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Words and Things

Plato · Aristotle

ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ
ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑΙ
ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ

Words and Things

Cratylus, with Aristotle's Categories,
On Interpretation, and Sophistical Refutations

---

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



CANES NOBILES · MMXXVI

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

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Words the editors seclude are not printed; words
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PLATO

ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ

Cratylus

Hermogenes asks Socrates to join his argument with Cratylus, who holds that every being has a correct name by nature, the same for Greeks and barbarians, and that Hermogenes is not truly his name. Hermogenes holds that names rest on agreement and custom: whatever anyone sets down is correct, as a renamed slave's new name is. Socrates draws him to grant that a statement can be true or false, and so can its smallest part, the name. Hermogenes holds to it: whatever name a person, or a city, gives a thing is its name, so one thing may have many names, as among Greeks and barbarians.

HERM. βούλει οὖν καὶ Σωκράτει τῷδε ἀνακοινωσώμεθα 383
do-you-wish then also to-Socrates here should-we-share
τὸν λόγον;
the argument
CRAT. εἴ σοι δοκεῖ.
if to-you it-seems-good
HERM. Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα b
Cratylus says here O Socrates of-name correctness
εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο
to-be for-each of-the beings by-nature grown and not this
εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν τινες συνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς
to-be a-name which — some having-agreed to-call call of-the
αὑτῶν φωνῆς μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα
their-own voice a-portion uttering but correctness some
τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν
of-the names to-be-natural both to-Greeks and to-barbarians the
αὐτὴν ἅπασιν. ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ εἰ αὐτῷ Κρατύλος
same to-all I-ask then him I whether to-him Cratylus
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα· ὁ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ. "τί δὲ Σωκράτει;"
in-the truth name-is he and agrees what and to-Socrates
ἔφην. "Σωκράτης," ἦ δ' ὅς. "οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
I-said Socrates said and he therefore also for-the other

ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν, ὅπερ καλοῦμεν ὄνομα ἕκαστον, τοῦτό
men all what-very we-call a-name each this
ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;" ὁ δέ, "οὔκουν σοί γε," ἦ δ' ὅς,
is for-each name he and not-then to-you at-least said and he
"ὄνομα Ἑρμογένης, οὐδὲ ἂν πάντες καλῶσιν ἄνθρωποι."
name-is Hermogenes not-even if all should-call men
384 καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος καὶ προθυμουμένου εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτὲ
and of-me asking and being-eager to-know what ever
λέγει, οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδὲν εἰρωνεύεταί τε πρός με,
he-means neither clarifies nothing he-dissembles and toward me
προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς
pretending something himself in himself to-think as
εἰδὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ εἰ βούλοιτο σαφῶς εἰπεῖν, ποιήσειεν
knowing about it which if he-wished clearly to-say he-would-make
ἂν καὶ ἐμὲ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει. εἰ οὖν
— also me to-agree and to-say what-very he-himself says if then
πῃ ἔχεις συμβαλεῖν τὴν Κρατύλου μαντείαν, ἡδέως ἂν
somehow you-are-able to-interpret the of-Cratylus prophecy gladly —
ἀκούσαιμι· μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ σοι ὅπῃ δοκεῖ περὶ ὀνομάτων
I-would-hear rather and yourself to-you how it-seems about of-names
ὀρθότητος ἔτι ἂν ἥδιον πυθοίμην, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ.
correctness still — more-gladly I-would-learn if to-you wishing
b soc. ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου Ἑρμόγενες, παλαιὰ παροιμία ὅτι
O son of-Hipponicus Hermogenes old proverb that
χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἐστιν ὅπῃ ἔχει μαθεῖν· καὶ δὴ
difficult the fine-things are how they-are to-learn and indeed
καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ σμικρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν
also the about the names not small happens being
μάθημα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν
a-study if indeed then I already had-heard from Prodicus the
πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν, ἣν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει
fifty-drachma lecture which for-one-having-heard it-belongs

περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ὥς φησιν ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲν ἂν
about this to-have-been-educated as says that-one nothing —
ἐκώλυέν σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ
would-have-prevented you at-once very to-know the truth about
ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν
of-names correctness now but not I-have-heard but the
δραχμιαίαν. οὔκουν οἶδα πῇ ποτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν
one-drachma not-then I-know how ever the true is about the
τοιούτων· συζητεῖν μέντοι ἕτοιμός εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ
such-things to-inquire-together however ready I-am both with-you and
Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ. ὅτι δὲ οὔ φησί σοι Ἑρμογένη ὄνομα
with-Cratylus in-common that and not he-says to-you Hermogenes name
εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὥσπερ ὑποπτεύω αὐτὸν σκώπτειν· οἴεται
to-be in-the truth as I-suspect him to-mock he-thinks
γὰρ ἴσως σε χρημάτων ἐφιέμενον κτήσεως ἀποτυγχάνειν
for perhaps you of-money desiring of-acquisition to-fail
ἑκάστοτε. ἀλλ', ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, εἰδέναι μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα
each-time but what just-now I-was-saying to-know indeed the such-things
χαλεπόν, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δὲ καταθέντας χρὴ σκοπεῖν
difficult into the common and having-set-down one-must to-examine
εἴτε ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἔχει εἴτε ὡς Κρατύλος.
whether as you say it-is or as Cratylus

HERM. καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ καὶ d
and indeed I-at-least O Socrates often indeed both
τούτῳ διαλεχθεὶς καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, οὐ δύναμαι
with-this-one having-conversed and with-others many not I-am-able
πεισθῆναι ὡς ἄλλη τις ὀρθότης ὀνόματος ἢ συνθήκη καὶ
to-be-persuaded that other some correctness of-name than convention and
ὁμολογία. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα,
agreement to-me for it-seems whatever — anyone to-anything should-set as-name
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν· καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται,
this to-be the correct and if again at-least other he-should-change-to

ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ὕστερον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν
that and no-longer should-call nothing less the later correctly to-be
τοῦ προτέρου, ὥσπερ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἡμεῖς μετατιθέμεθα·
than-the earlier as for-the servants we change
οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ
not for by-nature to-each to-be-natural name any to-anything but
νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων. εἰ δέ
by-custom and by-habit of-the having-accustomed both and calling if but
πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, ἕτοιμος ἔγωγε καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ ἀκούειν
somehow otherwise it-is ready I-at-least both to-learn and to-hear
οὐ μόνον παρὰ Κρατύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν.
not only from Cratylus but also from other anyone-whatever
385 SOC. ἴσως μέντοι τὶ λέγεις, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· σκεψώμεθα
perhaps however something you-say O Hermogenes let-us-examine
δέ. ὃ ἂν φῇς καλῇ τις ἕκαστον, τοῦθ' ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;
but what — you-say should-call one each this for-each name
HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems
SOC. καὶ ἐὰν ἰδιώτης καλῇ καὶ ἐὰν πόλις;
both if a-private-man should-call and if a-city
HERM. φημί.
I-say-so
SOC. τί οὖν; ἐὰν ἐγὼ καλῶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων,
what then if I should-call anything-whatever of-the beings
οἷον ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἄνθρωπον, ἐὰν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον
such-as what now we-call man if I this horse
προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον, ἔσται δημοσίᾳ
should-address what and now horse man will-be publicly
μὲν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος τῷ αὐτῷ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; καὶ
indeed name man for-the same privately and horse and
ἰδίᾳ μὲν αὖ ἄνθρωπος, δημοσίᾳ δὲ ἵππος; οὕτω λέγεις;
privately indeed again man publicly and horse so do-you-say

HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. b
to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. φέρε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ· καλεῖς τι ἀληθῆ λέγειν
come indeed to-me this tell do-you-call something true to-speak
καὶ ψευδῆ;
and false

HERM. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν λόγος ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής;
therefore would-be — speech true the(-one) and false

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν,
so then this which — the beings should-say as they-are
ἀληθής· ὃς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής;
true which but — as not they-are false

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, λόγῳ λέγειν τὰ ὄντα τε καὶ μή;
it-is-possible then this in-speech to-say the beings both and not

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὁ λόγος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθὴς πότερον μὲν ὅλος c
the speech and is the true whether indeed whole
ἀληθής, τὰ μόρια δ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ;
true the parts but of-it not true

HERM. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια.
no but also the parts

SOC. πότερον δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μόρια ἀληθῆ, τὰ δὲ
whether and the indeed large parts true the and
σμικρὰ οὔ· ἢ πάντα;
small not or all

HERM. πάντα, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
all think I-at-least

SOC. ἔστιν οὖν ὅτι λέγεις λόγου σμικρότερον μόριον ἄλλο
is-there then which you-say of-speech smaller part other
ἢ ὄνομα;
than name

HERM. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σμικρότατον.
no but this smallest

SOC. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λόγου λέγεται;
also this then the of-the true speech is-said

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἀληθές γε, ὡς φῄς.
true at-least as you-say

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. τὸ δὲ τοῦ ψεύδους μόριον οὐ ψεῦδος;
the and of-the falsehood part not false

HERM. φημί.
I-say-so

SOC. ἔστιν ἄρα ὄνομα ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ
it-is-possible then a-name false and true to-say if-indeed
καὶ λόγον;
also speech

d HERM. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not

SOC. ὃ ἂν ἄρα ἕκαστος φῇ τῳ ὄνομα εἶναι,
what — then each should-say to-anything name to-be
τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;
this is for-each name

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἦ καὶ ὁπόσα ἂν φῇ τις ἑκάστῳ ὀνόματα εἶναι,
truly also as-many-as — should-say one for-each names to-be
τοσαῦτα ἔσται καὶ τότε ὁπόταν φῇ;
so-many will-be also then whenever he-should-say

HERM. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ἄλλην e
not for have I-at-least O Socrates of-name other
ὀρθότητα ἢ ταύτην, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἕτερον εἶναι καλεῖν
correctness than this for-me indeed other to-be to-call
ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα, ὃ ἐγὼ ἐθέμην, σοὶ δὲ ἕτερον, ὃ
for-each name which I set for-you and other which
αὖ σύ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ὁρῶ ἰδίᾳ ἐνίοις
in-turn you thus and also for-the cities I-see privately for-some
ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κείμενα ὀνόματα, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ τοὺς
for the same set names both for-Greeks beside the
ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, καὶ Ἕλλησι παρὰ βαρβάρους.
other Greeks and for-Greeks beside barbarians

II · THINGS HAVE THEIR OWN BEING

Hermogenes does not hold with Protagoras that man is the measure of all things, since some men are good and wise and others bad. Then things are not as each man thinks them, nor, as Euthydemus says, all alike for all at once; they have a stable being of their own. Actions too have their own nature: one cuts and burns as cutting and burning require, not as one pleases. Speaking is an action, and naming a part of it, so one must name as things are naturally named, not as one wishes, and what must be named must be named with something.

SOC. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, πότερον καὶ τὰ 386
come indeed let-us-see O Hermogenes whether also the
ὄντα οὕτως ἔχειν σοι φαίνεται, ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία
beings so to-be to-you appears privately of-them the being

εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν λέγων "πάντων
to-be for-each as Protagoras said saying of-all
χρημάτων μέτρον" εἶναι ἄνθρωπον — ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν
things measure to-be man that then such-as indeed
ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί·
— to-me appear the things such indeed are for-me
οἷα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί — ἢ ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι
such-as and — to-you such and to-you or to-have seem to-you
αὐτὰ αὑτῶν τινα βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας;
they-themselves of-themselves some stability of-the being

HERM. ἤδη ποτὲ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα
already once I-at-least O Socrates being-at-a-loss also here
ἐξηνέχθην εἰς ἅπερ Πρωταγόρας λέγει· οὐ πάνυ τι
was-carried-away into what-very Protagoras says not very at-all
μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.
however to-me it-seems so to-be

b SOC. τί δέ; ἐς τόδε ἤδη ἐξηνέχθης, ὥστε μὴ πάνυ
what and to this already were-you-carried-away so-as not very
σοι δοκεῖν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον πονηρόν;
to-you to-seem to-be some man wicked

HERM. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ πέπονθα,
not by — Zeus but often indeed it I-have-experienced
ὥστε μοι δοκεῖν πάνυ πονηροὺς εἶναί τινας ἀνθρώπους,
so-as to-me to-seem very wicked to-be some men
καὶ μάλα συχνούς.
and very many

SOC. τί δέ; πάνυ χρηστοὶ οὔπω σοι ἔδοξαν εἶναι;
what and very good not-yet to-you seemed to-be

HERM. καὶ μάλα ὀλίγοι.
and very few

SOC. ἔδοξαν δ' οὖν;
they-seemed and then

HERM. ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least

SOC. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο τίθεσαι; ἆρ' ὧδε· τοὺς μὲν πάνυ
how then this do-you-put then thus the indeed very
χρηστοὺς πάνυ φρονίμους, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ πονηροὺς πάνυ
good very prudent the and very wicked very
ἄφρονας;
foolish

HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. c
to-me-at-least it-seems so

SOC. οἷόν τε οὖν, εἰ Πρωταγόρας ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν καὶ ἔστιν
possible — then if Protagoras true-things said and is
αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ οἷα ἂν δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ τοιαῦτα καὶ
this the truth the such-as — seem to-each such also
εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν φρονίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας;
to-be the indeed of-us prudent to-be the and foolish

HERM. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, σοὶ πάνυ δοκεῖ, d
and these-things at-least as I-think to-you very seems
φρονήσεως οὔσης καὶ ἀφροσύνης μὴ πάνυ δυνατὸν εἶναι
prudence being and folly not very possible to-be
Πρωταγόραν ἀληθῆ λέγειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν που τῇ
Protagoras true-things to-say nothing for — surely in-the
ἀληθείᾳ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου φρονιμώτερος εἴη, εἴπερ
truth the one than-the other more-prudent would-be if-indeed
ἃ ἂν ἑκάστῳ δοκῇ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθῆ ἔσται.
what-things — to-each seem to-each true will-be

HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' Εὐθύδημόν γε οἶμαι σοὶ
but indeed not-even according-to Euthydemus at-least I-think to-you
δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί· οὐδὲ
does-it-seem to-all all-things alike to-be at-once and always nor
γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶεν οἱ μὲν χρηστοί, οἱ δὲ πονηροί,
for — so would-be the indeed good the and wicked
εἰ ὁμοίως ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀρετή τε καὶ κακία εἴη.
if alike to-all and always virtue both and vice should-be
HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
e SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε πᾶσι πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἅμα
therefore if neither to-all all-things are alike at-once
καὶ ἀεί, μήτε ἑκάστῳ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι
and always nor to-each privately each clear indeed that
αὐτὰ αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ
they-themselves of-themselves being having some stable are the
πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενα ἄνω
things not relative-to us nor by us being-dragged up
καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ
and down by-the our image but by themselves
πρὸς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ πέφυκεν.
toward the of-themselves being holding as-very they-are-by-nature
HERM. δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω.
it-seems to-me O Socrates so
SOC. πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυκότα,
whether then they-themselves indeed — would-be so being-by-nature
αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον; ἢ
the and actions of-them not according-to the same way or
οὐ καὶ αὗται ἕν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων εἰσίν, αἱ πράξεις;
not also these one some form of-the beings are the actions
HERM. πάνυ γε καὶ αὗται.
certainly at-least also these

SOC. κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἄρα φύσιν καὶ αἱ πράξεις 387
according-to the of-themselves then nature also the actions
πράττονται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δόξαν. οἷον ἐάν
are-done not according-to the our opinion such-as if
τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν ἡμεῖς τῶν ὄντων τέμνειν, πότερον
something should-attempt we of-the beings to-cut whether
ἡμῖν τμητέον ἕκαστον ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα καὶ
by-us must-be-cut each as — we should-wish and
ᾧ ἂν βουληθῶμεν, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν
with-what — we-should-wish or if indeed according-to the nature
βουληθῶμεν ἕκαστον τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν τε καὶ τέμνεσθαι
we-should-wish each to-cut of-the to-cut both and to-be-cut
καὶ ᾧ πέφυκε, τεμοῦμέν τε καὶ πλέον τι ἡμῖν
and with-what it-is-natural we-shall-cut both and more something for-us
ἔσται καὶ ὀρθῶς πράξομεν τοῦτο, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν,
will-be and rightly we-shall-do this if but contrary-to nature
ἐξαμαρτησόμεθά τε καὶ οὐδὲν πράξομεν;
we-shall-err both and nothing we-shall-do
HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω. b
to-me-at-least it-seems so
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν κάειν τι ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, οὐ κατὰ
therefore also if to-burn something we-should-attempt not according-to
πᾶσαν δόξαν δεῖ κάειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὀρθήν; αὕτη
every opinion one-must to-burn but according-to the correct this
δ' ἐστὶν ᾗ ἐπεφύκει ἕκαστον κάεσθαί τε καὶ κάειν
and is by-which was-by-nature each to-be-burned both and to-burn
καὶ ᾧ ἐπεφύκει;
and with-which was-by-nature
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω;
therefore also the-others so

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ καὶ τὸ λέγειν μία τις τῶν πράξεών ἐστιν;
so then not also the to-speak one some of-the actions is

HERM. ναί.
yes

c SOC. πότερον οὖν ᾗ ἄν τῳ δοκῇ λεκτέον εἶναι,
whether then as — to-anyone should-seem must-be-spoken to-be
ταύτῃ λέγων ὀρθῶς λέξει, ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ
in-this-way speaking rightly he-will-speak or if indeed as is-natural the
πράγματα λέγειν τε καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ταύτῃ καὶ
things to-speak both and to-be-spoken and with-which in-this-way and
τούτῳ λέγῃ, πλέον τέ τι ποιήσει καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἂν
with-this he-should-speak more both something he-will-do and will-say if
δὲ μή, ἐξαμαρτήσεταί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει;
but not he-will-err both and nothing will-do

HERM. οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.
so to-me it-seems as you-say

SOC. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λέγειν μόριον τὸ ὀνομάζειν; διονομάζοντες
therefore of-the to-speak a-part the to-name naming
γάρ που λέγουσι τοὺς λόγους.
for surely they-speak the speeches

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ
therefore also the to-name an-action is if-indeed also the
λέγειν πρᾶξίς τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα;
to-speak action some was about the things

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν ἡμῖν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, d
the and actions appeared to-us not relative-to us being
ἀλλ᾽ αὑτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι;
but of-themselves some own nature having
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀνομαστέον ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα
therefore also one-must-name as is-natural the things
ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ᾧ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἂν
to-name both and to-be-named and with-which but not as —
ἡμεῖς βουληθῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει
we should-wish if-indeed something with-the former-things is-going
ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἂν πλέον τι
agreed to-be and so indeed — more something
ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοιμεν, ἄλλως δὲ οὔ;
we-would-do and would-name otherwise but not
HERM. φαίνεταί μοι.
it-appears to-me
SOC. φέρε δή, ὃ ἔδει τέμνειν, ἔδει τῳ,
come indeed what it-was-necessary to-cut it-was-necessary with-something
φαμέν, τέμνειν;
we-say to-cut
HERM. ναί.
yes
SOC. καὶ ὃ ἔδει κερκίζειν, ἔδει τῳ e
and what it-was-necessary to-weave it-was-necessary with-something
κερκίζειν; καὶ ὃ ἔδει τρυπᾶν, ἔδει τῳ
to-weave and what it-was-necessary to-bore it-was-necessary with-something
τρυπᾶν;
to-bore
HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. καὶ ὃ ἔδει δὴ ὀνομάζειν, ἔδει τῳ
and what it-was-necessary indeed to-name it-was-necessary with-something
ὀνομάζειν;
to-name

III · THE NAME AS A TOOL

As the borer bores and the shuttle weaves, the name is a tool: with it we teach one another and separate things as they are. The weaver uses the shuttle well, and the carpenter makes it; names are handed down by the law, that is, by a lawgiver, the rarest of craftsmen. The carpenter making a shuttle looks to the form of shuttle, and the smith puts the form of each tool into iron, any iron, here or among barbarians, and the tool is still right. So the lawgiver must put the natural name into sounds and syllables, looking to what a name is.

388 HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. τί δὲ ἦν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἔδει τρυπᾶν;
what and was that with-which it-was-necessary to-bore
HERM. τρύπανον.
a-borer
SOC. τί δὲ ᾧ κερκίζειν;
what and with-which to-weave
HERM. κερκίς.
a-shuttle
SOC. τί δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζειν;
what and with-which to-name
HERM. ὄνομα.
a-name
SOC. εὖ λέγεις. ὄργανον ἄρα τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.
well you-speak an-instrument then some is also the name

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην "τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς;" οὐχ
if then I should-ask what was instrument the shuttle not
ᾧ κερκίζομεν;
with-which we-weave

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. κερκίζοντες δὲ τί δρῶμεν; οὐ τὴν κρόκην καὶ τοὺς b
weaving and what do-we-do not the woof and the
στήμονας συγκεχυμένους διακρίνομεν;
warps confounded do-we-separate

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τρυπάνου ἕξεις οὕτως εἰπεῖν
therefore also about borer you-will-be-able so to-say
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;
and about the others

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἔχεις δὴ καὶ περὶ ὀνόματος οὕτως εἰπεῖν;
are-you-able indeed also about name so to-say
ὀργάνῳ ὄντι τῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζοντες τί ποιοῦμεν;
with-instrument being the name naming what do-we-do

HERM. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
not I-am-able to-say

SOC. ἆρ' οὐ διδάσκομέν τι ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ πράγματα
then not do-we-teach something one-another and the things
διακρίνομεν ᾗ ἔχει;
do-we-separate as they-are

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

c SOC. ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ
a-name then instructive some is instrument and
διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος.
separative of-the being as shuttle of-woven-stuff
HERM. ναί.
yes
SOC. ὑφαντικὸν δέ γε ἡ κερκίς;
for-weaving and at-least the shuttle
HERM. πῶς δ' οὔ;
how and not
SOC. ὑφαντικὸς μὲν ἄρα κερκίδι καλῶς χρήσεται, καλῶς
a-weaver indeed then with-the-shuttle well will-use well
δ' ἐστὶν ὑφαντικῶς· διδασκαλικὸς δὲ ὀνόματι, καλῶς δ'
and is weaver-like a-teacher and with-name well and
ἐστὶ διδασκαλικῶς.
is teacher-like
HERM. ναί.
yes
SOC. τῷ τίνος οὖν ἔργῳ ὁ ὑφάντης καλῶς χρήσεται
the of-whom then work the weaver well will-use
ὅταν τῇ κερκίδι χρῆται;
whenever the shuttle he-uses
HERM. τῷ τοῦ τέκτονος.
the of-the carpenter
SOC. πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
every and carpenter or the(-one) the art having
HERM. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
the(-one) the art
d SOC. τῷ τίνος δὲ ἔργῳ ὁ τρυπητὴς καλῶς χρήσεται
the of-whom and work the driller well will-use
ὅταν τῷ τρυπάνῳ χρῆται;
whenever the borer he-uses

HERM. τῷ τοῦ χαλκέως.
the of-the smith

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν πᾶς χαλκεὺς ἢ ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
so then every smith or the(-one) the art having

HERM. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
the(-one) the art

SOC. εἶεν. τῷ δὲ τίνος ἔργῳ ὁ διδασκαλικὸς χρήσεται
well the and of-whom work the teacher will-use
ὅταν τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆται;
whenever the name he-uses

HERM. οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχω.
not-even this I-am-able

SOC. οὐδὲ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, τίς παραδίδωσιν
not-even this at-least are-you-able to-say who hands-down
ἡμῖν τὰ ὀνόματα οἷς χρώμεθα;
to-us the names which we-use

HERM. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὐχὶ ὁ νόμος δοκεῖ σοι ὁ παραδιδοὺς αὐτά;
then not the law seems to-you the(-one) handing-down them

HERM. ἔοικεν.
it-seems

SOC. νομοθέτου ἄρα ἔργῳ χρήσεται ὁ διδασκαλικὸς ὅταν e
of-lawgiver then work will-use the teacher whenever
ὀνόματι χρῆται;
name he-uses

HERM. δοκεῖ μοι.
it-seems to-me

SOC. νομοθέτης δέ σοι δοκεῖ πᾶς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἢ ὁ
lawgiver and to-you does-it-seem every to-be man or the(-one)
τὴν τέχνην ἔχων;
the art having

HERM. ὁ τὴν τέχνην.
the(-one) the art

389 SOC. οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὄνομα θέσθαι
not then of-every man O Hermogenes name to-set
ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος δ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ
but of-some name-maker this and is as it-seems the
νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν
lawgiver who indeed of-the craftsmen rarest among
ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.
men comes-to-be

HERM. ἔοικεν.
it-seems

SOC. ἴθι δή, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ
come indeed consider whither looking the lawgiver the
ὀνόματα τίθεται· ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἀνάσκεψαι.
names sets from the former and reconsider
ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς
whither looking the carpenter the shuttle makes then not toward
τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν;
such something which was-by-nature to-weave

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

b SOC. τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον
what and if should-break for-him the shuttle making whether
πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς
again will-he-make another toward the broken looking or toward
ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει;
that the form toward which-very also which he-broke he-was-making

HERM. πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
toward that to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ' ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν κερκὶς
therefore that most-justly — itself what is shuttle
καλέσαιμεν;
we-would-call
HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems
SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν δέῃ λεπτῷ ἱματίῳ ἢ παχεῖ ἢ λινῷ ἢ c
therefore whenever it-is-needful for-fine garment or thick or linen or
ἐρεῷ ἢ ὁποιῳοῦν τινι κερκίδα ποιεῖν, πάσας μὲν δεῖ
woolen or of-any-sort-whatever some shuttle to-make all indeed one-must
τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἵα δ' ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη
the of-the shuttle to-have form such-as and for-each finest
ἐπεφύκει, ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον;
was-by-nature this to-give the nature into the work each
HERM. ναί.
yes
SOC. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὀργάνων ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· τὸ
and about the other indeed instruments the same way the
φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκὸς ὄργανον ἐξευρόντα δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι
by-nature for-each natural instrument having-found one-must to-give
εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ,
into that from which — he-makes not such-as — he-himself should-wish
ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει. τὸ φύσει γὰρ ἑκάστῳ, ὡς ἔοικε,
but such-as was-by-nature the by-nature for for-each as it-seems
τρύπανον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸν σίδηρον δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι.
borer natural into the iron one-must to-know to-put
HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. καὶ τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἑκάστῳ πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ξύλον.
and the by-nature shuttle for-each natural into wood
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

d SOC. φύσει γὰρ ἦν ἑκάστῳ εἴδει ὑφάσματος, ὡς ἔοικεν,
by-nature for was for-each form of-woven-stuff as it-seems
ἑκάστη κερκίς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.
each shuttle and the-others so
HERM. ναί.
yes
390 SOC. ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς
so then O best also the for-each by-nature natural
ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς
name the lawgiver that into the sounds and the
συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ
syllables one-must to-know to-set and looking toward itself
ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ
that which is name all the names to-make both and
τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης; εἰ δὲ μὴ
to-set if be-going authoritative to-be of-names setter if but not
εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς συλλαβὰς ἕκαστος ὁ νομοθέτης τίθησιν, οὐδὲν
into the same syllables each the lawgiver sets nothing
δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφιγνοεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν σίδηρον
one-must this to-doubt nor for into the same iron
ἅπας χαλκεὺς τίθησιν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιῶν τὸ αὐτὸ
every smith sets of-the same for-the-sake making the same
ὄργανον· ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἕως ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδῷ,
instrument but nevertheless as-long-as — the same form he-renders
ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ σιδήρῳ, ὅμως ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὄργανον,
whether in other iron nevertheless rightly is the instrument
ἐάντε ἐνθάδε ἐάντε ἐν βαρβάροις τις ποιῇ. ἦ γάρ;
whether here or among barbarians one should-make is-it-not for

So the lawgiver, here or among barbarians, is no worse for setting the form of the name in whatever syllables. The user judges the work: the lyre-player the lyre, the helmsman the rudder, and the man who knows how to ask and answer, the dialectician, the lawgiver's names. Giving names is then no trivial matter, and Cratylus is right that names belong to things by nature, and that only he who looks to the natural name can put its form into letters and syllables.

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε
therefore so will-you-deem also the lawgiver the both
ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ
here and the among the barbarians as-long-as — the
τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν
of-the name form he-renders the fitting for-each in
ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν
any-sort-whatever syllables in-nothing worse lawgiver to-be the
ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι;
here than the anywhere-whatever elsewhere

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος b
who then the(-one) going-to-know if the fitting form
κερκίδος ἐν ὁποιῳοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ
of-shuttle in of-any-sort-whatever wood lies the(-one) having-made the
τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος ὑφάντης;
carpenter or the(-one) going-to-use weaver

HERM. εἰκὸς μὲν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν χρησόμενον.
likely indeed rather O Socrates the(-one) going-to-use

SOC. τίς οὖν ὁ τῷ τοῦ λυροποιοῦ ἔργῳ χρησόμενος; ἆρ᾽
who then the(-one) the of-the lyre-maker work going-to-use then
οὐχ οὗτος ὃς ἐπίσταιτο ἂν ἐργαζομένῳ κάλλιστα ἐπιστατεῖν
not this who would-know — the-one-working best to-supervise
καὶ εἰργασμένον γνοίη εἴτ᾽ εὖ εἴργασται εἴτε μή;
and the-finished-work would-know whether well it-has-been-worked or not

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τίς;
who

HERM. ὁ κιθαριστής.
the lyre-player

SOC. τίς δὲ ὁ τῷ τοῦ ναυπηγοῦ;
who and the(-one) the of-the shipwright

c HERM. κυβερνήτης.
helmsman

SOC. τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσειέ τ᾽ ἂν
who and the of-the lawgiver work would-supervise both —
κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν
best and the-finished-work would-judge both here and among
τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται;
the barbarians then not whoever-very will-use(-it)

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτᾶν ἐπιστάμενος οὗτός ἐστιν;
so then not the(-one) to-ask knowing this is

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
the and same also to-answer

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. τὸν δὲ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο
the(-one) and to-ask and to-answer knowing other
τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν;
anything you call than dialectician
HERM. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
no but this
SOC. τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶν ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον d
of-carpenter indeed then work is to-make a-rudder
ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ
supervising the-helmsman if is-going fine to-be the
πηδάλιον.
rudder
HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears
SOC. νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην
of-lawgiver and at-least as it-seems a-name supervisor
ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὀνόματα
having dialectical man if he-is-going well names
θήσεσθαι.
to-set
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ e
it-is-likely then O Hermogenes to-be not trivial as you
οἴει, ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν
think the of-the name setting nor of-trivial men nor of-the
ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει λέγων φύσει τὰ
chance-comers and Cratylus true-things says saying by-nature the
ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν
names to-be for-the things and not every craftsman
ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα
of-names to-be but only that the(-one) looking

εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὃν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ
to the by-the nature name being for-each and being-able of-it
τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.
the form to-set into both the letters and the syllables

V · HOMER'S NAMES

Hermogenes wants to be shown what natural correctness is. Socrates says the sophists teach it for money; Hermogenes has no inheritance and should beg his brother Callias for what Protagoras taught him, and when he refuses Protagoras' Truth *he is sent to Homer, who distinguishes the names gods and men give: Xanthus and Scamander, chalcis and cymindis. The Trojan men, wiser than their women, who say Scamandrius, rightly call Hector's son Astyanax, since his father saved the city, and Hector means nearly the same as lord. A lion's offspring is rightly called a lion and a king's a king, and letters added or removed do not matter while the meaning shows, as the names of the letters prove.*

391 HERM. οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπως χρὴ πρὸς ἃ
not I-am-able O Socrates how one-must against what
λέγεις ἐναντιοῦσθαι. ἴσως μέντοι οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν οὕτως
you-say to-oppose perhaps however not easy it-is so
ἐξαίφνης πεισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ δοκῶ μοι ὧδε ἂν μᾶλλον
suddenly to-be-persuaded but I-seem to-myself thus — rather
πιθέσθαι σοι, εἴ μοι δείξειας ἥντινα φῂς εἶναι τὴν
to-be-persuaded by-you if to-me you-should-show what you-say to-be the
φύσει ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος.
by-nature correctness of-name

b SOC. ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ μακάριε Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδεμίαν λέγω, ἀλλ'
I indeed O blessed Hermogenes none say but
ἐπελάθου γε ὢν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην
you-have-forgotten at-least what a-little before I-was-saying that not I-knew
ἀλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ. νῦν δὲ σκοπουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐμοί
but would-examine with you now but for-examining us me

τε καὶ σοί, τοσοῦτον μὲν ἤδη φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ πρότερα,
both and you so-much indeed already appears contrary-to the former-things
φύσει τέ τινα ὀρθότητα ἔχον εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ οὐ παντὸς
by-nature both some correctness having to-be the name and not of-every
ἀνδρὸς ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ πράγματι ὁτῳοῦν θέσθαι· ἢ οὔ;
man to-know it for-thing whatever to-set or not

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο χρὴ ζητεῖν, εἴπερ ἐπιθυμεῖς
therefore the after this one-must to-seek if-indeed you-desire
εἰδέναι, ἥτις ποτ' αὖ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὀρθότης.
to-know what ever in-turn is of-it the correctness

HERM. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιθυμῶ γε εἰδέναι.
but indeed I-desire at-least to-know

SOC. σκόπει τοίνυν.
examine then

HERM. πῶς οὖν χρὴ σκοπεῖν;
how then must-one to-examine

SOC. ὀρθοτάτη μὲν τῆς σκέψεως, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ τῶν c
most-correct indeed of-the inquiry O comrade with the
ἐπισταμένων, χρήματα ἐκείνοις τελοῦντα καὶ χάριτας
knowing(-men) money to-those paying and gratitude
κατατιθέμενον. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ σοφισταί, οἷσπερ καὶ ὁ
laying-up are and these the sophists to-whom-very also the
ἀδελφός σου Καλλίας πολλὰ τελέσας χρήματα σοφὸς δοκεῖ
brother of-you Callias much having-paid money wise seems
εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς εἶ τῶν πατρῴων, λιπαρεῖν
to-be since and not master you-are of-the paternal-goods to-beg
χρὴ τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ δεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ διδάξαι σε τὴν
one-must the brother and to-ask of-him to-teach you the
ὀρθότητα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἣν ἔμαθεν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου.
correctness about the such-things which he-learned from Protagoras

HERM. ἄτοπος μεντἂν εἴη μου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δέησις, εἰ
strange however-would be my O Socrates the request if
τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι,
the indeed truth the of-Protagoras wholly not I-accept
τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῴην ὥς
the(-things) but in-the such truth said I-should-cherish as
του ἄξια.
of-something worth

d SOC. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρ' Ὁμήρου
but if not in-turn you these-things please from Homer
χρὴ μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.
one-must to-learn and from the other poets
HERM. καὶ τί λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ὅμηρος περὶ ὀνομάτων,
and what says O Socrates Homer about names
καὶ ποῦ;
and where

e SOC. πολλαχοῦ· μέγιστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐν οἷς
in-many-places greatest and also finest in which-places
διορίζει ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἅ τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὀνόματα
he-distinguishes for the same what both the men names
καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ θεοί. ἢ οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν μέγα τι
call and the gods or not do-you-think him great something
καὶ θαυμάσιον λέγειν ἐν τούτοις περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος;
and wonderful to-say in these-places about of-names correctness
δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἵ γε θεοὶ αὐτὰ καλοῦσιν πρὸς
clear for indeed that the at-least gods them call toward
ὀρθότητα ἅπερ ἔστι φύσει ὀνόματα· ἢ σὺ οὐκ οἴει;
correctness what-very are by-nature names or you not think
HERM. εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, εἴπερ καλοῦσιν, ὅτι ὀρθῶς
well know indeed then I-at-least if-indeed they-call that rightly
καλοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα ταῦτα λέγεις;
they-call but what-kind these-things do-you-mean

SOC. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ,
not do-you-know that about the river the in the Troy
ὃς ἐμονομάχει τῷ Ἡφαίστῳ, "ὃν Ξάνθον," φησί,
which fought-in-single-combat with-the Hephaestus which Xanthus he-says
"καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον;"
call gods men but Scamander

HERM. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. τί οὖν δή; οὐκ οἴει τοῦτο σεμνόν τι εἶναι 392
what then indeed not do-you-think this solemn something to-be
γνῶναι, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνον τὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον
to-know how ever rightly it-is that the river Xanthus
καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ Σκάμανδρον; εἰ δὲ βούλει, περὶ τῆς
to-call rather than Scamander if and you-wish about the
ὄρνιθος ἣν λέγει ὅτι —
bird which he-says that

χαλκίδα κικλήσκουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ κύμινδιν,
chalcis call gods men but cymindis

φαῦλον ἡγῇ τὸ μάθημα ὅσῳ ὀρθότερόν ἐστι b
trivial do-you-think the lesson by-how-much more-correct it-is
καλεῖσθαι χαλκὶς κυμίνδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνέῳ; ἢ τὴν
to-be-called chalcis than-cymindis for-the same bird or the
Βατίειάν τε καὶ Μυρίνην, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ τούτου
Batieia both and Myrine and other many-things both of-this
τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ ἄλλων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως μείζω
the poet and of-others but these-things indeed perhaps greater
ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν· ὁ δὲ Σκαμάνδριός
are than according-to me and you to-find-out the and Scamandrius
τε καὶ ὁ Ἀστυάναξ ἀνθρωπινώτερον διασκέψασθαι, ὡς
both and the Astyanax more-humanly to-examine as

ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ῥᾷον, ἅ φησιν ὀνόματα εἶναι τῷ τοῦ
to-me it-seems and more-easily which he-says names to-be for-the the
Ἕκτορος υἱεῖ, τίνα ποτὲ λέγει τὴν ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν. οἶσθα
of-Hector son what ever he-means the correctness of-them you-know
γὰρ δήπου ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.
for surely these-things the verses in which are-in which I mean

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. πότερον οὖν οἴει Ὅμηρον ὀρθότερον ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν
whether then do-you-think Homer more-correctly to-consider of-the
ὀνομάτων κεῖσθαι τῷ παιδί, τὸν "Ἀστυάνακτα" ἢ τὸν
names to-be-set for-the child the Astyanax or the
"Σκαμάνδριον";
Scamandrius

c HERM. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
not I-am-able to-say

SOC. ὧδε δὴ σκόπει. εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε πότερον οἴει
thus indeed examine if someone should-ask you whether you-think
ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς
more-correctly to-call the names the more-prudent or the
ἀφρονεστέρους;
more-foolish

HERM. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, φαίην ἄν.
clear indeed that the more-prudent I-would-say —

SOC. πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν φρονιμώτεραί
whether then the women in the cities more-prudent
σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος;
to-you seem to-be or the men as the whole to-say kind

HERM. οἱ ἄνδρες.
the men

SOC. οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ d
therefore you-know that Homer the little-child the of-the
Ἕκτορος ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων φησὶν καλεῖσθαι Ἀστυάνακτα,
Hector by the Trojans says to-be-called Astyanax
Σκαμάνδριον δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἵ
Scamandrius but clear that by the women since the
γε ἄνδρες αὐτὸν Ἀστυάνακτα ἐκάλουν;
at-least men him Astyanax called
HERM. ἔοικέ γε.
it-seems at-least
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ Ὅμηρος τοὺς Τρῶας σοφωτέρους ἡγεῖτο
therefore also Homer the Trojans wiser considered
ἢ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν;
than the women of-them
HERM. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
think I-at-least
SOC. τὸν "Ἀστυάνακτα" ἄρα ὀρθότερον ᾤετο κεῖσθαι
the Astyanax then more-correctly he-thought to-be-set
τῷ παιδὶ ἢ τὸν "Σκαμάνδριον";
for-the child than the Scamandrius
HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears
SOC. σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν
let-us-examine indeed because-of what ever or he-himself to-us
κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ —
most-finely explains the wherefore he-says for

οἷος γάρ σφιν ἔρυτο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά. e
alone for for-them he-guarded city and walls long

διὰ ταῦτα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ
for these-things indeed as it-seems rightly it-is to-call the of-the
σωτῆρος υἱὸν Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσῳζεν ὁ πατὴρ
savior son Astyanax of-this which saved the father
αὐτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος.
of-him as says Homer

HERM. φαίνεταί μοι.
it-appears to-me

SOC. τί δή ποτε; οὐ γάρ πω οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔγωγε μανθάνω·
why indeed ever not for yet not-even myself I-at-least understand
ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, σὺ δὲ μανθάνεις;
O Hermogenes you and understand

HERM. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.
by Zeus not I-at-least

393 SOC. ἀλλ' ἆρα, ὠγαθέ, καὶ τῷ Ἕκτορι αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὸ
but then good-sir also for-the Hector himself set the
ὄνομα Ὅμηρος;
name Homer

HERM. τί δή;
why indeed

b SOC. ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παραπλήσιόν τι εἶναι τῷ
because to-me it-seems also this close-to something to-be to-the
Ἀστυάνακτι, καὶ ἔοικεν Ἑλληνικοῖς ταῦτα. ὁ γὰρ "ἄναξ"
Astyanax and it-seems Greek these-things the for lord
καὶ ὁ "Ἕκτωρ" σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, βασιλικὰ
and the Holder nearly something the-same signify kingly
ἀμφότερα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα· οὗ γὰρ ἄν τις "ἄναξ" ᾖ,
both to-be the names of-what for — someone lord should-be
καὶ "Ἕκτωρ" δήπου ἐστὶν τούτου· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κρατεῖ τε
also Holder surely is of-this clear for that he-rules both
αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει αὐτό. ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν,
it and has-acquired and holds it or nothing to-you do-I-seem to-say

ἀλλὰ λανθάνω καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οἰόμενός τινος ὥσπερ ἴχνους
but I-escape-the-notice also of-myself thinking some as-it-were track
ἐφάπτεσθαι τῆς Ὁμήρου δόξης περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος;
to-lay-hold-of of-the of-Homer opinion about of-names correctness
HERM. μὰ Δί᾽ οὐ σύ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἴσως
by Zeus not you at-least as to-me you-seem but perhaps
τοῦ ἐφάπτῃ.
something you-lay-hold-of
SOC. δίκαιόν γέ τοί ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τὸν λέοντος c
just at-least surely it-is as to-me it-appears the of-lion
ἔκγονον λέοντα καλεῖν καὶ τὸν ἵππου ἔκγονον ἵππον.
offspring lion to-call and the of-horse offspring horse
οὔ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ τέρας γένηται ἐξ ἵππου
not at-all I-mean if as-it-were a-portent should-come-about from horse
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἵππος, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ γένους
other something than horse but of-whatever — should-be the kind
ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο λέγω· ἐὰν βοὸς ἔκγονον φύσει
offspring the nature this I-mean if of-cow offspring by-nature
ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν τέκῃ μόσχον, οὐ πῶλον κλητέον
a-horse contrary-to nature should-bear a-calf not a-foal must-be-called
ἀλλὰ μόσχον· οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου οἶμαι μὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπου
but a-calf nor — from man I-think not the of-man
ἔκγονον γένηται, τὸ ἔκγονον ἄνθρωπος κλητέος· καὶ
offspring should-come-about the offspring man must-be-called and
τὰ δένδρα ὡσαύτως καὶ τἆλλα ἅπαντα· ἢ οὐ συνδοκεῖ;
the trees likewise and the-others all or not do-you-agree
HERM. συνδοκεῖ.
I-agree
SOC. καλῶς λέγεις· φύλαττε γάρ με μή πῃ παρακρούσωμαί d
well you-say guard for me lest somehow I-should-mislead
σε. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κἂν ἐκ βασιλέως
you according-to for the same argument even-if from king

γίγνηταί τι ἔκγονον, βασιλεὺς κλητέος· εἰ δὲ ἐν
should-come-about some offspring king must-be-called if but in
ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς ἢ ἐν ἑτέραις τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν
other syllables or in other the same it-signifies no
πρᾶγμα· οὐδ' εἰ πρόσκειταί τι γράμμα ἢ ἀφῄρηται,
matter nor if is-added some letter or has-been-removed
οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἕως ἂν ἐγκρατὴς ᾖ ἡ οὐσία
nothing not-even this as-long-as — dominant should-be the being
τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι.
of-the thing being-shown in the name

HERM. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
how this do-you-mean

e SOC. οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῶν στοιχείων οἶσθα
nothing intricate but as of-the elements you-know
ὅτι ὀνόματα λέγομεν ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν
that names we-speak but not themselves the elements except
τεττάρων, τοῦ Ε καὶ τοῦ Υ καὶ τοῦ Ο καὶ τοῦ Ω· τοῖς δ'
four of-the E and of-the Y and of-the O and of-the Ō to-the and
ἄλλοις φωνήεσί τε καὶ ἀφώνοις οἶσθα ὅτι περιτιθέντες ἄλλα
other vowels both and mutes you-know that putting-around other
γράμματα λέγομεν, ὀνόματα ποιοῦντες· ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ
letters we-speak names making but as-long-as — of-it
δηλουμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐντιθῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὸ
shown the power we-put-in rightly it-is that the
ὄνομα καλεῖν ὃ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν δηλώσει. οἷον τὸ "βῆτα"· ὁρᾷς
name to-call which it to-us will-show such-as the beta you-see
ὅτι τοῦ ῆτα καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ τοῦ ἄλφα προστεθέντων οὐδὲν
that of-the eta and of-the tau and of-the alpha having-been-added nothing
ἐλύπησεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν
harmed so-as — — the of-that the element nature

δηλῶσαι ὅλῳ τῷ ὀνόματι οὗ ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης·
to-show with-whole the name of-which wished the lawgiver
οὕτως ἠπιστήθη καλῶς θέσθαι τοῖς γράμμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.
so knew finely to-set for-the letters the names
HERM. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
true-things to-me you-seem to-say

VI · KINGS AND TRAGIC HEROES

A king's son is called king, and the same meaning can be dressed in other syllables, as a doctor's drugs differ in color and smell: Astyanax and Hector, Archepolis, Agis, Polemarchus, Eupolemus. A son born contrary to nature takes the name of his kind, not his father's. Orestes is named for his wild, mountain nature, Agamemnon for his persevering endurance, Atreus for his ruinous daring, Pelops for seeing only what is near, and Tantalus for the weight hanging over him.

