GREEK SERIES · VOLUME 30

Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle · Plutarch

ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ
ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΦΙΛΙΑΣ

Nicomachean Ethics

Books I–X, with Plutarch on Having Many Friends

---

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



CANES NOBILES · MMXXVI

Copyright © 2026 Christopher Hench
All rights reserved

Published by Canes Nobiles
canesnobiles.com

The source text is used under a Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0



Volume 30 of the Canes Nobiles Greek interlinear texts

The Greek text follows Bywater's Oxford Aristotle
and Bernardakis' Teubner Plutarch

Set from the Perseus Digital Library, with corrections

Translated and composed with AI, edited by Christopher Hench
Artwork by Esther Steves

Words the editors seclude are not printed; words they supply
are printed without their brackets; † marks a passage
the editors hold corrupt; ∗∗∗ marks a gap in the text.

CONTENTS

ARISTOTLE

BOOK I

I · Every Art Aims at Some Good 13
II · The Good at Which Politics Aims 14
III · How Much Precision to Expect 16
IV · Agreed in Name, Disputed in Fact 18
V · The Three Lives 21
VI · Against the Form of the Good 23
VII · The Function of Man 29
VIII · The Definition Tested 36
IX · Learned, Given, or Chanced Upon 41
X · Call No Man Happy? 43
XI · The Fortunes of the Dead 49
XII · Praised or Honored 51
XIII · The Parts of the Soul 53

BOOK II

I · Virtue Comes by Habit 59
II · Destroyed by Excess and Defect 62
III · Pleasure and Pain as the Sign 66

ARISTOTLE

(continued)

BOOK II

(continued)

IV · Acting as the Just Man Acts 69
V · Virtue Is a State 72
VI · The Definition of Virtue 74
VII · The Table of the Virtues 80
VIII · How the Extremes Oppose the Mean 86
IX · How to Hit the Mean 89

BOOK III

I · The Voluntary and the Involuntary 93
II · Choice 101
III · Deliberation 104
IV · Wish 109
V · Virtue and Vice Are in Our Power 111
VI · What Courage Is About 118
VII · The Brave Man 121
VIII · Five Things Taken for Courage 124
IX · Courage and Pain 130
X · Which Pleasures Temperance Concerns 133
XI · Natural and Acquired Appetites 137
XII · Licentiousness and the Child 140

BOOK IV

I · Liberality 143
II · Magnificence 155
III · Greatness of Soul 161
IV · Ambition and Its Lack 171

ARISTOTLE

(continued)

BOOK IV

(continued)

V · Gentleness 173
VI · The Friendly Manner 177
VII · Truthfulness 180
VIII · Wit 184
IX · Shame 187

BOOK V

I · Justice in Two Senses 191
II · Particular Justice 197
III · Distributive Justice 201
IV · Corrective Justice 205
V · Reciprocity and Money 210
VI · Political Justice 217
VII · Natural and Legal Justice 220
VIII · Voluntary and Involuntary Wrongs 222
IX · Can One Be Wronged Willingly? 228
X · Equity 235
XI · Wronging Oneself 238

BOOK VI

I · What the Right Reason Is 243
II · Thought and Desire 244
III · Science 248
IV · Art 250

ARISTOTLE

(continued)

BOOK VI

(continued)

V · Practical Wisdom 252
VI · Intellect 255
VII · Wisdom 256
VIII · Practical Wisdom and Politics 260
IX · Excellence in Deliberation 263
X · Understanding 266
XI · Judgment and Intellect 267
XII · What Good Are They? 270
XIII · Natural and Strict Virtue 274

BOOK VII

I · Three Things to Avoid 279
II · The Puzzles 282
III · Knowing and Not Knowing 286
IV · Its Proper Sphere 292
V · Brutish and Morbid States 297
VI · Anger Less Disgraceful 300
VII · Softness and Endurance 304
VIII · The Licentious Man Cannot Repent 308
IX · Self-Control and Obstinacy 312
X · Practical Wisdom and Lack of Control 315
XI · Is Pleasure a Good? 318
XII · Replies 320

ARISTOTLE

(continued)

BOOK VII

(continued)

XIII · Pleasure and Happiness 324
XIV · Bodily Pleasures 327

BOOK VIII

I · Why Friendship Matters 333
II · The Lovable 336
III · Three Kinds 338
IV · Perfect and Imperfect 343
V · State and Activity 346
VI · Not Many 348
VII · Friendship Between Unequals 352
VIII · Loving and Being Loved 355
IX · Friendship and Community 358
X · Constitutions and Households 361
XI · Friendship in Each Constitution 365
XII · Friendship of Kin 368
XIII · Complaints in Utility Friendship 372
XIV · Disputes Between Unequals 377

BOOK IX

I · Measuring Returns 381
II · Conflicting Claims 385
III · Breaking Off Friendship 389
IV · Friendship with Oneself 392
V · Goodwill 396
VI · Concord 398

ARISTOTLE

(continued)

BOOK IX

(continued)

VII · Why Benefactors Love More 401
VIII · Self-Love 404
IX · Does the Happy Man Need Friends? 410
X · How Many Friends? 416
XI · In Good Fortune and Bad 419
XII · Living Together 422

BOOK X

I · Why Pleasure Must Be Discussed 425
II · Eudoxus and His Critics 427
III · Pleasure Is Not a Process 430
IV · What Pleasure Is 435
V · Pleasures Differ with Their Activities 441
VI · Happiness Is Not Amusement 447
VII · The Life of Contemplation 451
VIII · The Second Life, and the Gods 456
IX · From Ethics to Legislation 463

PLUTARCH

ON HAVING MANY FRIENDS

I–III · The Swarm of Friends 477
IV–VII · The Claims of Many 483
VIII–IX · Like to Like 492

ARISTOTLE

ΗΘΙΚΑ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΑ

Nicomachean Ethics

BOOK I

I · EVERY ART AIMS AT SOME GOOD

Every art, inquiry, action, and choice aims at some good, and so the good has been well defined as what all things aim at. Ends differ: some are activities, and some are products beyond the activity, and where there are products they are better than the activities. Where one art falls under another — bridle-making under horsemanship — the end of the master art is the more choiceworthy of the two.

πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε
every art and every inquiry similarly and action both
καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς
and choice of-good some to-aim-at seems therefore well
ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις
they-declared the-good which all-things aim-at a-difference and some
φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ
appears of-the ends the-ones indeed for are activities the-others and
παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς
besides them products some of-which and there-are ends some besides the
πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.
actions in these better are-by-nature than-the activities the products
πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ
many and actions being and arts and sciences many
γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
come-to-be also the ends of-medicine indeed for health of-shipbuilding and
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος.
a-ship of-generalship and victory of-household-management and wealth
ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν,
as-many-as and are of-the such-things under one certain capacity
καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι
just-as under the horsemanship bridle-making and as-many-as others

τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ
of-the equestrian instruments are this-one and also every military
πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον
action under the generalship according-to the same indeed way
ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας· ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν
others under others in all and the of-the master-arts
τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων
ends than-all are more-choiceworthy the-ones under them of-these
γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς
for for-the-sake those-also are-pursued it-differs and nothing the
ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ
activities themselves to-be the ends of-the actions or besides
ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
these another thing just-as in the mentioned sciences

II · THE GOOD AT WHICH POLITICS AIMS

If there is an end we want for its own sake, that end is the good, and knowing it would help us as a mark helps archers. Aristotle asks which science studies it, and answers that it is the most authoritative one, which is politics: politics decides what is to be studied in a city and by whom. Its end therefore takes in the ends of all the others, and that end is the human good.

εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὑτὸ
if indeed some end there-is of-the things-done which on-account-of itself
βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα
we-wish the-other-things and on-account-of this and not all-things
δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς
on-account-of another we-choose it-goes-on for thus at-least to
ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον
infinity so-as to-be empty and vain the desire (is)-clear

ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ
that this — would-be the-good and the best whether then also
πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ
for the life the knowledge of-it great has weight and
καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν
just-as archers a-mark having more — we-would-bit
τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν
the right-thing if and so it-must-be-tried in-outline at-least to-grasp
αὐτὸ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων.
it what ever it-is and of-which of-the sciences or capacities
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα
it-would-seem(-to-belong) and — of-the most-authoritative and most
ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται· τίνας
master-like such and the political-science appears which
γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας
for to-be needful of-the sciences in the cities and what-sort
ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει·
each-group to-learn and up-to what-point this-one ordains
ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
we-see and also the most-honored of-the capacities under this
οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν·
being for-instance generalship household-management rhetoric
χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
using and this-one the remaining of-the sciences further and
νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ
legislating what one-must to-do and from-what to-abstain the
ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν
of-this end it-would-include — the of-the others so-that this —
εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ
would-be the-human good if for even the-same it-is for-one
καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως
and for-a-city greater at-least and more-complete the of-the city

φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ
appears both to-attain and to-preserve welcome indeed for even
ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.
for-one alone nobler and also more-godlike for-a-nation and for-cities
ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.
the indeed then inquiry these aims-at political a-kind being

III · HOW MUCH PRECISION TO EXPECT

Noble and just things vary so much that they can look like matters of convention rather than of nature, so an account of them can only be given in outline. An educated man asks of each subject just the exactness its nature allows. A young man is not a fit hearer of politics — not because of his years but because he lives by feeling, and here the end is action rather than knowledge.

λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην
it-would-be-said and — sufficiently if according-to the underlying matter
διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς
it-should-be-made-clear the for exactness not alike in all the
λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις.
accounts is-to-be-sought just-as nor in the things-manufactured
τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται,
the and noble and the just about which the political-science inquires
πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ
much has variation and wandering so-as to-seem by-convention
μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει
only to-be by-nature and not such and a-certain wandering has
καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ'
also the-goods on-account-of the for-many to-befall harms from
αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι
them already for some perished on-account-of wealth others

δὲ δι᾽ ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ
and on-account-of courage welcome then about such-things and from
τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι,
such-things speaking roughly and in-outline the-truth to-indicate
καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας
and about the-things as for the most-part and from such-things speaking
τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ
such-things also to-conclude the same indeed way also
ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου
to-receive (is)-needful each of-the things-said of-an-educated-man
γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
for it-is to so-much the-exactness to-seek in each
γένος, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται·
kind to as-much-as the of-the subject nature admits
παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος
similar for it-appears a-mathematician both speaking-persuasively
ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.
to-accept and a-rhetorician demonstrations to-demand
ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν
each-man and judges well what he-knows and of-these he-is
ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος,
a-good judge in each indeed then the educated-man
ἁπλῶς δ᾽ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς
absolutely and the about everything educated-man therefore of-the
πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος
political-science not is a-fit hearer the young-man inexperienced
γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων
for of-the in the life actions the arguments and from these
καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς
and about these further and the passions inclined-to-follow
ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος
being idly he-will-listen and unprofitably since the end

ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν
is not knowledge but action it-differs and nothing young in-the
ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ
age or the character youthful not for because-of the time the
ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν
deficiency but on-account-of the according-to passion to-live and to-pursue
ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται,
each-thing to-the for such-men useless the knowledge becomes
καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς
just-as to-the uncontrolled to-those and according-to reason the
ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη
desires making and acting very-profitable — would-be
τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς
the about these to-know and about indeed a-hearer and how
ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω ταῦτα.
one-must-receive and what we-propose let-be-said-in-preface these-things

IV · AGREED IN NAME, DISPUTED IN FACT

Almost everyone calls the highest good happiness, and treats living well and faring well as the same thing, but no one agrees about what happiness is. The many name something visible — pleasure, wealth, honor — and often name whatever they happen to lack. Aristotle warns that arguments from first principles and arguments toward them are different, and that we have to begin from what is known to us.

λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ
let-us-say and taking-up-again since every knowledge and
προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν
choice of-good some reaches-for what it-is which we-say
τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον
the political-science to-aim-at and what the of-all highest

τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
of-the attainable goods in-name indeed then nearly by the
πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
most it-is-agreed the for happiness both the many
καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ
and the refined say the and well to-live and the well
πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ
to-fare the-same they-suppose with-the to-be-happy about
δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ
and the happiness what it-is they-dispute and not
ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἳ μὲν
alike the many with-the wise give-an-account the-ones indeed
γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ
for of-the evident something and manifest such-as pleasure or
πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο — πολλάκις δὲ καὶ
wealth or honor others and another-thing often and even
ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος
the same-man a-different having-fallen-ill indeed for health being-poor
δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα
and wealth being-conscious and to-themselves of-ignorance those great
τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ'
something and beyond them saying they-admire some and
ᾠοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτὸ
thought beside the many these goods another thing in itself
εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά.
to-be which also for-these all the-cause is of-the to-be good
ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως
all indeed then to-examine the opinions rather-idle perhaps
ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας
it-is enough and the most prevalent or seeming
ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ
to-have some reason not let-it-escape and us that they-differ the

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ
from the principles arguments and the to the principles well for also
ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν
— Plato was-perplexed-at this and inquired whether from the
ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ
principles or to the principles is the road just-as in the race-course
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον
from the judges to the turning-post or the-reverse one-must-begin
μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν
indeed for from the things-known these and in-two-ways the-ones indeed
γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον
for to-us the-others and absolutely perhaps then for-us at-least one-must-begin
ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι
from the to-us things-known therefore must in-the habits to-have-been-trained
καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν
nobly the-man about noble-things and just-things and generally the
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ
political-matters going-to-listen adequately a-principle for the that and if
τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι·
this should-appear sufficiently nothing he-will-need-besides the why
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ
the and such-a-man has or would-get — principles easily to-whom
δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·
and neither belongs of-these let-him-hear the of-Hesiod

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
this-man indeed (is)-best-of-all who himself all-things perceives
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
good and again that-man-also who well to-one-speaking listens

ὃς δέ κε μήτ᾽ αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ᾽ ἄλλου ἀκούων
who and — neither himself perceives nor of-another hearing
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.
in heart lays-it-up this-one and in-turn (is)-a-useless man

V · THE THREE LIVES

The many take happiness to be pleasure and so choose the life of enjoyment, which Aristotle calls the life of grazing beasts. Cultivated men take it to be honor, but honor lies more in those who give it than in the man honored, and they want it for virtue — yet virtue too is incomplete, since a man may have it and sleep, or suffer the worst misfortunes. The money-making life is lived under compulsion, and wealth is not the good sought, being useful only for something else.

ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
we and let-us-speak from-where we-digressed the for good
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων
and the happiness not unreasonably they-seem from the lives
ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν·
to-conceive the indeed many and most-vulgar the pleasure
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι
therefore also the life they-love the of-enjoyment three for are
μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς
chiefly the prominent-ones the both now mentioned and the political
καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς
and third the contemplative the indeed then many altogether
ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,
slavish appear of-cattle a-life choosing
τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς
they-obtain and consideration on-account-of the many of-those in the

ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ
positions-of-power to-feel-alike with-Sardanapallus the and refined and
πρακτικοὶ τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος.
practical honor of-the for political life nearly this (is)-end
φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ
it-appears and more-superficial to-be than-the thing-sought it-seems for
ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν
in those honoring rather to-be than in the one-honored the-good
δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα.
and one's-own something and hard-to-take-away to-be we-divine
ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν
further and they-seem the honor to-pursue so-that they-may-believe
ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων
themselves good to-be they-seek at-any-rate by the practically-wise
τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ·
to-be-honored and among those-by-whom they-are-known and for virtue
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.
(is)-clear then that according-to at-least these the virtue (is)-better
τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ
perhaps and even more — someone end of-the political
βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη·
life this would-suppose it-appears and more-incomplete even this-one
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν
it-seems for to-be-possible even to-sleep having the virtue
ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν
or to-be-inactive through life and besides these to-suffer-ill
καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν
and to-fare-badly the greatest the-man and thus living no-one —
εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν
would-call-happy if not a-thesis defending and about indeed
τούτων ἅλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται
these enough sufficiently for also in the popular-writings it-has-been-said

περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν
about them third and is the contemplative about which the
ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς
examination in the things-following we-shall-make the and money-maker
βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον
forced a-kind is and the wealth (is)-clear that not the thing-sought
ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ
good useful for and of-another for-the-sake therefore rather the
πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὑτὰ
earlier things-said ends someone — would-suppose on-account-of themselves
γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ
for they-are-loved it-appears and not-even those although many
λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.
arguments for them have-been-laid-down these indeed then let-be-dismissed

VI · AGAINST THE FORM OF THE GOOD

Friends of Aristotle introduced the theory of Forms, but truth comes first. The good is spoken of in every category — god and intellect, the virtues, the measured, the useful, the right moment — so it cannot be one universal thing. And a separate Good would be neither attainable nor acquirable by a man: no weaver or carpenter ever looks for it, and none would work better for having seen it.

τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι
the and universal better perhaps to-examine and to-work-through
πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως
how it-is-spoken-of although uphill the such inquiry
γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη.
being on-account-of the friends men to-have-introduced the forms
δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ
it-would-seem and — perhaps better to-be and to-be-necessary for

σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν,
the-saving at-least of-the truth even the things-one's-own to-destroy
ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν
otherwise both and philosophers being both for being
φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες
dear (it-is)-pious to-prefer the truth those indeed having-brought-in
τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον
the opinion this not made forms in which the prior
καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν
and posterior they-spoke-of therefore not-even of-the numbers a-form
κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
they-set-up the and good is-spoken-of both in the what it-is
καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ'
and in the quality and in the in-relation-to something the and in
αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός
itself and the substance (is)-prior in-the nature than-the in-relation-to
τι (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ
something an-offshoot for this resembles and an-accident of-the
ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.
being so-that not — would-be common some over these form
ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ
further and since the-good in-as-many-ways is-spoken-of as-the being and
γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν
for in the what it-is-spoken-of such-as the god and the intellect and in
τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν
the quality the virtues and in the quantity the measured and in
τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός,
the in-relation-to something the useful and in time the-right-moment
καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
and in place a-dwelling and others such-like (is)-clear that not

ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
— would-be common something universal and one not for —
ἐλέγετ᾽ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.
would-be-spoken-of in all the categories but in one alone
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ
further and since of-the things-under one form one also (is)-the-science also
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν
of-the goods all there-would-be — one some science now
δ᾽ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον
and there-are many even of-the-things under one category such-as
καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ᾽
of-the-right-moment in war indeed for generalship in sickness and
ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις
medicine and of-the measured in nourishment indeed medicine in exertions
δὲ γυμναστική. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ
and gymnastics would-be-perplexed and — someone what ever also
βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ
they-mean to-say the-thing-itself if-indeed in both man-himself
καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ
and in man one and the same account is the of-the
ἀνθρώπου. ᾗ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ᾽
man in-so-far-as for man in-nothing they-will-differ if and
οὕτως, οὐδ᾽ ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι
so nor in-so-far-as good but further nor by-the eternal to-be
μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον
more good it-will-be if-indeed nor whiter the long-lasting
τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι
than-the day-long more-persuasively and seem the Pythagoreans
λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ
to-speak about it placing in the of-the goods column the
ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ
one whom indeed also Speusippus to-have-followed seems but

περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν
about indeed these another let-there-be account to-the and things-said
ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς
dispute some appears-beneath on-account-of the not about every
ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν
good the arguments to-have-been-said to-be-called and according-to one
εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ
form the-things in themselves pursued and loved the-others
δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων
and productive of-these or preservative somehow or of-the opposites
κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.
preventive on-account-of these to-be-called also in-a-way different
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν
(is)-clear then that in-two-ways would-be-called — the-goods and the-ones indeed
καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν
in themselves the-others and on-account-of these having-separated then
ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ
from the beneficial the-things in themselves let-us-consider whether
λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη
they-are-called according-to one form in themselves and what-sort would-posit
τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ
someone — or as-many-as even being-isolated are-pursued such-as the
φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ
to-think and to-see and pleasures certain and honors these for if
καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ
even on-account-of another thing we-pursue nevertheless among-the in themselves
ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς
goods would-posit someone — or not-even another anything except the
ἰδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν
form so-that idle will-be the form if and also these are of-the
καθ' αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν
in themselves the of-the-good account in all them the same

ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ
to-show-itself it-will-be-necessary just-as in snow and white-lead
τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς
the of-the whiteness of-honor and also of-practical-wisdom and of-pleasure
ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά.
different and diverging the accounts in-this-respect in-which (they-are)-goods
οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.
not is then the good common something according-to one form
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
but how indeed is-it-called not for it-resembles the-things at-least from
τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ
chance homonymous but whether at-least by-the from one to-be or
πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;
toward one all to-contribute or rather according-to analogy
ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν
as for in body sight in soul intellect and one indeed in
ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν
another but perhaps these indeed must-be-left-aside the now to-work-out
γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.
for about them of-another — would-be philosophy more-proper
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν
likewise and also about the form if for even there-is one
τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν
something the in-common predicated good or separable
αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν
itself something in itself (is)-clear that not — would-be attainable
οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται.
nor acquirable for-man now and such-a-thing something is-sought
τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ
perhaps and to-someone it-would-seem — better to-be to-know it
πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ
with-a-view-to the acquirable and attainable of-the goods as for

παράδειγμα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
a-pattern this having more we-shall-know also the for-us
ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα
goods and-if we-know we-shall-attain them persuasiveness
μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις
indeed then some has the argument it-seems and with-the sciences
διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ
to-disagree all for of-good some aiming-at and the
ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ.
lacking seeking leave-aside the knowledge of-it
καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας
although an-aid so-great the craftsmen all
ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ᾽ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. ἄπορον
to-be-ignorant-of and not-even to-seek (is)-not reasonable puzzling
δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν
and also what will-be-benefited a-weaver or a-carpenter for the
αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς
his-own craft knowing the itself this good or how
ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν
more-skilled-in-medicine or more-skilled-in-generalship will-be the-man the form
αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν
itself having-beheld it-appears indeed for not-even the health
οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον
thus to-examine the physician but the of-a-man rather
δ᾽ ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ
and perhaps the of-this-one in each-case for he-heals and about
μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
indeed these to so-much let-it-have-been-said

The good is what is always chosen for itself and never for anything else, and only happiness meets that test; it is self-sufficient as well, and complete. To say what it is, Aristotle looks for the function of man: not life, which plants share, nor perception, which animals share, but the soul's activity in accordance with reason. The human good is that activity performed well, in a complete life — for one swallow does not make a spring.

πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί
again and let-us-return to the thing-sought good what
ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει
ever — would-be it-appears indeed for different in a-different action
καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς
and craft different for in medicine and generalship and the
λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ
rest likewise what then of-each (is)-the-good or (that)-of-which
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν
for-the-sake the rest are-done this and in medicine indeed
ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν
(is)-health in generalship and victory in house-building and a-house in
ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ
another and another in every and action and choice the
τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες.
end of-this for for-the-sake the rest do all
ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ'
so-that if some of-the attainable-things all there-is end this
ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα.
— would-be the attainable good if and more these
μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο δ'
passing-over indeed the argument to the-same has-come this and
ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται
still more to-make-clear it-must-be-tried since and more appear

τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον
the ends of-these and we-choose some on-account-of another such-as
πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι
wealth flutes and generally the instruments (is)-clear that not are
πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται.
all complete the and best complete something appears
ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ
so-that if indeed there-is one thing only complete this — would-be the
ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον
thing-sought if and more the most-complete of-these more-complete
δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ
and we-call the in itself pursuable than-the on-account-of another and
τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ
the never on-account-of another choiceworthy than-the both in themselves
καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ'
and on-account-of it choiceworthy and absolutely indeed complete the in
αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον
itself choiceworthy always and never on-account-of another such
δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα
and the happiness most to-be seems this for we-choose
ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν
always on-account-of itself and never on-account-of another honor
δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν
and also pleasure and intellect and every virtue we-choose indeed
καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ'
also on-account-of themselves nothing for resulting we-would-choose
ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
— each of-them we-choose and also of-the happiness
χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν
for-the-sake through these supposing to-be-happy the
δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως
and happiness no-one chooses of-these for-the-sake nor generally

δι᾽ ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ
on-account-of another it-appears and also from the self-sufficiency the same
συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ.
to-follow the for complete good self-sufficient to-be seems
τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον
the and self-sufficient we-call not for-him alone for-the living a-life
μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ
solitary but also for-parents and for-children and for-a-wife and
ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ
generally for-the friends and fellow-citizens since by-nature political the
ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ
man of-these and must-be-taken limit some to-one-extending for
ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς
to the parents and the descendants and of-the friends the
φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις
friends to infinity it-goes but this indeed later
ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δ᾽ αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον
must-be-examined the and self-sufficient we-posit which being-isolated
αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν
choiceworthy makes the life and of-nothing lacking such and the
εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην
happiness we-think to-be further and of-all most-choiceworthy
μὴ συναριθμουμένην — συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς
not being-counted-in being-counted-in and (is)-clear that
αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ
more-choiceworthy with the least of-the goods an-excess
γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ
for of-goods becomes the thing-added of-goods and the
μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται
greater (is)-more-choiceworthy always complete indeed something appears
καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.
and self-sufficient the happiness of-the attainable-things being end

ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν
but perhaps the indeed happiness the best to-call
ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ᾽ ἐναργέστερον
agreed something appears it-is-wanted and more-clearly
τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τοῦτ᾽, εἰ
what it-is still to-be-said perhaps indeed would-happen — this if
ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ
should-be-grasped the function of-the man just-as for for-a-flute-player
καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν
and for-a-sculptor and for-every craftsman and generally of-whom there-is
ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ
function some and an-action in the function seems the-good to-be and
τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι
the well so it-would-seem — also for-man if-indeed there-is some
ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν
function of-him whether then of-a-carpenter indeed and of-a-shoemaker there-are
ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ᾽ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽
functions some and actions of-a-man and none there-is but
ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς
idle he-is-by-nature or just-as of-an-eye and of-a-hand and of-a-foot
καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω
and generally of-each of-the parts appears some function so
καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον
also of-a-man beside all these would-posit someone — function
τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
some what then indeed this — would-be ever the indeed for to-live
κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.
common to-be appears even with-the plants is-sought and the peculiar
ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν.
must-be-set-aside then the both nutritive and the growth-giving life

ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ
following and perceptive some — would-be it-appears and also this
κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ
common both to-a-horse and to-an-ox and to-every animal there-remains indeed
πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν
active some of-the reason having of-this and the-one indeed
ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.
as obedient to-reason the-other and as having and thinking
διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
in-two-ways and also this being-spoken-of the according-to activity
θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ'
must-be-posited more-strictly for this seems to-be-called if and
ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον
is the-function of-man of-soul an-activity according-to reason
ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ
or not without reason the and same we-say function to-be in-the
γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ
kind of-this-one and of-this-one excellent just-as of-a-lyre-player and
σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
of-an-excellent lyre-player and absolutely indeed this in all-cases
προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ
being-added the according-to the virtue superiority to the
ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ
function of-a-lyre-player indeed for to-play-the-lyre of-an-excellent-one and the
εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
well if and so the human good of-soul an-activity
γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ
becomes according-to virtue if and more the virtues according-to
τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
the best and most-complete further and in a-life complete

μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ
one for swallow a-spring not makes nor one day so and
οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.
nor blessed and happy one day nor a-short time
περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως
let-it-be-outlined indeed then the-good in-this-way must for perhaps
ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ'
to-sketch first then later to-fill-in it-would-seem and
ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς
— of-anyone to-be to-carry-forward and to-articulate the-things well
ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς
being in-the outline and the time of-the such-things a-discoverer
ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν
or a-helper good to-be whence also of-the arts have-come
αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνῆσθαι
the advances of-anyone for to-add the thing-lacking to-remember
δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ
and also the things-said-before one-must and the exactness not
ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν
alike in all to-seek but in each-case according-to the
ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον
underlying matter and to so-much to as-much-as (is)-proper
τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως
to-the inquiry and for a-carpenter and a-geometer differently
ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη
seek the right-angle the-one indeed for to as-much-as (it-is)-useful
πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς
for the work the-other and what it-is or of-what-sort something a-beholder
γὰρ τἀληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
for of-the-truth the same indeed way also in the other-cases
ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται.
one-must-act so-that not the by-works than-the works more become

οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως,
not must-be-demanded and even the cause in all alike
ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ
but (it-is)-enough in some the that to-be-shown well such-as also
περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν
about the principles the and that (is)-first and a-principle of-the
ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ'
principles and the-ones indeed by-induction are-beheld the-others and
αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως.
by-perception the-others and by-habituation some and others and otherwise
μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ
to-pursue and one-must-try each in-the-way-that they-are-by-nature and
σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι
one-must-be-earnest that they-be-defined well great for they-have
ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ
weight for the things-following it-seems for more than half
τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι
of-the whole to-be the beginning and many-things evident to-become
δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.
through it of-the things-sought

A true account agrees with everything that is said about its subject. Calling happiness an activity of soul puts it among the goods of the soul, which are the goods most properly so called, and it explains why happiness is described as living well and faring well. It is pleasant in itself, since a lover of what is noble finds virtuous acts pleasant; but it still needs external goods, because noble action needs resources.

σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος
one-must-consider and about it not only from the conclusion
καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
and from what the argument but also from the things-said
περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ
about it with-the indeed for true all sings-in-tune the
ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές.
facts with-the and false quickly is-out-of-tune the-truth
νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν
having-been-divided indeed the goods three-ways and the-ones indeed
ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ
external being-called the-others and about soul and body the about
ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ
soul most-strictly we-call and most goods the and
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.
actions and the activities the of-soul about soul we-place
ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν
so-that well — would-be-said according-to at-least this the opinion
παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων.
old being and agreed by those philosophizing
ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ
rightly and also that actions certain are-called and activities the
τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ
end so for of-the about soul goods it-becomes and not

τῶν ἐκτός. συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ
of-the external it-sings-in-tune and with-the account also the well to-live and
τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις
the well to-fare the happy-man nearly for a-good-life a-kind
εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
it-has-been-called and good-action it-appears and also the things-sought
τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι.
the about the happiness all to-belong to-the thing-described
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία
to-some indeed for virtue to-others and practical-wisdom to-others and wisdom
τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς
a-kind to-be seems to-others and these or of-these some with pleasure
ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν
or not without pleasure others and also the external prosperity
συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ
take-in-besides of-these and the-ones indeed many and
παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες·
ancient say the-others and few and famous men
οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις,
neither and of-these (it-is)-reasonable to-miss in-the whole
ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς
but one at-least thing or even the most to-get-right with-those
μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν
indeed then saying the virtue or virtue some in-tune is
ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.
the account of-this for is the according-to it activity
διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ
it-differs and perhaps not little in possession or use the
ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν
best to-suppose and in a-state or an-activity the indeed
γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν,
for state it-is-possible nothing good to-accomplish while-present

οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν
as in-the man-sleeping or also otherwise somehow in-one-inactive the
δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ
and activity not possible — he-will-act for from necessity and
εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ
well he-will-act just-as and at-Olympia not the finest and
ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων
strongest are-crowned but those competing of-these
γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν
for some win so also of-the in the life noble
κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.
and-good those acting rightly possessors become
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
is and also the life of-them in itself pleasant the indeed for
ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς
to-take-pleasure (is)-of-the things-of-soul to-each and is pleasant toward
ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ,
which he-is-called a-lover-of-such as a-horse indeed to-the horse-lover
θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ
a-spectacle and to-the sight-lover the same and way also the
δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν
just-things to-the justice-lover and generally the-things according-to virtue
τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται
to-the virtue-lover for-the indeed then many the pleasant-things conflict
διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις
on-account-of the not by-nature such to-be for-the and lovers-of-the-noble
ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν
are pleasant the by-nature pleasant such and the according-to virtue
πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὑτάς.
actions so-that both to-these they-are pleasant and in themselves
οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ
in-nothing indeed needs-besides the pleasure the life of-them as-if

περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς
amulet some but has the pleasure in itself besides
τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων
the things-said for not-even is good the-man not rejoicing
ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι
in-the noble actions neither for just anyone — would-call
τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον
the-man not rejoicing in-the to-act-justly nor liberal
τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ
the-man not rejoicing in-the liberal actions likewise and
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ
also in the others if and so in themselves — would-be the
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε
according-to virtue actions pleasant but further also good at-least
καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς
and noble and most of-these each if-indeed well
κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν.
judges about them the excellent-man he-judges and as we-said
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία,
best then and noblest and most-pleasant the happiness
καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·
and not are-divided these according-to the Delian inscription

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
noblest the most-just best and to-be-healthy
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.
most-pleasant and it-is-by-nature what someone loves the to-obtain

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις·
all for belong these to-the best activities
ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι
these and or one of-these the best we-say to-be

τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς
the happiness it-appears and nevertheless also of-the external
ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ
goods needing-besides just-as we-said impossible for or
οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ
not easy the noble-things to-do unequipped being many
μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων
indeed for are-done just-as through instruments through friends
καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι
and wealth and political power of-some and being-deprived
ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους·
they-stain the blessedness such-as good-birth good-children beauty
οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης
not altogether for happy the-man in-the appearance utterly-ugly
ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἧττον,
or ill-born or solitary and childless still and perhaps less
εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες
if to-someone utterly-bad children should-be or friends or good being
τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς
they-have-died just-as then we-said it-seems to-need-besides also the
τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν
such well-being whence into the-same rank some the
εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
good-fortune with-the happiness others and the virtue

Happiness may be a gift of the gods, but even if it comes through virtue and learning it is among the most divine things, as the prize and end of virtue. Aristotle prefers that account: it is better than leaving the greatest thing to chance, and anyone not maimed for virtue can win it by study and care. No animal and no child is called happy, since neither can act in this way; and happiness needs a complete life, as Priam's end shows.

ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν
whence also it-is-disputed whether it-is learnable or acquirable-by-habit
ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν
or also otherwise somehow acquirable-by-training or according-to some divine
μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
dispensation or also through chance it-comes if indeed then also
ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον
another anything is of-gods a-gift to-men (it-is)-reasonable
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
also the happiness god-given to-be and most of-the
ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως
human-things by-how-much (it-is)-best but this indeed perhaps
ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ
of-another — would-be inquiry more-proper it-appears and even if
μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν
not god-sent it-is but through virtue and some learning
ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
or training it-comes of-the most-divine-things to-be the for of-the
ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν
virtue prize and end best to-be appears and divine
τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν
something and blessed would-be and — also widely-shared possible
γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν
for to-belong to-all those not maimed for virtue

διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω
through some learning and care if and it-is thus
βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν
better than the through chance to-be-happy (it-is)-reasonable to-stand
οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα
so if-indeed the-things according-to nature as possible — most-nobly
ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην
to-stand so are-by-nature likewise and also the-things according-to craft
καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην.
and every cause and most the-things according-to the best
τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν
the and greatest and noblest to-entrust to-chance very
πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ
faulty — would-be evident and it-is also from the argument the
ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν
thing-sought it-has-been-said for of-soul an-activity according-to virtue
ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν
of-a-kind some of-the and remaining goods the-ones indeed to-be-present
ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν
(is)-necessary the-others and helpful and useful are-by-nature
ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν
instrumentally agreeing and these — would-be also with-the at
ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη
beginning the for of-the political-science end best we-set-down this
δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ
and greatest care makes of-the of-a-certain-kind some and
ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.
good the citizens to-make and doers of-the noble-things
εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων
reasonably then neither an-ox nor a-horse nor another of-the animals
οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι
any happy we-call none for of-them possible — to-share-in

τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς
such an-activity through this and the cause not-even a-child
εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν
happy is not-yet for a-doer of-the such-things through the
ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ
age those and called-so through the hope are-called-blessed must
γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου.
for just-as we-said both of-virtue complete and of-a-life complete
πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ
many for changes happen and all-sorts-of fortunes through
τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ᾽ εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις
the life and it-is-possible the-man most flourishing into-great
συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς
calamities to-fall in old-age just-as in the Trojan-tales
περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον
about Priam is-told the-man and such having-met-with
τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.
fortunes and having-died wretchedly no-one calls-happy

X · CALL NO MAN HAPPY?

Solon said to look to the end, which raises the question whether a man can be called happy only once he is dead. Aristotle answers that happiness rests on activities in accordance with virtue, and those are the most lasting of all human things, so the happy man does not shift with fortune like a chameleon. Great misfortunes can mar his blessedness, but he will never become wretched, because he will never do what is hateful and base.

πότερον οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον
whether then not-even another any of-men must-be-called-happy
ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν;
as-long-as — he-lives according-to Solon and (is-it)-needful end to-see

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν
if and indeed also it-must-be-posited so whether at-least also is-he
εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς
happy then when he-has-died or this at-least (is)-utterly
ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν
strange otherwise both and for-the-ones saying us activity
τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα
some the happiness if and not we-call the dead-man
εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα
happy nor Solon this means but that then
ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη
— someone safely would-call-blessed a-man as outside already
τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ
the evils being and the misfortunes has indeed also
τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ
this dispute some it-seems for to-be something for-the
τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
dead-man both evil and good if-indeed also for-the living not
αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ
perceiving and such-as honors and dishonors and of-children and
ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ
generally of-descendants successes both and misfortunes a-difficulty and
καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι
also these provide for-the for blessedly having-lived until
γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς
old-age and having-died according-to reason it-is-possible many
μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν
changes to-happen concerning the descendants and the-ones indeed
αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν,
of-them good to-be and to-obtain a-life the according-to worth

τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι
the-others and from the-opposite (is)-clear and that also in-the distances
πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.
from the parents in-all-ways to-stand them it-is-possible
ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ
strange indeed it-would-become — if should-change-along also the
τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ'
dead-man and should-become at-one-time indeed happy again and
ἄθλιος· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπί τινα χρόνον
wretched strange and also the nothing even for some time
συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ'
to-reach the-things of-the descendants to-the parents but
ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν
one-must-return to the earlier thing-disputed perhaps for —
θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ
would-be-discerned also the now thing-sought from that if indeed
τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς
the end to-see must and then to-call-blessed each not as
ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον,
being blessed but that before he-was how (is-it)-not strange
εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ
if when he-is happy not will-be-said-truly of him the
ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν
fact through the not to-wish the living to-call-happy
διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν
through the changes and through the enduring something the
εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς
happiness to-have-supposed and in-no-way easily-changed the
δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον
and fortunes often to-come-round-again about the same-men (is)-clear
γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν
for that if we-should-follow the fortunes the same-man

εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά
happy and again wretched we-shall-call often a-chameleon
τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον.
a-kind the happy-man declaring and unsoundly founded
ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν;
or the indeed the fortunes to-follow (is)-in-no-way right
οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται
not for in these the well or badly but needs-besides
τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαι δ'
these the human life just-as we-said decisive and
εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ'
are the according-to virtue activities of-the happiness the and
ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν
opposite of-the opposite it-bears-witness and to-the account also the now
διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
thing-disputed about nothing for so belongs of-the human
ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν·
works permanence as about the activities the according-to virtue
μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν
more-lasting for even than-the sciences these seem
εἶναι· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ
to-be of-these and themselves the most-honored (are)-more-lasting through
τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς
the most and most-continuously to-live-out in them the
μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ
blessed this for seems the-cause of-the not to-happen about
αὐτὰς λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι,
them forgetting will-belong indeed the thing-sought to-the happy-man
καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα
and he-will-be through life such always for or most
πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ
of-all he-will-do and will-contemplate the-things according-to virtue and

τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς
the fortunes he-will-bear most-nobly and in-every-way altogether harmoniously
ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου.
the-man at-least as truly good and four-square without blame
πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει
many and happening by chance and differing in-magnitude
καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ
and in-smallness the-ones indeed small of-the good-fortunes likewise and
καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς,
also of-the opposites (is)-clear that not makes a-turning of-the life
τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον
the-others and great and many happening indeed well more-blessed
τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν,
the life will-make and for themselves to-adorn-besides are-by-nature
καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν
and the use of-them noble and excellent becomes the-reverse
δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας
and happening it-crushes and it-mars the blessedness pains
τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως
both for it-brings-on and it-impedes many activities nevertheless
δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ
and even in these shines-through the noble when bears
τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι'
someone easily many and great misfortunes not through
ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ'
insensibility but noble being and great-souled if and
εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς
are the activities decisive of-the life just-as we-said no-one
ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει
— would-become of-the blessed wretched never for will-he-do
τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν
the hateful and the base the-man for as truly good

καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν
and sensible all we-think the fortunes gracefully to-bear
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν,
and from the things-at-hand always the noblest to-do
καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
just-as also a-general good the present army
χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
to-use in-the-most-warlike-way and a-shoemaker from the given
σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
hides the-finest shoe to-make the same and way
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας.
also the other craftsmen all
εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων,
if and so wretched indeed never would-become — the happy-man
οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.
not however blessed at-least if into-Priam-like fortunes he-falls
οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
nor indeed shifting at-least and easily-changed neither for from the
εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων
happiness will-he-be-moved easily nor by the chance
ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν
misfortunes but by great and many from both the
τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ,
such-things not — he-would-become again happy in a-short time
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν
but if-indeed in a-long some and complete of-great and noble in
αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα
it having-become possessor what then prevents to-call happy
τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς
the-man according-to virtue complete acting and with-the external
ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον
goods sufficiently equipped not the chance time

ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ
but a-complete life or must-one-add and going-to-live so and
τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν
going-to-die according-to reason since the future unseen to-us
ἐστίν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ
is the happiness and end and complete we-set-down in-every-way
πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς
altogether if and so blessed we-shall-call of-the living to-whom
ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.
belong and will-belong the things-said blessed and (as)-men
καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.
and about indeed these to so-much let-it-be-determined

XI · THE FORTUNES OF THE DEAD

To say that the fortunes of friends and descendants make no difference at all to the dead looks both unfriendly and contrary to what people believe. Aristotle allows that such things do reach the dead somehow, but so faintly and so slightly that they cannot make the unhappy happy, or take blessedness away from those who have it.

τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ
the and of-the descendants fortunes and of-the friends all the
μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
indeed not-at-all to-contribute very unfriendly appears and to-the
δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς
opinions contrary many and also all-sorts-of having differences
τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων
of-the things-happening and the-ones indeed more reaching
τῶν δ' ἧττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ
the-others and less in each-case indeed to-distinguish long and
ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
endless appears in-general and said and in-outline perhaps —

ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὑτὸν
sufficiently it-would-stand if indeed just-as also of-the concerning oneself
ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν
misfortunes the-ones indeed have some weight and turning for the
βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ
life the-others and to-lighter-things seem so also the-things concerning
τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν
the friends alike all it-differs and of-the sufferings
ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ
each concerning the-living or the-dead to-happen much
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς
more than the lawless and terrible to-be-presupposed in the
τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην
tragedies or to-be-enacted one-must-reckon-in indeed also this
τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ
the difference rather and perhaps the to-be-in-doubt about
τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν
the departed whether of-any good they-share or of-the
ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖται πρὸς
opposites it-seems for from these if even it-reaches to
αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν
them anything-whatever whether good or the-contrary faint
τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή,
something and small either absolutely or for-them to-be if and not
τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας
so-great at-least and such-in-kind that not to-make happy
τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.
those not being nor those being to-take-away the blessedness
συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν
to-contribute indeed then something appear to-the departed
αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι,
the successes of-the friends likewise and also the misfortunes

τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας
such and also of-such-size that neither the happy
μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
not happy to-make nor another of-the such-things anything

XII · PRAISED OR HONORED

We praise a thing by referring it to something else, which is why praise of the gods sounds ridiculous. Happiness is not praised but called blessed, as the gods are, so it belongs among the things honored rather than the things praised — and Eudoxus argued the same way about pleasure. Happiness is a first principle, since it is for its sake that we all do everything else.

διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
having-been-determined and these let-us-consider about the
εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν
happiness whether of-the praiseworthy it-is or rather of-the
τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.
honored (is)-clear for that of-the at-least capacities not it-is
φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι
it-appears indeed everything the praiseworthy by-the of-a-kind some to-be
καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον
and toward something somehow to-stand to-be-praised the for just-man
καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν
and the brave-man and generally the good-man both and the
ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα,
virtue we-praise on-account-of the actions and the works
καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
and the strong-man and also the swift-runner and of-the others
ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς
each by-the of-a-kind some to-be-by-nature and to-stand somehow toward

ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
good something and excellent (is)-clear and this also from the
περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς
concerning the gods praises ridiculous for they-appear to
ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι
us being-referred this and happens through the to-come-about
τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. εἰ δ'
the praises through reference just-as we-said if and
ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων
is the praise of-the such-things (is)-clear that of-the best
οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον,
not there-is praise but greater something and better
καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν
just-as also appears the both for gods we-call-blessed
καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους.
and we-call-happy and of-the men the most-divine
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
likewise and also of-the goods no-one for the happiness
ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ
praises just-as the just but as more-divine something and
βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι
better he-calls-blessed seems and also Eudoxus well to-have-pleaded
περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι
about the first-prizes for-the pleasure the for not to-be-praised
τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν
of-the goods being to-show he-thought that better it-is than-the
ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· πρὸς
praiseworthy such and to-be the god and the-good toward
ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος
these for also the-other-things to-be-referred the indeed for praise
τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ
(is)-of-the virtue doers for of-the noble-things from this the

δ᾽ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ
and encomia (are)-of-the works likewise both of-the bodily and
τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν
of-the psychical but these indeed perhaps more-proper to-work-out
τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
for-those about the encomia having-labored for-us and (is)-clear from the
εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.
things-said that is the happiness of-the honored and complete
ἔοικε δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ
it-seems and so to-stand also through the to-be a-principle of-this for
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
for-the-sake the remaining all all-of-us do the principle and
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.
also the cause of-the goods honored something and divine we-set-down

XIII · THE PARTS OF THE SOUL

Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete virtue, the student of politics has to know something about the soul. One part is irrational and merely nutritive, shared by everything that grows and busiest in sleep. Another is irrational but listens to reason, as a child listens to a father — and the division of the virtues follows from this: wisdom and practical wisdom are virtues of thought, liberality and temperance virtues of character.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽
since and is the happiness of-soul activity some according-to
ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη·
virtue complete about virtue to-be-examined — (it)-would-be
τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας
perhaps for so — better also about the happiness
θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς
we-would-discern it-seems and also the according-to truth statesman

περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς
about this most to-have-labored he-wishes for the
πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους.
citizens good to-make and of-the laws obedient
παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ
an-example and of-these we-have the of-Cretans and
Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι
of-Lacedaemonians lawgivers and if any others such
γεγένηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη,
have-arisen if and of-the political-science is the inquiry this
δῆλον ὅτι γίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
(is)-clear that would-happen — the investigation according-to the from beginning
προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον
choice about virtue and to-be-examined human (is)-clear
ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν
that also for the-good human we-were-seeking and the
εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην
happiness human virtue and we-mean human
οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν
not the of-the body but the of-the soul and the
εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως
happiness and of-soul an-activity we-call if and these so
ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ
stand (is)-clear that must the statesman to-know somehow the-things about
ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν
soul just-as also the-man eyes going-to-treat and all
τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων
the body and more by-how-much more-honored and better
ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες
the political-science than-the medicine of-the and physicians the refined
πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν.
many-things busy-themselves-with about the of-the body knowledge

θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον
one-must-study indeed also for-the statesman about soul one-must-study
δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ
and of-these for-the-sake and to as-much-as sufficiently it-stands for the
ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον
things-sought the for to more to-work-out more-laborious
ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς
perhaps is than-the matters-before-us it-is-said and about it
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ
also in the external discourses sufficiently some-things and
χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
one-must-use them such-as the indeed irrational of-it to-be the and
λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ
reason having these and whether are-divided just-as the of-the
σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο
body parts and everything the divisible or in-the account two
ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ
they-are inseparable being-by-nature just-as in the circumference the
κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ
convex and the concave nothing it-matters for the present of-the
ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ
irrational and the-one indeed seems common and vegetative I-mean and
τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ
the cause of-the to-be-nourished and to-grow the such for
δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη
capacity of-the soul in all the things-nourished would-posit
τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ
someone — even in the embryos the same and this also
ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά.
in the full-grown (it-is)-more-reasonable for than another some

ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται·
of-this indeed then common some virtue and not human appears
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο
it-seems for in the sleeps to-be-active most the part this
καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα
and the capacity this the and good and bad least
διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ
distinguishable in sleep whence they-say nothing to-differ the half
τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο
of-the life the happy from-the wretched happens and this
εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ
reasonably an-inactivity for is the sleep of-the soul in-so-far-as
λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ
it-is-called excellent and base except if not to a-small-degree and
διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται
penetrate some of-the movements and in-this-way better become
τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ
the appearances of-the decent than of-the ordinary but about
μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς
indeed these enough and the nutritive must-be-let-alone since of-the
ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις
human virtue without-share it-is-by-nature seems and also another some
φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου.
nature of-the soul irrational to-be sharing however somehow in-reason
τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
of-the for self-controlled and uncontrolled the reason and of-the soul
τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα
the reason having we-praise rightly for and to the best
παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ
it-summons appears and in them also another something beside
τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ.
the reason being-by-nature which fights and strains-against the reason

ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος
simply for just-as the paralyzed of-the body
μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοὐναντίον εἰς
parts to the right when-men-choose to-move the-contrary to
τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ
the left are-carried-aside also in the soul so to
τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι
the-contrary for the impulses of-the uncontrolled but in the bodies
μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ
indeed we-see the thing-carried-aside in and the soul not
ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον
we-see perhaps and nothing less also in the soul one-must-think
εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ
to-be something beside the reason opposing this and
ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ᾽ ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ
going-against how and different nothing it-matters in-reason and also
τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν
this appears to-share just-as we-said it-obeys at-any-rate
τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς — ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι
the reason the of-the self-controlled still and perhaps more-obedient is
τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ
the of-the temperate and brave everything for speaks-with-one-voice
τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν
with-the reason appears indeed also the irrational twofold the-one indeed
γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν
for vegetative in-no-way shares in-reason the-other and appetitive
καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν
and generally desiderative shares somehow in-so-far-as attentive it-is
αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν
to-it and obedient so indeed also of-the father and of-the
φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.
friends we-say to-have account and not just-as of-the mathematical-things

ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ
that and it-is-persuaded somehow by reason the irrational shows also
ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ
the admonition and every rebuke both and exhortation if
δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ
and one-must also this to-say reason to-have twofold will-be also
τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ'
the reason having the-one indeed strictly and in itself the-other and
ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ
just-as of-the father listening something is-divided and also the
ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν
virtue according-to the difference this we-call for of-them
τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ
the-ones indeed intellectual the-others and moral wisdom indeed and
σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ
understanding and practical-wisdom intellectual liberality and
καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους
also temperance moral speaking for about the character
οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ
not we-say that (he-is)-wise or of-understanding but that gentle or
σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν·
temperate we-praise and also the wise-man according-to the state
τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.
of-the states and the praiseworthy virtues we-call

BOOK II

I · VIRTUE COMES BY HABIT

Intellectual virtue is got by teaching, moral virtue by habit — which is why its name is a slight variation on the word for habit. No moral virtue arises in us by nature: a stone thrown upward ten thousand times will not learn to rise. We get the virtues by first exercising them, as builders become builders by building, and this is why lawgivers make citizens good by habituating them.

διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
twofold indeed the virtue being the-one indeed intellectual the-other
δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας
and moral the indeed intellectual the more-part from teaching
ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας
has both the origin and the growth wherefore experience
δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν
it-needs and time the and moral from habit comes-about whence
καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ
also the-name it-has-got a-little deflected from the habit from
οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν
which also (is)-clear that none of-the moral virtues by-nature in-us
ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον
arises nothing for of-the by-nature being otherwise is-habituated such-as
ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω
the stone by-nature downward being-carried not — would-be-habituated upward
φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω
to-be-carried not-even if ten-thousand-times it should-habituate someone upward
ῥιπτῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως
throwing nor the fire downward nor another anything of-the otherwise
πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε
being-by-nature otherwise — would-be-habituated neither then by-nature nor

παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν
contrary-to nature arise the virtues but being-by-nature indeed
ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι
in-us to-receive them being-perfected and through the habit further
ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων
whatever indeed by-nature to-us comes the capacities of-these
πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν
first we-acquire later and the activities we-render
(ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ
which-very-thing in the senses (is)-clear not for from the
πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν,
often to-see or often to-hear the senses we-got
ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)·
but the-reverse having we-used not having-used we-got
τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ
the and virtues we-get having-acted first just-as
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν,
also in the other arts what for must having-learned to-do
ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι
these doing we-learn such-as building builders
γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ
they-become and playing-the-lyre lyre-players so indeed also the
μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
indeed just-things doing just we-become the and temperate-things
σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.
temperate the and brave-things brave

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ
bears-witness and also the thing-happening in the cities the for
νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ
lawgivers the citizens habituating make good and the
μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ
indeed intention of-every lawgiver this is as-many-as and

μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ
not well it do go-wrong and differs in-this
πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
a-constitution from-a-constitution good from-base further from the same
καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται,
and through the same both comes-to-be every virtue and is-destroyed
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
likewise and also art from for the to-play-the-lyre both the good
καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι
and bad become lyre-players proportionately and also builders
καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ
and the rest all from indeed for the well to-build good
οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως
builders they-will-be from and the badly bad if for not so
εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν
it-stood nothing — would-be-needed of-the teacher but all —
ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
would-become good or bad so indeed also in the virtues
ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς
it-stands doing for the-things in the dealings the
πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ
with the men we-become the-ones indeed just the-others and
ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι
unjust doing and the-things in the terrors and being-habituated
φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί.
to-fear or to-be-confident the-ones indeed brave the-others and cowardly
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ
likewise and also the-things about the appetites stand and the-things
περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι
about the angers the-ones indeed for temperate and gentle
γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ
become the-others and licentious and irascible the-ones indeed from

τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
the in-this-way in them to-conduct-themselves the-others and from the
οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν
in-that-way and in-one indeed word from the like activities
αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς
the states come-to-be therefore must the activities of-a-certain-kind
ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν
to-render according-to for the of-these differences follow
αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς
the states not a-little then it-matters the thus or thus straightway
ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.
from young to-be-habituated but very-greatly rather and the whole

II · DESTROYED BY EXCESS AND DEFECT

This inquiry aims not at knowledge but at becoming good, so it has to ask how we should act. Aristotle argues from what can be seen: too much exercise and too little both destroy strength, too much food and too little both destroy health, and proportionate amounts produce and preserve them. Courage and temperance work the same way — the man who flees everything becomes a coward, the man who fears nothing becomes rash.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά
since then the present treatise not of-contemplation for-the-sake
ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν
is just-as the others not for so-that we-may-know what is
ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ
the virtue we-inquire but so-that good we-may-become since
οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι
nothing — would-be benefit of-it (it-is)-necessary to-examine
τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ
the-things about the actions how one-must-do them these for

εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ
are decisive also of-the of-what-kind to-become the states just-as
εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν
we-have-said the indeed then according-to the right reason to-act
κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω — ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ
(is)-common and let-it-be-assumed it-will-be-said and later about
αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς
it both what is the right reason and how it-stands toward
τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ
the other virtues that and let-it-be-agreed-beforehand that every the
περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει
about the things-to-be-done account in-outline and not exactly ought
λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν
to-be-said just-as also at the-beginning we-said that according-to the
ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ
matter the accounts are-to-be-demanded the-things and in the actions and
τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.
the expedient nothing fixed have just-as nor the healthful
τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ
such and being the universal account still more the about
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
the according-to particulars account not has the-exactness neither for under
τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς
an-art nor under a-precept any it-falls must and themselves
ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
always those acting the-things toward the occasion to-look
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
just-as also in the medicine it-stands and the pilotage
ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον
but although being such the present account one-must-try
βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα
to-help first then this must-be-observed that the such-things

πέφυκεν ὑπ᾽ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ
are-by-nature by deficiency and excess to-be-destroyed must for
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι)
about the unseen the visible witnesses to-use
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε
just-as in the strength and the health we-see the-things both
γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει
for excessive exercises and the deficient destroy
τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ
the strength likewise and also the drinks and the foods more and
ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ
less becoming destroy the health the and proportionate both
ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης
make and increase and preserve so then also in temperance
καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὅ τε γὰρ
and courage it-stands and of-the other virtues the-man both for
πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς
everything fleeing and fearing and nothing withstanding a-coward
γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα
becomes the-man and nothing at-all fearing but toward everything
βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς
walking (becomes)-rash likewise and also the-one indeed every pleasure
ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ
enjoying and from-none abstaining (becomes)-licentious the-one
δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις·
and every fleeing just-as the boors insensible a-kind
φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς
is-destroyed indeed temperance and the courage by the excess
καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῴζεται.
and the deficiency by and the mean is-preserved

ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ
but not only the origins and increases and the destructions
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ
from the same and by the same come-about but also
αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
the activities in the same will-be and for in the
ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς
other the more-evident so it-stands such-as in the
ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ
strength it-comes for from the much food to-take and
πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ᾽ αὐτὰ
many labors to-endure and most — would-be-able these
ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ
to-do the strong-man so and it-stands also in the virtues from
τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες,
both for the to-abstain-from the pleasures we-become temperate
καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
and having-become most we-are-able to-abstain-from them likewise
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν
and also in the courage being-habituated for to-despise
τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ
the fearful-things and to-withstand them we-become brave and
γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.
having-become most we-shall-be-able to-withstand the fearful-things

III · PLEASURE AND PAIN AS THE SIGN

The pleasure or pain that follows an act is the sign of the state that produced it: the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and is glad to do so is temperate, the man who is vexed by it is licentious. Moral virtue is therefore concerned with pleasures and pains, which is why punishments work through them. Aristotle quotes Heraclitus for the difficulty: it is harder to fight pleasure than anger.

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην
a-sign and must to-make of-the states the supervening
ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος
pleasure or pain upon-the works the-man indeed for abstaining
τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων,
from-the bodily pleasures and in-very this-thing rejoicing (is)-temperate
ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων
the-man and being-vexed (is)-licentious and the-man indeed withstanding
τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος,
the terrors and rejoicing or not being-pained at-least (is)-brave
ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας
the-man and being-pained (is)-a-coward about pleasures for and pains
ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ
is the moral virtue on-account-of indeed for the pleasure the
φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν
base-things we-do on-account-of and the pain from-the noble-things
ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων,
we-abstain therefore must to-have-been-trained somehow straightway from youth
ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
as — Plato says so-as to-rejoice both and to-be-pained
οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ
in-what one-must the for right education this is further and if
αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ
the virtues are about actions and passions to-every and passion and

πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
to-every action follows pleasure and pain also on-account-of this
ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ
— would-be the virtue about pleasures and pains show and
καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές
also the punishments happening through these cures for certain
εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.
they-are the and cures through the opposites are-by-nature to-happen
ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρώην εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ'
further as also earlier we-said every of-soul state by
οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς
what-sort-of-things is-by-nature to-become worse and better toward
ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ
these and about these the nature has on-account-of pleasures and
καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν,
also pains base-men become by-the to-pursue these and to-flee
ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ
either what not one-must or when not one-must or as not one-must or
ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα.
in-however-many-ways otherwise by the reason are-defined the such-things
διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ
therefore also they-define the virtues freedoms-from-feeling certain and
ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς
stillnesses not well and because without-qualification they-speak but not as
δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
one-must and as not one-must and when and whatever else is-added
ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
it-is-assumed then the virtue to-be the such about pleasures and
λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.
pains of-the best productive the and vice the-contrary
γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν
it-might-become and — to-us also from these evident that about the

αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν
same-things three for being of-the toward the choices and three
τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τῶν
of-the toward the avoidances noble expedient pleasant and of-the
ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα
opposites shameful harmful painful about these indeed all
ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρτητικός,
the good-man apt-to-go-right he-is the and bad-man apt-to-go-wrong
μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς
most and about the pleasure common both for this to-the
ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ·
animals and to-all the-things under the choice it-attends
καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.
and for the noble and the expedient pleasant appears
ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν
further and from infancy in-all us it-has-been-bred-up therefore (it-is)-hard
ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ.
to-rub-off this the passion dyed-into the life
κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ
we-measure and also the actions the-ones indeed more the-others
δ' ἧττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον
and less by-pleasure and by-pain on-account-of this then (it-is)-necessary
εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν
to-be about these the whole treatise not for a-small-matter
εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι
for the actions well or badly to-rejoice and to-be-pained further
δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ
and (it-is)-harder with-pleasure to-fight than with-anger just-as
φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ
says Heraclitus about and the harder always both
τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν
art comes-to-be and virtue and for the well (is)-better in

τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
this so-that also on-account-of this about pleasures and pains
πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ·
(is)-all the treatise both for-the virtue and for-the political-science
ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ
the-man indeed for well these using good will-be the-man
δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς
and badly bad that indeed then is the virtue about pleasures
καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ
and pains and that from what-things it-comes-to-be by these both
αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι
it-is-increased and destroyed not in-the-same-way happening and that
ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.
from what-things it-came-to-be about these also it-is-active let-it-have-been-said

IV · ACTING AS THE JUST MAN ACTS

It looks paradoxical that we become just by doing just acts, since anyone doing them would already be just. Aristotle answers that a product of an art is judged by itself, but a virtuous act is judged by the agent: he must act knowingly, choose the act for its own sake, and act from a firm and unchanging state. The many take refuge in theory and expect philosophizing to make them good, like patients who listen carefully to the doctor and do nothing he prescribes.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
might-be-puzzled and — someone how we-say that must the indeed
δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
just-things doing just to-become the and temperate-things
σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα, ἤδη
temperate if for they-do the just-things and temperate-things already
εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ
they-are just and temperate just-as if the grammatical-things and

τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν
the musical-things (they-are)-grammarians and musicians or not-even in the
τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι
arts so it-stands it-is-possible for grammatical something
ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν
to-make also from chance and another having-prompted then indeed
ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ
he-will-be a-grammarian if also grammatical something he-makes
καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ
and grammatically this and is the according-to the in himself
γραμματικήν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν
grammar further not-even alike it-is in both the arts
καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα
and the virtues the-things indeed for by the arts coming-to-be
τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι·
the well have in themselves it-suffices then these somehow being to-come-to-be
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά
the-things and according-to the virtues coming-to-be not if themselves
πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ
somehow are justly or temperately are-done but also if the
πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ'
doer somehow being acts first indeed if knowing then
ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ
if choosing and choosing on-account-of themselves the
δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ.
and third if also firmly and unchangeably being he-acts
ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ
these and toward indeed the the other arts to-have not
συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς
are-counted-in except itself the to-know toward and the the virtues
τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν
the indeed to-know nothing or little avails the and others not little

ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν
but the whole avail which-very-things from the often to-do
τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα
the just-things and temperate-things come-about the indeed then deeds
δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν
just and temperate are-called whenever they-are such such-as —
ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων
the just-man or the temperate-man would-do just and also temperate
ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω πράττων
is not the-man these doing but also so doing
ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι
as the just and temperate do well then it-is-said that
ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
from the the just-things to-do the just-man comes-to-be and from the
τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα
the temperate-things the temperate-man from and the not to-do these
οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ
no-one — even would-be-likely to-become good but the many
ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες
these indeed not do to and the theory taking-refuge
οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν
they-think to-philosophize and so to-be-going-to-be excellent alike
τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι
something doing to-the sick who of-the physicians listen
μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων.
indeed carefully they-do and nothing of-the things-prescribed
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω
just-as then not those well will-have the body thus
θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.
being-treated nor these the soul thus philosophizing

V · VIRTUE IS A STATE

Three things arise in the soul: passions, capacities, and states. The virtues are not passions, because we are not called good or bad for our feelings and are neither praised nor blamed for them, and because passions are not chosen. Nor are they capacities, which we have by nature. What is left is that the virtues are states.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν
after and these what is the virtue must-be-considered since then
τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις,
the-things in the soul coming-to-be three are passions capacities states
τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν
of-these — something would-be the virtue I-mean and passions indeed
ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος
appetite anger fear confidence envy joy affection hatred
πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη·
longing emulation pity generally what-things follows pleasure or pain
δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον
capacities and according-to which capable-of-feeling of-these we-are-called such-as
καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι·
according-to which able to-be-angered or to-be-pained or to-pity
ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς,
states and according-to which toward the passions we-stand well or badly
οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως,
such-as toward the to-be-angered if indeed violently or slackly
κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.
badly we-stand if and moderately well likewise and also toward the-others
πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι
passions indeed then not are neither the virtues nor the vices because
οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ
not we-are-called according-to the passions excellent or base according-to

δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ
and the virtues and the vices we-are-called and because according-to
μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ
indeed the passions neither are-we-praised nor are-we-blamed not for
ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ
is-praised the-man fearing nor the-man being-angered nor
ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ
is-blamed the-man simply being-angered but the-man somehow according-to
δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.
and the virtues and the vices we-are-praised or we-are-blamed
ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ'
further we-are-angered indeed and we-fear without-choosing the and
ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς
virtues choices certain or not without choice besides
δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα,
and these according-to indeed the passions to-be-moved we-are-called
κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ
according-to and the virtues and the vices not to-be-moved but
διακεῖσθαί πως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν·
to-be-disposed somehow through these and nor capacities they-are
οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς
neither for good we-are-called by-the to-be-able to-feel simply
οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ
nor bad nor are-we-praised nor are-we-blamed further capable
μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει·
indeed we-are by-nature good and or bad not we-become by-nature
εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν
we-said and about this before if then neither passions are
αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅ
the virtues nor capacities it-remains states them to-be what
τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται.
thing indeed then it-is in-the genus the virtue has-been-said

Every virtue makes the thing that has it good and makes it do its work well, as the virtue of an eye makes the eye see well. In anything continuous one can take a larger part, a smaller, and an equal, and the mean wanted here is not the mean of the thing but the mean relative to us. Virtue is therefore a state of choice, lying in a mean relative to us and defined by reason — though some acts, such as adultery and murder, admit no mean at all.

δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
must and not only so to-say that (it-is)-a-state but also
ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ
of-what-kind some it-must-be-said then that every virtue of-whatever — it-is
ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ
a-virtue itself both well being makes-complete and the function of-it well
ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν
renders such-as the of-the eye excellence the both eye
σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ
excellent makes and the function of-it by-the for of-the
ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ
eye excellence well we-see likewise the of-the horse excellence
ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν
a-horse both excellent makes and good to-run and to-carry
τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ
the rider and to-await the enemy if indeed this in
πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν
all-cases so stands also the of-the man virtue would-be —
ἡ ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ
the state from which good a-man becomes and from which well
τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν
the his-own function he-will-render how and this will-be already indeed
εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν
we-have-said further and also thus it-will-be evident if we-observe

ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ
of-what-kind some is the nature of-it in every indeed continuous and
διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ
divisible it-is-possible to-take the indeed more the and less the
δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς
and equal and these either according-to itself the thing or toward
ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.
us the and equal a-mean something of-excess and of-deficiency
λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ'
I-mean and of-the indeed thing a-mean the equally distant from
ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
each of-the extremes which-very-thing is one and the same
πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει·
for-all toward us and what neither exceeds nor falls-short
τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα
this and not one nor the-same for-all such-as if the ten
πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ
many the and two few the six a-mean they-take according-to
τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται·
the thing by-an-equal for it-exceeds both and is-exceeded
τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν.
this and a-mean is according-to the arithmetic proportion
τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ
the and toward us not so must-be-taken not for if for-someone
δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης
ten minae to-eat (is)-much two and little the trainer
ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ
six minae will-prescribe it-is for perhaps also this much for-the
ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
(one)-going-to-take(-it) or little for-Milo indeed for (it-is)-little for-the and
ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
man-beginning the exercises (it-is)-much likewise in running and

πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ
wrestling so indeed every expert the excess indeed and
τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖται,
the deficiency flees the and mean seeks and this he-chooses
μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
a-mean and not the of-the thing but the toward us
εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς
if indeed every science so the work well completes toward
τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν
the mean looking and to this leading the works whence
εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ'
they-are-accustomed to-say-over the well being works that neither
ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
to-take-away it-is-possible nor to-add as the indeed excess and
τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης,
the deficiency destroying the well the and mean preserving
οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
the and good craftsmen as we-say toward this looking
ἐργάζονται)· ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
work the and virtue than-every art more-exact and
ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
better is just-as also the nature of-the mean — would-be
στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη
apt-to-aim I-mean and the moral this for is about passions
καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ
and actions in and these there-is excess and deficiency and the
μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ
mean such-as both to-be-afraid and to-be-confident and to-desire and
ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι
to-be-angered and to-pity and generally to-feel-pleasure and to-feel-pain
ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ'
it-is-possible both more and less and both not well the and

ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς
when one-must and at what and toward whom and of-which for-the-sake and as
δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
one-must (is)-a-mean both and best which-very-thing is of-the virtue
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
likewise and also about the actions there-is excess and
ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις
deficiency and the mean the and virtue about passions and actions
ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
is in which the indeed excess is-erred-in and the
ἔλλειψις, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα
deficiency the and mean is-praised and goes-right these
δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή,
and both of-the virtue mean some then is the virtue
στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν
apt-to-aim at-least being at-the mean further the indeed to-err
πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
in-many-ways is the for evil of-the unlimited as the
Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
Pythagoreans figured the and good of-the limited the
δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ
and to-go-right in-one-way therefore also the indeed (is)-easy the and
χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
(is)-hard easy indeed the to-miss the mark hard
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας
and the to-hit and on-account-of these then of-the indeed vice
ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·
the excess and the deficiency of-the and virtue the mean

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.
good indeed for in-one-way in-all-manner-of-ways and bad

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι
is then the virtue a-state of-choice in a-mean
οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ
being the toward us defined by-reason and by-which — the
φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν
practically-wise(-man) would-define a-mean and of-two vices of-the indeed
καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς
by excess of-the and by deficiency and further by-the the-ones
μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε
indeed to-fall-short the-others and to-exceed of-the requisite both in
τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον
the passions and in the actions the and virtue the mean
καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν
both to-find and to-choose therefore according-to indeed the substance
καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν
and the account the the what it-was to-be stating a-mean is
ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.
the virtue according-to and the best and the well (it-is)-an-extreme
οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν
not every and admits action nor every passion the
μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ
mean some for straightway have-been-named involved with
τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος,
the baseness such-as malice shamelessness envy
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα
and in the actions adultery theft murder all
γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα
for these and the such-like are-called by-the themselves base
εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις.
to-be but not the excesses of-them nor the deficiencies

οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ
not it-is-possible then ever about them to-go-right but always
ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν
to-err nor is-there the well or not well about the such-things in
τῷ ἢν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τὸ
the whom one-must and when and as to-commit-adultery but simply the
ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν
to-do any-of these to-err is alike then the to-claim
καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι
also about the to-act-unjustly and to-be-cowardly and to-be-licentious to-be
μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω
a-mean and an-excess and a-deficiency there-will-be for so
γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς
at-least of-excess and of-deficiency a-mean and of-excess
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης
an-excess and a-deficiency of-deficiency just-as and of-temperance
καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ
and of-courage not there-is an-excess and a-deficiency through the
τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐκείνων μεσότης
the mean to-be somehow an-extreme so nor of-those a-mean
οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται
nor an-excess and a-deficiency but however — it-is-done
ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως
it-is-erred-in generally for neither of-excess and of-deficiency
μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.
a-mean there-is nor of-a-mean an-excess and a-deficiency

The general account has to be fitted to particular cases, so Aristotle runs through the list. Courage lies between rashness and cowardice, temperance between licentiousness and insensibility, liberality between prodigality and illiberality, and so on through magnificence, greatness of soul, gentleness, truthfulness, ready wit, and friendliness. Several of the states have no name at all, and Aristotle coins names for the sake of clarity.

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
must and this not only in-general to-be-said but also
τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς
to-the according-to particulars to-fit in for the about the
πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ'
actions accounts the indeed general more-common are the and
ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα
about a-part truer about for the according-to particulars
αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον
the actions being-necessary and about these to-agree must-be-taken
οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ
then these from the diagram about indeed then fears and
θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν
confidences courage (is)-a-mean of-the and exceeding the-one indeed
τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ
in-the fearlessness (is)-nameless many and are nameless the-one
δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ
and in the to-be-confident exceeding (is)-rash the-one and in the
μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων
indeed to-fear exceeding in-the and to-be-confident falling-short
δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας — οὐ πάσας, ἧττον
(is)-a-coward about pleasures and also pains not all less
δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας — μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη,
and and about the pains a-mean indeed (is)-temperance

ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
an-excess and (is)-licentiousness falling-short and about the pleasures
οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν
not altogether they-become therefore not-even a-name have-they-got
οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δόσιν
nor the such-men let-them-be and insensible about and giving
χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ
of-money and taking a-mean indeed (is)-liberality an-excess
δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία.
and also a-deficiency prodigality and illiberality
ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ
oppositely and in them they-exceed and they-fall-short the-one
μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει
indeed for prodigal in indeed spending exceeds in and taking
ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει
falls-short the-one and illiberal in indeed taking exceeds
ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ
in and spending falls-short now indeed then in-outline and in
κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ
summary we-speak being-content with-very this-thing later and
ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα
more-exactly about them it-will-be-determined about and money
καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια
also other dispositions there-are a-mean indeed (is)-magnificence
(ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ μὲν
the for magnificent-man differs from-a-liberal-man the-one indeed
γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ
for about great-things the-other and about small-things an-excess and
ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια·
(is)-tastelessness and vulgarity a-deficiency and (is)-pettiness
διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα,
they-differ and these from-the about the liberality

πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ
in-what-way and they-differ later it-will-be-said about and
τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ
honor and dishonor a-mean indeed (is)-greatness-of-soul an-excess
δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
and vanity a-kind so-called a-deficiency and (is)-smallness-of-soul
ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν
as and we-were-saying to-stand toward the magnificence the
ἐλευθεριότητα, τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει
liberality by-the about small-things differing so stands
τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν
a-certain-one also toward the greatness-of-soul about honor being
μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ
great itself about a-small being it-is-possible for as one-must
ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται
to-reach-for honor and more than one-must and less it-is-called
δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ
and the-one indeed exceeding in-the desires honor-loving the-one
δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος.
and falling-short unambitious the-one and middle (is)-nameless
ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου
nameless and also the dispositions except the of-the honor-loving-man
φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας·
love-of-honor whence lay-claim the extremes to-the middle place
καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν
and we and it-is indeed when the middle-man honor-loving we-call
ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν
it-is and when unambitious and it-is indeed when we-praise the
φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ'
honor-loving-man it-is and when the unambitious-man through what and
αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ
cause this we-do in the following it-will-be-said now and

περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
about the remaining let-us-speak according-to the indicated way
ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ
there-is and also about the anger an-excess and a-deficiency and
μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
a-mean nearly and nameless being they the middle
πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
gentle calling the mean gentleness let-us-name of-the
δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ
and extremes the-one indeed exceeding irascible let-him-be the and
κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ'
vice irascibility the-one and falling-short unangry a-kind the and
ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες,
deficiency want-of-anger there-are and also other three means
ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι
having indeed some likeness to one-another differing
δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ
and from-one-another all indeed for they-are about of-words and
πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μέν ἐστι
of-actions association they-differ and because the-one indeed is
περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου
about the-true the in them the-others and about the pleasant of-this
δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.
and the indeed in amusement the and in all the-things in the life
ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν
it-must-be-said then also about these so-that more we-may-see
ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὔτ'
that in all-cases the mean (is)-praiseworthy the and extremes neither
ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ
praiseworthy nor right but blameworthy they-are indeed then also
τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
of-these the more nameless it-must-be-tried and just-as also in

τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ
the others ourselves to-coin-names of-clearness for-the-sake and
τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν
of-the easy-to-follow about indeed then the true the indeed
μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω,
middle-man truthful a-kind and the mean truthfulness let-it-be-called
ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία
the and pretense the-one indeed toward the greater boastfulness
καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον
and the-man having it a-boaster the and toward the less
εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ
irony and ironical(-man) the-man having about and the pleasant
τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ
the indeed in amusement the indeed middle-man witty and the
διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ
disposition wit the and excess buffoonery and the-man
ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ
having it a-buffoon the and falling-short a-boor a-kind and
ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ
the state boorishness about and the remaining pleasant the in the life
ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης
the-one indeed as one-must pleasant being (is)-a-friend and the mean
φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα,
friendship the-one and exceeding if indeed of-nothing for-the-sake
ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ'
obsequious if and of-advantage the his-own a-flatterer the-one and
ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.
falling-short and in all-things disagreeable quarrelsome a-kind and peevish
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες·
there-are and also in the feelings and about the passions means
ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ
the for sense-of-shame a-virtue indeed not is it-is-praised and also

ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μὲν λέγεται μέσος,
the modest-man and for in these the-one indeed is-called middle
ὃ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα
the-other and exceeding as the abashed-man the-man everything
αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος,
feeling-shame-at the-one and falling-short or at-nothing at-all (is)-shameless
ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου
the-one and middle (is)-modest righteous-indignation and (is)-a-mean of-envy
καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς
and of-malice they-are and about pain and pleasure the-ones
ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
at the things-befalling the neighbors arising the-man indeed for
νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν,
righteously-indignant is-pained at the undeservedly well faring
ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται,
the-man and envious exceeding this-one at all-cases is-pained
ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι
the-man and malicious so-much falls-short of-the to-be-pained
ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς
that even to-rejoice but about indeed these also elsewhere an-occasion
ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται,
there-will-be about and justice since not simply it-is-called
μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς
after these having-distinguished about each we-shall-say how
μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.
means they-are likewise and also about the rational virtues

The two extremes are opposed to each other and to the mean, and the mean looks like one extreme when it is set beside the other: the brave man looks rash beside the coward and cowardly beside the rash man. The greatest contrariety is between the extremes themselves. Which extreme is more opposed to the mean depends partly on the thing and partly on us — we are drawn toward pleasure, so licentiousness is the more contrary to temperance.

τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν
three indeed dispositions being two indeed vices the-one indeed
καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς
by excess the-other and by deficiency one and virtue
τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν
the mean all to-all are-opposed somehow the-ones indeed
γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν,
for extreme both to-the middle and to-one-another contrary are
ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν
the and middle to-the extremes just-as for the equal toward indeed
τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ
the less (is)-greater toward and the greater (is)-less so the
μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς
middle states toward indeed the deficiencies exceed toward
δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς
and the excesses fall-short both in the passions and in-the
πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς
actions the for brave-man toward indeed the coward rash
φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
appears toward and the rash-man (appears)-a-coward likewise and also the
σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ
temperate-man toward indeed the insensible-man (appears)-licentious toward and
τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν
the licentious-man (appears)-insensible the and liberal(-man) toward indeed the

ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος.
illiberal-man (appears)-prodigal toward and the prodigal (appears)-illiberal
διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς
therefore also push-away the middle-man the extremes each toward
ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν
each and they-call the brave-man the indeed coward rash
ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.
the-one and rash a-coward and in the others analogously
οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης
so and being-opposed to-one-another these greatest contrariety
ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον·
is to-the extremes toward one-another than toward the middle
πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ
further-off for these stand-apart from-one-another than from-the
μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
middle just-as the great from-the small and the small
τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν
from-the great or both from-the equal further toward indeed
τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ
the middle for-some extremes likeness some appears as for-the
θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν
rashness toward the courage and for-the prodigality toward the
ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη
liberality to-the and extremes toward one-another (there-is)-greatest
ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
unlikeness the-things and most standing-apart from one-another
ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον
contrary are-defined so-that also more contrary the-things more
ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ'
standing-apart toward and the middle is-opposed more in
ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή,
what-cases indeed the deficiency in what-cases and the excess

οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα,
such-as to-courage indeed not the rashness an-excess being
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ
but the cowardice a-deficiency being to-the and temperance not
ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ
the insensibility a-want being but the licentiousness an-excess
οὖσα. διὰ δύο δ᾽ αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν
being through two and causes this happens one indeed
τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
the from itself the thing by-the for nearer to-be
καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο
and more-like the one extreme to-the middle not this
ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
but the-contrary we-set-opposite rather such-as since more-like
εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον,
to-be seems to-the courage the rashness and nearer
ἀνομοιότερον δ᾽ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν·
more-unlike and the cowardice this rather we-set-opposite
τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα
the-things for standing-apart more from-the middle more-contrary
δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
seem to-be one indeed then cause this from itself the
πράγματος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ
thing another and from us ourselves toward what for
αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
we-ourselves more are-inclined somehow these more contrary
τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς
to-the middle appear such-as we-ourselves more are-inclined toward
τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν
the pleasures therefore more-prone we-are toward licentiousness
ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν,
than toward orderliness these then more contrary we-call

πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ
toward what the advance more happens and through this the
ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.
licentiousness an-excess being more-contrary is to-the temperance

IX · HOW TO HIT THE MEAN

It is hard work to be good, because in each case the mean is hard to find, as the center of a circle is not found by just anyone. Aristotle gives three rules: steer away from the more contrary extreme, as Calypso advises keeping the ship clear of the smoke and the wave; notice what you yourself are prone to and drag yourself the other way, as men straighten warped timber; and be most on guard against pleasure, which we never judge impartially.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ
that indeed then is the virtue the moral a-mean and how and
ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
that (it-is)-a-mean of-two vices of-the indeed by excess of-the
δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ
and by deficiency and that such it-is through the aiming
τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν,
of-the mean to-be the in the passions and in the actions
ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι.
sufficiently it-has-been-said therefore also a-task it-is excellent to-be
ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ
in each-case for the mean to-take (is)-a-task such-as of-a-circle the
μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν
center not of-anyone but of-the man-knowing so and also the indeed
ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον
to-be-angered (is)-of-anyone and easy and the to-give money
καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ
and to-spend the and to-whom and how-much and when and

οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ
of-which for-the-sake and how no-longer of-anyone nor easy therefore
τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ
the well both rare and praiseworthy and noble therefore must
τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν
the-man aiming-at of-the mean first indeed to-withdraw
τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ
from-the more contrary just-as also — Calypso advises

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
of-this indeed smoke and wave outside keep
νῆα.
the-ship

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ
of-the for extremes the-one indeed is more-erring the-other
δ' ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν,
and less since then of-the mean to-hit (is)-supremely hard
κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον
according-to the second they-say voyage the least must-be-taken
τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν
of-the evils this and will-be most in-this the
τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ
way which we-say to-look and must toward what also
αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα
ourselves prone we-are different-men for toward different-things
πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς
we-are-by-nature this and will-be recognizable from the pleasure
καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον
and the pain the arising about us into the-contrary
δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ
and ourselves to-drag-away must far for leading-away from-the

ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ
to-err into the mean we-shall-come which-very-thing those the
διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ
warped of-the timbers straightening do in everything and
μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ
most must-be-guarded-against the pleasant and the pleasure not for
ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες
unbribed we-judge it which-very-thing then the elders-of-the-people
ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς
felt toward — Helen this must to-feel also us toward
τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν·
the pleasure and in all-cases the of-those to-say-over utterance
οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα.
so for it sending-away less we-shall-err
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα
these then doing as in summary to-say most
δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ᾽ ἴσως τοῦτο,
we-shall-be-able of-the mean to-hit hard and perhaps this
καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον
and especially in the according-to particulars not for (it-is)-easy
διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
to-determine both how and with-whom and at what-sorts and how-much
χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς
time one-must-be-angry and for we at-one-time indeed those
ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς
falling-short we-praise and gentle we-call at-another and those
χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν
being-harsh manly calling-them but the-man indeed
μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ
a-little of-the well deviating not is-blamed neither toward the
μᾶλλον οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ
more nor toward the less the-man and more this-man for not

λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς
escapes-notice the-man and up-to what-point and to how-much (is)-blameworthy
οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
not (it-is)-easy in-the account to-define nor for another anything of-the
αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν
things-perceived the and such-things in the according-to particulars and in
τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ
the perception the judgment the indeed then so-much makes-clear that the
μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ
middle state in all-cases (is)-praiseworthy to-lean-away and must at-one-time
μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν·
indeed toward the excess at-another and toward the deficiency
οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.
so for most-easily of-the mean and of-the well we-shall-hit

BOOK III

I · THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

Praise and blame attach to voluntary acts, pardon and pity to involuntary ones, so the distinction has to be drawn. Acts done under force or through ignorance are involuntary; but throwing cargo overboard in a storm, or obeying a tyrant to save one's parents and children, is a mixed case, more like a voluntary act, since the man chooses it at the time. Ignorance makes an act involuntary only when it is of the particulars and the agent regrets it; acts done from anger or appetite are voluntary.

τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ
the virtue indeed about passions both and actions being and
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων,
upon indeed the voluntary-acts praises and blames arising
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου,
upon and the involuntary pardon sometimes and also pity
τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι
the voluntary and the involuntary (is)-necessary perhaps to-define
τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς
for-those about virtue inquiring useful and also for-those
νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ
legislating toward both the honors and the punishments it-seems
δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα·
indeed involuntary to-be the-things by-force or through ignorance happening
βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα
forced and (is)-that-of-which the origin (is)-from-without such being
ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων,
in which nothing contributes the doer or the sufferer
οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.
such-as if a-wind should-carry somewhere or men masters being
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ
as-many-things and through fear of-greater evils are-done or for

καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι
noble something such-as if a-tyrant should-order shameful something
πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν
to-do master being of-parents and of-children and having-done-it indeed
σῴζοιντο μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν
they-would-be-saved not having-done-it and they-would-die a-dispute
ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι
has whether involuntary they-are or voluntary such-a-thing and something
συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς
happens also about the in the storms jettisons simply
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ'
indeed for no-one throws-away willingly for the-saving and
αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.
of-himself and of-the rest all those sense having
μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ
mixed indeed then are the such actions they-resemble and
μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται,
more voluntary-acts choiceworthy for they-are then when they-are-done
τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ
the and end of-the action according-to the occasion is and
τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον.
the voluntary indeed and the involuntary when be-acts must-be-spoken-of
πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ
he-acts and willingly and for the origin of-the to-move the instrumental
μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν
parts in the such actions in him is of-what-things
δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ
and in him (is)-the origin in his-power also the to-act and
μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια·
not voluntary indeed the such-things simply and perhaps involuntary
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ
no-one for — would-choose in itself of-the such-things anything for

ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται,
the actions and the such sometimes even they-are-praised
ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ᾖ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ
whenever shameful something or painful they-endure in-return-for
μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ
great and noble if and the-reverse they-are-blamed the for
αἴσχιστ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ᾗ μετρίῳ φαύλου.
most-shameful to-endure for nothing noble or moderate (is)-of-a-base-man
ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ',
in some-cases and praise indeed not arises pardon and
ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν
whenever through such-things does someone what not one-must which the
ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι.
human nature overstrains and no-one — would-endure
ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
some-things and perhaps not it-is-possible to-be-compelled but rather
ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν
one-must-die having-suffered the most-terrible-things and for the
Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα
of-Euripides Alcmaeon ridiculous appear the-things having-compelled
μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον
to-kill-a-mother it-is and hard sometimes to-decide what-sort
ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον,
in-return-for what-sort must-be-chosen and what in-return-for what must-be-endured
ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ
further and (it-is)-harder to-abide-by the things-decided as for for
τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ'
the most-part are the-things indeed expected painful what and
ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ
they-are-compelled shameful whence praises and blames arise about
τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον
those having-been-compelled or not the-things indeed what-sort must-be-called

βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ
forced or simply indeed whenever — the cause in the outside is and
ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν
the doer nothing contributes what-things and in themselves indeed
ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ
involuntary are now and also in-return-for these-things choiceworthy and the
ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ
origin in the doer in themselves indeed involuntary are now and
καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις·
also in-return-for these-things voluntary rather and they-resemble voluntary-acts
αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια.
the for actions (are)-in the in particulars these and (are)-voluntary
ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι·
what-sorts and in-return-for what-sorts must-be-chosen not (it-is)-easy to-render
πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ
many for differences there-are in the in particulars if and
τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι
someone the pleasant-things and the noble-things should-say forced to-be
(ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια·
to-compel for outside being all-things — would-be for-him forced
τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ
of-these for for-the-sake all-men all-things do and the-ones
μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ
indeed by-force and unwilling painfully the-others and through the pleasant
καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός,
and noble with pleasure ridiculous and the to-blame the things-outside
ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ
but not himself easily-caught being by the such-things and
τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα.
of-the indeed noble-things himself of-the and shameful the pleasant-things

ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή,
it-seems indeed the forced to-be (that)-of-which (is)-from-without the origin
μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
nothing contributing the(-one) having-been-forced
τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον
the and through ignorance not voluntary indeed all is involuntary
δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν
and the painful and in regret the-man for through ignorance
πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει,
having-done anything-whatever nothing at-all being-annoyed at the action
ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων,
willingly indeed not has-acted what at-least not he-knew nor again unwillingly
μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν
not being-pained at-least of-the indeed through ignorance the-one indeed in
μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ
regret unwilling seems the-one and not regretting since
ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα
(is)-different let-him-be not willing since for it-differs better a-name
ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν
to-have peculiar different and seems also the through ignorance to-act
τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ
from-the being-ignorant the-man for being-drunk or being-angry not seems
δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων,
through ignorance to-act but through something of-the things-said
οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ
not knowing and but being-ignorant is-ignorant indeed then every the
μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ
wicked-man what one-must to-do and from-what one-must-abstain and
διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται·
through the such error unjust and generally bad they-become
τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ
the and involuntary means to-be-said not if someone is-ignorant-of the

συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ
expedient-things not for the in the choice ignorance (is)-cause of-the
ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται
involuntary but of-the wickedness nor the universal they-are-blamed
γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ
for through at-least this but the in particulars in which and
περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη·
about what the action in these for both pity and pardon
ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
the-man for of-these something being-ignorant involuntarily acts
ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί,
perhaps then not worse to-define them what and how-many they-are
τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει,
who both indeed and what and about what or in what he-acts
ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος,
sometimes and also with-what such-as an-instrument and for-the-sake of-what
οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα
such-as of-safety and how such-as gently or violently all
μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος,
indeed then these no-one — would-be-ignorant-of not being-mad
δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε;
(is)-clear and that nor the doer how for himself at-least
ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον †λέγοντές
what and he-does would-be-ignorant-of — someone such-as speaking
φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα
they-say to-slip-out them or not to-know that forbidden
ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος
they-were just-as Aeschylus the mysteries or to-show wishing
ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις
to-let-fly as the-man the catapult would-think and — someone
καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ
also the son an-enemy to-be just-as — Merope and

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσηριν
to-have-been-buttoned the pointed spear or the stone a-pumice
εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ
to-be and for safety having-given-drink would-kill — and
θῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν
to-touch wishing just-as the sparring-men would-strike
ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ
— about all indeed these of-the ignorance being in which the
πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ
action the-man of-these something having-been-ignorant-of unwilling seems
πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα
to-have-acted and especially in the most-decisive most-decisive
δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ
and to-be seem in which the action and of-which for-the-sake of-the
δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου
indeed according-to the such ignorance involuntary being-called
ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.
further must the action painful to-be and in regret
ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον
being and involuntary the by-force and through ignorance the voluntary
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ
would-seem — to-be (that)-of-which the origin (is)-in him knowing the-things
καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται
in particulars in which the action perhaps for not well it-is-said
ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν
involuntary to-be the-things through spirit or appetite first indeed
γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ
for nothing further of-the other animals voluntarily will-act nor the
παῖδες· εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν
children then whether nothing voluntarily we-do of-the-things
δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ
through appetite and spirit or the noble-things indeed voluntarily the

δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;
and shameful involuntarily or (is-it)-ridiculous of-one at-least cause being
ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι·
absurd and perhaps involuntary to-call what-things one-must to-reach-for
δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν,
must and also to-be-angry at some-things and to-desire some-things
οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν
such-as health and learning it-seems and also the-things indeed
ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.
involuntary painful to-be the-things and according-to appetite pleasant
ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ
further and what does-it-matter by-the involuntary to-be the-things according-to
λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
reasoning or spirit erred-in to-be-avoided indeed for both
δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη,
they-seem and not less human to-be the irrational passions
ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αἱ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ
so-that also the actions of-the man the from spirit and
ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.
appetite absurd indeed the to-set-down involuntary these

Choice is voluntary, but not everything voluntary is chosen: children and animals act voluntarily and do not choose. It is not appetite, spirit, wish, or opinion — wish can be for impossible things such as immortality, and opinion ranges over everything, while choice is only about what is in our power. It is what has been deliberated on beforehand, as the word itself suggests: what is taken in preference to other things.

διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ
having-been-defined and the both voluntary and the involuntary about
προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ
choice it-follows to-go-through most-proper for to-be it-seems
τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ
to-the virtue and more the characters to-judge than-the actions the
προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'
choice indeed voluntary indeed appears not the-same and but
ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ
over more (extends)-the voluntary of-the indeed for voluntary both
παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ
children and the-other animals share in-choice and not and
τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν
the-things sudden voluntary indeed we-call according-to choice
δ' οὔ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν
and not those and calling it appetite or spirit or wish
ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ
or some opinion not seem rightly to-speak not for common (is)-the
προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός.
choice also to-the irrational-animals appetite and also spirit
καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος
and the uncontrolled-man desiring indeed acts choosing
δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν,
and not the self-controlled-man and the-reverse choosing indeed

ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται,
desiring and not and to-choice indeed appetite is-opposed
ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος
appetite and to-appetite not and the indeed appetite (is)-of-the-pleasant
καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος.
and of-the-painful the choice and neither of-the-painful nor of-the-pleasant
θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ
spirit and still less least for the-things through spirit according-to
προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε,
choice to-be seem but indeed nor wish at-least
καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι
although close appearing choice indeed for not is
τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
of-the impossible-things and if someone should-say to-choose he-would-seem
ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
— silly to-be wish and is also of-the impossible-things
οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ
such-as of-immortality and the indeed wish is also about the-things
μηδαμῶς δι' αὑτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα
in-no-way through oneself would-be-done — such-as actor some
νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ'
to-win or an-athlete chooses and the such-things no-one but
ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν
as-many-as he-thinks would-come-about — through himself further and the indeed
βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν
wish of-the end is rather the and choice of-the-things
πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
toward the end such-as to-be-healthy we-wish we-choose and
δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ
through what we-shall-be-healthy and to-be-happy we-wish indeed and
φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ
we-say we-choose and to-say not it-fits generally for

ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ
seems the choice about the-things in our-power to-be nor indeed
δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
opinion — it-would-be the indeed for opinion seems about everything to-be
καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ
and nothing less about the eternal-things and the impossible-things than
τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ
the-things in our-power and by-the false and true is-divided not
τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.
by-the bad and good the choice and by-these rather
ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς.
generally indeed then with-opinion the-same perhaps not says anyone
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τινί· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ
but nor with-a-particular-one by-the for to-choose the-good-things
ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν
or the bad-things of-a-certain-kind some we-are by-the and to-hold-opinions
οὔ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν τι τῶν
not and we-choose indeed to-take or to-avoid something of-the
τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ
such-things we-hold-opinion and what it-is or to-whom (it-is)-expedient or
πῶς· λαβεῖν δ᾽ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν
how to-take and or to-avoid not at-all we-hold-opinion and the indeed
προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ
choice is-praised by-the to-be of-what one-must rather than
τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα
by-the rightly the and opinion by-the as truly and we-choose
μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ
indeed what most we-know good being we-hold-opinion and what
οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε
not at-all we-know they-seem and not the same to-choose both
ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,
best and to-hold-opinion but some to-hold-opinion indeed better

διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται
through vice and to-choose not what one-must if and comes-before
δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ
opinion of-the choice or accompanies nothing it-matters not
τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι δόξῃ τινί.
this for we-inquire but whether the-same it-is with-opinion some
τί οὖν ἢ ποιόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων
what then or of-what-sort something is since of-the things-said
οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ
nothing voluntary indeed indeed it-appears the and voluntary not
πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;
all object-of-choice but (is-it)-then at-least the thing-deliberated-beforehand
ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν
the for choice (is)-with reason and thought to-hint-at
δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.
and seems also the-name as being before others choiceworthy

III · DELIBERATION

No one deliberates about eternal things, or about what always happens the same way, or about chance, but only about what is in our power and can be brought about by acting. And we deliberate not about ends but about the means to them: having set the end, we ask how and through what it will come about, working backwards until we reach what is first in the order of doing. Choice is therefore deliberate desire of what is in our power.

βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν
they-deliberate and whether about everything and everything deliberable
ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως
is or about some-things not there-is deliberation it-must-be-said and perhaps
βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ
deliberable not about what would-deliberate — someone silly or

μαινόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ
mad but about what-things the-man sense having about indeed
τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου
the eternal-things no-one deliberates such-as about the universe
ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.
or the diagonal and the side that (they-are)-incommensurable
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
but nor about the-things in motion always and according-to the-same
γινομένων, εἴτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διά
happening whether from necessity or also by-nature or through
τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ
some cause other such-as of-solstices and of-risings nor about
τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ
the-things at-different-times differently such-as of-droughts and of-rains nor
περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως. ἀλλ᾽
about the-things from chance such-as of-treasure discovery but
οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι
nor about the human-things all such-as how — Scythians
ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. οὐ
best would-be-governed no-one of-Lacedaemonians deliberates not
γὰρ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι᾽ ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα
for would-come-about — of-these anything through us we-deliberate
δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ
and about the-things in our-power and attainable these and also
ἔστι λοιπά.
are what-remains
αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι
causes for seem to-be nature and necessity and chance further
δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων
and intellect and everything the through man of-the and men
ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι᾽ αὑτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ
each-group deliberate about the-things through themselves attainable and

περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ
about indeed the exact and self-sufficient of-the sciences not
ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς
there-is deliberation such-as about letters not for we-hesitate how
γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως
one-must-write but whatever comes-about through us not in-the-same-way
δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ'
and always about these we-deliberate such-as about the-things according-to
ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον
medicine and money-making and about pilotage more
ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι
than gymnastics by-how-much less it-has-been-made-exact and further
περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας
about the remaining likewise more and also about the arts
ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ ταύτας διστάζομεν. τὸ
than the sciences more for about these we-hesitate the
βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ
to-deliberate and (is)-in the-things as for the most-part unclear and
πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους
how it-will-turn-out and in which (there-is)-indeterminacy advisers
δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν
and we-take-along for the great-matters distrusting in-us
αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ
ourselves as not sufficient to-discern we-deliberate and not about
τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
the ends but about the-things toward the ends
οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ
neither for a-physician deliberates whether he-will-heal nor an-orator
εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει,
whether he-will-persuade nor a-statesman whether good-order he-will-make
οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι
nor of-the rest anyone about the end but having-set-down

τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ
the end the how and through what it-will-be they-consider and through
πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ
several indeed appearing to-come-about through what most-easily and
κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς
most-nobly they-examine through one and being-accomplished how
διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ
through this it-will-be and-that through what until — they-come to
τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. ὁ
the first cause which in the discovery last is the-man
γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον
for deliberating seems to-inquire and to-analyze the stated
τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα (φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ
way just-as a-diagram it-appears and the indeed inquiry not
πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις
all to-be deliberation such-as the mathematical the and deliberation
πᾶσα ζήτησις), καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον
(is)-all inquiry and the last in the analysis first
εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν,
to-be in the coming-to-be and-if indeed an-impossible-thing they-meet
ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε
they-desist such-as if money there-is-need these and not possible —
πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν.
to-be-procured if and possible it-appears they-set-about to-act
δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
possible and what through us would-come-about — the-things for through
τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.
the friends through us somehow are the for origin (is)-in us
ζητεῖται δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὁτὲ δ' ἡ χρεία
it-is-sought and at-one-time indeed the instruments at-another and the use
αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν δι' οὗ
of-them likewise and also in the rest at-one-time indeed through what

ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται,
at-another and how or through what it-seems indeed just-as it-has-been-said
ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ
man to-be a-principle of-the actions the and deliberation (is)-about
τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.
the-things for-himself attainable the and actions of-other-things for-the-sake
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς
not for — would-be deliberable the end but the-things toward
τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος
the ends nor indeed the-things in particulars such-as whether bread
τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ
this or it-has-been-baked as one-must of-perception for these if
δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ
and always he-will-deliberate to infinity it-will-go deliberable and
καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
also object-of-choice (are)-the same except marked-off already the
προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν
object-of-choice the for from the deliberation having-been-judged object-of-choice
ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς
is he-stops for each-man seeking how he-will-act whenever to
αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
himself he-refers-back the origin and of-himself to the ruling-part
τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
this for (is)-the thing-choosing (is)-clear and this also from the
ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς
ancient constitutions which Homer represented the for kings
ἃ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ
what they-had-chosen announced to-the people being and the
προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ
object-of-choice deliberable desirable of-the-things in our-power also the
προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν·
choice — would-be deliberative desire of-the-things in our-power

ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν
from the to-have-deliberated for having-judged we-desire according-to the
βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω,
deliberation the indeed then choice in-outline let-it-have-been-described
καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
and about what-sorts it-is and that (it-is)-of-the-things toward the ends

IV · WISH

Some say the object of wish is the good, others say it is the apparent good. Aristotle answers that without qualification it is the good, but that for each man it is what appears good to him — and for the excellent man what appears is what truly is, since he is the measure of it. For most people the deception comes through pleasure, which appears a good when it is not.

ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται, δοκεῖ
the and wish that indeed of-the end is it-has-been-said it-seems
δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου
and to-some indeed of-the-good to-be to-others and of-the apparent
ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι
good it-follows and for-those indeed wished the-good calling
μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος
not to-be wished what wishes the-man not rightly choosing
(εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως
if for it-will-be wished also good it-was and if so
ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν
it-happened bad for-those and again the apparent good
βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ
wished calling not to-be by-nature wished but for-each the
δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,
thing-seeming one-thing and to-another appears and if so it-happened

τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον
the-contraries if and indeed these not please (is-it)-then it-must-be-said
ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν,
simply indeed and according-to truth wished to-be the-good
ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ
for-each and the thing-appearing for-the indeed then excellent-man the
κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ
according-to truth to-be for-the and base-man the chance-thing just-as
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά
also in the bodies to-those indeed well disposed healthful
ἐστι τὰ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ᾽
are the-things according-to truth such being to-those and
ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
sickly other-things likewise and also bitter and sweet and
θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος
hot and heavy and of-the others each-thing the excellent-man
γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ
for each-thing judges rightly and in each-case the-true to-him
φαίνεται. καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ
appears according-to each for state peculiar are noble
καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ
and pleasant and differs most perhaps the excellent-man by-the
τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν
the-true in each-case to-see just-as a-rule and measure of-them
ὤν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε
being in the many and the deception through the pleasure seems
γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν
to-happen not for being good it-appears they-choose then
τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
the pleasant as good the and pain as bad they-flee

Where acting is in our power so is not acting, so virtue and vice are both voluntary; lawgivers assume this when they punish wrongdoers and double the penalty for the drunk. A man who has become unjust or licentious could once have avoided it and cannot now stop at will, as a thrown stone cannot be taken back. If someone objects that all pursue the apparent good and are not masters of how it appears, vice is still voluntary just as far as virtue is.

ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ
being indeed wished indeed the end deliberable and also
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
objects-of-choice the-things toward the end the about these actions
κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν
according-to choice — would-be and voluntary the and of-the
ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ
virtues activities (are)-about these in our-power indeed also the
ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
virtue likewise and also the vice in what-things for (is)-in our-power
τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ
the to-act also the not to-act also in what-things the not also
τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ
the yes so-that if the to-act noble being in our-power is also
τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ
the not to-act in our-power will-be shameful being and if the not
πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν
to-act noble being (is)-in our-power also the to-act shameful
ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ
being (is)-in our-power if and (is)-in our-power the noble-things to-do and
τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν
the shameful-things likewise and also the not to-do this and was
τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ
the good and bad to-be in our-power then the decent and

φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ'
base to-be the and to-say that no-one willingly (is)-wicked nor
ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ·
unwillingly blessed seems the-one indeed false the-other and true
μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον.
blessed indeed for no-one unwillingly the and wickedness (is)-voluntary
ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
or with-the at-least now things-said one-must-dispute and the
ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν
man not must-be-called a-principle to-be nor a-begetter of-the
πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ
actions just-as also of-children if and these appear and not
ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν,
we-have to other principles to-refer beside the-ones in us
ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
of-what-things also the principles (are)-in us also themselves (are)-in our-power
καὶ ἑκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ'
and voluntary to-these and it-seems to-be-witnessed both privately by
ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ
individuals and by themselves the lawgivers they-punish for
καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ
and take-vengeance-on those doing wicked-things as-many-as not by-force
ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ
or through ignorance of-which not themselves (are)-causes those and the
καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες
noble-things doing they-honor as the-ones indeed going-to-encourage
τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ
the-others and going-to-restrain although whatever neither in our-power is
μήθ' ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ
nor voluntary no-one encourages to-do as nothing of
ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ
use being the to-be-persuaded not to-be-hot or to-feel-pain or

πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ
to-be-hungry or another anything-whatever of-the such-things nothing for
ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν
less we-shall-suffer them and for at itself the to-be-ignorant
κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς
they-punish if a-cause to-be he-seems of-the ignorance such-as for-the
μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος
drunk double the penalties the for origin (is)-in him master
γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ᾽ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.
for of-the not to-get-drunk this and (is)-cause of-the ignorance
καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ
and those being-ignorant-of something of-the-things in the laws what
δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως
one-must to-know and not hard are they-punish likewise
δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι᾽ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν
and also in the others whatever through carelessness to-be-ignorant
δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ
they-seem as in their-power being the not to-be-ignorant of-the for
ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ
to-have-taken-care (they-are)-masters but perhaps such he-is so-as not
ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
to-take-care but of-the such to-become themselves (are)-causes
ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ
living loosely and of-the unjust or licentious to-be the-ones
μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
indeed doing-mischief the-others and in drinking-bouts and the such-things
διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν.
passing-their-time the for about each-thing activities such make
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν
this and (is)-clear from the men-training for any-whatever contest
ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν
or action they-persist for exercising the indeed then to-be-ignorant

ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ
that from the to-be-active about each-thing the states come-to-be (is)-utterly
ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ
of-an-insensible-man further and (it-is)-unreasonable the man-acting-unjustly not
βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.
to-wish unjust to-be or the man-acting-licentiously licentious
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος,
if and not being-ignorant someone acts from what he-will-be unjust
ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται,
willingly unjust he-would-be not indeed if at-least he-wishes
ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος.
unjust being he-will-cease and he-will-be just
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιὴς. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
nor for the man-being-ill (is)-healthy and if so it-happened
ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς.
willingly he-is-ill uncontrolledly living and disobeying the physicians
τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ'
at-that-time indeed then it-was-open to-him not to-be-ill having-let-it-go and
οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν
no-longer just-as nor to-one-having-thrown a-stone still it possible
ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν· ἡ γὰρ
to-take-back but nevertheless in his-power (was)-the to-throw the for
ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ
origin (was)-in him so and also for-the unjust-man and for-the
ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι,
licentious-man from beginning indeed it-was-open such not to-become
διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι.
therefore willing they-are having-become and no-longer it-is-possible not to-be
οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ'
not only and the of-the soul vices voluntary are but
ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς
in-some-cases also the of-the body for-which also we-blame for-those

μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι᾽
indeed for through nature ugly no-one blames for-those and through
ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν
lack-of-exercise and carelessness likewise and also about weakness
καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ
and maiming no-one for — would-reproach a-blind-man by-nature or
ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ᾽
from disease or from a-blow but rather would-pity the-man and
ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι.
from wine-bibbing or another licentiousness everyone — would-blame
τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται,
of-the indeed about the body vices the-ones in our-power are-blamed
αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
the-ones and not in our-power not if and so also in the others
αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις
the blamed of-the vices in our-power — would-be if and someone
λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς
should-say that all aim-at the apparent good of-the
δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖός ποθ᾽ ἕκαστός ἐστι,
and appearance not (are)-masters but of-what-sort ever each-man is
τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος
such also the end appears to-him if indeed then each-man
ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας
for-himself of-the state is somehow cause also of-the appearance
ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος
he-will-be somehow himself cause if and not no-one for-himself (is)-cause
τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
of-the to-do-evil but through ignorance of-the end these-things
πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι,
he-does through these thinking for-himself the best to-be
ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ
the and of-the end desire not self-chosen but to-be-born must

ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ᾽
just-as sight having by-which he-will-judge well and the according-to
ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο
truth good he-will-choose and is well-endowed to-whom this
καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ
well is-by-nature the for greatest and noblest and what
παρ᾽ ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον
from another not possible — to-take nor to-learn but as
ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο
he-was-born such he-will-have and the well and the nobly this
πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.
to-be-by-nature the complete and true — would-be good-endowment
εἰ δὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς
if indeed these are true what more the virtue than-the
κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ
vice will-be voluntary for-both for alike for-the good-man
καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται
and for-the bad-man the end by-nature or however appears
καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
and lies the and remaining-things toward this referring
πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει
they-do however whether indeed the end not by-nature
ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτόν
to-each appears of-whatever-sort but something also beside him
ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ
is or the indeed end (is)-natural by-the and the remaining-things
πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν,
to-do voluntarily the excellent-man the virtue voluntary is
οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ
nothing less also the vice voluntary — would-be alike for
καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι᾽ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
also for-the bad-man belongs the through himself in the actions

καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί
even if not in the end if then just-as it-is-said voluntary
εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί
are the virtues and for of-the states part-causes somehow ourselves
ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε
we-are and by-the of-a-certain-kind some to-be the end of-such-a-kind
τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.
we-set-down also the vices voluntary — would-be alike for
κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
in-common indeed then about the virtues it-has-been-said by-us the both
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ'
genus in-outline that means they-are and that (they-are)-states by
ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτάς,
what-things both they-come-to-be that of-these productive and in themselves
καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ
and that (they-are)-in our-power and voluntary and so as — the
ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί
right reason should-prescribe not alike and the actions voluntary
εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ
are and the states of-the indeed for actions from beginning until the
τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων
end masters we-are knowing the-things in particulars of-the states
δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ
and (we-are-masters)-of-the beginning in particulars and the addition not
γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν
recognizable just-as in the illnesses but because in our-power
ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.
it-was so or not so to-use through this (they-are)-voluntary

ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
taking-up-again and about each let-us-say which they-are and
περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ
about what-sorts and how at-the-same-time and it-will-be clear also
πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.
how-many they-are and first about courage

VI · WHAT COURAGE IS ABOUT

Courage is a mean concerning fear and confidence, but not concerning every fear. Poverty and disease are not what the brave man faces, and some things ought to be feared. The most fearful thing is death, and courage in the strict sense is shown in the noblest form of death, which is death in battle.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη
that indeed then a-mean it-is about fears and confidences already
φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά,
evident it-has-become we-fear and (is)-clear that the fearful-things
ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον
these and are as simply to-say evils therefore also the fear
ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ
they-define an-expectation of-evil we-fear indeed then all the
κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ'
evils such-as ill-repute poverty disease friendlessness death but
οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ
not about all seems the brave-man to-be some for even one-must
φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν·
to-fear and (it-is)-noble the and not (is)-shameful such-as ill-repute
ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ
the-man indeed for fearing (is)-decent and modest the-man and
μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος
not fearing (is)-shameless he-is-called and by some brave

κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ·
by transference he-has for something like to-the brave-man
ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ
fearless for a-kind also the brave-man poverty and perhaps not one-must
φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας
to-fear nor disease nor generally whatever not from vice
μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος
nor through oneself but nor the-man about these fearless
ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι
(is)-brave we-call and also this-man by likeness some
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί
for in the warlike dangers cowardly being liberal
εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν.
are and toward of-money loss confidently they-stand
οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται
nor indeed if someone outrage toward children and wife fears
ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ
or envy or something of-the such-things a-coward is nor if
θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν
he-is-confident being-about to-be-whipped (is-he)-brave about what-sorts then
τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς
of-the fearful-things (is)-the brave-man or about the greatest no-one
γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ
for (is)-more-enduring of-the terrors most-fearful and (is)-the
θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ
death an-end for and nothing still for-the dead-man seems
οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ
either good or bad to-be it-would-seem and — nor about
θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ
death the in every-case the brave-man to-be such-as at sea
ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι
or in-diseases in what-cases then or in the noblest such

δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ
and (are)-those in war in greatest for and noblest
κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς
danger agreeing and with-these are also the honors the in the
πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ'
cities and among the monarchs strictly indeed would-be-called
ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ
— brave the-man about the noble death fearless and
ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα
whatever death brings-on close-at-hand being such and especially
τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ
the-things in war not indeed but also at sea
καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς
and in diseases fearless (is)-the brave-man not so and as
οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν
the seamen the-ones indeed for have-given-up the safety
καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ
and the death the such they-resent the-others and
εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ
of-good-hope are through the experience at-the-same-time and also
ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν·
they-play-the-man in what-cases there-is defense or (it-is)-noble the to-die
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.
in the such and destructions neither belongs

The brave man fears what a man should fear and endures it as reason directs, for the sake of the noble — which is the end of virtue. On one side stand the man who fears nothing, a madman or insensible, and the rash man, thought a boaster pretending to a courage he has not got, who does not stay when the danger comes; on the other the coward, a man without hope, who fears everything. The brave are keen in the act and quiet before it; to die fleeing poverty, love or pain is a coward's act.

τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
the and fearful not for-all indeed (is)-the same we-call and something
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ
also beyond man this indeed then to-everyone (is)-fearful to-the
γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει
at-least sense having the-things and according-to man differ
μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
in-magnitude and by-the more and less likewise and also
τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς
the things-inspiring-confidence the-man and brave undismayed as
ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ
a-man he-will-fear indeed then also the such-things as one-must
δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο
and also as the reason he-will-endure of-the noble for-the-sake this
γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
for (is)-end of-the virtue it-is-possible and more and less
ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα
these to-fear and further the-things not fearful as such
φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὃ
to-fear it-happens and of-the errors the-one indeed because what
οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι
not one-must the-other and because not as one-must the-other and because
οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
not when or something of-the such-things likewise and also about

τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ
the things-inspiring-confidence the-man indeed then what one-must and of-which
ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε,
for-the-sake enduring and fearing and as one-must and when
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ,
likewise and also being-confident (is)-brave according-to worth for
καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
and as — the reason he-feels and acts the brave-man
τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. †καὶ
end and of-every activity is the according-to the state and
τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.† τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ
for-the brave-man and the courage (is)-noble such indeed also
τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ
the end is-defined for each-thing by-the end of-the-noble indeed
ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
for-the-sake the brave-man endures and does the-things according-to
τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ
the courage of-the and exceeding the-one indeed in-the
ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι
fearlessness (is)-nameless it-has-been-said and by-us in the earlier-parts that
πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ
many are nameless he-would-be and — someone mad or
ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα,
insensible-to-pain if nothing he-should-fear neither earthquake nor waves
καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
just-as they-say the Celts the-one and in-the to-be-confident
ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
exceeding about the fearful-things (is)-rash it-seems and also
ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς
a-boaster to-be the rash-man and a-pretender of-courage as
γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται
at-any-rate that-man about the fearful-things stands this-man wishes

φαίνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ
to-appear in what-things then he-is-able he-imitates therefore also
εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
are the many of-them rash-cowards in these for
θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ
playing-the-bold the fearful-things not they-endure the-one and in-the
φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ
to-fear exceeding (is)-a-coward and for what not one-must
καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
and as not one-must and all the such-things follow him
ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις
he-falls-short and also in-the to-be-confident but in the pains
ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή τις
exceeding more conspicuous he-is despairing indeed a-kind
ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως·
the coward everything for he-fears the-one and brave oppositely
τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταὐτὰ
the for to-be-confident (is)-of-a-man-of-good-hope about the-same-things
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ
indeed then is the both coward and the rash-man and the
ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἳ μὲν γὰρ
brave-man differently and they-stand toward them the-ones indeed for
ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ
exceed and fall-short the-one and moderately stands and
ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι
as one-must and the indeed rash (are)-headlong and wishing
πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ'
before the dangers in them and they-withdraw the-ones and
ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
brave in the deeds (are)-keen before and quiet

καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
just-as then it-has-been-said the courage a-mean is about
θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι
things-inspiring-confidence and fearful-things in which it-has-been-said and because
καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.
(it-is)-noble he-chooses and endures or because (it-is)-shameful the not
τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἤ τι
the and to-die fleeing poverty or love or something
λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία
painful not (is)-of-a-brave-man but rather of-a-coward softness
γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν
for the to-flee the toilsome-things and not because (it-is)-noble
ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.
he-endures but fleeing an-evil

VIII · FIVE THINGS TAKEN FOR COURAGE

Five states resemble courage without being it. Citizen courage comes closest, since it acts from shame and the wish for honor, and Homer's Diomedes and Hector show it. The others are the courage of experience, of spirit, of good hope, and of ignorance. Professional soldiers run first once the danger outruns their reckoning, while citizen troops stand their ground and die.

ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ
is indeed then the courage such-a-thing something they-are-called and
καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ
also other-kinds according-to five ways first indeed the
πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν
civic most for it-resembles they-seem for to-endure
τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων
the dangers the citizens through the-things from the laws

ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· καὶ διὰ
penalties and the reproaches and through the honors and through
τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ᾽ οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ
this bravest they-seem to-be among whom the cowards
ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ
(are)-dishonored and the brave (are)-honored such and also
Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα·
Homer makes such-as — Diomedes and — Hector

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
Polydamas on-me first reproach will-lay

καὶ
and

Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ᾽ ἀγορεύων
Hector for one-day will-say among Trojans speaking
Τυδείδης ὑπ᾽ ἐμεῖο.
Tydeus-son by me

ὡμοίωται δ᾽ αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ,
it-has-been-made-like and this most to-the earlier stated
ὅτι δι᾽ ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι᾽ αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ
because through virtue it-comes-about through shame for and through
καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ
of-the-noble desire of-honor for and flight of-reproach shameful
ὄντος. τάξαι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων
being would-rank and — someone also those by the rulers
ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· χείρους δ᾽, ὅσῳ οὐ δι᾽
being-compelled into the-same worse and by-how-much not through
αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ
shame but through fear it they-do and fleeing not

τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι,
the shameful but the painful they-compel for the masters
ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ
just-as — Hector

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,
whom and — I far-off of-battle cowering shall-see
οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.
not for-him sure it-will-be to-escape dogs

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες, τὸ
and those commanding and-if they-retreat striking the
αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
same do and those before the trenches and the such-things
παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
drawing-them-up all for compel must and not through
ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
necessity brave to-be but because (it-is)-noble it-seems and also
ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ
the experience the about each-thing courage to-be whence also —
Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ
Socrates thought knowledge to-be the courage such and
ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται·
others indeed in other-fields in the warlike-matters and the soldiers
δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα
it-seems for to-be many empty-alarms of-the war which most
συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν
they-have-observed these they-appear indeed brave because not know
οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα
the others of-what-kind they-are then to-act and not to-suffer most
δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις
they-are-able from the experience being-able to-use the arms

καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὁποῖα ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι
and such having of-what-sort — would-be both toward the to-act
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις
and toward the not to-suffer strongest just-as then with-unarmed-men
ὡπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
armed-men fight and athletes with-laymen and for in the
τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν,
such contests not the bravest most-fit-to-fight are
ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.
but those most being-strong and the bodies best having
οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ
the soldiers and cowards become whenever exceeds
ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς
the danger and they-are-left-behind in-the numbers and in-the
παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ
equipment first for they-flee the and civic-troops
μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη.
remaining die which-very-thing also-at the Hermaeum happened
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς
for-the indeed for (is)-shameful the to-flee and the death than-the
τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἳ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
such safety (is)-more-choiceworthy the-others and also from beginning
ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι,
were-risking as stronger being having-recognized and they-flee
τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ'
the death more than-the shameful fearing the-one and
ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
brave not such and the spirit and toward the courage
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
they-bring brave for to-be seem also those through spirit
ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι
just-as the beasts against those having-wounded rushing because

καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
also the brave (are)-spirited most-impetuous for (is)-the spirit
πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος σθένος ἔμβαλε
toward the dangers whence also Homer strength he-put
θυμῷ καὶ μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε καὶ δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ
in-spirit and might and spirit he-roused and keen and up
ῥῖνας μένος καὶ ἔζεσεν αἷμα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
nostrils might and boiled blood all for the such-things
ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν.
seem to-signify the of-the spirit rousing and impulse
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ
the-ones indeed then brave through the noble act the and
θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ
spirit works-with them the beasts and through pain through for
τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ
the to-have-been-struck or through the to-fear since if at-least in a-wood
ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ'
it-is not they-approach not indeed they-are brave through the by
ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν,
pain and spirit being-driven toward the danger to-rush
οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι
nothing of-the terrors foreseeing since so at-least even the asses
ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται
brave would-be being-hungry being-beaten for not they-stand-away
τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ
from-the pasture and the adulterers and through the appetite daring-things
πολλὰ δρῶσιν. φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν
many do most-natural and seems the through the spirit
εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα
to-be and having-taken-on-besides choice and the of-which for-the-sake
ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι,
courage to-be and the men indeed being-angry indeed feel-pain

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι
taking-vengeance and feel-pleasure those and through these fighting
μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς
fighters indeed not brave and not for through the noble nor as
ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.
the reason but through passion closely-resembling and they-have something
οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
nor indeed those of-good-hope being (are)-brave through for the
πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς
often and many to-have-conquered they-are-confident in the
κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ
dangers closely-alike and because both (are)-confident but the-ones
μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι,
indeed brave through the earlier things-said (are)-confident
οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἂν
the-others and through the to-think strongest to-be and nothing —
παθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες
to-suffer such and do also the men-getting-drunk of-good-hope
γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
for they-become whenever and to-them not happens the such-things
φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα
they-flee of-a-brave-man and it-was the fearful-things for-a-man being
καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ
and appearing to-endure because (it-is)-noble and (it-is)-shameful the
μή. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις
not therefore also of-a-braver-man it-seems to-be the in the sudden
φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις·
fears fearless and undisturbed to-be than in the foreseen
ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς·
from a-state for more it-was because less from preparation
τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις
the foreseen indeed for even from calculation and reason someone

προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι
would-choose the-things and sudden according-to the state brave
δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω
and appear also those being-ignorant and they-are not far
τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν
from-the men-of-good-hope worse and by-how-much standing nothing
ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ'
they-have those(-do) and therefore also they-remain some time those and
ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι,
having-been-deceived if they-recognize that (it-is)-other or they-suspect
φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες
they-flee which-very-thing the Argives suffered having-fallen-in
τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι
with-the Laconians as with-Sicyonians the both indeed brave
εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.
have-been-described of-what-sort some and those seeming brave

IX · COURAGE AND PAIN

Courage has more to do with what is fearful than with what gives confidence, and it is painful, which is why it is justly praised: enduring pain is harder than abstaining from pleasure. Its end is pleasant, but the surrounding circumstances hide that, as a boxer's crown is pleasant and the blows are not. The better a man is, the more he loses in dying — and he is no less brave for knowing it.

περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ
about confidences and also fears the courage being not alike about
ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν
both is but rather about the fearful-things the-man for in
τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος
these undisturbed and about these as one-must standing (is)-brave

μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ
rather than the-man about the things-inspiring-confidence by-the indeed the
λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ
painful-things to-endure as it-has-been-said brave they-are-called therefore
καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον
also painful the courage and justly it-is-praised (it-is)-harder
γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ
for the painful-things to-endure than from-the pleasant to-abstain not
μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος
indeed but it-would-seem — to-be the according-to the courage end
ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον καὶ ἐν
pleasant by the surrounding-circumstances and to-be-obscured such-as also-in
τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν
the gymnastic contests it-happens for-the for boxers the indeed
τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί,
end (is)-pleasant of-which for-the-sake the crown and the honors
τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν,
the and to-be-struck (is)-grievous if-indeed (they-are)-of-flesh and painful
καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν
and all the toil through and the many these to-be small
ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ
being the of-which for-the-sake nothing pleasant it-appears to-have if indeed
τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος
such it-is also the about the courage the indeed death
καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται,
and the wounds painful to-the brave-man and unwilling will-be
ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.
he-will-endure and them because (it-is)-noble or because (it-is)-shameful the not
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ
and by-how-much — more the virtue he-has whole and
εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ
happier he-is more at the death he-will-be-pained for-the

τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων
such-a-man for most to-live (is)-worth-while and this-man of-greatest
ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν
goods is-deprived knowing (it-is)-painful and this but nothing
ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
less (is-he)-brave perhaps and even more because the in the war
καλὸν ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς
noble instead-of those he-chooses not indeed in all the
ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τοῦ
virtues the pleasantly to-be-active belongs except to as-much-as of-the
τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς
end it-touches soldiers and nothing perhaps prevents not the
τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους,
such-men best to-be but the less indeed brave
ἄλλο δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς
another and good nothing having ready for these toward the
κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
dangers and the life for small gains they-exchange
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ᾽
about indeed then courage to so-much let-it-have-been-said what and
ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
it-is not (it-is)-hard in-outline at-least to-grasp from the things-said

Temperance is a mean concerning pleasures, but not the pleasures of the soul, and not those of sight, hearing, or smell: a man who delights in colors, or in songs, or in the scent of apples and roses is called neither temperate nor licentious. It concerns taste and touch, and chiefly touch, the sense we share with the other animals — which is why licentiousness is justly reproached, since it belongs to us not as men but as animals.

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ
after and this about temperance let-us-speak they-seem for
τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
of-the irrational parts these to-be the virtues that indeed then
μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν·
a-mean it-is about pleasures the temperance it-has-been-said by-us
ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
less for and not alike it-is about the pains in the
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
same and also the licentiousness appears about what-sorts then of-the
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ
pleasures now let-us-mark-off let-them-have-been-divided indeed the of-soul
καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἑκάτερος
and the bodily such-as love-of-honor love-of-learning each
γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος
for of-these rejoices in-what a-lover he-is nothing suffering
τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς
the body but rather the thought those and about the
τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται.
such pleasures neither temperate nor licentious are-called
ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν·
likewise and nor those about the others whatever not bodily are
τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
those for story-lovers and narrators and about the chance-things

κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
wearing-out the days chatterers licentious and not
λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ
we-call nor those being-pained over money or friends about
δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ
and the bodily would-be — the temperance not all and
οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως,
nor these those for rejoicing in-the-things through the sight
οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες
such-as in-colors and in-shapes and in-painting neither temperate
οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς
nor licentious are-called although it-would-seem — to-be also as
δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.
one-must to-rejoice also in-these and by excess and deficiency
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ
likewise and also in the-things about the hearing those for
ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς
excessively rejoicing in-songs or in-acting no-one
ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ
licentious calls nor those as one-must temperate nor
τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ
those about the smell except by accident those for
χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ
rejoicing of-apples or of-roses or of-incense in-smells not
λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων·
we-call licentious but rather those of-perfumes or of-dishes
χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων
they-rejoice for in-these the licentious because through these
ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι δ' ἄν
a-recollection comes to-them of-the objects-of-appetite would-see and —
τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν
someone also the others whenever they-are-hungry rejoicing in-the of-the

βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου·
foods smells the and in-such-things to-rejoice (is)-of-a-licentious-man
τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
for-this-man for objects-of-appetite these not there-is and nor in the
ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν
other animals according-to these the senses pleasure except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ
by accident nor for in-the smells of-the hares the
κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ
hounds rejoice but in-the eating the and perception the
ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ
smell made nor the lion in-the voice of-the ox but
τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο,
in-the feeding that and near it-is through the voice he-perceived
καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν
and to-rejoice indeed in-this he-appears likewise and nor having-seen
ἢ ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει.
either a-stag or a-wild goat but because food he-will-have
περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ
about the such and pleasures the temperance and the
ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν
licentiousness are in-which also the remaining animals share whence
ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν
slavish and beastlike they-appear these and are
ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν
touch and taste they-appear and also the taste to a-small-degree
ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν
or not-at-all to-use of-the for taste is the judgment of-the
χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες
flavors which-very-thing do those the wines testing
καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ
and the dishes seasoning not at-all and they-rejoice in-these or

οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται
not those at-least licentious but in-the enjoyment which comes-about
πᾶσα δι᾽ ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς
all through touch and in foods and in drinks and in-the
ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος
sexual(-things) things-so-called therefore also prayed someone a-gourmand
ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς
being the throat for-himself longer than-a-crane's to-become as
ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ᾽
taking-pleasure in-the touch most-common indeed of-the senses according-to
ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος
which the licentiousness and it-would-seem — justly reproachable
εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽
to-be because not in-so-far-as men we-are it-belongs but
ᾗ ζῷα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν
in-so-far-as animals the indeed in-such-things to-rejoice and most to-cherish
θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς
(is)-beastlike and for the most-liberal of-the through the touch
ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ
pleasures have-been-taken-away such-as the in the gymnasiums through
τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν
rubbing and the warming arising not for about all
τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη.
the body (is)-the of-the licentious-man touch but about certain parts

Some appetites are shared and natural, like the appetite for food, and few go wrong in these except by taking more than nature asks; such men are called belly-mad. In the appetites peculiar to individuals many go wrong in many ways. The licentious man is pained both when he fails to get what he wants and while he wants it, whereas the temperate man is not pained by the absence of what is pleasant.

τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ'
of-the and appetites the-ones indeed common seem to-be the-others and
ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς
peculiar and acquired such-as the indeed of-the food (is)-natural everyone
γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ
for desires the man-in-need of-dry or of-liquid food at-times and
ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων·
of-both and of-a-bed says Homer the young-man and man-in-his-prime
τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν.
the and of-such-a-kind or of-such-another-kind no-longer everyone nor of-the same
διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι
therefore it-appears our-own to-be not indeed but it-has at-least something
καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια
also natural different for for-different-men are pleasant and some
πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς
for-all more-pleasant than-the chance-things in indeed then the natural
ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον·
appetites few go-wrong and toward one toward the more
τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ,
the for to-eat the chance-things or to-drink until — one-is-over-filled
ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις
to-exceed is the according-to nature in-the amount a-filling-up
γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται
for of-the want (is)-the natural appetite therefore are-called

οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν.
these belly-mad as beyond the requisite filling it
τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ
such and become those excessively slavish about and
τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν.
the peculiar of-the pleasures many and in-many-ways go-wrong
τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς
of-the for lovers-of-such-things so-called either by-the to-rejoice in-what
μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ,
not one-must or by-the more than as the many or not as one-must
κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ
in all and the licentious exceed and for
χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι
they-rejoice in-some in-which not one-must hateful for and if in-some
δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ ὡς
one-must to-rejoice of-the such-things more than one-must and than as
οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ
the many rejoice the indeed then about the pleasures excess
ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ
that (is)-licentiousness and blameworthy (is)-clear about and the pains not
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ'
just-as in the courage by-the to-endure is-called temperate nor
ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
licentious by-the not but the-one indeed licentious by-the to-be-pained
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ
more than one-must because of-the pleasant-things not he-attains and
τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ
the pain and makes for-him the pleasure the-one and temperate by-the
μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
not to-be-pained at-the absence and by-the to-abstain from-the pleasant

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων
the-one indeed then licentious desires of-the pleasant-things all
ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε
or of-the most and is-led by the appetite so-as
ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται
instead-of the others these to-choose therefore also he-is-pained
καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ
both failing and desiring with pain for (is)-the
ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.
appetite absurd and it-resembles the through pleasure to-be-pained
ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον ἢ
falling-short and in-the-things about the pleasures and less than
δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν
one-must rejoicing not at-all become not for human is
ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει
the such insensibility and for the remaining animals distinguish
τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ· εἰ δέ
the foods and in-some indeed rejoice in-others and not if and
τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου,
for-someone nothing is pleasant nor differs one from-another
πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ'
far — he-would-be from-the man to-be not has-got and
ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ
the such-a-man a-name through the not at-all to-occur the-one and
σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται
temperate moderately indeed about these stands neither for takes-pleasure
οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ'
in-what most the licentious-man but rather is-annoyed nor
ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ'
at-all in-what not one-must nor violently in-such-a-thing in-any nor
ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον
being-absent is-he-pained nor desires or moderately nor more

ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων
than one-must nor when not one-must nor at-all of-the such-things
οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν
anything whatever and toward health are or toward good-condition
ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ
pleasant being of-these he-will-desire moderately and as one-must and
τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ
of-the other pleasant-things not hindrances to-these being or beside
τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων
the noble or beyond the substance the-man for so standing
μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ
more cherishes the such pleasures than-the worth the-one
δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
and temperate not such but as the right reason

XII · LICENTIOUSNESS AND THE CHILD

Licentiousness is more voluntary than cowardice, because it works through pleasure, and pleasure does not drive a man out of himself as pain does. Its name also covers children's faults, aptly: appetite, like a child, grows unless chastened, and must live by reason as a child by its tutor.

ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
voluntary and more resembles the licentiousness than-the cowardice
ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν
the-one indeed for through pleasure the-other and through pain of-which
τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν
the-one indeed (is)-choiceworthy the-other and (is)-to-be-avoided and the indeed
λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ
pain drives-out and destroys the of-the man-having nature the and
ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον. διὸ
pleasure nothing such does more indeed (it-is)-voluntary therefore

καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς
also more-reproachable and for to-be-habituated (is)-easier toward
αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ
them many for in the life the such-things and the habituations
ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε δ'
(are)-without-danger in and the fearful-things the-reverse it-would-seem and
ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον·
— not alike voluntary the cowardice to-be to-the in particular-cases
αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν,
itself indeed for (is)-painless these and through pain drives-out
ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥιπτεῖν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν·
so-as even the arms to-throw-away and the-other-things to-behave-shamefully
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν
therefore also seem forced to-be for-the and licentious-man the-reverse
τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἑκούσια (ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ
the-things indeed in particulars (are)-voluntary for-one-desiring for
καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ), τὸ δ' ὅλον ἧττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
and reaching-for the and whole less no-one for desires
ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς
licentious to-be the and name of-the licentiousness also to the
παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα.
childish faults we-carry they-have for some likeness
πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν
which and from which-of-the-two is-named nothing toward the now
διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου.
it-matters (is)-clear and that the later from the earlier
οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ
not badly and it-seems to-have-been-transferred to-have-been-chastened for must
τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον,
the-thing of-the shameful-things desiring and much increase having
τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ'
such and especially (is)-the appetite and the child according-to

ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις
appetite for they-live also the children and especially in these
ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ
(is)-the of-the pleasant desire if then not it-will-be obedient and under
τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος
the ruling-part to much it-will-go insatiable for (is)-the of-the pleasant
ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας
desire and from-every-quarter for-the senseless-man and the of-the appetite
ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι,
activity increases the kindred and-if great and violent they-are
καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι
also the reasoning they-knock-out therefore must moderate to-be
αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι — τὸ
them and few and to-the reason nothing to-be-opposed the
δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον — ὥσπερ
and such obedient we-call and chastened just-as
δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ
and the child must according-to the command of-the tutor
ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ
to-live so also the appetitive-part according-to the reason therefore
δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ·
must of-the temperate-man the appetitive-part to-agree with-the reason
σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων
a-mark for of-both (is)-the noble and desires the temperate-man
ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ
what-things one-must and as one-must and when so and orders also
ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.
the reason these then by-us let-it-have-been-said about temperance

BOOK IV

I · LIBERALITY

Liberality is the mean about money, praised more in giving than in taking. The liberal man gives to the right people, in the right amounts, and gladly, and does not take from the wrong sources. Prodigality exceeds in giving and is easily cured; illiberality falls short in giving and exceeds in taking, is incurable, and takes many forms, from the stingy and the cheeseparing to the sordid lender and the robber.

λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ
let-us-speak and next about liberality it-seems indeed to-be the
περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ
about money mean is-praised for the liberal-man not
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ
in the warlike-matters nor in which the temperate-man nor again
ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν,
in the judgments but about giving of-money and taking
μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων
more and in the giving money and we-call all whose
ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ
the worth by-currency is-measured are and also the prodigality and
ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ
the illiberality about money excesses and deficiencies and
τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον
the indeed illiberality we-attach always to-those more
ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν
than one-must about money being-serious the but prodigality
ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ
we-apply sometimes combining(-them) the for uncontrolled and
εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ
on licentiousness spending prodigals we-call therefore also

φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας
most-base they-seem to-be many for at-once vices
ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ
they-have not indeed properly they-are-so-called means for
ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἓν κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν
prodigal to-be the-man one evil having the to-destroy the
οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ
substance prodigal for the-man through himself being-ruined it-seems
δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
and ruin a-kind-of of-himself to-be also the of-the substance destruction
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος.
since the to-live through these being
οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. ὧν δ' ἐστὶ
so indeed the prodigality we-understand of-what-things and there-is
χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ
use it-is-possible these to-use both well and badly the
πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται
wealth and is of-the useful-things each and best uses
ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ
the-man having the about this virtue and wealth indeed
χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν·
will-use best the-man having the about the money virtue
οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ
this-man and is the liberal-man use and to-be seems
χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ
of-money spending and giving the and taking and the keeping
κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ
acquisition rather therefore more is of-the liberal-man the
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ
to-give to-whom one-must than to-take from-where one-must and not
λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ
to-take from-where not one-must of-the for virtue more the well

ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον
to-do than the well to-be-treated and the noble-things to-do more
ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν
than the shameful-things not to-do not unclear and that the indeed
δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ
giving follows the well to-do and the noble-things to-do the and
λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ
taking the well to-be-treated or not to-act-shamefully and the gratitude to-the
διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον.
one-giving not to-the not one-taking also the praise and more
καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον
also easier and the not to-take than-the to-give the for one's-own less
προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ
they-give-up rather than not they-take the another's and
ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες
liberal and are-called those giving those and not taking
οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς
not for liberality are-praised but not less for
δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ.
justice those and taking not-even are-praised at-all
φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς·
are-loved and nearly most the liberal of-those from virtue
ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
useful for this and in the giving the and according-to virtue
πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος
actions noble and of-the noble for-the-sake and the liberal-man
οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ
then will-give of-the noble for-the-sake and rightly to-whom for one-must
καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ
and as-much-as and when and the-other-things as-many-as follow the right
δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν
giving and these-things pleasantly or without-pain the for according-to virtue

ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς
(is)-pleasant or painless least and painful the-man and giving
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν᾽
to-whom not one-must or not of-the noble for-the-sake but through some
ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται.
other cause not liberal but other some will-be-called
οὐδ᾽ ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν τὰ χρήματα
nor the-man painfully rather for would-choose — the money
τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται
than-the noble action this and not of-a-liberal-man nor will-be-take
δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ
and from-where not one-must not for is of-the-man not valuing the
χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ᾽ αἰτητικός·
money the such taking not — he-would-be and nor given-to-asking
οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι.
not for is of-the-man well doing readily to-be-benefited
ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,
from-where and one-must he-will-take for-instance from the his-own possessions
οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι.
not as noble but as necessary so-that he-may-have to-give
οὐδ᾽ ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων
nor will-he-neglect the own wishing at-least through these
τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
some to-help nor to-the chance-comers will-be-give so-that he-may-have
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου
to-give to-whom one-must and when and where (it-is)-noble of-a-liberal-man
δ᾽ ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε
and it-is very-much also the to-exceed in the giving so-as
καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν
to-leave for-himself less the for not to-look to himself
ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ᾽ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται·
(is)-of-a-liberal-man according-to the substance and the liberality is-spoken-of

οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν
not for in the amount of-the things-given the liberal but in
τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν.
the of-the giver state this and according-to the substance gives
οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω
nothing indeed prevents more-liberal to-be the-man the less
διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι
giving if from less he-give more-liberal and to-be
δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν
seem those not having-acquired but having-inherited the
οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι
substance inexperienced both for of-the want and all love
μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
more the their-own works just-as the parents and the poets
πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα
to-be-rich and not easy the liberal-man neither acquisitive being
μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ
nor retentive free-giving but and not valuing for themselves
τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται
the money but for-the-sake of-the giving therefore also is-reproached
τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.
the fortune that those most worthy being least are-rich
συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ'
happens and not unreasonably this not for possible — money
ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ
to-have not taking-care that he-may-have just-as nor in-the-case-of
τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ'
the other-things not however he-will-give at-least to-whom not one-must nor
ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
when not one-must nor as-many-as other such-things not for —

ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
any-longer he-would-act according-to the liberality and on these
ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν.
having-spent not — he-would-have for what one-must to-spend
ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
just-as for has-been-said liberal is the-man according-to the
οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
substance spending and on what one-must the-man and exceeding
ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ
(is)-prodigal therefore the tyrants not we-call prodigal the
γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς
for amount of-the possessions not seems easy to-be by-the
δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος
gifts and by-the expenditures to-exceed of-the liberality
δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν,
indeed a-mean being concerning of-money giving and taking
ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ
the liberal-man both will-give and will-spend on what one-must and
ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα
as-much-as one-must alike in small-things and great and these
ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ.
pleasantly and will-take and from-where one-must and as-much-as one-must
τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει
of-the virtue for concerning both being a-mean he-will-do
ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη
both as one-must follows for the decent giving the such
λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι
taking the and not such contrary is the indeed then following
γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ.
come-to-be together in the same the and contrary clear that not
ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ
if and contrary-to the right and the well holding it-happen to-him

ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς
to-spend he-will-be-pained moderately and also as one-must of-the virtue
γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
for both to-take-pleasure and to-be-pained at what one-must and as one-must
καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
also easy-to-deal-with and is the liberal-man in money
δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα,
he-can for to-be-wronged not valuing at-least the money
καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ
and more vexed if anything needful not he-spent than
λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ
pained if not needful anything he-spent and — with-Simonides
οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει·
not pleased the and prodigal also in these errs
οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε
neither for does-be-take-pleasure at what one-must nor as one-must nor
λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώτερον. εἴρηται
is-pained it-will-be and to-(us)-going-on clearer it-has-been-said
δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία
indeed by-us that excesses and deficiencies are the prodigality
καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ
and the illiberality and in two in giving and taking also
τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
the spending for under the giving we-place the indeed then
ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ
prodigality in-the to-give and not to-take exceeds in-the
δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν
and to-take falls-short the and illiberality in-the to-give indeed
ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.
falls-short in-the to-take and exceeds except in small-things
τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ
the indeed then of-the prodigality not at-all are-combined not for

ῥᾴδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ
easy from-nowhere taking to-all to-give quickly for
ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ
fails the substance the private-persons giving who-indeed also
δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν
seem prodigal to-be since the at-least such-man would-seem —
οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου.
not by-a-little better to-be than-the illiberal-man
εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς
easily-cured both for he-is and by the age and by the
ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ
want and to the mean he-can to-come he-has for the-traits of-the
ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς
liberal-man both for he-gives and not takes neither but as
δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως
one-must nor well if indeed this he-should-be-habituated or somehow otherwise
μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ
he-should-change would-be — liberal he-will-give for to-whom one-must and
οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος
not will-take from-where not one-must therefore also he-seems not to-be base
τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν
the character not for of-a-wicked-man nor of-an-ignoble-man the to-exceed
διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον
giving and not taking of-a-fool but the-man and this
τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου
the way prodigal much seems better than-the illiberal-man
εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ
to-be through both the things-said and that the-one indeed benefits
πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ
many the-other and no-one but not-even himself but the many
τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ
of-the prodigals just-as has-been-said also take from-where not

δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται
one-must and are in this illiberal acquisitive and they-become
διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν
through the to-wish indeed to-spend easily but this to-do
μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.
not to-be-able quickly for fail them the means
ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἑτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ
they-are-compelled then from-elsewhere to-provide at-the-same-time and also
διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ
through the nothing of-the noble to-care-for carelessly and
πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς
from-everywhere they-take to-give for they-desire the and how
ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
or from-where nothing to-them matters therefore not-even liberal
αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα,
the gifts of-them are not for noble nor of-this for-the-sake
οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους
nor as one-must but sometimes whom it-should to-be-poor these
πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν
rich they-make and to-the indeed moderate the characters nothing
ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι
— would-they-give to-the but flatterers or some other pleasure providing
πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς
much therefore also licentious of-them are the many easily
γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι,
for spending also on the licentious-pleasures lavish they-are
καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς
and through the not toward the noble to-live toward the pleasures
ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος
they-turn-aside the indeed then prodigal untutored having-become
εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον
into these passes obtaining and care to the mean

καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ᾽ ἄν. ἡ δ᾽ ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ᾽
and to the right would-arrive — the but illiberality incurable both
ἐστίν (δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους
is seems for the old-age and every incapacity illiberal
ποιεῖν), καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας·
to-make and more-innate to-the men than-the prodigality
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί.
the for many money-loving more than given-to-giving
καὶ διατείνει δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ
also extends and over much and many-formed it-is many for
τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα,
ways seem of-the illiberality to-be in two for being
τῇ τ᾽ ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως,
the both deficiency of-the giving and the excess of-the taking
οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται,
not to-all entire comes but sometimes is-separated
καὶ οἳ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἳ δὲ τῇ δόσει
and some indeed in-the taking exceed others and in-the giving
ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον
fall-short the indeed for in the such names such-as
φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
misers stingy skinflints all in-the giving fall-short
τῶν δ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν,
of-the and others'-things not they-aim nor wish to-take
οἳ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν
some indeed through a-certain decency and caution of-the shameful-things
(δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν,
seem for some or say at-least through this to-keep(-it)
ἵνα μή ποτ᾽ ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων
so-that not ever they-be-compelled shameful something to-do of-these
δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται
and also the cumin-splitter and every the such(-man) has-been-named

δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἱ δ᾽
and from the excess of-the nothing — to-give others and
αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον
again through fear keep-away of-the others'-things as not easy
αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους
himself indeed the of-others to-take the and his-own others
μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι.
not it-pleases then them the neither to-take nor to-give
οἱ δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν
others and again in the taking exceed by-the from-everywhere
λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας
to-take and everything such-as those the illiberal trades
ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ
plying brothel-keepers and all the such and
τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι
usurers in small-sums and at high(-interest) all for these
ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν
from-where not one-must take and as-much-as not one-must common
δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα
and in them the sordid-greed appears all for for-the-sake
κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ
of-gain and that small reproaches endure the for
τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ
the great-things not from-where and one-must taking nor what
δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις
one-must not we-call illiberal such-as the tyrants cities
πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ
sacking and temples robbing but wicked rather and
ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης
impious and unjust the however gambler and the clothes-stealer
καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ.
and the robber of-the illiberal are sordidly-greedy for

κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη
of-gain for for-the-sake both are-busy and reproaches
ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἳ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα
endure and the-ones indeed dangers the greatest for-the-sake
τοῦ λήμματος, οἳ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς
of-the gain the-others and from the friends gain to-whom
δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν
one-must to-give both indeed from-where not one-must to-gain
βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις
wishing (are)-sordidly-greedy and all indeed the such takings
ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία
(are)-illiberal fittingly and to-the liberality illiberality
ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας,
opposite is-said greater both for is evil than-the prodigality
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
and more toward this they-err than in-the-way-of the
λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
said prodigality about indeed then liberality and the
ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
opposed vices so-much let-it-have-been-said

Magnificence is fitting expenditure on a great scale, and its possessor is like an expert who sees what is fitting. It shows in what is spent on the gods, on a trireme, a chorus, or a public feast, and in a man's house and gifts. Its excess is vulgarity, which spends lavishly where it should not, to show off; its deficiency is niggardliness, which spoils the great thing for a trifle.

δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας
it-would-seem and — fitting to-be also about magnificence
διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ
to-go-through it-seems for also it about money a virtue
εἶναι· οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας
to-be not just-as and the liberality extends over all
τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον·
the in money actions but over the expensive only
ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει.
in these and it-surpasses than-the liberality in-scale
καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει
just-as for the-name itself suggests in scale
πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ
fitting spending it-is the and scale relative to-something not
γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
for the same expense for-a-trierarch and for-a-head-of-an-embassy
τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ
the fitting indeed relative-to himself and in which and about

ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν
which the-man and in small-things or in moderate according-to worth
δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ
spending not is-called magnificent such-as the(-line)

πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ,
often I-gave to-a-wanderer

ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
but the-man in great-things thus the indeed for magnificent-man
ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής.
(is)-liberal the but liberal-man not-at-all more magnificent
τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια
of-the such and state the indeed deficiency niggardliness
καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
is-called the and excess vulgarity and tastelessness and
ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ
as-many-as such not exceeding in-the scale about
ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ
what one-must but in what not one-must and as not one-must
λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ
showing-off later and about them we-will-speak the but
μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται
magnificent-man an-expert resembles the fitting for he-can
θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
to-discern and to-spend great-sums tastefully just-as for in
ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται, καὶ ὧν
the-beginning we-said the state by-the activities is-defined and by-what
ἐστίν. αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ
it-is-of the indeed of-the magnificent-man expenditures (are)-great and
πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
fitting such indeed also the works so for will-be great

δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς
expense and fitting to-the work so-that the indeed work of-the
δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ
expense worthy must to-be the and expense of-the work or even
ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
to-exceed(-it) will-spend and the such-sums the magnificent-man
τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
of-the noble for-the-sake common for this to-the virtues
καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία
and further gladly and lavishly the for exact-reckoning
μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,
(is)-niggardly and how finest and most-fitting
σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
he-would-consider — rather than for-how-much and how for-least
ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ
necessary indeed also liberal the magnificent-man to-be also
γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
for the liberal-man will-spend what one-must and as one-must
ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
in these and the great of-the magnificent-man such-as greatness
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
about these the liberality being and from the equal
δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ
expense the work he-will-make more-magnificent not for
ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ
the same excellence of-a-possession and of-a-work possession indeed for the
πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ
of-most worth (is)-most-valuable such-as gold work and the
μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή,
great and noble of-the for such the contemplation (is)-admirable
τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,
the and magnificent (is)-admirable and is of-a-work excellence

μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων
magnificence in scale are and of-the expenditures
οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα
such-as we-call the honorable such-as the concerning gods offerings
καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ
and buildings and sacrifices likewise and also concerning all the
δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά
divine and as-many-as toward the public objects-of-honorable-ambition
ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς
are such-as if anywhere to-equip-a-chorus they-think one-must splendidly
ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν.
or to-fit-out-a-trireme or even to-feast the city
ἐν ἅπασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα
in all and just-as has-been-said also to the agent
ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ
is-referred the who being and of-what being-at-hand worthy for
δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
they-must of-these to-be and not only to-the work but also
τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη
to-the doer to-befit therefore a-poor-man indeed not — would-be
μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει
magnificent not for there-is from which much he-will-spend
πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
fittingly the-man and attempting(-it) (is)-a-fool contrary-to the worth
γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει
for and the due according-to virtue and the rightly(-done) it-befits
δὲ οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν
and those-for-whom such-things are-already-there through themselves or the
προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι
ancestors or those-with-whom to-them there-is-a-share and to-the well-born
καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
and to-the famous and as-many-as such all for these-things

μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος
greatness have and dignity most indeed then such
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν
(is)-the magnificent-man and in the such expenditures
ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ
the magnificence just-as has-been-said greatest for and
ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον
most-honored of-the and private-ones as-many-as once-for-all happen such-as
γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι ἡ πᾶσα
a-wedding and if anything such and if about something the whole
πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ
city is-earnest or those in dignity and about of-strangers and
ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ
receptions and send-offs and gifts and return-gifts not
γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
for on himself lavish the magnificent-man but on the
κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον.
public-things the and gifts to-the offerings have something similar
μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
of-a-magnificent-man and also a-house to-furnish suitably
τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ
to-the wealth an-ornament for a-kind-of also this and about
ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων
these-things rather to-spend as-many-as long-lasting of-the works
(κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ
finest for these-things and in each the fitting not for
ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ
the-same-things suit gods and men nor in temple and
τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ
tomb and since of-the expenditures each great in the
γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ
kind and most-magnificent absolutely indeed the in great

μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ
great here and the in these great and differs the
ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν
in the work great from-the in the expense ball indeed
γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ
for the finest or oil-flask magnificence has of-a-child's
δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον· διὰ
gift the but of-this price (is)-small and mean through
τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,
this it-is of-the magnificent-man in whatever — he-does kind
μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλητον)
magnificently to-do the for such not easily-surpassed
καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
and having according-to worth of-the expense such indeed then
ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος
(is)-the magnificent-man the-man and exceeding and vulgar
τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
in-the contrary-to the right to-spend exceeds just-as has-been-said
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει
in for the small of-the expenditures much he-spends
καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς
and makes-a-show out-of tune such-as club-members like-a-wedding
ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ
feasting and for-comedians equipping-a-chorus in the entrance
πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ
purple bringing-in just-as the at-Megara and all the
τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον
such-things he-will-do not of-the noble for-the-sake but the wealth
ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι,
displaying and through these-things thinking to-be-admired
καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν,
and where indeed one-must much to-spend little spending

οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα
where and little much the and niggardly-man about everything
ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν
will-fall-short and the greatest-sums having-spent in a-trifle the noble
ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν
will-lose and what ever — he-does delaying and considering how —
ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ'
least he-might-spend and these-things lamenting and everything
οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις
thinking greater to-do than one-must are indeed then the states
αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ
these vices not however reproaches at-least they-bring through the
μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
neither harmful to-the neighbor to-be nor very unseemly

III · GREATNESS OF SOUL

The great-souled man thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them; the small-souled man thinks himself worthy of less than he is, and the vain man of more. His concern is honor, and since he deserves the greatest he must be good in every virtue, so that greatness of soul is a kind of crown of the virtues. Aristotle describes his bearing: slow to act, ashamed to receive benefits, open in hatred and love, and deep-voiced.

ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος
the and greatness-of-soul about great-things indeed even from the name
ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν·
it-seems to-be about what-sort and it-is first let-us-grasp
διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν
it-makes-a-difference and nothing the state or the-man according-to the state
σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν
to-examine seems indeed great-souled to-be the-man of-great-things himself

ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ
deeming-worthy worthy being the-man for not according-to worth it
ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ'
doing (is)-a-fool of-the and according-to virtue no-one (is)-a-fool nor
ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ
senseless great-souled indeed then (is)-the-man described the-man
γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων,
for of-small-things worthy and of-these deeming-worthy himself (is)-temperate
μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ
great-souled but not in greatness for the greatness-of-soul just-as
καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι
also the beauty in a-large body the small and (are)-neat
καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν
and well-proportioned beautiful but not the-man and of-great-things himself
ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ
deeming-worthy unworthy being (is)-vain the-man and of-greater-things than
ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος
worthy not every(-one) (is)-vain the-man and of-lesser-things than worthy
μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε
(is)-small-souled if both of-great-things if and of-moderate if and
καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ.
even of-small-things worthy being still of-lesser-things himself he-deems-worthy
καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν
and most — would-seem(-so) the-man of-great-things worthy what for —
ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος
would-he-do if not of-so-much he-were worthy is indeed the great-souled-man
τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ
in-the indeed greatness an-extreme in-the but as one-must a-mean of-the for
κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ
according-to worth himself he-deems-worthy the-others and exceed and
ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν,
fall-short if indeed of-great-things himself he-deems-worthy worthy being

καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη. ἡ
and most of-the greatest about one most — he-would-be the
δ᾽ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ
and worth is-spoken-of with-reference-to the external goods greatest and
τοῦτ᾽ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ᾽
this — we-would-set which to-the gods we-render and which most
ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον·
aim-at those in dignity and the for the noblest-deeds prize
τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
such and (is)-the honor greatest for indeed this of-the external
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
goods about honors indeed and dishonors the great-souled-man is
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
as one-must also without and argument appear the great-souled
περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
about honor to-be of-honor for most they-deem-worthy themselves
κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς
according-to worth and the and small-souled-man falls-short both in-relation-to
ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα.
himself and in-relation-to the of-the great-souled-man claim
ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν
the and vain-man in-relation-to himself indeed exceeds not however the
γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων
at-least great-souled-man the and great-souled-man if-indeed of-the greatest
ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος,
worthy best — would-be of-greater for always the better(-man) (is)-worthy
καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον
and of-the-greatest the best the as truly then great-souled-man
δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν
must good to-be and would-seem — to-be of-a-great-souled-man the in
ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
each virtue great in-no-way and — it-would-befit a-great-souled-man

φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα
to-flee swinging-the-arms nor to-do-wrong of-what for for-the-sake
πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ'
will-be-do shameful-things to-whom at-least nothing (is)-great in particulars and
ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος
to-one-examining utterly ridiculous would-appear — the great-souled-man
μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος
not good being not he-would-be and — nor of-honor worthy base
ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
being of-the virtue for prize (is)-the honor and is-rendered to-the
ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος
good it-seems indeed then the greatness-of-soul as-it-were ornament
τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ
a-kind-of to-be of-the virtues greater for them it-makes and not
γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
comes-to-be without those through this hard in-the truth
μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
great-souled to-be not for possible — without nobility-and-goodness
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός
most indeed then about honors and dishonors the great-souled-man
ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων
is and at indeed the great and by the excellent
μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ
moderately he-will-be-pleased as of-the his-own obtaining or even
ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία
of-less of-virtue for complete not — could-be worthy
τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς
honor not however but he-will-accept(-it) at-least by-the not to-have they
μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων
greater to-him to-render the and from the chance-comers
καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων
and on small-grounds utterly he-will-despise not for of-these

ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως
(he-is)-worthy likewise and also dishonor not for it-will-be justly
περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ
about him most indeed then is just-as has-been-said the
μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον
great-souled-man about honors not however but also about wealth
καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
and power and all good-fortune and misfortune moderately
ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς
he-will-be-disposed however — it-happen and neither fortunate overjoyed
ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν
will-he-be nor unfortunate overpained not-even for about honor
οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ
so is-he-disposed as greatest being the for powers and
ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν
the wealth through the honor are choiceworthy those at-any-rate
ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ
having them to-be-honored through them wish to-whom and
καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα.
even the honor small is to-him also the-other-things
διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα
therefore disdainful they-seem to-be seem and also the goods-of-fortune
συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς
to-contribute toward greatness-of-soul the for well-born
ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν
are-deemed-worthy of-honor and those being-powerful or being-rich in
ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ
superiority for the and in-good superior all (is)-more-honored therefore
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ
also the such-things more-great-souled make they-are-honored for by
τινῶν· κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ
some in truth but the good-man alone (is)-to-be-honored to-whom

δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ
and both belong more is-deemed-worthy of-honor those but without
ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς
virtue the such goods having neither justly themselves
μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ
of-great-things deem-worthy nor rightly great-souled are-called without
γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ
for virtue complete not is these-things disdainful and also
ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ
insolent also those the such having goods become without
γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ
for virtue not easy to-bear gracefully the goods-of-fortune not
δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν
being-able and to-bear and thinking than-the others to-surpass
ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι
them indeed they-despise themselves but what ever — they-chance
πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι
do they-imitate for the great-souled-man not like
ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν
being this and they-do in what they-can the indeed then
κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων.
according-to virtue not they-do they-despise but the others
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
the indeed for great-souled-man justly despises he-judges
γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
for truly the but many at-random not is and
μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
a-petty-danger-seeker nor a-lover-of-danger through the few-things to-honor
μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδ�ὴς τοῦ βίου
a-great-danger-taker but and whenever he-runs-risk unsparing of-the life
ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν,
as not worthy being at-all-costs to-live and such-as well to-do

εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ
being-benefited but is-ashamed the indeed for of-one-superior the
δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ
but of-one-inferior and apt-to-repay with-more so for
οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς.
to-him will-owe-besides the one-who-began and will-be well treated
δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν
they-seem and also to-remember whom — they-have-done well from-whom
δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ (ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ
but — they-have-received not inferior for the one-treated well than-the
ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως
one-who-did(-it) he-wishes and to-be-superior and the-ones indeed gladly
ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν
to-hear the-others but unpleasantly therefore also — Thetis not to-mention
τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
the benefits — to-Zeus nor the Laconians to the
Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ
Athenians but what they-had-received well of-a-great-souled-man and also
τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ
the of-nothing to-be-in-need or scarcely to-serve but eagerly and
πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι,
toward indeed those in dignity and good-fortunes great to-be
πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν
toward but the middling moderate the-ones indeed for to-surpass
χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις
(is)-hard and lofty the-others and easy and over those
μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς
indeed to-be-lofty not ill-bred among but the humble
φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς
vulgar just-as against the weak to-use-strength and to
τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν
the honored-things not to-go or where hold-first-place others and idle

εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον,
to-be and a-delayer but except where honor great or work
καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.
and of-few indeed a-doer of-great but and famous
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον (τὸ
necessary and also open-in-hatred to-be and open-in-friendship the
γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας
for to-conceal(-them) (is)-of-a-fearful-man and to-neglect the truth
μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς
more than the opinion and to-speak and to-act openly
(παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ
outspoken for through the contemptuous to-be and
ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι᾽ εἰρωνείαν πρὸς τοὺς
truthful except as-much-as not through irony toward the
πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
many and in-dependence-on another not to-be-able to-live but except
φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ
a-friend slavish for(-it-is) therefore also all the flatterers (are)-servile
καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ
and the humble flatterers nor given-to-admiration nothing for
μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου
great to-him is nor bearing-grudges not for of-a-great-souled-man
τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
the to-remember especially both and wrongs but rather
παρορᾶν. οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ
to-overlook nor a-gossip neither for about himself will-he-speak
οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ᾽
nor about another neither for that he-be-praised is-it-a-care to-him nor
ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ
that the others be-blamed nor again given-to-praise is-he therefore
οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι᾽ ὕβριν.
nor evil-speaking not-even of-the enemies if not through insolence

καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ
and about necessary-things or small least given-to-lament and
δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα.
given-to-begging of-one-taking-seriously for so to-be-disposed about these-things
καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
and such-as to-possess rather the noble and unprofitable-things than-the
καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ
profitable and useful of-the-self-sufficient for more and
κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
movement and slow of-the great-souled-man seems to-be and voice
βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ
deep and speech steady not for hurried the-man about
ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος·
few-things being-serious nor intense the-man nothing great thinking
ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν
the and shrillness and the haste through these such indeed
οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος,
then (is)-the great-souled-man the-man and falling-short (is)-small-souled
ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν
the-man and exceeding vain not bad indeed then they-seem
εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.
to-be not-even these not for evil-doers are mistaken but
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ
the indeed for small-souled-man worthy being of-goods himself deprives
ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
of-what worthy he-is and seems evil to-have some from the not
ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν·
to-deem-worthy himself of-the goods and to-be-ignorant-of and himself
ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ
he-would-desire for — of-what worthy he-was goods at-least being not
μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
however fools at-least the such seem to-be but rather

ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν·
retiring the such and opinion seems even worse to-make
ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ
each for aim-at the-things according-to worth they-stand-aloof and
καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων
even from-the actions the noble and the pursuits
ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.
as unworthy being likewise and also from-the external goods
οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ᾽
the but vain (are)-fools and themselves ignorant-of and that
ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν,
conspicuously not for worthy being the honorable-things they-attempt
εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι
then they-are-exposed and with-clothing adorn-themselves and with-bearing
καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα καὶ
and with-the such-things and wish the goods-of-fortune also
φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ
manifest to-be their and they-speak about them as through
τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ
these going-to-be-honored is-opposed and to-the greatness-of-soul
ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται
the small-souledness more than-the vanity both for it-occurs
μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ
more and worse is the indeed then greatness-of-soul about
τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
honor is great just-as has-been-said

A nameless virtue concerned with moderate and small honors stands to greatness of soul as liberality stands to magnificence. Men can desire honor more than they should, or less, and we sometimes praise the ambitious man as manly and the unambitious man as moderate, and sometimes blame each. Because the mean has no name, the extremes seem to dispute the middle ground between them.

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
seems and also about this to-be virtue a just-as in the
πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἥ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν
first(-discussions) was-said which would-seem — similarly to-stand
πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς
toward the greatness-of-soul just-as also the liberality toward
τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου
the magnificence both for these from-the indeed great
ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς
stand-apart about but the moderate and small dispose us
ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης
as one-must just-as and in taking and giving of-money a-mean
ἔστι καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς
there-is and excess both and deficiency so also in of-honor
ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ
desire the more than one-must and less and the from-where one-must
καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον
and as one-must the both for ambitious-man we-blame as more
ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν
than one-must and from-where not one-must the honor aiming-at the
τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον
and unambitious-man as not-even for the noble-things choosing
τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς
to-be-honored there-are and times-when the ambitious-man we-praise as

ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ
manly and noble-loving the and unambitious-man as moderate and
σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ'
temperate just-as also in the first(-discussions) we-said clear and
ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
that in-many-senses the lover-of-such being-said not to the same
φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ
we-apply always the ambitious but praising indeed to the
μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.
more than the many blaming and to the more than one-must
ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν
nameless and being the mean as unclaimed seem
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
to-dispute(-it) the extremes in what and there-is excess and
ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ
deficiency also the mean they-desire and the honor both
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ·
more than one-must and less it-is-possible indeed also as one-must
ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν
is-praised and then the state this a-mean being about honor
ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν
nameless it-appears and in-relation-to indeed the ambition
ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία,
unambitiousness in-relation-to and the unambitiousness ambition
πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ'
in-relation-to both and both somehow seems and this
εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ'
to-be also about the other virtues to-be-opposed and here
οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.
the extremes appear through the not to-have-been-named the middle(-man)

Gentleness is the mean about anger, though the name leans toward the deficiency, which is nameless, perhaps a kind of inirascibility, and is thought slavish. The excess, irascibility, takes several forms: the irascible man quickly flares and quickly cools, the hot-tempered man is angry at everything, the sulky man nurses his anger, and the harsh man is not reconciled without revenge. How far and how long anger is right cannot easily be fixed in words.

πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ
gentleness and is a-mean about angers nameless and being the
μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα
mean nearly and also the extremes to the mean the gentleness
φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν.
we-apply toward the deficiency inclining nameless being
ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
the and excess irascibility a-kind-of might-be-called — the indeed for
πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα.
passion is anger the and things-producing(-it) many and differing
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
the indeed then at what one-must and with-whom one-must being-angry
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται·
further and also as one-must and when and how-much time is-praised
πρᾶος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται.
gentle indeed this-man — would-be if-indeed the gentleness is-praised
βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι
wishes for the gentle-man unperturbed to-be and not to-be-led
ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ
by the passion but as — the reason ordains so both at
τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν· ἁμαρτάνειν
these and for so-long time to-be-angry to-err
δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς
and he-seems rather toward the deficiency not for vengeful

ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις,
the gentle-man but rather forgiving the and deficiency
εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται.
whether inirascibility some is or what ever indeed ever is-blamed
οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
those for not being-angry at what one-must foolish seem to-be
καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ
and those not as one-must nor when nor with-whom one-must he-seems
γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε
for not to-perceive nor to-be-pained not being-angry and
οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι
not to-be apt-to-defend-himself the and being-insulted to-endure
καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ
and the one's-own to-overlook (is)-slavish the and excess
κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται (καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ,
in all-respects indeed occurs both for with-whom not one-must
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον,
and at what not one-must and more than one-must and quicker
καὶ πλείω χρόνον), οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ
and longer time not however all at-least to-the same-man
ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ
belongs not for — could to-be the for evil even itself
ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλόκληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν
destroys and-if entire it-be unbearable becomes the indeed
οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
then irascible quickly indeed get-angry and with-whom not one-must
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ
and at what not one-must and more than one-must they-stop but
ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς
quickly which also best they-have happens and to-them

τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν
this because not they-restrain the anger but they-retaliate
ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀποπαύονται.
in-which manifest they-are through the quickness then they-stop
ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν
by-excess and are the hot-tempered quick and toward everything
ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ
irascible and at everything whence also the-name the and sulky
δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
hard-to-reconcile and long time are-angry they-restrain for
τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ
the spirit a-stop and comes whenever he-retaliates the for
τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης
revenge stops from-the anger pleasure instead-of the pain
ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ
producing this and not happening the weight they-have through
γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν
for the not manifest to-be nor persuades them anyone in
αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι
himself and to-digest the anger of-time there-is-need are and the such
ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς
to-themselves most-troublesome and to-the most friends bad-tempered
δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ
and we-call those at what both not one-must being-angry and
μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους
more than one-must and longer time and not being-reconciled
ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον
without revenge or punishment to-the gentleness and rather
τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται·
the excess we-oppose both for more-often it-occurs
ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν
more-human for the to-take-revenge and for the to-live-together

οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται,
the bad-tempered (are)-worse which and also in the earlier(-discussions) has-been-said
καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς
also from the things-being-said (is)-clear not for easy to-determine the how
καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον,
and with-whom and at what-sort and how-much time one-must-be-angry
καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει.
and the up-to what-point rightly acts one or errs
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ'
the-man indeed for a-little deviating not is-blamed either
ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς
toward the more or toward the less sometimes for those
ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς
falling-short we-praise and gentle we-call(-them) and those
χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ
being-angry manly as able to-rule the-man
δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον
indeed how-far and how deviating (is)-blameworthy not easy
τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα κἀν τῇ
in-the account to-render in for the in particulars and-in the
αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι
perception (lies)-the judgment but the at-least so-much (is)-clear that
ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ
the indeed middle state (is)-praiseworthy according-to which with-whom one-must
ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ
we-are-angry and at what one-must and as one-must and all the
τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ
such-things the and excesses and deficiencies (are)-blameworthy and
ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον,
to a-little indeed occurring slightly to more and more

ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως
to much and very-much clear then that the middle state
ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
one-must-hold-to the indeed then about the anger states let-have-been-spoken-of

VI · THE FRIENDLY MANNER

In company some men praise everything to please and never oppose; others oppose everything and care nothing for giving pain. The mean, which has no name, resembles friendship without the affection: its possessor accepts and objects as he should, with an eye to what is noble and advantageous, and treats strangers and intimates, the distinguished and the ordinary, each as is fitting.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
in and the social-intercourse and the living-together and words and
πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἳ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ
deeds to-share some indeed obsequious seem to-be those
πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ᾽
everything for pleasure praising and nothing opposing but
οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ
thinking one-must painless to-those meeting(-them) to-be those and from
ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν
contrary to-these against everything opposing and of-the to-pain
οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται.
not-even anything caring surly and quarrelsome are-called
ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ
that indeed then the mentioned states blameworthy are not unclear and
ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ
that the middle of-these (is)-praiseworthy according-to which one-will-accept what
δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ᾽ οὐκ
one-must and as one-must likewise and also will-object name and not

ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ
has-been-assigned to-it any it-resembles and most friendship such for
ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν
is the-man according-to the middle state such-as we-mean to-call
τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει
the decent friend the to-feel-affection adding differs
δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν
and from-the friendship that without passion it-is and the to-feel-affection
οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν
for-those-with-whom he-associates not for by-the to-love or to-hate
ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.
he-accepts each-thing as one-must but by-the such to-be
ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ
alike for toward strangers and acquaintances and intimates and
ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει·
non-intimates it he-will-do except also in each-case as befits
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν,
not for alike it-is-fitting of-intimates and of-strangers to-take-thought
οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ
nor again to-pain in-general indeed then it-has-been-said that as one-must
ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον
he-will-associate referring and to the noble and the expedient
στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ
he-will-aim at-the not to-pain or to-give-pleasure he-seems indeed for about
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας·
pleasures and pains to-be the in the social-intercourse arising
τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν
of-these and as-many-as indeed to-him it-is not noble or harmful
συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ
to-give-pleasure he-will-object and will-choose to-pain and-if to-the
ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ
doer and disgrace it-bring and this not small or

βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ
harm the and opposition small pain not he-will-accept but
δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι
will-object differently and he-will-associate with-those in dignities
καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως
and with-the chance-comers and more or less with-acquaintances likewise
δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων
and also according-to the other differences to-each rendering
τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν,
the fitting and in itself indeed choosing the to-give-pleasure
λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ
to-pain but avoiding to-the and results if they-be
μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι.
greater following I-mean and the noble and the expedient
καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει.
and of-pleasure and for-the-sake the later great small he-will-pain
ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ
the indeed then middle(-man) such is not has-been-named but of-the
δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος
and one-giving-pleasure the-one indeed the pleasant to-be aiming-at
μὴ διά τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις
not through any other (is)-obsequious the-other and that benefit some
αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
to-himself may-come in money and as-many-as through money
κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι
(is)-a-flatterer the-man and at-everything objecting it-has-been-said that
δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα
(is)-surly and quarrelsome to-be-opposed and appear the extremes
ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.
to-each-other through the nameless to-be the mean

Near the same field lies the mean between boastfulness and irony. The boaster claims more than he has, for reputation or for gain, and the ironical man disowns what he has, as Socrates did. The truthful man, whom Aristotle praises, owns what he is, in life and in speech, where nothing hangs on it; he leans toward understatement, which is in better taste.

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας καὶ
about the same-things and nearly is also the of-the boastfulness and
εἰρωνείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ
irony mean nameless and also it not worse and
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν
also the such to-go-over better both for — we-would-know
τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ
the-things about the character in each having-gone-through and
μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων
means to-be the virtues we-would-believe — in all
οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν
so it-being seeing in indeed the living-together those indeed
πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ
with-a-view-to pleasure and pain associating have-been-discussed about
δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως
and those being-truthful both and lying let-us-speak alike
ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὴ
in words and deeds and the pretension seems indeed
ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ
the indeed boaster apt-to-claim the creditable to-be both not
ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων
belonging and greater than belong the and ironical-man
ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,
conversely to-deny the things-belonging or less to-make(-them)

ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ
the and middle(-man) straightforward a-kind-of being truthful both
τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι
in-the life and in-the speech the things-belonging acknowledging to-be
περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ
about himself and neither greater nor less it-is-possible and
τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηδενός.
of-these each both for-the-sake of-something to-do and of-nothing
ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ
each and such-as he-is such-things says and does and
οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ
so lives if not of-something for-the-sake he-act in itself and
τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν
the indeed falsehood (is)-base and blameworthy the and truth noble
καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν
and praiseworthy so and also the indeed truthful-man middle being
ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί,
(is)-praiseworthy the and lying both indeed (are)-blameworthy
μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον
more but the boaster about each and let-us-speak first
δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς
and about the truthful-man not for about the-man in the
ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ
agreements being-truthful we-speak nor as-many-as to injustice or
δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς),
justice tend of-another for — would-be these-things virtue
ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ
but in what nothing such being-at-stake both in speech
καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε
and in life he-is-truthful by-the the state such to-be would-seem
δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν
and — the such-man decent to-be the for truth-lover even in

οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει
what not matters being-truthful will-be-truthful also in what matters
ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ
still more as for shameful the falsehood he-will-shun which
γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ηὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός.
at-least also in itself he-shunned the and such-man (is)-praiseworthy
ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει·
toward the less and rather than-the truth he-inclines
ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
in-better-taste for it-appears through the offensive the exaggerations
εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
to-be the-man and greater than-the things-belonging claiming
μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε
of-nothing for-the-sake a-base-man indeed resembles not for — he-would-delight
τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ
in-the falsehood futile but he-appears rather than bad if
δ' ἕνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
and for-the-sake of-something the-one indeed of-reputation or of-honor not very
ψεκτός, †ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών,† ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα
blameworthy as the boaster the-other and of-money or as-many-things-as
εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν
into money more-unseemly not in the capacity and is
ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ
the boaster but in the choice according-to the state for and
τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν)· ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ
by-the such to-be a-boaster he-is just-as also a-liar the-one
μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος
indeed in-the falsehood itself delighting the-other and reputation desiring
ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ
or gain those indeed then of-reputation for-the-sake boasting the
τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
such-things claim for which praise or congratulation

οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ
those and of-gain of-which also enjoyment there-is for-the neighbors and
διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν.
to-escape-notice it-is-possible not being(-so) such-as a-seer wise a-physician
διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
through this the most claim the such-things and
ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ'
boast are for in them the things-mentioned the and
εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ
ironical toward the less speaking more-gracious indeed the
ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν,
characters appear not for of-gain for-the-sake they-seem to-speak
ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ
but avoiding the pompous most and also these the
ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ
creditable disown such-as also Socrates did those
δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ
and the small and obvious humbugs are-called and
εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται,
more-contemptible are and sometimes boastfulness it-appears
οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
such-as the of-the Laconians dress both for the excess and
ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι
the excessive deficiency (are)-boastful those and moderately using
τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ
the irony and about the-things not very obtrusive and obvious
εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ
being-ironical gracious appear to-be-opposed and the
ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.
boaster appears to-the truthful-man worse for(-he-is)

Life includes rest, and in rest there is a fitting way of joking and of listening to jokes. The buffoon will say anything for a laugh and spare no one, while the boor contributes nothing and takes offense at everything. The witty man jokes with tact; Aristotle contrasts the obscenity of the old comedy with the innuendo of the new, and says that the law forbids some kinds of abuse.

οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
there-being and also rest in the life and in this
διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία
pastime with play there-seems also here to-be intercourse
τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
a tasteful and what-sort one-must to-say and how likewise and also
ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων
to-hear it-will-differ and also the among such to-speak or such
ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή
to-hear clear and that also about these-things there-is excess
τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ
both and deficiency of-the mean those indeed then in-the ridiculous
ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί,
exceeding buffoons seem to-be and vulgar
γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι
hankering at-all-costs after-the joke and rather aiming
τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ
at-the laughter to-cause than at-the to-say seemly-things and not
λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες
to-pain the one-mocked those and neither themselves — saying
μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι
anything funny with-those and saying(-it) annoyed boorish
καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες
and stiff seem to-be those and tastefully joking

εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ
witty are-called as-it-were nimble of-the for
ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
character the such seem movements to-be just-as and the
σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη.
bodies from the movements are-judged so also the characters
ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων
abounding and the ridiculous and the most delighting
τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ
in-the play and in-the to-jest more than one-must even the
βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι
buffoons witty are-called as gracious that
δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.
but they-differ and not a-little from the things-said (is)-clear
τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ'
to-the middle and state proper also the tact is of-the and
ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ
tactful-man it-is such-things to-say and to-hear as to-the decent
καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ
and liberal-man befit there-are for some-things fitting for-the
τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ
such-man to-say in of-play the-way and to-hear and the of-the
ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ
liberal-man play differs from-that of-the slavish-man and
πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ
of-an-educated and of-an-uneducated might-see and — one also from
τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς
the comedies the old and the new to-the-ones
μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον
indeed for was funny the obscenity to-the-others and rather
ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς
the innuendo differ and not a-little these with-respect-to

εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον
decorum whether then the well jesting one-must-define
τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν
by-the to-say not unbecoming-things to-a-liberal-man or by-the not to-pain
τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον
the hearer or even to-delight(-him) or even the at-least such
ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ.
(is)-indefinite another-thing for to-another hateful both and pleasant
τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων,
such-things and also he-will-hear what for he-endures hearing
ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ
these also to-make he-seems not indeed every(-jest) he-will-make the for
σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια
jest abuse a-kind-of is the and lawgivers some-things
λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν.
to-abuse forbid they-ought(-to-forbid) and perhaps also to-jest
ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον
the indeed gracious and liberal-man so will-be-disposed as-it-were
νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν,
a-law being to-himself such indeed then the middle(-man) is
εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος
whether tactful or witty he-is-called the and buffoon
ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν
weaker is than-the joke and neither himself nor the
ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
others sparing if laughter he-will-cause and such-things saying
ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν
of-which none — would-say the gracious-man some and not-even —
ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος·
would-hear the and boor for the such intercourse (is)-useless
οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ
nothing for contributing at-everything he-is-annoyed seems and the

ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς
rest and the play in the life to-be necessary three
οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι
then the described in the life means are and all
περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι
about of-words some and of-deeds sharing they-differ
δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ
and that the-one indeed about truth is the-others and about
τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς
the pleasant of-these and about the pleasure the-one indeed in the
παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.
plays the-other and in the in the other life intercourse

IX · SHAME

Shame is more like a passion than a state: it is a fear of disrepute and shows in the body, as fear does. It suits the young, who live by passion and are kept from many wrongs by it, but a decent older man should feel none, since he should do nothing disgraceful. Self-control, likewise, is not a virtue but a mixed thing, as will be shown later.

περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·
about and sense-of-shame as some virtue not it-is-fitting to-speak
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος
a-passion for rather it-resembles than a-state it-is-defined at-any-rate fear
τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ
a-kind-of of-disrepute and it-turns-out to-the about the terrible-things fear
παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ
similar blush for those being-ashamed those and
τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί
the death fearing turn-pale bodily indeed appear

πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ
somehow to-be both which-very-thing seems of-a-passion rather than
ἕξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ
of-a-state to-be not to-every and age the passion befits but
τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας
to-the young we-think for it-is-needful those of-that-age modest
εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς
to-be through the by-passion living many-things to-err by the
αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων
sense-of-shame but to-be-restrained and we-praise of-the indeed young
τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι
the modest an-older-man but no-one — would-praise because
αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν
bashful nothing for we-think it-is-needful him to-do
ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ
at which is shame not-even for of-a-decent-man is the
αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον
shame if-indeed it-arises at the base-things not for one-must-do
τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ
the such-things if and are the-ones indeed in truth shameful
τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα
the-others and according-to opinion nothing it-makes-a-difference neither
γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ
for (are)-to-be-done so-that not one-must-be-ashamed of-a-base-man and also
τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν.
the to-be such as to-do any of-the shameful-things
τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων
the and so to-be-disposed so-that if he-should-do any of-the such-things
αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ
to-be-ashamed and through this to-think decent to-be (is)-absurd at
τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε
the voluntary-acts for the sense-of-shame willingly and the decent-man never

πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
will-do the base-things would-be and — the sense-of-shame on hypothesis
ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
decent if for he-should-do he-would-be-ashamed — not is and this
περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ
about the virtues if and the shamelessness (is)-base and the not
αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ
to-be-ashamed the shameful-things to-do not-at-all more the-man the
τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ'
such-things doing to-be-ashamed (is)-decent not is and not-even
ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ
the self-control a-virtue but a-kind-of mixed(-state) it-will-be-shown and
περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.
about it in the later(-books) now and about justice let-us-speak

BOOK V

I · JUSTICE IN TWO SENSES

Justice is the state from which men do just things, but both justice and injustice are spoken of in many senses. The unjust man is the lawless man and the grasping, unequal one. The laws aim at the common advantage and command the acts of every virtue, so that justice in this sense is complete virtue toward another, and neither evening nor morning star is so admirable.

περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε
about and justice and injustice one-must-consider about what-sort both
τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ
they-happen being actions and what-sort-of mean is the
δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις
justice and the just of-what-things (is)-a-mean the and inquiry
ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις.
for-us let-be according-to the same method as-the things-said-before
ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν
we-see indeed all the such state meaning to-call
δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ'
justice from which apt-to-do of-the just-things they-are and from
ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
which they-act-justly and wish the just-things the same and
τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται
way also about injustice from which they-act-unjustly and wish
τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω
the unjust-things therefore also for-us first as in outline let-be-assumed
ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν
these-things nor for the same does-it-hold way in-the-case-of both the
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις
sciences and capacities and in-the-case-of the states a-capacity

μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι,
indeed for and science seems of-the contraries the same to-be
ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ
a-state but the contrary of-the contraries not such-as from the health not
πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν
are-done the contrary-things but the healthy-things only we-say
γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων.
for healthily to-walk whenever one-walks as — the healthy-man
πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς
often indeed then is-recognized the contrary state from its
ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν
contrary often and the states from the subjects if
τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ
both for the good-condition be manifest also the bad-condition manifest
γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία καὶ
becomes and from the things-in-good-condition the good-condition and
ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία
from this the things-in-good-condition if for is the good-condition
πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα
firmness of-flesh necessary also the bad-condition to-be flabbiness
σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί.
of-flesh and the wholesome the productive of-firmness in flesh
ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς
it-follows and as for the most-part if the-one in-many-senses
λέγηται, καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ
be-said also the-other in-many-senses to-be-said such-as if the
δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ
just also the unjust it-seems and in-many-senses to-be-said the
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν
justice and the injustice but through the close to-be the
ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
equivocation of-them escapes-notice and not just-as in-the-case-of the

πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον, (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν
far-apart (it-is)-clear rather the for difference great the in the
ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ὑπὸ
form such-as that is-called key equivocally the(-bone) both under
τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων καὶ ᾗ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.
the neck of-the animals and that-with-which the doors they-lock
εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ
let-it-be-taken indeed the unjust-man in-how-many-senses is-said seems indeed the
τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος,
both lawless-man unjust to-be and the grasping-man and unequal(-man)
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ
so-that clear that also just will-be the both lawful-man and the
ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
equal(-man) the indeed just then (is)-the lawful and the equal the
δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης
and unjust the lawless and the unequal since and grasping
ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα
the unjust-man about the-goods he-will-be not all but about as-many-as
εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά,
good-fortune and misfortune which are indeed absolutely always goods
τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται
for-a-particular-person but not always the and men these pray-for
καὶ διώκουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς
and pursue one-should and not but to-pray indeed the absolutely
ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς
goods also for-themselves goods to-be to-choose and the for-themselves
ἀγαθά. ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ
goods the and unjust-man not always the more chooses but also
τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ
the less in-the-case-of the absolutely evils but because seems

καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ
also the lesser evil good somehow to-be of-the and good
ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι.
is the graspingness through this he-seems grasping to-be
ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ'
he-is and unequal this for includes(-it) and (is)-common since and
ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον
the lawless-man unjust was the and lawful-man just clear
ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ
that all the lawful-things are in-a-sense just the both for
ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον
things-defined by the legislative-art lawful are and each
τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ
of-these just to-be we-say the and laws pronounce about
ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν
all-things aiming-at either the in-common advantage for-all
ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ
or for-the best or for-the authorities or according-to other some
τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν
way such so-that in-one indeed sense just we-call
τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων
the productive and preservative of-happiness and of-the parts
αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος
of-it for-the political community commands and the law
καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν
also the of-the brave-man works to-do such-as not to-leave the
τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ
ranks nor to-flee nor to-throw-away the arms and the of-the
σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ
temperate-man such-as not to-commit-adultery nor to-commit-outrage and the
τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ
of-the gentle-man such-as not to-strike nor to-speak-evil likewise and

καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν
also according-to the other virtues and wickednesses the-ones indeed
κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος
bidding the-others and forbidding rightly indeed the(-law) laid-down
ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν
rightly worse and the(-one) hastily-made this indeed then
ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς
the justice virtue indeed is complete but not absolutely
ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη
but in-relation-to another and through this often the-greatest
τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος
of-the virtues to-be seems the justice and neither evening-star
οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν
nor morning-star so admirable and quoting-the-proverb we-say

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι
in and justice in-sum every virtue is

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς
and complete most virtue because of-the complete virtue
χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ
the-use it-is complete and it-is because the-man having it also
πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον
toward another can the virtue to-use but not only
καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ
by himself many for in indeed the private-affairs the virtue
δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ
can to-use in but the toward another are-unable and
διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα
through this well seems to-be the — of-Bias that office the-man
δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.
will-show toward another for and in community already the ruler

διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι
through and the same this also another's good seems to-be
ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν·
the justice alone of-the virtues because toward another it-is
ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ
for-another for the advantageous-things it-does either a-ruler or
κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ
a-partner worst indeed then (is)-the-man both toward himself and
πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ
toward the friends using the wickedness best but not
ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο
the-man toward himself the virtue but toward another this
γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος
for task (is)-hard this indeed then the justice not part
ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος
of-virtue but whole virtue is nor the opposite injustice part
κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ
of-vice but whole vice in-what and differs the virtue and the
δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
justice this clear from the things-said it-is indeed for
ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν πρὸς
the same the but to-be not the same but in-so-far-as indeed toward
ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.
another (it-is)-justice in-so-far-as and such state absolutely virtue

There is also a particular injustice, shown when a man takes more than his share through gain, as the adulterer who seeks profit is unjust and the one who follows his appetite is licentious. Particular justice has two kinds: one in the distribution of honors and wealth among citizens, and one that corrects transactions, both voluntary, such as sale and loan, and involuntary, such as theft and assault.

ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι
we-seek but at-least the in part of-virtue justice there-is
γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
for a-kind as we-say likewise and also about injustice the in
μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας
part a-sign and that there-is according-to indeed for the other
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ'
wickednesses the-man acting acts-unjustly indeed takes-more but
οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν
not-at-all such-as the-man having-thrown-away the shield through cowardice
ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας
or badly having-spoken through bad-temper or not having-helped
χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις
with-money through illiberality whenever but he-takes-more often
κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ
according-to none of-the such but indeed nor according-to
πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ)
all according-to wickedness but at-least some we-blame(-him) for
καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος
and according-to injustice there-is then other an injustice as part
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ
of-the whole and unjust a-kind-of in part of-the whole unjust the
παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὃ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα
contrary-to the law further if the-one indeed of-the to-gain for-the-sake

μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς
commits-adultery and gaining(-by-it) the-other and paying-in-addition
καὶ ζημιούμενος δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος
and losing through appetite this-one indeed licentious
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ᾽ ἄδικος,
would-seem — to-be rather than grasping(-man) that-one and unjust
ἀκόλαστος δ᾽ οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν.
licentious but not clear then that through the to-gain
ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἡ
further about indeed the-other all unjust-acts occurs the
ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν,
reference to some wickedness always such-as if he-committed-adultery
ἐπ᾽ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν,
to licentiousness if he-deserted the comrade-beside-him to cowardice
εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ᾽ ὀργήν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμίαν
if he-struck to anger if but he-gained to no
μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι
wickedness but except to injustice so-that manifest that there-is
τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι
an injustice beside the whole another in part synonymous because
ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς
the definition (is)-in the same genus both for in the toward
ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν
another have the force but the-one indeed about honor
ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι
or money or safety or if by-some we-could one name
περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
to-include these all and through pleasure the from the
κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
gain the-other and about all-things about which the excellent-man

ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι
that indeed then there-are the justices more(-than-one) and that there-is
τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ
a also other beside the whole virtue (is)-clear what and also
ποία τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε
what-sort a(-one) one-must-grasp has-been-distinguished indeed the unjust the both
παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ
lawless and the unfair the and just the both lawful and
τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη
the equal according-to indeed then the lawless the earlier mentioned
ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ
injustice is since and the unfair and the lawless (are)-not
ταὐτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον
the-same but different as part to whole the indeed for unfair
ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ
all (is)-lawless the but lawless not all unfair also the
ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν
unjust and the injustice not the-same but different from-those the-ones indeed
ὡς μέρη τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς
as parts the-others and as wholes a-part for this the injustice of-the
ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης.
whole injustice likewise and also the justice of-the justice
ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει
so-that also about the in part justice and about the in part
ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως.
injustice one-must-speak and the just and unjust in-the-same-way
ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη
the indeed then according-to the whole virtue ranked justice
καὶ ἀδικία, ἧ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς
and injustice the-one indeed of-the whole virtue being the-use toward
ἄλλον ἧ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ
another the-other and of-the vice let-be-set-aside also the just and

καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον·
and the unjust the according-to these (is)-manifest how one-must-distinguish
σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης
nearly for the many of-the lawful-things the(-ones) from the whole
ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν
virtue commanded are according-to each for virtue
προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ
commands to-live and according-to each wickedness forbids the
νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων
law the and productive of-the whole virtue are of-the lawful-things
ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν.
as-many-as have-been-enacted about education the for the common(-good)
περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς
about and the according-to individual education according-to which absolutely
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρας,
a-man good is whether of-the political-science it-is or of-another
ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ
later one-must-determine not for perhaps the-same for-a-man both good
εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης
to-be and for-a-citizen every of-the and in part justice
καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν
and of-the according-to it just one indeed is kind the in
ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα
the distributions of-honor or of-money or of-the other-things as-many-as
μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
divisible to-those sharing in-the constitution in these for
ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ
it-is-possible both unequal to-have and equal one than-another one and
τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο·
the in the transactions corrective of-this and parts two
τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ
of-the for transactions the-ones indeed voluntary are the-others

δ᾽ ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ
and involuntary voluntary indeed the following such-as sale purchase
δανεισμὸς ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια
loan surety loan-for-use deposit hire voluntary
δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων
and they-are-called because the origin of-the transactions these
ἑκούσιος), τῶν δ᾽ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ
(is)-voluntary of-the and involuntary the-ones indeed clandestine such-as theft
μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία
adultery poisoning procuring enticement-of-slaves assassination
ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς
false-witness the-others and violent such-as assault imprisonment
θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.
murder robbery maiming abuse insult

III · DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The just is an equal and a mean, and so it involves at least four terms: two persons and two shares. In distribution all agree it goes by worth, though democrats call worth freedom, oligarchs wealth, others birth, and aristocrats virtue. The just is thus a proportion, which the mathematicians call geometrical, and the unjust is what violates it.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὅ τ᾽ ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον,
since and the-man both unjust (is)-unequal and the unjust unequal
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ
(is)-clear that also mean some there-is of-the unequal this and is
τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ
the equal in whatever-kind for action there-is the more and the
ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ
less there-is also the equal if then the unjust (is)-unequal the

δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ
just (is)-equal which-very-thing also without argument seems to-all since
δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. ἔστι
and the equal (is)-a-mean the just mean some — would-be it-is
δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον
and the equal in least two necessary therefore the just
μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν,
a-mean both and equal to-be and relative-to something and for-some-persons
καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
and in-so-far-as indeed a-mean between-some-things these and are
πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ
more and less in-so-far-as and equal of-two in-so-far-as and
δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
just for-some-persons necessary then the just in least
εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο
to-be four for-whom both for just it-happens being two
ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται
are and in which the things two and the same will-be
ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς,
equality for-whom and in which as for those are-related the in which
οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν,
so those-also are-related if for not equal not equal-things they-will-have
ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ
but from-this the fights and the complaints whenever either not
ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται.
equal-things equals or not equals equal-things have and are-assigned
ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον
further from the according-to worth this (is)-clear the for just
ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ
in the distributions agree all according-to worth some
δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες,
must to-be the however worth not the same they-mean all

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ
but the indeed democrats freedom the and oligarchs
πλοῦτον, οἳ δ᾽ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν.
wealth others and good-birth the and aristocrats virtue
ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ
is then the just proportional something the for proportional not
μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ·
only is of-abstract number peculiar but generally of-number
ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν
the for proportion equality is of-ratios and in four
ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον.
at-least the indeed then discrete that in four (is)-clear
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δὶς
but also the continuous the for one as two it-uses and twice
λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ
it-mentions such-as as the — of-A to the — of-B so the —
β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται· ὥστ᾽
of-B to the — of-C twice then the — of-B has-been-mentioned so-that
ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι
if the — of-B be-set-down twice four will-be the proportionals is
δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος
and also the just in four at-least and the ratio
ὁ αὐτός· διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἅ.
the same is-divided for likewise for-whom both and what-things
ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν
it-will-be then as the A term to the B so the C to the
δ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν
D and alternately then as the A to the C the B to the
δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ
D so-that also the whole to the whole which-very-thing the distribution
συνδυάζει, κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα
couples and-if so it-be-combined justly it-couples the then

τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν
of-the A term with-the C and the of-the B with-the D coupling the in
διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ δ'
distribution just is and a-mean the just this is the and
ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ
unjust the contrary-to the proportional the for proportional (is)-a-mean the
δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν
and just (is)-proportional call and the such proportion
γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ
geometrical the mathematicians in for the geometrical
συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον
it-happens also the whole to the whole which-very-thing each
πρὸς ἑκάτερον. ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ
to each is and not continuous this the proportion not for
γίνεται εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον
comes-to-be one in-number term for-whom and what the indeed then just
τοῦτο, τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
this the proportional the and unjust the contrary-to the proportional
γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ
becomes then the-one indeed more the-other and less which-very-thing
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν
also in-the-case-of the works happens the indeed for acting-unjustly
πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
more has the and being-wronged less of-the good
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ
in-the-case-of and the evil the-reverse in of-good for account
γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν· ἔστι
becomes the lesser evil compared-with the greater evil is
γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος,
for the lesser evil more choiceworthy than-the greater

τὸ δ᾽ αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν
the and choiceworthy (is)-good and the more (is)-greater the indeed
οὖν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.
then one form of-the just this is

IV · CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

Corrective justice, in transactions, follows arithmetical proportion: the law looks only at the harm and treats the parties as equals. The judge restores equality by taking from the gain and adding to the loss, like dividing a line in two, as if the just were the bisected and the judge a bisector. The names loss and gain come from voluntary exchange.

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς
the and remaining one the corrective which arises in the
συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο
transactions both the voluntary and the involuntary this
δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν
and the just another form has than-the before the indeed
γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν
for distributive just of-the common(-goods) always according-to the
ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
proportion is the stated and for from money
κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον
common if be-made the distribution it-will-be according-to the ratio
τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ
the same which have to one-another the contributions and
τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ
the unjust the opposed to-the just this the contrary-to the
ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ
proportional is the and in the transactions just is

μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ
indeed equal something and the unjust unequal but not according-to
τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.
the proportion that but according-to the arithmetical
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν
nothing for does-it-differ whether a-decent-man a-base-man defrauded
ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ
or a-base-man a-decent-man nor whether committed-adultery a-decent-man or
φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον
a-base-man but to of-the harm the difference only
βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ
looks the law and treats(-them) as equals if the-one indeed acts-unjustly
ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται.
the-other and is-wronged and if harmed the-other and has-been-harmed
ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ
so-that the unjust this unequal being to-equalize tries the
δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ
judge and for whenever the-one indeed has-been-struck the-other and
πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ
has-struck or also kills the-other and dies are-divided the
πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ
suffering and the action into unequal-parts but he-tries by-the
ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς
penalty to-equalize taking-away from-the gain is-said for as
ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν
simply to-speak in-the-case-of the such(-cases) even if not for-some
οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ
appropriate a-name be the gain such-as to-the-man having-struck and
ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ
the loss to-the-man having-suffered but when at-least is-measured the
πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε
suffering is-called the-one indeed loss the-other and gain so-that

τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
of-the indeed more and less the equal (is)-a-mean the and
κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον
gain and the loss the-one indeed more the-other and less
ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ'
in-opposite-ways the indeed of-the good more of-the evil and
ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον
less (is)-gain the and contrary loss between-which was a-mean
τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν
the equal which we-say to-be just so-that the corrective
δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.
just — would-be the mean of-loss and of-gain
διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν
therefore also whenever they-dispute to the judge
καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν
they-have-recourse the and to the judge to-go to-go is
ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον
to the just the for judge means to-be as-it-were
δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
just ensouled and they-seek a-judge intermediate and
καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι,
call some(-people) mediators as if of-the mean they-hit
τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον,
of-the just they-will-hit a-mean then something the just
εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ
if-indeed also the judge the and judge restores-equality and
ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον
just-as a-line into unequal-parts having-been-cut by-what the greater
τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ
segment than-the half exceeds this he-has-taken-away and to-the
ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ
lesser segment added whenever and in-two is-divided

τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὑτοῦ ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ
the whole then they-say they-have the their-own when they-get the
ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος
equal the and equal mean is of-the greater and lesser
κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
according-to the arithmetical proportion through this also
ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
it-is-named just because in-two it-is just-as — if one
εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ
were-to-call(-it) bisected and the judge bisector whenever for
δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ
of-two equal-things is-taken-away from the-one to the-other and
προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη
is-added by-two these exceeds the-other if for was-taken-away
μέν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν.
indeed not was-added and by-one — only it-would-exceed
τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἑνί.
than-the mean then by-one and the mean from which was-taken-away by-one
τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ
by-this then we-shall-know what both to-take-away one-must from the-man
πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι·
more having and what to-add to-the-man less having
ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ
by-what indeed for the mean exceeds this to-add one-must
τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ
to-the-man less having by-what and it-is-exceeded to-take-away from
τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν αα ββ γγ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ
the greatest equal the-lines on which AA BB CC to-one-another from
τῆς αα ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ αε, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ γγ τὸ
the AA let-be-taken-away the AE and let-be-added to-the CC the(-line)
ἐφ' ᾧ γδ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ δγγ τῆς εα ὑπερέχει τῷ γδ
on which CD so-that whole the DCC than-the EA exceeds by-the CD

καὶ τῷ γζ· τῆς ἄρα ββ τῷ γδ. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα
and by-the CZ than-the then BB by-the CD have-come and the names
ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς ἑκουσίου
these the both loss and the gain from the voluntary
ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ κερδαίνειν
exchange the indeed for more to-have than the his-own to-gain
λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι, οἷον
is-called the and less than-the at the-start to-lose such-as
ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν
in the to-buy and to-sell and in as-many-as other(-cases) license
δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον
has-given the law whenever and neither more nor less
ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὑτῶν φασὶν
but the-very-things the through themselves come-about the their-own they-say
ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους
they-have and neither to-lose nor to-gain so-that of-a-gain
τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ
a-kind and of-a-loss a-mean the just is of-the-things contrary-to
τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.
the voluntary the equal to-have both before and after

The Pythagoreans defined justice as reciprocity, but simple reciprocity fits neither kind of justice. In exchange, though, proportionate reciprocity holds the city together, which is why the Graces have a shrine. The builder's and the shoemaker's work must be equated, and money, set up by convention, measures all things by need. Just action is a mean between doing and suffering injustice.

δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον,
seems and to-some also the reciprocal to-be simply just
ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ
just-as the Pythagoreans said they-defined for simply the
δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς
just (as)-the reciprocal to-another the but reciprocal
οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ
not fits neither on the distributive just nor on
τὸ διορθωτικόν — καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν
the corrective although they-mean at-least this to-say
καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον·
also the of-Rhadamanthys just

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο
if — he-should-suffer the-things — he-did justice — straight would-be

— πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν,
in-many-cases for it-disagrees such-as if office holding he-struck
οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
not must to-be-struck-in-return and if an-official he-struck not to-be-struck
μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ
only he-must but also to-be-punished further the voluntary and the
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς
involuntary differs much but in indeed the associations the

ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
of-exchange holds-together the such just the reciprocal
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν
according-to proportion and not according-to equality by-the to-do-in-return
γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς
for proportionately holds-together the city either for the badly
ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή,
they-seek(-to-return) if and not slavery it-seems to-be or the well if and not
μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ
exchange not takes-place by-the exchange and they-hold-together therefore
καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν᾽ ἀνταπόδοσις
also of-the-Graces a-shrine prominent they-make so-that requital
ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ
there-be this for (is)-peculiar of-grace to-serve-in-return for one-must
τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον.
to-the-man having-shown-grace and again oneself to-begin showing-grace
ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ
makes and the requital the according-to proportion the by
διάμετρον σύζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ᾽
diagonal conjunction a-builder on which A a-shoemaker on
ᾧ β, οἰκία ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ᾽ ᾧ δ.
which B a-house on which C a-shoe on which D
δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ
must then to-receive the builder from the shoemaker the
ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὑτοῦ.
of-that-man work and himself to-that-man to-give-in-return the his-own
ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον,
if then first there-be the according-to the proportion equal
εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ
then the reciprocal come-about there-will-be the thing-said if
δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει
and not not (it-is)-equal nor does-it-hold-together nothing for prevents

κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν
better to-be the of-the-one work than the of-the-other must then
ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
these to-be-equalized it-is and this also in-the-case-of the other
τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὃ ἐποίει τὸ
arts they-would-be-destroyed for — if not what produced the
ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε
acting(-party) both so-much and of-such-kind and the being-acted-on received
τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν
this and so-much and of-this-kind not for from two physicians
γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως
arises an-association but from a-physician and a-farmer and generally
ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
from-different-people and not equal but these must to-be-equalized
διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή.
therefore all-things comparable must somehow to-be of-which there-is exchange
ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα
for which the currency has-come and becomes in-a-way a-mean all-things
γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
for it-measures so-that both the excess and the deficiency
πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ.
how-many — indeed shoes (are)-equal to-a-house or to-food
δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ
must therefore as a-builder to a-shoemaker so-many
ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ
shoes to a-house or food if for not this not
ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη
there-will-be exchange nor association this and if not equal it-should-be
πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι,
somehow not will-be must then by-one some(-thing) all-things to-be-measured
ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ
just-as was-said before this and is in indeed truth

ἡ χρεία, ἣ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ
the need which all-things holds-together if for nothing they-needed or not
ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· οἷον δ'
alike either not there-will-be exchange or not the same as-it-were and
ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·
a-representative of-the need the currency has-become by agreement
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει
and through this the-name has currency because not by-nature
ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι
but by-convention it-is and in our-power to-change(-it) and to-make(-it)
ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε
useless there-will-be indeed reciprocity whenever it-is-equalized so-that
ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου
as farmer to shoemaker the work the of-the shoemaker
πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ
to the of-the farmer into a-figure but of-proportion not one-must
ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει
to-bring(-them) when they-have-exchanged if and not both will-have
τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν.
the excesses the one extreme but when they-have the their-own
οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται
thus (they-are)-equals and partners because this the equality can
ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς α, τροφὴ γ, σκυτοτόμος β,
in their-case come-about farmer A food C shoemaker B
τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν
the work of-him the equalized D if and so not it-were-possible
ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ
to-be-reciprocal not — there-would-be association that and the
χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ
need holds-together just-as one something being shows that when not
ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ
in need they-are of-one-another either both or one-of-the-two not

ἀλλάττονται, †ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον
they-exchange as when what has he-himself needs one such-as
οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγήν.† δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι.
wine giving of-corn export must then this to-be-equalized
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι
for and the future exchange if now nothing he-needs that
ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν·
there-will-be(-one) if he-need the currency as-it-were (a)-surety is for-us
δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν
must for for-the-man bringing-it there-be(-power) to-get suffers indeed then
καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ
also this the same not for always equal is-worth nevertheless and
βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι·
it-tends to-stay(-steady) more therefore must all-things to-have-been-priced
οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ
so for always there-will-be exchange if and this association the
δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε
indeed currency just-as a-measure commensurate making(-them) equalizes neither
γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ
for — not being exchange association would-there-be nor exchange
ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας.
equality not being nor equality not being commensurability
τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα
in indeed then truth (it-is)-impossible the-things so-much differing
σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται
commensurate to-become in-relation-to but the need it-is-possible
ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως·
sufficiently one indeed some(-thing) must there-be this and by convention
διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα·
therefore currency it-is-called this for all-things makes commensurate
μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη
are-measured for all-things by-currency a-house A minae ten B a-bed

γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ
C the A of-the B half if five minae worth the house or equal the
δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι
and bed a-tenth part the C of-the B (it-is)-clear therefore how-many
κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ
beds (are)-equal to-a-house that five that and so the exchange
ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν
was before the currency existed (is)-clear it-differs for nothing-at-all
ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
whether beds five for a-house or as-much-as the five beds
τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται.
what indeed then the unjust and what the just is has-been-said
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον
being-distinguished and these (it-is)-clear that the just-action a-mean
ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
is between-the to-act-unjustly and to-be-wronged the-one indeed for
πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη
(is)-more to-have the-other and less is the and justice
μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις
a-mean a-kind-of is not the same but way as-the other
ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων.
virtues but because of-a-mean it-is the and injustice of-the extremes
καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται
and the indeed justice is according-to which the just-man is-said
πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς
(to-be)-a-doer by choice of-the just and a-distributor
καὶ αὑτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ
both for-himself in-relation-to another and for-another in-relation-to another not
οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὑτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ
so as-to of-the indeed choiceworthy more to-himself less and
τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου
to-the neighbor of-the harmful and the-reverse but of-the equal

τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς
the according-to proportion likewise and also for-another in-relation-to
ἄλλον. ἡ δ᾽ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
another the and injustice contrariwise of-the unjust this and is
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ
excess and deficiency of-the beneficial or harmful contrary-to
τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία,
the proportional therefore excess and deficiency (is)-the injustice
ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ μὲν
because of-excess and of-deficiency it-is in-the-case-of himself indeed
ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ
of-excess indeed of-the absolutely beneficial of-deficiency and of-the
βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως,
harmful in-the-case-of and the others the indeed whole likewise
τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ
the but contrary-to the proportional in-whichever-way it-happens of-the and
ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον
unjust-act the indeed less to-be-wronged is the and greater
τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς
the to-act-unjustly about indeed then justice and injustice what
ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
of-each is the nature let-it-have-been-said in-this the way
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.
likewise and also about just and unjust in-general

A man can act unjustly without yet being unjust. Justice in the strict sense is political: it exists among free and equal partners living under law, so we let reason rule and not a man, and the ruler, as guardian of the just, is paid in honor. A master's and a father's justice are only analogous, since there is no injustice toward what is one's own.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ
since and it-is-possible acting-unjustly not-yet unjust to-be the(-man)
ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην
what-sort-of unjust-acts committing already unjust is in-each
ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν
injustice such-as a-thief or an-adulterer or a-robber or thus indeed
οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς
not-at-all will-it-differ also for — might-have-intercourse with-a-woman knowing
τὸ ᾧ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ
the with-whom but not through choice the-origin(-being) but
διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον
through passion acts-unjustly indeed then unjust but not he-is such-as
οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ·
not a-thief he-stole but nor an-adulterer he-committed-adultery but
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει
likewise and also in-the-case-of the others how indeed then is-related
τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ
the reciprocal to the just has-been-said before must
δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς
and not to-escape-notice that the thing-sought is both the absolutely
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ
just and the political just this and is among
κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ
partners of-life for the to-be self-sufficiency free and

ἴσων ἢ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν· ὥστε
equal either according-to proportion or according-to number so-that
ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ
for-whom not is this not there-is for-these toward one-another the
πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα.
political just but some just and by similarity
ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος
there-is for justice for-whom also law (is)-toward themselves law
δ᾽, ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου
and among whom injustice the for justice (is)-the-judgment of-the just
καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
and of-the unjust among whom and injustice also the to-act-unjustly
ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία),
among these among whom but the to-act-unjustly not in-all injustice
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν,
this and is the more to-oneself to-assign of-the absolutely goods
ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν. διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν
less and of-the absolutely evils therefore not we-allow to-rule
ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ
a-man but the reason because for-himself this he-does and
γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ᾽ ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ
becomes a-tyrant is and the ruler a-guardian of-the just if
δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον
and of-the just also of-the equal since and nothing to-him more
εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
to-be(-his) seems if-indeed (he-is)-just not for he-assigns more of-the
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν·
absolutely good to-himself if not to himself proportional it-is
διὸ ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν
therefore for-another he-labors and through this another's to-be they-say
ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)·
good the justice just-as was-said also before

μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας·
a-reward then some must-be-given this and (is)-honor and privilege
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.
for-whomever and not sufficient the such-things these become tyrants
τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις
the and of-a-master just and the of-a-father not the-same as-these
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ
but similar not for there-is injustice toward the his-own absolutely the
δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ,
and chattel and the child until — it-be of-an-age and be-separated
ὥσπερ μέρος αὑτοῦ, αὑτὸν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν·
(is)-as-it-were a-part of-himself himself and no-one chooses to-harm
διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ
therefore not there-is injustice toward oneself nor then unjust nor
δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς
just the political according-to law for it-was and among whom
ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης
it-was-natural to-be law these and were for-whom there-belongs equality
τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι
of-the to-rule and to-be-ruled therefore more toward a-wife is
δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
justice than toward children and chattels this for is the
οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.
household just different and also this from-the political

Political justice is partly natural, with the same force everywhere, and partly legal, indifferent until it is laid down, as with ransom at a mina or sacrifice to Brasidas. Some think all justice is convention because it changes, whereas fire burns alike here and in Persia; but even what is natural can change, as the right hand is stronger though men may become ambidextrous.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ
of-the and political just the-one indeed natural is the-other
δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον
and legal natural indeed the(-one) everywhere the same having
δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
force and not by-the to-seem or not legal and which from the-start
μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται,
indeed not-at-all differs (whether)-thus or otherwise whenever but they-lay-it-down
διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ
it-differs such-as the a-mina to-ransom(-at) or the a-goat to-sacrifice but
μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα
not two sheep further all-that in-the-case-of the according-to particulars
νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη.
they-legislate such-as the to-sacrifice to-Brasidas and the decree-like-things
δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει
it-seems and to-some to-be all such because the indeed by-nature
ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ
(is)-unchangeable and everywhere the same has force just-as
τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια
the fire both here and among Persians burns the but just-things
κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ'
changing they-see this but not is so (the-case) but
ἔστιν ὡς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς,
it-is in-a-way although among at-least the gods perhaps not-at-all

παρ᾽ ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι
among us but there-is indeed something also by-nature changeable however
πᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ φύσει.
all but nevertheless is the-one indeed by-nature the-other and not by-nature
ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν,
what-sort and (is)-by-nature of-the-things admitting also otherwise to-be
καὶ ποῖον οὖ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω
and what-sort not but legal and by-convention if-indeed both
κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς
(are)-changeable alike (is)-clear and in-the-case-of the others the same
ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι
will-fit distinction by-nature for the right(-hand) (is)-stronger although
ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ
it-is-possible all ambidextrous to-become the and according-to
συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὅμοιά ἐστι τοῖς
convention and the advantage of-the just-things like are the
μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα,
measures not for everywhere equal the wine and corn measures
ἀλλ᾽ οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν,
but where indeed they-buy (they-are)-larger where and they-sell
ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπινα
smaller likewise and also the not natural but human
δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ
just-things not the-same everywhere since not-even the constitutions but
μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ
one only everywhere according-to nature the best of-the and
δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ
just-things and lawful-things each as the universals to the
καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά,
according-to particulars is-related the indeed for things-done (are)-many
ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἕν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ
of-those and each (is)-one universal for differs and the

ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον·
unjust-act and the unjust and the just-act and the just
ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο,
unjust indeed for is by-the nature or by-ordinance itself and this
ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω,
whenever it-is-done an-unjust-act is before and to-be-done not-yet
ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον
but unjust likewise and also a-just-act is-called and rather
δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα
just-doing the common(-term) just-act and the correction
τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποιά τε εἴδη καὶ
of-the unjust-act in each and of-them what-kinds both forms and
πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
how-many and about what-sorts they-happen being later one-must-consider

VIII · VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY WRONGS

Whether an act is unjust depends on its being voluntary. Of the harms done in dealings, those done in ignorance are mistakes or misfortunes; those done knowingly but without deliberation, in anger, are unjust acts, though their doer is not yet unjust; those done from choice make a man unjust and wicked. Some involuntary acts are pardonable and some are not.

ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων,
being and the just-things and unjust-things the(-ones) mentioned
ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ
acts-unjustly indeed and acts-justly whenever willingly one them
πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ
does whenever but unwillingly neither he-acts-unjustly nor acts-justly
ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε
but except according-to accident for-whom for it-happens

δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
just to-be or unjust they-do an-unjust-act and and
δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν
a-just-act are-defined by-the voluntary and involuntary whenever
γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα
for voluntary it-be it-is-blamed at-the-same-time and also an-unjust-act
τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα
then it-is so-that there-will-be something unjust indeed an-unjust-act
δ' οὔπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον
but not-yet if not the voluntariness be-added I-call and voluntary
μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν
indeed just-as also before has-been-said what — one of-the-things
ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε
in his-own-power being knowing and not being-ignorant does neither
ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ
whom nor with-what nor of-what for-the-sake such-as whom he-strikes and
τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ
with-what and of-what for-the-sake and-of-those each not according-to
συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα
accident nor by-force just-as if one having-taken the hand
αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)·
of-him should-strike another not willingly not for in his-power(-it-was)
ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ'
it-is-possible and the(-man) being-struck father to-be the(-striker) and
ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι
that indeed a-man or of-the present-people one to-know that
δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω
but father to-be-ignorant likewise and the such-thing let-it-be-determined
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.
also in-the-case-of the of-which for-the-sake and about the action whole

τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ
the indeed being-unknown or not being-unknown indeed not in his-power
δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει
but being or by-force (is)-involuntary many for also of-the-things by-nature
ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν
belonging knowingly both we-do and we-undergo of-which
οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν
none either voluntary or involuntary is such-as the to-grow-old
ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ
or to-die it-is and likewise in-the-case-of the unjust-things and
τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν
the just-things also the according-to accident also for — the
παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν
deposit might-return one involuntarily and through fear whom
οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ
neither just-things to-do nor to-act-justly must-one-say but except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον
according-to accident likewise and also the-man being-compelled
καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ
and unwilling the deposit not returning according-to
συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν.
accident one-must-say to-act-unjustly and the unjust-things to-do
τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ
of-the and voluntary-acts the(-ones) indeed having-chosen we-do the-others
δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι,
and not having-chosen having-chosen indeed all-that having-deliberated-beforehand
ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν
unchosen and all-that undeliberated three indeed being
βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας
harms of-the in the associations the(-ones) indeed with ignorance
ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ
mistakes are whenever neither whom nor what nor with-what

μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν
nor of-which for-the-sake he-supposed he-acts either for not to-throw
ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη,
or not with-this or not this-man or not of-this for-the-sake he-thought
ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα
but it-happened not of-which for-the-sake he-thought such-as not so-that
τρώσῃ ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ.
he-might-wound but so-that he-might-prick or not whom or not with-what
ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται,
whenever indeed then contrary-to-reasonable-expectation the harm comes-about
ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ
(it-is)-a-misadventure whenever and not contrary-to-reasonable-expectation without but
κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν
vice a-mistake he-makes-a-mistake indeed for whenever the origin in
αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ᾽ ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν
himself is of-the cause he-is-unfortunate and whenever (it-is)-from-outside whenever
δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον
and knowingly indeed not having-deliberated-beforehand but (it-is)-an-unjust-act such-as
ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ
all-that both through anger and other passions all-that (are)-necessary or
φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες
natural happen to-the men these for harming
καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ
and making-mistakes they-act-unjustly indeed and unjust-acts they-are not
μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ
however yet (they-are)-unjust through these nor wicked not for
διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,
through wickedness (is)-the harm whenever but from choice
ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ
(he-is)-unjust and depraved therefore rightly the(-acts) from anger
οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
not from malice-aforethought are-judged not for begins the-man in-anger

ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ
acting but the-man having-angered(-him) further and not-even about the
γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ
to-happen or not is-it-disputed but about the justice at
φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν
apparent for injustice the anger is not for just-as in
τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν
the transactions about the to-happen they-dispute of-which
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ
necessarily the one to-be depraved if not through forgetfulness it
δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ
they-do but agreeing about the fact about but
τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας
the which-way just they-dispute the-man but having-plotted
οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὔ.
not is-ignorant so-that the-one indeed thinks to-be-wronged the-other but not
ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ
if but from choice he-harms he-acts-unjustly and according-to
ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν
these already the unjust-acts the-man acting-unjustly (is)-unjust whenever
παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ
contrary-to the proportional it-be or contrary-to the equal likewise and
καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ
also just whenever having-chosen he-acts-justly he-acts-justly
δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ
but if only willingly he-acts of-the and involuntary-acts the-ones
μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα
indeed are pardonable the-others but not pardonable all-that
μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν
indeed for not only being-ignorant but also through ignorance
ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν,
they-make-mistakes(-in) (are)-pardonable all-that and not through ignorance

ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ᾽
but being-ignorant indeed through passion and neither natural nor
ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.
human not pardonable

Aristotle tests Euripides' line about killing a willing mother and concludes that no one is wronged voluntarily, though one may be harmed so. In an unjust distribution it is the distributor who acts unjustly, not the receiver. Men think justice easy because the acts are easy, but doing them from the right disposition is not, any more than prescribing medicine is.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ
might-be-puzzled and — one whether adequately it-has-been-determined about
τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν
the to-be-wronged and to-act-unjustly first indeed whether it-is(-possible)
ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως
just-as Euripides has-said saying strangely

μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.
mother I-killed — my brief (is)-the-tale
ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;
willing willing or not willing not willing

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ
whether for as truly it-is(-possible) willingly to-be-wronged or
οὔ ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν
not but (is-it)-involuntary all just-as also the to-act-unjustly all
ἑκούσιον; καὶ ἆρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ἢ τὸ μὲν
(is)-voluntary and whether all (is)-thus or that-way or the-one indeed
ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
voluntary the-other and involuntary likewise and also in-the-case-of
τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον·
the to-be-justly-treated the for to-act-justly all (is)-voluntary
ὥστ' εὔλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ'
so-that (it-is)-reasonable to-be-opposed likewise in each(-case) the both

ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι.
to-be-wronged and to-be-justly-treated either voluntary or involuntary to-be
ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν
strange but — it-would-seem also in-the-case-of the to-be-justly-treated if all
ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἑκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε
(is)-voluntary some for are-justly-treated not willingly then also this
διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς
might-be-puzzled-over — one whether the-man the unjust having-suffered
ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν,
is-wronged every(-one) or just-as also in-the-case-of the to-do
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
(so)-also in-the-case-of the to-suffer it-is according-to accident
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων·
for it-is-possible in both(-cases) to-partake of-the just-things
ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ
likewise and (it-is)-clear that also in-the-case-of the unjust-things not for
ταὐτὸν τὸ τἄδικα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ
the-same (is)-the unjust-things to-do with-the to-act-unjustly nor the
ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
unjust-things to-suffer with-the to-be-wronged likewise and also in-the-case-of
τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι
the to-act-justly and to-be-justly-treated (it-is)-impossible for to-be-wronged
μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.
not someone-acting-unjustly or to-be-justly-treated not someone-acting-justly
εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα τινά,
if but is simply the to-act-unjustly the to-harm willingly someone
τὸ δ' ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς, ὁ
the and willingly (is)-knowing both whom and with-what and how the
δ' ἀκρατὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκὼν τ' ἂν
and uncontrolled-man willingly harms himself himself willingly both —
ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι
he-would-be-wronged and-also it-would-be-possible himself himself to-wrong is

δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται
and also this one of-the-things puzzled-over whether it-is-possible
αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις δι' ἀκρασίαν
himself himself to-wrong further willingly — one through lack-of-control
ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ'
by another might-be-harmed (who-acts)-willingly so-that it-would-be — willingly
ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον
to-be-wronged or not correct the definition but one-must-add
τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς τὸ
to-the to-harm knowing both whom and with-what and how the
παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις
contrary-to the of-that-man wish is-harmed indeed then one
ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών·
willingly and unjust-things suffers is-wronged but no-one willingly
οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ
no-one for wishes(-it) not-even the uncontrolled-man but contrary-to
τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ
the wish he-acts neither for wishes no-one what
μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ
not he-thinks to-be excellent the-man and uncontrolled not what
οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς,
he-thinks one-must to-do he-does the-man but the his-own giving
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει
just-as Homer says to-have-given — Glaucus — to-Diomedes

χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,
golden for-bronze hundred-oxen-worth for-nine-oxen-worth

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι
not is-wronged in his-power for is the to-give the but to-be-wronged
οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ
(is)-not in his-power but the(-one) acting-unjustly must to-be-present about
μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.
indeed then the to-be-wronged that (it-is)-not voluntary (it-is)-clear
ἔτι δ᾽ ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ᾽ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ᾽
further and of-what we-chose-beforehand two remain to-say whether ever
ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ
acts-unjustly the-man having-assigned contrary-to the worth the more or
ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ
the-man having(-it) and whether it-is(-possible) himself himself to-wrong if
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ
for is-possible the earlier stated and the distributor acts-unjustly
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον, εἴ τις πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ
but not the-man having the more if one more than-himself to-another
νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ
assigns knowingly and willingly this-man himself himself wrongs which-very-thing
δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός
seem the moderate-men to-do the for decent-man apt-to-take-less
ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
is or not-even this (is)-simple of-another for good if it-happens
πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται
he-gets-more such-as of-reputation or of-the absolutely noble further it-is-solved
κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
according-to the definition of-the to-act-unjustly nothing for contrary-to
τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε
the his-own he-suffers wish so-that not he-is-wronged through at-least
τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ
this but if-indeed is-harmed only (it-is)-evident and that also the
διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ
distributor acts-unjustly but not the-man the more having always not

γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ τὸ
for the(-man)-to-whom the unjust belongs acts-unjustly but to-whom the
ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως,
willingly this to-do this and (is)-whence the origin of-the action
ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι.
which is in the distributor but not in the receiver
ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν
further since in-many-senses the to-do is-said and there-is(-a-sense)
ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης
as the lifeless-things kill and the hand and the servant
ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
(when-a-master)-has-ordered not acts-unjustly indeed does but the unjust-things
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ
further if indeed being-ignorant he-judged not acts-unjustly according-to the
νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ᾽ ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς
legal just nor unjust the judgment is it-is but in-a-way
ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον·
unjust different for (is)-the legal just and the primary
εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ
if but knowing he-judged unjustly he-gets-more also himself either
χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ
of-favor or of-revenge just-as then also if one were-to-share of-the
ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον
unjust-act also the-man for these-reasons having-judged unjustly more
ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν
has and for in that(-case) the land having-awarded not land
ἀλλ᾽ ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται
but money he-got the but men in their-power think
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον.
to-be the to-act-unjustly therefore also the just to-be easy
τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ
the but not is(-so) to-lie-with indeed for with-the(-wife) of-the

γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ
neighbor and to-strike the neighbor and to-give with-the hand
τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ
the money (is)-easy and in their-power but the in-a-certain-way
ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς.
being-disposed these-things to-do neither (is)-easy nor in their-power
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν
likewise and also the to-know the just-things and the unjust-things nothing
οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ
they-think wise to-be because about what the laws speak not
χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ᾽ ἢ
hard to-understand but not these are the just-things but except
κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς
according-to accident but how done and how
νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ
distributed (are)-just-things this indeed (is)-a-greater task than the
ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον
healthy-things to-know since there-too honey and wine and hellebore
καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ
and cautery and surgery to-know (is)-easy but how one-must
νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
assign(-them) for health and to-whom and when so-great a-task
ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι᾽ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου
as a-physician to-be through very and this also of-the just-man
οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ
they-think to-be no less the to-act-unjustly because not less the
δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων·
just-man but also more could — each to-do of-these
καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος
and for to-lie-with a-woman and to-strike and the brave-man
τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ᾽ ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν.
the shield to-throw-away and having-turned in either-direction to-run

ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί,
but the to-be-a-coward and to-act-unjustly not the these-things to-do is
πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα
except according-to accident but the in-a-certain-way being-disposed
ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν
these-things to-do just-as also the to-practice-medicine and the to-heal
οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν
not the to-cut or not to-cut or to-drug or not to-drug
ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις
is but the in-a-certain-way are and the just-things among these
οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν
who share of-the absolutely goods have and excess in
τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ
these and deficiency for-the(-ones) indeed for not is excess
αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν μόριον
of-them such-as perhaps for-the gods for-the(-others) and nothing a-particle
ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει,
(is)-beneficial for-the incurably bad but all-things harm
τοῖς δὲ μέχρι του· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
for-the(-others) and up-to a-point through this human is

The equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice. Law must speak universally, and where a case falls outside the universal, equity corrects the law as the lawgiver would have done had he been there. It is like the leaden rule of Lesbian builders, which bends to the shape of the stone. The equitable man takes less than his due even when the law is on his side.

περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν
about and equity and the equitable how is-related the indeed
ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
equity to justice the and equitable to the just
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ'
next is to-speak neither for as the-same absolutely nor
ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις· καὶ ὁτὲ
as different in-the genus does-it-appear to-those-examining and at-one-time
μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε
indeed the equitable we-praise and a-man the such so-that
καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ
also to the other(-virtues) praising we-transfer(-it) instead-of the
ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ
good the more-equitable that (it-is)-better showing at-another-time
δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς
and the argument to-those-following it-appears strange if the equitable
παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ
contrary-to the just something being praiseworthy is either for the
δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο·
just (is)-not excellent or the equitable not just if other
ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία
or if both (are)-excellent the-same they-are the indeed then difficulty
σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δ'
roughly arises through these-things about the equitable they-are and

ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς·
all in-a-way some correct and nothing contrary to-themselves
τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,
the both for equitable than-just some being better is just
καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.
and not as another some genus being better is than-the just
ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν
the-same then (are)-just and equitable and both excellent
ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι
being better (is)-the equitable causes and the difficulty that
τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ,
the equitable just indeed is not the according-to law though
ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν
but a-correction of-legal justice the-cause and (is)-that the indeed
νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς
law (is)-universal all about some-things but not possible — rightly
εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου,
to-speak universally in which then (it-is)-necessary indeed to-speak universally
μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ
not possible — but rightly the as for the most-part takes the
νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν
law not being-ignorant-of the error and it-is none
ἧττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ'
the-less correct the for error (is)-not in the law nor
ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν·
in the lawgiver but in the nature of-the thing is
εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν
at-once for such the of-the things-done matter is when then
λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου
speaks indeed the law universally happens and(-a-case) on this
παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἧ παραλείπει ὁ
contrary-to the universal then rightly it-is where omits the

νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ
lawgiver and erred absolutely having-spoken to-correct the
ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ
omission which also the lawgiver himself — would-have-said there
παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν.
being-present and if he-had-known would-have-legislated
διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ
therefore just indeed it-is and better than-some just not than-the
ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος.
absolute though but than-the through the absolute(-statement) error
καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα
and this is the nature the of-the equitable a-correction
νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον
of-law where it-falls-short through the universality this for (is)-the-cause
καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων
also of-the not all-things according-to law to-be that about some-things
ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ
(it-is)-impossible to-lay-down a-law so-that of-a-decree there-is-need of-the
γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ
for indefinite indefinite also the rule is just-as also
τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ
of-the Lesbian building the leaden rule to for the
σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ
shape of-the stone it-shifts and not remains the rule and(-so)
τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ
the decree to the facts what indeed then is the
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον.
equitable and that (it-is)-just and than-some better just (is)-clear
φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν· ὁ
evident and from this also the equitable-man who is the(-man)
γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ
for of-the such-things apt-to-choose and apt-to-do and the(-man)

μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ
not strict-in-justice to the worse but apt-to-take-less although
ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη
having the law (on-his-side)-as-helper equitable is and the state this
ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.
equity justice a-kind-of being and not different some state

XI · WRONGING ONESELF

Can a man wrong himself? The suicide wrongs the city, which therefore punishes him, but not himself, since no one is wronged willingly and justice needs more than one person. Both doing and suffering injustice are bad, but doing it is worse, because it involves vice. Only by metaphor is there justice between the parts of one's own soul.

πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ
whether and it-is-possible oneself to-wrong or not (is)-evident from
τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ
the things-said the-ones indeed for are of-the just-things the
κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ
according-to every virtue by the law ordained such-as not
κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει,
it-commands to-kill oneself the law what and not it-commands
ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ
it-forbids further whenever contrary-to the law he-harms not
ἀντιβλάπτων ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς
retaliating willingly he-acts-unjustly willingly and (is)-the(-man) knowing
καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων
both whom and with-what the(-man) and through anger himself slaughtering
ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ
willingly this does contrary-to the right reason which not allows the
νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν
law he-acts-unjustly then but whom (is-it)-not the city himself

δ' οὔ; ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών. διὸ
and not willingly for he-suffers is-wronged and no-one willingly therefore
καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ
also the city penalizes and a-certain dishonor attaches to-the(-man)
ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ'
himself having-destroyed as the city wronging further according-to
ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος,
which (he-is)-unjust only the-man acting-unjustly and not wholly base
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου·
not it-is-possible to-wrong himself this for (is)-different from-that
ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός,
it-is for in-a-way the unjust(-man) thus wicked just-as the coward
οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην
not as whole having the wickedness so-that not-even according-to this
ἀδικεῖ)· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι
does-he-act-unjustly at-the-same-time for — to-the same would-be taken-away
καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ
and added the same-thing this but (is)-impossible but always
ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.
in more(-than-one) necessarily is the just and the unjust
ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον·
further and (it-is)-voluntary both and from choice and prior
ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ
the(-man) for because he-suffered and the same doing-in-return not seems
ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὑτόν, ταὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει
to-act-unjustly himself but himself the-same at-the-same-time both suffers
καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ
and does further would-be — willingly to-be-wronged in-addition and
τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ,
to-these without of-the in part unjust-acts no-one acts-unjustly
μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ
commits-adultery and no-one with-the(-wife) his-own nor burgles

τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται
the his-own wall nor steals the his-own generally and is-solved
τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ
the himself to-wrong also according-to the definition the about
τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν
the voluntarily to-be-wronged (it-is)-evident and also that both indeed
φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ
(are)-base both the to-be-wronged and the to-act-unjustly the-one indeed for
ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ
less the-other and more to-have is than-the mean and just-as
ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)·
healthy indeed in medicine fit and in gymnastics
ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν
but nevertheless worse (is)-the to-act-unjustly the indeed for to-act-unjustly
μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας
(is)-with vice and blameworthy and (with)-vice either the complete
καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ
and absolute or near(-it) not for all the voluntary (is)-with
ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
injustice the but to-be-wronged (is)-without vice and injustice
καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον, κατὰ
in itself indeed then the to-be-wronged (is)-less base according-to
συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν
accident but nothing prevents (it)-greater to-be an-evil but not-at-all
μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον
cares(-for-this) the art but pleurisy it-calls a-greater disease
προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
than-a-stumble although might-become — at-times the-other according-to
συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ
accident if (to-one)-having-stumbled through the to-fall it-happened by
τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ
the enemy to-be-captured or to-die by metaphor but

καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
and similarity there-is not for-oneself toward himself justice but
τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν
of-the(-parts) of-himself for-some not every but justice but the of-master
ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ
or the of-household in these for the accounts is-set-apart the
λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς ἃ δὴ
reason having part of-the soul from the irrational to which indeed
βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὑτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις
they-look also it-seems to-be injustice toward oneself because in these
ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ
it-is-possible to-suffer something contrary-to the their-own desires just-as
οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι
then for-ruler and for-ruled to-be toward one-another justice some
καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
also for-these about indeed then justice and the other
τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
the moral virtues let-it-be-determined in-the way this

BOOK VI

I · WHAT THE RIGHT REASON IS

We have said that one must choose the mean as the right reason prescribes. This is true but not clear: it is like telling a sick man to take whatever the art of medicine prescribes. For the states of the soul, too, Aristotle must define what the right reason is, and what standard fixes it.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον
since and we-happen earlier to-have-said that one-must the mean
αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ
to-choose not the excess nor the deficiency the and
μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.
mean is as the reason the right says this let-us-analyze
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
in all for the mentioned states just-as also in-the-case-of
τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ
the others there-is some target toward which looking the-man
τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος
the reason having tightens and loosens and some there-is standard
τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
of-the means which between we-say to-be the excess and
τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ
the deficiency being according-to the right reason it-is and the
μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν
indeed to-say thus true indeed not-at-all but clear and for in
ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ'
the other pursuits about whatever there-is science this
ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ
true indeed to-say that neither more nor less one-must
πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ
to-labor nor to-be-slack but the intermediate-things and as the

ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη
right reason this but only having — one nothing — would-know
πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,
more such-as what-sort one-must to-apply to the body
εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ
if one should-say that whatever the medical-art prescribes and as the-man
ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ
this having therefore one-must also about the of-the soul states not
μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ᾽ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
only truly to-be this stated but also determined
τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.
what is the right reason and of-this what (is)-the-standard

II · THOUGHT AND DESIRE

The rational soul has two parts: one contemplates what cannot be otherwise, the other calculates about what can. Three things in the soul govern action and truth: perception, intellect, and desire. Choice is deliberate desire, so good choice needs true reasoning and right desire; and no one chooses the past, for, as Agathon says, even god cannot make undone what is done.

τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ
the indeed of-the soul virtues having-divided the-ones indeed to-be of-the
ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
character we-said the-others and of-the intellect about indeed then the
ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
moral we-have-gone-through about but the rest about soul
πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν
first having-spoken let-us-speak thus before indeed then
ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ
it-was-said two to-be parts of-the soul the both reason having and the

ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
irrational now and about the reason having the same way
διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν
one-must-divide and let-it-be-assumed two the reason having one indeed
ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ
with-which we-contemplate the such of-the things-that-are whose the principles
μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα·
not admit otherwise to-be one and with-which the variable
πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων
toward for the in-the genus different also of-the of-the soul parts
ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ
different in-the genus (is)-the to each naturally-adapted if-indeed
καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει
according-to likeness some and kinship the knowledge belongs
αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ
to-them let-be-called and of-these the-one indeed scientific the-other
δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν,
and calculative the for to-deliberate and to-calculate (are)-the-same
οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.
no-one and deliberates about the not admitting otherwise to-be
ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν ἕν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.
so-that the calculative is one some part of-the reason having
ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη
one-must-grasp then of-each of-these what the best state this
γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ
for (is)-the-virtue of-each the and virtue (is-relative)-to the work the
οἰκεῖον. τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως
proper three indeed are in the soul the(-things) controlling action
καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις
and truth perception intellect desire of-these and the perception
οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν
of-no origin action (it-is)-clear and from-the the beasts perception

μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν
indeed to-have in-action and not to-share is and what in
διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις
thought (are)-affirmation and denial this in desire (are)-pursuit
καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική,
and avoidance so-that since the moral virtue (is)-a-state concerned-with-choice
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα
the and choice (is)-desire deliberate must on-account-of these
μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ
indeed the both reasoning true to-be and the desire right if-indeed
ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι
the choice (is-to-be)-excellent and the same-things the-one indeed assert
τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια
the-other and pursue this indeed then the thought and the truth
πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ
practical of-the but contemplative thought and not practical nor
ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος (τοῦτο
productive the well and badly the-true is and false this
γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον)· τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ
for is of-every intellectual(-part) the-work of-the but practical and
διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ.
intellectual truth in-agreement being with-the desire the right
πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις — ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ'
of-action indeed then origin (is)-choice whence the motion but
οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα — προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ
not of-which for-the-sake of-choice and desire and reasoning the
ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ'
for-the-sake of-something therefore neither without intellect and thought nor
ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
without a-moral is state the choice good-action for and the
ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια
contrary in action without thought and character not is thought

δ᾽ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·
and itself nothing moves but the for-the-sake of-something and practical
αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
this for also the productive rules for-the-sake for of-something makes
πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι
every the-man making and not an-end absolutely but relative-to something
καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία
and of-something the thing-made but the thing-done the for good-action
τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς
(is)-an-end the and desire (is)-of-this therefore either desiderative intellect
ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ
(is)-the choice or desire intellectual and the such origin
ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς
(is)-man not is and choosable nothing past such-as no-one
προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ
chooses Ilion to-have-sacked nor for deliberates about
τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ
the past but about the future and possible the
δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων
and past not admits not to-have-happened therefore rightly Agathon

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
alone for of-this even god is-deprived
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ᾽ ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.
undone to-make whatever-things — have-been done

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον.
of-both indeed the intellectual parts truth (is)-the work
καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται
according-to which then most states will-attain-truth each these
ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.
(are-the)-virtues of-both

The soul attains truth in five ways: art, science, practical wisdom, wisdom, and intellect. Science concerns what is necessary and so eternal; it can be taught, and teaching proceeds either by induction or by syllogism. Science is therefore a demonstrative state, and a man knows scientifically when he is convinced of its principles.

ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. ἔστω
having-begun then from-the-top about them again let-us-speak let-there-be
δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ
indeed (the-states)-by-which attains-truth the soul by-the to-affirm or
ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη
to-deny five in-the number these and are art
ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ
science practical-wisdom wisdom intellect by-supposition for and
δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί
by-opinion it-is-possible to-be-deceived science indeed then what
ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ
is from-this (is)-evident if one-must to-speak-precisely and not
ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ
to-follow the similarities all for we-suppose what
ἐπιστάμεθα, μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα
we-know not-even to-admit otherwise to-be the but admitting
ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ
otherwise whenever outside the to-contemplate they-come it-escapes-us whether
ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον
they-are or not of necessity then is the object-of-science eternal
ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ
then the for of necessity being absolutely all (are)-eternal the
δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα
and eternal-things (are)-ungenerated and imperishable further teachable all

ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ
science seems to-be and the object-of-science learnable from
προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν
things-known-before and (proceeds)-all teaching just-as also in
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἐπαγωγῆς,
the Analytics we-say the-one indeed for (is)-through induction
ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι
the-other and by-syllogism the indeed indeed induction a-principle is
καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.
also of-the universal the and syllogism (is)-from the universals
εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι
there-are then principles from which the syllogism(-proceeds) of-which not there-is
συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
a-syllogism induction then the indeed then science is
ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν
a-state demonstrative and whatever other-things we-add-in-definition in
τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι
the Analytics whenever for in-a-way one-believes and known
αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ
to-him are the principles he-knows if for not more than-the
συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.
conclusion according-to accident he-will-have the science
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
about indeed then science let-it-be-determined in-the way this

What can be otherwise includes things made and things done, and making differs from doing. Art is a productive state joined with true reasoning, concerned with bringing into being things whose origin lies in the maker, not in the thing made. Art and chance concern the same things; as Agathon says, art loved chance and chance art.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν
of-the and admitting otherwise to-be there-is something both made
καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν
and done different and is making and action we-trust
δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ
and about them also the exoteric discussions so-that also the
μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου
with reason state practical different is from-the with reason
ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε
productive state therefore nor are-they-included by one-another neither
γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ
for the action (is)-making nor the making action is since
δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις
and the building art some is and what-precisely (is)-a-state some
μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις
with reason productive and none either art is which
οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ
not with reason productive state is nor such-a-state which not
τέχνη, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
(is)-an-art the-same — would-be art and state with reason true
ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ
productive is and art all about coming-into-being and the
τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν
to-contrive and to-consider how — may-come-into-being something of-the-things

ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ
admitting both to-be and not to-be and whose the origin (is)-in the
ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ
maker but not in the thing-made neither for of-the-things of
ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν
necessity being or coming-into-being the art is nor of-the-things
κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ
according-to nature in themselves for have these the origin since
δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως
and making and action (are)-different necessarily the art of-making
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά
but not of-action to-be and in-a-way some about the same-things
ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
are the chance and the art just-as also Agathon says

τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.
art chance has-loved and chance art

ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
the indeed then art just-as has-been-said (is)-a-state some with reason
ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου
true productive is the and lack-of-art the-contrary with reason
ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
false productive state about the admitting otherwise to-be

The practically wise man deliberates well about what is good for himself, not in part but for living well as a whole. Practical wisdom is not science, since its object can be otherwise, nor art, since action is not making; it is a true state concerned with action about human goods, as in Pericles. Temperance preserves it, for pleasure and pain corrupt our grasp of the end.

περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας
about and practical-wisdom so — we-may-grasp(-it) having-considered whom
λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι
we-call the practically-wise it-seems indeed of-a-practically-wise-man to-be
τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
the to-be-able well to-deliberate about the for-himself good and
συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς
advantageous-things not in part such-as what-sort for health for
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι
strength but what-sort for the well living generally a-sign and (is)-that
καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος
also the in something practically-wise we-call(-them) whenever to end
τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη.
some excellent well they-calculate in-matters-of-which not is an-art
ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.
so-that also generally — would-be practically-wise the-man deliberative
βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ
deliberates and no-one about the-things impossible otherwise to-be nor
τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη
of-the not admitting(-it) for-him to-do so-that if-indeed science
μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως
indeed (is)-with demonstration of-which and the principles admit otherwise
ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ
to-be of-these not is demonstration all for admit also

ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ
otherwise to-be and not it-is-possible to-deliberate about the-things of
ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ
necessity being not — would-be the practical-wisdom science nor
τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως
art science indeed because admits the thing-done otherwise
ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.
to-be art and because different (is)-the genus of-action and of-making
λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν
it-remains then it to-be a-state true with reason practical
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως
about the for-man good and bad-things of-the indeed for making
ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ
different (is)-the end of-the but action not — would-be is for
αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς
itself the good-action an-end through this Pericles and the
τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ
such practically-wise we-think to-be because the for-themselves good
καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους
and the for-the men they-are-able to-see to-be and such
ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ
we-consider the household-managers and the statesmen whence also
τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς
the temperance by-this we-call the name as
σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν.
preserving the practical-wisdom it-preserves and the such supposition
οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ
not for every supposition destroys nor perverts the
ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ
pleasant and painful such-as that the triangle two right-angles has or
οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
not has but the(-ones) about the thing-done the indeed for principles

τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ
of-the things-done (are)-the of-which for-the-sake the things-done to-the but
διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή,
corrupted(-man) through pleasure or pain at-once not appears the-principle
οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι
nor (that)-one-must of-this for-the-sake nor because-of this to-choose
πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.
all-things and to-do is for the vice destructive of-the-principle
ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ
so-that necessarily the practical-wisdom a-state to-be with reason true
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης
about the human goods practical but further of-art
μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν
indeed there-is a-virtue of-practical-wisdom but not there-is and in
μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ
indeed art the-man willingly erring (is)-preferable in-the-case-of
δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
but practical-wisdom less just-as also in-the-case-of the virtues
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ'
(it-is)-clear then that virtue some it-is and not an-art of-two and
ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου
being parts of-the soul of-the reason having of-the-one
ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ
— would-be the-virtue of-the opining(-part) the both for opinion (is)-about
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν
the admitting otherwise to-be and the practical-wisdom but further
οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη
not-even (is-it)-a-state with reason only a-sign and (is)-that forgetting
μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.
indeed of-the such a-state there-is of-practical-wisdom but not there-is

Science is a supposition about universals reached by demonstration, but the first principles from which it starts cannot themselves be grasped by science, by art, or by practical wisdom, nor yet by wisdom, which demonstrates some things. What remains is that intellect grasps the principles.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ
since and the science about the universals is supposition and
τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν
of-the-things of necessity being there-are and principles of-the demonstrable
καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη),
and of-all science with reasoning for (is)-the science
τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε
of-the principle of-the object-of-science neither — science would-it-be nor
τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν,
art nor practical-wisdom the indeed for object-of-science (is)-demonstrable
αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
these and happen being about the-things admitting otherwise
ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ
to-be nor indeed wisdom of-these is of-the for wise-man
περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς
about some-things to-have demonstration it-is if indeed (the-states)-by-which
ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ
we-attain-truth and never are-deceived about the-things not
ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ
admitting or also admitting otherwise to-be science and
φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν
practical-wisdom is and wisdom and intellect of-these and the

τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν
three none can be I-mean and three practical-wisdom
ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.
science wisdom it-remains intellect to-be of-the principles

VII · WISDOM

We call Pheidias and Polycleitus wise for exactness in their arts, but some men are wise without qualification. Wisdom is intellect joined with science, of the most honorable things, and so is not political science, since man is not the best thing in the cosmos. Anaxagoras and Thales were wise but not practically wise; practical wisdom deals with particulars.

τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς
the and wisdom in — the arts to-the most-exact in-the
τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ
arts we-ascribe such-as Pheidias (as)-a-sculptor wise and
Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
Polycleitus (as)-a-maker-of-statues here indeed then nothing else
σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι
meaning-by the wisdom than that excellence of-art it-is to-be
δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο
and some wise we-think generally not in part nor (in)-other
τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ
something wise just-as Homer says in the Margites

τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἂρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα
him and neither then a-digger the-gods made nor a-plowman
οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.
nor otherwise in-anything wise

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ
so-that (it-is)-clear that most-exact — of-the sciences would-be the
σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
wisdom must then the wise-man not only the-things from the principles
εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
to-know but also about the principles to-attain-truth so-that would-be — the
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
wisdom intellect and science just-as a-head having science
τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν
of-the most-honorable-things strange for if one the political-science or the
φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον
practical-wisdom most-excellent thinks to-be if not the best
τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
of-the-things in the universe man is if indeed healthy indeed
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ
and good (is)-different for-men and for-fish the but white and
εὐθὺ ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν,
straight (is)-the-same always also the wise the-same all — would-say
φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ
practically-wise but different the for about itself particulars the(-faculty) well
θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά.
observing it-says to-be practically-wise and to-this it-will-entrust them
διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα
therefore also of-the beasts some practically-wise they-say to-be all-that
περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.
about the their-own life having appear a-power of-forethought
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ
(it-is)-evident and also that not — would-be the wisdom and the political-science
ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς
the same if for the(-knowledge) about the beneficial-things the for-themselves
ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία
they-will-call wisdom many will-be wisdoms not for (there-is)-one

περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ
about the of-all good the animals but a-different about
ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων.
each if not also medicine (is)-one about all the things-that-are
εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων,
if and (it-be-said)-that best (is)-man of-the other animals
οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα
nothing it-matters also for than-man other-things much more-divine
τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος
in-the nature such-as most-visible at-least (those)-from which the universe
συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία
is-composed from indeed the things-said (it-is)-clear that the wisdom
ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ
is both science and intellect of-the most-honorable-things by-the
φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους
nature therefore Anaxagoras and Thales and the such
σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν
wise indeed practically-wise but not they-say to-be when they-see(-them)
ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν
ignorant-of the advantageous-things for-themselves and extraordinary indeed
καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς
and wonderful and difficult and divine-things to-know them
φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.
they-say useless but because not the human goods they-seek
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν
the but practical-wisdom (is)-about the human-things and about which
ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα
it-is-possible to-deliberate of-the for practically-wise-man most
τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ'
this work to-be we-say the well to-deliberate deliberates and
οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων
no-one about the-things impossible otherwise to-be nor of-whatever-things

μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ'
not end some there-is and this a-practicable good the and
ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν
absolutely good-at-deliberating (is)-the(-man) of-the best for-man of-the
πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
practicable-things apt-to-aim according-to the calculation
οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
nor is the practical-wisdom of-the universals only but one-must
καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ
also the according-to particulars to-know (it-is)-practical for the
δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι
and action (is)-about the according-to particulars therefore also some
οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
not knowing (than)-others knowing (are)-more-practical and in the
ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα
other(-fields) the experienced(-ones) if for one-should-know that the light
εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ,
(are)-digestible meats and healthy what-sort but (are)-light should-be-ignorant-of
οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια
not he-will-produce health but the(-man) knowing that the chicken
ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική·
healthy will-produce(-it) more the but practical-wisdom (is)-practical
ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ'
so-that one-must both to-have or this(-one) more there-would-be and
ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.
— some also here master-art

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state, but their being differs: the master form is legislative, the other deliberative and judicial. Practical wisdom concerning oneself is thought the real kind, though one's good cannot be had without household and city. The young can be mathematicians but not practically wise, since this needs experience of particulars.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν
is and also the political-science and the practical-wisdom the same indeed
ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν
state the however being not the-same for-them of-the and about a-city
ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ
the-one indeed as master-art (is)-practical-wisdom legislative the-other
δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική·
and as the according-to particulars the common has name political
αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα
this and (is)-practical and deliberative the for decree
πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνον
(is)-to-be-done as the last-thing therefore to-engage-in-politics these only
λέγουσιν· μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι.
they-say alone for act these just-as the manual-laborers
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν
seems and also practical-wisdom most to-be the(-one) about himself
καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις·
and one and has this the common name practical-wisdom
ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία
of-those and the-one indeed household-management the-other and legislation
ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτικὴ
the-other and political and of-this the-one indeed deliberative
ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως
the-other and judicial a-kind indeed then some — would-be of-knowledge

τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ
the for-oneself to-know but it-has difference much and it-seems
ὁ τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος
the(-man) the-things about himself knowing and occupied-with practically-wise
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης
to-be the but statesmen busybodies therefore Euripides

πῶς δ᾽ ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
how and — could-I-be-wise to-whom it-was-possible free-of-trouble
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
among the many numbered of-the-army
ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
an-equal-share to-have
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον…
the for extraordinary and something doing more

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο
they-seek for the for-themselves good and they-think this
δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ
(that)-one-must to-do from this then the opinion has-come the
τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ
these practically-wise to-be although perhaps not is-possible the one's-own
εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ
well without household-management nor without a-constitution further and the
αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον
his-own how one-must to-manage (is)-unclear and one-must-consider a-sign
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ
and is of-the said also why geometers indeed young and
μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ᾽
mathematicians they-become and wise (in)-the such-things practically-wise but
οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά
not seems to-become(-one) the-cause and (is)-that also of-the according-to particulars

ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας,
is the practical-wisdom which become known from experience
νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ
a-young-man but experienced not is length for of-time produces
τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ
the experience since also this — one might-consider through what indeed
μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς
a-mathematician indeed a-boy may-become — wise but or a-natural-philosopher
οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ
not or (is-it)-that the indeed through abstraction are of-the and the
ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν
principles (come)-from experience and the-latter indeed not are-convinced-of
οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον;
the young but they-say(-them) of-the but the what (it)-is not unclear
ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ
further the error (is)-either about the universal in the
βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ
to-deliberate or about the according-to particular either for
ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ
that all the heavy waters (are)-base or that this
βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη,
(is)-heavy that and the practical-wisdom (is)-not science
φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ
(it-is)-evident of-the for last is just-as has-been-said the for
πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν
thing-done (is)-such it-is-opposed indeed indeed to-the intellect the indeed
γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
for intellect (is)-of-the definitions of-which not is reason the and (is)-of-the
ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ
last of-which not is science but perception not
ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι
the(-perception) of-the proper-objects but (the-sort)-by-which we-perceive that

τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη
the last (figure)-is-a-triangle it-will-stop for there-also but this
μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.
rather (is)-perception than practical-wisdom of-that but another form

IX · EXCELLENCE IN DELIBERATION

Excellence in deliberation is not science, since men do not inquire into what they know, nor skill in guessing, nor quick wit, nor opinion. It is a correctness of deliberation: reaching what is good, by the right means, at the right time, and with a view to the end of which practical wisdom is the true supposition.

τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ
the to-inquire and and the to-deliberate differ the for
βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ
to-deliberate to-inquire a-kind is one-must and to-grasp also about
εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ
excellence-in-deliberation what it-is whether science some or opinion or
εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν·
skill-in-guessing or other some genus science indeed indeed not it-is
οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία
not for they-inquire about what they-know the but excellence-in-deliberation
βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται.
(is)-deliberation a-kind the and deliberating(-man) inquires and calculates
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ
but further not-even (is-it)-skill-in-guessing without both for reasoning and
ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον,
quick something (is)-the skill-in-guessing they-deliberate but a-long time
καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,
and they-say to-act indeed one-must quickly the(-things) deliberated
βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον καὶ ἡ
to-deliberate but slowly further the quick-wit (is)-different and the

εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ
excellence-in-deliberation is and skill-in-guessing a-kind-of the quick-wit nor
δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ
indeed (is-it)-opinion the excellence-in-deliberation any but since the(-man)
μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς
indeed badly deliberating errs the(-man) and well rightly
βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν,
deliberates (it-is)-clear that correctness some the excellence-in-deliberation is
οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν
neither of-science but nor of-opinion of-science indeed for not there-is
ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια·
correctness nor for error of-opinion and correctness (is)-truth
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν.
at-the-same-time and also has-been-determined already all of-which opinion is
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα
but further not without reasoning the excellence-in-deliberation of-thought then
λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα
it-remains(-a-correctness) this for (is)-not-yet assertion and for the opinion
οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος,
(is)-not inquiry but assertion some already the and deliberating(-man)
ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι
whether — well or — also badly deliberates inquires something
καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία
and calculates but correctness some is the excellence-in-deliberation
βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ
of-deliberation therefore the deliberation must-be-inquired-into first what and
περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ
about what since and the correctness (is)-in-more-senses (it-is)-clear that not
πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται
every(-kind) the for uncontrolled(-man) and the base(-man) what he-proposes
†ἰδεῖν† ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἕσται
to-see from his calculation will-attain so-that rightly he-will-have

βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν
deliberated evil but great having-got seems and good
τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης
something the well to-have-deliberated the for such correctness
βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ'
of-deliberation (is)-excellence-in-deliberation the of-good apt-to-attain but
ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν
it-is-possible also this by-false syllogism to-attain and what indeed
δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον
one-must to-do to-attain through what but not but false the middle
ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ'
term to-be so-that not-even this yet (is)-excellence-in-deliberation according-to
ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι' οὗ ἔδει.
which what one-must indeed one-attains not however through what one-should
ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν
further it-is-possible a-long time deliberating to-attain the-other
δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ'
and quickly so not-even that yet (is)-excellence-in-deliberation but
ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
correctness the according-to the beneficial both what one-must and how
καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ
and when further it-is-possible also absolutely well to-have-deliberated and
πρός τι τέλος. ἢ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ
toward some end the-one indeed indeed absolutely the(-one) toward the
τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τι
end the absolute succeeding some and the(-one) toward some
τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ
end if indeed of-the practically-wise the well to-have-deliberated the
εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον
excellence-in-deliberation would-be — correctness the according-to the advantageous
πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.
toward the end of-which the practical-wisdom true supposition is

X · UNDERSTANDING

Understanding, by which we call men intelligent, is neither science nor opinion in general. It concerns the same matters as practical wisdom, but where practical wisdom commands, understanding only judges. It is using opinion to judge well what someone else says, and the word comes from its use for learning.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς
are and also the understanding and the good-understanding according-to which
λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ
we-call(-men) men-of-understanding and of-good-understanding neither wholly the
αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ δόξῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί)
same with-science or opinion all for — would-be men-of-understanding
οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἡ
nor some one of-the according-to part sciences such-as the
ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἡ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε
medicine about healthy-things the geometry about magnitudes neither
γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν
for about the always being and unchangeable the understanding is
οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν
nor about the-things coming-to-be of-whatever-sort but about which
ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ
might-be-puzzled — one and deliberate therefore about the same-things
μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σύνεσις
indeed as-the practical-wisdom it-is not is and the same understanding
καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν·
and practical-wisdom the indeed for practical-wisdom commanding is
τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν·
what for one-must to-do or not the end of-it is
ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις
the but understanding (is)-judging only the-same for (are)-understanding

καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι
and good-understanding and men-of-understanding and of-good-understanding it-is
δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ
and neither the to-have the practical-wisdom nor the to-acquire the
σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν
understanding but just-as the to-learn is-called to-understand when
χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ
one-uses the science so in the to-use the opinion for the
κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου
to-judge about these-things about which the practical-wisdom is when-another
λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς
speaks and to-judge rightly the for well with-the rightly
τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ σύνεσις,
(is)-the same and from-this has-come the-name the understanding
καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ
according-to which (men-are)-of-good-understanding from the(-understanding) in the
μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.
to-learn we-call for the to-learn to-understand often

XI · JUDGMENT AND INTELLECT

Judgment is the right discrimination of the equitable, and sympathetic judgment is its right discrimination in pardon. These states, with understanding, practical wisdom, and intellect, all concern ultimates and particulars. They seem natural and come with age, so we must attend to the undemonstrated sayings of experienced men, since experience gives them an eye to see.

ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας
the and so-called judgment according-to which (men)-sympathetic-in-judgment
καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις
and to-have we-say judgment the of-the equitable is judging

ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν
right a-sign and the for equitable-man most we-say
εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια
to-be sympathetic-in-judgment and equitable the to-have about some-things
συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ
sympathetic-judgment the and sympathetic-judgment judgment is judging
τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
of-the equitable right right and (is)-the(-judgment) of-the true
εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν
are and all the states reasonably to the-same tending we-speak-of
γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ
for judgment and understanding and practical-wisdom and intellect to
τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ
the same-men attributing judgment to-have and intellect already and
φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται
practically-wise and men-of-understanding all for the capacities these
τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν
of-the ultimates are and of-the according-to particulars and in indeed
τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς
the judging being about which the practically-wise-man (is)-of-understanding
καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ
and good-in-judgment or sympathetic-in-judgment the for equitable-things common
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι
of-the goods all are in the toward another are
δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ
and of-the according-to particulars and of-the ultimates all the
πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν
things-to-be-done and for the practically-wise-man one-must to-know
αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά,
them and the understanding and the judgment (are)-about the things-to-be-done
ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ'
these and (are)-ultimates and the intellect (is)-of-the ultimates in

ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
both-directions and for of-the first terms and of-the ultimates
νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς
intellect is and not reasoning and the-one indeed according-to the
ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν
demonstrations of-the unchangeable terms and first the-other and in
ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς
the practical(-reasonings) of-the ultimate and variable and of-the
ἑτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται·
other premise principles for of-the of-which for-the-sake these
ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν
(are)-from the according-to particulars for the universals of-these then
ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.
to-have one-must perception this and is intellect
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
therefore also natural seem to-be these and by-nature wise indeed
οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον
no-one judgment but to-have and understanding and intellect a-sign
δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ
and (is)-that also the ages we-think to-follow(-them) and this the
ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης.
age intellect has and judgment as the nature (the)-cause being
ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ
so-that one-must to-attend-to of-the experienced and older or
φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον
practically-wise the undemonstrated sayings and opinions not less
τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας
than-the demonstrations through for the to-have from the experience
ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις
an-eye they-see rightly what indeed then is the practical-wisdom

καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ
and the wisdom and about what each happens being and
ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.
that of-a-different of-the soul part virtue (is)-each has-been-said

XII · WHAT GOOD ARE THEY?

What use are wisdom and practical wisdom, if wisdom studies nothing that makes a man happy and practical wisdom does not make us more able to act? Both are choiceworthy in themselves; wisdom makes happiness not as medicine makes health but as health does; virtue makes the aim right and practical wisdom the means. Cleverness serves good and bad ends alike, so one cannot be practically wise without being good.

διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.
might-raise-the-difficulty and — one about them in-what useful they-are
ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
the indeed for wisdom nothing will-contemplate from which will-be happy
ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
a-man of-no for is(-it) coming-to-be the and practical-wisdom
τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς;
this indeed has but of-what for-the-sake is-there-need-of it
εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ
if-indeed the indeed practical-wisdom is the(-state) about the just-things and
καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ
noble-things and good-things for-man these and are what of-the
ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι
good it-is man to-do in-nothing and more-able-to-act
τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ
by-the to-know them are-we if-indeed states the virtues are just-as
οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ
neither the healthy-things nor the vigorous-things (that-is)-whatever not by-the

ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ
to-produce but by-the from the state being are-so-called in-nothing for
πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν
more-able-to-act by-the to-have the medical and gymnastic(-arts)
ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον
are-we if but not of-these for-the-sake practically-wise one-must-call(-a-man)
ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν
but of-the to-become(-good) to-the being excellent nothing —
εἴη χρήσιμος· ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν
would-be useful further and not-even to-the not having(-it) nothing
γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι,
for will-it-matter themselves to-have(-it) or to-others having(-it) to-listen
ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν·
sufficiently and it-would-be — for-us just-as also about the health
βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν.
wishing for to-be-healthy nevertheless not we-learn medicine
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς
in-addition and to-these strange — to-be would-seem if inferior to-the
σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει
wisdom being more-authoritative than-it it-will-be the for producing rules
καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον·
and commands about each about indeed these-things one-must-speak
νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. πρῶτον
now indeed for difficulties-have-been-raised about them only first
μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς
indeed then let-us-say that in themselves necessarily choiceworthy they
εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ
to-be virtues at-least being each of-each the part even
εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι
if not they-produce anything neither of-them then also they-produce
μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια,
indeed not as the medicine but health but as the health

οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης
so the wisdom happiness a-part for being of-the whole
ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ †τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.†
virtue by-the to-be-possessed it-makes and by-the being-active happy
ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ
further the work is-achieved according-to the practical-wisdom and
τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ
the moral virtue the indeed for virtue the target makes
ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ
right the and practical-wisdom the(-means) toward this of-the and
τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ
fourth part of-the soul not there-is virtue such of-the
θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν.
nutritive nothing for in its-power (is)-to-do or not to-do
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν
about and the in-nothing being more-able-to-act through the
φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν
practical-wisdom of-the noble and just-things a-little from-further-back
ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ
one-must-begin taking starting-point this just-as for also
τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους
the just-things we-say doing some-men not-yet just
εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα
to-be such-as the(-men) the(-things) by the laws ordained
ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν
doing either unwillingly or through ignorance or through other
τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ
something and not through themselves although they-do at-least what
δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν,
one-ought and all-that one-must the excellent-man so as it-seems
ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ'
it-is-possible the in-what-way being-disposed to-do each-thing so-as

εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν
to-be good I-mean and such-as through choice and themselves
ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν
for-the-sake of-the done(-acts) the indeed then choice right
ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε
makes the virtue the but all-that of-that for-the-sake are-naturally-adapted
πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας
to-be-done not is(-the-province) of-the virtue but of-another
δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ
capacity one-must-speak but dwelling-on(-it) more-clearly about
αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη
them there-is indeed a-capacity which they-call cleverness this
δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν
and is such so-as the toward the proposed target
συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ.
tending to-be-able these-things to-do and to-hit it
ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ
if indeed then the target be noble praiseworthy it-is if but
φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ
base (it-is)-villainy therefore also the practically-wise clever and
πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ
villainous we-say to-be is and the practical-wisdom not the
δύναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις
capacity but not without the capacity this the but state
τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς,
by-the eye this comes-to-be of-the soul not without virtue
ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν
as has-been-said both and is clear the for syllogisms of-the
πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ
things-to-be-done a-starting-point having are since such (is)-the
τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου
end and the best whatever being let-it-be for of-argument

χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ
for-the-sake the chance-thing this and if not to-the good-man not
φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι
appears perverts for the wickedness and to-be-deceived
ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι
makes(-us) about the practical starting-points so-that (it-is)-evident that
ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.
(it-is)-impossible practically-wise to-be not being good

XIII · NATURAL AND STRICT VIRTUE

Natural virtue is like a strong body moving without sight, harmful without intellect; strict virtue needs practical wisdom. Socrates was right that virtue is not without practical wisdom, wrong that it is practical wisdom. The virtues are therefore not separable. Practical wisdom does not rule over wisdom, any more than medicine rules over health.

σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ
one-must-consider indeed again also about virtue also for the virtue
παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα —
similarly is-related as the practical-wisdom to the cleverness
οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ — οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς
not the-same indeed like but so also the natural virtue to
τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν
the strict(-virtue) to-all for it-seems the-several of-the characters to-belong
φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι
by-nature in-a-way both for just and temperate and brave
καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν
and the-rest we-are straightway from birth but nevertheless we-seek
ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον
other something the strictly good and the such-things in-another

τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
way to-belong both for in-children and in-beasts the natural
ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι.
belong states but without intellect harmful they-appear being
πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ
except so-much seems to-be-seen that just-as for-a-body strong
ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ
without sight moving it-happens to-stumble heavily through
τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
the not to-have sight so also here if but it-take-on intellect
ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ᾽ ἔσται
in the to-act it-differs the and state like being then will-be
κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο
strictly virtue so-that just-as in-the-case-of the opinionative(-part) two
ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
are forms cleverness and practical-wisdom so also in-the-case-of the
ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἡ
moral(-part) two are the-one indeed virtue natural the-other and the
κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.
strict(-virtue) and of-these the strict not comes-to-be without practical-wisdom
διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις
therefore some say all the virtues forms-of-practical-wisdom
εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ᾽
to-be and Socrates in-the-one indeed rightly inquired in-the-other but
ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας
erred that indeed for forms-of-practical-wisdom he-thought to-be all
τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς
the virtues he-erred that but not without practical-wisdom well
ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν
he-said a-sign and also for now all when they-define the
ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ
virtue add the state having-named(-it) and to what-things

ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
it-is the(-state) according-to the right reason right and (is)-the(-reason)
κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως
according-to the practical-wisdom they-seem indeed to-divine somehow
ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν
all that the such state virtue is the according-to the
φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ
practical-wisdom one-must but a-little to-shift(-ground) it-is for not only the
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις
according-to the right reason but the with the right reason state
ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς
virtue is right and reason about the such-things the practical-wisdom
ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι
is Socrates indeed then reasons the virtues thought to-be
(ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον
sciences for to-be all we but (say)-with reason (it-is)-clear
οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως
then from the things-said that not possible — good to-be strictly
ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.
without practical-wisdom nor practically-wise without the moral virtue
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη
but also the argument in-this-way might-be-refuted — by-which might-argue
τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
one — that are-separated from-one-another the virtues not for the same-man
εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ'
(is)-best-endowed for all so-that the-one indeed already the-other but
οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς
not-yet having-acquired he-will-be this for in-respect-of indeed the natural
ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ
virtues is-possible in-respect-of which but absolutely is-called good not
ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ
is-possible at-the-same-time for with-the practical-wisdom one being-present

πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι
all will-be-present (it-is)-clear and even if not practical it-were that
ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι,
there-would-be-need — of-it through the of-the part virtue to-be
καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ'
and that not will-be the choice right without practical-wisdom nor
ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἣ δὲ τὰ πρὸς
without virtue the-one indeed for the end the-other and the-things toward
τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ'
the end makes(-us) do but further not-even sovereign at-least
ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
is(-it) over-the wisdom nor over-the better part just-as nor
τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
over-the health the medicine not for it-uses it but sees
ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ
how it-may-come-about of-that then for-the-sake it-commands but not
ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν
to-that further (it-is)-like even if one the political-science should-say to-rule
τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.
the gods because it-commands about all the(-things) in the city

BOOK VII

I · THREE THINGS TO AVOID

In character there are three things to avoid: vice, lack of control, and brutishness. Opposite them stand virtue, self-control, and a superhuman virtue, heroic and divine, such as Homer's Priam saw in Hector. Aristotle will set out the appearances, work through the difficulties, and keep the reputable opinions where he can, beginning with what is said of self-control.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν,
after and these-things one-must-say another making beginning
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη,
that of-the(-things) about the characters to-be-avoided three are kinds
κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ
vice lack-of-control brutishness the and contraries to-the indeed two
δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν
(are)-clear the-one indeed for virtue the-other and self-control
καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι
we-call to and the brutishness most — would-fit
λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν,
to-speak-of the above us virtue heroic a-kind and divine
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν
just-as Homer about — Hector has-made saying —
Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,
Priam that exceedingly he-was good

οὐδὲ ἐῴκει
nor did-be-seem
ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
of-a-man at-least mortal the-son to-be but of-a-god

ὥστ᾽ εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ
so-that if just-as they-say from men become gods
δι᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι
through of-virtue excess such some — would-be (it-is)-clear that
ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
the to-the brutish opposed state also for just-as neither
θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ᾽ ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽
of-a-beast is vice nor virtue so neither of-a-god but
ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ᾽ ἕτερόν τι γένος
the-one indeed (is)-more-honorable than-virtue the-other and different some kind
κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ
of-vice since and (it-is)-rare also the divine man to-be just-as
οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, οἳ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι
the Laconians are-accustomed to-address(-one) who whenever they-admire
σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης
exceedingly someone godlike a-man they-say so also the brutish(-man)
ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
among the men (is)-rare most and among the
βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ᾽ ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους
barbarians it-is it-comes-about and some(-cases) also through diseases
καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
and maimings and the(-men) through vice and of-the men
ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς
exceeding so we-call-by-the-ill-name but about indeed the
διαθέσεως τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν,
disposition the such later one-must-make some mention
περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας
about and vice it-has-been-spoken before about and lack-of-control
καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας
and softness and luxury one-must-speak and about self-control
καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ
and endurance neither for as about the same states with-the

ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ'
virtue and the wickedness each of-them one-must-suppose nor
ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
as a-different kind one-must and just-as in-the-case-of the others
τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας
setting-out the appearances and first having-gone-through-the-difficulties
οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ
so to-prove most indeed all the reputable-opinions about
ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα·
these the passions if but not the most and most-authoritative
ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ
if for are-resolved both the difficulties and are-left the
ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
reputable-opinions proved — it-would-be sufficiently
δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
it-seems indeed the both self-control and endurance of-the excellent
καὶ ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
and praiseworthy-things to-be the and lack-of-control both and softness of-the
φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ
base and blameworthy-things and the same-man (is)-self-controlled and
ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ
apt-to-abide-by the calculation and uncontrolled and apt-to-abandon the
λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει
calculation and the indeed uncontrolled-man knowing that base-things he-does
διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ
through passion the and self-controlled-man knowing that base (are)-the
ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα
appetites not follows(-them) because-of the reason and the temperate-man
μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἷ μὲν
indeed self-controlled and enduring the-one and such some indeed
πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ
all temperate others and not and the licentious-man uncontrolled and

τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἳ δ' ἑτέρους
the uncontrolled-man licentious confusedly others and different
εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν
to-be they-say the and practically-wise-man at-one-time indeed not they-say
ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας
to-be-possible to-be uncontrolled at-another and some practically-wise being
καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ
and clever uncontrolled to-be further uncontrolled they-are-called both in-anger
καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
and in-honor and in-gain the indeed then things-said these are

II · THE PUZZLES

How can a man who knows act without control? Socrates said he cannot, since no one acts against what he thinks best except through ignorance; others say it is opinion, not knowledge, that is overcome. Further puzzles follow: a practically wise man cannot lack control; if self-control abides by every opinion, even a false one, some lack of control will be excellent, as with Sophocles' Neoptolemus; and the proverb asks what to drink when water chokes.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς
might-raise-the-difficulty and — one how supposing rightly
ἀκρατεύεταί τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες
lacks-control one knowing indeed then not say some
οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς
(it-is)-possible — to-be terrible for knowledge being-within(-him) as
ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν
thought Socrates something-else some to-master and to-drag-about
αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως
it just-as a-slave Socrates indeed for wholly
ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα
fought against the argument as not existing lack-of-control no-one

γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ
for supposing(-so) to-act contrary-to the best but
δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς
through ignorance this indeed then the argument contradicts the
φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ
appearances plainly and one-must to-inquire about the passion if
δι᾽ ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ
through ignorance what the manner becomes of-the ignorance that for not
οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι,
thinks(-so) at-least the man-lacking-control before into the passion to-come
φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ᾽
(it-is)-evident there-are and some who the-one indeed concede the-other but
οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν,
not the indeed for than-knowledge nothing to-be stronger they-agree
τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ
the but no-one to-act contrary-to the having-seemed better not
ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ
they-agree and through this the uncontrolled-man they-say not
ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν.
knowledge having to-be-mastered by the pleasures but opinion
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ᾽ ἰσχυρὰ
but further if-indeed (it-is)-opinion and not knowledge nor strong
ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ᾽ ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
supposition the resisting but mild just-as in those
διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς
hesitating (there-is)-pardon for-the not to-abide in them against
ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη,
appetites strong for-the but wickedness (there-is)-not pardon
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως
nor for-the other(-things) any of-the blameworthy (is-it)-practical-wisdom
ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον·
then (that)-resists this for (is)-strongest but (that-is)-strange

ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής,
will-be for the same-man at-the-same-time practically-wise and uncontrolled
φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν
would-say but not-even — one of-a-practically-wise-man to-be the to-do
ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται
willingly the basest-things in-addition and to-these it-has-been-shown
πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ
earlier that apt-to-act at-least (is)-the practically-wise-man of-the for
ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν
ultimates (he-is)-one and the other having virtues further if indeed
ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής,
in the appetites having strong and base the self-controlled-man
οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
not will-be the temperate-man self-controlled nor the self-controlled-man
σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας
temperate neither for the excess(-is) of-a-temperate-man nor the base(-ones)
ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ
to-have but further it-must(-be-so) at-least if indeed for good the
ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ
appetites (is)-base the preventing state from following so-that the
ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι,
self-control not all excellent(-is) if but weak and not base
οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.
nothing grand(-it-is) nor if base and weak nothing great
ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη,
further if to-every opinion apt-to-abide-by makes the self-control (it-is)-base
οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία
such-as if even to-the false and if from-every opinion the lack-of-control
ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ
(is)-apt-to-abandon there-will-be some excellent lack-of-control such-as the
Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς
of-Sophocles Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes praiseworthy

γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως
for (he-is)-not abiding-by what he-was-persuaded-of by — Odysseus
διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος
through the to-be-pained lying further the sophistical argument
ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα
(is)-a-difficulty because for the paradoxes wishing to-refute so-that
δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς
clever they-may-be when they-succeed the resulting syllogism
ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ
a-difficulty becomes is-bound for the thought when to-stay not
βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι
it-wishes through the not to-please the conclusion to-advance
δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.
but not it-is-able through the to-resolve not to-have the argument
συμβαίνει δὴ ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας
it-results indeed from some argument the folly with lack-of-control
ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ
(is)-virtue the-contrary-things for he-does of-what he-supposes through
τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ
the lack-of-control he-supposes and the-goods evil to-be and not
δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι
one-must to-do(-them) so-that the-goods and not the evils he-will-do further
ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα
the(-man) through-the to-be-convinced doing and pursuing the pleasant-things
καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ
and choosing(-them) better — would-seem than-the(-man) not through
λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
calculation but through lack-of-control more-curable for through the
μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ
to-be-persuaded-otherwise — the but uncontrolled-man (is)-liable to-the proverb
ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ
in which we-say when the water chokes what must one-drink-after(-it) if

μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς
indeed for he-had-been-persuaded-of what he-does having-been-persuaded-otherwise
ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον
— he-would-have-stopped now but other-things being-persuaded no less
πράττει. ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια,
he-does further if about all-things lack-of-control is and self-control
τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς
who (is)-the absolutely uncontrolled-man no-one for all has the
ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς.
kinds-of-lack-of-control we-say but to-be some absolutely
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων
the indeed then difficulties such some arise of-these
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ
and the-ones indeed to-remove one-must the-others and to-leave the for
λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.
solution of-the difficulty discovery is

III · KNOWING AND NOT KNOWING

Knowing is said in two ways, having knowledge and using it, and a man may have both premises yet use only the universal one, not the particular. The uncontrolled man is like the sleeper, the madman, or the drunk reciting Empedocles: appetite drives him against the universal opinion, and so Socrates' view turns out in a sense to be true.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ
first indeed then one-must-consider whether knowing or not and
πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν
how knowing then about what-sort the uncontrolled-man and the
ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
self-controlled-man one-must-place I-mean and whether about every pleasure

καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ
and pain or about some determined(-ones) and the self-controlled-man
καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν·
and the enduring-man whether the same or different is
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς
likewise and also about the other(-questions) all-that akin to-the
θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως,
inquiry are this is and the-starting-point of-the inquiry
πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής εἰσι τῷ περὶ
whether the self-controlled-man and the uncontrolled-man are by-the about
ἃ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ
what or by-the how having the difference I-mean and whether by-the
περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὔ ἀλλὰ
about these-things being only uncontrolled the uncontrolled-man or not but
τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὔ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν
by-the how or not but from both then if about all-things is
ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ
lack-of-control and self-control or not neither for about all-things is the
ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος,
absolutely uncontrolled-man but about the-very-things-which the licentious-man
οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν
nor by-the toward these absolutely being-disposed the-same for —
ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν.
would-be with-the licentiousness but by-the in-a-certain-way being-disposed
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν
the-one indeed for is-led choosing thinking always one-must
τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει
the present pleasant to-pursue the-other and not thinks(-so) indeed pursues(-it)
δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην
but about indeed then the opinion true but not knowledge
εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν
to-be against which they-lack-control nothing it-matters to the

λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ'
argument some for of-the opining(-men) not hesitate but
οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν
think exactly to-know if then through the weakly believing
οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν
the opining(-men) more than-the knowing(-men) against the
ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι
supposition will-act nothing will-differ knowledge from-opinion some
γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι
for believe no less what they-opine than others
οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς
what they-know shows and Heraclitus but since in-two-senses
λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ
we-speak-of the to-know both for the(-man) having indeed not
χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται
using but the knowledge and the(-man) using is-said
ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
to-know it-will-differ the having indeed not contemplating and also
τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ
the contemplating what not one-must to-do this for seems
δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν
terrible but not if not contemplating further since two (are)-the-kinds of-the
προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν
premises having indeed both nothing prevents to-act
παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ
contrary-to the knowledge using however the universal but
μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
not the according-to part (are)-things-done for the according-to particulars
διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
it-differs and also the universal the-one indeed for (is)-predicated-of himself
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ
the-other and of the thing is such-as that to-every man

συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ
(are)-beneficial the dry(-foods) and that he-himself (is)-a-man or that dry the
τοιόνδε· ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ·
such-and-such but if this (is)-such-and-such either not he-has or not is-active
κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον
according-to — indeed these will-differ the ways (to-an)-inconceivable
ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως
(degree) so-that to-seem thus indeed to-know nothing strange otherwise
δὲ θαυμαστόν. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον
and (is)-astonishing further the to-have the knowledge in-another way
τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ
than-the(-ways) now stated belongs to-the men in the for
ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν,
to-have indeed not using and differing we-see the state
ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα
so-that both to-have in-a-way and not to-have such-as the sleeping
καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται
and mad and drunk but further thus are-disposed
οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ
those at-least in the passions being outbursts-of-anger for and
ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ
appetites for-sexual-pleasures and some of-the such-things manifestly also
τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον
the body alter for-some and even madnesses they-produce (it-is)-clear
οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις.
then that similarly to-be-disposed one-must-say the uncontrolled to-these
τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν
the and to-say the words the(-ones) from the knowledge (is)-no
σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες
sign also for the(-men) in the passions these being
ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ
demonstrations and verses recite of-Empedocles and the(-men)

πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ'
first having-learned string-together indeed the words know but
οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφυῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε
not-yet must for to-grow-into(-them) this and time needs so-that
καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν
just-as the actors so one-must-suppose to-speak
καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις
also the men-lacking-control further also thus physically — one
ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ
might-look-at the cause the-one indeed for (is)-universal opinion the
δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις
and other about the according-to particulars is which perception
ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ
already controls whenever and one comes-to-be from them necessarily the
συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς
conclusion there indeed (one-must)-assert the soul in and the
ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι
productive(-cases) to-do(-it) at-once such-as if every sweet-thing to-taste
δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον,
one-must this and (is)-sweet as one some(-thing) of-the according-to particulars
ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα
necessarily the(-man) being-able and not being-hindered at-the-same-time
τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ
this also to-do whenever then the indeed universal(-opinion) be-present
κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ
forbidding to-taste the-other and that every sweet-thing (is)-pleasant this
δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα,
and (is)-sweet this and is-active it-happens and appetite being-present
ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει·
the-one indeed then says to-avoid this the and appetite leads(-on)
κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει
to-move for each it-can of-the parts so-that it-happens

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ
by reason in-a-way and opinion (that-one)-lacks-control not contrary and
καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός — ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία
in itself but according-to accident the for appetite
ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα — τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ
(is)-contrary but not the opinion to-the right reason so-that also
διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
through this the beasts (are)-not uncontrolled because not they-have universal
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.
supposition but of-the according-to particulars imagination and memory
πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων
how and is-dissolved the ignorance and again becomes a-knower
ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ
the uncontrolled-man the same account (holds)-as about the-drunk-man and
καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ
sleeping-man and not peculiar of-this the passion which one-must
παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία
from the physiologists to-hear since and the last
πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων,
premise (is)-an-opinion both about-a-perceptible and controlling of-the actions
ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ
this either not he-has in the passion being or so has as not
ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος
it-was the to-have to-know but to-say just-as the drunk-man
τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ'
the(-verses) of-Empedocles and through the not universal nor
ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον
scientific equally to-be to-seem with-the universal the last
ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ
term also seems what sought Socrates to-result not for
τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται
(when)-the strictly knowledge to-be seeming is-present does-arise

τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
the passion nor this is-dragged-about through the passion but (when)-the
αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ
perceptual(-knowledge-is-present) about indeed then the knowing and not and
πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.
how knowing it-is-possible to-lack-control so-much let-it-have-been-said

IV · ITS PROPER SPHERE

Absolute lack of control concerns the same bodily pleasures as licentiousness, though without choice. In matters choiceworthy in themselves, such as honor, gain, and victory, we speak of lack of control only with a qualification, a different thing, as Anthropos the Olympic victor differed from 'man'. Excess even toward good things, as in Niobe or Satyrus the father-lover, is not wickedness.

πότερον δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ
whether and there-is some(-one) absolutely uncontrolled or all(-are-so) in
μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον
part and if there-is about what-sort-of-things it-is one-must-discuss
ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ'
next that indeed then about pleasures and pains are the both
ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί,
self-controlled and enduring and the uncontrolled and soft
φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν
(it-is)-evident since and are the-ones indeed necessary of-the(-things)
ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ
producing pleasure the-others and choiceworthy indeed in themselves
ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά (λέγω
admitting but excess necessary indeed the bodily(-ones) I-mean
δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν
and the such the(-ones) both about the food and the of-the

ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ
sexual need and the such of-the bodily(-things) about
ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ
which the licentiousness we-set and the temperance the-others
δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά (λέγω δ'
and necessary indeed not choiceworthy but in themselves I-mean and
οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ
such-as victory honor wealth and the such of-the good and
ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
pleasant(-things) the(-men) indeed then toward these contrary-to the right
λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ
reason exceeding the(-reason) in themselves absolutely indeed not
λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς
we-call uncontrolled adding but the (in)-money uncontrolled
καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς
and (in)-gain and (in)-honor and (in)-anger absolutely but not as
ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος
different and by similarity spoken-of just-as Anthropos
ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος
the(-one) the Olympic-games winning for-that-one for the common definition
τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν.
from-the particular(-one) a-little differed but nevertheless different it-was
σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς
a-sign and the indeed for lack-of-control is-blamed not as
ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἁπλῶς
an-error only but also as vice some either absolutely
οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδείς. τῶν δὲ
being or in some part of-these and none of-the and
περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν
about the bodily enjoyments about which we-speak-of the
σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν
temperate and licentious-man the(-man) not by-the to-choose of-the

ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς — καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν
pleasant-things pursuing the excesses and of-the painful-things
φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ
avoiding (those)-of-hunger and of-thirst and of-heat and of-cold and
πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν — ἀλλὰ παρὰ
of-all the(-things) about touch and taste but contrary-to
τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ
the choice and the thought uncontrolled is-called not
κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ'
with addition that about these-things just-as of-anger but
ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται
absolutely only a-sign and also for soft they-are-called
περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
about these about those but none and through this
εἰς ταὐτὸ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν
into the-same(-class) the uncontrolled-man and the licentious-man we-put
καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα,
and self-controlled(-man) and temperate but not of-those any
διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι·
through the about the same somehow pleasures and pains to-be
οἳ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν,
they and are indeed about the-same-things but not in-the-same-way they-are
ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἳ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται.
but the-ones indeed choose the-others and not choose
διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ
therefore more licentious — we-would-call (the-man)-who not
ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας
desiring or weakly pursues the excesses and avoids moderate
λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ
pains than this-man who through the to-desire violently what for
ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ
— that-one would-do if were-added appetite youthful and

περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν
about the of-the necessities lack pain strong since and of-the
ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι τῶν τῷ
appetites and of-the pleasures the-ones indeed are of-the(-things) in-the
γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει
genus noble and excellent of-the for pleasant-things some by-nature
αἱρετά), τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ,
(are)-choiceworthy the-others and contrary to-these the-others and intermediate
καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ
just-as we-distinguished before such-as money and gain and
νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ
victory and honor in-relation-to all and also the such and the
μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται,
intermediate not by-the to-experience and to-desire and to-love they-are-blamed
ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν
but by-the in-a-certain-way and exceeding therefore as-many-as indeed
παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει
contrary-to the reason either are-mastered-by or pursue of-the by-nature
τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον
something noble and good such-as the(-men) about honor more
ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ
than one-should being-in-earnest or about children and parents also
γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ
for these (are)-of-the goods and are-praised the(-men) about
ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
these being-in-earnest but nevertheless there-is some excess even
ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
in these if one just-as — Niobe should-fight even against the
θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος
gods or just-as Satyrus the father-loving(-one) so-called
περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν)· μοχθηρία
about the father exceedingly for he-seemed to-be-foolish wickedness

μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι
indeed then none about these is through the stated(-reason) that
φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι᾽ αὑτό, φαῦλαι
by-nature of-the choiceworthy-things each is through itself base
δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.
but and to-be-avoided of-them are the excesses
ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ
likewise and (there-is)-not lack-of-control(-here) the for lack-of-control not
μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι᾽
only (is)-to-be-avoided but also of-the blameworthy-things is through
ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν
similarity but of-the passion adding the lack-of-control
περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν
(as)-about each they-speak such-as a-bad doctor and a-bad
ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν
actor whom absolutely not — they-would-call bad just-as then
οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν
not-even here through the not vice to-be each of-them
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ
but by-the analogous(-way) similar so (it-is)-clear that there-also
ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις
one-must-suppose only (that)-lack-of-control and self-control to-be which
ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
is about the-same-things as-the temperance and licentiousness about but
θυμοῦ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες
anger by similarity we-speak therefore also adding(-the-qualification)
ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.
uncontrolled in-anger just-as in-honor and in-gain we-say

Some things are pleasant not by nature but through maiming, habit, or depraved nature: the woman who ripped open pregnant women, the savages of the Pontus, Phalaris, and morbid habits such as plucking hair or eating earth. Such states lie outside the limits of vice, and mastering or yielding to them is lack of control only by similarity.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν
since and there-are some indeed pleasant by-nature and of-these the-ones indeed
ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
absolutely the-others and according-to kinds both of-animals and of-men
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ
the-others but not are(-so) but the-ones indeed through maimings the-others
δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις,
and through habits come-to-be the-others and through depraved natures
ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις·
it-is-possible also about these each similar to-see states
λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι
I-mean and the brutish such-as the female(-human) whom they-say
τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ
the pregnant(-women) ripping-up the children to-devour or
οἵοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν
(in)-what-sorts to-delight they-say some of-the savage(-tribes) about the
Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν,
Pontus the-ones indeed in-raw(-meat) the-others and of-men in-flesh
τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἢ
the(-ones) and the children to-lend to-one-another for a-feast or
τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ
the about Phalaris told these indeed (are)-brutish the-others
δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ
and through diseases come-to-be and through madness in-some just-as

ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ
the(-man) the mother having-sacrificed and eaten(-her) and the(-one)
τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἧπαρ) αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ
of-the fellow-slave the liver(-eating) the-others and morbid(-states) or from
ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ'
habit such-as of-hairs pluckings and of-nails bitings further and
ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων
of-coals and of-earth in-addition and to-these the of-the sexual(-pleasures)
τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους
for-the males for-the indeed for by-nature for-the(-others) and from habit
συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων.
they-occur such-as to-the(-ones) being-abused from childhood
ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν
for-whom indeed then nature (is)-the-cause these indeed no-one — would-call
ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ'
uncontrolled just-as nor the women because not they-marry but
ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι
are-married likewise and also as-many-as morbidly are-disposed
δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων
through habit the indeed then to-have each of-these outside the limits
ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸν δ' ἔχοντα
is of-the vice just-as also the brutishness the and having(-them)
κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ'
to-master(-them) or to-be-mastered(-is) not the simple lack-of-control but the by
ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα
similarity just-as also the(-man) about the angers having
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα
in-this the way of-the passion uncontrolled but not one-must-call every
γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία
for excessive both folly and cowardice and licentiousness
καὶ χαλεπότης αἳ μὲν θηριώδεις αἳ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
and bad-temper the-ones indeed brutish the-others and morbid

εἰσίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν
are the indeed for by-nature such as to-fear all-things even-if
ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν
squeaks a-mouse (with)-a-brutish cowardice (is)-cowardly the(-man) and the
γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ
weasel feared through disease and of-the foolish the-ones indeed from
φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις,
nature irrational and only by-the perception living (are)-brutish
ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ
just-as some races of-the distant barbarians the-others and through
νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις.
diseases such-as the epileptic or madnesses (are)-morbid
τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον,
of-these and it-is-possible indeed to-have some(-one) sometimes indeed only
μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν
not to-be-mastered and I-mean and such-as if Phalaris restrained(-himself)
ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον
desiring a-child to-eat or toward of-sexual-pleasures an-unnatural
ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν· ὥσπερ
pleasure it-is-possible and also to-be-mastered not only to-have just-as
οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς
then also of-wickedness the-one indeed according-to man absolutely
λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης
is-called wickedness the-other and by addition that (it-is)-brutish
ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον
or morbid absolutely and not in-the same way (it-is)-clear
ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ
that also lack-of-control is the-one indeed brutish the-other and
νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
morbid absolutely but the(-one) according-to the human
ἀκολασίαν μόνη.
licentiousness alone

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ
that indeed then lack-of-control and self-control are only about
ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ
the-very-things-which licentiousness and temperance and that about
τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ
the other-things is another kind of-lack-of-control spoken-of by
μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον.
metaphor and not absolutely (it-is)-clear

VI · ANGER LESS DISGRACEFUL

Lack of control in anger is less disgraceful than in appetite. Anger half hears reason, like hasty servants or barking dogs; appetite does not. Anger is more natural, like the son who beat his father because his father had beaten his own, and open, while appetite schemes like guile-weaving Aphrodite. Brutishness is less evil than vice but more fearful.

ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ
that and also less disgraceful (is)-lack-of-control the (in)-the anger
ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
than the (in)-the appetites let-us-consider seems for the anger
ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ
to-hear indeed something of-the reason to-mishear(-it) but just-as the
ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον
hasty of-the servants who before hearing all the thing-said
ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ
run-off then mistake the order and the
κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ,
dogs before considering whether (he-is)-a-friend if only there-be-a-noise
ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα
bark so the anger through heat and quickness

τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ
of-the nature having-heard indeed not an-order but having-heard rushes
πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι
to the revenge the indeed for reason or the imagination that
ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος
an-insult or a-slight showed it and just-as having-reasoned
ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς·
that one-must with-the such-a-man to-fight is-angered indeed at-once
ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ
the but appetite if only says that (it-is)-pleasant the reason or
ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς
the perception rushes to the enjoyment so-that the indeed anger
ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων
follows the reason in-a-way the but appetite not (it-is)-more-disgraceful
οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως
then the-one indeed for in-the anger uncontrolled by-the reason in-a-way
ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
is-defeated the-other and by-the appetite and not by-the reason
ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν,
further for-the natural (there-is)-more pardon to-follow desires
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ
since also for-appetites the such more as-many-as (are)-common
πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον
to-all and to the-extent (they-are)-common the and anger (is)-more-natural
καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς
and the harshness than-the appetites the(-ones) of-the excess
καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι
and of-the not necessary(-things) just-as the(-man) defending-himself because
τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ
the father he-beat and for this(-man) he-said the(-father) his-own
κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ
and-that(-one) the(-one) before and the child pointing-to and

οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη, "ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ
this(-man) me he-said when a-man he-becomes (it-is)-congenital for
ἡμῖν·" καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε
in-us and the(-man) being-dragged by the son to-stop bade
πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα
at the doors also for himself (had)-dragged the father
μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ
up-to there further more-unjust (are)-the more-scheming the
μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ
indeed then hot-tempered-man (is)-not scheming nor the anger but
φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν·
open the but appetite just-as — Aphrodite they-say(-of-her)

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·
of-the-guile-weaving for Cyprus-born

καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·
and the embroidered girdle Homer

πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.
beguilement which — stole the-wits shrewdly though of-one-thinking

ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη
so-that if-indeed more-unjust and more-disgraceful the lack-of-control this
τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία
than-the about the anger is also absolutely lack-of-control and vice
πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ
in-a-way further no-one insults being-pained the(-man) but in-anger
ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ'
acting every(-man) acts being-pained the but insulting (acts)-with
ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον,
pleasure if then (the-acts)-at-which to-be-angry most just

ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ
these (are)-more-unjust also the lack-of-control the through appetite not
γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ
for there-is in anger insult that indeed therefore more-disgraceful (is)-the
περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι
about appetites lack-of-control than-the about the anger and that
ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς
is self-control and the lack-of-control about appetites and pleasures
σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς
bodily (it-is)-clear of-themselves and these the differences
ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν
one-must-grasp just-as for has-been-said at the-beginning the-ones indeed
ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
human are and natural both in-the kind and in-the
μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ
magnitude the-others and brutish the-others and through maimings and
νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ
diseases of-these and about the first temperance and
ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα
licentiousness only are therefore also the beasts neither temperate
οὔτ᾽ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ
nor licentious do-we-call but than by metaphor and if
τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν
in-some(-respect) wholly one compared-to another differs kind of-the
ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ
animals in-wantonness and in-mischief and by-the omnivorous being not
γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξέστηκε τῆς
for has(-it) choice nor calculation but it-has-departed-from the
φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ
nature just-as the madmen of-the men less and
θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ
(is)-brutishness than-vice more-fearful but not for is-corrupted the

βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον
better(-part) just-as in the man but not it-has similar(-it-is)
οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον
then just-as an-inanimate-thing to-compare with an-animate whether
κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ
(it-is)-worse more-harmless for (is)-the baseness always the of-the(-one)
μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον
not having a-principle the and intellect (is)-a-principle similar
οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι
then (is)-the to-compare injustice with a-man unjust it-is
γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ
for as each (is)-worse ten-thousand-times for — evil-things
ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
would-do a-man bad than-a-beast

VII · SOFTNESS AND ENDURANCE

With pleasures a man is uncontrolled or self-controlled; with pains he is soft or enduring. The licentious man, who chooses excess, is worse than the uncontrolled one. Self-control masters and endurance only resists, so self-control is the more choiceworthy. Philoctetes and Cercyon are pardoned; Xenophantus burst out laughing. Lack of control may be impetuosity or weakness.

περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
about and the through touch and taste pleasures and pains
καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ
and appetites and avoidances about which the both licentiousness and the
σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν
temperance were-defined before it-is-possible indeed so to-be-disposed
ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι
as to-be-defeated even-by(-those) which the many master it-is-possible

δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δ'
and to-master even(-those) by-which the many (are)-defeated of-these and
ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ
the-one indeed about pleasures (is)-uncontrolled the-other and self-controlled the-one
δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ'
and about pains soft the-other and enduring between and
ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς
(is)-the of-the most state even if they-lean more towards the
χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ'
worse since and some of-the pleasures necessary are others and
οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις,
not and up-to a-point the but excesses not nor the deficiencies
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς
likewise and also about appetites it-is and pains the-man indeed the
ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων †ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς† ἢ διὰ
excesses pursuing of-the pleasant-things or to excess or through
προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον,
choice for themselves and nothing for another(-thing) resulting
ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
(is)-licentious necessarily for this-man not to-be apt-to-repent
ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.
so-that (be-is)-incurable the for unrepentant (is)-incurable
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος
the and deficient(-man) (is)-the opposite the and intermediate(-man)
σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς
temperate likewise and also the(-man) avoiding the bodily
λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ
pains not through defeat but through choice of-the but not
προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ
choosing(-men) the-one indeed is-led through the pleasure the-other and
διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε
through the to-avoid the pain the(-pain) from the appetite so-that

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι,
they-differ from-one-another to-everyone but — would-seem worse to-be
εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ
if one not desiring or weakly should-do something disgraceful than if
σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ
violently desiring and if not being-angry he-should-strike than if
ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ
being-angry what for — would-be-have-done in passion being therefore the
ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων
licentious-man (is)-worse than-the uncontrolled-man of-the indeed things-mentioned
τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος.
the-one indeed of-softness (is)-a-kind more the-other and licentious(-is)
ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ
is-opposed and to-the indeed uncontrolled-man the self-controlled-man to-the and
μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ
soft-man the enduring-man the indeed for to-endure is in the
ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ
to-resist the and self-control in the to-master different and (is)-the
ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ
to-resist and to-master just-as also the not to-be-defeated from-the
νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν.
to-win therefore also more-choiceworthy self-control than-endurance is
ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ
the and deficient(-man) in-respect-of what the many both resist and
δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ
can this(-man) (is)-soft and effeminate even for the effeminacy
μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ
softness a-kind is who trails the cloak so-that not he-may-suffer
τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα
the(-pain) from the to-lift pain and imitating the sick-man
οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως
not thinks(-himself) wretched to-be to-a-wretch similar being likewise

δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις
and it-is also about self-control and lack-of-control not for if one
ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν,
by-strong and excessive pleasures is-defeated or pains
θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ
(it-is)-astonishing but pardonable if (he-is)-resisting just-as
ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ
the of-Theodectes Philoctetes by the snake bitten or
ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ
the of-Carcinus in the Alope Cercyon and just-as the(-men)
κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν,
to-restrain trying the laughter in-a-burst guffaw
οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ· ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ
such-as happened to-Xenophantus but if one with-respect-to what the
πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται
many can resist by-these is-defeated and not is-able
ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον,
to-resist not through nature of-the race or through disease
οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ
such-as among the of-the-Scythians kings the softness through the
γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν.
race and as the female from the male is-distinguished
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ
seems and also the lover-of-amusement licentious to-be he-is but
μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν
soft the for amusement a-relaxation is if-indeed (it-is)-a-rest of-the
δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.
and with-respect-to this excessive(-men) the lover-of-amusement is
ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ᾽ ἀσθένεια. οἳ
of-lack-of-control and the-one indeed (is)-impetuosity the-other and weakness the-ones
μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο
indeed for having-deliberated not abide-by what they-deliberated

διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται
through the passion the-others and through the not to-deliberate are-led
ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ
by the passion some for just-as having-tickled-first not
γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες
are-tickled so also having-perceived-beforehand and having-foreseen
καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ
and having-roused-beforehand themselves and the calculation not
ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ' ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν
are-defeated by the passion neither if pleasant it-be nor if
λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν
painful most and the quick and melancholic(-men) in-the
προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν
impetuous lack-of-control are uncontrolled the-ones indeed for through the
ταχυτῆτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι
quickness the-others and through the vehemence not await
τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.
the reason through the apt-to-follow being the imagination

VIII · THE LICENTIOUS MAN CANNOT REPENT

The licentious man abides by his choice and does not repent, so he is incurable, like one with dropsy, while the uncontrolled man is like an epileptic, with intermittent fits. The uncontrolled man is not unjust but does unjust things, as Demodocus said of the Milesians. Virtue preserves the first principle and vice destroys it.

ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός·
is and the indeed licentious-man just-as was-said not apt-to-repent
ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς
he-abides for by-the choice the but uncontrolled-man (is)-apt-to-repent
πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
every(-one) therefore not just-as we-raised-the-difficulty so also it-is

ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ᾽ ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ
but the-one indeed (is)-incurable the-other and curable resembles for the
μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει,
indeed wickedness (one)-of-the diseases such-as dropsy and consumption
ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς
the and lack-of-control the epileptic(-fits) the-one indeed for (is)-continuous
ἡ δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ᾽ ἕτερον
the-other and not continuous badness and generally and different
τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία
(is)-the kind of-lack-of-control and of-vice the indeed for vice
λανθάνει, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. αὐτῶν δὲ
escapes-notice(-of-its-owner) the but lack-of-control not escapes-notice of-themselves and
τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
these better (are)-the carried-away(-ones) than the(-ones) the reason
ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ᾽ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους
having indeed not abiding(-by-it) but by a-lesser for passion
ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος
they-are-defeated and not without-deliberation just-as the-others like
γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ᾽
for the uncontrolled-man is to-those quickly getting-drunk and by
ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν
little wine and less than as the many that indeed
οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ
then a-vice the lack-of-control not is (it-is)-evident but in-a-way
ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ
perhaps the indeed for (is)-contrary-to choice the but according-to

τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ
the choice is not indeed but similar at-least in
τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους
the actions just-as the(-saying) of-Demodocus against (the)-Milesians

Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
Milesians stupid indeed
οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι,
not they-are they-do but what-very-things the-stupid(-do)

καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ.
and the uncontrolled unjust indeed not are they-will-act-unjustly but
ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι
since and the-one indeed (is)-such as not through the to-be-convinced
διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
to-pursue the to excess and contrary-to the right
λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ
reason bodily pleasures the-other and is-convinced through the
τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν
such to-be as to-pursue them that-one indeed then
εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία
(is)-easily-persuaded-otherwise this-one but not the for virtue and wickedness
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ
the first-principle the-one indeed destroys the-other and preserves in and
ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν
the actions the of-which for-the-sake (is)-the-first-principle just-as in
τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος
the mathematics the hypotheses neither indeed there (is)-the reason
διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ
instructive of-the first-principles nor here but virtue either
φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.
natural or habituated of-the to-hold-right-opinion about the first-principle

σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος.
temperate indeed then (is)-the such(-man) licentious and the contrary
ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
there-is and some(-one) through passion carried-away contrary-to the right
λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
reason who so-that indeed not to-act according-to the right
λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον
reason masters(-him) the passion so-that and to-be such as
πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
to-be-convinced to-pursue without-restraint one-must the such pleasures
οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ὢν τοῦ
not it-masters this-one is the uncontrolled-man better being than-the
ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον,
licentious-man nor base absolutely is-preserved for the best(-thing)
ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ
the first-principle another and (is)-the-contrary the(-man) apt-to-abide and
οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ
not carried-away through at-least the passion (it-is)-evident indeed from
τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.
these that the-one indeed (is)-an-excellent state the-other and base

Does self-control abide by any opinion, or only by the right one? The obstinate, who abide by their own opinions, resemble the uncontrolled man more than the self-controlled one, for they are led by the pleasure of winning. Neoptolemus abandoned his plan for a noble pleasure. Self-control and temperance are called alike by similarity.

πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
whether then self-controlled is the(-man) any-whatever reason and
ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς
any-whatever choice abiding-by or the(-man) the right and uncontrolled
δὲ ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν
and the(-man) any-whatever not abiding-by choice and any-whatever
λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει
reason or the(-man) the not false reason and the choice
τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν
the right just-as was-raised-as-a-difficulty before or according-to indeed
συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ
accident any-whatever in itself but the true reason and the
ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει;
right choice the-one indeed abides-by the-other and not abides-by
εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ
if for one this for-the-sake-of that chooses or pursues in itself
μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ
indeed that he-pursues and chooses according-to accident but the
πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτό. ὥστε ἔστι
former absolutely and we-say the in itself so-that it-is(-possible)
μὲν ὡς ὁποιᾳοῦν δόξῃ ὃ μὲν ἐμμένει ὃ δ'
indeed in-a-way any-whatever opinion the-one indeed abides-by the-other and
ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ
abandons absolutely but the true(-one) there-are and some who

ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἱ
apt-to-abide-by the opinion are whom they-call strong-headed the
δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἷ ὅμοιον μέν τι
hard-to-persuade and not easily-persuaded-otherwise who similar indeed something
ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ
have to-the self-controlled-man just-as the prodigal to-the liberal-man
καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά.
and the rash-man to-the confident-man are and different in many(-respects)
ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει,
the-one indeed for through passion and appetite not changes
ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἱ
since easily-persuaded when it-happens will-be the self-controlled-man the-others
δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ
and not by reason since appetites at-least they-acquire and
ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες
are-led many(-of-them) by the pleasures are and strong-headed
οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν
the opinionated and the ignorant and the boorish the indeed
ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες
opinionated through pleasure and pain they-rejoice for winning
ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ
if not they-are-persuaded-otherwise and they-are-pained if void the
αὐτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ
their-own be just-as decrees so-that more the uncontrolled-man
ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν
they-resemble than the self-controlled-man there-are and some who the opinions
οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ
not abide-by not through lack-of-control such-as in the Philoctetes
τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ
the of-Sophocles — Neoptolemus although through pleasure not
ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν
he-abided(-by-it) but a-noble(-one) the for to-tell-the-truth to-him noble

ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ
was he-had-been-persuaded but by — Odysseus to-lie not for
πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος
every the(-man) through pleasure something doing (is)-either licentious
οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.
or base or uncontrolled but the(-man) through a-disgraceful(-one)
ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ
since and there-is some(-one) also such as less than one-should
τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ
in-the bodily(-things) to-delight and not abiding-by the reason the(-man)
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ
between-this and the uncontrolled-man (is)-intermediate the self-controlled-man the
μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν
indeed for uncontrolled-man not abides-by the reason through the more
τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς
something this-one and through the less something the and self-controlled-man
ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ
abides-by(-it) and not through either changes one-must and if-indeed
ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις
the self-control (is)-excellent both the contrary states
φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν
base to-be just-as also they-appear but through the the
ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ
one in few and seldom being apparent just-as the
σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω
temperance to-the licentiousness seems contrary to-be only so
καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα
also the self-control to-the lack-of-control since and by similarity
πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ'
many-things are-said also the self-control the of-the temperate-man by
ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν
similarity has-followed the both for self-controlled-man (is)-such-as nothing

παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ
contrary-to the reason through the bodily pleasures to-do and the
σώφρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας
temperate-man but the-one indeed having the-other and not having base
ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ
appetites and the-one indeed (is)-such as not to-take-pleasure contrary-to
τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ᾽ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
the reason the-other and such-as to-take-pleasure but not to-be-led
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν
alike and (are)-both the uncontrolled-man and licentious-man different indeed
ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ᾽
being both but the bodily pleasant-things pursue but
ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δ᾽ οὐκ οἰόμενος.
the-one indeed also thinking (that)-one-must the-other and not thinking(-so)

X · PRACTICAL WISDOM AND LACK OF CONTROL

The same man cannot be practically wise and uncontrolled, though a clever man can be uncontrolled. The uncontrolled man is like a city that passes the right decrees and has good laws but uses none, as Anaxandrides jested. Lack of control from habit is more curable than from nature, for, as Evenus says, long practice becomes a man's nature in the end.

οὐδ᾽ ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
nor at-the-same-time practically-wise and uncontrolled can be
τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος
the same(-man) at-the-same-time for practically-wise and excellent
τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι
in-the character it-has-been-shown (that-one)-is further not by-the to-know
μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ᾽
only (one-is)-practically-wise but also by-the being-apt-to-act the and

ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός — τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν
uncontrolled-man (is)-not apt-to-act the but clever-man nothing
κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι
prevents uncontrolled to-be therefore also seem sometimes practically-wise
μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα
indeed to-be some(-men) uncontrolled but through the the cleverness
διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
to-differ from-the practical-wisdom in-the stated way in the
πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι,
first discussions and according-to indeed the reason near to-be
διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν — οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς
to-differ but according-to the choice nor indeed (is-he)-as
ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ
the(-man) knowing and contemplating but as the(-man) sleeping or
οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ
drunk and willingly indeed in-a-way for some knowing both
ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ
what he-does and of-what for-the-sake wicked but not(-he-is) the for
προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ
choice (is)-decent so-that (he-is)-half-wicked and not unjust not
γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς
for (he-is)-a-plotter the-one indeed for of-them (is)-not apt-to-abide-by what
ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὃ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς
— he-deliberates the-other and melancholic not-even deliberative
ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται
at-all and resembles indeed the uncontrolled-man a-city which votes

μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους,
indeed all the needful(-decrees) and laws has excellent
χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν
uses but none just-as Anaxandrides jested

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·
the city willed to-which of-laws nothing cares

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς
the and wicked-man (resembles-one)-using indeed the laws wicked
δὲ χρωμένῃ. ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ
but using(-them) is and lack-of-control and self-control about the
ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει
exceeding of-the of-the many state the-one indeed for abides-by
μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως.
more the-other and less than-the of-the most capacity
εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ
more-curable and of-the lack-of-controls (is-that)-which the melancholic
ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων
lack-control than-of-the(-men) deliberating indeed not abiding-by
δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον
but and the(-men) through habituation uncontrolled than-the natural(-ones) easier
γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος
for (is)-habit to-change than-nature through for this also the habit
χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει
(is)-hard because to-the nature it-resembles just-as also Evenus says

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή
I-say long-continued practice to-be friend and indeed
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.
this for-men in-the-end nature to-be

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί
what indeed then is self-control and what lack-of-control and what
καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις
endurance and what softness and how are-related the states
αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.
these to one-another has-been-said

XI · IS PLEASURE A GOOD?

Pleasure and pain must be studied by the political philosopher, since virtue is about them and happiness is thought pleasant. Some hold that no pleasure is good, some that a few are good and most bad, some that even if all are good the best cannot be pleasure. Aristotle lists their arguments: pleasure is a becoming, the temperate man avoids it, and it hinders thought.

περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν
about and pleasure and pain to-study (is)-of-the(-man) the
πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους
political(-science) philosophizing(-about) this-one for of-the end
ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν
(is)-the-architect toward which looking each(-thing) the-one indeed bad
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν
the-other and good absolutely we-call further and also (it-is)-of-the
ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ
necessary(-things) to-examine about them the both for virtue and
τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν
the vice the moral about pains and pleasures we-set and the
εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν
happiness the most with pleasure to-be say therefore also the
μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ
blessed-man they-have-named from the to-rejoice to-some indeed then it-seems

οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ
no pleasure to-be a-good neither in itself nor according-to
συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς
accident not for to-be the-same the good and pleasure to-others
δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων
and some indeed to-be(-good) the but many (are)-base further and of-these
τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι
(is)-a-third(-view) if even all (are)-a-good nevertheless not to-be-possible to-be
τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα
the best pleasure generally indeed then (it-is)-not a-good because every
ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις
pleasure a-coming-to-be is into nature perceptible no and coming-to-be
συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ.
(is)-akin to-the ends such-as no building to-a-house
ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ
further the temperate-man avoids the pleasures further the practically-wise-man the
ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ
painless pursues not the pleasant further an-obstacle to-the to-think (are)-the
ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τῇ
pleasures and the-more more he-delights more such-as the(-pleasure)
τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι
of-the sexual(-things) no-one for — could think anything
ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν
in it further art (there-is)-none of-pleasure although every good
τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς.
of-art (is)-the-work further children and beasts pursue the pleasures
τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ
of-the(-argument) and not all excellent (is)-that they-are both disgraceful
καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ὅτι βλαβεραί· νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια
and reproached and that (they-are)-harmful unhealthy for (are)-some

τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐ τἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος
of-the pleasant-things that and not (is)-the-best pleasure that (it-is)-not an-end
ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
but a-coming-to-be the indeed then things-said roughly these are

XII · REPLIES

Such arguments do not show that pleasure is not good. What restores us to our natural state is pleasant only by accident, and pleasure is not a perceptible becoming but the unimpeded activity of a natural state. Pleasures that are unhealthy are bad in that respect only, and the temperate man avoids only pleasures with appetite and pain.

ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ
that and not it-follows through these not to-be a-good nor the
ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ
best from these-(considerations) (it-is)-clear first indeed since the
ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί),
good (is)-twofold the-one indeed for absolutely the-other and for-someone
καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ
also the natures and the states will-follow so-that also the
κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι
movements and the comings-to-be and the base seeming to-be
αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὔ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ
the-ones indeed absolutely base for-someone but not but choiceworthy
τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον
for-this(-man) some and not-even for-this(-man) but at-times and a-little
χρόνον αἱρεταί, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί,
time choiceworthy absolutely but not the-others and not-even pleasures
ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν,
but appear(-so) all-that (are)-with pain and of-cure for-the-sake

οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ
such-as the(-ones) of-the sick further since of-the good the-one
μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ
indeed (is)-activity the-other and a-state according-to accident the(-processes)
καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν· ἔστι δ'
restoring to the natural state pleasant are is and
ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ
the activity in the appetites of-the remaining state and
φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί,
nature since also without pain and appetite there-are pleasures
οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης.
such-as the(-ones) of-the to-contemplate the nature not deficient being
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης
a-sign and that not in-the same pleasant they-delight being-replenished
τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν
both the nature and settled but (when-it-is)-settled indeed
τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις·
in-the absolutely pleasant-things being-replenished but even in-the contrary(-things)
καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε
and for in-sharp and in-bitter they-delight of-which none (is)-either
φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ
by-nature pleasant or absolutely pleasant so-that nor (are-they)-pleasures as for
τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ
the pleasant-things from one-another differ so also the pleasures
αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι
the(-ones) from these further (it-is)-not necessary other something to-be
βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς
better than-the pleasure just-as some say the end than-the
γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι,
coming-to-be not for comings-to-be they-are nor with coming-to-be all
ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν
but activities and an-end nor (when-we-are)-becoming do-they-occur

ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν
but (when-we-are)-using(-a-capacity) and the-end not of-all (is)-other
τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς
something but of-the(-ones) to the perfecting being-led of-the
φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι
nature therefore also not well it-is the a-perceptible coming-to-be to-say
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς
to-be the pleasure but rather one-must-call(-it) activity of-the
κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον.
according-to nature state instead-of and the perceptible unimpeded
δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν
it-seems and a-coming-to-be to-some to-be because strictly (it-is)-good the
γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.
for activity a-coming-to-be they-think to-be it-is but different
τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ
the and to-be base because unhealthy some pleasant-things the same
καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτῃ
(is-to-say)-also that healthy some (are)-base for money-making in-this-way
οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ
then base (are)-both but not base in-respect-of at-least this since
καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει δὲ
also the to-contemplate at-times harms for health impedes and
οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή,
neither practical-wisdom nor state any the from each pleasure
ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν
but the alien(-pleasures) since the(-pleasures) from the to-contemplate
καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.
and to-learn more will-make(-one) contemplate and learn
τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως
the and of-art not to-be the-work pleasure any reasonably
συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη
has-come-about nor for of-other activity any art

ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη
is but of-the capacity although also the perfumer's art
καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα
and the cook's seems of-pleasure to-be the and the temperate-man
φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ
to-avoid and the practically-wise-man to-pursue the painless life and
τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται
the the children and the beasts to-pursue by-the same(-argument) is-solved
πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς
all since for it-has-been-said how good absolutely and how
οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ
not good all the pleasures the such both the beasts and
τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος,
the children pursue and the from-these painlessness the practically-wise-man
τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωματικάς
the(-pleasures) with appetite and pain and the bodily(-ones)
(τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
such for (are)-these and the of-these excesses in-respect-of
ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει
which the licentious-man (is)-licentious therefore the temperate-man avoids
ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.
these since there-are pleasures also of-the-temperate-man

Pain is admitted to be evil, so its contrary, pleasure, is a good; Speusippus' answer fails. Some pleasure may even be the chief good if happiness is unimpeded activity, which is why the happy man needs bodily and external goods, and the man broken on the wheel is not happy. That all creatures pursue pleasure is a sign that it is in a way the chief good, and perhaps all pursue the same pleasure, since all things have something divine by nature.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ
but further that also the pain (is)-an-evil is-agreed and
φευκτόν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἢ δὲ τῷ
to-be-avoided the-one indeed for (is)-absolutely evil the-other and by-the
πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ
in-some-way (being)-impeding to-the and to-be-avoided the contrary in-so-far-as
φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν
to-be-avoided something and evil (is)-good necessarily then the
ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν,
pleasure a-good something to-be as for Speusippus solved(-it)
οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ
not it-works the solution just-as the greater to-the less and
τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν
to-the equal (is)-contrary not for — he-would-say that-precisely evil
τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν
something to-be the pleasure the-best and nothing prevents pleasure
τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην
some to-be if some (are)-base pleasures just-as also science
τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ
some some base being perhaps and even necessary if-indeed
ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ
of-each state there-are activities unimpeded whether the
πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ
of-all activity is happiness or the of-some of-them — it-be

ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή.
unimpeded (it)-most-choiceworthy to-be this and is pleasure
ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν
so-that would-be — some pleasure the best of-the many pleasures
φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες
base being if it-happens absolutely and through this all
τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν
the happy pleasant think life to-be and weave-in the
ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια
pleasure into the happiness reasonably no for activity
τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων·
(is)-complete being-impeded the and happiness (is)-of-the complete(-things)
διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ
therefore needs-in-addition the happy-man the in body goods and
τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα.
the external and the fortune so-that not he-be-impeded in-these
οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις
the(-men) and the(-man) being-broken-on-the-wheel and the(-man) into-misfortunes
μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ
great falling happy asserting to-be if he-be
ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ
good either willingly or unwillingly nothing say through and the
προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία
to-need-in-addition the fortune it-seems to-some the-same to-be the good-fortune
τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα
with-the happiness not being(-so) since even it excessive
ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον·
an-impediment is and perhaps no-longer good-fortune to-call(-it) (is)-just
πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ
in-relation-to for the happiness (is)-the limit of-it and the

διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν
to-pursue and all both beasts and men the pleasure
σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·
(is)-a-sign some of-the to-be in-a-way the best it

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί
rumor but none wholly perishes which some peoples
πολλοί…
many

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη
but since not the same either nature or state the best
οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν
neither is nor seems nor pleasure do-they-pursue the same
πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ
all pleasure however all perhaps and also they-pursue not
ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν·
(the-one)-which they-think nor which — they-would-say but the same
πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν
all for by-nature has something divine but have-taken the
τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ
of-the name inheritance the bodily pleasures through the
πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν
most-often both to-resort to them and all to-partake
αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας
of-them through the alone then familiar to-be these alone
οἴονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ
they-think to-be(-pleasures) (it-is)-evident and also that if not pleasure
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως
(is)-a-good and the activity not it-will-be(-possible) to-live pleasantly
τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς,
(for)-the happy-man of-what for for-the-sake would-he-need — of-it

εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε
if-indeed not (it-is)-good but even painfully it-is-possible to-live neither
κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή·
evil for nor good (is)-the pain if-indeed not-even pleasure
ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ
so-that through what — would-he-avoid(-it) nor indeed (is)-more-pleasant the
βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.
life the of-the excellent-man if not also the activities of-him

XIV · BODILY PLEASURES

Why do bodily pleasures seem most choiceworthy? Because they drive out pain and are intense, and so are pursued as cures, especially by the young and the melancholic. A nature that is not simple finds no one thing always pleasant, while god enjoys one simple pleasure; change is sweet, as the poet says, through some badness. Friendship is next.

περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
about and indeed the bodily pleasures one-must-examine
τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ
(in-reply)-to-the(-men) saying that some at-least pleasures (are)-choiceworthy
σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ
exceedingly such-as the noble(-ones) but not the bodily(-ones) and(-those)
περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι
about which the licentious-man(-is-licentious) through what then (are)-the contrary
λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως
pains bad to-evil for good (is)-contrary or (are-they)-thus
ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ
good the necessary(-ones) because also the not bad good is or
μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων
up-to a-point good of-the indeed for states and movements of-which

μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
not there-is of-the better(-sort) excess neither of-the pleasure of-which
δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
but there-is also of-the pleasure there-is and of-the bodily goods
ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν,
excess and the base-man by-the to-pursue the excess is(-base)
ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως
but not the necessary(-pleasures) all for enjoy in-some-way
καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ.
both dainties and wines and sexual(-things) but not as one-should
ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
contrariwise and in-the-case-of the pain not for the excess
φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη
he-avoids but (pain)-altogether not for is to-the excess pain
ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
contrary but than to-the(-man) pursuing the excess
ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
since and not only one-must the-truth to-state but also the cause
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
of-the falsehood this for contributes to the conviction
ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται
whenever for reasonable appears the(-reason) through what appears
ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ
true not being true to-believe it-makes(-us) the truth
μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ
more so-that one-must-say through what appear the bodily
ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει
pleasures more-choiceworthy first indeed then indeed because it-drives-out
τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης
the pain and through the excesses of-the pain as being
ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ
a-cure the pleasure they-pursue the excessive(-one) and

ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι,
generally the bodily(-one) violent and become the cures
διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.
therefore also they-are-pursued through the beside the contrary to-appear(-so)
καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
and not excellent indeed seems the pleasure through two these(-reasons)
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις
just-as has-been-said because the-ones indeed of-a-base nature are actions
(ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ
either from birth just-as of-a-beast or through habit such-as the(-ones)
τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς,
of-the base men the-others and (are)-cures of-(a-nature)-deficient
καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι· αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι
and to-be-in-a-state (is)-better than to-become(-so) the-others and occur
τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι.
(when-natures)-are-being-completed according-to accident then (they-are)-excellent
ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν
further they-are-pursued through the violent being by the(-men)
ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς
in-other(-pleasures) not able to-delight themselves at-any-rate for-themselves
δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς,
thirsts some prepare whenever indeed then (they-are)-harmless
ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν
(it-is)-blameless whenever but harmful base neither for have-they
ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς
other-things in which they-delight the and neutral (is)-to-many
λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ
painful through the nature always for labors the animal just-as also
οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες
the physiologists testify the to-see the to-hear asserting
εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν. ὁμοίως
to-be painful but already accustomed we-are as they-say likewise

δ᾽ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι
and in indeed the youth through the growth just-as the drunken
διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν
are-disposed and pleasant (is)-the youth the and melancholic the
φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον
nature need always cure also for the body being-stung
διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν·
continues through the temperament and always in desire violent they-are
ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ᾽ ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα,
drives-out and pleasure pain the both contrary and the chance(-one)
ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι
if it-be strong and through these licentious and base
γίνονται. αἱ δ᾽ ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται
they-become the but without pains not have excess these
δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
and (are)-of-the by-nature pleasant-things and not according-to accident
λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα·
I-mean and according-to accident pleasant the(-things) curing
ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς
because for it-happens (that-one)-is-cured of-the remaining healthy(-part)
πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει
doing something through this pleasant it-seems to-be by-nature
δ᾽ ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. οὐκ
and pleasant(-are) what produce action of-the such nature not
ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν
always and nothing (is)-pleasant the same through the not simple our
εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ
to-be the nature but to-be-in(-us) something also different in-so-far-as
φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο
(we-are)-perishable so-that if something the-one does this
τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ᾽ ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε
to-the other nature (is)-contrary-to nature when and it-balances neither

λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του
painful seems nor pleasant the thing-done since if of-someone
ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται.
the nature simple were always the same action most-pleasant will-be
διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ
therefore the god always one and simple enjoys pleasure not for
μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ
only of-movement is (there)-activity but also of-immobility and
ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ
pleasure more in rest is than in movement change and
πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά·
of-all-things (is)-sweet according-to the poet through badness some
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ
just-as for man (is)-changeable the bad(-man) also the
φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.
nature the needing change (is)-not for simple nor decent
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς
about indeed then self-control and lack-of-control and about pleasure
καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ
and pain it-has-been-spoken both what each and how the-ones
μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ
indeed good of-them are the-others and bad remaining and also
περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.
about friendship we-shall-speak

BOOK VIII

I · WHY FRIENDSHIP MATTERS

Friendship is a virtue or involves virtue, and is most necessary for life: no one would choose to live without friends, though he had every other good. It holds cities together, and lawgivers care for it more than for justice. Men dispute whether like loves like, as jackdaw goes to jackdaw, or opposites attract, as Euripides and Heraclitus held.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ
after and these-things about friendship would-follow — to-discuss it-is for
ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν
a-virtue some(-kind) or with virtue further and most-necessary for the
βίον, ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ
life without for friends no-one would-choose — to-live having the other
ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας
goods all and for to-the-rich and offices and powers
κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ
possessing seems of-friends most to-be need what for
ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας,
(is-the)-benefit of-the such prosperity taken-away beneficence
ἢ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς
which comes-about most and most-praiseworthy toward friends or how
ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων,
— could-it-be-guarded and preserved without friends the-more for greater(-it-is)
τοσούτῳ ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς
the-more precarious in poverty both and the other
δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ
misfortunes the-only they-think refuge to-be the friends and
νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς
for-the-young and toward the not-erring and for-the-older toward
θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν
care and the lacking of-the action through weakness

βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν
help to-those and in prime toward the noble actions with
τε δύ' ἐρχομένω·" καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.
— two going and for to-think and to-act (they-are)-more-able
φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ
by-nature both to-be-present it-seems toward the begotten in-the
γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον
begetter and toward the begetter in-the begotten not only
ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις
among men but also among birds and the most
τῶν ζώων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα
of-the animals and to-those of-the-same-race toward one-another and most
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν.
to-the men whence the philanthropic we-praise
ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας
might-see and — one also in the wanderings how akin every
ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις
man to-man and friendly it-seems and also the cities
συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
to-hold-together the friendship and the lawgivers more about it
σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιόν
to-be-in-earnest than the justice the for concord similar
τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται
something to-the friendship seems to-be this and most they-aim-at
καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ
and the faction enmity being most they-drive-out and
φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ'
friends indeed being(-so) not-at-all there-is-need of-justice just but
ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα
being they-need-besides friendship and of-the just(-things) the most
φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ
friendly to-be seems not only and necessary it-is but

καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε
also noble the for lovers-of-friends we-praise the both
πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἔν τι εἶναι· καὶ ἔτι
having-many-friends seems of-the noble-things one something to-be and further
τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
the same(-men) they-think men good to-be and friends
διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν
is-disputed and about it not few-things the-ones indeed
γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους
for likeness some set it and the like
φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ
friends whence the like they-say (goes)-to the like and
κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ
jackdaw to jackdaw and the such(-sayings) the-others and from
ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις
the-opposite(-side) potters all the such to-one-another
φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι
say to-be and about themselves these more-deeply they-inquire
καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν μὲν
and more-physically Euripides indeed saying to-love indeed
ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν
of-rain (the)-earth dried-up to-love and (the)-majestic sky
πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ
being-filled with-rain to-fall to earth and Heraclitus the
ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην
opposing (as)-beneficial and from the differing(-tones) (the)-most-beautiful
ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας
harmony and all-things by strife to-come-about from the-opposite(-side)
δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ
and to-these others both and Empedocles the for like the
ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων
like to-aim-at the indeed then physical of-the problems

ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)·
let-be-dismissed not for (they-are)-proper of-the present inquiry
ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ
all-that but is human and pertains to the characters and the
πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται
passions these let-us-examine such-as whether among all arises
φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ
friendship or not possible — wicked being friends to-be and
πότερον ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν
whether one form of-the friendship is or more the indeed for one
οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ
thinking(-it) because it-admits the more and less not by-adequate
πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ
have-trusted a-sign admit for the more and less also
τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.
the different in-the form it-has-been-spoken and about them before

II · THE LOVABLE

Not everything is loved, only the lovable, which is good, pleasant, or useful. There is no friendship with lifeless things, since there is no loving in return and no wishing them well. Goodwill is wishing another good for his sake, but friendship requires that it be returned and that each know it.

τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ
perhaps and — would-become about them clear (when)-recognized the
φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
lovable seems for not everything to-be-loved but the lovable
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε
this and to-be good or pleasant or useful it-would-seem
δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ
and — useful to-be through which comes-about good something or

ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ
pleasure so-that lovable — would-be the-good both and the pleasant
ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς
as ends whether then the-good they-love or the for-themselves
ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
good disagree for sometimes these likewise and also about
τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ
the pleasant seems and the for-himself good to-love each and
εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ
to-be absolutely indeed the-good lovable to-each and the(-good)
ἑκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ
to-each loves and each not the being for-himself good but
τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν
the apparent will-differ and nothing will-be for the lovable
φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν,
apparent three and being (things)-through which they-love
ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία·
in-the-case-of indeed the of-the lifeless-things loving not is-called friendship
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ
not for there-is return-of-love nor wish for-it of-good
(γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλ'
laughable for perhaps for-the wine to-wish the-goods but
εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ)· τῷ
if-anything to-be-preserved one-wishes it so-that oneself may-have(-it) to-the
δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
but friend they-say one-must to-wish the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake
τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὐνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
the(-men) and wishing so the-goods well-disposed they-call if not
ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
the-same also from that(-one) comes-about goodwill for in reciprocating(-men)
φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν
friendship to-be or one-must-add not escaping-notice many for are

εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς
well-disposed to-whom not they-have-seen they-suppose but decent
εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι
to-be or useful this and the same also of-those one would-feel
πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις·
toward this(-man) well-disposed indeed then these appear to-one-another
φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν
friends but how — one could-call(-them) unaware how they-are-disposed
ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι
to-each-other one-must then to-bear-goodwill to-one-another and to-wish
τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.
the-goods not unaware through one some(-one) of-the(-things) mentioned

III · THREE KINDS

There are three kinds of friendship, matching the three lovable things. Friends for use or pleasure love not the man but what they get, and so their friendships dissolve easily; the old seek the useful and the young the pleasant. Complete friendship is between good men alike in virtue; it lasts, but it is rare and needs time, for they must first eat the proverbial salt together.

διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα
differ and these from-one-another in-form and(-so) the lovings then
καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα
and the friendships three indeed (are)-the of-the friendship kinds equal-in-number
τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ
to-the lovable(-things) in-respect-of each for there-is return-of-love not
λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ
unnoticed the and loving one-another wish goods
ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ
for-one-another in-that in-which they-love the indeed then through the

χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν,
useful loving one-another not in themselves love
ἀλλ' ᾗ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν.
but in-so-far-as comes-about some for-them from one-another good
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς
likewise and also the(-ones) through pleasure not for by-the of-a-certain-sort
τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς
some(-people) being they-like the witty but because pleasant
αὑτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ
to-themselves the both indeed through the useful loving through
τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν
the for-themselves good they-love and the(-ones) through pleasure
διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός
through the to-themselves pleasant and not in-so-far-as the beloved
ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός
is but in-so-far-as useful or pleasant according-to accident
τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν
both indeed the friendships these are not for in-so-far-as is
ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ
who-precisely is the beloved in-this he-is-loved but in-so-far-as
πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν.
they-provide the-ones indeed good some the-others and pleasure
εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν
easily-dissolved indeed the such are not remaining them
ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται
alike if for no-longer pleasant or useful they-are they-stop
φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε
loving the and useful not remains but at-different-times
ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν,
different becomes being-dissolved then (that)-through which friends they-were
διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.
is-dissolved also the friendship as being the friendship toward those

μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία
most and among the old the such seems friendship
γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ
to-come-about not for the pleasant the of-such-an-age pursue but
τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ
the beneficial and of-the(-ones) in prime and young all-who the
συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι
advantageous pursue not altogether and the such nor live-together
μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ
with one-another sometimes for not-even are-they pleasant nor indeed
προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν·
do-they-need the such association if not beneficial they-be
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν
in so-far for they-are pleasant in as-far-as hopes they-have
ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν
of-good among these and also the (friendship)-of-hosts-and-guests
τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ·
they-set the and of-the young friendship through pleasure to-be seems
κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ
according-to passion for these live and most they-pursue the
ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης
pleasant for-themselves and the present of-the age and changing
καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
also the pleasant-things become different therefore quickly they-become
φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία
friends and stop together for with-the pleasant the friendship
μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή.
changes of-the and such pleasure quick (is)-the change
καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι'
and erotic and (are)-the young according-to passion for and through
ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως
pleasure the most of-the erotic(-love) therefore they-love and quickly

παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες.
stop often the same day changing
συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται·
to-spend-the-days(-together) and also to-live-together these wish
γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως.
comes-about for to-them the according-to the friendship thus
τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
complete and is the of-the good friendship and in virtue
ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις
alike these for the-goods alike wish for-one-another
ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ
in-so-far-as good good and they-are in themselves the(-ones) and
βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα
wishing the-goods to-the friends of-those for-the-sake (are)-most
φίλοι· δι' αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ
friends through themselves for so they-are-disposed and not according-to
συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ
accident lasts then the of-these friendship as-long-as — good
ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς
they-are the and virtue (is)-lasting and is each absolutely
ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ
good and to-the friend the for good (are)-both absolutely good
καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς
and to-one-another beneficial likewise and also pleasant also for absolutely
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ'
the good (are)-pleasant and to-one-another to-each for according-to
ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν
pleasure are the his-own actions and the such of-the good
δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος
and (are)-the same or similar the such and friendship lasting
εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις
reasonably is joins for in itself all-things that to-the friends

δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι᾽ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ δι᾽
must to-belong every for friendship through good is or through
ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά
pleasure either absolutely or for-the loving(-one) and according-to similarity
τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ᾽ αὑτούς·
some in-this and all-things belong the mentioned in themselves
†ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια† καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν
in-this for similar and the remaining the both absolutely good
καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ
and pleasant absolutely is most and these (are)-lovable and the
φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη.
to-love indeed and the friendship in these most and best
σπανίας δ᾽ εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ
rare and likely the such to-be few for the
τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ
such further and it-needs-besides time and familiarity according-to
τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν
the proverb for not it-is-possible to-know one-another before
τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ᾽ ἀποδέξασθαι
the proverbial salt to-have-eaten-together nor to-accept
δὴ πρότερον οὐδ᾽ εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος
indeed earlier nor to-be friends before — each
ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ
to-each appear lovable and be-trusted the(-ones) and quickly the
φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι
friendly(-offices) toward one-another doing wish indeed friends
εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἴσασιν·
to-be not they-are but if not also lovable and this they-know
βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ᾽ οὔ.
wish indeed for quick for-friendship arises friendship but not

Friendship for pleasure resembles the complete kind, since the good are pleasant to each other, though lover and beloved do not take pleasure in the same things. Bad men can be friends for pleasure or use, but only the good are friends for each other's sake, and only their friendship is proof against slander. Others are friends by resemblance.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ
this indeed then both in-respect-of the time and in-respect-of the rest
τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια
complete is and in-respect-of all-things the-same come-about and similar
ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν.
to-each from each which-precisely must to-the friends to-belong
ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
the and through the pleasant a-resemblance of-this has also for the
ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ
good (are)-pleasant to-one-another likewise and also the(-one) through the
χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα
useful also for such to-one-another (are)-the good most
δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται
and also in these the friendships last when the same comes-about
παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ
from one-another such-as pleasure and not only so but also
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ
from the same(-source) such-as to-the witty and not as to-a-lover
καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι,
and to-a-beloved not for in the same-things take-pleasure these
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ
but the-one indeed seeing that(-one) the-other and being-attended by
τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία
the lover fading and the bloom sometimes also the friendship

λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ'
fades to-the-one indeed for not is pleasant the sight to-the-other and
οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν
not comes the attention many and again last if
ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες.
from the familiarity the characters they-come-to-love alike-in-character being
οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
the(-ones) and not the pleasant exchanging but the
χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ
useful in the love-affairs both are less friends and
διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα
last the(-ones) and through the useful being friends with
τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι
the advantage are-dissolved not for of-one-another they-were friends
ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ
but of-the profitable through pleasure indeed then and through the
χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι
useful even base-men it-is-possible friends to-one-another to-be
καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, δι'
and decent(-men) with-base and neither(-good-nor-bad) with-any-sort through
αὑτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ
themselves but (it-is)-clear that only the good the for bad
οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ
not delight in-one-another if not some benefit should-come-about and
μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ
alone and the of-the good friendship proof-against-slander is not for
ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ'
(it-is)-easy for-anyone to-believe about the(-man) in much time by
αὑτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις,
himself tested and the to-trust (is)-among these
καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς
and the never — would-act-unjustly and whatever else in the as

ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει
truly friendship is-thought-proper in and the others nothing prevents
τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους
the such-things to-occur since for the men call friends
καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι
also the(-ones) through the useful just-as the cities seem
γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ
for the alliances for-the cities to-arise for-the-sake-of the
συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας,
advantage and the(-ones) through pleasure one-another loving
ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους
just-as the children perhaps to-call indeed must also we friends
τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως
the such kinds and of-the friendship more(-than-one) and primarily
μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς
indeed and strictly the of-the good in-so-far-as (they-are)-good the
δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι
and others by similarity in-so-far-as for good something
καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν
and similar something in-so-far friends also for the pleasant (is)-good
τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ
to-the pleasure-lovers not altogether and these combine nor
γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ
become the same(-people) friends through the useful and through the
ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
pleasant not for altogether are-coupled the according-to accident
εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν
into these and the kinds the friendship having-been-divided the indeed
φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ
base will-be friends through pleasure or the useful in-this
ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ
similar being the and good through themselves friends in-so-far-as

γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ
for (they-are)-good these indeed then absolutely friends those and
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις.
according-to accident and by-the to-have-been-likened these

V · STATE AND ACTIVITY

As with the virtues, friends may be friends in state or in activity: distance does not dissolve friendship, but long absence makes it forgotten. The sour and the old make few friends, since no one can spend his days with the unpleasant. Loving is like a passion, friendship like a state, for friends wish each other good from choice.

ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἳ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν
just-as and in-the-case-of the virtues the-ones indeed in-respect-of state
οἳ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ
the-others and in-respect-of activity good are-called so also
ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν
in-the-case-of the friendship the indeed for living-together delight
ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ
in-one-another and provide the-goods the and sleeping or
κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν
separated in-the places not are-active indeed so but are-disposed
ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
as to-be-active friendly-wise the for places not dissolve the friendship
ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία
absolutely but the activity if and long the absence
γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
becomes also of-the friendship it-seems forgetfulness to-cause whence it-has-been-said

πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.
many indeed friendships want-of-address has-dissolved

οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὔθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ
not appear and neither the old nor the sour friendly
εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς
to-be little for in them (is)-the(-element) of-the pleasure no-one
δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ
and can to-spend-the-days(-together) with-the painful nor with-the not
ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν,
pleasant most for the nature appears the painful to-avoid
ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους,
to-aim-at and the pleasant the(-ones) and accepting one-another
μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν
not living-together but well-disposed seem rather than friends nothing
γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν (ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ
for so is of-friends as the to-live-together benefit indeed for
οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι·
the needy desire to-spend-the-days(-together) and even the blessed
μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει)· συνδιάγειν δὲ
solitary for to-be for-these least befits to-spend-time and
μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας
with one-another not it-is-possible not pleasant being nor delighting
τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.
in-the same-things which-precisely the comradely(-friendship) seems to-have
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ
most indeed then is friendship the of-the good just-as
πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ
often has-been-said seems for lovable indeed and choiceworthy the
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον·
absolutely good or pleasant to-each and the for-himself such
ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε
the and good(-man) to-the good(-man) through both these resembles
δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ
and the indeed loving a-passion the and friendship a-state the for

φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι
loving not less toward the lifeless-things is love-in-return
δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἕξεως·
and with choice the and choice (comes)-from state
καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα,
and the-goods they-wish for-the beloved of-those for-the-sake
οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν
not according-to passion but according-to state and loving the
φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος
friend the for-themselves good they-love the for good(-man) a-friend
γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἑκάτερος οὖν
becoming a-good becomes to-whom (he-is)-a-friend each then
φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
loves both the for-himself good and the equal repays
τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης,
in-the wishing and in-the pleasant is-said for friendship equality
μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.
most and in-the(-friendship) of-the good these belong

VI · NOT MANY

One cannot be a friend to many in the complete sense, any more than one can love many at once. For use or pleasure many can please, and pleasure friendships, like those of the young, are the more liberal. The blessed need pleasant friends, and men in power keep their useful and their pleasant friends apart.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ
among and the sour and old less arises the
φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις
friendship in-so-far-as more-ill-tempered they-are and less in-the associations
χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ
they-delight these for seem most to-be friendly and productive

φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ'
of-friendship therefore young indeed become friends quickly old and
οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν·
not not for become friends (with-those)-in-whom — not they-delight
ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν
likewise and nor the sour but the such well-disposed indeed
εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς
are to-one-another they-wish for the-goods and they-meet(-them) in the
χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν
needs friends but not altogether they-are through the not to-spend-the-days(-together)
μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά.
nor delighting in-one-another which indeed most to-be seem friendly
πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ
to-many and to-be a-friend according-to the complete friendship not
ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ
it-is-possible just-as nor to-love many at-the-same-time it-is-like for
ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)·
an-excess the such and toward one is-naturally-apt to-arise
πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον,
many and at-once the same(-man) to-please greatly not (is)-easy
ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν
perhaps and nor good to-be(-so-many) must and also experience
λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον.
to-take and in familiarity to-come-to-be which (is)-extremely-hard
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν
through the useful and also the pleasant to-many to-please
ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
is-possible many for the such and in little time
αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ
the services of-these and more resembles friendship the(-one) through
τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν
the pleasant when the-same-things from both come-about and they-delight

ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι·
in-one-another or in-the same-things such-as of-the young are the friendships
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ
more for in these (is)-the liberal the and through
τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων
the useful (is)-of-market-people and the blessed and of-useful
μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ
indeed not-at-all need of-pleasant(-friends) but to-live-together indeed for
βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον
wish with-some the and painful little indeed time
φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ
they-bear continuously but no-one — would-endure not-even itself the
ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς
good if painful to-him it-were therefore the friends pleasant
ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ
they-seek must and perhaps also good such being and
ἔτι αὑτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις.
further to-themselves so for will-belong to-them all-that must to-the friends
οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι
the(-men) and in the powers divided appear to-use
τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς,
the friends others for for-them are useful and others pleasant
ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς
both but the same not altogether neither for pleasant with virtue
ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν
do-they-seek nor useful for the noble-things but the-ones indeed
εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ
witty the pleasant aiming-at the-others and clever to-do the
ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς
thing-ordered these and not altogether come-about in the same(-man) pleasant
δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος·
and and useful at-the-same-time it-has-been-said that the excellent(-man-is)

ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ
but to-a-superior not becomes the such(-man) a-friend if not also
τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον
in-the virtue he-be-surpassed if but not not he-equalizes proportionally
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.
being-surpassed not altogether and are-accustomed such to-come-about
εἰσὶ δ᾽ οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ
are and then the mentioned friendships in equality the for same-things
γίνεται ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ᾽
come-about from both and they-wish for-one-another or one-thing for
ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ᾽ ὠφελείας· ὅτι
another they-exchange such-as pleasure for benefit that
δὲ καὶ ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
and also less are these friendships and last it-has-been-said
δοκοῦσι δὲ δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ
they-seem and through similarity and dissimilarity of-the-same-thing
εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα γὰρ
to-be both and not to-be friendships by similarity for
τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
to-the(-friendship) in virtue they-appear friendships the-one indeed for
τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ᾽ ὑπάρχει
the pleasant has the-other and the useful these and belong
κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι,
to-that-too in-the and that indeed proof-against-slander and lasting to-be
ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν
these and quickly to-change in-other(-respects) both to-differ
πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι, δι᾽ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.
many not they-appear friendships through dissimilarity of-that

Another kind of friendship rests on superiority, as between father and son, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. In such friendships loving must be proportional: the better should be loved more than he loves. In friendship equality is first by quantity, and when the gap grows too wide, as between men and gods or kings, friendship ends.

ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον
different and is of-friendship a-kind the(-one) by superiority such-as
πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον,
for-a-father toward a-son and generally for-an-elder toward a-younger
ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς
for-a-husband and toward a-wife and for-every ruler toward
ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ
ruled differ and these also from-one-another not for (is)-the
αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ'
same for-parents toward children and for-rulers toward ruled but
οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ
nor for-a-father toward a-son and for-a-son toward a-father nor for-a-husband
πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἑκάστου
toward a-wife and for-a-wife toward a-husband different for (is)-of-each
τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ
of-these the-virtue and the function different and also (the-things)-through which
φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταὐτὰ
they-love different then (are)-also the lovings and the friendships the-same
μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ
indeed indeed neither comes-about for-each from the-other nor must-one
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ
to-seek(-it) when but to-parents indeed children render what (they)-must
τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις,
to-the(-ones) having-begotten(-them) parents and what (they)-must to-the children

μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον
lasting the of-the such and decent will-be friendship proportional
δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν
and in all the by superiority being friendships also the
φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι
loving must to-come-about such-as the better more to-be-loved
ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον
than to-love and the more-useful and of-the others each
ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε
likewise when for according-to worth the loving comes-about then
γίνεταί πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
arises in-a-way equality which indeed (the-mark)-of-the friendship to-be seems
οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ
not alike and the equal in both the just(-things) and in the friendship
φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρώτως
appears to-be it-is for in indeed the just(-things) equal primarily
τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
the(-equal) according-to worth the and according-to quantity secondarily in but
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ'
the friendship the indeed according-to quantity primarily the and according-to
ἀξίαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται
worth secondarily (it-is)-clear and if great an-interval arise
ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ
of-virtue or of-vice or of-wealth or of-some other(-thing) not for
ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον
any-longer friends they-are but not-even do-they-think-it-fit most-evident
δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι
and (is)-this in-the-case-of the gods most for these in-all
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
the goods surpass (it-is)-clear and also in-the-case-of the
βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ
kings not-even for with-these think-fit to-be friends the(-men)

πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις
much inferior nor with-the best or wisest
οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
the(-men) of-nothing worthy exact indeed then in the such(-cases)
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ
not there-is definition up-to what(-point) the friends(-remain) many for
ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ
being-taken-away still it-remains much and having-been-separated as the
θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται
god no-longer whence also it-is-puzzled-over whether ever not wish
οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς
the friends for-the friends the greatest of-the goods such-as gods
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ
to-be not for any-longer friends they-will-be to-them nor indeed
ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται
goods the for friends (are)-goods if indeed well it-has-been-said
ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα,
that the friend for-the friend wishes the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake
μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ
to-remain — he-would-have-to such-as ever is that(-one) for-a-man
δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ
indeed being he-will-wish the greatest goods perhaps but not
πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.
all for-himself for most each wishes the-goods

Most men, through love of honor, want to be loved rather than to love, and so love flatterers. Friendship lies more in loving, as mothers show who give up their children to be raised and are content to see them do well. Friends love according to worth, and contraries attract only by accident, each aiming at the mean.

οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι
the many and seem through love-of-honor to-wish to-be-loved
μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί·
more than to-love therefore (are)-lovers-of-flatterers the many
ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται
(one)-surpassed for friend (is)-the flatterer or pretends
τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι
(to-be)-such and more to-love than to-be-loved the and to-be-loved
ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.
near to-be seems to-the to-be-honored which indeed the many aim-at
οὐ δι' αὑτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
not for itself but they-seem to-choose the honor but according-to
συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν
accident they-delight for the indeed many by the(-men) in
ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ
the powers being-honored through the hope they-think for
τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἄν του δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ
to-be-going-to-get from them if anything they-need as indeed by-a-sign
τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)· οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν
of-the good-treatment they-delight in-the honor the(-others) and by the
ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν
decent and knowing desiring honor to-confirm the own
δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν· χαίρουσι δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ
opinion aim-at about themselves they-delight indeed that they-are good

πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι
trusting in-the of-the(-men) saying(-so) judgment in-the to-be-loved
δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι
and in itself they-delight therefore it-would-seem — better to-be
τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι.
than-the to-be-honored and the friendship in itself choiceworthy to-be
δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.
it-seems and in the to-love more than in the to-be-loved to-be(-found)
σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι
a-sign and (are)-the mothers in-the to-love delighting some
γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν
for give the their-own(-children) to-be-reared and love indeed
εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ
knowing(-them) to-be-loved-in-return but not they-seek if both not
ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ
it-be-possible but sufficient for-them it-seems to-be if they-see(-them) well
πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν
faring and they love them even-if those nothing
ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.
of-what to-a-mother befits render through the ignorance
μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν
more and the friendship being in the to-love and the
φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετὴ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν,
lovers-of-friends being-praised of-friends (the)-virtue the to-love seems
ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι
so-that in whom this comes-about according-to worth these (are)-lasting
φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι
friends and the of-these friendship so and — even the unequal
μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
most would-be friends would-be-equalized for — the and equality
καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ'
and likeness (is)-friendship and most indeed the of-the(-men) in

ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς
virtue likeness lasting for being in themselves also toward
ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ᾽ ὑπηρετοῦσι
one-another they-remain and neither ask-for base-things nor render(-them)
τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν
such but so-to speak even they-prevent(-them) (it-is)-of-the good
γὰρ μήτ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν.
for neither themselves to-err nor for-the friends to-permit(-it)
οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς
the but wicked the indeed steadfastness not have nor for to-themselves
διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται
do-they-remain alike being for little but time they-become
φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ
friends delighting in-the one-another's wickedness the useful and
καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν
also pleasant for longer remain as-long-as for — they-provide
ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν
pleasures or benefits to-one-another from contraries and most indeed
δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον
seems the(-friendship) through the useful to-arise friendship such-as
πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις
poor-man with-rich ignorant with-knowing for-what for happens one
ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα
lacking being this aiming-at he-gives-in-return another-thing here
δ᾽ ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν
and — one might-drag-in both lover and beloved and beautiful
καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε,
and ugly therefore appear also the lovers ridiculous sometimes
ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας
thinking-fit to-be-loved as they-love alike indeed lovable being
ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον.
perhaps one-must-think-it-fit nothing and such having (it-is)-ridiculous

ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ᾽ αὑτό,
perhaps and not-even aims-at the contrary the contrary in itself
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν·
but according-to accident the and desire for-the mean is
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽
this for (is)-good such-as for-the dry not wet to-become but
ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως.
to the mean to-come and for-the hot and for-the others likewise
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.
these indeed then let-be-dismissed and for they-are more-foreign

IX · FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNITY

Friendship and justice concern the same things and the same persons, for in every community there is some justice and some friendship, and the proverb says friends' things are common. Wrongs grow worse the closer the friend. All communities are parts of the political community, which aims at the advantage of the whole of life.

ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταὐτὰ
it-seems and just-as at the-beginning it-has-been-said about the-same-things
καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἥ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
and among the same(-persons) to-be the both friendship and the just
ἐν ἁπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία
in every for community seems some just(-element) to-be and friendship
δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ
too they-address at-any-rate as friends the fellow-voyagers and
τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
the fellow-soldiers likewise and also the(-ones) in the other
κοινωνίαις. καθ᾽ ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι
communities as far and they-share in so-far there-is
φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία κοινὰ
friendship and for the just and the proverb (says)-common

τὰ φίλων, ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι
the(-things) of-friends rightly in community for (is)-the friendship is
δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις
and for-brothers indeed and for-comrades all common for-the and others
ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ
(things)-set-apart and for-some indeed more for-others but less also
γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἧττον. διαφέρει
for of-the friendships some indeed more some and less they-differ
δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα
and also the just(-claims) not for the-same for-parents toward children
καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις,
and for-brothers toward one-another nor for-comrades and for-citizens
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ
likewise and also in-the-case-of the other friendships different indeed also
τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει
the unjust(-acts) toward each of-these and increase they-take
τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι
by-the more toward friends to-be such-as money to-defraud
ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ
a-comrade (is)-more-terrible than a-citizen and not to-help a-brother
ἢ ἀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλον.
than a-stranger and to-strike a-father than anyone else
αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον,
to-increase and is-natural together-with the friendship also the just
ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.
as among the same being and over equal(-range) extending
αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς·
the and communities all to-parts seem-like of-the political(-community)
συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί
they-journey-together for for some advantage and providing
τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ
some(-thing) of-the(-things) for the life and the political and

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
community for-the advantage for-the-sake seems both from the-beginning
συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται
to-have-come-together and to-remain this for also the lawgivers
στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.
aim-at and just they-say to-be the in-common advantageous
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος
the indeed then other communities at parts of-the advantage
ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν
aim such-as sailors indeed the(-advantage) in the voyage
πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται
toward acquisition of-money or something such fellow-soldiers
δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε
and the(-advantage) in the war whether of-money or
νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ
of-victory or of-a-city desiring likewise and also tribesmen and
δημόται. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν
demesmen all and these under the political(-community) seem
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ
to-be not for the present advantage the political(-community)
ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον *** θυσίας τε
aims-at but for all the life (lacuna) sacrifices both
ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμάς τε ἀπονέμοντες
performing and about these gatherings honors both rendering
τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς.
to-the gods and for-themselves relaxations providing with pleasure
αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ
the for ancient sacrifices and gatherings appear to-take-place after
τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ
the of-the crops harvestings as first-fruits most for
ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται
in these they-had-leisure the seasons all indeed appear

αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι
the communities parts of-the political(-community) to-be will-follow
δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.
and the such friendships the such communities

X · CONSTITUTIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS

There are three constitutions, kingship, aristocracy, and timocracy, and three deviations, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Their likenesses appear in households: a father with his sons is like a king, while Persian fathers are tyrants; husband and wife are like an aristocracy, brothers like a timocracy, and a masterless house like a democracy.

πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις,
of-constitution and are kinds three equal and also deviations
οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία
as corruptions of-these are and the indeed constitutions kingship
τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν
both and aristocracy third and (one)-from property-ratings which
τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
timocratic to-call (is)-fitting it-appears polity but it
εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν
are-accustomed the most to-call of-these and best (is)-indeed
ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις
the kingship worst and the timocracy deviation
δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι,
and of-kingship indeed (is)-tyranny both for (are)-monarchies
διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ
they-differ but most the indeed for tyrant the for-himself
συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ
advantageous looks-to the and king the of-the ruled not

γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
for is a-king the(-man) not self-sufficient and in-all the
ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ
goods surpassing the and such(-man) of-nothing is-in-need the
ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ'
beneficial(-things) then for-himself indeed not — he-would-look-to for-the but
ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη
ruled the for not such chosen-by-lot — a-kind-of would-be
βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ
king the and tyranny from the-opposite to-this the for
ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης
for-himself good he-pursues and (it-is)-clearer in-the-case-of this
ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
that (it-is)-worst worst and (is)-the contrary to-the best
μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ
it-passes and from kingship into tyranny baseness for
ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς
is of-monarchy the tyranny the and wicked king
τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν
a-tyrant becomes from aristocracy and into oligarchy
κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἳ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως
by-vice of-the rulers who distribute the(-things) of-the city
παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν
contrary-to the worth and all or the most of-the
ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ
goods to-themselves and the offices always to-the same of
πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ
most making the to-be-rich few indeed rule and
μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ τιμοκρατίας
wicked instead-of the most-decent from and timocracy
εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους
into democracy bordering for are these of-a-multitude

γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες
for wishes also the timocracy to-be and equal all
οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ
the(-men) in the property-rating least and wicked is the
δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας
democracy by little for deviates the of-the constitution
εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι·
form change indeed then most thus the constitutions
ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα
least for so and most-easily they-pass-over likenesses
δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ
and of-them and as-it-were patterns one may-take — even
ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία
in the households the indeed for of-a-father toward sons community
βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει·
of-kingship has the-form of-the children for to-the father (there-is)-care
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει·
hence and also Homer — Zeus father addresses
πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι.
paternal for rule wishes the kingship to-be
ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ
among Persians and the of-the father (is)-tyrannical they-use for
ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς
as slaves the sons tyrannical and also the of-a-master toward
δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται.
slaves the for of-the master advantage in it is-done
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη·
this indeed then right appears the Persian and mistaken
τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ
of-the differing for the rules (are)-different of-husband and and
γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ
of-wife aristocratic appears according-to worth for the

ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ
husband rules and about these which must the husband all-that but
γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἁπάντων δὲ κυριεύων
to-a-wife befits to-her he-hands-over of-all and being-master
ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ
the husband into oligarchy changes(-it) contrary-to the worth for
αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ
it he-does and not in-so-far-as (he-is)-better sometimes and rule the
γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
wives heiresses being not indeed come-about according-to virtue
αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
the rules but through wealth and power just-as in the
ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι
oligarchies timocratic and resembles the of-the brothers equal
γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν
for except in so-far-as in-the ages they-differ therefore if
πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ
much in-the ages they-differ no-longer brotherly becomes the
φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις
friendship democracy and most indeed (is)-in the masterless
τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ
of-the dwellings there for all (are)-on equal(-footing) and
ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία.
in which weak the ruler and to-each (is)-license

Each constitution has as much friendship as it has justice: a king benefits his subjects as a shepherd does his flock, as Homer called Agamemnon, and parents stand above their children. Brothers are like comrades. In tyranny there is little friendship, for there is none with a slave as slave, a living tool, though there may be with him as a man.

καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον
in-respect-of each and of-the constitutions friendship appears in so-far-as
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν
also the just for-a-king indeed toward the ruled-by-a-king (it-lies)-in
ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους,
superiority of-benefaction well for he-treats the ruled-by-a-king
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν,
if-indeed good being he-cares-for them so-that well they-may-fare
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα
just-as a-shepherd of-sheep whence also Homer — Agamemnon
ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική,
shepherd of-the-peoples called such and also (is)-the paternal(-friendship)
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ
it-differs but in-the magnitude of-the benefits (the)-cause for
τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας.
of-the to-be (which)-seems greatest and of-nurture and of-education
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε
also to-the ancestors and these are-ascribed by-nature and
ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς
ruling(-is) a-father of-sons and ancestors of-descendants and a-king
βασιλευομένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ
of-subjects in superiority and (are)-the friendships these therefore
καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις
also are-honored the parents and the just indeed in these

οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ
(is)-not the-same but the according-to worth so for also the
φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν
friendship and of-husband and toward wife the same friendship (is)-as in
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον
aristocracy according-to virtue for and to-the better more
ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
good and the fitting to-each so and also the just
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ
the and of-the brothers to-the comradely resembles equal for and
ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς
of-an-age the such and like-in-feeling and like-in-character as
ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν
for the most-part resembles and this also the(-friendship) according-to the
τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς
timocratic(-constitution) equal for the citizens wish and decent
εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ
to-be in turn indeed the to-rule and on equal(-terms) so indeed
καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
also the friendship in and the deviations just-as also the
δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν
just to little(-extent) is so also the friendship and least in
τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας.
the worst in tyranny for (there-is)-nothing or little of-friendship
ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ,
in which for nothing common is to-the ruler and to-ruled
οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς
nor (is-there)-friendship nor for just(-thing) such-as for-a-craftsman toward
ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον·
tool and for-soul toward body and for-master toward slave
ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων,
are-benefited indeed for all these by the users

φιλία δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
friendship but not there-is toward the lifeless-things nor just(-thing) but nor
πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος.
toward a-horse or ox nor toward a-slave in-so-far-as (he-is)-a-slave
οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον,
nothing for common is the for slave (is)-a-living tool
τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος,
the and tool a-lifeless slave in-so-far-as indeed then (he-is)-a-slave
οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ
not there-is friendship toward him in-so-far-as but a-man seems
γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν
for to-be some just(-element) for-every man toward all the(-one)
δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία
able to-share in-law and in-agreement and friendship
δή, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν
indeed in so-far-as (he-is)-a-man to little(-extent) indeed also in
ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς
the tyrannies (are)-the friendships and the just in and the
δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ
democracies to more many for (are)-the common(-things)
ἴσοις οὖσιν.
to-equals being

All kinship depends on that of the father: parents love their children as part of themselves, and sooner and more than children love parents. Brothers love each other as springing from the same source. Children love parents as men love gods, and husband and wife love by nature, since the household is prior to the city; children are the bond between them.

ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
in community indeed then every friendship is just-as has-been-said
ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν.
might-set-apart and — one the both kindred and the comradely
αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι
the and civic and tribal and shipboard and all-that
τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ'
(are)-such to-communal(-ones) seem-like more as-it-were for according-to
ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν
agreement some they-appear to-be among these and might-class —
τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται
one also the host-and-guest(-friendship) and the kindred and appears
πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ
manifold to-be to-depend and all on the paternal the
γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα,
parents indeed for love the children as of-themselves something being
τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον
the and children the parents as from those something being more
δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα
and know the parents the(-ones) from themselves than the begotten
ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται τὸ ἀφ'
that (they-are)-from these and more is-bound-closely the from
οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι·
which(-it-comes) to-the begotten than the thing-produced to-the maker

τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ᾽ οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς θριξ
the for from him (is)-proper to-the(-one) from which such-as a-tooth a-hair
ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ᾽ οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ᾽ οὗ, ἢ ἧττον.
anything to-the having to-that and nothing the from which or less
καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἳ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς
and by-the length and of-the time the-ones indeed for at-once
γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς
having-been-born love(-them) the-others and having-passed time the
γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ
parents understanding or perception having-acquired from these and
δῆλον καὶ δι᾽ ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς
(it-is)-clear also through what love more the mothers parents
μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν
indeed then children love as themselves the for from them
οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς
(are)-as-it-were other selves by-the to-have-been-separated children and parents
ὡς ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ᾽ ἀλλήλους τῷ
as from those having-sprung brothers and one-another by-the
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης
from the same to-have-sprung the for to those identity
ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν
to-one-another the-same makes whence they-speak-of the-same blood and root
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις.
and the such they-are indeed the-same in-a-way even in separated(-persons)
μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ᾽
great and toward friendship (is)-also the being-reared-together and the according-to
ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι·
age of-an-age for (delights)-the-coeval and the familiar (are)-comrades
διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ
therefore also the brotherly to-the comradely is-likened cousins and and
οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνῳκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ
the other kinsmen from these are-bound-together by-the for from

τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ
the same to-be they-become and the-ones indeed more-akin the-others
δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι.
and more-foreign by-the near or far the founder to-be
ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις
is and the indeed toward parents friendship for-children and for-men
πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ
toward gods as toward good and superior well for
πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι
they-have-done the greatest(-things) of-the for to-be and to-be-nurtured
αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ
(they-are)-the-causes and (for-those)-born of-the to-be-educated it-has and also
τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν
the pleasant and the useful the such friendship more than-the
ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.
strangers' in-so-far-as also more-common the life to-them is
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ
it-is and also in the brotherly(-friendship) the-very-things-which also in the
ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν
comradely and more among the decent and generally among
τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι
the alike in-so-far-as more-akin and from birth they-begin
στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ
loving one-another and in-so-far-as more-alike-in-character the(-ones)
ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως·
from the same(-parents) and reared-together and educated alike
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιοτάτη.
and the by the time testing (is)-most and surest
ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ
proportional and also among the rest of-the kinsmen the
φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
friendly(-things) for-husband and and for-wife friendship seems according-to

φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
nature to-belong man for by-the nature (is)-apt-to-pair
μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον
more than political in-so-far-as prior and more-necessary
οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις.
(is)-the-household than-the-city and child-making more-common to-the animals
τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν,
for-the indeed then other(-animals) to so-far the community is
οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν
the and men not only of-the child-making for-the-sake
συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ
live-together but also of-the(-things) for the life at-once for
διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός·
are-divided the functions and are different of-husband and of-wife
ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ
they-supply then one-another into the common putting the
ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ
private-things through these and also the useful to-be seems and
τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι'
the pleasant in this the friendship it-would-be and — also through
ἀρετήν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ
virtue if decent they-should-be is for of-each a-virtue and
χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ
they-would-delight — in-the such a-bond and the children seem
εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα
to-be therefore more-quickly the childless separate the for children
κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ
(are)-a-common good to-both holds-together and the common(-thing) the
δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ
and how must-live for-husband toward wife and generally for-friend
πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς
toward friend nothing other appears to-be-sought than how

δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον
(it-is)-just not for the-same appears for-the friend toward the friend
καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.
and the stranger and the comrade and the schoolfellow

XIII · COMPLAINTS IN UTILITY FRIENDSHIP

Complaints arise mostly in friendships for use, since each always wants more. Such friendship is either legal, on stated terms, or moral, given as to a friend but expecting a return, and quarrels come when men part on terms other than those they began on. The return is measured by the benefit received; in virtue friendship, by the giver's choice.

τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,
threefold and being friendships just-as at (the)-beginning it-has-been-said
καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων
and in each the-ones indeed in equality friends being
τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι
the-others and by superiority and for alike good(-men) friends
γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς
become and better with-worse likewise and also pleasant(-men)
καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ
and through the useful equalizing in-the benefits and
διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν
differing the equals indeed by equality must in-the to-love
καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον
and in-the rest to-equalize the and unequal the proportional
ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ
to-the superiorities to-render arise and the complaints and
αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ
the reproaches in the according-to the useful friendship either alone or

μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες
most reasonably the indeed for through virtue friends being
εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς
well to-do one-another are-eager this for (is-the-mark)-of-virtue
καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν
and of-friendship to this and (they)-striving not there-are
ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα
complaints nor fights the for loving and well treating(-him)
οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ
no-one is-annoyed-with but if he-be gracious he-retaliates well
δρῶν. ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν
doing the and exceeding getting what he-aims-at not —
ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται.
would-complain-of the friend each for the good desires
οὐ πάνυ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς δι᾽ ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ
not altogether and nor among the through pleasure together for
ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν
to-both comes what they-desire if in-the to-spend-time-together
χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ᾽ ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν
they-delight ridiculous and — would-appear also the(-man) complaining-of
τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνημερεύειν. ἡ
the not delighting(-him) it-being-possible not to-spend-the-days(-with-him) the
δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ
and through the useful (is)-complaint-prone for benefit for
χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον
using one-another always the more they-need and less
ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι
to-have they-think than-the fitting and they-blame because
οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ
not as-much-as they-need so-much they-get worthy being the
δ᾽ εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων
and well doing not are-able to-supply so-much as-much-as

οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι
the receiving need it-seems and just-as the just is
διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ
twofold the-one indeed unwritten the-other and according-to law also
τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ
of-the according-to the useful friendship the-one indeed moral the-other
δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν
and legal to-be arise then the complaints most when
μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι
not according-to the same(-kind) they-contract and dissolve(-it) is
δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν
and the legal indeed the(-one) on stated(-terms) the-one indeed wholly
ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα
commercial from hand to hand the-other and more-liberal
εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος.
for time according-to agreement but what for what
δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν
clear and in this the debt and-not disputable friendly
δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διόπερ ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
but the delay it-has therefore with-some not there-are of-these
δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν
lawsuits but they-think one-must to-love the(-men) on trust
συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς
having-contracted the and moral(-kind) (is)-not on stated(-terms) but as
φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ
to-a-friend gives or whatever else to-get-back but he-thinks-fit
τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ
the equal or more as not having-given but having-lent not
ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο
alike and having-contracted and dissolving he-will-complain this
δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς
and happens through the to-wish indeed all or the

πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν
most the noble-things to-choose but the beneficial noble
δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ
and (is)-the well to-do not so-that one-may-receive-in-return beneficial and
τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν
the to-be-benefited for-(one)-able indeed one-must-repay the worth
ὧν ἔπαθεν (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς
of-what he-received unwilling for (as)-friend not one-must-make(-him) as
δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ᾽
indeed having-erred at the beginning and well having-been-treated by
οὗ οὐκ ἔδει — οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
whom not he-should not for by a-friend nor for it this
δρῶντος — καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
doing just-as then on stated(-terms) having-been-benefited
διαλυτέον)· καὶ †ὁμολογήσαι δ᾽† ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·
one-must-dissolve and one-would-agree and — being-able to-repay
ἀδυνατοῦντα δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν.
unable and not-even the giver would-have-thought-fit —
ὥστ᾽ εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ᾽ ἐπισκεπτέον
so-that if possible one-must-repay at (the)-beginning and one-must-consider
ὑφ᾽ οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις
by whom one-is-benefited and on what(-terms) so-that on these
ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ᾽ ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ
one-may-accept or not dispute but it-has whether one-must by-the
τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην
of-the receiver benefit to-measure and with-reference-to this
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ.
to-make the return or by-the of-the doer beneficence
οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν
the indeed for receivers such they-say to-have-received from the
εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ᾽ ἑτέρων
benefactors what small was to-those and it-was-possible from others

λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα
to-receive belittling(-it) the and conversely the greatest
τῶν παρ' αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν,
of-the(-things) from themselves and which from others not was(-to-be-had)
καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. ἆρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν
and in dangers or such needs whether then through indeed
τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια
the useful the friendship being the of-the receiver benefit
μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ
measure is this-one for (is)-the(-one) needing and he-aids
αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται
him as going-to-get-back the equal so-much then has-been
ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ
the help as this-one has-been-benefited and one-must-repay indeed
αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ
to-him as-much-as he-gained or even more (it-is)-nobler for in and
ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ
the according-to virtue complaints indeed not there-are by-measure
δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
and resembles the of-the doer choice of-the virtue for
καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.
and of-the character in the choice (lies)-the decisive(-element)

In friendships of superiority each claims more: the better man because he is better, the needy because a good friend should help him. Both are right, but in different things: honor to the superior, gain to the needy, as in cities. So a son may not disown his father, though a father may disown his son, since the son can never repay his debt.

διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ
they-quarrel and also in the by superiority friendships thinks-fit
γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, διαλύεται
for each more to-have when and this happens is-dissolved
ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὑτῷ πλέον
the friendship thinks for the — better (that)-it-befits him more
ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
to-have to-the for good to-be-assigned more likewise and also the
ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν·
more-useful useless for being not they-say one-must equal to-have
λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ'
a-public-service both for (it)-becomes and not a-friendship if not according-to
ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται
worth of-the works will-be the(-things) from the friendship they-think
γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν
for just-as in of-money a-partnership more receive
οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ
the(-ones) contributing more so one-must also in the
φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ
friendship the and needy and the worse conversely of-a-friend for
ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν,
good (it-is)-to-be the to-aid the needy what for they-say
ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν
(is-the)-benefit to-an-excellent(-man) or to-a-potentate friend to-be nothing

γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς
at-least being-about to-enjoy it-seems and then each rightly
ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας,
to-think-fit and one-must to-each more to-assign from the friendship
οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς τῷ
not of-the same however but to-the indeed superior of-honor to-the
δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας
and needy of-gain of-the indeed for virtue and of-the beneficence
ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος.
the honor (is)-the-prize of-the and need help the gain
οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ
so and to-be this also in the constitutions appears not for
τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ
is-honored the(-man) nothing good for-the common(-weal) providing the
κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι,
common(-good) for is-given to-the(-man) the common(-weal) benefiting
ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα
the honor and (is)-common(-good) not for it-is-possible at-the-same-time
χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι
to-make-money from the common(-funds) and to-be-honored in all
γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα
for the less no-one endures to-the(-man) indeed in money
ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα·
being-made-less honor they-assign and to-the bribe-taker money
τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν,
the according-to worth for equalizes and preserves the friendship
καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον,
just-as has-been-said so indeed also with-the unequal one-must-associate
καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν
and to-the(-man) in money being-benefited or in virtue honor
ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ
one-must-return rendering the possible(-things) the possible for

ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν
the friendship seeks not the according-to worth nor for is-it(-possible)
ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς
in all(-cases) just-as in the toward the gods honors and the
γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν
parents no-one for the worth ever — could-render to power
δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν
but the(-man) serving decent to-be seems therefore also
δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ
it-would-seem not to-be-permitted for-a-son a-father to-disown for-a-father
δ᾽ υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον
but a-son owing for one-must-repay nothing and having-done worthy
τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ᾽ ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ᾽
of-the(-things) received he-has-done so-that always he-owes to-whom but
ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἅμα δ᾽
it-is-owed (there-is)-power to-remit and to-the father indeed together and
ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ᾽ ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος
perhaps no-one ever — would-stand-aloof it-seems not exceeding
μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν
in-wickedness apart-from for the natural friendship the help
ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ
(it-is)-human not to-reject to-the(-son) but to-be-avoided or not
σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ
to-be-striven-for (is)-the to-aid (him)-wicked being well to-be-treated for
οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές.
the many wish the but to-do(-it) they-avoid as unprofitable
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
about indeed then these to so-much let-it-have-been-said

BOOK IX

I · MEASURING RETURNS

In friendships of unlike kinds proportion keeps the friendship, as money does in the city. A lover complains that he is not loved in return, and a beloved that promises are not kept; a lyre player was paid in pleasure for pleasure. Protagoras let his pupils fix the fee, and with philosophy no return can match the worth.

ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον
in all and the dissimilar friendships the proportional
ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν
equalizes and preserves the friendship just-as has-been-said such-as also in
τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων
the political(-friendship) to-the shoemaker in-return-for the shoes
ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς
a-return comes according-to worth and to-the weaver and to-the
λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ
rest here indeed then has-been-provided a-common measure the
νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ
currency and to this indeed all-things are-referred and
τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ
by-this are-measured in and the erotic(-friendship) sometimes indeed the
ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν
lover complains that loving-excessively not he-is-loved-in-return nothing
ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος
having lovable if so it-happens often and the beloved
ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ.
that formerly promising all-things now nothing he-fulfills
συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν
happen and the such-things whenever the-one indeed through pleasure
τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν
the beloved loves the-other and through the useful the

ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς
lover these but not to-both belong through these for the
φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν
friendship being dissolution comes whenever not come(-the-things) of-which
ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ
for-the-sake they-loved not for them they-loved but the(-things)
ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
belonging not lasting being therefore such (are)-also the friendships
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
the and of-the characters in itself being remains just-as has-been-said
διαφέρονται δ' ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ
they-quarrel and when different-things come to-them and not
ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
what they-desire like for to-the nothing to-come(-of-it) when
οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ
what one-aims-at not one-gets such-as also to-the lyre-singer the(-man)
ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω·
promising and the better he-should-sing so-much more
εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν
at dawn but to-(him)-demanding the promises for pleasure pleasure
ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο,
to-have-rendered he-said if indeed then each this wished
ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὃ μὲν τέρψιν ὃ δὲ
sufficiently — it-would-have-been if but the-one indeed delight the-other and
κέρδος, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἔχει ὃ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
gain and the-one indeed has the-other and not not — would-be
τὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος
the(-terms) of the association well what for needing
τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν
one-happens-to(-want) to-these also he-attends and-of-that at-least for-the-sake
ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ
these he-will-give the worth but whose to-fix is-it of-the(-one)

προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ᾽
giving-first or of-the(-one) having-received-first the for giving-first seems
ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
to-leave(-it) to-that(-one) which-precisely they-say also Protagoras to-do
ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν
when for he-taught anything to-value(-it) the learner he-bade
ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.
as-much-as it-seems worth to-know and he-took so-much
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ᾽ ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ μισθὸς δ᾽ ἀνδρί.
in the such and to-some (is)-pleasing the wage and for-a-man
οἱ δὲ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες
the and taking-beforehand the money then nothing doing
ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν,
of-what they-said through the excesses of-the promises
εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν
reasonably in complaints come not for they-fulfill
ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ
what they-agreed this and perhaps to-do the sophists
ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν
are-compelled through the no-one — would-give money for-what
ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν,
they-know these indeed then of-what they-took the wage
μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς
not doing reasonably in complaints are in which(-cases)
δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν
but not comes agreement of-the service the(-ones) indeed
δι᾽ αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι
for themselves giving-first it-has-been-said that (are)-not-open-to-complaint
(τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν φιλία), τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε
such for (is)-the according-to virtue friendship the return and
ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου
one-must-make according-to the choice this for (is)-of-the friend

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)· οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας
and of-the virtue so and it-seems also to-those philosophy
κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται,
having-shared(-in) not for by money the worth is-measured
τιμή τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν,
honor and equal-in-weight not — could-come-about but perhaps (it-is)-sufficient
καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.
just-as also toward gods and toward parents the possible
μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα
not such and being the gift but for something most
μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν
indeed perhaps must the return to-come-about seeming to-both
κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον
according-to worth to-be if but this not should-happen not only
ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ
necessary it-would-seem — the(-one) having-received-first to-fix(-it) but
καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν
also just as-much-as for this-one was-benefited or for as-much-as the
ἡδονὴν εἵλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει
pleasure he-would-have-chosen — so-much having-received-in-return he-will-have
τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω
the from this-one worth and for in the things-for-sale so
φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων
appears happening in-some-places and there-are laws of-the voluntary
συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε,
contracts lawsuits not to-be as one-ought with-whom one-trusted
διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ
to-settle toward this-one just-as he-entered-the-partnership to-whom for
ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ
it-was-entrusted this-one thinks juster to-be to-fix(-it) than-the(-one)
ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ
having-entrusted(-it) the many for not at-the equal value the(-ones)

ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ
having and the(-ones) wishing to-get the for own(-things) and
ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως
what they-give to-each appear of-much worth but nevertheless
ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ
the return comes to so-much as-much-as — fix the
λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ᾽ ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
receivers must but perhaps not so-much to-value(-it) as-much-as
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.
having(-it) it-appears worth but as-much-as before to-have(-it) he-valued(-it)

II · CONFLICTING CLAIMS

Must one obey one's father in everything? Should one repay a benefactor or oblige a comrade, ransom one's ransomer or one's father? Such questions admit no precise answer; as a rule a debt should be repaid, but different things are due to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, and Aristotle gives examples of each.

ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
a-difficulty and contains also the such(-questions) such-as whether one-must
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
all-things to-the father to-assign and to-obey or being-sick
μὲν ἰατρῷ πιστεύειν, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν
indeed a-doctor to-trust as-general and one-must-elect the
πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ
military(-man) likewise and a-friend rather than an-excellent-man
ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον
one-must-serve and to-a-benefactor one-must-return a-favor rather
ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον, ἐὰν ἄμφω μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρ᾽
than to-a-comrade one-must-give if both not be-possible whether
οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον;
then all the such-things precisely indeed to-determine not (is)-easy

πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει
many for and various they-have differences both in-magnitude
καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ
and in-smallness and in-the noble and necessary that but not
πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ τὰς
all-things to-the same(-person) must-be-rendered (is)-not unclear and the
μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον
indeed benefactions must-be-repaid as for the most-part rather
ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφείλει
than one-must-do-favors to-comrades just-as also a-loan to-whom one-owes
ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ
must-be-repaid rather than to-a-comrade must-be-given perhaps but not-even
τοῦτ' ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα
this always such-as for-the(-man) ransomed from robbers whether
τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ
the(-one) having-ransomed(-him) must-he-ransom-in-turn even-if whoever be-he or
μὴ ἑαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα
not having-been-captured demanding but must-he-repay or the father
λυτρωτέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα.
must-he-ransom it-would-seem for — even than-himself more the father
ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον,
as then has-been-said generally indeed the debt must-be-repaid
ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ,
if but outweighs the gift in-the noble or in-the necessary
πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ
toward these one-must-incline sometimes for not-even is equal the
τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον
the previous(-service) to-return when the-one indeed an-excellent-man
εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνηται
knowing(-him) well has-done to-the(-other) and the return comes
ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι
whom he-thinks wicked to-be nor for to-the(-one) having-lent

ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι
sometimes one-must-lend-in-return the-one indeed for thinking to-get(-it)-back
ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι
lent to-a-decent(-man) being the-other and not hopes to-get(-it)-back
παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ
from a-wicked(-man) whether therefore in-the truth so it-is not
ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ
equal (is)-the claim or it-is indeed not so they-think but not
ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται,
— they-would-seem strange-things to-do as then often has-been-said
οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι
the about the passions and the actions discussions alike have
τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
the definiteness with-the(-things) about which they-are that indeed then
οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα,
not the-same-things to-all must-be-rendered nor to-the father all-things
καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ'
just-as nor — to-Zeus is-sacrificed(-everything) (is)-not unclear since and
ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις,
different-things to-parents and to-brothers and to-comrades and to-benefactors
ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον.
to-each the proper and the fitting must-be-assigned
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι
so and also to-do they-appear to weddings indeed for they-invite
τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ
the kinsmen to-these for (is)-common the family and the about
τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται
this indeed actions and to the funerals and most they-think
δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε
must the kinsmen to-meet through the-same(-reason) it-would-seem
δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς
and — of-food indeed to-parents must most to-supply(-them) as

ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ
owing(-it) and to-the causes of-the to-be nobler being than
ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ
to-ourselves in this to-supply(-it) and honor and to-parents just-as
θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ
to-gods not every(-honor) but nor for the same to-father and
μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,
to-mother nor again the of-the wise-man or the of-the general
ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ
but the paternal likewise and also maternal and to-every and
τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ
the elder honor according-to age by-rising-up and
κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ
by-seating and the such toward comrades and again and
ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι
brothers frankness and of-all-things community and to-kinsmen
δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν
and and to-tribesmen and to-fellow-citizens and to-the rest all
ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ
always one-must-try the proper to-assign and to-compare the(-things)
ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ
to-each belonging according-to kinship and virtue or
χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ σύγκρισις, τῶν
usefulness of-the indeed then same-kind easier (is)-the comparison of-the
δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο
and differing more-laborious not indeed through at-least this
ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
one-must-desist but as — it-may-be-possible so one-must-distinguish

Friendships for use or pleasure may end when these fail, but a man deceived about a friend's character has a just complaint. When a friend becomes wicked, one should try to help him if he can be helped. When of two boyhood friends one stays a child in mind, they cannot stay friends, but something is still owed for the former intimacy.

ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ
it-has and a-difficulty also about the to-break-off the friendships or not
πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ
with the(-ones) not remaining(-the-same) or with indeed the(-ones) through the
χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν,
useful or the pleasant friends being when no-longer these they-have
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν
(is-it)-nothing strange to-break-off of-those for they-were friends which
ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις,
having-failed (it-is)-reasonable the not to-love might-complain and — one
εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ
if through the useful or the pleasant loving(-him) he-pretended(-it-was) through
τὸ ἦθος. ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ
the character as for at (the)-beginning we-said most differences
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι
arise for-the friends when not alike they-think and are
φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι
friends when indeed then is-deceived one and supposes to-be-loved
διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν
through the character nothing such that(-one) doing himself
αἰτιῶτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως
he-would-blame — when but by the of-that(-one) pretense
ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον
he-is-deceived (it-is)-just to-complain-of the deceiver and more

ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ
than of-the(-ones) the coinage debasing in-so-far-as about
τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία. ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν,
a-more-valuable(-thing) the villainy if but one-accepts(-him) as good
γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον;
he-becomes and wicked and seems(-so) (is-it)-then still one-must-love(-him)
ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν;
or (is-it)-not possible if-indeed not all-things (are)-lovable but the-good
οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον
nor and lovable (is)-the evil nor must(-one-love-it) a-lover-of-evil
γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ'
for not one-must to-be nor to-be-likened to-a-base(-man) it-has-been-said and
ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυτέον;
that the like to-the like (is)-dear whether then at-once must-one-break-off
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
or not with-all but with-the incurable in the wickedness
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ
capacity-for-correction but having rather one-must-help in the character than
τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον.
the property in-so-far-as (it-is)-better and to-the friendship more-proper
δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν·
it-would-seem and — the(-man) breaking-off nothing strange to-do
οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν
not for to-the such(-man) a-friend he-was changed then unable
ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ'
to-restore(-him) he-withdraws if but the-one indeed should-remain the-other and
ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ,
more-decent should-become and much should-differ in-the virtue
ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ
(is-it)-then must-one-treat(-him-as) a-friend or (is-it)-not possible in great
δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς
and distance most clear (it)-becomes such-as in the childhood

φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ
friendships if for the-one indeed should-remain in-the understanding a-child the-other
δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μήτ'
and a-man should-be such-as (the)-best how — could-they-be friends neither
ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι;
pleased with-the same-things nor delighting and being-pained
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ
nor for about one-another these-things will-belong to-them without and
τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ
these not it-was(-possible) friends to-be to-live-together for not
οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν
possible — it-has-been-said and about these whether then (that)-in-no-way
ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει
otherwise toward him must-one-be-disposed than if not he-had-been
φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης
a-friend ever or one-must remembrance to-have of-the former
συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα
intimacy and just-as for-friends rather than for-strangers we-think
δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον
one-must do-favors so also to-the former(-friends) one-must-assign
τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι'
something through the former friendship when not through
ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.
excess of-wickedness the-breaking-off take-place

The marks of friendship seem to come from a man's relation to himself. The good man is of one mind with himself, wishes and does good for his own sake, spends time with himself gladly, and is his own friend, for a friend is another self. Bad men are at variance with themselves, flee themselves, and some even destroy themselves.

τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς
the friendly(-relations) and the toward the neighbors and (those)-by-which
αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
the friendships are-defined seem from the(-relations) toward oneself
ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ
to-have-come they-define for (as)-a-friend the(-man) wishing and
πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν
doing the-goods or the apparent(-goods) of-that(-one) for-the-sake or the(-man)
βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ
wishing to-be and to-live the friend of-him for-the-sake which-precisely
αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ
the mothers toward the children have-felt and of-the friends the(-ones)
προσκεκρουκότες. οἷς δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ
having-quarreled others and the(-one) spending-time-together and the-same-things
αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ
choosing or the(-one) grieving-with and rejoicing-with the
φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει.
friend most and also this about the mothers happens
τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ
of-these and by-one also the friendship they-define toward oneself and
τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς,
of-these each to-the decent(-man) belongs to-the and rest
ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ
in-so-far-as such they-suppose(-themselves) to-be it-seems and just-as

εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος
has-been-said (that)-measure of-each the virtue and the excellent-man
εἶναι)· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
to-be this-one for is-of-one-mind with-himself and the same-things
ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ
he-desires with all the soul and he-wishes indeed for-himself
τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ
the-goods and the apparent(-goods) and does(-them) of-the for good(-man)
τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ
the-good to-work-out and of-himself for-the-sake of-the for intellectual(-part)
χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται
for-the-sake which-precisely each to-be seems and to-live and he-wishes
ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ.
himself and to-be-preserved and most this by-which he-thinks
ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ
good for for-the excellent-man (is)-the to-be each and for-himself
βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς
wishes the-goods having-become and another chooses no-one
πάντ' ἔχειν (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλ' ὢν
all-things to-have has for even now the god the-good but being
ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος
what ever ever he-is it-would-seem and — the thinking(-part) each
εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ
to-be or most to-spend-time-together and the such(-man) with-himself
βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων
wishes pleasantly for it he-does of-the both for things-done
ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
delightful (are)-the memories and of-the future (his)-hopes
ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ'
(are)-good the such and (are)-pleasant and of-objects-of-contemplation and
εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ'
he-abounds in-the thought he-grieves-with both and rejoices-with most

ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ
with-himself always for is the same-thing painful both and
ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς
pleasant and not at-different-times different unrepentant for so
εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ
to-say by-the indeed toward himself each of-these to-belong to-the
ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν
decent(-man) toward and the friend to-be-disposed just-as toward himself
(ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων
is for the friend another self also the friendship (of)-these
εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.
to-be something seems and friends (are-those)-to-whom these belong
πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω
toward himself and whether there-is or not there-is friendship let-be-dismissed
ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ
for the present it-would-seem and — in-this to-be friendship in-so-far-as
ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ
there-are two or more from the things-said and because the excess
τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται δὲ
of-the friendship to-the(-friendship) toward oneself is-likened appear and
τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις.
the things-said also to-the many to-belong although being base
ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν
whether then in-so-far-as both they-please themselves and suppose(-themselves)
ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε
decent to-be in-this they-share them since of-the at-least
κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ'
utterly base and impious-doers none these belong but
οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· διαφέρονται
not-even appear(-to) nearly and nor to-the base they-are-at-variance
γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ
for with-themselves and other-things indeed they-desire other-things and

βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν
they-wish such-as the uncontrolled they-choose for instead-of the
δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα·
seeming to-themselves good to-be the pleasant harmful being
οἳ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ
the(-others) and again through cowardice and laziness shrink from-the
πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς
to-do what they-think for-themselves best to-be (those)-by-whom
δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν
and many and terrible-things have-been-done also through the wickedness
μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς.
are-hated and flee the living and destroy themselves
ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς
seek and the wicked with whom they-will-spend-the-days themselves
δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν,
but they-flee they-remember for many and unpleasant(-things)
καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων
and such other-things they-expect by themselves being with others
δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν
but being they-forget nothing and lovable having nothing
φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν
friendly they-feel toward themselves nor indeed rejoice-with
οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν
nor grieve-with the such themselves is-in-revolt for of-them
ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν
the soul and the-one indeed through wickedness grieves abstaining
τινων, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ'
from-some-things the-other and takes-pleasure and the-one indeed hither the-other and
ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα
thither pulls just-as tearing-apart if but not possible — at-the-same-time
λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται
to-be-pained and to-take-pleasure but after a-little at-least he-is-pained

ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι
that he-took-pleasure and not — he-would-wish pleasant these to-become
αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται
to-him of-regret for the base are-full not indeed appears
ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ
the base(-man) not-even toward himself in-a-friendly-way to-be-disposed through
τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν
the nothing to-have lovable if indeed the so to-be-disposed
λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως
very is wretched one-must-avoid the wickedness with-all-one's-strength
καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
and one-must-try decent to-be so for also toward himself
φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.
in-a-friendly-way — he-would-be-disposed and to-another a-friend would-become

V · GOODWILL

Goodwill resembles friendship but is not friendship, since it can be felt for strangers and go unnoticed, and it lacks intensity and desire. It arises suddenly, as for competitors in games. It seems a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is of love, and may become friendship with time and intimacy.

ἡ δ' εὔνοια φιλικῷ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι
the and goodwill to-a-friendly(-thing) indeed resembles not indeed it-is
γε φιλία· γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ
at-least friendship arises for goodwill even toward unknown(-people) and
λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται.
unnoticed friendship but not and before and these-things have-been-said
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν,
but nor loving is(-it) not for it-has intensity nor desire
τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ
for-the loving but these follow and the indeed loving (is)-with

συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ
familiarity the but goodwill even from a-sudden(-moment) as also about
τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται
the competitors happens well-disposed for toward-them they-become
καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ
and they-wish-with(-them) would-help-in and — nothing which-precisely
γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως
for we-said suddenly well-disposed they-become and superficially
στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ
they-love it-seems indeed a-beginning of-friendship to-be just-as of-the
ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ
to-love the through the sight pleasure not for having-been-pleased-first by-the
ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
form no-one loves the(-man) but delighting in-the form not-at-all more
ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας
loves but when even absent he-longs-for(-them) and the presence
ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους
desires so indeed also friends not possible — to-be not well-disposed
γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν·
having-become the(-ones) and well-disposed not-at-all more love
βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι,
they-wish for only the-goods (for-those)-to-whom they-are well-disposed
συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.
would-help-in and — nothing nor be-troubled on-behalf-of them
διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν,
therefore transferring(-the-term) might-say one — it idle to-be friendship
χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι
being-prolonged but and into familiarity arriving to-become
φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ·
friendship not the(-one) through the useful nor the(-one) through the pleasant
οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς
nor for goodwill on these arises the indeed for (one)-benefited

ἀνθ᾽ ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν·
in-return-for what he-received renders the goodwill the just-things doing
ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν᾽ εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας
the(-one) and wishing someone to-prosper hope having of-plenty
δι᾽ ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ᾽ εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
through that(-one) not seems well-disposed to-that(-one) to-be but rather
ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα
to-himself just-as nor a-friend if he-courts him through some
χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ᾽ εὔνοια δι᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα
use generally and goodwill through virtue and decency some
γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι
arises when to-someone appears noble someone or brave or something
τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.
such just-as also in-the-case-of the competitors we-said

VI · CONCORD

Concord is not mere agreement of opinion, but agreement about practical matters, as when citizens agree that offices should be elective or that Pittacus should rule. It is political friendship, found among decent men, whose wishes stay fixed and do not ebb and flow like a strait. Bad men cannot agree, each grasping and shirking.

φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ
friendly and also the concord appears therefore not
ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν
it-is identity-of-opinion this indeed for even (to-those)-ignorant-of
ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν
one-another might-belong — nor the(-ones) about anything-whatever
ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν
of-one-mind to-be-in-concord they-say such-as the(-ones) about the
οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν),
heavenly(-things) not for (is)-friendly the about these being-in-concord

ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
but the cities to-be-in-concord they-say when about the
συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται
advantageous(-things) they-are-of-one-mind and the-same-things choose
καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
and do the in-common resolved about the practicable(-things)
δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ
indeed they-are-in-concord and of-these about the(-ones) in magnitude and
ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις,
possible to-both to-belong or to-all such-as the cities
ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν
when to-all it-seems-good the offices elective to-be or to-ally-with
Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.
(the)-Lacedaemonians or to-rule Pittacus when also he-himself was-willing
ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς
when but each himself wishes just-as the(-men) in the
Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ
Phoenissae they-are-in-faction not for it-is being-in-concord the
αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ
same-thing each to-think whatever but the(-thinking-it) in the
αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς
same(-person) such-as when both the people and the decent the
ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται.
best to-rule(-wish) so for to-all comes what they-aim-at
πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ
political indeed friendship appears the concord just-as also
λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ
it-is-called about the advantageous(-things) for it-is and the(-things)
εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν
into the life coming is and the such concord among
τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ
the decent these for both with-themselves are-in-concord and

ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων
with-one-another on the same(-ground) being so to-say of-the such
γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ
for remain the wishes and not flow-back(-and-forth) just-as
εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα,
a-strait they-wish both the just-things and the advantageous-things
τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν
of-these and also in-common they-aim-at the and base not possible
τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι,
— to-be-in-concord except to little(-extent) just-as also friends to-be
πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις
of-graspingness aiming-at in the benefits in and the labors
καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος
and the public-services falling-short for-himself and each
βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ
wishing these-things the neighbor he-scrutinizes and hinders not
γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν
for (they)-watching the common(-good) is-ruined it-happens then
αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς
for-them to-be-in-faction one-another indeed compelling themselves
δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
and not wishing the just-things to-do

Benefactors love those they benefit more than the reverse. Most people say it is like a creditor's concern for his debtor, but Aristotle finds a natural cause: a maker loves his work, as poets love their poems, because existence lies in activity and the work is the maker in activity. The noble deed endures, while the use passes.

οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν
the and benefactors the benefited seem more to-love
ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον
than the well treated the(-ones) having-done(-it) and as contrary-to reason
γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι
happening it-is-inquired-into to-the indeed then most it-appears that
οἳ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν
the-ones indeed owe to-the-others and it-is-owed just-as then
ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι
in-the-case-of the loans the indeed owing wish not to-exist
οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς
(those)-to-whom they-owe the and having-lent even care-for the
τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας
of-the owing(-men) safety so also the(-men) having-benefited
βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς
to-wish to-exist the receivers as going-to-get-back the
χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι.
favors to-the(-others) and not to-be a-concern the to-repay
Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ
Epicharmus indeed then perhaps — would-say these-things to-say them from
πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ
bad(-side) looking it-seems and like-human(-nature) forgetful for
οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.
(are)-the many and more well to-be-treated than to-do aim-at

δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδ'
it-would-seem and — more-natural to-be the cause and not-even
ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ
similar the about the lenders not for there-is loving toward
ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα·
those but of-the to-be-preserved a-wish of-the recovery for-the-sake
οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας
the and well having-done love and cherish the treated
κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν.
even-if in-nothing they-be useful nor in later(-time) would-become —
ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς
which-precisely also in-the-case-of the craftsmen has-happened every(-one)
γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν
for the his-own work loves more than would-be-loved —
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο
by the work ensouled having-become most and perhaps this
περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ
about the poets happens they-overlove for these the
οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ
own poems loving(-them) just-as children such indeed
ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς
seems also the(-case) of-the benefactors the for well treated(-one)
ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ
work is of-them this indeed they-love more than the
ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι
work the(-one) having-made(-it) of-this and (the)-cause (is)-that the to-be
πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ (τῷ ζῆν
for-all (is)-choiceworthy and lovable we-are and by-activity by-the living
γὰρ καὶ πράττειν), ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον
for and acting by-activity and the(-one) having-made the work
ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι.
is in-a-way he-loves indeed the work because also the to-be

τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ
this and (is)-natural what for he-is in-capacity this in-activity
τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ
the work reveals at-the-same-time and also for-the indeed benefactor
καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ
(is)-noble the(-thing) in the action so-that (he)-delights in whom
τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ᾽
this(-is) for-the but receiver nothing noble in the doer but
εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν.
if-anything advantageous this and less (is)-pleasant and lovable
ἡδεῖα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ
pleasant and is of-the indeed present the activity of-the and
μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον
future the hope of-the and past the memory most-pleasant
δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως.
and (is)-the(-thing) according-to the activity and lovable likewise
τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ
for-the indeed then (one)-having-done(-it) remains the work the noble for
πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ
(is)-long-lasting for-the but receiver the useful passes-away the
τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ
both memory of-the indeed noble(-things) (is)-pleasant of-the but useful not
πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν.
altogether or less the expectation and the-reverse to-be seems
καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ
and the indeed loving to-making resembles the to-be-loved and to-the
πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἕπεται τὸ
to-be-acted-on to-the(-ones) superior and in the action follows the
φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα
to-love and the friendly(-things) further and the(-things) laboriously come-about
πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ
all more love such-as also the money the(-ones)

κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ
having-acquired(-it) than-the(-ones) having-inherited(-it) it-seems and the indeed well
πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ
to-be-treated without-labor to-be the(-other) and well to-do laborious through
ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα
these and also the mothers (are)-fonder-of-their-children more-laborious
γὰρ ἡ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὑτῶν.
for (is)-the begetting and more they-know that (they-are)-their-own
δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.
it-would-seem and — this also to-the benefactors proper to-be

VIII · SELF-LOVE

Should a man love himself most? Those who use self-lover as a reproach mean the man who grabs money, honors, and bodily pleasures. But the man who gratifies the most authoritative part of himself, his intellect, is a self-lover in a nobler sense: he will give up money for friends and country, even die for them, and take the noble for himself.

ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα
it-is-puzzled-over and also whether one-must to-love oneself most
ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ'
or another some(-one) they-censure for the(-ones) themselves most
ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι,
loving and as in a-disgraceful(-sense) self-lovers they-call(-them)
δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν,
seems and the indeed base(-man) of-himself for-the-sake all-things to-do
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον —
and the-more — more-wicked he-be the-more more
ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει —
they-accuse indeed him such-as that nothing from himself he-does

ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ,
the but decent(-man) through the noble(-acts) and the-more — better he-be
μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ
more through the noble and of-a-friend for-the-sake the and his-own
παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ
he-passes-over with-the arguments and with-these the facts disagree not
ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα
without-reason they-say for one-must to-love most the most
φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται
friend friend and (is)-most the(-one) wishing for-whom he-wishes
τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ'
the-goods of-that(-one) for-the-sake even if no-one will-know these and
ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ
belong most to-him toward himself and the rest indeed
πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ'
all by-which the friend is-defined it-has-been-said for that from
αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει.
him all the friendly(-things) also toward the others extend
καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ
and the proverbs and all agree such-as the(-sayings)
μία ψυχὴ καὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης καὶ
one soul and common the(-things) of-friends and equality (is)-friendship and
γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστ'
the-knee than-the-shin (is)-nearer all for these toward himself most
ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον
— would-belong most for (he-is)-a-friend to-himself and one-must-love
δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὴ εἰκότως ποτέροις
indeed most oneself it-is-puzzled-over indeed reasonably which
χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς
one-ought to-follow both having the credibility perhaps then the
τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ'
such one-must of-the arguments to-distinguish and to-determine in

ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ
so-far-as each and how they-are-true if indeed we-should-grasp the
φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον.
self-loving how each speak(-of-it) perhaps — would-become clear
οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι
the(-ones) indeed then into reproach bringing it self-lovers call
τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι
the(-ones) to-themselves assigning the larger(-share) in money
καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ
and honors and pleasures the bodily these for the
πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα
many desire and have-been-eager about them as best
ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα
being therefore also fought-over they-are the(-ones) indeed about these
πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι
grasping gratify the appetites and generally the passions
καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί·
and the irrational(-part) of-the soul such and are the many
διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
therefore also the appellation has-arisen from the prevailing(-type)
φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται.
base being justly indeed to-those thus self-loving it-is-reproached
ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ᾽ αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι
that and the(-ones) the such to-themselves assigning are-accustomed
λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ
to-call the many self-lovers (is)-not unclear if for one always
σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων
should-be-eager the just-things to-do himself most of-all
ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς
or the temperate-things or any-whatever others of-the(-things) according-to the
ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς
virtues and generally always the noble for-himself should-secure no-one

ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ
will-call this(-man) a-self-lover nor blame(-him) it-would-seem but — the
τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ
such(-man) more to-be a-self-lover he-assigns at-any-rate to-himself
τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ
the noblest and most good-things and gratifies of-himself the
κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ
most-authoritative(-part) and in-all-things this obeys just-as and
καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ
also a-city the most-authoritative(-element) most to-be seems and
πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ
every other system so also a-man and a-self-lover indeed
μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
most (is)-the(-man) this loving and this gratifying
καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν
and self-controlled and and uncontrolled is-called by-the to-master(-of) the
νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέναι
intellect or not as this each being and to-have-acted
δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα.
seem themselves and voluntarily the(-acts) with reason most
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον,
that indeed then this each is or most (is)-not unclear
καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ.
and that the decent(-man) most this loves
διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος
therefore a-self-lover most — he-would-be according-to another kind
τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ
than-the reproached(-one) and differing so-much as-much-as the
κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι
according-to reason living from-the according-to passion and desiring
ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
either the noble or the seeming to-be-advantageous the indeed then

περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες
about the noble actions exceptionally being-eager all
ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων
welcome and praise all and striving
πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν
for the noble and straining the noblest-things to-do
κοινῇ τ᾽ ἂν πάντ᾽ εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ
in-common both — all would-be the needful(-things) and privately for-each
τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
the greatest of-the goods if-indeed the virtue such is
ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς
so-that the indeed good(-man) must a-self-lover to-be and for himself
ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει),
will-profit the noble-things doing and the others will-benefit
τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς
the but wicked(-man) not must he-will-harm for both himself and the
πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν
neighbors base passions following for-the wicked indeed then
διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικής,
are-discordant what he-must to-do and what he-does the but decent(-man)
ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ
what he-must these also does every for intellect chooses the
βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ.
best for-itself the and decent(-man) obeys the intellect
ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα
(it-is)-true and about the excellent(-man) also the of-the friends for-the-sake
πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ
many-things to-do and of-the fatherland even-if it-be-necessary
ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
to-die-for(-them) he-will-give-up for both money and honors
καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ
and generally the fought-over goods securing for-himself

τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον
the noble a-little for time to-take-pleasure intensely rather
ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς
he-would-choose — than a-long(-time) mildly and to-live nobly
ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ᾽ ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν
a-year than many years indifferently and one action
καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ᾽
noble and great than many and small the(-ones) and
ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ᾽ ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ
dying-for(-others) this perhaps happens they-choose indeed
μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ᾽ ἂν ἐφ᾽
a-great noble(-thing) for-themselves and money they-would-give-up — on
ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
condition-that more will-get the friends comes for to-the
μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον
indeed friend money to-himself and the noble the indeed greater
ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς
good to-himself he-assigns and about honors and also offices
ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται·
the same way all for to-the friend these he-will-give-up
καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ
noble for to-him this and praiseworthy reasonably indeed he-seems
σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν.
excellent to-be instead-of all-things choosing the noble
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι
it-is-possible and also actions to-the friend to-give-up and to-be
κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι.
nobler than-the himself to-do(-it) the cause for-the friend to-become
ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται
in all indeed the praiseworthy(-things) the excellent(-man) appears

ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον
to-himself of-the noble more assigning so indeed then a-self-lover
εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
to-be one-must just-as has-been-said as but the many not one-ought

IX · DOES THE HAPPY MAN NEED FRIENDS?

Some say the self-sufficient need no friends, but it would be strange to give the happy man every good and leave out friends, for man is a political creature. The good man delights in the good actions of a friend, which he can see more easily than his own, and since a friend is another self, he needs to perceive his friend's existence as his own.

ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται
it-is-disputed and also about the happy(-man) whether he-will-need
φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις
friends or not nothing for they-say need of-friends for-the blessed
καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις
and self-sufficient to-belong for to-them the-goods self-sufficient
οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
then being of-nothing (they)-need-in-addition the and friend another
αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν
self being to-provide what through himself he-is-unable whence

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;
when the god well gives what need of-friends

ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι
it-seems and strange the all-things assigning the-goods to-the happy(-man)
φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον
friends not to-assign which seems of-the external goods greatest

εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
to-be if both of-a-friend more it-is the well to-do than to-be-treated(-well)
καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον
and is of-the good(-man) and of-the virtue the to-benefit (it-is)-nobler
δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων
and well to-do friends than-strangers the(-ones) well to-be-treated
δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν
will-need the excellent(-man) therefore also it-is-inquired whether in
εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ
good-fortunes more there-is-need of-friends than in misfortunes as also
τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν
the unfortunate(-man) needing the(-ones) going-to-benefit(-him) and the
εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ
fortunate (those)-whom well they-will-treat strange and perhaps also the
μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ'
solitary to-make the blessed(-man) no-one for would-choose — by
αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
himself the all-things to-have goods political for (is)-the man
καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ'
and to-live-together naturally-disposed also to-the happy(-man) indeed this
ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς
belongs the(-things) for by-the nature good he-has (it-is)-clear and that
μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν
with friends and decent(-people) (it-is)-better than with strangers and the
τυχόντων συνημερεύειν. δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων.
chance(-comers) to-spend-the-days there-is-need then for-the happy(-man) of-friends
τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ
what then do-they-mean the first(-party) and how are-they-right or
ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι;
(is-it)-that the many friends think the useful to-be
τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ
of-the such indeed then nothing will-need the blessed(-man) since

τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ,
the-goods belong to-him nor indeed of-the(-ones) through the pleasant
ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται
or to little(-extent) pleasant for the life being(-already) nothing needs
ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων
imported pleasure not needing and the such friends
οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν
not he-seems to-need friends the but not is perhaps true at
ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις
(the)-beginning for it-has-been-said that the happiness activity some
ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει
is the and activity (it-is)-clear that comes-to-be and not belongs
ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν
just-as possession some if and the to-be-happy is in the living
καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ
and being-active of-the and good(-man) the activity (is)-excellent and
ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ
pleasant in itself just-as at (the)-beginning was-said is and
καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς
also the own(-thing) of-the pleasant(-things) to-contemplate and more the
πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
neighbors we-are-able than ourselves and the of-those actions than
τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
the own the of-the excellent and actions friends being
ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει
(are)-pleasant to-the good both for they-have the by-the nature
ἡδέα)· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται,
pleasant(-qualities) the blessed(-man) indeed friends such will-need
εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας,
if-indeed to-contemplate he-chooses actions decent and his-own
τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.
such and (are)-the(-actions) of-the good friend being

οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. μονώτῃ μὲν
they-think and one-must pleasantly to-live the happy(-man) for-a-solitary indeed
οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν
then hard (is)-the life not for easy by oneself to-be-active
συνεχῶς, μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται
continuously with others and also toward others easier it-will-be
οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ὃ
then the activity more-continuous pleasant being in itself which
δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ
must about the blessed(-man) to-be the for excellent(-man) in-so-far-as
σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ᾽
(he-is)-excellent in-the according-to virtue actions delights in-the and
ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς
from vice is-vexed just-as the musical(-man) in-the beautiful
μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο
tunes takes-pleasure at and the base is-pained might-come-about
δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν
and — also training some of-the virtue from the living-together
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον
with-the good just-as also Theognis says more-naturally
δ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ
and (to-those)-considering it-seems the excellent friend to-the excellent(-man)
τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
by-the nature choiceworthy to-be the for by-the nature good
εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ᾽
it-has-been-said that to-the excellent(-man) good and pleasant is in
αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,
itself the and living they-define for-the animals by-capacity of-perception
ἀνθρώποις δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς
for-men and of-perception or of-thought the and capacity to

τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ·
the activity is-referred the and decisive(-thing) (is)-in the activity
ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν.
it-seems indeed the living to-be strictly the to-perceive or to-think
τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων·
the and living (is)-of-the in itself good and pleasant(-things)
ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ
definite for the and definite (is)-of-the of-the-good nature the
δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν
and by-the nature good (is)-also to-the decent(-man) therefore it-seems to-all
ἡδὺ εἶναι· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ
pleasant to-be not one-must and to-take(-as-an-example) a-wicked life and
διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη,
corrupted nor in pains indefinite for (is)-the such
καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις
just-as the(-things) belonging to-it in the following(-discussions)
δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν
and about the pain it-will-be clearer if and itself the living
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι
(is)-good and pleasant it-seems and also from the all desiring
αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις
of-it and most the decent and blessed to-these
γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
for the life (is)-most-choiceworthy and the of-these most-blessed
ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι
life the and seeing(-man) that he-sees perceives and the hearing(-man) that
ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
he-hears and the walking(-man) that he-walks and in-the-case-of the others
ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε
likewise there-is something the perceiving that we-are-active so-that
ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν,
if we-perceive that we-perceive and-if we-think that we-think

τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ
the and that we-perceive or we-think (is-to-perceive)-that we-are the
γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι
for to-be was perceiving or thinking the and to-perceive that
ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή,
one-lives (is)-of-the pleasant(-things) in itself by-nature for good (is)-life
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ),
the and good belonging in oneself to-perceive (is)-pleasant
αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ
choiceworthy and the living and most to-the good because the
εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ
to-be good is to-them and pleasant being-conscious for
τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται), ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει
of-the in itself good take-pleasure as and toward himself is-disposed
ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
the excellent(-man) (so)-also toward the friend another for self the
φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν
friend is just-as then the himself to-be choiceworthy is
ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.
for-each so also the(-being) the friend or nearly(-so)
τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
the and to-be was choiceworthy through the to-perceive himself good
ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν.
being the and such perception (is)-pleasant in itself
συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο
to-be-conscious then one-must also of-the friend that he-is this
δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων
and would-come-about — in the living-together and sharing words
καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ
and thought so for — would-seem the living-together in-the-case-of
τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
the men to-be-meant and not just-as in-the-case-of the

βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ
cattle the in the same(-place) to-feed if indeed for-the
μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει
blessed(-man) the to-be choiceworthy is in itself good by-the nature
ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν,
being and pleasant similar and also the of-the friend is(-being)
κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ
and-so the friend of-the choiceworthy(-things) would-be what and is for-him
αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται.
choiceworthy this must to-belong to-him or in-this deficient he-will-be
δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.
there-will-be-need then for-the(-one) going-to-be-happy of-friends excellent

X · HOW MANY FRIENDS?

Should one make as many friends as possible? Of the useful, a few suffice, and of the pleasant, a few, like seasoning in food. Of good friends there is a limit, as with a city: as many as one can live with. Celebrated friendships come in pairs, and the man of many friends is a friend to none, except in a civic way.

ἆρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ
whether then as many-as-possible friends must-one-make or just-as
ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ μήτε
in-the-case-of the hospitality aptly to-have-been-said it-seems neither
πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει
with-many-guests nor without-guests also in-the-case-of the friendship it-will-fit
μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν;
neither friendless to-be nor again with-many-friends to excess
τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν
to-the(-friends) indeed indeed for use even very would-seem to-fit
τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ
the thing-said many for to-serve-in-return (is)-laborious and not

ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν
sufficient (is)-the life it to-do the more indeed than-the(-ones)
πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς
for the own life sufficient (are)-superfluous and hindrances to
τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς
the nobly living not-at-all then there-is-need of-them also the(-ones) for
ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα.
pleasure and suffice few just-as in the food the seasoning
τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν,
the and excellent(-friends) (should-they-be)-whether most in number
ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως;
or is-there some limit also of-a-friendly number just-as of-a-city
οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ
neither for from ten men would-become — a-city nor from
δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν
ten myriads still a-city is(-it) the and quantity not is
ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων.
perhaps one some(-number) but any the between some fixed(-points)
καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι
and of-friends indeed there-is a-number fixed and perhaps the most
μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει
with whom — could one to-live-together this for seemed
φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν
most-friendly to-be that and not possible — with-many to-live-together
καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ
and to-distribute oneself not unclear further and those-too must
ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων
with-one-another friends to-be if they-are-to all with one-another
συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν.
to-spend-the-days this and (is)-laborious among many to-be-the-case
χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν
hard and becomes also the to-rejoice-with and the to-grieve-with

οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ
intimately with-many likely for to-coincide at-the-same-time with-one
μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει
indeed to-be-pleased-with with-another and to-be-grieved-with perhaps then well it-is
μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι
not to-seek as most-many-friended to-be but so-many as-many-as
εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν
for the living-together (are)-sufficient nor for to-be-possible it-would-seem —
πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων·
to-many to-be a-friend intensely therefore not-even to-love more(-than-one)
ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς
an-excess for some to-be wishes of-friendship this and (is)-toward
ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν
one and the intense indeed toward few so and to-be(-the-case)
ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι
seems also in-the-case-of the facts not become for friends
πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι
many according-to the comradely friendship the(-pairs) and celebrated-in-song
ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως
in twos are-spoken-of the and many-friended and with-all intimately
ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς,
meeting to-no-one seem to-be friends except in-a-civic-way
οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι
whom also they-call obsequious in-a-civic-way indeed then it-is-possible
πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς
with-many to-be a-friend and not obsequious being but as truly
ἐπιεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι
decent through virtue but and through themselves not it-is(-possible)
πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.
toward many (it-is)-desirable and even few to-find such

Friends are needed in good fortune and in bad. In misfortune their presence lightens grief, though a manly man will not make friends share his pain. One should invite friends to share good fortune eagerly and bad fortune reluctantly, and go to friends in misfortune unbidden, but be slow to be benefited by their good fortune.

πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ
whether and in good-fortunes more of-friends (there-is)-need or
ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε
in misfortunes in both for they-are-sought-after the both
γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες
for unfortunate need help the and fortunate
συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ
companions and (those)-whom well they-will-treat they-wish for
εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις,
well to-do more-necessary indeed indeed in the misfortunes
διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς
therefore the useful(-ones) here are-needed nobler and in the
εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ
good-fortunes therefore also the decent they-seek these for
αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν.
(it-is)-more-choiceworthy to-benefit and with these to-spend-time
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ
is for also the presence itself of-the friends pleasant both
ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται
in the good-fortunes and in the misfortunes are-lightened
γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν
for the grieving grieving-with(-them) the friends therefore even
ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν,
might-be-puzzled one whether just-as of-a-burden they-take-a-share

ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ
or this indeed not the presence but of-them pleasant being and
ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ
the thought of-the to-grieve-with lesser the pain makes whether
μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,
indeed then through these or through another something they-are-lightened
ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε
let-be-dismissed to-happen and anyway appears the thing-said it-seems
δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι.
and the presence mixed some of-them to-be
αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε
itself indeed for the to-see the friends (is)-pleasant otherwise both
καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ
and to-one-in-misfortune and comes-about some help toward the not
λυπεῖσθαι (παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει
to-be-pained consoling for (is)-the friend both by-the sight
καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος
and by-the word if he-be tactful he-knows for the character
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται)· τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον
and at what he-takes-pleasure and is-pained the and grieving
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ
to-perceive at the his-own misfortunes (is)-painful everyone for
φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν
avoids of-pain the-cause to-be to-the friends therefore the indeed
ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους
manly the nature take-care to-make-share-pain the friends
αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις
with-themselves and-if not he-be-exceedingly-beyond in-the painlessness the to-those
γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ
arising pain not he-endures(-it) wholly and fellow-lamenters not
προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια
he-admits through the not-even himself to-be given-to-lament womenfolk

δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι,
and also the such men in-the(-ones) groaning-with(-them) delight
καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ'
and love(-them) as friends and fellow-grievers to-imitate but
ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς
in all-things one-must (it-is)-clear that the better(-man) the and in the
εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
good-fortunes of-the friends presence the both spending-of-time pleasant
ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
has and the thought that they-take-pleasure at the his-own goods
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς
therefore it-would-seem — one-must to indeed the good-fortunes to-invite the
φίλους προθύμως (εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν), εἰς δὲ
friends eagerly beneficent for to-be (is)-noble to but
τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ
the misfortunes hesitating to-share for as least one-must
τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. μάλιστα δὲ
of-the evils whence the enough I being-unfortunate(-am) most and
παρακλητέον ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ'
one-must-summon(-them) when they-are-going-to a-little being-troubled greatly
αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν
him to-benefit to-go and conversely perhaps it-befits to indeed
τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ
the unfortunate unbidden and eagerly (it-is)-of-a-friend for
εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας·
well to-do and most the(-ones) in need and not having-asked
ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας
for-both for (it-is)-nobler and pleasanter to but the good-fortunes
συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία
cooperating indeed eagerly also for for these (there-is)-need
φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ
of-friends toward good-cheer but leisurely not for (is)-noble the

προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ
to-be-eager to-be-benefited the-appearance but of-disagreeableness in the
διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ
to-reject perhaps one-must-beware sometimes for it-happens the
παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται.
presence indeed of-the friends in all(-circumstances) choiceworthy appears

XII · LIVING TOGETHER

As lovers prize sight, friends prize living together, and each spends the days with his friends in what he loves most: drinking, dicing, exercising, hunting, or philosophizing. Bad men become worse through such friendship, good men better, for they take the impress of one another. Pleasure is to be discussed next.

ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν
whether then just-as for-the lovers the to-see most-desirable
ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς
is and rather they-choose this the sense than the
λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος
rest as according-to this most the love being
καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ
and arising so also for-the friends most-choiceworthy is the
συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
living-together a-partnership for (is)-the friendship and as toward himself
ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ
he-is-disposed so also toward the friend about himself and the
αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ
perception that he-is (is)-choiceworthy and about the friend indeed the
δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως
and activity comes-about of-it in the living-together so-that reasonably
τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ
this they-aim-at and what ever is for-each the to-be or

οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων
of-what for-the-sake they-choose the living in this with the friends
βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
they-wish to-spend-time therefore some indeed drink-together others and
συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν
dice-together others and exercise-together and hunt-together
ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ
or philosophize-together each in this spending-the-days what
τι περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν
ever ever most they-love of-the(-things) in the life to-live-together
γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ
for wishing with the friends these-things they-do and
τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ
these they-share by-which they-think to-live-together it-becomes then the
μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά (κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων
indeed of-the base friendship wicked they-share for in-base-things
ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι
unstable being and wicked and become being-made-like
ἀλλήλοις), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη
to-one-another the and of-the decent (is)-decent growing-together
ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες
with-the associations they-seem and also better to-become being-active
καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων
and correcting one-another they-take-the-impress for from one-another
οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά.
(of-what) they-are-pleased-by whence of-noble(-men) indeed for from noble-things
περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον
about indeed then friendship to so-much let-it-have-been-said following
δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.
and — it-would-be to-discuss about pleasure

BOOK X

I · WHY PLEASURE MUST BE DISCUSSED

Pleasure is bound up with our nature, which is why the young are steered by pleasure and pain, and why the great thing for virtue of character is to enjoy and hate the right things. Some call pleasure the good, others call it utterly base — the second sometimes as a corrective, expecting that men pushed the other way will end at the middle. Aristotle answers that in matters of action words are trusted less than deeds, so a false argument here does real harm.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα
after and these about pleasure perhaps it-follows to-go-through most
γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι
for it-seems to-have-been-made-akin to-the kind of-us therefore they-educate
τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
the young steering by-pleasure and by-pain it-seems and also toward
τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ
the of-the character virtue greatest to-be the to-rejoice in-what one-must
καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς
and to-hate what one-must extends for these through all
τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ
the life weight having and power toward virtue both and
τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται,
the happy life the-things indeed for pleasant they-choose
τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ᾽
the-things and painful they-flee about and the such-things least
ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν
— it-would-seem must-be-passed-over to-be otherwise both and much
ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν
having dispute the-ones indeed for the-good pleasure
λέγουσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν
call the-others and from the-contrary utterly base the-ones indeed

ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι
perhaps having-been-persuaded so also to-be the-others and thinking
βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν
better to-be toward the life of-us to-declare the pleasure
τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς
of-the base-things and if not it-is to-incline for the many
πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν
toward it and to-be-slaves to-the pleasures therefore to-be-necessary
εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον.
to the-contrary to-lead to-come for — so to the mean
μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν
perhaps after-all and not well this is-said the for about the-things
ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ
in the passions and the actions accounts less are trustworthy
τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν
than-the deeds whenever then they-are-out-of-tune with-the-things according-to the
αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ ταὐληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν·
perception being-despised also the-truth they-destroy-besides
ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς ποτ' ἐφιέμενος,
the-man for blaming the pleasure having-been-seen once reaching-for
ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν·
to-lean seems toward it as such being all
τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ
the to-distinguish for not is of-the many they-seem then the
ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι
true of-the accounts not only toward the to-know most-useful
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς
to-be but also toward the life in-tune for being with-the
ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας
deeds they-are-believed therefore they-urge those understanding

ζῆν κατ᾽ αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ
to-live according-to them of-the indeed then such-things enough the-things
δ᾽ εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.
and said about the pleasure let-us-go-over

II · EUDOXUS AND HIS CRITICS

Eudoxus argued that pleasure is the good because all things aim at it, and his arguments were believed for his character rather than themselves, since he was thought exceptionally temperate. Plato answered that the pleasant life with practical wisdom is better than without it, so pleasure is not the good, because nothing added to the good makes it more choiceworthy. Aristotle grants the point but refuses the further claim that pleasure is no good at all.

Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετ᾽ εἶναι διὰ τὸ
Eudoxus indeed then the pleasure the-good thought to-be through the
πάνθ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι
all-things to-see reaching-for it both rational and irrational in all
δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον·
and to-be the choiceworthy the decent and the most (is)-best
τὸ δὴ πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο
the indeed all-things toward the-same to-be-carried to-show that for-all this
ἄριστον ὄν (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ
best being each-thing for the for-itself good to-find just-as
καὶ τροφήν), τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται,
also food the and for-all good and what all-things reach-for
τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ
the-good to-be were-believed and the arguments through the of-the
ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ αὑτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ
character virtue rather than through themselves exceedingly for
ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει
he-seemed temperate to-be not indeed as a-friend of-the pleasure he-seemed

ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἧττον
these to-say but so to-stand according-to truth not less
δ' ᾤετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην
and he-thought to-be evident from the contrary the for pain
καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον
in itself for-all to-be-avoided to-be likewise indeed the-contrary
αἱρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον
(is)-choiceworthy most and to-be choiceworthy what not through another
μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως
nor of-another for-the-sake we-choose such and confessedly
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα
to-be the pleasure no-one for to-ask of-what for-the-sake
ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.
he-takes-pleasure as in itself being choiceworthy the pleasure
προστιθεμένην τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον
being-added-to and to-anything-whatever of-the goods more-choiceworthy
ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι
to-make such-as to-the to-act-justly and to-be-temperate to-be-increased
δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ. ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν
and the good by-itself seems indeed this at-least the argument of-the
ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν
goods it to-declare and nothing more than-another everything
γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον.
for with another good (is)-more-choiceworthy than being-isolated
τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν
by-such-a indeed argument also Plato refutes that not is
ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον
pleasure the-good more-choiceworthy for to-be the pleasant life
μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ
with practical-wisdom than apart if and the mixed (is)-better not
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ
to-be the pleasure the-good of-nothing for having-been-added to-it

τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο
the-good more-choiceworthy to-become (is)-clear and that nor another
οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ
anything the-good — would-be which with something of-the in itself
ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ
goods more-choiceworthy becomes what then is such in-which
καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ'
also we share such for is-sought those and
ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν
objecting that not (is)-good what all-things reach-for perhaps nothing
λέγουσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ
say what for to-all seems these to-be we-say the-man
δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.
and destroying this the belief not at-all more-credible-things will-say
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν
if indeed for the senseless-things reach-for them there-would-be —
τι λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν
something being-said if and also the practically-wise(-beings) how could-they-say
ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν
— anything perhaps and also in the base-things there-is something natural
ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου
good better than according-to themselves which reaches-for the proper
ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
good not it-seems and nor about the contrary well to-be-said
οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν
not for they-say if the pain an-evil is the pleasure good
εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ
to-be to-be-opposed for also an-evil to-an-evil and both to-the
μηδετέρῳ — λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν
neither saying these not badly not indeed in at-least the
εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν τῶν κακῶν καὶ
things-said speaking-truly of-both for being of-the evils also

φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον
to-be-avoided it-was-necessary both to-be of-the neither and neither
ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν,
or alike now and they-appear the-one indeed fleeing as an-evil
τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.
the-other and choosing as good so indeed also they-are-opposed

III · PLEASURE IS NOT A PROCESS

Pleasure is not ruled out as a good for not being a quality or for admitting degrees, and it is no motion. Pain is said to be a want and pleasure its filling, but that fits only the pleasures of food: learning, smell, sights, sounds, memory, and hope fill no want. Pleasures differ in kind, since the just man's pleasure cannot be had by the unjust; and no one would choose a child's mind for life, so pleasure is not the good, though some pleasures are choiceworthy in themselves.

οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ
not indeed nor if not of-the qualities is the pleasure through
τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι
this nor of-the goods nor for the of-the virtue activities
ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν
qualities are nor the happiness they-say and the indeed
ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι
good to-have-been-limited the and pleasure unlimited to-be because
δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι
it-admits the more and less if indeed then from the to-take-pleasure
τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
this they-judge also about the justice and the other
ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς
virtues according-to which evidently they-say more and less the
ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται
of-such-kinds to-be-so and to-act according-to the virtues it-will-be

ταὐτά· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι
the-same just for they-are more and brave it-is-possible
δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
and also to-act-justly and to-be-temperate more and less
εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν
if and by-the pleasures perhaps after-all not they-say the cause if
ὦσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει,
there-are the-ones indeed unmixed the-others and mixed and what prevents
καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
just-as health limited being admits the more and
ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν
less so also the pleasure not for the same proportion in
πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη
all-cases is nor in the same one some always but slackening
διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
it-persists until a-point and it-differs by-the more and less
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
such indeed also the about the pleasure it-is-possible to-be
τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς
complete both the-good positing the and motions and the
γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν
comings-to-be incomplete the pleasure a-motion and a-coming-to-be
ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ'
to-declare they-try not well and they-seem to-speak nor
εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ
to-be a-motion to-every for proper to-be seems speed and
βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς
slowness and if not in itself such-as to-the of-the universe toward
ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι
another to-the and pleasure of-these neither belongs to-take-pleasure
μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ'
indeed for it-is-possible quickly just-as to-be-angered to-take-pleasure and

οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα
not nor toward another to-walk and also to-grow and all
τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως
the such-things to-change indeed then into the pleasure quickly
καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ
and slowly it-is-possible to-be-active and according-to it not
ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι. γένεσίς τε πῶς
it-is-possible quickly I-mean and to-take-pleasure a-coming-to-be and how
ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν
— would-it-be it-seems for not from the chance-thing the chance-thing
γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ
to-come-about but from what it-comes-about into this to-be-dissolved and
οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά.
of-what a-coming-to-be (is)-the pleasure of-this the pain (is)-destruction
καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
and they-say and the indeed pain a-want of-the according-to nature
εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά
to-be the and pleasure a-filling-up these and bodily
ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις
are the affections if indeed it-is of-the according-to nature a-filling-up
ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο·
the pleasure in what the filling-up this — also would-take-pleasure
τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις
the body then not it-seems and nor is then the filling-up
ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ'
pleasure but happening indeed a-filling-up would-take-pleasure
ἄν τις, καὶ †τεμνόμενος† λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη
— someone and being-cut would-be-pained the opinion and this
δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ
seems to-have-arisen from the about the food pains and
ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας
pleasures in-want for having-become and having-been-pained-beforehand

ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας
to-take-pleasure in-the filling-up this and not about all
συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ
happens the pleasures painless for are the both mathematical
καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως,
and of-the according-to the senses the through the smell
καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ
and hearings and also sights many and memories and
ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ
hopes of-what then these comings-to-be will-be of-nothing for
ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς
a-want has-arisen of-which would-come-about — a-filling-up toward
δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν
and those bringing-forward the reproachable of-the pleasures
λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα (οὐ γὰρ εἰ
would-say someone — that not are these pleasant not for if
τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ
for-those badly disposed pleasant they-are one-must-think them
καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς
also pleasant to-be except for-these just-as nor the-things for-the
κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ
sick healthful or sweet or bitter nor again white
τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν)· ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις
the-things appearing to-the sore-eyed or so would-say someone
ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε
— that the indeed pleasures choiceworthy are not indeed from at-least
τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὔ, καὶ
these just-as also the to-be-rich for-one-having-betrayed and not and
τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι· ἢ τῷ εἴδει
the to-be-healthy not indeed anything-whatever for-one-having-eaten or in-the form
διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν
they-differ the pleasures different for the-ones from the noble-things

τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι
from-the-ones from the shameful-things and not it-is-possible to-take-pleasure
τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ
the of-the just-man not being just nor the of-the musician
μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
not being musical likewise and also in the others
ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος
to-make-evident and seems also the friend different being from-the flatterer
οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὁ μὲν
not being good the pleasure or different in-form the-one indeed
γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν,
for toward the-good to-associate seems the-other and toward pleasure
καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς
and the-one indeed is-reproached the-other and they-praise as toward
ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου
different-things associating no-one and — would-choose to-live of-a-child
διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία
understanding having through life taking-pleasure in what-things the children
ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν
as possible — most nor to-rejoice doing something of-the
αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε
most-shameful-things never being-about to-be-pained about many-things and
σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν,
zeal we-would-make — even if none it-should-bring pleasure
οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ
such-as to-see to-remember to-know the virtues to-have if and from
ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα
necessity follow these pleasures nothing it-matters we-would-choose
γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι
for — these even if not should-come from them pleasure that
μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή,
indeed then neither the-good the pleasure nor every (is)-choiceworthy

δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς
(is)-clear it-seems to-be also that there-are some choiceworthy in themselves
διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν
differing in-the form or from what-things the-things indeed then
λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.
said about the pleasure and pain sufficiently let-it-have-been-said

IV · WHAT PLEASURE IS

Seeing is complete at any moment, and so is pleasure; it is therefore not a motion, since every motion takes time and aims at an end. Pleasure completes an activity, not as a state within it but as something supervening, like the bloom on those in their prime. No one is pleased continuously, since no human activity is continuous, and men reach for pleasure because they reach for life.

τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποιόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ'
what and it-is or of-what-sort something more-evident it-would-become
ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ'
— from beginning for-those-taking-it-up it-seems for the indeed seeing over
ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς
any-whatever time complete to-be not for it-is lacking of-anything
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος·
which into later becoming will-complete of-it the form
τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί,
to-such-a-thing and it-resembles also the pleasure a-whole for something it-is
καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ
and over no time would-take someone — a-pleasure of-which over
πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ
more time occurring will-be-completed the form therefore
οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους
nor a-motion is in time for (is)-every motion and of-an-end

τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ
some such-as the house-building and (is)-complete whenever it-makes what
ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ
it-aims-at either in all indeed the time or in-this in and
τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι
the parts and in-the time all (are)-incomplete and different
τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων
in-the form from-the whole and from-one-another the for of-the stones
σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται
putting-together (is)-different from-the of-the column fluting and these
τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία
from-the of-the temple making and the indeed of-the temple (is)-complete
(οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον), ἡ δὲ τῆς
of-nothing for lacking toward the thing-proposed the and of-the
κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα.
foundation and of-the triglyph (is)-incomplete of-a-part for each
τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ
in-the form then they-differ and not it-is-possible in any-whatever time
λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι.
to-take a-motion complete in-the form but if-indeed in the whole
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν
likewise and also in walking and of-the rest if for is
ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ'
the locomotion a-motion from-where to-where also of-this differences according-to
εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ'
kinds flying walking leaping and the such-things not only and
οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ
so but also in itself the walking the for from-where to-where
οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ
(is)-not the same in the race-course and in the part and in another
μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε
part and in another nor the to-traverse the line this

κἀκείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
and-that not only for a-line does-it-pass-through but also in
τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν
a-place being in another and this-one than-that with exactness indeed
οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν
then about motion in other-places it-has-been-said it-seems and not in
ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ
all time complete to-be but the many (are)-incomplete and
διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν.
differing in-the form if-indeed the from-where to-where (is)-form-making
τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον
of-the pleasure and in any-whatever time (is)-complete the form (is)-clear
οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων
then that different both — they-would-be from-one-another and of-the wholes
τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ
something and complete-things the pleasure it-would-seem and — this also
ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι
from the not to-be-possible to-be-moved not in time to-take-pleasure
δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον
and the for in the now (is)-a-whole something from these and (is)-clear
καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν
also that not well they-say a-motion or a-coming-to-be to-be the
ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν
pleasure not for of-all-things these are-said but of-the divisible
καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ
and not whole nor for of-seeing is a-coming-to-be nor
στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ
of-a-point nor of-a-unit nor of-these any (is)-a-motion nor
γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ
a-coming-to-be nor indeed of-pleasure a-whole for something of-perception and
πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ
of-all toward the perceptible being-active completely and of-the well

διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν
disposed toward the noblest of-the-things under the perception
(τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν
such for most to-be seems the complete activity it
δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω),
and to-call to-be-active or in which it-is nothing let-it-differ
καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ
according-to each indeed best is the activity of-the
ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν.
best disposed toward the best of-the-things under it
αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν
this and — most-complete would-be and most-pleasant according-to every
γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ
for perception is pleasure likewise and also thought and
θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ'
contemplation most-pleasant and (is)-the most-complete most-complete and
ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν
(is)-the of-the well being toward the most-excellent of-the-things
ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν
under it completes and the activity the pleasure not the
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν
same and way the both pleasure completes and the perceptible
τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια
both and the perception excellent being just-as nor the health
καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ'
and the physician alike a-cause is of-the to-be-healthy according-to
ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμὲν
each and perception that arises pleasure (is)-clear we-say
γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δῆλον δὲ καὶ
for sights and hearings to-be pleasant (is)-clear and also
ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς
that most whenever the both perception is strongest and toward

τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
such-an-object it-is-active such and being the both perceptible and
τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε
the perceiver always there-will-be pleasure being-present at-least
τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν
the both thing-acting and the thing-affected completes and the
ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς
activity the pleasure not as the state being-present-within but as
ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.
supervening something end such-as for-the men-in-their-prime the bloom
ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ
as-long-as — then the both intelligible or perceptible is such-as one-must
καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ
and the thing-judging or contemplating will-be in the activity the
ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν
pleasure alike for being and toward one-another the same
τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ
way standing the both passive and the active
ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται;
the-same is-by-nature to-come-about how then no-one continuously takes-pleasure
ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς
or is-wearied all for the human-things are-unable continuously
ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ
to-be-active not comes-about then nor pleasure it-follows for the
ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ
activity some-things and delight new being later and not
ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται
alike through the-same the indeed for first has-been-summoned
ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ
the thought and intently about them is-active just-as
κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη
in the sight those gazing afterward and not such

ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ
(is)-the activity but neglected therefore also the pleasure
ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν
is-dimmed to-reach-for and the pleasure would-think someone —
ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ
all-men because also of-the to-live all reach-for the and life
ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις
activity some is and each-man about these and by-these
ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ
is-active what also most he-cherishes such-as the indeed musician by-the
ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ
hearing about the songs the and lover-of-learning by-the thought about the
θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ'
objects-of-contemplation so and also of-the rest each-man the and
ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται.
pleasure completes the activities and the to-live indeed which they-reach-for
εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ
reasonably then also the pleasure they-reach-for it-completes for for-each
τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν
the to-live choiceworthy being whether and through the pleasure the to-live
αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ
we-choose or through the to-live the pleasure let-it-be-dismissed in the
παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ
present to-have-been-yoked-together indeed for these appear and
χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται
separation not to-admit without both for activity not comes-about
ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.
pleasure every and activity completes the pleasure

Each activity is completed by its own pleasure, and that pleasure sharpens it: men become geometers by enjoying geometry. Pleasures from elsewhere get in the way, as flute-lovers cannot attend to an argument once they hear a flute. Since activities differ in worth, so do their pleasures; and what is pleasant is what appears so to the good man, as what is sweet is what tastes sweet to the healthy man and not to the feverish.

ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα
whence they-seem also in-the form to-differ the-things for different
τῷ εἴδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι (οὕτω γὰρ
in-the form by different-things we-think to-be-completed so for
φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον
it-appears both the natural-things and the-things by craft such-as
ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ οἰκία καὶ
animals and trees and a-painting and a-statue and a-house and
σκεῦος)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας
a-vessel likewise and also the activities the differing
τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι
in-the form by differing-things in-form to-be-completed they-differ
δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ
and the of-the thought from-the according-to the senses and themselves
ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.
from-one-another according-to form and the completing indeed pleasures
φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν
it-would-appear and — this also from the to-have-been-made-akin of-the
ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει
pleasures each to-the activity which it-completes it-increases-together
γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα
for the activity the proper pleasure more for each-thing
κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον
they-judge and work-out-exactly those with pleasure being-active such-as

γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ
geometers become those rejoicing in-the to-do-geometry and
κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι
they-understand each-thing more likewise and also the lovers-of-music
καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς
and lovers-of-building and of-the others each-group advance into
τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ
the proper work rejoicing in-it they-increase-together and the
ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ
pleasures the-things and increasing-together (are)-proper to-the different-things and
τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει.
in-the form also the proper-things (are)-different in-the form
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ᾽ ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων
further and more this — would-appear from the the from other-things
ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι
pleasures hindrances to-the activities to-be those for flute-loving
ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν
are-unable to-the arguments to-attend if they-hear-close-by
αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης
one-playing-the-flute more rejoicing in-flute-playing than-the present
ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ
activity the according-to the flute-playing then pleasure the about
τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
the argument activity destroys likewise and this also in the
ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ
others happens whenever at-the-same-time about two one-is-active the for
ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν
pleasanter the other knocks-out and-if much it-differs according-to the
ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ᾽ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν.
pleasure more so-as not-even to-be-active according-to the other
διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν
therefore rejoicing in-anything-whatever violently not at-all we-do

ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι,
another and other-things we-do in-others mildly being-pleased
οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι
such-as also in the theaters those eating-sweets whenever base
οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ
the competitors are then most it they-do since and the
μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας
indeed proper pleasure works-out-exactly the activities and longer-lasting
καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον
and better makes the-ones and alien mar (is)-clear
ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ
that much they-stand-apart nearly for the alien pleasures
ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς
do which-very-thing the proper pains they-destroy for the
ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν
activities the proper pains such-as if for-someone the to-write
ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ
(is)-unpleasant and painful or the to-reason the-one indeed for not
γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας.
writes the-other and not reasons painful being the activity
συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν
it-happens indeed about the activity the-contrary from the
οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
proper pleasures both and pains proper and are the-ones over the
ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ
activity in itself arising the-ones and alien pleasures
εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν·
it-has-been-said that closely-resembling something to-the pain they-do
φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν
they-destroy for except not alike differing and the
ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν
activities in-decency and in-baseness and the-ones indeed choiceworthy

οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως
being the-others and to-be-avoided the-others and neither alike
ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία
stand also the pleasures according-to each for activity a-proper
ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ
pleasure there-is the indeed then to-the excellent proper (is)-decent the and
τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν
to-the base (is)-wicked and for the appetites of-the indeed noble-things
ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ
(are)-praiseworthy of-the and shameful-things (are)-blameworthy more-proper and
ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἳ μὲν
to-the activities the in them pleasures than-the desires the-ones indeed
γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἳ
for distinguished are both in-the times and in-the nature the-others
δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν
and close to-the activities and undistinguished so so-as to-have
ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
a-dispute whether the-same is the activity as-the pleasure
οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις
not indeed it-seems at-least the pleasure thought to-be nor perception
(ἄτοπον γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι
absurd for but through the not to-be-separated it-appears to-some
ταὐτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.
the-same just-as then the activities (are)-different also the pleasures
διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ
it-differs and the sight from-touch in-purity and hearing and
ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί,
smell from-taste likewise indeed they-differ also the pleasures
καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.
and from-these the-ones about the thought and both-kinds from-one-another
δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ
it-seems and to-be for-each animal also a-pleasure proper just-as also

ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ
a-function the for according-to the activity and in each(-case) and
θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ
observing this — would-appear different for of-a-horse (is)-pleasure and
κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους
of-a-dog and of-a-man just-as Heraclitus says asses
σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ
sweepings — to-choose rather than gold (is)-pleasanter for
χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει
than-gold food for-asses the-ones indeed then of-the different-kinds in-the form
διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον
differ in-form the-ones and of-the same undiffering (it-is)-reasonable
εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων·
to-be they-vary and not a-little in at-least the men
τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς
the-things for same some indeed delight others and pain and to-some
μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά.
indeed painful and hateful are to-others and pleasant and lovable
καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ
and in sweet-things and this happens not for the same
δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν
seem to-the man-with-a-fever and to-the healthy-man nor hot
εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
to-be to-the weak-man and to-the vigorous-man likewise and this also
ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις
in other-cases happens it-seems and in all the such-things
εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς
to-be the thing-appearing to-the excellent-man if and this well
λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ
is-said just-as it-seems and is of-each-thing a-measure the
ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν
virtue and the-good-man in-so-far-as such also pleasures would-be —

αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.
the-ones to-this-man appearing and pleasant-things in-which this-man rejoices
τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν
the-things and to-this-man disagreeable if to-someone appear pleasant nothing
θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων
(is)-surprising many for corruptions and impairments of-men
γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω
occur pleasant and not are but to-these and so
διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον
disposed the-ones indeed then confessedly shameful (is)-clear
ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις·
that not must-be-called pleasures to-be except for-the corrupted
τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον
of-the and decent to-be seeming which-sort or which must-be-called
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις
of-the man to-be or from the activities (is)-clear these
γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ
for follow the pleasures whether then one it-is or more the
τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι
of-the complete and blessed man the-ones these completing
ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ
pleasures strictly would-be-called — of-man pleasures to-be the-ones
δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.
and remaining secondarily and in-a-far-lower-degree just-as the activities

Happiness is an activity chosen for its own sake, and acts of virtue are such acts. Amusements look like happiness because men in power spend their leisure on them, but power is not virtue, and children think whatever they value is best. It would be absurd for the end to be play, and to labor and suffer a whole life for the sake of playing: we play in order to work.

εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας
having-been-discussed and the-things about the virtues both and friendship
καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν,
and pleasures (it)-remains about happiness in-outline to-go-through
ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι
since end it we-set-down of-the human-things for-those-taking-up
δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος.
indeed the things-said-before shorter — would-be the account
εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι
we-said indeed that not it-is a-state and for for-the man-sleeping
διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ
through life it-would-belong — of-plants living a-life and for-the
δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει,
man-faring-badly the greatest(-misfortunes) if indeed these not please
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
but rather into activity some it-must-be-put just-as in the
πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν
earlier-parts it-has-been-said of-the and activities the-ones indeed are
ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς,
necessary and through other-things choiceworthy the-others and in themselves
δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ
(is)-clear that the happiness of-the in themselves choiceworthy some
θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ
it-must-be-put and not of-the through another of-nothing for lacking (is)-the

εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ᾽ αὐτάρκης. καθ᾽ αὑτὰς δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ
happiness but self-sufficient in themselves and are choiceworthy
ἀφ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται
from which nothing is-sought beside the activity such
δ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ
and to-be seem the according-to virtue actions the-things for
καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι᾽ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν.
noble and excellent to-do (are)-of-the through themselves choiceworthy
καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι᾽ ἕτερα
and of-the amusements and the pleasant not for through other-things
αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ
them they-choose they-are-harmed for from them more than
ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως.
they-are-benefited neglecting the bodies and the property
καταφεύγουσι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν
they-take-refuge and in the such pastimes of-those
εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις
called-happy the many therefore among the tyrants
εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι·
are-esteemed those in the such pastimes witty
ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς,
of-what for they-reach-for in these they-offer them themselves pleasant
δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα
they-need and of-such-men it-seems indeed then conducive-to-happiness these
εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν,
to-be through the those in positions-of-power in these to-pass-their-leisure
οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
nothing and perhaps a-sign the such-men are not for in the
δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι
to-hold-power (is)-the virtue nor the intellect from which the excellent
ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς
activities nor if untasting these being of-pleasure pure

καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ
and liberal to the bodily they-take-refuge through
τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
this these one-must-think more-choiceworthy to-be and for the
παῖδες τὰ παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται
children the-things among themselves honored best they-think
εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα
to-be reasonable indeed just-as to-children and to-men different-things
φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν.
appear honorable so also to-base-men and to-decent-men
καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ
just-as then often it-has-been-said also honorable and pleasant are
τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἡ κατὰ
the-things to-the excellent-man such being to-each and the according-to
τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ
the proper state most-choiceworthy activity and to-the excellent-man indeed
ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία·
the according-to the virtue not in amusement then (is)-the happiness
καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι
and for (it-is)-absurd the end to-be amusement and to-labor
καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν.
and to-suffer-hardship the life whole of-the to-play for-the-sake
ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς
everything for as to-say of-another for-the-sake we-choose except the
εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν
happiness end for this to-be-earnest and also to-toil
παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν.
of-amusement for-the-sake silly it-appears and excessively childish
παίζειν δ᾽ ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ᾽ Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς
to-play and so-that one-may-be-earnest according-to Anacharsis rightly
ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες
to-stand it-seems a-rest for it-resembles the amusement being-unable

δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ
and continuously to-toil of-rest they-need not indeed end the
ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ
rest it-comes-about for for-the-sake of-the activity it-seems and the
εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς,
happy life according-to virtue to-be this and (is)-with earnestness
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα
but not in amusement better both we-call the earnest-things
τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ
than-the laughable-things and with amusement and of-the better always
καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν·
both of-a-part and of-a-man more-excellent the activity
ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.
the and of-the better (is)-superior and more-conducive-to-happiness already
ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ
would-enjoy both — the bodily pleasures the chance-man and
ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς
a-slave not less than-the best-man of-happiness and no-one
ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
to-a-slave gives-a-share if not also of-a-life not for in the
τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ'
such pastimes (is)-the happiness but in the according-to
ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.
virtue activities just-as also earlier it-has-been-said

If happiness is activity in accordance with the highest virtue, it will be the activity of the best thing in us, which is intellect. Contemplation is the most continuous of activities, the most self-sufficient — the wise man can do it by himself — and the only one loved for nothing beyond itself. It is a life above a man's own, lived not in so far as he is a man but in so far as something divine is present in him.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια,
if and is the happiness according-to virtue an-activity
εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ
(it-is)-reasonable according-to the best this and — would-be of-the
ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ
best whether indeed intellect this or another something which indeed
κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν
according-to nature seems to-rule and to-lead and understanding
ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ
to-have about noble-things and divine-things whether divine being also itself
εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια
or of-the-things in us the most-divine the of-this activity
κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία.
according-to the proper virtue would-be — the complete happiness
ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ'
that and it-is contemplative it-has-been-said agreeing and this
ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
— would-seem to-be both with-the earlier(-statements) and with-the true
κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια (καὶ γὰρ ὁ
best both for this is the activity and for the
νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ
intellect (is)-of-the-things in us and of-the knowable-things about which
ὁ νοῦς)· ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν γὰρ δυνάμεθα
the intellect further and (it-is)-most-continuous to-contemplate for we-are-able

συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε
continuously more than to-do anything-whatever we-think and
δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστῃ
to-be-necessary pleasure to-have-been-mixed-in with-the happiness most-pleasant
δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν
and of-the according-to virtue activities the according-to the wisdom
ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς
confessedly is it-seems at-any-rate the philosophy wonderful
ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ
pleasures to-have in-purity and in-the steadfast (it-is)-reasonable and
τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.
for-those knowing than-for-those seeking pleasanter the passing-of-time to-be
ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ'
the and so-called self-sufficiency about the contemplative most
ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ
— would-be of-the indeed for toward the to-live necessaries both
σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ
a-wise-man and a-just-man and the rest need with-the and
τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται
such-things sufficiently having-been-supplied the indeed just-man needs
πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
toward whom he-will-act-justly and with whom likewise and also
ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
the temperate-man and the brave-man and of-the others each
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ
the and wise-man even by himself being is-able to-contemplate and
ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως
by-how-much — wiser he-is more better and perhaps
συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι
fellow-workers having but nevertheless (he-is)-most-self-sufficient it-would-seem
τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ
and — this alone through itself to-be-loved nothing for

ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν
from it comes-about beside the to-have-contemplated from and the
πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ
practical either more or less we-gain-besides beside
τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι·
the action it-seems and the happiness in the leisure to-be
ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν᾽
we-are-unleisured for so-that we-may-have-leisure and we-make-war so-that
εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς
peace we-may-keep of-the indeed then practical virtues in the
πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ
political-matters or in the warlike-matters (is)-the activity the and
περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
about these actions seem unleisured to-be the-ones indeed
πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς (οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν
warlike and altogether no-one for chooses the to-make-war
τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι
of-the to-make-war for-the-sake nor prepares a-war he-would-seem
γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους
for — altogether blood-thirsty a-kind to-be if the friends
πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοιντο)· ἔστι
enemies he-should-make so-that battles and slaughters might-happen it-is
δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ
and also the of-the statesman (activity)-unleisured and beside itself the
πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν
to-take-part-in-politics gaining-besides powers and honors or the
γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν
at-least happiness for-himself and for-the citizens different being
τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν.
from-the political-activity which also we-seek (is)-clear as different being

εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ
if indeed of-the indeed according-to the virtues actions the political
καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ᾽
and warlike in-nobility and in-magnitude excel these and
ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι᾽ αὑτὰς
(are)-unleisured and of-an-end some they-aim-at and not through themselves
αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε
choiceworthy are the and of-the intellect activity in-earnestness both
διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ᾽ αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς
to-differ seems contemplative being and beside itself of-no
ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ
to-aim-at end and to-have the pleasure proper this and
συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ
increases-together the activity and the self-sufficient indeed and
σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ
leisurely and untiring as for-a-man and whatever else to-the
μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
blessed-man is-assigned the-things according-to this the activity
φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη
appear being the complete indeed happiness this — would-be
ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές
of-man having-taken a-length of-life complete nothing for incomplete
ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος
is of-the-things of-the happiness the and such — would-be life
κρείττων ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός
superior than according-to man not for in-so-far-as a-man
ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ
he-is so he-will-live but in-so-far-as divine something in him
ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου,
is-present by-how-much and differs this from-the composite
τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
by-so-much also the activity from-the according-to the other virtue

εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ
if indeed divine (is)-the intellect toward the man also the
κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ
according-to this life (is)-divine toward the human life not
χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν
one-must and according-to those advising human-things to-think
ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ'
a-man being nor mortal-things the mortal-man but to
ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ
as-much-as it-is-possible to-play-the-immortal and everything to-do toward the
ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ
to-live according-to the best of-the-things in him if for even
τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον
in-the bulk small it-is in-power and in-worth much more
πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο,
than-all it-excels it-would-seem and — also to-be each-man this
εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν,
if-indeed the sovereign and better absurd then it-would-become —
εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ
if not the of-himself life he-should-choose but of-some other the
λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον
thing-said both earlier will-fit also now the for proper
ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ·
to-each in-the nature (is)-best and pleasantest is to-each
καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ
and to-the man indeed the according-to the intellect life if-indeed
τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.
this most (is)-man this then also (is)-happiest

The life of moral virtue is happy in a secondary way, because its acts are human ones and need money, power, and opportunity. Contemplation needs almost none of that. Aristotle argues from the gods: no one can picture them making contracts or facing danger, and if they are alive and active, nothing is left them but contemplation. Solon and Anaxagoras agree that happiness needs only moderate means, and the wise man, dearest to the gods, is happiest.

δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ
secondarily and the according-to the other virtue the for according-to
ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ
this activities (are)-human just-things for and brave-things and
τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν
the others the according-to the virtues toward one-another we-do
ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε
in dealings and needs and in-actions of-all-kinds in and
τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι
the passions preserving the fitting for-each these and to-be
φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ
appear all human some and also to-follow from the
σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν
body seems and many to-have-been-made-akin with-the passions
ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις
the of-the character virtue it-has-been-yoked and also the practical-wisdom
τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ
with-the of-the character virtue and this with-the practical-wisdom if-indeed
αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν
the indeed of-the practical-wisdom principles according-to the moral are
ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
virtues the and right of-the moral (is)-according-to the practical-wisdom
συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον
joined-together and these also with-the passions about the composite

ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ
— *would-be the and of-the composite virtues (are)-human and the*
βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ
life indeed the according-to these and the happiness the and of-the
νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω·
intellect (is)-separated so-much for about it let-it-have-been-said
διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν.
to-work-out-in-detail for (is)-greater than-the thing-proposed it-is
δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ
it-would-seem and — also of-the external equipment to a-small-degree or
ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων
to a-less-degree to-need than-the moral of-the indeed for necessaries
ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ
of-both (there-is)-need and from equal let-it-be if even more labors
περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ
about the body the statesman and whatever such-things a-little for
ἄν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει.
— *something it-might-differ toward and the activities much it-will-differ*
τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ
for-the indeed for liberal-man there-will-be-need of-money toward the
πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς
to-do the liberal-acts and for-the just-man indeed for the
ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ
requitals the for wishes (are)-unseen they-pretend and
καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ
also those not just to-wish to-act-justly for-the brave-man
δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ
and of-power if-indeed he-accomplishes something of-the-things according-to
τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος
the virtue and for-the temperate-man of-opportunity how for evident
ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε
will-he-be either this-man or of-the others any it-is-disputed and

πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ
whether more-decisive of-the virtue (is)-the choice or the
πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς
actions as in both being the indeed complete (is)-clear that
ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται,
in both — it-would-be toward and the actions of-many it-needs
καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων.
and by-how-much — greater they-are and nobler of-more
τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν
for-the and man-contemplating of-none of-the such-things toward at-least the
ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός
activity (is)-need but as to-say even hindrances they-are toward
γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι
at-least the contemplation in-so-far-as and a-man he-is and with-more
συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν·
he-lives-together he-chooses the-things according-to the virtue to-do
δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ
he-will-need then of-the such-things toward the to-live-as-a-man the
δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια,
and complete happiness that contemplative a-kind is an-activity
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα
also from-this-point — would-appear the gods for most
ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ
we-have-supposed blessed and happy to-be actions and
ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας;
of-what-sort to-assign is-it-needful to-them whether the just
ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας
or ridiculous will-they-appear making-contracts and deposits
ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους ***
restoring and whatever such-things but the brave (lacuna)
ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν;
enduring the fearful-things and running-risks because (it-is)-noble

ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ
or the liberal to-whom and will-they-give absurd and if also
ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες
there-will-be for-them currency or something such the and temperate
τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι
what — would-they-be or vulgar (is)-the praise that not they-have
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν
base appetites for-those-going-through and all-things would-appear —
τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.
the-things about the actions small and unworthy of-gods
ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ
but indeed to-live at-least all have-supposed them and
ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.
to-be-active then not for indeed to-sleep just-as — Endymion
τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ
for-the indeed living-being the to-act being-taken-away still and
μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ
more the to-produce what remains except contemplation so-that the
τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν
of-the god activity in-blessedness excelling contemplative —
εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη
would-be and of-the human-things indeed the to-this most-akin
εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν
(is)-most-conducive-to-happiness a-sign and also the not to-share
τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας
the remaining animals in-happiness of-the such activity
ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος
being-deprived completely for-the indeed for gods all the life
μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς
(is)-blessed for-the and men to as-much-as likeness some of-the
τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν
such activity belongs of-the and other animals none

εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον
is-happy since in-no-way it-shares in-contemplation to as-much-as
δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς
indeed extends the contemplation also the happiness and in-whom
μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ
more belongs the to-contemplate also to-be-happy not by
συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ'
accident but according-to the contemplation this for in
αὑτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.
itself (is)-honorable so-that would-be — the happiness contemplation some
δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ
there-will-be-need and also of-the external well-being for-a-man being not
γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ
for self-sufficient (is)-the nature toward the to-contemplate but must also
τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν
the body to-be-healthy and food and the remaining care
ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων
to-be-present not indeed one-must-think at-least of-many and great
δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν
to-have-need the man-going-to-be-happy if not it-is-possible without the
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ
external goods blessed to-be not for in the excess
τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα
(is)-the self-sufficient nor the action possible and also not ruling
γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ
of-land and of-sea to-do the noble-things and for from
μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν
moderate-means would-be-able — someone to-do according-to the virtue
(τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν
this and it-is-possible to-see clearly the for private-men than-the
δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ
potentates not less seem the decent-things to-do but

καὶ μᾶλλον)· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ
even more enough and so-much to-be-present will-be for the
βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος.
life happy of-the-man according-to the virtue being-active
καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς,
and Solon and the happy perhaps declared well
εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας
saying moderately with-the external-goods supplied having-done
δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως·
and the noblest-things as he-thought and having-lived temperately
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ.
it-is-possible for moderate-means possessing to-do what one-must
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην
it-seems and also Anaxagoras not rich nor a-potentate
ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ
to-have-supposed the happy-man saying that not — he-would-wonder if
τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι
someone strange should-appear to-the many these for judge
τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν
by-the external-things of-these perceiving only to-agree
δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν
indeed with-the arguments seem the of-the wise opinions credit
μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν
indeed then also the such-things have some the and true in
τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται·
the practical-matters from the deeds and the life is-judged
ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα
in these for (is)-the sovereign to-look indeed the things-said-before
χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων
one-must to the deeds and the life bringing-them and agreeing
μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους
indeed with-the deeds they-must-be-accepted disagreeing and words

ὑπολεπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον
they-must-be-supposed the-man and according-to intellect being-active and this
θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος
tending and disposed best also most-god-beloved
ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν
seems if for some care of-the human-things by gods
γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε
happens just-as it-seems also it-would-be — reasonable to-rejoice both
αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη
them in-the best and most-akin this and — would-be
ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας
the intellect and those loving most this and honoring-it
ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ
to-benefit-in-return as of-the-things dear to-them taking-care and
ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
rightly both and nobly acting that and all these
τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος
for-the wise-man most belong not (is)-unclear most-god-beloved
ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε
then the same and (it-is)-likely also happiest so-that
κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.
also so would-be the wise-man most happy

Arguments are not enough to make men good. They can turn a generous young man toward virtue, but they cannot move the many, who obey fear rather than shame. Character has to be prepared beforehand by habit, as soil is prepared for seed, and that takes laws — paternal command has no force, and Sparta is almost alone in legislating for upbringing. Practicing politicians have not made statesmen even of their own sons, and the sophists who profess to teach politics are far from being able to teach it, so Aristotle proposes to examine legislation and the constitutions himself.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ
whether then if about both these and the virtues further and also
φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος
friendship and pleasure sufficiently it-has-been-said in-the outlines end
ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ
to-have must-one-think the choice or just-as it-is-said not
ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
it-is in the practicable-things end the to-have-contemplated each-thing and
γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ
to-have-known but rather the to-do them nor indeed about
ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον,
virtue (is)-enough the to-know but to-have and to-use one-must-try
ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν
or if somehow otherwise good we-become if indeed then were
οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς
the arguments self-sufficient toward the to-make decent many
ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν
— wages and great justly they-would-earn according-to —
Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν
Theognis and it-would-be-necessary — these to-provide now
δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν
and they-appear to-urge indeed and to-stir-up of-the

νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἤθός τ᾽ εὐγενὲς καὶ
young the liberal to-be-strong-enough a-character and well-born and
ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς
as truly loving-the-noble to-make — possessed by the
ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν
virtue the and many to-be-unable toward nobility-and-goodness
προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ
to-urge not for they-are-by-nature by-shame to-obey but
φόβῳ, οὐδ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
by-fear nor to-abstain from-the base-things through the shameful
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας
but through the punishments by-passion for living the proper
ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ
pleasures they-pursue and through what these will-be they-flee and
τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς
the opposing pains of-the and noble and as truly
ἡδέος οὐδ᾽ ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες.
pleasant not-even a-notion they-have untasting being
τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ γὰρ
the indeed such-men what — argument would-reform not for
οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι
possible — or not easy the-things from old-time in-the characters
κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ᾽ ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ
gripped by-reason to-shift welcome and perhaps it-is if
πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι᾽ ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι,
of-all being-present through which decent we-seem to-become
μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ᾽ ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἳ
we-should-get-a-share of-the virtue to-become and good they-think the-ones
μὲν φύσει οἳ δ᾽ ἔθει οἳ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν
indeed by-nature the-others and by-habit the-others and by-teaching the indeed then
τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά
of-the nature (is)-clear that not in our-power it-belongs but through

τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ
certain divine causes to-those as truly fortunate it-belongs the and
λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ᾽ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει,
reason and the teaching perhaps after-all not in all-men is-strong-enough
ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ
but must to-have-been-worked-beforehand by-the habits the of-the hearer
ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν
soul toward the nobly to-rejoice and to-hate just-as earth
τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου
the-one going-to-nourish the seed not for — he-would-listen-to a-word
ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ᾽ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
turning-him-away nor again would-he-understand the-man according-to passion
ζῶν· τὸν δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι;
living the-man and thus being how possible (it-is) to-persuade-otherwise
ὅλως τ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ.
generally and not seems to-reason to-yield the passion but to-force
δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς
must indeed the character to-be-present-beforehand somehow proper of-the
ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.
virtue loving the noble and being-annoyed-at the shameful
ἐκ νέου δ᾽ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν
from young and of-training right to-obtain toward virtue (is)-hard
μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως
not under such having-been-reared laws the for temperately
καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε
and enduringly to-live (is)-not pleasant to-the many otherwise both
καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν
and to-young-men therefore by-laws must to-have-been-ordered the nurture
καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη
and the pursuits not they-will-be for painful customary
γενόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ᾽ ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ
having-become not enough and perhaps young being of-nurture and

ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας
of-care to-obtain right but since also having-become-men
δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
one-must to-practice them and to-be-habituated and about these
δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον·
we-should-need — of-laws and generally indeed about all the life
οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι
the for many by-necessity more than by-reason obey
καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς
and by-penalties than by-the noble therefore think some those
νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν
legislating to-be-necessary indeed to-summon to the virtue
καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων
and to-urge of-the noble for-the-sake as going-to-listen
τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ
those decently by-the habits led-on disobeying and also
ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς
less-well-endowed being punishments both and penalties to-impose the-ones
δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς
and incurable altogether to-banish the-one indeed for decent-man toward
τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον
the noble living to-the reason will-obey the-one and base-man
ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον.
of-pleasure reaching-for by-pain to-be-chastened just-as a-beast-of-burden
διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἷς
therefore also they-say to-be-necessary such to-become the pains which
μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν,
most are-opposed to-the cherished pleasures if and then
καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι
just-as it-has-been-said the man-going-to-be good to-have-been-reared
καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν
nobly must and to-have-been-habituated then so in pursuits

ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ᾽ ἄκοντα μήθ᾽ ἑκόντα πράττειν
decent to-live and neither unwilling nor willing to-do
τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν βιουμένοις κατά
the base-things these and would-come-about — for-those-living according-to
τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν
some intellect and an-order right having strength the indeed then
πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
paternal injunction not has the strong nor the compelling
οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ
nor indeed generally the of-one man not a-king being or
τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν,
of-someone such the and law compelling has power
λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν
a-rule being from some practical-wisdom and intellect and of-the indeed
ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς,
men they-hate those opposing to-the impulses
κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς
even-if rightly it they-do the and law not is burdensome
τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει
ordering the decent in only and the of-Lacedaemonians city
ἢ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι
or with few the lawgiver care seems to-have-made
τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν
of-nurture both and of-pursuits in and the most of-the
πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος
cities it-has-been-neglected about the such-things and lives each-man
ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχου.
as he-wishes Cyclops-like laying-down-law for-children and for-a-wife
κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν·
best indeed then the to-become a-common care and right
κοινῇ δ᾽ ἐξαμελουμένων ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν
in-common and being-neglected to-each-man it-would-seem — to-belong

τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι,
to-the his-own children and friends toward virtue to-contribute
*** ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι
(lacuna) or to-choose at-least rather and — this to-be-able
δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. αἱ
it-would-seem from the things-said a-legislator having-become the-ones
μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται,
indeed for common cares (is)-clear that through laws come-about
ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμμένων δ'
decent and the through the good(-laws) written and
ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν
or unwritten nothing — it-would-seem to-differ nor through which
εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
one or many will-be-educated just-as nor in music or
γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
gymnastics and of-the other pursuits just-as for in
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἤθη, οὕτω καὶ
the cities prevail the customs and the characters so also
ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
in households the paternal words and the habits and still more
διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι
through the kinship and the benefits they-are-present-beforehand
γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
for loving and obedient in-the nature further and also
διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν,
they-differ the according-to each educations from-the common
ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι
just-as in medicine in-general indeed for for-the man-with-a-fever
συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὅ
is-beneficial rest and fasting for-someone and perhaps not the-man
τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν.
and skilled-in-boxing perhaps not on-all the same fighting imposes

ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
to-be-worked-out-exactly indeed it-would-seem — more the according-to each
ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου
peculiar the care becoming more for of-the suitable
τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν ἂν ἄριστα καθ'
attains each-man but would-take-care indeed — best according-to
ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου
one both a-physician and a-trainer and every other the-man in-general
εἰδώς, τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί (τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι
knowing what for-all or for-the such-men of-the common for the sciences
λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν
are-called both and are not indeed but of-one some nothing
ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα,
perhaps prevents nobly to-take-care even unscientific being
τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι'
having-observed and exactly the-things happening in each-case through
ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι
experience just-as also physicians some seem of-themselves best
εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον
to-be to-another nothing — would-be-able to-help nothing and less
ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ
perhaps for-the at-least man-wishing skilled to-become and contemplative
ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κἀκεῖνο
to the universal one-must-proceed to-be it-would-seem — and-that
γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ
must-be-known as it-is-possible it-has-been-said for that about this the
ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας
sciences perhaps and also for-the man-wishing through care
βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ
better to-make whether many or few a-legislator
πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἄν.
one-must-try to-become if through laws good we-should-become —

ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ
whomever for then also the man-set-before-one to-dispose nobly not
ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ
it-is of-the chance-man but if-indeed of-anyone of-the man-knowing just-as
ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις
in medicine and of-the rest of-which there-is care some
καὶ φρόνησις. ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν
and practical-wisdom whether then after this must-be-examined from-where
ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ
or how a-legislator would-become — someone or just-as in
τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς
the others from the statesmen a-part for it-seemed of-the
πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς
political-science to-be or not alike it-appears in the political-science
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν
and of-the rest sciences both and capacities in indeed
γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις
for the others the same appear the both capacities
παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ
handing-on and being-active from them such-as physicians
γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ
painters the and political-matters they-profess indeed to-teach the
σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι,
sophists practices and of-them no-one but those taking-part-in-politics
οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ
who they-would-seem — by-a-capacity some this to-do and by-experience
μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες
rather than by-thought neither for writing nor speaking
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ
about the such-things do-they-appear although nobler it-was perhaps than

λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς
speeches forensic both and deliberative nor again statesmen
πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.
having-made the their-own sons or some others of-the friends
εὔλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν
reasonable and it-was if-indeed they-were-able neither for to-the cities
ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι
better anything they-would-have-left — nor for-themselves to-belong
προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ
would-choose — rather than-the such capacity nor indeed
τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία
for-the dearest not indeed a-small-thing at-least it-seems the experience
συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς
to-contribute nor for they-would-become — through the political
συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς
familiarity statesmen therefore for-those aiming about political-science
εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ
to-know to-need-besides it-seems of-experience of-the and sophists those
ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι.
professing exceedingly appear far to-be from-the to-teach
ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποιόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν·
generally for not-even of-what-sort something it-is or about what-sorts they-know
οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν,
not for — the same as-the rhetoric nor worse they-would-set-it-down
οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι
nor — they-would-think easy to-be the to-legislate for-one-collecting
τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς
the well-esteemed of-the laws to-pick-out for to-be the
ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ
best just-as nor the picking-out being of-understanding and the
κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν.
to-judge rightly (is)-greatest just-as in the-things according-to music

οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ
the for experienced about each-thing judge rightly the works and
δι᾽ ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις
through what or how it-is-accomplished they-understand and what-sorts with-what-sorts
συνᾴδει· τοῖς δ᾽ ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν
agree for-the and inexperienced (it-is)-welcome the not to-escape-notice
εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς.
whether well or badly has-been-made the work just-as in painting
οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· πῶς οὖν
the and laws of-the political-science to-works are-like how then
ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς
from these a-legislator would-become — someone or the
ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ᾽ ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν
best to-judge not for they-appear nor physicians from the
συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ
treatises to-become although they-try at-least to-say not
μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ
only the remedies but also how they-might-be-healed — and
ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις·
how one-must to-treat each-kind having-distinguished the states
ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ᾽
these and to-the indeed experienced useful to-be seem to-the and
ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν
unscientific useless perhaps then also of-the laws and of-the
πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι
constitutions the collections to-the indeed men-able to-contemplate
καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις
and to-judge what nobly or the-contrary and what-sorts with-what-sorts
ἁρμόττει εὔχρηστ᾽ ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ
fit useful — would-be to-the and without a-state the
τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι,
such-things going-through the indeed to-judge nobly not — would-belong

εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
if not then by-chance more-intelligent and toward these
τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων
perhaps — they-would-become having-passed-over then the earlier-writers
ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι
unexplored the about the legislation ourselves to-examine
μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως
rather (is)-better perhaps and generally indeed about a-constitution so-that
εἰς δύναμιν ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ.
within (our)-power the about the human-affairs philosophy may-be-completed
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς
first indeed then if something in part has-been-said nobly
ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ
by the predecessors let-us-try to-go-over then from
τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σῴζει
the collected constitutions to-contemplate the what-sorts preserve
καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν
and destroy the cities and the what-sorts each of-the
πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἳ μὲν καλῶς αἳ
constitutions and through what causes the-ones indeed nobly the-others
δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων
and the-contrary are-governed having-been-contemplated for these
τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
perhaps — more we-would-discern both what-sort-of constitution (is)-best
καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι
and how each having-been-ordered and by-what laws and customs
χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.
using let-us-speak then having-begun

PLUTARCH

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΥΦΙΛΙΑΣ

On Having Many Friends

Socrates mocked Meno's swarm of virtues, and we, who lack one firm friendship, fear having too many. The desire for many friends works against friendship, as the famous pairs, Theseus and Peirithous, Orestes and Pylades, show it comes in two. A friend must be tested over the proverbial bushel of salt, and a bad friend, once taken, is hard to get rid of.

Μένωνα τὸν Θετταλὸν οἰόμενον ἐν λόγοις ἱκανῶς 1
Meno the Thessalian thinking in arguments sufficiently
γεγυμνάσθαι καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους
to-have-been-trained and this indeed the(-thing) by — Empedocles
λεγόμενον σοφίης ἐπ᾽ ἄκροισι θαμίζειν ἠρώτησεν ὁ
said of-wisdom on the-heights to-dwell asked —
Σωκράτης τί ἀρετή ἐστιν· ἀποκριναμένου δ᾽ ἰταμῶς ἐκείνου
Socrates what virtue is having-answered and boldly that(-man)
καὶ προχείρως ὅτι καὶ παιδός ἐστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ πρεσβύτου
and readily that both of-a-child there-is a-virtue and of-an-old-man
καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἰδιώτου καὶ
and of-a-man and of-a-woman and of-a-ruler and of-a-private-man and
δεσπότου καὶ θεράποντος, εὖ γ᾽ εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι
of-a-master and of-a-servant well indeed said — Socrates that
μίαν ἀρετὴν αἰτηθεὶς σμῆνος ἀρετῶν κεκίνηκας, οὐ
one virtue having-been-asked-for a-swarm of-virtues you-have-stirred-up not
κακῶς τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι μηδεμίαν εἰδὼς ἀρετὴν ἄνθρωπος
badly inferring that no knowing virtue the-man
πολλὰς ὠνόμαζεν. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμῖν ἄν τις
many named whether then not also us — someone
ἐπιχλευάσειεν ὅτι μηδέπω μίαν φιλίαν κεκτημένοι βεβαίως
might-mock that not-yet one friendship having-acquired firmly
φοβούμεθα μὴ λάθωμεν εἰς πολυφιλίαν ἐμπεσόντες;
we-fear lest unawares into having-many-friends we-fall

σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρομεν ἀνθρώπου κολοβοῦ καὶ
nearly for nothing we-differ from-a-man maimed and
τυφλοῦ, φοβουμένου μὴ Βριάρεως ὁ ἑκατόγχειρ καὶ Ἄργος
blind fearing lest Briareus the hundred-handed and Argus
ὁ πανόπτης γένηται. καίτοι τόν γε παρὰ τῷ Μενάνδρῳ
the all-seeing he-become and-yet the at-least in — Menander
νεανίσκον ὑπερφυῶς ἐπαινοῦμεν εἰπόντα θαυμαστὸν ὅσον
youth exceedingly we-praise having-said wonderful how-much
νομίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστον, ἂν ἔχῃ φίλου σκιάν.
to-think a-good each(-one) if he-has of-a-friend (a)-shadow

2 ἐναντίον δὲ μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἥκιστα πρὸς
an-obstacle and with many others not least to
φιλίας κτῆσιν ἡ τῆς πολυφιλίας ὄρεξις, ὥσπερ
of-friendship acquisition the of-the having-many-friends desire just-as
ἔρως ἀκολάστων γυναικῶν τῷ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοῖς
a-passion of-licentious women by-the often and with-many
συμπλέκεσθαι τῶν πρώτων κρατεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος
being-entangled the first(-ones) to-hold not being-able
ἀμελουμένων καὶ ἀπορρεόντων· μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ὁ τῆς
being-neglected and slipping-away rather and just-as the —
Ὑψιπύλης τρόφιμος εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα καθίσας ἔδρεπεν
of-Hypsipyle nursling in the meadow having-sat plucked

ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ αἰρόμενος
one after another seizing
ἄγρευμ' ἀνθέων ἡδομένᾳ ψυχᾷ
a-catch of-flowers with-delighted soul
τὸ νήπιον ἄπληστον ἔχων,
the childish insatiable having

οὕτως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ φιλόκαινον καὶ ἀψίκορον
so each of-us through the love-of-novelty and fickleness
ὁ πρόσφατος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀνθῶν ἐπάγεται, καὶ μετατίθησι
the fresh always and blooming attracts and changes(-us)
πολλὰς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀτελεῖς ἀρχὰς πράττοντας φιλίας
many at-once and unfinished beginnings making of-friendship
καὶ συνηθείας, ἔρωτι τοῦ διωκομένου παρερχομένους τὸ
and of-intimacy through-love of-the pursued passing-by the
καταλαμβανόμενον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ ἀφ' ἑστίας
overtaken first indeed then just-as from (the)-hearth
ἀρξάμενοι τῆς τοῦ βίου φήμης ἣν ὑπὲρ φίλων βεβαίων
beginning from-the of-the life report which about friends steadfast
ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡμῖν, τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα
has-left to-us the long and ancient age (as)-witness
ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ
at-once of-the argument and counselor let-us-take in which according-to
ζεῦγος φιλίας λέγονται Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθους, Ἀχιλλεὺς
pair of-friendship are-named Theseus and Peirithous Achilles
καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φιντίας καὶ Δάμων,
and Patroclus Orestes and Pylades Phintias and Damon
Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας. σύννομον γὰρ ἡ φιλία
Epaminondas and Pelopidas a-pair-grazing for the friendship
ζῷον οὐκ ἀγελαῖόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κολοιῶδες, καὶ τὸ ἄλλον
a-creature not a-herding(-one) is nor jackdaw-like and the another
αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν φίλον καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἑταῖρον ἕτερον
self to-consider the friend and to-call(-him) comrade other
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ μέτρῳ φιλίας τῇ δυάδι χρωμένων. οὔτε γὰρ
nothing is than by-measure of-friendship the duality (of-men)-using neither for
δούλους οὔτε φίλους ἔστι κτήσασθαι πολλοὺς ἀπ' ὀλίγου
slaves nor friends is-it-possible to-acquire many from small
νομίσματος. τί οὖν νόμισμα φιλίας; εὔνοια καὶ χάρις
coinage what then (is)-the-coinage of-friendship goodwill and grace

μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς, ὧν οὐδὲν ἔχει σπανιώτερον ἡ φύσις. ὅθεν
with virtue of-which nothing has rarer the nature whence
τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖσθαι πρὸς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν,
the intensely loving and being-loved toward many not is(-possible)
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ ποταμοὶ πολλὰς σχίσεις καὶ κατατομὰς
but just-as the rivers many divisions and channels
λαμβάνοντες ἀσθενεῖς καὶ λεπτοὶ ῥέουσιν, οὕτω τὸ φιλεῖν
taking weak and thin flow so the to-love
ἐν ψυχῇ σφοδρὸν πεφυκὸς εἰς πολλοὺς μεριζόμενον
in (the)-soul intense being-by-nature into many being-divided
ἐξαμαυροῦται. διὸ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὸ φιλότεκνον τοῖς
is-dimmed therefore also of-the animals the love-of-offspring in-the
μονοτόκοις ἰσχυρότερον ἐμφύεται, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἀγαπητὸν
bearing-one-young stronger is-implanted and Homer a-beloved
υἱὸν ὀνομάζει μοῦνον τηλύγετον, τουτέστι τὸν τοῖς μήτ᾽
son calls only late-born that-is the(-son) to-the neither
ἔχουσιν ἕτερον γονεῦσι μήθ᾽ ἕξουσι γεγενημένον.
having another parents nor going-to-have born
3 τὸν δὲ φίλον ἡμεῖς μοῦνον μὲν οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι,
the and friend we only indeed not think-fit to-be
μετ᾽ ἄλλου δὲ τηλύγετός τις καὶ ὀψίγονος ἔστω, τὸν
with another but late-born some and late-begotten let-him-be the
θρυλούμενον ἐκεῖνον χρόνῳ τῶν ἁλῶν συγκατεδηδοκὼς
proverbial that in-time of-the salt having-eaten-through-with(-us)
μέδιμνον, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ φίλοι λεγόμενοι
a-bushel not just-as now many friends so-called
συμπιόντες ἅπαξ ἢ συσφαιρίσαντες ἢ συγκυβεύσαντες
having-drunk-together once or having-played-ball-together or having-diced-together
ἢ συγκαταλύσαντες, ἐκ πανδοκείου καὶ παλαίστρας καὶ
or having-lodged-together from an-inn and a-wrestling-school and
ἀγορᾶς φιλίαν συλλέγουσιν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων
a-market friendship they-collect in and the of-the rich

καὶ ἡγεμονικῶν οἰκίαις πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ θόρυβον
and powerful houses a-great crowd and din
ἀσπαζομένων καὶ δεξιουμένων καὶ δορυφορούντων
of-men-greeting and of-men-shaking-hands and attending-as-bodyguards
ὁρῶντες εὐδαιμονίζουσι τοὺς πολυφίλους. καίτοι πλείονάς
seeing they-count-happy the many-friended and-yet more
γε μυίας ἐν τοῖς ὀπτανείοις αὐτῶν ὁρῶσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὔθ᾽
at-least flies in the kitchens of-them they-see but neither
αὗται τῆς λιχνείας οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι τῆς χρείας ἐπιλιπούσης
these the gluttony nor those the usefulness having-failed
παραμένουσιν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ ἀληθινὴ φιλία τρία ζητεῖ
stay-on since and the true friendship three(-things) seeks
μάλιστα, τὴν ἀρετὴν ὡς καλόν, καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν ὡς
most the virtue as noble and the intimacy as
ἡδύ, καὶ τὴν χρείαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδέξασθαι
pleasant and the usefulness as necessary one-must for to-accept(-him)
κρίναντα καὶ χαίρειν συνόντα καὶ χρῆσθαι δεόμενον,
having-judged(-him) and to-delight being-with(-him) and to-use(-him) needing(-it)
ἃ πάντα πρὸς τὴν πολυφιλίαν ὑπεναντιοῦται, καὶ
which all to the having-many-friends are-opposed and
μάλιστά πως τὸ κυριώτατον ἡ κρίσις), σκεπτέον
most in-a-way the most-important the judging one-must-consider
πρῶτον εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ δοκιμάσαι
first whether possible it-is in short time to-test
χορευτὰς συγχορευσομένους, ἐρέτας ὁμορροθήσοντας,
chorus-dancers going-to-dance-together rowers going-to-pull-together
οἰκέτας χρημάτων ἐπιτρόπους ἢ τέκνων παιδαγωγοὺς
household-slaves of-property stewards or of-children tutors

ἐσομένους, μήτι γε φίλους πολλοὺς εἰς ἀγῶνα πάσης
going-to-be not-to-speak at-least-of friends many for a-contest of-every
τύχης συναποδυσομένους, ὧν ἕκαστος αὐτός θ' αὑτόν
fortune going-to-strip-together of-whom each himself both himself

πράττων εὖ τίθησιν εἰς μέσον,
faring well puts in the-middle
τοῦ δυστυχοῦς τε λαγχάνων οὐκ ἄχθεται.
of-the unfortunate and getting-a-share not is-vexed

οὔτε ναῦς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσούτους ἕλκεται χειμῶνας εἰς
neither a-ship for to-face so-many is-dragged storms into
θάλατταν, οὔτε χωρίοις τριγχοὺς καὶ λιμέσι προβάλλουσιν
the-sea nor for-places walls and for-harbors they-throw-before
ἕρκη καὶ χώματα τηλικούτους προσδεχόμενοι κινδύνους
fences and moles so-great expecting dangers
καὶ τοσούτους, ὅσων ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλία καταφυγὴν
and so-many as-many-as promises friendship (of)-refuge
καὶ βοήθειαν, ὀρθῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἐξετασθεῖσα· τῶν δ'
and help rightly and firmly having-been-tested of-the(-ones) but
ἀνεξετάστως παραρρυέντων ὥσπερ νομισμάτων ἀδοκίμων
untested having-slipped-in just-as coins counterfeit
ἐλεγχομένων
being-detected

οἱ μὲν ἐστερημένοι
the(-ones) indeed having-been-deprived(-of-them)
χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἔχοντες εὔχονται φυγεῖν.
rejoice the(-others) but having(-them) pray to-escape(-them)

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, τὸ φυγεῖν ἢ
is and this hard and not easy the to-escape or
ἀποθέσθαι δυσαρεστουμένην φιλίαν. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ σιτίον
to-put-away an-unpleasing friendship but just-as food
βλαβερὸν καὶ δυσχεραινόμενον οὔτε κατέχειν οἷόν τε μὴ
harmful and disagreeable neither to-keep-down possible — not
λυποῦν καὶ διαφθεῖρον οὔτ᾽ ἐκβάλλειν οἷον εἰσῆλθεν ἀλλ᾽
giving-pain and corrupting nor to-cast-out such-as it-went-in but
εἰδεχθὲς καὶ συμπεφυρμένον καὶ ἀλλόκοτον, οὕτω φίλος
loathsome and mingled and strange so a-friend
πονηρὸς ἢ σύνεστι λυπῶν καὶ λυμαινόμενος, ἢ βίᾳ
wicked either is-with(-one) paining and doing-damage or by-force
μετ᾽ ἔχθρας καὶ δυσμενείας ὥσπερ χολή τις ἐξέπεσε.
with hostility and enmity just-as bile some is-thrown-out

IV–VII · THE CLAIMS OF MANY

Friendship should be sought slowly, as Zeuxis painted slowly. Intimacy is its enjoyment, as Homer's verses show, but many friendships pull a man apart, and friends need help at once in different affairs. Plutarch turns Euripides' advice of moderate friendships onto enmities, cites Chilon, and shows that a friend shares his friends' enmities, as Alexander, Nero, and Tiberius showed.

διὸ δεῖ μὴ ῥᾳδίως προσδέχεσθαι μηδὲ κολλᾶσθαι 4
therefore one-must not readily to-accept nor to-cleave-to
τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι μηδὲ φιλεῖν τοὺς διώκοντας, ἀλλὰ
the(-ones) chancing-upon(-us) nor to-love the(-ones) pursuing(-us) but
τοὺς ἀξίους φιλίας διώκειν. οὐ γὰρ αἱρετέον πάντως
the worthy of-friendship to-pursue not for one-must-choose by-all-means
τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἁλισκόμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπαρίνην καὶ βάτον
the readily caught and for cleavers and bramble

ἐπιλαμβανομένην ὑπερβάντες καὶ διωσάμενοι βαδίζομεν ἐπὶ
laying-hold-of(-us) stepping-over and pushing-away we-walk to
τὴν ἐλαίαν καὶ τὴν ἄμπελον. οὕτως ἀεὶ μὴ τὸν εὐχερῶς
the olive and the vine so always not the(-man) easily
περιπλεκόμενον ποιεῖσθαι συνήθη καλόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀξίοις
embracing(-us) to-make an-intimate (is)-noble but to-the worthy
σπουδῆς καὶ ὠφελίμοις αὐτοὺς περιπλέκεσθαι δοκιμάζοντας.
of-esteem and useful ourselves to-attach testing(-them)
5 ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Ζεῦξις αἰτιωμένων αὐτόν τινων ὅτι
just-as then — Zeuxis blaming him some(-people) because
ζωγραφεῖ βραδέως, ὁμολογῶ εἶπεν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
he-paints slowly I-admit he-said in much time
γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς πολύν, οὕτω φιλίαν δεῖ καὶ
to-paint and for for much(-time) so friendship one-must and
συνήθειαν σῴζειν παραλαβόντας ἐν πολλῷ κριθεῖσαν.
intimacy to-preserve having-received(-it) in much(-time) judged
ἆρ᾽ οὖν κρῖναι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι πολλοὺς φίλους ῥᾴδιον,
whether then to-judge indeed not is-it many friends easy
συνεῖναι δὲ πολλοῖς ὁμοῦ ῥᾴδιον, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον;
to-be-with but with-many at-once (is-it)-easy or also this (is)-impossible
καὶ μὴν ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστιν ἡ συνήθεια τῆς φιλίας, καὶ
and indeed enjoyment is the intimacy of-the friendship and
τὸ ἥδιστον ἐν τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ συνδιημερεύειν·
the most-pleasant (is)-in the to-be-together and to-spend-the-days-together

οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων
not indeed for alive at-least dear apart from-comrades
βουλὰς ἑζόμενοι βουλεύσομεν.
counsels sitting we-will-devise

καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως ὁ Μενέλαος
and about — Odysseus — Menelaus

οὐδέ κεν ἄλλο
nor — else
ἄμμε διέκρινεν φιλέοντέ τε τερπομένω τε,
us would-have-parted loving both delighting and
πρὶν γ᾽ ὅτε δὴ θανάτοιο μέλαν νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψε.
before at-least when indeed of-death black cloud enfolded(-us)

τοὐναντίον οὖν ἔοικεν ἡ καλουμένη πολυφιλία ποιεῖν.
the-opposite then seems the so-called having-many-friends to-do
ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνάγει καὶ συνίστησι καὶ συνέχει
the(-one) indeed for brings-together and unites and holds-together
καταπυκνοῦσα ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ φιλοφροσύναις
condensing(-it) by-the associations and friendly-acts

ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ὀπὸς γάλα λευκὸν ἐγόμφωσεν καὶ ἔδησε
as and when fig-juice milk white has-bound and fastened

κατ᾽ Ἐμπεδοκλέα (τοιαύτην γὰρ ἡ φιλία βούλεται
according-to Empedocles such for the friendship wishes
ποιεῖν ἑνότητα καὶ σύμπηξιν), ἡ δὲ πολυφιλία διίστησι
to-make unity and compaction the and having-many-friends separates
καὶ ἀποσπᾷ καὶ ἀποστρέφει, τῷ μετακαλεῖν καὶ μεταφέρειν
and tears-away and turns-aside by-the to-call-away and to-transfer
ἄλλοτε πρὸς ἄλλον οὐκ ἐῶσα κρᾶσιν οὐδὲ κόλλησιν
at-another-time to another not allowing blending nor cementing
εὐνοίας ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ περιχυθείσῃ καὶ παγείσῃ
of-goodwill in the intimacy having-been-poured-around and set
γενέσθαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εὐθὺς ὑποβάλλει καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰς
to-come-about this and at-once introduces also the about the

ὑπουργίας ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ δυσωπίαν· τὰ γὰρ εὔχρηστα
services unevenness and awkwardness the for serviceable(-things)
τῆς φιλίας δύσχρηστα γίγνεται διὰ τὴν πολυφιλίαν.
of-the friendship unserviceable become through the having-many-friends

ἄλλον τρόπον γὰρ ἄλλων ἐγείρει φροντὶς ἀνθρώπων·
another way for of-other stirs care of-men

οὔτε γὰρ αἱ φύσεις ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ταῖς ὁρμαῖς
neither for the natures of-us toward the-same-things in-the impulses
ῥέπουσιν, οὔτε τύχαις ὁμοτρόποις ἀεὶ σύνεσμεν· οἵ τε
incline nor with-fortunes alike always are-we-together the and
τῶν πράξεων καιροὶ καθάπερ τὰ πνεύματα τοὺς μὲν
of-the actions occasions just-as the winds the(-ones) indeed
φέρουσι τοῖς δ' ἀντιπίπτουσι.
carry the(-others) and oppose
6 καίτοι κἂν πάντες ἅμα τῶν αὐτῶν οἱ φίλοι δέωνται,
and-yet even-if all at-once of-the same-things the friends need(-help)
χαλεπὸν ἐξαρκέσαι πᾶσι βουλευομένοις ἢ πολιτευομένοις
(it-is)-hard to-suffice for-all deliberating or being-in-politics
ἢ φιλοτιμουμένοις ἢ ὑποδεχομένοις. ἂν δ' ἑνὶ καιρῷ
or seeking-honor or entertaining-guests if and at-one moment
διαφόροις πράγμασι καὶ πάθεσι προστυγχάνοντες ὁμοῦ
in-different affairs and experiences falling at-once
παρακαλῶσιν ὁ μὲν πλέων συναποδημεῖν, ὁ δὲ
they-summon(-one) the-one indeed sailing to-go-abroad-with(-him) the-other and
κρινόμενος συνδικεῖν, ὁ δὲ κρίνων συνδικάζειν,
being-tried to-plead-with(-him) the-other and judging to-judge-with(-him)

ὁ δὲ πιπράσκων ἢ ἀγοράζων συνδιοικεῖν, ὁ
the-other and selling or buying to-manage-with(-him) the-other
δὲ γαμῶν συνθύειν, ὁ δὲ θάπτων συμπενθεῖν,
and marrying to-sacrifice-with(-him) the-other and burying to-mourn-with(-him)

πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμῃ,
the-city and at-once indeed with-incense be-full
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων
at-once and with-paeans both and with-groans

ἡ πολυφιλία, πᾶσι μὲν ἀμήχανον παρεῖναι, μηδενὶ
the having-many-friends to-all indeed (it-is)-impossible to-be-present to-none
δ' ἄτοπον, ἑνὶ δ' ὑπουργοῦντα προσκρούειν πολλοῖς
and (is)-absurd to-one and serving to-offend many
ἀνιαρόν·
(is)-painful

οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀγαπῶν αὐτὸς ἀμελεῖθ' ἡδέως.
no-one for loving himself is-neglected gladly

καίτοι τὰς ἀμελείας καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας τῶν φίλων πραότερον
yet the neglects and remissnesses of-the friends more-mildly
φέρουσι, καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπολογίας ἀμηνίτως δέχονται
they-bear and the such excuses without-wrath accept
παρ' αὐτῶν ἐξελαθόμην ἠγνόησα. ὁ δὲ λέγων οὐ
from them I-forgot I-did-not-know the(-man) but saying not
παρέστην σοι δίκην ἔχοντι, παριστάμην γὰρ ἑτέρῳ
I-stood-by you a-lawsuit having I-was-standing-by for another
φίλῳ, καὶ πυρέττοντά σ' οὐκ εἶδον, τῷ δεῖνι γὰρ
friend and in-fever you not I-saw with-the so-and-so for
φίλους ἑστιῶντι συνησχολούμην αἰτίαν τῆς ἀμελείας τὴν
friends entertaining I-was-busy (as)-the-cause of-the neglect the

ἑτέρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος οὐ λύει τὴν μέμψιν, ἀλλὰ
of-others care making not removes the blame but
προσεπιβάλλει ζηλοτυπίαν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τὰς πολυφιλίας
adds-on jealousy but the many the having-many-friends
ἃ δύνανται παρέχειν μόνον ὡς ἔοικε σκοποῦσιν, ἃ δ'
what they-can provide only as it-seems consider what but
ἀνταπαιτοῦσι παρορῶσι, καὶ οὐ μνημονεύουσιν ὅτι δεῖ
they-demand-in-return they-overlook and not remember that one-must
τὸν πολλοῖς εἰς ἃ δεῖται χρώμενον πολλοῖς δεομένοις
the(-man) many for what he-needs using to-many needing
ἀνθυπουργεῖν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Βριάρεως ἑκατὸν χερσὶν
to-serve-in-return just-as then — Briareus with-a-hundred hands
εἰς πεντήκοντα φορῶν γαστέρας οὐδὲν ἡμῶν πλέον
to fifty bringing(-food) bellies nothing than-us more
εἶχε τῶν ἀπὸ δυεῖν χεροῖν μίαν κοιλίαν διοικούντων,
had of-the(-ones) from two hands one belly managing
οὕτως ἐν τοῖς φίλοις χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ λειτουργεῖν πολλοῖς
so in the friends useful also the to-serve many
ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ συναγωνιᾶν καὶ τὸ συνασχολεῖσθαι καὶ
is-involved and the to-share-anxiety and the to-be-busy-with and
συγκάμνειν. οὐ γὰρ Εὐριπίδῃ πειστέον λέγοντι
to-toil-with not for Euripides one-must-believe saying

χρῆν γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους
one-ought for moderate to one-another
φιλίας θνητοὺς ἀνακίρνασθαι
friendships (for)-mortals to-mix
καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς,
and not to the-innermost marrow of-the-soul

εὔλυτα δ' εἶναι στέργηθρα φρενῶν,
easily-loosed and to-be the-love-charms of-the-heart
ἀπὸ τ' ὦσασθαι καὶ ξυντεῖναι,
away both to-push and to-draw-tight

καθάπερ πόδα νεὼς ἐνδιδόντι καὶ προσάγοντι ταῖς χρείαις
just-as the-sheet of-a-ship letting-out and drawing-in to-the needs
τὴν φιλίαν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Εὐριπίδη, μεταθῶμεν ἐπὶ τὰς
the friendship but this indeed O Euripides let-us-transfer to the
ἔχθρας, καὶ κελεύωμεν μετρίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ
enmities and let-us-bid moderate to-make the differences and
μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς, εὔλυτα δ' εἶναι μίση καὶ
not to the-innermost marrow of-the-soul easily-loosed and to-be hatreds and
ὀργὰς καὶ μεμψιμοιρίας καὶ ὑπονοίας· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν
angers and complainings and suspicions that and rather to-us
παραίνει τὸ Πυθαγορικὸν μὴ πολλοῖς ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν,
recommends the Pythagorean(-saying) not to-many to-give a-right-hand
τουτέστι μὴ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι φίλους μηδὲ πολύκοινον μηδὲ
that-is not many to-make friends nor a-common-to-many nor
πάνδημον ἀσπάζεσθαι φιλίαν καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίην ἢ
a-common-to-all to-embrace friendship and (friendship)-toward the-contrary or
μετὰ πολλῶν παθῶν εἰσιοῦσαν, ὧν τὸ μὲν συναγωνιᾶν καὶ
with many passions entering of-which the indeed to-share-anxiety and
συνάχθεσθαι καὶ συμπονεῖν καὶ συγκινδυνεύειν πάνυ δύσοιστον
to-be-grieved-with and to-toil-with and to-share-danger very hard-to-bear
τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τοῦ σοφοῦ
for-the free and noble is the and of-the wise
Χίλωνος ἀληθές, ὃς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα μηδένα ἔχειν
Chilon(-saying) (is)-true who to the(-man) having-said no-one to-have

ἐχθρὸν ἔοικας ἔφη σὺ μηδὲ φίλον ἔχειν. αἱ γὰρ ἔχθραι ταῖς
an-enemy you-seem said-he you not-even a-friend to-have the for enmities on-the
φιλίαις εὐθὺς ἐπακολουθοῦσι καὶ συμπλέκονται, ἐπείπερ
friendships at-once follow and are-entangled-with(-them) since
7 οὐκ ἔστι φίλον μὴ συναδικεῖσθαι μηδὲ
not it-is-possible (for)-a-friend not to-be-wronged-with(-him) nor
συναδοξεῖν μηδὲ συναπεχθάνεσθαι· οἱ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ τὸν
to-be-disgraced-with(-him) nor to-be-hated-with(-him) the for enemies the
φίλον εὐθὺς ὑφορῶνταί τε καὶ μισοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι πολλάκις
friend at-once suspect both and hate the and friends often
φθονοῦσί τε καὶ ζηλοτυποῦσι καὶ περισπῶσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ
envy both and are-jealous and draw-away(-one) just-as then the
τῷ Τιμησίᾳ περὶ τῆς ἀποικίας δοθεὶς χρησμὸς προηγόρευσε
— to-Timesias about the colony given oracle foretold

σμῆνα μελισσάων τάχα τοι καὶ σφῆκες ἔσονται,
swarms of-bees soon you also wasps will-be

οὕτως οἱ φίλων ζητοῦντες ἑσμὸν ἔλαθον ἐχθρῶν σφηκιαῖς
so the(-ones) of-friends seeking a-swarm unawares of-enemies wasps'-nests
περιπεσόντες. καὶ οὐκ ἴσον ἄγει σταθμὸν ἐχθροῦ μνησικακία
have-fallen-into and not equal draws weight of-an-enemy the-grudge
καὶ φίλου χάρις. ὅρα δὲ τοὺς Φιλώτου καὶ Παρμενίωνος
and of-a-friend the-favor look and (at)-the of-Philotas and of-Parmenion
φίλους καὶ οἰκείους ἃ διέθηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἃ τοὺς
friends and kinsmen how treated(-them) Alexander how the(-friends)
Δίωνος Διονύσιος τοὺς Πλαύτου Νέρων καὶ τοὺς
of-Dion Dionysius the(-friends) of-Plautus Nero and the(-friends)
Σηιανοῦ Τιβέριος στρεβλοῦντες καὶ ἀποκτιννύοντες. ὡς γὰρ
of-Sejanus Tiberius racking and killing(-them) as for
τὸν Κρέοντα τῆς θυγατρὸς οὐδὲν ὁ χρυσὸς οὐδ' ὁ πέπλος
— Creon of-the daughter nothing the gold nor the robe

ὠφέλει, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἀναφθὲν αἰφνιδίως προσδραμόντα καὶ
benefited the but fire kindled suddenly (him)-running-up and
περιπτύξαντα κατέκαυσε καὶ συναπώλεσεν, οὕτως ἔνιοι
embracing(-her) burned-up and destroyed-together(-with-her) so some
τῶν φίλων οὐδὲν ἀπολαύσαντες εὐτυχούντων συναπόλλυνται
of-the friends nothing having-enjoyed (of-them)-prospering perish-with
δυστυχοῦσι. καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα πάσχουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι καὶ
(them)-unfortunate and this most suffer the philosophers and
χαρίεντες, ὡς Θησεὺς τῷ Πειρίθῳ κολαζομένῳ καὶ δεδεμένῳ
refined as Theseus — with-Peirithous being-punished and being-bound

αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεύτοις συνέζευκται πέδαις,
of-shame by-unforged is-yoked-together fetters

ἐν δὲ τῷ λοιμῷ φησιν ὁ Θουκυδίδης τοὺς ἀρετῆς
in and the plague says — Thucydides the(-ones) of-virtue
μάλιστα μεταποιουμένους συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς φίλοις
most laying-claim to-perish-with the friends
νοσοῦσιν ἠφείδουν γὰρ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἰόντες παρὰ τοὺς
sick they-did-not-spare for of-them themselves going to the
ἐπιτηδείους.
intimates

Friendship arises from likeness, as harmony does from sounds alike in some way, and many friendships cannot keep it. A man would need to change like Theognis' octopus or a Proteus, now a reader with readers, now a hunter with hunters. A steadfast friend is therefore rare and hard to find.

8 ὅθεν οὕτω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφειδεῖν οὐ προσῆκον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοις
whence thus the virtue to-squander not (is)-fitting at-one-time with-others
συνδέοντας αὐτὴν καὶ συμπλέκοντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀξίοις τὴν
binding it and entangling(-it) but for-the worthy the
αὐτῆς κοινωνίαν φυλάττειν, τουτέστι τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλεῖν καὶ
of-it partnership to-keep that-is for-those alike to-love and
κοινωνεῖν δυναμένοις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων μέγιστόν
to-share being-able and for indeed this of-all greatest
ἐστιν ἐναντίωμα πρὸς τὴν πολυφιλίαν, ὅτι τῇ φιλίᾳ
is an-obstacle to the having-many-friends that for-the friendship
γένεσις δι' ὁμοιότητός ἐστιν. ὅπου γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα
(the)-origin through likeness is where for even the lifeless-things
τὰς μίξεις πρὸς τὰ ἀνόμοια ποιεῖται μετὰ βίας ἀναγκαζόμενα
the mixtures with the unlike make with force being-compelled
καὶ ὀκλάζει καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ φεύγοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τοῖς
both sink and are-indignant fleeing from one-another with-the
δὲ συγγενέσι καὶ οἰκείοις ὁμοπαθεῖ κεραννύμενα καὶ
and kindred and akin (they)-sympathize being-blended and
προσίεται τὴν κοινωνίαν λείως καὶ μετ' εὐμενείας, πῶς οἷόν
admit the partnership smoothly and with goodwill how possible
τε φιλίαν ἤθεσι διαφόροις ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ πάθεσιν
— (for)-friendship in-characters differing to-arise and in-passions
ἀνομοίοις καὶ βίοις ἑτέρας προαιρέσεις ἔχουσιν; ἡ μὲν
unlike and in-lives different choices having the indeed

γὰρ περὶ ψαλμοὺς καὶ φόρμιγγας ἁρμονία δι᾽ ἀντιφώνων
for about harp-playing and lyres harmony through octaves
ἔχει τὸ σύμφωνον, ὀξύτησι καὶ βαρύτησιν ἁμωσγέπως
has the concord in-high-pitches and low-pitches somehow
ὁμοιότητος ἐγγιγνομένης· τῆς δὲ φιλικῆς συμφωνίας ταύτης
(a)-likeness arising of-the but friendly concord this
καὶ ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἀνόμοιον οὐδ᾽ ἀνώμαλον οὐδ᾽ ἄνισον
and harmony nothing unlike nor uneven nor unequal
εἶναι δεῖ μέρος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίως ἐχόντων
to-be must part but from all alike being-disposed
ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ὁμοβουλεῖν καὶ ὁμοδοξεῖν καὶ συνομοπαθεῖν,
to-agree and to-will-alike and to-think-alike and to-feel-alike
ὥσπερ μιᾶς ψυχῆς ἐν πλείοσι διῃρημένης σώμασι.
just-as of-one soul in more-than-one divided bodies
τίς οὖν ἐστιν οὕτως ἐπίπονος καὶ μετάβολος καὶ 9
who then is so laborious and changeable and
παντοδαπὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὥστε πολλοῖς ἑαυτὸν ἐξομοιοῦν
manifold a-man so-as to-many himself to-assimilate
καὶ προσαρμόττειν καὶ μὴ καταγελᾶν τοῦ Θεόγνιδος
and to-adapt and not to-laugh-at — Theognis
παραινοῦντος
advising

πουλύποδος νόον ἴσχε πολυχρόου, ὃς ποτὶ πέτρῃ,
of-the-octopus the-mind have many-colored which toward the-rock
τῇ περ ὁμιλήσῃ, τοῖος ἰδεῖν ἐφάνη;
which ever it-cleaves-to such to-see appeared

καίτοι τοῦ πολύποδος αἱ μεταβολαὶ βάθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ
and-yet of-the octopus the changes depth not have but
περὶ αὐτὴν γίγνονται τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, στυφότητι καὶ μανότητι
about itself they-happen the surface by-density and by-rarity

τὰς ἀπορροὰς τῶν πλησιαζόντων ἀναλαμβάνουσαν·
the effluences of-the(-things) approaching(-it) taking-up
αἱ δὲ φιλίαι τὰ ἤθη ζητοῦσι συνεξομοιοῦν καὶ τὰ πάθη
the but friendships the characters seek to-assimilate and the passions
καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις.
and the words and the pursuits and the dispositions
Πρωτέως τινὸς οὐκ εὐτυχοῦς οὐδὲ πάνυ χρηστοῦ τὸ
of-a-Proteus some(-kind) not fortunate nor very useful the
ἔργον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γοητείας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἐξ
work but by sorcery himself into one form from
ἑτέρου μεταλλάττοντος ἐν ταὐτῷ πολλάκις, φιλολόγοις
another changing in the-same(-place) often with-scholars
συναναγιγνώσκοντος καὶ παλαισταῖς συγκονιομένου
reading-together and with-wrestlers getting-dusty-together
καὶ φιλοθήροις συγκυνηγετοῦντος καὶ φιλοπόταις
and with-hunters hunting-together and with-drinkers
συμμεθυσκομένου καὶ πολιτικοῖς συναρχαιρεσιάζοντος,
getting-drunk-together and with-politicians canvassing-together
ἰδίαν ἤθους ἑστίαν οὐκ ἔχοντος. ὡς δὲ τὴν ἀσχημάτιστον
own of-character hearth not having as and the formless
οἱ φυσικοὶ καὶ ἀχρώματον οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην λέγουσιν
the physicists and colorless substance and matter speak-of
ὑποκειμένην καὶ τρεπομένην ὑφ' αὑτῆς νῦν μὲν φλέγεσθαι
underlying and being-turned by itself now indeed to-blaze
νῦν δ' ἐξυγραίνεσθαι, τοτὲ δ' ἐξαεροῦσθαι πήγνυσθαι
now and to-become-liquid at-times and to-become-air to-solidify
δ' αὖθις, οὕτως ἄρα τῇ πολυφιλίᾳ ψυχὴν ὑποκεῖσθαι
and again so then for-the having-many-friends a-soul to-underlie
δεήσει πολυπαθῆ καὶ πολύτροπον καὶ ὑγρὰν καὶ ῥᾳδίαν
will-be-needed much-affected and versatile and fluid and easy
μεταβάλλειν. ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία στάσιμόν τι ζητεῖ καὶ
to-change but the friendship stable something seeks and

βέβαιον ἦθος καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ·
steadfast character and unchanging in one place and intimacy
διὸ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ δυσεύρετόν ἐστι φίλος βέβαιος.
therefore also rare and hard-to-find is a-friend steadfast
