that is overcome. Further puzzles follow: a practically wise man cannot lack control; if self-control abides by every opinion, even a false one, some lack of control will be excellent, as with Sophocles' Neoptolemus; and the proverb asks what to drink when water chokes.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς
might-raise-the-difficulty and — one how supposing rightly
ἀκρατεύεταί τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες
lacks-control one knowing indeed then not say some
οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς
(it-is)-possible — to-be terrible for knowledge being-within(-him) as
ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν
thought Socrates something-else some to-master and to-drag-about
αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως
it just-as a-slave Socrates indeed for wholly
ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα
fought against the argument as not existing lack-of-control no-one

γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ
for supposing(-so) to-act contrary-to the best but
δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς
through ignorance this indeed then the argument contradicts the
φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ
appearances plainly and one-must inquire about the passion if
δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ
through ignorance what the manner becomes of-the ignorance that for not
οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι,
thinks(-so) at-least the man-lacking-control before into the passion to-come
φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ᾽
(it-is)-evident there-are and some who the-one indeed concede the-other but
οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν,
not the indeed for than-knowledge nothing to-be stronger they-agree
τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ
the but no-one to-act contrary-to the having-seemed better not
ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ
they-agree and through this the uncontrolled-man they-say not
ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
knowledge having to-be-mastered by the pleasures but opinion
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ᾽ ἰσχυρὰ
but further if-indeed (it-is)-opinion and not knowledge nor strong
ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ᾽ ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
supposition the resisting but mild just-as in those
διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς
hesitating (there-is)-pardon for-the not to-abide in them against
ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη,
appetites strong for-the but wickedness (there-is)-not pardon
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως
nor for-the other(-things) any of-the blameworthy (is-it)-practical-wisdom
ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον·
then (that)-resists this for (is)-strongest but (that-is)-strange

ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής,
will-be for the same-man at-the-same-time practically-wise and uncontrolled
φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν
would-say but not-even — one of-a-practically-wise-man to-be the to-do
ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται
willingly the basest-things in-addition and to-these it-has-been-shown
πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ
earlier that apt-to-act at-least (is)-the practically-wise-man of-the for
ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν
ultimates (he-is)-one and the other having virtues further if indeed
ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής,
in the appetites having strong and base the self-controlled-man
οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
not will-be the temperate-man self-controlled nor the self-controlled-man
σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας
temperate neither for the excess(-is) of-a-temperate-man nor the base(-ones)
ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ
to-have but further it-must(-be-so) at-least if indeed for good the
ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ
appetites (is)-base the preventing state from following so-that the
ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι,
self-control not all excellent(-is) if but weak and not base
οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.
nothing grand(-it-is) nor if base and weak nothing great
ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη,
further if to-every opinion apt-to-abide-by makes the self-control (it-is)-base
οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία
such-as if even to-the false and if from-every opinion the lack-of-control
ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ
(is)-apt-to-abandon there-will-be some excellent lack-of-control such-as the
Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς
of-Sophocles Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes praiseworthy

γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως
for (he-is)-not abiding-by what he-was-persuaded-of by — Odysseus
διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος
through the to-be-pained lying further the sophistical argument
ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα
(is)-a-difficulty because for the paradoxes wishing to-refute so-that
δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς
clever they-may-be when they-succeed the resulting syllogism
ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ
a-difficulty becomes is-bound for the thought when to-stay not
βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι
it-wishes through the not to-please the conclusion to-advance
δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.
but not it-is-able through the to-resolve not to-have the argument
συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας
it-results indeed from some argument the folly with lack-of-control
ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ
(is)-virtue the-contrary-things for he-does of-what he-supposes through
τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ
the lack-of-control he-supposes and the-goods evil to-be and not
δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι
one-must do(-them) so-that the-goods and not the evils he-will-do further
ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα
the(-man) through-the to-be-convinced doing and pursuing the pleasant-things
καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ
and choosing(-them) better — would-seem than-the(-man) not through
λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
calculation but through lack-of-control more-curable for through the
μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ
to-be-persuaded-otherwise — the but uncontrolled-man (is)-liable to-the proverb
ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ
in which we-say when the water chokes what must one-drink-after(-it) if

μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς
indeed for he-had-been-persuaded-of what he-does having-been-persuaded-otherwise
ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον
— he-would-have-stopped now but other-things being-persuaded no less
πράττει. ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια,
he-does further if about all-things lack-of-control is and self-control
τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς
who (is)-the absolutely uncontrolled-man no-one for all has the
ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.
kinds-of-lack-of-control we-say but to-be some absolutely
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων
the indeed then difficulties such some arise of-these
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ
and the-ones indeed to-remove one-must the-others and to-leave the for
λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.
solution of-the difficulty discovery is

III · KNOWING AND NOT KNOWING

Knowing is said in two ways, having knowledge and using it, and a man may have both premises yet use only the universal one, not the particular. The uncontrolled man is like the sleeper, the madman, or the drunk reciting Empedocles: appetite drives him against the universal opinion, and so Socrates' view turns out in a sense to be true.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ
first indeed then one-must-consider whether knowing or not and
πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν
how knowing then about what-sort the uncontrolled-man and the
ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
self-controlled-man one-must-place I-mean and whether about every pleasure

καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ
and pain or about some determined(-ones) and the self-controlled-man
καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν·
and the enduring-man whether the same or different is
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς
likewise and also about the other(-questions) all-that akin to-the
θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως,
inquiry are this is and the-starting-point of-the inquiry
πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ
whether the self-controlled-man and the uncontrolled-man are by-the about
ἃ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ
what or by-the how having the difference I-mean and whether by-the
περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὗ ἀλλὰ
about these-things being only uncontrolled the uncontrolled-man or not but
τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν
by-the how or not but from both then if about all-things is
ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ
lack-of-control and self-control or not neither for about all-things is the
ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος,
absolutely uncontrolled-man but about the-very-things-which the licentious-man
οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν
nor by-the toward these absolutely being-disposed the-same for —
ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν.
would-be with-the licentiousness but by-the in-a-certain-way being-disposed
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν
the-one indeed for is-led choosing thinking always one-must
τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει
the present pleasant pursue the-other and not thinks(-so) indeed pursues(-it)
δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην
but about indeed then the opinion true but not knowledge
εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν
to-be against which they-lack-control nothing it-matters to the

λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ'
argument some for of-the opining(-men) not hesitate but
οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν
think exactly to-know if then through the weakly believing
οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν
the opining(-men) more than-the knowing(-men) against the
ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι
supposition will-act nothing will-differ knowledge from-opinion some
γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι
for believe no less what they-opine than others
οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς
what they-know shows and Heraclitus but since in-two-senses
λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ
we-speak-of the to-know both for the(-man) having indeed not
χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται
using but the knowledge and the(-man) using is-said
ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
to-know it-will-differ the having indeed not contemplating and also
τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ
the contemplating what not one-must do this for seems
δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν
terrible but not if not contemplating further since two (are)-the-kinds of-the
προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν
premises having indeed both nothing prevents to-act
παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ
contrary-to the knowledge using however the universal but
μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
not the according-to part (are)-things-done for the according-to particulars
διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
it-differs and also the universal the-one indeed for (is)-predicated-of himself
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ
the-other and of the thing is such-as that to-every man

συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ
(are)-beneficial the dry(-foods) and that he-himself (is)-a-man or that dry the
τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ·
such-and-such but if this (is)-such-and-such either not he-has or not is-active
κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον
according-to — indeed these will-differ the ways (to-an)-inconceivable
ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως
(degree) so-that to-seem thus indeed to-know nothing strange otherwise
δὲ θαυμαστόν. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον
and (is)-astonishing further the to-have the knowledge in-another way
τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ
than-the(-ways) now stated belongs to-the men in the for
ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν,
to-have indeed not using and differing we-see the state
ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα
so-that both to-have in-a-way and not to-have such-as the sleeping
καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται
and mad and drunk but further thus are-disposed
οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ
those at-least in the passions being outbursts-of-anger for and
ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ
appetites for-sexual-pleasures and some of-the such-things manifestly also
τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον
the body alter for-some and even madnesses they-produce (it-is)-clear
οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις.
then that similarly to-be-disposed one-must-say the uncontrolled to-these
τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν
the and to-say the words the(-ones) from the knowledge (is)-no
σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες
sign also for the(-men) in the passions these being
ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ
demonstrations and verses recite of-Empedocles and the(-men)

πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ'
first having-learned string-together indeed the words know but
οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε
not-yet must for to-grow-into(-them) this and time needs so-that
καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑπολη̣πτέον λέγειν
just-as the actors so one-must-suppose to-speak
καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις
also the men-lacking-control further also thus physically — one
ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ
might-look-at the cause the-one indeed for (is)-universal opinion the
δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις
and other about the according-to particulars is which perception
ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ
already controls whenever and one comes-to-be from them necessarily the
συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς
conclusion there indeed (one-must)-assert the soul in and the
ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι
productive(-cases) to-do(-it) at-once such-as if every sweet-thing to-taste
δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον,
one-must this and (is)-sweet as one some(-thing) of-the according-to particulars
ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα
necessarily the(-man) being-able and not being-hindered at-the-same-time
τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ
this also to-do whenever then the indeed universal(-opinion) be-present
κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ
forbidding to-taste the-other and that every sweet-thing (is)-pleasant this
δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα,
and (is)-sweet this and is-active it-happens and appetite being-present
ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει·
the-one indeed then says to-avoid this the and appetite leads(-on)
κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει
to-move for each it-can of-the parts so-that it-happens

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ
by reason in-a-way and opinion (that-one)-lacks-control not contrary and
καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός — ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία
in itself but according-to accident the for appetite
ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα — τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ
(is)-contrary but not the opinion to-the right reason so-that also
διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
through this the beasts (are)-not uncontrolled because not they-have universal
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.
supposition but of-the according-to particulars imagination and memory
πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων
how and is-dissolved the ignorance and again becomes a-knower
ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ
the uncontrolled-man the same account (holds)-as about the-drunk-man and
καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ
sleeping-man and not peculiar of-this the passion which one-must
παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία
from the physiologists hear since and the last
πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων,
premise (is)-an-opinion both about-a-perceptible and controlling of-the actions
ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ
this either not he-has in the passion being or so has as not
ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος
it-was the to-have to-know but to-say just-as the drunk-man
τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ'
the(-verses) of-Empedocles and through the not universal nor
ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον
scientific equally to-be to-seem with-the universal the last
ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ
term also seems what sought Socrates to-result not for
τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται
(when)-the strictly knowledge to-be seeming is-present does-arise

τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
the passion nor this is-dragged-about through the passion but (when)-the
αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ
perceptual(-knowledge-is-present) about indeed then the knowing and not and
πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.
how knowing it-is-possible to-lack-control so-much let-it-have-been-said

IV · ITS PROPER SPHERE

Absolute lack of control concerns the same bodily pleasures as licentiousness, though without choice. In matters choiceworthy in themselves, such as honor, gain, and victory, we speak of lack of control only with a qualification, a different thing, as Anthropos the Olympic victor differed from 'man'. Excess even toward good things, as in Niobe or Satyrus the father-lover, is not wickedness.

πότερον δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ
whether and there-is some(-one) absolutely uncontrolled or all(-are-so) in
μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον
part and if there-is about what-sort-of-things it-is one-must-discuss
ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ'
next that indeed then about pleasures and pains are the both
ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί,
self-controlled and enduring and the uncontrolled and soft
φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν
(it-is)-evident since and are the-ones indeed necessary of-the(-things)
ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ
producing pleasure the-others and choiceworthy indeed in themselves
ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά (λέγω
admitting but excess necessary indeed the bodily(-ones) I-mean
δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν
and the such the(-ones) both about the food and the of-the

ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ
sexual need and the such of-the bodily(-things) about
ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ
which the licentiousness we-set and the temperance the-others
δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά (λέγω δ'
and necessary indeed not choiceworthy but in themselves I-mean and
οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
such-as victory honor wealth and the such of-the good and
ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
pleasant(-things) the(-men) indeed then toward these contrary-to the right
λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ
reason exceeding the(-reason) in themselves absolutely indeed not
λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς
we-call uncontrolled adding but the (in)-money uncontrolled
καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς
and (in)-gain and (in)-honor and (in)-anger absolutely but not as
ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος
different and by similarity spoken-of just-as Anthropos
ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος
the(-one) the Olympic-games winning for-that-one for the common definition
τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν.
from-the particular(-one) a-little differed but nevertheless different it-was
σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς
a-sign and the indeed for lack-of-control is-blamed not as
ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἁπλῶς
an-error only but also as a-vice some either absolutely
οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδείς. τῶν δὲ
being or in some part of-these and none of-the and
περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν
about the bodily enjoyments about which we-speak-of the
σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν
temperate and licentious-man the(-man) not by-the to-choose of-the

ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς — καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν
pleasant-things pursuing the excesses and of-the painful-things
φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ
avoiding (those)-of-hunger and of-thirst and of-heat and of-cold and
πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν — ἀλλὰ παρὰ
of-all the(-things) about touch and taste but contrary-to
τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ
the choice and the thought uncontrolled is-called not
κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ'
with addition that about these-things just-as of-anger but
ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται
absolutely only a-sign and also for soft they-are-called
περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
about these about those but none and through this
εἰς ταὐτὸ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν
into the-same(-class) the uncontrolled-man and the licentious-man we-put
καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα,
and self-controlled(-man) and temperate but not of-those any
διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι·
through the about the same somehow pleasures and pains to-be
οἳ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν,
they and are indeed about the-same-things but not in-the-same-way they-are
ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἳ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται.
but the-ones indeed choose the-others and not choose
διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ
therefore more licentious — we-would-call (the-man)-who not
ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας
desiring or weakly pursues the excesses and avoids moderate
λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ
pains than this-man who through the to-desire violently what for
ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ
— would-that-one do if were-added appetite youthful and

περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν
about the of-the necessities lack pain strong since and of-the
ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι τῶν τῷ
appetites and of-the pleasures the-ones indeed are of-the(-things) in-the
γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει
genus noble and excellent of-the for pleasant-things some by-nature
αἱρετά), τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ,
(are)-choiceworthy the-others and contrary to-these the-others and intermediate
καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ
just-as we-distinguished before such-as money and gain and
νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ
victory and honor in-relation-to all and also the such and the
μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται,
intermediate not by-the to-experience and to-desire and loving they-are-blamed
ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν
but by-the in-a-certain-way and exceeding therefore as-many-as indeed
παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει
contrary-to the reason either are-mastered-by or pursue of-the by-nature
τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον
something noble and good such-as the(-men) about honor more
ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ
than one-should being-in-earnest or about children and parents also
γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ
for these (are)-of-the goods and are-praised the(-men) about
ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
these being-in-earnest but nevertheless there-is some excess even
ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
in these if one just-as — Niobe should-fight even against the
θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος
gods or just-as Satyrus the father-loving(-one) so-called
περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν)· μοχθηρία
about the father exceedingly for he-seemed to-be-foolish wickedness

μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι
indeed then none about these is through the stated(-reason) that
φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό, φαῦλαι
by-nature of-the choiceworthy-things each is through itself base
δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.
but and to-be-avoided of-them are the excesses
ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ
likewise and (there-is)-not lack-of-control(-here) the for lack-of-control not
μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι'
only (is)-to-be-avoided but also of-the blameworthy-things is through
ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν
similarity but of-the passion adding the lack-of-control
περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν
(as)-about each they-speak such-as a-bad doctor and a-bad
ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν
actor whom absolutely not — they-would-call bad just-as then
οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν
not-even here through the not vice to-be each of-them
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ
but by-the analogous(-way) similar so (it-is)-clear that there-also
ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις
one-must-suppose only (that)-lack-of-control and self-control to-be which
ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
is about the-same-things as-the temperance and licentiousness about but
θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες
anger by similarity we-speak therefore also adding(-the-qualification)
ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.
uncontrolled in-anger just-as in-honor and in-gain we-say

Some things are pleasant not by nature but through maiming, habit, or depraved nature: the woman who ripped open pregnant women, the savages of the Pontus, Phalaris, and morbid habits such as plucking hair or eating earth. Such states lie outside the limits of vice, and mastering or yielding to them is lack of control only by similarity.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν
since and there-are some indeed pleasant by-nature and of-these the-ones indeed
ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
absolutely the-others and according-to kinds both of-animals and of-men
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ
the-others but not are(-so) but the-ones indeed through maimings the-others
δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις,
and through habits come-to-be the-others and through depraved natures
ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις·
it-is-possible also about these each similar to-see states
λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι
I-mean and the brutish such-as the female(-human) whom they-say
τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ
the pregnant(-women) ripping-up the children to-devour or
οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν
(in)-what-sorts to-delight they-say some of-the savage(-tribes) about the
Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν,
Pontus the-ones indeed in-raw(-meat) the-others and of-men in-flesh
τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ
the(-ones) and the children to-lend to-one-another for a-feast or
τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ
the about Phalaris told these indeed (are)-brutish the-others
δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ
and through diseases come-to-be and through madness in-some just-as

ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ
the(-man) the mother having-sacrificed and eaten(-her) and the(-one)
τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ) αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ
of-the fellow-slave the liver(-eating) the-others and morbid(-states) or from
ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ'
habit such-as of-hairs pluckings and of-nails bitings further and
ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων
of-coals and of-earth in-addition and to-these the of-the sexual(-pleasures)
τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους
for-the males for-the indeed for by-nature for-the(-others) and from habit
συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων.
they-occur such-as to-the(-ones) being-abused from childhood
ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν
for-whom indeed then nature (is)-the-cause these indeed no-one — would-call
ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ'
uncontrolled just-as nor the women because not they-marry but
ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι
are-married likewise and also as-many-as morbidly are-disposed
δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων
through habit the indeed then to-have each of-these outside the limits
ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸν δ' ἔχοντα
is of-the vice just-as also the brutishness the and having(-them)
κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ'
to-master(-them) or to-be-mastered(-is) not the simple lack-of-control but the by
ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα
similarity just-as also the(-man) about the angers having
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα
in-this the way of-the passion uncontrolled but not one-must-call every
γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία
for excessive both folly and cowardice and licentiousness
καὶ χαλεπότης αἳ μὲν θηριώδεις αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
and bad-temper the-ones indeed brutish the-others and morbid

εἰσίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν
are the indeed for by-nature such as to-fear all-things even-if
ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν
squeaks a-mouse (with)-a-brutish cowardice (is)-cowardly the(-man) and the
γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ
weasel feared through disease and of-the foolish the-ones indeed from
φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις,
nature irrational and only by-the perception living (are)-brutish
ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ
just-as some races of-the distant barbarians the-others and through
νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις.
diseases such-as the epileptic or madnesses (are)-morbid
τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον,
of-these and it-is-possible indeed to-have some(-one) sometimes indeed only
μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν
not to-be-mastered and I-mean and such-as if Phalaris restrained(-himself)
ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον
desiring a-child to-eat or toward of-sexual-pleasures an-unnatural
ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν· ὥσπερ
pleasure it-is-possible and also to-be-mastered not only to-have just-as
οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς
then also of-wickedness the-one indeed according-to man absolutely
λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης
is-called wickedness the-other and by addition that (it-is)-brutish
ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον
or morbid absolutely and not in-the same way (it-is)-clear
ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ
that also lack-of-control is the-one indeed brutish the-other and
νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
morbid absolutely but the(-one) according-to the human
ἀκολασίαν μόνη.
licentiousness alone

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
that indeed then lack-of-control and self-control are only about
ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ
the-very-things-which licentiousness and temperance and that about
τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ
the other-things is another kind of-lack-of-control spoken-of by
μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον.
metaphor and not absolutely (it-is)-clear

VI · ANGER LESS DISGRACEFUL

Lack of control in anger is less disgraceful than in appetite. Anger half hears reason, like hasty servants or barking dogs; appetite does not. Anger is more natural, like the son who beat his father because his father had beaten his own, and open, while appetite schemes like guile-weaving Aphrodite. Brutishness is less evil than vice but more fearful.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ
that and also less disgraceful (is)-lack-of-control the (in)-the anger
ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
than the (in)-the appetites let-us-consider seems for the anger
ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ
to-hear indeed something of-the reason to-mishear(-it) but just-as the
ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
hasty of-the servants who before hearing all the thing-said
ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ
run-off then mistake the order and the
κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ,
dogs before considering whether (he-is)-a-friend if only there-be-a-noise
ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα
bark so the anger through heat and quickness

τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ
of-the nature having-heard indeed not an-order but having-heard rushes
πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι
to the revenge the indeed for reason or the imagination that
ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος
an-insult or a-slight showed it and just-as having-reasoned
ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς·
that one-must with-the such-a-man fight is-angered indeed at-once
ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ
the but appetite if only says that (it-is)-pleasant the reason or
ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς
the perception rushes to the enjoyment so-that the indeed anger
ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων
follows the reason in-a-way the but appetite not (it-is)-more-disgraceful
οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως
then the-one indeed for in-the anger uncontrolled by-the reason in-a-way
ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
is-defeated the-other and by-the appetite and not by-the reason
ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
further for-the natural (there-is)-more pardon to-follow desires
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
since also for-appetites the such more as-many-as (are)-common
πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον
to-all and to the-extent (they-are)-common the and anger (is)-more-natural
καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς
and the harshness than-the appetites the(-ones) of-the excess
καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι
and of-the not necessary(-things) just-as the(-man) defending-himself because
τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ
the father he-beat and for this(-man) he-said the(-father) his-own
κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ
and-that(-one) the(-one) before and the child pointing-to and

οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη, "ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ
this(-man) me he-said when a-man he-becomes (it-is)-congenital for
ἡμῖν·" καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε
in-us and the(-man) being-dragged by the son to-stop bade
πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα
at the doors also for himself (had)-dragged the father
μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ
up-to there further more-unjust (are)-the more-scheming the
μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ
indeed then hot-tempered-man (is)-not scheming nor the anger but
φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·
open the but appetite just-as — Aphrodite they-say(-of-her)

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·
of-the-guile-weaving for Cyprus-born

καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·
and the embroidered girdle Homer

πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.
beguilement which — stole the-wits shrewdly though of-one-thinking

ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη
so-that if-indeed more-unjust and more-disgraceful the lack-of-control this
τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία
than-the about the anger is also absolutely lack-of-control and vice
πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ
in-a-way further no-one insults being-pained the(-man) but in-anger
ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ'
acting every(-man) acts being-pained the but insulting (acts)-with
ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον,
pleasure if then (the-acts)-at-which to-be-angry most just

ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ
these (are)-more-unjust also the lack-of-control the through appetite not
γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ
for there-is in anger insult that indeed therefore more-disgraceful (is)-the
περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι
about appetites lack-of-control than-the about the anger and that
ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς
is self-control and the lack-of-control about appetites and pleasures
σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς
bodily (it-is)-clear of-themselves and these the differences
ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν
one-must-grasp just-as for has-been-said at the-beginning the-ones indeed
ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
human are and natural both in-the kind and in-the
μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ
magnitude the-others and brutish the-others and through maimings and
νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ
diseases of-these and about the first temperance and
ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα
licentiousness only are therefore also the beasts neither temperate
οὔτ᾽ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ
nor licentious do-we-call but than by metaphor and if
τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν
in-some(-respect) wholly one compared-to another differs kind of-the
ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ
animals in-wantonness and in-mischief and by-the omnivorous being not
γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξέστηκε τῆς
for has(-it) choice nor calculation but it-has-departed-from the
φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ
nature just-as the madmen of-the men less and
θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ
(is)-brutishness than-vice more-fearful but not for is-corrupted the

βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον
better(-part) just-as in the man but not it-has similar(-it-is)
οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον
then just-as an-inanimate-thing to-compare with an-animate whether
κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ
(it-is)-worse more-harmless for (is)-the baseness always the of-the(-one)
μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον
not having a-principle the and intellect (is)-a-principle similar
οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι
then (is)-the to-compare injustice with a-man unjust it-is
γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ
for as each (is)-worse ten-thousand-times for — evil-things
ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
would-do a-man bad than-a-beast

VII · SOFTNESS AND ENDURANCE

With pleasures a man is uncontrolled or self-controlled; with pains he is soft or enduring. The licentious man, who chooses excess, is worse than the uncontrolled one. Self-control masters and endurance only resists, so self-control is the more choiceworthy. Philoctetes and Cercyon are pardoned; Xenophantus burst out laughing. Lack of control may be impetuosity or weakness.

περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
about and the through touch and taste pleasures and pains
καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
and appetites and avoidances about which the both licentiousness and the
σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν
temperance were-defined before it-is-possible indeed so to-be-disposed
ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι
as to-be-defeated even-by(-those) which the many master it-is-possible

δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δ'
and to-master even(-those) by-which the many (are)-defeated of-these and
ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ
the-one indeed about pleasures (is)-uncontrolled the-other and self-controlled the-one
δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ'
and about pains soft the-other and enduring between and
ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς
(is)-the of-the most state even if they-lean more towards the
χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἳ δ'
worse since and some of-the pleasures necessary are others and
οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις,
not and up-to a-point the but excesses not nor the deficiencies
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς
likewise and also about appetites it-is and pains the-man indeed the
ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων †ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς† ἢ διὰ
excesses pursuing of-the pleasant-things or to excess or through
προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,
choice for themselves and nothing for another(-thing) resulting
ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
(is)-licentious necessarily for this-man not to-be apt-to-repent
ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.
so-that (he-is)-incurable the for unrepentant (is)-incurable
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος
the and deficient(-man) (is)-the opposite the and intermediate(-man)
σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς
temperate likewise and also the(-man) avoiding the bodily
λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ
pains not through defeat but through choice of-the but not
προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ
choosing(-men) the-one indeed is-led through the pleasure the-other and
διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε
through the to-avoid the pain the(-pain) from the appetite so-that

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι,
they-differ from-one-another to-everyone but — would-seem worse to-be
εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ
if one not desiring or weakly should-do something disgraceful than if
σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ
violently desiring and if not being-angry he-should-strike than if
ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ
being-angry what for — would-be-have-done in passion being therefore the
ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων
licentious-man (is)-worse than-the uncontrolled-man of-the indeed things-mentioned
τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος.
the-one indeed of-softness (is)-a-kind more the-other and licentious(-is)
ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ
is-opposed and to-the indeed uncontrolled-man the self-controlled-man to-the and
μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ
soft-man the enduring-man the indeed for to-endure is in the
ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ
to-resist the and self-control in the to-master different and (is)-the
ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ
to-resist and to-master just-as also the not to-be-defeated from-the
νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν.
to-win therefore also more-choiceworthy self-control than-endurance is
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ
the and deficient(-man) in-respect-of what the many both resist and
δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ
can this(-man) (is)-soft and effeminate even for the effeminacy
μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ
softness a-kind is who trails the cloak so-that not he-may-suffer
τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα
the(-pain) from the to-lift pain and imitating the sick-man
οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως
not thinks(-himself) wretched to-be to-a-wretch similar being likewise

δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
and it-is also about self-control and lack-of-control not for if one
ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
by-strong and excessive pleasures is-defeated or pains
θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ
(it-is)-astonishing but pardonable if (he-is)-resisting just-as
ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ
the of-Theodectes Philoctetes by the snake bitten or
ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ
the of-Carcinus in the Alope Cercyon and just-as the(-men)
κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν,
to-restrain trying the laughter in-a-burst guffaw
οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ
such-as happened to-Xenophantus but if one with-respect-to what the
πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται
many can resist by-these is-defeated and not is-able
ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον,
to-resist not through nature of-the race or through disease
οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ
such-as among the of-the-Scythians kings the softness through the
γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν.
race and as the female from the male is-distinguished
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ
seems and also the lover-of-amusement licentious to-be he-is but
μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν
soft the for amusement a-relaxation is if-indeed (it-is)-a-rest of-the
δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.
and with-respect-to this excessive(-men) the lover-of-amusement is
ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. οἳ
of-lack-of-control and the-one indeed (is)-impetuosity the-other and weakness the-ones
μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο
indeed for having-deliberated not abide-by what they-deliberated

διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται
through the passion the-others and through the not to-deliberate are-led
ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ
by the passion some for just-as having-tickled-first not
γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες
are-tickled so also having-perceived-beforehand and having-foreseen
καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ
and having-roused-beforehand themselves and the calculation not
ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ' ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν
are-defeated by the passion neither if pleasant it-be nor if
λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν
painful most and the quick and melancholic(-men) in-the
προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν
impetuous lack-of-control are uncontrolled the-ones indeed for through the
ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι
quickness the-others and through the vehemence not await
τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
the reason through the apt-to-follow being the imagination

VIII · THE LICENTIOUS MAN CANNOT REPENT

The licentious man abides by his choice and does not repent, so he is incurable, like one with dropsy, while the uncontrolled man is like an epileptic, with intermittent fits. The uncontrolled man is not unjust but does unjust things, as Demodocus said of the Milesians. Virtue preserves the first principle and vice destroys it.

ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός·
is and the indeed licentious-man just-as was-said not apt-to-repent
ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς
he-abides for by-the choice the but uncontrolled-man (is)-apt-to-repent
πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
every(-one) therefore not just-as we-raised-the-difficulty so also it-is

ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ᾽ ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ
but the-one indeed (is)-incurable the-other and curable resembles for the
μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει,
indeed wickedness (one)-of-the diseases such-as dropsy and consumption
ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς
the and lack-of-control the epileptic(-fits) the-one indeed for (is)-continuous
ἡ δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ᾽ ἕτερον
the-other and not continuous badness and generally and different
τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία
(is)-the kind of-lack-of-control and of-vice the indeed for vice
λανθάνει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. αὐτῶν δὲ
escapes-notice(-of-its-owner) the but lack-of-control not escapes-notice of-themselves and
τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
these better (are)-the carried-away(-ones) than the(-ones) the reason
ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ᾽ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους
having indeed not abiding(-by-it) but by a-lesser for passion
ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος
they-are-defeated and not without-deliberation just-as the-others like
γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ᾽
for the uncontrolled-man is to-those quickly getting-drunk and by
ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν
little wine and less than as the many that indeed
οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ
then a-vice the lack-of-control not is (it-is)-evident but in-a-way
ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ
perhaps the indeed for (is)-contrary-to choice the but according-to

τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ
the choice is not indeed but similar at-least in
τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους
the actions just-as the(-saying) of-Demodocus against (the)-Milesians

Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
Milesians stupid indeed
οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ᾽ οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι,
not they-are they-do but what-very-things the-stupid(-do)

καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ.
and the uncontrolled unjust indeed not are they-will-act-unjustly but
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι
since and the-one indeed (is)-such as not through the to-be-convinced
διώκειν τὰς καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
to-pursue the to excess and contrary-to the right
λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ
reason bodily pleasures the-other and is-convinced through the
τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν
such to-be as to-pursue them that-one indeed then
εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία
(is)-easily-persuaded-otherwise this-one but not the for virtue and wickedness
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ
the first-principle the-one indeed destroys the-other and preserves in and
ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν
the actions the of-which for-the-sake (is)-the-first-principle just-as in
τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος
the mathematics the hypotheses neither indeed there (is)-the reason
διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετὴ ἢ
instructive of-the first-principles nor here but virtue either
φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.
natural or habituated of-the to-hold-right-opinion about the first-principle

σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος.
temperate indeed then (is)-the such(-man) licentious and the contrary
ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
there-is and some(-one) through passion carried-away contrary-to the right
λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
reason who so-that indeed not to-act according-to the right
λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον
reason masters(-him) the passion so-that and to-be such as
πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
to-be-convinced to-pursue without-restraint one-must the such pleasures
οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ
not it-masters this-one is the uncontrolled-man better being than-the
ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον,
licentious-man nor base absolutely is-preserved for the best(-thing)
ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ
the first-principle another and (is)-the-contrary the(-man) apt-to-abide and
οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ
not carried-away through at-least the passion (it-is)-evident indeed from
τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.
these that the-one indeed (is)-an-excellent state the-other and base

Does self-control abide by any opinion, or only by the right one? The obstinate, who abide by their own opinions, resemble the uncontrolled man more than the self-controlled one, for they are led by the pleasure of winning. Neoptolemus abandoned his plan for a noble pleasure. Self-control and temperance are called alike by similarity.

πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
whether then self-controlled is the(-man) any-whatever reason and
ὁποιαοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς
any-whatever choice abiding-by or the(-man) the right and uncontrolled
δὲ ὁ ὁποιαοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν
and the(-man) any-whatever not abiding-by choice and any-whatever
λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει
reason or the(-man) the not false reason and the choice
τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν
the right just-as was-raised-as-a-difficulty before or according-to indeed
συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιαοῦν, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ
accident any-whatever in itself but the true reason and the
ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει;
right choice the-one indeed abides-by the-other and not abides-by
εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ
if for one this for-the-sake-of that chooses or pursues in itself
μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ
indeed that he-pursues and chooses according-to accident but the
πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτό. ὥστε ἔστι
former absolutely and we-say the in itself so-that it-is(-possible)
μὲν ὡς ὁποιαοῦν δόξῃ ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ'
indeed in-a-way any-whatever opinion the-one indeed abides-by the-other and
ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ
abandons absolutely but the true(-one) there-are and some who

ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ
apt-to-abide-by the opinion are whom they-call strong-headed the
δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἷ ὅμοιον μέν τι
hard-to-persuade and not easily-persuaded-otherwise who similar indeed something
ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ
have to-the self-controlled-man just-as the prodigal to-the liberal-man
καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά.
and the rash-man to-the confident-man are and different in many(-respects)
ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει,
the-one indeed for through passion and appetite not changes
ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἱ
since easily-persuaded when it-happens will-be the self-controlled-man the-others
δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ
and not by reason since appetites at-least they-acquire and
ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες
are-led many(-of-them) by the pleasures are and strong-headed
οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν
the opinionated and the ignorant and the boorish the indeed
ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες
opinionated through pleasure and pain they-rejoice for winning
ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ
if not they-are-persuaded-otherwise and they-are-pained if void the
αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ
their-own be just-as decrees so-that more the uncontrolled-man
ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷ τοῖς δόξασιν
they-resemble than the self-controlled-man there-are and some who the opinions
οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ
not abide-by not through lack-of-control such-as in the Philoctetes
τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ
the of-Sophocles — Neoptolemus although through pleasure not
ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν
he-abided(-by-it) but a-noble(-one) the for to-tell-the-truth to-him noble

ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ
was he-had-been-persuaded but by — Odysseus to-lie not for
πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος
every the(-man) through pleasure something doing (is)-either licentious
οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.
or base or uncontrolled but the(-man) through a-disgraceful(-one)
ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ
since and there-is some(-one) also such as less than one-should
τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ
in-the bodily(-things) to-delight and not abiding-by the reason the(-man)
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ
between-this and the uncontrolled-man (is)-intermediate the self-controlled-man the
μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν
indeed for uncontrolled-man not abides-by the reason through the more
τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς
something this-one and through the less something the and self-controlled-man
ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ
abides-by(-it) and not through either changes one-must and if-indeed
ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις
the self-control (is)-excellent both the contrary states
φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν
base to-be just-as also they-appear but through the the
ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ
one in few and seldom being apparent just-as the
σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω
temperance to-the licentiousness seems contrary to-be only so
καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα
also the self-control to-the lack-of-control since and by similarity
πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ'
many-things are-said also the self-control the of-the temperate-man by
ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν
similarity has-followed the both for self-controlled-man (is)-such-as nothing

παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ
contrary-to the reason through the bodily pleasures to-do and the
σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας
temperate-man but the-one indeed having the-other and not having base
ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ
appetites and the-one indeed (is)-such as not to-take-pleasure contrary-to
τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
the reason the-other and such-as to-take-pleasure but not to-be-led
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν
alike and (are)-both the uncontrolled-man and licentious-man different indeed
ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ'
being both but the bodily pleasant-things pursue but
ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.
the-one indeed also thinking (that)-one-must the-other and not thinking(-so)

X · PRACTICAL WISDOM AND LACK OF CONTROL

The same man cannot be practically wise and uncontrolled, though a clever man can be uncontrolled. The uncontrolled man is like a city that passes the right decrees and has good laws but uses none, as Anaxandrides jested. Lack of control from habit is more curable than from nature, for, as Evenus says, long practice becomes a man's nature in the end.

οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
nor at-the-same-time practically-wise and uncontrolled can be
τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος
the same(-man) at-the-same-time for practically-wise and excellent
τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι
in-the character it-has-been-shown (that-one)-is further not by-the to-know
μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ'
only (one-is)-practically-wise but also by-the being-apt-to-act the and

ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός — τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν
uncontrolled-man (is)-not apt-to-act the but clever-man nothing
κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι
prevents uncontrolled to-be therefore also seem sometimes practically-wise
μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα
indeed to-be some(-men) uncontrolled but through the the cleverness
διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
to-differ from-the practical-wisdom in-the stated way in the
πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι,
first discussions and according-to indeed the reason near to-be
διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν — οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς
to-differ but according-to the choice nor indeed (is-he)-as
ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ
the(-man) knowing and contemplating but as the(-man) sleeping or
οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ
drunk and willingly indeed in-a-way for some knowing both
ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ
what he-does and of-what for-the-sake wicked but not(-he-is) the for
προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ
choice (is)-decent so-that (he-is)-half-wicked and not unjust not
γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς
for (he-is)-a-plotter the-one indeed for of-them (is)-not apt-to-abide-by what
ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς
— he-deliberates the-other and melancholic not-even deliberative
ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται
at-all and resembles indeed the uncontrolled-man a-city which votes

μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους,
indeed all the needful(-decrees) and laws has excellent
χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν
uses but none just-as Anaxandrides jested

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·
the city willed to-which of-laws nothing cares

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς
the and wicked-man (resembles-one)-using indeed the laws wicked
δὲ χρωμένῃ. ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ
but using(-them) is and lack-of-control and self-control about the
ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει
exceeding of-the of-the many state the-one indeed for abides-by
μᾶλλον ὃ δ' ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.
more the-other and less than-the of-the most capacity
εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ
more-curable and of-the lack-of-controls (is-that)-which the melancholic
ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων
lack-control than-of-the(-men) deliberating indeed not abiding-by
δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον
but and the(-men) through habituation uncontrolled than-the natural(-ones) easier
γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος
for (is)-habit to-change than-nature through for this also the habit
χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει
(is)-hard because to-the nature it-resembles just-as also Evenus says

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
I-say long-continued practice to-be friend and indeed
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.
this for-men in-the-end nature to-be

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί
what indeed then is self-control and what lack-of-control and what
καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις
endurance and what softness and how are-related the states
αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.
these to one-another has-been-said

XI · IS PLEASURE A GOOD?

Pleasure and pain must be studied by the political philosopher, since virtue is about them and happiness is thought pleasant. Some hold that no pleasure is good, some that a few are good and most bad, some that even if all are good the best cannot be pleasure. Aristotle lists their arguments: pleasure is a becoming, the temperate man avoids it, and it hinders thought.

περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν
about and pleasure and pain to-study (is)-of-the(-man) the
πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους
political(-science) philosophizing(-about) this-one for of-the end
ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν
(is)-the-architect toward which looking each(-thing) the-one indeed bad
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν
the-other and good absolutely we-call further and also (it-is)-of-the
ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ
necessary(-things) to-examine about them the both for virtue and
τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν
the vice the moral about pains and pleasures we-set and the
εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν
happiness the most with pleasure to-be say therefore also the
μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ
blessed-man they-have-named from the to-rejoice to-some indeed then it-seems

οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ
no pleasure to-be a-good neither in itself nor according-to
συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς
accident not for to-be the-same the good and pleasure to-others
δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων
and some indeed to-be(-good) the but many (are)-base further and of-these
τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι
(is)-a-third(-view) if even all (are)-a-good nevertheless not to-be-possible to-be
τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα
the best pleasure generally indeed then (it-is)-not a-good because every
ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις
pleasure a-coming-to-be is into nature perceptible no and coming-to-be
συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ.
(is)-akin to-the ends such-as no building to-a-house
ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ
further the temperate-man avoids the pleasures further the practically-wise-man the
ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ
painless pursues not the pleasant further an-obstacle to-the to-think (are)-the
ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ
pleasures and the-more more he-delights more such-as the(-pleasure)
τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι
of-the sexual(-things) no-one for — could think anything
ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν
in it further art (there-is)-none of-pleasure although every good
τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς.
of-art (is)-the-work further children and beasts pursue the pleasures
τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ
of-the(-argument) and not all excellent (is)-that they-are both disgraceful
καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια
and reproached and that (they-are)-harmful unhealthy for (are)-some

τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐ τἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος
of-the pleasant-things that and not (is)-the-best pleasure that (it-is)-not an-end
ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
but a-coming-to-be the indeed then things-said roughly these are

XII · REPLIES

Such arguments do not show that pleasure is not good. What restores us to our natural state is pleasant only by accident, and pleasure is not a perceptible becoming but the unimpeded activity of a natural state. Pleasures that are unhealthy are bad in that respect only, and the temperate man avoids only pleasures with appetite and pain.

ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ
that and not it-follows through these not to-be a-good nor the
ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ
best from these-(considerations) (it-is)-clear first indeed since the
ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί),
good (is)-twofold the-one indeed for absolutely the-other and for-someone
καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ
also the natures and the states will-follow so-that also the
κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι
movements and the comings-to-be and the base seeming to-be
αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὔ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ
the-ones indeed absolutely base for-someone but not but choiceworthy
τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον
for-this(-man) some and not-even for-this(-man) but at-times and a-little
χρόνον αἱρεταί, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί,
time choiceworthy absolutely but not the-others and not-even pleasures
ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν,
but appear(-so) all-that (are)-with pain and of-cure for-the-sake

οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ
such-as the(-ones) of-the sick further since of-the good the-one
μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ
indeed (is)-activity the-other and a-state according-to accident the(-processes)
καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν· ἔστι δ'
restoring to the natural state pleasant are is and
ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ
the activity in the appetites of-the remaining state and
φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί,
nature since also without pain and appetite there-are pleasures
οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης.
such-as the(-ones) of-the to-contemplate the nature not deficient being
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης
a-sign and that not in-the same pleasant they-delight being-replenished
τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν
both the nature and settled but (when-it-is)-settled indeed
τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
in-the absolutely pleasant-things being-replenished but even in-the contrary(-things)
καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε
and for in-sharp and in-bitter they-delight of-which none (is)-either
φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ
by-nature pleasant or absolutely pleasant so-that nor (are-they)-pleasures as for
τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ
the pleasant-things from one-another differ so also the pleasures
αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι
the(-ones) from these further (it-is)-not necessary other something to-be
βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς
better than-the pleasure just-as some say the end than-the
γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι,
coming-to-be not for comings-to-be they-are nor with coming-to-be all
ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν
but activities and an-end nor (when-we-are)-becoming do-they-occur

ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν
but (when-we-are)-using(-a-capacity) and the-end not of-all (is)-other
τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς
something but of-the(-ones) to the perfecting being-led of-the
φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι
nature therefore also not well it-is the a-perceptible coming-to-be to-say
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς
to-be the pleasure but rather one-must-call(-it) activity of-the
κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον.
according-to nature state instead-of and the perceptible unimpeded
δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν
it-seems and a-coming-to-be to-some to-be because strictly (it-is)-good the
γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.
for activity a-coming-to-be they-think to-be it-is but different
τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ
the and to-be base because unhealthy some pleasant-things the same
καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτῃ
(is-to-say)-also that healthy some (are)-base for money-making in-this-way
οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ
then base (are)-both but not base in-respect-of at-least this since
καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει δὲ
also the to-contemplate at-times harms for health impedes and
οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή,
neither practical-wisdom nor state any the from each pleasure
ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν
but the alien(-pleasures) since the(-pleasures) from the to-contemplate
καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.
and to-learn more will-make(-one) contemplate and learn
τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως
the and of-art not to-be the-work pleasure any reasonably
συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη
has-come-about nor for of-other activity any art

ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη
is but of-the capacity although also the perfumer's art
καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα
and the cook's seems of-pleasure to-be the and the temperate-man
φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ
to-avoid and the practically-wise-man to-pursue the painless life and
τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται
the the children and the beasts to-pursue by-the same(-argument) is-solved
πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς
all since for it-has-been-said how good absolutely and how
οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ
not good all the pleasures the such both the beasts and
τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος,
the children pursue and the from-these painlessness the practically-wise-man
τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικάς
the(-pleasures) with appetite and pain and the bodily(-ones)
(τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
such for (are)-these and the of-these excesses in-respect-of
ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει
which the licentious-man (is)-licentious therefore the temperate-man avoids
ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.
these since there-are pleasures also of-the-temperate-man

Pain is admitted to be evil, so its contrary, pleasure, is a good; Speusippus' answer fails. Some pleasure may even be the chief good if happiness is unimpeded activity, which is why the happy man needs bodily and external goods, and the man broken on the wheel is not happy. That all creatures pursue pleasure is a sign that it is in a way the chief good, and perhaps all pursue the same pleasure, since all things have something divine by nature.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ
but further that also the pain (is)-an-evil is-agreed and
φευκτόν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἢ δὲ τῷ
to-be-avoided the-one indeed for (is)-absolutely evil the-other and by-the
πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ
in-some-way (being)-impeding to-the and to-be-avoided the contrary in-so-far-as
φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν
to-be-avoided something and evil (is)-good necessarily then the
ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν,
pleasure a-good something to-be as for Speusippus solved(-it)
οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ
not it-works the solution just-as the greater to-the less and
τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν
to-the equal (is)-contrary not for — he-would-say that-precisely evil
τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν
something to-be the pleasure the-best and nothing prevents pleasure
τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην
some to-be if some (are)-base pleasures just-as also science
τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ
some some base being perhaps and even necessary if-indeed
ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ
of-each state there-are activities unimpeded whether the
πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ
of-all activity is happiness or the of-some of-them — it-be

ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή.
unimpeded (it)-most-choiceworthy to-be this and is pleasure
ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν
so-that would-be — some pleasure the best of-the many pleasures
φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες
base being if it-happens absolutely and through this all
τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν
the happy pleasant think life to-be and weave-in the
ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια
pleasure into the happiness reasonably no for activity
τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων·
(is)-complete being-impeded the and happiness (is)-of-the complete(-things)
διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ
therefore needs-in-addition the happy-man the in body goods and
τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα.
the external and the fortune so-that not he-be-impeded in-these
οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις
the(-men) and the(-man) being-broken-on-the-wheel and the(-man) into-misfortunes
μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ
great falling happy asserting to-be if he-be
ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ
good either willingly or unwillingly nothing say through and the
προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία
to-need-in-addition the fortune it-seems to-some the-same to-be the good-fortune
τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα
with-the happiness not being(-so) since even it excessive
ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον·
an-impediment is and perhaps no-longer good-fortune to-call(-it) (is)-just
πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ
in-relation-to for the happiness (is)-the limit of-it and the

διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν
to-pursue and all both beasts and men the pleasure
σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·
(is)-a-sign some of-the to-be in-a-way the best it

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί
rumor but none wholly perishes which some peoples
πολλοί…
many

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη
but since not the same either nature or state the best
οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν
neither is nor seems nor pleasure do-they-pursue the same
πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ
all pleasure however all perhaps and also they-pursue not
ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν·
(the-one)-which they-think nor which — they-would-say but the same
πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν
all for by-nature has something divine but have-taken the
τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ
of-the name inheritance the bodily pleasures through the
πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν
most-often both to-resort to them and all to-partake
αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας
of-them through the alone then familiar to-be these alone
οἴονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ
they-think to-be(-pleasures) (it-is)-evident and also that if not pleasure
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως
(is)-a-good and the activity not it-will-be(-possible) to-live pleasantly
τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς,
(for)-the happy-man of-what for for-the-sake would-he-need — of-it

εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε
if-indeed not (it-is)-good but even painfully it-is-possible to-live neither
κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή·
evil for nor good (is)-the pain if-indeed not-even pleasure
ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ
so-that through what — would-he-avoid(-it) nor indeed (is)-more-pleasant the
βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.
life the of-the excellent-man if not also the activities of-him

XIV · BODILY PLEASURES

Why do bodily pleasures seem most choiceworthy? Because they drive out pain and are intense, and so are pursued as cures, especially by the young and the melancholic. A nature that is not simple finds no one thing always pleasant, while god enjoys one simple pleasure; change is sweet, as the poet says, through some badness. Friendship is next.

περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
about and indeed the bodily pleasures one-must-examine
τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ
(in-reply)-to-the(-men) saying that some at-least pleasures (are)-choiceworthy
σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ
exceedingly such-as the noble(-ones) but not the bodily(-ones) and(-those)
περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι
about which the licentious-man(-is-licentious) through what then (are)-the contrary
λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως
pains bad to-evil for good (is)-contrary or (are-they)-thus
ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ
good the necessary(-ones) because also the not bad good is or
μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων
up-to a-point good of-the indeed for states and movements of-which

μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
not there-is of-the better(-sort) excess neither of-the pleasure of-which
δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
but there-is also of-the pleasure there-is and of-the bodily goods
ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν,
excess and the base-man by-the to-pursue the excess is(-base)
ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως
but not the necessary(-pleasures) all for enjoy in-some-way
καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ.
both dainties and wines and sexual(-things) but not as one-should
ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
contrariwise and in-the-case-of the pain not for the excess
φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη
he-avoids but (pain)-altogether not for is to-the excess pain
ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
contrary but than to-the(-man) pursuing the excess
ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
since and not only one-must the-truth to-state but also the cause
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
of-the falsehood this for contributes to the conviction
ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται
whenever for reasonable appears the(-reason) through what appears
ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ
true not being true to-believe it-makes(-us) the truth
μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ
more so-that one-must-say through what appear the bodily
ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει
pleasures more-choiceworthy first indeed then indeed because it-drives-out
τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης
the pain and through the excesses of-the pain as being
ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ
a-cure the pleasure they-pursue the excessive(-one) and

ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι,
generally the bodily(-one) violent and become the cures
διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.
therefore also they-are-pursued through the beside the contrary to-appear(-so)
καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
and not excellent indeed seems the pleasure through two these(-reasons)
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις
just-as has-been-said because the-ones indeed of-a-base nature are actions
(ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ
either from birth just-as of-a-beast or through habit such-as the(-ones)
τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς,
of-the base men the-others and (are)-cures of-(a-nature)-deficient
καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι· αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι
and to-be-in-a-state (is)-better than to-become(-so) the-others and occur
τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι.
(when-natures)-are-being-completed according-to accident then (they-are)-excellent
ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν
further they-are-pursued through the violent being by the(-men)
ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς
in-other(-pleasures) not able to-delight themselves at-any-rate for-themselves
δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς,
thirsts some prepare whenever indeed then (they-are)-harmless
ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν
(it-is)-blameless whenever but harmful base neither for have-they
ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς
other-things in which they-delight the and neutral (is)-to-many
λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ
painful through the nature always for labors the animal just-as also
οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες
the physiologists testify the to-see the to-hear asserting
εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν. ὁμοίως
to-be painful but already accustomed we-are as they-say likewise

δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι
and in indeed the youth through the growth just-as the drunken
διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν
are-disposed and pleasant (is)-the youth the and melancholic the
φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον
nature need always cure also for the body being-stung
διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν·
continues through the temperament and always in desire violent they-are
ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα,
drives-out and pleasure pain the both contrary and the chance(-one)
ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι
if it-be strong and through these licentious and base
γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται
they-become the but without pains not have excess these
δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
and (are)-of-the by-nature pleasant-things and not according-to accident
λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα·
I-mean and according-to accident pleasant the(-things) curing
ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς
because for it-happens (that-one)-is-cured of-the remaining healthy(-part)
πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει
doing something through this pleasant it-seems to-be by-nature
δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. οὐκ
and pleasant(-are) what produce action of-the such nature not
ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν
always and nothing (is)-pleasant the same through the not simple our
εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ
to-be the nature but to-be-in(-us) something also different in-so-far-as
φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο
(we-are)-perishable so-that if something the-one does this
τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε
to-the other nature (is)-contrary-to nature when and it-balances neither

λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του
painful seems nor pleasant the thing-done since if of-someone
ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται.
the nature simple were always the same action most-pleasant will-be
διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ
therefore the god always one and simple enjoys pleasure not for
μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ
only of-movement is (there)-activity but also of-immobility and
ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ
pleasure more in rest is than in movement change and
πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά·
of-all-things (is)-sweet according-to the poet through badness some
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ
just-as for man (is)-changeable the bad(-man) also the
φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.
nature the needing change (is)-not for simple nor decent
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς
about indeed then self-control and lack-of-control and about pleasure
καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ
and pain it-has-been-spoken both what each and how the-ones
μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ
indeed good of-them are the-others and bad remaining and also
περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.
about friendship we-shall-speak

BOOK VIII

I · WHY FRIENDSHIP MATTERS

Friendship is a virtue or involves virtue, and is most necessary for life: no one would choose to live without friends, though he had every other good. It holds cities together, and lawgivers care for it more than for justice. Men dispute whether like loves like, as jackdaw goes to jackdaw, or opposites attract, as Euripides and Heraclitus held.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ
after and these-things about friendship would-follow — to-discuss it-is for
ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν
a-virtue some(-kind) or with virtue further and most-necessary for the
βίον, ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ
life without for friends no-one would-choose — to-live having the other
ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας
goods all and for to-the-rich and offices and powers
κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ
possessing seems of-friends most to-be need what for
ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας,
(is-the)-benefit of-the such prosperity taken-away beneficence
ἢ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς
which comes-about most and most-praiseworthy toward friends or how
ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων,
— could-it-be-guarded and preserved without friends the-more for greater(-it-is)
τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
the-more precarious in poverty both and the other
δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ
misfortunes the-only they-think refuge to-be the friends and
νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς
for-the-young and toward the not-erring and for-the-older toward
θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν
care and the lacking of-the action through weakness

βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν
help to-those and in prime toward the noble actions with
τε δύ' ἐρχομένω·" καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.
— two going and for to-think and to-act (they-are)-more-able
φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ
by-nature both to-be-present it-seems toward the begotten in-the
γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον
begetter and toward the begetter in-the begotten not only
ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις
among men but also among birds and the most
τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα
of-the animals and to-those of-the-same-race toward one-another and most
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν.
to-the men whence the philanthropic we-praise
ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας
might-see and — one also in the wanderings how akin every
ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις
man to-man and friendly it-seems and also the cities
συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
to-hold-together the friendship and the lawgivers more about it
σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν
to-be-in-earnest than the justice the for concord similar
τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται
something to-the friendship seems to-be this and most they-aim-at
καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ
and the faction enmity being most they-drive-out and
φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ'
friends indeed being(-so) not-at-all there-is-need of-justice just but
ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα
being they-need-besides friendship and of-the just(-things) the most
φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ
friendly to-be seems not only and necessary it-is but

καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε
also noble the for lovers-of-friends we-praise the both
πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἔν τι εἶναι· καὶ ἔτι
having-many-friends seems of-the noble-things one something to-be and further
τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
the same(-men) they-think men good to-be and friends
διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἳ μὲν
is-disputed and about it not few-things the-ones indeed
γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους
for a-likeness some set it and the like
φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ
friends whence the like they-say (goes)-to the like and
κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἳ δ' ἐξ
jackdaw to jackdaw and the such(-sayings) the-others and from
ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις
the-opposite(-side) potters all the such to-one-another
φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι
say to-be and about themselves these more-deeply they-inquire
καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν
and more-physically Euripides indeed saying to-love indeed
ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν
of-rain (the)-earth dried-up to-love and (the)-majestic sky
πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ
being-filled with-rain to-fall to earth and Heraclitus the
ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην
opposing (as)-beneficial and from the differing(-tones) (the)-most-beautiful
ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας
harmony and all-things by strife to-come-about from the-opposite(-side)
δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ
and to-these others both and Empedocles the for like the
ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων
like to-aim-at the indeed then physical of-the problems

ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)·
let-be-dismissed not for (they-are)-proper of-the present inquiry
ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ
all-that but is human and pertains to the characters and the
πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται
passions these let-us-examine such-as whether among all arises
φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ
friendship or not possible — wicked being friends to-be and
πότερον ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν
whether one form of-the friendship is or more the indeed for one
οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ
thinking(-it) because it-admits the more and less not by-adequate
πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ
have-trusted a-sign admit for the more and less also
τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
the different in-the form it-has-been-spoken and about them before

II · THE LOVABLE

Not everything is loved, only the lovable, which is good, pleasant, or useful. There is no friendship with lifeless things, since there is no loving in return and no wishing them well. Goodwill is wishing another good for his sake, but friendship requires that it be returned and that each know it.

τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ
perhaps and — would-become about them clear (when)-recognized the
φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
lovable seems for not everything to-be-loved but the lovable
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε
this and to-be good or pleasant or useful it-would-seem
δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ
and — useful to-be through which comes-about good something or

ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ
pleasure so-that lovable — would-be the-good both and the pleasant
ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς
as ends whether then the-good they-love or the for-themselves
ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
good disagree for sometimes these likewise and also about
τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ
the pleasant seems and the for-himself good to-love each and
εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ
to-be absolutely indeed the-good lovable to-each and the(-good)
ἑκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ
to-each loves and each not the being for-himself good but
τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν
the apparent will-differ and nothing will-be for the lovable
φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν,
apparent three and being (things)-through which they-love
ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία·
in-the-case-of indeed the of-the lifeless-things loving not is-called friendship
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ
not for there-is return-of-love nor wish for-it of-good
(γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλ'
laughable for perhaps for-the wine to-wish the-goods but
εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ)· τῷ
if-anything to-be-preserved one-wishes it so-that oneself may-have(-it) to-the
δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
but friend they-say one-must wish the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake
τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὐνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
the(-men) and wishing so the-goods well-disposed they-call if not
ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
the-same also from that(-one) comes-about goodwill for in reciprocating(-men)
φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν
friendship to-be or one-must-add not escaping-notice many for are

εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς
well-disposed to-whom not they-have-seen they-suppose but decent
εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι
to-be or useful this and the same might-also of-those one feel
πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις·
toward this(-man) well-disposed indeed then these appear to-one-another
φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν
friends but how — one could-call(-them) unaware how they-are-disposed
ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι
to-each-other one-must then (that-they)-bear-goodwill to-one-another and wish
τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.
the-goods not unaware through one some(-one) of-the(-things) mentioned

III · THREE KINDS

There are three kinds of friendship, matching the three lovable things. Friends for use or pleasure love not the man but what they get, and so their friendships dissolve easily; the old seek the useful and the young the pleasant. Complete friendship is between good men alike in virtue; it lasts, but it is rare and needs time, for they must first eat the proverbial salt together.

διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα
differ and these from-one-another in-form and(-so) the lovings then
καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα
and the friendships three indeed (are)-the of-the friendship kinds equal-in-number
τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ
to-the lovable(-things) in-respect-of each for there-is return-of-love not
λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ
unnoticed the and loving one-another wish goods
ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ
for-one-another in-that in-which they-love the indeed then through the

χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν,
useful loving one-another not in themselves love
ἀλλ' ᾗ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν.
but in-so-far-as comes-about some for-them from one-another good
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς
likewise and also the(-ones) through pleasure not for by-the of-a-certain-sort
τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς
some(-people) being they-like the witty but because pleasant
αὑτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ
to-themselves the both indeed through the useful loving through
τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν
the for-themselves good they-love and the(-ones) through pleasure
διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός
through the to-themselves pleasant and not in-so-far-as the beloved
ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός
is but in-so-far-as useful or pleasant according-to accident
τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν
both indeed the friendships these are not for in-so-far-as is
ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ
who-precisely is the beloved in-this he-is-loved but in-so-far-as
πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν.
they-provide the-ones indeed good some the-others and pleasure
εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν
easily-dissolved indeed the such are not remaining them
ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται
alike if for no-longer pleasant or useful they-are they-stop
φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε
loving the and useful not remains but at-different-times
ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν,
different becomes being-dissolved then (that)-through which friends they-were
διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.
is-dissolved also the friendship as being the friendship toward those

μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία
most and among the old the such seems friendship
γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ
to-come-about not for the pleasant the of-such-an-age pursue but
τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ
the beneficial and of-the(-ones) in prime and young all-who the
συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι
advantageous pursue not altogether and the such nor live-together
μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ
with one-another sometimes for not-even are-they pleasant nor indeed
προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν·
do-they-need the such association if not beneficial they-be
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν
in so-far for they-are pleasant in as-far-as hopes they-have
ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν
of-good among these and also the (friendship)-of-hosts-and-guests
τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ·
they-set the and of-the young friendship through pleasure to-be seems
κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ
according-to passion for these live and most they-pursue the
ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης
pleasant for-themselves and the present of-the age and changing
καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
also the pleasant-things become different therefore quickly they-become
φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία
friends and stop together for with-the pleasant the friendship
μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή.
changes of-the and such pleasure quick (is)-the change
καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι'
and erotic and (are)-the young according-to passion for and through
ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως
pleasure the most of-the erotic(-love) therefore they-love and quickly

παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες.
stop often the same day changing
συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται·
to-spend-the-days(-together) and also to-live-together these wish
γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως.
comes-about for to-them the according-to the friendship thus
τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
complete and is the of-the good friendship and in virtue
ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις
alike these for the-goods alike wish for-one-another
ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ
in-so-far-as good good and they-are in themselves the(-ones) and
βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα
wishing the-goods to-the friends of-those for-the-sake (are)-most
φίλοι· δι' αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ
friends through themselves for so they-are-disposed and not according-to
συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ
accident lasts then the of-these friendship as-long-as — good
ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς
they-are the and virtue (is)-lasting and is each absolutely
ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ
good and to-the friend the for good (are)-both absolutely good
καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς
and to-one-another beneficial likewise and also pleasant also for absolutely
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ'
the good (are)-pleasant and to-one-another to-each for according-to
ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν
pleasure are the his-own actions and the such of-the good
δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος
and (are)-the same or similar the such and friendship lasting
εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις
reasonably is joins for in itself all-things that to-the friends

δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι᾽ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ δι᾽
must belong every for friendship through good is or through
ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά
pleasure either absolutely or for-the loving(-one) and according-to similarity
τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ᾽ αὑτούς·
some in-this and all-things belong the mentioned in themselves
†ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια† καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν
in-this for similar and the remaining the both absolutely good
καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ
and pleasant absolutely is most and these (are)-lovable and the
φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη.
to-love indeed and the friendship in these most and best
σπανίας δ᾽ εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ
rare and likely the such to-be few for the
τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ
such further and it-needs-besides time and familiarity according-to
τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν
the proverb for not it-is-possible to-know one-another before
τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ᾽ ἀποδέξασθαι
the proverbial salt to-have-eaten-together nor to-accept
δὴ πρότερον οὐδ᾽ εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος
indeed earlier nor to-be friends before — each
ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ
to-each appear lovable and be-trusted the(-ones) and quickly the
φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι
friendly(-offices) toward one-another doing wish indeed friends
εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἴσασιν·
to-be not they-are but if not also lovable and this they-know
βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ᾽ οὔ.
wish indeed for quick for-friendship arises friendship but not

Friendship for pleasure resembles the complete kind, since the good are pleasant to each other, though lover and beloved do not take pleasure in the same things. Bad men can be friends for pleasure or use, but only the good are friends for each other's sake, and only their friendship is proof against slander. Others are friends by resemblance.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ
this indeed then both in-respect-of the time and in-respect-of the rest
τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια
complete is and in-respect-of all-things the-same come-about and similar
ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν.
to-each from each which-precisely must to-the friends belong
ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
the and through the pleasant a-resemblance of-this has also for the
ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ
good (are)-pleasant to-one-another likewise and also the(-one) through the
χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα
useful also for such to-one-another (are)-the good most
δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται
and also in these the friendships last when the same comes-about
παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ
from one-another such-as pleasure and not only so but also
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ
from the same(-source) such-as to-the witty and not as to-a-lover
καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι,
and to-a-beloved not for in the same-things take-pleasure these
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ
but the-one indeed seeing that(-one) the-other and being-attended by
τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία
the lover fading and the bloom sometimes also the friendship

λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ'
fades to-the-one indeed for not is pleasant the sight to-the-other and
οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν
not comes the attention many and again last if
ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες.
from the familiarity the characters they-come-to-love alike-in-character being
οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
the(-ones) and not the pleasant exchanging but the
χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ
useful in the love-affairs both are less friends and
διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα
last the(-ones) and through the useful being friends with
τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι
the advantage are-dissolved not for of-one-another they-were friends
ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ
but of-the profitable through pleasure indeed then and through the
χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι
useful even base-men it-is-possible friends to-one-another to-be
καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, δι'
and decent(-men) with-base and neither(-good-nor-bad) with-any-sort through
αὑτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ
themselves but (it-is)-clear that only the good the for bad
οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ
not delight in-one-another if not some benefit should-come-about and
μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ
alone and the of-the good friendship proof-against-slander is not for
ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ'
(it-is)-easy for-anyone to-believe about the(-man) in much time by
αὑτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις,
himself tested and the to-trust (is)-among these
καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς
and the never — would-act-unjustly and whatever else in the as

ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει
truly friendship is-thought-proper in and the others nothing prevents
τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους
the such-things to-occur since for the men call friends
καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι
also the(-ones) through the useful just-as the cities seem
γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ
for the alliances for-the cities to-arise for-the-sake-of the
συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας,
advantage and the(-ones) through pleasure one-another loving
ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους
just-as the children perhaps to-call indeed must also we friends
τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως
the such kinds and of-the friendship more(-than-one) and primarily
μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς
indeed and strictly the of-the good in-so-far-as (they-are)-good the
δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι
and others by similarity in-so-far-as for good something
καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν
and similar something in-so-far friends also for the pleasant (is)-good
τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ
to-the pleasure-lovers not altogether and these combine nor
γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ
become the same(-people) friends through the useful and through the
ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
pleasant not for altogether are-coupled the according-to accident
εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν
into these and the kinds the friendship having-been-divided the indeed
φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ
base will-be friends through pleasure or the useful in-this
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ
similar being the and good through themselves friends in-so-far-as

γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ
for (they-are)-good these indeed then absolutely friends those and
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις.
according-to accident and by-the to-have-been-likened these

V · STATE AND ACTIVITY

As with the virtues, friends may be friends in state or in activity: distance does not dissolve friendship, but long absence makes it forgotten. The sour and the old make few friends, since no one can spend his days with the unpleasant. Loving is like a passion, friendship like a state, for friends wish each other good from choice.

ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἳ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν
just-as and in-the-case-of the virtues the-ones indeed in-respect-of state
οἳ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ
the-others and in-respect-of activity good are-called so also
ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν
in-the-case-of the friendship the indeed for living-together delight
ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ
in-one-another and provide the-goods the and sleeping or
κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν
separated in-the places not are-active indeed so but are-disposed
ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
as to-be-active friendly-wise the for places not dissolve the friendship
ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία
absolutely but the activity if and long the absence
γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
becomes also of-the friendship it-seems forgetfulness to-cause whence it-has-been-said

πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.
many indeed friendships want-of-address has-dissolved

οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὔθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ
not appear and neither the old nor the sour friendly
εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς
to-be little for in them (is)-the(-element) of-the pleasure no-one
δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ
and can to-spend-the-days(-together) with-the painful nor with-the not
ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν,
pleasant most for the nature appears the painful to-avoid
ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους,
to-aim-at and the pleasant the(-ones) and accepting one-another
μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν
not living-together but well-disposed seem rather than friends nothing
γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν (ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ
for so is of-friends as the to-live-together benefit indeed for
οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι·
the needy desire to-spend-the-days(-together) and even the blessed
μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει)· συνδιάγειν δὲ
solitary for to-be for-these least befits to-spend-time and
μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας
with one-another not it-is-possible not pleasant being nor delighting
τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
in-the same-things which-precisely the comradely(-friendship) seems to-have
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ
most indeed then is friendship the of-the good just-as
πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ
often has-been-said seems for lovable indeed and choiceworthy the
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον·
absolutely good or pleasant to-each and the for-himself such
ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε
the and good(-man) to-the good(-man) through both these resembles
δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ
and the indeed loving a-passion the and friendship a-state the for

φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι
loving not less toward the lifeless-things is love-in-return
δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἕξεως·
and with choice the and choice (comes)-from state
καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα,
and the-goods they-wish for-the beloved of-those for-the-sake
οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν
not according-to passion but according-to state and loving the
φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος
friend the for-themselves good they-love the for good(-man) a-friend
γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἑκάτερος οὖν
becoming a-good becomes to-whom (he-is)-a-friend each then
φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
loves both the for-himself good and the equal repays
τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης,
in-the wishing and in-the pleasant is-said for friendship equality
μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.
most and in-the(-friendship) of-the good these belong

VI · NOT MANY

One cannot be a friend to many in the complete sense, any more than one can love many at once. For use or pleasure many can please, and pleasure friendships, like those of the young, are the more liberal. The blessed need pleasant friends, and men in power keep their useful and their pleasant friends apart.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ
among and the sour and old less arises the
φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις
friendship in-so-far-as more-ill-tempered they-are and less in-the associations
χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ
they-delight these for seem most to-be friendly and productive

φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ'
of-friendship therefore young indeed become friends quickly old and
οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν·
not not for become friends (with-those)-in-whom — not they-delight
ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν
likewise and nor the sour but the such well-disposed indeed
εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς
are to-one-another they-wish for the-goods and they-meet(-them) in the
χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν
needs friends but not altogether they-are through the not to-spend-the-days(-together)
μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά.
nor delighting in-one-another which indeed most to-be seem friendly
πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ
to-many and to-be a-friend according-to the complete friendship not
ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ
it-is-possible just-as nor to-love many at-the-same-time it-is-like for
ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)·
an-excess the such and toward one is-naturally-apt to-arise
πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον,
many and at-once the same(-man) to-please greatly not (is)-easy
ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν
perhaps and nor good to-be(-so-many) must and also experience
λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον.
to-take and in familiarity to-come-to-be which (is)-extremely-hard
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν
through the useful and also the pleasant to-many to-please
ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
is-possible many for the such and in little time
αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ
the services of-these and more resembles friendship the(-one) through
τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν
the pleasant when the-same-things from both come-about and they-delight

ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι·
in-one-another or in-the same-things such-as of-the young are the friendships
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ
more for in these (is)-the liberal the and through
τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων
the useful (is)-of-market-people and the blessed and of-useful
μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ
indeed not-at-all need of-pleasant(-friends) but to-live-together indeed for
βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον
wish with-some the and painful little indeed time
φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ
they-bear continuously but no-one — would-endure not-even itself the
ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς
good if painful to-him it-were therefore the friends pleasant
ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ
they-seek must and perhaps also good such being and
ἔτι αὑτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις.
further to-themselves so for will-belong to-them all-that must to-the friends
οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι
the(-men) and in the powers divided appear to-use
τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς,
the friends others for for-them are useful and others pleasant
ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς
both but the same not altogether neither for pleasant with virtue
ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν
do-they-seek nor useful for the noble-things but the-ones indeed
εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ
witty the pleasant aiming-at the-others and clever to-do the
ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς
thing-ordered these and not altogether come-about in the same(-man) pleasant
δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος·
and and useful at-the-same-time it-has-been-said that the excellent(-man-is)

ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ
but to-a-superior not becomes the such(-man) a-friend if not also
τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον
in-the virtue he-be-surpassed if but not not he-equalizes proportionally
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.
being-surpassed not altogether and are-accustomed such to-come-about
εἰσὶ δ᾽ οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ
are and then the mentioned friendships in equality the for same-things
γίνεται ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ᾽
come-about from both and they-wish for-one-another or one-thing for
ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ᾽ ὠφελείας· ὅτι
another they-exchange such-as pleasure for benefit that
δὲ καὶ ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
and also less are these friendships and last it-has-been-said
δοκοῦσι δὲ δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ
they-seem and through similarity and dissimilarity of-the-same-thing
εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα γὰρ
both to-be and not to-be friendships by similarity for
τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
to-the(-friendship) in virtue they-appear friendships the-one indeed for
τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει
the pleasant has the-other and the useful these and belong
κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι,
to-that-too in-the and that indeed proof-against-slander and lasting to-be
ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν
these and quickly to-change in-other(-respects) both to-differ
πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι, δι᾽ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.
many not they-appear friendships through dissimilarity of-that

Another kind of friendship rests on superiority, as between father and son, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. In such friendships loving must be proportional: the better should be loved more than he loves. In friendship equality is first by quantity, and when the gap grows too wide, as between men and gods or kings, friendship ends.

ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον
different and is of-friendship a-kind the(-one) by superiority such-as
πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον,
for-a-father toward a-son and generally for-an-elder toward a-younger
ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς
for-a-husband and toward a-wife and for-every ruler toward
ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ
ruled differ and these also from-one-another not for (is)-the
αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ'
same for-parents toward children and for-rulers toward ruled but
οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ
nor for-a-father toward a-son and for-a-son toward a-father nor for-a-husband
πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστου
toward a-wife and for-a-wife toward a-husband different for (is)-of-each
τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ
of-these the-virtue and the function different and also (the-things)-through which
φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταὐτὰ
they-love different then (are)-also the lovings and the friendships the-same
μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ
indeed indeed neither comes-about for-each from the-other nor must-one
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ
seek(-it) when but to-parents indeed children render what (they)-must
τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις,
to-the(-ones) having-begotten(-them) parents and what (they)-must to-the children

μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον
lasting the of-the such and decent will-be friendship proportional
δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν
and in all the by superiority being friendships also the
φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι
loving must come-about such-as the better more to-be-loved
ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον
than to-love and the more-useful and of-the others each
ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε
likewise when for according-to worth the loving comes-about then
γίνεταί πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
arises in-a-way equality which indeed (the-mark)-of-the friendship to-be seems
οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ
not alike and the equal both in the just(-things) and in the friendship
φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως
appears to-be it-is for in indeed the just(-things) equal primarily
τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
the(-equal) according-to worth the and according-to quantity secondarily in but
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ'
the friendship the indeed according-to quantity primarily the and according-to
ἀξίαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται
worth secondarily (it-is)-clear and if great an-interval arise
ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ
of-virtue or of-vice or of-wealth or of-some other(-thing) not for
ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον
any-longer friends they-are but not-even do-they-think-it-fit most-evident
δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι
and (is)-this in-the-case-of the gods most for these in-all
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
the goods surpass (it-is)-clear and also in-the-case-of the
βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ
kings not-even for with-these think-fit to-be friends the(-men)

πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις
much inferior nor with-the best or wisest
οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
the(-men) of-nothing worthy exact indeed then in the such(-cases)
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ
not there-is definition up-to what(-point) the friends(-remain) many for
ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ
being-taken-away still it-remains much and having-been-separated as the
θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται
god no-longer whence also it-is-puzzled-over whether ever not wish
οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς
the friends for-the friends the greatest of-the goods such-as gods
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ
to-be not for any-longer friends they-will-be to-them nor indeed
ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται
goods the for friends (are)-goods if indeed well it-has-been-said
ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα,
that the friend for-the friend wishes the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake
μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ
to-remain — he-would-have-to such-as ever is that(-one) for-a-man
δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ
indeed being he-will-wish the greatest goods perhaps but not
πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.
all for-himself for most each wishes the-goods

Most men, through love of honor, want to be loved rather than to love, and so love flatterers. Friendship lies more in loving, as mothers show who give up their children to be raised and are content to see them do well. Friends love according to worth, and contraries attract only by accident, each aiming at the mean.

οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι
the many and seem through love-of-honor to-wish to-be-loved
μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί·
more than to-love therefore (are)-lovers-of-flatterers the many
ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται
(one)-surpassed for friend (is)-the flatterer or pretends
τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
(to-be)-such and more to-love than to-be-loved the and to-be-loved
ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.
near to-be seems to-the to-be-honored which indeed the many aim-at
οὐ δι' αὑτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
not for itself but they-seem to-choose the honor but according-to
συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν
accident they-delight for the indeed many by the(-men) in
ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ
the powers being-honored through the hope they-think for
τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἄν του δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ
to-be-going-to-get from them if anything they-need as indeed by-a-sign
τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)· οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν
of-the good-treatment they-delight in-the honor the(-others) and by the
ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν
decent and knowing desiring honor to-confirm the own
δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν· χαίρουσι δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ
opinion aim-at about themselves they-delight indeed that they-are good

πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι
trusting in-the of-the(-men) saying(-so) judgment in-the to-be-loved
δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι
and in itself they-delight therefore it-would-seem — better to-be
τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.
than-the to-be-honored and the friendship in itself choiceworthy to-be
δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.
it-seems and in the to-love more than in the to-be-loved to-be(-found)
σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι
a-sign and (are)-the mothers in-the to-love delighting some
γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν
for give the their-own(-children) to-be-reared and love indeed
εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ
knowing(-them) to-be-loved-in-return but not they-seek if both not
ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ
it-be-possible but sufficient for-them it-seems to-be if they-see(-them) well
πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν
faring and they love them even-if those nothing
ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
of-what to-a-mother befits render through the ignorance
μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν
more and the friendship being in the to-love and the
φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν,
lovers-of-friends being-praised of-friends (the)-virtue the to-love seems
ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι
so-that in whom this comes-about according-to worth these (are)-lasting
φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι
friends and the of-these friendship so and — even the unequal
μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
most would-be friends would-be-equalized for — the and equality
καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ'
and likeness (is)-friendship and most indeed the of-the(-men) in

ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς
virtue likeness lasting for being in themselves also toward
ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι
one-another they-remain and neither ask-for base-things nor render(-them)
τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν
such but so-to speak even they-prevent(-them) (it-is)-of-the good
γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν.
for neither themselves to-err nor for-the friends to-permit(-it)
οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς
the but wicked the indeed steadfastness not have nor for to-themselves
διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται
do-they-remain alike being for little but time they-become
φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ
friends delighting in-the one-another's wickedness the useful and
καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν
also pleasant for longer remain as-long-as for — they-provide
ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν
pleasures or benefits to-one-another from contraries and most indeed
δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον
seems the(-friendship) through the useful to-arise friendship such-as
πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις
poor-man with-rich ignorant with-knowing for-what for happens one
ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα
lacking being this aiming-at he-gives-in-return another-thing here
δ' ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν
and — one might-drag-in both lover and beloved and beautiful
καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε,
and ugly therefore appear also the lovers ridiculous sometimes
ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας
thinking-fit to-be-loved as they-love alike indeed lovable being
ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον.
perhaps one-must-think-it-fit nothing and such having (it-is)-ridiculous

ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ᾽ αὑτό,
perhaps and not-even aims-at the contrary the contrary in itself
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν·
but according-to accident the and desire for-the mean is
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽
this for (is)-good such-as for-the dry not wet to-become but
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως.
to the mean to-come and for-the hot and for-the others likewise
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.
these indeed then let-be-dismissed and for they-are more-foreign

IX · FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNITY

Friendship and justice concern the same things and the same persons, for in every community there is some justice and some friendship, and the proverb says friends' things are common. Wrongs grow worse the closer the friend. All communities are parts of the political community, which aims at the advantage of the whole of life.

ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταὐτὰ
it-seems and just-as at the-beginning it-has-been-said about the-same-things
καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἥ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
and among the same(-persons) to-be the both friendship and the just
ἐν ἁπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία
in every for community seems some just(-element) to-be and friendship
δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ
too they-address at-any-rate as friends the fellow-voyagers and
τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
the fellow-soldiers likewise and also the(-ones) in the other
κοινωνίαις. καθ᾽ ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι
communities as far and they-share in so-far there-is
φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία κοινὰ
friendship and for the just and the proverb (says)-common

τὰ φίλων, ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι
the(-things) of-friends rightly in community for (is)-the friendship is
δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις
and for-brothers indeed and for-comrades all common for-the and others
ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ
(things)-set-apart and for-some indeed more for-others but less also
γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἧττον. διαφέρει
for of-the friendships some indeed more some and less they-differ
δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα
and also the just(-claims) not for the-same for-parents toward children
καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις,
and for-brothers toward one-another nor for-comrades and for-citizens
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ
likewise and also in-the-case-of the other friendships different indeed also
τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει
the unjust(-acts) toward each of-these and increase they-take
τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι
by-the more toward friends to-be such-as money to-defraud
ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ
a-comrade (is)-more-terrible than a-citizen and not to-help a-brother
ἢ ἀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον.
than a-stranger and to-strike a-father than anyone else
αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον,
to-increase and is-natural together-with the friendship also the just
ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.
as among the same being and over equal(-range) extending
αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς·
the and communities all to-parts seem-like of-the political(-community)
συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί
they-journey-together for for some advantage and providing
τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ
some(-thing) of-the(-things) for the life and the political and

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
community for-the advantage for-the-sake seems both from the-beginning
συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται
to-have-come-together and to-remain this for also the lawgivers
στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.
aim-at and just they-say to-be the in-common advantageous
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος
the indeed then other communities at parts of-the advantage
ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν
aim such-as sailors indeed the(-advantage) in the voyage
πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται
toward acquisition of-money or something such fellow-soldiers
δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε
and the(-advantage) in the war whether of-money or
νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ
of-victory or of-a-city desiring likewise and also tribesmen and
δημόται. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν
demesmen all and these under the political(-community) seem
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ
to-be not for the present advantage the political(-community)
ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον *** θυσίας τε
aims-at but for all the life (lacuna) sacrifices both
ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμάς τε ἀπονέμοντες
performing and about these gatherings honors both rendering
τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς.
to-the gods and for-themselves relaxations providing with pleasure
αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ
the for ancient sacrifices and gatherings appear to-take-place after
τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ
the of-the crops harvestings as first-fruits most for
ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται
in these they-had-leisure the seasons all indeed appear

αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι
the communities parts of-the political(-community) to-be will-follow
δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.
and the such friendships the such communities

X · CONSTITUTIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS

There are three constitutions, kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy, and three deviations, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Their likenesses appear in households: a father with his sons is like a king, while Persian fathers are tyrants; husband and wife are like an aristocracy, brothers like a timocracy, and a masterless house like a democracy.

πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις,
of-constitution and are kinds three equal and also deviations
οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία
as corruptions of-these are and the indeed constitutions kingship
τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
both and aristocracy third and (one)-from property-ratings which
τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
timocratic to-call (is)-fitting it-appears polity but it
εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν
are-accustomed the most to-call of-these and best (is)-indeed
ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις
the kingship worst and the timocracy deviation
δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι,
and of-kingship indeed (is)-tyranny both for (are)-monarchies
διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ
they-differ but most the indeed for tyrant the for-himself
συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ
advantageous looks-to the and king the of-the ruled not

γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
for is a-king the(-man) not self-sufficient and in-all the
ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ
goods surpassing the and such(-man) of-nothing is-in-need the
ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ'
beneficial(-things) then for-himself indeed not — he-would-look-to for-the but
ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη
ruled the for not such chosen-by-lot — a-kind-of would-be
βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ
king the and tyranny from the-opposite to-this the for
ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης
for-himself good he-pursues and (it-is)-clearer in-the-case-of this
ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
that (it-is)-worst worst and (is)-the contrary to-the best
μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ
it-passes and from kingship into tyranny baseness for
ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς
is of-monarchy the tyranny the and wicked king
τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν
a-tyrant becomes from aristocracy and into oligarchy
κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἳ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως
by-vice of-the rulers who distribute the(-things) of-the city
παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν
contrary-to the worth and all or the most of-the
ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ
goods to-themselves and the offices always to-the same of
πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ
most making the to-be-rich few indeed rule and
μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ τιμοκρατίας
wicked instead-of the most-decent from and timocracy
εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους
into democracy bordering for are these of-a-multitude

γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες
for wishes also the timocracy to-be and equal all
οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ
the(-men) in the property-rating least and wicked is the
δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας
democracy by little for deviates the of-the constitution
εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι·
form change indeed then most thus the constitutions
ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα
least for so and most-easily they-pass-over likenesses
δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ
and of-them and as-it-were patterns one may-take — even
ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία
in the households the indeed for of-a-father toward sons community
βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει·
of-kingship has the-form of-the children for to-the father (there-is)-care
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει·
hence and also Homer — Zeus father addresses
πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι.
paternal for rule wishes the kingship to-be
ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ
among Persians and the of-the father (is)-tyrannical they-use for
ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς
as slaves the sons tyrannical and also the of-a-master toward
δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται.
slaves the for of-the master advantage in it is-done
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη·
this indeed then right appears the Persian and mistaken
τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ
of-the differing for the rules (are)-different of-husband and and
γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ
of-wife aristocratic appears according-to worth for the

ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ
husband rules and about these which must the husband all-that but
γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἁπάντων δὲ κυριεύων
to-a-wife befits to-her he-hands-over of-all and being-master
ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ
the husband into oligarchy changes(-it) contrary-to the worth for
αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ
it he-does and not in-so-far-as (he-is)-better sometimes and rule the
γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
wives heiresses being not indeed come-about according-to virtue
αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
the rules but through wealth and power just-as in the
ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι
oligarchies timocratic and resembles the of-the brothers equal
γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν
for except in so-far-as in-the ages they-differ therefore if
πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ
much in-the ages they-differ no-longer brotherly becomes the
φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις
friendship democracy and most indeed (is)-in the masterless
τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ
of-the dwellings there for all (are)-on equal(-footing) and
ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία.
in which weak the ruler and to-each (is)-license

Each constitution has as much friendship as it has justice: a king benefits his subjects as a shepherd does his flock, as Homer called Agamemnon, and parents stand above their children. Brothers are like comrades. In tyranny there is little friendship, for there is none with a slave as slave, a living tool, though there may be with him as a man.

καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον
in-respect-of each and of-the constitutions friendship appears in so-far-as
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν
also the just for-a-king indeed toward the ruled-by-a-king (it-lies)-in
ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους,
superiority of-benefaction well for he-treats the ruled-by-a-king
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν,
if-indeed good being he-cares-for them so-that well they-may-fare
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα
just-as a-shepherd of-sheep whence also Homer — Agamemnon
ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική,
shepherd of-the-peoples called such and also (is)-the paternal(-friendship)
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ
it-differs but in-the magnitude of-the benefits (the)-cause for
τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας.
of-the to-be (which)-seems greatest and of-nurture and of-education
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε
also to-the ancestors and these are-ascribed by-nature and
ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς
ruling(-is) a-father of-sons and ancestors of-descendants and a-king
βασιλευομένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ
of-subjects in superiority and (are)-the friendships these therefore
καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις
also are-honored the parents and the just indeed in these

οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ
(is)-not the-same but the according-to worth so for also the
φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν
friendship and of-husband and toward wife the same friendship (is)-as in
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον
aristocracy according-to virtue for and to-the better more
ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
good and the fitting to-each so and also the just
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ
the and of-the brothers to-the comradely resembles equal for and
ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς
of-an-age the such and like-in-feeling and like-in-character as
ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν
for the most-part resembles and this also the(-friendship) according-to the
τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς
timocratic(-constitution) equal for the citizens wish and decent
εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ
to-be in turn indeed the to-rule and on equal(-terms) so indeed
καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
also the friendship in and the deviations just-as also the
δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν
just to little(-extent) is so also the friendship and least in
τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας.
the worst in tyranny for (there-is)-nothing or little of-friendship
ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ,
in which for nothing common is to-the ruler and to-ruled
οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς
nor (is-there)-friendship nor for just(-thing) such-as for-a-craftsman toward
ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον·
tool and for-soul toward body and for-master toward slave
ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων,
are-benefited indeed for all these by the users

φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
friendship but not there-is toward the lifeless-things nor just(-thing) but nor
πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος.
toward a-horse or ox nor toward a-slave in-so-far-as (he-is)-a-slave
οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον,
nothing for common is the for slave (is)-a-living tool
τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος,
the and tool a-lifeless slave in-so-far-as indeed then (he-is)-a-slave
οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ
not there-is friendship toward him in-so-far-as but a-man seems
γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν
for to-be some just(-element) for-every man toward all the(-one)
δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία
able to-share in-law and in-agreement and friendship
δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν
indeed in so-far-as (he-is)-a-man to little(-extent) indeed also in
ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς
the tyrannies (are)-the friendships and the just in and the
δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ
democracies to more many for (are)-the common(-things)
ἴσοις οὖσιν.
to-equals being

All kinship depends on that of the father: parents love their children as part of themselves, and sooner and more than children love parents. Brothers love each other as springing from the same source. Children love parents as men love gods, and husband and wife love by nature, since the household is prior to the city; children are the bond between them.

ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
in community indeed then every friendship is just-as has-been-said
ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν.
one-might-set-apart and — one the both kindred and the comradely
αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι
the and civic and tribal and shipboard and all-that
τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ'
(are)-such to-communal(-ones) seem-like more as-it-were for according-to
ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν
agreement some they-appear to-be among these and might-class —
τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται
one also the host-and-guest(-friendship) and the kindred and appears
πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ
manifold to-be to-depend and all on the paternal the
γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
parents indeed for love the children as of-themselves something being
τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
the and children the parents as from those something being more
δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα
and know the parents the(-ones) from themselves than the begotten
ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται τὸ ἀφ'
that (they-are)-from these and more is-bound-closely the from
οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι·
which(-it-comes) to-the begotten than the thing-produced to-the maker

τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς θριξ
the for from him (is)-proper to-the(-one) from which such-as a-tooth a-hair
ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἧττον.
anything to-the having to-that and nothing the from which or less
καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἳ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς
and by-the length and of-the time the-ones indeed for at-once
γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς
having-been-born love(-them) the-others and having-passed time the
γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
parents understanding or perception having-acquired from these and
δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς
(it-is)-clear also through what love more the mothers parents
μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν
indeed then children love as themselves the for from them
οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς
(are)-as-it-were other selves by-the to-have-been-separated children and parents
ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ
as from those having-sprung brothers and one-another by-the
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης
from the same to-have-sprung the for to those identity
ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν
to-one-another the-same makes whence they-speak-of the-same blood and root
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις.
and the such they-are indeed the-same in-a-way even in separated(-persons)
μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ'
great and toward friendship (is)-also the being-reared-together and the according-to
ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι·
age of-an-age for (delights)-the-coeval and the familiar (are)-comrades
διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ
therefore also the brotherly to-the comradely is-likened cousins and and
οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνῳκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ
the other kinsmen from these are-bound-together by-the for from

τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ
the same to-be they-become and the-ones indeed more-akin the-others
δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι.
and more-foreign by-the near or far the founder to-be
ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις
is and the indeed toward parents friendship for-children and for-men
πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ
toward gods as toward good and superior well for
πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι
they-have-done the greatest(-things) of-the for to-be and to-be-nurtured
αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ
(they-are)-the-causes and (for-those)-born of-the to-be-educated it-has and also
τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν
the pleasant and the useful the such friendship more than-the
ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.
strangers' in-so-far-as also more-common the life to-them is
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
it-is and also in the brotherly(-friendship) the-very-things-which also in the
ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν
comradely and more among the decent and generally among
τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι
the alike in-so-far-as more-akin and from birth they-begin
στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ
loving one-another and in-so-far-as more-alike-in-character the(-ones)
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως·
from the same(-parents) and reared-together and educated alike
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιοτάτη.
and the by the time testing (is)-most and surest
ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ
proportional and also among the rest of-the kinsmen the
φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
friendly(-things) for-husband and and for-wife friendship seems according-to

φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
nature to-belong man for by-the nature (is)-apt-to-pair
μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον
more than political in-so-far-as prior and more-necessary
οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις.
(is)-the-household than-the-city and child-making more-common to-the animals
τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν,
for-the indeed then other(-animals) to so-far the community is
οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν
the and men not only of-the child-making for-the-sake
συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ
live-together but also of-the(-things) for the life at-once for
διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός·
are-divided the functions and are different of-husband and of-wife
ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ
they-supply then one-another into the common putting the
ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ
private-things through these and also the useful to-be seems and
τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι'
the pleasant in this the friendship it-would-be and — also through
ἀρετήν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ
virtue if decent they-should-be is for of-each a-virtue and
χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ
they-would-delight — in-the such a-bond and the children seem
εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα
to-be therefore more-quickly the childless separate the for children
κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ
(are)-a-common good to-both holds-together and the common(-thing) the
δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ
and how must-live for-husband toward wife and generally for-friend
πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς
toward friend nothing other appears to-be-sought than how

δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον
(it-is)-just not for the-same appears for-the friend toward the friend
καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.
and the stranger and the comrade and the schoolfellow

XIII · COMPLAINTS IN UTILITY FRIENDSHIP

Complaints arise mostly in friendships for use, since each always wants more. Such friendship is either legal, on stated terms, or moral, given as to a friend but expecting a return, and quarrels come when men part on terms other than those they began on. The return is measured by the benefit received; in virtue friendship, by the giver's choice.

τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,
threefold and being friendships just-as at (the)-beginning it-has-been-said
καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων
and in each the-ones indeed in equality friends being
τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι
the-others and by superiority and for alike good(-men) friends
γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς
become and better with-worse likewise and also pleasant(-men)
καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ
and through the useful equalizing in-the benefits and
διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν
differing the equals indeed by equality must in-the to-love
καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον
and in-the rest equalize the and unequal the proportional
ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ
to-the superiorities render arise and the complaints and
αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ
the reproaches in the according-to the useful friendship either alone or

μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες
most reasonably the indeed for through virtue friends being
εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς
well to-do one-another are-eager this for (is-the-mark)-of-virtue
καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν
and of-friendship to this and (they)-striving not there-are
ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα
complaints nor fights the for loving and well treating(-him)
οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ
no-one is-annoyed-with but if he-be gracious he-retaliates well
δρῶν. ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν
doing the and exceeding getting what he-aims-at not —
ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται.
would-complain-of the friend each for the good desires
οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δι᾽ ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ
not altogether and nor among the through pleasure together for
ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν
to-both comes what they-desire if in-the to-spend-time-together
χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ᾽ ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν
they-delight ridiculous and — would-appear also the(-man) complaining-of
τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνημερεύειν. ἡ
the not delighting(-him) it-being-possible not to-spend-the-days(-with-him) the
δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ
and through the useful (is)-complaint-prone for benefit for
χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον
using one-another always the more they-need and less
ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι
to-have they-think than-the fitting and they-blame because
οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ
not as-much-as they-need so-much they-get worthy being the
δ᾽ εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων
and well doing not are-able to-supply so-much as-much-as

οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι
the receiving need it-seems and just-as the just is
διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ
twofold the-one indeed unwritten the-other and according-to law also
τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ
of-the according-to the useful friendship the-one indeed moral the-other
δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν
and legal to-be arise then the complaints most when
μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι
not according-to the same(-kind) they-contract and dissolve(-it) is
δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν
and the legal indeed the(-one) on stated(-terms) the-one indeed wholly
ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα
commercial from hand to hand the-other and more-liberal
εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος.
for time according-to agreement but what for what
δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν
clear and in this the debt and-not disputable friendly
δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
but the delay it-has therefore with-some not there-are of-these
δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν
lawsuits but they-think one-must love the(-men) on trust
συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς
having-contracted the and moral(-kind) (is)-not on stated(-terms) but as
φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ
to-a-friend gives or whatever else to-get-back but he-thinks-fit
τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ
the equal or more as not having-given but having-lent not
ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο
alike and having-contracted and dissolving he-will-complain this
δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς
and happens through the to-wish indeed all or the

πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν
most the noble-things to-choose but the beneficial noble
δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ
and (is)-the well to-do not so-that one-may-receive-in-return beneficial and
τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν
the to-be-benefited for-(one)-able indeed one-must-repay the worth
ὧν ἔπαθεν (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς
of-what he-received unwilling for (as)-friend not one-must-make(-him) as
δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ᾽
indeed having-erred at the beginning and well having-been-treated by
οὗ οὐκ ἔδει — οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
whom not he-should not for by a-friend nor for it this
δρῶντος — καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
doing just-as then on stated(-terms) having-been-benefited
διαλυτέον)· καὶ †ὁμολογήσαι δ᾽† ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·
one-must-dissolve and one-would-agree and — being-able to-repay
ἀδυνατοῦντα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν.
unable and not-even the giver would-have-thought-fit —
ὥστ᾽ εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον
so-that if possible one-must-repay at (the)-beginning and one-must-consider
ὑφ᾽ οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις
by whom one-is-benefited and on what(-terms) so-that on these
ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ᾽ ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ
one-may-accept or not dispute but it-has whether one-must by-the
τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην
of-the receiver benefit measure and with-reference-to this
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ.
make the return or by-the of-the doer beneficence
οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν
the indeed for receivers such they-say to-have-received from the
εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ᾽ ἑτέρων
benefactors what small was to-those and it-was-possible from others

λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα
to-receive belittling(-it) the and conversely the greatest
τῶν παρ' αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν,
of-the(-things) from themselves and which from others not was(-to-be-had)
καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. ἆρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν
and in dangers or such needs whether then through indeed
τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια
the useful the friendship being the of-the receiver benefit
μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ
measure is this-one for (is)-the(-one) needing and he-aids
αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται
him as going-to-get-back the equal so-much then has-been
ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ
the help as this-one has-been-benefited and one-must-repay indeed
αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ
to-him as-much-as he-gained or even more (it-is)-nobler for in and
ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ
the according-to virtue complaints indeed not there-are by-measure
δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
and resembles the of-the doer choice of-the virtue for
καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.
and of-the character in the choice (lies)-the decisive(-element)

In friendships of superiority each claims more: the better man because he is better, the needy because a good friend should help him. Both are right, but in different things: honor to the superior, gain to the needy, as in cities. So a son may not disown his father, though a father may disown his son, since the son can never repay his debt.

διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ
they-quarrel and also in the by superiority friendships thinks-fit
γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, διαλύεται
for each more to-have when and this happens is-dissolved
ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὑτῷ πλέον
the friendship thinks for the — better (that)-it-befits him more
ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
to-have to-the for good to-be-assigned more likewise and also the
ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν·
more-useful useless for being not they-say one-must equal to-have
λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ'
a-public-service both for (it)-becomes and not a-friendship if not according-to
ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται
worth of-the works will-be the(-things) from the friendship they-think
γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν
for just-as in of-money a-partnership more receive
οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ
the(-ones) contributing more so one-must also in the
φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ
friendship the and needy and the worse conversely of-a-friend for
ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν,
good (it-is)-to-be the to-aid the needy what for they-say
ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν
(is-the)-benefit to-an-excellent(-man) or to-a-potentate friend to-be nothing

γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς
at-least being-about to-enjoy it-seems and then each rightly
ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας,
to-think-fit and one-must to-each more to-assign from the friendship
οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς τῷ
not of-the same however but to-the indeed superior of-honor to-the
δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας
and needy of-gain of-the indeed for virtue and of-the beneficence
ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.
the honor (is)-the-prize of-the and need help the gain
οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ
so and to-be this also in the constitutions appears not for
τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ
is-honored the(-man) nothing good for-the common(-weal) providing the
κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι,
common(-good) for is-given to-the(-man) the common(-weal) benefiting
ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα
the honor and (is)-common(-good) not for it-is-possible at-the-same-time
χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι
to-make-money from the common(-funds) and to-be-honored in all
γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα
for the less no-one endures to-the(-man) indeed in money
ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα·
being-made-less honor they-assign and to-the bribe-taker money
τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν,
the according-to worth for equalizes and preserves the friendship
καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον,
just-as has-been-said so indeed also with-the unequal one-must-associate
καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν
and to-the(-man) in money being-benefited or in virtue honor
ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ
one-must-return rendering the possible(-things) the possible for

ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν
the friendship seeks not the according-to worth nor for is-it(-possible)
ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς
in all(-cases) just-as in the toward the gods honors and the
γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν
parents no-one for the worth ever — could-render to power
δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν
but the(-man) serving decent to-be seems therefore also
δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ
it-would-seem not to-be-permitted for-a-son a-father to-disown for-a-father
δ᾽ υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον
but a-son owing for one-must-repay nothing and having-done worthy
τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ᾽ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ᾽
of-the(-things) received he-has-done so-that always he-owes to-whom but
ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἅμα δ᾽
it-is-owed (there-is)-power to-remit and to-the father indeed together and
ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος
perhaps no-one ever — would-stand-aloof it-seems not exceeding
μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν
in-wickedness apart-from for the natural friendship the help
ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ
(it-is)-human not to-reject to-the(-son) but to-be-avoided or not
σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ
to-be-striven-for (is)-the to-aid (him)-wicked being well to-be-treated for
οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές.
the many wish the but to-do(-it) they-avoid as unprofitable
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
about indeed then these to so-much let-it-have-been-said

BOOK IX

I · MEASURING RETURNS

In friendships of unlike kinds proportion keeps the friendship, as money does in the city. A lover complains that he is not loved in return, and a beloved that promises are not kept; a lyre player was paid in pleasure for pleasure. Protagoras let his pupils fix the fee, and with philosophy no return can match the worth.

ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
in all and the dissimilar friendships the proportional
ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν
equalizes and preserves the friendship just-as has-been-said such-as also in
τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων
the political(-friendship) to-the shoemaker in-return-for the shoes
ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς
a-return comes according-to worth and to-the weaver and to-the
λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ
rest here indeed then has-been-provided a-common measure the
νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ
currency and to this indeed all-things are-referred and
τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ
by-this are-measured in and the erotic(-friendship) sometimes indeed the
ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν
lover complains that loving-excessively not he-is-loved-in-return nothing
ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος
having lovable if so it-happens often and the beloved
ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ.
that formerly promising all-things now nothing he-fulfills
συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὃ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν
happen and the such-things whenever the-one indeed through pleasure
τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν
the beloved loves the-other and through the useful the

ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς
lover these but not to-both belong through these for the
φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν
friendship being dissolution comes whenever not come(-the-things) of-which
ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ
for-the-sake they-loved not for them they-loved but the(-things)
ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
belonging not lasting being therefore such (are)-also the friendships
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
the and of-the characters in itself being remains just-as has-been-said
διαφέρονται δ' ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ
they-quarrel and when different-things come to-them and not
ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
what they-desire like for to-the nothing to-come(-of-it) when
οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ
what one-aims-at not one-gets such-as also to-the lyre-singer the(-man)
ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω·
promising and the better he-should-sing so-much more
εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν
at dawn but to-(him)-demanding the promises for pleasure pleasure
ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο,
to-have-rendered he-said if indeed then each this wished
ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ
sufficiently — it-would-have-been if but the-one indeed delight the-other and
κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
gain and the-one indeed has the-other and not not — would-be
τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος
the(-terms) of the association well what for needing
τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν
one-happens-to(-want) to-these also he-attends and-of-that at-least for-the-sake
ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ
these he-will-give the worth but whose to-fix is-it of-the

προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ᾽
(one)-giving-first or of-the(-one) having-received-first the for giving-first seems
ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
to-leave(-it) to-that(-one) which-precisely they-say also Protagoras to-do
ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
when for he-taught anything to-value(-it) the learner he-bade
ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.
as-much-as it-seems worth to-know and he-took so-much
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ᾽ ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δ᾽ ἀνδρί.
in the such and to-some (is)-pleasing the wage and for-a-man
οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες
the and taking-beforehand the money then nothing doing
ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν,
of-what they-said through the excesses of-the promises
εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν
reasonably in complaints come not for they-fulfill
ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ
what they-agreed this and perhaps to-do the sophists
ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν
are-compelled through the no-one — would-give money for-what
ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν,
they-know these indeed then of-what they-took the wage
μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς
not doing reasonably in complaints are in which(-cases)
δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν
but not comes agreement of-the service the(-ones) indeed
δι᾽ αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι
for themselves giving-first it-has-been-said that (are)-not-open-to-complaint
(τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φιλία), τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε
such for (is)-the according-to virtue friendship the return and
ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου
one-must-make according-to the choice this for (is)-of-the friend

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας
and of-the virtue so and it-seems also to-those philosophy
κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται,
having-shared(-in) not for by money the worth is-measured
τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν,
honor and equal-in-weight not — could-come-about but perhaps (it-is)-sufficient
καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.
just-as also toward gods and toward parents the possible
μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα
not such and being the gift but for something most
μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν
indeed perhaps must the return come-about seeming to-both
κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον
according-to worth to-be if but this not should-happen not only
ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ
necessary it-would-seem — the (one)-having-received-first to-fix(-it) but
καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν
also just as-much-as for this-one was-benefited or for as-much-as the
ἡδονὴν εἵλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει
pleasure he-would-have-chosen — so-much having-received-in-return he-will-have
τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω
the from this-one worth and for in the things-for-sale so
φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων
appears happening in-some-places and there-are laws of-the voluntary
συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε,
contracts lawsuits not to-be as one-ought with-whom one-trusted
διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ
to-settle toward this-one just-as he-entered-the-partnership to-whom for
ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ
it-was-entrusted this-one thinks juster to-be to-fix(-it) than-the(-one)
ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ
having-entrusted(-it) the many for not at-the equal value the(-ones)

ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ
having and the(-ones) wishing to-get the for own(-things) and
ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
what they-give to-each appear of-much worth but nevertheless
ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ
the return comes to so-much as-much-as — fix the
λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
receivers must but perhaps not so-much to-value(-it) as-much-as
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.
having(-it) it-appears worth but as-much-as before to-have(-it) he-valued(-it)

II · CONFLICTING CLAIMS

Must one obey one's father in everything? Should one repay a benefactor or oblige a comrade, ransom one's ransomer or one's father? Such questions admit no precise answer; as a rule a debt should be repaid, but different things are due to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, and Aristotle gives examples of each.

ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
a-difficulty and contains also the such(-questions) such-as whether one-must
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
all-things to-the father to-assign and to-obey or being-sick
μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν
indeed a-doctor trust as-general and one-must-elect the
πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ
military(-man) likewise and a-friend rather than an-excellent-man
ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον
one-must-serve and to-a-benefactor one-must-return a-favor rather
ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρ᾽
than to-a-comrade one-must-give if both not be-possible (is-it)-then
οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον;
then all the such-things precisely indeed to-determine not (is)-easy

πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει
many for and various they-have differences both in-magnitude
καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ
and in-smallness and in-the noble and necessary that but not
πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ τὰς
all-things to-the same(-person) must-be-rendered (is)-not unclear and the
μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον
indeed benefactions must-be-repaid as for the most-part rather
ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει
than one-must-do-favors to-comrades just-as also a-loan to-whom one-owes
ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ
must-be-repaid rather than to-a-comrade must-be-given perhaps but not-even
τοῦτ' ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα
this always such-as for-the(-man) ransomed from robbers whether
τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ
the(-one) having-ransomed(-him) must-he-ransom-in-turn even-if whoever be-he or
μὴ ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα
not having-been-captured demanding but must-he-repay or the father
λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα.
must-he-ransom it-would-seem for — even than-himself more the father
ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον,
as then has-been-said generally indeed the debt must-be-repaid
ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ,
if but outweighs the gift in-the noble or in-the necessary
πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ
toward these one-must-incline sometimes for not-even is equal the
τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον
the previous(-service) to-return when the-one indeed an-excellent-man
εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις
knowing(-him) did-well(-to-him) to-the other and the return
γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ
comes whom he-thinks wicked to-be nor for to-the(-one)

δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος
having-lent sometimes one-must-lend-in-return the-one indeed for thinking
κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει
to-get(-it)-back lent to-a-decent(-man) being the-other and not hopes
κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως
to-get(-it)-back from a-wicked(-man) whether therefore in-the truth so
ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται
it-is not equal (is)-the claim or it-is indeed not so they-think
δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις
but not — they-would-seem strange-things to-do as then often
εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως
has-been-said the about the passions and the actions discussions alike
ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν
have the definiteness with-the(-things) about which they-are that indeed
οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα,
then not the-same-things to-all must-be-rendered nor to-the father all-things
καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ'
just-as nor — to-Zeus is-sacrificed(-everything) (is)-not unclear since and
ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις,
different-things to-parents and to-brothers and to-comrades and to-benefactors
ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον.
to-each the proper and the fitting must-be-assigned
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ
so and also to-do they-appear to weddings indeed for
καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ
they-invite the kinsmen to-these for (is)-common the family and
αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ'
the about this indeed actions and to the funerals and most
οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό.
they-think must the kinsmen meet through the-same(-reason)
δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν,
it-would-seem and — of-food indeed to-parents must most supply(-them)

ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ
as owing(-it) and to-the causes of-the to-be (it-is)-nobler being than
ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ
to-ourselves in this to-supply(-it) and honor and to-parents just-as
θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ
to-gods not every(-honor) but nor for the same to-father and
μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,
to-mother nor again the of-the wise-man or the of-the general
ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ
but the paternal likewise and also maternal and to-every and
τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ
the elder honor according-to age by-rising-up and
κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ
by-seating and the such toward comrades and again and
ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι
brothers frankness and of-all-things community and to-kinsmen
δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν
and and to-tribesmen and to-fellow-citizens and to-the rest all
ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ
always one-must-try the proper to-assign and to-compare the(-things)
ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ
to-each belonging according-to kinship and virtue or
χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν
usefulness of-the indeed then same-kind easier (is)-the comparison of-the
δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο
and differing more-laborious not indeed through at-least this
ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
one-must-desist but as — it-may-be-possible so one-must-distinguish

Friendships for use or pleasure may end when these fail, but a man deceived about a friend's character has a just complaint. When a friend becomes wicked, one should try to help him if he can be helped. When of two boyhood friends one stays a child in mind, they cannot stay friends, but something is still owed for the former intimacy.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ
it-has and a-difficulty also about the to-break-off the friendships or not
πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ
with the(-ones) not remaining(-the-same) or with indeed the(-ones) through the
χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν,
useful or the pleasant friends being when no-longer these they-have
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν
(is-it)-nothing strange to-break-off of-those for they-were friends which
ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις,
having-failed (it-is)-reasonable the not to-love might-complain and — one
εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ
if through the useful or the pleasant loving(-him) he-pretended(-it-was) through
τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ
the character as for at (the)-beginning we-said most differences
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι
arise for-the friends when not alike they-think and are
φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι
friends when indeed then is-deceived one and supposes to-be-loved
διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν
through the character nothing such that(-one) doing himself
αἰτιῶτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως
he-would-blame — when but by the of-that(-one) pretense
ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον
he-is-deceived (it-is)-just to-complain-of the deceiver and more

ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ
than of-the(-ones) the coinage debasing in-so-far-as about
τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία. ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν,
a-more-valuable(-thing) the villainy if but one-accepts(-him) as good
γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον;
he-becomes and wicked and seems(-so) (is-it)-then still one-must-love(-him)
ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν;
or (is-it)-not possible if-indeed not all-things (are)-lovable but the-good
οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον
nor and lovable (is)-the evil nor must(-one-love-it) a-lover-of-evil
γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ'
for not one-must to-be nor to-be-likened to-a-base(-man) it-has-been-said and
ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον;
that the like to-the like (is)-dear whether then at-once must-one-break-off
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
or not with-all but with-the incurable in the wickedness
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ
capacity-for-correction but having rather one-must-help in the character than
τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον.
the property in-so-far-as (it-is)-better and to-the friendship more-proper
δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν·
it-would-seem and — the(-man) breaking-off nothing strange to-do
οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν
not for to-the such(-man) a-friend he-was changed then unable
ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ'
to-restore(-him) he-withdraws if but the-one indeed should-remain the-other and
ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ,
more-decent should-become and much should-differ in-the virtue
ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ
(is-it)-then must-one-treat(-him-as) a-friend or (is-it)-not possible in great
δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς
and distance most clear (it)-becomes such-as in the childhood

φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ
friendships if for the-one indeed should-remain in-the understanding a-child the-other
δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ'
and a-man should-be such-as (the)-best how — could-they-be friends neither
ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι;
pleased with-the same-things nor delighting and being-pained
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ
nor for about one-another these-things will-belong to-them without and
τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ
these not it-was(-possible) friends to-be to-live-together for not
οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν
possible — it-has-been-said and about these (is-it)-then then (that)-in-no-way
ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει
otherwise toward him must-one-be-disposed than if not he-had-been
φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης
a-friend ever or one-must remembrance to-have of-the former
συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα
intimacy and just-as for-friends rather than for-strangers we-think
δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον
one-must do-favors so also to-the former(-friends) one-must-assign
τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι'
something through the former friendship when not through
ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.
excess of-wickedness the-breaking-off take-place

The marks of friendship seem to come from a man's relation to himself. The good man is of one mind with himself, wishes and does good for his own sake, spends time with himself gladly, and is his own friend, for a friend is another self. Bad men are at variance with themselves, flee themselves, and some even destroy themselves.

τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς
the friendly(-relations) and the toward the neighbors and (those)-by-which
αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
the friendships are-defined seem from the(-relations) toward oneself
ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ
to-have-come they-define for (as)-a-friend the(-man) wishing and
πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν
doing the-goods or the apparent(-goods) of-that(-one) for-the-sake or the(-man)
βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ
wishing to-be and to-live the friend of-him for-the-sake which-precisely
αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ
the mothers toward the children have-felt and of-the friends the(-ones)
προσκεκρουκότες. οἷς δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ
having-quarreled others and the(-one) spending-time-together and the-same-things
αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ
choosing or the(-one) grieving-with and rejoicing-with the
φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει.
friend most and also this about the mothers happens
τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ
of-these and by-one also the friendship they-define toward oneself and
τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς,
of-these each to-the decent(-man) belongs to-the and rest
ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ
in-so-far-as such they-suppose(-themselves) to-be it-seems and just-as

εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος
has-been-said (that)-measure of-each the virtue and the excellent-man
εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
to-be this-one for is-of-one-mind with-himself and the same-things
ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ
he-desires with all the soul and he-wishes indeed for-himself
τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ
the-goods and the apparent(-goods) and does(-them) of-the for good(-man)
τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ
the-good to-work-out and of-himself for-the-sake of-the for intellectual(-part)
χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται
for-the-sake which-precisely each to-be seems and to-live and he-wishes
ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ.
himself and to-be-preserved and most this by-which he-thinks
ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ
good for for-the excellent-man (is)-the to-be each and for-himself
βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς
wishes the-goods having-become and another chooses no-one
πάντ' ἔχειν (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλ' ὢν
all-things to-have has for even now the god the-good but being
ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος
what — ever he-is it-would-seem and — the thinking(-part) each
εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ
to-be or most to-spend-time-together and the such(-man) with-himself
βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων
wishes pleasantly for it he-does of-the both for things-done
ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
delightful (are)-the memories and of-the future (his)-hopes
ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ'
(are)-good the such and (are)-pleasant and of-objects-of-contemplation and
εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ'
he-abounds in-the thought he-grieves-with both and rejoices-with most

ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ
with-himself always for is the same-thing painful both and
ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς
pleasant and not at-different-times different unrepentant for so
εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ
to-say by-the indeed toward himself each of-these to-belong to-the
ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν
decent(-man) toward and the friend to-be-disposed just-as toward himself
(ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων
is for the friend another self also the friendship (of)-these
εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.
to-be something seems and friends (are-those)-to-whom these belong
πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω
toward himself and whether there-is or not there-is friendship let-be-dismissed
ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ
for the present it-would-seem and — in-this to-be friendship in-so-far-as
ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ
there-are two or more from the things-said and because the excess
τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται δὲ
of-the friendship to-the(-friendship) toward oneself is-likened appear and
τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις.
the things-said also to-the many to-belong although being base
ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν
whether then in-so-far-as both they-please themselves and suppose(-themselves)
ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε
decent to-be in-this they-share them since of-the at-least
κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ'
utterly base and impious-doers none these belong but
οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται
not-even appear(-to) nearly and nor to-the base they-are-at-variance
γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ
for with-themselves and other-things indeed they-desire other-things and

βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν
they-wish such-as the uncontrolled they-choose for instead-of the
δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα·
seeming to-themselves good to-be the pleasant harmful being
οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ
the(-others) and again through cowardice and laziness shrink from-the
πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς
to-do what they-think for-themselves best to-be (those)-by-whom
δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν
and many and terrible-things have-been-done also through the wickedness
μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς.
are-hated and flee the living and destroy themselves
ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς
seek and the wicked with whom they-will-spend-the-days themselves
δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν,
but they-flee they-remember for many and unpleasant(-things)
καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων
and such other-things they-expect by themselves being with others
δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν
but being they-forget nothing and lovable having nothing
φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν
friendly they-feel toward themselves nor indeed rejoice-with
οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν
nor grieve-with the such themselves is-in-revolt for of-them
ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν
the soul and the-one indeed through wickedness grieves abstaining
τινων, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ'
from-some-things the-other and takes-pleasure and the-one indeed hither the-other and
ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα
thither pulls just-as tearing-apart if but not possible — at-the-same-time
λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται
to-be-pained and to-take-pleasure but after a-little at-least he-is-pained

ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι
that he-took-pleasure and not — he-would-wish pleasant these to-become
αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται
to-him of-regret for the base are-full not indeed appears
ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ
the base(-man) not-even toward himself in-a-friendly-way to-be-disposed through
τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν
the nothing to-have lovable if indeed the so to-be-disposed
λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως
very is wretched one-must-avoid the wickedness with-all-one's-strength
καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
and one-must-try decent to-be so for also toward himself
φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.
in-a-friendly-way — he-would-be-disposed and to-another a-friend would-become

V · GOODWILL

Goodwill resembles friendship but is not friendship, since it can be felt for strangers and go unnoticed, and it lacks intensity and desire. It arises suddenly, as for competitors in games. It seems a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is of love, and may become friendship with time and intimacy.

ἡ δ' εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι
the and goodwill to-a-friendly(-thing) indeed resembles not indeed it-is
γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ
at-least friendship arises for goodwill even toward unknown(-people) and
λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται.
unnoticed friendship but not and before and these-things have-been-said
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν,
but nor loving is(-it) not for it-has intensity nor desire
τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ
for-the loving but these follow and the indeed loving (is)-with

συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ
familiarity the but goodwill even from a-sudden(-moment) as also about
τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται
the competitors happens well-disposed for toward-them they-become
καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ
and they-wish-with(-them) would-help-in and — nothing which-precisely
γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως
for we-said suddenly well-disposed they-become and superficially
στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ
they-love it-seems indeed a-beginning of-friendship to-be just-as of-the
ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ
to-love the through the sight pleasure not for having-been-pleased-first by-the
ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
form no-one loves the(-man) but delighting in-the form not-at-all more
ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας
loves but when even absent he-longs-for(-them) and the presence
ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους
desires so indeed also friends not possible — to-be not well-disposed
γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν·
having-become the(-ones) and well-disposed not-at-all more love
βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι,
they-wish for only the-goods (for-those)-to-whom they-are well-disposed
συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.
would-help-in and — nothing nor be-troubled on-behalf-of them
διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν,
therefore transferring(-the-term) might-say one — it idle to-be friendship
χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι
being-prolonged but and into familiarity arriving to-become
φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ·
friendship not the(-one) through the useful nor the(-one) through the pleasant
οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς
nor for goodwill on these arises the indeed for (one)-benefited

ἀνθ᾽ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν·
in-return-for what he-received renders the goodwill the just-things doing
ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν᾽ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας
the(-one) and wishing someone to-prosper hope having of-plenty
δι᾽ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ᾽ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
through that(-one) not seems well-disposed to-that(-one) to-be but rather
ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα
to-himself just-as nor a-friend if he-courts him through some
χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ᾽ εὔνοια δι᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα
use generally and goodwill through virtue and decency some
γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι
arises when to-someone appears noble someone or brave or something
τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.
such just-as also in-the-case-of the competitors we-said

VI · CONCORD

Concord is not mere agreement of opinion, but agreement about practical matters, as when citizens agree that offices should be elective or that Pittacus should rule. It is political friendship, found among decent men, whose wishes stay fixed and do not ebb and flow like a strait. Bad men cannot agree, each grasping and shirking.

φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ
friendly and also the concord appears therefore not
ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν
it-is identity-of-opinion this indeed for even (to-those)-ignorant-of
ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν
one-another might-belong — nor the(-ones) about anything-whatever
ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν
of-one-mind to-be-in-concord they-say such-as the(-ones) about the
οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν),
heavenly(-things) not for (is)-friendly the about these being-in-concord

ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
but the cities to-be-in-concord they-say when about the
συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται
advantageous(-things) they-are-of-one-mind and the-same-things choose
καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
and do the in-common resolved about the practicable(-things)
δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
indeed they-are-in-concord and of-these about the(-ones) in magnitude and
ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις,
possible to-both to-belong or to-all such-as the cities
ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν
when to-all it-seems-good the offices elective to-be or to-ally-with
Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.
(the)-Lacedaemonians or to-rule Pittacus when also he-himself was-willing
ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς
when but each himself wishes just-as the(-men) in the
Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ
Phoenissae they-are-in-faction not for it-is being-in-concord the
αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ
same-thing each to-think whatever but the(-thinking-it) in the
αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς
same(-person) such-as when both the people and the decent the
ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.
best to-rule(-wish) so for to-all comes what they-aim-at
πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ
political indeed friendship appears the concord just-as also
λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ
it-is-called about the advantageous(-things) for it-is and the(-things)
εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν
into the life coming is and the such concord among
τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
the decent these for both with-themselves are-in-concord and

ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων
with-one-another on the same(-ground) being so to-say of-the such
γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ
for remain the wishes and not flow-back(-and-forth) just-as
εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα,
a-strait they-wish both the just-things and the advantageous-things
τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν
of-these and also in-common they-aim-at the and base not possible
τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι,
— to-be-in-concord except to little(-extent) just-as also friends to-be
πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις
of-graspingness aiming-at in the benefits in and the labors
καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος
and the public-services falling-short for-himself and each
βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ
wishing these-things the neighbor he-scrutinizes and hinders not
γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν
for (they)-watching the common(-good) is-ruined it-happens then
αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς
for-them to-be-in-faction one-another indeed compelling themselves
δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
and not wishing the just-things to-do

Benefactors love those they benefit more than the reverse. Most people say it is like a creditor's concern for his debtor, but Aristotle finds a natural cause: a maker loves his work, as poets love their poems, because existence lies in activity and the work is the maker in activity. The noble deed endures, while the use passes.

οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν
the and benefactors the benefited seem more to-love
ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον
than the well treated the(-ones) having-done(-it) and as contrary-to reason
γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι
happening it-is-inquired-into to-the indeed then most it-appears that
οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν
the-ones indeed owe to-the-others and it-is-owed just-as then
ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι
in-the-case-of the loans the indeed owing wish not to-exist
οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς
(those)-to-whom they-owe the and having-lent even care-for the
τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας
of-the owing(-men) safety so also the(-men) having-benefited
βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς
to-wish to-exist the receivers as going-to-get-back the
χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι.
favors to-the(-others) and not to-be a-concern the to-repay
Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ
Epicharmus indeed then perhaps — would-say these-things to-say them from
πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ
bad(-side) looking it-seems and like-human(-nature) forgetful for
οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.
(are)-the many and more well to-be-treated than to-do aim-at

δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδ'
it-would-seem and — more-natural to-be the cause and not-even
ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ
similar the about the lenders not for there-is loving toward
ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα·
those but of-the to-be-preserved a-wish of-the recovery for-the-sake
οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας
the and well having-done love and cherish the treated
κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν.
even-if in-nothing they-be useful nor in later(-time) would-become —
ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς
which-precisely also in-the-case-of the craftsmen has-happened every(-one)
γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν
for the his-own work loves more than would-be-loved —
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο
by the work ensouled having-become most and perhaps this
περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ
about the poets happens they-overlove for these the
οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ
own poems loving(-them) just-as children such indeed
ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς
seems also the(-case) of-the benefactors the for well treated(-one)
ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ
work is of-them this indeed they-love more than the
ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι
work the(-one) having-made(-it) of-this and (the)-cause (is)-that the to-be
πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ (τῷ ζῆν
for-all (is)-choiceworthy and lovable we-are and by-activity by-the living
γὰρ καὶ πράττειν), ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον
for and acting by-activity and the(-one) having-made the work
ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι.
is in-a-way he-loves indeed the work because also the to-be

τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ
this and (is)-natural what for he-is in-capacity this in-activity
τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ
the work reveals at-the-same-time and also for-the indeed benefactor
καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ
(is)-noble the(-thing) in the action so-that (he)-delights in whom
τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ᾽
this(-is) for-the but receiver nothing noble in the doer but
εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν.
if-anything advantageous this and less (is)-pleasant and lovable
ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ
pleasant and is of-the indeed present the activity of-the and
μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον
future the hope of-the and past the memory most-pleasant
δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως.
and (is)-the(-thing) according-to the activity and lovable likewise
τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ
for-the indeed then (one)-having-done(-it) remains the work the noble for
πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ
(is)-long-lasting for-the but receiver the useful passes-away the
τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ
both memory of-the indeed noble(-things) (is)-pleasant of-the but useful not
πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν.
altogether or less the expectation and the-reverse to-be seems
καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ
and the indeed loving to-making resembles the to-be-loved and to-the
πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ
to-be-acted-on to-the(-ones) superior and in the action follows the
φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα
to-love and the friendly(-things) further and the(-things) laboriously come-about
πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ
all more love such-as also the money the(-ones)

κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ
having-acquired(-it) than-the(-ones) having-inherited(-it) it-seems and the indeed well
πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ
to-be-treated without-labor to-be the(-other) and well to-do laborious through
ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα
these and also the mothers (are)-fonder-of-their-children more-laborious
γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν.
for (is)-the begetting and more they-know that (they-are)-their-own
δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
it-would-seem and — this also to-the benefactors proper to-be

VIII · SELF-LOVE

Should a man love himself most? Those who use self-lover as a reproach mean the man who grabs money, honors, and bodily pleasures. But the man who gratifies the most authoritative part of himself, his intellect, is a self-lover in a nobler sense: he will give up money for friends and country, even die for them, and take the noble for himself.

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα
it-is-puzzled-over and also whether one-must love oneself most
ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ'
or another some(-one) they-censure for the(-ones) themselves most
ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι,
loving and as in a-disgraceful(-sense) self-lovers they-call(-them)
δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν,
seems and the indeed base(-man) of-himself for-the-sake all-things to-do
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον —
and the-more — more-wicked he-be the-more more
ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει —
they-accuse indeed him such-as that nothing from himself he-does

ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ,
the but decent(-man) through the noble(-acts) and the-more — better he-be
μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ
more through the noble and of-a-friend for-the-sake the and his-own
παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ
he-passes-over with-the arguments and with-these the facts disagree not
ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα
without-reason they-say for one-must love most the most
φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται
friend friend and (is)-most the(-one) wishing for-whom he-wishes
τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ'
the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake even if no-one will-know these and
ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ
belong most to-him toward himself and the rest indeed
πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ'
all by-which the friend is-defined it-has-been-said for that from
αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει.
him all the friendly(-things) also toward the others extend
καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ
and the proverbs and all agree such-as the(-sayings)
μία ψυχή καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης
one soul and common the(-things) of-friends and equality (is)-friendship
καὶ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν
and the-knee than-the-shin (is)-nearer all for these toward himself
μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ
most — would-belong most for (he-is)-a-friend to-himself and
φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως
one-must-love indeed most oneself it-is-puzzled-over indeed reasonably
ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως
which one-ought to-follow both having the credibility perhaps
οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν
then the such one-must of-the arguments distinguish and determine

ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ
in so-far-as each and how they-are-true if indeed we-should-grasp the
φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον.
self-loving how each speak(-of-it) perhaps — would-become clear
οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι
the(-ones) indeed then into reproach bringing it self-lovers call
τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι
the(-ones) to-themselves assigning the larger(-share) in money
καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ
and honors and pleasures the bodily these for the
πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα
many desire and have-been-eager about them as best
ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα
being therefore also fought-over they-are the(-ones) indeed about these
πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι
grasping gratify the appetites and generally the passions
καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί·
and the irrational(-part) of-the soul such and are the many
διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
therefore also the appellation has-arisen from the prevailing(-type)
φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται.
base being justly indeed to-those thus self-loving it-is-reproached
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ᾽ αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι
that and the(-ones) the such to-themselves assigning are-accustomed
λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ
to-call the many self-lovers (is)-not unclear if for one always
σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων
should-be-eager the just-things to-do himself most of-all
ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς
or the temperate-things or any-whatever others of-the(-things) according-to the
ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς
virtues and generally always the noble for-himself should-secure no-one

ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ
will-call this(-man) a-self-lover nor blame(-him) it-would-seem but — the
τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ
such(-man) more to-be a-self-lover he-assigns at-any-rate to-himself
τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ
the noblest and most good-things and gratifies of-himself the
κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ
most-authoritative(-part) and in-all-things this obeys just-as and
καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ
also a-city the most-authoritative(-element) most to-be seems and
πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ
every other system so also a-man and a-self-lover indeed
μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
most (is)-the(-man) this loving and this gratifying
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν
and self-controlled and and uncontrolled is-called by-the to-master(-of) the
νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέναι
intellect or not as this each being and to-have-acted
δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.
seem themselves and voluntarily the(-acts) with reason most
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον,
that indeed then this each is or most (is)-not unclear
καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ.
and that the decent(-man) most this loves
διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος
therefore a-self-lover most — he-would-be according-to another kind
τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ
than-the reproached(-one) and differing so-much as-much-as the
κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι
according-to reason living from-the according-to passion and desiring
ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
either the noble or the seeming to-be-advantageous the indeed then

περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες
about the noble actions exceptionally being-eager all
ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων
welcome and praise all and striving
πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν
for the noble and straining the noblest-things to-do
κοινῇ τ᾽ ἂν πάντ᾽ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ
in-common both — all would-be the needful(-things) and privately for-each
τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
the greatest of-the goods if-indeed the virtue such is
ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς
so-that the indeed good(-man) must a-self-lover be and for himself
ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει),
will-profit the noble-things doing and the others will-benefit
τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς
the but wicked(-man) not must he-will-harm for both himself and the
πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν
neighbors base passions following for-the wicked indeed then
διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικής,
are-discordant what he-must do and what he-does the but decent(-man)
ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ
what he-must these also does every for intellect chooses the
βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ.
best for-itself the and decent(-man) obeys the intellect
ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα
(it-is)-true and about the excellent(-man) also the of-the friends for-the-sake
πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ
many-things to-do and of-the fatherland even-if it-be-necessary
ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
to-die-for(-them) he-will-give-up for both money and honors
καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ
and generally the fought-over goods securing for-himself

τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον
the noble a-little for time to-take-pleasure intensely rather
ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς
he-would-choose — than a-long(-time) mildly and to-live nobly
ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν
a-year than many years indifferently and one action
καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ'
noble and great than many and small the(-ones) and
ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ
dying-for(-others) this perhaps happens they-choose indeed
μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ'
a-great noble(-thing) for-themselves and money they-would-give-up — on
ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
condition-that more will-get the friends comes for to-the
μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον
indeed friend money to-himself and the noble the indeed greater
ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς
good to-himself he-assigns and about honors and also offices
ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται·
the same way all for to-the friend these he-will-give-up
καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ
noble for to-him this and praiseworthy reasonably indeed he-seems
σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν.
excellent to-be instead-of all-things choosing the noble
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι
it-is-possible and also actions to-the friend to-give-up and to-be
κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι.
nobler than-the himself to-do(-it) the cause for-the friend to-become
ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται
in all indeed the praiseworthy(-things) the excellent(-man) appears

ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον
to-himself of-the noble more assigning so indeed then a-self-lover
εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
to-be one-must just-as has-been-said as but the many not one-ought

IX · DOES THE HAPPY MAN NEED FRIENDS?

Some say the self-sufficient need no friends, but it would be strange to give the happy man every good and leave out friends, for man is a political creature. The good man delights in the good actions of a friend, which he can see more easily than his own, and since a friend is another self, he needs to perceive his friend's existence as his own.

ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται
it-is-disputed and also about the happy(-man) whether he-will-need
φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις
friends or not nothing for they-say need of-friends for-the blessed
καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις
and self-sufficient belong for to-them the-goods self-sufficient
οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
then being of-nothing (they)-need-in-addition the and friend another
αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν
self being to-provide what through himself he-is-unable whence

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;
when the god well gives what need of-friends

ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι
it-seems and strange the all-things assigning the-goods to-the happy(-man)
φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον
friends not to-assign which seems of-the external goods greatest

εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
to-be if both of-a-friend more it-is the well to-do than to-be-treated(-well)
καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον
and is of-the good(-man) and of-the virtue the to-benefit (it-is)-nobler
δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων
and well to-do friends than-strangers the(-ones) well to-be-treated
δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν
will-need the excellent(-man) therefore also it-is-inquired whether in
εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ
good-fortunes more there-is-need of-friends than in misfortunes as also
τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν
the unfortunate(-man) needing the(-ones) going-to-benefit(-him) and the
εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ
fortunate (those)-whom well they-will-treat strange and perhaps also the
μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ'
solitary to-make the blessed(-man) no-one for would-choose — by
αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
himself the all-things to-have goods political for (is)-the man
καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ'
and to-live-together naturally-disposed also to-the happy(-man) indeed this
ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς
belongs the(-things) for by-the nature good he-has (it-is)-clear and that
μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν
with friends and decent(-people) (it-is)-better than with strangers and the
τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων.
chance(-comers) to-spend-the-days there-is-need then for-the happy(-man) of-friends
τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ
what then do-they-mean the first(-party) and how are-they-right or
ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι;
(is-it)-that the many friends think the useful to-be
τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ
of-the such indeed then nothing will-need the blessed(-man) since

τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ,
the-goods belong to-him nor indeed of-the(-ones) through the pleasant
ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται
or to little(-extent) pleasant for the life being(-already) nothing needs
ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων
imported pleasure not needing and the such friends
οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν
not he-seems to-need friends the but not is perhaps true at
ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις
(the)-beginning for it-has-been-said that the happiness an-activity some
ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει
is the and activity (it-is)-clear that comes-to-be and not belongs
ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν
just-as a-possession some if and the to-be-happy is in the living
καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ
and being-active of-the and good(-man) the activity (is)-excellent and
ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ
pleasant in itself just-as at (the)-beginning was-said is and
καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς
also the own(-thing) of-the pleasant(-things) to-contemplate and more the
πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
neighbors we-are-able than ourselves and the of-those actions than
τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
the own the of-the excellent and actions friends being
ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει
(are)-pleasant to-the good both for they-have the by-the nature
ἡδέα)· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται,
pleasant(-qualities) the blessed(-man) indeed friends such will-need
εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας,
if-indeed to-contemplate he-chooses actions decent and his-own
τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.
such and (are)-the(-actions) of-the good friend being

οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. μονώτῃ μὲν
they-think and one-must pleasantly live the happy(-man) for-a-solitary indeed
οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν
then hard (is)-the life not for easy by oneself to-be-active
συνεχῶς, μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται
continuously with others and and toward others easier it-will-be
οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ὃ
then the activity more-continuous pleasant being in itself which
δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ
must about the blessed(-man) be the for excellent(-man) in-so-far-as
σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ᾽
(he-is)-excellent in-the according-to virtue actions delights in-the and
ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς
from vice is-vexed just-as the musical(-man) in-the beautiful
μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο
tunes takes-pleasure at and the base is-pained might-come-about
δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν
and — also training some of-the virtue from the living-together
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον
with-the good just-as also Theognis says more-naturally
δ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ
and (to-those)-considering it-seems the excellent friend to-the excellent(-man)
τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
by-the nature choiceworthy to-be the for by-the nature good
εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ᾽
it-has-been-said that to-the excellent(-man) good and pleasant is in
αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,
itself the and living they-define for-the animals by-capacity of-perception
ἀνθρώποις δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς
for-men and of-perception or of-thought the and capacity to

τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ·
the activity is-referred the and decisive(-thing) (is)-in the activity
ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν.
it-seems indeed the living to-be strictly the to-perceive or thinking
τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων·
the and living (is)-of-the in itself good and pleasant(-things)
ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ
definite for the and definite (is)-of-the of-the-good nature the
δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν
and by-the nature good (is)-also to-the decent(-man) therefore it-seems to-all
ἡδὺ εἶναι· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ
pleasant to-be not one-must and take(-as-an-example) a-wicked life and
διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη,
corrupted nor in pains indefinite for (is)-the such
καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις
just-as the(-things) belonging to-it in the following(-discussions)
δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν
and about the pain it-will-be clearer if and itself the living
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι
(is)-good and pleasant it-seems and also from the all desiring
αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις
of-it and most the decent and blessed to-these
γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
for the life (is)-most-choiceworthy and the of-these most-blessed
ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι
life the and seeing(-man) that he-sees perceives and the hearing(-man) that
ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
he-hears and the walking(-man) that he-walks and in-the-case-of the others
ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε
likewise there-is something the perceiving that we-are-active so-that
ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν,
if we-perceive that we-perceive and-if we-think that we-think

τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ
the and that we-perceive or we-think (is-to-perceive)-that we-are the
γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι
for to-be was perceiving or thinking the and to-perceive that
ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή,
one-lives (is)-of-the pleasant(-things) in itself by-nature for good (is)-life
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ),
the and good belonging in oneself to-perceive (is)-pleasant
αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ
choiceworthy and the living and most to-the good because the
εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ
to-be good is to-them and pleasant being-conscious for
τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει
of-the in itself good take-pleasure as and toward himself is-disposed
ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς
the excellent(-man) (so)-also toward the friend another for self
ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν
the friend is just-as then the himself to-be choiceworthy
ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.
is for-each so also the the friend or nearly(-so)
τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
the and to-be was choiceworthy through the to-perceive himself good
ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν.
being the and such perception (is)-pleasant in itself
συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο
to-be-conscious then one-must also of-the friend that he-is this
δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων
and would-come-about — in the living-together and sharing words
καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ
and thought so for — would-seem the living-together in-the-case-of
τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
the men to-be-meant and not just-as in-the-case-of the

βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ
cattle the in the same(-place) to-feed if indeed for-the
μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει
blessed(-man) the to-be choiceworthy is in itself good by-the nature
ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν,
being and pleasant similar and also the of-the friend is(-being)
κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ
and-so the friend of-the choiceworthy(-things) would-be what and is for-him
αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται.
choiceworthy this must belong to-him or in-this deficient be-will-be
δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.
there-will-be-need then for-the (one)-going-to-be-happy of-friends excellent

X · HOW MANY FRIENDS?