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ἔσται γάρ 394
therefore also about king the same argument will-be for
ποτε ἐκ βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ
sometimes from king a-king and from good good and
ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἑκάστου
from fine fine and the-others all so from each
γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, ἐὰν μὴ τέρας γίγνηται·
kind other such offspring if not a-portent should-come-about
κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς
one-must-call indeed the-same names to-vary but it-is-allowed by-the
συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα
syllables so-as to-seem — to-the in-lay-fashion being other
εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν
to-be than-one-another the same being as to-us the of-the
ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα
doctors drugs with-colors and with-smells adorned other

φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν
appear the same being to-the but at-least doctor inasmuch-as the
δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ
power of-the drugs examining the same appear and
οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως
not he-is-confounded by the(-things) added so and perhaps
καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν
also the(-one) knowing about names the power of-them
σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα
examines and not is-confounded if some is-added letter
ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν
or is-transposed or has-been-removed or even in other altogether
γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις. ὥσπερ ὃ
letters is the of-the name power as what
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, "Ἀστυάναξ" τε καὶ "Ἕκτωρ" οὐδὲν τῶν
just-now we-were-saying Astyanax both and Hector nothing of-the
αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλ' ὅμως ταὐτὸν
same letters has except the tau but nevertheless the-same
σημαίνει. καὶ "Ἀρχέπολίς" γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί
signifies and Archepolis at-least of-the indeed letters what
ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἄλλα πολλά
has-in-common shows but nevertheless the same and others many
ἐστιν ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει· καὶ ἄλλα
are which nothing but than king signify and others
γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἷον "Ἀγις" καὶ "Πολέμαρχος"
at-least in-turn general such-as Agis and Polemarchus
καὶ "Εὐπόλεμος". καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, "Ἰατροκλῆς"
and Eupolemus and medical at-least others Iatrocles
καὶ "Ἀκεσίμβροτος"· καὶ ἕτερα ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὕροιμεν
and Acesimbrotus and others — perhaps many we-would-find

ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφωνοῦντα, τῇ
in-the indeed syllables and in-the letters disagreeing in-the
δὲ δυνάμει ταὐτὸν φθεγγόμενα. φαίνεται οὕτως ἢ οὔ;
but power the-same uttering it-appears so or not

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. d
certainly indeed then

SOC. τοῖς μὲν δὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τὰ αὐτὰ
to-the indeed indeed according-to nature coming-to-be the same
ἀποδοτέον ὀνόματα.
must-be-given names

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τί δὲ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν, οἳ ἂν ἐν τέρατος εἴδει
what and to-the contrary-to nature who — in of-portent form
γένωνται; οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θεοσεβοῦς
should-come-to-be such-as whenever from man good and god-fearing
ἀσεβὴς γένηται, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, κἂν
an-impious-one should-come-to-be then not as in the former even-if
ἵππος βοὸς ἔκγονον τέκῃ, οὐ τοῦ τεκόντος δήπου ἔδει
a-horse of-cow offspring should-bear not of-the having-borne surely it-was-necessary
τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους οὗ εἴη;
the name to-have but of-the kind of-which it-might-be

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. καὶ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς ἄρα γενομένῳ ἀσεβεῖ τὸ e
and to-the from the pious then having-come-to-be impious the
τοῦ γένους ὄνομα ἀποδοτέον.
of-the kind name must-be-given

HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. οὐ "Θεόφιλον," ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲ "Μνησίθεον" οὐδὲ
not Theophilus as it-seems nor Mnesitheus nor
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ὅτι τἀναντία τούτοις σημαίνει,
of-the such any but what the-opposite to-these signifies
ἐάνπερ τῆς ὀρθότητος τυγχάνῃ τὰ ὀνόματα.
if-indeed of-the correctness should-hit the names
HERM. παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
of-all at-least more O Socrates
SOC. ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὁ "Ὀρέστης," ὦ Ἑρμόγενες,
as at-least also the Orestes O Hermogenes
κινδυνεύει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, εἴτε τις τύχη ἔθετο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα
is-likely rightly to-be whether some chance set for-him the name
εἴτε καὶ ποιητής τις, τὸ θηριῶδες τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὸ
or even poet some the beastly of-the nature and the
ἄγριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὀρεινὸν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῷ ὀνόματι.
wild of-him and the mountain-like showing by-the name
395 HERM. φαίνεται οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
it-appears so O Socrates
SOC. ἔοικεν δέ γε καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
it-seems and at-least also for-the father of-him according-to nature
τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι.
the name to-be
HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears
b SOC. κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ "Ἀγαμέμνων," οἷος
it-is-likely for such some to-be the Agamemnon such-as
ἃ δόξειεν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι καὶ καρτερεῖν τέλος
what-things should-seem-good to-him to-toil-through and to-endure an-end
ἐπιτιθεὶς τοῖς δόξασι δι' ἀρετήν. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῦ
putting to-the things-resolved through virtue sign and of-him
ἡ ἐν Τροίᾳ μονὴ τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ καρτερίας. ὅτι οὖν
the in Troy staying of-the suffering both and endurance that then

ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐνσημαίνει τὸ
admirable according-to the persistence this the man signifies the
ὄνομα ὁ "Ἀγαμέμνων." ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὁ "Ἀτρεὺς" ὀρθῶς
name the Agamemnon perhaps and also the Atreus rightly
ἔχει. ὅ τε γὰρ τοῦ Χρυσίππου αὐτῷ φόνος καὶ ἃ
is the both for of-the Chrysippus by-him murder and what-things
πρὸς τὸν Θυέστην ὡς ὠμὰ διεπράττετο, πάντα ταῦτα
toward the Thyestes how cruelly he-did all these-things
ζημιώδη καὶ ἀτηρὰ πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὀνόματος
harmful and ruinous toward virtue the then of-the name
ἐπωνυμία σμικρὸν παρακλίνει καὶ ἐπικεκάλυπται, ὥστε μὴ
naming little deviates and is-veiled so-as not
πᾶσι δηλοῦν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός· τοῖς δ' ἐπαΐουσι
to-all to-show the nature of-the man to-those but understanding
περὶ ὀνομάτων ἱκανῶς δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται ὁ "Ἀτρεύς."
about names sufficiently it-shows what means the Atreus
καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεστον καὶ
both for according-to the unwearying and according-to the fearless and
κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρὸν πανταχῇ ὀρθῶς αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα κεῖται.
according-to the ruinous everywhere rightly to-him the name is-set
δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τῷ Πέλοπι τὸ ὄνομα ἐμμέτρως κεῖσθαι·
it-seems and to-me also for-the Pelops the name in-measure to-be-set
σημαίνει γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸν τὰ ἐγγὺς ὁρῶντα.
signifies for this the name the(-one) the(-things) near seeing

HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed

SOC. οἷόν που καὶ κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῷ d
such-as surely also of that is-said the man in the
τοῦ Μυρτίλου φόνῳ οὐδὲν οἷόν τε γενέσθαι προνοηθῆναι
of-the Myrtilus murder nothing able — to-become to-foresee
οὐδὲ προϊδεῖν τῶν πόρρω τῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν γένος, ὅσης
nor to-see-ahead of-the(-things) far-off the into the whole family how-much

αὐτὸ δυστυχίας ἐνεπίμπλη, τὸ ἐγγὺς μόνον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ
it with-misfortune he-was-filling the near only seeing and the
παραχρῆμα — τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ "πέλας" — ἡνίκα προεθυμεῖτο
immediate this and is near when he-was-eager
λαβεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸν τῆς Ἱπποδαμείας γάμον. τῷ δὲ
to-take in-every way the of-the Hippodameia marriage to-the and
Ταντάλῳ καὶ πᾶς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο τοὔνομα ὀρθῶς καὶ κατὰ
Tantalus also every-one — would-think the-name rightly and according-to
φύσιν τεθῆναι εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν λεγόμενα.
nature to-have-been-set if true the(-things) about him said

HERM. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;
the what-sort these-things

e SOC. ἅ τέ που ἔτι ζῶντι δυστυχήματα ἐγένετο πολλὰ
which both surely still to-him-living misfortunes came-about many
καὶ δεινά, ὧν καὶ τέλος ἡ πατρὶς αὐτοῦ ὅλη ἀνετράπετο,
and terrible of-which also at-last the fatherland of-him whole was-overturned
καὶ τελευτήσαντι ἐν Ἅιδου ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ λίθου
and to-him-having-died in Hades the over the head of-the stone
ταλαντεία θαυμαστὴ ὡς σύμφωνος τῷ ὀνόματι· καὶ
balancing wonderful how harmonious with-the name and
ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος ταλάντατον
simply it-seems as — if someone wishing most-wretched
ὀνομάσαι ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὀνομάσειε καὶ εἴποι ἀντ'
to-name concealing should-name and should-say instead-of
ἐκείνου "Τάνταλον," τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα
that Tantalus such something also to-this the name
ἔοικεν ἐκπορίσαι ἡ τύχη τῆς φήμης.
seems to-have-provided the chance of-the report

Zeus' two names, Zena and Dia, make one account: he through whom all living things have life. Cronus is pure, unmixed mind, and Uranus the sight of the things above. Socrates says this wisdom has come over him from Euthyphro, and proposes to use it today and purify it tomorrow. The first Greeks called the gods theoi *from their running; daemons are the knowing; heroes are born of love, or are skilled askers. Socrates then asks why men are called* anthrōpoi*, and Hermogenes, declining to strain after it, leaves the finding to him.*

φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένῳ τῷ Διὶ 396
it-appears and also for-the father of-him called the Zeus
παγκάλως τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· ἔστι δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον κατανοῆσαι.
very-finely the name to-be-set it-is but not easy to-understand
ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἐστιν οἷον λόγος τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα, διελόντες
simply for is like a-phrase the of-the Zeus name having-divided
δὲ αὐτὸ διχῇ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει, οἱ δὲ τῷ
and it in-two the(-ones) indeed the one part the(-ones) and the
ἑτέρῳ χρώμεθα — οἱ μὲν γὰρ "Ζῆνα," οἱ δὲ
other we-use the(-ones) indeed for Zena the(-ones) and
"Δία" καλοῦσιν — συντιθέμενα δ' εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν
Dia call being-put-together and into one it-shows the nature
τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οὑῷ τε εἶναι
of-the god which indeed to-befit we-say for-a-name able — to-be
ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις
to-accomplish not for is for-us and for-the others all who
ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς
is cause more of-the living than the ruler both and king
τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ
of-the all it-follows then rightly to-be-named this the
θεὸς εἶναι, δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει·
god to-be because-of whom living always for-all the living belongs

διείληπται δὲ δίχα, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἓν ὂν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ
it-has-been-divided and in-two as I-say one being the name into-the
"Διὶ" καὶ τῷ "Ζηνί." τοῦτον δὲ Κρόνου ὑὸν ὑβριστικὸν μὲν
Dia and the Zena this and of-Cronus son insolent indeed
ἄν τις δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης, εὔλογον δὲ μεγάλης
— one might-think to-be on-hearing suddenly reasonable but of-great
τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία· κόρον γὰρ σημαίνει
some thought offspring to-be the Zeus koros for signifies
οὐ παῖδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ.
not child but the pure of-it and undefiled of-the mind
c ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Οὐρανοῦ ὑός, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ
is and this of-Uranus son as account-goes the and in-turn to the
ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι, "οὐρανία,"
above sight finely is this the name to-be-called ourania
ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, ὅθεν δὴ καί φασιν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τὸν
seeing the above-things whence indeed also they-say O Hermogenes the
καθαρὸν νοῦν παραγίγνεσθαι οἱ μετεωρολόγοι, καὶ τῷ
pure mind to-be-present the astronomers also for-the
οὐρανῷ ὀρθῶς τὸ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι· εἰ δ' ἐμεμνήμην τὴν
heaven rightly the name to-be-set if but I-had-remembered the
Ἡσιόδου γενεαλογίαν, τίνας ἔτι τοὺς ἀνωτέρω προγόνους
of-Hesiod genealogy which still the higher ancestors
λέγει τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυόμην διεξιὼν ὡς ὀρθῶς
he-names of-these not — I-would-have-stopped going-through how rightly
αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται, ἕως ἀπεπειράθην τῆς σοφίας
for-them the names are-set until I-had-made-trial of-the wisdom
ταυτησὶ τί ποιήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἀπερεῖ ἢ οὔ, ἢ ἐμοὶ
this-here what it-will-do whether then it-will-give-out or not which to-me
ἐξαίφνης νῦν οὑτωσὶ προσπέπτωκεν ἄρτι οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπόθεν.
suddenly now thus has-fallen-upon just-now not I-know whence

HERM. καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτεχνῶς γέ μοι
and indeed indeed O Socrates simply at-least to-me
δοκεῖς ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξαίφνης χρησμῳδεῖν.
you-seem as the inspired suddenly to-chant-oracles
SOC. καὶ αἰτιῶμαί γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, μάλιστα αὐτὴν 397
and I-blame at-least O Hermogenes most it
ἀπὸ Εὐθύφρονος τοῦ Προσπαλτίου προσπεπτωκέναι μοι·
from Euthyphro the Prospaltian to-have-fallen-upon me
ἕωθεν γὰρ πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὦτα.
from-dawn for much with-him I-was-together and was-lending the ears
κινδυνεύει οὖν ἐνθουσιῶν οὐ μόνον τὰ ὦτά μου ἐμπλῆσαι
it-is-likely then inspired not only the ears of-me to-have-filled
τῆς δαιμονίας σοφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπειλῆφθαι.
of-the divine wisdom but also the soul to-have-seized
δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι οὑτωσὶ ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι· τὸ μὲν
it-seems then to-me to-be-necessary thus us to-do the indeed
τήμερον εἶναι χρήσασθαι αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ περὶ τῶν
today to-be to-use it and the remaining about the
ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψασθαι, αὔριον δέ, ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν συνδοκῇ,
names to-examine tomorrow but if also to-you it-seems-good-too
ἀποδιοπομπησόμεθά τε αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρούμεθα ἐξευρόντες
we-shall-drive-off both it and shall-purify finding
ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινὸς καθαίρειν, εἴτε τῶν ἱερέων τις
whoever the such-things clever to-purify whether of-the priests someone
εἴτε τῶν σοφιστῶν.
or of-the sophists
HERM. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ μὲν συγχωρῶ· πάνυ γὰρ ἂν ἡδέως τὰ
but I indeed agree very for — gladly the
ἐπίλοιπα περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀκούσαιμι.
remaining about the names I-would-hear

b SOC. ἀλλὰ χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν. πόθεν οὖν βούλει ἀρξώμεθα
but one-must so to-do whence then do-you-wish should-we-begin
διασκοποῦντες, ἐπειδήπερ εἰς τύπον τινὰ ἐμβεβήκαμεν, ἵνα
examining since into outline some we-have-entered so-that
εἰδῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιμαρτυρήσει αὐτὰ τὰ ὀνόματα
we-may-know whether then to-us will-bear-witness themselves the names
μὴ πάνυ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὕτως ἕκαστα κεῖσθαι,
not very from the spontaneous so each to-be-set
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν τινὰ ὀρθότητα; τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡρώων καὶ
but to-have some correctness the indeed then of-the heroes and
ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὀνόματα ἴσως ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσειεν·
men said names perhaps — us might-deceive
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖται κατὰ προγόνων ἐπωνυμίας,
many indeed for of-them are-set according-to of-ancestors namings
οὐδὲν προσῆκον ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐλέγομεν,
nothing befitting to-some as at the-beginning we-were-saying
πολλὰ δὲ ὥσπερ εὐχόμενοι τίθενται, οἷον "Εὐτυχίδην"
many and as praying they-set such-as Eutychides
καὶ "Σωσίαν" καὶ "Θεόφιλον" καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. τὰ μὲν
and Sosias and Theophilus and other many the indeed
οὖν τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι ἐᾶν· εἰκὸς δὲ μάλιστα
then such-things it-seems to-me to-be-necessary to-let-go likely but most
ἡμᾶς εὑρεῖν τὰ ὀρθῶς κείμενα περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα
us to-find the(-names) rightly set about the(-things) always being
καὶ πεφυκότα. ἐσπουδάσθαι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα
and being-by-nature to-have-been-taken-seriously for here most
πρέπει τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων· ἴσως δ᾽ ἔνια αὐτῶν καὶ
it-befits the setting of-the names perhaps and some of-them also
ὑπὸ θειοτέρας δυνάμεως ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέθη.
by more-divine power than the of-the men were-set
HERM. δοκεῖς μοι καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
you-seem to-me well to-speak O Socrates

SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἄρχεσθαι,
so then not just from the gods to-begin
σκοπουμένους πῇ ποτε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα οἱ "θεοὶ"
examining how ever very this the name the gods
ὀρθῶς ἐκλήθησαν;
rightly were-called
HERM. εἰκός γε.
likely at-least
SOC. τοιόνδε τοίνυν ἔγωγε ὑποπτεύω· φαίνονταί μοι οἱ d
such then I-at-least suspect appear to-me the
πρῶτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τούτους
first of-the men of-the about the Greece these
μόνους ἡγεῖσθαι οὕσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἥλιον καὶ
only to-consider whom-very now many of-the barbarians sun and
σελήνην καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανόν· ἅτε οὖν αὐτὰ
moon and earth and stars and heaven inasmuch-as then them
ὁρῶντες πάντα ἀεὶ ἰόντα δρόμῳ καὶ θέοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς
seeing all always going in-course and running from this the
φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῖν "θεοὺς" αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι· ὕστερον δὲ
nature the of-the to-run gods them to-have-named later but
κατανοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἤδη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι
perceiving the others all already by-this the name
προσαγορεύειν. ἔοικέ τι ὃ λέγω τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἢ οὐδέν;
to-address it-seems something what I-say to-the true or nothing
HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν.
certainly indeed then it-seems
SOC. τί οὖν ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο σκοποῖμεν;
what then — after this should-we-examine
HERM. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαίμονας.
clear indeed that daemons

e SOC. καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, τί ἄν ποτε νοοῖ
and as truly O Hermogenes what — ever might-mean
τὸ ὄνομα οἱ "δαίμονες"; σκέψαι ἄν τί σοι δόξω
the name the daemons examine if something to-you I-should-seem
εἰπεῖν.
to-say

HERM. λέγε μόνον.
speak only

SOC. οἶσθα οὖν τίνας φησὶν Ἡσίοδος εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας;
do-you-know then whom says Hesiod to-be the daemons

HERM. οὐκ ἐννοῶ.
not I-recall

SOC. οὐδὲ ὅτι χρυσοῦν γένος τὸ πρῶτόν φησιν γενέσθαι
nor that golden race the first he-says to-have-become
τῶν ἀνθρώπων;
of-the men

HERM. οἶδα τοῦτό γε.
I-know this at-least

SOC. λέγει τοίνυν περὶ αὐτοῦ —
he-says then about it

αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρ' ἐκάλυψεν,
but since this race according-to fate covered
398 οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι καλέονται,
they indeed daemons holy under-the-earth are-called
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.
noble warders-off-of-evil guardians of-mortal men

HERM. τί οὖν δή;
what then indeed

SOC. ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος οὐκ
because think I to-mean him the golden race not
ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν. τεκμήριον
from gold grown but good both and fine proof
δέ μοί ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς φησιν σιδηροῦν εἶναι γένος.
and to-me is that also us he-says iron to-be race
HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν νῦν οἴει ἂν φάναι αὐτὸν εἴ b
therefore also of-the(-men) now do-you-think — to-say him if
τις ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;
someone good is of-that the golden race to-be
HERM. εἰκός γε.
likely at-least
SOC. οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι;
the and good other anything than prudent
HERM. φρόνιμοι.
prudent
SOC. τοῦτο τοίνυν παντὸς μᾶλλον λέγει, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοὺς c
this then of-all more he-means as to-me it-seems the
δαίμονας· ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, "δαίμονας"
daemons because prudent and knowing they-were daemons
αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν· καὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
them he-named and in at-least the old the our
φωνῇ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τὸ ὄνομα. λέγει οὖν καλῶς καὶ
tongue it agrees the name says then well both
οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ ὅσοι λέγουσιν ὡς,
this-one and other poets many as-many-as say that
ἐπειδάν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν τελευτήσῃ, μεγάλην μοῖραν
when someone good being should-die great portion
καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ γίγνεται δαίμων κατὰ τὴν τῆς
and honor he-has and becomes a-daemon according-to the of-the

φρονήσεως ἐπωνυμίαν. ταύτῃ οὖν τίθεμαι καὶ ἐγὼ πάντ'
prudence naming in-this-way then set also I every
ἄνδρα ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, δαιμόνιον εἶναι καὶ ζῶντα
man who — good should-be daemonic to-be both living
καὶ τελευτήσαντα, καὶ ὀρθῶς "δαίμονα" καλεῖσθαι.
and having-died and rightly daemon to-be-called

HERM. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου πάνυ σοι
also I to-me seem O Socrates in-this very with-you
σύμψηφος εἶναι. ὁ δὲ δὴ "ἥρως" τί ἂν εἴη;
of-one-vote to-be the and indeed hero what — might-be

SOC. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἐννοῆσαι. σμικρὸν γὰρ
this and not very difficult to-understand slightly for
παρῆκται αὐτῶν τὸ ὄνομα, δηλοῦν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔρωτος
has-been-altered of-them the name showing the from the love
γένεσιν.
birth

HERM. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean

SOC. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἡμίθεοι οἱ ἥρωες;
not do-you-know that demigods the heroes

HERM. τί οὖν;
what then

d SOC. πάντες δήπου γεγόνασιν ἐρασθέντος ἢ θεοῦ
all surely have-been-born of-having-loved either god
θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς. ἐὰν οὖν σκοπῇς καὶ τοῦτο
a-mortal-woman or mortal a-goddess if then you-examine also this
κατὰ τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν, μᾶλλον εἴσῃ·
according-to the Attic the old tongue more you-will-know
δηλώσει γάρ σοι ὅτι παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄνομα, ὅθεν
it-will-show for to-you that from the of-the love name whence
γεγόνασιν οἱ ἥρωες, σμικρὸν παρηγμένον ἐστὶν ὀνόματος
have-been-born the heroes slightly altered it-is of-name

χάριν. καὶ ἤτοι τοῦτο λέγει τοὺς ἥρωας, ἢ ὅτι σοφοὶ
for-the-sake and either this it-means the heroes or that wise
ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐρωτᾶν ἱκανοὶ
they-were and orators clever and dialecticians to-ask able
ὄντες· τὸ γὰρ "εἴρειν" λέγειν ἐστίν. ὅπερ οὖν ἄρτι
being the for eirein to-speak is which-very then just-now
λέγομεν, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ λεγόμενοι οἱ ἥρωες ῥήτορές
we-say in the Attic tongue being-called the heroes orators
τινες καὶ ἐρωτητικοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὥστε ῥητόρων καὶ
some and questioners turn-out so-that of-orators and
σοφιστῶν γένος γίγνεται τὸ ἡρωικὸν φῦλον. ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦτο
of-sophists race becomes the heroic tribe but not this
χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
difficult is to-understand but rather the of-the men
διὰ τί ποτε "ἄνθρωποι" καλοῦνται· ἢ σὺ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;
because-of what ever men are-called or you are-able to-say
HERM. πόθεν, ὠγαθέ, ἔχω; οὐδ' εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἂν
whence good-sir am-I-able not-even if something able — —
εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ μᾶλλον
I-should-be to-find not I-strain because-of the to-think you rather
εὑρήσειν ἢ ἐμαυτόν.
will-find than myself

Names often gain or lose letters and change accent, as Diphilos from Dii philos, *and so* anthrōpos, *with a letter dropped and the accent changed, is the one who looks up at what he has seen, which no beast does. The* psychē *refreshes the body, or holds and carries nature;* sōma *is the soul's tomb or its sign, or, as the Orphics say, the enclosure where it is kept. Of the gods we know nothing, nor the names they call themselves; failing that, we call them as our prayers do, by the names they like.*

399 SOC. τῇ τοῦ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπιπνοίᾳ πιστεύεις, ὡς ἔοικας.
in-the of-the Euthyphro inspiration you-trust as you-seem

HERM. δῆλα δή.
clear indeed

b SOC. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ πιστεύων· ὡς καὶ νῦν γέ μοι φαίνομαι
rightly at-least you trusting as also now at-least to-me I-appear
κομψῶς ἐννενοηκέναι, καὶ κινδυνεύσω, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι,
subtly to-have-conceived and I-shall-risk if not I-take-care
ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. σκόπει δὴ
still today wiser than-the needful to-become examine indeed
ὃ λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι περὶ
what I-say first indeed for the such one-must to-consider about
ὀνομάτων, ὅτι πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ
names that often we-insert letters the(-ones)
δ' ἐξαιροῦμεν, παρ' ὃ βουλόμεθα ὀνομάζοντες, καὶ τὰς
and we-take-out contrary-to what we-wish naming and the
ὀξύτητας μεταβάλλομεν. οἷον "Διὶ φίλος" — τοῦτο ἵνα
acute-accents we-change such-as Dii philos this so-that
ἀντὶ ῥήματος ὄνομα ἡμῖν γένηται, τό τε ἕτερον αὐτόθεν
instead-of phrase a-name for-us should-become the both one from-it
ἰῶτα ἐξείλομεν καὶ ἀντὶ ὀξείας τῆς μέσης συλλαβῆς
iota we-took-out and instead-of acute of-the middle syllable

βαρεῖαν ἐφθεγξάμεθα. ἄλλων δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐμβάλλομεν
a-grave we-uttered of-others but the-opposite we-insert
γράμματα, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα ὀξύτερα φθεγγόμεθα.
letters the(-ones) and graver more-acute we-utter
HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
SOC. τούτων τοίνυν ἓν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνομα
of-these then one also the of-the men name
πέπονθεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐκ γὰρ ῥήματος ὄνομα γέγονεν,
has-undergone as to-me it-seems from for phrase a-name has-become
ἑνὸς γράμματος τοῦ ἄλφα ἐξαιρεθέντος καὶ βαρυτέρας
one letter the alpha having-been-taken-out and graver
τῆς τελευτῆς γενομένης.
the ending having-become
HERM. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean
SOC. ὧδε. σημαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ὁ "ἄνθρωπος" ὅτι c
thus signifies this the name the man that
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ οὐδὲ
the indeed other beasts of-what they-see nothing examine nor
ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅμα ἑώρακεν —
reckon-up nor look-up the but man at-once has-seen
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ "ὄπωπε" — καὶ ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεται
this and is opōpe and looks-up and reasons-out
τοῦτο ὃ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὴ μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὀρθῶς
this which he-has-seen hence indeed alone of-the beasts rightly
ὁ ἄνθρωπος "ἄνθρωπος" ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε.
the man anthrōpos was-named looking-up-at what he-has-seen
HERM. τί οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ὃ ἡδέως ἂν —
what then the after this shall-I-ask you which gladly
πυθοίμην;
I-would-learn

SOC. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

d HERM. ὥσπερ τοίνυν μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις ἑξῆς εἶναί τι
as then to-me it-seems to-these next to-be some
χρῆμα. "ψυχὴν" γάρ που καὶ "σῶμα" καλοῦμεν τοῦ
thing soul for surely and body we-call of-the
ἀνθρώπου.
man

SOC. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not

HERM. πειρώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα διελεῖν ὥσπερ τὰ
let-us-try indeed also these-things to-divide as the
ἔμπροσθεν.
former

SOC. ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι ὡς εἰκότως τούτου τοῦ
soul do-you-mean to-examine how reasonably this the
ὀνόματος τυγχάνει, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ σῶμα;
name it-happens-to-have then in-turn the body

HERM. ναί.
yes

400 SOC. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγειν, οἶμαί τι
as indeed then from the instant to-speak I-think something
τοιοῦτον νοεῖν τοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνομάσαντας, ὡς τοῦτο
such to-mean the(-ones) the soul having-named that this
ἄρα, ὅταν παρῇ τῷ σώματι, αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ ζῆν αὐτῷ,
then whenever it-is-present to-the body cause is of-the living for-it
τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν δύναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψῦχον, ἅμα δὲ
the of-the to-breathe power providing and cooling at-once and
ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψύχοντος τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυταί τε καὶ
failing the cooling the body is-destroyed both and
τελευτᾷ· ὅθεν δή μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸ "ψυχὴν" καλέσαι. εἰ
dies whence indeed to-me they-seem it soul to-have-called if

δὲ βούλει — ἔχε ἠρέμα· δοκῶ γάρ μοί τι καθορᾶν
but you-wish hold quietly I-seem for to-myself something to-discern
πιθανώτερον τούτου τοῖς ἀμφὶ Εὐθύφρονα. τούτου μὲν
more-persuasive than-this for-the(-ones) around Euthyphro this indeed
γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καταφρονήσαιεν ἂν καὶ ἡγήσαιντο
for as to-me it-seems they-would-despise — and would-think
φορτικὸν εἶναι· τόδε δὲ σκόπει ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ἀρέσῃ.
vulgar to-be this but examine if then also to-you it-should-please

HERM. λέγε μόνον.
speak only

SOC. τὴν φύσιν παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε καὶ ζῆν καὶ
the nature of-all the body so-as both to-live and
περιιέναι, τί σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὀχεῖν ἄλλο ἢ
to-go-about what to-you seems to-hold both and to-carry other than
ψυχή;
soul

HERM. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
nothing other

SOC. τί δέ; καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις
what and also the of-the others all nature not do-you-trust
Ἀναξαγόρᾳ νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακοσμοῦσαν καὶ
Anaxagoras mind and soul to-be the ordering and
ἔχουσαν;
holding

HERM. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. καλῶς ἄρα ἂν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχοι τῇ δυνάμει b
finely then — the name this would-have for-the power
ταύτῃ ᾗ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει "φυσέχην" ἐπονομάζειν.
this which nature carries and holds physechē to-name
ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ "ψυχὴν" κομψευόμενον λέγειν.
it-is-allowed and also psychē speaking-subtly to-say

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ δοκεῖ γέ μοι τοῦτο ἐκείνου
certainly indeed then and seems at-least to-me this than-that
τεχνικώτερον εἶναι.
more-artful to-be

SOC. καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν· γελοῖον μέντοι φαίνεται ὡς ἀληθῶς
and for it-is ridiculous however it-appears as truly
ὀνομαζόμενον ὡς ἐτέθη.
being-named as it-was-set

HERM. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο πῶς φῶμεν ἔχειν;
but indeed the after this how are-we-to-say to-be

SOC. τὸ σῶμα λέγεις;
the body do-you-mean

HERM. ναί.
yes

c SOC. πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν
in-many-ways to-me it-seems this at-least if indeed even little
τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινές φασιν
one should-bend-aside even very and for sēma some say
αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι·
it to-be of-the soul as buried in the now present
καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ
and because in-turn by-this it-signifies what-things — it-should-signify
ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ "σῆμα" ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι. δοκοῦσι
the soul also in-this-way sēma rightly to-be-called they-seem
μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ
however to-me most to-have-set the(-ones) around Orpheus this the
ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα
name as penalty paying the soul for-what indeed for-the-sake
δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σῴζηται,
it-pays this and enclosure to-have so-that it-may-be-kept
δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ
of-prison image to-be then of-the soul this as

αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα,
itself is-named until — it-should-pay-off the(-things) owed
"σῶμα," καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα.
sōma and nothing to-be-necessary to-alter not-even one letter
HERM. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, d
these-things indeed to-me seem sufficiently O Socrates
εἰρῆσθαι· περὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον καὶ
to-have-been-said about but of-the gods the names as also
περὶ τοῦ "Διὸς" νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, ἔχοιμεν ἄν που
about the Zeus just-now you-were-saying we-would-be-able — surely
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπισκέψασθαι κατὰ τίνα
according-to the same way to-examine according-to what
ποτὲ ὀρθότητα αὐτῶν τὰ ὀνόματα κεῖται;
ever correctness of-them the names are-set
SOC. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἡμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἴπερ γε νοῦν 401
yes by Zeus we at-least O Hermogenes if-indeed at-least sense
ἔχοιμεν, ἕνα μὲν τὸν κάλλιστον τρόπον, ὅτι περὶ θεῶν
we-should-have one indeed the finest way that about gods
οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων,
nothing we-know neither about them nor about the names
ἅττα ποτὲ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσιν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκεῖνοί γε
whatever ever themselves they-call clear for that those at-least
τἀληθῆ καλοῦσι. δεύτερος δ' αὖ τρόπος ὀρθότητος,
the-true-things call second and in-turn way of-correctness
ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὔχεσθαι, οἵτινές
as in the prayers law is for-us to-pray whoever
τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι, ταῦτα καὶ ἡμᾶς
both and whencesoever they-rejoice being-named these-things also us
αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, ὡς ἄλλο μηδὲν εἰδότας· καλῶς γὰρ δὴ
them to-call as other nothing knowing finely for indeed
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νενομίσθαι.
to-me-at-least it-seems to-have-been-established

Disclaiming knowledge of the gods, they look at the opinions of those who named them, star-gazers and babblers. Hestia is ousia, *being, or the pusher of things in motion. Rhea and Cronus are names of streams, as Heraclitus says all things flow, and Homer and Hesiod name Oceanus and Tethys as origins. Poseidon is a foot-fetter, or knows much, or shakes. Pluto is named for the wealth sent up from the earth. Men fear Hades wrongly: he binds the dead by the strongest bond, the desire to be made better, so that none, not even the Sirens, wishes to return, and he is a perfect sophist and a great benefactor.*

εἰ οὖν βούλει, σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ προειπόντες τοῖς
if then you-wish let-us-examine as having-declared-beforehand to-the
θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς σκεψόμεθα — οὐ γὰρ
gods that about them nothing we shall-examine not for
ἀξιοῦμεν οἷοί τ' ἂν εἶναι σκοπεῖν — ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν
we-deem able — — to-be to-examine but about the
ἀνθρώπων, ἥν ποτέ τινα δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς
men what ever some opinion having they-set for-them
τὰ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνεμέσητον.
the names this for is-blameless

HERM. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ
but to-me you-seem O Socrates moderately to-speak and
οὕτω ποιῶμεν.
so let-us-do

b SOC. ἄλλο τι οὖν ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἀρχώμεθα κατὰ τὸν
other anything then from Hestia should-we-begin according-to the
νόμον;
custom

HERM. δίκαιον γοῦν.
just at-any-rate

SOC. τί οὖν ἄν τις φαίη διανοούμενον τὸν ὀνομάσαντα
what then — one might-say meaning the(-one) having-named
Ἑστίαν ὀνομάσαι;
Hestia to-have-named
HERM. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐδὲ τοῦτο οἶμαι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι.
not by — Zeus not-even this I-think easy to-be
SOC. κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν, ὠγαθὲ Ἑρμόγενες, οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ
are-likely at-any-rate good Hermogenes the first the
ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι καὶ
names setting not trivial to-be but star-gazers and
ἀδολέσχαι τινές.
babblers some
HERM. τί δή;
what indeed
SOC. καταφαίνεταί μοι ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων τοιούτων c
appears to-me the setting of-the names of-such
τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἐάν τις τὰ ξενικὰ ὀνόματα ἀνασκοπῇ,
some men and if one the foreign names examines
οὐχ ἧττον ἀνευρίσκεται ὃ ἕκαστον βούλεται. οἷον καὶ ἐν
not less is-discovered what each means such-as also in
τούτῳ ὃ ἡμεῖς "οὐσίαν" καλοῦμεν, εἰσὶν οἳ "ἐσσίαν"
this which we being call there-are who essia
καλοῦσιν, οἳ δ' αὖ "ὡσίαν." πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κατὰ
call they and in-turn ōsia first indeed then according-to
τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα τούτων ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσία
the one name of-these the of-the things being
"Ἑστία" καλεῖσθαι ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ὅτι γε αὖ ἡμεῖς
Hestia to-be-called has reason and because at-least in-turn we
τὸ τῆς οὐσίας μετέχον "ἔστιν" φαμέν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
the of-the being partaking is we-say also according-to this
ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖτο "Ἑστία"· ἐοίκαμεν γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ
rightly — would-be-called Hestia we-seem for also we the

