GREEK SERIES · VOLUME 32

Protagoras, Meno, and Euthydemus

Plato

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ
ΜΕΝΩΝ
ΕΥΘΥΔΗΜΟΣ

Protagoras, Meno, and Euthydemus

Three Dialogues on Whether Virtue Can Be Taught

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with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



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

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The Greek text follows Burnet's Oxford Plato

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Words Burnet secludes are not printed; words
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PLATO

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

Protagoras

A friend teases Socrates for coming from his hunt after Alcibiades, whose beard is now growing. Socrates admits that he was with him and that Alcibiades spoke much on his side, but says he scarcely noticed him, for someone far more beautiful was there: the wisest man living, Protagoras of Abdera, who has been in Athens for two days. The friend asks to hear the conversation, and Socrates agrees to tell it from the start.

FR. πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; ἦ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ 309
from-where O Socrates do-you-appear or (is-it)-clear indeed that from
κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι
(the)-hunt the after the of-Alcibiades bloom and indeed to-me
καὶ πρῴην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ
also the-day-before-yesterday seeing(-him) handsome indeed he-appeared a-man
ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν
still a-man however O Socrates as at-least among ourselves —
εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.
to-be-said and with-a-beard already being-filled
SOC. εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ, b
then what (of)-this not you however of-Homer an-admirer are
ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ πρῶτον ὑπηνήτου,
who said most-graceful (the)-youth to-be of-the first bearded
ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;
which now Alcibiades has
FR. τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνῃ; καὶ πῶς
what then the now truly from that(-man) do-you-appear and how
πρός σε ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;
toward you the young-man is-disposed
SOC. εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν c
well to-me-at-least he-seemed not least and also on-the present
ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε βοηθῶν ἐμοί,
day and for many-things on-behalf-of me he-said helping me

καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον μέντοι
and so also just-now from that(-man) I-come strange however
τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου, οὔτε
something to-you I-wish to-tell present for that(-man) neither
προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.
I-paid — attention I-forgot and him often

FR. καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κἀκεῖνον τοσοῦτον
and what — having-happened would-be about you and-him so-great
πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλῳ ἔν
a-matter not for surely some more-handsome you-met other(-one) in
γε τῇδε τῇ πόλει.
at-least this — city

SOC. καὶ πολύ γε.
and much at-least

FR. τί φῄς; ἀστῷ ἢ ξένῳ;
what do-you-say a-townsman or a-stranger

SOC. ξένῳ.
a-stranger

FR. ποδαπῷ;
from-where

SOC. Ἀβδηρίτῃ.
from-Abdera

FR. καὶ οὕτω καλός τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε
and so handsome some the stranger seemed to-you to-be so-as
τοῦ Κλεινίου υἱέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;
than-the of-Clinias son more-handsome to-you to-appear

SOC. πῶς δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον
how but not is-it-likely O blessed-one the wisest
κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;
more-handsome to-appear

FR. ἀλλ᾽ ἦ σοφῷ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν d
but truly with-a-wise some(-man) for-us O Socrates having-met
πάρει;
you-are-here

SOC. σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι
the-wisest indeed then surely of-the at-least present if to-you
δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.
seems wisest to-be Protagoras

FR. ὦ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;
oh what do-you-say Protagoras has-come-to-town

SOC. τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.
(the)-third at-least already day

FR. καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις;
and just-now then with-that(-man) having-been-together you-come

SOC. πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. 310
certainly at-least many-things both having-said and having-heard

FR. τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ
why then not will-you-relate to-us the conversation if not you
τι κωλύει, καθεζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν
something prevents sitting-down here having-made-get-up the
παῖδα τουτονί;
slave this

SOC. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.
certainly indeed then and gratitude at-least I-shall-feel if you-listen

FR. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.
and indeed also we to-you if you-tell(-it)

SOC. διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἀκούετε.
double — would-be the gratitude but then listen

II · HIPPOCRATES AT DAWN

Before daybreak Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, beats on Socrates' door with his stick and bursts in, crying that Protagoras has come. He would spend his own money and his friends' to become wise, and begs Socrates to speak to Protagoras for him. Since it is too early, the two walk about in the courtyard while they wait for day.

b τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου,
the for past night this-here still deep (at)-dawn
Ἱπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν
Hippocrates the of-Apollodorus son of-Phason and brother the
θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ
door with-the stick very hard knocked and when for-him
ἀνέῳξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ᾔει ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ
opened someone at-once inside he-went hurrying and with-the voice
μέγα λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις;
loud saying O Socrates he-said are-you-awake or are-you-asleep
καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, "Ἱπποκράτης," ἔφην,
and I the voice recognizing of-him Hippocrates I-said
"οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις;" οὐδέν γ', ἦ
(is-it)-this-one not something new do-you-bring nothing at-least said
δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. "εὖ ἂν λέγοις," ἦν δ'
and he if not good(-news) at-least well — you-would-speak said and
ἐγώ· "ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου;"
I is(-it) but what and of-what for-the-sake at-such-an-hour have-you-come
Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἥκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. "πρῴην,"
Protagoras he-said has-come standing beside me (the)-day-before-yesterday
ἔφην ἐγώ· "σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι;" νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη,
I-said I you but just-now have-learned(-it) by the gods he-said
ἑσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος
in-the-evening at-least and at-the-same-time having-felt-for the bed

ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἶπεν· ἑσπέρας δῆτα,
he-sat-down by the feet of-me and said in-the-evening indeed
μάλα γε ὀψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς
very at-least late having-arrived from Oenoe the for you-know slave
με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν
me — Satyrus ran-away and indeed intending to-you to-tell
ὅτι διωξοίμην αὐτόν, ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην.
that I-was-going-to-pursue him by some other(-thing) I-forgot
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν d
when and I-came and having-dined we-were and were-about
ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας.
to-go-to-bed then to-me (my)-brother says that has-come Protagoras
καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτά μοι
and still indeed I-tried at-once to you to-go then to-me
λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστά
too far it-seemed into-the night to-be as and soonest
με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω
me from the weariness — sleep let-go at-once getting-up so
δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
here I-made-my-way and I knowing of-him the courage
καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, "τί οὖν σοι," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "τοῦτο; μῶν
and the excitement what then to-you said and I (is)-this surely-not
τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;" καὶ ὃς γελάσας, νὴ τοὺς
in-something you wrongs Protagoras and he laughing by the
θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός,
gods he-said O Socrates (in-this)-that at-least alone he-is wise
ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. "ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία," ἔφην ἐγώ, "ἂν αὐτῷ
me but not he-makes(-so) but yes by Zeus I-said I if to-him
διδῷς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθῃς ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν."
you-give money and persuade that(-man) he-will-make also you wise
εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτῳ εἴη· ὡς οὔτ'
if only said and he O Zeus and gods on this it-were as neither

ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ'
— — *of-my-own I-would-spare anything nor of-the friends but*
αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ
(for)-the-very these also now I-come to you so-that on-behalf-of me
διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός
you-may-talk to-him I for at-the-same-time indeed both younger
εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ'
am at-the-same-time and not-even I-have-seen Protagoras ever nor
ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησε.
I-have-heard anything still for a-child I was when the previous(-time) he-came-to-town
311 ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν
but for O Socrates all the man praise
καί φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν
and say most-wise to-be at-speaking but why not are-we-walking
παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς
to him so-that indoors we-may-catch(-him) he-lodges and as
ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱπποvίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.
I heard with Callias the (son)-of-Hipponicus but let-us-go
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· "μήπω, ἀγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν — πρῲ γάρ
and I said not-yet good-sir there let-us-go early for
ἐστιν — ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ
it-is but here let-us-get-up into the courtyard and
περιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα
walking-around here let-us-pass-the-time until — light comes then
ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει,
let-us-go and for the most-part Protagoras indoors spends-time
ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον."
so-that take-heart we-shall-catch him as the likely(-thing) indoors

Socrates tests the young man. One who paid Hippocrates of Cos would become a doctor, and one who paid Polyclitus or Phidias a sculptor; what then will Protagoras make of him? Hippocrates blushes and owns that he would become a sophist, and would be ashamed to have the Greeks see him one. Socrates suggests he goes for an education, as to the teacher of letters or the trainer, and asks what a sophist is. Hippocrates says he is one who knows wise things and makes men clever at speaking, but cannot say about what.

μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῄμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ b
after these-things having-got-up into the courtyard we-walked-about and I
ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν
testing — of-Hippocrates the strength examined
αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες,
him and asked tell me I-said I O Hippocrates
παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν
to Protagoras now you-are-attempting to-go money paying
ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος
to-that(-man) (as)-a-fee on-behalf-of yourself as to whom about-to-come
καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν
and what about-to-become as — if you-had-in-mind to —
σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἱπποκράτη τὸν Κῷον, τὸν
your-own namesake going Hippocrates the of-Cos the(-one)
τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν
of-the Asclepiads money to-pay on-behalf-of yourself (as)-a-fee
ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν,
to-that(-man) if someone you asked tell me you-are-about to-pay
ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, Ἱπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι;" τί
O Hippocrates to-Hippocrates a-fee as to-whom being what
ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; — εἶπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ. —
— would-you-have-replied I-would-have-said — he-said that as to-a-doctor

"ὡς τίς γενησόμενος;" — ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη. — εἰ δὲ
as what about-to-become as a-doctor he-said if and
παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον
to Polyclitus the Argive or Phidias the Athenian
ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν
you-had-in-mind going a-fee on-behalf-of yourself to-pay
ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· "τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον
to-them if someone you asked to-pay this — money
ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ;"
as to-whom being in mind have-you to-Polyclitus both and to-Phidias
d τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; — εἶπον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. —
what — would-you-have-replied I-would-have-said — as to-sculptors
"ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός;" — δῆλον ὅτι
as what but about-to-become yourself (it-is)-clear that
ἀγαλματοποιός. — εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ
a-sculptor well said and I to and indeed
Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον
Protagoras now going I both and you money
ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἕτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν
to-that(-man) (as)-a-fee ready we-shall-be to-pay on-behalf-of you if
μὲν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν
indeed suffices — our money and with-these we-persuade
αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες.
him if but not also the(-money) of-the friends spending-in-addition
εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας
if then someone us about these so very being-in-earnest
ἔροιτο· "εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἱππόκρατες,
were-to-ask tell me O Socrates both and Hippocrates
ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα
as to-whom being — to-Protagoras in mind have-you money
τελεῖν;" τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε
to-pay what — him would-we-answer what name other at-least

λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου
spoken about Protagoras do-we-hear as about Phidias
ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ
sculptor and about Homer poet what such(-name) about
Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; — σοφιστὴν δή τοι ὀνομάζουσί
Protagoras do-we-hear sophist indeed you-know they-call
γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη. — ὡς σοφιστῇ
at-least O Socrates the man to-be he-said as to-a-sophist
ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα; — μάλιστα. —
then we-go paying the money certainly
εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· "αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς 312
if then also this someone you should-ask yourself but indeed as
τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχῃ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;" — καὶ
what about-to-become do-you-go to — Protagoras and
ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας — ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας,
he said blushing already for was-showing something of-day
ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι — εἰ μέν τι τοῖς
so-that visible he to-become if indeed at-all to-the
ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος. —
previous(-cases) it-is-like (it-is)-clear that a-sophist about-to-become
σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς
you and said and I before (the)-gods not — would-you-be-ashamed before
τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; — νὴ τὸν Δία,
the Greeks yourself a-sophist presenting by — Zeus
ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. —
O Socrates if-indeed at-least what I-think one-must to-say
ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις
but then O Hippocrates perhaps not such suppose
σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἵαπερ
of-you the from Protagoras learning to-be but such-as
ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ
the(-learning) from the schoolmaster was and lyre-player and

παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες,
gymnastic-trainer of-these for you each not for (a)-craft you-learned
ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην
as a-craftsman going-to-be but for education as the private-man
καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. — πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ,
and the free(-man) befits certainly indeed then to-me it-seems
ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.
he-said such more to-be the from Protagoras learning
c οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει;
do-you-know then what you-are-about now to-do or you escapes(-it)
ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — τοῦ πέρι; — ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν
said and I of-what about that you-are-about the soul —
σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῂς, σοφιστῇ· ὅτι
your-own to-hand-over to-tend to-a-man as you-say to-a-sophist what
δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι
but ever the sophist is I-would-be-surprised — if you-know and-yet
εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα,
if this you-do-not-know not-even to-whom you-hand-over the soul you-know
οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. — οἶμαί γ', ἔφη,
neither if to-a-good nor if to-a-bad thing I-think at-least he-said
εἰδέναι. — λέγε δή, τί ἡγῇ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν; —
to-know say then what do-you-consider to-be the sophist
ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοὔνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι
I indeed said and he as the-name says this(-man) to-be
τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. — οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο
the of-the wise-things knower therefore said and I this
μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων,
indeed it-is-possible to-say also about painters and about carpenters
ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ
that these are the(-ones) of-the wise-things knowers but if
τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, "τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι
someone should-ask us of-the what wise-things are the painters

ἐπιστήμονες,” εἴποιμεν ἄν που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς
knowers we-would-say — perhaps to-him that of-the(-things) toward
τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.
the production the of-the images and the-rest so
εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, “ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν e
if but someone that should-ask the but sophist of-the what wise-things
ἐστιν;” τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας
is(-he) what — would-we-answer him of-what production
ἐπιστάτης; — τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
(the)-master what — would-we-say him to-be O Socrates
ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; — ἴσως ἄν,
than master of-the making clever to-speak perhaps —
ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε·
said and I true-things we-would-say not however sufficiently at-least
ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ
of-question for still the answer our needs about what the
σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δεινὸν
sophist clever makes(-one) to-speak as the lyre-player clever
δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ
surely makes(-one) to-speak about which-precisely also knowing about
κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ; — ναί. — εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς
lyre-playing is-it-not for yes well the but indeed sophist
περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; — δῆλον ὅτι περὶ
about what clever does-he-make(-one) to-speak (it-is)-clear that about
οὗπερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; — εἰκός γε. τί δή ἐστιν
which-precisely also to-know (it-is)-likely at-least what indeed is
τοῦτο περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ
this about which himself both knowing is the sophist and
τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; — μὰ Δί’, ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.
the pupil makes(-so) by Zeus he-said no-longer I-can to-you tell

Socrates warns Hippocrates of the danger: he is handing his soul to a man he does not know. The sophist is a merchant of the wares that feed the soul, who praises everything he sells, and unlike food these cannot be carried home in a vessel and tested by an expert before they are eaten; they are taken straight into the soul. So the two should consider the matter with their elders. For now, Socrates says, they should go and hear the man and confer with others afterward, since Hippias and Prodicus are there too.

313 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο· τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἷόν τινα
and I said after this what then do-you-know into what-sort some
κίνδυνον ἔρχῃ ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα
danger you-go about-to-stake the soul or if indeed the body
ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῳ διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν
to-entrust you had to-someone risking either good
αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω
it to-become or bad many-things — you-would-have-considered
εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὔ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τούς τε
whether it-must-be-entrusted or not and into counsel the both
φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους σκοπούμενος
friends — you-would-have-called and the kinsmen considering(-it)
ἡμέρας συχνάς· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος
(for)-days many what but about more than-the body
ἡγῇ, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ σὰ
you-consider the soul and in which all are — your-things
ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ
either well or badly to-fare good or bad it
γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ
having-become about but this neither with-the father nor with-the
ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ'
brother you-consulted nor of-us the comrades with-anyone whether

ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν
it-must-be-entrusted or also not to-the arrived this stranger —
σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἑσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῄς, ὄρθριος ἥκων
your soul but in-the-evening having-heard as you-say at-dawn coming
περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιῇ, εἴτε
about indeed this no word nor counsel you-make whether
χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἕτοιμος δ' εἶ
one-must to-entrust yourself to-him or not ready but you-are
ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς
to-spend the both your-own and the of-the friends money as
ἤδη διεγνωκὼς ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὃν
already having-decided that by-all-means one-must-be-with Protagoras whom
οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φῄς, οὔτε διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε,
neither you-know as you-say nor you-have-talked-with ever
σοφιστὴν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν
a-sophist and you-call(-him) the but sophist what ever he-is
φαίνῃ ἀγνοῶν, ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν;
you-appear not-knowing to-whom you-are-about yourself to-entrust
— καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας, ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ὧν σὺ 314
and he having-heard it-seems he-said O Socrates from what you
λέγεις. — ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἱππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει
say so then O Hippocrates the sophist happens
ὢν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ
being a-merchant some or a-retailer of-the wares on which (the)-soul
τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις. — τρέφεται
is-nourished he-appears for to-me-at-least such some(-one) is-nourished
δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι; — μαθήμασιν δήπου, ἦν δ'
and O Socrates (the)-soul on-what on-learning surely said and
ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν
I and that at-least not O comrade the sophist praising
ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ
what he-sells may-deceive us as the(-men) about the of-the

σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ
body nourishment the merchant both and retailer and for
οὗτοί που ὧν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅτι
these surely of-what they-bring wares neither themselves know what
χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα
(is)-good or bad for the body they-praise but everything
πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις
selling nor the(-men) buying from them if not someone
τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὤν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ
happens a-gymnastic-trainer or a-doctor being so and also the(-men) the
μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ
learnings carrying-about through the cities and selling and
καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα
retailing(-them) to-the always desiring(-one) praise indeed everything
ἃ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἄν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων
which they-sell perhaps but — some O best-one even these
ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς
might-not-know of-what they-sell what (is)-good or bad for
τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν,
the soul as and likewise also the(-men) buying from them
ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὤν.
if not someone happens about the soul in-turn medical being
εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν
if indeed then you happen knowing of-these what (is)-good
καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ
and bad (it-is)-safe for-you to-buy learnings both from
Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὦ
Protagoras and from other anyone-whatever if but not see O
μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς.
blessed-one lest about the dearest-things you-gamble both and run-risks

καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν b
and for indeed also much greater (is)-the-danger in the of-the
μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ
learnings purchase than in the of-the foods foods indeed for and
ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἔξεστιν ἐν
drinks having-bought from the retailer and merchant it-is-possible in
ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ
other vessels to-carry-away and before taking them into the
σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν
body drinking or eating having-put(-them)-down at-home it-is-possible
συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅτι τε
to-take-counsel calling-in the expert what both
ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅτι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον καὶ ὁπότε· ὥστε ἐν
must-be-eaten or drunk and what not and how-much and when so-that in
τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
the purchase not great (is)-the danger learnings but not it-is-possible in
ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν
another vessel to-carry-away but (of)-necessity having-paid-down the price
τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι
the learning in itself the soul having-taken and having-learned to-go-away
ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ
either harmed or benefited these-things then let-us-consider also
μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε
with the older(-men) than-us we for (are)-still young so-as
τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν,
so-great a-matter to-decide now however as we-set-out
ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ
let-us-go and let-us-hear the man then having-heard also
ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας
with-others let-us-confer and for not alone Protagoras

αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος — οἶμαι δὲ
there is but also Hippias the Elean I-think and
καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον — καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.
also Prodicus the Cean and others many and wise

V · CALLIAS' HOUSE

The doorkeeper, a eunuch weary of sophists, slams the door on them, and when they knock again he answers through the shut door that his master has no leisure; only when Socrates says that they are not sophists and have come to see Protagoras does he let them in. Inside, Protagoras walks in the cloister with a train of followers who wheel neatly behind him at each turn. Socrates sees Hippias on a high seat answering questions about nature and the heavens, and Prodicus, still in bed in a storeroom, his deep voice booming so that his words cannot be made out. Alcibiades and Critias come in after them.

d δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν
having-seemed(-best) to-us these-things we-went when and in
τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου
the porch we-were standing about some argument
διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν
we-conversed which to-us on the way had-come-up so-that then
μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν,
not unfinished it-might-be but having-concluded(-it) so we-might-enter
στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν
standing in the porch we-conversed until we-agreed
ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις,
with-one-another it-seems then to-me the doorkeeper a-eunuch some
κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
was-overhearing us he-is-likely and through the multitude of-the
σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν·
sophists to-be-annoyed with-the(-men) coming into the house

ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν
when at-any-rate we-knocked-on the door having-opened and seen
ἡμᾶς, ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ
us ha he-said sophists some not (there-is)-leisure for-him and
ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως
at-once with-both the hands the door very eagerly
ὡς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν,
as able — he-was he-slammed and we again knocked
καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλῃμένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, ὦ
and he being-shut the door answering said O
ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ;
men he-said not have-you-heard that not (there-is)-leisure for-him
"ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ," ἔφην ἐγώ, "οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν
but good-sir I-said I neither to Callias we-have-come
οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν. ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ
nor sophists we-are but take-heart Protagoras for
τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν." μόγις
you-know wanting to-see we-came announce(-us) then with-difficulty
οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέῳξεν τὴν θύραν.
then at-last for-us the-fellow opened the door
ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ 315
when and we-entered we-found Protagoras in the
προστῴῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἑξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπάτουν
portico walking-about in-a-row and with-him were-walking-about
ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου καὶ ὁ
from indeed the on one-side Callias the (son)-of-Hipponicus and the
ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ
brother of-him the by-the-same-mother Paralus the (son)-of-Pericles and
Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος
Charmides the (son)-of-Glaucon from and the on the-other-side the other
τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου
of-the (sons)-of-Pericles Xanthippus and Philippides the (son)-of-Philomelus

καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν
and Antimoerus the Mendaean who-precisely is-best-regarded most of-the
Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς
of-Protagoras pupils and for (a)-craft learns as a-sophist
ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες
going-to-be of-these and who behind followed listening-to
τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο — οὓς
the things-said the indeed most(-part) strangers appeared whom
ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν
brings from each the cities — Protagoras through which
διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ
he-passes charming(-them) with-the voice like Orpheus they and
κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι — ἦσαν δέ τινες
according-to the voice follow charmed were and some
καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα
also of-the natives in the chorus this — chorus most
ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὼν
I-at-least seeing was-pleased how beautifully they-took-care never in-the-way
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς
in the front to-be of-Protagoras but when he-himself
ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ
turned-round also the(-ones) with him well somehow and in order
περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν
split-apart these — listeners on-this-side and on-that-side and in
κύκλῳ περιιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.
a-circle going-round always into the back took-their-places most-beautifully
c τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἱππίαν τὸν
the and after(-him) I-perceived said Homer Hippias the
Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστῴῳ ἐν
Elean sitting in the over against portico on
θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός
a-throne around him and were-sitting on benches Eryximachus

τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ
both the (son)-of-Acumenus and Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian and
Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε
Andron the (son)-of-Androtion and of-the strangers fellow-citizens both
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε
of-him and others some they-appeared and about nature both
καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν
and the heavenly-things astronomical some(-things) to-be-asking —
Ἱππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν
Hippias he and on (the)-throne sitting to-each of-them
διέκρινεν καὶ διεξῄει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.
was-deciding and was-going-through the things-asked
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον — ἐπεδήμει γὰρ d
and indeed truly also Tantalus at-least I-saw was-in-town for
ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος — ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι,
then also Prodicus the Cean was and in a-room some
ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιείῳ ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν
which before the(-time) indeed as a-storeroom used Hipponicus now
δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ
but by the multitude of-the lodgers — Callias also
τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν
this having-emptied for-strangers a-lodging has-made — indeed then
Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κῳδίοις τισὶν καὶ
Prodicus still was-lying wrapped-up in sheepskins some and
στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο
blankets and very many as it-appeared were-sitting-beside
δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ
and him on the nearby couches Pausanias both the(-one) from
Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς
Cerameis and with Pausanias a-young some still lad as
μὲν ἐγῷμαι καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν
indeed I-think fine both and-good the nature the but then looks

πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα,
very handsome I-seemed to-hear (the)-name for-him to-be Agathon
καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν.
and not — I-would-be-surprised if (the)-darling of-Pausanias he-happens being
316 τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὼ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω,
this and was the lad and the Adeimantuses both
ὅ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς
the(-one) both (son)-of-Cepis and the (son)-of-Leucolophides and others some
ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε
appeared about but what they-were-conversing not could I-at-least
μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ
learn from-outside although eagerly being(-disposed) to-hear —
Προδίκου — πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ
Prodicus all-wise for to-me seems the-man to-be and
θεῖος — ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις
divine but through the deepness of-the voice a-booming some
ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.
in the room arising unclear made the things-said
καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθεμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν
and we indeed just-now had-entered behind and us
ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῂς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ
came-in-after Alcibiades both the handsome as say you and I
πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου.
am-persuaded and Critias the (son)-of-Callaeschrus

Socrates presents Hippocrates, and Protagoras chooses to speak before all. The sophist's art, he says, is ancient, but its earlier practitioners hid it under other names, poetry, rites and oracles, gymnastics, and music, from fear of envy. He has taken the opposite road and professes openly that he is a sophist and an educator of men, and he has come to no harm by it. Prodicus and Hippias are called, and all sit down together to hear him.

ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ᾽ ἄττα διατρίψαντες b
we then when we-entered still small some(-things) having-lingered-over
καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆμεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν,
and these having-looked-over approached to — Protagoras
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἤλθομεν
and I said O Protagoras to you you-know we-came
ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης οὗτος.
I both and Hippocrates here
πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ
whether he-said with-(me)-alone wishing to-talk or also
μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων;
with the others
ἡμῖν μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὗ
to-us indeed said and I nothing it-matters having-heard but for-what
ἕνεκα ἤλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι.
for-the-sake we-came yourself consider
τί οὖν δή ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὗ ἕνεκα ἥκετε;
what then indeed is(-it) he-said for-which for-the-sake you-have-come
Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου c
Hippocrates here is indeed of-the natives of-Apollodorus
υὁς, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν
son of-a-house great both and prosperous himself and by-the
φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν
nature he-seems a-match to-be for-the men-of-his-age to-desire

δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ
and to-me he-seems notable to-become in the city this and
οἴεταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο·
he-thinks for-him most — would-happen if with-you he-were-to-associate
ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος
these-things then now you consider whether about them alone
οἴει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων.
you-think one-must to-converse with alone or with others
d ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.
rightly he-said you-take-forethought O Socrates on-behalf-of me
ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν
a-stranger for a-man and going into cities great and in
ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας
these persuading of-the young the best leaving
τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ
the of-the others company both of-kin and of-strangers both
πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους
older and younger with-himself to-associate as better
ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
going-to-be through — his-own company one-must to-beware
τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι
the(-man) these-things doing not for small about them jealousies
τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ
both arise and other hostilities both and plots I
δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ
and the sophistic art say indeed to-be ancient the but
μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους
practicing it of-the ancient men fearing
τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι,
the odious(-part) of-it a-screen to-make and to-cloak(-it)
τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ
the-ones indeed poetry as Homer both and Hesiod and

Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμῳδίας,
Simonides the-others and in-turn rites both and oracles
τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δέ τινας
those around both Orpheus and Musaeus some and some
ᾔσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος
I-have-perceived also gymnastic as Iccus both the Tarentine
καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἧττων σοφιστὴς Ἡρόδικος
and the(-one) now still being of-none inferior a-sophist Herodicus
ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ
the Selymbrian the but original Megarian music and
Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας
Agathocles both — your(-countryman) (as)-a-screen made great
ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί.
being sophist and Pythocleides the Cean and others many
οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς
these all as I-say fearing the jealousy —
τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο.
arts these as-screens used
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι· 317
I but with-these all in this to-be not do-agree
ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὔ τι διαπράξασθαι ὧ
I-think for them not at-all to-have-accomplished what
ἐβουλήθησαν — οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς
they-wished not for to-escape-notice of-the men those
δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὥνπερ ἕνεκα
being-able in the cities to-act of-which-precisely for-the-sake
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἵ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος
these are the screens since the at-least many so a-word
εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι,
to-say nothing perceive but whatever — these announce
ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν — τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι
these-things they-chant the then running-away not to-be-able

ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ
to-escape but detected to-be (is)-much folly also of-the
ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη
attempt and much more-hostile to-make (of)-necessity
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς
the men they-think for — such(-man) in-addition-to the
ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν
other(-things) also a-villain to-be I then of-these the opposite
ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ
whole way have-gone and admit both a-sophist to-be and
παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω
to-educate men and precaution this I-think better
ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ
than-that to-be the admitting rather than denial to-be and
ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτῃ ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν,
other(-precautions) besides this I-have-considered so-that with god to-say
μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι.
nothing terrible to-suffer through the admitting a-sophist to-be
καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ
and-yet many at-least years already I-am in the art and for
καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν — οὐδενὸς ὅτου
also the all-together many to-me are(-the-years) of-none of-whom
οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην — ὥστε
not of-all — of-you in age father I-could-be so-that
πολύ μοι ἥδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε, περὶ τούτων
much to-me most-pleasant it-is if something you-wish about these
ἁπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι.
all before those inside being the discussion to-make
d καὶ ἐγώ — ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε
and I I-suspected for to-wish him — both
Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι
to-Prodicus and — to-Hippias to-show-off and to-make-a-display

ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν — τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ,
that admirers of-him having-come we-were why then I-said I
οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἱππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽
not also Prodicus and Hippias did-we-call and the(-ones) with
αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν;
them so-that they-may-listen-to us
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
certainly indeed then said — Protagoras
βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν,
do-you-wish then — Callias said a-council we-should-arrange
ἵνα καθεζόμενοι διαλέγησθε;
so-that sitting-down you-may-converse
ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἅσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι e
it-seemed (that)-one-should gladly and all we as about-to-hear
ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων
men wise and ourselves both taking-hold of-the benches
καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἱππίᾳ — ἐκεῖ
and of-the couches arranged(-them) beside — Hippias there
γὰρ προϋπῆρχε τὰ βάθρα — ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας
for were-already the benches in and this Callias
τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον,
both and Alcibiades they-two-came bringing-the-two — Prodicus
ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.
having-made-get-up from the couch and the(-ones) with — Prodicus
ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, νῦν
when and all we-sat-down-together — Protagoras now
δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἵδε
indeed — he-said you-might-speak O Socrates since also these
πάρεισιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιοῦ
are-present about what a-little before mention you-were-making
πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου.
to me on-behalf-of the young-man

VII · THE ART OF CITIZENSHIP

Protagoras promises that Hippocrates will go home better every day. Asked better at what, he answers that he teaches good counsel in one's own affairs and in the city's, how to manage a household and to be most able in public speech and action. Socrates asks whether he means the political art, and making men good citizens, and Protagoras says that is exactly what he professes.

318 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἡ αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
and I said that the same to-me beginning is O Protagoras
ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε
which-precisely just-now about what I-came Hippocrates for here
τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὢν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅτι οὖν
happens in desire being — of-your company what then
αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῇ, ἡδέως ἄν φησι
for-him will-result if with-you he-associates gladly — he-says
πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.
to-learn so-much — at-least our statement
ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται
taking-up(-the-word) then — Protagoras said O young-man it-will-be
τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῇς, ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ,
then for-you if with-me you-associate on-what — day with-me you-associate
ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ
to-go-away home better having-become and on the next(-day) the-same
ταῦτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι.
these-things and each day always toward the better to-advance
b καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν
and I having-heard said O Protagoras this indeed
οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ
nothing surprising you-say but likely since even you although
τηλικοῦτος ὢν καὶ οὕτως σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ
so-old being and so wise if someone you should-teach what

μὴ τυγχάνοις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ
not you-happen knowing better — you-would-become but
μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν
not so but as — if straightway very changing
τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας
the desire Hippocrates here should-desire the company
τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος,
of-this — young-man the(-one) now newly staying-in-town
Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν,
of-Zeuxippus the Heracleote and coming to him
ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα
as to you now he-should-hear from-him the-same these-things
ἅπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἑκάστης ἡμέρας συνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων
which-precisely from-you that each day associating with-him better
ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο· "τί δὴ φῂς
he-will-be and will-advance if him he-should-ask in-what indeed you-say
βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν;" εἴποι ἂν αὐτῷ
better to-be-going-to-be and toward what to-advance would-say — to-him
ὁ Ζεύξιππος ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν· κἂν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρᾳ τῷ
— Zeuxippus that toward painting and if with-Orthagoras the
Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταὐτὰ ταῦτα
Theban having-associated having-heard from-that(-man) the-same these-things
ἅπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅτι βελτίων καθ'
which-precisely from-you he-should-ask him toward what better day-by
ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἴποι ἂν ὅτι
day he-will-be associating with-that(-man) he-would-say — that
εἰς αὔλησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ
toward flute-playing so indeed also you tell the young-man and me
ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἱπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόρᾳ
on-behalf-of him asking Hippocrates here with-Protagoras
συγγενόμενος, ᾧ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρᾳ συγγένηται, βελτίων
having-associated on-what — with-him day he-associates better

ἄπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἑκάστης οὕτως
will-go-away having-become and of-the other days each so
ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ;
will-advance toward what O Protagoras and about what
319 καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, σύ τε καλῶς
and — Protagoras me these-things having-heard you both well
ἐρωτᾷς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς
ask he-said O Socrates and I in-the(-men) well
ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ
asking delight answering Hippocrates for to me
ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ
coming not will-suffer what-precisely — he-would-have-suffered with-another
τῳ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι
any having-associated of-the sophists the indeed for others
λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας
maltreat the young the for arts them having-fled
ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας,
unwilling again in-turn bringing they-thrust into arts
λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν
calculations both and astronomy and geometry and music
διδάσκοντες — καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν —
teaching and at-the-same-time at — Hippias he-glanced
παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του
to but me coming he-will-learn not about other anything
ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία
than about what he-comes(-for) the and learning is good-counsel
περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν
about the domestic(-affairs) how — best — his-own household
διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς
he-may-manage and about the(-affairs) of-the city how the of-the
πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.
city most-able — he-may-be both to-act and to-speak

ἆρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι
then I-said I follow you the argument you-seem for to-me
λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν
to-mean the political art and to-promise to-make
ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας.
men good citizens
αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ
the-very indeed then this is(-it) he-said O Socrates the
ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.
profession which I-profess

VIII · SOCRATES' DOUBT

Socrates says he did not think this could be taught. The Athenians call experts on building or ships, but on the city's government any carpenter, smith, or cobbler may advise, and no one asks where he learned it. Pericles gave his sons the best teachers in everything teachers could give, but not in his own wisdom, and when he feared that Alcibiades would corrupt his young brother Clinias, he took the boy away to be educated in Ariphron's house, but within six months he could do nothing with him and sent him back. He asks Protagoras to show that virtue can be taught.

ἦ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ b
truly fine said and I a-device then you-have-acquired if-indeed
κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται
you-have-acquired(-it) not for anything else to at-least you will-be-said
ἢ ἅπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ
than what-precisely I-think I for this O Protagoras not
ᾤμην διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως
thought teachable to-be to-you but saying(-so) not I-can how
ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι
I-should-disbelieve(-it) whence and it I-consider not teachable to-be

μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός εἰμι
nor by men providable for-men just I-am
εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες,
to-say I for the-Athenians as also the other Greeks
φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν
say wise to-be I-see then when we-gather into the
ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέῃ
assembly when indeed about building something there-be-need
πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους
to-do the city the builders sending-for
συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ
(as)-advisers about the buildings when and about
ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως,
shipbuilding the shipbuilders and the-rest all so
ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ
as-many-as they-consider learnable both and teachable to-be if but
τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ
some other(-man) tries them to-advise whom they not
οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ᾖ καὶ πλούσιος
think a-craftsman to-be even-if very handsome he-be and rich
καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ
and of-the well-born not-at-all any more they-accept(-him) but
καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ
they-laugh-at(-him) and make-an-uproar until — either himself withdraws
ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν
the(-man) attempting to-speak shouted-down or the archers him
ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων.
drag-away or carry-off ordering the presiding-officers
d περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω
about indeed then what they-think in art to-be so
διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως
they-proceed when but something about the of-the city

διοικήσεως δέῃ βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς
administration there-be-need to-deliberate advises them
ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ
standing-up about these alike indeed a-carpenter alike and
χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης,
a-smith a-shoemaker merchant shipowner rich poor
γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει
well-born low-born and these no-one this reproaches
ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος
as the(-ones) before that from-nowhere having-learned nor being
διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ·
a-teacher any to-him then to-advise he-attempts
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν
(it-is)-clear for that not they-consider teachable to-be(-it) not therefore
ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
(only)-that the common(-body) of-the city so is(-disposed) but
ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην
privately for-us the wisest and best of-the citizens this
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι·
— virtue which they-have not able — to-others to-hand-down
ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους 320
since Pericles the of-these — young-men father these
ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν,
what indeed of-teachers depended(-on) finely and well educated
ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῳ
what but himself wise is neither himself he-educates(-them) nor to-any
ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ
other hands(-them)-over but they going-around graze like
ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ
sacred-animals-let-loose if somewhere of-their-own-accord they-may-chance-upon the
ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουΐ
virtue if and you-wish Clinias the of-Alcibiades here

νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ
younger brother being-guardian the same this man
Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ
Pericles fearing about him lest he-should-be-corrupted indeed by
Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν
Alcibiades having-torn(-him)-away from this(-man) depositing(-him) in
Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἓξ μῆνας γεγονέναι,
(the-house)-of-Ariphron educated(-him) and before six months had-passed
ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ
gave(-him)-back to-this(-man) not knowing what he-should-do with-him and
ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ
others to-you very-many I-can to-tell who themselves good
ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων
being no-one ever better made neither of-the kin
οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς
nor of-the strangers I therefore O Protagoras at
ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν·
these looking not I-consider teachable to-be virtue
ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ
when but you I-hear these-things saying I-am-bent and
οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν
I-think something you to-say through the considering you of-many indeed
ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν
experienced to-have-become many and to-have-learned the and yourself
ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς
to-have-discovered if then you-can more-clearly to-us demonstrate that
διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.
teachable is — virtue not begrudge(-it) but demonstrate(-it)

Protagoras tells a story. When the gods molded the mortal kinds, Epimetheus gave out the powers, speed, strength, fur, and hooves, and spent them all on the beasts, leaving man naked. Prometheus stole fire and craft from Hephaestus and Athena, but men still lacked the political art and destroyed one another. So Zeus sent Hermes with reverence and justice, to be shared by everyone and not, like crafts, by a few.

ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν,
but O Socrates he-said not I-shall-begrudge(-it) but whether to-you
ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ
as an-older(-man) to-younger a-story telling shall-I-demonstrate(-it) or
λόγῳ διεξελθών;
in-argument going-through(-it)
πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων
many then to-him replied of-the(-men) sitting-by
ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο οὕτως διεξιέναι. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι,
whichever-way he-wished so to-go-through(-it) it-seems then to-me
ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.
he-said more-pleasing to-be a-story to-you to-tell
ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη d
there-was for once a-time when gods indeed were mortal but kinds
οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἱμαρμένος
not were when and also for-these (the)-time came appointed
γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ
of-birth mold them (the)-gods of-earth within from earth and
πυρὸς μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται.
fire having-mixed and of-the(-things) which with-fire and earth are-mixed
ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν
when and to-lead them toward light they-were-about they-ordered
Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις
Prometheus and Epimetheus to-equip both and to-distribute powers

ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς
to-each as is-fitting Prometheus but begs Epimetheus
αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, "νείμαντος δέ μου," ἔφη, "ἐπίσκεψαι·"
himself to-distribute (when)-having-distributed and I he-said inspect(-it)
καὶ οὕτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν
and so having-persuaded(-him) he-distributes distributing and to-the-ones indeed
ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, τοὺς δ' ἀσθενεστέρους
strength without speed he-attached the and weaker
τάχει ἐκόσμει· τοὺς δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς
with-speed he-equipped the-ones and he-armed to-the-others and unarmed giving
φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν.
(a)-nature other some for-them he-contrived power for safety
321 ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ
what indeed for of-them with-smallness he-clothed winged flight or
κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν· ἃ δὲ ηὔξε μεγέθει, τῷδε αὐτῷ
underground dwelling he-assigned what but he-increased in-size by-this itself
αὐτὰ ἔσῳζεν· καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα
them he-saved and the-rest so balancing he-distributed these-things
δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη·
and he-contrived precaution having lest any kind should-be-annihilated
ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς
when and for-them of-mutual-destruction escapes he-had-supplied against
τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ
the from Zeus seasons comfort he-contrived clothing them
πυκναῖς τε θριξὶν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν
with-thick both hairs and firm hides sufficient indeed
ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ εἰς εὐνὰς
to-ward-off winter able and also heats and to beds
ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ
going so-that might-belong the same these (as)-bedding own both and
αὐτοφυὴς ἑκάστῳ· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν ὁπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ
natural for-each and shoeing the-ones indeed with-hoofs the-others and

δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τοὐντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις
with-hides firm and bloodless from-then foods to-others
ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις
other he-provided to-the-ones indeed from earth grass to-others
δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς
and of-trees fruits to-the-others and roots there-are and to-whom
ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῴων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς
he-gave to-be (as)-food of-animals other (the)-flesh and to-the-ones
μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ
indeed few-offspring he-attached to-the-others and being-consumed by
τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων.
these many-offspring safety for-the kind providing
ἅτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς c
inasmuch-as indeed then not very at-all wise being — Epimetheus
ἔλαθεν αὑτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ
escaped-the-notice-of himself having-spent the powers on the
ἄλογα· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ
irrational(-animals) left indeed unequipped still for-him was the
ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅτι χρήσαιτο. ἀπορουῦντι
of-men kind and he-was-at-a-loss what he-should-do being-at-a-loss
δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν,
and to-him comes Prometheus to-inspect the distribution
καὶ ὁρᾷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν
and sees the indeed other animals harmoniously in-all-things provided the
δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον
but man naked both and unshod and bedless
καὶ ἄοπλον· ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν,
and unarmed already and also the appointed day was-at-hand
ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς.
on which it-was-necessary also man to-go-forth from earth to light
ἀπορίᾳ οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἥντινα σωτηρίαν
by-perplexity then held — Prometheus what safety

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὕροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς
for-the man he-could-find steals of-Hephaestus and of-Athena
τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί — ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν
the technical wisdom with fire impossible for it-was
ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῳ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι —
without fire it acquirable by-anyone or useful to-become
καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν
and so indeed he-gives(-it) to-man the indeed then about the
βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν
livelihood wisdom man thus had the but political
οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί.
not he-had it-was for with — Zeus
322 τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς
— but to-Prometheus into indeed the citadel the — of-Zeus
οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν — πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ
dwelling no-longer it-was-possible to-enter besides and also the
Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν — εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ
of-Zeus guards fearsome were into but the — of-Athena and
Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνείτην,
of-Hephaestus workshop the common(-one) in which the-two-practiced-their-arts
λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τήν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην
unnoticed he-enters and having-stolen the both fiery art
τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
the — of-Hephaestus and the other the — of-Athena
δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ
he-gives(-it) to-man and from this plenty indeed for-man
τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι᾽ Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον,
of-the livelihood comes-about Prometheus but through Epimetheus later
ἥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.
as-precisely is-told for-theft penalty overtook

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν b
when and — man of-divine shared portion first indeed
διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν ζῴων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν,
through the of-the god kinship of-animals alone gods he-believed-in
καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν·
and attempted altars both to-set-up and statues of-gods
ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,
then speech and names quickly he-articulated by-the art
καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ
and dwellings and clothes and shoes and bedding and
τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἠῦρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι
the from earth foods he-discovered so indeed equipped
κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ
at first men lived scattered cities but not
ἦσαν· ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ
there-were they-were-perishing then by the beasts through the in-every-way
αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς
than-them weaker to-be and the craftsman's art for-them
πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν
for indeed food sufficient help was for but the of-the
θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής — πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω
beasts war deficient (the)-political for art not-yet
εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική — ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι
they-had of-which a-part (is)-warfare they-sought indeed to-gather
καὶ σῴζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν,
and be-saved founding cities when then they-gathered
ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν
they-wronged one-another inasmuch-as not having the political
τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν
art so-that again scattering they-perished Zeus then
δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν
fearing for the race our lest it-should-perish whole Hermes

πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν'
sends bringing to men shame both and justice so-that
εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί.
there-might-be of-cities orders both and bonds of-friendship uniting
d ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην
asks then Hermes Zeus in-what then way he-should-give justice
καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· "πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται,
and shame to-men whether as the arts have-been-distributed
οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε·
so also these should-I-distribute they-have-been-distributed and thus
εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
one having medicine for-many sufficient private-men and the other
δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς
craftsmen and justice indeed and shame so shall-I-place among the
ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;" "ἐπὶ πάντας," ἔφη ὁ
men or to all should-I-distribute to all said —
Ζεύς, "καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις,
Zeus and all let-them-share not for — would-arise cities
εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ
if few of-them should-share as of-other arts and
νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς
a-law at-least lay-down from me the(-man) not able in-shame
καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως." οὕτω δή,
and justice to-share to-kill as a-disease of-the-city so indeed
ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι,
O Socrates and through these-things the both others and the-Athenians
ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ᾖ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης
when indeed about virtue carpenter's there-be discussion or other
τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς,
some craftsman's for-few they-think to-belong counsel

καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὢν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ
and if someone outside being of-the few should-advise not
ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῄς — εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι —
they-tolerate(-it) as you say reasonably as I say

X · EVERY MAN CLAIMS JUSTICE

This is why the Athenians let everyone advise on justice and temperance: everyone is thought to share in them. A man who claims a skill he lacks is laughed at, but one who confesses to being unjust is thought mad. That men think virtue comes by teaching is shown by their punishment, which no one turns on defects of nature, and which looks not to the past wrong but to deterring the next; so the Athenians too think it teachable.

ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ 323
when but into counsel of-political virtue they-go which must
διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως
through justice all to-go and temperance reasonably
ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης
every man they-tolerate as for-everyone befitting in-this
γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὖτη, ὦ
at-least to-share — virtue or not to-be cities this O
Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.
Socrates of-this (is)-the-cause
ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται b
so-that and not you-may-think to-be-deceived as in reality consider
πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
all men every man to-share in-justice both and
τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον.
the other political virtue this in-turn take (as)-proof
ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις
in for the other virtues as you say if someone

φῇ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην ἣν
says a-good flute-player to-be or other any-whatever art which
μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι
not he-is either they-laugh-at(-him) or are-angry and the kinsmen
προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ
approaching admonish(-him) as mad in but justice and
ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός
in the other political virtue if someone even they-know that unjust
ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον
he-is if this(-man) himself against himself the-truth tell before
πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν,
many what there temperance they-thought to-be the-truth to-tell
ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι
here (they-think)-madness and they-say all must to-say to-be
δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ
just whether they-are or not or to-be-mad the(-man) not
προσποιούμενον· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὅντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμῶς
pretending(-to-it) as necessary no-one who not in-some-way
γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.
at-least somehow to-share in-it or not to-be among men
d ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης
that indeed then every man reasonably they-accept about this
τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι
— virtue (as)-adviser through the believing everyone to-share
αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι
in-it these-things I-say that but it not by-nature they-believe to-be
οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας
nor from the spontaneous but teachable both and from care
παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ
to-come-to whomever — it-comes-to this to-you after
τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους
this I-shall-try to-demonstrate whatever for consider one-another

κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ
evils to-have men by-nature or by-chance no-one is-angry nor
νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας,
admonishes nor teaches nor punishes the(-men) these having
ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς
so-that not such they-may-be but they-pity(-them) as the ugly
ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι
or small or weak who (is)-so foolish as anything
τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἴσασιν ὅτι
of-these to-attempt to-do these-things indeed for I-think they-know that
φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ
by-nature both and by-chance to-the men come the fine-things
καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως
and the-opposites to-these all-that but from care and practice
καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἐάν τις
and teaching they-think to-come-about good for-men if someone
ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τούτων κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που
these not have but the-opposite of-these evils at these surely
οἵ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις.
the both angers arise and the punishments and the admonitions
ὧν ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην 324
of-which is one also the injustice and the impiety and in-a-word
πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς
all the opposite of-the political virtue there indeed everyone
παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ
with-everyone is-angry and admonishes (it-is)-clear that as from
ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις
care and learning acquirable being(-it) if for you-wish
ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας
to-consider the punishing O Socrates the(-men) doing-wrong
τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι
what ever it-means it you will-teach that the at-least men

ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει
consider providable to-be virtue no-one for punishes
τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου
the(-men) doing-wrong to this the mind having and for-this
ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως
for-the-sake that he-did-wrong whoever not like a-beast irrationally
τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ
takes-vengeance the(-man) but with reason attempting to-punish not
τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται — οὐ
of-the past for-the-sake wrong takes-vengeance not
γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη — ἀλλὰ τοῦ
for — the at-least deed undone he-could-make but of-the
μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς
future for-the-sake so-that not again may-do-wrong either himself
οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ
this(-man) or another the(-man) him having-seen punished and
τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν·
such a-thought having thinks teachable to-be virtue
ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν
(for)-deterrence at-any-rate for-the-sake he-punishes this then — opinion
πάντες ἔχουσιν ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
all hold whoever take-vengeance both privately and publicly
d τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἵ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς
take-vengeance and and punish the both other men whomever
ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ σοὶ πολῖται·
— they-think to-do-wrong and not least the-Athenians — your fellow-citizens
ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν
so-that according-to this — argument also the-Athenians are of-the(-men)
ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν. ὡς
considering providable to-be and teachable virtue that
μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως
indeed then reasonably accept — your fellow-citizens both a-smith

καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
and a-shoemaker advising-on the political(-affairs) and that
διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετήν, ἀποδέδεικταί
teachable and providable they-consider virtue has-been-demonstrated
σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὥς γέ μοι φαίνεται.
to-you O Socrates sufficiently as at-least to-me it-appears

XI · PUNISHMENT AND TEACHING

Protagoras turns to Socrates' second question, why good men teach their sons everything but virtue, and answers with an argument instead of a story. Virtue (justice, temperance, and holiness) is the one thing every citizen must share if there is to be a city, and whoever lacks it is taught and punished, or else exiled or killed. So a man is taught it from his nurse and parents onward, then by the teachers of letters and the lyre, the poets, and the trainer, and finally by the city's laws; the wonder would be if it could not be taught.

ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν e
still indeed remaining difficulty is which you-raise about the men
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
the good why ever the men the good the indeed other(-things)
τοὺς αὑτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται καὶ
— their-own sons teach which on-teachers depend and
σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδενὸς
wise they-make(-them) which but themselves (in)-virtue (are)-good than-no-one
βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι
better they-make(-them) this indeed about O Socrates no-longer
μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὧδε γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον
a-story to-you I-shall-tell but an-argument thus for consider whether
ἔστιν τι ἓν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς
there-is some one(-thing) or not is of-which (it-is)-necessary all the

πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ
citizens to-share if-indeed is-to a-city to-be in this for
αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς ἢ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ.
this is-resolved the difficulty which you raise or elsewhere nowhere
325 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἓν οὐ
if indeed for there-is and this is the one(-thing) not
τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη
carpentry nor smithing nor pottery but justice
καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἓν
and temperance and the holy to-be and in-a-word one
αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν — εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
itself I-call to-be of-a-man virtue if this is
οὗ δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα,
of-which must all to-share and with this every man
ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω
if anything also else he-wish to-learn or to-do so
πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ
to-do without but this not or the(-one) not sharing both
διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα,
to-teach and to-punish both child and man and woman
ἕωσπερ ἂν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ
until — punished better he-becomes who but — not
ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα
obeys punished and taught as incurable being
τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν — εἰ οὕτω
this(-man) to-expel from the cities or to-kill if so
μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ
indeed it-is so and it being-by-nature the good men if the
μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς ὑεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι
indeed other(-things) teach the sons this but not consider
ὡς θαυμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν
how wonderfully become the good-men that indeed for teachable

αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀπεδείξαμεν·
it they-consider both privately and publicly we-demonstrated
διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα
teachable but being and cultivable the indeed other(-things) then
τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία
the sons they-teach on which not is death the penalty
ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ ἥ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν
if not they-know on what but the both penalty (is)-death for-their
τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς
the children and exiles not having-learned nor been-cultivated toward
ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις
virtue and in-addition-to the death of-property both confiscations
καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν συλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα
and so a-word to-say in-a-word of-the households overturnings these
δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν;
but then not they-teach nor they-take-care every care
οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν d
to-think at-least one-must O Socrates from children small
ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ
beginning until which — they-live both they-teach and
νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα,
admonish(-them) as-soon-as sooner understands someone the things-said
καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
both nurse and mother and tutor and himself the
πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται
father about this fight how — best will-be
ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες
the child at each both deed and word teaching
καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον,
and showing that the-one indeed (is)-just the-other but unjust
καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν
and this indeed fine this but shameful and this indeed

ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ
holy this but unholy and the-ones indeed do the-others but not
ποίει. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον
do and if indeed willingly be-obeys(-well) if but not like wood
διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς
twisted and bent they-straighten(-him) with-threats
καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες
and blows after but these-things into (the-schools)-of-teachers sending(-him)
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν
much more they-enjoin to-attend-to good-behavior of-the
παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως·
children than letters both and lyre-playing
326 οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὖ
the and teachers these both attend-to and when in-turn
γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα
letters they-learn and are-about to-understand the written-things
ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν
as before the speech they-set-before them on the
βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ
benches to-read of-poets good poems and
ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις
to-learn-by-heart they-compel(-them) in which many indeed admonitions
ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια
are-in many and narratives and praises and encomia
παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται
of-ancient men good so-that the child emulating may-imitate
καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἵ τ' αὖ κιθαρισταί,
and desire such to-become the and in-turn lyre-players
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως
other such(-things) of-temperance both attend-to and that
ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν
— the young nothing may-do-wrong besides and these when

κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα
to-play-the-lyre they-learn of-other in-turn poets good poems
διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες,
they-teach of-lyric-poets to the lyre-tunes setting(-them)
καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν
and the rhythms both and the harmonies they-compel
οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε
to-be-made-at-home in-the souls of-the children so-that gentler both
ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι
they-may-be and more-rhythmical and more-harmonious becoming
χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ
useful they-may-be for the speaking both and acting all for
ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.
the life of-the man of-good-rhythm both and of-good-harmony needs
ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου c
further then in-addition-to these to (the-school)-of-a-gymnastic-trainer
πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ
they-send(-them) so-that the bodies better having they-may-serve the
διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν
mind good being and not they-be-compelled to-play-the-coward
διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις
through the badness of-the bodies both in the wars
καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
and in the other actions and these-things do the(-men)
μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα — μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ
most able most most and are-able the
πλουσιώτατοι — καὶ οἱ τούτων ὑεῖς, πρωαίτατα εἰς
richest and the of-these sons earliest to
διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα
(the-schools)-of-teachers of-the age beginning to-go latest
ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν,
leave when and from teachers they-are-released

ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ
the city in-turn the both laws compels(-them) to-learn and
κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ
according-to these to-live as-a pattern so-that not themselves
ἐφ' αὑτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ
by themselves at-random they-act but simply as
οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν
the writing-masters for-the(-ones) not-yet clever to-write of-the
παίδων ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ
children having-traced-beneath lines with-the stylus so the
γραμματεῖον διδόασιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ
tablet give(-it) and compel(-them) to-write according-to
τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους
the guidance of-the lines so and also the city laws
ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα,
having-traced-beneath of-good and ancient lawgivers (the)-inventions
κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὃς δ'
according-to these compels(-them) both to-rule and to-be-ruled who but
ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει· καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει
— outside steps of-these it-punishes and (the)-name for-the punishment
ταύτῃ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης
this both among you and elsewhere in-many-places as straightening
τῆς δίκης, εὐθῦναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης
the justice (is)-corrections so-great then the care being
περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες,
about virtue privately and publicly do-you-wonder O Socrates
καὶ ἀπορεῖς εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ
and are-you-puzzled whether teachable is virtue but not one-must
θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.
to-wonder but much more if not teachable(-were-it)

If flute playing were a thing everyone in a city had to have, the sons of good players would be no better than anyone else's, and all would be tolerable players. So it is with virtue: even the most unjust man raised among laws is just beside savages, and no teacher of it appears because all teach it, as all teach Greek. Protagoras claims only to be a little better than others at teaching it, and explains his fee: a student may pay his price or swear in a temple to what the lessons were worth.

διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ ὑεῖς φαῦλοι 327
through what then of-the good fathers many sons worthless
γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ
become this in-turn learn nothing for (it-is)-surprising if-indeed
ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ
true-things I in the preceding was-saying that (in)-this —
πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα
thing the virtue if is-to a-city to-be no-one
δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει —
must to-be-a-layman if for indeed what I-say so is(-the-case)
ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως — ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν
it-is and most of-all so consider another of-the
ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ
pursuits whatever and learnings having-chosen(-it) if not
οἷόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν
possible — it-were a-city to-be if not all flute-players we-were
ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ
whatever-sort one could each and this both privately and
δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ
publicly everyone everyone both taught and rebuked the(-one) not
καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν
well playing-the-flute and not begrudged this as now of-the
δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται
just-things and of-the lawful-things no-one begrudges nor conceals(-them)

ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων — λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι
as of-the other skills profits for I-think
ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς
us the of-one-another justice and virtue through these everyone
παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
to-everyone eagerly tells and teaches both the just-things and the
νόμιμα — εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν
lawful-things if then so also in flute-playing all eagerness
καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἴει ἄν
and ungrudgingness we-had one-another to-teach do-you-think —
τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν
at-all he-said more O Socrates of-the good flute-players
ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων;
good flute-players the sons would-become than of-the worthless
c οἶμαι μὲν οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ ὑὸς εὐφυέστατος
I-think indeed not but whose happened the son most-gifted
γενόμενος εἰς αὔλησιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη,
being for flute-playing this(-one) — notable would-have-grown
ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ
whose but ungifted (would-have-been)-obscure and often indeed of-a-good
αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν
flute-player a-worthless(-one) — would-have-turned-out often and —
φαύλου ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες
of-a-worthless(-one) a-good(-one) but anyway flute-players at-least — all
ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν
would-have-been competent compared with the laymen and in-nothing
αὐλήσεως ἐπαΐοντας. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι
of-flute-playing expert so think also now whoever to-you
ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ
most-unjust appears a-man of-the(-ones) among laws and
ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν
men raised just him to-be and a-craftsman

τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς
of-this — thing if it-were-necessary him to-be-judged against
ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε
men for-whom neither education is nor courts nor
νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα
laws nor compulsion any through everything compelling
ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες οἷοίπερ
of-virtue to-take-care but they-were wild some such-as-precisely
οὓς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ.
those-whom last-year Pherecrates the poet produced at (the)-Lenaea
ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος,
truly very among — such men having-come
ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις
as the(-ones) in that — chorus man-haters you-would-be-glad
ἂν εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδᾳ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι'
— if you-met Eurybatus and Phrynondas and you-would-lament
ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν. νῦν δὲ
— longing-for the of-the here men wickedness now but
τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς
you-are-spoiled O Socrates because all teachers are of-virtue
καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται·
in so-far-as they-are-able each and no-one to-you appears(-to-be)
εἶθ', ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, 328
then as — if you-should-seek who (is)-a-teacher of-the speaking-Greek
οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν οἶμαι εἰ ζητοῖς τίς
not-even — one would-appear nor at-least — I-think if you-should-seek who
ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην
— us could-teach the of-the craftsmen sons very this
τὴν τέχνην ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ'
— art which indeed from the father they-have-learned in
ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες
so-far-as able — was the father and the of-the father friends being

ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι
of-the-same-craft these still who — could-teach not easy I-think
εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ
to-be O Socrates of-these a-teacher to-appear of-the but
ἀπείρων παντάπασι ῥᾴδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
inexperienced altogether easy so and of-virtue and of-the others
πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν
all but even if a-little there-is someone who excels us
προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν. ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι
in-advancing toward virtue (it-is)-to-be-welcomed of-whom indeed I think
εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων
one to-be and exceptionally would beyond-the other men
ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως
to-help someone toward the fine and good to-become and worthily
τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ
of-the fee which I-charge and even more so-that also to-himself
δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς
to-seem(-so) the(-one) having-learned through these also the manner of-the
πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι· ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις
charging of-the fee such I-have-made when for someone
παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ
from me learns if indeed he-wishes he-pays which I
πράττομαι ἀργύριον· ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας
charge money if but not having-gone into a-temple having-sworn
ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκε.
as-much-as — he-says worth to-be the learnings so-much he-deposits
d τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ
such to-you he-said O Socrates I both a-story and
λόγον εἴρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως
an-argument have-spoken that teachable (is)-virtue and the-Athenians so
ἡγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν
think and that (it-is)-nothing surprising of-the good

πατέρων φαύλους ὑεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθούς,
fathers worthless sons to-become and of-the worthless good(-ones)
ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου ὑεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου
since also the of-Polyclitus sons of-Paralus and of-Xanthippus
τοῦδε ἡλικιῶται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ
here (are)-coevals nothing compared-with the father are and
ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ οὔπω ἄξιον τοῦτο
others of-other craftsmen of-these but not-yet (it-is)-right this
κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.
to-charge still for in them are hopes young for(-they-are)

XIII · ONE SMALL QUESTION

Socrates is enchanted by the speech and thanks Hippocrates for bringing him, but has one small thing to ask. Orators, like books, cannot answer a question, while Protagoras can make long speeches and give short answers alike. He spoke of justice, temperance, holiness, and the rest as if virtue were one thing: are these parts of it, or names for one and the same?

Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος e
Protagoras indeed so-much and such having-displayed
ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον
stopped the speech and I for indeed long time
κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι,
charmed still at him looked as about-to-say something
ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ᾐσθόμην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι
desiring to-hear when and indeed I-perceived that in reality
πεπαυμένος εἴη, μόγις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας
stopped be-had hardly somehow myself as-it-were collecting
εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου,
I-said looking at — Hippocrates O son of-Apollodorus

ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προύτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι·
how grateful to-you I-am that you-urged me here to-come
πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἃ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου.
of-much for I-make(-it) to-have-heard what I-have-heard from-Protagoras
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι
I for in indeed the former time I-thought not to-be
ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται·
human care by-which good the good-men become
νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδών,
now but I-am-persuaded except small something to-me (is-in)-the-way
ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ
which (it-is)-clear that Protagoras easily will-explain-further since
καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν.
also the many these he-has-explained
329 καὶ γὰρ εἰ μέν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο
and for if indeed someone about very these(-things) should-converse-with
ὁτῳοῦν τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους
any-whatever of-the public-speakers perhaps — also such speeches
ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν·
he-could-hear either of-Pericles or of-other some of-the able to-speak
εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὥσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν
if but he-should-ask someone something like books nothing they-can
οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τις καὶ
neither to-answer nor themselves to-ask but if someone even
σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία
a-small(-thing) asks any of-the things-said like the bronze-vessels
πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί
struck long resound and prolong(-it) if not takes-hold
τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω, σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον
someone also the orators so small-things asked a-long-course
κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν
stretch-out of-the speech Protagoras but here (is)-able indeed

μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς
long speeches and fine to-make as these-things show able
δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος
and also asked to-answer in short and having-asked
περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις
to-wait both and to-receive the answer which to-few
ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινος
is provided now then O Protagoras of-a-small something
ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν
short I-am all to-have if to-me you-would-answer this the virtue
φῂς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῳ ἀνθρώπων
you-say teachable to-be and I if-indeed another any of-men
πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου
would-be-persuaded — also by-you am-persuaded what but I-wondered-at you
λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον.
saying this to-me in the soul fill-up
ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ d
you-said for that — Zeus the justice and the shame
πέμψειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς
sent to-the men and in-turn in-many-places in the
λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ
speeches it-was-said by you the justice and temperance and
ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἕν τι εἴη συλλήβδην,
holiness and all these as one something were in-a-word
ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ διέλθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ
(that-is)-virtue these then themselves go-through for-me precisely in-the
λόγῳ, πότερον ἓν μέν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ
argument whether one indeed something is the virtue parts and
αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης,
of-it are the justice and temperance and holiness

ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ
or these are what just-now I was-saying all names of-the
αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.
same one being this is what still I-long-for

XIV · IS JUSTICE HOLY?

Protagoras answers that the virtues are parts, as the parts of a face are, each with its own power, and that a man can have one without the others, being brave and unjust, or just and unwise; wisdom is the greatest of them. Socrates asks whether justice is just and holiness holy, and Protagoras agrees. If the parts are unlike one another, holiness would not be just and justice would not be holy. Protagoras says he does not think justice and holiness are simply the same, but they are alike in some way, as anything resembles anything else, and that a slight likeness does not make them alike.

e ἀλλὰ ῥᾴδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι,
but easy this at-least he-said O Socrates to-answer
ὅτι ἑνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς. —
that one being — virtue parts they-are which you-ask
πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν,
whether I-said as of-a-face the parts parts are
στόμα τε καὶ ῥὶς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ
mouth both and nose and eyes and ears or as
τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν
the of-the gold parts nothing differ the ones from-the
ἑτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ
others from-one-another and from-the whole except than in-size and
σμικρότητι; — ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ
smallness in-that-way to-me it-appears O Socrates as
τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. —
the of-the face parts are-related to the whole face

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι
whether then said and I also partake the men
τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ
of-these — of-the virtue parts the-ones indeed one the-others
δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις ἓν λάβῃ, ἅπαντα
and another or (is-it)-necessary if someone one takes all
ἔχειν; — οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι
to-have in-no-way he-said since many brave are unjust
δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὔ. —
but and just in-turn wise but not
ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, 330
are for then also these parts of-the virtue I-said I
σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; — πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ
wisdom both and courage of-all most surely he-said and
μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. — ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν
greatest at-least the wisdom of-the parts each and of-them
ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; — ναί. — ἦ καὶ
is said and I one-thing the-other and another-thing yes truly also
δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου,
power of-them each its-own has as the of-the face
οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἷον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ
not is (the)-eye like the ears nor the power of-it the
αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ
same nor of-the others anything is like the other either in
τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς
the power or in the other(-respects) so then so also the of-the
ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ
virtue parts not is the one like the other either itself
οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ
or the power of-it or (is-it)-clear indeed that so it-is if-indeed
τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικε; — ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει,
to-the example at-least it-is-like but so he-said it-is

ὦ Σώκρατες. — καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς
O Socrates and I said none then is of-the of-the
ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἷον δικαιοσύνη,
virtue parts other(-one) like knowledge nor like justice
οὐδ' οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ὁσιότης.
nor like courage nor like temperance nor like holiness
c — οὐκ ἔφη. — φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα
no he-said come then I-said I in-common let-us-consider
ποιόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ
what-sort something of-them is each first indeed —
τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν
the-following the justice a-thing something is(-it) or no
πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί; — κἀμοί, ἔφη. —
thing to-me indeed for it-seems what and to-you and-to-me he-said
τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα
what then if someone should-ask me both and you O Protagoras
τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ
both and Socrates tell-the-two indeed me this — thing which
ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν
you-named just-now the justice itself this just is(-it)
ἢ ἄδικον;" ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον·
or unjust I indeed — to-him would-answer that (it-is)-just
σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; —
you but what — vote would-you-cast the same as-me or another
τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη. — ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον
the same he-said is then such the justice as
δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ
just to-be I-would-say — I-at-least answering the(-man)
ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ; — ναί, ἔφη. — εἰ οὖν μετὰ
asking therefore also you yes he-said if then after

τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· "οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητά τινά φατε
this us he-should-ask therefore also holiness some do-you-say
εἶναι;" φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. — ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.
to-be we-would-say — as I-think yes said and he
— "οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι;" φαῖμεν e
therefore do-you-say also this a-thing some to-be we-would-say
ἄν· ἢ οὔ; — καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. — "πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ
— or not also this he-agreed whether and this-very itself
τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ
the thing do-you-say such to-be-by-nature as unholy to-be or
οἷον ὅσιον;" ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι,
as holy I-would-be-indignant — I-at-least I-said at-the question
καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντἄν τι
and I-would-say — hush O man hardly however anything
ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται.
else holy would-be if not itself at-least the holiness holy will-be
τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; — πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
what and you not so — would-you-answer certainly indeed then he-said
εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· "πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον
if then after this he-should-say asking us how then a-little
πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ
before were-you-saying then not rightly you I-heard you-seemed
μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς
to-me to-say the of-the virtue parts to-be so related to
ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·"
one-another as not to-be the one of-them like the other
εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι 331
I-would-say — I-at-least that the indeed other(-things) rightly you-heard that
δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας
but also me you-think to-say this you-misheard Protagoras
γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν
for here these-things answered I but was-asking if then

εἴποι· "ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ
he-should-say true-things this(-man) says O Protagoras do-you
φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν
say not to-be the one part like the other of-the
τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν;" τί ἂν αὐτῷ
of-the virtue your this — statement is(-it) what — to-him
ἀποκρίναιο; — ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν.
would-you-answer (it-is)-necessary he-said O Socrates to-agree
b τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα
what then O Protagoras shall-we-answer him these-things
ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· "οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν
having-agreed if us he-asks-further not then is
ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον
holiness such just to-be a-thing nor justice such
ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δ' ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον,
holy but such not holy the and holiness such not just
ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;" τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα;
but unjust then the and unholy what to-him shall-we-answer
ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν
I indeed for myself on-behalf-of at-least myself would-say — both the
δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ
justice holy to-be and the holiness just and on-behalf-of
σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐᾷς, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι
you and if me you-should-allow the-same — these-things I-would-answer that
ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ' ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον,
either the-same at-least is justness with-holiness or that most-similar
καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης
and most of-all the both justice like holiness
καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις
and the holiness like justice but see if you-forbid(-me)
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως. — οὐ πάνυ
to-answer or also to-you it-seems-good so not altogether

μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε
to-me it-seems he-said O Socrates so simple to-be so-as
συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα
to-concede the both justice holy to-be and the holiness
δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι.
just but some(-thing) to-me seems in it different to-be
ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν d
but what this does-it-matter he-said if for you-wish let-it-be for-us
καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον. — μή μοι, ἦν
both justice holy and holiness just not to-me said
δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἴ
and I nothing for I-need the if you-wish this and if
σοι δοκεῖ" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' "ἐμέ
to-you it-seems to-be-examined but me both and you the and me
τε καὶ σέ" τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ'
both and you this I-say thinking so the argument best
ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ "εἴ" ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. — ἀλλὰ
— to-be-examined if one the if should-take-away from-it but
μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι· καὶ
however said and he resembles somewhat justice holiness and
γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ
for anything anything in-some-way at-least somehow resembles the for
λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν
white the black there-is where it-resembles and the hard
τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι
the soft and the-rest which seem most-opposite to-be
ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ
to-one-another and what then we-said other power to-have and not
εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια,
to-be the one like the other the of-the face parts
ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ
in-some-way at-least somehow resemble and is the one like the

ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις,
other so-that in-this at-least — way even these you-could-refute
εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ
if you-wished as all are similar to-one-another but not
τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ
the(-things) similar something having similar (it-is)-just to-call nor
τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν
the(-things) dissimilar something having dissimilar even-if very small
ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον. — καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν·
they-have the similar and I having-wondered said to him
ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα
truly for so to-you the just and the holy to one-another
ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; —
are-related so-that similar something small to-have to-one-another

XV · WISDOM AND TEMPERANCE

Socrates tries another route. Folly is the opposite of wisdom, and those who act wrongly act foolishly and without temperance. Each thing has one opposite only, and folly has been found opposite to both wisdom and temperance, so these two must be one. Protagoras grudgingly agrees. Asked whether a wrongdoer can be temperate, he would be ashamed to say so, though many do, and Socrates takes up their view with him as answerer.

332 οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι
not altogether he-said so not however nor in-turn as you to-me
δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι. — ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς
seem to-think but indeed I-said I since uncomfortably
δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν,
you-seem to-me to-be-disposed toward this this indeed let-us-leave
τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην
this but other of-what you-said let-us-consider folly

τι καλεῖς; — ἔφη. — τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν
something you-call he-said(-yes) to-this — thing not wholly
τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία; — ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. —
the-opposite is the wisdom to-me-at-least it-seems he-said
πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ
whether and when act men rightly both and
ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες,
beneficially then to-be-temperate to-you they-seem so acting
ἢ τοὐναντίον; — σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνῃ
or the-opposite to-be-temperate he-said therefore by-temperance
σωφρονοῦσιν; — ἀνάγκη. — οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς
are-they-temperate (of)-necessity therefore the(-men) not rightly
πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω
acting foolishly act and not are-temperate so
πράττοντες; — συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. — τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν
acting it-seems-so-too to-me he-said the-opposite then is
τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; — ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν
the foolishly to-act to-the temperately he-said(-yes) therefore
τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται,
the-things indeed foolishly done by-folly are-done
τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ; — ὡμολόγει. — οὐκοῦν
the-things but temperately by-temperance he-agreed therefore
εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ
if something by-strength is-done strongly it-is-done and if
τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;
something by-weakness weakly
— ἐδόκει. — καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ c
it-seemed(-so) and if something with speed quickly and if
τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως; — ἔφη. — καὶ εἴ τι
something with slowness slowly he-said(-yes) and if something
δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ
indeed in-the-same-way is-done by the same is-it-done and

εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου; — συνέφη. — φέρε
if something oppositely by the opposite he-agreed come
δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν; — συνεχώρει. —
indeed said and I is(-there) something beautiful he-granted(-it)
τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν; — οὐκ
to-this is(-there) something opposite except the ugly not
ἔστιν. — τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν; — ἔστιν. — τούτῳ
there-is what and is(-there) something good there-is to-this
ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν; — οὐκ ἔστιν. —
is(-there) something opposite except the bad not there-is
τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ; — ἔφη. — τούτῳ
what and is(-there) something high in sound he-said(-yes) to-this
μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ; — οὐκ
(surely)-not is something opposite other except the low not
ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων
he-said therefore said and I to-one each of-the opposites
ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά; — συνωμολόγει.
one only is opposite and not many he-agreed
d ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα
come indeed said and I let-us-sum-up the(-things) agreed
ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω
by-us we-have-agreed one to-one only opposite to-be more
δὲ μή; — ὡμολογήκαμεν. — τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον
but not we-have-agreed the and oppositely done
ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; — ἔφη. — ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ
by opposites to-be-done he-said(-yes) we-have-agreed and
ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ
oppositely to-be-done what — foolishly is-done to-the
σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ; — ἔφη. — τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως
temperately done he-said(-yes) the and temperately
πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως
done by temperance to-be-done the and foolishly

ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; — συνεχώρει. — οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως
by folly he-granted(-it) therefore if-indeed oppositely
πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ᾽ ἄν; — ναί. —
it-is-done by an-opposite it-would-be-done — yes
πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ
is-done and the-one indeed by temperance the-other and
ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; — ναί. — ἐναντίως; — πάνυ γε. —
by folly yes oppositely certainly at-least
οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων; — ναί. — ἐναντίον ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν
therefore by opposites being yes opposite then is
ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης; — φαίνεται. — μέμνησαι οὖν
folly of-temperance it-appears do-you-remember then
ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη
that in the(-things) before it-has-been-agreed by-us folly
σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι; — συνωμολόγει. —
to-wisdom opposite to-be he-agreed
ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; — φημί. — πότερον οὖν, 333
one but to-one only opposite to-be I-say whether then
ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον
O Protagoras shall-we-dissolve of-the statements the one to-one only
ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι
opposite to-be or that in which it-was-said different to-be
σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς
from-temperance wisdom part and each of-virtue and in-addition-to
τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις
the different to-be also dissimilar both themselves and the powers
αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ
of-them as the of-the face parts which then indeed
λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς
shall-we-dissolve these for the statements both not very musically
λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις.
are-spoken not for they-harmonize nor fit with-one-another

πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μὲν
how for — could-they-harmonize if-indeed at-least (it-is)-necessary to-one indeed
ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ
one only opposite to-be to-more but not to-the and folly
ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται·
one being wisdom opposite and temperance in-turn appears
ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως; —
is-it-not for O Protagoras I-said I or otherwise somehow
ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως. — οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ
he-agreed and very unwillingly therefore one — would-be the
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν
temperance and the wisdom the but earlier in-turn appeared to-us
ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν.
the justice and the holiness nearly something the-same being
c ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν
come indeed said and I O Protagoras not let-us-grow-weary
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ
but also the rest let-us-examine then someone to-you seems
ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ; — αἰσχυνοίμην
doing-wrong a-man to-be-temperate in-that he-does-wrong I-would-be-ashamed
ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί
— I-at-least he-said O Socrates this to-agree since many
γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. — πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους
at-least say(-so) of-the men whether then toward them
τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; — εἰ βούλει,
the argument shall-I-make I-said or toward you if you-wish
ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν
he-said toward this first the argument argue the of-the
πολλῶν. — ἀλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε
many but nothing to-me it-matters if only you at-least
ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή· τὸν γὰρ
answer whether then it-seems to-you so or not the for

λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ
argument I-at-least most examine it-happens however perhaps also
ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.
me the(-one) asking and the(-one) answering to-be-examined

XVI · PROTAGORAS ON THE GOOD

Protagoras demurs, then grants that some wrongdoers are temperate, deliberating well in doing wrong. Asked whether the good things are those that benefit men, he bristles and makes a speech: things useless to men help horses, cattle, dogs, or trees; dung feeds roots but kills shoots; oil is the worst thing for plants and for the hair of every animal but man. So varied is the good that doctors allow the sick only a little oil.

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας — d
the indeed then first was-making-airs with-us — Protagoras
τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἠτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι — ἔπειτα μέντοι
the for argument he-alleged troublesome to-be then however
συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. — ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ
he-consented to-answer come indeed I-said I from
ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν
(the)-start to-me answer seem some to-you to-be-temperate
ἀδικοῦντες; — ἔστω, ἔφη. — τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ
doing-injustice let-it-be he-said the and being-temperate you-call well
φρονεῖν; — ἔφη. — τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι,
thinking he-said(-yes) the and well thinking (is)-well deliberating
ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; — ἔστω, ἔφη. — πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
in-that they-do-injustice let-it-be he-said whether said and I
εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; — εἰ εὖ. —
if well they-fare doing-injustice or if badly if well
λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι; — λέγω. — ἆρ' οὖν,
do-you-say then good-things some to-be I-say so then

ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς
said and I these are good which are beneficial to-the
ἀνθρώποις; — καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
men and yes by Zeus he-said even-if not to-the men
ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά. — καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ
beneficial they-be I-at-least call(-them) good and to-me seemed —
Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ
Protagoras already to-have-become-irritated both and to-be-agitated and
παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων
to-have-drawn-up-for-battle against the to-answer when then I-saw
αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην.
him so being(-disposed) being-cautious gently I-asked
334 πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἃ
whether said and I do-you-mean O Protagoras the-things-which
μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν
to-no-one of-men beneficial are or which not-even — altogether
ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; — οὐδαμῶς,
beneficial(-are) and — such you good call in-no-way
ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ
he-said but I-at-least many know which for-men indeed unbeneficial
ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία,
are both foods and drinks and drugs and others countless
τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν
the-others but at-least beneficial the-others and for-men indeed
οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ
neither for-horses but the-others and for-cattle only the-others and
κυσίν· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ·
for-dogs the-others but at-least of-these indeed to-none for-trees but
τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ
the-others and of-the tree for-the indeed roots good for-the but
βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων τῶν φυτῶν
shoots bad as also the dung of-all the plants

ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις
to-the indeed roots good being-applied if but you-should-wish
ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν,
on the twigs and the young sprouts to-put(-it)
πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς
all it-destroys since also the oil to-the indeed plants
ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον
all is very-bad and to-the hairs most-hostile
ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
to-the(-hairs) of-the other animals except the(-hairs) of-the man
ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι.
to-the(-hairs) and of-the man helpful and to-the other body
οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, c
so but varied something is the good and manifold
ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος
that also here for-the(-parts) indeed outside the body
ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν
good it-is for-the man for-the(-parts) but inside the-same
τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες
this (is)-worst and through this the doctors all
ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλ' ἢ
forbid the sick not to-use oil except than
ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον
as smallest in these which he-is-going to-eat as-much only
τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς
the disgust to-quench the(-one) in the sensations the(-ones)
διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.
through the nostrils arising in the foods both and relishes

The audience applauds, and Socrates, pleading a bad memory, asks Protagoras to answer briefly, since he can speak at either length. Protagoras refuses to be ruled by another's method. Socrates rises to leave, and Callias seizes him by the hand and cloak. Socrates answers that he cannot keep pace with a runner like Crison, so Protagoras must slow down, but Callias thinks Protagoras' claim to speak as he likes is just.

d εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν
having-said then these-things he the(-men) present applauded
ὡς εὖ λέγοι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω
that well he-spoke and I said O Protagoras I happen
ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ
forgetful a being man and if someone to-me long-things
λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν
says I-forget about what — is the argument as then
εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ᾧου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ
if I-happened hard-of-hearing being you-would-think — it-necessary if-indeed
ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς
you-were-going with-me to-converse louder to-speak than to
τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες,
the others so also now since a-forgetful(-man) you-have-met
σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει,
cut-short for-me the answers and shorter make(-them)
εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι.
if I-am-to you to-follow
πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά
how then do-you-bid me short-things to-answer or shorter
σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ;
to-you he-said should-I-answer than (is)-needed
μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
by-no-means said and I

ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη.
but as-long-as is-needed he-said
ναί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. e
yes said and I
πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά
whether then as-long-as to-me seems needed to-answer so-long
σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;
to-you should-I-answer or as-long-as to-you
ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἷός τ᾽ εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς 335
I-have-heard at-any-rate said and I that you able — are both yourself
καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν,
and another to-teach about the same-things both long-things to-speak
ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ
if you-wish so as the speech never to-give-out and
αὖ βραχέα οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις
in-turn short-things so as no-one than-you in shorter(-words)
εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ
to-speak if then you-are-going with-me to-converse the other use
τρόπῳ πρός με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ.
way toward me the brevity
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων
O Socrates he-said I with-many already into a-contest of-speeches
ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ
have-come men and if this I-had-done which you
κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν με διαλέγεσθαι,
bid as the(-man) arguing-against bade me to-converse
οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ᾽
so I-had-conversed than-no-one — better I-would-have-appeared nor
ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
— would-have-arisen of-Protagoras (the)-name among the Greeks

b καὶ ἐγώ — ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ταῖς
and I I-knew for that not he-had-pleased himself himself in-the
ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν
answers the previous and that not he-would-be-willing willingly
εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι — ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι
to-be answering to-converse considering no-longer
ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἀλλά τοι,
my task to-be to-be-present at the meetings but you-know
ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ
I-said O Protagoras nor I eagerly am(-disposed) contrary-to
τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ'
the(-things) to-you seeming the meeting for-us to-take-place but
ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι,
when you wish to-converse as I can follow
τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ,
then with-you I-will-converse you indeed for as is-said about you
φῂς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ
you-say and also yourself both in long-speaking and in short-speaking
οἷός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι — σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ — ἐγὼ
able — are meetings to-hold wise for you-are I
δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν
but the long(-speeches) these (am)-unable(-for) since I-would-wish —
οἷός τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν
able — to-be but you it-was-right for-us to-yield the(-man)
ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ
both being-able so-that the meeting might-take-place now but
ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ
since not you-are-willing and to-me some engagement is and not
ἂν οἷός τ' εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς
— able — I-would-be with-you to-stay stretching-out long

λόγους — ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ — εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ
speeches to-go for somewhere me (it-is)-needed I-am-going since even
ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.
these-things — perhaps not unpleasantly from-you I-would-hear
καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καί d
and at-once these-things having-said I-was-getting-up as going-away and
μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς
me getting-up takes-hold — Callias of-the hand
τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος
with-the right with-the and left he-took-hold of-the cloak
τουτουΐ, καὶ εἶπεν· οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν
this and said not we-will-let-go you O Socrates if
γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι.
for you go-out not alike for-us will-be the discussions
δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν
I-ask then you to-stay with-us as I not-even —
ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου
one more-gladly would-hear than you both and Protagoras
διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν.
conversing but do-a-favor to-us all
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον — ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών — ὦ παῖ e
and I said already and I-had-stood-up as going-out O son
Ἱππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι,
of-Hipponicus always indeed I-at-least your — philosophy admire
ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν
but also now I-praise and love(-it) so-that I-would-wish —
χαρίζεσθαί σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο·
to-gratify you if me possible-things you-were-to-ask
νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ 336
now but it-is as — if you-should-ask me Crison the
Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων
Himeraean runner in-his-prime to-follow or of-the long-distance-runners

τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι,
some(-one) or of-the day-couriers to-run-through both and to-follow
εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ
I-would-say — to-you that much than-you more I myself
δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι,
ask running these to-keep-up-with but not for I-can
ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι δέῃ θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ
but if anything you-need to-see in the same(-race) me both and
Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ
Crison running this ask(-him) to-slow-down I indeed for
οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν
not can quickly run he but can slowly if then
ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ
you-desire me and Protagoras to-hear this(-man) ask as
τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ
at-the first to-me he-answered through short(-words) both and the-very
τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ
the things-asked so also now to-answer if but not what the
τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ᾽ ᾤμην εἶναι
manner will-be of-the discussions separate for I-at-least thought to-be
τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.
the to-be-together both with-one-another conversing and the to-harangue
ἀλλ᾽ — ὁρᾷς; — ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν
but you-see he-said O Socrates just-things seems to-say
Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως
Protagoras claiming for-himself both to-be-allowed to-converse as
βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ.
he-wishes and you as — in-turn you wish

Alcibiades says Socrates concedes the long speeches and Protagoras ought to concede the short exchange. Critias asks for fairness, and Prodicus distinguishes hearing both in common from weighing them equally, disputing from wrangling, and esteem from praise. Hippias calls them all kinsmen by nature, not by law, asks Socrates to slacken the reins and Protagoras not to run out to sea, and proposes an umpire to keep the measure of the speeches.

ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ c
taking-up then — Alcibiades not well you-speak he-said O
Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ
Callias Socrates indeed for here admits not to-have-a-share himself
μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι
of-long-speaking and yields to-Protagoras the but to-converse
οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι
able — to-be and to-know an-account both to-give and to-receive
θαυμάζομ' ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν
I-would-be-surprised — if to-anyone of-men he-yields if indeed then
καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους
also Protagoras admits worse to-be than-Socrates
διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται,
at-conversing it-suffices for-Socrates if but he-lays-claim
διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ
let-him-converse asking both and answering not at each
ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους
question a-long speech stretching-out knocking-away the arguments
καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἕως
and not willing to-give an-account but lengthening-out until
ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ
— forget about what the question was the many
τῶν ἀκουόντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ
of-the listeners since Socrates at-least I guarantee not

ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι.
to-forget(-it) not that he-is-jesting and says forgetful to-be
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν·
to-me indeed then seems more-reasonable-things Socrates to-say
χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.
one-must for each — his-own opinion to-declare
e μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ
after and — Alcibiades as I-think Critias was the(-one)
εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα
speaking O Prodicus and Hippias Callias indeed seems to-me very
πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι
on-the-side of-Protagoras to-be Alcibiades but always contentious is
πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν
toward whatever — he-sets-out(-for) us but not-at-all must to-join-in-the-contest
οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων
either for-Socrates or for-Protagoras but in-common both
δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν.
to-ask not midway to-break-up the meeting
337 εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, καλῶς μοι, ἔφη,
having-said and he these-things — Prodicus well to-me he-said
δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε
you-seem to-speak O Critias must for the(-men) at such
λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν
discussions being-present common indeed to-be of-both the
διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή — ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ
conversing listeners equal but not it-is for not
ταὐτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ
the-same in-common indeed for to-hear one-must both not
ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον,
equally but to-assign to-each but to-the indeed wiser more
τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ
to-the but more-ignorant less I indeed also myself O

Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ
Protagoras both and Socrates think-fit you to-concede and
ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ
with-one-another about the arguments to-dispute indeed to-wrangle but
μή — ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι
not dispute indeed for even through goodwill the friends
τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ
with-the friends wrangle but the opponents both and enemies
ἀλλήλοις — καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία
with-one-another and so — most-beautiful for-us the meeting
γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως
would-become you both for the(-ones) speaking most — so
ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε —
among us the listeners would-be-esteemed and not be-praised
εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων
to-be-esteemed indeed for is(-to-be) in the souls of-the listeners
ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ
without deception to-be-praised but in word often contrary-to
δόξαν ψευδομένων — ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ'
opinion of-(men)-lying we and in-turn the listeners most
ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεσθα — εὐφραίνεσθαι
— so would-be-gladdened not be-pleased to-be-gladdened
μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως
indeed for is learning something and of-prudence
μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά
partaking with-the-very the mind to-be-pleased but eating
τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.
something or other pleasant experiencing with-the-very the body
ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν d
these-things then having-said — Prodicus many very of-the
παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ
present-ones approved after and — Prodicus Hippias the

σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ
wise said O men he-said the(-ones) present consider I
ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι —
you kinsmen both and relatives and fellow-citizens all to-be
φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές
by-nature not by-law the for like to-the like by-nature akin
ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ
is the but law tyrant being of-the men many-things
παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται — ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν
contrary-to the nature forces us then (it-is)-shameful the indeed
φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν
nature of-the things to-know wisest but being of-the
Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε
Greeks and for very this now having-assembled the both
Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς
of-Greece to the-very the town-hall of-the wisdom and of-the-very the
πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν
city to the greatest and most-prosperous house this nothing
τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
of-this — dignity worthy to-display but like
τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
the meanest of-the men to-quarrel with-one-another
338 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα
I indeed then both ask and advise O Protagoras
τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν
both and Socrates to-come-together you as by arbitrators
ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς
us bringing(-you)-together to the middle and neither you the precise
τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν,
this form of-the discussions to-seek the in brevity too-much
εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι
if not (it-is)-pleasing to-Protagoras but to-let-go and to-slacken

τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ
the reins for-the speeches so-that more-magnificent and
εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν
more-graceful to-us they-may-appear nor in-turn Protagoras
πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς
every rope stretching-out with-a-fair-wind letting-go to-flee into
τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον
the open-sea of-the speeches having-hidden (the)-land but a-middle
τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὡς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ
something both to-cut so then you-will-do and be-persuaded-by
μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς
me an-umpire and president and chairman to-choose who
ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου.
for-you will-guard the moderate length of-the speeches of-each

XIX · THE POEM OF SIMONIDES

Socrates rejects an umpire and proposes that Protagoras question first, and then answer. Protagoras says that the greatest part of education is skill in poetry, and asks about Simonides' poem to Scopas, which says that it is hard to become a good man truly, and later blames Pittacus for saying that it is hard to be good. Is not the poet contradicting himself? The crowd applauds, and Socrates is dizzied as by a boxer's blow.

ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ c
these-things pleased the(-men) present and all approved and me
τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο
both — Callias not said he-would-let-go and to-choose they-asked(-me)
ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν
a-president said then I that shameful it-would-be an-umpire
ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν
to-choose of-the speeches whether for worse will-be than-us

ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν
the(-man) chosen not rightly — it-would-be the worse(-man) over-the
βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδ᾽ οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ
better to-preside or similar not-even so rightly the
γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ
for similar(-man) to-us similar-things also will-do so-that from superfluity
ἡρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν
he-will-be-chosen but indeed a-better(-man) than-us you-will-choose in-the indeed
ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου
truth as I-think impossible(-it-is) for-you so-as than-Protagoras
τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν
here wiser someone to-choose if but you-will-choose indeed nothing
βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται,
better you-will-say(-so) but shameful also this to-this(-man) becomes
ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό
as for-a-worthless man a-president to-choose since the
γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ᾽ οὑτωσὶ ἐθέλω
at-least mine(-part) nothing to-me matters but thus I-am-willing
ποιῆσαι, ἵν᾽ ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι
to-do so-that what you-desire meeting both and discussions
ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
for-us may-take-place if not wishes Protagoras to-answer
οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα
this(-man) indeed let-him-ask I and will-answer and at-the-same-time
πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν
I-will-try him to-show how I say one-should the(-man)
ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι
answering to-answer when and I have-answered
ὁπόσ᾽ ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ
as-many-as — he wishes to-ask again this(-man) to-me
λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος
an-account let-him-render likewise if then not he-seems eager

εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ
to-be toward the-very the thing-asked to-answer both I
καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ,
and you in-common will-ask him what-very you (asked)-me
μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου
not to-ruin the meeting and nothing (is)-needed of-this
ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ
for-the-sake one president to-be but all in-common
ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι· καὶ ὁ
will-preside it-seemed-good to-all so one-must-do to-be and —
Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη
Protagoras quite indeed not was-willing nevertheless but was-compelled
ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν
to-agree to-ask and when sufficiently he-had-asked again
δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.
to-give an-account by little answering
ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως· — ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ 339
he-began then to-ask thus somehow I-consider he-said O
Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι
Socrates I for-a-man of-education (the)-greatest part to-be
περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν
about verses clever to-be is and this the(-things) by the
ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς
poets spoken able — to-be to-understand which both rightly
πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε
have-been-composed and which not and to-know-how to-distinguish(-them) both
καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ
and being-asked an-account to-give and indeed also now will-be the
ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
question about the same indeed about which-very I both and you
νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποίησιν·
now are-conversing about virtue transferred but to poetry

τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς
so-much only it-will-differ says for somewhere Simonides to
Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι —
Scopas the of-Creon son the Thessalian that

b ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
a-man good indeed truly to-become (is)-hard
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
in-hands both and feet and mind four-square without blame
τετυγμένον.
wrought

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω;
this do-you-know the song or all for-you shall-I-go-through
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ
and I said that there-is-no need I-know both for and
πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.
very to-me happens having-been-a-care the song
c εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ
well he-said you-speak whether then well to-you seems(-it)
πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ; — πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς
to-have-been-made and rightly or not very I-said I well
τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. — δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι,
both and rightly does-it-seem and to-you well to-have-been-made
εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ ποιητής; — οὐ καλῶς,
if contrary-things says himself to-himself the poet not well
ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — ὅρα δή, ἔφη, βέλτιον. — ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ,
said and I look then he-said better but good-sir

ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς. — οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προιόντος
I-have-considered(-it) sufficiently you-know then he-said that going-on
τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που —
the song says somewhere

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
nor to-me harmoniously the of-Pittacus is-current
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν
although wise from man spoken hard he-said good
ἔμμεναι.
to-be

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ d
do-you-perceive that the same this(-man) both these-things says and-those the
ἔμπροσθεν; — οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη,
former I-know said and I does-it-seem then to-you he-said
ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; — φαίνεται ἔμοιγε (καὶ
these to-those to-agree it-appears to-me-at-least and
ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι) ἀτάρ,
at-the-same-time however I-was-afraid lest something he-was-saying but
ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται; — πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο
I-said I to-you not does-it-appear(-so) how for — would-he-appear
ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων,
to-agree himself with-himself the(-man) these both saying
ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι
who at-least the indeed first himself proposed hard to-be
ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος
a-man good to-become in-truth a-little but of-the poem
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν
into the forward having-advanced he-forgot and Pittacus the(-man)
ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι,
the-same-things saying as-himself that (it-is)-hard good to-be

τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ
this(-man) he-blames both and not says to-accept him the
αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος; καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ
same-things as-himself saying and-yet when the(-man) the-same-things
λέγοντα αὑτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται,
saying as-himself he-blames (it-is)-clear that also himself he-blames
ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει.
so-that either the earlier or later not rightly he-says
340 εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον
having-said then these-things to-many uproar he-caused and praise
τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ
of-the listeners and I the indeed first as-it-were by
ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα
a-good boxer struck was-darkened both and grew-dizzy
εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων·
having-said he these-things and the others applauding-loudly
ἔπειτα — ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα μοι
then as at-least to you to-be-said the-truth so-that to-me
χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής —
time might-arise for-the consideration what said the poet
τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ
I-turn to — Prodicus and having-called him O
Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης·
Prodicus I-said I your however Simonides (is)-fellow-citizen
δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί.
right you-are to-help the man

XX · PRODICUS CALLED TO HELP

Socrates calls on Prodicus as Scamander called on Simois. To become and to be are different, so the poet does not contradict himself: according to Hesiod, it is hard to become good, but easy to stay so once one has reached the top. Protagoras objects that this cure makes the poet look more ignorant. Socrates jokes that the Ceans may take hard to mean bad, and Prodicus plays along; when Protagoras protests, Socrates says Prodicus was jesting to test him and offers his own reading.

δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος
I-seem then to-myself I to-call-on you as said Homer
τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν
— Scamander besieged by — Achilles —
Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα —
Simois to-call-on saying

φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
dear brother the-strength of-the-man both-of-us indeed
σχῶμεν…
let-us-check

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν b
but also I you call-on lest for-us — Protagoras —
Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ
Simonides sack and for indeed also needs the on-behalf-of
Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ᾗ τό τε
Simonides restoration — your art by-which the both
βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, καὶ
wishing and desiring you-distinguish as not the-same being and
ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι
what just-now you-said many both and fine and now consider if to-you
συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν
it-seems-good which-very to-me not for he-seems contrary-things to-say

αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι
himself to-himself Simonides you for O Prodicus declare-first
τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ
— your opinion the-same to-you seems to-be the becoming and
τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; — ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. —
the being or different different by Zeus said — Prodicus
οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης
therefore I-said I in indeed the first(-lines) himself — Simonides
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ
— his-own opinion declared that a-man good in-truth
γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη; — ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. —
to-become hard it-was true-things you-say said — Prodicus
τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς
— but at-least Pittacus said and I he-blames not as
οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο.
thinks Protagoras the-same as-himself saying but other
d οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι
not for this — Pittacus said the hard to-become
ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν
good as — Simonides but the to-be is
δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε,
but not the-same O Protagoras as says Prodicus here
τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ
the being and the becoming if but not the same is the
εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης
being with-the becoming not contrary-things says — Simonides
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι
himself to-himself and perhaps — would-say Prodicus here and others
πολλοὶ καθ' Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν
many according-to Hesiod to-become indeed good hard
εἶναι — τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα
to-be of-the for virtue before the gods sweat

θεῖναι — ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥᾳδίην
to-have-placed when but someone of-it to (the)-top comes easy
δὴπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.
thereafter to-be hard though being to-possess
ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπῄνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ
— indeed then Prodicus having-heard these-things praised me — but
Πρωταγόρας, τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
Protagoras the restoration of-yours he-said O Socrates
μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς.
greater error has than what you-restore
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ e
and I said bad-work then by-me has-been-done as it-seems O
Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον
Protagoras and I-am some laughable doctor healing greater
τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.
the disease I-make
ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.
but so it-is he-said
πῶς δή; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
how indeed said and I
πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω
great — he-said ignorance would-be of-the poet if so
φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ
trivial something he-says to-be the virtue to-possess which
ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις.
is of-all-things hardest as to-all seems men
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν 341
and I said by — Zeus in time at-least has-happened-by
ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ
with-us in the discussions Prodicus here is-likely for you-know O
Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι
Protagoras the of-Prodicus wisdom divine some to-be of-old whether

ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ
from Simonides beginning or even still older you but
ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνῃ,
of-other many-things experienced being of-this inexperienced to-be appear
οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου
not as I experienced through the pupil to-be of-Prodicus
τουτουΐ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ
here and now to-me you-seem not to-understand that also the
"χαλεπὸν" τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν
hard this perhaps not so Simonides took
ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ "δεινοῦ"
as you take(-it) but as about the dread
Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ
Prodicus me here admonishes each-time when praising I
ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ
either you or another someone I-say that Protagoras wise and
δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ
dread is a-man he-asks if not I-am-ashamed the-good-things dread
καλῶν. τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν
calling the for dread he-says bad is no-one at-any-rate
λέγει ἑκάστοτε "δεινοῦ πλούτου" οὐδὲ "δεινῆς εἰρήνης" οὐδὲ
says each-time of-dread wealth nor of-dread peace nor
"δεινῆς ὑγιείας," ἀλλὰ "δεινῆς νόσου" καὶ "δεινοῦ πολέμου"
of-dread health but of-dread disease and of-dread war
καὶ "δεινῆς πενίας," ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ἴσως οὖν
and of-dread poverty as the dread bad being perhaps then
καὶ τὸ "χαλεπὸν" αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν
also the hard in-turn the Ceans and — Simonides either bad
ὑπολαμβάνουσι ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις· ἐρώμεθα
take or other something which you not understand let-us-ask

οὖν Πρόδικον — δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον
then Prodicus (it-is)-right for the of-Simonides dialect this(-man)
ἐρωτᾶν — τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ "χαλεπὸν" Σιμωνίδης;
to-ask what meant O Prodicus the hard Simonides
κακόν, ἔφη.
bad he-said
διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε,
through this then also he-blames said and I O Prodicus
τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν
— *Pittacus saying hard good to-be as —*
εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
if he-heard him saying that it-is bad good to-be
ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην
but what do-you-think he-said to-mean O Socrates Simonides
ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ Πιττακῷ ὅτι τὰ
other than this and to-reproach — Pittacus that the
ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε Λέσβιος
names not he-knew rightly to-distinguish inasmuch-as a-Lesbian
ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος;
being and in a-dialect barbarous raised
ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. d
you-hear indeed I-said I O Protagoras Prodicus here
ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν;
can-you something to these to-say
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ
and — Protagoras much at-least it-lacks he-said so to-be O
Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ "χαλεπὸν"
Prodicus but I well know that also Simonides the hard
ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ
meant which-precisely we the others not the bad but whatever
ἂν μὴ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται.
— not easy is but through many troubles comes-about

e ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν
but also I think I-said O Protagoras this to-mean
Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν
Simonides and Prodicus at-least here to-know but to-jest
καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ τῷ
and you to-seem to-test whether able — you-will-be —
σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει
your-own argument to-help since that at-least Simonides not means
τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ
the hard bad a-great proof is straightway the after
τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι —
this saying he-says for that

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας,
god — alone this would-have privilege

οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἶτα
not surely this at-least meaning bad good to-be then
τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο
the god he-says alone this — to-have and to-the god this
γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἄν τινα λέγοι
privilege assigned alone intemperate for — some(-one) would-call
Σιμωνίδην ὁ Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον.
Simonides — Prodicus and not-at-all a-Cean

342 ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
but what to-me seems to-think Simonides in this —
ᾄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν
song I-am-willing to-you to-say if you-wish to-take of-me a-test
ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ
how I-am-disposed which you call this about verses if but
βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.
you-wish of-you I-will-hear

ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος,
— *indeed then Protagoras having-heard me these-things saying*
εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ
if you wish he-said O Socrates — and Prodicus both and
ὁ Ἱππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.
— *Hippias the-two-urged very and the others*

XXI · THE SPARTAN PHILOSOPHERS

Socrates gives his own reading. Philosophy is oldest and strongest in Crete and Sparta, where the sophists hide their wisdom and pretend to excel in war; the proof is the short sayings a Spartan throws into talk like a javelin. The Seven Sages admired this brevity and dedicated their sayings at Delphi, Know thyself and Nothing too much. Pittacus' It is hard to be good was one such saying, and Simonides wrote his song to overthrow it: the opening's 'indeed' makes sense only as a retort to Pittacus.

ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ b
I then said and I what at-least to-me seems about the
ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία
song this I-will-try to-you to-go-through philosophy
γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων
for is most-ancient both and most-abundant of-the Greeks
ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι
in Crete both and in Lacedaemon and sophists most-numerous
γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσιν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται
of-earth there are but they-deny(-it) and pretend
ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφίᾳ τῶν
ignorant to-be so-that not manifest they-may-be that in-wisdom the
Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε
Greeks they-surpass like those-whom Protagoras spoke-of

τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ
the sophists but they-may-seem in-the fighting and in-courage
περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ᾧ περίεισιν, πάντας
to-surpass thinking if they-were-known in-what they-surpass all
τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι
this would-practice the wisdom now but having-hidden
ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας,
that they-have-deceived the in the cities laconizers
καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς,
and the indeed ears both break imitating them
καὶ ἱμάντας περιελίττονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ
and thongs wrap-round(-themselves) and love-gymnastics and
βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας
short cloaks wear as indeed by-these mastering
τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
the Greeks the Lacedaemonians the but Lacedaemonians
ἐπειδὰν βούλωνται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς συγγενέσθαι
whenever they-wish freely with-the among themselves to-converse
σοφισταῖς καὶ ἤδη ἄχθωνται λάθρᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι,
sophists and already are-vexed secretly conversing
ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόντων τούτων
expulsions-of-strangers making of-the both laconizers these
καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὢν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς
and if some other stranger being visits they-converse with-the
σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα
sophists escaping-the-notice-of the strangers and they-themselves none
ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
allow of-the young into the other cities to-go-out as not-even
Κρῆτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν.
Cretans so-that not they-unlearn what they-themselves teach

εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ e
are and in these — cities not only men on
παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γνοῖτε
education great thinking but also women you-may-know
δ' ἂν ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
and — that I these-things true say and Lacedaemonians
πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται, ὧδε·
toward philosophy and discussions best have-been-educated thus
εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ
if for wishes someone of-Lacedaemonians with-the most-common
συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει αὐτὸν
to-converse the indeed most in the discussions he-will-find him
φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ
common some(-one) appearing then wherever — it-happens
τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ
of-the things-said he-throws-in a-saying worthy of-account short and
συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι
compressed like clever javelin-thrower so-that to-appear
τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω.
the conversing-with(-him) than-a-child in-nothing better
τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἳ κατανενοήκασι 343
this then itself also of-the present are some-who have-perceived
καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν
and of-the ancients that the to-laconize much more is
φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν
to-philosophize than to-love-gymnastics knowing that such able
τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν
— to-be sayings to-utter of-a-perfectly educated is
ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς
man of-these was also Thales the Milesian and Pittacus
ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ
the Mytilenean and Bias the Prienian and Solon —

ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς,
our and Cleobulus the Lindian and Myson the Chenian
καὶ ἕβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων.
and seventh among these was-said the-Lacedaemonian Chilon
οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς
these all emulators and lovers and pupils were of-the
Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας, καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν
of-Lacedaemonians education and would-learn — someone their the
σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα
wisdom such being sayings short memorable
ἑκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ συνελθόντες ἀπαρχὴν
by-each spoken these also in-common having-come-together first-fruit
τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν
of-the wisdom dedicated — to-Apollo in the temple the at
Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶθι
Delphi having-written these which indeed all celebrate know
σαυτόν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν. τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω;
yourself and nothing too-much of-what indeed for-sake these-things do-I-say
ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας,
that this — manner was of-the ancients of-the philosophy
βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ
short-speaking some Laconic and indeed also — of-Pittacus privately
περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν,
was-carried-about this — saying praised by the wise
τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε
the hard good to-be — then Simonides inasmuch-as
φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ
ambitious being for wisdom knew that if he-should-overthrow this —
ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ,
saying like well-reputed athlete and should-get-the-better of-it
αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς
himself he-would-be-well-reputed among the then men against

τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων
this then — saying and of-this for-sake against-this plotting
κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ᾆσμα πεποίηκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.
to-dock it whole the song he-has-made as to-me it-appears
ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ d
let-us-examine indeed it in-common all whether then I
ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ᾄσματος μανικὸν
true-things say straightway for the first of-the song mad
ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
— would-appear if wishing to-say that a-man good
γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ
to-become hard then he-threw-in the indeed this for not-even
πρὸς ἕνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις
toward one reason appears to-have-been-thrown-in if not someone
ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα
suppose toward the — of-Pittacus saying as contending
λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην· λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν
to-speak — Simonides saying — Pittacus that hard
ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὔκ, ἀλλὰ
good to-be disputing to-say that no but
γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὦ Πιττακέ,
to-become indeed hard a-man good is O Pittacus
ὡς ἀληθῶς — οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει
as truly not in-truth good not upon this he-speaks
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς
the truth as then being some the indeed as truly
ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς — εὖηθες
good the but good indeed not however truly silly
γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου —
for this at-least would-appear — and not of-Simonides

Socrates rearranges the opening: Simonides answers Pittacus that it is not being good but becoming good that is hard truly. He quotes the next lines, that only a god could hold the privilege and that a man cannot help being bad when helpless misfortune casts him down. Such a misfortune can only overthrow a man who is standing, the resourceful man and not the one who is always helpless; so becoming good is hard but possible, and being good impossible.

344 ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως,
but transposed one-must to-place in the song the truly
οὑτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν
thus somehow having-supplied the — of-Pittacus as —
εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην
if we-should-put him speaking — Pittacus and Simonides
ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπόντα· ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν
answering saying O men hard good
ἔμμεναι, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐκ
to-be the-other and answering that O Pittacus not
ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα
true-things you-say not for to-be but to-become indeed is a-man
ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
good in-hands both and feet and mind four-square without blame
τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον
wrought hard truly thus appears toward reason
τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτῳ
the indeed thrown-in and the truly rightly at last
κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως
lying and the following-things all to-this bear-witness that thus
εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν
it-has-been-said many indeed for it-is-possible also about each of-the in
τῷ ᾄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται — πάνυ
the song things-said to-show how well it-has-been-made very

γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει — ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν
for gracefully and carefully it-is but long —
εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον
would-be it thus to-go-through but the outline its the whole
διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός
let-us-go-through and the intention that than-anything more refutation
ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.
is of-the Pittacean saying through all the song
λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ c
he-says for after this a-little having-gone-through as — if
λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν
he-were-making a-speech that to-become indeed a-man good hard
ἀληθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον
truly possible — however for at-least time some having-become
δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν,
but to-remain in this — state and to-be a-man good
ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον,
as you say O Pittacus impossible and not human
ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,
but god — alone this would-have the privilege

ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ
a-man but not
ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
it-is-possible not not bad to-be
ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.
whom helpless misfortune casts-down

τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ; d
whom then helpless misfortune casts-down in of-a-ship command
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ
(it-is)-clear that not the private(-man) the indeed for private(-man) always

καθῄρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι,
has-been-cast-down as then not the lying(-man) someone — would-throw-down
ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἑστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις
but the indeed standing at-some-time would-throw-down — someone
ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν
so-as lying to-make the but lying not so also the
εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι,
resourceful being at-some-time helpless — misfortune would-cast-down
τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ, καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας
the but always helpless being not and the helmsman great
χειμὼν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν
storm falling-upon helpless — would-make and a-farmer
χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν
harsh season coming-on helpless — would-make and a-doctor
ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι,
the-same these to-the indeed for good it-is-possible bad to-become
ὥσπερ καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος —
as also by another poet it-is-attested the having-said

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ᾽ ἐσθλός·
but a-man good at-one-time indeed bad at-another but good

e τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ εἶναι
to-the but bad not it-is-possible to-become but always to-be
ἀνάγκη. ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν
(of)-necessity so-that the indeed resourceful and wise and good
ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ
whenever helpless misfortune casts-down not it-is-possible not not
κακὸν ἔμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φῄς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν
bad to-be you but say O Pittacus hard good

ἔμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δέ,
to-be it but is to-become indeed hard possible but
ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον·
good to-be but impossible

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
having-fared indeed for well every man good
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.
bad but if badly

XXIII · FARED WELL, FARED BADLY

Faring well in letters means learning them, and faring badly means losing knowledge through time, toil, or disease, which can only happen to one who has it. So a good man can become bad, but the bad man is always so. Simonides will not waste his life seeking a blameless man, and praises willingly all who do nothing base: Socrates takes the willingly with the praising, since no wise man thinks anyone does wrong willingly, and a good man is often compelled to praise a strange parent or country. Simonides is content with the middling man.

τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα 345
what then in letters good faring is and what a-man
ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις.
good makes in letters clear that the of-these learning
τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῶν
what and good-faring a-good doctor makes clear that the of-the
καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς
sick of-the treatment learning bad but badly who
οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον
then — bad doctor would-become clear that to-whom first

μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῷ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῷ ἰατρῷ — οὗτος
indeed it-belongs a-doctor to-be then a-good doctor this(-man)
γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο — ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται
for — also bad would-become we but the of-medicine laymen
οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε
not — ever would-become badly having-fared either doctors or
τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς
carpenters or other anything — of-such whoever but not a-doctor
ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός.
— would-become badly having-fared clear that not-even a-bad doctor
οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ
so also the indeed good man would-become — at-some-time also
κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ
bad either by time or by toil or by disease or by
ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος — αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ
other some accident this for alone is bad
πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι — ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄν
faring of-knowledge to-be-deprived the but bad man not —
ποτε γένοιτο κακός — ἔστιν γὰρ ἀεί — ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει
ever would-become bad he-is for always but if he-is-to
κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι. ὥστε
bad to-become it-must him first good to-become so-that
καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ᾄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν
also this of-the song toward this tends that to-be indeed
ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι
a-man good not possible — continuing good to-become
δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ
but good possible — and bad at-least the same this(-man) for
πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.
longest and also best are those-whom — the gods love

ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ
these-things both then all to — Pittacus have-been-said and the
ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ᾄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ —
following-things at-least of-the song still more show he-says for

τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
therefore not ever I the not to-become
δυνατὸν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄ-
possible seeking empty into un-
πρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
-achievable hope portion of-life I-shall-throw
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι
all-blameless man of-broad-based as-many-as
καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
fruit we-take of-earth
ἐπί θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω,
then — to-you having-found I-will-report

φησίν — οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος d
he-says so vehemently and through whole the song
ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι —
he-attacks the — of-Pittacus saying

πάντας δ᾽ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
all and I-praise and love
ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ
willing whoever does
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκῃ δ᾽ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται·
nothing shameful against-necessity but not-even gods fight

e καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως
and this is toward the same this said not for so
ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν,
uneducated was Simonides as these to-say to-praise
ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ
whoever — willing nothing bad does as being some who
ἑκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο,
willing bad-things do I for nearly somewhat think this
ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων
that no-one of-the wise men thinks anyone of-men
ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἑκόντα
willing to-err nor shameful-things both and bad-things willing
ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ
to-do but well they-know that all the the shameful-things
καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ
and the bad-things doing unwilling do and indeed also —
Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῇ ἑκών, τούτων φησὶν
Simonides not whoever — not bad-things does willing of-these says
ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἑκών.
a-praiser to-be but about himself he-says this — willing
346 ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὑτὸν
he-thought for a-man fine and-good often himself
ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην, οἷον
to-compel friend to-someone to-become and praiser as
ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον
to-a-man often to-happen a-mother or father strange
ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
or fatherland or other something — of-such the indeed then
πονηρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὥσπερ
wicked whenever such something to-them happens as
ἁσμένους ὁρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν
gladly to-see and blaming to-display and to-accuse the

πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν
wickedness of-the parents or fatherland so-that them neglecting
αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ' ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι
them not may-reproach the men nor may-revile that
ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας
they-neglect so-that still more to-blame both them and enmities
ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ'
voluntary to the necessary to-add the but
ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἄν
good to-conceal(-it) both and to-praise to-be-compelled and if
τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες,
at-something they-are-angry at-the parents or fatherland having-been-wronged
αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι
themselves themselves to-soothe and to-be-reconciled
προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ
compelling themselves to-love — their-own and
ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ οἶμαι καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο
to-praise often but I-think also Simonides believed
καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων
even himself either a-tyrant or another some-one — of-such
ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος.
to-praise and to-extol not willing but being-compelled

ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιττακέ,
these-things indeed also — to-Pittacus he-says that I O Pittacus
οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ —
not through these-things you blame because I-am fond-of-blame since

ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ
to-me-at-least it-suffices
ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰ-
whoever — not bad is nor too lawless know-
δώς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν
-ing and city-helping justice
ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ· οὔ μιν ἐγὼ
a-sound man not him I
μωμήσομαι —
shall-blame

οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος —
not for I-am fond-of-blame

τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα,
of-the for fools endless the-breed
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται.
all-things you-know fine with-which — shameful-things not are-mixed

d οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά,
not this he-says as — if he-were-saying all-things you-know white
οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμεικται — γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη
with-which black-things not are-mixed laughable for — would-be
πολλαχῇ — ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται
in-many-ways but that he-himself also the middling accepts
ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν. καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον,
so-as not to-blame and not I-seek he-said all-blameless man

εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν
of-broad-based as-many-as fruit we-take of-earth then — to-you
εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἕνεκα οὐδένα
having-found I-will-report so-that of-this at-least for-sake no-one
ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ ἂν ᾖ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν
I-shall-praise but to-me it-suffices if he-be middling and nothing
κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι — καὶ
bad does since I all love and praise and
τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς
the dialect there he-has-used the of-the Mytileneans as to
Πιττακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκών —
Pittacus saying the all and I-praise and love willing
ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἑκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα — ὅστις ἔρδῃ
there one-must in the willing to-divide saying whoever does
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.
nothing shameful unwilling but there-are whom I praise and love

XXIV · LEAVE THE POETS ASIDE

Socrates closes his reading, and Hippias offers to give his own. Alcibiades insists they return to their agreement. Socrates says that talk about poets is like the drinking parties of common men, who hire flute girls because they cannot entertain each other with their own voices. Good men converse among themselves without poets, whom no one can question, and Protagoras, shamed by Alcibiades and Callias, agrees to answer.

σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ 347
you then even if moderately you-were-saying reasonable and true-things O
Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἔψεγον· νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ
Pittacus not — ever I-would-blame now but vehemently for and
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ
about the greatest-things lying you-seem true-things to-say through

ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω. ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε
these-things you I blame these-things to-me seem O Prodicus
καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος
and Protagoras said and I Simonides intending
πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾄσμα.
to-have-made this — song
b καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ
and — Hippias well indeed to-me you-seem he-said O Socrates also you
περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διειληλυθέναι· ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ
about the song to-have-gone-through there-is however he-said also to-me
λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε.
an-account about it well holding which to-you I-will-display if you-wish
καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, εἰς αὖθίς γε·
and — Alcibiades yes he-said O Hippias for again at-least
νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἃ ὡμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω
now but just it-is what the-two-agreed with each-other
Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι
Protagoras and Socrates Protagoras indeed if still
βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ
he-wishes to-question to-answer Socrates if but indeed
βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον.
he-wishes to-Socrates to-answer to-question the other
c καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁπότερον
and I said I-leave(-it) indeed I-at-least to-Protagoras whichever
αὐτῷ ἥδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ᾀσμάτων τε καὶ
to-him pleasanter if but he-wishes about indeed songs both and
ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἠρώτησα,
verses let-us-let-be about but what the first I you asked
ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ
O Protagoras gladly — to end I-would-come with you
σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως
inquiring and for seems to-me the about poetry

διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν
to-converse most-like to-be to-the drinking-parties the of-the
φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ
common and market-place men and for these through
τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ
the not to-be-able with-one-another through themselves to-be-together in the
πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν
drinking nor through — their-own voice and the words —
ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας,
their-own from want-of-education valuable make the flute-girls
πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν,
much hiring another's voice the of-the flutes
καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ
and through the of-those voice with-one-another are-together where but
καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν
fine and-good fellow-drinkers and educated are not —
ἴδοις οὔτ' αὐλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας,
you-would-see either flute-girls or dancing-girls or harp-girls
ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν
but themselves to-themselves sufficient being to-be-together without the
λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν φωνῆς,
nonsense both and games these through — their-own voice
λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως,
speaking both and listening in turn their-own orderly
κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε
even-if very much wine they-drink so and also — such
συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν οἷοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ
gatherings if indeed they-take men such-as of-us the
πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ
many say to-be nothing need of-another's voice nor
ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν
of-poets whom neither to-question possible — is about what

λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
they-say bringing-in both them the many in the discussions
οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα,
the some these-things say the poet to-mean the but other-things
περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι·
about a-matter conversing which they-are-unable to-prove
348 ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ
but — indeed such gatherings they-let to-fare-well themselves
δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις
but with-themselves are-together through themselves in — their-own words
πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους
a-test of-one-another taking and giving — such
μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ,
to-me seems to-be-needful rather to-imitate me both and you
καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
having-laid-aside the poets ourselves through us ourselves
πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ
to each-other the discussions to-make of-the truth and
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας· κἂν μὲν βούλῃ ἔτι
of-us ourselves a-test taking and-if indeed you-wish still
ἐρωτᾶν, ἕτοιμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν
to-question ready I-am to-you to-offer(-myself) answering if
δὲ βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχες, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα
but you-wish you to-me offer(-yourself) about what midway we-stopped
διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.
going-through to-these an-end to-put
b λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν
saying then me these-things and such other-things nothing
ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ
made-clear — Protagoras which-of-the-two he-would-do said then —
Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι,
Alcibiades toward — Callias having-looked O Callias seems to-you

ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε
he-said even now finely Protagoras to-act not willing whether
δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ᾽
he-will-give account or not to-make-clear to-me for not it-seems but
ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα
either let-him-converse or let-him-say that not he-wishes to-converse so-that
τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ
to-this(-man) indeed these-things we-may-know Socrates but with-another
τῳ διαλέγηται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλῳ.
some(-one) may-converse or another whoever — wishes with-another
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὥς γέ μοι ἔδοξεν, c
and — Protagoras having-been-shamed as at-least to-me it-seemed
τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου
— both Alcibiades these-things saying and — Callias
δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων,
asking and of-the others nearly somewhat of-the present
μόγις προυτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν
with-difficulty was-turned to the to-converse and bade
ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινούμενος.
to-question him as going-to-answer

XXV · COURAGE SET APART

Socrates says he speaks with Protagoras because he is the one man who openly professes to teach virtue. He repeats his question about the five names, and Protagoras now answers that four of the parts are reasonably alike, but courage is very different, since many men are most unjust, unholy, intemperate, and ignorant and yet most courageous. Socrates argues that the boldest men are those with knowledge, so wisdom would be courage, but Protagoras says Socrates misremembers his answer: the courageous are bold, but not all the bold are courageous, as power is not strength.

εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἴου διαλέγεσθαί μέ
said indeed I O Protagoras not think to-converse me
σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ
with-you other something wishing than what myself I-am-at-a-loss-about
ἑκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν
each-time these-things to-examine-thoroughly I-think for very to-say
τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ —
something — Homer the

d σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.
together and two going and — before he the-other noticed

e εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς
more-resourceful for somehow all we-are the men toward
ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε
every deed and word and thought alone but if-indeed —
νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξηται καὶ μεθ'
he-notices at-once going-around he-seeks to-whom he-may-show(-it) and with
ὅτου βεβαιώσηται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα
whom he-may-confirm(-it) until — he-meets(-one) as also I for-sake-of
τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί,
this with-you gladly converse rather than with-another some(-one)
ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν
thinking you best would to-examine also about the
ἄλλων περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ
other-things about which it-is-likely to-inquire the reasonable(-man) and
δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ
indeed also about virtue whom for other than you who at-least not
μόνον αὐτὸς οἴει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι
only yourself think fine and-good to-be as some others
αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν·
themselves indeed reasonable are others but not are-able to-make

σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ᾽ εἶ ποιεῖν 349
you but both yourself good are and others able — are to-make
ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
good and so have-trusted yourself that even others
ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ᾽ ἀναφανδὸν
this — art concealing you at-least openly
σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας,
yourself having-proclaimed to all the Greeks
σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ
sophist having-named yourself you-declared of-education and
ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας
of-virtue teacher first of-this a-fee having-thought-fit
ἄρνυσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν
to-earn how then not you was-it-needful to-call-on to the
τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ᾽
of-these inquiry and to-question and to-consult not it-is
ὅπως οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον
how not and now indeed I those-things which-very the first
ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν
I-asked about these again I-desire from beginning the indeed
ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς
to-recall from you the but to-examine-together was and as
ἐγᾦμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία
I-think the question this wisdom and temperance and courage
καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα
and justice and holiness whether these five being
ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἑνὶ πράγματί ἐστιν, ἢ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων
names upon one thing are or to-each of-the names
τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ
these underlies some peculiar being and thing having its-own
δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὂν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον;
power each not being like the one of-them the other

c ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον
you-said then you not names upon one to-be but each
ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα
to-a-peculiar thing of-the names these to-be-applied all
δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ
and these parts to-be of-virtue not as the of-the gold
μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά
parts like are to-one-another and to-the whole of-which parts
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ
they-are but as the of-the face parts both to-the whole of-which
μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν
parts they-are and to-one-another unlike peculiar each power
ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι·
having these-things if indeed to-you seems still as then say(-so)
εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι
if but otherwise somehow this define(-it) since I-at-least nothing to-you
ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν φήσῃς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
to-account set if somehow otherwise now you-say not for —
θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.
I-would-wonder if then testing me these-things you-were-saying
ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα
but I to-you he-said say O Socrates that these all
μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς
parts indeed are of-virtue and the indeed four of-them reasonably
παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ
similar to-one-another are the but courage very much
διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ
differing from-all these thus but you-will-know that I true-things
λέγω· εὑρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους
say you-will-find for many of-the men most-unjust

μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ
indeed being and most-unholy and most-intemperate and
ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.
most-ignorant most-courageous but exceptionally
ἔχε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. e
hold indeed I-said I worthy for you-know to-examine what you-say
πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; — καὶ
whether the courageous bold you-mean or other something and
ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι. — φέρε
rash at-least he-said to what the many fear to-go come
δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῂς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ
indeed the virtue fine something do-you-say to-be and as fine
ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις; — κάλλιστον
being it you teacher yourself offer finest
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. — πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ'
indeed then he-said if not I-am-mad at-least whether then said and
ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν,
I the indeed some(-part) of-it shameful the other some(-part) fine
ἢ ὅλον καλόν; — ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. —
or whole fine whole I-suppose fine as possible — most
οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; — 350
do-you-know then who into the wells dive boldly
ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. — πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ
I-at-least that the divers whether because they-know or
δι' ἄλλο τι; — ὅτι ἐπίστανται. — τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
through other something because they-know who and from the
ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἢ οἱ
horses to-fight bold are whether the horsemen or the
ἄφιπποι; — οἱ ἱππικοί. — τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ
non-horsemen the horsemen who and light-shields having the
πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; — οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
light-shield-men or the not the light-shield-men and the other-things

γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν
at-least all if this you-seek he-said the knowing than-the
μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν
not knowing bolder are and themselves than-themselves
ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. — ἤδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας,
after they-learn or before to-learn already and some have-you-seen
ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας
I-said of-all these without-knowledge being bold
δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; — ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν
but toward each of-these I-at-least said and he and too
γε θαρροῦντας. — οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ
at-least bold therefore the bold these also
ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν; — αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία·
courageous are shameful however he-said would-be the courage
ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν. — πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ,
since these at-least mad are how then I-said I
λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι; —
do-you-mean the courageous not the bold to-be
καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω
and now at-least he-said therefore these said and I the so
θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται;
bold being not courageous but mad appear
καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί
and there in-turn the wisest these also boldest
εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ
are boldest and being most-courageous and according-to
τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἴη;
this — argument the wisdom — courage would-be
d οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ ἔλεγόν
not well he-said you-remember O Socrates what I-was-saying
τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ
both and was-answering to-you I-at-least having-been-asked by you if the

ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι
courageous bold are agreed if but also the bold
ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην — εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου,
courageous not I-was-asked if for me then you-had-asked
εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες — τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ
I-would-have-said — that not all the but courageous that not
θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς
bold are — my admission nowhere you-showed that
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς
not rightly I-agreed then the knowing themselves
ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ
than-themselves bolder being you-declare and than-not
ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει τὴν ἀνδρείαν
knowing others and in this you-think the courage
καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ
and the wisdom the-same to-be in-this but — way
μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον
proceeding even the strength you-would-think — to-be wisdom first
μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔροιό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ
indeed for if so proceeding you-should-ask me if the strong
δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι
powerful are I-would-say(-so) — then if the knowing
παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν
to-wrestle more-powerful are than-the not knowing to-wrestle
καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν,
and themselves than-themselves after they-learn or before to-learn
φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογήσαντος ἐξείη
I-would-say(-so) — these-things and me having-agreed it-would-be-possible
ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις, λέγειν
— for-you using the same proofs these to-say
ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς.
that according-to — my admission the wisdom is strength

351 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς
I but nowhere not-even here agree the powerful
ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ
strong to-be the however strong powerful not for
ταὐτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ
the-same to-be power both and strength but the one also
ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας
from knowledge to-come-about the power and from madness
γε καὶ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν
at-least and spirit strength but from nature and good-nurture of-the
σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κἀκεῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ
bodies so and there-too not the-same to-be boldness both and
ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους
courage so-that it-follows the indeed courageous bold
εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τούς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας·
to-be not however the at-least bold courageous all
θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις
boldness indeed for both from art comes-about to-men
καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις,
and from spirit at-least and from madness as the power
ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.
courage but from nature and good-nurture of-the souls comes-about

XXVI · IS PLEASURE THE GOOD?

Socrates asks whether living pleasantly is good and living painfully bad. Protagoras, wary, answers that some pleasures are not good, some pains not bad, and some neither, and they agree to examine it. Socrates then asks whether he takes knowledge, like the many, for a slave dragged about by passion, pleasure, and fear, or a power that rules. Protagoras says it would be shameful for him above all to deny that wisdom is the strongest of human things, and that the many are wrong in much.

λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ c
do-you-say and some I-said O Protagoras of-the men well
ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; — ἔφη. — ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος
to-live the but badly he-said(-so) so then seems to-you a-man
ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζώῃ; — οὐκ
— well to-live if being-distressed both and suffering he-should-live no
ἔφη. — τί δ' εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν; οὐκ
he-said what and if pleasantly having-lived the life he-should-end not
εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; — ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. —
well — to-you does-be-seem so to-have-lived to-me-at-least he-said
τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν. —
the indeed then pleasantly to-live good the but unpleasantly bad
εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζώῃ ἡδόμενος. — τί
if-indeed in-the fine-things at-least he-said he-should-live taking-pleasure what
δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδὲ
indeed O Protagoras surely-not also you like the many pleasant
ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω,
some-things call bad and distressing good I for say
καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἆρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ
according-to what pleasant they-are then according-to this not good not if
τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ
anything from them will-result other and again in-turn the distressing
ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά; — οὐκ
in-the-same-way so not according-to as-much-as distressing bad not
οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ
I-know O Socrates he-said simply so as you ask whether
ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα
by-me to-be-answered it-is that the pleasant both good are all
καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν
and the distressing bad but to-me it-seems not only toward the
νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι,
present answer for-me safer to-be to-answer

ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι
but also toward all the other life — my that there-are
μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ
indeed some of-the pleasant-things not are good there-are and in-turn
καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἃ
also some of-the distressing-things not are bad there-are and some-which
ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά.
are also a-third which neither-of-the-two neither bad nor good
e — ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς
pleasant and do-you-call said and I not the-things of-pleasure
μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν; — πάνυ γ', ἔφη. —
partaking or making pleasure certainly at-least he-said
τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ
this then I-say according-to as-much-as pleasant they-are whether
οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν
not good the pleasure itself asking if not good
ἐστιν. — ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες,
it-is as you say he-said each-time O Socrates
σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι
let-us-examine it and if indeed to reason it-seems to-be
τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν,
the inquiry and the same appears pleasant both and good
συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν.
we-shall-agree if but not then already we-shall-dispute
πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς
whether then said and I you wish to-lead the
σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι;
inquiry or I am-to-lead
δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ
just he-said you to-lead you for also begin the
λόγου.
argument

ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῇδέ πῃ καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν 352
so then said and I this-way somehow clear — to-us
γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους
would-it-become as if someone a-man examining from the form
ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος
either toward health or toward other something of-the of-the body
ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας
functions having-seen the face and the hands extremities
εἶποι· "ἴθι δή μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ
should-say come indeed for-me having-uncovered both the chest and the
μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον," καὶ
back show(-me) so-that I-may-examine more-clearly also
ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος
I such something desire toward the inquiry having-observed
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς φῄς,
that so you-are-disposed toward the good and the pleasant as you-say
δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
I-need such something to-say come indeed for-me O Protagoras
καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς
also this of-the thought uncover how are-you-disposed toward
ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς
knowledge whether also this to-you seems as to-the
πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ
many men or otherwise it-seems and to-the many about
ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἡγεμονικὸν
knowledge such something not strong nor leading
οὐδ᾽ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος
nor ruling to-be nor as about such it being
διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης
they-think but being-present often in-a-man knowledge
οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ
not the knowledge him to-rule but other something at-one-time

μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε
indeed spirit at-another and pleasure at-another and pain sometimes
δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ
and love often and fear simply thinking about
τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ
the knowledge as about a-slave dragged-about by
τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι
the others all so then also to-you such something
περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ
about it seems or fine both to-be the knowledge and
οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις
such-as to-rule the man and if-indeed knows someone
τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς
the-good-things and the bad-things not — to-be-mastered by anything
ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ,
so-as other some-things to-do than whatever knowledge bids
ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;
but sufficient to-be the prudence to-help the man
d καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
and it-seems he-said as you say O Socrates and
ἅμα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ
at-the-same-time if-indeed for-any other shameful it-is also for-me
σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι
wisdom and knowledge not — of-all mightiest to-say
εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.
to-be of-the human things
e καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα
finely at-least I-said I you speaking and true-things you-know
οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ
then that the many of-the men me both and you not
πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα
believe but many they-say knowing the best-things

οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα
not to-be-willing to-do it-being-possible for-them but other-things
πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτε αἴτιόν
to-do and as-many-as indeed I asked what ever the-cause
ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ
is of-this by pleasure they-say being-overcome or pain or
ὧν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους
which just-now I was-speaking-of by some of-these being-mastered
ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας.
these-things to-do the doing
πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ
many-things for I-think he-said O Socrates also other not
ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
rightly say the men

XXVII · OVERCOME BY PLEASURE

Together they question the many, who say they are often overcome by pleasure and do what they know is bad. Socrates shows that they call food, drink, and sex bad not for the pleasure but for the pain and disease that come after, and they call exercise, campaigns, and surgery good though painful, because of the health and wealth that follow. Pleasure and pain remain their only standards.

ἴθι δὴ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ 353
come indeed with me try to-persuade the men and
διδάσκειν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ
to-teach what is for-them this — experience which they-call by
τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ
the pleasures to-be-overcome and not to-do because-of these-things the
βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων
best-things since to-know at-least them perhaps for — saying

ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε,
us that not rightly you-speak O men but you-lie
ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ
would-ask — us O Protagoras both and Socrates if
μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί
not is this — experience by-pleasure to-be-overcome but what
ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν."
ever is-it and what you it say to-be tell-the-two us
τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν
what and O Socrates must we to-examine the of-the
πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο
many opinion of-men who whatever — happens(-to-them) this
λέγουσιν;
say

b οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν
I-think said and I to-be something for-us this toward the to-find-out
περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τἆλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς
about courage toward the-other parts the of-the virtue how
ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν
ever it-stands if then to-you it-seems-good to-abide-by what just-now seemed-good
ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι ᾗ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν
to-us me to-lead where I-think — I-at-least most-finely evident
γενέσθαι, ἕπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐῶ χαίρειν.
to-become follow if but not you-wish if to-you dear I-let(-it) fare-well
ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω.
but he-said rightly you-speak and finish as you-began

c πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· "τί οὖν
again then I-said I if they-should-ask us what then
φατε τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν
do-you-say this to-be which we weaker to-be than-the pleasures
ἐλέγομεν;" εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὧδί· Ἀκούετε
were-saying I-would-say — I-at-least to them thus listen

δή· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας
indeed we-will-try for to-you I both and Protagoras
φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο
to-explain other something for O men do-you-say to-you this
γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν
to-happen in these-things as often by foods and drinks
καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες
and sexual-pleasures being-mastered pleasant being knowing
ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν; — φαῖεν
that bad they-are nevertheless them to-do they-would-say(-so)
ἄν. — οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν·
— therefore would-ask — them I both and you again
Πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν
bad but them in-what-way do-you-say to-be whether because the
ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν
pleasure this in the immediate provides and pleasant is
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε
each of-them or because into the later time diseases both
ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει;
makes and poverties and other such many-things prepares
ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει,
or even if anything of-these into the later nothing prepares
χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι
to-rejoice but only makes nevertheless but — bad would-they-be because
μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν; ἆρ' οἰόμεθ' ἂν
having-learned to-rejoice it-makes and in-whatever-way then do-we-think —
αὐτούς, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἢ ὅτι
them O Protagoras other something to-answer than that
οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν
not according-to the of-itself of-the pleasure the immediate working
κακά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον γιγνόμενα, νόσους
bad-things they-are but through the later coming-about diseases

τε καὶ τἆλλα. — ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
both and the-rest I indeed think said — Protagoras
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. — οὐκοῦν νόσους
the many — these-things to-answer therefore diseases
ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ;
making distresses it-makes and poverties making distresses it-makes
Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. — συνέφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. —
they-would-agree — as I-think assented — Protagoras
354 οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε
therefore it-appears O men to-you as we-say I both
καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα
and Protagoras through nothing other these-things bad being
ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν
than because into distresses both it-ends and of-other pleasures
ἀποστερεῖ; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν; — συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν. —
deprives they-would-agree — it-seemed-so to-us both
οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· ὦ
therefore again — them the opposite if we-should-ask O
ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐ
men the saying in-turn good-things distressing to-be then not
τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας
— such-things you-mean as the both exercises and the campaigns
καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε
and the by the doctors treatments the through burnings both
καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας,
and cuttings and drugs and starvations coming-about
ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν
that these-things good indeed are distressing but they-would-say(-so)
ἄν; — συνεδόκει. — πότερον οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ
— it-seemed-so whether then according-to this good them
καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει
you-call that in the immediate pains the extreme it-provides

καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε
and agonies or that into the later time healths both
ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ
from them come-about and good-conditions of-the bodies and
τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι;
of-the cities preservations and over-others rules and riches
φαίεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. — συνεδόκει. — ταῦτα δὲ c
they-would-say(-so) — as I-think it-seemed-so these-things and
ἀγαθά ἐστι δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ
good are through other something than that into pleasures they-end
καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο
and of-pains riddances both and avertings or have-you some other
τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ᾽
end to-name to which looking them good you-call but
ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαίεν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. —
than pleasures both and pains not — they-would-say as I-think
οὐδ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. — οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν
nor to-me it-seems said — Protagoras therefore the indeed
ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς
pleasure you-pursue as good being the but pain you-flee as
κακόν; — συνεδόκει. — τοῦτ᾽ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ᾽ εἶναι κακόν, τὴν
bad it-seemed-so this then you-think to-be bad the
λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν
pain and good the pleasure since even itself the to-rejoice
τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῇ
then you-say bad to-be when of-greater pleasures it-deprives
ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν
than as-many-as itself has or pains greater prepares than-the
ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ
in it pleasures since if according-to other something itself the

χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες,
to-rejoice bad you-call and to other some end looking
ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.
you-would-be-able — also to-us to-say but not you-will-be-able
e — οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. — ἄλλο
nor to-me they-seem said — Protagoras other
τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς
something then again also about itself the to-be-pained the same
τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ
manner then you-call itself the to-be-pained good when either
μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους
greater pains than-the in it being it-rids or greater
ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο
pleasures than-the pains prepares since if toward other
τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι
some end you-look when you-call itself the to-be-pained
ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ'
good or toward what I say you-have to-us to-say but
οὐχ ἕξετε. — ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
not you-will-be-able true-things he-said you-say — Protagoras
πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι,
again then I-said I if me you-should-ask O men
"τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἕνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ
for-what then ever sake much about this do-you-speak and
πολλαχῇ;" Συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον
in-many-ways forgive me I-would-say — I-at-least first
μὲν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδεῖξαι τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο ὃ
indeed for not easy to-show what is ever this which
ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἧττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ
you call than-the pleasures weaker to-be then in this
εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις.
are all the proofs

If the good is the pleasant, it becomes laughable to say that a man does bad things knowingly because he is overcome by good things. Being overcome can only mean taking greater evils in place of lesser goods. Like a man skilled at weighing, one must set pleasures against pains, near ones against far ones, and choose the greater sum.

ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε 355
but still even now to-retract it-is-possible if somehow you-are-able
ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ
other something to-say to-be the good than the pleasure or the
κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως
bad other something than the distress or suffices for-you the pleasantly
καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ
to-live-through the life without pains if but it-suffices and not
ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὃ μὴ
you-are-able anything other to-say to-be good or bad which not
εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν
into these-things ends the after this listen I-say for to-you
τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν
this so being laughable the argument to-become when
λέγητε ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι
you-say that often knowing the bad-things a-man that
κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν,
bad they-are nevertheless does them it-being-possible not to-do
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις
by the pleasures being-led and being-stunned and again
αὖ λέγετε ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τἀγαθὰ
in-turn you-say that knowing the man the-good-things
πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ
to-do not is-willing because-of the immediate pleasures by

τούτων ἡττώμενος. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον
these being-overcome that but these-things laughable are clear
ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ
will-be if not many names we-use at-once pleasant both and
ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα,
distressing and good and bad but since two appeared these-things
δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν
with-two also names let-us-address them first indeed
ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ.
with-good and bad then again with-pleasant both and distressing
d θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι Γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος
having-posited indeed so let-us-say that Knowing the man
τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν
the bad-things that bad they-are nevertheless them does if then
τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, "διὰ τί;" Ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· "ὑπὸ
someone us asks because-of what Being-overcome we-shall-say by
τοῦ;" ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς
what he will-ask us to-us but by indeed pleasure
οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν — ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν
no-longer it-is-possible to-say other for name has-taken-on
ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν — ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα
instead-of the pleasure the good to-him indeed let-us-answer
καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἡττώμενος — "ὑπὸ τίνος;" φήσει. τοῦ
and let-us-say that Being-overcome by what he-will-say by-the
ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρόμενος
good we-shall-say by Zeus if then it-happens the asking
ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὤν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· "ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε
us insolent being he-will-laugh and will-say truly laughable you-speak
πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά
a-matter if does someone bad-things knowing that bad
ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν
they-are not being-needful him to-do being-overcome by the

ἀγαθῶν. ἆρα," φήσει, "οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν
good-things then he-will-say not worthy being to-conquer in
ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων;" φήσομεν δῆλον
you the good-things the bad-things or worthy we-shall-say clear
ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
that answering that not worthy being not for —
ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. "κατὰ
he-would-be-erring whom we-say weaker to-be than-the pleasures according-to
τί δέ," φήσει ἴσως, "ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν
what and he-will-say perhaps unworthy are the-good-things of-the bad-things
ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν
or the bad-things of-the good-things or according-to other something than when
τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ᾖ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω
the indeed greater the but smaller are or more the but fewer
ᾖ;" οὐχ ἕξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. "δῆλον ἄρα," 356
are not we-shall-be-able to-say other than this clear then
φήσει, "ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων
he-will-say that the to-be-overcome this you-mean instead-of lesser
ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν." ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω.
goods greater evils to-take these-things indeed then so
μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ
let-us-exchange indeed the names again the pleasant both and
ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος
distressing for the same these and let-us-say that A-man
πράττει — τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν
does then indeed we-were-saying the bad-things now but let-us-say
τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος
the distressing-things knowing that distressing they-are being-overcome
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ
by the pleasant-things clear that unworthy being to-conquer and
τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῇ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ
what other unworthiness for-pleasure toward pain is but than

ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε
excess of-each-other and deficiency these-things and are greater both
καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω
and smaller becoming than-each-other and more and fewer
καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι "ἀλλὰ πολὺ
and more and less if for someone should-say that but much
διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν
differs O Socrates the immediate pleasant from-the into the
ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ," μῶν ἄλλῳ τῳ,
later time both pleasant and painful surely-not in-other anything
φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ
I-would-say — I-at-least than in-pleasure and pain not for it-is in-what
ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς
other but like a-good to-weigh man having-put-together
τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ
the pleasant-things and having-put-together the painful-things and the near and
τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.
the far having-set in the balance say which more are
c ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἱστῇς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ
if indeed for pleasant-things against pleasant-things you-weigh the greater always
καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω
and more to-be-taken if but painful-things against painful-things the fewer
καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ
and smaller if but pleasant-things against painful-things if indeed the
ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάντε τὰ ἐγγὺς
distressing-things are-exceeded by the pleasant-things whether the near
ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάντε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην
by the far or the far by the near this
τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ᾗ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῇ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ
— action to-be-done in which — these-things are-present if but the
ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα. μή πῃ
pleasant-things by the distressing-things not to-be-done surely-not in-some-way

ἄλλῃ ἔχει, φαίην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι; οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ
otherwise it-is I-would-say — these-things O men I-know that not
ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. — συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ.
— they-would-be-able otherwise to-say it-seemed-so also to-him

XXIX · MEASUREMENT AS SALVATION

Sizes, thicknesses, and sounds appear greater when near and smaller when far. If our good depended on choosing great lengths, our salvation would be the art of measurement, not appearance, which leads us astray. So with pleasures and pains: the right choice is knowledge, and being overcome by pleasure is the greatest ignorance, which the sophists cure, though the many will not pay them.

ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. d
since indeed this so stands this to-me answer I-shall-say
φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω,
appear to-you to-the sight the same magnitudes from-near indeed greater
πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὔ; — φήσουσιν. — καὶ τὰ παχέα
from-afar but smaller or not they-will-say(-so) and the thick-things
καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν
and the many-things in-the-same-way and the voices the equal from-near
μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; — φαῖεν
indeed greater from-afar but smaller they-would-say(-so)
ἄν. — εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ
— if then in this for-us was the well to-fare in the
τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ
the indeed great lengths both to-do and to-take the but
σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία
small both to-avoid and not to-do what — to-us salvation
ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ
would-have-appeared of-the life then the measuring art or the of-the

φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει
appearing power or this indeed us led-astray and made
ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ
up both and down often to-take-in-turn the-same-things and
μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν
to-repent both in the actions and in the choices of-the
μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν
great both and small the but measuring(-art) ineffective indeed —
ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς
would-have-made this — appearance having-revealed but the truth
ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ
quiet — would-have-made to-have the soul abiding by the
ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἆρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν
truth and would-have-saved — the life then — would-agree
οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῴζειν
the men toward these-things us the measuring to-save
ἂν τέχνην ἢ ἄλλην; — τὴν μετρητικήν, ὡμολόγει. —
— art or another the measuring he-agreed
357 τί δ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν
what and if in the of-the odd and even choice for-us
ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει
was the salvation of-the life whenever the more rightly one-had
ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ
to-choose and whenever the less either itself toward itself or the
ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πόρρω εἴη;
one toward the other whether near or far it-should-be
τί ἂν ἔσῳζεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἆρ' ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ
what — would-save for-us the life then — not knowledge and
ἆρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητική τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ
then — not measuring(-knowledge) some since-indeed of-excess both and
ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου,
deficiency is the art since and of-odd both and even

ἆρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική; Ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν
then other some(-art) than arithmetic they-would-agree — with-us
οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὔ; — ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ
the men or not they-seemed — also — to-Protagoras
ὁμολογεῖν. — εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς
to-agree very-well O men since and indeed of-pleasure
τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία
both and of-pain in right the choice appeared to-us the salvation
τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ
of-the life being of-the both more and less and
μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω,
greater and smaller and farther and nearer
ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε
then first indeed not measuring does-it-appear of-excess both
καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις;
and deficiency being and of-equality toward one-another an-inquiry
— ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη. — ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκῃ δήπου τέχνη c
but (of)-necessity since and measuring necessarily surely art
καὶ ἐπιστήμη. — συμφήσουσιν. — ἥτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη
and knowledge they-will-agree which indeed then art
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰς αὖθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ
and knowledge is this for another-time we-shall-examine that but
ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἣν
knowledge it-is so-much suffices for the proof which
ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς.
me must also Protagoras to-show about what you-asked us
ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν
you-asked and if you-remember when we with-one-another were-agreeing
ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν,
than-knowledge nothing to-be stronger but this always to-master
ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων· ὑμεῖς
wherever — it-is-present both pleasure and the others all you

δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος
and indeed said the pleasure often to-master even the knowing
ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο
man since and with-you not we-agreed after this
ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· "ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι
you-asked us O Protagoras both and Socrates if not is
τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ
this — experience by-pleasure to-be-overcome but what ever is-it and
τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε ἡμῖν." εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε
what you it say to-be tell us if indeed then then
εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελᾶτε ἂν ἡμῶν·
straightway to-you we-had-said that ignorance you-would-have-laughed-at — us
νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε.
now but if us you-laugh-at also you yourselves you-will-laugh-at
e καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ
and for you have-agreed of-knowledge through-lack
ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν
to-err about the of-the pleasures choice and pains
τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας — ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε
the erring these-things and are good both
καὶ κακά — καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧς
and bad and not only of-knowledge but also of-which
τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἡ δὲ
the before still you-agreed that of-measuring the and
ἐξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που
being-done-amiss action without knowledge you-know I-suppose
καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ
also yourselves that by-ignorance is-done so-that this is the
ἡδονῆς ἧττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη, ἧς Πρωταγόρας
than-pleasure weaker to-be ignorance the greatest of-which Protagoras
ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἱππίας· ὑμεῖς
here says doctor to-be and Prodicus and Hippias you

δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι
but because-of the to-think other something than ignorance to-be
οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς
neither yourselves nor — your children to the
τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς
of-these teachers these — sophists send as
οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ
not teachable being but caring-for the silver and not
διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
giving to-these badly you-fare both privately and publicly

XXX · NO ONE GOES WILLINGLY TO EVIL

Hippias, Prodicus, and Protagoras all agree that pleasant is good. No one who knows or thinks that something else is better does what is worse when the better is in his power, and no one goes willingly toward what he thinks bad. Fear is the expectation of an evil. So no one will willingly go toward what he fears, and Socrates turns this against Protagoras' account of courage.

ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν· ὑμᾶς 358
these-things indeed to-the many having-answered — we-would-be you
δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἱππία τε καὶ
but indeed with Protagoras I-ask O Hippias both and
Πρόδικε (κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος) πότερον
Prodicus common for indeed let-be for-you the argument whether
δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. — ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει
do-I-seem to-you true-things to-say or to-lie extraordinarily it-seemed
ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. — ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ'
to-all true to-be the things-said you-agree then said and
ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν
I the indeed pleasant good to-be the but distressing bad the

δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι·
but of-Prodicus here distinction of-the names I-beg-off
εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε
whether for pleasant or delightful you-call(-it) or enjoyable or
ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων,
from-whatever-source and however you-enjoy — such-things naming
ὦ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι
O best Prodicus this to-me toward what I-wish
ἀπόκριναι. — γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ
answer having-laughed then — Prodicus agreed and
οἱ ἄλλοι. — τί δὲ δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ
the others what and indeed O men I-said I — such-as-this the
ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως,
for this actions all for the painlessly to-live and pleasantly
ἆρ᾽ οὐ καλαί; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;
then not fine and the fine work good both and beneficial
c — συνεδόκει. — εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν
it-seemed-so if then I-said I the pleasant good
ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω
is no-one neither knowing nor thinking other-things better
εἶναι ἢ ἃ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα,
to-be than what he-does and possible then does these-things
ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω· οὐδὲ τὸ ἧττω εἶναι αὑτοῦ ἄλλο
it-being-possible the better nor the weaker to-be than-himself other
τι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ
something this is than ignorance nor stronger than-himself
ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. — συνεδόκει πᾶσιν. — τί δὲ
other something than wisdom it-seemed-so to-all what and
δή; ἀμαθίαν ἆρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν
indeed ignorance then — such-as-this do-you-call the false to-have
δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ
opinion and to-be-deceived about the matters the of-much

ἀξίων; — καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. — ἄλλο τι οὖν,
worth and this to-all it-seemed-so other something then
ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ
I-said I toward at-least the bad-things no-one willing goes nor
ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν
toward what he-thinks bad to-be nor is this as it-seems in
ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι
of-man nature toward what he-thinks bad to-be to-wish to-go
ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν
instead-of the good-things when and he-is-compelled of-two evils
τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται ἐξὸν
the one to-choose no-one the greater will-choose it-being-possible
τὸ ἔλαττον; — ἅπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν.
the lesser all these-things it-seemed-so to-all us
— τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ 359
what then I-said I do-you-call something dread and fear and
ἆρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε). προσδοκίαν
then what-very I to you say O Prodicus expectation
τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. —
some I-say of-evil this whether fear or dread you-call
ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρᾳ μὲν καὶ Ἱππίᾳ δέος τε καὶ φόβος
it-seemed to-Protagoras indeed and to-Hippias dread both and fear
εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ. — ἀλλ' οὐδέν,
to-be this to-Prodicus but dread fear but not but nothing
ἔφην ἐγώ, Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ
I-said I Prodicus differs but this if true the-things
ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἆρά τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα
before are then someone of-men will-wish toward these-things
ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ
to-go which he-dreads it-being-possible toward what not or impossible from
τῶν ὡμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι
the things-agreed what for he-dreads it-has-been-agreed to-think

κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ
bad to-be what and he-thinks bad no-one either to-go toward
ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα. — ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.
these-things or to-take willing it-seemed also these-things to-all
b οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Πρόδικέ τε καὶ
so indeed these being-laid-down said and I Prodicus both and
Ἱππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον
Hippias let-defend-himself to-us Protagoras here what the first
ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει — μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι·
he-answered how rightly they-stand not what the first altogether
τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν
then indeed for indeed five being parts of-the virtue none
ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον
he-said to-be the one such-as the other peculiar but its-own each
ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον
to-have power but not these-things I-mean but what the later
εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς
he-said the for later he-said the indeed four reasonably
παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν
similar to-one-another to-be the but one very much to-differ
τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ
from-the others the courage to-know and me he-said by-proof
τῷδε· εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους
this you-will-find for O Socrates men most-unholy
μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ
indeed being and most-unjust and most-intemperate and
ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ᾧ γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ
most-ignorant most-courageous but by-which you-will-know that much
διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ
differs the courage from-the other parts of-the virtue and

ἐγὼ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι
I straightway then very wondered-at the answer and still
μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον.
more since these-things with you I-went-through

XXXI · COURAGE IS WISDOM

Cowards and the brave alike go toward what they are confident about. The brave go willingly to war because it is fine and good, and so pleasant; the cowards refuse through ignorance of what is truly to be feared. So cowardice is ignorance of what is and is not dreadful, and courage, its opposite, is wisdom about these things. Protagoras falls silent, and at last concedes that the most ignorant cannot be the most courageous.

ἠρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· c
I-asked and anyhow him if the courageous he-called bold
ὁ δέ, καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ
and he and rash at-least he-said do-you-remember said and I O
Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; — ὡμολόγει. — ἴθι
Protagoras these-things answering he-agreed come
δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι
indeed I-said I tell us toward what do-you-say rash to-be
τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἦ ἐφ' ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί; — οὐκ ἔφη. —
the courageous surely toward which-very the cowards no he-said
οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα. — ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. — πότερον οἱ
therefore toward other-things yes said and he whether the
μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι
indeed cowards toward the bold-things go the but courageous
ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; — λέγεται δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ
toward the dreadful-things it-is-said indeed O Socrates so by
τῶν ἀνθρώπων. — ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ
the men true-things I-said I you-say but not

τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῂς ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς
this do-I-ask but you toward what do-you-say rash to-be the
ἀνδρείους; ἆρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ
courageous then toward the dreadful-things thinking dreadful to-be or
ἐπὶ τὰ μή; — ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες
toward the not but this at-least he-said in which you were-saying
τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον. — καὶ τοῦτο,
the arguments was-shown just-now that impossible also this
ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη,
I-said I true you-say so-that if this rightly was-shown
ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ
toward indeed what dreadful he-thinks to-be no-one goes since
τὸ ἧττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.
the weaker to-be than-himself was-found ignorance being
e — ὡμολόγει. — ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ γε θαρροῦσι
he-agreed but surely toward what at-least they-are-bold-about
πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτῃ
all in-turn go both cowards and courageous and in-this-way
γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ
at-least toward the same-things go the cowards both and the
ἀνδρεῖοι. — ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε
courageous but however he-said O Socrates all at-least
τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἃ οἵ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ
the-opposite is toward what the both cowards go and the
ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι,
courageous for-instance into the war the indeed are-willing to-go
οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. — πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὂν
the but not are-willing whether I-said I fine being
ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; — καλόν, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν,
to-go or shameful fine he-said therefore if-indeed fine
καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ
also good we-agreed in the earlier(-part) the for

καλὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν. — ἀληθῆ
fine actions all good we-agreed true-things
λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. —
you-say and always to-me-at-least it-seems so
ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῂς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον 360
rightly at-least I-said I but which do-you-say into the war
οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὂν καὶ ἀγαθόν; — τοὺς δειλούς, ἦ
not to-be-willing to-go fine being and good the cowards said
δ' ὅς. — οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ
and he therefore said and I if-indeed fine and good also
ἡδύ; — ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη. — ἆρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες
pleasant it-has-been-agreed at-any-rate he-said so then knowing
οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ
the cowards not are-willing to-go toward the finer both and
ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον; — ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν,
better and pleasanter but also this if we-agree
ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. — τί δ'
he-said we-shall-destroy the earlier agreements what and
ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ
the courageous(-man) not toward the finer both and better and
ἥδιον ἔρχεται; — ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν. — οὐκοῦν
pleasanter goes (of)-necessity he-said to-agree therefore
ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν
wholly the courageous not shameful fears fear when
φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; — ἀληθῆ,
they-fear nor shameful confidences are-confident true-things
ἔφη. — εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἆρ' οὐ καλά; — ὡμολόγει. —
he-said if but not shameful then not fine he-agreed
εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά; — ναί. — οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ
if but fine also good yes therefore also the cowards

καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τοὐναντίον αἰσχρούς τε
and the rash and the mad on-the-contrary shameful both
φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν;
fears fear and shameful confidences are-confident
c — ὡμολόγει. — θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι'
he-agreed are-confident and the shameful-things and bad-things through
ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν; — οὕτως ἔχει,
other something than through unknowing and ignorance so it-is
ἔφη. — τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν
he-said what then this through which cowards are the cowards cowardice
ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; — δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. — δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ
or courage do-you-call(-it) cowardice I-at-least he-said cowards and not
διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; — πάνυ
through the of-the dreadful-things ignorance appeared being certainly
γ', ἔφη. — διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν; —
at-least he-said through this then the ignorance cowards they-are
ὡμολόγει. — δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται
he-agreed through which and cowards they-are cowardice is-agreed
παρὰ σοῦ; — συνέφη. — οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ
by you he-assented therefore the of-the dreadful-things and not
δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη; — ἐπένευσε. — ἀλλὰ μήν,
dreadful-things ignorance cowardice — would-be he-nodded but surely
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ. — ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν ἡ
said and I opposite courage to-cowardice he-said(-so) therefore the
τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων
of-the dreadful-things and not dreadful-things wisdom opposite to-the of-these
ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν; — καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. — ἡ δὲ
ignorance is and here still he-nodded the but
τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; — πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν.
of-these ignorance cowardice very with-difficulty here he-nodded

— ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία e
the wisdom then of-the dreadful-things and not dreadful-things courage
ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ; — οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα
is opposite being to-the of-these ignorance no-longer here
οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε. — καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·
not-even to-nod he-was-willing was-silent and and I said
τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε
what indeed O Protagoras neither you affirm what I-ask nor
ἀπόφῃς; — αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον. — ἕν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ,
deny yourself he-said finish one at-least I-said I
μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι
only asking still you if to-you as the first still
δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι
seem to-be some men most-ignorant indeed most-courageous
δέ. — φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ
but to-be-contentious to-me he-said you-seem O Socrates the me
εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι
to-be the answering(-one) I-will-gratify then you and I-say that
ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.
from the things-agreed impossible to-me it-seems to-be
οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα
not-at-all said and I for-other sake I-ask all these-things
ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς
than to-examine wishing how ever stand the-things about the
ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ἡ ἀρετή.
virtue and what ever is it the virtue

Socrates says the argument would laugh at them both. He began by denying that virtue can be taught and now argues that it is knowledge, while Protagoras, who said it could be taught, makes it something other than knowledge. He would like to begin again with what virtue is, taking forethought like Prometheus rather than Epimetheus. Protagoras praises his eagerness and predicts that he will be famous for wisdom, and they part.

361 οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν
I-know for that this evident having-become most —
κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
clear would-become that about which I both and you
μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ
a-long speech each stretched-out I indeed saying that not
διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ
teachable virtue you but that teachable and to-me it-seems our the
ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε
just-now outcome of-the arguments like a-man to-accuse both
καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι "ἄτοποί
and to-mock and if voice it-should-get to-say — that strange
γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν
at-least you-are O Socrates both and Protagoras you indeed
λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν
saying that not teachable is virtue in the earlier(-part) now
σεαυτῷ τἀναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πάντα
to-yourself the-opposite you-hasten trying to-show that all
χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη
things are knowledge both the justice and temperance
καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ᾧπερ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη
and the courage in-which way most — teachable would-appear
ἡ ἀρετή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ
the virtue if indeed for other something was than knowledge the

ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν
virtue as Protagoras was-trying to-say clearly not —
ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ
it-would-be teachable now but if it-shall-appear knowledge whole as you
σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν.
hasten O Socrates wonderful it-will-be not teachable being
Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν c
Protagoras and in-turn teachable then having-supposed now
τοὐναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι
the-opposite resembles one-hastening nearly everything rather to-appear
αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν."
it than knowledge and so — least it-would-be teachable
ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω
I then O Protagoras all these-things seeing-plainly up down
ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ
being-thrown-into-confusion dreadfully all eagerness have clear
αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας
them to-become and I-would-wish — these-things having-gone-through
ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ πάλιν
us to-go-on also to the virtue what it-is and again
ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν,
to-examine about it whether teachable or not teachable
μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει
lest perhaps us — Epimetheus that-one also in the inquiry
σφήλῃ ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἠμέλησεν
should-trip-up having-deceived as also in the distribution he-neglected
ἡμῶν, ὡς φῂς σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ
us as say you pleased then me also in the myth —
Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ
Prometheus more — than-Epimetheus whom using I and
προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα
taking-forethought for the life — my-own whole all

ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ'
these-things I-busy-myself-with and if you should-wish which-very also at
ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην.
beginning I-was-saying with you — most-gladly these-things I-would-examine-together
e καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ
and — Protagoras I indeed he-said O Socrates praise
σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ
your the eagerness and the going-through of-the arguments and for
οὔτε τἆλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε
neither in-the-rest I-think bad to-be a-man envious both
ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ
least of-men since also about you to many indeed
εἴρηκα ὅτι ὧν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ,
I-have-said that of-those-whom I-meet much most I-admire you
τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
of-the indeed of-such-an-age and very and I-say at-least that not —
θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.
I-would-wonder if of-the renowned you-should-become men for wisdom
καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰς αὖθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν·
and about these but for another-time whenever you-wish we-will-go-through
νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι.
now but hour already also to other something to-turn
362 ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ
but said and I so it-is-needful to-do if to-you it-seems and
γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἷπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ
for for-me whither I-said to-go long-ago hour but to-Callias the
καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.
fine gratifying I-stayed
ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.
these-things having-said and having-heard we-went-away

PLATO

ΜΕΝΩΝ

Meno

Meno asks whether virtue can be taught, or is got by practice, or comes by nature or in some other way. Socrates says the Thessalians, once famous for horses and wealth, are now famous for wisdom too, thanks to Gorgias, but at Athens there is a drought of it: he himself does not know what virtue is, and so cannot know what sort of thing it is. He has never met anyone who knew, he thinks, though he cannot recall what he thought of Gorgias.

MEN. ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ 70
can-you to-me tell O Socrates then teachable the
ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν
virtue or not teachable but got-by-practice or neither got-by-practice
οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
nor learnable but by-nature comes to-the men
ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;
or in-other some way

SOC. ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν b
O Meno before this indeed Thessalians well-reputed were among
τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ,
the Greeks and were-admired for horsemanship both and wealth
νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ
now but as to-me it-seems also for wisdom and not least the —
σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν
of-your companion Aristippus citizens Larissaeans of-this and for-you
αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς
the-cause is Gorgias having-come for into the city lovers
ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ
for wisdom he-has-taken of-the-Aleuadae both the first of-whom —
σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν.
your lover is Aristippus and of-the other Thessalians
καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε
and indeed also this — habit you he-has-accustomed fearlessly both

καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται,
and magnificently to-answer if someone something asks
ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων
as it-is-fitting the knowing inasmuch-as also himself offering
αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν
himself to-question of-the Greeks to-the wishing whatever —
τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.
anyone wishes and to-no-one whom not answering
71 ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν· ὥσπερ
here but O dear Meno the opposite has-come-round as
αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε
drought some of-the wisdom has-come-about and is-likely from these
τῶν τόπων παρ' ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν
— places to you to-be-gone the wisdom if at-any-rate
τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις
someone you-wish so to-ask of-the here(-men) no-one who
οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· "ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν
not will-laugh and will-say O stranger I-am-likely to-you to-seem
μακάριός τις εἶναι — ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν
blessed some(-one) to-be virtue at-any-rate whether teachable
εἴθ' ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι — ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον
or in-what way it-comes to-know I but so-much
δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὥστ' οὐδὲ
lack whether teachable or not teachable to-know that not-even
αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς."
itself what ever is — altogether virtue I-happen knowing
b ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι
I then also myself O Meno so am I-share-the-poverty
τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν
with-the citizens of-this — matter and myself
καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν·
I-blame as not knowing about virtue — altogether

ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποιόν γέ τι
what and not I-know what it-is how — of-what-sort at-least it
εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα
would-I-know or does-it-seem to-you possible — to-be whoever Meno
μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι
not knows — altogether who he-is this(-one) to-know
εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε
whether handsome or rich or also noble he-is or
καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι;
also the-opposite of-these does-it-seem to-you possible — to-be
MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς οὐδ' c
not to-me-at-least but you O Socrates truly not-even
ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ
what virtue is do-you-know but these-things about you also
οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;
home are-we-to-report
SOC. μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλῳ
not only at-least O comrade but also that not-even another
πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.
yet I-met knowing as to-me I-seem
MEN. τί δέ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν;
what and Gorgias not did-you-meet when here he-was
SOC. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least
MEN. εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;
then not did-he-seem to-you to-know
SOC. οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν d
not very I-am of-good-memory O Meno so-that not I-can say in
τῷ παρόντι πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε,
the present how to-me then he-seemed but perhaps that-one both knows

καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε· ἀνάμνησον οὖν με πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ
and you what that-one was-saying remind then me how he-was-saying if
δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.
but you-wish yourself say it-seems for surely to-you which-very to-that-one
MEN. ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least

II · A SWARM OF VIRTUES

Meno says it is easy: a man's virtue is to manage the city's affairs, help friends, and harm enemies; a woman's to manage the house and obey her husband; and there are others for a child, an old man, the free, and the slave. Socrates has sought one virtue and found a swarm. Bees do not differ as bees, and health is the same in a man and a woman; so the virtue of all must be the same, since all are good by justice and temperance.

SOC. ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν· σὺ
that-one indeed then let-us-let-be since also he-is-away you
δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν
but yourself O by gods Meno what do-you-say virtue
εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα
to-be say and not begrudge(-it) so-that most-fortunate a-lie
ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας,
having-lied I-may-be if you-appear you indeed knowing and Gorgias
ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.
I but having-said to-no-one ever knowing to-have-met
72 MEN. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον
but not hard O Socrates to-say first
μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν
indeed if you-wish a-man's virtue easy that this is
ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ
of-a-man virtue sufficient to-be the of-the city to-do and

πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς
doing the indeed friends well to-treat the but enemies
κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν.
badly and himself to-take-care nothing such to-suffer
εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι
if but you-wish a-woman's virtue not hard to-go-through that
δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ
it-is-needful her the household well to-manage preserving both the-things
ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν
within and obedient being to-the husband and another is
παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου
of-a-child virtue both female and male and of-an-older
ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου.
man if indeed you-wish free if but you-wish slave
καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν
and other very-many virtues there-are so-that not perplexity to-say
ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων
virtue about what it-is according-to each for of-the actions
καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ
and of-the ages toward each work to-each of-us the
ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.
virtue is in-the-same-way but I-think O Socrates also the vice
soc. πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ b
great at-least some good-luck I-seem to-have-enjoyed O Meno if
μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ
one seeking virtue a-swarm some I-have-found of-virtues with you
κείμενον. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν
lying but O Meno according-to this — image the
περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ'
about the swarms if me asking of-a-bee about being what ever
ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί
it-is many and of-all-kinds you-were-saying them to-be what

ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· "ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς
— *would-you-have-answered me if you I-had-asked then in-this do-you-say*
πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων,
many and of-all-kinds to-be and differing from-one-another
τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ
in-the bees to-be or in-this indeed nothing they-differ in-other
δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν
but some(-respect) such-as either in-beauty or in-size or in-other some(-respect) —
τοιούτων;" εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;
of-such say what — would-you-have-answered so having-been-asked
MEN. τοῦτ' ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται
this I-at-least that nothing they-differ in-so-far-as bees
εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.
they-are the one from-the other
c SOC. εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· "τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ
if then I-had-said after these-things this then to-me itself
εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων· ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν
tell O Meno in-which nothing they-differ but the-same
εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι;" εἶχες δήπου
are all what this do-you-say to-be you-would-be-able surely
ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;
— *something to-me to-say*
MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least
d SOC. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ
so indeed also about the virtues even if many and
παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν
of-all-kinds they-are one at-least some form the-same all have
δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει
through which they-are virtues to which finely I-suppose it-is-fitting
ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο
having-looked the answering to-the having-asked that

δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις
to-make-clear which happens being virtue or not do-you-understand
ὅτι λέγω;
what I-say

MEN. δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί
I-seem at-least to-myself to-understand not however as I-wish
γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.
at-least yet I-grasp the being-asked

SOC. πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ e
whether and about virtue only to-you so does-it-seem O
Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν
Meno other indeed of-a-man to-be other but of-a-woman and of-the
ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος
others or also about health and about size and about strength
ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια,
in-the-same-way other indeed of-a-man does-it-seem to-you to-be health
ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ
other but of-a-woman or the-same everywhere form it-is if-indeed
ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ;
health it-be whether in a-man or in other anything-whatever it-be

MEN. ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ
the same to-me seems health at-least to-be both of-a-man and
γυναικός.
of-a-woman

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ
therefore also size and strength if-indeed strong a-woman
ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται;
be by-the same form and by-the same strength strong will-she-be
τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ
the for by-the same this I-mean in-nothing differs toward the

ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί.
strength to-be the strength whether in a-man it-be or in a-woman
ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;
or does-it-seem in-some-way to-you to-differ

MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
not to-me-at-least

73 SOC. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι,
the and virtue toward the virtue to-be will-differ in-some-way
ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ
whether in a-child it-be or in an-old-man or in a-woman
ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί;
or in a-man

MEN. ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι
to-me-at-least somehow it-seems O Socrates this no-longer
ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
like to-be to-the others these

SOC. τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ
what and not of-a-man indeed virtue were-you-saying a-city well
διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;
to-manage of-a-woman but a-household

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ
so then possible — well to-manage either a-city or a-household or
ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;
other anything-whatever not temperately and justly managing

MEN. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

b SOC. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν,
therefore if-indeed justly and temperately they-manage
δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν;
with-justice and with-temperance they-will-manage

MEN. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity

SOC. τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν
of-the same-things then both need if-indeed they-are-to
ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ
good to-be both the woman and the man of-justice and
σωφροσύνης.
of-temperance

MEN. φαίνονται.
they-appear(-so)

SOC. τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες
what and a-child and an-old-man surely-not intemperate being
καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο;
and unjust good — ever would-become

MEN. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι; c
but temperate and just

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. πάντες ἄρ' ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν·
all then men in-the same way good are
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.
of-the same-things for having-obtained good they-become

MEN. ἔοικε.
it-seems(-so)

SOC. οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν,
not — surely if at-least not the same virtue was theirs
τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.
in-the same — way good they-would-be

MEN. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

Meno next says virtue is to be able to rule men. Socrates objects that a slave or a child should not rule, and asks whether he would add justly. Meno says justice is virtue, and Socrates asks whether it is virtue or a virtue, as roundness is a figure and not figure itself. Meno names courage, temperance, wisdom, and magnificence, and Socrates, finding many again, shows with figure and color what one name over many must cover.

SOC. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ
since then the same virtue of-all is try
εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ
to-say and to-recall what it says Gorgias to-be and
σὺ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.
you with him

d MEN. τί ἄλλο γ᾽ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
what other at-least than to-rule able — to-be the men
εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.
if-indeed one at-least something you-seek covering all

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ
but surely I-seek at-least but then also of-a-child the same
ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ
virtue O Meno and of-a-slave to-rule able — to-be the
δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;
master and does-it-seem to-you still — a-slave to-be the ruling(-one)

MEN. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not very to-me it-seems O Socrates

SOC. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει.
not for likely O best still for also this consider
ἄρχειν φὴς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ
to-rule you-say able — to-be not shall-we-add there the
δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;
justly unjustly but not

MEN. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή
I-think I-at-least the for justice O Socrates virtue
ἐστιν.
is

SOC. πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις; e
whether virtue O Meno or virtue a(-certain)

MEN. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
how this do-you-mean

SOC. ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει,
as about other anything-whatever for-instance if you-wish
στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί
roundness about I-would-say — I-at-least that a-figure some
ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ
is not so simply that a-figure through these-things and
οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.
so — I-would-say that also others there-are figures

MEN. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον
rightly at-least saying you since also I say not only
δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.
justice but also others to-be virtues

SOC. τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ 74
which these tell as also I to-you would-tell — also
ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ
other figures if me you-should-bid also you then to-me tell
ἄλλας ἀρετάς.
other virtues

MEN. ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ
the courage then to-me-at-least seems virtue to-be and
σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι
temperance and wisdom and magnificence and others
πάμπολλαι.
very-many

SOC. πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ
again O Meno the-same we-have-experienced many in-turn
ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ
we-have-found virtues one seeking in-other way than
νυνδή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ
just-now the but one which through all these is not
δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.
we-are-able to-discover

b MEN. οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς,
not for I-am-able yet O Socrates as you seek
μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.
one virtue to-grasp covering all as in the others
SOC. εἰκότως γε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τ'
reasonably at-least but I will-be-eager if able —
ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ
I-am us to-bring-forward you-understand for I-suppose that thus
ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ
it-stands about everything if someone you should-ask this which
νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, "τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων;" εἰ αὐτῷ
just-now I was-saying what is figure O Meno if to-him
εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ,
you-had-said that roundness if to-you he-had-said which-very I
"πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι;"
whether figure the roundness is or figure a(-certain)
εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.
you-would-have-said surely — that figure a(-certain)
MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

c SOC. οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν σχήματα;
therefore through these-things that also others there-are figures
MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν;
and if at-least he-asked-further you of-what-sort you-would-say —

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅτι
and in-turn if about color in-the-same-way he-asked what
ἐστίν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα
it-is and having-said you that the white after these-things
ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν· "πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ
took-up the asking whether the white color is or
χρῶμά τι;" εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι
color a(-certain) you-would-have-said — that color a(-certain) because
καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα;
also others happen being

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες d
and if at-least you he-bade to-say other colors you-would-say
ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ
— others which in-nothing less happen being colors than-the
λευκοῦ;
white

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι e
if then as I he-pursued the argument and said that
"ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ'
always into many we-arrive but not to-me so but
ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι,
since the many these by-one some you-address name
καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
and say none of-them that not figure to-be even these even

ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, ὅτι ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον
opposite being to-one-another what is this which in-nothing less
κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις
covers the round than the straight which indeed you-name
σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα
figure and in-nothing more you-say the round figure
εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ;" ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;
to-be than the straight or not so do-you-speak

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. ἆρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς
so then when so you-speak then in-nothing more do-you-say
τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ
the round to-be round than straight nor the straight
εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;
straight than round

MEN. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not surely O Socrates

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ
but surely figure at-least in-nothing more you-say to-be the
στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.
round than-the straight nor the one than-the other

MEN. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

IV · FIGURE AND COLOR

Socrates shows what he wants by defining figure: the only thing that always follows color. Meno objects that this assumes one knows color, and Socrates, to be more dialectical, defines figure as the limit of a solid. Meno asks for color too, and Socrates gives him one in Gorgias' manner, after Empedocles: an effluence of figures fitted to sight and perceived. Meno prefers it, and Socrates says the other was better.

SOC. τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ 75
what ever then this of-which this name is the
σχῆμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ
figure try to-say if then to-the asking so either about
σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι "ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω
figure or color you-had-said that but not-even understand
ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις," ἴσως
I-at-least what you-wish O man nor know what you-mean perhaps
ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· "οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ
— he-would-have-wondered and said not do-you-understand that I-seek the
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν;" ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων,
in all these the-same or not-even about these O Meno
ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη· "τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ
would-you-be-able — to-say if someone you should-ask what is in the
στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα
round and straight and in the others which indeed figures
καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;" πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί
you-call the-same in all try to-say so-that also may-come-about
σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.
for-you practice for the about the virtue answer

MEN. μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. b
no but you O Socrates tell(-me)

SOC. βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;
do-you-wish you I-should-gratify

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;
will-you-be-willing then also you to-me to-tell about the virtue

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.
one-must-be-eager then worthy(-of-it) for

MEN. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

c SOC. φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα.
come indeed let-us-try for-you to-say what is figure
σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ
consider then if this you-accept it to-be let-be for indeed
ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι
for-us this figure which alone of-the beings happens color
ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ
always following sufficiently for-you or otherwise somehow do-you-seek I
γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.
for even so would-be-content if to-me virtue you-should-tell
MEN. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.
but this at-least silly O Socrates
SOC. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean
MEN. ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ
that figure I-suppose is according-to — your account what
ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ
always color follows well if but indeed the color someone not
φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ
should-say to-know but in-the-same-way should-be-at-a-loss as about
τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;
the figure what — do-you-think for-you to-have-been-answered
d SOC. τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις
the-truth I-at-least and if indeed at-least of-the wise some(-one)
εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος,
should-be and contentious both and combative the asking
εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι "ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ
I-would-say — to-him that by-me indeed it-has-been-said if but not
ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν."
rightly I-speak your work to-take account and to-refute

εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο
if but as I both and you now friends being should-wish
ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως
with-one-another to-converse one-must indeed more-gently somehow
καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ
and more-dialectically to-answer it-is and perhaps the
διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
more-dialectical not only the-truth to-answer but also
δι᾽ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος.
through those which — admits to-know the being-asked
πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ
I-will-try indeed also I to-you so to-speak tell for
μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ
me end do-you-call something of-this-sort I-mean such-as limit and
ἔσχατον — πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δ᾽
extremity all these the-same something I-mean perhaps but
ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς
— with-us Prodicus would-differ but you at-least I-suppose call
πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι — τὸ τοιοῦτον
to-have-been-limited something and to-have-ended — such-thing
βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.
I-wish to-say nothing elaborate

MEN. ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις.
but I-call(-it-so) and I-think to-understand what you-say

SOC. τί δ᾽; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ 76
what and plane do-you-call something and other in-turn
στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;
solid such-as these the-ones in the geometries

MEN. ἔγωγε καλῶ.
I-at-least call(-it-so)

SOC. ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα
already then — you-may-learn from-me from these figure
ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς
what I-mean covering for every figure this I-say into
ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν
which the solid ends this to-be figure which-very —
συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.
putting-together I-would-say of-solid limit figure to-be
MEN. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
the and color what do-you-say O Socrates
b SOC. ὑβριστής γ' εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ
insolent at-least you-are O Meno to-a-man elderly
πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις
troubles you-impose to-answer yourself but not are-willing
ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.
having-recalled to-say what ever says Gorgias virtue to-be
MEN. ἀλλ' ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ' εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ
but when to-me you this tell O Socrates I-will-tell
σοι.
you
SOC. κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων,
even veiled someone would-know O Meno
διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι
conversing you that handsome you-are and lovers to-you still
εἰσίν.
are
MEN. τί δή;
what indeed
c SOC. ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ
that nothing but than you-command in the discussions which-very
ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν
do the spoiled-ones inasmuch-as playing-tyrant as-long-as — in

ὥρᾳ ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ
bloom they-are and at-the-same-time me perhaps you-have-detected that I-am
ἥττων τῶν καλῶν· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
weaker than-the beautiful I-will-gratify then you and will-answer

MEN. πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.
certainly indeed then gratify(-me)

SOC. βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ
do-you-wish then you according-to Gorgias I-should-answer where
ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;
— you most would-follow

MEN. βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
I-wish how for not

SOC. οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ
therefore do-you-say effluences some of-the beings according-to
Ἐμπεδοκλέα;
Empedocles

MEN. σφόδρα γε.
strongly at-least

SOC. καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ
and passages into which and through which the effluences
πορεύονται;
travel

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν d
and of-the effluences the indeed to-fit some of-the
πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;
passages the but smaller or larger to-be

MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;
therefore also sight do-you-call something

MEN. ἔγωγε.

I-at-least

SOC. ἐκ τούτων δὴ "σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω," ἔφη Πίνδαρος.

from these indeed understand what to-you I-say said Pindar

ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ

is for color effluence of-figures to-sight commensurate and

αἰσθητός.

perceptible

MEN. ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν

best to-me you-seem O Socrates this — answer

εἰρηκέναι.

to-have-spoken

e SOC. ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται· καὶ

perhaps for to-you according-to custom it-has-been-said and

ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ

at-the-same-time I-think you-notice that you-could — from it to-say also

φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

voice what it-is and smell and other many-things — of-such

MEN. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

certainly indeed then

SOC. τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε

tragic for is O Meno the answer so-that

ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

it-pleases you more than the about the figure

MEN. ἔμοιγε.

to-me-at-least

SOC. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν

but not it-is O son of-Alexidemus as I myself

πείθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη βελτίων· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ' ἂν σοὶ δόξαι,

persuade but that-one better I-think but not-even — to-you it-would-seem

εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ
if not as yesterday you-were-saying necessary for-you to-go-away before
τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.
the mysteries but if you-should-wait both and should-be-initiated

V · DESIRING GOOD THINGS

Meno, quoting a poet, says virtue is to delight in fine things and have the power to get them. Socrates argues that no one desires bad things knowing them to be bad and harmful, for no one wishes to be wretched; so all wish for good things, and the difference must lie in the power to procure them. Gold and silver procured unjustly would be vice, so justice must be added, and that is a part of virtue.

MEN. ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ᾽ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ 77
but I-would-wait — O Socrates if to-me many
τοιαῦτα λέγοις.
such-things you-should-say
SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ b
but surely of-eagerness at-least nothing I-will-leave-out both you
ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ
for-sake-of and myself saying such-things but (I-fear) lest not
οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ
able — I-shall-be many such-things to-say but come indeed try
καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν
also you to-me the promise to-pay-back covering whole having-said
ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ
virtue about what it-is and stop many making from the
ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντά τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ
one which-very they-say the breaking something each-time the

σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν
joking(-ones) but having-let(-it-be) whole and sound tell what is
ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.
virtue the and at-least examples from me you-have-taken

MEN. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ
seems then to-me O Socrates virtue to-be just-as
ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, "χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι·"
the poet says to-rejoice both in-fine-things and to-be-able
καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν
and I this call virtue desiring the fine-things
δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.
able to-be to-procure

SOC. ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν
then do-you-mean the the fine-things desiring of-good-things
ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;
a-desirer to-be

MEN. μάλιστά γε.
most at-least

c SOC. ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν,
then as being some who the bad-things desire
ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὥριστε, δοκοῦσί
others but who the good-things not all O-best seem
σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;
to-you the good-things to-desire

MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
not to-me-at-least

SOC. ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;
but some the bad-things

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ
thinking the bad-things good to-be do-you-mean or even
γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;
knowing that bad they-are nevertheless they-desire them
MEN. ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
both to-me-at-least they-seem
SOC. ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ
truly for seems someone to-you O Meno knowing the
κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;
bad-things that bad they-are nevertheless to-desire them
MEN. μάλιστα.
most(-certainly)
SOC. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;
what to-desire do-you-mean surely to-come-about for-him
MEN. γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; d
to-come-about what for other
SOC. πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ
whether thinking the bad-things to-benefit that-one to-whom
ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ
— *they-come-about or knowing the bad-things that they-harm whom*
ἂν παρῇ;
— *they-are-present-to*
MEN. εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν
there-are indeed some-who thinking the bad-things to-benefit there-are
δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.
and also some-who knowing that they-harm
SOC. ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά
truly also do-they-seem to-you to-know the bad-things that bad
ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν;
they-are the thinking the bad-things to-benefit
MEN. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.
not very to-me it-seems this at-least

e SOC. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν,
therefore clear that these indeed not the bad-things desire
οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ
the not-knowing them but those which they-thought good
εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες
to-be are but these at-least bad so-that the not-knowing
αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
them and thinking good to-be clear that the good-things
ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ;
they-desire or not
MEN. κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.
are-likely(-to) these at-least
SOC. τί δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς
what and the the bad-things indeed desiring as say
σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν
you thinking but the bad-things to-harm that-one to-whom —
γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν;
they-come-about do-they-know surely that they-will-be-harmed by them
78 MEN. ἀνάγκη.
(of)-necessity
SOC. ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους
but the being-harmed these not do-they-think wretched
εἶναι καθ᾽ ὅσον βλάπτονται;
to-be according-to as-much-as they-are-harmed
MEN. καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.
also this (of)-necessity
SOC. τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;
the and wretched not unhappy
MEN. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
I-think I-at-least

SOC. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων
is-there then anyone-who wishes wretched and unhappy
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not to-me it-seems O Socrates

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ
not then wishes O Meno the bad-things anyone if-indeed
μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον
not be-wishes such to-be what for other is wretched
εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;
to-be than to-desire both the bad-things and to-acquire(-them)

MEN. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς b
you-are-likely true-things to-say O Socrates and no-one
βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.
to-wish the bad-things

SOC. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί
therefore just-now you-were-saying that is the virtue to-wish
τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι;
both the-good-things and to-be-able

MEN. ἔφην γάρ.
I-said(-so) for

SOC. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν
therefore of-the thing-said the indeed to-wish to-all
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου
belongs and in-this-way at-least in-nothing the one than-the other
βελτίων;
better

MEN. φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)

SOC. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου,
but clear that if-indeed is better one than-another
κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.
according-to the to-be-able — he-would-be superior

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

c SOC. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον
this is then as it-seems according-to — your account
ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.
virtue power of-the to-procure the-good-things

MEN. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς
altogether to-me it-seems O Socrates so to-be as
σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
you now suppose

SOC. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ
let-us-see indeed also this if true you-say perhaps for
ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φὴς οἷόν τ' εἶναι πορίζεσθαι
— well you-may-speak the-good-things you-say able — to-be to-procure
ἀρετὴν εἶναι;
virtue to-be

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον;
good-things and do-you-call not such-as health both and wealth

MEN. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν
and gold I-mean and silver to-acquire and honors in
πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.
a-city and offices

SOC. μὴ ἄλλ' ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
surely-not other some-things you-call the-good-things than — such-things

d MEN. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.
no but all I-mean — such-things

SOC. εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή
well gold and indeed and silver to-procure virtue
ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς
is as says Meno the of-the great king hereditary
ξένος. πότερον προστιθεὶς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ
guest-friend whether do-you-add to-this — procuring O Meno the
δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως
justly and piously or nothing to-you does-it-differ but even-if unjustly
τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;
someone them procures likewise you them virtue call

MEN. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not surely O Socrates

SOC. ἀλλὰ κακίαν.
but vice

MEN. πάντως δήπου.
entirely surely

SOC. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην e
it-is-needful then as it-seems to-this — procuring justice
ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον
or temperance or holiness to-be-added or other some part
ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα
of-virtue if but not not it-will-be virtue although procuring
τἀγαθά.
the-good-things

MEN. πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ' ἄν;
how for without these virtue would-it-come-about —

SOC. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ
the and not to-procure gold and silver whenever not
δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη
just it-be either for-oneself or for-another not virtue also this
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;
is the lack-of-procuring

MEN. φαίνεται.

it-appears(-so)

79 SOC. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν

in-nothing then more the procuring — of-such good-things

ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ

than the lack-of-procuring virtue — would-be but as it-seems what

μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ'

indeed — with justice comes-about virtue will-be what but

ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

— without all — such vice

MEN. δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

seems to-me necessary to-be as you-say

SOC. οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον

therefore of-these each a-little before part

ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ

of-virtue we-said to-be the justice and temperance and

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

all — such

MEN. ναί.

yes

VI · BACK TO THE BEGINNING

Socrates complains that Meno has broken virtue into pieces after being asked for it whole: he says every action done with a part of virtue is virtue, while the whole is still unknown. They rejected an answer about figure that used terms still being sought, and so must reject this one. Socrates asks him to answer again from the beginning what he and Gorgias say virtue is.

SOC. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;

then O Meno you-jest with me

MEN. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
what indeed O Socrates

SOC. ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ b
that just-now me having-asked you not to-break nor
κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα
to-chop-into-small-change the virtue and having-given examples
καθ' ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας,
according-to which one-should to-answer this indeed you-neglected
λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τἀγαθὰ
you-say and to-me that virtue is able — to-be the-good-things
πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς
to-procure with justice this but you-say part of-virtue
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου c
therefore it-follows from what you agree the with a-part
ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι·
of-virtue to-do whatever — one-does this virtue to-be
τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα
the for justice part you-say of-virtue to-be and each
τούτων. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον
of-these what then indeed this do-I-mean that me having-asked whole
εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν,
to-tell the virtue itself indeed much you-lack to-tell what it-is
πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου
all but you-say action virtue to-be if-indeed with a-part
ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον
of-virtue it-be-done as having-said what virtue is the whole
καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς
and already going-to-recognize(-it) me even if you chop-up

αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς
it into parts needs then for-you again from beginning as
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί
to-me it-seems the same question O dear Meno what
ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν
is virtue if with a-part of-virtue every action virtue —
εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα
would-be this for is to-say whenever says someone that every
ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ
the with justice action virtue is or not does-it-seem
σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ' οἴει
to-you again to-need the same question but do-you-think
τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;
anyone to-know a-part of-virtue what it-is itself not knowing

MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
not to-me-at-least it-seems

d SOC. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ' ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην
if for also you-remember when I to-you just-now answered
περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην
about the figure we-rejected I-suppose — such
ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω
answer the through the still being-sought-things and not-yet
ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
agreed attempting to-answer

MEN. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
and rightly at-least we-rejected(-it) O Socrates

e SOC. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης
not then O best nor you still being-sought
ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων
virtue whole what it-is think through the of-it parts
ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν
answering to-make-clear it to-anyone or other anything-whatever

τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς
in-this — same way saying but again the same
δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ
to-need question what being of-virtue do-you-say what
λέγεις· ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;
you-say or nothing to-you do-I-seem to-say
MEN. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
to-me-at-least you-seem rightly to-speak
SOC. ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῂς ἀρετὴν
answer then again from beginning what do-you-say virtue
εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;
to-be both you and the companion of-you

VII · THE NUMBFISH

Meno says Socrates is like the flat numbfish of the sea, which numbs whoever touches it: he has numbed Meno's soul and mouth, and it is wise of him not to travel abroad. Socrates says he numbs others only because he is numb himself. Meno asks how one can seek what one does not know, and Socrates calls this the contentious argument that a man can seek neither what he knows nor what he does not.

MEN. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι 80
O Socrates I-used-to-hear indeed I-at-least before even to-meet
σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς
you that you nothing other than yourself both are-at-a-loss and the
ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς,
others make to-be-at-a-loss and now as at-least to-me you-seem
γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε
you-bewitch me and drug(-me) and simply enchant(-me) so-that
μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ
full of-perplexity to-have-become and you-seem to-me entirely if

δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ
one-must something also to-jest most-like to-be the both form and
τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη
the-rest to-this — flat numbfish the of-the-sea and for this
τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ
the always approaching and touching to-be-numb makes and you
δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι· ἀληθῶς
seem to-me now me such something to-have-done truly
γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα νάρκω, καὶ οὐκ
for I-at-least both the soul and the mouth am-numb and not
ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ
I-can what I-may-answer you and-yet ten-thousand-times at-least about
ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ
virtue very-many speeches I-have-made and to many and
πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδ' ὅτι ἐστὶν
very well as at-least to-myself I-seemed now but not-even what it-is
τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ
— altogether I-can to-say and to-me you-seem well to-take-counsel not
ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ' ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ
sailing-away from-here nor going-abroad if for a-stranger in another
πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ' ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης.
city such-things you-should-do perhaps — as a-sorcerer you-would-be-led-away

SOC. πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.
a-rogue you-are O Meno and nearly you-deceived me

MEN. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
how most(-of-all) O Socrates

c SOC. γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ἤκασας.
I-know of-what for-sake me you-likened

MEN. τίνος δὴ οἴει;
of-what indeed do-you-think

SOC. ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων d
so-that you I-may-liken-in-return I but this know about all
τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι — λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ
the handsome that they-rejoice being-likened it-profits for
αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες — ἀλλ'
them handsome for I-think of-the handsome also the images but
οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα
not I-will-liken-in-return you I but if indeed the numbfish itself being-numb
οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ.
so also the others makes to-be-numb I-resemble it if but not not
οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ
not for being-resourceful myself the others I-make to-be-at-a-loss but
παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
than-anything more myself being-at-a-loss so also the others
ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν
I-make to-be-at-a-loss and now about virtue what it-is I indeed
οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ
not know you however perhaps before indeed knew before me
ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ
to-touch now however like you-are not to-one-knowing nevertheless but
ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν.
I-am-willing with you to-examine and to-seek-together what ever it-is
MEN. καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ
and in-what manner will-you-seek O Socrates this which not
οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ
you-know — altogether what it-is what-sort for of-the-things-which not
οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις
you-know having-proposed will-you-seek or if even — most you-should-meet
αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα;
it how will-you-know that this is what you not knew

e SOC. μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον
I-understand what you-wish to-say O Meno do-you-see this
ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν
how contentious argument you-bring-down that not then it-is-possible to-seek
ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ
for-a-man either what he-knows or what not he-knows neither for
ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ — οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ
— what at-least he-knows he-would-seek he-knows for and nothing needs
τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως — οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν —
— at-least to-such(-man) of-seeking nor what not he-knows
οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει.
not-even for he-knows what he-will-seek

VIII · LEARNING AS RECOLLECTION

Socrates rejects the contentious argument and cites priests, priestesses, and poets like Pindar, who say the soul is immortal and has been born many times. It has seen all things here and in Hades, so there is nothing it has not learned, and what is called learning is recollection. Such an argument makes men industrious, while Meno's would make them idle; Meno asks to be shown that it is true.

81 MEN. οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος,
therefore finely to-you seems to-be-spoken the argument this
ὦ Σώκρατες;
O Socrates
SOC. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
not to-me-at-least
MEN. ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ;
can-you say in-what-way

SOC. ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν
I-at-least I-have-heard for of-men both and of-women wise
περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα —
about the divine things
MEN. τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;
what account saying
SOC. ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.
true to-me-at-least to-seem and fine
MEN. τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;
what this and who the saying
SOC. οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν b
the indeed saying are of-the priests both and of-the priestesses
ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις
as-many-as it-has-been-a-care about what they-handle an-account able
τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ
— *to-be to-give says and also Pindar and others many*
τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί
of-the poets as-many-as divine are what and they-say these-here
ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ
are but consider if to-you they-seem true-things to-say they-say
γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ
for the soul of-the man to-be immortal and at-one-time
μὲν τελευτᾶν — ὃ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι — τοτὲ
indeed to-end which indeed to-die they-call at-another
δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε· δεῖν
and again to-come-into-being to-perish but never to-be-needful

δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον·
indeed through these-things as most-holily to-live-through the life
οἷσιν γὰρ ἂν —
from-whom for —

Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
Persephone requital for-ancient grief
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ
shall-receive to the above sun of-those in-the-ninth year
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν,
she-gives-up souls again
c ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ
from these kings noble
καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
and in-strength swift in-wisdom and greatest
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον
men grow into and the remaining time
ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.
heroes holy by men are-called

d ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις
inasmuch-as then the soul immortal both being and often
γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν
having-been-born and having-seen both the-things here and the-things in
Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν·
of-Hades and all things not there-is what not it-has-learned
ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων
so-that nothing wonderful also about virtue and about other-things
οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον
possible — to-be it to-recall what at-least also before
ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης,
it-knew since for the nature all akin being

καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον
and having-learned the soul all-things nothing prevents one only
ἀναμνησθέντα — ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι —
having-recalled which indeed learning call men
τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ
the-rest all him to-discover if someone courageous be and
μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν
not grow-weary seeking the for to-seek then and the to-learn
ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ
recollection whole is not-then one-must to-be-persuaded by-this —
ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν
contentious argument this indeed for — us idle would-make
καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε
and it-is to-the soft of-the men pleasant to-hear this
δὲ ἐργατικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων
but industrious both and inquiring makes in-which I trusting
ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν.
true to-be am-willing with you to-seek virtue what it-is

MEN. ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ
yes O Socrates but how do-you-mean this that not
μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;
we-learn but which we-call learning recollection is
ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;
can-you me this to-teach that so it-is

IX · THE SQUARE AND THE BOY

Socrates calls one of Meno's attendants, a Greek boy born in the house, and draws a square of two-foot sides. The boy agrees it is four feet, and that a square twice as large would be eight. He thinks the side must be doubled, and sees that this gives sixteen; then he tries three feet, and sees that this gives nine. Now he is at a loss and says he does not know.

82 SOC. καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ
and just-now I-said O Meno that a-rogue you-are and
νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι
now you-ask if I-can you to-teach who not say teaching to-be
ἀλλ' ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ
but recollection so-that indeed at-once I-may-appear myself to-myself
τἀναντία λέγων.
the-opposite saying

MEN. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας
no by — Zeus O Socrates not to this having-looked
εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλ' εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις
I-spoke but from the habit but if somehow to-me you-can
ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.
to-show that it-is as you-say show(-me)

b SOC. ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω
but it-is indeed not easy nevertheless but I-am-willing
προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν
to-be-eager you for-sake-of but to-me call of-the
πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὁντινα
many attendants these-here — your-own one whichever
βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.
you-wish so-that in this to-you I-may-show(-it)

MEN. πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.
certainly at-least come-here approach

SOC. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει;
a-Greek indeed he-is and speaks-Greek

MEN. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής γε.
certainly at-least exceedingly home-born at-least

SOC. πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν ὁπότερ' ἄν σοι φαίνηται,
apply indeed the mind which-of-the-two — to-you he-appears
ἢ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ' ἐμοῦ.
either recollecting or learning from me

MEN. ἀλλὰ προσέξω.
but I-will-apply(-it)

SOC. εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον
tell indeed me O boy do-you-know a-square space
ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;
that such it-is

BOY ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς c
is then a-square space equal having the lines
ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας;
these all four being

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον;
not also these-here the through middle is equal having

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ
therefore could-be — such a-space both greater and
ἔλαττον;
smaller

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη
if then should-be this — side of-two feet and this
δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει·
of-two of-how-many — would-be feet the whole thus but consider
εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον,
if was this-way of-two feet that-way but of-one foot only
ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον;
other something once — would-be of-two feet the space

d BOY ναί.

yes

SOC. ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ
since but of-two feet also that-way other something than
δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται;
twice of-two does-it-become

BOY γίγνεται.

it-becomes

SOC. δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν;
of-two then twice it-becomes of-feet

BOY ναί.

yes

SOC. πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες; λογισάμενος εἰπέ.
how-many then are the two twice feet having-reckoned say

BOY τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

four O Socrates

SOC. οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον
therefore could-come-to-be — than-this — space another
διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς
double such but equal having all the lines
ὥσπερ τοῦτο;
as this

BOY ναί.

yes

SOC. πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν;
of-how-many then will-it-be feet

BOY ὀκτώ.

eight

SOC. φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκείνου e
come indeed try to-me to-say how-large — will-be of-that
ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί
the line each the indeed for of-this of-two feet what
δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου;
and the of-that — double
BOY δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.
clear indeed O Socrates that double
SOC. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ᾽
do-you-see O Meno how I him nothing teach but
ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι ὁποία ἐστὶν
ask all-things and now he thinks to-know of-what-sort(-line) is
ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
from which the eight-foot space will-come-to-be or not does-it-seem to-you
MEN. ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least
SOC. οἶδεν οὖν;
does-he-know then
MEN. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed
SOC. οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;
he-thinks but at-least from the double
MEN. ναί.
yes
SOC. θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ
watch indeed him recollecting in-order as one-must
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι.
to-recollect
σὺ δέ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς 83
you and to-me say from the double line do-you-say
τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι; τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ
the double space to-come-to-be such I-mean not this-way

μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω
indeed long that-way but short but equal every-way let-it-be
ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλ' ὅρα
like this-here double but of-this eight-foot but see
εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.
if still to-you from the double it-seems to-be-going-to-be

BOY ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν
therefore double this of-this becomes if another
τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;
as-large we-add from-here

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

b SOC. ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῄς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον,
from this indeed you-say will-be the eight-foot space
ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται;
if four so-large come-to-be

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο
let-us-draw indeed from it equal four other
τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι;
something than this-here — would-be which you-say the eight-foot to-be

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον
therefore in it are these-here four of-which each
ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι;
equal to-this is to-the four-foot

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;
how-large then does-it-become not four-times so-large

BOY πῶς δ' οὔ;
how and not

SOC. διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;
double then is the four-times so-large

BOY οὐ μὰ Δία.
no by Zeus

SOC. ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον;
but how-many-fold

BOY τετραπλάσιον.
four-fold

SOC. ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ c
from the double then O boy not double but
τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.
four-fold becomes space

BOY ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

SOC. τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα. οὐχί;
of-four for four-times is sixteen not

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. ὀκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν
eight-foot and from what-sort line not from indeed
ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;
this four-fold

BOY φημί.
I-say(-so)

SOC. τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί;
four-foot and from the half this-here this-here

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,
well the and eight-foot not of-this indeed double is
τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ;
of-this but half
BOY ναί.
yes
d SOC. οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς,
not from indeed greater will-it-be than so-large a-line
ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί; ἢ οὔ;
from smaller but than this-large or not
BOY ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.
to-me-at-least it-seems so
SOC. καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι
finely the for to-you seeming this answer and to-me
λέγε· οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων;
say not this indeed of-two feet was the but of-four
BOY ναί.
yes
SOC. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴν μείζω
it-must then the of-the eight-foot space line greater
μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.
indeed to-be than-this — two-foot smaller but than-the four-foot
BOY δεῖ.
it-must
e SOC. πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι.
try indeed to-say how-large some(-line) you-say it to-be
BOY τρίποδα.
three-foot
SOC. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης
therefore if-indeed three-foot it-be the half of-this
προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ
we-shall-add and it-will-be three-foot two indeed for these the

δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς·
but one and from-here likewise two indeed these the but one
καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῄς.
and comes-to-be this — space which you-say
BOY ναί.
yes
SOC. οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον
therefore if it-be this-way of-three and that-way of-three the whole
χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;
space of-three three-times feet becomes
BOY φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)
SOC. τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;
three and three-times how-many are feet
BOY ἐννέα.
nine
SOC. ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;
it-had-to and the double of-how-many to-be feet
BOY ὀκτώ.
eight
SOC. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον
not-even then from the three-foot yet the eight-foot space
γίγνεται.
comes-to-be
BOY οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed
SOC. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ 84
but from what-sort try to-us to-say exactly and if
μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας.
not you-wish to-count but show from what-sort
BOY ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.
but by — Zeus O Socrates I-at-least not know

Socrates points out that the boy is better off at a loss, since he now wants to learn. Socrates draws four of the squares together and the lines from corner to corner, and the boy sees that each line cuts its square in half, that the inner square holds four halves, and that it is therefore eight feet: the double square stands on the line from corner to corner of the first.

b SOC. ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων
do-you-notice in-turn O Meno where he-is already going
ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ᾔδει
this(-boy) of-the recollecting that the indeed first he-knew
μὲν οὔ, ἦτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή,
indeed not which is the of-the eight-foot space line
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὖν ᾤετό γ' αὐτὴν
as not-even now yet he-knows but anyhow he-thought at-least it
τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ
then to-know and boldly answered as knowing and
οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ
not he-thought to-be-at-a-loss now but he-thinks to-be-at-a-loss already and
ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ' οἴεται εἰδέναι.
as not he-knows nor he-thinks to-know

MEN. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

SOC. οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ
therefore now better is-he about the matter which not
ᾔδει;
he-knew

MEN. καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.
also this to-me it-seems

SOC. ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ
to-be-at-a-loss then him having-made and to-be-numb like
ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;
the numbfish surely-not in-any-way did-we-harm(-him)
MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
not to-me-at-least it-seems
SOC. προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς c
something-useful at-any-rate somewhat we-have-done as it-seems toward
τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως
the to-find-out how it-is now indeed for even he-would-seek — gladly
οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ
not knowing then but easily — both before many and
πολλάκις ᾠέτ' ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου
often he-would-have-thought — well to-speak about the double
χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.
space that it-must double the line to-have in-length
MEN. ἔοικεν.
it-seems(-so)
SOC. οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν
do-you-think then — him before would-have-tried to-seek
ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς
or to-learn this which he-thought to-know not knowing before into
ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν
perplexity he-fell having-thought not to-know and longed-for
τὸ εἰδέναι;
the to-know
MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not to-me it-seems O Socrates
SOC. ὤνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας;
he-was-benefited then having-been-numbed
MEN. δοκεῖ μοι.
it-seems to-me

d SOC. σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει
consider indeed from this — perplexity what also he-will-discover
ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ
seeking with me nothing but than asking me and not
διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ
teaching watch and if somehow you-find me teaching and
διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.
explaining to-him but not the of-this(-boy) opinions asking-for
λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι
tell for me you not — indeed four-foot this for-us is
χωρίον; μανθάνεις;
space do-you-understand

BOY ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον;
another and to-it we-could-add — this-here equal

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων;
and a-third this equal to-each of-these

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;
therefore we-could-fill-up — the in the corner this

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

e SOC. ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ' ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία
other something then would-there-be — four equal spaces
τάδε;
these

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται;
what then the whole this how-many-fold of-this becomes

BOY τετραπλάσιον.
four-fold

SOC. ἔδει δέ γε διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ
it-had-to and at-least double for-us to-become or not
μέμνησαι;
do-you-remember

BOY πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν 85
therefore is this a-line from corner to corner
τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων;
cutting in-two each of-these — spaces

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι,
therefore four these become lines equal
περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον;
enclosing this-here — space

BOY γίγνονται γάρ.
they-become(-so) for

SOC. σκόπει δή· πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον;
consider indeed how-large something is this — space

BOY οὐ μανθάνω.
not I-understand

SOC. οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη
not four being these half of-each each
ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὔ;
the line has-cut-off inside or not

BOY ναί.
yes

SOC. πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν;

how-many then so-large in this are-in(-it)

BOY τέτταρα.

four

SOC. πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε;

how-many and in this

BOY δύο.

two

SOC. τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν;

the and four to-the two what is

BOY διπλάσια.

double

b SOC. τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται;

this then how-many-feet becomes

BOY ὀκτώπουν.

eight-foot

SOC. ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς;

from what-sort line

BOY ἀπὸ ταύτης.

from this

SOC. ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος;

from the from corner to corner stretching of-the four-foot

BOY ναί.

yes

The sophists call this line the diagonal. The boy gave only his own opinions, and these were true opinions in a man who did not know, stirred up like a dream; asked often enough, he will end by knowing. He was never taught geometry, so he must have had the knowledge in another time; if the truth is always in the soul, the soul is immortal. Socrates will not insist on everything, but says one must keep seeking what one does not know.