Should one make as many friends as possible? Of the useful, a few suffice, and of the pleasant, a few, like seasoning in food. Of good friends there is a limit, as with a city: as many as one can live with. Celebrated friendships come in pairs, and the man of many friends is a friend to none, except in a civic way.

ἆρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ
whether then as many-as-possible friends must-one-make or just-as
ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ μήτε
in-the-case-of the hospitality aptly to-have-been-said it-seems neither
πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει
with-many-guests nor without-guests also in-the-case-of the friendship it-will-fit
μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν;
neither friendless to-be nor again with-many-friends to excess
τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν
to-the(-friends) indeed indeed for use even very would-seem to-fit
τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ
the thing-said many for to-serve-in-return (is)-laborious and not

ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν
sufficient (is)-the life it to-do the more indeed than-the(-ones)
πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς
for the own life sufficient (are)-superfluous and hindrances to
τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς
the nobly living not-at-all then there-is-need of-them also the(-ones) for
ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα.
pleasure and suffice few just-as in the food the seasoning
τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν,
the and excellent(-friends) (should-they-be)-whether most in number
ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως;
or is-there some limit also of-a-friendly number just-as of-a-city
οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ
neither for from ten men would-become — a-city nor from
δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν
ten myriads still a-city is(-it) the and quantity not is
ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων.
perhaps one some(-number) but any the between some fixed(-points)
καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ
and of-friends indeed there-is a-number fixed and perhaps the
πλεῖστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει
most with whom — could one live-together this for seemed
φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν
most-friendly to-be that and not possible — with-many to-live-together
καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ
and to-distribute oneself not unclear further and those-too must
ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων
with-one-another friends be if they-are-to all with one-another
συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν.
spend-the-days this and (is)-laborious among many to-be-the-case
χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν
hard and becomes also the to-rejoice-with and the to-grieve-with

οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ
intimately with-many likely for to-coincide at-the-same-time with-one
μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει
indeed to-be-pleased-with with-another and to-be-grieved-with perhaps then well it-is
μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι
not to-seek as most-many-friended to-be but so-many as-many-as
εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν
for the living-together (are)-sufficient nor for to-be-possible it-would-seem —
πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων·
to-many to-be a-friend intensely therefore not-even to-love more(-than-one)
ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς
an-excess for some to-be wishes of-friendship this and (is)-toward
ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν
one and the intense indeed toward few so and to-be(-the-case)
ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι
seems also in-the-case-of the facts not become for friends
πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι
many according-to the comradely friendship the(-pairs) and celebrated-in-song
ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως
in twos are-spoken-of the and many-friended and with-all intimately
ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς,
meeting to-no-one seem to-be friends except in-a-civic-way
οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι
whom also they-call obsequious in-a-civic-way indeed then it-is-possible
πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς
with-many to-be a-friend and not obsequious being but as truly
ἐπιεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι
decent through virtue but and through themselves not it-is(-possible)
πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.
toward many (it-is)-desirable and even few to-find such

Friends are needed in good fortune and in bad. In misfortune their presence lightens grief, though a manly man will not make friends share his pain. One should invite friends to share good fortune eagerly and bad fortune reluctantly, and go to friends in misfortune unbidden, but be slow to be benefited by their good fortune.

πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ
whether and in good-fortunes more of-friends (there-is)-need or
ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε
in misfortunes in both for they-are-sought-after the both
γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες
for unfortunate need help the and fortunate
συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ
companions and (those)-whom well they-will-treat they-wish for
εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις,
well to-do more-necessary indeed indeed in the misfortunes
διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς
therefore the useful(-ones) here are-needed nobler and in the
εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ
good-fortunes therefore also the decent they-seek these for
αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν.
(it-is)-more-choiceworthy to-benefit and with these to-spend-time
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ
is for also the presence itself of-the friends pleasant both
ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται
in the good-fortunes and in the misfortunes are-lightened
γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν
for the grieving grieving-with(-them) the friends therefore even
ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν,
one-might-be-puzzled one whether just-as of-a-burden they-take-a-share

ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ
or this indeed not the presence but of-them pleasant being and
ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ
the thought of-the to-grieve-with lesser the pain makes whether
μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,
indeed then through these or through another something they-are-lightened
ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε
let-be-dismissed to-happen and anyway appears the thing-said it-seems
δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι.
and the presence mixed some of-them to-be
αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε
itself indeed for the to-see the friends (is)-pleasant otherwise both
καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ
and to-one-in-misfortune and comes-about some help toward the not
λυπεῖσθαι (παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει
to-be-pained consoling for (is)-the friend both by-the sight
καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος
and by-the word if he-be tactful he-knows for the character
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται)· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον
and at what he-takes-pleasure and is-pained the and grieving
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ
to-perceive at the his-own misfortunes (is)-painful everyone for
φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν
avoids of-pain the-cause to-be to-the friends therefore the indeed
ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους
manly the nature take-care to-make-share-pain the friends
αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις
with-themselves and-if not he-be-exceedingly-beyond in-the painlessness the to-those
γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ
arising pain not he-endures(-it) wholly and fellow-lamenters not
προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια
he-admits through the not-even himself to-be given-to-lament womenfolk

δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι,
and also the such men in-the(-ones) groaning-with(-them) delight
καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ'
and love(-them) as friends and fellow-grievers to-imitate but
ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς
in all-things one-must (it-is)-clear that the better(-man) the and in the
εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
good-fortunes of-the friends presence the both spending-of-time pleasant
ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
has and the thought that they-take-pleasure at the his-own goods
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς
therefore it-would-seem — one-must to indeed the good-fortunes invite the
φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ
friends eagerly beneficent for to-be (is)-noble to but
τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ
the misfortunes hesitating to-share for as least one-must
τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. μάλιστα δὲ
of-the evils whence the enough I being-unfortunate(-am) most and
παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ'
one-must-summon(-them) when they-are-going-to a-little being-troubled greatly
αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν
him to-benefit to-go and conversely perhaps it-befits to indeed
τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ
the unfortunate unbidden and eagerly (it-is)-of-a-friend for
εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας·
well to-do and most the(-ones) in need and not having-asked
ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας
for-both for (it-is)-nobler and pleasanter to but the good-fortunes
συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία
cooperating indeed eagerly also for for these (there-is)-need
φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ
of-friends toward good-cheer but leisurely not for (is)-noble the

προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ
to-be-eager to-be-benefited the-appearance but of-disagreeableness in the
διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ
to-reject perhaps one-must-beware sometimes for it-happens the
παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται.
presence indeed of-the friends in all(-circumstances) choiceworthy appears

XII · LIVING TOGETHER

As lovers prize sight, friends prize living together, and each spends the days with his friends in what he loves most: drinking, dicing, exercising, hunting, or philosophizing. Bad men become worse through such friendship, good men better, for they take the impress of one another. Pleasure is to be discussed next.

ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν
whether then just-as for-the lovers the to-see most-desirable
ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς
is and rather they-choose this the sense than the
λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος
rest as according-to this most the love being
καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ
and arising so also for-the friends most-choiceworthy is the
συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
living-together a-partnership for (is)-the friendship and as toward himself
ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ
he-is-disposed so also toward the friend about himself and the
αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ
perception that he-is (is)-choiceworthy and about the friend indeed the
δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως
and activity comes-about of-it in the living-together so-that reasonably
τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ
this they-aim-at and what ever is for-each the to-be or

οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων
of-what for-the-sake they-choose the living in this with the friends
βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
they-wish to-spend-time therefore some indeed drink-together others and
συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν
dice-together others and exercise-together and hunt-together
ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ
or philosophize-together each in this spending-the-days what
τι περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν
— ever most they-love of-the(-things) in the life to-live-together
γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ
for wishing with the friends these-things they-do and
τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ
these they-share by-which they-think to-live-together it-becomes then the
μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων
indeed of-the base friendship wicked they-share for in-base-things
ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι
unstable being and wicked and become being-made-like
ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη
to-one-another the and of-the decent (is)-decent growing-together
ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες
with-the associations they-seem and also better to-become being-active
καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων
and correcting one-another they-take-the-impress for from one-another
οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλά.
(of-what) they-are-pleased-by whence of-noble(-men) indeed for from noble-things
περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον
about indeed then friendship to so-much let-it-have-been-said following
δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.
and — it-would-be to-discuss about pleasure

PLUTARCH

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΦΙΛΙΑΣ

On Having Many Friends

Socrates mocked Meno's swarm of virtues, and we, who lack one firm friendship, fear having too many. The desire for many friends works against friendship, as the famous pairs, Theseus and Peirithous, Orestes and Pylades, show it comes in two. A friend must be tested over the proverbial bushel of salt, and a bad friend, once taken, is hard to get rid of.

Μένωνα τὸν Θετταλὸν οἰόμενον ἐν λόγοις ἱκανῶς 1
Meno the Thessalian thinking in arguments sufficiently
γεγυμνάσθαι καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους
to-have-been-trained and this indeed the(-thing) by — Empedocles
λεγόμενον σοφίης ἐπ᾽ ἄκροισι θαμίζειν ἠρώτησεν ὁ
said of-wisdom on the-heights to-dwell asked —
Σωκράτης τί ἀρετή ἐστιν· ἀποκριναμένου δ᾽ ἰταμῶς ἐκείνου
Socrates what virtue is having-answered and boldly that(-man)
καὶ προχείρως ὅτι καὶ παιδός ἐστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ πρεσβύτου
and readily that both of-a-child there-is a-virtue and of-an-old-man
καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἰδιώτου καὶ
and of-a-man and of-a-woman and of-a-ruler and of-a-private-man and
δεσπότου καὶ θεράποντος, εὖ γ᾽ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι
of-a-master and of-a-servant well indeed said — Socrates that
μίαν ἀρετὴν αἰτηθεὶς σμῆνος ἀρετῶν κεκίνηκας, οὐ
one virtue having-been-asked-for a-swarm of-virtues you-have-stirred-up not
κακῶς τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι μηδεμίαν εἰδὼς ἀρετὴν ἄνθρωπος
badly inferring that no knowing virtue the-man
πολλὰς ὠνόμαζεν. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμῖν ἄν τις
many named whether then not also us — someone
ἐπιχλευάσειεν ὅτι μηδέπω μίαν φιλίαν κεκτημένοι βεβαίως
might-mock that not-yet one friendship having-acquired firmly
φοβούμεθα μὴ λάθωμεν εἰς πολυφιλίαν ἐμπεσόντες;
we-fear lest unawares into having-many-friends we-fall

σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρομεν ἀνθρώπου κολοβοῦ καὶ
nearly for nothing we-differ from-a-man maimed and
τυφλοῦ, φοβουμένου μὴ Βριάρεως ὁ ἑκατόγχειρ καὶ Ἄργος
blind fearing lest Briareus the hundred-handed and Argus
ὁ πανόπτης γένηται. καίτοι τόν γε παρὰ τῷ Μενάνδρῳ
the all-seeing he-become and-yet the at-least in — Menander
νεανίσκον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινοῦμεν εἰπόντα θαυμαστὸν ὅσον
youth exceedingly we-praise having-said wonderful how-much
νομίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστον, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν.
to-think a-good each(-one) if he-has of-a-friend (a)-shadow

2 ἐναντίον δὲ μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἥκιστα πρὸς
an-obstacle and with many others not least to
φιλίας κτῆσιν ἡ τῆς πολυφιλίας ὄρεξις, ὥσπερ
of-friendship acquisition the of-the having-many-friends desire just-as
ἔρως ἀκολάστων γυναικῶν τῷ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοῖς
a-passion of-licentious women by-the often and with-many
συμπλέκεσθαι τῶν πρώτων κρατεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος
being-entangled the first(-ones) to-hold not being-able
ἀμελουμένων καὶ ἀπορρεόντων· μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ὁ τῆς
being-neglected and slipping-away rather and just-as the —
Ὑψιπύλης τρόφιμος εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα καθίσας ἔδρεπεν
of-Hypsipyle nursling in the meadow having-sat plucked

ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ αἰρόμενος
one after another seizing
ἄγρευμ' ἀνθέων ἡδομένᾳ ψυχᾷ
a-catch of-flowers with-delighted soul
τὸ νήπιον ἄπληστον ἔχων,
the childish insatiable having

οὕτως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ φιλόκαινον καὶ ἀψίκορον
so each of-us through the love-of-novelty and fickleness
ὁ πρόσφατος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀνθῶν ἐπάγεται, καὶ μετατίθησι
the fresh always and blooming attracts and changes(-us)
πολλὰς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀτελεῖς ἀρχὰς πράττοντας φιλίας
many at-once and unfinished beginnings making of-friendship
καὶ συνηθείας, ἔρωτι τοῦ διωκομένου παρερχομένους τὸ
and of-intimacy through-love of-the pursued passing-by the
καταλαμβανόμενον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ ἀφ' ἑστίας
overtaken first indeed then just-as from (the)-hearth
ἀρξάμενοι τῆς τοῦ βίου φήμης ἣν ὑπὲρ φίλων βεβαίων
beginning from-the of-the life report which about friends steadfast
ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡμῖν, τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα
has-left to-us the long and ancient age (as)-witness
ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ
at-once of-the argument and counselor let-us-take in which according-to
ζεῦγος φιλίας λέγονται Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθους, Ἀχιλλεὺς
pair of-friendship are-named Theseus and Peirithous Achilles
καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φιντίας καὶ Δάμων,
and Patroclus Orestes and Pylades Phintias and Damon
Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας. σύννομον γὰρ ἡ φιλία
Epaminondas and Pelopidas a-pair-grazing for the friendship
ζῷον οὐκ ἀγελαῖόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κολοιῶδες, καὶ τὸ ἄλλον
a-creature not a-herding(-one) is nor jackdaw-like and the another
αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν φίλον καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἑταῖρον ἕτερον
self to-consider the friend and to-call(-him) comrade other
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ μέτρῳ φιλίας τῇ δυάδι χρωμένων. οὔτε γὰρ
nothing is than by-measure of-friendship the duality (of-men)-using neither for
δούλους οὔτε φίλους ἔστι κτήσασθαι πολλοὺς ἀπ' ὀλίγου
slaves nor friends is-it-possible to-acquire many from small
νομίσματος. τί οὖν νόμισμα φιλίας; εὔνοια καὶ χάρις
coinage what then (is)-the-coinage of-friendship goodwill and grace

μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς, ὧν οὐδὲν ἔχει σπανιώτερον ἡ φύσις. ὅθεν
with virtue of-which nothing has rarer the nature whence
τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖσθαι πρὸς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν,
the intensely loving and being-loved toward many not is(-possible)
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ ποταμοὶ πολλὰς σχίσεις καὶ κατατομὰς
but just-as the rivers many divisions and channels
λαμβάνοντες ἀσθενεῖς καὶ λεπτοὶ ῥέουσιν, οὕτω τὸ φιλεῖν
taking weak and thin flow so the to-love
ἐν ψυχῇ σφοδρὸν πεφυκὸς εἰς πολλοὺς μεριζόμενον
in (the)-soul intense being-by-nature into many being-divided
ἐξαμαυροῦται. διὸ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὸ φιλότεκνον τοῖς
is-dimmed therefore also of-the animals the love-of-offspring in-the
μονοτόκοις ἰσχυρότερον ἐμφύεται, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἀγαπητὸν
bearing-one-young stronger is-implanted and Homer a-beloved
υἱὸν ὀνομάζει μοῦνον τηλύγετον, τουτέστι τὸν τοῖς μήτ᾽
son calls only late-born that-is the(-son) to-the neither
ἔχουσιν ἕτερον γονεῦσι μήθ᾽ ἕξουσι γεγενημένον.
having another parents nor going-to-have born
3 τὸν δὲ φίλον ἡμεῖς μοῦνον μὲν οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι,
the and friend we only indeed not think-fit to-be
μετ᾽ ἄλλου δὲ τηλύγετός τις καὶ ὀψίγονος ἔστω, τὸν
with another but late-born some and late-begotten let-him-be the
θρυλούμενον ἐκεῖνον χρόνῳ τῶν ἁλῶν συγκατεδηδοκὼς
proverbial that in-time of-the salt having-eaten-through-with(-us)
μέδιμνον, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ φίλοι λεγόμενοι
a-bushel not just-as now many friends so-called
συμπιόντες ἅπαξ ἢ συσφαιρίσαντες ἢ συγκυβεύσαντες
having-drunk-together once or having-played-ball-together or having-diced-together
ἢ συγκαταλύσαντες, ἐκ πανδοκείου καὶ παλαίστρας καὶ
or having-lodged-together from an-inn and a-wrestling-school and
ἀγορᾶς φιλίαν συλλέγουσιν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων
a-market friendship they-collect in and the of-the rich

καὶ ἡγεμονικῶν οἰκίαις πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ θόρυβον
and powerful houses a-great crowd and din
ἀσπαζομένων καὶ δεξιουμένων καὶ δορυφορούντων
of-men-greeting and of-men-shaking-hands and attending-as-bodyguards
ὁρῶντες εὐδαιμονίζουσι τοὺς πολυφίλους. καίτοι πλείονάς
seeing they-count-happy the many-friended and-yet more
γε μυίας ἐν τοῖς ὀπτανείοις αὐτῶν ὁρῶσιν. ἀλλ' οὔθ'
at-least flies in the kitchens of-them they-see but neither
αὗται τῆς λιχνείας οὔτ' ἐκεῖνοι τῆς χρείας ἐπιλιπούσης
these the gluttony nor those the usefulness having-failed
παραμένουσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἀληθινὴ φιλία τρία ζητεῖ
stay-on since and the true friendship three(-things) seeks
μάλιστα, τὴν ἀρετὴν ὡς καλόν, καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν ὡς
most the virtue as noble and the intimacy as
ἡδύ, καὶ τὴν χρείαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδέξασθαι
pleasant and the usefulness as necessary one-must for accept(-him)
κρίναντα καὶ χαίρειν συνόντα καὶ χρῆσθαι δεόμενον,
having-judged(-him) and delight being-with(-him) and use(-him) needing(-it)
ἃ πάντα πρὸς τὴν πολυφιλίαν ὑπεναντιοῦται, καὶ
which all to the having-many-friends are-opposed and
μάλιστά πως τὸ κυριώτατον ἡ κρίσις), σκεπτέον
most in-a-way the most-important the judging one-must-consider
πρῶτον εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ δοκιμάσαι
first whether possible it-is in short time to-test
χορευτὰς συγχορευσομένους, ἐρέτας ὁμορροθήσοντας,
chorus-dancers going-to-dance-together rowers going-to-pull-together
οἰκέτας χρημάτων ἐπιτρόπους ἢ τέκνων παιδαγωγοὺς
household-slaves of-property stewards or of-children tutors

ἐσομένους, μήτι γε φίλους πολλοὺς εἰς ἀγῶνα πάσης
going-to-be not-to-speak at-least-of friends many for a-contest of-every
τύχης συναποδυσομένους, ὧν ἕκαστος αὐτός θ' αὑτόν
fortune going-to-strip-together of-whom each himself both himself

πράττων εὖ τίθησιν εἰς μέσον,
faring well puts in the-middle
τοῦ δυστυχοῦς τε λαγχάνων οὐκ ἄχθεται.
of-the unfortunate and getting-a-share not is-vexed

οὔτε ναῦς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσούτους ἕλκεται χειμῶνας εἰς θάλατταν,
neither a-ship for for so-many is-dragged storms into the-sea
οὔτε χωρίοις τριγχοὺς καὶ λιμέσι προβάλλουσιν ἕρκη καὶ
nor for-places walls and for-harbors they-throw-before fences and
χώματα τηλικούτους προσδεχόμενοι κινδύνους καὶ τοσούτους,
moles so-great expecting dangers and so-many
ὅσων ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλία καταφυγὴν καὶ βοήθειαν,
as-many-as promises friendship (of)-refuge and help
ὀρθῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἐξετασθεῖσα· τῶν δ' ἀνεξετάστως
rightly and firmly having-been-tested of-the(-ones) but untested
παραρρυέντων ὥσπερ νομισμάτων ἀδοκίμων ἐλεγχομένων
having-slipped-in just-as coins counterfeit being-detected

οἱ μὲν ἐστερημένοι
the(-ones) indeed having-been-deprived(-of-them)
χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἔχοντες εὔχονται φυγεῖν.
rejoice the(-others) but having(-them) pray to-escape(-them)

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, τὸ φυγεῖν ἢ
is and this hard and not easy the to-escape or
ἀποθέσθαι δυσαρεστουμένην φιλίαν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σιτίον
to-put-away an-unpleasing friendship but just-as food

βλαβερὸν καὶ δυσχεραινόμενον οὔτε κατέχειν οἷόν τε μὴ
harmful and disagreeable neither to-keep-down possible — not
λυποῦν καὶ διαφθεῖρον οὔτ' ἐκβάλλειν οἷον εἰσῆλθεν ἀλλ'
giving-pain and corrupting nor to-cast-out such-as it-went-in but
εἰδεχθὲς καὶ συμπεφυρμένον καὶ ἀλλόκοτον, οὕτω φίλος
loathsome and mingled and strange so a-friend
πονηρὸς ἢ σύνεστι λυπῶν καὶ λυμαινόμενος, ἢ βίᾳ
wicked either is-with(-one) paining and doing-damage or by-force
μετ' ἔχθρας καὶ δυσμενείας ὥσπερ χολή τις ἐξέπεσε.
with hostility and enmity just-as bile some is-thrown-out

IV–VII · THE CLAIMS OF MANY

Friendship should be sought slowly, as Zeuxis painted slowly. Intimacy is its enjoyment, as Homer's verses show, but many friendships pull a man apart, and friends need help at once in different affairs. Plutarch turns Euripides' advice of moderate friendships onto enmities, cites Chilon, and shows that a friend shares his friends' enmities, as Alexander, Nero, and Tiberius showed.