παλαιὸν "ἐσσίαν" καλεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ
old essia to-call the being still and also according-to
τὰς θυσίας ἄν τις ἐννοήσας ἡγήσαιτο οὕτω νοεῖν ταῦτα
the sacrifices — one having-considered would-think so to-mean these-things
τοὺς τιθεμένους· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ πάντων θεῶν τῇ Ἑστίᾳ
the(-men) setting the for before all gods to-the Hestia
πρώτῃ προθύειν εἰκὸς ἐκείνους οἵτινες τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν
first to-sacrifice-first likely those who the of-all being
"ἐσσίαν" ἐπωνόμασαν. ὅσοι δ' αὖ "ὠσίαν," σχεδόν
essia named as-many-as but in-turn ōsia nearly
τι αὖ οὗτοι καθ' Ἡράκλειτον ἂν ἡγοῖντο τὰ
something in-turn these according-to Heraclitus — would-think the
ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν· τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ
beings to-go both all and to-stay nothing the then cause and
τὸ ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὠθοῦν, ὅθεν δὴ καλῶς ἔχειν
the leader of-them to-be the pushing whence indeed finely to-be
αὐτὸ "ὠσίαν" ὠνομάσθαι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταύτῃ ὡς
it ōsia to-have-been-named and these-things indeed indeed thus as
παρὰ μηδὲν εἰδότων εἰρήσθω· μετὰ δ' Ἑστίαν δίκαιον
from nothing knowing(-men) let-them-be-said after and Hestia just
Ῥέαν καὶ Κρόνον ἐπισκέψασθαι. καίτοι τό γε τοῦ
Rhea and Cronus to-examine and-yet the at-least of-the
Κρόνου ὄνομα ἤδη διήλθομεν. ἴσως μέντοι οὐδὲν λέγω.
Cronus name already we-went-through perhaps however nothing I-say

HERM. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;
what indeed O Socrates

SOC. ὠγαθέ, ἐννενόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας.
good-sir I-have-perceived some swarm of-wisdom

HERM. ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;
what-kind indeed this

SOC. γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα 402
ridiculous indeed very to-say I-think however some plausibility
ἔχον.
having
HERM. τίνα ταύτην;
what this
SOC. τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαί᾽ ἄττα
the Heraclitus to-me I-seem to-discern ancient some
σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ
wise-things saying simply the(-things) in-the-time-of Cronus and
Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν.
Rhea which also Homer said
HERM. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;
how this do-you-mean
SOC. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι "πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν
says somewhere Heraclitus that all-things move and nothing
μένει," καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς
stays and of-a-river to-the-flow likening the beings he-says that
"δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης."
twice into the same river not — you-would-step
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things
SOC. τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡρακλείτου νοεῖν b
what then does-he-seem to-you otherwise than-Heraclitus to-think
ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις "Ῥέαν"
the(-one) setting for-the of-the other gods ancestors Rhea
τε καὶ "Κρόνον"; ἆρα οἴει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου αὐτὸν
both and Cronus then do-you-think from the spontaneous him
ἀμφοτέροις ῥευμάτων ὀνόματα θέσθαι; ὥσπερ αὖ Ὅμηρος
for-both of-streams names to-set as in-turn Homer

"Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσίν" φησιν "καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν·"
Ocean both of-gods origin says and mother Tethys
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ὅτι
I-think and also Hesiod says and somewhere also Orpheus that

Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρροος ἦρξε γάμοιο,
Ocean first fair-flowing began marriage
c ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν.
who then sister of-the-same-mother Tethys wedded

ταῦτ' οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς
these-things then examine that both with-one-another they-agree and toward
τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει.
the(-things) of-the Heraclitus all-things tend
HERM. φαίνῃ τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· τὸ μέντοι
you-appear something to-me to-say O Socrates the however
τῆς Τηθύος οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὄνομα τί βούλεται.
of-the Tethys not I-perceive name what it-means
d SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς
but indeed this at-least almost itself says that of-spring
ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ διαττώμενον καὶ
name hidden is the for being-strained and
τὸ ἠθούμενον πηγῆς ἀπείκασμά ἐστιν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων
the being-filtered of-spring likeness is from and these
ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ "Τηθὺς" τὸ ὄνομα σύγκειται.
both the names the Tethys the name is-composed
HERM. τοῦτο μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κομψόν.
this indeed O Socrates subtle
SOC. τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; τὸν μὲν
what and not is-it-likely but what the after this the indeed
Δία εἴπομεν.
Zeus we-spoke-of

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγωμεν, τόν τε Ποσειδῶ
the brothers indeed of-him let-us-speak-of the both Poseidon
καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ὃ ὀνομάζουσιν
and the Pluto and the other name which they-name
αὐτόν.
him

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνός μοι φαίνεται e
the indeed then of-the Poseidon to-me appears
ὠνομάσθαι, ὅτι αὐτὸν βαδίζοντα ἐπέσχεν ἡ τῆς
to-have-been-named because him walking held-back the of-the
θαλάττης φύσις καὶ οὐκέτι εἴασεν προελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
sea nature and no-longer allowed to-go-forward but as
δεσμὸς τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο. τὸν οὖν ἄρχοντα
fetter of-the feet to-him it-became the then ruler
τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης θεὸν ὠνόμασεν "Ποσειδῶνα," ὡς
of-the power this god he-named Poseidon as
"ποσίδεσμον" ὄντα· τὸ δὲ ε ἔγκειται ἴσως εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκα.
posidesmos being the and e is-inserted perhaps of-seemliness for-the-sake
τάχα δὲ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο λέγοι, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ σῖγμα δύο 403
perhaps but not — this he-would-mean but instead-of the sigma two
λάβδα τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγετο, ὡς πολλὰ εἰδότος τοῦ θεοῦ. ἴσως
lambdas the first was-said as many-things knowing the god perhaps
δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν "ὁ σείων" ὠνόμασται· πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ πεῖ
but from the shaking the shaker has-been-named is-added and the pi
καὶ τὸ δέλτα. τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
and the delta the and of-Pluto this indeed according-to the of-the
πλούτου δόσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς κάτωθεν ἀνίεται ὁ πλοῦτος,
wealth giving because from the earth below is-sent-up the wealth

ἐπωνομάσθη· ὁ δὲ "Ἅιδης," οἱ πολλοὶ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν
he-was-named the and Hades the many indeed to-me seem
ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀιδὲς προσειρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ,
to-suppose the unseen to-have-been-designated by-the name this
καὶ φοβούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα "Πλούτωνα" καλοῦσιν αὐτόν.
and fearing the name Pluto they-call him

b HERM. σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες;
to-you and how does-it-appear O Socrates

SOC. πολλαχῇ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι διημαρτηκέναι
in-many-ways to-me-at-least seem the-men to-have-erred
περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὸν
about this the god the power and to-fear him
οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν. ὅτι τε γάρ, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τις ἡμῶν
not worthy being that both for when once someone of-us
ἀποθάνῃ, ἀεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ
should-die always there he-is they-fear and that the soul
γυμνὴ τοῦ σώματος παρ' ἐκεῖνον ἀπέρχεται, καὶ τοῦτο
naked of-the body to that-one goes-away and this
πεφόβηνται· τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πάντα ἐς ταὐτόν
they-have-feared the(-things) but to-me it-seems all into the-same
τι συντείνειν, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα.
something to-tend both the rule of-the god and the name

HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed

c SOC. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ ἅ γέ μοι φαίνεται. εἰπὲ γάρ
I to-you will-tell what-things at-least to-me appear tell for
μοι, δεσμὸς ζῴῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὥστε μένειν ὁπουοῦν,
me bond for-living-thing any-whatever so-as to-stay anywhere-whatever
πότερος ἰσχυρότερός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπιθυμία;
which stronger is necessity or desire

HERM. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ ἐπιθυμία.
much it-differs O Socrates the desire

SOC. οἴει οὖν τὸν Ἅιδην οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς ἐκφεύγειν, εἰ
do-you-think then the Hades not — many to-escape if
μὴ τῷ ἰσχυροτάτῳ δεσμῷ ἔδει τοὺς ἐκεῖσε ἰόντας;
not with-the strongest bond he-bound the(-ones) thither going

HERM. δῆλα δή.
clear indeed

SOC. ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἄρα τινὶ αὐτούς, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ, εἴπερ τῷ
with-desire then some them as it-seems he-binds if-indeed with-the
μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ δεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ.
greatest bond he-binds and not with-necessity

HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. οὐκοῦν ἐπιθυμίαι αὖ πολλαί εἰσιν;
therefore desires in-turn many are

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. τῇ μεγίστῃ ἄρα ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν δεῖ d
with-the greatest then desire of-the desires he-binds
αὐτούς, εἴπερ μέλλει τῷ μεγίστῳ δεσμῷ κατέχειν.
them if-indeed he-is-going with-the greatest bond to-hold-down

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἔστιν οὖν τις μείζων ἐπιθυμία ἢ ὅταν τίς τῳ
is-there then some greater desire than when one with-someone
συνὼν οἴηται δι' ἐκεῖνον ἔσεσθαι ἀμείνων ἀνήρ;
being-together thinks through that-one to-be-going-to-be better man

HERM. μὰ Δί' οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
by Zeus not-even in-any-way-whatever O Socrates

SOC. διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα φῶμεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐδένα δεῦρο e
for these-things then let-us-say O Hermogenes no-one hither
ἐθελῆσαι ἀπελθεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰς τὰς
to-have-wished to-come-away of-the(-ones) from-there not-even themselves the

Σειρῆνας, ἀλλὰ κατακεκηλῆσθαι ἐκείνας τε καὶ τοὺς
Sirens but to-have-been-enchanted those both and the
ἄλλους πάντας· οὕτω καλούς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπίσταται
others all so fine some as it-seems he-knows
λόγους λέγειν ὁ Ἅιδης, καὶ ἔστιν, ὥς γ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
words to-speak the Hades and it-is as at-least from the argument
τούτου, ὁ θεὸς τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας εὐεργέτης
this the god perfect sophist both and great benefactor
τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ, ὅς γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα
of-the(-ones) beside him who at-least also to-the(-ones) here so-many
ἀγαθὰ ἀνίησιν· οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περιόντα ἐκεῖ
goods sends-up so many-things to-him the surplus there
ἐστιν, καὶ τὸν "Πλούτωνα" ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα.
are and the Pluto from this he-got the name

X · HADES, DEMETER, HERA, APOLLO

Hades keeps company with souls freed of the body's ills and desires, and is named from knowing all fine things, not from the unseen. Demeter is the mother who gives food, Hera is lovely, or the air, and Pherrephatta wise, touching what moves. Apollo's name fits his four arts, music, prophecy, medicine, and archery: he washes, is simple, always hits, and moves all together; a second lambda was put in because the name sounded like destruction.

404 καὶ τὸ αὖ μὴ ἐθέλειν συνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι τὰ
and the in-turn not to-be-willing to-be-with the men having the
σώματα, ἀλλὰ τότε συγγίγνεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρὰ
bodies but then to-associate when the soul pure
ᾖ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν,
should-be of-all the(-things) about the body evils and desires
οὐ φιλοσόφου δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ εὖ ἐντεθυμημένου ὅτι
not of-a-philosopher does-it-seem to-you to-be and well having-considered that

οὕτω μὲν ἂν κατέχοι αὐτοὺς δήσας τῇ περὶ ἀρετὴν
so indeed — he-could-hold them having-bound with-the about virtue
ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἔχοντας δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πτοίησιν καὶ
desire having but the of-the body excitement and
μανίαν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Κρόνος δύναιτο ὁ πατὴρ συγκατέχειν
madness not-even — the Cronus could the father to-hold-with
αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς δήσας τοῖς αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις;
himself in the bonds having-bound the of-him said

HERM. κινδυνεύεις τὶ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
you-are-likely something to-say O Socrates

SOC. καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὁ "Ἅιδης," ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, b
and the at-least name the Hades O Hermogenes
πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς ἐπωνομάσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
much is-lacking from the unseen to-have-been-named but much
μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ καλὰ εἰδέναι, ἀπὸ τούτου
rather from the all the fine-things to-know from this
ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου "Ἅιδης" ἐκλήθη.
by the lawgiver Hades he-was-called

HERM. εἶεν· τί δὲ Δήμητρά τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ Ἀπόλλω
well what and Demeter both and Hera and Apollo
καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ Ἥφαιστον καὶ Ἄρη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
and Athena and Hephaestus and Ares and the other
θεούς, πῶς λέγομεν;
gods how do-we-speak

SOC. Δημήτηρ μὲν φαίνεται κατὰ τὴν δόσιν τῆς ἐδωδῆς c
Demeter indeed appears according-to the giving of-the food
διδοῦσα ὡς μήτηρ "Δημήτηρ" κεκλῆσθαι, Ἥρα δὲ ἐρατή
giving as mother Demeter to-have-been-called Hera and lovely
τις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ λέγεται ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτῆς ἐρασθεὶς ἔχειν.
some as then also is-said the Zeus her having-loved to-have
ἴσως δὲ μετεωρολογῶν ὁ νομοθέτης τὸν ἀέρα "Ἥραν"
perhaps but studying-the-heavens the lawgiver the air Hera

ὠνόμασεν ἐπικρυπτόμενος, θεὶς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τελευτήν·
named concealing having-put the beginning at end
γνοίης δ' ἄν, εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας
you-would-know and — if often you-should-say the of-the Hera
ὄνομα. "Φερρέφαττα" δέ· πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο φοβοῦνται
name Pherrephatta and many indeed also this fear
τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν "Ἀπόλλω," ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, ὡς ἔοικεν,
the name and the Apollo through inexperience as it-seems
ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος. καὶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντες σκοποῦνται
of-names correctness and for changing they-examine
τὴν "Φερσεφόνην," καὶ δεινὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ
the Phersephone and terrible to-them appears it but
μηνύει σοφὴν εἶναι τὴν θεόν. ἅτε γὰρ φερομένων
it-reveals wise to-be the goddess inasmuch-as for being-carried
τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ ἐπαφῶν καὶ
the things the(-thing) laying-hold-of and touching and
δυνάμενον ἐπακολουθεῖν σοφία ἂν εἴη. "Φερέπαφα" οὖν
able to-follow-along wisdom — would-be Pherepapha then
διὰ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαφὴν τοῦ φερομένου ἡ
because-of the wisdom and the touching of-the being-carried the
θεὸς ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι — δι' ὅπερ
goddess — rightly would-be-called or such something through which-very
καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ ὁ Ἅιδης σοφὸς ὤν, διότι τοιαύτη
also is-with her the Hades wise being because such
ἐστίν — νῦν δὲ αὐτῆς ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ ὄνομα εὐστομίαν περὶ
she-is now but of-her they-bend-aside the name euphony of
πλείονος ποιούμενοι τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε "Φερρέφατταν"
more making than-the truth so-as Pherrephatta
αὐτὴν καλεῖν. ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, ὅπερ
her to-call the-same and also about the Apollo what-very

λέγω, πολλοὶ πεφόβηνται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥς
I-say many have-feared about the name of-the god as
τι δεινὸν μηνύοντος· ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι;
something terrible revealing or not have-you-perceived
HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
certainly indeed then and true-things you-say
SOC. τὸ δέ γ᾽ ἐστίν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, κάλλιστα κείμενον
it but at-least is as to-me it-seems most-finely set
πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ.
toward the power of-the god
HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed
SOC. ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται· 405
I will-try to-tell what at-least to-me appears
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι ἂν μᾶλλον ὄνομα ἥρμοσεν ἓν ὂν
not for there-is what — rather name would-have-fitted one being
τέτταρσι δυνάμεσι ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥστε πασῶν ἐφάπτεσθαι
to-four powers the of-the god so-as all to-lay-hold-of
καὶ δηλοῦν τρόπον τινὰ μουσικήν τε καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ
and to-show way some music both and prophecy and
ἰατρικὴν καὶ τοξικήν.
medicine and archery
HERM. λέγε δή· ἄτοπον γάρ τί μοι λέγεις τὸ ὄνομα
speak indeed strange for something to-me you-say the name
εἶναι.
to-be
SOC. εὐάρμοστον μὲν οὖν, ἅτε μουσικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ. b
well-fitted indeed then inasmuch-as musical being the god
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ
first indeed for the purification and the purifications both according-to
τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς
the medicine and according-to the prophecy and the(-fumigations) with-the

ἰατρικοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ αἱ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιθειώσεις
medical drugs and the(-ones) with-the prophetic fumigations
τε καὶ τὰ λουτρὰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιρράνσεις,
both and the washings the in the such-things and the sprinklings
πάντα ἕν τι ταῦτα δύναιτ' ἄν, καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν
all one something these could — pure to-make the
ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν· ἢ οὔ;
man both according-to the body and according-to the soul or not

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὁ καθαίρων θεὸς καὶ ὁ ἀπολούων τε καὶ
therefore the purifying god and the washing-off both and
ἀπολύων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οὗτος ἂν εἴη;
releasing from-the such evils this — would-be

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

c SOC. κατὰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰς ἀπολύσεις τε καὶ ἀπολούσεις,
according-to indeed then the releasings both and washings-off
ὡς ἰατρὸς ὢν τῶν τοιούτων, "Ἀπολούων" ἂν ὀρθῶς
as physician being of-the such-things Apolouōn — rightly
καλοῖτο· κατὰ δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ
would-be-called according-to and the prophecy and the true both and
τὸ ἁπλοῦν — ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν — ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Θετταλοὶ
the simple the-same for it-is as then the Thessalians
καλοῦσιν αὐτόν, ὀρθότατ' ἂν καλοῖτο· "Ἅπλουν" γάρ
call him most-rightly — he-would-be-called Aploun for
φασι πάντες Θετταλοὶ τοῦτον τὸν θεόν. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ
say all Thessalians this the god through and the always
βολῶν ἐγκρατὴς εἶναι τοξικῇ "Ἀειβάλλων" ἐστίν. κατὰ
of-shots master to-be with-archery Aeiballōn he-is according-to
δὲ τὴν μουσικὴν δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἄλφα σημαίνει
and the music one-must to-suppose that the alpha signifies

πολλαχοῦ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοῦ πόλησιν καὶ περὶ
in-many-places the together and here the together revolving both about
τὸν οὐρανόν, οὓς δὴ "πόλους" καλοῦσιν, καὶ περὶ τὴν
the heaven which indeed poles they-call and about the
ἐν τῇ ᾠδῇ ἁρμονίαν, ἣ δὴ συμφωνία καλεῖται, ὅτι
in the song harmony which indeed concord is-called because
ταῦτα πάντα, ὥς φασιν οἱ κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ
these-things all as say the subtle(-men) about music and
ἀστρονομίαν, ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ πολεῖ ἅμα πάντα· ἐπιστατεῖ
astronomy with-harmony some revolves together all-things he-presides
δὲ οὗτος ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ ὁμοπολῶν αὐτὰ πάντα καὶ
and this the god over-the harmony co-revolving them all both
κατὰ θεοὺς καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν ὁμοκέλευθον
among gods and among men as then the homokeleuthos
καὶ ὁμόκοιτιν "ἀκόλουθον" καὶ "ἄκοιτιν" ἐκαλέσαμεν,
and homokoitis akolouthos and akoitis we-called
μεταβαλόντες ἀντὶ τοῦ "ὁμο—" "ἀ—," οὕτω καὶ
changing instead-of the homo a so also
"Ἀπόλλωνα" ἐκαλέσαμεν ὃς ἦν "ὁμοπολῶν," ἕτερον λάβδα
Apollo we-called who was homopolōn another lambda
ἐμβαλόντες, ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἐγίγνετο τῷ χαλεπῷ ὀνόματι.
inserting because same-named it-became with-the harsh name

The Muses are named from searching; Leto from her gentleness; Artemis from soundness and order, or her hatred of sowing; Dionysus gives wine, and wine makes those who drink think they have sense; Aphrodite is born of foam. Pallas is from brandishing, Athena mind of god or thought in character, Hephaestus knower of light, and Ares the male, the manly, or the unbending. Socrates wants to leave the gods, but Hermogenes asks about one more, Hermes, since Cratylus says he is no Hermogenes.

406 ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ὑποπτεύοντές τινες διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς
what-very also now suspecting some because-of the not rightly
σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὀνόματος φοβοῦνται αὐτὸ ὡς
to-examine the power of-the name they-fear it as
σημαῖνον φθοράν τινα· τὸ δὲ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, πασῶν
signifying destruction some it but as just-now was-said all
ἐφαπτόμενον κεῖται τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεων, ἁπλοῦ, ἀεὶ
laying-hold-of is-set of-the of-the god powers simple always
βάλλοντος, ἀπολούοντος, ὁμοπολοῦντος. τὰς δὲ "Μούσας"
shooting washing co-revolving the and Muses
τε καὶ ὅλως τὴν μουσικὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι, ὡς ἔοικεν,
both and wholly the music from the to-search as it-seems
καὶ τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο
and of-the inquiry both and philosophy the name this
ἐπωνόμασεν. Λητὼ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πραότητος τῆς θεοῦ,
he-named Leto and from the gentleness of-the goddess
κατὰ τὸ ἐθελήμονα εἶναι ὧν ἄν τις δέηται. ἴσως δὲ
according-to the willing to-be of-what — someone should-need perhaps but
ὡς οἱ ξένοι καλοῦσιν — πολλοὶ γὰρ "Ληθὼ" καλοῦσιν —
as the foreigners call many for Lethō call
ἔοικεν οὖν πρὸς τὸ μὴ τραχὺ τοῦ ἤθους ἀλλ' ἥμερόν
it-seems then for the not rough of-the character but gentle

τε καὶ λεῖον “Ληθὼ” κεκλῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦτο
both and smooth Lethō to-have-been-called by the(-ones) this
καλούντων. “Ἄρτεμις” δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμὲς φαίνεται
calling Artemis and because-of the sound appears
καὶ τὸ κόσμιον, διὰ τὴν τῆς παρθενίας ἐπιθυμίαν·
and the orderly because-of the of-the virginity desire
ἴσως δὲ ἀρετῆς ἵστορα τὴν θεὸν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ καλέσας,
perhaps but of-virtue knower the goddess called the(-one) having-called
τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ ὡς τὸν ἄροτον μισησάσης τὸν ἀνδρὸς
perhaps and — also as the plowing having-hated the of-man
ἐν γυναικί· ἢ διὰ τούτων τι ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα
in woman or because-of of-these some or because-of all these-things
τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ὁ τιθέμενος ἔθετο τῇ θεῷ.
the name this the(-one) setting set for-the goddess
HERM. τί δὲ ὁ “Διόνυσός” τε καὶ ἡ “Ἀφροδίτη”;
what and the Dionysus both and the Aphrodite
SOC. μεγάλα, ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ ἔστι γὰρ καὶ c
great-things O son of-Hipponicus you-ask but is for both
σπουδαίως εἰρημένος ὁ τρόπος τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτοις τοῖς
seriously said the manner of-the names for-these the
θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς. τὸν μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖον ἄλλους τινὰς
gods and playfully the indeed then serious others some
ἐρώτα, τὸν δὲ παιδικὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει διελθεῖν· φιλοπαίσμονες
ask the and playful nothing prevents to-go-through fond-of-play
γὰρ καὶ οἱ θεοί. ὅ τε γὰρ Διόνυσος εἴη ἂν ὁ διδοὺς
for also the gods the both for Dionysus would-be — the(-one) giving
τὸν οἶνον “Διδοίνυσος” ἐν παιδιᾷ καλούμενος, οἶνος δ’,
the wine Didoinysos in play being-called wine and
ὅτι οἴεσθαι νοῦν ἔχειν ποιεῖ τῶν πινόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς
because to-think sense to-have it-makes of-the drinking the many
οὐκ ἔχοντας, “οἰόνους” δικαιότατ’ ἂν καλούμενος. περὶ δὲ
not having oionous most-justly — being-called about and

Ἀφροδίτης οὐκ ἄξιον Ἡσιόδῳ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ συγχωρεῖν
Aphrodite not worthy Hesiod to-contradict but to-concede
ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν "Ἀφροδίτη" ἐκλήθη.
that because-of the from the foam birth Aphrodite she-was-called
HERM. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' Ἀθηνᾶς Ἀθηναίός γ' ὤν, ὦ
but indeed not-even Athena Athenian at-least being O
Σώκρατες, ἐπιλήσῃ, οὐδ' Ἡφαίστου τε καὶ Ἄρεως.
Socrates will-you-forget nor Hephaestus both and Ares
SOC. οὐδὲ εἰκός γε.
nor likely at-least
HERM. οὐ γάρ.
not for
SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὄνομα αὐτῆς οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν
therefore the indeed one name of-her not difficult to-say
δι' ὃ κεῖται.
because-of which it-is-set
HERM. τὸ ποῖον;
the what-sort
SOC. "Παλλάδα" που αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν.
Pallas surely her we-call
HERM. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not
407 SOC. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ὀρχήσεως
this indeed then from the in the arms dancing
ἡγούμενοι τεθῆναι ὀρθῶς ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἡγοίμεθα· τὸ
considering to-have-been-set rightly — as I-think we-would-consider the
γάρ που ἢ αὐτὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο μετεωρίζειν ἢ ἀπὸ
for surely either oneself or something other to-lift-up either from
τῆς γῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν "πάλλειν" τε καὶ "πάλλεσθαι"
the earth or in the hands to-brandish both and to-be-brandished
καὶ ὀρχεῖν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καλοῦμεν.
and to-make-dance and to-dance we-call

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. "Παλλάδα" μὲν τοίνυν ταύτῃ.
Pallas indeed then in-this-way

HERM. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον πῶς λέγεις;
and rightly at-least but indeed the other how do-you-mean

SOC. τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς;
the of-the Athena

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. τοῦτο ἐμβριθέστερον, ὦ φίλε. ἐοίκασι δὴ καὶ οἱ b
this weightier O friend seem indeed also the
παλαιοὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν νομίζειν ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν περὶ
ancients the Athena to-consider as the(-men) now about
Ὅμηρον δεινοί. καὶ γὰρ τούτων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξηγούμενοι
Homer clever also for of-these the many explaining
τὸν ποιητήν φασι τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αὐτὸν νοῦν τε καὶ διάνοιαν
the poet say the Athena him mind both and thought
πεποιηκέναι, καὶ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα ποιῶν ἔοικε τοιοῦτόν
to-have-made and the(-one) the names making seems such
τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ μειζόνως λέγων
something about her to-think still and more-grandly saying
θεοῦ νόησιν ὡσπερεὶ λέγει ὅτι "ἁ θεονόα" ἐστὶν αὕτη,
of-god intellection as-if says that ha theonoa is she
τῷ ἄλφα ξενικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα χρησάμενος καὶ τὸ
with-the alpha foreign-fashion instead-of the eta having-used and the
ἰῶτα καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἀφελών. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ'
iota and the sigma having-removed perhaps but not-even in-this-way but
ὡς τὰ θεῖα νοούσης αὐτῆς διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
as the divine-things knowing her beyond the others
"Θεονόην" ἐκάλεσεν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἀπέχει καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ
Theonoē he-called nothing and hinders also the in the

ἤθει νόησιν ὡς οὖσαν τὴν θεὸν ταύτην "Ἠθονόην" μὲν
character intellection as being the goddess this Ēthonoē indeed
βούλεσθαι προσειπεῖν· παραγαγὼν δὲ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤ τινες
to-wish to-address having-altered and either himself or some
ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον ὡς ᾠοντο, "Ἀθηνάαν" ἐκάλεσαν.
later toward the finer as they-thought Athēnaa called

HERM. τί δὲ δὴ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, πῇ λέγεις;
what and indeed the Hephaestus how do-you-mean

SOC. ἦ τὸν γενναῖον τὸν "φάεος ἴστορα" ἐρωτᾷς;
truly the noble the of-light knower do-you-ask

HERM. ἔοικα.
I-seem-to

SOC. οὐκοῦν οὗτος μὲν παντὶ δῆλος "Φαῖστος" ὤν, τὸ
therefore this indeed to-everyone clear Phaistos being the
ἦτα προσελκυσάμενος;
eta having-drawn-on

HERM. κινδυνεύει, ἐὰν μή πῃ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτι ἄλλῃ
it-is-likely if not somehow to-you as it-seems still otherwise
δόξῃ.
should-seem

SOC. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ, τὸν Ἄρη ἐρώτα.
but so-that not it-should-seem the Ares ask

HERM. ἐρωτῶ.
I-ask

d SOC. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν βούλει, κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τε καὶ
therefore if indeed you-wish according-to the male both and
κατὰ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον "Ἄρης" ἂν εἴη· εἰ δ' αὖ
according-to the manly Ares — would-be if and in-turn
κατὰ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον, ὃ δὴ
according-to the hard both and unbending which indeed

"ἄρρατον" καλεῖται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν πανταχῇ πολεμικῷ
arraton is-called also in-this-way — everywhere for-warlike
θεῷ πρέποι "Ἄρη" καλεῖσθαι.
god it-would-befit Ares to-be-called

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν θεῶν πρὸς θεῶν ἀπαλλαγῶμεν,
from indeed then the gods by gods let-us-get-away
ὡς ἐγὼ δέδοικα περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι· περὶ δὲ ἄλλων
as I fear about them to-converse about but others
ὧν τινων βούλει προβαλλέ μοι, "ὄφρα ἴδηαι οἷοι"
of-which some you-wish put-forth to-me so-that you-may-see what-sort
Εὐθύφρονος "ἵπποι."
of-Euthyphro horses

HERM. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἔτι γε ἓν ἐρόμενός σε περὶ e
but I-will-do these-things still at-least one having-asked you about
Ἑρμοῦ, ἐπειδή με καὶ οὔ φησιν Κρατύλος Ἑρμογένη εἶναι.
Hermes since me also not says Cratylus Hermogenes to-be
πειρώμεθα οὖν τὸν "Ἑρμῆν" σκέψασθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ
let-us-try then the Hermes to-examine what also means the
ὄνομα, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶμεν εἰ τὶ ὅδε λέγει.
name so-that also we-may-know whether something this-man says

Hermes is about speech: interpreter, messenger, thief, deceiver, and trader; he devised speaking. Pan, his son, is speech that signifies all and turns always, true and smooth above, false and goatish below. The sun gathers men and rolls about the earth, the moon is light always new and old, the month wanes, and the stars are named from lightning. Fire and water may be foreign words; air flows always, aether runs always, and earth bears. The seasons bound, and the year tests all.

408 SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι
but indeed this at-least seems about speech something to-be
ὁ "Ἑρμῆς," καὶ τὸ ἑρμηνέα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ
the Hermes and the interpreter to-be and the messenger and the
κλοπικόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν,
thievish both and the deceitful in words and the marketing
περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστιν πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία· ὅπερ
about of-speech power is all this the business which-very
οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, τὸ "εἴρειν" λόγου χρεία
then also in the former we-were-saying the eirein of-speech use
ἐστί, τὸ δέ, οἷον καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ λέγει, "ἐμήσατό"
is the and as also Homer in-many-places says emēsato
φησιν, τοῦτο δὲ μηχανήσασθαί ἐστιν. ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὖν
he-says this and to-contrive is from both then
τούτων τὸν τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ τὸν λόγον μησάμενον — τὸ δὲ
these the the to-speak both and the speech having-contrived the and
λέγειν δή ἐστιν εἴρειν — τοῦτον τὸν θεὸν ὡσπερεὶ ἐπιτάττει
to-speak indeed is eirein this the god as-it-were enjoins
ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης· "ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὃς τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο,
on-us the lawgiver O men who the eirein contrived
δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ὑπὸ ὑμῶν εἰρέμης"· νῦν δὲ ἡμεῖς,
justly — would-be-called by you eiremēs now but we
ὡς οἰόμεθα, καλλωπίζοντες τὸ ὄνομα "Ἑρμῆν" καλοῦμεν.
as we-think beautifying the name Hermes call

HERM. νὴ τὸν Δία, εὖ ἄρα μοι δοκεῖ Κρατύλος λέγειν
by — Zeus well then to-me seems Cratylus to-say
τὸ ἐμὲ μὴ εἶναι Ἑρμογένη· οὔκουν εὐμήχανός γέ εἰμι
the me not to-be Hermogenes not-then resourceful at-least I-am
λόγου.
of-speech

SOC. καὶ τό γε τὸν Πᾶνα τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ εἶναι ὑὸν διφυῆ
and the at-least the Pan of-the Hermes to-be son double-natured
ἔχει τὸ εἰκός, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
has the likelihood O comrade

HERM. πῶς δή; c
how indeed

SOC. οἶσθα ὅτι ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει καὶ κυκλεῖ καὶ
you-know that the speech the all signifies and circles and
πολεῖ ἀεί, καὶ ἔστι διπλοῦς, ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής.
revolves always and is double true both and false

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ λεῖον καὶ θεῖον καὶ
therefore the indeed true of-it smooth and divine and
ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος κάτω ἐν
above dwelling among the gods the and falsehood below among
τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν·
the many of-the men and rough and goatish
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πλεῖστοι οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη ἐστίν,
here for most the myths both and the falsehoods are
περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον.
about the tragic life

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

d SOC. ὀρθῶς ἄρ᾽ ἂν ὁ πᾶν μηνύων καὶ ἀεὶ πολῶν "Πὰν
rightly then — the(-one) all revealing and always revolving Pan
αἰπόλος" εἴη, διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ υἱός, τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν
goatherd would-be double-natured of-Hermes son the(-parts) indeed from-above
λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής. καὶ ἔστιν
smooth the(-parts) and from-below rough and goat-shaped and is
ἤτοι λόγος ἢ λόγου ἀδελφὸς ὁ Πάν, εἴπερ Ἑρμοῦ υἱός
either speech or of-speech brother the Pan if-indeed of-Hermes son
ἐστιν· ἀδελφῷ δὲ ἐοικέναι ἀδελφὸν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. ἀλλ᾽
he-is to-a-brother and to-resemble brother nothing wonderful but
ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὦ μακάριε, ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν.
what-very I was-saying O blessed let-us-get-away from the gods

e HERM. τῶν γε τοιούτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει. περὶ
from-the at-least such O Socrates if you-wish about
τῶν τοιῶνδε δὲ τί σε κωλύει διελθεῖν, οἷον ἡλίου τε
the such but what you prevents to-go-through such-as sun both
καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καὶ γῆς καὶ αἰθέρος καὶ ἀέρος
and moon and stars and earth and aether and air
καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ;
and fire and water and seasons and year

SOC. συχνὰ μέν μοι προστάττεις, ὅμως δέ, εἴπερ σοι
many indeed to-me you-enjoin nevertheless but if-indeed to-you
κεχαρισμένον ἔσται, ἐθέλω.
gratifying it-will-be I-am-willing

HERM. καὶ μὴν χαριῇ.
and indeed you-will-gratify

SOC. τί δὴ οὖν πρῶτον βούλει; ἢ ὥσπερ εἶπες τὸν
what indeed then first do-you-wish or as you-said the
ἥλιον διέλθωμεν;
sun should-we-go-through

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἔοικε τοίνυν κατάδηλον γενόμενον ἂν μᾶλλον εἰ τῷ 409
it-seems then clear having-become — more if the
Δωρικῷ τις ὀνόματι χρῷτο — "ἅλιον" γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ
Doric one name should-use halios for call the
Δωριῆς — "ἅλιος" οὖν εἴη μὲν ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἁλίζειν
Dorians halios then would-be indeed — according-to the to-gather
εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπειδὰν ἀνατείλῃ, εἴη δ'
into the-same the men when it-rises it-would-be and
ἂν καὶ τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀεὶ εἱλεῖν ἰών, ἐοίκοι δ'
— also by-the about the earth always to-roll going it-would-seem and
ἂν καὶ ὅτι ποικίλλει ἰὼν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τῆς γῆς·
— also that it-variegates going the(-things) coming-to-be from the earth
τὸ δὲ ποικίλλειν καὶ αἰολεῖν ταὐτόν.
the and to-variegate and aiolein the-same

HERM. τί δὲ ἡ "σελήνη";
what and the moon

SOC. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν πιέζειν.
this and the name appears the Anaxagoras to-press

HERM. τί δή;
what indeed

SOC. ἔοικε δηλοῦντι παλαιότερον ὃ ἐκεῖνος νεωστὶ b
it-seems like-one-showing older what that-one recently
ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς.
was-saying that the moon from the sun has the light

HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed

SOC. τὸ μέν που "σέλας" καὶ τὸ "φῶς" ταὐτόν.
the indeed surely selas and the light the-same

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. νέον δέ που καὶ ἕνον ἀεί ἐστι περὶ τὴν σελήνην
new and surely and old always is about the moon
τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσιν·
this the light if-indeed true-things the Anaxagoreans say
κύκλῳ γάρ που ἀεὶ αὐτὴν περιὼν νέον ἀεὶ ἐπιβάλλει,
in-a-circle for surely always her going-around new always it-throws-on
ἕνον δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ τοῦ προτέρου μηνός.
old and belongs the of-the former month

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. "Σελαναίαν" δέ γε καλοῦσιν αὐτὴν πολλοί.
Selanaia and at-least call her many

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

c SOC. ὅτι δὲ σέλας νέον καὶ ἕνον ἔχει ἀεί, "Σελαενονεοάεια"
because and gleam new and old it-has always Selaenoneoaeia
μὲν δικαιότατ' ἂν ὀνομάτων καλοῖτο, συγκεκροτημένον
indeed most-justly — of-names would-be-called compressed
δὲ "Σελαναία" κέκληται.
but Selanaia it-has-been-called

HERM. διθυραμβῶδές γε τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
dithyrambic at-least this the-name O Socrates
ἀλλὰ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὰ ἄστρα πῶς λέγεις;
but the month and the stars how do-you-mean

SOC. ὁ μὲν "μεὶς" ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι εἴη ἂν "μείης"
the indeed meis from the to-be-diminished would-be — meiēs
ὀρθῶς κεκλημένος, τὰ δ' "ἄστρα" ἔοικε τῆς ἀστραπῆς
rightly called the and stars seem of-the lightning
ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ "ἀστραπή," ὅτι τὰ ὦπα
naming to-have the and lightning because the eyes

ἀναστρέφει, "ἀναστρωπὴ" ἂν εἴη, νῦν δὲ "ἀστραπὴ"
it-turns-up anastrōpē — would-be now but astrapē
καλλωπισθεῖσα κέκληται.
beautified has-been-called
HERM. τί δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ;
what and the fire and the water
SOC. τὸ "πῦρ" ἀπορῶ· καὶ κινδυνεύει ἤτοι ἡ τοῦ d
the fire I-am-at-a-loss-about and it-is-likely either the of-the
Εὐθύφρονός με μοῦσα ἐπιλελοιπέναι, ἢ τοῦτό τι
Euthyphro me muse to-have-failed or this something
παγχάλεπον εἶναι. σκέψαι οὖν ἣν εἰσάγω μηχανὴν ἐπὶ
very-difficult to-be examine then which I-introduce contrivance for
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἃ ἂν ἀπορῶ.
all the such-things which — I-should-be-at-a-loss-about
HERM. τίνα δή;
what indeed
SOC. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ἀπόκριναι γάρ μοι· ἔχοις ἂν
I to-you will-tell answer for to-me would-you-be-able —
εἰπεῖν πῦρ κατὰ τίνα τρόπον καλεῖται;
to-say fire according-to what way it-is-called
HERM. μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
by Zeus not I-at-least
SOC. σκέψαι δὴ ὃ ἐγὼ ὑποπτεύω περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ e
examine indeed what I suspect about it I-perceive for
ὅτι πολλὰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ὀνόματα ἄλλως τε καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ
that many the Greeks names especially both and the(-ones) under
τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰλήφασιν.
the barbarians dwelling from the barbarians have-taken
HERM. τί οὖν δή;
what then indeed

SOC. εἴ τις ζητοῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν
if someone should-seek these-things according-to the Greek tongue
ὡς εἰκότως κεῖται, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνην ἐξ ἧς
how reasonably they-are-set but not according-to that from which
τὸ ὄνομα τυγχάνει ὄν, οἶσθα ὅτι ἀποροῖ ἄν.
the name happens being you-know that he-would-be-at-a-loss —
HERM. εἰκότως γε.
reasonably at-least

410 SOC. ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὸ "πῦρ" μή τι
see then also this the name the fire lest something
βαρβαρικὸν ᾖ. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδιον προσάψαι ἐστὶν
barbarian it-be this for neither easy to-attach is
Ἑλληνικῇ φωνῇ, φανεροί τ' εἰσὶν οὕτως αὐτὸ καλοῦντες
to-Greek tongue evident both are so it calling
Φρύγες σμικρόν τι παρακλίνοντες· καὶ τό γε
Phrygians little something bending-aside and the at-least
"ὕδωρ" καὶ τὰς "κύνας" καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
water and the dogs and others many
HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

b SOC. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ταῦτα προσβιάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἔχοι γ'
not then one-must these-things to-force since could at-least
ἄν τις εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ
— someone to-say about them the indeed then fire and the water
ταύτῃ ἀπωθοῦμαι· ὁ δὲ δὴ ἀὴρ ἆρά γε, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες,
in-this-way I-push-away the and indeed air then at-least O Hermogenes
ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, "ἀὴρ" κέκληται; ἢ ὅτι
because it-raises the(-things) from the earth air has-been-called or because
ἀεὶ ῥεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέοντος;
always it-flows or because wind from it comes-to-be flowing
οἱ γὰρ ποιηταί που τὰ πνεύματα "ἀήτας" καλοῦσιν·
the for poets surely the winds aētai call