SOC. καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί· ὥστ'
call and at-least this diagonal the sophists so-that
εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ
if to-this diagonal the-name from the diagonal — as you
φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.
say O boy of-Meno would-come-to-be — the double space

BOY πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
certainly indeed then O Socrates

SOC. τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ
what to-you seems O Meno is-there which opinion not
αὐτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο;
his-own this(-boy) answered

MEN. οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ. c
no but his-own

SOC. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον.
and indeed not he-knew at-least as we-said a-little before

MEN. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

SOC. ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι· ἢ οὔ;
were-in and at-least him these — opinions or not

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν
in-the not knowing then about what — not he-knows are-in
ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε;
true opinions about these which not he-knows
MEN. φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)
d SOC. καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι
and now indeed at-least in-him as a-dream just-now
ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται
have-been-stirred-up the opinions these if but him someone shall-ask
πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ' ὅτι
often the same these-things and in-many-ways you-know that
τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.
ending than-no-one less exactly he-will-know about these
MEN. ἔοικεν.
it-seems(-so)
SOC. οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος
therefore no-one having-taught but having-asked
ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;
he-will-know having-recovered himself from himself the knowledge
MEN. ναί.
yes
SOC. τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ
the but to-recover himself in himself knowledge not
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν;
to-recollect is
MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι
so then not the knowledge which now this(-boy) has either
ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν;
he-got at-some-time or always had

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων· e
therefore if indeed always he-had always also he-was knowing
εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ
if but he-got(-it) at-some-time not — in at-least the present life
εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν;
having-got he-would-be or has-taught someone him to-do-geometry
οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα,
he for will-do about all geometry the-same these-things
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις
and of-the other studies all is-there then anyone-who
τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι,
him all-things has-taught just for I-suppose you-are to-know
ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.
otherwise both since in — your house he-was-born and has-been-reared
MEN. ἀλλ᾽ οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.
but know I-at-least that no-one ever taught(-him)
SOC. ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί;
he-has and these — opinions or not
MEN. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.
(of)-necessity O Socrates it-appears
SOC. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο 86
if but not in the present life having-got(-them) not already this
δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;
clear that in other some time he-had and had-learned(-them)
MEN. φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)
SOC. οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἦν
therefore this at-least is the time when not he-was
ἄνθρωπος;
a-man

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. εἰ οὖν ὅν τ' ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὂν ἂν μὴ ᾖ
if then whatever both — be time and whatever — not be-be
ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει
a-man will-be-in him true opinions which by-questioning
ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρ' οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ
having-been-awakened knowledges become so then the forever
χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι
time having-learned will-be the soul his clear for that
τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
the all time he-is or not he-is a-man

MEN. φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)

b SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ
therefore if always the truth for-us of-the beings is in the
ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ
soul immortal — the soul would-be so-that being-bold one-must
ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν — τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὃ
what not you-happen knowing now this and is what
μὴ μεμνημένος — ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι;
not remembering to-try to-seek and to-recollect

MEN. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως.
well to-me you-seem to-speak O Socrates not I-know how

c SOC. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε
and for I to-myself O Meno and the indeed at-least
ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην·
other-things not — very on-behalf-of the argument I-would-insist
ὅτι δ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους
that but thinking one-ought to-seek what not someone knows better
ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ
— we-would-be and manlier and less idle than if

οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν
we-should-think what not we-know neither possible to-be to-find
μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην,
nor to-be-needful to-seek about this very — I-would-fight
εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.
if able — I-were both in-word and in-deed

MEN. καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ
and this indeed at-least you-seem to-me well to-say O
Σώκρατες.
Socrates

SOC. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ
do-you-wish then since we-agree that one-must-seek about what
μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽
not someone knows let-us-try in-common to-seek what ever
ἐστὶν ἀρετή;
is virtue

XII · FROM A HYPOTHESIS

Meno wants to return to his first question. Socrates agrees to examine it from a hypothesis, as geometers do: if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, and if not, not. Next they must ask whether virtue is knowledge. Virtue is good, and if there is nothing good that knowledge does not embrace, they would be right to suspect that virtue is knowledge of some kind.

MEN. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ d
certainly indeed then not however O Socrates but
ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ
I-at-least that — most-gladly which-very I-asked the first both
σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ
would-examine and would-hear whether as teachable being to-it

δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ
one-must to-set-about or as by-nature or as in-what ever way
παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.
coming to-the men the virtue

e SOC. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ
but if indeed I ruled O Meno not only myself
ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε
but also you not — we-would-have-examined before whether
διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον
teachable or not teachable the virtue before what it-is first
ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς
we-sought it since but you yourself indeed not-even try
ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε
to-rule so-that indeed free you-may-be me but you-try both
ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι — τί γὰρ χρὴ
to-rule and do-rule I-will-give-way to-you what for must-one
ποιεῖν; — ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποιόν τί ἐστιν ὃ
to-do it-seems then to-be-examined to-be of-what-sort something is what
μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ
not-yet we-know what it-is if not anything then but a-little at-least
μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
for-me of-the rule relax and allow(-me) from hypothesis
αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν.
it to-examine whether teachable it-is or in-whatever-way

87 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι
I-mean and the from hypothesis thus as the geometers
πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον
often examine whenever someone asks them for-instance
περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ
about a-space if possible — into this — circle this —
χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι "οὔπω
space a-triangle to-be-inscribed would-say — someone that not-yet

οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μέν τινα
I-know if is this such but as indeed some
ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε·
hypothesis useful I-think to-have toward the matter such
εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν
if indeed is this — space such that along the
δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ
given its line applying(-it) to-fall-short by-such-a
χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι
space as — itself the applied be other something
συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν
to-follow to-me it-seems and other in-turn if impossible it-is
ταῦτα παθεῖν. ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ
these-things to-undergo having-hypothesized then I-am-willing to-tell you the
συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε
result about the inscription of-it in the circle whether
ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή." οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ
impossible or not so indeed also about virtue we since
οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι
not we-know neither what it-is nor of-what-sort something having-hypothesized
αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε
it let-us-examine whether teachable or not teachable it-is thus
λέγοντες· εἰ ποιόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
saying if of-what-sort something is of-the about the soul
ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον
being virtue teachable — would-it-be or not teachable first
μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν
indeed indeed if it-is other than such-as knowledge then teachable
ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν — διαφερέτω
or not or what just-now we-were-saying recollectable let-it-differ
δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα — ἀλλ'
and nothing for-us whichever — the name we-use but

ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν
then teachable or this at-least to-everyone clear that nothing
ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;
other is-taught a-man than knowledge
MEN. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems
SOC. εἰ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι
if and at-least is knowledge some the virtue clear that
διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.
teachable — it-would-be
MEN. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not
SOC. τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν
of-this indeed then quickly we-have-been-rid that such indeed
ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ' οὔ.
being teachable such but not
MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι
the indeed after this as it-seems one-must to-examine
πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
whether is knowledge the virtue or other-than knowledge
d MEN. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.
to-me-at-least it-seems this after this to-be-examined to-be
SOC. τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι
what and indeed other something than good it we-say to-be
τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν
the virtue and this — hypothesis abides for-us good
αὐτὸ εἶναι;
it to-be
MEN. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον
therefore if indeed something is good also other separated
ἐπιστήμης, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ
from-knowledge perhaps — would-be the virtue not knowledge some(-kind) if
δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην
but nothing is good which not knowledge embraces knowledge
ἄν τιν᾽ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.
— some(-kind) it suspecting to-be rightly we-would-suspect

MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γ᾽ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί; e
and indeed by-virtue at-least we-are good

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα.
if but good beneficial all for the-good-things beneficial
οὐχί;
not

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;
and the virtue indeed beneficial is

MEN. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.
(of)-necessity from the things-agreed

Health, strength, beauty, and wealth sometimes help and sometimes harm, depending on whether they are rightly used. So too courage, temperance, and quickness to learn harm without mind and help with it. Everything depends on the soul, and the soul's goods on prudence; so virtue is prudence, in whole or in part. If so, the good would not be good by nature, or we would guard the good youths in the citadel like gold. Meno concludes virtue is teachable, but Socrates doubts it is knowledge: what has no teachers cannot be taught.

SOC. σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες
let-us-examine indeed according-to each taking-up
ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ
of-what-sort are the-things-which us benefit health we-say and
ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ
strength and beauty and wealth indeed these-things we-call and
τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;
— such-things beneficial not
MEN. ναί.
yes
88 SOC. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ
the-same and these-things we-say sometimes also to-harm or you
ἄλλως φὴς ἢ οὕτως;
otherwise say than so
MEN. οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτως.
no but so
SOC. σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ
consider indeed when what of-each of-these leads it-benefits
ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ
us and when what it-harms then not when indeed right
χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;
use it-benefits when but not it-harms

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. b
still then also the-things concerning the soul let-us-examine

σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν
temperance something do-you-call and justice and courage

καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα
and quickness-to-learn and memory and magnificence and all

τὰ τοιαῦτα;
— *such*

MEN. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη
consider indeed of-these whichever to-you seem not knowledge

εἶναι ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει,
to-be but other-than knowledge if not at-one-time indeed they-harm

τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ
at-another but benefit such-as courage if not is prudence the

ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ
courage but like boldness some not when indeed without mind

θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
is-bold a-man he-is-harmed when but with mind he-is-benefited

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· μετὰ
therefore also temperance likewise and quickness-to-learn with

μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα,
indeed mind both learned and trained beneficial

ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;
without but mind harmful

MEN. πάνυ σφόδρα. c
very vehemently

SOC. οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα
therefore in-sum all the of-the soul undertakings
καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν
and endurances leading indeed prudence in happiness
τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ' εἰς τοὐναντίον;
end of-folly but in the-opposite

MEN. ἔοικεν.
it-seems(-so)

d SOC. εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ
if then virtue of-the-things in the soul something is and
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι,
necessary for-it beneficial to-be prudence it must to-be
ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ'
since-indeed all the-things concerning the soul themselves indeed by
αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης
themselves neither beneficial nor harmful are being-added
δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα
but prudence or folly harmful both and beneficial
γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφελιμόν γε
become according-to indeed this — argument beneficial at-least
οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν' εἶναι.
being the virtue prudence it-must some(-kind) to-be

MEN. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems

e SOC. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν
and indeed truly also the-rest which just-now we-were-calling wealth
τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ
both and — such-things at-one-time indeed good at-another but harmful
εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη
to-be then not as for-the rest soul the prudence leading
ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά,
beneficial the-things of-the soul made the but folly harmful

οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη
so in-turn also for-these the soul rightly indeed using
καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;
and leading beneficial them makes not rightly but harmful

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δ' ἡ ἄφρων;
rightly and at-least the wise leads erroneously but the foolish

MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, 89
therefore so indeed covering all to-say it-is-possible
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν
for-the man the indeed other-things all on the soul
ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ
to-hang the but of-the soul itself on prudence if
μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν
they-are-to good to-be and by-this — argument prudence —
εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;
would-be the beneficial we-say and the virtue beneficial to-be

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι σύμπασαν ἢ
prudence then we-say virtue to-be either all or
μέρος τι;
part some

MEN. δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.
seems to-me finely to-be-said O Socrates the things-said

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ
therefore if these-things so are not — would-be by-nature the
ἀγαθοί.
good

MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
not to-me it-seems

b SOC. καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ' ἦν· εἰ φύσει
and for — I-suppose also this would-have-been if by-nature
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ
the good were-born there-would-be I-suppose — for-us some-who
ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς
knew of-the young the good the natures whom we
ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν
— having-taken-over those having-pointed-them-out would-guard
ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ
— in the-citadel having-sealed-them-up much rather than
τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ
the gold so-that no-one them should-corrupt but when
ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι.
they-came into the age useful they-might-become to-the cities

MEN. εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
likely at-least you-know O Socrates

c SOC. ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται,
so then since not by-nature the good good become
ἆρα μαθήσει;
then by-learning

MEN. δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ
it-seems to-me already necessary to-be and clear O
Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
Socrates according-to the hypothesis if-indeed knowledge is
ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.
virtue that teachable it-is

SOC. ἴσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;
perhaps by Zeus but lest this not finely we-agreed
MEN. καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
and surely it-seemed at-least just-now finely to-be-said
SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν
but lest not in the just-now only it-must it to-seem
καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα,
finely to-be-said but also in the now and in the hereafter
εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.
if it-is-to anything of-it sound to-be
MEN. τί οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ d
what then indeed toward what looking are-you-dissatisfied-with it
καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή;
and distrust lest not knowledge be the virtue
SOC. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν
I to-you will-tell O Meno the indeed for teachable
αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ
it to-be if-indeed knowledge it-is not I-retract as
οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι
not finely to-be-said that but not it-is knowledge consider
ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ
if to-you I-seem reasonably to-distrust this for to-me tell if
ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ
is teachable any-whatever matter not only virtue not
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;
necessary of-it both teachers and learners to-be
MEN. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems

e SOC. οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε
therefore the-opposite in-turn of-which neither teachers nor
μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν
learners there-should-be finely — it conjecturing we-would-conjecture
μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
not teachable to-be
MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα· ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι
it-is these-things but of-virtue teachers not do-they-seem to-you
εἶναι;
to-be

XIV · ANYTUS

Anytus, son of Anthemion, sits down beside them, a man whose father became rich by his own wisdom and diligence and not by gift, unlike Ismenias the Theban with Polycrates' money. Socrates asks him where to send Meno for virtue: to doctors for medicine, to cobblers for shoemaking, and to those who profess the art and take fees for it. These, he says, are the sophists, and Anytus cries out that they are the ruin of all who associate with them.

90 SOC. πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς
often at-any-rate seeking if any should-be of-it
διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ
teachers everything doing not I-am-able to-find and-yet with
πολλῶν γε ζητῶ, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι
many at-least I-seek and of-these most whom — I-think
ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ
most-experienced to-be of-the matter and indeed also now O
Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ
Meno at fine(-time) for-us Anytus here sat-down-beside(-us) to-whom
μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. εἰκότως δ' ἂν μεταδοῖμεν·
let-us-give-a-share of-the search reasonably and — we-would-give-a-share

Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε
Anytus for here first indeed is of-a-father rich both
καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ
and wise Anthemion who became rich not from
τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ
the of-itself nor giving(-it) someone as the now recently
εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος,
having-received the of-Polycrates money Ismenias the Theban
ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα
but — by-his-own wisdom having-acquired(-it) and diligence then
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ
also in-the other-things not arrogant seeming to-be a-citizen nor
ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς
pompous both and offensive but orderly and well-behaved
ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ
a-man then this(-son) well he-reared and educated as it-seems
Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς
of-Athenians to-the multitude they-elect at-any-rate him to the
μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς
greatest offices just indeed with such-men to-seek virtue
πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες. σὺ οὖν
about teachers whether there-are or not and who you then
ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ
for-us O Anytus join-the-search with-me both and — with-your-own
ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τίνες
guest-friend Meno here about this — matter who
ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοίμεθα
— would-be teachers thus and consider if we-should-wish
Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν
Meno here a-good doctor to-become to whom —
αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς;
him would-we-send as-teachers then not to the doctors

ANY. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τί δ' εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι,
what and if a-cobbler good we-should-wish(-him) to-become
ἆρ' οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;
then not to the cobblers

ANY. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;
and the-rest so

ANY. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

d SOC. ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς
thus indeed for-me again about the same-things tell(-me) to the
ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν,
doctors we-say sending this(-man) finely — we-would-send
βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἆρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε
wishing a-doctor to-become then when this we-say this
λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν
we-mean that to these sending him we-would-be-wise
ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή,
— the claiming both the art rather than the not
καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας
and the a-fee exacting for it this having-declared
αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν;
themselves teachers of-the wishing to-come both and to-learn
ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;
then not toward these-things having-looked finely — would-we-send

ANY. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ e
therefore also about flute-playing and the others the same
ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα
these-things much folly it-is wishing flute-player some(-one)
ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν
to-make to indeed the promising to-teach the
τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν,
art and a-fee exacting not to-be-willing to-send
ἄλλοις δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν
to-others but some trouble to-give seeking to-learn
παρὰ τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι
from these who neither claim teachers to-be
μήτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος
nor is of-them a-pupil any of-this — subject
ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν
which we think-fit to-learn from them whom —
πέμπωμεν. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;
we-send not great to-you does-it-seem unreason to-be
ANY. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.
yes by Zeus to-me-at-least and ignorance at-least besides
SOC. καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ 91
finely you-speak now then it-is-possible for-you with me in-common
βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουΐ Μένωνος. οὗτος
to-take-counsel about the guest-friend this-here Meno this(-man)
γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς
for O Anytus for-long says to me that he-desires this —
σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ
wisdom and virtue by-which the men the both households and
τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν
the cities finely manage and the parents — their-own
θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ
tend and citizens and strangers to-receive both and

ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν
to-send-off know worthily of-a-man good this then
τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς
the virtue consider to whom — sending him rightly
πέμποιμεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ὅτι παρὰ
we-would-send or clear indeed according-to the just-now argument that to
τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ
these — promising of-virtue teachers to-be and
ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ
having-declared themselves common of-the Greeks to-the wishing
μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;
to-learn a-fee for-this having-fixed both and exacting

ANY. καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;
and whom do-you-mean these O Socrates

SOC. οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι
you-know surely also you that these are whom the men
καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.
call sophists

c ANY. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν γ᾽
Heracles speak-no-ill O Socrates no-one of-the at-least
ἐμῶν μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε
my neither kinsmen nor friends neither citizen nor
ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα
stranger such madness may-seize so-as to these having-gone
λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ
to-be-ruined since these at-least manifest are ruin both and
διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.
corruption of-the associating(-with-them)

Socrates is surprised: Protagoras made more money than Phidias and ten other sculptors, and taught for forty years without being found out, though menders who returned shoes worse would be found out within thirty days and starve. Anytus says the madness belongs to those who pay them and the cities that admit them. He has never met a sophist, but knows who they are, and says any Athenian gentleman will make Meno better than the sophists.

soc. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν d
how do-you-mean O Anytus these then alone of-the
ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον
claiming something to-know to-do-good so-much
τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν,
from-the others differ as not only not they-benefit
ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅτι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
as the others whatever — someone to-them hands-over but also
τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα
the opposite they-corrupt and for-these openly money
ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι
they-think-fit to-exact I indeed then not can how you
πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω
I-may-believe I-know for a-man one Protagoras more
χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν
money having-acquired from this — wisdom than Phidias
τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἠργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους
both who so conspicuously fine works wrought and other
δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν. καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ
ten of-the statue-makers and-yet a-marvel you-tell if the indeed the
ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι
shoes working-on the old and the cloaks mending
οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα
not — could escape-notice thirty days worse

ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα,
giving-back than they-received the cloaks both and shoes
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν,
but if such-things they-did quickly — by-the hunger they-would-die
Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν
Protagoras but then whole the Greece escaped-the-notice-of
διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους
corrupting the associating(-with-him) and worse
ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα
sending-away than he-received(-them) more than forty
ἔτη — οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα
years I-think for him to-have-died near also seventy
ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα —
years having-been(-old) forty and in the art being
92 καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ
and in all the time this still to the day this-here
εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας,
being-well-reputed not-at-all he-has-ceased and not only Protagoras
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες
but also others very-many the indeed before having-been
ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν
than-him the but also now still being whether indeed then
φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν
are-we-to-say according-to — your account knowingly them to-deceive
καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λελῆθέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς;
and to-ruin the young or to-have-escaped-the-notice even of-themselves
καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσομεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι
and so to-be-mad shall-we-think these whom some say
σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;
wisest of-men to-be

ANY. πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ b
much at-least they-lack to-be-mad O Socrates but
πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων,
much more the to-these giving silver of-the young
τούτων δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ
of-these but still more the to-these entrusting(-them) the
προσήκοντες, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι
relatives much but most of-all the cities allowing
αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις
them to-come-in and not driving(-them)-out whether some
ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.
stranger attempts such something to-do or citizen
SOC. πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν,
whether and O Anytus has-wronged someone you of-the sophists
ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ;
or why so to-them harsh are-you
ANY. οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί,
nor by Zeus I-at-least have-associated ever with-them with-none
οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.
nor — another I-would-allow — of-mine none
SOC. ἄπειρος ἄρ' εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν;
inexperienced then you-are altogether of-the men
ANY. καὶ εἴην γε.
and may-I-be at-least
SOC. πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ c
how then — O marvelous(-man) would-you-know about this —
πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον,
matter whether some good it-has in itself or bad
οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἶης;
of-which altogether inexperienced you-should-be

ANY. ῥᾳδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν, εἴτ' οὖν
easily these at-any-rate I-know who they-are whether then
ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή.
inexperienced of-them I-am or not

d SOC. μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως
a-seer you-are perhaps O Anytus since how at-least otherwise
οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν.
you-know these about from what yourself you-say I-would-wonder —
ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐπιζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρ' οὓς ἂν
but for not these we-seek who they-are to whom —
Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο — οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ
Meno having-come bad would-become these indeed for if
σὺ βούλει, ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί — ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ
you wish let-them-be the sophists but indeed those tell
ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον φράσας
us and the hereditary this companion benefit having-told
αὐτῷ παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν
him to whom having-gone in so-great a-city in-the
ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ' ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.
virtue which just-now I went-through be-would-become — worthy of-account
ANY. τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας;
why but to-him not you told(-it)

e SOC. ἀλλ' οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι,
but whom indeed I thought teachers of-these to-be
εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς· καὶ ἴσως
I-said but I-happen nothing saying as you say and perhaps
τὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ
something you-say but you indeed in the turn to-him tell to
τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει.
whom he-is-to-go of-Athenians tell a-name whose-ever you-wish

ANY. τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτῳ γὰρ
why and of-one man the-name must-be to-hear whom for
ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν
— he-meets of-Athenians of-the fine and-good none there-is
ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάνπερ
who not better him will-make than the sophists if-indeed
ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.
he-is-willing to-be-persuaded

XVI · GOOD FATHERS AND THEIR SONS

Socrates asks whether the good men of Athens could hand on their virtue. Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to stand upright on horseback and throw javelins, but no one ever heard that he was wise or good. Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides had their sons taught riding, music, and wrestling, but not their own virtue, though they would have found a teacher had it been teachable. Anytus warns Socrates that it is easy to do men harm in Athens.

SOC. πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου 93
whether and these — fine and-good from the of-itself
ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ᾽ οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι
became such from no-one having-learned nevertheless however
ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον;
others to-teach able — being these-things which themselves not learned
ANY. καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων
also these I-at-least think from the earlier(-men)
μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι
to-have-learned being fine and-good or not seem to-you
πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;
many and good to-have-been in this — city men

b SOC. ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ
to-me-at-least O Anytus both to-be they-seem here good
τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ
in-the political-things and to-have-been still not less than to-be but
μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς;
surely-not also teachers good have-they-been — of-their-own virtue
τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν· οὐκ εἰ
this for is about which the discussion for-us happens being not if
εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ' εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ
there-are good or not men here nor if they-have-been in the
πρόσθεν, ἀλλ' εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοποῦμεν.
past but if teachable is virtue for-long we-are-examining
τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες
this but examining this we-examine then the good men
καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν
both of-the present and of-the earlier this — virtue in-which
αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι,
themselves good they-were knew-how also to-another to-hand-on
ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ
or not to-be-handed-on this for-a-man nor to-be-received by-one
παρ' ἄλλου· τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε
from another this is what for-long we-seek I both
καὶ Μένων. ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου·
and Meno thus then consider from — your-own argument
Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;
Themistocles not good — would-you-say a-man to-have-been
ANY. ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.
I-at-least of-all at-least most
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς
therefore also teacher good if-indeed anyone else —
αὑτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι;
of-his-own virtue teacher was that-one-too to-be

ANY. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.
I-think I-at-least if-indeed he-wished(-it) at-least

SOC. ἀλλ', οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας d
but do-you-think not — would-he-have-wished others both some

καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑὸν τὸν
fine and-good to-become most and I-suppose the son —

αὐτοῦ; ἢ οἴει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ
his-own or do-you-think him to-begrudge him and on-purpose not

παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ
to-hand-on the virtue in-which himself good he-was or not

ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα
have-you-heard that Themistocles Cleophantus the son a-horseman

μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων
indeed had-taught good he-remained at-any-rate on the horses

ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ
upright standing and threw-javelins from the horses upright and

ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἠργάζετο ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν
other many-things and wonderful he-wrought which that-one him

ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων
had-educated(-in) and he-made(-him) skilled as-much-as on-teachers

ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο· ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;
good depended or these-things not have-you-heard from-the elders

ANY. ἀκήκοα.
I-have-heard

SOC. οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ
not — then the at-least nature of-the son his

ᾐτιάσατ' ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν.
would-have-blamed — anyone to-be bad

ANY. ἴσως οὐκ ἄν. e
perhaps not —

SOC. τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ
what and this that Cleophantus the (son)-of-Themistocles a-man
ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη
good and wise became in-what-very the father his ever
του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου;
from-someone have-you-heard either younger or older

ANY. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ
so then these-things indeed do-we-think to-have-wished him — his-own
ὑὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν
son to-educate in-which but himself wisdom was wise in-nothing than-the
γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή;
neighbors better to-make if-indeed was at-least teachable the virtue

ANY. ἴσως μὰ Δί᾽ οὔ.
perhaps by Zeus not

94 SOC. οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν
this(-man) indeed truly for-you such a-teacher of-virtue whom
καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι·
also you agree among the best of-the earlier(-men) to-be
ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου·
another and indeed let-us-examine Aristides the (son)-of-Lysimachus
ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;
or this(-man) not do-you-agree good to-have-been

ANY. ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.
I-at-least entirely surely

b SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα
therefore also this(-man) the son — his-own Lysimachus as-much-as
μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσε,
indeed on-teachers depended most-finely of-Athenians educated
ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι;
a-man but better does-he-seem to-you than-anyone-whatever to-have-made

τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν. εἰ
with-this for I-suppose also you-have-associated and you-see what-sort he-is if
δὲ βούλει, Περικλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα,
and you-wish Pericles so magnificently wise a-man
οἶσθ' ὅτι δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον;
do-you-know that two sons he-reared Paralus and Xanthippus
ANY. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least
SOC. τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν c
these however as you-know also you horsemen indeed he-taught
οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ
than-none worse of-Athenians and music and contest and
τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται οὐδενὸς χείρους·
the-rest he-educated(-them-in) as-much-as on-art depends than-none worse
ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μέν,
good but then men not did-he-wish to-make I-think indeed
ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους
he-wished but lest not it-be teachable so-that and not few
οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι
you-think and the meanest of-Athenians unable to-have-been
τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο ὑεῖς
this — matter consider that Thucydides in-turn two sons
ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν
reared Melesias and Stephanus and these he-educated
τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων —
the both other-things well and they-wrestled most-finely of-Athenians
τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δέ που
the one for to-Xanthias he-gave the but to-Eudorus these and I-suppose
ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν — ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;
seemed of-the then most-finely to-wrestle or not do-you-remember
ANY. ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.
I-at-least by-hearsay

d soc. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν
therefore clear that this(-man) not — ever where indeed
ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς
it-was-needful spending to-teach these-things indeed taught the
παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα
children — his-own where but nothing it-was-needful having-spent
ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ
good men to-make these-things but not did-he-teach if
διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν,
teachable it-was but for perhaps — Thucydides worthless was
καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν
and not were to-him very-many friends of-Athenians and of-the
συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα
allies and of-a-house great he-was and had-power greatly
ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν
in the city and in the other Greeks so-that if-indeed was
τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς υἱεῖς
this teachable to-find-out — whoever was-going-to his the sons
ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων,
good make either of-the natives someone or of-the strangers
εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν.
if himself not had-leisure because-of the of-the city care
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.
but for O comrade Anytus lest not be teachable virtue
95 any. ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν
O Socrates easily to-me you-seem badly to-speak-of
ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ
men I indeed then — to-you would-advise if
ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ
you-are-willing me to-obey to-be-careful since perhaps indeed also

ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ
in another city easier it-is badly to-do men than
εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ· οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.
well in this and even very I-think and you also yourself to-know

XVII · THEOGNIS CONTRADICTS HIMSELF

Socrates says Anytus is angry because he thinks Socrates is slandering his own kind. Meno reports that the gentlemen of his own country sometimes say virtue can be taught and sometimes not, and that Gorgias laughs at the sophists' promises. Theognis says both, in one place that one learns good things from the good and in another that teaching will never make a bad man good. With no teachers and no learners, virtue cannot be taught.

SOC. ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν
O Meno Anytus indeed to-me seems to-be-angry and nothing
θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους
I-wonder he-thinks for me first indeed to-slander these
τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων.
— men then he-thinks also himself to-be one of-these
ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ
but this(-man) indeed if ever he-recognizes what-sort-of-thing is the
κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ
badly to-speak he-will-stop being-angry now but he-does-not-know you
δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσιν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;
but to-me tell not also among you are fine and-good men
MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

b SOC. τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους
what then are-willing these to-offer themselves as-teachers
τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν
to-the young and to-agree teachers both to-be and teachable
ἀρετήν;
virtue
MEN. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν
no by — Zeus O Socrates but at-one-time indeed —
αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.
of-them you-would-hear that teachable at-another but that not
SOC. φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ
are-we-to-say then these teachers to-be of-this —
πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται;
matter by-whom not-even itself this is-agreed
MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not to-me it-seems O Socrates
SOC. τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι
what and indeed the sophists to-you these who-indeed alone
ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;
profess do-they-seem teachers to-be of-virtue
c MEN. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι,
and in-Gorgias most O Socrates these-things I-admire
ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου,
that not — ever from-him this you-would-hear promising
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ
but also the others he-laughs-at whenever he-hears(-them)
ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.
promising but to-speak he-thinks one-must to-make clever
SOC. οὐδ' ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;
not-even then to-you seem the sophists teachers to-be

MEN. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ
not I-can to-say O Socrates and for myself which-very
οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ
the many I-have-experienced at-one-time indeed to-me they-seem(-so) at-another
δὲ οὔ.
but not
SOC. οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις d
you-know and that not only to-you both and to-the others
τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν,
the politicians this seems at-one-time indeed to-be teachable
τοτὲ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι
at-another but not but also Theognis the poet you-know that
ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει;
the-same these-things says
MEN. ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;
in what-sort verses
SOC. ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει —
in the elegiacs where he-says

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
and beside these drink and eat and with these
ἵζε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
sit and please those of-whom great the-power
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
the-good indeed for from good-things you-will-be-taught if but with-bad
συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον. e
you-mingle you-will-lose even the being mind

οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς
you-know that in these indeed as teachable being the virtue
λέγει;
he-speaks

MEN. φαίνεταί γε.
it-appears(-so) at-least
SOC. ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς, —
in others and at-least a-little having-shifted

εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
if but it-were makeable he-says and placeable-in in-a-man the-thought

λέγει πως ὅτι —
he-says somehow that

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον
many — fees and great would-carry-off

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ —
the able this to-do and

οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
not ever — from a-good father there-would-have-been bad
96 πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
obeying to-words temperate but teaching
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν.
not ever you-will-make the bad man good

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
do-you-notice that himself to-himself again about the same-things
τἀναντία λέγει;
the-opposite he-says
MEN. φαίνεται.
it-appears(-so)

SOC. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ b
can-you then to-name of-other any-whatever matter of-which
οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων
the indeed claiming teachers to-be not that of-others
διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι,
teachers are-agreed but not-even themselves to-understand(-it)
ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ
but wicked to-be about itself this — matter of-which
φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ
they-claim teachers to-be the but agreed themselves fine
κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ
and-good at-one-time indeed say it teachable to-be at-another
δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν
but not the then so confused about anything-whatever
φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;
would-you-say — you properly teachers to-be
MEN. μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
by Zeus not I-at-least
SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ
therefore if neither the sophists nor the themselves fine
κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι
and-good being teachers are of-the matter clear that
οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;
not — others at-least
MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
not to-me it-seems
SOC. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; c
if but at-least not teachers neither learners
MEN. δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.
it-seems to-me to-be as you-say

SOC. ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε
we-have-agreed and at-least of-a-matter of-which neither
διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν
teachers nor learners there-should-be this not-even teachable
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. ὡμολογήκαμεν.
we-have-agreed

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;
therefore of-virtue nowhere appear teachers

MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;
if but at-least not teachers neither learners

MEN. φαίνεται οὕτως.
it-appears so

SOC. ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;
virtue then not — would-be teachable

d MEN. οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ὥστε καὶ
not it-seems if-indeed rightly we have-examined(-it) so-that also
θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδ' εἰσὶν
I-wonder indeed O Socrates whether ever not-even there-are
ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως
good men or what — would-be the-way of-the coming-to-be
τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.
of-the good coming-to-be

Socrates says they have missed something: good men can guide rightly by true opinion as well as by knowledge, as a man who has the right opinion about the road to Larissa leads as well as one who has walked it. Knowledge differs because it is tied down by reasoning about the cause, like the statues of Daedalus, which run away unless they are bound. This tying down is recollection, and it makes opinion knowledge.

SOC. κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες e
we-are-likely O Meno I both and you worthless some
εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι
to-be men and you both Gorgias not sufficiently to-have-educated
καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν
and me Prodicus than-anything more then one-must-apply the
νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ
mind to-ourselves ourselves and one-must-seek whoever us in-one at-least some
τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει· λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς
way better will-make I-say and these-things having-looked toward
τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ
the just-now search how us it-escaped laughably that not
μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
only with-knowledge leading rightly both and well for-the men
πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς
are-done the affairs in-which-way perhaps also escapes us
τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.
the to-know in-what ever way become the good men
MEN. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
how this do-you-mean O Socrates

97 SOC. ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους
thus that indeed the good men must beneficial
εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως
to-be rightly we-have-agreed this at-least that not — otherwise
ἔχοι· ἦ γάρ;
it-could-be is-it-not for

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται
and that at-least beneficial they-will-be if rightly for-us they-lead
τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;
the affairs also this I-suppose finely we-agreed

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος
that but not it-is-possible rightly to-lead if not prudent
ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.
one-be this like we-are not rightly to-those-who-have-agreed

MEN. πῶς δὴ λέγεις;
how indeed do-you-mean

SOC. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. εἰ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι
I will-tell if knowing the road the to Larissa or whither
βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι
you-wish elsewhere he-should-walk and others lead other something
ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;
rightly — and well would-he-lead

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τί δ' εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ b
what and if someone rightly indeed opining which is the
ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ' ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος
road having-gone but not nor knowing(-it) not also this(-man)
ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;
— *rightly would-lead*
MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. καὶ ἕως γ' ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ
and as-long-as at-least — I-suppose right opinion he-has about what the
ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος
other knowledge in-nothing worse a-guide he-will-be thinking
μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.
indeed true-things understanding but not than-the this understanding
MEN. οὐδὲν γάρ.
in-nothing for
SOC. δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν c
opinion then true toward rightness of-action in-nothing
χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ
worse a-guide than-prudence and this is what just-now
παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν
we-were-leaving-out in the about the virtue inquiry of-what-sort
τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ
something it-may-be saying that prudence alone leads the
ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.
rightly to-act the and then also opinion was true
MEN. ἔοικέ γε.
it-seems(-so) at-least
SOC. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.
in-nothing then less beneficial is right opinion than-knowledge

MEN. τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
by-so-much at-least O Socrates that the indeed the knowledge
ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ
having always — would-hit-the-mark the but the right opinion at-one-time
μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ' οὔ.
indeed — would-hit(-it) at-another but not
SOC. πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν
how do-you-mean the always having right opinion not always —
τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;
would-hit(-it) as-long-as rightly be-opines
d MEN. ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες,
(of)-necessity to-me it-appears so-that I-wonder O Socrates
τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα
this so being why indeed ever much more-valued
ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι' ὅτι τὸ μὲν
the knowledge than-the right opinion and through what the indeed
ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἑτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.
other the but other is of-them
SOC. οἶσθα οὖν δι' ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;
do-you-know then through what you-wonder or I to-you am-to-tell
MEN. πάνυ γ' εἰπέ.
certainly at-least tell
SOC. ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν
that to-the of-Daedalus statues not you-have-applied the
νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἔστιν παρ' ὑμῖν.
mind perhaps and not-even there-are among you
MEN. πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;
toward what and indeed this do-you-say
SOC. ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει
that also these if indeed not bound they-be run-away
καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.
and escape if but bound they-stay

MEN. τί οὖν δή; e
what then indeed

SOC. τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι 98
of-the of-that-one works loosed indeed to-own
οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην
not of-much some worth is price as a-runaway
ἄνθρωπον — οὐ γὰρ παραμένει — δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ
man not for it-stays bound but of-much
ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ
worth very for fine the works are toward what then indeed
λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι
do-I-say these-things toward the opinions the true and for the opinions
αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ
the true as-much indeed — time as-they-stay fine the
χρῆμα καὶ πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ
thing and all good-things they-work much but time not
ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
they-are-willing to-stay but they-run-away from the soul
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις
of-the man so-that not of-much worth they-are until — someone
αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε,
them binds of-cause by-reasoning this but is O Meno comrade
ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν
recollection as in the previous(-parts) by-us has-been-agreed when
δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα
and they-are-bound first indeed knowledges they-become then
μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς
stable and through these-things indeed more-valued knowledge than-right
δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.
opinion is and differs by-a-bond knowledge from-right opinion
MEN. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.
by — Zeus O Socrates it-resembles such something

b SOC. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων·
and surely also I as not knowing speak but conjecturing
ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ
that but is something different right opinion and knowledge not
πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο
very to-me I-seem this to-conjecture but if-indeed anything else
φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι — ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην — ἓν δ' οὖν
I-would-say — to-know few-things but — I-would-say one but anyhow
καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.
also this among-those I-would-place — of-which I-know
MEN. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.
and rightly at-least O Socrates you-speak
SOC. τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη
what and this not rightly that true opinion leading
τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται
the work of-each the action in-nothing worse accomplishes
ἢ ἐπιστήμη;
than knowledge
MEN. καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
also this you-seem to-me true-things to-say
c SOC. οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον
in-nothing then right opinion than-knowledge worse nor less
ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν
beneficial will-be for the actions nor the-man the having right
δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.
opinion than the knowledge
MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν
and surely the at-least good man beneficial by-us
ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.
has-been-agreed to-be

MEN. ναί.
yes

XIX · BY DIVINE DISPENSATION

Neither knowledge nor true opinion comes by nature. Since virtue cannot be taught, it is not knowledge or prudence, and the statesmen led their cities by right opinion, like soothsayers and oracle singers who say much that is true and know nothing of it. So virtue comes by divine dispensation, unless there is a statesman able to make another, who would be among the living what Tiresias was among the shades. Socrates must go, and asks Meno to calm Anytus.

SOC. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην d
since then not only through knowledge
ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς
good men — would-be and beneficial to-the
πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀρθὴν
cities if-indeed they-should-be but also through right
δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς
opinion of-these-two but neither by-nature is for-the
ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, οὔτ᾽
men either knowledge or opinion true nor
ἐπίκτητα — ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν
acquired or does-it-seem to-you by-nature either-one-whatever of-them
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
not to-me-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν
therefore since not by-nature not-even the good by-nature would-be
ἄν.
—

MEN. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
since and at-least not by-nature we-were-examining the after this
εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.
if teachable it-is

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ
therefore teachable it-seemed to-be if prudence the
ἀρετή;
virtue

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν
and if at-least teachable it-were prudence —
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

e SOC. καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι,
and if indeed at-least teachers there-were teachable — to-be
μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;
not being but not teachable

MEN. οὕτω.
so

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ
but indeed we-have-agreed not to-be of-it
διδασκάλους;
teachers

MEN. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν
we-have-agreed then neither teachable it nor prudence
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν
but indeed good at-least it we-agree
εἶναι;
to-be

MEN. ναί.
yes

SOC. ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς
beneficial and also good to-be the rightly
ἡγούμενον;
leading

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα 99
rightly and at-least to-lead two being these
μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων
alone opinion both true and knowledge which having
ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται — τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης
a-man rightly leads the-things for from chance
τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ
some rightly coming-about not by-human guidance
γίγνεται — ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν
come-about of-which and a-man guide is
ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ
toward the right two these opinion true and
ἐπιστήμη.
knowledge

MEN. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

it-seems to-me so

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμη

therefore since not teachable it-is not-even knowledge

δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;

indeed any-longer becomes the virtue

MEN. οὐ φαίνεται.

not it-appears

b SOC. δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν

of-two then being good and beneficial the indeed

ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει

one has-been-dismissed and not — would-be in political action

ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

knowledge guide

MEN. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

not to-me it-seems

SOC. οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ

not then by-wisdom some nor wise being —

τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ

such men led the cities the around

Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὗς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν·

Themistocles both and whom just-now Anytus here was-speaking-of

διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους

wherefore indeed also not able — others to-make such

οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες

as themselves are inasmuch-as not through knowledge being

τοιοῦτοι.

such

MEN. ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς

it-seems so to-be O Socrates as

λέγεις.

you-say

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ c
therefore if not by-knowledge by-good-opinion indeed the
λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι
remaining it-comes-about by-which the political men using
τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες
the cities set-right in-nothing differently being
πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ
toward the to-be-prudent than the oracle-singers both and the
θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν
soothsayers and for these being-inspired say
μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν
indeed true-things and many know but nothing of-what
λέγουσιν.
they-say

MEN. κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.
it-is-likely so to-be

SOC. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν
therefore O Meno worthy these divine to-call
τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ
the men who mind not having many
καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ
and great-things succeed-in of-what they-do and
λέγουσι;
say

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν d
rightly then — we-would-call divine both whom just-now we-were-calling
χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας·
oracle-singers and seers and the poetic all
καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν
and the political not least of-these we-would-say —

θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ
divine both to-be and to-be-inspired breathed-into being and
κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες
possessed by the god when they-succeed saying
πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν
many and great things nothing knowing of-what
λέγουσιν.
they-say

MEN. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς
and the at-least women surely O Meno the
ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν
good men divine call and the Laconians when
τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, "θεῖος ἀνήρ," φασίν,
someone they-praise a-good man divine man they-say
"οὗτος."
this(-man-is)

e MEN. καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς
and they-appear at-least O Socrates rightly
λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται
to-speak and-yet perhaps Anytus here with-you is-vexed
λέγοντι.
speaking(-so)

100 SOC. οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ
nothing it-concerns to-me-at-least with-this(-man) indeed O Meno also
αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ
again we-will-converse if but now we in all the argument
τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν
this finely searched both and spoke virtue —
εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ
would-be neither by-nature nor teachable but by-divine dispensation

παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ
coming without mind to-whom — it-comes if
μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος
not someone should-be such of-the political men as
καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν
also another to-make political if but he-should-be nearly —
τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον
something this(-man) would-be-called such among the living as
ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι,
said Homer among the dead — Tiresias to-be
λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου,
saying about him that alone he-has-wits of-those in of-Hades
τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος
they but shades flit the-same — also here — such(-man)
ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς
as among shades a-true — thing would-be in-respect-of
ἀρετήν.
virtue

MEN. κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. b
most-finely you-seem to-me to-speak O Socrates

SOC. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ c
from indeed then this — reasoning O Meno by-divine
μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς ἂν
dispensation to-us appears coming the virtue to-whom —
παραγίγνηται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε,
it-comes the but clear-truth about it we-shall-know then
ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται
when before in-whatever way to-the men comes
ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ζητεῖν
virtue first we-try it by itself to-seek
τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι
what ever is virtue now but for-me indeed hour somewhere

ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι
to-go you but the-same these-things which-very yourself have-been-persuaded-of
πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πραότερος
persuade also the guest-friend here Anytus so-that gentler
ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους
he-may-be since if you-persuade this(-man) it-is that also the-Athenians
ὀνήσεις.
you-will-benefit

PLATO

ΕΥΘΥΔΗΜΟΣ

Euthydemus

Crito asks who was talking with Socrates yesterday in the Lyceum, where a crowd kept him from hearing. Socrates names Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus, Chians who settled at Thurii and were exiled from it. They were masters of fighting in armor and of the law courts, and now have mastered the last kind of combat, refuting whatever is said, true or false. Socrates means to become their pupil, despite his age, with Crito's sons as bait, and begins his story: as he rose to leave the undressing room, his divine sign came.

CRI. τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθὲς ἐν Λυκείῳ 271
who was-it O Socrates with-whom yesterday in the-Lyceum
διελέγου; ἦ πολὺς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιειστήκει, ὥστ'
you-were-conversing truly great you a-crowd stood-around so-that
ἔγωγε βουλόμενος ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦ
I-at-least wishing to-hear having-come-near nothing able — I-was
ἀκοῦσαι σαφές· ὑπερκύψας μέντοι κατεῖδον, καί μοι
to-hear clear having-peered-over however I-looked-down and to-me
ἔδοξεν εἶναι ξένος τις ᾧ διελέγου. τίς ἦν;
he-seemed to-be a-stranger some(-one) with-whom you-were-conversing who was-he
SOC. πότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; οὐ γὰρ εἷς ἀλλὰ
which-of-the-two also do-you-ask O Crito not for one but
δύ' ἦστην.
two there-were
CRI. ὃν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ b
whom indeed I mean on right third from you
καθῆστο· ἐν μέσῳ δ' ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιόχου μειράκιον ἦν.
sat in middle and of-you the of-Axiochus lad was
καὶ μάλα πολύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξεν,
and very much O Socrates to-have-grown to-me he-seemed
καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν
and — from-our not much at-all in-the age to-differ

Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μὲν σκληφρός, οὗτος δὲ
Critobulus but that-one indeed lanky this-one but
προφερὴς καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄψιν.
forward and fine and good in-the appearance

SOC. Εὐθύδημος οὑτός ἐστιν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς, ὁ
Euthydemus this(-man) is O Crito whom you-ask the
δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου,
but beside me sitting on left brother of-this(-man)
Διονυσόδωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων.
Dionysodorus takes-part and also this(-man) in-the discussions

c CRI. οὐδέτερον γιγνώσκω, ὦ Σώκρατες. καινοί τινες αὖ
neither I-know O Socrates new some in-turn
οὗτοι, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφισταί· ποδαποί; καὶ τίς ἡ σοφία;
these as it-seems sophists from-where and what the wisdom

d SOC. οὗτοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐντεῦθέν ποθέν εἰσιν
these the indeed descent as I-think from-here from-somewhere are
ἐκ Χίου, ἀπῴκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους, φεύγοντες δὲ ἐκεῖθεν
from Chios they-emigrated but to Thurii being-exiled and from-there
πόλλ' ἤδη ἔτη περὶ τούσδε τοὺς τόπους διατρίβουσιν. ὃ
many already years about these — places they-spend-time which
δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων·
but you ask the wisdom of-the-two marvelous O Crito
πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τώ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅτι εἶεν οἱ
all-wise simply the-two at-least not I-knew before — what were the
παγκρατιασταί. τούτω γάρ ἐστον κομιδῇ παμμάχω. οὐ κατὰ
pancratiasts these-two for are completely all-fighters not like
τὼ Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενέσθην τὼ παγκρατιαστὰ ἀδελφώ·
the-two Acarnanians were the-two pancratiast brothers
ἐκείνω μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἵω τε μάχεσθαι,
those indeed for with-the body only able — to-fight
τούτω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ σώματι δεινοτάτω ἐστὸν
these-two but first indeed with-the body most-dread are

— ἐν ὅπλοις γὰρ αὐτώ τε σοφὼ πάνυ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον, 272
in arms for themselves both wise very to-fight and another
ὃς ἂν διδῷ μισθόν, οἵω τε ποιῆσαι — ἔπειτα τὴν ἐν τοῖς
whoever — gives a-fee able — to-make then the in the
δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον
law-courts fight most-mighty and to-contend and another
διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἵους εἰς τὰ
to-teach to-speak both and to-compose speeches such-as for the
δικαστήρια. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δεινὼ ἦστην μόνον, νῦν
law-courts before — indeed then these-things dread were only now
δὲ τέλος ἐπιτεθήκατον παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ. ἦ γὰρ ἦν
but completion they-two-have-put to-the-pancratiastic art which for was
λοιπὴ αὐτοῖν μάχη ἀργός, ταύτην νῦν ἐξείργασθον, ὥστε
remaining for-them fight untried this now they-have-worked-out so-that
μηδ' ἂν ἕνα αὐτοῖς οἷόν τ' εἶναι μηδ' ἀντᾶραι·
not-even — one against-them able — to-be nor to-raise-himself-against(-them)
οὕτω δεινὼ γεγόνατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαί τε καὶ
so dread they-have-become in the arguments to-fight both and
ἐξελέγχειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἐάντε ψεῦδος ἐάντε
to-refute the always being-said alike whether false or
ἀληθὲς ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐν νῷ ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδροῖν
true it-be I indeed then O Crito in mind have to-the two-men
παραδοῦναι ἐμαυτόν· καὶ γάρ φατον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
to-hand-over myself and for they-two-say in little time
ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δεινόν.
to-make — also another anyone-whatever the same these-things dread
CRI. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβῇ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ
what and O Socrates not do-you-fear the age lest
ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ᾖς;
already older you-be

c SOC. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων· ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον ἔχω καὶ
least at-least O Crito sufficient proof I-have and
παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. αὐτὼ γὰρ τούτω, ὡς
encouragement of-the not to-fear themselves for these-two so
ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γέροντε ὄντε ἠρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας
a-word to-say old-men being began this — wisdom
ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσιν ἢ προπέρυσιν
which I-at-least desire the eristic last-year or the-year-before
οὐδέπω ἤστην σοφώ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἓν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖ
not-yet were wise but I one only fear lest in-turn
ὄνειδος τοῖν ξένοιν περιάψω, ὥσπερ Κόννῳ τῷ Μητροβίου,
reproach to-the strangers I-fasten-on as to-Connus the (son)-of-Metrobius
τῷ κιθαριστῇ, ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν·
the harpist who me teaches still even now to-play-the-harp
ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες οἱ συμφοιτηταί μοι ἐμοῦ τε
seeing then the boys the fellow-pupils of-mine me both
καταγελῶσι καὶ τὸν Κόννον καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον.
laugh-at and — Connus call old-man-teacher
μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένοιν τις ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὀνειδίσῃ·
lest then also to-the strangers someone the-same this reproach
οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσως φοβούμενοι τάχα με οὐκ ἂν
they and it this perhaps fearing probably me not —
ἐθέλοιεν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖσε μὲν
would-be-willing to-receive I but O Crito there indeed
ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητάς μοι φοιτᾶν πρεσβύτας,
others I-have-persuaded fellow-learners with-me to-attend elderly
ἐνταῦθα δέ γε ἑτέρους πειράσομαι πείθειν. καὶ σὺ τί οὐ
here but at-least others I-will-try to-persuade and you why not
συμφοιτᾷς; ὡς δὲ δέλεαρ αὐτοῖς ἄξομεν τοὺς σοὺς υἱεῖς·
attend-with(-us) as and bait for-them we-will-bring — your sons
ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς παιδεύσουσιν.
longing for them I-know that also us they-will-educate

CRI. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν γε σοὶ
but nothing prevents O Socrates if at-least to-you
δοκῇ. πρῶτον δέ μοι διήγησαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῖν
it-seems(-good) first but to-me relate the wisdom of-the
ἀνδροῖν τίς ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ μαθησόμεθα.
two-men what it-is so-that I-may-know what also we-shall-learn
SOC. οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων· ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί e
not — you-could-be-too-quick hearing since not — I-could
γε εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ
at-least say that not I-applied the mind to-them but very
καὶ προσεῖχον καὶ μέμνημαι, καί σοι πειράσομαι ἐξ
both I-applied(-it) and I-remember and to-you I-will-try from
ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγήσασθαι. κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον
beginning all-things to-relate according-to god for some I-happened
καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὗπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ
sitting here where-very you me saw in the undressing-room
μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ
alone and already in mind I-had to-stand-up standing-up but
μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.
of-me came the customary sign the divine

II · THE BROTHERS ARRIVE

Socrates sits down again, and the brothers come in, then Clinias with his lovers, Ctesippus of Paeania among them. Socrates praises the brothers to Clinias for their skill in war and the courts, and they laugh: they now treat that as a sideline, and teach virtue better and faster than anyone. Socrates hails them as gods, and asks whether they can persuade one who doubts it to learn virtue from them.