διὸ δεῖ μὴ ῥᾳδίως προσδέχεσθαι μηδὲ κολλᾶσθαι 4
therefore one-must not readily accept nor cleave-to
τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι μηδὲ φιλεῖν τοὺς διώκοντας, ἀλλὰ
the(-ones) chancing-upon(-us) nor love the(-ones) pursuing(-us) but
τοὺς ἀξίους φιλίας διώκειν. οὐ γὰρ αἱρετέον πάντως
the worthy of-friendship pursue not for one-must-choose by-all-means
τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἁλισκόμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπαρίνην καὶ βάτον
the readily caught and for cleavers and bramble
ἐπιλαμβανομένην ὑπερβάντες καὶ διωσάμενοι βαδίζομεν ἐπὶ
laying-hold-of(-us) stepping-over and pushing-away we-walk to
τὴν ἐλαίαν καὶ τὴν ἄμπελον. οὕτως ἀεὶ μὴ τὸν εὐχερῶς
the olive and the vine so always not the(-man) easily

περιπλεκόμενον ποιεῖσθαι συνήθη καλόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀξίοις
embracing(-us) to-make an-intimate (is)-noble but to-the worthy
σπουδῆς καὶ ὠφελίμοις αὐτοὺς περιπλέκεσθαι δοκιμάζοντας.
of-esteem and useful ourselves to-attach testing(-them)
ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Ζεῦξις αἰτιωμένων αὐτόν τινων ὅτι
just-as then — Zeuxis blaming him some(-people) because
ζωγραφεῖ βραδέως, ὁμολογῶ εἶπεν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
he-paints slowly I-admit he-said in much time
γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς πολύν, οὕτω φιλίαν δεῖ καὶ
to-paint and for for much(-time) so friendship one-must and
συνήθειαν σῴζειν παραλαβόντας ἐν πολλῷ κριθεῖσαν.
intimacy preserve having-received(-it) in much(-time) judged
ἆρ᾽ οὖν κρῖναι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πολλοὺς φίλους ῥᾴδιον,
whether then to-judge indeed not is-it many friends easy
συνεῖναι δὲ πολλοῖς ὁμοῦ ῥᾴδιον, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον;
to-be-with but with-many at-once (is-it)-easy or also this (is)-impossible
καὶ μὴν ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστιν ἡ συνήθεια τῆς φιλίας, καὶ
and indeed enjoyment is the intimacy of-the friendship and
τὸ ἥδιστον ἐν τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ συνδιημερεύειν·
the most-pleasant (is)-in the to-be-together and spending-the-days-together

οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων
not indeed for alive at-least dear apart from-comrades
βουλὰς ἑζόμενοι βουλεύσομεν.
counsels sitting we-will-devise

καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ὁ Μενέλαος
and about — Odysseus — Menelaus

οὐδέ κεν ἄλλο
nor — else
ἄμμε διέκρινεν φιλέοντέ τε τερπομένω τε,
us would-have-parted loving both delighting and
πρὶν γ' ὅτε δὴ θανάτοιο μέλαν νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψε.
before at-least when indeed of-death black cloud enfolded(-us)

τοὐναντίον οὖν ἔοικεν ἡ καλουμένη πολυφιλία ποιεῖν.
the-opposite then seems the so-called having-many-friends to-do
ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνάγει καὶ συνίστησι καὶ συνέχει
the(-one) indeed for brings-together and unites and holds-together
καταπυκνοῦσα ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ φιλοφροσύναις
condensing(-it) by-the associations and friendly-acts

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὀπὸς γάλα λευκὸν ἐγόμφωσεν καὶ ἔδησε
as and when fig-juice milk white has-bound and fastened

κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα (τοιαύτην γὰρ ἡ φιλία βούλεται
according-to Empedocles such for the friendship wishes
ποιεῖν ἑνότητα καὶ σύμπηξιν), ἡ δὲ πολυφιλία διίστησι
to-make unity and compaction the and having-many-friends separates
καὶ ἀποσπᾷ καὶ ἀποστρέφει, τῷ μετακαλεῖν καὶ μεταφέρειν
and tears-away and turns-aside by-the to-call-away and to-transfer
ἄλλοτε πρὸς ἄλλον οὐκ ἐῶσα κρᾶσιν οὐδὲ κόλλησιν
at-another-time to another not allowing blending nor cementing
εὐνοίας ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ περιχυθείσῃ καὶ παγείσῃ
of-goodwill in the intimacy having-been-poured-around and set
γενέσθαι. τοῦτο δ' εὐθὺς ὑποβάλλει καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰς
to-come-about this and at-once introduces also the about the

ὑπουργίας ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ δυσωπίαν· τὰ γὰρ εὔχρηστα
services unevenness and awkwardness the for serviceable(-things)
τῆς φιλίας δύσχρηστα γίγνεται διὰ τὴν πολυφιλίαν.
of-the friendship unserviceable become through the having-many-friends

ἄλλον τρόπον γὰρ ἄλλων ἐγείρει φροντὶς ἀνθρώπων·
another way for of-other stirs care of-men

οὔτε γὰρ αἱ φύσεις ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ταῖς ὁρμαῖς
neither for the natures of-us toward the-same-things in-the impulses
ῥέπουσιν, οὔτε τύχαις ὁμοτρόποις ἀεὶ σύνεσμεν· οἵ τε
incline nor with-fortunes alike always are-we-together the and
τῶν πράξεων καιροὶ καθάπερ τὰ πνεύματα τοὺς μὲν
of-the actions occasions just-as the winds the(-ones) indeed
φέρουσι τοῖς δ' ἀντιπίπτουσι.
carry the(-others) and oppose
6 καίτοι κἂν πάντες ἅμα τῶν αὐτῶν οἱ φίλοι δέωνται,
and-yet even-if all at-once of-the same-things the friends need(-help)
χαλεπὸν ἐξαρκέσαι πᾶσι βουλευομένοις ἢ πολιτευομένοις
(it-is)-hard to-suffice for-all deliberating or being-in-politics
ἢ φιλοτιμουμένοις ἢ ὑποδεχομένοις. ἂν δ' ἑνὶ καιρῷ
or seeking-honor or entertaining-guests if and at-one moment
διαφόροις πράγμασι καὶ πάθεσι προστυγχάνοντες ὁμοῦ
in-different affairs and experiences falling at-once
παρακαλῶσιν ὁ μὲν πλέων συναποδημεῖν, ὁ δὲ
they-summon(-one) the-one indeed sailing to-go-abroad-with(-him) the-other and
κρινόμενος συνδικεῖν, ὁ δὲ κρίνων συνδικάζειν,
being-tried to-plead-with(-him) the-other and judging to-judge-with(-him)

ὁ δὲ πιπράσκων ἢ ἀγοράζων συνδιοικεῖν, ὁ
the-other and selling or buying to-manage-with(-him) the-other
δὲ γαμῶν συνθύειν, ὁ δὲ θάπτων συμπενθεῖν,
and marrying to-sacrifice-with(-him) the-other and burying to-mourn-with(-him)

πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμῃ,
the-city and at-once indeed with-incense be-full
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων
at-once and with-paeans both and with-groans

ἡ πολυφιλία, πᾶσι μὲν ἀμήχανον παρεῖναι, μηδενὶ
the having-many-friends to-all indeed (it-is)-impossible to-be-present to-none
δ' ἄτοπον, ἑνὶ δ' ὑπουργοῦντα προσκρούειν πολλοῖς
and (is)-absurd to-one and serving to-offend many
ἀνιαρόν·
(is)-painful

οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀγαπῶν αὐτὸς ἀμελεῖθ' ἡδέως.
no-one for loving himself is-neglected gladly

καίτοι τὰς ἀμελείας καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας τῶν φίλων πραότερον
yet the neglects and remissnesses of-the friends more-mildly
φέρουσι, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπολογίας ἀμηνίτως δέχονται
they-bear and the such excuses without-wrath accept
παρ' αὐτῶν ἐξελαθόμην ἠγνόησα. ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐ
from them I-forgot I-did-not-know the(-man) but saying not
παρέστην σοι δίκην ἔχοντι, παριστάμην γὰρ ἑτέρῳ
I-stood-by you a-lawsuit having I-was-standing-by for another
φίλῳ, καὶ πυρέττοντά σ' οὐκ εἶδον, τῷ δεῖνι γὰρ
friend and in-fever you not I-saw with-the so-and-so for
φίλους ἑστιῶντι συνησχολούμην αἰτίαν τῆς ἀμελείας τὴν
friends entertaining I-was-busy (as)-the-cause of-the neglect the

ἑτέρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος οὐ λύει τὴν μέμψιν, ἀλλὰ
of-others care making not removes the blame but
προσεπιβάλλει ζηλοτυπίαν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τὰς πολυφιλίας
adds-on jealousy but the many the having-many-friends
ἃ δύνανται παρέχειν μόνον ὡς ἔοικε σκοποῦσιν, ἃ δ'
what they-can provide only as it-seems consider what but
ἀνταπαιτοῦσι παρορῶσι, καὶ οὐ μνημονεύουσιν ὅτι δεῖ
they-demand-in-return they-overlook and not remember that one-must
τὸν πολλοῖς εἰς ἃ δεῖται χρώμενον πολλοῖς δεομένοις
the(-man) many for what he-needs using to-many needing
ἀνθυπουργεῖν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Βριάρεως ἑκατὸν χερσὶν
serve-in-return just-as then — Briareus with-a-hundred hands
εἰς πεντήκοντα φορῶν γαστέρας οὐδὲν ἡμῶν πλέον
to fifty bringing(-food) bellies nothing than-us more
εἶχε τῶν ἀπὸ δυεῖν χεροῖν μίαν κοιλίαν διοικούντων,
had of-the(-ones) from two hands one belly managing
οὕτως ἐν τοῖς φίλοις χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ λειτουργεῖν πολλοῖς
so in the friends useful also the to-serve many
ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ συναγωνιᾶν καὶ τὸ συνασχολεῖσθαι καὶ
is-involved and the to-share-anxiety and the to-be-busy-with and
συγκάμνειν. οὐ γὰρ Εὐριπίδῃ πειστέον λέγοντι
toiling-with not for Euripides one-must-believe saying

χρῆν γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους
one-ought for moderate to one-another
φιλίας θνητοὺς ἀνακίρνασθαι
friendships (for)-mortals to-mix
καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς,
and not to the-innermost marrow of-the-soul

εὔλυτα δ' εἶναι στέργηθρα φρενῶν,
easily-loosed and to-be the-love-charms of-the-heart
ἀπὸ τ' ὦσασθαι καὶ ξυντεῖναι,
away both to-push and to-draw-tight

καθάπερ πόδα νεὼς ἐνδιδόντι καὶ προσάγοντι ταῖς χρείαις
just-as the-sheet of-a-ship letting-out and drawing-in to-the needs
τὴν φιλίαν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Εὐριπίδη, μεταθῶμεν ἐπὶ τὰς
the friendship but this indeed O Euripides let-us-transfer to the
ἔχθρας, καὶ κελεύωμεν μετρίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ
enmities and let-us-bid moderate to-make the differences and
μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς, εὔλυτα δ' εἶναι μίση καὶ
not to the-innermost marrow of-the-soul easily-loosed and to-be hatreds and
ὀργὰς καὶ μεμψιμοιρίας καὶ ὑπονοίας· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν
angers and complainings and suspicions that and rather to-us
παραίνει τὸ Πυθαγορικὸν μὴ πολλοῖς ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν,
recommends the Pythagorean(-saying) not to-many to-give a-right-hand
τουτέστι μὴ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι φίλους μηδὲ πολύκοινον μηδὲ
that-is not many to-make friends nor a-common-to-many nor
πάνδημον ἀσπάζεσθαι φιλίαν καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίην ἢ
a-common-to-all to-embrace friendship and (friendship)-toward the-contrary or
μετὰ πολλῶν παθῶν εἰσιοῦσαν, ὧν τὸ μὲν συναγωνιᾶν καὶ
with many passions entering of-which the indeed sharing-anxiety and
συνάχθεσθαι καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ συγκινδυνεύειν πάνυ δύσοιστον
being-grieved-with and toiling-with and sharing-danger very hard-to-bear
τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τοῦ σοφοῦ
for-the free and noble is the and of-the wise
Χίλωνος ἀληθές, ὃς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα μηδένα ἔχειν
Chilon(-saying) (is)-true who to the(-man) having-said no-one to-have

ἐχθρὸν ἔοικας ἔφη σὺ μηδὲ φίλον ἔχειν. αἱ γὰρ ἔχθραι ταῖς
an-enemy you-seem said-he you not-even a-friend to-have the for enmities on-the
φιλίαις εὐθὺς ἐπακολουθοῦσι καὶ συμπλέκονται, ἐπείπερ
friendships at-once follow and are-entangled-with(-them) since
7 οὐκ ἔστι φίλον μὴ συναδικεῖσθαι μηδὲ
not it-is-possible (for)-a-friend not to-be-wronged-with(-him) nor
συναδοξεῖν μηδὲ συναπεχθάνεσθαι· οἱ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ τὸν
to-be-disgraced-with(-him) nor to-be-hated-with(-him) the for enemies the
φίλον εὐθὺς ὑφορῶνταί τε καὶ μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι πολλάκις
friend at-once suspect both and hate the and friends often
φθονοῦσί τε καὶ ζηλοτυποῦσι καὶ περισπῶσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ
envy both and are-jealous and draw-away(-one) just-as then the
τῷ Τιμησίᾳ περὶ τῆς ἀποικίας δοθεὶς χρησμὸς προηγόρευσε
— to-Timesias about the colony given oracle foretold

σμῆνα μελισσάων τάχα τοι καὶ σφῆκες ἔσονται,
swarms of-bees soon you also wasps will-be

οὕτως οἱ φίλων ζητοῦντες ἑσμὸν ἔλαθον ἐχθρῶν σφηκιαῖς
so the(-ones) of-friends seeking a-swarm unawares of-enemies wasps'-nests
περιπεσόντες. καὶ οὐκ ἴσον ἄγει σταθμὸν ἐχθροῦ μνησικακία
have-fallen-into and not equal draws weight of-an-enemy the-grudge
καὶ φίλου χάρις. ὅρα δὲ τοὺς Φιλώτου καὶ Παρμενίωνος
and of-a-friend the-favor look and (at)-the of-Philotas and of-Parmenion
φίλους καὶ οἰκείους ἃ διέθηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἃ τοὺς
friends and kinsmen how treated(-them) Alexander how the(-friends)
Δίωνος Διονύσιος τοὺς Πλαύτου Νέρων καὶ τοὺς
of-Dion Dionysius the(-friends) of-Plautus Nero and the(-friends)
Σηιανοῦ Τιβέριος στρεβλοῦντες καὶ ἀποκτιννύοντες. ὡς γὰρ
of-Sejanus Tiberius racking and killing(-them) as for
τὸν Κρέοντα τῆς θυγατρὸς οὐδὲν ὁ χρυσὸς οὐδ' ὁ πέπλος
— Creon of-the daughter nothing the gold nor the robe

ὠφέλει, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἀναφθὲν αἰφνιδίως προσδραμόντα καὶ
benefited the but fire kindled suddenly (him)-running-up and
περιπτύξαντα κατέκαυσε καὶ συναπώλεσεν, οὕτως ἔνιοι
embracing(-her) burned-up and destroyed-together(-with-her) so some
τῶν φίλων οὐδὲν ἀπολαύσαντες εὐτυχούντων συναπόλλυνται
of-the friends nothing having-enjoyed (of-them)-prospering perish-with
δυστυχοῦσι. καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα πάσχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι καὶ
(them)-unfortunate and this most suffer the philosophers and
χαρίεντες, ὡς Θησεὺς τῷ Πειρίθῳ κολαζομένῳ καὶ δεδεμένῳ
refined as Theseus — with-Peirithous being-punished and being-bound

αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεύτοις συνέζευκται πέδαις,
of-shame by-unforged is-yoked-together fetters

ἐν δὲ τῷ λοιμῷ φησιν ὁ Θουκυδίδης τοὺς ἀρετῆς
in and the plague says — Thucydides the(-ones) of-virtue
μάλιστα μεταποιουμένους συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς φίλοις
most laying-claim to-perish-with the friends
νοσοῦσιν ἠφείδουν γὰρ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἰόντες παρὰ τοὺς
sick they-did-not-spare for of-them themselves going to the
ἐπιτηδείους.
intimates

Friendship arises from likeness, as harmony does from sounds alike in some way, and many friendships cannot keep it. A man would need to change like Theognis' octopus or a Proteus, now a reader with readers, now a hunter with hunters. A steadfast friend is therefore rare and hard to find.

8 ὅθεν οὕτω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφειδεῖν οὐ προσῆκον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοις
whence thus the virtue to-squander not (is)-fitting at-one-time with-others
συνδέοντας αὐτὴν καὶ συμπλέκοντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀξίοις τὴν
binding it and entangling(-it) but for-the worthy the
αὐτῆς κοινωνίαν φυλάττειν, τουτέστι τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλεῖν καὶ
of-it partnership to-keep that-is for-those alike to-love and
κοινωνεῖν δυναμένοις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων μέγιστόν
to-share being-able and for indeed this of-all greatest
ἐστιν ἐναντίωμα πρὸς τὴν πολυφιλίαν, ὅτι τῇ φιλίᾳ
is an-obstacle to the having-many-friends that for-the friendship
γένεσις δι' ὁμοιότητός ἐστιν. ὅπου γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα
(the)-origin through likeness is where for even the lifeless-things
τὰς μίξεις πρὸς τὰ ἀνόμοια ποιεῖται μετὰ βίας ἀναγκαζόμενα
the mixtures with the unlike make with force being-compelled
καὶ ὀκλάζει καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ φεύγοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τοῖς
both sink and are-indignant fleeing from one-another with-the
δὲ συγγενέσι καὶ οἰκείοις ὁμοπαθεῖ κεραννύμενα καὶ
and kindred and akin (they)-sympathize being-blended and
προσίεται τὴν κοινωνίαν λείως καὶ μετ' εὐμενείας, πῶς οἷόν
admit the partnership smoothly and with goodwill how possible
τε φιλίαν ἤθεσι διαφόροις ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ πάθεσιν
— (for)-friendship in-characters differing to-arise and in-passions
ἀνομοίοις καὶ βίοις ἑτέρας προαιρέσεις ἔχουσιν; ἡ μὲν
unlike and in-lives different choices having the indeed

γὰρ περὶ ψαλμοὺς καὶ φόρμιγγας ἁρμονία δι᾽ ἀντιφώνων
for about harp-playing and lyres harmony through octaves
ἔχει τὸ σύμφωνον, ὀξύτησι καὶ βαρύτησιν ἁμωσγέπως
has the concord in-high-pitches and low-pitches somehow
ὁμοιότητος ἐγγιγνομένης· τῆς δὲ φιλικῆς συμφωνίας ταύτης
(a)-likeness arising of-the but friendly concord this
καὶ ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἀνόμοιον οὐδ᾽ ἀνώμαλον οὐδ᾽ ἄνισον
and harmony nothing unlike nor uneven nor unequal
εἶναι δεῖ μέρος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίως ἐχόντων
to-be must part but from all alike being-disposed
ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ὁμοβουλεῖν καὶ ὁμοδοξεῖν καὶ συνομοπαθεῖν,
to-agree and to-will-alike and to-think-alike and to-feel-alike
ὥσπερ μιᾶς ψυχῆς ἐν πλείοσι διῃρημένης σώμασι.
just-as of-one soul in more-than-one divided bodies
τίς οὖν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐπίπονος καὶ μετάβολος καὶ 9
who then is so laborious and changeable and
παντοδαπὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὥστε πολλοῖς ἑαυτὸν ἐξομοιοῦν
manifold a-man so-as to-many himself to-assimilate
καὶ προσαρμόττειν καὶ μὴ καταγελᾶν τοῦ Θεόγνιδος
and to-adapt and not to-laugh-at — Theognis
παραινοῦντος
advising

πουλύποδος νόον ἴσχε πολυχρόου, ὃς ποτὶ πέτρῃ,
of-the-octopus the-mind have many-colored which toward the-rock
τῇ περ ὁμιλήσῃ, τοῖος ἰδεῖν ἐφάνη;
which ever it-cleaves-to such to-see appeared

καίτοι τοῦ πολύποδος αἱ μεταβολαὶ βάθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ
and-yet of-the octopus the changes depth not have but
περὶ αὐτὴν γίγνονται τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, στυφότητι καὶ μανότητι
about itself they-happen the surface by-density and by-rarity

τὰς ἀπορροὰς τῶν πλησιαζόντων ἀναλαμβάνουσαν·
the effluences of-the(-things) approaching(-it) taking-up
αἱ δὲ φιλίαι τὰ ἤθη ζητοῦσι συνεξομοιοῦν καὶ τὰ πάθη
the but friendships the characters seek to-assimilate and the passions
καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις.
and the words and the pursuits and the dispositions
Πρωτέως τινὸς οὐκ εὐτυχοῦς οὐδὲ πάνυ χρηστοῦ τὸ
of-a-Proteus some(-kind) not fortunate nor very useful the
ἔργον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γοητείας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἐξ
work but by sorcery himself into one form from
ἑτέρου μεταλλάττοντος ἐν ταὐτῷ πολλάκις, φιλολόγοις
another changing in the-same(-place) often with-scholars
συναναγιγνώσκοντος καὶ παλαισταῖς συγκονιομένου
reading-together and with-wrestlers getting-dusty-together
καὶ φιλοθήροις συγκυνηγετοῦντος καὶ φιλοπόταις
and with-hunters hunting-together and with-drinkers
συμμεθυσκομένου καὶ πολιτικοῖς συναρχαιρεσιάζοντος,
getting-drunk-together and with-politicians canvassing-together
ἰδίαν ἤθους ἑστίαν οὐκ ἔχοντος. ὡς δὲ τὴν ἀσχημάτιστον
own of-character hearth not having as and the formless
οἱ φυσικοὶ καὶ ἀχρώματον οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην λέγουσιν
the physicists and colorless substance and matter speak-of
ὑποκειμένην καὶ τρεπομένην ὑφ' αὑτῆς νῦν μὲν φλέγεσθαι
underlying and being-turned by itself now indeed to-blaze
νῦν δ' ἐξυγραίνεσθαι, τοτὲ δ' ἐξαεροῦσθαι πήγνυσθαι
now and to-become-liquid at-times and to-become-air to-solidify
δ' αὖθις, οὕτως ἄρα τῇ πολυφιλίᾳ ψυχὴν ὑποκεῖσθαι
and again so then for-the having-many-friends a-soul to-underlie
δεήσει πολυπαθῆ καὶ πολύτροπον καὶ ὑγρὰν καὶ ῥᾳδίαν
will-be-needed much-affected and versatile and fluid and easy
μεταβάλλειν. ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία στάσιμόν τι ζητεῖ καὶ
to-change but the friendship stable something seeks and

βέβαιον ἦθος καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ·
steadfast character and unchanging in one place and intimacy
διὸ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ δυσεύρετόν ἐστι φίλος βέβαιος.
therefore also rare and hard-to-find is a-friend steadfast