ἴσως οὖν λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι πνευματόρρουν,
perhaps then it-means as — if he-should-say wind-flowing
"ἀητόρρουν". τὸν δὲ αἰθέρα τῇδέ πῃ ὑπολαμβάνω,
aēt-flowing the and aether thus somehow I-take
ὅτι ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων "ἀειθεὴρ" δικαίως
because always it-runs about the air flowing aeitheēr justly
ἂν καλοῖτο. γῆ δὲ μᾶλλον σημαίνει ὃ βούλεται ἐάν
— would-be-called earth and more signifies what it-means if
τις "γαῖαν" ὀνομάσῃ· γαῖα γὰρ γεννήτειρα ἂν εἴη
someone gaia should-name gaia for begetter — would-be
ὀρθῶς κεκλημένη, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος· τὸ γὰρ "γεγάασιν"
rightly called as says Homer the for gegaasin
γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει. εἶεν· τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;
to-have-been-begotten he-means well what then to-us was the after this
HERM. ὧραι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ ἔτος.
seasons O Socrates and year and year
SOC. αἱ μὲν δὴ ὧραι Ἀττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον, d
the indeed indeed seasons in-Attic as the old must-be-said
εἴπερ βούλει τὸ εἰκὸς εἰδέναι· HOPAI γάρ εἰσι διὰ
if-indeed you-wish the likely to-know HORAI for they-are because-of
τὸ ὁρίζειν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς
the to-delimit winters both and summers and winds and the
καρποὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς· ὁρίζουσαι δὲ δικαίως ἂν "ὧραι"
fruits the from the earth delimiting and justly — horai
καλοῖντο. ἐνιαυτὸς δὲ καὶ ἔτος κινδυνεύει ἕν τι εἶναι. τὸ
would-be-called eniautos and also etos is-likely one something to-be the
γὰρ τὰ φυόμενα καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον
for the(-things) growing and the(-things) coming-to-be in turn each
προάγον εἰς φῶς καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐξετάζον, τοῦτο,
bringing-forward into light and itself in itself examining this
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα δίχα διῃρημένον
as in the former the of-the Zeus name in-two divided

οἱ μὲν Ζῆνα, οἱ δὲ Δία ἐκάλουν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα
the(-ones) indeed Zena the(-ones) and Dia called so also here
οἱ μὲν "ἐνιαυτόν," ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οἱ δὲ "ἔτος,"
the(-ones) indeed eniauton because in itself the(-ones) and etos
ὅτι ἐτάζει· ὁ δὲ ὅλος λόγος ἐστὶν τὸ "ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζον"
because it-examines the and whole phrase is the in itself examining
τοῦτο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἓν ὂν δίχα, ὥστε δύο ὀνόματα
this to-be-addressed one being in-two so-that two names
γεγονέναι, "ἐνιαυτόν" τε καὶ "ἔτος," ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου.
to-have-come-about eniauton both and etos from one phrase

HERM. ἀλλὰ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολὺ ἐπιδίδως.
but indeed O Socrates much you-advance

SOC. πόρρω ἤδη οἶμαι φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν.
far already I-think I-appear in-wisdom to-drive

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις.
soon more you-will-say

XIII · THE NAMES OF VIRTUE

Socrates thinks the namers were dizzy and saw all things whirling. So phronēsis *is the thought of motion,* noēsis *a longing for the new, and* sōphrosynē *the saving of wisdom;* epistēmē *follows things moving, and* sophia *touches motion. Justice passes through and governs all things, be it sun, fire, heat, or mind. Injustice hinders that passage, and* andreia *names the counterflow of battle.*

411 HERM. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἔγωγε ἡδέως ἂν
but after this the form I-at-least gladly —
θεασαίμην ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα τίνι ποτὲ ὀρθότητι
would-behold these the fine names by-what ever correctness

κεῖται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἷον "φρόνησίς" τε καὶ
are-set the(-ones) about the virtue such-as prudence both and
"σύνεσις" καὶ "δικαιοσύνη" καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα.
understanding and justice and the-others the such all
SOC. ἐγείρεις μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐ φαῦλον γένος ὀνομάτων· b
you-rouse indeed O comrade not trivial kind of-names
ὅμως δὲ ἐπειδήπερ τὴν λεοντῆν ἐνδέδυκα, οὐκ
nevertheless but since the lion-skin I-have-put-on not
ἀποδειλιατέον ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικε, φρόνησιν καὶ
one-must-lose-heart but one-must-examine as it-seems prudence and
σύνεσιν καὶ γνώμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ἃ
understanding and judgment and knowledge and the-others indeed which
φῂς πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα.
you-say all these the fine names
HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐ δεῖ ἡμᾶς προαποστῆναι.
certainly indeed then not one-must we to-stand-off-beforehand
SOC. καὶ μήν, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς c
and indeed by the dog I-seem at-least to-myself not badly
μαντεύεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐνενόησα, ὅτι οἱ πάνυ παλαιοὶ
to-divine what also just-now I-perceived that the very ancient
ἄνθρωποι οἱ τιθέμενοι τὰ ὀνόματα παντὸς μᾶλλον,
men the(-ones) setting the names of-all more
ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ὑπὸ
as also of-the(-men) now the many of-the wise through
τοῦ πυκνὰ περιστρέφεσθαι ζητοῦντες ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα
the often to-be-turned-around seeking how are the beings
εἰλιγγιῶσιν, κἄπειτα αὐτοῖς φαίνεται περιφέρεσθαι τὰ
become-dizzy and-then to-them appear to-be-carried-around the
πράγματα καὶ πάντως φέρεσθαι. αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ
things and in-every-way to-be-carried they-blame indeed not the
ἔνδον τὸ παρὰ σφίσιν πάθος αἴτιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς
within the among themselves condition cause to-be of-this the

δόξης, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, οὐδὲν
opinion but themselves the things so to-be-by-nature nothing
αὐτῶν μόνιμον εἶναι οὐδὲ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι
of-them abiding to-be nor stable but to-flow and to-be-carried
καὶ μεστὰ εἶναι πάσης φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ἀεί. λέγω
and full to-be of-all motion and of-becoming always I-say
δὴ ἐννοήσας πρὸς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ ὀνόματα.
indeed having-perceived with-regard-to all the(-ones) just-now names
HERM. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
how indeed this O Socrates
SOC. οὐ κατενόησας ἴσως τὰ ἄρτι λεγόμενα ὅτι
not you-perceived perhaps the(-things) just-now said that
παντάπασιν ὡς φερομένοις τε καὶ ῥέουσι καὶ γιγνομένοις
altogether as to-being-carried both and flowing and coming-to-be
τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίκειται.
the things the names are-set
HERM. οὐ πάνυ ἐνεθυμήθην.
not very I-considered
d SOC. καὶ μὴν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ὃ πρῶτον εἴπομεν
and indeed first indeed this which first we-said
παντάπασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τοιούτων ἐστίν.
altogether as for such is
HERM. τὸ ποῖον;
the what-sort
e SOC. ἡ "φρόνησις"· φορᾶς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις. εἴη
the prudence of-motion for is and of-flow intellection it-might-be
δ' ἂν καὶ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς· ἀλλ' οὖν περί γε τὸ
and — also benefit to-take of-motion but then about at-least the
φέρεσθαί ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ "γνώμη" παντάπασιν δηλοῖ
to-be-carried it-is if and you-wish the judgment altogether shows
γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ νώμησιν· τὸ γὰρ "νωμᾶν" καὶ τὸ
of-begetting consideration and scanning the for to-scan and the

"σκοπεῖν" ταὐτόν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ "νόησις" τοῦ νέου
to-examine the-same if and you-wish itself the intellection of-the new
ἐστὶν ἔσις, τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει γιγνόμενα
is besis the and new to-be the beings signifies coming-to-be
ἀεὶ εἶναι· τούτου οὖν ἐφίεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ ὄνομα
always to-be this then to-desire the soul reveals the name
ὁ θέμενος τὴν "νεόεσιν." οὐ γὰρ "νόησις" τὸ ἀρχαῖον
the(-one) having-set the neoesis not for noēsis the ancient
ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦτα εἶ ἔδει λέγειν δύο, "νοέεσιν."
was-called but instead-of the eta ei one-had to-say two noeesis
"σωφροσύνη" δὲ σωτηρία οὗ νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, 412
moderation and preservation of-what just-now we-have-examined
φρονήσεως. καὶ μὴν ἥ γε ἐπιστήμη μηνύει ὡς
of-prudence and indeed the at-least knowledge reveals as
φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἑπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
being-carried the things following the soul the
ἀξίας λόγου, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολειπομένης οὔτε προθεούσης·
worthy of-account and neither left-behind nor running-ahead
διὸ δὴ ἐμβάλλοντας δεῖ τὸ εἶ "ἐπεϊστήμην"
wherefore indeed inserting one-must the ei hepeistēmē
αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν. "σύνεσις" δ' αὖ οὕτω μὲν δόξειεν
it to-name understanding and in-turn so indeed would-seem
ἂν ὥσπερ συλλογισμὸς εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ συνιέναι λέγῃ,
— like reckoning-together to-be whenever and to-understand one-says
ταὐτὸν παντάπασιν τῷ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει λεγόμενον·
the-same altogether to-the to-know it-happens being-said
συμπορεύεσθαι γὰρ λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ
to-go-along-with for it-means the soul with-the things the
"συνιέναι." ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε "σοφία" φορᾶς ἐφάπτεσθαι
to-understand but indeed the at-least wisdom of-motion to-lay-hold-of
σημαίνει. σκοτωδέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξενικώτερον· ἀλλὰ
signifies more-obscure and this and more-foreign but

δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὅτι πολλαχοῦ
one-must from the poets to-recall that in-many-places
λέγουσιν περὶ ὅτου ἂν τύχωσιν τῶν ἀρχομένων
they-say about whatever — they-chance of-the(-things) beginning
ταχὺ προϊέναι "ἐσύθη" φασίν. Λακωνικῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ τῶν
quickly to-go-forward esythē they-say to-a-Laconian and man of-the
εὐδοκίμων καὶ ὄνομα ἦν "Σοῦς"· τὴν γὰρ ταχεῖαν ὁρμὴν
reputable also name was Sous the for quick impulse
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτο καλοῦσιν. ταύτης οὖν τῆς φορᾶς
the Lacedaemonians this call of-this then the motion
ἐπαφὴν σημαίνει ἡ σοφία, ὡς φερομένων τῶν ὄντων. καὶ
touching signifies the wisdom as being-carried the beings and
μὴν τό γε "ἀγαθόν," τοῦτο τῆς φύσεως πάσης τῷ
indeed the at-least good this of-the nature all to-the
ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πορεύεται
admirable means the name to-be-set since for go
τὰ ὄντα, ἔνι μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοῖς τάχος, ἔνι δὲ βραδυτής. ἔστιν
the beings is-in indeed then in-them speed is-in and slowness is
οὖν οὐ πᾶν τὸ ταχὺ ἀλλὰ τὶ αὐτοῦ ἀγαστόν. τοῦ θοοῦ
then not all the quick but something of-it admirable of-the swift
δὴ τῷ ἀγαστῷ αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστίν, "τἀγαθόν."
indeed to-the admirable this the naming is the-good
d "δικαιοσύνη" δέ, ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει
justice and that indeed on the of-the just understanding
τοῦτο κεῖται τὸ ὄνομα, ῥᾴδιον συμβαλεῖν· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ
this is-set the name easy to-conjecture it but the
"δίκαιον" χαλεπόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔοικε μέχρι μέν του
just difficult and for indeed also it-seems up-to indeed a-point
ὁμολογεῖσθαι παρὰ πολλῶν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι.
to-be-agreed by many then and to-be-disputed
ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν
as-many-as for consider the all to-be in motion the indeed

πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον
great-part of-it they-suppose such something to-be such-as
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι
nothing other than to-move through but of-this all to-be something
διεξιόν, δι᾽ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι
going-through through which all the(-things) coming-to-be to-come-to-be to-be
δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι
and swiftest this and finest not for — to-be-able
ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε
otherwise through of-the being to-go all if not finest both
ἦν ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον ὥστε χρῆσθαι
it-were so-as it nothing to-keep-out and swiftest so-as to-use
ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα
as standing the others since and then it-governs the others
πάντα διαϊόν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς "δίκαιον,"
all going-through this the name was-called rightly dikaion
εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κάππα δύναμιν προσλαβόν.
of-euphony for-the-sake the of-the kappa power taking-in-addition
μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν 413
up-to indeed then here what just-now we-were-saying by many
ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες,
is-agreed this to-be the just I but O Hermogenes
ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα
inasmuch-as persistent being about it these-things indeed all
διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
I-have-found-out in secrets that this is the just and the
αἴτιον — δι᾽ ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον —
cause because-of which for it-comes-to-be this is the cause
καὶ "Δία" καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα.
and Dia to-call said someone this rightly to-be for these-things
ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἠρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν
when and gently them I-question-again having-heard these-things nothing

ἧττον· "τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
less what then ever is O best just if this so
ἔχει;" δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν
is I-seem both already longer than-the befitting to-ask
καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἅλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι
and beyond the dug-marks to-leap sufficiently for me they-say
πεπύσθαι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσιν, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με,
to-have-learned and they-attempt wishing to-fill-up me
ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν
other other-things already to-say and no-longer they-agree the indeed
γὰρ τίς φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ
for one says this to-be just the sun this for
μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν
alone going-through and burning to-govern the beings when
οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἅσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς,
then to-someone I-say it gladly as fine something having-heard
καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον
laughs-at me this-one having-heard and asks if nothing just
οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ.
I-think to-be among the men when the sun sets
d λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅτι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει αὐτό, τὸ
persisting then me what in-turn that-one says it the
πῦρ φησιν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ οὐκ
fire he-says this but not easy is to-know the and not
αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησιν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ
itself the fire says but itself the hot the in the fire
ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησιν, εἶναι
being-in the and of-these indeed all to-laugh-at he-says to-be
δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο·
but the just what says Anaxagoras mind to-be this
αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον
self-ruling for it being and with-nothing mixed

πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων
all-things he-says it to-order the things through all
ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ
going here indeed I O friend much in greater perplexity
εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὅτι
am than before to-attempt to-learn about the just what
ποτ᾽ ἔστιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα ἐσκοποῦμεν, τό
ever it-is but then of-which-very for-the-sake we-were-examining the
γε ὄνομα τοῦτο φαίνεται αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα κεῖσθαι.
at-least name this appears to-it because-of these-things to-be-set
HERM. φαίνῃ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα μὲν ἀκηκοέναι
you-appear to-me O Socrates these-things indeed to-have-heard
του καὶ οὐκ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν.
from-someone and not to-improvise
SOC. τί δὲ τἆλλα;
what and the-others
HERM. οὐ πάνυ.
not very
SOC. ἄκουε δή· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα e
listen indeed perhaps for — you also the remaining
ἐξαπατήσαιμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω. μετὰ γὰρ δικαιοσύνην
I-might-deceive as not having-heard I-speak after for justice
τί ἡμῖν λείπεται; ἀνδρείαν οἶμαι οὔπω διήλθομεν. ἀδικία
what to-us remains courage I-think not-yet we-went-through injustice
μὲν γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ὄντος ἐμπόδισμα τοῦ διαϊόντος,
indeed for clear that is of-being hindrance of-the going-through
ἀνδρεία δὲ σημαίνει ὡς ἐν μάχῃ ἐπονομαζομένης τῆς
courage and signifies as in battle being-named the
ἀνδρείας — μάχην δ᾽ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἴπερ ῥεῖ,
courage battle and to-be in the being if-indeed it-flows
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν ῥοήν — ἐὰν οὖν τις
not other anything than the contrary flow if then someone

ἐξέλῃ τὸ δέλτα τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀνδρείας, αὐτὸ
should-take-out the delta of-the name of-the courage itself
μηνύει τὸ ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἡ "ἀνρεία."
reveals the work the name the anreia

XIV · ART, VICE, AND VIRTUE

Courage is not every counterflow, but the one against injustice. Male and man name the upward flow, woman birth, the female the nipple, and thallein *youth's sudden growth.* Technē *is the holding of mind; when Hermogenes finds that strained, Socrates blames letters added for euphony and asks for moderation.* Mēchanē *is great achievement.* Kakia *is going badly, as cowardice shows;* aretē *is the unchecked flow of a good soul, and it stands if* kakia *does.*

414 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ ῥοῇ ἡ ἐναντία ῥοὴ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν,
clear then that not to-every flow the contrary flow courage is
ἀλλὰ τῇ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ῥεούσῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῃνεῖτο
but to-the contrary-to the just flowing not for — would-be-praised
ἡ ἀνδρεία. καὶ τὸ "ἄρρεν" καὶ ὁ "ἀνὴρ" ἐπὶ παραπλησίῳ
the courage and the male and the man for similar
τινὶ τούτῳ ἐστί, τῇ ἄνῳ ῥοῇ. "γυνὴ" δὲ γονή μοι
something this is to-the upward flow woman and birth to-me
φαίνεται βούλεσθαι εἶναι. τὸ δὲ "θῆλυ" ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς
appears to-mean to-be the and female from the nipple
τι φαίνεται ἐπωνομάσθαι· ἡ δὲ "θηλὴ" ἆρά γε, ὦ
somehow appears to-have-been-named the and nipple then at-least O
Ἑρμόγενες, ὅτι τεθηλέναι ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀρδόμενα;
Hermogenes because to-flourish it-makes as the(-things) being-watered
HERM. ἔοικέν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
it-seems at-least O Socrates

SOC. καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ "θάλλειν" τὴν αὔξην b
and indeed itself at-least the to-flourish the growth
μοι δοκεῖ ἀπεικάζειν τὴν τῶν νέων, ὅτι ταχεῖα καὶ
to-me seems to-liken the of-the young because quick and
ἐξαιφνιδία γίγνεται. οἷόνπερ οὖν μεμίμηται τῷ ὀνόματι,
sudden it-becomes what-very then he-imitated with-the name
συναρμόσας ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν καὶ ἅλλεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ'
having-fitted-together from the to-run and to-leap the name but
οὐ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖς με ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον
not for you-watch me as outside the-course being-carried
ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι· ἐπίλοιπα δὲ ἡμῖν ἔτι συχνὰ
when smooth-ground I-lay-hold-of remaining and to-us still many
τῶν δοκούντων σπουδαίων εἶναι.
of-the(-things) seeming serious to-be
HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
SOC. ὧν γ' ἔστιν ἓν καὶ "τέχνην" ἰδεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ
of-which at-least is one also art to-see what ever
βούλεται εἶναι.
it-means to-be
HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then
SOC. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἕξιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν ταῦ c
therefore this at-least having of-mind signifies the indeed tau
ἀφελόντι, ἐμβαλόντι δὲ οὖ μεταξὺ τοῦ χεῖ καὶ τοῦ
for-one-having-removed for-one-inserting and o between the chi and the
νῦ καὶ τοῦ νῦ καὶ τοῦ ἦτα;
nu and the nu and the eta
HERM. καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
and very at-least with-difficulty O Socrates

d SOC. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τεθέντα
O blessed not you-know that the first names having-been-set
κατακέχωσται ἤδη ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τραγῳδεῖν
have-been-buried already by the(-ones) wishing to-make-tragic
αὐτά, περιτιθέντων γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιρούντων εὐστομίας
them putting-around letters and taking-out of-euphony
ἕνεκα καὶ πανταχῇ στρεφόντων, καὶ ὑπὸ καλλωπισμοῦ
for-the-sake and everywhere twisting and by beautification
καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνου. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ "κατόπτρῳ" οὐ δοκεῖ ἄτοπον
and by time since in the katoptrō not seems strange
εἶναι τὸ ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τὸ ῥῶ; ἀλλὰ τοιαῦτα οἶμαι ποιοῦσιν
to-be the to-have-been-inserted the rho but such-things I-think do
οἱ τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζοντες, τὸ δὲ στόμα
the(-ones) of-the indeed truth nothing caring the but mouth
πλάττοντες, ὥστ' ἐπεμβάλλοντες πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα
molding so-that inserting many-things on the first
ὀνόματα τελευτῶντες ποιοῦσιν μηδ' ἂν ἕνα ἀνθρώπων
names in-the-end they-make not-even — one of-men
συνεῖναι ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα· ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν
to-understand what ever means the name as also the
Σφίγγα ἀντὶ "φικὸς" "σφίγγα" καλοῦσιν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
Sphinx instead-of phix sphinx they-call and others many
HERM. ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
these-things indeed are so O Socrates
SOC. εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἐάσει καὶ ἐντιθέναι καὶ ἐξαιρεῖν ἅττ'
if and in-turn someone will-allow both to-put-in and to-take-out whatever
ἂν βούληταί τις εἰς τὰ ὀνόματα, πολλὴ εὐπορία ἔσται
— one-wishes one into the names great abundance will-be
καὶ πᾶν ἂν παντί τις ὄνομα πράγματι προσαρμόσειεν.
and every — to-every one name thing would-fit
e HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

SOC. ἀληθῆ μέντοι. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέτριον οἶμαι δεῖ φυλάττειν
true-things however but the moderate I-think one-must to-guard
καὶ τὸ εἰκὸς σὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιστάτην.
and the likely you the wise supervisor
HERM. βουλοίμην ἄν.
I-would-wish —
SOC. καὶ ἐγώ σοι συμβούλομαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἀλλὰ 415
also I to-you wish-with O Hermogenes but
μὴ λίαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀκριβολογοῦ, "μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς
not too-much O divine-sir be-precise lest me you-unman
μένεος." ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὧν εἴρηκα,
of-strength I-come for to the summit of-what I-have-said
ἐπειδὰν μετὰ τέχνην μηχανὴν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. "μηχανὴ"
when after art contrivance we-examine mēchanē
γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦ ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολὺ σημεῖον εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ
for to-me seems of-the anein toward much sign to-be the for
"μῆκός" πως τὸ πολὺ σημαίνει· ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὖν τούτοιν
length somehow the much signifies from both then these
σύγκειται, "μήκους" τε καὶ τοῦ "ἄνειν," τὸ ὄνομα ἡ
is-composed of-length both and of-the anein the name the
"μηχανή." ἀλλ', ὅπερ νυνδὴ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν
mēchanē but what-very just-now I-said to the summit
δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν· "ἀρετὴ" γὰρ καὶ
one-must of-the(-things) said to-come aretē for and
"κακία" ὅτι βούλεται τὰ ὀνόματα ζητητέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν
kakia what mean the names must-be-sought the indeed then
ἕτερον οὔπω καθορῶ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον δοκεῖ μοι κατάδηλον
one not-yet I-discern the but other seems to-me evident
εἶναι. συμφωνεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πᾶσιν. ἅτε γὰρ
to-be it-agrees for with-the former all inasmuch-as for
ἰόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, πᾶν τὸ κακῶς ἰὸν "κακία" ἂν
going the things all the badly going kakia —

εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ὅταν ἐν ψυχῇ ᾖ, τὸ κακῶς ἰέναι
would-be this and whenever in soul should-be the badly to-go
ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα, μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει
toward the things most the of-the whole naming has
τῆς κακίας. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἰέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, δοκεῖ μοι
of-the vice the and badly to-go what ever it-is seems to-me
δηλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ "δειλίᾳ," ᾗ οὔπω διήλθομεν ἀλλ'
to-show also in the cowardice which not-yet we-went-through but
ὑπερέβημεν, δέον αὐτὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν σκέψασθαι·
we-passed-over being-necessary it after the courage to-examine
δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑπερβεβηκέναι.
we-seem and to-me also others many to-have-passed-over
d ἡ δ' οὖν δειλία τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνει δεσμὸν εἶναι ἰσχυρόν·
the and then cowardice of-the soul signifies bond to-be strong
τὸ γὰρ "λίαν" ἰσχύς τίς ἐστιν. δεσμὸς οὖν ὁ λίαν καὶ ὁ
the for lian strength some is bond then the excessive and the
μέγιστος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δειλία ἂν εἴη· ὥσπερ γε καὶ
greatest of-the soul the cowardice — would-be as at-least also
ἡ ἀπορία κακόν, καὶ πᾶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ἂν ἐμποδὼν
the perplexity evil and every-thing as it-seems which — in-the-way
ᾖ τῷ ἰέναι καὶ πορεύεσθαι. τοῦτ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ
should-be to-the to-go and to-travel this then appears the
κακῶς ἰέναι δηλοῦν, τὸ ἰσχομένως τε καὶ ἐμποδιζομένως
badly to-go to-show the with-restraint both and with-hindrance
πορεύεσθαι, ᾗ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ, κακίᾳ μεστὴ
to-travel which indeed soul whenever it-has of-vice full
γίγνεται. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοιούτοις ἡ "κακία" ἐστὶν τοὔνομα,
becomes if and for such-things the kakia is the-name
τοὐναντίον τούτου ἡ "ἀρετὴ" ἂν εἴη, σημαῖνον πρῶτον
the-opposite of-this the aretē — would-be signifying first
μὲν εὐπορίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ λελυμένην τὴν ῥοὴν τῆς ἀγαθῆς
indeed easy-passage then and loosed the flow of-the good

ψυχῆς εἶναι ἀεί, ὥστε τὸ ἀσχέτως καὶ τὸ ἀκωλύτως ἀεὶ
soul to-be always so-as the unchecked and the unhindered always
ῥέον ἐπωνυμίαν εἴληφεν, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦτο τοὔνομα, ὃ
flowing naming has-taken as it-seems this the-name which
ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔχει "ἀειρείτην" καλεῖν, συγκεκρότηται δὲ καὶ
rightly indeed is aeireitē to-call it-has-been-compressed but and
καλεῖται "ἀρετή." καὶ ἴσως με αὖ φήσεις πλάττειν·
is-called aretē and perhaps me in-turn you-will-say to-fabricate
ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἴπερ ὃ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἡ
I but say if-indeed what before I-said rightly is the
"κακία," καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν "ἀρετὴν" ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
kakia also this the name the aretē rightly to-be

XV · BAD, SHAMEFUL, AND BEAUTIFUL

Kakon *may be a foreign word.* Aischron*, the shameful, is what always holds back flow, and* kalon*, the fine or beautiful, is the thought that calls things by name, and so a work of mind. The advantageous moves with things, the gainful mixes with all, the profitable looses motion from any end, and the beneficial makes grow. The harmful binds the flow, so that its namer should have called it* boulapteroun*, and Hermogenes says Socrates has piped a prelude to Athena's hymn.*

HERM. τὸ δὲ δὴ "κακόν," δι' οὗ πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν 416
the and indeed evil through which many of-the former
εἴρηκας, τί ἂν νοοῖ τοὔνομα;
you-have-said what — might-mean the-name
SOC. ἄτοπόν τι νὴ Δία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ χαλεπὸν
strange something by Zeus to-me-at-least seems and difficult
συμβαλεῖν. ἐπάγω οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἐκείνην τὴν μηχανήν.
to-conjecture I-bring-on then also to-this that the contrivance
HERM. ποίαν ταύτην;
what-sort this

SOC. τὴν τοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι καὶ τοῦτο φάναι εἶναι.
the of-the barbarian something also this to-say to-be
HERM. καὶ ἔοικάς γε ὀρθῶς λέγοντι. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ,
and you-seem at-least rightly speaking but if it-seems-good
ταῦτα μὲν ἐῶμεν, τὸ δὲ "καλὸν" καὶ "αἰσχρὸν"
these-things indeed let-us-let-go the and fine and shameful
πειρώμεθα ἰδεῖν πῇ εὐλόγως ἔχει.
let-us-try to-see how reasonably they-are
b SOC. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν "αἰσχρὸν" καὶ δὴ κατάδηλόν μοι
the indeed then aischron also indeed evident to-me
φαίνεται ὃ νοεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
appears what it-means also this for with-the former
ὁμολογεῖται. τὸ γὰρ ἐμποδίζον καὶ ἴσχον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα
is-agreed the for hindering and holding of-the flow the beings
λοιδορεῖν μοι φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθείς,
to-revile to-me appears through all the(-one) the names setting
καὶ νῦν τῷ ἀεὶ ἴσχοντι τὸν ῥοῦν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔθετο τὸ
and now to-the always holding the flow this the name he-set the
"ἀεισχοροῦν"· νῦν δὲ συγκροτήσαντες "αἰσχρὸν" καλοῦσιν.
aeischoroun now but compressing aischron they-call
HERM. τί δὲ τὸ "καλόν";
what and the fine
SOC. τοῦτο χαλεπώτερον κατανοῆσαι. καίτοι λέγει γε
this more-difficult to-understand and-yet says at-least
αὐτό· ἁρμονίᾳ μόνον καὶ μήκει τοῦ οὗ παρῆκται.
it with-harmony only and with-length of-the o it-has-been-altered
HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed
SOC. τῆς διανοίας τις ἔοικεν ἐπωνυμία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ
of-the thought some it-seems naming to-be this the
ὄνομα.
name

HERM. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean

SOC. φέρε, τί οἴει σὺ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον κληθῆναι ἑκάστῳ c
come what think you to-be the cause to-be-called for-each
τῶν ὄντων; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα θέμενον;
of-the beings then not that the the names having-set

HERM. πάντως που.
altogether surely

SOC. οὐκοῦν διάνοια ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἤτοι θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων
therefore thought — would-be this either of-gods or of-men
ἢ ἀμφότερα;
or both

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ καλέσαν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ καλοῦν
therefore the having-called the things and the calling
ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο, διάνοια;
the-same is this thought

HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσα μὲν ἂν νοῦς τε καὶ διάνοια
therefore also as-many-as indeed — mind both and thought
ἐργάσηται, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἐπαινετά, ἃ δὲ μή, ψεκτά;
should-work-out these are the praiseworthy what but not blameworthy

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τὸ οὖν ἰατρικὸν ἰατρικὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν d
the then medical medical-things works and the carpentry
τεκτονικά; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
carpentry-things or how do-you-mean

HERM. οὕτως ἔγωγε.
so I-at-least

SOC. καὶ τὸ καλοῦν ἄρα καλά;
and the calling then fine-things

HERM. δεῖ γέ τοι.
it-must at-least surely

SOC. ἔστι δέ γε τοῦτο, ὥς φαμεν, διάνοια;
is and at-least this as we-say thought

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ὀρθῶς ἄρα φρονήσεως αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία ἐστὶν τὸ
rightly then of-prudence this the naming is the
"καλὸν" τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζομένης, ἃ δὴ καλὰ
fine of-the the such-things working-out which indeed fine
φάσκοντες εἶναι ἀσπαζόμεθα.
saying to-be we-welcome

HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears

e SOC. τί οὖν ἔτι ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῶν τοιούτων;
what then still for-us remaining of-the such-things

417 HERM. ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν,
these the(-ones) about the good both and fine
συμφέροντά τε καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ ὠφέλιμα καὶ
advantageous both and profitable and beneficial and
κερδαλέα καὶ τἀναντία τούτων.
gainful and the-opposites of-these

b SOC. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν "συμφέρον" ἤδη που κἂν σὺ εὕροις ἐκ
therefore the indeed advantageous already surely even you could-find from
τῶν πρότερον ἐπισκοπῶν· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἀδελφόν τι
the former examining of-the for knowledge sibling something
φαίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο δηλοῖ ἢ τὴν ἅμα φορὰν τῆς
it-appears nothing for other shows than the together motion of-the
ψυχῆς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου
soul with the things and the(-things) by the such

πραττόμενα "συμφέροντά" τε καὶ "σύμφορα" κεκλῆσθαι
done advantageous both and expedient to-have-been-called
ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπεριφέρεσθαι ἔοικε, τὸ δέ γε "κερδαλέον"
from the to-be-carried-around-together it-seems the and at-least gainful
ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους. "κέρδος" δὲ νῦ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέλτα ἀποδιδόντι
from the gain kerdos and nu instead-of the delta for-one-restoring
ἐς τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κατ' ἄλλον
into the name shows what it-means the for good in other
τρόπον ὀνομάζει. ὅτι γὰρ κεράννυται ἐς πάντα διεξιόν,
way it-names because for it-is-mixed into all going-through
ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπονομάζων ἔθετο τοὔνομα·
this of-it the power naming he-set the-name
δέλτα δ' ἐνθεὶς ἀντὶ τοῦ νῦ "κέρδος" ἐφθέγξατο.
delta and having-put-in instead-of the nu kerdos uttered
HERM. "Λυσιτελοῦν" δὲ τί δή;
Profitable and what indeed
SOC. ἔοικεν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, οὐχὶ καθάπερ οἱ κάπηλοι αὐτῷ c
it-seems O Hermogenes not as the retailers it
χρῶνται, ἐὰν τὸ ἀνάλωμα ἀπολύῃ, οὐ ταύτῃ λέγειν μοι
use if the outlay it-pays-off not in-this-way to-mean to-me
δοκεῖ τὸ "λυσιτελοῦν," ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστον ὂν τοῦ ὄντος
seems the lysiteloun but because swiftest being of-the being
ἵστασθαι οὐκ ἐᾷ τὰ πράγματα, οὐδὲ τέλος λαβοῦσαν
to-stand not it-allows the things nor end having-taken
τὴν φορὰν τοῦ φέρεσθαι στῆναί τε καὶ παύσασθαι, ἀλλ'
the motion of-the to-be-carried to-stand both and to-cease but
ἀεὶ λύει αὐτῆς ἄν τι ἐπιχειρῇ τέλος ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
always it-looses of-it if something should-attempt end to-come-to-be-in
καὶ παρέχει ἄπαυστον καὶ ἀθάνατον αὐτήν, ταύτῃ μοι
and makes unceasing and undying it in-this-way to-me
δοκεῖ ἐπιφημίσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν λυσιτελοῦν· τὸ γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς
seems to-name the good lysiteloun the for of-the motion

λύον τὸ τέλος "λυσιτελοῦν" καλέσαι. "ὠφέλιμον" δὲ
loosing the end lysiteloun to-call ōphelimon and
ξενικὸν τοὔνομα, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ κέχρηται, τῷ
foreign the-name which also Homer in-many-places has-used the
"ὀφέλλειν"· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ αὔξειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπωνυμία.
ophellein is and this of-the to-increase and to-make naming

d HERM. τὰ δὲ δὴ τούτων ἐναντία πῶς ἔχει ἡμῖν;
the and indeed of-these opposites how are for-us

SOC. ὅσα μὲν ἀπόφησιν αὐτῶν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ,
as-many-as indeed denial them as at-least to-me it-seems
οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτα διεξιέναι.
nothing one-must these-things to-go-through

HERM. ποῖα ταῦτα;
what-sort these

SOC. "ἀσύμφορον" καὶ "ἀνωφελὲς" καὶ "ἀλυσιτελὲς" καὶ
inexpedient and unbeneficial and unprofitable and
"ἀκερδές."
ungainful

HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say

SOC. ἀλλὰ "βλαβερόν" γε καὶ "ζημιῶδες."
but harmful at-least and hurtful

HERM. ναί.
yes

e SOC. καὶ τὸ μέν γε "βλαβερὸν" τὸ βλάπτον τὸν ῥοῦν
and the indeed at-least harmful the harming the flow
εἶναι λέγει· τὸ δὲ "βλάπτον" αὖ σημαίνει βουλόμενον
to-be it-means the and harming in-turn signifies wishing
ἅπτειν· τὸ δὲ "ἅπτειν" καὶ δεῖν ταὐτόν ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ
to-fasten the and to-fasten and to-bind the-same is this and
πανταχοῦ ψέγει. τὸ βουλόμενον οὖν ἅπτειν ῥοῦν ὀρθότατα
everywhere it-blames the wishing then to-fasten flow most-rightly

μὲν ἂν εἴη "βουλαπτεροῦν," καλλωπισθὲν δὲ καλεῖσθαί
indeed — would-be boulapteroun beautified and to-be-called
μοι φαίνεται "βλαβερόν."
to-me appears blaberon

HERM. ποικίλα γέ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκβαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα. 418
varied at-least to-you O Socrates turn-out the names
καὶ γὰρ νῦν μοι ἔδοξας ὥσπερ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηνάας νόμου
and for now to-me you-seemed as of-the of-the Athena hymn
προαύλιον στομαυλῆσαι, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα προειπὼν τὸ
prelude to-pipe-with-the-mouth this the name pronouncing the
"βουλαπτεροῦν."
boulapteroun

XVI · OLD LETTERS AND PLEASURES

The namers are to blame, not Socrates. Old speech used iota and delta where newer speech has epsilon or eta and zeta, as day and yoke show; in the old letters the needful means passing through, and the hurtful binding what goes. Pleasure is named from benefit, pain from the body's dissolution, joy from the soul's free flow, and longing and love from flowing. Opinion comes from pursuit or the bow's shot, the voluntary yields to what goes, and necessity is named from the hard going through ravines.