273 πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμην, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον
again then I-sat-down and a-little later come-in
τούτω — ὅ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος — καὶ
these-two — both Euthydemus and — Dionysodorus and
ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὖ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν· εἰσελθόντε
other pupils with-them in-turn many to-me to-seem having-come-in
δὲ περιπατείτην ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ οὔπω
and they-walked-about in the roofed running-track and not-yet
τούτω δύ' ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιεληλυθότε ἤστην, καὶ
these-two two or three courses having-gone-around were and
εἰσέρχεται Κλεινίας, ὃν σὺ φῂς πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι, ἀληθῆ
comes-in Clinias whom you say much to-have-grown true-things
λέγων· ὄπισθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί τε καὶ
saying behind and him lovers very many both and
ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος, νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα
others and Ctesippus a-youth some(-one) of-Paeania very
καλός τε κἀγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστὴς διὰ
fine both and-good in-the nature so-far-as not insolent because-of
τὸ νέος εἶναι. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλεινίας ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου
the young to-be having-seen then me — Clinias from the entrance
μόνον καθήμενον, ἄντικρυς ἰὼν παρεκαθέζετο ἐκ δεξιᾶς,
alone sitting straight going sat-down-beside(-me) on right
ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ φῂς. ἰδόντε δὲ αὐτὸν ὅ τε Διονυσόδωρος
as also you say having-seen and him — both Dionysodorus
καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντε διελεγέσθην
and — Euthydemus first indeed having-stopped conversed
ἀλλήλοιν, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε εἰς ἡμᾶς —
with-each-other other and other(-glance) looking at us
καὶ γὰρ πάνυ αὐτοῖν προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν — ἔπειτα ἰόντε ὁ
and for very to-them I-applied the mind then going the

μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον ἐκαθέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρ᾽
one beside the lad sat-down — Euthydemus the but beside
αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστος ἐτύγχανεν.
right me on left the and others as each happened
ἠσπαζόμην οὖν αὐτὼ ἅτε διὰ χρόνου ἑωρακώς· c
I-greeted then the-two inasmuch-as after time having-seen(-them)
μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εἶπον πρὸς τὸν Κλεινίαν· ὦ Κλεινία, τώδε
after and this I-said to — Clinias O Clinias these-two
μέντοι τὼ ἄνδρε σοφώ, Εὐθύδημός τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρος,
however — two-men wise Euthydemus both and Dionysodorus
οὐ τὰ σμικρὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν
not the small-things but the great-things the-things for about the
πόλεμον πάντα ἐπίστασθον, ὅσα δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα
war all-things know-the-two as-many-as must the intending
ἀγαθὸν στρατηγὸν ἔσεσθαι, τάς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς
good general to-be the both orderings and the
ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι·
commands of-the armies and in arms to-fight
οἵω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ
able-the-two — and also to-make able to-be him himself
βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἄν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ.
to-help in the law-courts if someone him wrongs
εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα κατεφρονήθην ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖν· ἐγελασάτην d
having-said then these-things I-was-despised by the-two laughed
οὖν ἄμφω βλέψαντε εἰς ἀλλήλω, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν·
then both having-looked at each-other and — Euthydemus said
οὔτοι ἔτι ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ
not-at-all any-longer these-things O Socrates we-are-serious-about but
παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.
as-side-works them we-use

κἀγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον· καλὸν ἄν που τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν
and-I having-wondered said fine — I-suppose the work your
εἴη, εἰ τηλικαῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει
would-be if so-great matters side-works for-you happen
ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν εἴπετόν μοι τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν.
being and by gods tell-the-two me what is this — fine
ἀρετήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμεθα οἵω τ' εἶναι
virtue he-said O Socrates we-think able-the-two — to-be
παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.
to-hand-on most-finely of-men and most-quickly
e ὦ Ζεῦ, οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα· πόθεν τοῦτο
O Zeus what-sort said and I you-two-tell a-matter whence this
τὸ ἕρμαιον ηὑρέτην; ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν διενοούμην ἔτι,
— godsend did-you-two-find I but about you was-thinking still
ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο δεινοῖν ὄντοιν,
as just-now I-was-saying that for-the most-part this dread being
ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἔλεγον περὶ σφῷν· ὅτε
in arms to-fight and these-things I-was-saying about you-two when
γὰρ τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδημησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφὼ
for the earlier(-time) you-two-visited this I-remember you-two
ἐπαγγελλομένω.
professing
274 εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον,
if but now truly this — knowledge you-two-have
ἵλεω εἶτον — ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφὼ ὥσπερ θεὼ
gracious be-the-two simply for I-at-least you-two as gods
προσαγορεύω, συγγνώμην δεόμενος ἔχειν μοι τῶν
address pardon asking to-have for-me of-the
ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτον, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ
before said-things but see-the-two O Euthydemus both and

Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγετον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους
Dionysodorus if true-things you-two-say by for the greatness
τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν.
of-the profession nothing wonderful to-disbelieve
ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον.
but well know O Socrates this so being
μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον
I-count-blessed then you I-at-least for-the possession much more
ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς· τοσόνδε δέ μοι εἴπετον,
than great king for-the rule so-much and me tell-the-two
εἰ ἐν νῷ ἔχετον ἐπιδεικνύναι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ
if in mind you-two-have to-display this — wisdom or
πῶς σφῷν βεβούλευται.
how by-you-two it-has-been-resolved
ἐπ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς b
for itself at-least this we-are-here O Socrates as
ἐπιδείξοντε καὶ διδάξοντε, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ
going-to-display-the-two and going-to-teach-the-two if someone wishes
μανθάνειν.
to-learn
ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ὑμῖν c
but that indeed they-will-wish all the not having(-it) I to-you
ἐγγυῶμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὑτοσί, πρὸς
guarantee first indeed I then and Clinias this-here besides
δ' ἡμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὅδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ
and us Ctesippus both here and the others these said and I
δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἱ δὲ ἐτύγχανον
showing to-him the lovers the of-Clinias they and happened
ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιστάμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρω
us already standing-around — for Ctesippus happened far
καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου — καὶμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ὁ
sitting — from-Clinias and-to-me to-seem as happened —

Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνενευκὼς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν,
Euthydemus with-me conversing leaning-forward to the front
ἐν μέσῳ ὄντος ἡμῶν τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ
in middle being of-us — Clinias he-blocked — Ctesippus
τῆς θέας — βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος
from-the view wishing both then to-view — Ctesippus
τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας
the beloved and at-the-same-time fond-of-listening being having-leapt-up
πρῶτος προσέστη ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ καταντικρύ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ
first he-stood-by us in the opposite(-place) so then also the
ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἵ τε τοῦ Κλεινίου
others him having-seen stood-around us the both — of-Clinias
ἐρασταὶ καὶ οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου τε καὶ Διονυσοδώρου
lovers and the — of-Euthydemus both and of-Dionysodorus
ἑταῖροι. τούτους δὴ ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ
companions these indeed I showing said — to-Euthydemus
ὅτι πάντες ἕτοιμοι εἶεν μανθάνειν· ὅ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος
that all ready were to-learn — both then Ctesippus
συνέφη μάλα προθύμως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτὼ
assented very eagerly and the others and they-bade the-two
κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.
in-common all to-display the power of-the wisdom
e εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ· ὦ Εὐθύδημε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πάνυ
said then I O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus certainly
μὲν οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ
indeed then in-every way both these gratify-the-two and me
ἕνεκα ἐπιδείξασθον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ
for-sake-of display-the-two the indeed then most clear that not
ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐπιδεῖξαι· τόδε δέ μοι εἴπετον, πότερον
small work to-display this but me tell-the-two whether
πεπεισμένον ἤδη ὡς χρὴ παρ' ὑμῶν μανθάνειν δύναισθ'
persuaded already that one-must from you to-learn could-you-two

ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μήπω
— good to-make a-man only or also that-one — not-yet
πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ὅλως τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν
persuaded because-of the not to-think at-all the matter the
ἀρετὴν μαθητὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴ σφὼ εἶναι αὐτῆς διδασκάλω;
virtue learnable to-be or not you-two to-be of-it teachers
φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον
come also the so disposed of-the same art work
πεῖσαι ὡς καὶ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ οὗτοι ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ
to-persuade that both teachable the virtue and these you are
παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθοι, ἢ ἄλλης;
from whom — most-finely anyone it might-learn or of-another
ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ
of-this indeed then he-said the same O Socrates —
Διονυσόδωρος.
Dionysodorus
ὑμεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν 275
you then said and I O Dionysodorus of-the present
ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ᾽ ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ
men most-finely — would-urge to philosophy and
ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν;
of-virtue care
οἰόμεθά γε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες.
we-think at-least indeed O Socrates

Socrates asks them to show their exhortation on Clinias, a cousin of Alcibiades whose friends fear another may corrupt him. Euthydemus asks whether the wise or the ignorant learn, and Dionysodorus whispers that whatever the boy answers he will be refuted. Clinias says the wise, and is shown that learners are ignorant; then he is shown that it is the wise who learn the dictation, and the brothers' followers cheer.

b τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἡμῖν, ἔφην, εἰς
of-the indeed then other-things the display for-us I-said for
αὖθις ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ ἐπιδείξασθον· τουτονὶ
another-time put-off-the-two this but itself display-the-two this-here
τὸν νεανίσκον πείσατον ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς
— youth persuade-the-two that one-must to-philosophize and of-virtue
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ χαριεῖσθον ἐμοί τε καὶ τουτοισὶ πᾶσιν.
to-take-care and you-two-will-gratify me both and these-here all
συμβέβηκεν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον τῷ μειρακίῳ τούτῳ·
has-happened for something such — to-lad this
ἐγώ τε καὶ οἵδε πάντες τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὡς
I both and these all happen desiring as
βέλτιστον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν
best him to-become is and this(-boy) of-Axiochus indeed
υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτανεψιὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν
son the (son)-of-Alcibiades the elder first-cousin but of-the now
ὄντος Ἀλκιβιάδου· ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ Κλεινίας. ἔστι δὲ νέος·
being Alcibiades name and to-him Clinias he-is and young
φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ,
we-fear indeed about him as is-likely about a-young(-one)
μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας
lest someone anticipate us to other some pursuit having-turned
αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρῃ. σφὼ οὖν ἥκετον
his the mind and corrupt(-him) you-two then you-two-have-come

εἰς κάλλιστον· ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν, λάβετον
in finest(-time) but if not anything it-matters to-you take-the-two
πεῖραν τοῦ μειρακίου καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναντίον ἡμῶν.
a-test of-the lad and converse-the-two before us
εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοῦ σχεδόν τι αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος c
having-said then me nearly somewhat very these-things — Euthydemus
ἅμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει,
at-once manfully both and boldly but nothing it-matters
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐὰν μόνον ἐθέλῃ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ
O Socrates he-said if only he-is-willing to-answer the
νεανίσκος.
youth
ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε καὶ εἴθισται·
but indeed truly I-said I this at-least also he-is-accustomed-to
θαμὰ γὰρ αὐτῷ οἵδε προσιόντες πολλὰ ἐρωτῶσίν τε
often for to-him these coming-to(-him) many-things ask both
καὶ διαλέγονται, ὥστε ἐπικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι.
and converse so-that reasonably he-is-bold the to-answer
τὰ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι d
the indeed after these-things O Crito how — finely to-you
διηγησαίμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν
could-I-relate not for small the task to-be-able to-recapture
διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην· ὥστ' ἔγωγε, καθάπερ
going-through wisdom unmanageable how-great so-that I-at-least like
οἱ ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως μούσας τε
the poets need beginning the narrative muses both
καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. ἤρξατο δ' οὖν ἐνθένδε
and Memory to-invoke began and anyhow from-here
ποθὲν ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς ἐγῷμαι· ὦ Κλεινία, πότεροί εἰσι
somewhere — Euthydemus as I-think O Clinias which are
τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;
of-the men the learning the wise or the ignorant

e καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος,
and the lad inasmuch-as great being the question
ἠρυθρίασέν τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἐνέβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ· καὶ
blushed both and being-at-a-loss looked to me and
ἐγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, θάρρει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ
I perceiving him confused be-bold said and I O
Κλεινία, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ἀνδρείως, ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται·
Clinias and answer manfully whichever to-you appears(-right)
ἴσως γάρ τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μεγίστην ὠφελίαν.
perhaps for you-know it-benefits the greatest benefit
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκύψας μοι μικρὸν πρὸς
and in this — Dionysodorus leaning-toward me a-little to
τὸ οὖς, πάνυ μειδιάσας τῷ προσώπῳ, καὶ μήν, ἔφη,
the ear very having-smiled with-the face and surely he-said
σοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, προλέγω ὅτι ὁπότερ' ἂν ἀποκρίνηται
to-you O Socrates I-foretell that whichever — answers
τὸ μειράκιον, ἐξελεγχθήσεται.
the lad he-will-be-refuted

276 καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεινίας ἔτυχεν
and him meanwhile these-things saying — Clinias happened
ἀποκρινάμενος, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαί μοι ἐξεγένετο
having-answered so-that not-even to-urge to-me it-was-possible
εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ
to-be-careful the lad but he-answered that the wise
εἶεν οἱ μανθάνοντες.
were the learning

b καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καλεῖς δέ τινας, ἔφη, διδασκάλους, ἢ
and — Euthydemus call and some he-said teachers or
οὔ; — ὡμολόγει. — οὐκοῦν τῶν μανθανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι
not he-agreed therefore of-the learning the teachers
διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς
teachers are as the harpist and the letter-teacher

διδάσκαλοι δήπου ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων,
teachers surely were of-you and of-the other boys
ὑμεῖς δὲ μαθηταί; — συνέφη. — ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα
you and pupils he-assented other something then when
ἐμανθάνετε, οὔπω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα ἃ ἐμανθάνετε; — οὐκ
you-were-learning not-yet did-you-know these-things which you-were-learning no
ἔφη. — ἆρ' οὖν σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἠπίστασθε; —
he-said so then wise were-you when these-things not you-knew
οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς. — οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; — πάνυ
not indeed said and he therefore if not wise ignorant certainly
γε. — ὑμεῖς ἄρα μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἠπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς
at-least you then learning what not you-knew ignorant
ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε. — ἐπένευσε τὸ μειράκιον. — οἱ ἀμαθεῖς
being you-were-learning nodded the lad the ignorant
ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ σοφοί, ὡς σὺ οἴει.
then learn O Clinias but not the wise as you think
ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς c
these-things then having-said him as at teacher a-chorus
ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ
having-signaled together shouted-applause both and laughed the
ἑπόμενοι ἐκεῖνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου τε καὶ Εὐθυδήμου·
following those with — Dionysodorus both and Euthydemus
καὶ πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον,
and before to-recover-breath finely both and well the lad
ἐκδεξάμενος ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, τί δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὁπότε
having-taken-up — Dionysodorus what and O Clinias he-said whenever
ἀποστοματίζοι ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστής, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν
was-dictating to-you the letter-teacher which learned of-the
παίδων τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; — οἱ
boys the dictated-things the wise or the ignorant the

σοφοί, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. — οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν ἀλλ'
wise said — Clinias the wise then learn but
οὐχ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, καὶ οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἄρτι Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω.
not the ignorant and not well you just-now to-Euthydemus answered
d ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν
here indeed and very greatly laughed both and shouted
οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ
the lovers of-the two-men admiring the wisdom of-the-two the
δ' ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς
but others we being-stunned were-silent perceiving and us
ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν
— Euthydemus stunned so-that still more we-might-admire
αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνίει τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλ' ἠρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ
him not he-let-go the lad but asked and like
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα
the good dancers double-turns twisted the questions
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη· πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες
about the same and said whether for the learning
μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται;
learn what they-know or what not they-know
e καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρός με ψιθυρίσας,
and — Dionysodorus again a-little to me having-whispered
καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερον τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ
also this he-said O Socrates another such as the
πρότερον.
earlier
ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἦ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν
O Zeus I-said I truly indeed also the earlier at-least fine
ἡμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα.
to-us appeared the question
πάντ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφυκτα.
all he-said O Socrates such we ask inescapable

τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖτέ μοι εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς
therefore said and I you-seem to-me to-be-well-reputed among the
μαθηταῖς.
pupils

IV · THE CORYBANTIC DANCE

Euthydemus asks whether learners learn what they know or what they do not, and turns Clinias' answer around by way of the letters he already knows; Dionysodorus catches the argument like a ball and throws it back. As the lad founders, Socrates comforts him: these are the dances of the Corybantic initiation, games before the rites, and he is now hearing the first of the sophistic mysteries.

ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλεινίας τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι 277
in and this — indeed Clinias — to-Euthydemus answered that
μανθάνοιεν οἱ μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταιντο· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο
learn the learning what not they-know he but asked
αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧνπερ τὸ πρότερον· τί δέ; ἦ
him through the same-things through-which-very the earlier what and said
δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα; — ναί, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν
and he not know you letters yes he-said therefore
ἅπαντα; — ὡμολόγει. — ὅταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματίζῃ
all he-agreed when then someone dictates
ὁτιοῦν, οὐ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει; — ὡμολόγει. —
anything-whatever not letters does-he-dictate he-agreed
οὐκοῦν ὧν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι, ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει,
therefore of-which something you know he-said he-dictates
εἴπερ πάντα ἐπίστασαι; — καὶ τοῦτο ὡμολόγει. — τί οὖν;
if-indeed all-things you-know also this he-agreed what then
ἦ δ' ὅς, ἆρα σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις ἅττ' ἂν ἀποστοματίζῃ τις,
said and he then you not learn whatever — dictates someone

ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μανθάνει; — οὔκ, ἀλλ',
he but not knowing letters learns no but
ἦ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. — οὐκοῦν ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἦ δ' ὅς,
said and he I-learn therefore what you-know said and he
μανθάνεις, εἴπερ γε ἅπαντα τὰ γράμματα ἐπίστασαι. —
you-learn if-indeed at-least all the letters you-know
ὡμολόγησεν. — οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη.
he-agreed not then rightly you-answered he-said
c καὶ οὔπω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἴρητο τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ, καὶ
and not-yet very at-all these-things had-been-said — by-Euthydemus and
ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον
— Dionysodorus like a-ball having-caught the argument
πάλιν ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μειρακίου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε
again aimed at-the lad and said deceives you
Εὐθύδημος, ὦ Κλεινία. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τὸ μανθάνειν οὐκ
Euthydemus O Clinias tell for me the to-learn not
ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτου οὗ ἄν τις μανθάνῃ; —
knowledge is to-take of-this which — someone learns
ὡμολόγει ὁ Κλεινίας. — τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἦ δ' ὅς,
agreed — Clinias the and to-know said and he
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν; — συνέφη. —
other something than to-have knowledge already is be-assented
τὸ ἄρα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μήπω ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν; —
the then not to-know not-yet to-have knowledge is
ὡμολόγει αὐτῷ. — πότερον οὖν εἰσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες
he-agreed with-him whether then are the taking
ὁτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἤδη ἢ οἳ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν; —
anything-whatever the having already or those-who — not have
οἳ ἂν μή. — οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ
those-who — not therefore you-have-agreed to-be of-these also
τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων; — κατένευσε. —
the not knowing of-the not having he-nodded

τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
of-the taking then are the learning but not
τῶν ἐχόντων; — συνέφη. — οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη,
of-the having he-assented the not knowing then he-said
μανθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.
learn O Clinias but not the knowing
ἔτι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλὼν ὥσπερ πάλαισμα d
still indeed for the third going-to-throw(-him) as a-wrestling-fall
ὥρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς
was-rushing-at — Euthydemus the youth and I perceiving
βαπτιζόμενον τὸ μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό,
being-swamped the lad wishing to-rest him
μὴ ἡμῖν ἀποδειλιάσειε, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον· ὦ Κλεινία,
lest for-us he-should-lose-heart encouraging(-him) I-said O Clinias
μὴ θαύμαζε εἴ σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι. ἴσως
not wonder if to-you appear unaccustomed the arguments perhaps
γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ οἷον ποιεῖτον τὼ ξένω περὶ
for not you-perceive what-sort the-two-are-doing the two-strangers about
σέ· ποιεῖτον δὲ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν
you they-two-are-doing and the-same which-very the in the initiation of-the
Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνωσιν ποιῶσιν περὶ τοῦτον
Corybants when the enthronement they-make about this(-one)
ὃν ἂν μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ χορεία τίς ἐστι
whom — they-are-going to-initiate and for there dance some is
καὶ παιδιά, εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν τούτω
and play if then also you-have-been-initiated also now these-two
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σὲ καὶ οἷον ὀρχεῖσθον
nothing other than dance-the-two about you and as-it-were dance
παίζοντε, ὡς μετὰ τοῦτο τελοῦντε. νῦν οὖν νόμισον
playing-the-two as after this going-to-initiate(-you) now then consider
τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν.
the first-things of-the rites to-hear of-the sophistic

First, as Prodicus says, one must learn about the correctness of names. Men use the word learn both for acquiring knowledge and for understanding with knowledge already had, and the brothers have been playing on this. Such learning is play: it teaches nothing about how things are and only lets one trip people up, like those who pull away a stool from a man about to sit. Socrates asks the brothers to turn to the serious part, and offers his own model first.

278 πρῶτον γάρ, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος
first for as says Prodicus about of-names correctness
μαθεῖν δεῖ· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθόν σοι τὼ ξένω, ὅτι
to-learn one-must which indeed also are-showing to-you the-two strangers that
οὐκ ἤδησθα τὸ μανθάνειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ
not you-knew the to-learn that the men call(-it) indeed in
τῷ τοιῷδε, ὅταν τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην
the such(-case) when someone from beginning no having knowledge
περὶ πράγματός τινος ἔπειτα ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ τὴν
about matter some then later of-it takes the
ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι δὲ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔχων
knowledge they-call and the-same this also when having
ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο
already the knowledge with-this — knowledge the-same this
πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῇ ἢ πραττόμενον ἢ λεγόμενον — μᾶλλον
matter be-examines either being-done or being-said rather
μὲν αὐτὸ συνιέναι καλοῦσιν ἢ μανθάνειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε
indeed it to-understand they-call than to-learn there-is and when
καὶ μανθάνειν — σὲ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς οὗτοι ἐνδείκνυνται,
also to-learn you and this as these show
διαλέληθεν, ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως
has-escaped-the-notice-of the-same name for men oppositely
ἔχουσιν κείμενον, τῷ τε εἰδότι καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μή· παραπλήσιον
disposed being-applied to-the both knowing and for the not similar

δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐρωτήματι, ἐν ᾧ ἠρώτων
and to-this also the in the second question in which they-asked
σε πότερα μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ
you whether learn the men what they-know or what
μή. ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδιά ἐστιν — διὸ
not these-things indeed of-the learnings play is wherefore
καί φημι ἐγώ σοι τούτους προσπαίζειν — παιδιὰν δὲ
also say I to-you these to-make-sport play and
λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα
I-call(-it) through these-things that if even many someone or even all
τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον
— such-things should-learn the indeed matters not-at-all — more
εἰδείη πῇ ἔχει, προσπαίζειν δὲ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη
he-would-know how it-stands to-make-sport but able — — he-would-be
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν
with-the men because-of the of-the names difference
ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ σκολύθρια
tripping-up and overturning(-them) as the the stools
τῶν μελλόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες χαίρουσι καὶ
of-the going-to sit-down pulling-out rejoice and
γελῶσιν, ἐπειδὰν ἴδωσιν ὕπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον.
laugh whenever they-see on-his-back overturned
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιὰν γεγονέναι· d
these-things indeed then to-you from these consider play to-have-been
τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι τούτω γέ σοι αὐτὼ τὰ
the but after these-things clear that these-two at-least to-you themselves the
σπουδαῖα ἐνδείξεσθον, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν ἵνα
serious-things will-show and I will-guide them so-that
μοι ὃ ὑπέσχοντο ἀποδῶσιν. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι
to-me what they-promised they-may-render they-two-said for to-display
τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν· νῦν δέ, μοι δοκεῖ, δεῖν
the exhortatory wisdom now but to-me it-seems to-be-necessary

ᾠηθήτην πρότερον παῖσαι πρὸς σέ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὦ
they-thought first to-play toward you these-things indeed then O
Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν,
Euthydemus both and Dionysodorus let-it-have-been-played both by-you
καὶ ἴσως ἱκανῶς ἔχει· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον
and perhaps sufficiently it-is the but indeed after these-things display-the-two
προτρέποντε τὸ μειράκιον ὅπως χρὴ σοφίας τε καὶ
exhorting the lad how one-must of-wisdom both and
ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δ' ἐγὼ σφῷν ἐνδείξομαι
of-virtue to-take-care before but I to-you-two will-show
οἷον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ οἵου αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκοῦσαι.
what-sort it I-take(-to-be) and what-sort of-it I-desire to-hear
ἐὰν οὖν δόξω ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ γελοίως αὐτὸ ποιεῖν,
if then I-seem to-you amateurishly both and laughably it to-do
μή μου καταγελᾶτε· ὑπὸ προθυμίας γὰρ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς
not me laugh-at from eagerness for of-the to-hear —
ὑμετέρας σοφίας τολμήσω ἀπαυτοσχεδιάσαι ἐναντίον ὑμῶν.
your wisdom I-will-dare to-improvise before you
ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούοντες αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ
bear-with-me-the-two then without-laughing listening yourselves both and the
μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν· σὺ δέ μοι, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου, ἀπόκριναι.
pupils your you but for-me O son of-Axiochus answer

VI · SOCRATES EXHORTS CLINIAS

All men wish to fare well, and they think they would if they had many good things: wealth, health, beauty, good birth, power, and honor, and justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom too. They nearly forget good fortune, the greatest of goods, but Socrates realizes they have counted it twice, since wisdom is good fortune: flute players, letter teachers, and helmsmen are the most fortunate in their own fields.

ἆρά γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἢ
then at-least all men wish well to-fare or
τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὢν νυνδὴ ἐφοβούμην ἓν τῶν
this indeed question of-those-which just-now I-was-fearing one of-the
καταγελάστων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ
laughable senseless for surely even the to-ask —
τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ οὐ βούλεται ἀνθρώπων εὖ πράττειν; —
such-things who for not wishes of-men well to-fare
οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὔκ, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. — εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ 279
no-one who not said — Clinias well said and I the
δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν
indeed after this since we-wish well to-fare how —
εὖ πράττοιμεν; ἆρ' ἂν εἰ ἡμῖν πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ εἴη; ἢ
well might-we-fare then — if for-us many and-good-things there-were or
τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἔτι εὐηθέστερον; δῆλον γάρ που καὶ τοῦτο
this than-that still sillier clear for I-suppose also this
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. — συνέφη. — φέρε δή, ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα
that so it-is he-assented come indeed good-things and what-sort
ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ
then of-the beings happen for-us being or not hard nor
σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι εὐπορεῖν;
of-an-august man very at-all nor this seems to-be to-find-out
πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν· ἦ
every(-one) for — to-us would-say that the to-be-rich good is-it-not

γάρ; — πάνυ γ', ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ
for certainly at-least he-said therefore also the to-be-healthy and
τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς
the handsome to-be and the-other-things concerning the body sufficiently
παρεσκευάσθαι; — συνεδόκει. — ἀλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαί γε καὶ
to-be-provided it-seemed-so but surely noble-births at-least and
δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δῆλά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα. —
powers and honors in — one's-own clear are good being
ὡμολόγει. — τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν;
he-agreed what then I-said still for-us remains of-the goods
c τί ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ σώφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ
what then is the temperate both to-be and just and
ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον πρὸς Διός, ὦ Κλεινία, ἡγῇ σύ, ἐὰν
courageous whether by Zeus O Clinias do-you-think you if
ταῦτα τιθῶμεν ὡς ἀγαθά, ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσειν,
these we-set-down as good rightly us to-be-going-to-set(-them)
ἢ ἐὰν μή; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσειεν· σοὶ
or if not perhaps for — someone with-us might-dispute to-you
δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ; — ἀγαθά, ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας. — εἶεν, ἦν
but how does-it-seem good said — Clinias well said
δ' ἐγώ· τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; ἐν τοῖς
and I the and wisdom where of-the-chorus shall-we-place among the
ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; — ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. — ἐνθυμοῦ
goods or how do-you-say among the goods consider
δὴ μή τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον
indeed lest any we-leave-out of-the goods that also worthy
λόγου. — ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδέν, ὁ Κλεινίας. —
of-account but to-me we-seem he-said none — Clinias
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεὶς εἶπον ὅτι ναὶ μὰ Δία κινδυνεύομέν
and I having-recalled said that yes by Zeus we-are-likely
γε τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν. — τί
at-least the greatest of-the goods to-leave-out what(-is)

τοῦτο; ἦ δ' ὅς. — τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὦ Κλεινία· ὃ
this said and he the good-fortune O Clinias which
πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάνυ φαῦλοι, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν
all say even the very common greatest of-the goods
εἶναι. — ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. — καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ πάλιν
to-be true-things you-say he-said and I in-turn again
μετανοήσας εἶπον ὅτι ὀλίγου καταγέλαστοι ἐγενόμεθα
having-changed-my-mind said that nearly laughable we-became
ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιόχου.
before the strangers I both and you O son of-Axiochus
— τί δή, ἔφη, τοῦτο; — ὅτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν e
why indeed he-said this that good-fortune in the earlier(-things)
θέμενοι νυνδὴ αὖθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν. — τί οὖν
having-placed just-now again about the same we-were-speaking what then
δὴ τοῦτο; — καταγέλαστον δήπου, ὃ πάλαι πρόκειται,
indeed this laughable surely what for-long lies-before
τοῦτο πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δὶς ταὐτὰ λέγειν. — πῶς,
this again to-propose and twice the-same-things to-say how
ἔφη, τοῦτο λέγεις; — ἡ σοφία δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐτυχία
he-said this do-you-mean the wisdom surely said and I good-fortune
ἐστίν· τοῦτο δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοίη. — καὶ ὃς ἐθαύμασεν·
is this and even-a child would-know and he wondered
οὕτως ἔτι νέος τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστί. — κἀγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν
so still young both and simple he-is and-I perceiving him
θαυμάζοντα, ἆρα οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, ὅτι περὶ
wondering then not you-know I-said O Clinias that in
αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοί εἰσιν; —
flute-playings success the flute-players most-fortunate are
συνέφη. — οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων
he-assented therefore said and I also in letters
γραφῆς τε καὶ ἀναγνώσεως οἱ γραμματισταί; — πάνυ
writing both and reading the letter-teachers certainly

γε. — τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης κινδύνους μῶν
at-least what and against the of-the sea dangers surely-not
οἴει εὐτυχεστέρους τινὰς εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν κυβερνητῶν,
you-think more-fortunate any to-be than-the wise helmsmen
ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν; — οὐ δῆτα.
as for all to-say not indeed

VII · USE, NOT POSSESSION

A wise man needs no good fortune besides. Good things profit us only if they are used, as food is if eaten and tools if worked with, and only if they are used rightly, which knowledge provides. So knowledge gives both good fortune and success in every possession and action.

280 τί δέ; στρατευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ
what and campaigning with which-of-the-two — more-gladly the
κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ
danger both and the fortune would-you-share with a-wise general
ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; — μετὰ σοφοῦ. — τί δέ; ἀσθενῶν μετὰ
or with an-ignorant with a-wise what and being-sick with
ποτέρου ἂν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ
which-of-the-two — gladly would-you-run-risk with a-wise doctor or
μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; — μετὰ σοφοῦ. — ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι
with an-ignorant with a-wise so then said and I that
εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἴει πράττειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πράττων ἢ
more-fortunately — you-think to-fare with a-wise faring than
μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς; — συνεχώρει. — ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ
with an-ignorant he-agreed the wisdom then everywhere
εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἁμαρτάνοι
to-be-fortunate makes the men not for surely would-err

γ᾽ ἄν ποτέ τι σοφία, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ὀρθῶς πράττειν
at-least — ever in-anything wisdom but (of)-necessity rightly to-act
καὶ τυγχάνειν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.
and to-hit(-the-mark) truly for — no-longer wisdom would-be
συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ἐν b
we-agreed ending-up not I-know how in
κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν, σοφίας παρούσης, ᾧ ἂν
sum so this to-be wisdom being-present whomever —
παρῇ, μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο
it-is-present-to nothing to-need-besides good-fortune since and this
συνωμολογησάμεθα, πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον
we-agreed again I-inquired of-him the before
ὡμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ,
agreed-things how — for-us they-would-stand we-agreed for
ἔφην, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ παρείη, εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ
I-said if to-us good-things many were-present to-be-happy — and
εὖ πράττειν. — συνέφη. — ἆρ᾽ οὖν εὐδαιμονοῖμεν ἂν διὰ
well to-fare he-assented so then would-we-be-happy — through
τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθά, εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ; —
the present good-things if nothing us they-benefit or if they-benefit
εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη. — ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄν τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη
if they-benefit he-said so then — anything would-they-benefit if they-were
μόνον ἡμῖν, χρῴμεθα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς μή; οἷον σιτία εἰ ἡμῖν
only for-us we-used but them not as food if for-us
εἴη πολλά, ἐσθίοιμεν δὲ μή, ἢ ποτόν, πίνοιμεν δὲ μή,
there-were much we-ate but not or drink we-drank but not
ἔσθ᾽ ὅτι ὠφελοίμεθ᾽ ἄν; — οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. — τί δέ; οἱ
is-it that we-would-be-benefited — not indeed he-said what and the
δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια
craftsmen all if for-them there-were all the necessaries
παρεσκευασμένα ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, χρῷντο δὲ
provided for-each for — his-own work they-used but

αὐτοῖς μή, ἆρ' ἂν οὕτοι εὖ πράττοιεν διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν, ὅτι
them not then — these well would-fare through the possession because
κεκτημένοι εἶεν πάντα ἃ δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν δημιουργόν;
having-acquired they-were all-things which must to-have-acquired the craftsman
d οἷον τέκτων, εἰ παρεσκευασμένος εἴη τά τε ὄργανα
for-instance a-carpenter if provided he-were the both tools
ἅπαντα καὶ ξύλα ἱκανά, τεκταίνοιτο δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὅτι
all and wood sufficient did-carpentry but not is-it that
ὠφελοῖτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως; — οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. —
he-would-be-benefited — from the possession in-no-way he-said
τί δέ, εἴ τις κεκτημένος εἴη πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ἃ
what and if someone having-acquired should-be wealth both and what
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθά, χρῷτο δὲ αὐτοῖς
just-now we-were-calling all the goods used but them
μή, ἆρ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῖ διὰ τὴν τούτων κτῆσιν τῶν
not then — would-be-be-happy through the of-these possession of-the
ἀγαθῶν; — οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. — δεῖ ἄρα, ἔφην,
goods not indeed O Socrates it-is-needful then I-said
ὡς ἔοικεν, μὴ μόνον κεκτῆσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν
as it-seems not only to-have-acquired — such goods the
μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ἢ
going-to happy to-be but also to-use them or
οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται. — ἀληθῆ λέγεις. —
no benefit of-the possession comes-about true-things you-say
ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα
so then O Clinias already this sufficient toward the happy
ποιῆσαί τινα, τό τε κεκτῆσθαι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι
to-make someone the both to-have-acquired the-good-things and the to-use
αὐτοῖς; — ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. — πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν
them to-me-at-least it-seems whether said and I if
ὀρθῶς χρῆταί τις ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή; — ἐὰν ὀρθῶς.
rightly one-uses(-them) someone or also if not if rightly

καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. πλέον γάρ που οἶμαι 281
finely at-least said and I you-speak more for I-suppose I-think
θάτερόν ἐστιν, ἐάν τις χρῆται ὁτῳοῦν μὴ ὀρθῶς
the-other is if someone uses any-whatever not rightly
πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἐᾷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὔτε
thing than if he-lets(-it-be) the indeed for bad the but neither
κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω φαμέν; — συνεχώρει. —
bad nor good or not so do-we-say he-agreed
τί οὖν; ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσει τῇ περὶ τὰ ξύλα
what then in the working both and use the about the wood
μῶν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι
surely-not other something is the accomplishing rightly to-use
ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἡ τεκτονική; — οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. — ἀλλὰ μήν
than knowledge the carpentry not indeed he-said but surely
που καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τὰ σκεύη ἐργασίᾳ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη
I-suppose also in the about the vessels working the rightly knowledge
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπεργαζομένη. — συνέφη. — ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
is the accomplishing he-assented so then said and I
καὶ περὶ τὴν χρείαν ὧν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
also about the use of-what we-were-calling the first of-the goods
πλούτου τε καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς
wealth both and health and beauty the rightly all —
τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμη ἦν ἡγουμένη καὶ κατορθοῦσα
such to-use knowledge was leading and directing-rightly
τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; — ἐπιστήμη, ἦ δ' ὅς. — οὐ μόνον
the action or other something knowledge said and he not only
ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη
then good-fortune but also success as it-seems the knowledge
παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν πάσῃ κτήσει τε καὶ πράξει.
provides to-the men in every possession both and action

Without wisdom the other goods do more harm, since the more one has the more one errs, and a poor, weak, timid man errs less. In themselves they are neither good nor bad: led by ignorance they are greater evils, and by wisdom greater goods. Since wisdom alone is good, a man must seek it from father, guardians, and lovers alike. Clinias says it can be taught, and Socrates asks the brothers to show whether one knowledge makes a man happy and which; Dionysodorus begins by asking whether they are in earnest.

c — ὡμολόγει. — ἆρ' οὖν ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄφελός
he-agreed so then O by Zeus said and I benefit
τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄνευ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; ἆρά
any of-the other possessions without prudence and wisdom then
γε ἂν ὄναιτο ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ
at-least — would-profit a-man many-things having-acquired and many-things
πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων; ὧδε
doing mind not having or rather few-things mind having thus
δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι,
and consider not fewer-things doing fewer-things — would-he-err
ἐλάττω δὲ ἁμαρτάνων ἧττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι, ἧττον
fewer-things and erring less — badly would-he-fare less
δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἄθλιος ἧττον ἂν εἴη; — πάνυ γ',
and badly faring wretched less — would-he-be certainly at-least
ἔφη. — πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις πράττοι πένης
he-said whether then — rather fewer-things one would-do poor
ὢν ἢ πλούσιος; — πένης, ἔφη. — πότερον δὲ ἀσθενὴς ἢ
being or rich poor he-said whether and weak or
ἰσχυρός; — ἀσθενής. — πότερον δὲ ἔντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος; —
strong weak whether and honored or dishonored
ἄτιμος. — πότερον δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ὢν καὶ σώφρων ἐλάττω
dishonored whether and courageous being and temperate fewer-things

ἂν πράττοι ἢ δειλός; — δειλός. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀργὸς
would-he-do or cowardly cowardly therefore also idle
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης; — συνεχώρει. — καὶ βραδὺς μᾶλλον
rather than industrious he-agreed and slow rather
ἢ ταχύς, καὶ ἀμβλὺ ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἢ ὀξύ;
than quick and dimly seeing and hearing rather than sharply
— πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις. — ἐν e
all — such-things we-agreed with-one-another in
κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα ἃ
sum and I-said O Clinias it-is-likely all-together what
τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος
the first we-said goods to-be not about this the account
αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτά γε καθ' αὑτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ,
for-them to-be how they at-least by themselves are-by-nature good
ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία,
but as it-seems thus it-is if indeed them leads ignorance
μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα
greater evils to-be than-the opposites by-as-much-as more-able
ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι, ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε
to-serve the leading bad being if but prudence both
καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθά, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ οὐδέτερα
and wisdom greater goods they but by themselves neither
αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι. — φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν,
of-them of-anything worth to-be it-appears he-said as it-seems
οὕτως, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. — τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν
so as you say what then for-us follows from the
εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὂν
things-said other something than of-the indeed others nothing being
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν ἡ μὲν
either good or bad of-these but two being the indeed
σοφία ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν; — ὡμολόγει.
wisdom good the but ignorance bad he-agreed

282 ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφην, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἐπειδὴ εὐδαίμονες
still then I-said the remaining let-us-examine since happy
μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, ἐφάνημεν δὲ τοιοῦτοι
indeed to-be we-are-eager all we-appeared and such
γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαί τε τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ
becoming from the to-use both the things and
ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ εὐτυχίαν ἐπιστήμη
rightly to-use the and rightness and good-fortune knowledge
ἦν ἡ παρέχουσα, δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκ παντὸς
was the providing it-is-needful indeed as it-seems from every
τρόπου ἅπαντα ἄνδρα τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὅπως ὡς
way every man this to-provide-for-himself that as
σοφώτατος ἔσται· ἢ οὔ; — ναί, ἔφη. — καὶ παρὰ πατρός
wisest he-will-be or not yes he-said and from a-father
γε δήπου τοῦτο οἰόμενον δεῖν παραλαμβάνειν πολὺ
at-least surely this thinking to-be-needful to-receive much
μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ παρ᾽ ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων τῶν
rather than money and from guardians and friends the
τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἐραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων
both others and the claiming lovers to-be and from-strangers
καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἱκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι,
and citizens begging and beseeching of-wisdom to-give-a-share
οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν, ὦ Κλεινία, οὐδὲ νεμεσητὸν ἕνεκα τούτου
nothing shameful O Clinias nor blameworthy for-sake-of this
ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ,
to-serve and to-be-a-slave both to-a-lover and to-every man
ὁτιοῦν ἐθέλοντα ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων,
anything-whatever being-willing to-serve of-the fine services
προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ,
being-eager wise to-become or not does-it-seem to-you I-said I
οὕτως; — πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
so certainly indeed then well to-me you-seem to-speak said and he

— εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Κλεινία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σοφία διδακτόν, d
if is at-least O Clinias said and I the wisdom teachable
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·
but not from of-itself comes to-the men
τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὔπω διωμολογημένον
this for for-us still unexamined and not-yet agreed-on
ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί. — ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
by-me both and by-you but to-me-at-least he-said O Socrates
διδακτὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. — καὶ ἐγὼ ἡσθεὶς εἶπον· ἦ καλῶς
teachable to-be it-seems and I delighted said truly finely
λέγεις, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με
you-speak O best of-men and well you-did having-released me
σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδακτὸν
from-an-inquiry long about this itself whether teachable
ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ σοφία. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδή σοι καὶ διδακτὸν
or not teachable the wisdom now then since to-you both teachable
δοκεῖ καὶ μόνον τῶν ὄντων εὐδαίμονα καὶ εὐτυχῆ ποιεῖν
it-seems and alone of-the beings happy and fortunate to-make
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄλλο τι ἢ φαίης ἂν ἀναγκαῖον
the man other something than you-would-say — necessary
εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῷ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν; —
to-be to-philosophize and yourself in mind have it to-do
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.
certainly indeed then he-said O Socrates as possible — most
κἀγὼ ταῦτα ἅσμενος ἀκούσας, τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, ἔφην, e
and-I these-things gladly having-heard — indeed my I-said
παράδειγμα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οἵων
example O Dionysodorus both and Euthydemus of-what-sort
ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι, τοιοῦτον, ἰδιωτικὸν
I-desire the exhortatory speeches to-be such amateurish
ἴσως καὶ μόλις διὰ μακρῶν λεγόμενον· σφῷν δὲ
perhaps and with-difficulty at length spoken of-you-two but

ὁπότερος βούλεται, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο τέχνῃ πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω
whichever wishes the-same this with-art doing let-him-display
ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βούλεσθον, ὅθεν ἐγὼ ἀπέλιπον, τὸ
to-us if but not this you-two-wish where I left-off the
ἑξῆς ἐπιδείξατον τῷ μειρακίῳ, πότερον πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην
next display-you-two to-the lad whether every knowledge
δεῖ αὐτὸν κτᾶσθαι, ἢ ἔστι τις μία ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα
must he to-acquire or there-is some one which one-must having-got
εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, καὶ τίς αὕτη.
to-be-happy both and good man to-be and what this-is
ὡς γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀρχόμενος, περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν τυγχάνει
as for I-was-saying beginning of much to-us it-happens
ὂν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.
being this — youth wise both and good to-become
283 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἶπον, ὦ Κρίτων· τῷ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο
I indeed then these-things said O Crito to-the and after this
ἐσομένῳ πάνυ σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐπεσκόπουν
going-to-be very vehemently I-applied the mind and watched
τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἅψοιντο τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὁπόθεν
in-what ever way they-would-take-up the argument and whence
ἄρξοιντο παρακελευόμενοι τῷ νεανίσκῳ σοφίαν τε καὶ
they-would-begin urging the youth wisdom both and
ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ὁ οὖν πρεσβύτερος αὐτῶν, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος,
virtue to-practice the then elder of-them — Dionysodorus
πρότερος ἤρχετο τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν
first began the argument and we all were-looking
πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους
toward him as immediately very going-to-hear wonderful
τινὰς λόγους. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἡμῖν· θαυμαστὸν γάρ
some speeches which-very then also happened to-us wonderful for

τινα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀνὴρ κατῆρχεν λόγον, οὗ σοὶ ἄξιον
some O Crito the-man began speech which for-you worth
ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς παρακελευστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετήν.
to-hear how exhortatory the speech was toward virtue
εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι
tell me he-said O Socrates both and you the others as-many-as
φατὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφὸν γενέσθαι,
say to-desire this — youth wise to-become
πότερον παίζετε ταῦτα λέγοντες ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιθυμεῖτε
whether you-jest these-things saying or truly really desire(-it)
καὶ σπουδάζετε;
and are-serious
κἀγὼ διενοήθην ὅτι ᾠηθήτην ἄρα ἡμᾶς τὸ πρότερον c
and-I thought that they-two-thought then us the earlier
παίζειν, ἡνίκα ἐκελεύομεν διαλεχθῆναι τῷ νεανίσκῳ
to-jest when we-bade to-converse with-the youth
αὐτώ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσεπαισάτην τε καὶ οὐκ
them-two and through these-things they-two-jested-along both and not
ἐσπουδασάτην· ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεὶς ἔτι μᾶλλον εἶπον
were-serious these-things then having-thought still more I-said
ὅτι θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζοιμεν.
that wonderfully we-were-serious

IX · WISHING HIM DEAD

Dionysodorus asks whether they wish Clinias to become wise and no longer to be what he is; then they wish him dead. Ctesippus calls this a lie, and Euthydemus argues that no one can speak falsely, since speaking is about what is, and what is not cannot be spoken or made. Ctesippus says good men speak of things as they are; the brothers twist this into speaking badly of bad things, Ctesippus turns it on them, and Dionysodorus calls him abusive.

d καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως
and — Dionysodorus consider surely he-said O Socrates that
μὴ ἔξαρνος ἔσῃ ἃ νῦν λέγεις. — ἔσκεμμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ·
not denying you-will-be what now you-say I-have-considered said and I
οὐ γὰρ μή ποτ' ἔξαρνος γένωμαι. — τί οὖν; ἔφη· φατὲ
not for not ever denying I-shall-become what then he-said do-you-say
βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι; — πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — νῦν
to-wish him wise to-become certainly indeed then now
δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, Κλεινίας πότερον σοφός ἐστιν ἢ οὔ; — οὔκουν
but said and he Clinias whether wise is or not not-then
φησί γέ πω· ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀλαζών. — ὑμεῖς δέ,
says at-least yet he-is and said and I not a-boaster you and
ἔφη, βούλεσθε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφόν, ἀμαθῆ δὲ μὴ εἶναι; —
he-said you-wish to-become him wise ignorant and not to-be
ὡμολογοῦμεν. — οὐκοῦν ὃς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν
we-agreed therefore who indeed not he-is you-wish him
γενέσθαι, ὃς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι. — καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας
to-become who but he-is now no-longer to-be and I having-heard
ἐθορυβήθην· ὁ δέ μου θορυβουμένου ὑπολαβών, ἄλλο τι
I-was-confused he and me being-confused taking-up other something
οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ βούλεσθε αὐτὸν ὃς νῦν ἐστὶν μηκέτι εἶναι,
then he-said since you-wish him who now he-is no-longer to-be
βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι; καίτοι πολλοῦ
you-wish him as it-seems to-have-perished and-yet much
ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν φίλοι τε καὶ ἐρασταί, οἵτινες
— worth — such would-be friends both and lovers who
τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιήσαιντο ἐξολωλέναι.
the beloved above all — would-esteem to-have-perished-utterly
e καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἠγανάκτησέν τε ὑπὲρ τῶν
and — Ctesippus having-heard was-indignant both on-behalf-of the
παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ ξένε Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον,
beloved and said O stranger Thurian if not more-boorish

ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἄν· "σοὶ εἰς κεφαλήν,"
he-said it-were to-say I-would-have-said — to-you on head(-be-it)
ὅτι μαθών μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδῃ τοιοῦτον
why having-learned of-me and of-the others you-lie-against such
πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ
a-thing which I think not-even holy to-be to-say that I
τόνδε βουλοίμην ἂν ἐξολωλέναι.
this(-boy) should-wish — to-have-perished-utterly
τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἦ δοκεῖ σοι 284
what and said O Ctesippus — Euthydemus truly seems to-you
οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι; — νὴ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί
possible — to-be to-lie by Zeus he-said if not I-am-mad
γε. — πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος
at-least whether saying the thing about which — the discourse
ᾖ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα; — λέγοντα, ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
is or not saying(-it) saying(-it) he-said therefore if-indeed
λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ
he-says it not other he-says of-the beings than that which-very
λέγει; — πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — ἓν μὴν
he-says how for — said — Ctesippus one surely
κἀκεῖνό γ' ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ λέγει, χωρὶς τῶν
that-too at-least is of-the beings which he-says apart-from the
ἄλλων. — πάνυ γε. — οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων τὸ ὄν,
others certainly at-least therefore the that saying the being
ἔφη, λέγει; — ναί. — ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε τὸ ὂν λέγων
he-said says yes but surely he at-least the being saying
καὶ τὰ ὄντα τἀληθῆ λέγει· ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, εἴπερ
and the beings the-truth says so-that — Dionysodorus if-indeed
λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τἀληθῆ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ ψεύδεται.
he-says the beings he-says the-truth and nothing against you lies

b ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ
yes he-said but the these-things saying said — Ctesippus O
Εὐθύδημε, οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.
Euthydemus not the beings says
c καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, ἄλλο τι ἢ
and — Euthydemus the but not being he-said other something than
οὐκ ἔστιν; — οὐκ ἔστιν. — ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά
not are not are other something then nowhere the
γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν; — οὐδαμοῦ. — ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως
at-least not being being are nowhere is-it then how
περὶ ταῦτα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα, πράξειεν ἄν τίς τι, ὥστ'
about these — not being would-do — anyone anything so-that
ἐκεῖνα ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὁστισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα; —
those would-make — even anyone-whatever the nowhere being
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — τί οὖν; οἱ
not to-me-at-least it-seems said — Ctesippus what then the
ῥήτορες ὅταν λέγωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, οὐδὲν πράττουσι; —
orators when they-speak in the people nothing do
πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. — οὐκοῦν εἴπερ πράττουσι,
they-do indeed then said and he therefore if-indeed they-do
καὶ ποιοῦσι; — ναί. — τὸ λέγειν ἄρα πράττειν τε καὶ
also they-make yes the to-speak then to-do both and
ποιεῖν ἐστιν; — ὡμολόγησεν. — οὐκ ἄρα τά γε μὴ ὄντ',
to-make is he-agreed not then the at-least not being
ἔφη, λέγει οὐδείς — ποιοῖ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη τί· σὺ δὲ
he-said speaks anyone he-would-make for — at-once something you and
ὡμολόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μηδένα ποιεῖν —
have-agreed the not being not possible — to-be anyone to-make
ὥστε κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ λέγει, ἀλλ'
so-that according-to — your argument no-one false-things says but
εἴπερ λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τἀληθῆ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.
if-indeed speaks Dionysodorus the-truth both and the beings he-speaks

νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα
by Zeus said — Ctesippus O Euthydemus but the beings
μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει.
indeed in-a-way some he-speaks not however as at-least they-are
πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὦ Κτήσιππε; εἰσὶν γάρ d
how do-you-mean said — Dionysodorus O Ctesippus are for
τινες οἳ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει; — εἰσὶν μέντοι,
some who speak the things as they-are there-are however
ἔφη, οἱ καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τἀληθῆ λέγοντες. — τί
he-said the fine both and-good and the the-truth speaking what
οὖν; ἦ δ' ὅς· τἀγαθὰ οὐκ εὖ, ἔφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ
then said and he the-good-things not well he-said are the but bad-things
κακῶς; — συνεχώρει. — τοὺς δὲ καλούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς
badly he-agreed the and fine both and good
ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὡς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα; — ὁμολογῶ. —
do-you-agree to-speak as are the things I-agree
κακῶς ἄρα, ἔφη, λέγουσιν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ
badly then he-said speak O Ctesippus the good the
κακά, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν. — ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ'
bad-things if-indeed as they-are they-speak yes by Zeus said and
ὅς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γοῦν κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ὧν
he vehemently at-least the at-any-rate bad men of-whom
σύ, ἐάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσῃ εἶναι, ἵνα μή σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
you if me you-obey will-take-care to-be so-that not you the good
κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὡς εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κακῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
badly may-speak since well know that badly speak the good
τοὺς κακούς. — καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος,
the bad and the great said — Euthydemus
μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς θερμῶς; — μάλιστα
greatly they-speak and the hot hotly most
δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς
surely said — Ctesippus the at-any-rate frigid frigidly

λέγουσί τε καὶ φασὶν διαλέγεσθαι. — σὺ μέν, ἔφη ὁ
they-speak both and say to-converse you indeed he-said —
Διονυσόδωρος, λοιδορῇ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορῇ.
Dionysodorus you-are-abusive O Ctesippus you-are-abusive
285 μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε,
by Zeus not I-at-least said and he O Dionysodorus since I-love you
ἀλλὰ νουθετῶ σε ὡς ἑταῖρον, καὶ πειρῶμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε
but I-admonish you as a-comrade and try to-persuade never
ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀγροίκως λέγειν ὅτι ἐγὼ τούτους
in-presence of-me so boorishly to-say that I these
βούλομαι ἐξολωλέναι, οὓς περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦμαι.
wish to-have-perished-utterly whom about most I-value

X · NO CONTRADICTION

Socrates calms them, offering himself to be destroyed and remade like Medea's victims, and Ctesippus offers his own hide if it will become virtue rather than Marsyas' wineskin. Dionysodorus denies that there is such a thing as contradiction: either both speak the account of the thing and say the same, or neither speaks it, or one speaks of something else, and in no case do they contradict.

b ἐγὼ οὖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἐδόκουν ἀγριωτέρως πρὸς ἀλλήλους
I then since to-me they-seemed more-savagely toward each-other
ἔχειν, προσέπαιζόν τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον ὅτι ὦ
to-be-disposed made-sport-of both — Ctesippus and said that O
Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων
Ctesippus to-me indeed it-seems needful us from the strangers
δέχεσθαι ἃ λέγουσιν, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ
to-accept what they-say if they-are-willing to-give(-it) and not
ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολλύναι
over-a-word to-quarrel if for they-know so to-destroy

ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ᾽ ἐκ πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χρηστούς
men so-that from wicked both and senseless good
τε καὶ ἔμφρονας ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο εἴτε αὐτὼ
both and sensible to-make(-them) and this whether themselves
ηὑρήκατον εἴτε καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην φθόρον τινὰ
they-have-found or also from another someone they-learned destruction some
καὶ ὄλεθρον τοιοῦτον, ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὄντα
and ruin such so-that having-destroyed a-wicked(-man) being
χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφῆναι· εἰ τοῦτο ἐπίστασθον — δῆλον
good again to-render(-him) if this they-know clear
δὲ ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι
and that they-know they-said at-any-rate the art of-them to-be
τὴν νεωστὶ ηὑρημένην ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ
the newly found good to-make the men from
πονηρῶν — συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν αὐτοῖν αὐτό· ἀπολεσάντων
wicked let-us-grant then to-them it let-them-destroy
ἡμῖν τὸ μειράκιον καὶ φρόνιμον ποιησάντων, καὶ ἅπαντάς
for-us the lad and prudent let-them-make(-him) and all
γε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι φοβεῖσθε, ὥσπερ
at-least us the others if but you the young are-afraid as
ἐν Καρὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος· ὡς ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ
in a-Carian in me let-be the risk since I since also
πρεσβύτης εἰμί, παρακινδυνεύειν ἕτοιμος καὶ παραδίδωμι
old I-am to-run-the-risk ready and I-hand-over
ἐμαυτὸν Διονυσοδώρῳ τούτῳ ὥσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ.
myself to-Dionysodorus this as — to-Medea the Colchian
ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται, ἑψέτω, εἰ δ᾽, ὅτι
let-him-destroy me and if indeed he-wishes let-him-boil(-me) if but whatever
βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιείτω· μόνον χρηστὸν ἀποφηνάτω.
he-wishes this let-him-do only good let-him-render(-me)

d καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώκρατες,
and — Ctesippus I indeed he-said also myself O Socrates
ἕτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν
ready am to-offer myself to-the strangers and if
βούλωνται δέρειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι ἡ
they-wish to-flay(-me) still more than now they-flay(-me) if for-me the
δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσει, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου,
hide not in a-wineskin shall-end like the — of-Marsyas
ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετήν. καίτοι με οἴεται Διονυσόδωρος οὑτοσὶ
but in virtue and-yet me thinks Dionysodorus here
χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλεπαίνω, ἀλλ' ἀντιλέγω
to-be-angry with-him I but not am-angry but contradict
πρὸς ταῦτα ἅ μοι δοκεῖ πρός με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.
against these-things which to-me he-seems toward me not finely to-say
ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ
but you the to-contradict he-said O noble Dionysodorus not
κάλει λοιδορεῖσθαι· ἕτερον γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι.
call to-be-abusive different for something is the to-be-abusive
καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ
and Dionysodorus as being he-said the to-contradict O
Κτήσιππε, ποιῇ τοὺς λόγους;
Ctesippus do-you-make the arguments
e πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, καὶ σφόδρα γε· ἢ σύ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε,
altogether surely he-said and vehemently at-least or you O Dionysodorus
οὐκ οἴει εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν;
not think there-is to-contradict
οὔκουν σύ γ' ἄν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πώποτε ἀκούσας
not-then you at-least — he-said could-show ever having-heard
οὐδενὸς ἀντιλέγοντος ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ.
anyone contradicting one another

ἀληθῆ λέγεις; ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ἀκούων μὲν νυνί σοι ἀποδείκνυμι
true-things you-say he-said but hearing indeed now to-you I-show(-it)
ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησίππου Διονυσοδώρῳ.
contradicting Ctesippus to-Dionysodorus
ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον;
truly also would-you-render — of-this an-account
πάνυ, ἔφη.
very he-said
τί οὖν; ἦ δ' ὅς· εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; — 286
what then said and he are-there for-each of-the beings accounts
πάνυ γε. — οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν;
certainly at-least therefore as is each or as not is
ὡς ἔστιν. — εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ
as it-is if for you-remember he-said O Ctesippus also
ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ
just-now we-showed no-one saying as not is the for
μὴ ὂν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. — τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἦ
not being no-one appeared saying what then indeed this said
δ' ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος· ἧττόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγώ τε
and he — Ctesippus less at-all do-we-contradict I both
καὶ σύ; — πότερον οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἂν τοῦ
and you whether then said and he would-we-contradict — of-the
αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφότεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω
same matter the-account both saying or so
μὲν ἂν δήπου ταὐτὰ λέγοιμεν; — συνεχώρει. — ἀλλ'
indeed — surely the-same-things we-would-say he-agreed but
ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ,
when neither he-said the of-the matter account says
τότε ἀντιλέγοιμεν ἄν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἂν
then would-we-contradict — or so at-least — altogether not-even —
μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; — καὶ
mindful would-be of-the matter either of-us also

τοῦτο συνωμολόγει. — ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ
this he-agreed but then when I indeed the of-the
πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε
matter account say you but of-other some another then
ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις
do-we-contradict or I say indeed the matter you but not-even speak
τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς ἂν ἀντιλέγοι;
— altogether the but not speaking to-the speaking how — could-contradict

XI · NO FALSEHOOD, NO IGNORANCE

Socrates has heard this argument from Protagoras' school and earlier, and says it overturns itself. If there is no false speech or opinion, there is no ignorance and no error, and then what do the brothers teach? Dionysodorus calls him a Cronus for remembering what was said earlier, and quibbles over whether phrases have souls. Ctesippus says they talk marvelous nonsense.

c καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐσίγησεν· ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν
and — indeed Ctesippus fell-silent I but having-wondered-at the
λόγον, πῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γάρ τοι
argument how I-said O Dionysodorus do-you-mean not for you-know
ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις
but this at-least — argument from-many indeed and often
ἀκηκοὼς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω — καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν
having-heard always I-wonder-at and for the around Protagoras
σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ
vehemently used it and the still older to-me
δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε
but always wonderful some(-thing) it-seems to-be both the both
ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν — οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ
others overturning and itself itself I-think and of-it

τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι
the truth from you most-finely to-learn other something
ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν; — τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος·
false-things to-say not it-is-possible this for means the argument
ἦ γάρ; — ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν;
is-it-not for but either speaking true-things to-say or not to-speak
συνεχώρει.
he-agreed
πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν d
whether then false-things indeed to-say not it-is-possible to-opine
μέντοι ἔστιν;
however it-is-possible
οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη.
not-even to-opine he-said
οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδής, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν.
not-even then false said and I opinion is — altogether
οὐκ ἔφη.
no he-said
οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν
not-even then ignorance nor ignorant men or not this —
εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων;
would-be ignorance if-indeed it-were the to-be-deceived about-the matters
πάνυ γε, ἔφη.
certainly at-least he-said
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
but this not is said and I
οὐκ ἔφη.
no he-said

λόγου ἕνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα
of-argument for-sake O Dionysodorus do-you-speak the argument so-that
δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς
indeed something-strange you-may-say or as truly does-it-seem to-you no-one
εἶναι ἀμαθὴς ἀνθρώπων;
to-be ignorant of-men
e ἀλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον.
but you he-said refute(-me)
ἦ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι,
truly also is-it-possible this according-to — your argument to-refute
μηδενὸς ψευδομένου;
no-one lying
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.
not it-is he-said — Euthydemus
οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, νυνδὴ Διονυσόδωρος
not-even then was-bidding I-said I just-now Dionysodorus
ἐξελέγξαι;
to-refute
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν πῶς ἄν τις κελεύσαι; σὺ δὲ κελεύεις;
the for not being how — someone would-bid you but bid
ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
because said and I O Euthydemus the wise-things these and the
εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μανθάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως
well being not very at-all I-understand but dully somehow
ἐννοῶ. ἴσως μὲν οὖν φορτικώτερόν τι ἐρήσομαι,
I-grasp perhaps indeed then more-vulgar something I-shall-ask
ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκε.
but forgive(-me)
287 ὅρα δέ· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστιν μήτε ψευδῆ
see and if for neither to-lie it-is-possible nor false-things
δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῆ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν
to-opine nor ignorant to-be other something not-even to-err

ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι πράττῃ; πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ
is-it-possible when someone something does doing for not
ἔστιν ἁμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ πράττει· οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε;
it-is-possible to-err-in this which he-does not so do-you-say
πάνυ γ', ἔφη.
certainly at-least he-said
τοῦτό ἐστιν ἤδη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἐρώτημα. εἰ b
this is already said and I the vulgar question if
γὰρ μὴ ἁμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε
for not we-err either doing or saying or
διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει,
thinking you O by Zeus if these-things so are
τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἥκετε; ἢ οὐκ ἄρτι ἔφατε ἀρετὴν
of-what teachers have-you-come or not just-now you-said virtue
κάλλιστ' ἂν παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλοντι μανθάνειν;
most-finely — to-hand-on of-men to-the wishing to-learn
εἶτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβών,
then he-said O Socrates — Dionysodorus taking-up
οὕτως εἶ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἃ τὸ πρῶτον εἴπομεν νῦν
so are-you a-Cronus that what the first we-said now
ἀναμιμνήσκῃ, καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθήσῃ,
you-recall and if anything last-year I-said now you-will-recall
τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι λεγομένοις οὐχ ἕξεις ὅτι χρῇ;
with-the but in the present things-said not will-you-know what to-do
καὶ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποί εἰσιν πάνυ — εἰκότως· παρὰ c
and for I-said I hard they-are very reasonably from
σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται — ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ
wise-men for they-are-said since also this — last
παγχάλεπον χρήσασθαί ἐστιν, ᾧ λέγεις. τὸ γὰρ "οὐκ ἔχω
very-hard to-use is which you-mention the for not I-know
ὅτι χρῶμαι" τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι
what to-do what ever do-you-mean O Dionysodorus or clear that

ὡς οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἰπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ
that not I-am-able to-refute it since tell what to-you other means
τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ "οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι τοῖς λόγοις";
this — phrase the not I-know what to-do-with the arguments
ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ ἀπόκριναι.
but what you mean he-said since answer
πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε;
before you to-answer said and I O Dionysodorus
οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ἔφη.
not will-you-answer he-said
ἦ καὶ δίκαιον;
truly and just
δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη.
just certainly he-said
d κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε,
according-to what account said and I or clear that according-to this
ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφῖξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ
that you now all-wise some(-one) to-us have-come about arguments and
οἶσθα ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ'
you-know when one-must to-answer and when not and now not-even
ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρίνῃ, ἅτε γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ;
— anything-whatever do-you-answer inasmuch-as recognizing that not one-must
λαλεῖς, ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, πείθου
you-babble he-said having-neglected to-answer but good-sir obey
καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι.
and answer since also you-agree me wise to-be
πειστέον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν· σὺ
one-must-obey then said and I and (of)-necessity as it-seems you
γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.
for rule but ask

πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ
whether then soul having think the thinking or also the
ἄψυχα;
soulless
τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα.
the soul having
οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥῆμα ψυχὴν ἔχον;
do-you-know then any he-said phrase soul having
μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.
by Zeus not I-at-least
τί οὖν ἄρτι ἤρου ὅτι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα; e
why then just-now did-you-ask what to-me meant the phrase
τί ἄλλο γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν;
what other at-least said and I than I-erred through the stupidity
ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν
or not I-erred but also this rightly I-said having-said
ὅτι νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα; πότερα φῂς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὔ;
that mean the phrases whether do-you-say to-err me or not
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς 288
if for not I-erred not-even you will-refute(-me) although wise
ὤν, οὐδ' ἔχεις ὅτι χρῇ τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δ' ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ'
being nor know what to-do with-the argument if but I-erred not-even
οὕτως ὀρθῶς λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
so rightly you-speak claiming not to-be-possible to-err
καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς ἃ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ
and these-things not about what last-year you-were-saying I-say but
ἔοικεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος
it-seems I-said I O Dionysodorus both and Euthydemus this
μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταὐτῷ μένειν καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ
indeed — argument in the-same-place to-remain and still as —
παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ
of-old having-thrown(-another) to-fall and so-that this not

πάσχειν οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρῆσθαι,
to-suffer not-even by — your yet art to-have-been-discovered
καὶ ταῦτα οὑτωσὶ θαυμαστῆς οὔσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν λόγων.
and these-things so wonderful being as-to precision of-arguments
b καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμάσιά γε λέγετ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες
and — Ctesippus Marvelous-things at-least you-say he-said O men
Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθ' ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρετον
Thurians or Chians or from-wherever and however you-two-rejoice
ὀνομαζόμενοι· ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν.
being-named how nothing to-you it-matters of-the talking-nonsense

XII · PROTEUS AND MENELAUS

Socrates tells Ctesippus the brothers are like Proteus the Egyptian sophist, bewitching them, and they must hold on like Menelaus. Resuming with Clinias, he seeks the knowledge that benefits: not finding gold, nor making men immortal, but one that both makes and knows how to use what it makes. So lyre making will not do, and Clinias shows that speech writers cannot use their own speeches.

c καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς μὴ λοιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπράυνον
and I having-feared lest abuse might-arise again tried-to-calm
τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νυνδὴ ἃ
— Ctesippus and said O Ctesippus also just-now what
πρὸς Κλεινίαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγω,
to Clinias I-was-saying also to you the-same these-things I-say
ὅτι οὐ γιγνώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι θαυμασία
that not you-recognize of-the strangers the wisdom that wonderful
ἐστίν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε,
it-is but not the-two-are-willing to-us to-display(-it) being-serious
ἀλλὰ τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν
but — Proteus the-two-imitate the Egyptian sophist

γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς. ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ
the-two-bewitching us we then — Menelaus let-us-imitate and
μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῆτον ἐφ᾽
not let-us-let-go the two-men until — to-us they-two-appear-plainly in
ᾧ αὐτὰ σπουδάζετον· οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον
what they-two are-serious-about I-think for something of-them all-fine
φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἄρξωνται σπουδάζειν. ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα
to-be-going-to-appear when they-begin to-be-serious but let-us-beg
καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώμεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι.
and let-us-encourage and let-us-pray to-them to-appear-plainly
ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν ὑφηγήσασθαι οἵῳ
I then to-me I-seem also myself again to-lead-the-way as-what-sort
προσεύχομαι αὐτὰ φανῆναί μοι· ὅθεν γὰρ τὸ πρότερον
I-pray the-two to-appear to-me whence for the earlier
ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἑξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι,
I-left-off the next to-these I-will-try as — I-can
διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντέ με καὶ
to-go-through if somehow I-may-call-forth(-them) and having-pitied me and
οἰκτίραντε συντεταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτὰ
having-felt-compassion straining and being-serious also themselves
σπουδάσητον.
they-two-may-be-serious
σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν με πόθεν τότ᾽ ἀπελίπομεν. e
you and O Clinias I-said remind me whence then we-left-off
ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐγῷμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν. φιλοσοφητέον
as indeed then I-think from-here somewhere one-must-philosophize
ὡμολογήσαμεν τελευτῶντες· ἦ γάρ; — ναί, ἦ δ᾽
we-agreed ending is-it-not for yes said and
ὅς. — ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως;
he the and at-least philosophy acquisition of-knowledge not so
ἔφην. — ναί, ἔφη. — τίνα ποτ᾽ οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην
I-said yes he-said what ever then — having-acquired knowledge

ὀρθῶς κτησαίμεθα; ἆρ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην
rightly would-we-acquire(-it) then not this indeed simple that this
ἥτις ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει; — πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. — ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄν τι
which us will-benefit certainly at-least he-said so then — anything
ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ ἐπισταίμεθα γιγνώσκειν περιόντες ὅπου
us would-benefit if we-knew-how to-recognize going-around where
τῆς γῆς χρυσίον πλεῖστον κατορώρυκται; — ἴσως, ἔφη.
of-the earth gold most has-been-buried perhaps he-said
289 ἀλλὰ τὸ πρότερον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι
but the earlier said and I this at-least we-refuted that
οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν
nothing more not-even if without troubles and the to-dig
τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν χρυσίον γένοιτο· ὥστε οὐδ᾽ εἰ
the earth the whole for-us gold should-come-to-be so-that not-even if
τὰς πέτρας χρυσᾶς ἐπισταίμεθα ποιεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀξία ἡ
the rocks golden we-knew-how to-make of-nothing — worth the
ἐπιστήμη εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ
knowledge would-be if for not also to-use we-shall-know-how the
χρυσίῳ, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ ἐφάνη ὄν· ἦ οὐ μέμνησαι;
gold no benefit of-it appeared being or not do-you-remember
ἔφην ἐγώ. — πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη, μέμνημαι. — οὐδέ γε, ὡς
I-said I certainly at-least he-said I-remember nor at-least as
ἔοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ὄφελος γίγνεται οὐδέν, οὔτε
it-seems of-the other knowledge benefit comes-about any either
χρηματιστικῆς οὔτε ἰατρικῆς οὔτε ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, ἥτις
of-money-making or of-medicine or of-other any which
ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρῆσθαι δὲ μὴ ᾧ ἂν ποιήσῃ·
to-make something knows to-use but not what — it-makes
οὐχ οὕτως; — συνέφη. — οὐδέ γε εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη
not so he-assented nor at-least if some is knowledge
ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ
so-as immortal to-make without the to-know the immortality

χρῆσθαι οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, εἴ τι δεῖ
to-use not-even of-this it-seems benefit any if anything one-must
τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡμολογημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι. — συνεδόκει
from-the before agreed-things to-infer it-seemed-so
ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα. — τοιαύτης τινὸς ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης
to-us all these-things of-such some(-kind) then for-us knowledge
δεῖ, ὦ καλὲ παῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα
there-is-need O fine boy said and I in which has-coincided at-once
τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ ὃ ἂν ποιῇ.
the both to-make and the to-know to-use this which — it-makes
— φαίνεται, ἔφη. — πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς c
it-appears(-so) he-said far then it-lacks as it-seems us
λυροποιοὺς δεῖν εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἐπιστήμης
lyre-makers to-need to-be and of-such some knowledge
ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιοῦσα τέχνη,
possessed here for indeed separately indeed the making art
χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη διῄρηται τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ
separately but the using has-been-divided the same about the for
λυροποιικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολὺ διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν. οὐχ
lyre-making and the harp-playing much differ from-each-other not
οὕτως; — συνέφη. — οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποιικῆς γε δῆλον ὅτι
so he-assented nor surely of-flute-making at-least clear that
δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἑτέρα τοιαύτη. — συνεδόκει. — ἀλλὰ
we-have-need and for this other such it-seemed-so but
πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ τὴν λογοποιικὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν,
by gods I-said I if the speech-writing art we-should-learn
ἆρά ἐστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας
then is this which it-was-needful having-acquired us happy
εἶναι; — οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών.
to-be not I-think he-said I — Clinias taking-up
τίνι τεκμηρίῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρῇ; d
by-what proof said and I do-you-use

ὁρῶ, ἔφη, τινὰς λογοποιούς, οἳ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ
I-see he-said some speech-writers who the own speeches which themselves
ποιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς
make not know-how to-use like the lyre-makers the
λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκεῖνοι
lyres but also here others able to-use what those
ἠργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ
wrought the to-write-speeches themselves unable clear then that also
περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἡ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρῆσθαι.
about speeches separately the of-the making art and the of-the using

XIII · THE HUNTERS HAND OVER

Socrates accepts Clinias' proof that speech writing is not the art, lofty as it seems: it is a part of the art of enchantment. He proposes generalship, and Clinias rules it out as hunting: hunters hand over their catch to cooks, geometers and astronomers theirs to the dialecticians, and generals the cities they take to the statesmen.

e ἱκανόν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ
sufficient to-me you-seem I-said I proof to-offer that not
αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἣν ἂν κτησάμενός
this is the of-the speech-writers art which — having-acquired
τις εὐδαίμων εἴη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾤμην ἐνταῦθά που
one happy would-be and-yet I thought here somewhere
φανήσεσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν.
to-be-going-to-appear the knowledge which indeed for-long we-seek
καὶ γάρ μοι οἵ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν
and for to-me the both men themselves the speech-writers when
συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
I-am-with them extra-wise O Clinias seem to-be
καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή.
and itself the art their divine some(-thing) and lofty

καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· ἔστι γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπῳδῶν
and however nothing wonderful it-is for of-the of-the enchantments
τέχνης μόριον μικρῷ τε ἐκείνης ὑποδεεστέρα.
art a-part by-a-little both than-that inferior
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπῳδῶν ἔχεών τε καὶ φαλαγγίων καὶ 290
the indeed for of-the enchantments of-vipers both and of-spiders and
σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησίς
of-scorpions and of-the other beasts both and of-diseases a-charming
ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν
is the but of-jurors both and of-assemblymen and of-the
ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὖσα·
other crowds charming both and soothing happens being
ἢ σοί, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ;
or to-you I-said I otherwise somehow does-it-seem
οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.
no but so to-me it-appears he-said as you say
ποῖ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίαν τέχνην;
whither then I-said I might-we-turn — still to what-sort art
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη.
I indeed not am-resourceful he-said
ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι ηὑρηκέναι.
but said and I I I-think to-have-found(-it)
τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεινίας.
which said — Clinias
ἡ στρατηγική μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς b
the generalship to-me seems I-said I art than-anything
μᾶλλον εἶναι ἣν ἄν τις κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἴη.
more to-be which — someone having-acquired happy would-be
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
not to-me-at-least it-seems
πῶς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
how said and I

θηρευτική τις ἥδε γέ ἐστιν τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.
hunting some this at-least is art of-men
τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ.
what indeed then I-said I
c οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἢ
none he-said of-the hunting itself over more is than
ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ χειρώσωνται
as-much-as to-hunt and to-subdue when but they-subdue
τοῦτο ὃ ἂν θηρεύωνται, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι,
this which — they-hunt not they-are-able this to-use
ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κυνηγέται καὶ οἱ ἁλιῆς τοῖς ὀψοποιοῖς
but the indeed huntsmen and the fishermen to-the cooks
παραδιδόασιν, οἱ δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι
hand-over the but in-turn geometers and the astronomers
καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί — θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ
and the calculators hunters for are also these not
γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ
for they-make the diagrams each of-these but the
ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν — ἅτε οὖν χρῆσθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς
beings they-discover inasmuch-as then to-use themselves them
οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον, παραδιδόασι δήπου
not knowing-how but to-hunt only they-hand-over surely
τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρῆσθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς εὑρήμασιν,
to-the dialecticians to-use-up their the discoveries
ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοί εἰσιν.
as-many-as at-least of-them not altogether senseless are
εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεινία·
well said and I O finest and wisest Clinias
τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;
this so is

πάνυ μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἵ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν d
certainly indeed then and the at-least generals he-said so the same
τρόπον· ἐπειδὰν ἢ πόλιν τινὰ θηρεύσωνται ἢ στρατόπεδον,
way when either a-city some they-hunt or an-army
παραδιδόασι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσιν — αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ
they-hand-over to-the political men themselves for not
ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ ἐθήρευσαν — ὥσπερ οἶμαι
know-how to-use these which they-hunted as I-think
οἱ ὀρτυγοθῆραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόασιν. εἰ οὖν, ἦ
the quail-hunters to-the quail-keepers hand-over if then said
δ' ὅς, δεόμεθα ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἥτις ὧ ἂν κτήσηται
and he we-need that — art which what — it-acquires
ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται
either having-made or having-hunted itself also will-know-how
χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην
to-use and — such will-make us blessed another
δή τινα, ἔφη, ζητητέον ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.
indeed some he-said one-must-seek instead-of the generalship
CRI. τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μειράκιον e
what do-you-say you O Socrates that — lad
τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγξατο;
such-things uttered
SOC. οὐκ οἴει, ὦ Κρίτων;
not do-you-think(-so) O Crito

XIV · THE KINGLY ART

Crito doubts that Clinias said this; Socrates is no longer sure who did, and wonders whether a higher power was present. They tried the kingly art, the same as the political, which in Aeschylus' phrase sits alone at the city's stern and steers all, but found themselves back at the start, as in a labyrinth. Asked what work it produces, as medicine produces health and farming food, Crito cannot say.

CRI. μὰ Δί᾽ οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτ᾽
by Zeus not certainly I-think for him I if these-things
εἶπεν, οὔτ᾽ Εὐθυδήμου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτ᾽ ἀνθρώπου
he-said neither of-Euthydemus nor of-other no any-longer man
δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.
to-need for education

SOC. ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ
but then O by Zeus surely-not — Ctesippus was the
ταῦτ᾽ εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;
these-things having-said I and not remember

291 CRI. ποῖος Κτήσιππος;
what-sort Ctesippus

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος
but surely this at-least well I-know that neither Euthydemus
οὔτε Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν ταῦτα· ἀλλ᾽, ὦ δαιμόνιε
nor Dionysodorus was the having-said these-things but O marvelous
Κρίτων, μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ
Crito surely-not someone of-the higher-powers being-present them
ἐφθέγξατο; ὅτι γὰρ ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα.
uttered that for I-heard at-least these-things well I-know

CRI. ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι
yes by Zeus O Socrates of-the higher-powers certainly
τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολύ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο
some(-one) to-me it-seems and by-much at-least but after this
ἔτι τινὰ ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ηὕρετε ἐκείνην ἢ οὐχ
still some did-you-seek art and did-you-find that or not
ηὕρετε, ἧς ἕνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;
did-you-find of-which for-sake you-were-seeking

b SOC. πόθεν, ὦ μακάριε, ηὕρομεν; ἀλλ᾽ ἦμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι·
whence O blessed did-we-find(-it) but we-were very laughable
ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, ἀεὶ ᾠόμεθα
like the children the the larks chasing always we-thought

ἑκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι, αἱ δ' ἀεὶ
each of-the knowledges at-once to-be-going-to-catch they but always
ὑπεξέφευγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἄν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ
slipped-away the indeed then many-things why — to-you should-I-tell to
δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι
and indeed the kingly having-come art and examining
αὐτὴν εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἡ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσά
it whether this might-be the the happiness providing
τε καὶ ἀπεργαζομένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύρινθον
both and producing there as into a-labyrinth
ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες
having-fallen thinking already at end to-be having-turned-round
πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες
again as at beginning of-the search we-appeared being
καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι ὅσουπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.
and of-the equal needing as-much-as when the first we-were-seeking

CRI. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
how indeed this to-you happened O Socrates

SOC. ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ
I will-explain it-seemed for indeed to-us the political and the
βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.
kingly art the same to-be

CRI. τί οὖν δή;
what then indeed

SOC. ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ ἥ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι d
to-this — art the both generalship and the others
παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοί
to-hand-over to-rule of-the works of-which themselves craftsmen
εἰσιν, ὡς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει
are as alone knowing to-use clearly then it-seemed
ἡμῖν αὕτη εἶναι ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς
to-us this to-be which we-were-seeking and the cause of-the rightly

πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου
to-do in the city and simply according-to the of-Aeschylus
ἰαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα
iambic-line alone in the stern to-sit of-the city all-things
κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.
steering and all ruling all-things useful to-make

CRI. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
therefore finely to-you did-it-seem O Socrates

e SOC. σὺ κρινεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ
you will-judge O Crito if you-wish to-hear also the-things after
ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν ὧδέ
these happening to-us again for indeed again we-examined thus
πως· φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τὶ ἡμῖν
somehow come all ruling the kingly art something for-us
ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν; πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν
does-it-produce work or nothing altogether surely we said
πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;
to one-another not also you — these-things would-say O Crito

CRI. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ
what then — would-you-say its work to-be as if
σὲ ἐγὼ ἠρωτῶην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει,
you I should-ask all ruling the medicine which it-rules
τί ἔργον παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἂν φαίης;
what work does-it-provide not the health — would-you-say

CRI. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. τί δὲ ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἡ γεωργία; πάντων ἄρχουσα 292
what and — your art the farming all ruling
ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφὴν ἂν φαίης
which it-rules what does-it-produce not the nourishment — would-you-say
τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;
the from the earth to-provide to-us
CRI. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least
SOC. τί δὲ ἡ βασιλικὴ πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει; τί
what and the kingly all ruling which it-rules what
ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάνυ γ' εὐπορεῖς.
does-it-produce perhaps not quite at-least you-are-resourceful
CRI. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.
by — Zeus O Socrates

XV · CORINTH, SON OF ZEUS

The kingly art must give something good, and the only good is a knowledge, yet it cannot be shoemaking or carpentry. If it makes men good, good at what? They are back where they started, Corinth, son of Zeus. Socrates begs the brothers like the Dioscuri to save them from the third wave of the argument, and Euthydemus offers to show that Socrates has the knowledge already.

SOC. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα,
nor for we O Crito but so-much at-least you-know
ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν
that if-indeed is this which we seek beneficial it
δεῖ εἶναι.
it-must to-be
CRI. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν
therefore good at-least something it-must to-us it
παραδιδόναι;
to-hand-over
CRI. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
(of)-necessity O Socrates
b SOC. ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὡμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις ἐγώ
good and at-least I-suppose we-agreed with-one-another I
τε καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.
both and Clinias nothing to-be other than knowledge some
CRI. ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.
yes so you-were-saying
c SOC. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίη ἄν τις πολιτικῆς
therefore the indeed other works which would-say — someone of-political(-art)
εἶναι — πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους
to-be many and I-suppose these — would-be such-as rich
τοὺς πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιάστους —
the citizens to-make and free and free-of-faction
πάντα ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ
all these-things neither bad nor good appeared it-was-needful but
σοφοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλεν
wise to-make and of-knowledge to-give-a-share if-indeed it-was-to
αὕτη εἶναι ἡ ὠφελοῦσά τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦσα.
this to-be the benefiting both and happy making
CRI. ἔστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὡμολογήθη, ὡς
it-is these-things then at-any-rate so to-you was-agreed as
σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.
you the discussions reported
SOC. ἆρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
so then the kingly wise makes the men
καὶ ἀγαθούς;
and good

CRI. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;
what for prevents O Socrates
SOC. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθούς; καὶ πᾶσαν
but then all and in-all-things good and every
ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικήν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
knowledge cobbling both and carpentry and the others
ἁπάσας, αὕτη ἡ παραδιδοῦσά ἐστιν;
all this the handing-on is
CRI. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not I-think I-at-least O Socrates
SOC. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἦ τί χρησόμεθα; d
but what indeed knowledge with-which what shall-we-use
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι
of-the indeed for works of-none must it craftsman to-be
τῶν μήτε κακῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι
of-the neither bad nor good knowledge but to-hand-on
μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς
none other than itself itself let-us-say indeed then what
ποτέ ἐστιν αὕτη, ἦ τί χρησόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν,
ever is this with-which what shall-we-use do-you-wish we-should-say
ὦ Κρίτων, ἦ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;
O Crito by-which others good we-shall-make
CRI. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. οἳ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; e
who in-what will-be for-us good and in-what useful
ἢ ἔτι λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι
or still are-we-to-say that others they-will-make the but others
ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλους; ὅτι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοί εἰσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν
those others in-what but ever good they-are nowhere to-us
φαίνονται, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς
they-appear since-indeed the works the said to-be of-the

πολιτικῆς ἠτιμάσαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ
political(-art) we-dishonored but simply the saying the
Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ ἔλεγον, τοῦ ἴσου
of-Zeus Corinth becomes and which-very I-was-saying of-the equal
ἡμῖν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλέονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τίς ποτέ ἐστιν
for-us we-lack or still of-more for the to-know what ever is
ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη ἢ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσει;
the knowledge that which us happy will-make

CRI. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν,
by — Zeus O Socrates into great at-least perplexity
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀφίκεσθε.
as it-seems you-came

293 SOC. ἔγωγε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
I-at-least then also myself O Crito since in this —
ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφίειν, δεόμενος
perplexity I-had-fallen every already voice was-letting-go begging
τοῖν ξένοιν ὥσπερ Διοσκούρων ἐπικαλούμενος σῶσαι
the two-strangers as the-Dioscuri invoking to-save
ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ
us me both and the lad from the third-wave of-the
λόγου, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσαντας
argument and in-every way to-be-serious and being-serious
ἐπιδεῖξαι τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἧς τυχόντες ἂν
to-show what ever is the knowledge which having-gained —
καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν.
finely the remaining life we-might-go-through

CRI. τί οὖν; ἠθέλησέν τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος;
what then was-willing anything to-you to-show — Euthydemus

SOC. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ ἤρξατό γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πάνυ
how for not and he-began at-least O comrade very
μεγαλοφρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὧδε —
high-mindedly the argument thus

πότερον δή σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, b
whether indeed you he-said O Socrates this — knowledge
περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα;
about which for-long you-are-at-a-loss shall-I-teach or shall-I-show having(-it)
ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο;
O blessed said and I is and on you this
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
certainly indeed then he-said
ἐπίδειξον τοίνυν με νὴ Δί', ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ
show then me by Zeus I-said I having(-it) much for
ῥᾷον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα.
easier than to-learn for-such-an-age a-man

XVI · KNOWING EVERYTHING

Euthydemus argues that if Socrates knows one thing he is knowing, and so knows all things, and Dionysodorus claims the brothers know everything too: carpentry, cobbling, the stars, and the sand. Ctesippus demands how many teeth each has, and they claim to know whatever he asks; Socrates in disbelief asks about dancing and tumbling among swords, and they say they knew everything even as infants. Euthydemus offers to prove the same of Socrates, then rebukes him for answering a question with a question.

φέρε δή μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὅτι ἐπίστασαι; — c
come indeed to-me answer he-said is-there anything-that you-know
πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρά γε. — ἀρκεῖ,
certainly at-least said and I and many-things small-things at-least it-suffices
ἔφη. ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο
he-said so then do-you-think possible — anything of-the beings this
ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; — ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί'
which happens being it this not to-be but by Zeus

οὐκ ἔγωγε. — οὐκοῦν σύ, ἔφη, ἐπίστασαί τι; — ἔγωγε. —
not I-at-least therefore you he-said know something I-at-least
οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπίστασαι; — πάνυ γε,
therefore knowing you-are if-indeed you-know certainly at-least
τούτου γε αὐτοῦ. — οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη
of-this at-least itself nothing it-matters but not necessity
σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; — μὰ
you holds all-things to-know knowing at-least being by
Δί', ἔφην ἐγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλὰ ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. —
Zeus I-said I since many other-things not I-know
οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. —
therefore if something not you-know not knowing you-are
ἐκείνου γε, ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — ἧττον οὖν τι, ἔφη,
of-that at-least O dear said and I less then at-all he-said
οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι·
not knowing are-you just-now and knowing you-said to-be
καὶ οὕτως τυγχάνεις ὢν αὐτὸς οὗτος ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὖ
and so you-happen being yourself this who you-are and in-turn
πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἅμα.
again not you-are in-the same-respect at-once
εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ
well said and I Euthydemus the for saying(-goes) finely indeed
παταγεῖς· πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἐκείνην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν
you-rattle-on how then do-I-know that — knowledge which
ἐζητοῦμεν; ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί
we-were-seeking since indeed this impossible is the same to-be
τε καὶ μή, εἴπερ ἓν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι —
both and not if-indeed one-thing I-know all-things I-know
οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴην ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἅμα —
not for — I-could-be knowing both and not-knowing at-once

ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, κἀκείνην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
since and all-things I-know also-that indeed the knowledge
ἔχω· ἆρα οὕτως λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ σοφόν;
I-have then so do-you-mean and this is the wise(-thing)
αὐτὸς σαυτόν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. e
yourself yourself at-least indeed you-refute he-said O Socrates
τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ πέπονθας τοῦτο
what and said and I O Euthydemus you not have-you-suffered this
τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὁτιοῦν ἂν
— same experience I for you-know with you anything-whatever —
πάσχων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσοδώρου τοῦδε, φίλης κεφαλῆς,
suffering and with Dionysodorus this dear head
οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ἀγανακτοίην. εἰπέ μοι, σφὼ οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν
not — very I-would-be-vexed tell me you-two not the indeed
ἐπίστασθον τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθον;
know-the-two of-the beings the but not know-the-two
ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.
least at-least he-said O Socrates — Dionysodorus
πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγώ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον;
how do-you-two-mean I-said I but nothing then know-the-two
καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.
and very(-much) said and he
πάντ' ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπίστασθον, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ 294
all-things then I-said I know-the-two since-indeed also
ὁτιοῦν;
anything-whatever
πάντ', ἔφη· καὶ σύ γε πρός, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἐπίστασαι,
all-things he-said and you at-least besides if-indeed even one you-know
πάντα ἐπίστασαι.
all-things you-know

ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα
O Zeus I-said I how wonderful you-say and good great
πεφάνθαι. μῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντ᾽
to-have-come-to-light surely-not also the other all men all-things
ἐπίστανται, ἢ οὐδέν;
know or nothing
οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δ᾽
not for surely he-said the indeed they-know the but
οὐκ ἐπίστανται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἅμα ἐπιστήμονές τε καὶ
not they-know and are at-once knowing both and
ἀνεπιστήμονες.
not-knowing
ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
but what said and I
πάντες, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πάντα ἐπίστανται, εἴπερ καὶ ἕν.
all said and he all-things know if-indeed even one
b ὦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε — δῆλοι
O by the gods said and I O Dionysodorus evident
γάρ μοί ἐστον ἤδη ὅτι σπουδάζετον, καὶ μόλις
for to-me are-the-two already that you-two-are-serious and with-difficulty
ὑμᾶς προυκαλεσάμην σπουδάζειν — αὐτὼ τῷ ὄντι πάντα
you I-called-forth to-be-serious yourselves in reality all-things
ἐπίστασθον; οἷον τεκτονικὴν καὶ σκυτικήν;
know-the-two such-as carpentry and shoemaking
πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
certainly at-least he-said
ἦ καὶ νευρορραφεῖν δυνατώ ἐστον;
truly also to-stitch-leather able are-the-two
καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία καττύειν, ἔφη.
and yes by Zeus to-cobble he-said

ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας ὁπόσοι εἰσί, καὶ τὴν
truly also — such-things the stars how-many they-are and the
ἄμμον;
sand
πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς· εἶτ' οὐκ ἂν οἴει ὁμολογῆσαι
certainly at-least said and he then not — do-you-think to-agree
ἡμᾶς;
us
καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ὑπολαβών· πρὸς Διός, ἔφη, Διονυσόδωρε, c
and — Ctesippus taking-up by Zeus he-said Dionysodorus
τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ᾧ
proof some to-me of-these display-the-two such by-which
εἴσομαι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον.
I-shall-know that true-things you-two-say
τί ἐπιδείξω; ἔφη.
what shall-I-display he-said
οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον ὁπόσους ὀδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος
do-you-know Euthydemus how-many teeth he-has and — Euthydemus
ὁπόσους σύ;
how-many you
οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα;
not does-it-suffice for-you he-said to-hear that all-things we-know
μηδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῖν μόνον εἴπατον
in-no-way said and he but this still to-us only tell-the-two
καὶ ἐπιδείξατον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον· καὶ ἐὰν εἴπητον
and display-the-two that true-things you-two-say and if you-two-tell
ὁπόσους ἑκάτερος ἔχει ὑμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνόντες ἡμῶν
how-many each has of-you and you-appear having-known we
ἀριθμησάντων, ἤδη πεισόμεθα ὑμῖν καὶ τἆλλα.
having-counted already we-shall-believe you also the-rest

d ἡγουμένω οὖν σκώπτεσθαι οὐκ ἠθελέτην, ἀλλ'
thinking then to-be-mocked not the-two-were-willing but
ὡμολογησάτην πάντα χρήματα ἐπίστασθαι, καθ' ἓν
they-two-agreed all things to-know according-to one
ἕκαστον ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ Κτησίππου. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος
each being-asked by Ctesippus — for Ctesippus
πάνυ ἀπαρακαλύπτως οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ
very unreservedly nothing that not asked ending even
τὰ αἴσχιστα, εἰ ἐπισταίσθην· τὼ δὲ ἀνδρειότατα
the most-shameful-things if they-two-knew(-them) the-two and most-courageously
ὁμόσε ᾔτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, ὁμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι,
to-close-quarters went with-the questions agreeing to-know
ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν ὁμόσε
like the boars the against the blow to-close-quarters
ὠθούμενοι, ὥστ' ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ὑπ' ἀπιστίας
pushing so-that I-at-least even myself O Crito from disbelief
ἠναγκάσθην τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι εἰ καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐπίσταιτο
was-compelled ending to-ask if also to-dance he-knew-how
ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ὁ δέ, πάνυ, ἔφη.
— Dionysodorus he and very he-said
οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστᾶν
not surely said and I also into swords at-least to-tumble
καὶ ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι τηλικοῦτος ὤν, οὕτω πόρρω
and on a-wheel to-be-whirled so-old being so far
σοφίας ἥκεις;
of-wisdom have-you-come
οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὅτι οὔ.
nothing he-said that not
πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ
whether and said and I all-things now only know-the-two or
καὶ ἀεί;
also always

καὶ ἀεί, ἔφη.
also always he-said
καὶ ὅτε παιδία ἦστην καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ἠπίστασθε
also when children you-two-were and straightway being-born you-knew
πάντα;
all-things
ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω.
they-two-said(-so) at-once both
καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄπιστον ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι· ὁ δ' 295
and to-us indeed incredible seemed the matter to-be — but
Εὐθύδημος, ἀπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Euthydemus do-you-disbelieve he-said O Socrates
πλήν γ' ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐστι σοφοὺς εἶναι.
except at-least that said and I likely you it-is wise to-be
ἀλλ' ἴν, ἔφη, ἐθελήσῃς μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω
but if he-said you-are-willing to-me to-answer I will-show
καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ὁμολογοῦντα.
also you these — wonderful-things agreeing
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ
but surely said and I most-gladly in-these-things I-am-refuted if
γάρ τοι λέληθα ἐμαυτὸν σοφὸς ὤν, σὺ δὲ
for you-know I-have-escaped-the-notice-of myself wise being you and
τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὡς πάντα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ ἀεί, τί μεῖζον
this will-show that all-things I-know and always what greater
ἕρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὕροιμι ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ;
godsend than-this — could-I-find in all the life
ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη.
answer indeed he-said
ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου ἐρώτα. b
as going-to-answer ask

ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστήμων του εἶ
so then he-said O Socrates knowing of-something are-you
ἢ οὔ; — ἔγωγε. — πότερον οὖν ᾧ ἐπιστήμων εἶ,
or not I-at-least whether then by-what knowing you-are
τούτῳ καὶ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ; — ᾧ ἐπιστήμων.
by-this also do-you-know or by-another something by-which knowing
οἶμαι γάρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν λέγειν· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;
I-think for you the soul to-mean or not this do-you-mean
οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾷς;
not are-you-ashamed he-said O Socrates being-asked you-ask-in-return
εἶεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γὰρ ποιήσω
well said and I but how am-I-to-do so for I-will-do
ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύῃς. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς, κελεύεις
as — you bid when not I-know what you-ask you-bid
με ὅμως ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπανερέσθαι;
me nevertheless to-answer but not to-ask-back
c ὑπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι, ἔφη, ὃ λέγω;
you-understand for surely something he-said which I-say
ἔγωγε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
I-at-least said and I
πρὸς τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀποκρίνου ὃ ὑπολαμβάνεις.
to this then answer which you-understand
τί οὖν, ἔφην, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλῃ ἐρωτᾷς διανοούμενος,
what then I-said if you indeed in-one-way ask meaning
ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλλῃ ὑπολάβω, ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι,
I but in-another understand then to this I-answer
ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἐὰν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι;
does-it-suffice for-you if nothing to the-point I-answer
ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοί γε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.
to-me-at-least said and he not however to-you at-least as I-think

οὐ τοίνυν μὰ Δία ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρότερον
not then by Zeus I-will-answer said and I before
πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι.
before — I-learn
οὐκ ἀποκρινῇ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι
not you-will-answer he-said to what — each-time you-understand because
ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος.
persisting you-talk-nonsense and more-old-fashioned you-are than-the needful

XVII · SOCRATES' BROTHER AND FATHER

Socrates, remembering how Connus is vexed when he does not yield, yields to Euthydemus' rules and is made to agree that he always knew everything, before he was born and before heaven and earth. When Dionysodorus' answer spoils the argument, Dionysodorus blushes. Socrates likens himself to Heracles beset by the hydra and the crab, and Dionysodorus turns to his family: Patrocles is his brother and not his brother, and Chaeredemus, being other than a father, is no father; so, Euthydemus adds, neither is Sophroniscus, and Socrates is fatherless.