SOC. οὐκ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, αἴτιος, ἀλλ' οἱ θέμενοι
not I O Hermogenes cause but the(-ones) having-set
τὸ ὄνομα.
the name

HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ "ζημιῶδες" τί ἂν
true-things you-say but indeed the hurtful what —
εἴη;
might-be

b SOC. τί δ' ἂν εἴη ποτὲ "ζημιῶδες"; θέασαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες,
what and — might-be ever hurtful behold O Hermogenes
ὡς ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω λέγων ὅτι προστιθέντες γράμματα καὶ
how I true-things say saying that adding letters and
ἐξαιροῦντες σφόδρα ἀλλοιοῦσι τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοίας,
taking-out greatly they-alter the of-the names meanings
οὕτως ὥστε σμικρὰ πάνυ παραστρέφοντες ἐνίοτε τἀναντία
so so-as small very twisting sometimes the-opposite
ποιεῖν σημαίνειν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῷ "δέοντι"· ἐνενόησα γὰρ αὐτὸ
to-make to-signify such-as also in the needful I-perceived for it
καὶ ἀνεμνήσθην ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὃ ἔμελλόν σοι ἐρεῖν ὅτι ἡ
and I-recalled just-now from this which I-was-going to-you to-say that the
μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἡ καλὴ αὕτηι καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέτρεψε
indeed new tongue our the fine this-here also the-opposite turned-round
μηνύειν τὸ "δέον" καὶ τὸ "ζημιῶδες," ἀφανίζουσα ὅτι
to-reveal the needful and the hurtful obscuring what
νοεῖ, ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ ἀμφότερον δηλοῖ ὃ βούλεται τοὔνομα.
it-means the but old both shows what means the-name
HERM. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean

c SOC. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῷ
I to-you will-tell you-know that the ancients the our(-people) the
ἰῶτα καὶ τῷ δέλτα εὖ μάλα ἐχρῶντο, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα αἱ
iota and the delta well very used and not least the
γυναῖκες, αἵπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι. νῦν
women who-very most the ancient tongue preserve now
δὲ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰῶτα ἢ εἶ ἢ ἦτα μεταστρέφουσιν,
but instead-of indeed the iota either ei or eta they-turn
ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δέλτα ζῆτα, ὡς δὴ μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα.
instead-of and the delta zeta as indeed more-magnificent being
HERM. πῶς δή;
how indeed

SOC. οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότατοι "ἱμέραν" τὴν ἡμέραν
such-as the indeed most-ancient himera the day
ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ "ἑμέραν," οἱ δὲ νῦν "ἡμέραν."
called the(-ones) and hemera the(-ones) and now hēmera

HERM. ἔστι ταῦτα.
it-is these-things

SOC. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τούτων δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον d
you-know then that alone of-these shows the ancient
ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου; ὅτι γὰρ ἁσμένοις
name the thought of-the having-set because for to-glad
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἱμείρουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σκότους τὸ φῶς
the men and longing out-of the darkness the light
ἐγίγνετο, ταύτῃ ὠνόμασαν "ἱμέραν."
came-to-be in-this-way they-named himera

HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. νῦν δέ γε τετραγῳδημένον οὐδ' ἂν κατανοήσαις
now but at-least made-tragic not-even — would-you-understand
ὅτι βούλεται ἡ "ἡμέρα." καίτοι τινὲς οἴονται, ὡς δὴ ἡ
what means the hēmera and-yet some think that indeed the
ἡμέρα ἥμερα ποιεῖ, διὰ ταῦτα ὠνομάσθαι αὐτὴν οὕτως.
day gentle makes for these-things to-have-been-named it so

HERM. δοκεῖ μοι.
it-seems to-me

SOC. καὶ τό γε "ζυγὸν" οἶσθα ὅτι "δυογὸν" οἱ παλαιοὶ
and the at-least zygon you-know that dyogon the ancients
ἐκάλουν.
called

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

e SOC. καὶ τὸ μέν γε "ζυγὸν" οὐδὲν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν
and the indeed at-least zygon nothing shows the but of-the two
ἕνεκα τῆς δέσεως ἐς τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπωνόμασται "δυογὸν"
for-the-sake of-the binding into the drawing has-been-named dyogon
δικαίως· νῦν δὲ "ζυγόν." καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα οὕτως ἔχει.
justly now but zygon and others very-many so are
HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears
SOC. κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ "δέον" οὕτω
according-to the-same then first indeed the deon so
λεγόμενον τοὐναντίον σημαίνει πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
said the-opposite signifies to-all the about the good
ὀνόμασιν· ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμὸς
names of-good for form being the deon appears bond
εἶναι καὶ κώλυμα φορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸν ὂν τοῦ βλαβεροῦ.
to-be and hindrance of-motion as sibling being of-the harmful
HERM. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω φαίνεται.
and very O Socrates so it-appears
419 SOC. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐὰν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ὀνόματι χρῇ, ὃ πολὺ μᾶλλον
but not if the ancient name you-use which much more
εἰκός ἐστιν ὀρθῶς κεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογήσει τοῖς
likely is rightly to-be-set than the now but it-will-agree with-the
πρόσθεν ἀγαθοῖς, ἐὰν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶ τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς,
former good-things if instead-of the ei the iota you-restore
ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν· διῖὸν γὰρ αὖ σημαίνει, ἀλλ' οὐ δέον,
as the old diion for in-turn it-signifies but not deon
τἀγαθόν, ὅπερ δὴ ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ οὕτω οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται
the-good which-very indeed he-praises and so not is-opposed
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ "δέον"
himself to-himself the(-one) the names setting but deon
καὶ "ὠφέλιμον" καὶ "λυσιτελοῦν" καὶ "κερδαλέον" καὶ
and beneficial and profitable and gainful and

"ἀγαθὸν" καὶ "συμφέρον" καὶ "εὔπορον" τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται,
good and advantageous and easy-passing the same appears
ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι σημαῖνον τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰὸν πανταχοῦ
with-other names signifying the ordering and going everywhere
ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἴσχον καὶ δοῦν ψεγόμενον. καὶ
praised the and holding and binding being-blamed and
δὴ καὶ τὸ "ζημιῶδες," ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν
indeed also the zēmiōdes if according-to the ancient tongue
ἀποδῷς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φανεῖταί σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ
you-restore instead-of the zeta delta it-will-appear to-you to-be-set the
ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν, ἐπονομασθὲν "δημιῶδες."
name on the binding the going named dēmiōdes
HERM. τί δὲ δὴ "ἡδονὴ" καὶ "λύπη" καὶ "ἐπιθυμία"
what and indeed pleasure and pain and desire
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
and the such-things O Socrates
SOC. οὐ πάνυ χαλεπά μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες. ἥ τε c
not very difficult to-me they-appear O Hermogenes the both
γὰρ "ἡδονή," ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν ἔοικε τείνουσα πρᾶξις
for pleasure the toward the benefit seems tending action
τοῦτο ἔχειν τὸ ὄνομα — τὸ δέλτα δὲ ἔγκειται, ὥστε
this to-have the name the delta and is-inserted so-as
"ἡδονὴ" ἀντὶ "ἡονῆς" καλεῖται — ἥ τε "λύπη" ἀπὸ
hēdonē instead-of hēonē is-called the both pain from
τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν ἐπωνομάσθαι ἣν ἐν
the dissolution of-the body it-seems to-have-been-named which in
τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ ἥ γε "ἀνία"
this the experience has the body and the at-least distress
τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι. ἡ δὲ "ἀλγηδὼν" ξενικόν τι
the hindering of-the to-go the and ache foreign something
φαίνεταί μοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὠνομασμένον. "ὀδύνη" δὲ
appears to-me from the painful named grief and

ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένῃ ἔοικεν. "ἀχθηδὼν"
from the entering of-the pain called it-seems vexation
δὲ καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς
and also to-everyone clear likened the name to-the of-the
φορᾶς βάρει. "χαρὰ" δὲ τῇ διαχύσει καὶ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς
motion weight joy and to-the spreading and easy-passage of-the
ῥοῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικε κεκλημένῃ. "τέρψις" δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
flow of-the soul it-seems called delight and from the
τερπνοῦ· τὸ δὲ "τερπνὸν" ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕρψεως
delightful the and delightful from the through the soul creeping
πνοῇ ἀπεικασθὲν κέκληται, ἐν δίκῃ μὲν ἂν "ἕρπνουν"
to-breath likened has-been-called with justice indeed — herpnoun
καλούμενον, ὑπὸ χρόνου δὲ "τερπνὸν" παρηγμένον.
being-called by time but terpnon altered
"εὐφροσύνη" δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι·
good-cheer and nothing needs-besides the wherefore to-be-said
παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν
to-everyone for clear that from the well with-the things the
ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, "εὐφεροσύνην" τό
soul to-be-carried this it-took the name eupherosynē the
γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν "εὐφροσύνην." οὐδ'
at-least just nevertheless but it we-call euphrosynē nor
"ἐπιθυμία" χαλεπόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ δυνάμει
desire difficult the for to the spirit going power
δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. "θυμὸς" δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς
clear that this was-called the name spirit and from the
θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.
raging and boiling of-the soul would-have — this the name
420 ἀλλὰ μὴν "ἵμερός" γε τῷ μάλιστα ἕλκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν
but indeed longing at-least to-the most drawing the soul
ῥῷ ἐπωνομάσθη· ὅτι γὰρ ἱέμενος ῥεῖ καὶ ἐφιέμενος
flow was-named because for rushing it-flows and yearning-for

τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπισπᾷ σφόδρα τὴν
the things and so indeed draws-on strongly the
ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν ἔσιν τῆς ῥοῆς, ἀπὸ ταύτης οὖν πάσης
soul because-of the rush of-the flow from this then all
τῆς δυνάμεως "ἵμερος" ἐκλήθη. καὶ μὴν "πόθος" αὖ
the power himeros was-called and indeed pothos in-turn
καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί
is-called signifying not of-the present to-be but of-the elsewhere
που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος, ὅθεν "πόθος" ἐπωνόμασται
somewhere being and absent whence pothos has-been-named
ὃς τότε, ὅταν παρῇ οὗ τις ἐφίετο, "ἵμερος" ἐκαλεῖτο·
which then whenever is-present what one desired himeros was-called
ἀπογενομένου δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος "πόθος" ἐκλήθη. "ἔρως"
having-gone-away and the same this pothos was-called erōs
δέ, ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ
and because it-flows-in from-outside and not proper is the flow
αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι ἀλλ' ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων,
this to-the having(-one) but brought-in through the eyes
διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν "ἔσρος" τό γε παλαιὸν
for these-things from the esrein esros the at-least old
ἐκαλεῖτο — τῷ γὰρ οὖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα — νῦν
was-called the for o instead-of the ō we-used now
δ' "ἔρως" κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖ
and erōs has-been-called because-of the of-the ō instead-of the o
μεταλλαγήν. ἀλλὰ τί ἔτι σὺ λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν;
change but what still you say what we-should-examine
HERM. "δόξα" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῇ σοι φαίνεται;
opinion and the such-things how to-you appears
SOC. "δόξα" δὴ ἤτοι τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόμασται, ἣν c
opinion indeed either from-the pursuit has-been-named which
ἡ ψυχὴ διώκουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα
the soul pursuing the to-know how are the things

πορεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολῇ. ἔοικε δὲ τούτῳ
goes or by-the from the bow shot it-seems and to-this
μᾶλλον. ἡ γοῦν "οἴησις" τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ. "οἶσιν"
rather the at-any-rate supposition with-this agrees oisis
γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον
for of-the soul to every thing what-kind is each
τῶν ὄντων, δηλούσῃ προσέοικεν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ
of-the beings showing it-resembles as at-least also the
"βουλή" πως τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ "βούλεσθαι" τὸ ἐφίεσθαι
counsel somehow the shot and the to-wish the to-aim
σημαίνει καὶ τὸ "βουλεύεσθαι"· πάντα ταῦτα δόξῃ
signifies and the to-deliberate all these-things with-opinion
ἑπόμεν' ἄττα φαίνεται τῆς βολῆς ἀπεικάσματα, ὥσπερ
following some appear of-the shot likenesses as
αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἡ "ἀβουλία" ἀτυχία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡς
in-turn also the-opposite the ill-counsel misfortune seems to-be as
οὐ βαλόντος οὐδὲ τυχόντος οὗ τ' ἔβαλλε καὶ ὃ
not having-shot nor having-bit what and he-was-shooting and what
ἐβούλετο καὶ περὶ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο καὶ οὗ ἐφίετο.
he-wished and about what he-was-deliberating and what he-desired

d HERM. ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πυκνότερα
these-things already to-me you-seem O Socrates thicker
ἐπάγειν.
to-bring-on

e SOC. τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θέω. "ἀνάγκην" δ' οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι
end for already I-run necessity and then still I-wish
διαπεραῦναι, ὅτι τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ "ἑκούσιον."
to-go-through because to-these next is also the voluntary
τὸ μὲν οὖν "ἑκούσιον," τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν ἀλλ',
the indeed then voluntary the yielding and not resisting but
ὥσπερ λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ
as I-say yielding to-the going shown — would-be by-this

τῷ ὀνόματι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ· τὸ δὲ
the name the according-to the will coming-to-be the and
"ἀναγκαῖον" καὶ ἀντίτυπον, παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὄν, τὸ
necessary and resistant contrary-to the will being the
περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμαθίαν, ἀπείκασται
about the error — would-be and ignorance it-is-likened
δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη πορείᾳ, ὅτι δύσπορα καὶ τραχέα
and to-the along the ravines going because hard-to-pass and rough
καὶ λάσια ὄντα ἴσχει τοῦ ἰέναι. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἴσως
and bushy being they-hold-back of-the to-go hence then perhaps
ἐκλήθη "ἀναγκαῖον," τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἄγκους ἀπεικασθὲν
it-was-called anankaion to-the through the ravine likened
πορείᾳ. ἕως δὲ πάρεστιν ἡ ῥώμη, μὴ ἀνιῶμεν αὐτήν·
going as-long-as but is-present the strength not let-us-slacken it
ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ μὴ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα.
but also you not slacken but ask

XVII · THE PRIMARY NAMES

Truth is a divine wandering, falsehood its opposite, being what goes, and name what is searched for. Hermogenes asks about going, flowing, and binding. Socrates says names made of other names must end in elements that cannot be taken apart, and these primary names must show things in another way. As the mute show things by gesture, names imitate with the voice, not like animals' noises or music, but each thing's being, in letters and syllables.

HERM. ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, τήν τε 421
I-ask indeed the greatest and the finest the both
"ἀλήθειαν" καὶ τὸ "ψεῦδος" καὶ τὸ "ὂν" καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
truth and the falsehood and the being and itself this

περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, "ὄνομα," δι' ὅτι
about which now the argument for-us is name through what
τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει.
the name has

SOC. μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι;
maiesthai then do-you-call something

HERM. ἔγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν.
I-at-least the at-least to-seek

b SOC. ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ,
it-seems then from phrase to-a-name compressed
λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ὄν,
saying that this is being of-which happens search being
"ὄνομα." μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ
onoma more and — it you-would-know in which we-say the
"ὀνομαστόν"· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὃν οὗ
onomaston here for clearly it-says this to-be being of-which
μάσμα ἐστίν. ἡ δ' "ἀλήθεια," καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε·
search is the and truth also this to-the others resembles
ἡ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ
the for divine of-the being motion seems to-be-addressed by-this the
ῥήματι, τῇ "ἀληθείᾳ," ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη. τὸ δὲ "ψεῦδος"
phrase the alētheia as divine being wandering the and falsehood
τοὐναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ λοιδορούμενον ἥκει
the-opposite to-the motion again for in-turn being-reviled comes
τὸ ἰσχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται
the being-held and the being-compelled to-be-at-rest it-is-likened
δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψεῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν
and to-the sleeping the psi and added conceals the
βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος. τὸ δὲ "ὂν" καὶ ἡ "οὐσία" ὁμολογεῖ
intent of-the name the and being and the ousia agrees

τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ
with-the true the iota having-lost ion for it-signifies and the
"οὐκ ὂν" αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό, "οὐκ ἰόν."
not being in-turn as some also name it ouk ion
HERM. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως
these-things indeed to-me you-seem O Socrates manfully
πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τίς σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ
very to-have-hammered-out if but someone you should-ask this the
"ἰὸν" καὶ τὸ "ῥέον" καὶ τὸ "δοῦν," τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα
ion and the rheon and the doun what has correctness
ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα —
these the names
SOC. "τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;" λέγεις; ἦ γάρ;
what — to-him should-we-answer you-mean is-it-not for
HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then
SOC. ἓν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν
one indeed then just-now somehow we-provided so-as to-seem
τὶ λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι.
something to-say answering
HERM. τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο;
the what-sort this
SOC. φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν τι d
to-say what — not we-should-know barbarian something
τοῦτ' εἶναι. εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἄν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
this to-be might-be indeed then perhaps — something in-the truth
καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ παλαιότητος
also such of-them it-might-be and even by antiquity
τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
the first of-the names undiscoverable to-be through for the

πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ ἡ
everywhere to-be-twisted the names nothing wonderful if the
παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει.
old tongue against the present-here of-barbarian nothing differs
HERM. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.
and nothing at-least from the-way you-say
e SOC. λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα. οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις
I-say for then likely-things not however to-me it-seems excuses
ἀγὼν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι.
contest to-admit but one-must-be-eager these-things to-examine
ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις ἀεί, δι' ὧν ἂν λέγηται τὸ
let-us-consider and if someone always through what — is-said the
ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὖθις αὖ
name those will-ask-in-turn the phrases and again in-turn
δι' ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῇ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ
through what — the phrases should-be-said those he-will-inquire and
τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα
this not will-stop doing then not necessity at-last
ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον;
to-give-up the(-one) answering
HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems
422 SOC. πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτο
when then giving-up the(-one) renouncing justly would-stop
ἄν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ
— then not when at those be-should-be the names which
ὥσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων;
as-it-were elements of-the others are both of-phrases and of-names
ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων
these for surely no-longer just to-appear from other names
συγκείμενα, ἂν οὕτως ἔχῃ. οἷον νυνδὴ τὸ "ἀγαθὸν" ἔφαμεν
composed if so it-is such-as just-now the good we-said

ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ "θοὸν"
from the admirable and from the swift to-be-composed the and swift
ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἑτέρων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· ἀλλ' ἐάν
perhaps we-would-say — from others those and from others but if
ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων σύγκειται
ever at-least we-should-take what no-longer from some others is-composed
ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι
names justly — we-would-say at element both already to-be
καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.
and no-longer this us to-need to other names to-refer
HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
to-me-at-least you-seem rightly to-speak
SOC. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νῦν ἅ γ' ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα
so then also now what at-least you-ask the names elements
ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη
being happen and one-must of-them in-other some way already
τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἥτις ἐστίν;
the correctness to-examine what is
HERM. εἰκός γε.
likely at-least
SOC. εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται c
likely indeed O Hermogenes all at-any-rate appear
τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως
the former into these to-have-gone-back if and this so
ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετ'
is as to-me it-seems to-be here in-turn examine-together with
ἐμοῦ μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἵαν δεῖ τὴν
me lest something I-should-talk-nonsense saying what-sort one-must the
τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι.
of-the first names correctness to-be

HERM. λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρ' ἐμοί
speak only as as-much-as at-least of-power with me
ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι.
is I-will-examine-together

SOC. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς
that indeed then one at-least some the correctness of-every
ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει
name both first and last and nothing differs
τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.
in-the name to-be none of-them I-think also to-you it-seems-too

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

d SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν τῶν
but indeed of-which at-least just-now we-have-gone-through of-the
ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα
names the correctness such some wished to-be as
δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων.
to-show of-what-sort each is of-the beings

HERM. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
how for not

SOC. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ
this indeed then in-nothing less both the first one-must
ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται.
to-have and the later if-indeed names they-will-be

HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων
but the indeed later as it-seems through the former
οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
able — were this to-accomplish

HERM. φαίνεται.
it-appears

SOC. εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὔπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, e
well the and indeed first to-which not-yet others underlie
τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φανερὰ
in-what way according-to the possible as most evident
ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι;
to-us will-they-make the beings if-indeed they-are-going names to-be
ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἴχομεν μηδὲ
answer and to-me this if voice not we-had nor
γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα,
tongue we-wished and to-show to-one-another the things
ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἄν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν
then not — as now the dumb we-would-try — to-signify
ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι;
with-the hands and head and with-the other body
HERM. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες;
how for — otherwise O Socrates
SOC. εἰ μέν γ᾽ οἶμαι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα 423
if indeed at-least I-think the up and the light we-wished
δηλοῦν, ἤρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι
to-show we-would-raise — toward the heaven the hand imitating
αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ κάτω καὶ
itself the nature of-the thing if and the(-things) below and
τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν. καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἤ τι ἄλλο
the heavy toward the earth and if horse running or some other
τῶν ζῴων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατ᾽ ἂν
of-the animals we-wished to-show you-know that as most-like —
τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιοῦμεν ἐκείνοις.
the our own bodies and figures we-would-make to-those
HERM. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.
necessity to-me it-seems as you-say to-be

b SOC. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι δήλωμά του ἐγίγνετο,
so for — I-think showing of-something would-come-about
μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐβούλετο
imitating as it-seems the body that which it-wished
δηλῶσαι.
to-show

HERM. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι
since and with-voice both and tongue and mouth
βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἆρ' οὐ τότε ἑκάστου δήλωμα ἡμῖν
we-wish to-show then not then of-each showing for-us
ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα
will-be the(-thing) from these coming-about whenever imitation
γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὁτιοῦν;
comes-about through these about anything-whatever

HERM. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ.
necessity to-me it-seems

SOC. ὄνομ' ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ
a-name then is as it-seems imitation with-voice of-that which
μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ
he-imitates and names the(-one) imitating with-the voice what
ἂν μιμῆται.
— he-imitates

HERM. δοκεῖ μοι.
it-seems to-me

c SOC. μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ
by Zeus but not to-me yet it-seems finely to-be-said O
ἑταῖρε.
comrade

HERM. τί δή;
what indeed

SOC. τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς
the(-ones) the sheep imitating these and the
ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναγκαζοίμεθ' ἂν ὁμολογεῖν
cocks and the other animals we-would-be-compelled — to-agree
ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἅπερ μιμοῦνται.
to-name these-things which-very they-imitate
HERM. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
SOC. καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι;
finely then to-be seems to-you
HERM. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις
not to-me-at-least but what — O Socrates imitation
εἴη τὸ ὄνομα;
might-be the name
SOC. πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐὰν καθάπερ τῇ d
first indeed as to-me it-seems not if as with-the
μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι
music we-imitate the things so we-should-imitate and-yet
φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐὰν ἅπερ
with-voice at-least also then we-imitate then not if what-very
ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὗ μοι δοκοῦμεν
the music imitates also we should-imitate not to-me we-seem
ὀνομάσειν. λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι
to-be-going-to-name I-mean and surely this is for-the things
φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς;
voice and figure for-each and color at-least for-many
HERM. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται, οὐδὲ περὶ
it-seems then not if someone these-things should-imitate nor about
ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι. αὗται
these the imitations the art the naming to-be these
μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική· ἦ γάρ;
indeed for are the indeed music the but painting is-it-not for

HERM. ναί.
yes

e SOC. τί δὲ δὴ τόδε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι
what and indeed this not also being seems to-you to-be
ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;
for-each as also color and what just-now we-were-saying
πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν
first for-it the color and the voice not is
οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα
being some for-each of-them and for-the others all as-many-as
ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;
have-been-deemed-worthy of-this the address of-the to-be

HERM. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο
what then if someone itself this to-imitate could
ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ'
of-each the being with-letters both and syllables then
οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὔ;
not — would-he-show each what it-is or not

Hermogenes agrees that the one who can do this is the namer. Socrates says they must first divide the letters into vowels, mutes, and semivowels, and the beings likewise, then match letter to thing as a painter mixes colors for a likeness. Neither trusts himself to do it, so they will try as best they can, admitting they know nothing. Letters imitating things will seem absurd, Socrates warns, but that is better than calling in gods from the machine, or saying the names came from barbarians older than the Greeks.

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 424
certainly indeed then

SOC. καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ
and what — would-you-say the(-one) this being-able as
τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δὲ
the former the indeed musician you-said the and
γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα;
painter this-one and who

HERM. τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι
this to-me-at-least seems O Socrates which-very long-since
ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός.
we-seek this-one — to-be the namer

SOC. εἰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἤδη ἔοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ b
if then this true already it-seems one-must-examine about
ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων ὧν σὺ ἤρου, περὶ "ῥοῆς" τε
those the names which you asked about flow both
καὶ τοῦ "ἰέναι" καὶ "σχέσεως," εἰ τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ
and the to-go and holding whether by-the letters and
ταῖς συλλαβαῖς τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιλαμβάνεται αὐτῶν ὥστε
the syllables of-the being he-lays-hold-of of-them so-as
ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ;
to-imitate the being or also not

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. φέρε δὴ ἴδωμεν πότερον ἄρα ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶ τῶν
come indeed let-us-see whether then these alone are of-the
πρώτων ὀνομάτων ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
first names or also others many

HERM. οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλα.
think I-at-least also others

c SOC. εἰκὸς γάρ. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος τῆς διαιρέσεως
likely for but what — might-be the way of-the division
ὅθεν ἄρχεται μιμεῖσθαι ὁ μιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐκ ἐπείπερ
whence begins to-imitate the(-one) imitating then not since
συλλαβαῖς τε καὶ γράμμασιν ἡ μίμησις τυγχάνει οὖσα τῆς
with-syllables both and letters the imitation happens being of-the
οὐσίας, ὀρθότατόν ἐστι διελέσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ
being most-correct it-is to-divide the elements first as
οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς τῶν στοιχείων πρῶτον
the(-ones) attempting the rhythms of-the elements first
τὰς δυνάμεις διείλοντο, ἔπειτα τῶν συλλαβῶν, καὶ οὕτως
the powers divided then of-the syllables and so
ἤδη ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς σκεψόμενοι, πρότερον δ' οὔ;
already they-come to the rhythms going-to-examine before but not

HERM. ναί.
yes

425 SOC. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ
so then also us so one-must first indeed the
φωνήεντα διελέσθαι, ἔπειτα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ εἴδη τά
vowels to-divide then of-the others according-to forms the
τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα — οὑτωσὶ γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ
both voiceless and soundless so for surely say the
δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων — καὶ τὰ αὖ φωνήεντα μὲν
clever(-men) about these and the(-ones) in-turn vowels indeed

οὔ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα; καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν φωνηέντων
not not however at-least soundless and themselves of-the vowels
ὅσα διάφορα εἴδη ἔχει ἀλλήλων; καὶ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα
as-many-as different forms have from-one-another and when these-things
διελώμεθα εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόματα ἐπιθεῖναι,
we-have-divided well all in-turn to-which one-must names to-assign
εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα,
if there-is into which are-referred all as the elements
ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν
from which it-is-possible to-see them both and whether in them are-in
εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις·
forms according-to the same way as in the elements
ταῦτα πάντα καλῶς διαθεασαμένους ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιφέρειν
these-things all finely having-surveyed to-know to-apply
ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα, ἐάντε ἓν ἑνὶ δέῃ
each according-to the likeness whether one to-one it-should-be-needful
ἐπιφέρειν, ἐάντε συγκεραννύντα πολλά, ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι
to-apply or mixing many as the painters
βουλόμενοι ἀφομοιοῦν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὄστρεον μόνον ἐπήνεγκαν,
wishing to-represent sometimes indeed purple alone they-applied
ἐνίοτε δὲ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν φαρμάκων, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε
sometimes and any-whatever other of-the pigments there-is and when
πολλὰ συγκεράσαντες, οἷον ὅταν ἀνδρείκελον σκευάζωσιν
many having-mixed such-as whenever flesh-color they-prepare
ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων — ὡς ἂν οἶμαι δοκῇ ἑκάστη
or other some of-the such as — I-think should-seem each
ἡ εἰκὼν δεῖσθαι ἑκάστου φαρμάκου — οὕτω δὴ καὶ
the image to-need each pigment so indeed also
ἡμεῖς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐποίσομεν, καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ
we the elements to the things will-apply both one to
ἕν, οὗ ἂν δοκῇ δεῖν, καὶ σύμπολλα, ποιοῦντες ὃ
one which — should-seem to-be-needful and many-together making which

δὴ συλλαβὰς καλοῦσιν, καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες,
indeed syllables they-call and syllables in-turn composing
ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται· καὶ
from which the both names and the phrases are-composed and
πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων μέγα ἤδη τι
again from the names and phrases great already something
καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅλον συστήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ζῷον τῇ
and fine and whole we-shall-construct as there the figure by-the
γραφικῇ, ἐνταῦθα τὸν λόγον τῇ ὀνομαστικῇ ἢ ῥητορικῇ
painting here the speech by-the naming or rhetoric
ἢ ὅτις ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.
or whatever is the art
b μᾶλλον δὲ οὐχ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ λέγων ἐξηνέχθην. συνέθεσαν
rather but not we but speaking I-was-carried-away composed
μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἥπερ σύγκειται οἱ παλαιοί· ἡμᾶς δὲ
indeed for so as-very it-is-composed the ancients us but
δεῖ, εἴπερ τεχνικῶς ἐπιστησόμεθα σκοπεῖσθαι αὐτὰ
one-must if-indeed with-art we-shall-understand to-examine them
πάντα, οὕτω διελομένους, εἴτε κατὰ τρόπον τά τε
all so having-divided whether according-to rule the both
πρῶτα ὀνόματα κεῖται καὶ τὰ ὕστερα εἴτε μή, οὕτω
first names are-set and the later or not so
θεᾶσθαι· ἄλλως δὲ συνείρειν μὴ φαῦλον ᾖ καὶ οὐ
to-behold otherwise but to-string-together lest trivial it-be and not
καθ' ὁδόν, ὦ φίλε Ἑρμόγενες.
according-to way O friend Hermogenes
HERM. ἴσως νὴ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.
perhaps by Zeus O Socrates
SOC. τί οὖν; σὺ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ οἷός τ' ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα
what then you trust yourself able — — to-be these-things
οὕτω διελέσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔ.
so to-divide I indeed for not

HERM. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέω ἔγωγε.
much then lack I-at-least

SOC. ἐάσομεν οὖν, ἢ βούλει οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δυνώμεθα, c
shall-we-let-go then or do-you-wish so as — we-can
καὶ ἂν σμικρόν τι αὐτῶν οἷοί τ' ὦμεν κατιδεῖν,
and if small something of-them able — we-should-be to-discern
ἐπιχειρῶμεν, προειπόντες, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρότερον τοῖς
let-us-attempt having-declared-beforehand as a-little before to-the
θεοῖς, ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
gods that nothing knowing of-the truth the of-the men
δόγματα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκάζομεν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ νῦν αὖ
opinions about them we-conjecture so and also now in-turn
εἰπόντες αὐτοῖς ἴωμεν, ὅτι εἰ μέν τι χρῆν
having-said to-them let-us-go that if indeed anything it-was-needful
αὐτὰ διελέσθαι εἴτε ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν εἴτε ἡμᾶς, οὕτως
them to-divide whether other anyone-whatever or us so
ἔδει αὐτὰ διαιρεῖσθαι, νῦν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ
it-was-necessary them to-divide now but the saying-goes according-to
δύναμιν δεήσει ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματεύεσθαι;
power it-will-be-necessary us about them to-be-busied
δοκεῖ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
does-it-seem-good these-things or how do-you-mean

HERM. πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
certainly indeed then strongly to-me-at-least it-seems

SOC. γελοῖα μὲν οἶμαι φανεῖσθαι, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, γράμμασι d
ridiculous indeed I-think to-appear O Hermogenes with-letters
καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα κατάδηλα
and syllables the things imitated evident
γιγνόμενα· ὅμως δὲ ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν τούτου
becoming nevertheless but necessity not for we-have than-this
βέλτιον εἰς ὅτι ἐπανενέγκωμεν περὶ ἀληθείας τῶν πρώτων
better to what we-may-refer about truth of-the first

ὀνομάτων, εἰ μὴ ἄρα βούλει, ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοποιοὶ
names if not then you-wish as the tragedians
ἐπειδάν τι ἀπορῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσι
when something they-are-at-a-loss to the machines they-flee
θεοὺς αἴροντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως εἰπόντες ἀπαλλαγῶμεν,
gods raising also we so having-said let-us-be-rid
ὅτι τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα οἱ θεοὶ ἔθεσαν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
that the first names the gods set and because-of these-things
ὀρθῶς ἔχει. ἆρα καὶ ἡμῖν κράτιστος οὗτος τῶν λόγων;
rightly they-are then also to-us strongest this of-the arguments
ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι παρὰ βαρβάρων τινῶν αὐτὰ παρειλήφαμεν,
or that that from barbarians some them we-have-received
εἰσὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἀρχαιότεροι βάρβαροι;
are and than-us older barbarians

XIX · RHO, LAMBDA, AND THE REST

Pleading antiquity is one more evasion, and whoever cannot account for the first names cannot know the later ones. Rho is the tool of motion, in flowing, trembling, running, and striking; iota of fine things going through all; phi, psi, sigma, and zeta of blowing and shaking; delta and tau of binding and rest; lambda of gliding and smoothness; gamma of the sticky; nu of the inward; alpha of the great, eta of length, and omicron of the round. Hermogenes presses Cratylus to answer, and Cratylus asks whether anything so great is learned so quickly.

426 ἢ ὅτι ὑπὸ παλαιότητος ἀδύνατον αὐτὰ ἐπισκέψασθαι,
or that by antiquity impossible them to-examine
ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικά; αὗται γὰρ ἂν πᾶσαι ἐκδύσεις
as also the barbarian these for — all evasions
εἶεν καὶ μάλα κομψαὶ τῷ μὴ ἐθέλοντι λόγον
would-be and very subtle for-the(-one) not wishing account

διδόναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὡς ὀρθῶς κεῖται.
to-give about the first names how rightly they-are-set
καίτοι ὅτῳ τις τρόπῳ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων τὴν
and-yet in-whatever one way of-the first names the
ὀρθότητα μὴ οἶδεν, ἀδύνατόν που τῶν γε ὑστέρων
correctness not knows impossible surely of-the at-least later
εἰδέναι, ἃ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀνάγκη δηλοῦσθαι ὧν τις πέρι
to-know which from those necessity to-be-shown which one about
μηδὲν οἶδεν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν φάσκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν
nothing knows but clear that the(-one) claiming about them
τεχνικὸν εἶναι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων μάλιστά τε
skilled to-be about the first names most both
καὶ καθαρώτατα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἢ εὖ εἰδέναι ὅτι
and most-purely one-must to-be-able to-demonstrate or well to-know that
τά γε ὕστερα ἤδη φλυαρήσει. ἢ σοὶ ἄλλως δοκεῖ;
the at-least later already will-talk-nonsense or to-you otherwise does-it-seem
HERM. οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως.
not-even in-any-way-whatever O Socrates otherwise
SOC. ἃ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων
what indeed then I have-perceived about the first
ὀνομάτων πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα. τούτων
names very to-me seem insolent to-be and ridiculous of-these
οὖν σοι μεταδώσω, ἂν βούλῃ· σὺ δ' ἄν τι ἔχῃς
then to-you I-will-give-a-share if you-wish you and if something you-have
βέλτιόν ποθεν λαβεῖν, πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐμοὶ μεταδιδόναι.
better from-somewhere to-take to-try also to-me to-give-a-share
HERM. ποιήσω ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν λέγε.
I-will-do these-things but taking-courage speak
SOC. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ῥῶ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται ὥσπερ c
first indeed then the rho to-me-at-least appears as
ὄργανον εἶναι πάσης τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν οὐδ' εἴπομεν
instrument to-be of-all the motion which not-even we-said

δι᾽ ὅτι ἔχει τοῦτο τοὔνομα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἕσις
because-of what it-has this the-name but for clear that hesis
βούλεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἦτα ἐχρώμεθα ἀλλὰ εἶ τὸ παλαιόν.
it-wishes to-be not for eta we-used but ei the old
ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ "κίειν" — ξενικὸν δὲ τοὔνομα —
the and beginning from the kiein foreign and the-name
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰέναι. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ παλαιὸν αὐτῆς
this and is to-go if then someone the old of-it
εὕροι ὄνομα εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν φωνὴν συμβαῖνον, "ἕσις"
should-find name into the our tongue agreeing hesis
ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖτο· νῦν δὲ ἀπό τε τοῦ ξενικοῦ τοῦ κίειν
— rightly would-be-called now but from both the foreign the kiein
καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἦτα μεταβολῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ νῦ ἐνθέσεως
and from the of-the eta change and the of-the nu insertion
"κίνησις" κέκληται, ἔδει δὲ "κιείνησιν" καλεῖσθαι. ἡ
kinēsis has-been-called it-was-necessary and kieinēsis to-be-called the
δὲ στάσις ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἰέναι βούλεται εἶναι, διὰ δὲ
and stasis negation of-the to-go wishes to-be because-of and
τὸν καλλωπισμὸν "στάσις" ὠνόμασται. τὸ δὲ οὖν ῥῶ τὸ
the beautification stasis has-been-named the and then rho the
στοιχεῖον, ὥσπερ λέγω, καλὸν ἔδοξεν ὄργανον εἶναι τῆς
element as I-say fine seemed instrument to-be of-the
κινήσεως τῷ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀφομοιοῦν
motion to-the(-one) the names setting for the to-liken
τῇ φορᾷ, πολλαχοῦ γοῦν χρῆται αὐτῷ εἰς αὐτήν·
to-the motion in-many-places at-any-rate he-uses it for it
πρῶτον μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ "ῥεῖν" καὶ "ῥοῇ" διὰ τούτου
first indeed in itself the rhein and rhoē through this
τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται, εἶτα ἐν τῷ "τρόμῳ,"
the letter the motion he-imitates then in the tromos
εἶτα ἐν τῷ "τρέχειν," ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ῥήμασιν οἷον
then in the trechein still and in the such phrases such-as

"κρούειν," "θραύειν," "ἐρείκειν," "θρύπτειν," "κερματίζειν,"
krouein thrauein ereikein thryptein kermatizein
"ῥυμβεῖν," πάντα ταῦτα τὸ πολὺ ἀπεικάζει διὰ τοῦ ῥῶ.
rhymbein all these-things the most-part he-likens through the rho
ἑώρα γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἥκιστα μένουσαν,
he-saw for I-think the tongue in this least staying
μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην· διὸ φαίνεταί μοι τούτῳ πρὸς
most and being-shaken wherefore it-appears to-me this for
ταῦτα κατακεχρῆσθαι. τῷ δὲ αὖ ἰῶτα πρὸς τὰ λεπτὰ
these-things to-have-used to-the and in-turn iota for the fine-things
πάντα, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα διὰ πάντων ἴοι ἄν.
all which indeed most through all might-go —
διὰ ταῦτα τὸ "ἰέναι" καὶ τὸ "ἵεσθαι" διὰ τοῦ ἰῶτα 427
because-of these-things the ienai and the hiesthai through the iota
ἀπομιμεῖται, ὥσπερ γε διὰ τοῦ φεῖ καὶ τοῦ ψεῖ καὶ τοῦ
he-imitates as at-least through the phi and the psi and the
σῖγμα καὶ τοῦ ζῆτα, ὅτι πνευματώδη τὰ γράμματα, πάντα
sigma and the zeta because breathy the letters all
τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμίμηται αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζων, οἷον τὸ "ψυχρὸν"
the such-things he-has-imitated with-them naming such-as the psychron
καὶ τὸ "ζέον" καὶ τὸ "σείεσθαι" καὶ ὅλως σεισμόν. καὶ
and the zeon and the seiesthai and wholly seismos and
ὅταν που τὸ φυσώδες μιμῆται, πανταχοῦ ἐνταῦθα ὡς τὸ
whenever somehow the windy he-imitates everywhere here as the
πολὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράμματα ἐπιφέρειν φαίνεται ὁ τὰ
most-part the such letters to-apply appears the(-one) the
ὀνόματα τιθέμενος. τῆς δ' αὖ τοῦ δέλτα συμπιέσεως καὶ
names setting of-the and in-turn of-the delta compression and
τοῦ ταῦ καὶ ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης τὴν δύναμιν χρήσιμον
of-the tau and pressing of-the tongue the power useful
φαίνεται ἡγήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ "δεσμοῦ" καὶ
he-appears to-have-thought for the imitation of-the bond and

τῆς "στάσεως." ὅτι δὲ ὀλισθάνει μάλιστα ἐν τῷ λάβδα
of-the rest because and slides most in the lambda
ἡ γλῶττα κατιδών, ἀφομοιῶν ὠνόμασε τά τε "λεῖα" καὶ
the tongue having-observed likening he-named the both leia and
αὐτὸ τὸ "ὀλισθάνειν" καὶ τὸ "λιπαρὸν" καὶ τὸ "κολλῶδες"
itself the olisthanein and the liparon and the kollōdes
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ᾗ δὲ ὀλισθανούσης
and the-others all the such-things where and sliding
τῆς γλώττης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ τοῦ γάμμα δύναμις, τὸ
of-the tongue takes-hold the of-the gamma power the
"γλίσχρον" ἀπεμιμήσατο καὶ "γλυκὺ" καὶ "γλοιῶδες."
glischron he-imitated and glyky and gloiōdes
c τοῦ δ' αὖ νῦ τὸ εἴσω αἰσθόμενος τῆς φωνῆς, τὸ
of-the and in-turn nu the inward having-perceived of-the voice the
"ἔνδον" καὶ τὰ "ἐντὸς" ὠνόμασεν, ὡς ἀφομοιῶν τοῖς
endon and the entos he-named as likening with-the
γράμμασι τὰ ἔργα. τὸ δ' αὖ ἄλφα τῷ "μεγάλῳ"
letters the works the and in-turn alpha to-the megalos
ἀπέδωκε, καὶ τῷ "μήκει" τὸ ἦτα, ὅτι μεγάλα τὰ
he-assigned and to-the mēkos the eta because great the
γράμματα. εἰς δὲ τὸ "γογγύλον" τοῦ οὗ δεόμενος σημείου,
letters into and the gongylon of-the o needing sign
τοῦτο πλεῖστον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ἐνεκέρασεν. καὶ τἆλλα
this most to-it into the name he-mixed and the-others
οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν καὶ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ
so appears to-fit and according-to letters and
κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων σημεῖόν τε καὶ
according-to syllables for-each of-the beings sign both and
ὄνομα ποιῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ
name making the lawgiver from and these the rest
ἤδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομιμούμενος. αὕτη μοι
already with-the-very these to-compose imitating this to-me

φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, βούλεσθαι εἶναι ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων
appears O Hermogenes to-wish to-be the of-the names
ὀρθότης, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο Κρατύλος ὅδε λέγει.
correctness if not something else Cratylus here says
HERM. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλά γέ μοι πολλάκις e
and indeed O Socrates many-things at-least to-me often
πράγματα παρέχει Κρατύλος, ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον,
troubles gives Cratylus as at the-beginning I-was-saying
φάσκων μὲν εἶναι ὀρθότητα ὀνομάτων, ἥτις δ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲν
claiming indeed to-be correctness of-names what but it-is nothing
σαφὲς λέγων, ὥστε με μὴ δύνασθαι εἰδέναι πότερον ἑκὼν
clear saying so-as me not to-be-able to-know whether willing
ἢ ἄκων οὕτως ἀσαφῶς ἑκάστοτε περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει. νῦν
or unwilling so unclearly each-time about them he-speaks now
οὖν μοι, ὦ Κρατύλε, ἐναντίον Σωκράτους εἰπὲ πότερον
then to-me O Cratylus in-the-presence-of Socrates tell whether
ἀρέσκει σοι ᾗ λέγει Σωκράτης περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἢ ἔχεις
pleases you as says Socrates about names or you-are-able
πῃ ἄλλῃ κάλλιον λέγειν; καὶ εἰ ἔχεις, λέγε, ἵνα ἤτοι
somehow otherwise more-finely to-speak and if you-are-able speak so-that either
μάθῃς παρὰ Σωκράτους ἢ διδάξῃς ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέρους.
you-may-learn from Socrates or you-may-teach us both
CRAT. τί δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες; δοκεῖ σοι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι οὕτω
what and O Hermogenes does-it-seem to-you easy to-be so
ταχὺ μαθεῖν τε καὶ διδάξαι ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι
quickly to-learn both and to-teach any-whatever thing not to-speak-of
τοσοῦτον, ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μέγιστον εἶναι;
so-great which indeed seems among the(-things) greatest to-be

Hermogenes urges Cratylus to add even a little, and Socrates invites him to speak. Cratylus answers in Achilles' words to Ajax: Socrates spoke to his mind. Socrates, wary of his own wisdom, reviews what was agreed: names show what things are, are spoken to teach, and are made by lawgivers. Cratylus grants that painters and builders are better and worse, but not lawgivers: every name is rightly set, a wrong one is no name, and no one can speak falsely. Socrates asks about greeting Cratylus as Hermogenes.

428 HERM. μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου καλῶς
by Zeus not to-me-at-least but the of-the Hesiod well
μοι φαίνεται ἔχειν, τὸ εἰ καί τις σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ
to-me appears to-be the if even someone small on small
καταθείη, προὔργου εἶναι. εἰ οὖν καὶ σμικρόν τι οἷός
should-lay-down of-advantage to-be if then even small something able
τ' εἶ πλέον ποιῆσαι, μὴ ἀπόκαμνε ἀλλ' εὐεργέτει καὶ
— you-are more to-do not grow-weary but benefit both
Σωκράτη τόνδε — δίκαιος δ' εἶ — καὶ ἐμέ.
Socrates here just and you-are also me

b SOC. καὶ μὲν δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὐδὲν
and indeed indeed I-at-least also myself O Cratylus nothing
ἂν ἰσχυρισαίμην ὧν εἴρηκα, ᾗ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο μεθ'
— would-insist-on of-what I-have-said as and to-me it-appeared with
Ἑρμογένους ἐπεσκεψάμην, ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα
Hermogenes I-examined so-as of-this at-least for-the-sake
θαρρῶν λέγε, εἴ τι ἔχεις βέλτιον, ὡς ἐμοῦ ἐνδεξομένου.
taking-courage speak if something you-have better as me going-to-accept
εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν
if however you-have something you finer than-these to-say not —
θαυμάζοιμι· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι αὐτός τε ἐσκέφθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα
I-would-wonder you-seem for to-me yourself both to-have-examined the such-things

καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλων μεμαθηκέναι. ἐὰν οὖν λέγῃς τι κάλλιον,
and from others to-have-learned if then you-say something finer
ἕνα τῶν μαθητῶν περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐμὲ γράφου.
one of-the disciples about correctness of-names also me enroll
CRAT. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, c
but indeed indeed O Socrates as you say
μεμέληκέν τέ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴσως ἄν σε ποιησαίμην
it-has-been-a-care both to-me about them and perhaps — you I-might-make
μαθητήν. φοβοῦμαι μέντοι μὴ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον ᾖ,
disciple I-fear however lest of-this all the-opposite it-be
ὅτι μοί πως ἐπέρχεται λέγειν πρὸς σὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως,
because to-me somehow it-occurs to-say to you the of-the Achilles
ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἐν Λιταῖς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα λέγει. φησὶ δὲ
which that-one in the-Prayers to the Ajax says he-says and

Αἶαν διογενὲς Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν,
Ajax Zeus-born Telamonian lord of-peoples
πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἐείσω μυθήσασθαι.
all-things somehow to-me according-to heart you-seemed to-speak

καὶ ἐμοὶ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς φαίνῃ κατὰ νοῦν
and to-me you O Socrates fairly appear according-to mind
χρησμῳδεῖν, εἴτε παρ᾽ Εὐθύφρονος ἐπίπνους γενόμενος,
to-chant-oracles whether from Euthyphro inspired having-become
εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις Μοῦσα πάλαι σε ἐνοῦσα ἐλελήθει.
or also other some Muse long-since you being-in escaped-notice
SOC. ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, θαυμάζω καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ d
good Cratylus I-wonder also myself long-since at-the of-myself
σοφίαν καὶ ἀπιστῶ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι χρῆναι ἐπανασκέψασθαι
wisdom and I-distrust it-seems then to-me to-be-necessary to-reexamine
τί καὶ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ πάντων
what also I-say the for to-be-deceived oneself by oneself of-all

χαλεπώτατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ ἀλλ'
hardest whenever for not-even a-little he-stands-apart but
ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ δή,
always is-present the(-one) going-to-deceive how not terrible one-must indeed
ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ
as it-seems often to-turn-back to the said-before and
πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν "ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ
to-try the of-that the poet to-look at-once forward and
ὀπίσσω." καὶ δὴ καὶ νυνὶ ἡμεῖς ἴδωμεν τί ἡμῖν εἴρηται.
backward and indeed also now we let-us-see what by-us has-been-said
ὀνόματος, φαμέν, ὀρθότης ἐστὶν αὕτη, ἥτις ἐνδείξεται
of-name we-say correctness is this which will-show
οἷόν ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα· τοῦτο φῶμεν ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι;
of-what-sort is the thing this are-we-to-say sufficiently to-have-been-said

CRAT. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ πάνυ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
to-me indeed it-seems very strongly O Socrates

SOC. διδασκαλίας ἄρα ἕνεκα τὰ ὀνόματα λέγεται;
of-teaching then for-the-sake the names are-spoken

CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ ταύτην τέχνην εἶναι καὶ
therefore are-we-to-say also this art to-be and
δημιουργοὺς αὐτῆς;
craftsmen of-it

CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. τίνας;
whom

429 CRAT. οὕσπερ σὺ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας.
whom-very you at the-beginning said the lawgivers

SOC. πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν
whether then also this are-we-to-say the art among
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ μή;
the men to-come-to-be-in as also the others or not
βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. ζωγράφοι εἰσίν που οἱ
I-wish and to-say the such painters are surely the(-ones)
μὲν χείρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους;
indeed worse the(-ones) and better
CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα καλλίω
therefore the(-ones) indeed better the of-themselves works finer
παρέχονται, τὰ ζῷα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα; καὶ οἰκοδόμοι
produce the figures the(-ones) and inferior and house-builders
ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται,
likewise the(-ones) indeed finer the houses work
οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους;
the(-ones) and uglier
CRAT. ναί.
yes
SOC. ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ αὑτῶν b
so then also lawgivers the(-ones) indeed finer the of-themselves
παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω;
produce the(-ones) and uglier
CRAT. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι.
not to-me it-seems this any-longer
SOC. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους,
not then seem to-you laws the(-ones) indeed better
οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι;
the(-ones) and inferior to-be
CRAT. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed

SOC. οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ
not-even indeed name as it-seems seems to-you to-be-set the
μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμεινον;
indeed worse the and better
CRAT. οὐ δῆτα.
not indeed
SOC. πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κεῖται;
all then the names rightly are-set
CRAT. ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν.
as-many-as at-least names are
c SOC. τί οὖν; ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον
what then which also just-now was-said for-Hermogenes here whether
μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ
not-even name this to-be-set are-we-to-say if not something to-him of-Hermes
γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;
birth belongs or to-be-set indeed not however rightly at-least
CRAT. οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ
not-even to-be-set to-me-at-least it-seems O Socrates but
δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ
to-seem to-be-set to-be and of-another this the-name of-whom-very
καὶ ἡ φύσις.
also the nature
SOC. πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεται ὅταν τις φῇ Ἑρμογένη
whether not-even does-he-lie whenever someone says Hermogenes
αὐτὸν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον
him to-be lest for not-even this in-turn it-be the him
φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;
to-say Hermogenes to-be if not he-is
CRAT. πῶς λέγεις;
how do-you-mean

SOC. ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἆρα d
then that false-things to-speak — at-all not is-it-possible then
τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ
this to-you means the argument many for some the(-ones)
λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.
saying O dear Cratylus both now and long-ago
CRAT. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο
how for — O Socrates saying at-least someone this
ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι; ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ
which he-says not the being would-be-say or not this is the
ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν;
false-things to-say the not the beings to-say
SOC. κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ e
more-subtle indeed the argument than according-to me and according-to
τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ὅμως μέντοι εἰπέ μοι τοσόνδε·
the my age O comrade nevertheless however tell me so-much
πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ;
whether to-speak indeed not seems to-you to-be-possible false-things to-assert but
CRAT. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι.
not to-me it-seems not-even to-assert
SOC. οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας
nor to-say nor to-address such-as if someone having-met
σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· "χαῖρε, ὦ
you in foreign-parts taking the hand should-say greetings O
ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, υἱὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενες," οὗτος λέξειεν
stranger Athenian son-of-Smicrion Hermogenes this-one would-speak
ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ
— these-things or would-assert — these-things or would-say — these-things or
προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε; ἢ οὐδένα;
would-address — so you indeed not Hermogenes but this-one or no-one

CRAT. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος
to-me indeed it-seems O Socrates otherwise — this-one
ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.
these-things to-utter

XXI · TRUE AND FALSE ASSIGNMENTS

Cratylus says such a speaker only makes a noise. Socrates: a name imitates its thing as a picture does, and either can be assigned to its own or to another, a man's likeness to a woman. The fitting assignment is correct, and with names also true; the other is incorrect, and with names false. Cratylus says names, unlike pictures, are always right, but concedes the point. If names can be misassigned, so can phrases and statements. A name, like a picture, renders its object well or badly, so there will be good and bad lawgivers.

430 SOC. ἀλλ' ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν
but welcome also this whether for true-things —
φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ; ἢ τὸ μέν τι
would-utter these-things the(-one) having-uttered or false-things or the indeed some
αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος; καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ.
of-them true the and false even for — also this would-suffice
CRAT. ψοφεῖν ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν
to-make-noise I-at-least — would-say the such(-man) in-vain him
ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε
himself moving as — if someone a-bronze-pot should-move
κρούσας.
having-struck

SOC. φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε· ἆρ᾽
come indeed if somehow we-might-be-reconciled O Cratylus then
οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ
not other indeed — would-you-say the name to-be other and
ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;
that of-which the name is

CRAT. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ b
therefore also the name you-agree imitation some to-be of-the
πράγματος;
thing

CRAT. πάντων μάλιστα.
of-all most

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον
therefore also the paintings in-way some other
λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;
you-say imitations to-be of-things some

CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. φέρε δή — ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτ᾽
come indeed perhaps for I not understand whatever ever
ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχ᾽ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις — ἔστι
is what you-say you but perhaps — rightly might-say is-it-possible
διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα,
to-distribute and to-apply these both the imitations
τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν
the both paintings and-those the names to-the things
ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ;
of-which imitations they-are or not

CRAT. ἔστιν. c
it-is-possible

SOC. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε. ἆρ' ἄν τις τὴν
first indeed indeed examine this then — someone the
μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς
indeed of-the man image to-the man might-assign the and of-the
γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;
woman to-the woman and the-others so

CRAT. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
certainly indeed then

SOC. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ
therefore also the-opposite the indeed of-the man to-the
γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί;
woman the and of-the woman to-the man

CRAT. ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.
it-is-possible also these-things

SOC. ἆρ' οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ
so then these the distributions both correct or the
ἑτέρα;
one

CRAT. ἡ ἑτέρα.
the one

SOC. ἣ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον
which — to-each I-think the befitting both and the like
ἀποδιδῷ.
assigns

CRAT. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
to-me-at-least it-seems

d SOC. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ
so-that then not we-may-fight in the arguments I both and
σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω. τὴν τοιαύτην
you friends being accept of-me what I-say the such
γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις
for O comrade call I-at-least distribution for both

μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν,
indeed the imitations the both figures and the names
ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ·
correct for and the names besides the correct also true
τὴν δ' ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν,
the and other the of-the unlike giving both and applying
οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπ' ὀνόμασιν ᾖ.
not correct and false whenever for names it-be
CRAT. ἀλλ' ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς e
but see-that not O Socrates in indeed the
ζωγραφήμασιν ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ
paintings it-be this the not rightly to-distribute for and
τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς.
the names not but necessary it-be always rightly
SOC. πῶς λέγεις; τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει; ἆρ' οὐκ
how do-you-mean what this from-that differs then not
ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι "τουτί ἐστι
is-it-possible having-approached man some to-say that this-here is
σὸν γράμμα," καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου
your picture and to-show to-him if indeed it-happen of-that-one
εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός; τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς
image if and it-happen of-woman the and to-show I-mean into
τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.
the of-the eyes perception to-set
CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. τί δέ; πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι 431
what and again to-him this having-approached to-say that
"τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα"; ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα
this-here is your name is and surely also the name
μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα. τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν
imitation as the painting this indeed I-mean then not —

εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι "τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα," καὶ
would-it-be-possible to-him to-say that this-here is your name and
μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι,
after this into the of-the hearing in-turn perception to-set
ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ
if indeed it-happen the of-that-one imitation saying that man if and
τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι
it-happen the of-the female of-the human kind saying that
γυνή; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;
woman not seems to-you this possible — to-be and to-come-about sometimes
CRAT. ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω
I-am-willing to-you O Socrates to-concede and let-it-be
οὕτως.
so

b SOC. καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως·
finely at-least you doing O friend if is this so
οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ'
nothing for one-must now very to-fight-it-out about it if and
οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον
then there-is such some distribution also here the indeed one
τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι.
of-these to-speak-truly we-wish to-call the and other to-speak-falsely
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ
if and this so is also it-is-possible not rightly to-distribute the
ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλ'
names nor to-assign the(-ones) befitting to-each but
ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα
sometimes the(-ones) not befitting it-would-be-possible — also phrases
ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω
the-same this to-do if and phrases and names it-is-possible so

τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
to-set necessity also statements statements for surely as I-think
ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;
the of-these combination is or how do-you-mean O Cratylus

CRAT. οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
so finely for to-me you-seem to-speak

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα
therefore if with-letters in-turn the first names
ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν
we-liken it-is-possible as in the paintings
καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα
both all the befitting colors both and figures
ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλ' ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια
to-assign and not all in-turn but some to-leave-out some
δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
and also to-add both more and greater or not is-it-possible

CRAT. ἔστιν.
it-is-possible

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ
therefore the(-one) indeed assigning all fine the
γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ
letters both and the images assigns the(-one) and
ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας
either adding or removing letters indeed also images
ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;
works also this-one but bad

CRAT. ναί. d
yes

SOC. τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων
what and the(-one) through the syllables both and letters
τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος; ἆρα οὐ
the being of-the things imitating then not

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ
according-to the same argument if indeed all he-assigns the
προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται — τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν
befitting fine the image will-be this and is
ὄνομα — ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε,
name if but small-things he-leaves-out or adds sometimes
εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ; ὥστε τὰ μὲν
image indeed will-come-about fine but not so-that the(-names) indeed
καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς;
finely worked will-be of-the names the(-ones) and badly

CRAT. ἴσως.
perhaps

e SOC. ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων,
perhaps then will-be the indeed good craftsman of-names
ὁ δὲ κακός;
the and bad

CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ "νομοθέτης" ἦν ὄνομα.
therefore to-this(-one) the lawgiver was name

CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δί' ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
perhaps then by Zeus there-will-be as in the other
τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός,
arts also lawgiver the indeed good the and bad
ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν.
if-indeed the former those should-be-agreed by-us

Cratylus says a name with a letter added, removed, or moved is no longer that name. Socrates answers that this holds of numbers, but an image of Cratylus perfect in every respect would be a second Cratylus. A name need not render everything; while the outline stays, the thing is named, well or badly. Cratylus grudgingly accepts this and agrees that a well-set name needs fitting letters, like the things, though he still dislikes calling a name badly set. Socrates asks which he prefers: first names that show things by likeness, or Hermogenes' convention, under which small could as well be called great.

CRAT. ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα 432
it-is these-things but you-see O Socrates whenever these
τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
the letters the both alpha and the beta and each of-the
στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ
elements to-the names we-assign by-the grammatical
τέχνῃ, ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν
art if something we-remove or add or transpose
τι, οὐ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι
something not has-been-written indeed by-us the name not however
ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς
rightly but — altogether not-even it-has-been-written but at-once
ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ.
other it-is if something of-these it-suffers
SOC. μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ
lest for not finely we-examine so examining O
Κρατύλε.
Cratylus
CRAT. πῶς δή;
how indeed

b soc. ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ
perhaps as-many-as from some number necessary to-be or not
εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ
to-be might-suffer — this which you say as also themselves
τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι
the ten or whichever you-wish other number if you-remove something
ἢ προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ
or add other at-once it-has-become of-the and quality some and
συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ
of-all image lest not this be the correctness but the
ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν
contrary not-even — at-all one-must all to-assign such-as
ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ
is to-which it-likens if it-is-going image to-be examine and if something
λέγω. ἆρ' ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος
I-say then — two things would-be such such-as Cratylus
καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα
and of-Cratylus image if some of-gods not only the your color
καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
and figure should-represent as the painters but also
τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ
the(-things) within all such should-make such-as-very the yours and
μαλακότητας καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν
softnesses and warmths the same should-assign and motion
καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη
and soul and prudence such-as-very the with you should-put-in
αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα
them and in-one word all what-very you have such
ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου; πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ
others should-set-up near you whether Cratylus — and
εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότ' εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;
image of-Cratylus then would-be the such or two Cratyluses

CRAT. δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.
two to-me-at-least seem O Socrates Cratyluses
SOC. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα d
you-see then O friend that other one-must of-image correctness
ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν
to-seek and of-what just-now we-were-saying and not to-compel if
τι ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι;
something should-be-absent or should-be-added no-longer it image to-be
ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ
or not do-you-perceive by-how-much fall-short the images the same
ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;
to-have to-those of-which images they-are
CRAT. ἔγωγε.
I-at-least
SOC. γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων
ridiculous-things at-any-rate O Cratylus by the names
πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ
would-suffer — those of-which names are the names if
πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη. διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που
all in-every-way to-them they-should-be-made-like double for — surely
πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδεὶς
all-things would-become and not — would-be-able of-them to-say anyone
οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.
either which is the indeed itself the and name
CRAT. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
true-things you-say
SOC. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν 433
taking-courage then O noble-one allow also name the indeed
εὖ κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ
well to-be-set the and not and not compel all to-have the
γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ
letters so-that entirely it-be such such-as-very that-of-which

ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα
name it-is but allow also the not befitting letter
ἐπιφέρειν. εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ
to-apply if and letter also name in statement if and
ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν
name also statement in speech not befitting to-the things
ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ
to-be-applied and nothing less to-be-named the thing and
λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ
to-be-spoken as-long-as — the outline is-in of-the thing about which
ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν,
— the speech should-be as in the of-the elements names
εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.
if you-remember what just-now I and Hermogenes we-were-saying
CRAT. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.
but I-remember
b SOC. καλῶς τοίνυν. ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῇ, κἂν μὴ πάντα
finely then whenever for this is-in even-if not all
τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχῃ, λέξεταί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς
the befitting-things it-has will-be-spoken at-least the thing finely
ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δὲ ὅταν ὀλίγα· λέγεσθαι δ᾽ οὖν,
whenever all badly and whenever few to-be-spoken and then
ὦ μακάριε, ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ
O blessed let-us-allow so-that not we-incur as the(-men)
ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ
in Aegina by-night going-around late of-road also we to
τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως
the things should-seem in-turn in-the truth so somehow
ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτει τινὰ ἄλλην
to-have-come later than-the needful or seek some other
ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὁμολόγει δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς
of-name correctness and not agree showing with-syllables

καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος ὄνομα εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα
and letters of-thing name to-be if for these-things
ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσῃ συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ.
both you-say not able — you-will-be to-agree with-yourself
CRAT. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν,
but to-me you-seem at-least O Socrates moderately to-speak
καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι.
and so I-set-it-down
SOC. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν συνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα
since then these-things to-us seem-good-too after these-things
τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει φαμὲν καλῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ
these-things let-us-examine if it-is-going we-say finely to-be-set the
ὄνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν;
name the befitting one-must it letters to-have
CRAT. ναί.
yes
SOC. προσήκει δὲ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν; c
befit and the like-things to-the things
CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least
SOC. τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κεῖται· εἰ δὲ μή
the(-ones) indeed then finely set so are-set if but not
τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων
something finely was-set the indeed — much perhaps from befitting
εἴη γραμμάτων καὶ ὁμοίων, εἴπερ ἔσται εἰκών, ἔχοι δ'
would-be letters and like if-indeed it-will-be image would-have but
ἄν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, δι' ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη
— something also not befitting because-of which not — fine would-be
οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὄνομα. οὕτω φαμὲν ἢ ἄλλως;
nor finely worked the name so do-we-say or otherwise

CRAT. οὐδὲν δεῖ οἶμαι διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ
nothing one-must I-think to-fight-it-out O Socrates since
οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὄνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ
not pleases at-least me the to-say name indeed to-be not
μέντοι καλῶς γε κεῖσθαι.
however finely at-least to-be-set

d SOC. πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα
whether this not pleases you the to-be the name
δήλωμα τοῦ πράγματος;
showing of-the thing

CRAT. ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least

SOC. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων
but the to-be of-the names the(-ones) indeed from former
συγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ
composed the(-ones) and first not finely to-you seems
λέγεσθαι;
to-be-said

CRAT. ἔμοιγε.
to-me-at-least

e SOC. ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίγνεσθαι,
but the first if they-are-going showings of-some to-become
ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι
have-you some finer way of-the showings them to-become
ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ
other than them to-make as most such as those which
δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά; ἢ ὅδε μᾶλλόν σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν
one-must to-show them or this rather you pleases the way which
Ἑρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ
Hermogenes says and others many the conventions to-be the
ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς συνθεμένοις προειδόσι δὲ τὰ
names and to-show to-the(-ones) having-agreed knowing-beforehand and the

πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, συνθήκην,
things and to-be this correctness of-name convention
διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐάντε τις συνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν σύγκειται,
to-differ and nothing whether someone should-agree as now it-is-agreed
ἐάντε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν,
or also the-opposite for indeed which now small great to-call
ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν; πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει;
for and which great small which you the way pleases

XXIII · CUSTOM HAS A SHARE

Cratylus prefers likeness. Socrates: then letters must be like things; but in sklērotēs *the lambda signifies the opposite, and still we understand. Custom is a kind of convention, and it signifies through like and unlike letters alike. Nor can the names of the numbers be likenesses, so agreement has a share in correctness. Socrates asks what names are for; Cratylus says to teach: knowing the names is knowing the things. Is that the only way, or the best?*

CRAT. ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι 434
in-whole and in-all it-differs O Socrates the by-likeness
δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄν τις δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι.
to-show whatever — one shows but not by-the chance(-sign)
SOC. καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὅμοιον b
finely you-say therefore if-indeed will-be the name like
τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια
to-the thing necessary to-be-by-nature the elements like
τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις συνθήσει;
to-the things from which the first names one will-compose
ὧδε δὲ λέγω· ἆρά ποτ' ἄν τις συνέθηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ
thus and I-mean then ever — someone would-have-composed what just-now
ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὅμοιόν τῳ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει
we-were-saying painting like to-any of-the beings if not by-nature

ὑπῆρχε φαρμακεῖα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ
there-were pigments like being from which are-composed the(-things)
ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἡ γραφική· ἢ ἀδύνατον;
painted to-those which imitates the painting or impossible

CRAT. ἀδύνατον.
impossible

SOC. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὅμοια
therefore likewise also names not — ever like
γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ὁμοιότητά τινα
would-become to-anything if not will-belong those first likeness some
ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι
having from which are-composed the names to-those of-which are
τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα; ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα;
the names imitations are and from which one-must-compose elements

CRAT. ναί.
yes

c SOC. ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνῃ τοῦ λόγου οὗπερ ἄρτι
already then also you share of-the argument which-very just-now
Ἑρμογένης. φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ
Hermogenes come finely to-you do-we-seem to-say that the rho to-the
φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς;
motion and movement and hardness resembles or not finely

CRAT. καλῶς ἔμοιγε.
finely to-me-at-least

SOC. τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ
the and lambda to-the smooth and soft and what just-now
ἐλέγομεν;
we-were-saying

CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν
you-know then that for the same we indeed say
"σκληρότης," Ἐρετριῆς δὲ "σκληροτήρ";
sklērotēs Eretrians and sklērotēr

CRAT. πάνυ γε.
certainly at-least

SOC. πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφότερα
whether then the both rho and the sigma resemble both
τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ
the same and shows to-those both the same ending the
ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σῖγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ;
rho and to-us the sigma or to-the one of-us not it-shows

CRAT. δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις. d
it-shows indeed then to-both

SOC. πότερον ᾗ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ
whether in-so-far-as like they-happen being the rho and the
σῖγμα, ἢ ᾗ μή;
sigma or in-so-far-as not

CRAT. ᾗ ὅμοια.
in-so-far-as like

SOC. ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ;
truly then like are-they everywhere

CRAT. πρός γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν.
for at-least the perhaps motion to-show

SOC. ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον; οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ
truly also the lambda being-inserted not the contrary shows
σκληρότητος;
of-hardness

CRAT. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὥσπερ
perhaps for not rightly it-is-inserted O Socrates as
καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἐξαιρῶν τε καὶ
also what just-now you to Hermogenes said taking-out both and

ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὗ δέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις
putting-in letters where it-might-be-needful and rightly you-seemed
ἔμοιγε. καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν.
to-me-at-least and now perhaps instead-of the lambda rho one-must to-say

e SOC. εὖ λέγεις. τί οὖν; νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν
well you-say what then now as we-say nothing do-we-understand
ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῇ "σκληρόν," οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ
of-one-another when someone says sklēron nor do-you-know you
νῦν ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω;
now what I say

CRAT. ἔγωγε, διά γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε.
I-at-least through at-least the custom O dearest

SOC. ἔθος δὲ λέγων οἴει τι διάφορον λέγειν
custom and saying do-you-think something different to-say
συνθήκης; ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι
from-convention or other something you-mean the custom than that
ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ
I whenever this I-utter I-mean that you and
γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι; οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;
know that that I-mean not this do-you-mean

435 CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. οὐκοῦν εἰ γιγνώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθεγγομένου, δήλωμα σοι
therefore if you-know me uttering showing to-you
γίγνεται παρ' ἐμοῦ;
comes-about from me

CRAT. ναί.
yes

b SOC. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὃ διανοούμενος
from the unlike at-least than what meaning
φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῇ ᾗ φῂς
I-utter if-indeed the lambda unlike is to-the which you-say

σὺ σκληρότητι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ
you hardness if and this so is what other than
αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καί σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ
yourself with-yourself agreed and to-you comes-about the correctness of-the
ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδή γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ
name convention since at-least shows both the like and the
ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα; εἰ δ'
unlike letters of-custom both and of-convention having-gained if and
ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι
as most not is the custom convention not — finely still
ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος·
it-would-be to-say the likeness showing to-be but the custom
ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ. ἐπειδὴ
that for as it-seems both with-like and with-unlike shows since
δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε — τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου
and these-things we-concede O Cratylus the for silence of-you
συγχώρησιν θήσω — ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι
concession I-will-set necessary surely both convention something
καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι
and custom to-contribute toward showing of-what meaning
λέγομεν· ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ 'θέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν,
we-speak since O best if you-wish to the number to-come
πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν
whence do-you-think you-will-have names like to-one each of-the
ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν
numbers to-apply if not you-allow something the your agreement
καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι;
and convention authority to-have of-the names correctness about
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν d
to-me indeed then also myself pleases indeed according-to the possible
ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς
like to-be the names to-the things but lest as

ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη
truly the of-the Hermogenes sticky should-be the drawing this
τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ
of-the likeness necessary and should-be also to-the vulgar
τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα.
this to-use-as-well the convention for of-names correctness
ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο
since perhaps according-to at-least the possible most-finely — would-be-spoken
ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται,
whenever either with-all or as with-most like-things it-should-be-spoken
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον.
this and is with-befitting most-shamefully and the-opposite
τόδε δέ μοι ἔτι εἰπὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει
this and to-me still tell after these-things what for-us power have
τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι;
the names and what are-we-to-say them fine to-accomplish
CRAT. διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῦτο
to-teach to-me-at-least it-seems O Socrates and this
πάνυ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίστηται,
very simple to-be whoever — the names should-know
ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
to-know also the things
e SOC. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, ὡς ἐπειδάν
perhaps for O Cratylus the such you-mean that when
τις εἰδῇ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν — ἔστι δὲ οἷόνπερ
someone knows the name of-what-sort it-is is and of-what-sort-very
τὸ πρᾶγμα — εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπείπερ
the thing he-will-know indeed also the thing since-indeed
ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρ' ἐστὶν
like it-happens being to-the name art and one then is
ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων. κατὰ τοῦτο
the same of-all the(-things) to-one-another like according-to this

δή μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰδῇ
indeed to-me you-seem to-say that whoever — the names should-know
εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
will-know also the things

CRAT. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
most-truly you-say

SOC. ἔχε δή, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτ' ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος
hold indeed let-us-see what ever — would-be the way this
τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν, καὶ
of-the teaching of-the beings which you say now and
πότερον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι βελτίων, ἢ
whether there-is indeed also other this however better or
οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος. ποτέρως οἴει;
not-even there-is other than this in-which-way do-you-think

XXIV · NAMES CAN MISLEAD

Cratylus says it is the only and best way, and the way of seeking and finding too. Socrates warns that the first namer may have erred and deceived his followers. Cratylus answers that the namer knew, as the names' agreement proves. Socrates replies that a first small error can force the rest to agree, as in a geometer's diagram. Knowledge, the steady, inquiry, the trustworthy, and memory name rest, not motion, and ignorance and licentiousness name motion. Cratylus says most still signify motion; but are names to be counted like votes? He agrees not.

CRAT. οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ 436
so I-at-least not very at-all to-be other this but
καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον.
both only and best

SOC. πότερον δὲ καὶ εὕρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην
whether and also discovery of-the beings the same this
εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὑρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ηὑρηκέναι
to-be the(-one) the names having-found also those to-have-found
ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ἕτερον
of-which are the names or to-seek indeed and to-find other
δεῖν τρόπον, μανθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον;
to-be-necessary way to-learn but this
CRAT. πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν
of-all most both to-seek and to-find the same
τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταὐτά.
way this according-to the-same-things
b SOC. φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν
come indeed let-us-consider O Cratylus if someone seeking
τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον
the things should-follow the names examining of-what-sort
ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἆρ' ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς
each means to-be then do-you-perceive that not small
κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι;
danger is to-be-deceived
CRAT. πῶς;
how
SOC. δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα
clear that the(-one) having-set first the names of-what-sort
ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ
he-considered to-be the things such he-was-setting also the
ὀνόματα, ὥς φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;
names as we-say is-it-not for
CRAT. ναί.
yes

SOC. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα
if then that-one not rightly considered set and such-as
ἡγεῖτο, τί οἴει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ
he-considered what do-you-think us the(-ones) following him
πείσεσθαι; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι;
to-suffer other anything than to-be-deceived
CRAT. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον c
but lest not so it-is O Socrates but necessary
ᾖ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ
it-be knowing to-set the(-one) setting the names if and
μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη.
not what-very long-ago I was-saying not-even — names would-they-be
μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς
greatest and to-you let-be proof that not has-erred from-the
ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα
truth the(-one) setting not for — ever so harmonious
ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα
were to-him all-things or not did-you-perceive yourself saying that all-things
κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;
according-to the-same and toward the-same came-about the names
SOC. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν ἐστιν d
but this indeed good Cratylus nothing is
ἀπολόγημα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος
defense if for the first having-erred the(-one) setting
τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὐτῷ συμφωνεῖν
the-others already toward this he-forced and with-himself to-agree
ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε
compelled nothing strange as of-the diagrams sometimes
τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ
the first small and obscure falsehood having-come-about the
λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις.
remaining very-many already being following to-agree with-one-another

δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ
one-must indeed about the beginning of-every thing every
ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν
man the much account to-be and the much examination
εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης
whether rightly or not it-is-laid-down that and having-been-examined
ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα. οὐ μέντοι
sufficiently the remaining to-appear that following not however
ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ
but I-would-wonder — if also the names agree themselves
αὑτοῖς. πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ πρότερον
with-themselves again for let-us-examine what the former
διήλθομεν. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ
we-went-through as the whole going both and being-carried and
ῥέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα.
flowing we-say to-signify to-us the being the names
ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;
other something so to-you does-it-seem to-show

437 CRAT. πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.
very strongly and rightly at-least it-signifies

b SOC. σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν
let-us-examine indeed from them taking-up first indeed
τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν "ἐπιστήμην," ὡς ἀμφίβολον, καὶ
this the name the epistēmē how ambiguous and
μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς
more it-seems to-one-signifying that it-sets-at-rest our at the
πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν
things the soul than that it-goes-around-with and more-correct
ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ
it-is as now of-it the beginning to-say rather than
ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ "ἐπεϊστήμην," ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν
inserting the ei hepeistēmē but the insertion

ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ
to-make instead-of the in the ei in the iota then the
"βέβαιον," ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα
bebaion that of-standing some it-is and of-rest imitation
ἀλλ' οὐ φορᾶς. ἔπειτα ἡ "ἱστορία" αὐτό που σημαίνει
but not of-motion then the historia it surely signifies
ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν. καὶ τὸ "πιστὸν" ἱστὰν παντάπασι
that it-stops the flow and the piston stopping altogether
σημαίνει. ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ "μνήμη" παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή
signifies then and the mnēmē to-everyone surely reveals that rest
ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλ' οὐ φορά. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ "ἁμαρτία"
is in the soul but not motion if and you-wish the hamartia
καὶ ἡ "συμφορά," εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει,
and the symphora if according-to the name one will-follow
φανεῖται ταὐτὸν τῇ "συνέσει" ταύτῃ καὶ "ἐπιστήμῃ" καὶ
will-appear the-same to-the synesis this and epistēmē and
τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν.
to-the others all the about the serious-things names
ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ "ἀμαθία" καὶ ἡ "ἀκολασία" παραπλησία c
still then the amathia and the akolasia similar
τούτοις φαίνεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία
to-these appear the indeed for of-the with god going journey
φαίνεται, ἡ "ἀμαθία," ἡ δ' "ἀκολασία" παντάπασιν
appears the amathia the and akolasia altogether
ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται. καὶ οὕτως, ἃ
following to-the things appears and so which
νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιότατ' ἂν
we-consider for the worst names to-be most-like —
φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα
would-appear to-the(-ones) for the finest I-think and also others
πόλλ' ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγματεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη
many — someone would-find if he-should-busy-himself from which he-might-think

ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα
— *in-turn again the(-one) the names setting not going*
οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν.
nor being-carried but staying the things to-signify

d CRAT. ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως
but O Socrates you-see that the most(-part) in-that-way
ἐσήμαινεν.
signified

SOC. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε; ὥσπερ ψήφους
what then this O Cratylus as votes
διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ
shall-we-count the names and in this will-be the
ὀρθότης; ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα
correctness whichever — more should-appear the names
σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τἀληθῆ;
signifying these indeed will-be the-true
CRAT. οὔκουν εἰκός γε.
not-then likely at-least

XXV · LEARNING WITHOUT NAMES

How could the first namers know things when no names existed? Cratylus: a power above men gave them, so they must be right. But the names fight among themselves, so something other than names must decide, the things themselves. Beauty itself and good itself are always as they are; if they changed, nothing could be said of them, for what never stays the same could not even be.

438 SOC. οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ταῦτα μέν γε αὐτοῦ
not-even in-any-way-whatever O friend and these-things indeed at-least here
ἐάσωμεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν.
let-us-let-go let-us-go-back and again whence hither we-crossed

ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον
just-now for in the former if you-remember the(-one) setting
τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς
the names necessary you-said to-be knowing to-set for-whom
ἐτίθετο. πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὔ;
he-set whether then still to-you it-seems so or not

CRAT. ἔτι.
still

SOC. ἦ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῂς
truly also the(-one) the first setting knowing you-say
τίθεσθαι;
to-set

CRAT. εἰδότα.
knowing

SOC. ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκὼς ἢ ηὑρηκὼς ἦν b
from what-sort then names either having-learned or having-found was-he
τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μήπω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δ'
the things if-indeed the at-least first not-yet were-set to-learn and
αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως
in-turn we-say the things and to-find impossible to-be otherwise
ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι;
than the names having-learned or ourselves having-found-out of-what-sort they-are

CRAT. δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
you-seem something to-me to-say O Socrates

SOC. τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ
what then way are-we-to-say them knowing to-have-set or
νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα κεῖσθαί τε καὶ
lawgivers to-be before even any-whatever name to-be-set both and
ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν
those to-know if-indeed not it-is-possible the things to-learn
ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων;
but than from the names

c CRAT. οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ
I-think indeed I the truest account about
τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι
these to-be O Socrates greater some power to-be
ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς
than human the(-one) having-set the first names for-the
πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
things so-as necessary to-be them rightly to-be
SOC. εἶτα οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
then do-you-think contrary-things — would-have-set himself to-himself
ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός; ἢ οὐδέν σοι
the(-one) having-set being daemon some or god or nothing to-you
ἐδοκοῦμεν ἄρτι λέγειν;
we-seemed just-now to-say
CRAT. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦν τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα.
but lest not were of-these the one names
SOC. πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄγοντα ἢ
which O best the(-ones) toward the rest leading or
τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φοράν; οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι
the(-ones) toward the motion not for surely according-to the just-now
λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται.
said by-number it-will-be-judged
d CRAT. οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
not indeed just at-least O Socrates
SOC. ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων
names then having-revolted and the indeed claiming
ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δ' ἑαυτά, τίνι
themselves to-be the like-ones to-the truth the and themselves by-what
ἔτι διακρινοῦμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες; οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ
further shall-we-decide or to what having-come not for surely to
ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
names at-least other others than-these not for there-are but

δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ
clear that other some-things must-be-sought besides names which
ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὁπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ
to-us will-make-plain without names which of-these are
τἀληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων.
the-true having-shown clear that the truth of-the beings
CRAT. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. e
it-seems to-me so
SOC. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατὸν μαθεῖν
it-is then as it-seems O Cratylus possible to-learn
ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
without names the beings if-indeed these-things so are
CRAT. φαίνεται.
it-appears
SOC. διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν;
through what other then still do-you-expect — these-things to-learn
ἆρα δι᾽ ἄλλου του ἢ οὗπερ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιότατον,
then through other something than which-very likely both and most-just
δι᾽ ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ
through one-another at-least if somehow akin they-are and themselves
δι᾽ αὑτῶν; τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον
through themselves the for surely other than-those and different
ἕτερον ἄν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον σημαίνοι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα.
other — something and different would-signify but not those
CRAT. ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.
true-things to-me you-appear to-say
SOC. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι 439
hold indeed by Zeus the and names not often however
ὡμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα ἐοικότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις
did-we-agree the(-ones) finely set like to-be to-those
ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων;
of-which names are-set and to-be images of-the things

CRAT. ναί.
yes

b SOC. εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι᾽ ὀνομάτων τὰ
if then it-is-possible indeed as most through names the
πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν, ποτέρα
things to-learn it-is-possible and also through themselves which
ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ μάθησις; ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος
— would-be finer and clearer the learning from the image
μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν
to-learn itself both itself whether finely it-has-been-likened and the
ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε
truth of-which it-was image or from the truth itself both
αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται;
itself and the image of-it whether fittingly it-has-been-worked
CRAT. ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
from the truth to-me it-seems necessity to-be
SOC. ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν
in-what indeed then way one-must to-learn or to-find
τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατ᾽ ἐμὲ
the beings greater perhaps it-is to-have-known than according-to me
καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ
and you to-be-content-with and also this to-agree that not
ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ
from names but much rather themselves from themselves both
μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
must-be-learned and must-be-sought than from the names
CRAT. φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
it-appears O Socrates
c SOC. ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ
further then this let-us-examine how not us the many
ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν
these names to the-same tending deceive if in-the reality indeed

οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων
the(-ones) having-set them having-meant at-least set as going
ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων — φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ
all always and flowing they-appear for to-me-at-least also
αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι — τὸ δ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως
myself so to-have-meant it but if it-chanced not so
ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἷς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες
it-is but these themselves both as into some whirl having-fallen
κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν. σκέψαι
are-stirred and us drawing-after throw-in-besides examine
γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω.
for O wonderful Cratylus what I-at-least often dream
πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν
whether are-we-to-say something to-be itself fine and good
καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;
and one each of-the beings so or not
CRAT. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
to-me-at-least it-seems O Socrates
SOC. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν
itself then that let-us-examine not whether face
τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα
some is fine or something of-the such and seems these-things
πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον
all to-flow but itself are-we-to-say the fine not such
ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;
always is such-as it-is
CRAT. ἀνάγκη.
necessity
SOC. ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ
so then possible — to-address it rightly if always
ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι
it-slips-away first indeed that that it-is then that

τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ
such or necessity at-the-same-time us speaking other it
εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;
at-once to-become and to-slip-away and no-longer so to-be

CRAT. ἀνάγκη.
necessity

e SOC. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε
how then — would-be something that which never
ὡσαύτως ἔχει; εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἔν γ'
in-the-same-way is if for ever in-the-same-way it-holds in at-least
ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ
that the time clear that nothing it-changes if and always
ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε
in-the-same-way it-is and the same is how — this at-least
μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;
would-change or be-moved nothing departing-from of-the its-own form

CRAT. οὐδαμῶς.
in-no-way

If everything changed, nothing could be known, since it would change as the knower approached, and knowledge itself would cease to be. If knower and known, the beautiful and the good, always are, they seem nothing like flux. Whether that or Heraclitus is right is hard to decide, but no man of sense entrusts himself and his soul to names. Cratylus, bidden to examine it bravely, inclines to Heraclitus. Socrates sends him off to the country with Hermogenes, and Cratylus asks him to keep thinking too.