καὐγὼ ἔγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνοι διαστέλλοντι d
and-I perceived him that with-me be-was-angry distinguishing
τὰ λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα
the things-said wishing me to-hunt the words
περιστήσας. ἀνεμνήσθην οὖν τοῦ Κόννου, ὅτι μοι
having-set-around(-me) I-remembered then — Connus that with-me
κἀκεῖνος χαλεπαίνει ἑκάστοτε ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπείκω,
also-that-one is-angry each-time when to-him not I-yield
ἔπειτά μου ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖται ὡς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος· ἐπεὶ
then of-me less he-takes-care as ignorant being since
δὲ οὖν διενενοήμην καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον φοιτᾶν, ᾠήθην
and then I-had-intended also to this(-man) to-go I-thought

δεῖν ὑπείκειν, μή με σκαιὸν ἡγησάμενος φοιτητὴν μὴ
it-needful to-yield lest me awkward having-thought a-pupil not
προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, Εὐθύδημε,
he-should-accept I-said then but if it-seems-good to-you Euthydemus
οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως που κάλλιον
so to-do one-must-do(-it) you for altogether I-suppose better
ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου
know-how to-converse than I an-art having of-a-layman
ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
man ask then again from beginning
ἀποκρίνου δή, ἔφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαί τῳ
answer indeed he-said again whether do-you-know by-something
ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὔ; — ἔγωγε, ἔφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.
what you-know or not I-at-least I-said by-the at-least soul
296 οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ
this(-man) in-turn he-said answers-besides the questions not
γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαί τῳ.
for I-at-least ask by-what but if you-know by-something
πλέον αὖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμην ὑπὸ
more in-turn I-said I than-the needful I-answered from
ἀπαιδευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκέ μοι· ἀποκρινοῦμαι γὰρ
lack-of-education but forgive me I-will-answer for
ἤδη ἁπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαί τῳ ἃ ἐπίσταμαι. —
now simply that I-know by-something what I-know
πότερον, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' ἀεί, ἢ ἔστι
whether said and he by-the same this at-least always or are-there
μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε ἑτέρῳ; — ἀεί,
indeed times-when by-this there-are and times-when by-another always
ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτῳ.
when I-know said and I by-this
οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσῃ παραφθεγγόμενος;
not in-turn he-said will-you-stop adding-things

ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μή τι ἡμᾶς σφήλῃ τὸ “ἀεὶ” τοῦτο.
but see-that not anything us should-trip-up the always this
οὔκουν ἡμᾶς γ᾽, ἔφη, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, σέ. ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρίνου· b
not-then us at-least he-said but if-indeed you but answer
ἦ ἀεὶ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι; — ἀεί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ
truly always by-this do-you-know always said and I since
δεῖ ἀφελεῖν τὸ “ὅταν.” — οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ μὲν τούτῳ
one-must to-take-away the when therefore always indeed by-this
ἐπίστασαι· ἀεὶ δ᾽ ἐπιστάμενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ
you-know always and knowing whether the indeed by-this
ἐπίστασαι ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ
you-know by-which you-know the but by-another or by-this
πάντα; — τούτῳ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, ἅ γ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι.
all-things by-this I-said I all which at-least I-know
τοῦτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη· ἥκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα.
this that he-said comes the same addition
ἀλλ᾽ ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ “ἅ γ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι.”
but I-take-away I-said I the which at-least I-know
ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἕν, ἔφη, ἀφέλῃς· οὐδὲν γάρ σου δέομαι. c
but not-even one he-said take-away nothing for of-you I-need
ἀλλά μοι ἀπόκριναι· δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ
but to-me answer could-you — all-things know if
μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταιο;
not all-things you-knew
τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
a-marvel for — it-would-be said and I
καὶ ὃς εἶπε· Προστίθει τοίνυν ἤδη ὅτι βούλει· ἅπαντα
and he said add then now whatever you-wish all-things
γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι.
for you-agree to-know

ἔοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν
I-seem(-to) I-said I since-indeed at-least no has power
τὸ "ἃ ἐπίσταμαι," πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι.
the which I-know all-things and I-know
d οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ ᾧ
therefore also always you-have-agreed to-know by-this by-which
ἐπίστασαι, εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστῃ εἴτε ὅπως βούλει· ἀεὶ γὰρ
you-know whether when you-know or however you-wish always for
ὡμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ
you-have-agreed to-know and at-once all-things clear then that even
παῖς ὢν ἠπίστω, καὶ ὅτ' ἐγίγνου, καὶ ὅτ' ἐφύου·
a-child being you-knew and when you-were-being-born and when you-were-begotten
καὶ πρὶν αὐτὸς γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι,
and before yourself to-come-to-be and before heaven and earth to-come-to-be
ἠπίστω ἅπαντα, εἴπερ ἀεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία,
you-knew all-things if-indeed always you-know and yes by Zeus
ἔφη, αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστήσῃ καὶ ἅπαντα, ἂν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι.
he-said yourself always will-know and all-things if I wish
e ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, εἰ δὴ
but may-you-wish said and I O much-honored Euthydemus if indeed
τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ' οὔ σοι πάνυ πιστεύω ἱκανῷ εἶναι,
in reality true-things you-say but not you very I-trust sufficient to-be
εἰ μή σοι συμβουληθείη ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὑτοσὶ Διονυσόδωρος·
if not you should-wish-with the brother your this-here Dionysodorus
οὕτω δὲ τάχα ἄν. εἶπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ — τὰ μὲν
so but perhaps — tell-the-two and me said and I the indeed
γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοίην, οὕτως
for other-things not I-can with-you how I-might-dispute so
εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα
in wisdom prodigious men that I not all-things
ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδή γε ὑμεῖς φατε — τὰ δὲ τοιάδε πῶς
know since at-least you say the but such-things how

φῶ ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοί
am-I-to-say to-know Euthydemus that the good men unjust
εἰσιν; φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι;
are come tell this do-I-know or not do-I-know
ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη.
you-know certainly he-said
τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
what said and I
ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί.
that not unjust are the good
πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλαι. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· 297
certainly at-least said and I long-since but not this I-ask
ἀλλ' ὡς ἄδικοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἔμαθον;
but that unjust are the good where I this learned
οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.
nowhere said — Dionysodorus
οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφην, τοῦτο ἐγώ.
not then I-know I-said this I
διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν
you-are-ruining he-said the argument — Euthydemus to —
Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὑτοσὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ
Dionysodorus and will-appear this-man not knowing and
ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος
knowing at-once being and not-knowing and — Dionysodorus
ἠρυθρίασεν.
blushed
ἀλλὰ σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ b
but you said and I how do-you-say O Euthydemus not seems
σοι ὀρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντ' εἰδώς;
to-you rightly the-brother to-speak the all-things knowing

ἀδελφὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγώ εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν
brother for he-said I am of-Euthydemus quickly taking-up
ὁ Διονυσόδωρος;
— Dionysodorus
καὶγὼ εἶπον· ἔασον, ὠγαθέ, ἕως ἂν Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ
and-I said let(-it-be) good-sir until — Euthydemus me teaches
ὡς ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὅτι ἄδικοί εἰσι, καὶ
that I-know the good men that unjust they-are and
μή μοι φθονήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος.
not to-me begrudge the lesson
φεύγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ
you-flee he-said O Socrates — Dionysodorus and not
ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
are-willing to-answer
c εἰκότως γ', εἶπον ἐγώ· ἥττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου
reasonably at-least said I weaker for I-am even than-the one
ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγειν. πολὺ
of-you so-that far I-lack not not two at-least to-flee much
γάρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἷός τε
for I-suppose I-am inferior — than-Heracles who not able —
ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ καὶ διὰ
was with-the both hydra to-fight-it-out a-sophistess being and through
τὴν σοφίαν ἀνιείσῃ, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις
the wisdom sending-up if one head of-the argument someone
ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ
should-cut-off many instead-of the one and with-a-crab some other
σοφιστῇ ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένῳ, νεωστί, μοι δοκεῖν,
sophist from sea having-arrived recently to-me to-seem
καταπεπλευκότι· ὃς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ
having-sailed-in who since him he-was-vexing so from the
ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων, τὸν Ἰόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν
on left speaking and biting — Iolaus the nephew

βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ
as-helper called-in he and him sufficiently helped —
δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλεως εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν.
but my Iolaus if he-should-come more — the-other would-do
ἀπόκριναι δή, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὁπότε σοι ταῦτα
answer indeed said — Dionysodorus since to-you these-things
ὕμνηται· πότερον ὁ Ἰόλεως τοῦ Ἡρακλέους μᾶλλον
have-been-hymned whether — Iolaus — of-Heracles more
ἦν ἀδελφιδοῦς ἢ σός;
was nephew or yours
κράτιστον τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, e
best then for-me O Dionysodorus said and I
ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῇς ἐρωτῶν, σχεδόν
to-answer you not for not you-will-let-up asking nearly
τι ἐγὼ τοῦτ' εὖ οἶδα, φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα
somewhat I this well know begrudging and hindering so-that
μὴ διδάξῃ με Εὐθύδημος ἐκεῖνο τὸ σοφόν. — ἀποκρίνου
not may-teach me Euthydemus that — wise(-thing) answer
δή, ἔφη. — ἀποκρίνομαι δή, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἡρακλέους
indeed he-said I-answer indeed I-said that — of-Heracles
ἦν ὁ Ἰόλεως ἀδελφιδοῦς, ἐμὸς δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδ'
was — Iolaus nephew mine but as to-me it-seems not-even
ὁπωστιοῦν. οὐ γὰρ Πατροκλῆς ἦν αὐτῷ πατήρ, ὁ
in-any-way-whatever not for Patrocles was to-him father —
ἐμὸς ἀδελφός, ἀλλὰ παραπλήσιον μὲν τοὔνομα Ἰφικλῆς,
my brother but similar indeed the-name Iphicles
ὁ Ἡρακλέους ἀδελφός. — Πατροκλῆς δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς,
the of-Heracles brother Patrocles but said and he
σός; — πάνυ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμομήτριός γε, οὐ μέντοι
yours certainly at-least I-said I of-the-same-mother at-least not however
ὁμοπάτριος. — ἀδελφὸς ἄρα ἐστί σοι καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός. —
of-the-same-father brother then is to-you and not brother

οὐχ ὁμοπάτριός γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην· ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ
not of-the-same-father at-least O best I-said of-that-one indeed for
Χαιρέδημος ἦν πατήρ, ἐμὸς δὲ Σωφρονίσκος. — πατὴρ
Chaeredemus was father mine but Sophroniscus father
δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Χαιρέδημος;
and was he-said Sophroniscus and Chaeredemus
298 πάνυ γ', ἔφην· ὁ μέν γε ἐμός, ὁ δὲ ἐκείνου. —
certainly at-least I-said the indeed at-least mine the but of-that-one
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἕτερος ἦν Χαιρέδημος τοῦ πατρός; —
therefore said and he different was Chaeredemus from-the father
τοὐμοῦ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ. — ἆρ' οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἕτερος
from-mine at-least I-said I so then father was-he different
ὢν πατρός; ἢ σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ λίθῳ; — δέδοικα μὲν
being from-father or you are the same as-the stone I-fear indeed
ἔγωγ', ἔφην, μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτός· οὐ μέντοι μοι
I-at-least I-said lest I-appear by you the same not however to-me
δοκῶ. — οὐκοῦν ἕτερος εἶ, ἔφη, τοῦ λίθου; — ἕτερος
I-seem therefore different are-you he-said from-the stone different
μέντοι. — ἄλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὢν λίθου
certainly other something then different said and he being from-stone
οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ; —
not stone are-you and different being from-gold not gold are-you
ἔστι ταῦτα. — οὔκουν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν
it-is these-things not-then also — Chaeredemus he-said different being
πατρὸς πατήρ ἐστιν. — ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ πατὴρ εἶναι.
from-father father is it-seems said and I not father to-be
b εἰ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, πατήρ ἐστιν ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν
if for surely he-said father is — Chaeredemus taking-up
ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλιν αὖ ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἕτερος ὢν
— Euthydemus again in-turn — Sophroniscus different being
πατρὸς οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν, ὥστε σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἶ.
from-father not father is so-that you O Socrates fatherless are

Ctesippus asks whether the brothers' father is in the same case, and Euthydemus makes him father of all men and animals, his mother mother of the sea urchins. Dionysodorus makes Ctesippus agree that his dog has puppies and is his, so the dog is his father and he is brother to the puppies. Ctesippus laughs that he should rather beat the brothers' father. Euthydemus then argues that if medicine and arms are good, one should drink a wagonload of hellebore and carry all the spears one can, and Ctesippus asks whether he would arm Geryon and Briareus so.

καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐκδεξάμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, αὖ c
and — Ctesippus taking-up the but your he-said in-turn
πατὴρ οὐ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πέπονθεν; ἕτερός ἐστιν τοὐμοῦ
father not the-same these-things has-undergone different is-he from-my
πατρός; — πολλοῦ γ', ἔφη, δεῖ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος. — ἀλλά,
father of-much at-least he-said it-lacks — Euthydemus but
ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁ αὐτός; — ὁ αὐτὸς μέντοι. — οὐκ ἂν
said and he the same(-man) the same(-man) however not —
συμβουλοίμην. ἀλλὰ πότερον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐμὸς μόνον ἐστὶ
I-would-agree-with(-it) but whether O Euthydemus mine only is-he
πατὴρ ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; — καὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
father or also of-the other men also of-the others
ἔφη· ἢ οἴει τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; —
he-said or do-you-think the same father being not father to-be
ὤιμην δῆτα, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· χρυσὸν
I-thought indeed said — Ctesippus what and said and he gold
ὄντα μὴ χρυσὸν εἶναι; ἢ ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ ἄνθρωπον; —
being not gold to-be or man being not man
μὴ γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον,
not for he-said — Ctesippus O Euthydemus the saying(-goes)
οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτεις· δεινὸν γὰρ λέγεις πρᾶγμα εἰ ὁ
not flax to-flax you-tie dread for you-say thing if —

σὸς πατὴρ πάντων ἐστὶν πατήρ. — ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη. —
your father of-all is father but he-is he-said
πότερον ἀνθρώπων; ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἵππων
whether of-men said and he — Ctesippus or also of-horses
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζῴων; πάντων, ἔφη. — ἦ καὶ
and of-the other all animals of-all he-said truly also
μήτηρ ἡ μήτηρ; — καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε. — καὶ τῶν ἐχίνων
mother the mother also the mother at-least and of-the urchins
ἄρα, ἔφη, ἡ σὴ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τῶν θαλαττίων. — καὶ
then he-said — your mother mother is of-the of-the-sea also
ἡ σή γ', ἔφη. — καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἀδελφὸς εἶ τῶν κωβιῶν
— yours at-least he-said and you then brother are of-the gudgeons
καὶ κυναρίων καὶ χοιριδίων. — καὶ γὰρ σύ, ἔφη. — κάπρος
and of-the-puppies and of-the-piglets and for you he-said a-boar
ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων. — καὶ γὰρ σοί, ἔφη.
then to-you father is and a-dog and for to-you he-said
e αὐτίκα δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἄν μοι
immediately and at-least said and he — Dionysodorus if to-me
ἀποκρίνῃ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι,
you-answer O Ctesippus you-will-agree-to these-things tell for me
ἔστι σοι κύων; — καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. —
is-there to-you a-dog and very bad said — Ctesippus
ἔστιν οὖν αὐτῷ κυνίδια; — καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. —
are then to-him puppies and very he-said others such
οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων; — ἔγωγέ τοι εἶδον,
therefore father is of-them the dog I-at-least you-know saw
ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύνα. — τί οὖν; οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ
he-said him mounting the bitch what then not yours is the
κύων; — πάνυ γ', ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν πατὴρ ὢν σός ἐστιν,
dog certainly at-least he-said therefore father being yours he-is
ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;
so-that your father becomes the dog and you of-puppies brother

καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ
and again quickly taking-up — Dionysodorus so-that not
πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι
first something might-say — Ctesippus and still at-least to-me
μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριναι· τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον; — καὶ
a-little he-said answer do-you-beat the dog this and
ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ
— Ctesippus having-laughed by the gods he-said not for
δύναμαι σέ. — οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις;
I-am-able you therefore — your-own father he-said you-beat
πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιότερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρ' ἂν 299
much certainly he-said more-justly — your father —
τύπτοιμι, ὅτι μαθὼν σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλ'
I-would-beat because having-learned wise sons so he-begot but
ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, πόλλ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας
truly I-suppose O Euthydemus many good-things from — your
σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ὑμέτερός τε καὶ
wisdom this has-enjoyed the father — yours both and
τῶν κυνιδίων.
of-the puppies
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οὔτ'
but nothing he-needs of-many good-things O Ctesippus either
ἐκεῖνος οὔτε σύ.
that-one or you
οὐδὲ σύ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός;
nor you said and he O Euthydemus yourself
οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, ὦ b
nor other at-least any of-men tell for me O
Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἀγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενοῦντι φάρμακον
Ctesippus if good you-think to-be for-one-sick medicine
πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὅταν δέηται· ἢ
to-drink or not good to-be it-seems to-you when he-needs(-it) or

εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἴῃ, ὅπλα ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἰέναι ἢ
into war when he-goes arms having rather to-go than
ἄνοπλον. — ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. καίτοι οἶμαί τί σε τῶν
unarmed to-me-at-least he-said and-yet I-think something you of-the
καλῶν ἐρεῖν. — σὺ ἄριστα εἴσῃ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.
fine-things will-say you best will-know he-said but answer
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὡμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν
since for you-agreed good to-be medicine when
δέῃ, πίνειν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς
one-needs to-drink for-a-man other something this — good as
πλεῖστον δεῖ πίνειν, καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἕξει, ἐάν τις
most must-one to-drink and finely there will-it-be if someone
αὐτῷ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἑλλεβόρου ἅμαξαν; — καὶ ὁ
for-him having-pounded mixes-in of-hellebore a-wagon-load and —
Κτήσιππος εἶπεν· πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐὰν
Ctesippus said certainly at-least vehemently O Euthydemus if
ᾖ γε ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδριὰς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς. —
be at-least the drinking as-big-as the statue the at Delphi
οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
therefore he-said also in the war since good it-is
ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὡς πλεῖστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατά τε καὶ
arms to-have as most must-one to-have spears both and
ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδήπερ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; — μάλα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ
shields since-indeed good it-is very surely said —
Κτήσιππος· σὺ δ' οὐκ οἴει, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ἓν
Ctesippus you but not think O Euthydemus but one and one
δόρυ; — ἔγωγε. — ἦ καὶ τὸν Γηρυόνην ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸν
spear I-at-least truly also — Geryon — he-said and —
Βριάρεων οὕτως σὺ ὁπλίσαις; ἐγὼ δὲ ᾤμην σὲ δεινότερον
Briareus so you would-arm I but thought you more-dread
εἶναι, ἅτε ὁπλομάχην ὄντα, καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἑταῖρον.
to-be inasmuch-as an-arms-fighter being and this — companion

Dionysodorus asks whether gold is good, so one should have it always and everywhere, in the belly and the skull; Ctesippus answers that the Scythians drink from their gilded skulls. Euthydemus asks whether we see possible things, and Dionysodorus whether one can speak of the silent; Ctesippus says the irons in the smithies shout. Asked whether all things are silent or speak, Dionysodorus answers neither and both, and Ctesippus guffaws that he has made the argument go both ways. Clinias' laughter swells Ctesippus tenfold, and Dionysodorus asks Socrates whether he has ever seen a beautiful thing.

καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσίγησεν· ὁ δὲ Διονυσόδωρος πρὸς d
and — indeed Euthydemus fell-silent — but Dionysodorus to
τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα τῷ Κτησίππῳ ἤρετο, οὐκοῦν καὶ
the before answered-things — to-Ctesippus asked therefore also
χρυσίον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν; — πάνυ, καὶ
gold said and he good seems to-you to-be to-have very and
ταῦτά γε πολύ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — τί οὖν; ἀγαθὰ οὐ
these-things at-least much he-said — Ctesippus what then good-things not
δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι ἀεί τ' ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ; — σφόδρα
seem to-you to-be-needful always both to-have and everywhere vehemently
γ', ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογεῖς
at-least he-said therefore also the gold good you-agree
εἶναι; — ὡμολόγηκα μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. — οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ
to-be I-have-agreed indeed then said and he therefore always
δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ;
one-must it to-have and everywhere and as most in oneself
καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος εἰ ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία
and would-be — most-happy if he-had of-gold indeed three
τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρί, τάλαντον δ' ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατῆρα
talents in the belly a-talent and in the skull a-stater
δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶφθαλμῷ; — φασί γε οὖν, ὦ
and of-gold in each the-eye they-say at-least then O

Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, τούτους εὐδαιμονεστάτους εἶναι
Euthydemus said — Ctesippus these most-happy to-be
Σκυθῶν καὶ ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, οἳ χρυσίον τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις
of-Scythians and best men who gold both in the skulls
ἔχουσιν πολὺ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες τὸν κύνα
have much — their-own as you just-now were-saying the dog
τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὃ θαυμασιώτερόν γε ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ πίνουσιν
the father and what more-wonderful at-least still that also they-drink
ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν κρανίων κεχρυσωμένων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντὸς
from — their-own skulls gilded and these inside
καθορῶσιν, τὴν ἑαυτῶν κορυφὴν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες.
they-look-down-on — their-own crown in the hands holding
300 πότερον δὲ ὁρῶσιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καὶ Σκύθαι τε καὶ
whether and see he-said — Euthydemus also Scythians both and
οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα; — τὰ
the other men the possible-things to-see or the impossible-things the
δυνατὰ δήπου. — οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ, ἔφη; — κἀγώ. — ὁρᾷς
possible-things surely therefore also you he-said and-I do-you-see
οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἱμάτια; — ναί. — δυνατὰ οὖν ὁρᾶν ἐστὶν
then — our cloaks yes possible then to-see are
ταῦτα. — ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος. — τί δέ; ἦ δ'
these extraordinarily he-said — Ctesippus what and said and
ὅς. — μηδέν. σὺ δὲ ἴσως οὐκ οἴει αὐτὰ ὁρᾶν· οὕτως ἡδὺς
he nothing you but perhaps not think them to-see so sweet
εἶ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικεκοιμῆσθαι
you-are but to-me you-seem Euthydemus not sleeping to-have-fallen-asleep
καί, εἰ οἷόν τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
and if possible — speaking nothing to-say also you this to-do
b ἦ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τ', ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγῶντα
truly for not possible — he-said — Dionysodorus being-silent
λέγειν; — οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Κτήσιππος. —
to-speak not-even in-any-way-whatever said and he — Ctesippus

ἆρ᾽ οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; — ἔτι ἧττον, ἔφη. — ὅταν
then not-even speaking to-be-silent still less he-said when
οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα
then stones you-speak-of and timbers and irons not silent(-things)
λέγεις; — οὔκουν εἴ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς
you-speak not-then if at-least I he-said pass-by in the
χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ
smithies but uttering and shouting loudest the
σιδήρια λέγεται, ἐάν τις ἅψηται· ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν
irons are-said if someone touches(-them) so-that this indeed
ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι μοι τὸ
through wisdom you-failed-to-notice nothing saying but still to-me the
ἕτερον ἐπιδείξατον, ὅπως αὖ ἔστιν λέγοντα σιγᾶν.
other display-the-two how in-turn it-is-possible speaking to-be-silent
καί μοι ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ c
and to-me seemed to-be-over-anxious — Ctesippus because-of the
παιδικά.
beloved
ὅταν σιγᾷς, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾷς; —
when you-are-silent said — Euthydemus not all-things are-you-silent
ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾷς,
I-at-least said and he therefore also the speaking-things you-are-silent
εἴπερ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν. — τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος,
if-indeed of-the all-things they-are what and said — Ctesippus
οὐ σιγᾷ πάντα; — οὐ δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. — ἀλλ᾽
not is-silent all no surely said — Euthydemus but
ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα; — τά γε δήπου
then O best speak the all-things the at-least surely
λέγοντα. — ἀλλά, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ
speaking but said and he not this I-ask but the
πάντα σιγᾷ ἢ λέγει;
all-things is-silent or speaks

d οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος·
neither and both said snatching(-it) — Dionysodorus
εὖ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις ὅτι
well for I-know that with-the answer not you-will-have what
χρῇ.
you-may-use(-it)
καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας,
and — Ctesippus as was-his-custom greatly very having-guffawed
ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρικεν τὸν
O Euthydemus he-said the brother your has-made-both-ways the
λόγον, καὶ ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἥττηται. καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάνυ
argument and has-perished both and is-beaten and — Clinias very
ἥσθη καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὥστε ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐγένετο πλεῖον
was-pleased and laughed so-that — Ctesippus became more
ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. ὁ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἅτε πανοῦργος ὤν, ὁ
than ten-fold he but to-me seems inasmuch-as a-rogue being —
Κτήσιππος, παρ' αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρηκηκόει·
Ctesippus from very these very these-things had-overheard
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.
not for is of-others such wisdom of-the present men
e κἀγὼ εἶπον· τί γελᾷς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὕτω
and-I said why do-you-laugh O Clinias at serious so
πράγμασιν καὶ καλοῖς;
matters and fine
σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πώποτ' εἶδες, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν
you for already any ever saw O Socrates fine
πρᾶγμα; ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.
thing said — Dionysodorus
ἔγωγε, ἔφην, καὶ πολλά γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.
I-at-least I-said and many at-least O Dionysodorus
301 ἆρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἔφη, ἢ ταὐτὰ τῷ καλῷ;
then different being from-the fine he-said or the-same as-the fine

Asked whether beautiful things are different from the beautiful, Socrates says beauty is present in each, and Dionysodorus asks whether an ox beside him makes him an ox. If it belongs to the cook to chop and boil, then one may chop and boil the cook. Dionysodorus makes Socrates agree that his family gods, Apollo, Zeus, and Athena, are his, and are animals; so, Euthydemus concludes, he may sell or sacrifice them like his other animals.

κἀγὼ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἡγούμην δίκαια
and-I into every(-state) came from perplexity and thought just-things
πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἔγρυξα, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα ἔφην αὐτοῦ γε
to-have-suffered because I-muttered nevertheless but different I-said from-itself at-least
τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.
the fine is-present however to-each of-them beauty some
ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι
if then he-said is-present-with you an-ox an-ox are-you and because
νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ;
now I to-you am-present Dionysodorus are-you
εὐφήμει τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
speak-no-ill this at-least said and I
ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου
but in-what manner he-said different with-different being-present
τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη;
the different different — would-be
ἆρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; ἤδη δὲ τοῖν b
then this I-said I you-are-at-a-loss-about already and of-the-two
ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν
men the wisdom I-was-trying to-imitate inasmuch-as desiring
αὐτῆς.
it

πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
how for not am-I-at-a-loss he-said both I and the other
ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι ὃ μὴ ἔστι;
all men what not is
c τί λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλόν
what do-you-say said and I O Dionysodorus not the fine fine
ἐστιν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρόν; — ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῇ. —
is and the shameful shameful if to-me-at-least he-said it-seems
οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ; — πάνυ γ', ἔφη. — οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν
therefore does-it-seem certainly at-least he-said therefore also the same
ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τό γε ἕτερον
same and the different different not for surely the at-least different
ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι,
the-same but I-at-least not-even — a-child thought this to-be-at-a-loss-over
ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἑτερόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ', ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τοῦτο
that not the different different is but O Dionysodorus this
μὲν ἑκὼν παρῆκας, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε ὥσπερ
indeed willingly you-passed-over since in-the other-things to-me you-seem like
οἱ δημιουργοὶ οἷς ἕκαστα προσήκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ
the craftsmen to-whom each(-thing) belong to-accomplish also
ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
you the to-converse all-finely to-accomplish
d οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προσήκει ἑκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν;
do-you-know then he-said what belongs to-each of-the craftsmen
πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα; — ἔγωγε· ὅτι
first whom to-forge belongs do-you-know I-at-least that
χαλκέα. — τί δέ, κεραμεύειν; — κεραμέα. — τί δέ,
a-smith what and to-make-pots a-potter what and
σφάττειν τε καὶ ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ μικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαντα
to-slaughter both and to-skin and the small meats having-chopped-up
ἕψειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν; μάγειρον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — οὐκοῦν ἐάν
to-boil and to-roast a-cook said and I therefore if

τις, ἔφη, τὰ προσήκοντα πράττῃ, ὀρθῶς πράξει; —
someone he-said the belonging-things does rightly he-will-do
μάλιστα. — προσήκει δέ γε, ὡς φῄς, τὸν μάγειρον
most it-belongs and at-least as you-say the cook
κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρειν; ὡμολόγησας ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; —
to-chop-up and to-skin did-you-agree these-things or not
ὡμολόγησα, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε. — δῆλον
I-agreed I-said but pardon to-me have clear
τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἄν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον
then said and he that if someone having-slaughtered the cook
καὶ κατακόψας ἑψήσῃ καὶ ὀπτήσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα
and having-chopped-up boils and roasts the belonging-things
ποιήσει· καὶ ἐὰν τὸν χαλκέα τις αὐτὸν χαλκεύῃ καὶ τὸν
he-will-do and if the smith someone himself forges and the
κεραμέα κεραμεύῃ, καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.
potter makes-into-pots also this(-man) the belonging-things will-do
ὦ Πόσειδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς τῇ e
O Poseidon said and I already a-finishing-touch you-put on-the
σοφίᾳ. ἆρά μοί ποτε αὕτη παραγενήσεται ὥστε μοι
wisdom then to-me ever this will-be-present so-that to-me
οἰκεία γενέσθαι;
own to-become
ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οἰκείαν
would-you-recognize — it O Socrates he-said own
γενομένην;
having-become
ἐὰν σύ γε βούλῃ, ἔφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι.
if you at-least wish I-said I clear that(-I-would)
τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ σαυτοῦ οἴει γιγνώσκειν;
what and said and he — your-own-things do-you-think to-know

εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ
if not something you other mean from you for one-must
ἄρχεσθαι, τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον τόνδε.
to-begin to-end and at Euthydemus here
302 ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἡγῇ σὰ εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξῃς
so then he-said these-things do-you-think yours to-be of-which — you-rule
καὶ ἐξῇ σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ; οἷον
and it-is-possible for-you them to-use however — you-wish for-instance
βοῦς καὶ πρόβατον, ἆρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἅ
ox and sheep then — would-you-think these yours to-be which
σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι
for-you it-might-be-possible both to-sell and to-give and to-sacrifice
ὅτῳ βούλοιο θεῶν; ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ, οὐ σά;
to-whichever you-might-wish of-gods what but — not so are not yours
b κἀγώ (ᾔδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν καλόν τι ἀνακύψοιτο τῶν
and-I I-knew for that from them fine something would-come-up of-the
ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος ὅτι τάχιστ'
questions and at-the-same-time wishing as quickly(-as-possible)
ἀκοῦσαι) πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, οὕτως ἔχει· τὰ τοιαῦτά
to-hear certainly indeed then I-said so it-is — such-things
ἐστιν μόνα ἐμά. — τί δέ; ζῷα, ἔφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς
are alone mine what and animals he-said not these do-you-call
ἃ ἂν ψυχὴν ἔχῃ; ναί, ἔφην. — ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν ζῴων
which — soul have yes I-said do-you-agree then of-the animals
ταῦτα μόνα εἶναι σά, περὶ ἃ ἄν σοι ἐξουσία ᾖ πάντα
these alone to-be yours about which — for-you power be all
ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον; — ὁμολογῶ. —
these-things to-do which just-now I was-saying I-agree
καὶ ὅς, εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχὼν ὥς τι μέγα
and he ironically very having-paused as something great
σκοπούμενος, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν σοι Ζεὺς
examining tell me he-said O Socrates is-there to-you a-Zeus

πατρῷος; — καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύσας ἥξειν τὸν λόγον
ancestral and I having-suspected to-be-going-to-come the argument
οἷπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ
whither-very it-ended a-helpless some twist was-fleeing both and
ἐστρεφόμην ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημμένος· οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν
was-twisting already as in a-net caught not there-is said
δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε. — ταλαίπωρος ἄρα τις σύ γε
and I O Dionysodorus wretched then some you at-least
ἄνθρωπος εἶ καὶ οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖος, ᾧ μήτε θεοὶ πατρῷοί
man are and not-even an-Athenian to-whom neither gods ancestral
εἰσιν μήτε ἱερὰ μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
are nor shrines nor other anything fine and good
— ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ d
let(-it-be) said and I O Dionysodorus speak-no-ill both and not
χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε. ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ
harshly me lecture there-are for to-me-at-least both altars
καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ πατρῷα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσαπερ τοῖς
and shrines household and ancestral and the other-things as-many-as-very for-the
ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις τῶν τοιούτων. — εἶτα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἔφη,
other Athenians — of-such then for-the other he-said
Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῷος; — οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ'
Athenians not is Zeus the ancestral not is said and
ἐγώ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία Ἰώνων οὐδενί, οὔθ' ὅσοι ἐκ τῆσδε
I this — title of-Ionians for-none neither as-many-as from this
τῆς πόλεως ἀπῳκισμένοι εἰσὶν οὔθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων
— city settled-away are nor for-us but Apollo
πατρῷος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἴωνος γένεσιν· Ζεὺς δ' ἡμῖν πατρῷος
ancestral through the — of-Ion birth Zeus but for-us ancestral
μὲν οὐ καλεῖται, ἕρκειος δὲ καὶ φράτριος, καὶ Ἀθηναία
indeed not is-called of-the-household but and of-the-brotherhood and Athena
φρατρία. — ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ γ', ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ἔστιν
of-the-brotherhood but it-suffices at-least he-said — Dionysodorus there-is

γάρ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ. —
for to-you as it-seems Apollo both and Zeus and Athena
πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἶεν;
very said and I therefore also these to-you gods — would-be
ἔφη. — πρόγονοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δεσπόται. — ἀλλ' οὖν
he-said ancestors said and I and masters but anyhow
σοί γε, ἔφη· ἢ οὐ σοὺς ὡμολόγηκας αὐτοὺς εἶναι;
to-you at-least he-said or not yours have-you-agreed them to-be
e — ὡμολόγηκα, ἔφην· τί γὰρ πάθω; — οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ
I-have-agreed I-said what for am-I-to-suffer therefore he-said also
ζῷά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ θεοί; ὡμολόγηκας γὰρ ὅσα ψυχὴν
animals are these — gods you-have-agreed for as-many-as soul
ἔχει ζῷα εἶναι. ἢ οὗτοι οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ψυχήν; —
have animals to-be or these — gods not have soul
ἔχουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. — οὐκοῦν καὶ ζῷά εἰσιν; — ζῷα,
they-have said and I therefore also animals they-are animals
ἔφην. — τῶν δέ γε ζῴων, ἔφη, ὡμολόγηκας ταῦτ' εἶναι
I-said of-the and at-least animals he-said you-have-agreed these to-be
σά, ὅσα ἄν σοι ἐξῇ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι
yours as-many-as — for-you it-is-possible both to-give and to-sell
καὶ θῦσαι δὴ θεῷ ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ. — ὡμολόγηκα,
and to-sacrifice indeed to-god to-whichever — you-wish I-have-agreed
ἔφην· οὐκ ἔστιν γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσις, ὦ Εὐθύδημε.
I-said not there-is for to-me a-way-out O Euthydemus
303 ἴθι δή μοι εὐθύς, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰπέ· ἐπειδὴ σὸν
come indeed to-me straightway said and he tell(-me) since yours
ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, ἆρα
you-agree to-be — Zeus and the other gods then
ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτι
is-it-possible for-you them to-sell or to-give or otherwise whatever
ἂν βούλῃ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις;
— you-wish to-use as the other animals

XXI · THE COLUMNS APPLAUD

Socrates lies speechless, and Ctesippus cries bravo, Heracles, and Dionysodorus asks whether Heracles is a bravo or a bravo is Heracles. The whole company applauds, almost the columns of the Lyceum too, and Socrates, overcome, praises the brothers. Their arguments please only those like them, and sew up their own mouths along with everyone else's, and they can be learned so quickly that Ctesippus has already caught them; Socrates advises them to talk only to each other or to those who pay, and urges Crito to join him as their pupil.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου,
I indeed then O Crito as struck by the argument
ἐκείμην ἄφωνος· ὁ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι ἰὼν ὡς βοηθήσων,
lay speechless — but Ctesippus for-me going as going-to-help
Πυππὰξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου. — καὶ ὁ
Bravo O Heracles he-said of-a-fine argument and —
Διονυσόδωρος, πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἐστιν
Dionysodorus whether then he-said — Heracles a-bravo is
ἢ ὁ πυππὰξ Ἡρακλῆς; — καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Πόσειδον,
or the bravo Heracles and — Ctesippus O Poseidon
ἔφη, δεινῶν λόγων. ἀφίσταμαι· ἀμάχω τὼ ἄνδρε.
he-said of-dread arguments I-stand-aside unconquerable the two-men
ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν b
here however O dear Crito no-one who not of-the
παρόντων ὑπερεπῄνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τὼ ἄνδρε, καὶ
present praised-exceedingly the argument and the two-men both
γελῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν.
laughing and clapping and rejoicing nearly they-were-worn-out
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ' ἑκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως
at indeed for the earlier-things at each all all-finely
ἐθορύβουν μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου ἐρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ
shouted alone the — of-Euthydemus lovers here but

ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ᾽ ἐπὶ
nearly even the columns the in the Lyceum shouted both at
τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἥσθησαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω
the two-men and were-pleased I indeed then also myself so
διετέθην, ὥστε ὁμολογεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους
was-disposed so-as to-agree no ever men
ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφούς, καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς ὑπὸ
to-have-seen so wise and altogether having-been-enslaved by
τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτὼ
the wisdom of-the-two to the praising both and extolling them
ἐτραπόμην, καὶ εἶπον· ὦ μακάριοι σφὼ τῆς θαυμαστῆς
I-turned and said O blessed-pair you-two for-the wonderful
φύσεως, οἳ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ
nature who so-great a-thing so quickly and in little
χρόνῳ ἐξείργασθον. πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι
time have-accomplished many indeed then also other-things the arguments
ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε· ἐν
your fine have O Euthydemus both and Dionysodorus among
δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν
and them also this most-magnificent that of-the many
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τὶ
men and of-the august indeed and seeming something
εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν μόνον.
to-be nothing to-you it-matters but of-the like to-you only
e ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάνυ μὲν ἂν
I for well know that these — arguments very indeed —
ὀλίγοι ἀγαπῷεν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὕτως
few would-love men like to-you the but others so
ἀγνοοῦσιν αὐτούς, ὥστ᾽ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν
are-ignorant-of them so-that well I-know that they-would-be-ashamed —
μᾶλλον ἐξελέγχοντες τοιούτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ
rather refuting with-such arguments the others than themselves

ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ τόδε αὖ ἕτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ
being-refuted and this in-turn other popular something and
πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὁπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν
gentle in the arguments whenever you-say neither fine to-be anything
μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα μήτε λευκὸν μηδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων
nor good thing nor white nor other — of-such
μηδέν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἑτέρων ἕτερον, ἀτεχνῶς μὲν
anything nor — altogether of-different-things different simply indeed
τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε τὰ στόματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ
in reality you-sew-up the mouths of-the men as also
φατέ· ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δόξαιτε
you-say that and not only the-mouths of-the others but you-would-seem
ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, τοῦτο πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστιν καὶ
— also — your-own of-yourselves this very gracious both is and
τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρεῖται. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον,
the offensive of-the arguments takes-away the and indeed greatest
ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξηύρηται, ὥστ'
that these-things so are for-you and artfully has-been-devised so-that
ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὁντινοῦν ἂν μαθεῖν ἀνθρώπων·
in very little time anyone-whatever — could-learn of-men
ἔγνων ἔγωγε καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχων ὡς
I-perceived I-at-least also — to-Ctesippus the mind applying how
ταχὺ ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα μιμεῖσθαι οἷός τε ἦν.
quickly you from the immediate to-imitate able — he-was
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν τὸ σοφὸν πρὸς 304
this indeed then of-the matter of-you-two the wise(-part) toward
μὲν τὸ ταχὺ παραδιδόναι καλόν, ἐναντίον δ' ἀνθρώπων
indeed the quickly to-hand-on fine before but men
διαλέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ' ἄν γέ μοι πείθησθε,
to-converse not suitable but if at-least to-me you-obey
εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ
you-will-take-care not of-many before to-speak so-that not quickly

ἐκμαθόντες ὑμῖν μὴ εἰδῶσιν χάριν. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὼ
having-learned(-it) to-you not they-know thanks but most indeed the-two
πρὸς ἀλλήλω μόνω διαλέγεσθον· εἰ δὲ μή, εἴπερ ἄλλου του
with each-other alone converse-the-two if but not if-indeed of-another anyone
ἐναντίον, ἐκείνου μόνου ὃς ἂν ὑμῖν διδῷ ἀργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ
before of-that-one only who — to-you gives silver the same
δὲ ταῦτα, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλεύσετε,
and these-things if you-are-prudent also to-the pupils you-will-advise
μηδέποτε μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ ὑμῖν τε καὶ
never to-anyone of-men to-converse but than to-you both and
αὑτοῖς· τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ
to-themselves the for rare O Euthydemus precious the but water
εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλ' ἄγετε,
cheapest best being as said Pindar but come
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπως κἀμὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παραδέξεσθον.
said and I so-that both-me and Clinias here you-two-will-receive
c ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα ἅττα ἔτι βραχέα διαλεχθέντες
these-things O Crito and other some-things still brief having-conversed
ἀπῇμεν. σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις παρὰ τὼ ἄνδρε,
we-went-away consider then how you-will-attend-with(-us) with the two-men
ὡς ἐκείνω φατὸν οἵω τε εἶναι διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντ'
since those-two say able-the-two — to-be to-teach the willing
ἀργύριον διδόναι, καὶ οὔτε φύσιν οὔθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν
silver to-give and neither nature nor age to-exclude
οὐδεμίαν — ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι
any which and also to-you most belongs to-hear that
οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν — μὴ
not-even the to-make-money they-two-say to-hinder anything not
οὐ παραλαβεῖν ὁντινοῦν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.
not to-take-in anyone-whatever easily — their wisdom

Crito reports a speechwriter who stood by and said that the matter and the men who spend time on it are worthless and laughable. Socrates says such men live on the border between philosophy and politics and think themselves wisest, having a moderate share of each, though a thing between two goods is worse than either. Crito despairs of teachers for his son Critobulus, and Socrates tells him to test philosophy itself, not its practitioners, and if it is as he thinks, to pursue it with his children.

CRI. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ d
and surely O Socrates fond-of-listening indeed I-at-least and
ἡδέως ἄν τι μανθάνοιμι, κινδυνεύω μέντοι κἀγὼ εἷς
gladly — something I-would-learn I-am-likely however I-too one
εἶναι τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων ὧν δὴ
to-be of-the not like to-Euthydemus but of-those whom indeed
καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἥδιον ἂν ἐξελεγχομένων ὑπὸ τῶν
also you were-speaking-of of-the more-gladly — being-refuted by —
τοιούτων λόγων ἢ ἐξελεγχόντων. ἀτὰρ γελοῖον μέν μοι
such arguments than refuting but laughable indeed to-me
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ νουθετεῖν σε, ὅμως δέ, ἅ γ' ἤκουον,
seems to-be the to-admonish you nevertheless but what at-least I-heard
ἐθέλω σοι ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τῶν ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἀπιόντων ἴσθ' ὅτι
I-am-willing to-you to-report of-the from you going-away know that
προσελθών τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ
having-come-up someone to-me walking-about a-man thinking very
εἶναι σοφός, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς
to-be wise of-these some(-one) of-the about the speeches the
εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ
for the law-courts clever O Crito he-said not-at-all do-you-listen
τώνδε τῶν σοφῶν; — οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ
to-these — wise not by — Zeus said and I not for
οἷός τ' ἦ προσστὰς κατακούειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου. —
able — I-was standing-near to-hear-clearly because-of the crowd

καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. — τί δέ; ἦν δ'
and surely he-said worth at-least it-was to-hear what and said and
ἐγώ. — ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων οἳ νῦν
I so-that you-would-have-heard men conversing who now
σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους. — κἀγὼ
wisest are of-the about such arguments and-I
εἶπον· τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι; — τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἢ
said what then appeared-they to-you what and other said and he than
οἷάπερ ἀεὶ ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων καὶ
such-as-very always — anyone — of-such might-hear talking-nonsense and
περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων; (οὑτωσὶ
about of-nothing worth-things unworthy seriousness making thus
γάρ πως καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν). — καὶ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ
for somehow also he-said with-the words and I but
μέντοι, ἔφην, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία.
however I-said gracious at-least some thing is the philosophy
305 ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε; οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον.
what-sort he-said gracious O blessed of-nothing indeed then worth
ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ νῦν παρεγένου, πάνυ ἄν σε οἶμαι
but even if now you-had-been-present very — you I-think
αἰσχυνθῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἑταίρου· οὕτως ἦν
to-have-been-ashamed on-behalf-of — your-own companion so he-was
ἄτοπος, ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς οὐδὲν
strange being-willing himself to-offer to-men to-whom nothing
μέλει ὅτι ἂν λέγωσιν, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται.
it-matters whatever — they-say every but phrase they-cling-to
καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κράτιστοί εἰσι
and these which-very just-now I-was-saying among the mightiest are
τῶν νῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ
of-the present but for O Crito he-said the matter itself
καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι διατρίβοντες φαῦλοί
and the men the in the matter spending-time worthless

εἰσιν καὶ καταγέλαστοι. ἐμοὶ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πρᾶγμα
are and laughable to-me but O Socrates the matter
ἐδόκει οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν οὔθ' οὗτος οὔτ' εἴ τις ἄλλος
seemed not rightly to-blame neither this(-man) nor if anyone else
ψέγει· τὸ μέντοι ἐθέλειν διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτοις ἐναντίον
blames the however to-be-willing to-converse with-such before
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι.
many men rightly to-me he-seemed to-find-fault-with

SOC. ὦ Κρίτων, θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ
O Crito wonderful are — such men but
οὔπω οἶδα ὅτι μέλλω ἐρεῖν. ποτέρων ἦν ὁ προσελθών
not-yet I-know what I-am-going to-say of-which-sort was the having-come-up
σοι καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν
to-you and finding-fault-with the philosophy whether of-the
ἀγωνίσασθαι δεινῶν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις,
to-contend clever in the law-courts an-orator some(-one)
ἢ τῶν τοὺς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητὴς τῶν λόγων
or of-the — such sending-in a-composer of-the speeches
οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται;
with-which the orators contend

CRI. ἥκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτ' αὐτὸν c
least by — Zeus an-orator nor I-think ever him
ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαΐειν αὐτόν φασι
into a-law-court to-have-gone-up but to-understand him they-say
περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ
about the matter by — Zeus and clever to-be and
δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.
clever speeches to-compose

SOC. ἤδη μανθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νυνδὴ ἔμελλον d
already I-understand about these also myself just-now I-was-going
λέγειν. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν μέν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος
to-speak these for are indeed O Crito whom said Prodicus

μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἴονται
border-land of-philosophical both man and political they-think
δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ
and to-be of-all wisest of-men besides and the
εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν
to-be also to-seem very among many so-that among all
εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ
to-be-well-reputed in-the-way for-them to-be no others than
τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν
the about philosophy men they-think then if
τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους
these into opinion they-establish of-nothing to-seem worthy
εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ νικητήρια
to-be indisputably already among all the prize-of-victory
εἰς δόξαν οἴσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ
into opinion to-be-going-to-carry-off wisdom about to-be indeed for in-the
ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν
truth themselves wisest in but the private discussions whenever
ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ
they-are-cut-off by the around Euthydemus to-be-docked wise
δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνυ — εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ
and they-think to-be very reasonably moderately indeed for
φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος
of-philosophy to-have moderately and of-political-matters very from reasonable
λόγου — μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, ἐκτὸς
account to-partake for of-both as-much-as was-needful outside
δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.
and being of-dangers and contests to-reap the wisdom

CRI. τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν; οὐ
what then do-they-seem to-you anything O Socrates to-say not
γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ ὅ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν
for you-know but the at-least argument has some plausibility of-the
ἀνδρῶν.
men

SOC. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ 306
and for it-has really O Crito plausibility rather than
ἀλήθειαν. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον αὐτοὺς πεῖσαι ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι
truth not for easy them to-persuade that both men
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα μεταξύ τινοιν δυοῖν ἐστιν καὶ
and the-rest all as-many-as between some two are and
ἀμφοτέροιν τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ
of-both happen partaking as-many indeed from bad and
ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα
good than-the one better than-the other worse become as-many
δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς
but from two goods not toward the-same than-both worse toward
ὃ ἂν ἑκάτερον ᾖ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη·
what — each be useful of-those from which it-was-composed
ὅσα δ' ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συντεθέντα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ
as-many but from two evils composed not toward the same
ὄντοιν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστίν, ταῦτα μόνα βελτίω ἑκατέρου
being in the middle are these alone better than-each
ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν. εἰ μὲν
of-those are of-which of-both part they-partake if indeed
οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις,
then the philosophy good is and the political action
πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρα, οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες
toward other and each these but of-both partaking
τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν — ἀμφοτέρων γάρ
of-these in middle are nothing they-say than-both for

εἰσι φαυλότεροι — εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν μὲν
they-are worse if but good and bad than-the one
βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφότερα, οὕτως
better than-the other worse if but bad both so
ἄν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς.
— something they-would-say true otherwise but in-no-way
c οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογῆσαι οὔτε κακὼ αὐτὼ
not — then I-think them to-agree either bad them
ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ
both to-be or the one bad the other good but
τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους
in reality these of-both partaking than-both inferior
εἰσὶν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἥ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ
are toward each toward which the both political-art and the
φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἐστόν, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ
philosophy worthy-the-two of-account are and third being in-the
ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. συγγιγνώσκειν μὲν
truth they-seek first to-seem to-be to-pardon indeed
οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν,
then them one-must for-the desire and not to-be-angry
ἡγεῖσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοί εἰσιν· πάντα γὰρ
to-think however such to-be as they-are every for
ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὁτιοῦν λέγει ἐχόμενον
man one-must to-cherish who even anything-whatever says pertaining-to
φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξιὼν διαπονεῖται.
prudence a-thing and manfully pursuing(-it) labors-through
307 CRI. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν ὑέων,
and surely O Socrates also myself about the sons
ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρός σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμὶ τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς
as always to you I-say in perplexity I-am what one-must them
χρήσασθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρός ἐστιν,
to-do-with the indeed then younger still also small is

Κριτόβουλος δ᾽ ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖταί τινος ὅστις
Critobulus but already age has and needs someone who
αὐτὸν ὀνήσει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι, οὕτω
him will-benefit I indeed then whenever with-you I-am so
διατίθεμαι ὥστ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἕνεκα τῶν
I-am-disposed so-that to-me it-seems madness to-be the for-sake-of the
παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδὴν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι,
children of-other-things indeed many seriousness such to-have-had
καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρός,
and about the marriage that from noblest they-will-be mother
καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν
and about the money that as richest of-them
δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελῆσαι· ὅταν δὲ εἴς τινα ἀποβλέψω
but about education to-have-neglected when but toward someone I-look
τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεῦσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαι καί
of-the claiming — to-educate men I-am-stunned and
μοι δοκεῖ εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος
to-me seems one each of-them examining very strange
εἶναι, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω
to-be as at-least to you the-truth to-be-told so-that not I-can
ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.
how I-am-to-urge the lad to philosophy

SOC. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι
O dear Crito not do-you-know that in every pursuit
οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι
the indeed worthless many and of-nothing worth the but serious
ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ
few and of-all worth since gymnastics not fine does-it-seem
σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία;
to-you to-be and money-making and rhetoric and generalship

CRI. ἔμοιγε πάντως δήπου.
to-me-at-least wholly surely

b SOC. τί οὖν; ἐν ἑκάστῃ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς
what then in each of-these the many in-relation-to
ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὁρᾷς;
each the work not laughable do-you-see
CRI. ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
yes by — Zeus and very true-things you-say
SOC. ἦ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτός τε φεύξῃ πάντα τὰ
truly then of-this for-sake yourself both will-flee all the
ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεις;
pursuits and to-the son not will-entrust(-them)
CRI. οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not-then just at-least O Socrates
c SOC. μὴ τοίνυν ὅ γε οὐ χρὴ ποίει, ὦ Κρίτων,
not then what at-least not one-must do O Crito
ἀλλ' ἐάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε
but having-let to-fare-well the pursuing philosophy whether
χρηστοί εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας
good they-are or wicked itself the matter having-tested
καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, ἐὰν μέν σοι φαίνηται φαῦλον ὄν,
finely both and well if indeed to-you it-appears worthless being
πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς υἱεῖς· ἐὰν δὲ
every man turn-away not only the sons if but
φαίνηται οἷον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ
it-appears such-as I-think it I to-be being-bold pursue and
ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.
practice the saying indeed this yourself both and the children