SOC. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. 440
but indeed not-even — it-would-be-known at-least by anyone
ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ
at-once for — approaching the(-one) going-to-know other and
ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθείη ἔτι ὁποῖόν
different it-would-become so-that not — it-would-be-known still of-what-sort
γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία
at-least something it-is or how being knowledge and surely no
γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.
knows what it-knows in-no-way being
CRAT. ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.
it-is as you-say
SOC. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ b
but not-even knowledge to-be to-say likely O Cratylus if
μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ
change all things and nothing stays if indeed for itself
τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι
this the knowledge of-the knowledge to-be not changes would-stay
τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
both — always the knowledge and would-be knowledge if and even itself the
εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τ' ἂν μεταπίπτοι εἰς
form changes of-the knowledge at-once both — it-would-change into

ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ
other form of-knowledge and not — would-be knowledge if and always
μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ
it-changes always not — would-be knowledge and from this the
λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον
argument neither the(-one) going-to-know nor the(-thing) going-to-be-known
ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ
— would-be if and is indeed always the knowing is and
τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
the known is and the fine is and the good
ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα
is and one each of-the beings not to-me appear these-things
ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ
like being which now we say to-flux nothing nor
φορᾷ. ταῦτ' οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς
to-motion these-things then whether ever so it-is or that-way as
οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί,
the(-ones) about Heraclitus both say and others many
μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος
lest not easy it-be to-examine nor very sense having
ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ
for-man having-entrusted to-names himself and the of-himself
ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις
soul to-tend having-trusted those and the(-ones) having-set
αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ
them to-insist as something knowing and of-himself both and
τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ
of-the beings to-condemn that nothing sound of-anything but
πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ
all as earthen-pots flow and simply as the with-catarrh
νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα
sick men so to-think also the things

διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα χρήματα
to-be-disposed by flux both and catarrh all things
ἔχεσθαι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως
to-be-held perhaps indeed then indeed O Cratylus so it-is perhaps
δὲ καὶ οὔ. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ
and also not to-examine then one-must manfully both and well and
μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι — ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν
not easily to-accept still for young you-are and age
ἔχεις — σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί.
you-have having-examined and if you-should-find to-share also with-me
CRAT. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, e
but I-will-do these-things well however know O Socrates
ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλά μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ
that not-even now unexamined am-I but to-me examining and
πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς
trouble having much rather that-way it-appears to-be as
Ἡράκλειτος λέγει.
Heraclitus says
SOC. εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὰν
to another-time then me O comrade you-will-teach when
ἥκῃς· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν·
you-come now but as you-are-prepared go to country
προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὅδε.
will-escort and you also Hermogenes here
CRAT. ταῦτ' ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι
these-things will-be O Socrates but also you try still
ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.
to-consider these-things already

ARISTOTLE

ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑΙ

Categories

Things are homonymous when only their name is common and the account of being that goes with the name differs, as a man and a drawing are both called animal. They are synonymous when both the name and the account are the same, as a man and an ox are animals in the same sense. Things are paronymous when they take their name from something else with a change of ending, as the grammarian from grammar and the brave man from bravery.

Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ
Homonymous are-called of-which name only common the but according-to
τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος
the-name account of-the substance different such-as animal the both man
καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. Τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ
and the drawn Of-these for name only common the
δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἂν γάρ τις
but according-to the-name account of-the substance different if for someone
ἀποδιδῷ τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον
should-render what is of-them for-each the for-animal to-be own
ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό
of-each account he-will-render Synonymous and are-called of-which the
τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας
both name common and the according-to the-name account of-the substance
ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς. Ὁ γὰρ
the same such-as animal the both man and the ox The for
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον,
man and the ox by-common name are-addressed animal
καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις
and the account and of-the substance the same if for should-render someone
τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον, τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ
the of-each account what is of-them for-each the for-animal
εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει. Παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται
to-be the same account he-will-render Paronymous and are-called

ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ
as-many-as from something differing in-the inflection the according-to
τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς
the-name appellation have such-as from the grammar
ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
the grammarian and from the courage the courageous

II · IN AND OF A SUBJECT

Things said are either combined, like man runs, or uncombined, like man and runs. Of things that are, some are said of a subject but are in none, as man of a particular man; some are in a subject but said of none, as a particular piece of grammar is in the soul; some are both, as knowledge is in the soul and said of grammar; and some are neither, as a particular man or horse. Particulars and things one in number are said of no subject, though some may be in one.

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν
Of-the(-things) said the(-ones) indeed according-to combination
λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ
are-said the(-ones) and without combination The(-ones) indeed then according-to
συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ
combination such-as man runs man wins the(-ones)
δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.
and without combination such-as man ox runs wins
Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται,
Of-the beings the(-ones) indeed of subject some are-said
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ'
in subject but no are such-as man of
ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν
subject indeed is-said of-the particular man in
ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστι· τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ
subject but no is the(-ones) and in subject

μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται (ἐν
indeed are of subject but no are-said in
ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον
subject and I-mean what in something not as part belonging
ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν), οἷον ἡ τὶς
impossible apart to-be from-the in which it-is such-as the particular
γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ'
grammar in subject indeed is in-the soul of
ὑποκειμένου δ' οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν
subject but no is-said and the particular white
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν τῷ σώματί ἐστιν (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα
in subject indeed in-the body is all for color
ἐν σώματι), καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· τὰ
in body of subject but no is-said the(-ones)
δὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν,
and of subject both are-said and in subject are
οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ'
such-as the knowledge in subject indeed is in-the soul of
ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτ'
subject and is-said of-the grammar the(-ones) and neither
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται,
in subject are nor of subject some are-said
οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ τὶς ἵππος· οὐδὲν
such-as the particular man and the particular horse nothing
γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ'
for of-the such neither in subject is nor of
ὑποκειμένου λέγεται. Ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ
subject is-said Simply and the individuals and one in-number
κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἔνια
of no subject are-said in subject but some

οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γάρ τις γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν
nothing prevents to-be the for particular grammar of-the(-things) in
ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται.
subject indeed is of subject but no is-said

III · PREDICATES AND DIFFERENTIAE

When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever is said of the predicate is said of the subject too: animal of man, and so of a particular man. Genera that are different and not ranged under one another have differentiae different in kind, as the differentiae of animal and of knowledge differ; but nothing prevents subordinate genera from sharing differentiae, for whatever differentiae the predicate has, the subject will have as well.

Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ' ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ' ὑποκειμένου,
Whenever one of another is-predicated as of subject
ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ
as-many-as of the predicated are-said all also of
τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς
the subject will-be-said such-as man of the particular
ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου·
man is-predicated the and animal of the man
οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ
therefore also of the particular man will-be-predicated the
ζῷον· ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.
animal the for particular man both man is and animal
Τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι
Of-the different-in-genus and not under one-another ranked different
τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης·
in-the species also the differentiae such-as of-animal and of-knowledge
ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ
of-animal indeed for differentiae the both footed and the two-footed and

τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων·
the winged and the aquatic of-knowledge but none of-these
οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι.
not for differs knowledge from-knowledge by-the two-footed to-be
Τῶν δέ γε ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς
Of-the but at-least under one-another genera nothing prevents the same
διαφορὰς εἶναι· τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὰ γενῶν
differentiae to-be the for higher of-the under them genera
κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί
are-predicated so-that as-many-as of-the predicated differentiae
εἰσι, τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.
are so-many also of-the subject will-be

IV · THE TEN CATEGORIES

Each thing said without combination signifies substance, quantity, quality, relative, where, when, position, having, acting, or being affected. In outline: man, horse; two cubits long; white, grammatical; double, half, greater; in the Lyceum; yesterday; lies, sits; is shod, is armed; cuts, burns; is cut, is burned. None of these by itself is an affirmation or a negation; only their combination makes one, true or false, while man, white, runs, wins are neither.

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον
Of-the(-things) according-to no combination said each
ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ
either substance signifies or quantity or qualified or relative something or where
ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία
or when or to-lie or to-have or to-act or to-be-affected Is and substance
μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ
indeed as in-outline to-say such-as man horse quantity and
οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν·
such-as two-cubits three-cubits qualified and such-as white grammatical

πρός τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον
relative something and such-as double half greater where and such-as
ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι
in Lyceum in market-place when and such-as yesterday last-year to-lie
δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται,
and such-as he-reclines he-sits to-have and such-as he-has-shoes-on
ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον
he-is-armed to-act and such-as he-cuts he-burns to-be-affected and such-as
τέμνεται, καίεται. Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ
he-is-cut he-is-burned Each and of-the(-things) said itself
μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται ἢ ἀποφάσει,
indeed by itself in no affirmation is-said or negation
τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ
by-the and toward one-another of-these combination affirmation or
ἀπόφασις γίνεται. Ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ
negation comes-about All for seems affirmation and
ἀπόφασις ἤτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ
negation either true or false to-be of-the but according-to
μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε
no combination said nothing either true or
ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.
false is such-as man white runs wins

Primary substance, such as a particular man or horse, is neither said of a subject nor in one; secondary substances are the species and genera it belongs to. Everything else is said of or in primary substances, so without them nothing else could be, and the species is more substance than the genus. No substance is in a subject, nor is a differentia, and what is said from them is said synonymously. A primary substance signifies a this, a secondary one rather a qualified substance; substance has no contrary and does not admit more and less. Most distinctive of all, one and the same substance admits contraries by changing itself, as a man becomes pale and dark; statements and beliefs do so only as the things change.

Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα
Substance and is the most-properly both and primarily and most
λεγομένη, ἥ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ'
said which neither of subject some is-said nor
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ
in subject some is such-as the particular man or the
τὶς ἵππος. Δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν
particular horse Secondary and substances are-called in which species
αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ
the primarily substances called belong these both and the
τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει
of-the species these genera such-as the particular man in species
μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ
indeed belongs to-the man genus and of-the species is
τὸ ζῷον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε
the animal secondary then these are-called substances such-as the both
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον. Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
man and the animal Evident and from the(-things) said
ὅτι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
that of-the(-things) of subject said necessary both

τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον
the-name and the account to-be-predicated of-the subject such-as
ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου,
the man of subject is-said of-the particular man
καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα· τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ
and is-predicated at-least the-name the for man of-the
τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ τοῦ
particular man you-will-predicate Also the account and the of-the
ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται·
man of the particular man will-be-predicated
ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.
the for particular man both man is and animal
Ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
So-that both the-name and the account of the subject
κατηγορηθήσεται. Τῶν δ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ
will-be-predicated Of-the(-things) and in subject being for
μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔθ' ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται
indeed the most neither the-name nor the account is-predicated
τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει
of-the subject for some and the-name indeed nothing prevents
κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον
to-be-predicated sometimes of-the subject the but account
ἀδύνατον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι
impossible such-as the white in subject being in-the body
κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται),
is-predicated of-the subject white for body is-called
ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ σώματος
the but account the of-the white never of body
κατηγορηθήσεται. Τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ'
will-be-predicated The(-things) and other all either of
ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις
subjects are-said the primary substances or in subjects

αὐταῖς ἐστίν. Τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ'
them are This and evident from the(-things) according-to
ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
each set-forth such-as the animal of the man
κατηγορεῖται· οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου
is-predicated therefore also of the particular man
κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ ζῷον· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν
will-be-predicated the animal if for of none of-the particular
ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως. Πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα
men not-even of man at-all Again the color
ἐν σώματι· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν
in body therefore also in particular body if for not in
τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως.
particular of-the(-things) according-to each not-even in body at-all
Ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν
So-that the other all either of subjects are-said the
πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. Μὴ οὐσῶν
primary substances or in subjects them are Not being
οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.
then the primary substances impossible of-the others anything to-be
Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ
Of-the and secondary substances more substance the species than-the
γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν. Ἐὰν γὰρ
genus nearer for to-the primary substance it-is If for
ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον
should-render someone the primary substance what it-is more-knowably
καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἤπερ τὸ γένος,
and more-properly he-will-render the species rendering than the genus
οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἂν
such-as the particular man rendering more-knowably —
ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον
he-would-render man than animal rendering the indeed for proper

μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον. Καὶ τὸ
more of-the particular man the and more-common And the
τὶ δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον
particular tree rendering more-knowably he-will-render tree
ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν. Ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς
rendering than plant Further the primary substances because-of the to-the
ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων
others all to-underlie and all the others of these
κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι
to-be-predicated or in them to-be because-of this most substances
λέγονται. Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα
are-called As and at-least the primary substances toward the others all
ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· ὑπόκειται
are so also the species toward the genus is underlies
γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν
for the species to-the genus the indeed for genera of the species
κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.
are-predicated the and species of the genera not convert
Ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον
So-that also from these the species than-the genus more
οὐσία. Αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη,
substance Of-them and the species as-many-as not are genera
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
nothing more one than-another substance is nothing for
οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσεις κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν
more-properly you-will-render of the particular man the
ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου τὸν
man rendering than of the particular horse the
ἵππον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν
horse Likewise and also of-the primary substances nothing

μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον
more one than-another substance is nothing for more
ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.
the particular man substance than the particular ox
Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων
Reasonably and after the primary substances alone of-the others
τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόνα γὰρ
the species and the genera secondary substances are-called alone for
δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων. Τὸν γάρ
they-show the primary substance of-the predicated(-things) The for
τινα ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν εἶδος
particular man if should-render someone what he-is the indeed species
ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει καὶ γνωριμώτερον
or the genus rendering properly he-will-render and more-knowable
ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὅ
will-make man or animal rendering of-the and others what
τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον
ever — should-render someone inappropriately he-will-be having-rendered such-as
λευκόν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς.
white or runs or anything-whatever of-the such rendering
Ὥστε εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα μόνα οὐσίαι λέγονται. Ἔτι
So-that reasonably of-the others these alone substances are-called Further
αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι
the primary substances because-of the to-the others all to-underlie
κυριώτατα οὐσίαι λέγονται. Ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι
most-properly substances are-called As and at-least the primary substances
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη
toward the others all are so the species and the genera
τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ
of-the primary substances toward the remaining all are of
τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται. Τὸν γάρ τινα
these for all the remaining are-predicated The for particular

ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ
man you-will-call grammatical therefore also man and
ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
animal grammatical you-will-call Likewise and also for the others
Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι. Ἡ
Common and of all substance the not in subject to-be The
μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ'
indeed for primary substance neither in subject is nor of
ὑποκειμένου λέγεται· τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φανερὸν μὲν
subject is-said of-the and secondary substances evident indeed
καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος
also thus that not they-are in subject The for man
καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, ἐν
of subject indeed of-the particular man is-said in
ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ
subject but not is not for in the particular man the
ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ' ὑποκειμένου
man is Likewise and also the animal of subject
μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον
indeed is-said of-the particular man not is but the animal
ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. Ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ
in the particular man Further and of-the(-things) in subject
ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε
being the indeed name nothing prevents to-be-predicated sometimes
τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον. Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων
of-the subject the but account impossible Of-the and secondary
οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
substances is-predicated both the account of the subject
καὶ τοὔνομα· τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ
and the-name the for of-the man account of the

τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις, καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου ὡσαύτως.
particular man you-will-predicate and the of-the animal likewise
Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.
So-that not — would-be the substance of-the(-things) in subject
Οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ
Not proper and this of-the substance but also the differentia
τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. Τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ
of-the(-things) not in subject is The for footed and the
δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν
two-footed of subject indeed is-said the man in
ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ
subject but not is not for in the man is the
δίπουν ἢ τὸ πεζόν. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς
two-footed or the footed Also the account and is-predicated the of-the
διαφορᾶς, καθ' οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά, οἷον εἰ τὸ
differentia of which — should-be-said the differentia such-as if the
πεζὸν κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ
footed of the man is-said also the account the of-the
πεζοῦ κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
footed will-be-predicated of-the man footed for is the
ἄνθρωπος. Μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν
man Not let-disturb and us the parts of-the substances
ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν
as in subjects being the wholes lest ever we-be-compelled
οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν
not substances them to-say to-be not for so the(-things) in
ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.
subject were-meant the(-ones) as parts belonging in something
Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα
Belongs and to-the substances and to-the differentiae the all
συνωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι. Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπ' αὐτῶν
synonymously from them to-be-said All for the from them

κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ
predications either of the individuals are-predicated or of
τῶν εἰδῶν. Ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία
the species From indeed for the primary substance none
ἐστὶ κατηγορία· κατ᾽ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·
is predication of no for subject it-is-said
τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου
of-the and secondary substances the indeed species of the individual
κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ
is-predicated the and genus both of the species and of
τοῦ ἀτόμου. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ κατὰ τῶν
the individual Likewise and also the differentiae of the
εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται. Καὶ τὸν
species and of the individuals are-predicated Also the
λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν
account and admit the primary substances the of-the species
καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους·
and the of-the genera and the species and the of-the genus
ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ
as-many-as for of the predicated are-said all also
κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν
of the subject will-be-said Likewise and also the
τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἄτομα.
of-the differentiae account admit the species and the individuals
Συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν καὶ
Synonymous and at-least were of-which both the-name common and
ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν
the account the same so-that all the(-things) from the substances
καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.
and the(-things) from the differentiae synonymously are-said

Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν
Every and substance seems this something to-signify For indeed then
τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι
the primary substances indisputable and true is that
τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ
this something it-signifies individual for and one in-number the(-thing)
δηλούμενόν ἐστιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν
shown is for but the secondary substances it-appears indeed
ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν,
likewise by-the form of-the appellation this something to-signify
ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ
whenever one-says man or animal not indeed true at-least but
μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον
rather qualified some it-signifies not for one is the subject
ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
just-as the primary substance but of many the man
λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον. Οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει,
is-said and the animal Not simply but qualified some it-signifies
ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ᾽
just-as the white Nothing for other signifies the white but
ἢ ποιόν. Τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν
than qualified The but species and the genus about substance the qualified
ἀφορίζει· ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει. Ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ
mark-off qualified for some substance it-signifies Over more and by-the
γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται· ὁ γὰρ ζῷον
genus than by-the species the marking-off it-makes the(-one) for animal
εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περιλαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
saying over more includes than the(-one) the man
Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον
Belongs and to-the substances also the nothing to-them contrary
εἶναι. Τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον, οἷον
to-be To-the for primary substance what — would-be contrary such-as

τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ τινὶ ζῴῳ; οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν
to-the particular man or to-the particular animal nothing for is
ἐναντίον. Οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ οὐδέν
contrary Nor at-least to-the man or to-the animal nothing
ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ
is contrary Not proper and this of-the substance but
καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ· τῷ γὰρ
also for others many such-as for the quantity to-the for
διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τοῖς
two-cubits or three-cubits nothing is contrary nor at-least to-the
δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις τὸ πολὺ
ten nor of-the such to-any if not someone the much
τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ.
to-the little should-say contrary to-be or the great to-the small
Τῶν δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.
Of-the and determinate quantities nothing to-nothing contrary is
Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
Seems and the substance not to-admit the more and the less
Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία
I-mean but not that substance than-substance not is more substance
καὶ ἧττον οὐσία (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν), ἀλλ᾽
and less substance this indeed for has-been-said that it-is but
ὅτι ἑκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστίν, οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ
that each substance this which-very it-is not is-said more and
ἧττον. Οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται
less Such-as if is itself the substance man not will-be
μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος
more and less man neither himself than-himself nor one
ἑτέρου· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος,
than-another not for is one than-another more man
ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ ἧττον
just-as the white one than-another more is and less

λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον καλὸν καὶ ἧττον
white and fine one than-another more fine and less
λέγεται. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται,
is-said Also itself and than-itself more and less is-said
οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον λευκὸν εἶναι λέγεται νῦν
such-as the body white being more white to-be is-said now
ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον
than before and hot being more hot and less
λέγεται. Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται·
is-said The but at-least substance not more and less is-said
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον
not for man more now man than before
λέγεται, οὐδέ γε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν οὐσίαι.
is-said nor at-least of-the others nothing as-many-as are substances
Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
So-that not — would-admit the substance the more and less
Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ
Most and proper of-the substance seems to-be the same and
ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν
one in-number being of-the contraries to-be receptive such-as for indeed
τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις τὸ τοιοῦτο προενεγκεῖν,
the others not — could someone the such to-bring-forward
ὅσα μή εἰσιν οὐσίαι, ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων
as-many-as not are substances which one in-number being of-the contraries
δεκτικόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν
receptive is such-as the color which is one and same
τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ
in-the number not will-be white and black nor the same
πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία·
action and one in-the number not will-be bad and good
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μή εἰσιν οὐσίαι.
likewise and also for the others as-many-as not are substances

Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν
The but at-least substance one and same in-number being receptive of-the
ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
contraries is such-as the particular man one and the same
ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλας γίνεται, καὶ
being at-one-time indeed white at-another-time and black becomes and
θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
hot and cold and bad and good For but the
ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο
others of-none appears the such if not someone should-object
τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι
the statement and the opinion saying of-the contraries to-be
δεκτικά. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς εἶναι
receptive The for same statement true and false to-be
δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα,
seems such-as if true should-be the statement the to-sit someone
ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος λόγος ψευδὴς ἔσται.
having-stood-up him the same this statement false will-be
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι
Likewise and also for the opinion if for someone truly should-opine
τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει,
the to-sit someone having-stood-up him falsely he-will-opine
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο
the same having about him opinion If but someone even this
παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει. Τὰ μὲν
should-admit but in-the at-least way it-differs The(-things) indeed
γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν
for in-the-case-of the substances themselves changing receptive of-the
ἐναντίων ἐστί· ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν
contraries are cold for from hot having-become it-changed
(ἠλλοίωται γάρ) καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ
it-has-been-altered for and black from white and good from

φαύλου. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
bad Likewise and also for the others each of-them
μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν. Ὁ δὲ
change admitting of-the contraries receptive is The but
λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως
statement and the opinion themselves indeed unmoved in-every-way altogether
διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ
remain of-the but thing being-moved the contrary about them
γίνεται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί
comes-about the indeed for statement remains the same the to-sit
τινα, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς
someone of-the but thing having-been-moved at-one-time indeed true
ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
at-another-time and false is-called Likewise and also for the
δόξης. Ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ
opinion So-that by-the way at-least proper — would-be of-the substance the
κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι.
according-to the its-own change receptive of-the contraries to-be
Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν
If and someone even these-things should-admit the statement and the
δόξαν δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο.
opinion receptive of-the contraries to-be not is true this
Ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαί τι
The for statement and the opinion not by-the themselves to-receive something
τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν
of-the contraries to-be receptive are-said but by-the about other
τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι. Τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι
something the affection to-have-come-about By-the for the thing to-be
ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι
or not to-be by-this also the statement true or false to-be
λέγεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸς δεκτικὸς εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἁπλῶς
is-said not by-the itself receptive to-be of-the contraries Simply

γὰρ οὐθὲν ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα,
for nothing by anything neither the statement is-moved nor the opinion
ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς
so-that not — would-be receptive of-the contraries nothing in them
γινομένου πάθους. Ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴ τὰ ἐναντία
coming-about affection The but at-least substance by-the itself the contraries
δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι λέγεται· νόσον
to-receive by-this receptive of-the contraries to-be is-said disease
γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν· καὶ
for and health it-receives and whiteness and blackness and
ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι
each of-the such itself receiving of-the contraries to-be
δεκτικὴ λέγεται. Ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν
receptive is-said So-that proper — of-substance would-be the same
καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ τὴν
and one in-number being receptive to-be of-the contraries according-to the
ἑαυτῆς μεταβολήν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.
its-own change About indeed then substance so-much let-it-be-said

Quantity is discrete, like number and speech, or continuous, like line, surface, body, time, and place; some have parts with position relative to one another, as a line's, and some do not, as number's and time's. Other things are quantities only by accident, as action is long because its time is. A quantity has no contrary: large and small, many and few are relatives. It does not admit more and less. Most distinctive of quantity is being called equal and unequal.

Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές,
Of-the and quantity the indeed is discrete the and continuous
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὑτοῖς
and the indeed from position having toward one-another of-the in themselves
μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν. Ἔστι δὲ
parts is-composed the and not from having position Is and
διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ οἷον
discrete indeed such-as number and speech continuous and such-as
γραμμή, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος
line surface body further and besides these time
καὶ τόπος. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι
and place Of-the indeed for of-the number parts no is
κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, οἷον τὰ
common boundary toward which join the parts of-it such-as the
πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον
five if is of-the ten part toward no common boundary
συνάπτει τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ
join the five and the five but they-are-separated and the
τρία γε καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει·
three at-least and the seven toward no common boundary join
οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν ἔχοις ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ κοινὸν ὅρον λαβεῖν
nor at-all — could-you for number common boundary to-take
τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διώρισται· ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς
of-the parts but always they-are-separated so-that the indeed number

τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν
of-the discrete is Likewise and also the speech of-the
διωρισμένων ἐστίν. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος,
discrete is That indeed for quantity is the speech
φανερόν· καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ βραχείᾳ καὶ μακρᾷ.
evident it-is-measured for by-syllable short and long
Λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λόγον γιγνόμενον. Πρὸς
I-mean and it the with voice speech coming-about Toward
οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει· οὐ
no for common boundary of-it the parts join not
γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ συνάπτουσιν,
for is common boundary toward which the syllables join
ἀλλ' ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν. Ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ
but each is-separated itself by itself The and line
συνεχής ἐστιν· ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν
continuous is it-is-possible for to-take common boundary toward which
τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν, καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας
the parts of-it join a-point and of-the surface
γραμμήν· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα κοινὸν
a-line the for of-the plane parts toward some common
ὅρον συνάπτει. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοις
boundary join Likewise and also for the body you-could
ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἃ
— to-take common boundary line or surface toward which
τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος
the of-the body parts join Is and also the time
καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει
and the place of-the such the for now time joins
πρὸς τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα. Πάλιν ὁ τόπος
toward the past and the future Again the place
τῶν συνεχῶν ἐστί· τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια
of-the continuous is place for some the of-the body parts

κατέχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐκοῦν καὶ
occupy which toward some common boundary join therefore also
τὰ τοῦ τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος
the of-the place parts which occupies each of-the of-the body
μορίων, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ
parts toward the same boundary join toward which also the
τοῦ σώματος μόρια. Ὥστε συνεχὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος·
of-the body parts So-that continuous — would-be also the place
πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.
toward for one common boundary of-it the parts join
Ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν
Further and the(-ones) indeed from position having toward one-another of-the in
αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν,
themselves parts are-composed the(-ones) and not from having position
οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα·
such-as the indeed of-the line parts position have toward one-another
ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν
each for of-them lies somewhere and you-could — to-distinguish
καὶ ἀποδοῦναι ὅπου ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ
and to-render where each lies in the plane and
πρὸς ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει. Ὡσαύτως δὲ
toward what-sort part of-the remaining it-joins Likewise and
καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν
also the of-the plane parts position have some likewise for —
ἀποδοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς
would-be-rendered each where it-lies and what-sort join toward
ἄλληλα· καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου.
one-another and the of-the solid and likewise and the of-the place
Ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τὰ
For but at-least the number not — could someone to-show that the
μόρια αὐτοῦ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που,
parts of-it position some have toward one-another or lie somewhere

ἢ ποιά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων. Οὐδὲ τὰ
or what-sort at-least toward one-another join of-the parts Nor the
τοῦ χρόνου· ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων·
of-the time remains for nothing of-the of-the time parts
ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι;
what and not is remaining how — this position some could-have
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν
but rather order some you-would-say — to-have by-the the indeed
πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου τὸ δ' ὕστερον. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
earlier to-be of-the time the and later And for the
ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως τῷ τὸ ἓν πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι
number and likewise by-the the one earlier to-be-counted
τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν· καὶ οὕτω τάξιν τινὰ
than-the two and the two than-the three and so order some
ἂν ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις ἄν. Καὶ ὁ
— it-would-have position but not at-all you-would-take — Also the
λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν μορίων
speech and likewise nothing for remains of-the parts
αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο
of-it but it-has-been-said both and not it-is-possible still this
λαβεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ,
to-take so-that not — would-be position of-the parts of-it
εἴγε μηδὲν ὑπομένει. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων
if-indeed nothing remains The(-ones) indeed then from position having
τῶν μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.
the parts are-composed the(-ones) and not from having position
Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα,
Properly and quantities these alone are-called the(-ones) said
τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ
the and others all according-to accident to these for
ἀποβλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν, οἷον πολὺ τὸ
looking also the-others quantities we-call such-as much the

λευκὸν λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ
white is-called by-the the surface much to-be and the
πρᾶξις μακρὰ τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ
action long by-the at-least the time much to-be and the
κίνησις πολλή. Οὐ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν
motion much Not for by itself each of-these quantity
λέγεται. Οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι,
is-called Such-as if should-render someone how-great some the action is
τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ, ἐνιαυσιαίαν ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς.
by-the time he-will-define yearlong or so somehow rendering
Καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ
And the white quantity some rendering by-the surface
ὁριεῖ· ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ
he-will-define how-great for — the surface should-be so-great also
τὸ λευκὸν φήσειεν ἂν εἶναι. Ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ'
the white he-would-say — to-be So-that alone properly and by
αὑτὰ ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων
themselves quantities are-called the(-ones) said of-the and others
οὐδὲν καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
nothing by itself but if then according-to accident
Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ
Further to-the quantity nothing is contrary In-the-case-of indeed for
τῶν ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον
the determinate evident that nothing is contrary such-as
τῷ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων
to-the two-cubits or three-cubits or to-the surface or of-the such
τινί· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ πολὺ
to-any nothing for is to-them contrary if not then the much
τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ.
to-the little should-say someone to-be contrary or the great to-the small
Τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· οὐδὲν γὰρ
Of-these but none is quantity but of-the relative something nothing for

αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον
itself by itself great is-called or small but by-the toward other
ἀναφέρεσθαι, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ
to-be-referred such-as mountain indeed small is-called millet-grain and
μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
great by-the the indeed than-the same-kind greater to-be the and
ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά,
less than-the same-kind Therefore toward other the reference
ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ' αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ
since if-indeed by itself small or great it-were-called not — ever the
μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη. Πάλιν
indeed mountain small would-be-called the and millet-grain great Again
ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ φαμὲν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις
in indeed the village we-say many men to-be in Athens
δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ
but few many-times-more than-them being and in indeed the house
πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.
many in but the theater few by-much more being
Ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων
Further the indeed two-cubits and three-cubits and each of-the such
ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ
quantity signifies the but great or small not signifies quantity but
μᾶλλον πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ
rather relative something toward for other is-considered the great and
τὸ μικρόν. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.
the small So-that evident that these of-the relative something are
Ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις ταῦτα ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ,
Further if both should-set one these quantities to-be if and not should-set
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν· ὃ γὰρ μή ἐστιν αὐτὸ
not is to-them contrary nothing what for not it-is-possible itself
καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, πῶς ἂν
by itself to-take but toward other is-referred how —

φαίη τις τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον; ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα
could-say someone to-this something contrary further and if will-be the great
καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία
and the small contraries it-will-follow the same at-once the contraries
ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία. Συμβαίνει
to-admit and themselves to-themselves to-be contrary It-follows
γάρ ποτε ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι· ἔστι
for sometimes at-once the same great both and small to-be it-is
γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
for toward indeed this small toward other but the same this
μέγα. Ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
great So-that the same both great and small at the same
χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει· ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι.
time to-be it-follows so-that at-once the contraries to-admit
Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δοκεῖ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς
But nothing seems at-once the contraries to-admit such-as for the
οὐσίας· δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὔτι
substance receptive indeed of-the contraries seems to-be but not-at-all
γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν
at-least at-once is-sick and is-healthy But nor white and black
ἐστὶν ἅμα. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἅμα
is at-once But nor of-the others nothing is which at-once
τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται. Καὶ αὐτὰ δ' ἑαυτοῖς συμβαίνει
the contraries admits Also themselves and to-themselves it-follows
ἐναντία εἶναι. Εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ
contrary to-be If for is the great to-the small contrary the
δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἴη
and same is at-once great and small itself to-itself would-be
ἂν ἐναντίον. Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ εἶναί
— contrary But of-the impossible-things it-is itself to-itself to-be
τι ἐναντίον. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον,
anything contrary Not is then the great to-the small contrary

οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ. Ὥστε εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν πρός τι
nor the much to-the little So-that if even not of-the relative something
ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἕξει.
these-things one will-say but of-the quantity nothing contrary it-will-have
Μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον
Most and the contrariety of-the quantity about the place
δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν. Τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι,
seems to-belong The for up to-the down contrary they-set
τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες διὰ τὸ
the toward the middle region down calling because-of the
πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου
greatest to-the middle distance toward the limits of-the world
εἶναι. Ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν
to-be They-seem and also the of-the other contraries definition
ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων
from these to-apply the for most from-one-another
διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.
standing-apart of-the in the same genus contraries they-define
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον
Not seems and the quantity to-admit the more and less such-as
τὸ δίπηχυ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ. Οὐδ'
the two-cubits not for is one than-another more two-cubits Nor
ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
for the number such-as the three than-the five nothing more
τὰ τρία, οὐδὲ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν. Οὐδὲ χρόνος ἕτερος
the three nor the five than-the three Nor time one
ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος εἶναι λέγεται. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν
than-another more time to-be is-said Nor for of-the(-things)
εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται.
said at-all of-none the more and the less is-said
Ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
So-that also the quantity not admits the more and the less

Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον
Proper and most of-the quantity the equal both and unequal
λέγεσθαι. Ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν ἴσον τε καὶ
to-be-called Each for of-the said quantities equal both and
ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ
unequal is-called such-as body both equal and unequal is-called and
χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
time both equal and unequal Likewise and also for the others
τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται.
of-the(-things) stated each equal both and unequal is-called
Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσά, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι
Of-the and remaining as-many-as not are quantities not at-all — would-seem
ἴσα τε καὶ ἄνισα λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις οὐ πάνυ ἴση
equal both and unequal to-be-called such-as the disposition not at-all equal
τε καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν
both and unequal is-called but rather like and the white
ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιον. Ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ
equal both and unequal not at-all but like So-that of-the quantity
μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.
most — would-be proper the equal both and unequal to-be-called

Relatives are things said to be what they are of or than something else: the greater is greater than something, the double double of something, and state, knowledge, perception, and position are relatives too. Some have contraries and admit more and less, and all are said reciprocally if the correlative is given properly. Most seem simultaneous by nature, though the knowable seems prior to knowledge and the perceptible to perception. Whether any substance is a relative is a hard question. On an amended definition, a relative is that whose being is being related to something, and whoever knows one definitely knows its correlative. A head or a hand can be known without knowing whose it is, so no substance is a relative, though the question needs more study.

Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ
Relative something and the such are-called as-many-as themselves
ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως
what-very they-are of-others to-be are-said or in-any-way otherwise
πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου
toward other such-as the greater this which-very it-is of-other
λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ λέγεται μεῖζον· καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον
is-said than-something for is-said greater and the double
τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον
this which-very it-is of-other is-said of-something for double
λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Ἔστι
is-called Likewise and also as-many-as other such Are
δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις,
and also the such of-the relative something such-as state disposition
αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις. Πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα
perception knowledge position All for the(-things) said
αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο
themselves what-very they-are of-others to-be are-said and not other
τι· ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη
anything the for state of-something state is-said and the knowledge

τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ
of-something knowledge and the position of-something position and the
ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως. Πρός τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ
others and likewise Relative something then are as-many-as themselves
ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς
what-very they-are of-others to-be are-said or in-any-way otherwise toward
ἕτερον, οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον· πρός τι
other such-as mountain great is-called toward other relative something
γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος· καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον
for great is-called the mountain and the like to-something like
λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι
is-called and the others and the such likewise relative something
λέγεται. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ
are-called Further and also the reclining and the standing and the
καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι. Τὸ
sitting positions some the and position of-the relative something The
δὲ ἀνακεῖσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ
and to-recline or to-stand or to-sit themselves indeed not are
θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.
positions paronymously but from the said positions are-called
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον
Belongs and also contrariety in the relative something such-as
ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον ὂν τῶν πρός τι, καὶ
virtue to-vice contrary each being of-the relative something and
ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίᾳ. Οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει
knowledge to-ignorance Not to-all but the relative something belongs
τὸ ἐναντίον· τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον,
the contrary to-the for double nothing is contrary
οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.
nor to-the triple nor of-the such to-any

Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ
Seem and also the more and the less to-admit the
πρός τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόμοιον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
relative something like for and unlike more and less
λέγεται, καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται,
is-said and equal and unequal more and less is-said
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν· τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον
each of-them relative something being the both for like
τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τινὶ ἀνόμοιον.
to-something like is-called and the unlike to-something unlike
Οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
Not all but the relative something admits the more and
ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
less the for double not is-called more and less
διπλάσιον, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
double nor of-the such any
Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται,
All and the relative something toward correlatives are-said
οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται καὶ ὁ δεσπότης
such-as the slave of-master slave is-called and the master
δούλου δεσπότης, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον
of-slave master and the double of-half double
καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος
and the half of-double half and the greater than-less
μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ
greater and the less than-greater less Likewise and
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει
also for the others except in-the inflection sometimes it-will-differ
κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται
according-to the expression such-as the knowledge of-the-knowable is-called
ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ
knowledge and the knowable by-knowledge knowable and the

αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει
perception of-the-perceptible perception and the perceptible by-perception
αἰσθητόν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν,
perceptible Not indeed but sometimes not it-will-seem to-reciprocate
ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ, ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ
if not properly toward what it-is-said it-be-rendered but should-err
ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος,
the(-one) rendering such-as the wing if it-be-rendered of-bird
οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ. Οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον
not reciprocates bird of-wing Not for properly the first
ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ
has-been-rendered wing of-bird not for in-so-far-as bird in-this-way
τὸ πτερὸν αὐτοῦ λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστι·
the wing of-it is-called but in-so-far-as winged it-is
πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν, ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες.
of-many for also others wings are which not are birds
Ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον
So-that if it-be-rendered properly also it-reciprocates such-as
τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ
the wing of-winged wing and the winged by-wing
πτερωτόν. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον,
winged Sometimes and also to-coin-names perhaps necessary
ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν
if not established should-be name toward which properly —
ἀποδοθείη, οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον τοῦ πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ,
it-would-be-rendered such-as the rudder of-the ship if it-be-rendered
οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον,
not proper the rendering becomes not for in-so-far-as ship
ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν
in-this-way of-it the rudder is-called there-are for ships of-which
οὐκ ἔστι πηδάλια. Διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον
not are rudders Wherefore not it-reciprocates the for ship

οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον. Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ
not is-called of-rudder ship But perhaps more-proper — the
ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη, τὸ πηδάλιον
rendering would-be if so somehow should-be-rendered the rudder
πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ
of-ruddered rudder or in-any-way otherwise name for not
κεῖται. Καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ
is-established And it-reciprocates at-least if properly it-be-rendered the
γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
for ruddered by-rudder ruddered Likewise and also
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη
for the others such-as the head more-properly — would-be-rendered
κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου ἀποδιδομένη· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον,
of-headed than of-animal being-rendered not for in-so-far-as animal
κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.
head it-has many for of-the animals head not have
Οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις λάβοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται
So and most-easily — perhaps one would-take for-which not are-established
ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ
names if from the first both for-the(-ones) toward them
ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
reciprocating one-should-set the names just-as for the
προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ
aforesaid from the wing the winged and from the
πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν. Πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν
rudder the ruddered All then the relative something if
περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται,
indeed properly they-be-rendered toward correlatives are-said
ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς
since if at-least toward the chance they-be-rendered and not toward
αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. Λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ
itself what it-is-said not it-reciprocates I-mean and that not-even

τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων,
of-the(-things) admittedly toward correlatives said
καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων, οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός
and names for-them established none reciprocates if toward
τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ
some of-the accidents it-be-rendered and not toward itself what
λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ'
it-is-said such-as the slave if not of-master it-be-rendered but
ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ
of-man or of-biped or of-anything-whatever of-the such not
ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσίς ἐστιν. Ἔτι δ' ἐὰν
it-reciprocates not for proper the rendering is Further and if
μέν τι οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται,
indeed something properly rendered should-be toward what it-is-said
πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα
all being-stripped-away of-the others as-many-as accidental
ἐστί, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τούτου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη
are being-left and alone this toward which it-was-rendered
οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν πρὸς
properly always toward it it-will-be-said such-as the slave if toward
δεσπότην λέγηται, περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων
master it-be-said being-stripped-away of-the others all
ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι
as-many-as accidental are to-the master such-as the to-biped to-be
καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου
and the of-knowledge receptive and the to-man being-left
δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ
and alone the master to-be always the slave toward it
ῥηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται.
will-be-said the for slave of-master slave is-called

Ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγεται,
If but at-least not properly it-be-rendered toward what ever it-is-said
περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καταλειπομένου δὲ
being-stripped-away indeed the others being-left and
μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό.
alone the toward which it-was-rendered not it-will-be-said toward it
Ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν
Let-be-rendered for the slave of-man and the wing
ὄρνιθος, καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότην αὐτὸν
of-bird and let-be-stripped-away of-the man the master him
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται·
to-be not for any-longer the slave toward man will-be-said
μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως καὶ
not for being master nor slave is Likewise also
τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι
of-the bird let-be-stripped-away the to-winged to-be not for any-longer
ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ
will-be the wing of-the relative something not for being winged
οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός. Ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι
nor wing will-be of-something So-that one-must indeed to-render
πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται. Κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ
toward what ever properly it-is-said And-if indeed name should-be
κείμενον, ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίνεται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον
established easy the rendering becomes not being but necessary
ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν. Οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων φανερὸν ὅτι
perhaps to-coin-names So and being-rendered evident that
πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται.
all the relative something toward correlatives are-said
Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν
Seem and the relative something at-once by-the nature to-be and for indeed
τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν. Ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ
the most true it-is At-once for double both is and

ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστι· καὶ δεσπότου ὄντος
half and half being double is and master being
δοῦλός ἐστι, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ
slave is and slave being master is likewise and
τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ
to-these also the others Also destroy-with and these one-another not
γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος
for being double not is half and half not being
οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα
not is double likewise and also for the others as-many-as
τοιαῦτα. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ τὸ
such Not for all but the relative something true seems the
ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρότερον ἂν δόξειε
at-once by-the nature to-be the for knowable prior — would-seem
τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρχόντων
than-the knowledge to-be As for on the most-part pre-existing
τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ᾽
the things the knowledges we-acquire in-the-case-of
ὀλίγων γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ
few for — or in-the-case-of none would-see someone — at-once with-the
ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γινομένην. Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν
knowable the knowledge coming-about Further the indeed knowable
ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ
destroyed destroys-with the knowledge the but knowledge the
ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ἐπιστητοῦ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ
knowable not destroys-with knowable indeed for not being not
ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη), ἐπιστήμης
is knowledge of-nothing for will-be knowledge knowledge
δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι, οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ
but not being nothing prevents knowable to-be such-as also the of-the

κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη
circle squaring if-indeed it-is knowable knowledge
μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν.
indeed of-it not is not-yet it but knowable is
Ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ'
Further animal indeed destroyed not will-be knowledge of-the and
ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ
knowables many it-is-possible to-be Likewise and to-these also
τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει. Τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον
the(-things) for the perception hold The for perceptible prior
τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν
than-the perception seems to-be The indeed for perceptible destroyed
συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ
destroys-with the perception the but perception the perceptible not
συναναιρεῖ. Αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν,
destroys-with The for perceptions about body and in body are
αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ σῶμα (τῶν
perceptible and destroyed is-destroyed also the body of-the
γὰρ αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα), σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιρεῖται
for perceptibles the body body and not being is-destroyed
καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.
also the perception so-that destroys-with the perceptible the perception
Ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ζῴου γὰρ
The but at-least perception the perceptible not destroys-with animal for
ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀναιρεῖται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται,
destroyed perception indeed is-destroyed perceptible but will-be
οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα
such-as body hot sweet bitter and the-others all as-many-as
ἐστὶν αἰσθητά. Ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ
are perceptible Further the indeed perception at-once with-the perceiver
γίνεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ζῴῳ γίνεται καὶ αἴσθησις· τὸ δέ
comes-about at-once for with-the animal comes-about also perception the but

γε αἰσθητόν ἐστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ἢ αἴσθησιν εἶναι·
at-least perceptible is also before the animal or perception to-be
πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον
fire for and water and the such from which also the animal
συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,
is-constituted is also before the animal at-all to-be or perception
ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.
so-that prior — than-the perception the perceptible to-be would-seem
Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι
It-has and difficulty whether no substance of-the relative something
λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας
is-said just-as it-seems or this is-possible with-respect-to some
τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων
of-the secondary substances In-the-case-of indeed for the primary
οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός
substances true it-is neither for the wholes nor the parts relative
τι λέγεται. Ὁ γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός
something are-said The for particular man not is-called of-some
τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς.
particular man nor the particular ox of-some particular ox
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη· ἡ γάρ τις χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται
Likewise and also the parts the for particular hand not is-called
τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλά τινος χείρ, καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ
of-some particular hand but of-some hand and the particular head
οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλά τινος κεφαλή.
not is-called of-some particular head but of-some head
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπί γε τῶν
Likewise and also for the secondary substances for at-least the
πλείστων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος,
most such-as the man not is-called of-some man
οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλά
nor the ox of-some ox nor the wood of-some wood but

τινος κτῆμα λέγεται. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φανερὸν
of-some property it-is-called For indeed then the such evident
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων
that not they-are of-the relative something for some but of-the secondary
οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται
substances it-has dispute such-as the head of-some is-called
κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
head and the hand of-some is-called hand and each of-the
τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.
such so-that these of-the relative something would-seem — to-be
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται,
If indeed then sufficiently the of-the relative something definition has-been-rendered
ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ δεῖξαι ὡς
either of-the very difficult or of-the impossible it-is the to-show that
οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς,
no substance of-the relative something is-said if but not sufficiently
ἀλλ' ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ
but are the relative something for-which the to-be the-same is with-the
πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.
toward something somehow to-be perhaps — might-be-said something toward them
Ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός
The and former definition follows indeed all the relative
τι, οὐ μὴν ταὐτόν γέ ἐστι τῷ πρός τι αὐτοῖς
something not indeed the-same at-least it-is with-the relative something for-them
εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων
to-be the themselves what-very they-are of-others to-be-said From and these
δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν
clear it-is that if someone should-know something definitely of-the
πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται.
relative something also-that toward which it-is-said definitely he-will-know
Φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστίν. Εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε
Evident indeed then also from them it-is If for knows someone this

τι ὅτι ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός
something that it-is of-the relative something is and the to-be for-the relative
τι ταὐτὸν τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε
something the-same with-the toward something somehow to-be also-that he-knows
πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ
toward which this somehow is if for not he-knows at-all toward which
τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ' εἰ πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.
this somehow is not-even if toward something somehow it-is he-will-know
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, οἷον
And for the according-to each and clear the such such-as
τόδε τι εἰ οἶδε ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι διπλάσιον, καὶ
this something if he-knows definitely that it-is double also
ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν· εἰ γὰρ
of-what double it-is at-once definitely he-knows if for
μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ' εἰ
of-none of-the definite he-knows it double not-even if
διπλάσιόν ἐστιν ὅλως οἶδεν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι
double it-is at-all he-knows Likewise and also this something
εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς
if he-knows that finer it-is also than-what finer it-is at-once
ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἀορίστως
definitely necessary to-know because-of these-things Not indefinitely
δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις γὰρ
and he-will-know that this is than-worse finer supposition for
τὸ τοιοῦτο γίνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀκριβῶς
the such becomes not knowledge not for any-longer exactly
εἴσεται ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον. Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,
he-will-know that it-is than-worse finer If for so it-chanced
οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν
nothing is worse than-it So-that evident that necessary
ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ἀφωρισμένως,
it-is what — should-know someone of-the relative something definitely

κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀφωρισμένως εἰδέναι. Τὴν δέ
also-that toward which it-is-said definitely to-know The but
γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων,
at-least head and the hand and each of-the such
ἅ εἰσιν οὐσίαι, αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν
which are substances itself indeed what-very it-is definitely it-is-possible
εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Τίνος γὰρ
to-know toward what but it-is-said not necessary Of-whom for
αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χείρ, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι
this the head or of-whom the hand not it-is-possible to-know
ὡρισμένως. Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι.
definitely So-that not — would-be these of-the relative something
Εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη
If and not are these of-the relative something true — would-be
λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. Ἴσως δὲ
to-say that no substance of-the relative something is Perhaps and
χαλεπὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ
difficult about the such strongly to-declare not
πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι
often having-examined the however to-have-gone-through-the-difficulties
ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.
for each of-them not useless is

Quality is that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified, and it is said in several ways. One kind is states and dispositions, states being more lasting, like the sciences and the virtues. Another is natural capacity or incapacity, as for boxing or health. A third is affective qualities and affections: sweetness, heat, and a complexion from birth are qualities, but a blush from shame passes quickly and is only an affection. A fourth is shape and figure, straight and curved. Things are called qualified mostly by names derived from qualities. Qualities mostly have contraries and admit more and less, and likeness and unlikeness are distinctive of them; some things may be counted both under quality and among relatives.

Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται.
Quality and I-call according-to which qualified some to-be are-said
Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. Ἓν
Is and the quality of-the in-more-ways said One
μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν.
indeed then species of-quality state and disposition let-be-called
Διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολὺ χρονιώτερον εἶναι
Differs and state from-disposition by-the much more-lasting to-be
καὶ μονιμώτερον. Τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ
and more-stable Such and the both knowledges and the
ἀρεταί· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι
virtues the both for knowledge seems of-the permanent to-be
καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ,
and hard-to-move if even moderately someone knowledge should-take
ἐάν περ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ
if indeed not great change should-come-about by disease or
ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, οἷον ἡ
other some such likewise and also the virtue such-as the
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων,
justice and the moderation and each of-the such

οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ' εὐμετάβολον. Διαθέσεις δὲ
not easily-moved seems to-be nor easily-changed Dispositions and
λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον
are-called which are easily-moved and quickly changing such-as
θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα
heat and chill and disease and health and as-many-as
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ
other such is-disposed indeed for somehow according-to these the
ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος
man quickly but be-changes from hot cold having-become
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
and from the to-be-healthy into the to-be-sick likewise and also for
τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ
the others if not someone also of-the-very these should-happen through
χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ
of-time length already become-natural and incurable or very
δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.
hard-to-move being which — someone perhaps state already should-call
Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις λέγειν, ἅ
Evident and that these-things they-wish states to-call which
ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα· τοὺς γὰρ
are longer-lasting and harder-to-move the(-ones) for
τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ' εὐκινήτους
of-the knowledges not very holding but easily-moved
ὄντας οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως
being not they-say state to-have and-yet they-are-disposed at-least somehow
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον. Ὥστε
according-to the knowledge either worse or better So-that
διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι,
differs state from-disposition by-the the indeed easily-moved to-be
τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν τε καὶ δυσκινητοτέραν. Εἰσὶ
the and longer-lasting both and harder-to-move Are

δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις
and the(-ones) indeed states also dispositions the(-ones) and dispositions
οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ
not of necessity states the(-ones) indeed for states having also
διάκεινταί γέ πως κατ᾽ αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι
are-disposed at-least somehow according-to them the(-ones) but disposed
οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.
not altogether also state have
Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ᾽ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ
Other and genus of-quality according-to which boxers or
δρομικοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα
runners or healthy or sickly we-call and simply as-many-as
κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ
according-to capacity natural or incapacity are-said Not for by-the
διακεῖσθαί γέ πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποιὸν λέγεται,
to-be-disposed at-least somehow each of-the such qualified is-called
ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ποιῆσαί
but by-the capacity to-have natural or incapacity of-the to-do
τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν, οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ
something easily or nothing to-be-affected such-as boxers or runners
οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως λέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν
not by-the to-be-disposed somehow are-called but by-the capacity to-have
φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ
natural of-the to-do something easily healthy and are-called by-the
δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων
capacity to-have natural of-the nothing to-be-affected by the chance(-things)
ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν
easily sickly and by-the incapacity to-have natural of-the nothing
πάσχειν ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις
to-be-affected easily by the chance(-things) Likewise and to-these
καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν
also the hard and the soft is the indeed for hard

λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ
is-called by-the capacity to-have of-the not easily to-be-divided the
δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.
and soft by-the incapacity to-have of-the same this
Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη.
Third and genus of-quality affective qualities and affections
Ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης
Are and the such such-as sweetness both and bitterness
καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ
and sourness and all the to-these akin further and
θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. Ὅτι μὲν
heat and coldness and whiteness and blackness That indeed
οὖν αὗται ποιότητές εἰσι, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα αὐτὰ
then these qualities are evident the for having-received them
ποιὰ λέγεται κατ᾽ αὐτάς, οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα
qualified are-called according-to them such-as the honey by-the sweetness
δεδέχθαι γλυκὺ λέγεται καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα
to-have-received sweet is-called and the body white by-the whiteness
δεδέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. Παθητικαὶ
to-have-received likewise and also for the others it-is Affective
δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς
and qualities are-called not by-the themselves the having-received the
ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ
qualities to-have-been-affected something neither for the honey by-the
πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
to-have-been-affected something is-called sweet nor of-the others of-the
τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ
such any Likewise and to-these also the heat and the
ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ
coldness affective qualities are-called not by-the themselves the
δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
having-received to-have-been-affected something by-the but according-to the perceptions

ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν
each of-the said qualities of-affection to-be productive
παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι
affective qualities are-called the both for sweetness affection some
κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν.
according-to the taste produces and the heat according-to the touch
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. Λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ
Likewise and also the others Whiteness but and blackness and
αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις
the other colors not the same way as-the said
παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ
affective qualities are-called but by-the themselves from
πάθους γεγονέναι. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίνονται διὰ πάθος
affection to-have-come-about That indeed then come-about through affection
πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον· αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ
many changes of-colors clear having-been-ashamed for
τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον
someone red became and having-been-frightened pale and each
τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι
of-the such so-that also if someone by-nature of-the such some
παθὼν πέπονθεν ἔκ τινων φυσικῶν συμπτωμάτων, τὴν
affection has-suffered from some natural coincidences the
ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ
like color likely it-is to-have him which for now in the
αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ
to-be-ashamed disposition of-the(-things) about the body came-about also
κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἄν, ὥστε
according-to natural constitution the same would-come-about — so-that
φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν
by-nature also the color like to-come-about As-many-as indeed then
τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων
of-the such coincidences from some affections hard-to-move

καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες
and permanent the beginning have-taken affective qualities
λέγονται. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης
are-called Whether for in the according-to nature constitution paleness
ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότητες λέγονται (ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ
or blackness has-come-about qualities they-are-called qualified for according-to
ταύτας λεγόμεθα), εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα τὸ
these we-are-called or through disease long or through heat the
αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως
same this has-happened paleness or blackness and not easily
ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ
they-are-restored or even through life remain qualities also
αὐταὶ λέγονται· ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.
themselves are-called likewise for qualified according-to these we-are-called
Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ
As-many-as but from easily dissolved and quickly
ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, ποιότητες
restored come-about affections are-called qualities
δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταύτας. Οὔτε
and not not for are-called qualified some according-to these Neither
γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται,
for the blushing because-of the to-be-ashamed ruddy is-called
οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
nor the paling because-of the to-be-frightened pallid but rather
πεπονθέναι τι. Ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται,
to-have-been-affected something So-that affections indeed the such are-called
ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. Ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν
qualities but not Likewise and to-these also according-to the soul
παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. Ὅσα γὰρ ἐν
affective qualities and affections are-called As-many-as for in
τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων γεγένηται,
the birth at-once from some affections hard-to-move have-come-about

ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ
qualities are-called such-as the both mad derangement and the
ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται,
anger and the such qualified for according-to these are-called
ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις
irascible both and mad Likewise and also as-many-as derangements
μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ' ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων
not natural but from some other coincidences
γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες
have-come-about hard-to-be-rid-of or even altogether unmoved qualities
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται.
also the such qualified for according-to these they-are-called
Ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη
As-many-as but from quickly restored come-about affections
λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν·
are-called such-as if being-grieved someone more-irritable is
οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει
nor for is-called irascible the(-one) in the such affection
ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. Ὥστε
more-irritable being but rather to-have-been-affected something So-that
πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὔ.
affections indeed are-called the such qualities but not
Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ
Fourth and genus of-quality figure both and the about
ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης
each belonging shape further and besides these straightness
καὶ καμπυλότης, καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.
and curvedness and if anything to-these like is
Καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τὸ
According-to each for of-these qualified something is-called the
γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται,
for triangle or square to-be qualified something is-called

καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. Καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ
and the straight or curved And according-to the shape and
ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. Τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν
each qualified something is-called The but rare and the dense
καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιόν τι
and the rough and the smooth would-seem indeed — qualified something
σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ
to-signify it-seems but foreign the such to-be of-the about
τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γὰρ μᾶλλόν τινα φαίνεται τῶν
the qualified division position for rather some appears of-the
μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν. Πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια
parts each to-show Dense indeed for by-the the parts
σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ᾽
close to-be to-one-another rare and by-the to-stand-apart from
ἀλλήλων· καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια
one-another and smooth indeed by-the on straight somehow the parts
κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.
to-lie rough and by-the the indeed to-project the and to-fall-short
Ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος
Perhaps indeed then also other — some might-appear way
ποιότητος, ἀλλ᾽ οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν οὗτοί
of-quality but the at-least most said nearly these
εἰσιν.
are

Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ
Qualities indeed then are the said qualified and the(-things)
κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ᾽
according-to these paronymously said or in-any-way otherwise from
αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων
them For indeed then the most and nearly for all
παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος λευκὸς καὶ
paronymously it-is-said such-as from the whiteness white and

ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης
from the grammar grammarian and from the justice
δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ἐπ' ἐνίων
just likewise and also for the others For some
δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ
but because-of the not to-be-established for-the qualities names not
ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ' αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι οἷον δρομικὸς
it-is-possible paronymously from them to-be-said such-as runner
ἢ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ'
or boxer the(-one) according-to capacity natural said from
οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος παρωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται
no quality paronymously is-said not for are-established
ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ' ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται,
names for-the capacities according-to which these qualified are-called
ὥσπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ' ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ
just-as for-the knowledges according-to which boxers or wrestlers
κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται· πυκτικὴ γὰρ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη
according-to disposition are-called boxing for is-called knowledge
καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ
and wrestling qualified and from these paronymously the(-ones)
διακείμενοι λέγονται. Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου
disposed are-called Sometimes and even name being-established
οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν ποιὸν
not is-said paronymously the(-thing) according-to it qualified
λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ
said such-as from the virtue the excellent by-the for
ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ
virtue to-have excellent is-called but not paronymously from
τῆς ἀρετῆς. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. Ποιὰ
the virtue Not for many but the such is Qualified

τοίνυν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων
then are-called the(-things) paronymously from the said
ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν.
qualities said or in-any-way otherwise from them
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον
Belongs and also contrariety according-to the qualified such-as
δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ
justice to-injustice contrary and whiteness to-blackness and
τἆλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς ποιὰ
the-others and likewise also the(-things) according-to them qualified
λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ
said such-as the unjust to-the just and the white to-the
μέλανι. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ
black Not for all but the such to-the for red or
ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.
pale or to-the such colors nothing contrary qualified being
Ἔτι δέ, ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ
Further and if of-the contraries the-one should-be qualified also the
λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς
remaining will-be qualified This and clear for-one-examining the
ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ
other categories such-as if is the justice to-the injustice
ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·
contrary qualified and the justice qualified then also the injustice
οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόσει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ·
none for of-the other categories will-fit to-the injustice
οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε τὸ πρός τι οὔτε ποῦ οὔθ᾽
neither for the quantity nor the relative something nor where nor
ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ποιόν. Ὡσαύτως
at-all anything of-the such none but except qualified Likewise
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.
and also for the others the according-to the qualified contraries

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά. Λευκὸν
Admit and the more and the less the qualified White
γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον
for more and less one than-another is-called and just
ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει·
one than-another more Also itself and increase takes
λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι. Οὐ
white for being still it-is-possible whiter to-become Not
πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα. Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ
all and but the most Justice for than-justice if
λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις· ὁμοίως δὲ
is-said more and less would-be-puzzled — someone likewise and
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. Ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι
also for the other dispositions Some for dispute
περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης
about the such justice indeed for than-justice
οὐ πάνυ φασὶ δεῖν λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον,
not at-all they-say to-be-necessary to-be-said more and less
οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
nor health than-health less however to-have one than-another
ὑγίειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ
health and justice one than-another likewise and
καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις. Ἀλλ' οὖν τά
also grammar and the other dispositions But then the
γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται
at-least according-to these said indisputably admit
τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος
the more and the less more-grammatical for one
ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ ὑγιεινότερος καὶ δικαιότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ
than-another is-called and healthier and juster and for

τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. Τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ
the others likewise Triangle but and square not seems
τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν.
the more to-admit nor of-the other figures none
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον ἢ τὸν
The(-ones) indeed for admitting the of-the triangle account or the
τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ' ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσί, τῶν δὲ
of-the circle all alike triangles or circles are of-the but
μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου ῥηθήσεται·
not admitting nothing more one than-another will-be-said
οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτερομήκους κύκλος
nothing for more the square than-the oblong circle
ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον.
is neither for admits the of-the circle account
Ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου
Simply and if not admit both the of-the proposed
λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. Οὐ
account not will-be-said the one than-the other more Not
πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
all then the qualified admit the more and the less
Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια
Of-the indeed then said none proper of-quality like
δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται·
and also unlike according-to alone the qualities are-said
ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν
like for one to-another not is according-to other nothing
ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. Ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς
than according-to which qualified it-is So-that proper — would-be of-the
ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ' αὐτήν.
quality the like and unlike to-be-said according-to it

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι, μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ
Not one-must and to-be-disturbed lest someone us should-say about
ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός
quality the proposal having-made many of-the relative
τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν
something to-count-in the for states and dispositions of-the
πρός τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν. Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων
relative something to-be we-said Nearly for in-the-case-of all
τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ
of-the such the genera relative something are-said of-the but
καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδέν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα,
according-to each none The indeed for knowledge genus being
αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται (τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη
itself what-very it-is of-other is-said of-something for knowledge
λέγεται), τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν
is-called of-the but according-to each none itself what-very it-is
ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς
of-other is-said such-as the grammar not is-called of-something
γραμματικὴ οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα,
grammar nor the music of-something music But if then
κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται τῶν πρός τι λέγονται,
according-to the genus also these of-the relative something are-said
οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς
such-as the grammar is-called of-something knowledge not of-something
γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη λέγεται, οὐ
grammar and the music of-something knowledge is-called not
τινὸς μουσική. Ὥστε αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν
of-something music So-that the according-to each not are of-the
πρός τι. Λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα·
relative something We-are-called and qualified by-the according-to each
ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν· ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ
these for also we-have knowing for we-are-called by-the

ἔχειν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά. Ὥστε αὗται ἂν
to-have of-the according-to each knowledges some So-that these —
καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν, αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, καθ' ἅς ποτε
also qualities would-be the according-to each according-to which ever
καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.
also qualified we-are-called these but not are of-the relative something
Ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνοι τὸ αὐτὸ πρός τι καὶ ποιὸν ὄν, οὐδὲν
Further if it-should-happen the same relative something and qualified being nothing
ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.
strange in both the genera it to-be-counted

IX · ACTING, BEING AFFECTED, AND THE REST

Acting and being affected also admit contraries and more and less: heating is contrary to cooling, and being heated to being cooled. Of being in a position it has been said, in treating relatives, that it is named paronymously from positions. Of the others, when, where, and having, nothing is said beyond the examples already given, since they are evident: having, for example, is being shod or armed; where is in the Lyceum.

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐναντιότητα
Admit and also the to-act and the to-be-affected contrariety
καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ
and the more and the less the for to-heat to-the
ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ
to-cool contrary and the to-be-heated to-the to-be-cooled and the
ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. Καὶ
to-be-pleased to-the to-be-pained so-that they-admit contrariety Also
τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἧττον· θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
the more and also less to-heat for more and less

ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Ἐπιδέχεται
it-is-possible and to-be-heated more and less Admit
οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.
then the more and the less the to-act and the to-be-affected
Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ
About indeed then these so-much is-said it-has-been-said and also
ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ
about the to-lie in the relative something that paronymously from
τῶν θέσεων λέγεται. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ
the positions it-is-said About and the remaining the both when and
τοῦ ποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ
the where and the to-have because-of the obvious to-be nothing about
αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐρρέθη, ὅτι τὸ
them other is-said than as-many-as in beginning were-said that the
ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποῦ
to-have indeed signifies the to-have-shoes-on the to-be-armed the and where
οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐρρέθη.
such-as in Lyceum and the others and as-many-as about them were-said

Things are opposed in four ways: as relatives, like double and half; as contraries, like bad and good; as privation and state, like blindness and sight; and as affirmation and negation, like he sits and he does not sit. Relatives are said of each other, contraries are not, and some contraries have something between them, named or not. Privation and state are not relatives, since sight is not sight of blindness, nor contraries, since change runs from state to privation and never back. Only with affirmation and negation is one always true and the other false, even when Socrates does not exist.

Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ
About indeed then the proposed genera sufficient the(-things)
εἰρημένα· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθεν
said about and the opposites in-how-many-ways they-are-wont
ἀντικεῖσθαι, ῥητέον. Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι
to-be-opposed must-be-said It-is-said and one to-another to-be-opposed
τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ
in-four-ways either as the relative something or as the contraries or
ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.
as privation and state or as affirmation and negation
Ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν ὡς
Is-opposed and each of-the such as in-outline to-say as
μὲν τὰ πρός τι, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς
indeed the relative something such-as the double to-the half as
δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ τὰ
and the contraries such-as the bad to-the good as and the(-things)
κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς
according-to privation and state such-as blindness and sight as
δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, οἷον κάθηται — οὐ κάθηται.
and affirmation and negation such-as he-sits not he-sits

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, αὐτὰ
As-many-as indeed then as the relative something are-opposed themselves
ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως
what-very they-are of-the opposites are-said or in-any-way otherwise
πρὸς αὐτά, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστίν,
toward them such-as the double itself which-very it-is
ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον. Καὶ ἡ
of-another double is-called of-something for double Also the
ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται,
knowledge and to-the knowable as the relative something is-opposed
καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ
and is-said at-least the knowledge itself which-very it-is of-the
ἐπιστητοῦ. Καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς
knowable Also the knowable and itself which-very it-is toward
ἀντικείμενον λέγεται, τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν
opposite is-said the knowledge the for knowable
τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητόν, τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
to-something is-called knowable to-the knowledge
Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, αὐτὰ ἅπερ
As-many-as then are-opposed as the relative something themselves what-very
ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται.
they-are of-others are-said or in-any-way-whatever toward one-another are-said
Τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς
The(-ones) and as the contraries themselves indeed what-very they-are in-no-way
πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται·
toward one-another are-said contraries however of-one-another are-called
οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ᾽
neither for the good of-the bad is-called good but
ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναντίον.
contrary nor the white of-the black white but contrary
Ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αἵδε αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. Ὅσα
So-that differ these the oppositions from-one-another As-many-as

δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε
and of-the contraries such are so-that in which it-is-natural
γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον
to-come-about or of-which it-is-predicated necessary of-them the-one
ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον. Ὧν δέ γε
to-belong of-these nothing is between middle Of-which but at-least
μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ
not necessary the-one to-belong of-these is something between
μέσον πάντως, οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου
middle altogether such-as disease and health in body of-animal
πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν
is-natural to-come-about and necessary at-least the-one to-belong
τῷ τοῦ ζῴου σώματι, ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν. Καὶ περιττὸν
to-the of-the animal body either disease or health Also odd
δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε
and also even of-number is-predicated and necessary at-least
θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον.
the-one to-the number to-belong either odd or even
Καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου
And not is at-least of-these nothing between middle neither of-disease
καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. Ὧν δέ γε μὴ
and health nor of-odd and even Of-which but at-least not
ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ
necessary the-one to-belong of-these is something between
μέσον, οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι,
middle such-as black and white in body is-natural to-come-about
καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ
and not necessary at-least the-one of-them to-belong to-the
σώματι· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν. Καὶ φαῦλον
body not for all either white or black is Also bad
δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπου
and also good is-predicated indeed both of man

καὶ κατὰ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν
and of others many not necessary but the-one of-them
ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν κατηγορῆται· οὐ γὰρ πάντα
to-belong to-those of-which — it-should-be-predicated not for all
ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν. Καὶ ἔστι γέ τι
either bad or good are And is at-least something
τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ
of-these between middle such-as of-the indeed white and black the
φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ
gray and the pale and as-many-as other colors of-the and
φαύλου καὶ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον.
bad and good the neither bad nor good
Ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ
For some indeed then names are-established for-the(-things) between
μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν
middle such-as of-white and black the gray and the pale
καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα· ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν
and as-many-as other colors for some and by-name indeed
οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δ᾽ ἑκατέρου
not easy the between middle to-render by-the but of-each
τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ
of-the extremes negation the between middle is-defined such-as the
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.
neither good nor bad and neither just nor unjust
Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον
Privation and also state are-said indeed about the-same something such-as
ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν,
the sight and the blindness about eye generally and to-say
ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἕξις πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον
in which the state is-natural to-come-about about this is-said each
αὐτῶν. Ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς
of-them To-be-deprived and then we-say each of-the of-the

ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε
state receptive(-things) whenever in which it-is-natural to-belong and when
πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ. Νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ
it-is-natural to-have in-no-way it-belongs Toothless both for we-call not
τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ
the not having teeth and blind not the not having sight but
τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε
the not having when it-is-natural to-have some for from birth neither
ὄψιν ἔχει οὔτε ὀδόντας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λέγεται οὔτε νωδὰ οὔτε
sight have nor teeth but not are-called either toothless or
τυφλά. Τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔστι
blind The and to-be-deprived and the the state to-have not is
στέρησις καὶ ἕξις. Ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις
privation and state State indeed for is the sight privation
δὲ ἡ τυφλότης· τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ
and the blindness the and to-have the sight not is sight nor
τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης. Στέρησις γάρ τίς ἡ τυφλότης
the blind to-be blindness Privation for some the blindness
ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν.
is the and blind to-be to-be-deprived not privation is
Ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι,
Further if were the blindness the-same with-the blind to-be
κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς
would-be-predicated — both of the same but blind
μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης δὲ οὐδαμῶς λέγεται ὁ
indeed is-called the man blindness but in-no-way is-called the
ἄνθρωπος. Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι
man To-be-opposed and also these seem the to-be-deprived
καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν, ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ
and the the state to-have as privation and state the for
τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης

way of-the opposition the same as for the blindness

τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν
to-the sight is-opposed so also the blind to-be to-the sight
ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.
to-have is-opposed
Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν
Not is and not-even the under the negation and affirmation
ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ
negation and affirmation the indeed for affirmation statement is
καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ
affirmative and the negation statement negative of-the but under
τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος. Λέγεται δὲ
the affirmation and negation none is statement Are-said and
καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·
also these to-be-opposed to-one-another as affirmation and negation
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός.
also for in-the-case-of these the way of-the opposition the same
Ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται,
As for ever the affirmation toward the negation is-opposed
οἷον τὸ κάθηται τῷ οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ᾽
such-as the he-sits to-the not he-sits so also the under
ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι τῷ μὴ καθῆσθαι.
each thing is-opposed the to-sit to-the not to-sit
Ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ
That and the privation and the state not are-opposed as the
πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ
relative something evident not for is-said itself what-very it-is of-the
ἀντικειμένου. Ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ᾽
opposite The for sight not is of-blindness sight nor
ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ
otherwise in-no-way toward it is-said Likewise and not-even the
τυφλότης λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις
blindness would-be-called — blindness of-sight but privation

μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ
indeed of-sight the blindness is-called blindness but of-sight not
λέγεται. Ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα
is-called Further the relative something all toward correlatives
λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός
are-said so-that also the blindness if-indeed it-were of-the relative
τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται. Ἀλλ'
something would-reciprocate — also-that toward which it-is-said But
οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.
not it-reciprocates not for is-called the sight of-blindness sight
Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ' ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ
That and not-even as the contraries are-opposed the(-things) according-to
στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν λεγόμενα, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ
privation and state said from these clear Of-the indeed for
ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν ᾧ
contraries of-which nothing is between middle necessary in which
πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν
it-is-natural to-come-about or of-which it-is-predicated the-one of-them
ὑπάρχειν ἀεί· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν
to-belong always of-these for nothing was between middle of-which
θάτερον ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου
the-one was necessary to-the receptive to-belong such-as for disease
καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. Ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι
and health and odd and even Of-which but is something
ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε
between middle never necessity to-every to-belong the-one neither
γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε
for white or black necessity all to-be the receptive nor
θερμὸν οὔτε ψυχρόν· τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν
hot nor cold of-these for between middle something nothing
κωλύει ὑπάρχειν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον,
prevents to-belong Further and also of-these was something between middle

ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ
of-which not necessary the-one to-belong was to-the receptive if
μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ
not to-which by-nature the one belongs such-as to-the fire the hot
εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως
to-be and to-the snow the white For and these definitely
ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ
necessary the-one to-belong and not whichever chanced not
γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν.
for it-is-possible the fire cold to-be nor the snow black
Ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν
So-that to-every indeed not necessity to-the receptive the-one of-them
ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ
to-belong but only to-which by-nature the one belongs and
τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. Ἐπὶ
to-these definitely the one and not whichever chanced For
δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων
and the privation and the state neither of-the said-things
ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον
true not-even for always to-the receptive necessary the-one
αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε
of-them to-belong the for not-yet natural sight to-have neither
τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχον λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα
blind nor sight having is-called so-that not — would-be these
τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον. Ἀλλ'
of-the such contraries of-which nothing is between middle But
οὐδ' ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε
nor of-which something is between middle necessary for sometimes
παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη
to-every the receptive the-one of-them to-belong when for already
πεφυκὸς ᾖ ὄψιν ἔχειν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον
natural it-should-be sight to-have then either blind or sight having

ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ'
it-will-be-called and of-these not definitely the-one but
ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν
whichever chanced not for necessary either blind or having sight
εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστι
to-be but whichever chanced For but the contraries of-which is
τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον
something between middle never necessary was to-every the-one
ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισί, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν. Ὥστε
to-belong but to-some and to-these definitely the one So-that
δῆλον ὅτι κατ' οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία
clear that according-to neither of-the ways as the contraries
ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.
are-opposed the(-things) according-to privation and state opposed
Ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ,
Further for indeed the contraries being-present the receptive
δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι, εἰ μή τινι φύσει
possible into one-another change to-come-about if not to-some by-nature
τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
the one belongs such-as to-the fire the hot to-be and for the
ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι
healthy possible to-fall-sick and the white black to-become
καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ
and the cold hot and from good at-least bad and
ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. Ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος
from bad good possible to-become The for bad
εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν
into better pursuits being-led and words even-if small
γέ τι ἐπιδοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίων εἶναι. Ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ
at-least something should-advance into the better to-be If and once
κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελέως
even small advance he-should-take evident that either completely

ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι· ἀεὶ γὰρ
— he-would-change or very much advance he-would-take always for
εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίνεται, κἂν ἠντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν
more-easily-moved toward virtue he-becomes even-if any-whatever advance
εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν
having-taken from beginning he-be so-that also more likely advance
αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γινόμενον τελείως εἰς
him to-take And this always coming-about completely into
τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάν περ μὴ χρόνῳ
the contrary state restores if indeed not by-time
ἐξείργηται. Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως
he-be-prevented For but at-least the state and the privation
ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι. Ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ
impossible into one-another change to-come-about From indeed for
τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ
the state to the privation comes-about change from but
τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον. Οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς
the privation to the state impossible Neither for blind
γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἀνέβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν
having-become someone again saw-again nor bald being
πάλιν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.
again long-haired became nor toothless being teeth grew
Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανερὸν
As-many-as and as affirmation and negation are-opposed evident
ὅτι κατ᾽ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται·
that according-to none of-the said ways they-are-opposed
ἐπὶ γὰρ μόνων τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς
in-the-case-of for alone these necessary always the one true
τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. Οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
the other false of-them to-be Neither for in-the-case-of the
ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ
contraries necessary always the-one true to-be the-other and

ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ
false nor for the relative something nor for the state and
τῆς στερήσεως. Οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ
the privation Such-as the health and the disease contraries and
οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν. Ὡσαύτως δὲ
neither at-least either true or false is Likewise and
καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται,
also the double and the half as the relative something are-opposed
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος.
and not is of-them neither either true or false
Οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις
Nor at-least the(-things) according-to privation and state such-as the sight
καὶ ἡ τυφλότης. Ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν
and the blindness Wholly and of-the(-things) according-to no
συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός
combination said nothing either true or false
ἐστιν· πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται. Οὐ
is all and the said without combination are-said Not
μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειε τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ
indeed but most — would-seem the such to-happen for
τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων· τὸ γὰρ
the(-things) according-to combination contraries said the for
ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτην τῷ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην ἐναντίον ἐστίν.
to-be-healthy Socrates to-the to-be-sick Socrates contrary is
Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς
But nor for these necessary always the-one indeed true
θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι. Ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους
the-other and false to-be Being indeed for Socrates
ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφότερα
will-be the one true the other false not being but both
ψευδῆ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν
false neither for the to-be-sick Socrates nor the to-be-healthy

ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους. Ἐπὶ
is true him not being at-all the Socrates For
δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος τε ὅλως
and the privation and the state not being both at-all
οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος τε οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθὲς
neither true being both not always the-one true
θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτην τῷ
the-other and false the for sight to-have Socrates to-the
τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτην ἀντίκειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις,
blind to-be Socrates is-opposed as privation and state
καὶ ὄντος τε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος
and being both not necessary the-one true to-be or false
(ὅτε γὰρ μήπω πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ), μὴ ὄντος
when for not-yet he-is-natural to-have both false not being
τε ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ
both at-all the Socrates and so false both both
τὸ ὄψιν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς
the sight to-have and the blind him to-be For but at-least the
καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε
affirmation and the negation always if both he-be if and
μὴ ᾖ, τὸ ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές. Τὸ
not he-be the one will-be false and the other true The
γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην, ὄντος
for to-be-sick Socrates and the not to-be-sick Socrates being
τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος,
both him evident that the one of-them true or false
καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος
and not being likewise the indeed for to-be-sick not being
ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές. Ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων
false the and not to-be-sick true So-that for alone these

ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος
proper — would-be the always the-one of-them true or false
εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται.
to-be as-many-as as affirmation and negation are-opposed

XI · CONTRARIES

Bad is necessarily contrary to good, as disease to health, but sometimes bad is contrary to bad, as excess to deficiency. Not both of a pair of contraries need exist: if everything were well, there would be no disease. Contraries naturally come about in the same thing, by species or genus: disease and health in an animal's body, white and black in body, justice and injustice in a man's soul. They lie in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or are themselves genera, as good and bad.

Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο
Contrary and is of necessity to-good indeed bad this
δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος
and clear by-the according-to each induction such-as to-health disease
καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Κακῷ
and to-courage cowardice likewise and also for the others To-bad
δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν·
but at-one-time indeed good contrary at-another-time and bad
τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν
to-the for deficiency bad being the excess contrary bad
ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα
being likewise and also the mean contrary to-each being
ἀγαθόν. Ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ
good For few but — the such would-see someone for but
τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.
the most always to-the bad the good contrary is

Ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν θάτερον ᾖ,
Further for the contraries not necessary if the-one should-be
καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι. Ὑγιαινόντων μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων
also the remaining to-be Being-healthy indeed for all
ὑγίεια μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν
health indeed will-be disease but not likewise and also white
ὄντων ἁπάντων λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ. Ἔτι
being all whiteness indeed will-be blackness but not Further
εἰ τὸ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτην νοσεῖν ἐναντίον
if the Socrates to-be-healthy to-the Socrates to-be-sick contrary
ἐστί, μὴ ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν,
is not it-is-possible and at-once both to-the same to-belong
οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ
not — it-would-be-possible the one of-the contraries being also
τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι· ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτην ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ
the remaining to-be being for the Socrates to-be-healthy not
ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτην.
— would-be the to-be-sick Socrates
Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε
Clear and that also about the-same either in-species or in-genus are-natural
γίνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία. Νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι
to-come-about the contraries Disease indeed for and health in body
ζῴου πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς
of-animal is-natural to-come-about whiteness and also blackness simply
ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου.
in body justice and also injustice in soul of-man
Ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν
Necessity and all the contraries either in the same genus to-be or in
τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. Λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ
the contrary genera or themselves genera to-be White indeed for
καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος),
and black in the same genus color for of-them the genus

δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν
justice and also injustice in the contrary genera of-the indeed
γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος)· ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν
for virtue of-the and vice the genus good and also bad
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα.
not is in genus but themselves happen genera of-some being

XII · PRIOR

One thing is called prior to another in four ways: in time, as the older; when the sequence of being does not reverse, as one is prior to two; in order, as in the sciences and in speeches, where the proem comes before the narration; and, most remotely, as the better and more honored, as people call those they love prior. There seems to be a fifth: of things whose being reciprocates, the cause is prior, as a man's being is the cause of the true statement that he is, though the statement is no cause of his being.

Πρότερον ἑτέρου ἕτερον λέγεται τετραχῶς, πρῶτον μὲν
Prior than-another one is-called in-four-ways first indeed
καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ' ὃ πρεσβύτερον
and most-properly according-to time according-to which older
ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τὸν
one than-another and more-ancient is-called by-the for the
χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον
time more to-be both older and more-ancient
λέγεται. Δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ
is-called Second and the not reciprocating according-to the of-the
εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν
to-be implication such-as the one than-the two prior two
μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ
indeed for being follows at-once the one to-be one but
ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ
being not necessary two to-be so-that not reciprocates from

τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν. Πρότερον
the one the implication of-the to-be the remaining Prior
δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀφ᾽ οὗ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει ἡ
and seems the such to-be from which not reciprocates the
τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις.
of-the to-be implication
Τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται,
Third and according-to some order the prior is-said
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. Ἔν τε γὰρ
just-as for the knowledges and the speeches In both for
ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ
the demonstrative knowledges belongs the prior and
τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει (τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν
the later in-the order the for elements prior than-the
διαγραμμάτων τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ
diagrams in-the order and for the grammar the
στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν), ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων
elements prior than-the syllables for both the speeches
ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ
likewise the for proem than-the narration prior in-the
τάξει ἐστίν.
order is
Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον
Further besides the(-things) said the better and the more-honored
πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ. Εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ
prior to-be by-the nature seems Are-wont and also the
πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ᾽
many the more-honored and more loved by
αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς εἶναι. Ἔστι μὲν
them prior to-say among themselves to-be Is indeed
δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν τρόπων οὗτος.
indeed also nearly most-foreign of-the ways this

Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί
The indeed then said ways of-the prior nearly so-many
εἰσιν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ ἕτερος εἶναι
are It-would-seem and — besides the said also another to-be
προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν
of-prior way of-the for reciprocating according-to the
τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι
of-the to-be implication the cause in-any-way to-the-other of-the to-be
πρότερον εἰκότως τῇ φύσει λέγοιτ' ἄν. Ὅτι δ' ἔστι
prior reasonably by-the nature would-be-called — That and there-are
τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει
some such clear the for to-be man reciprocates
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ
according-to the of-the to-be implication toward the true about
αὐτοῦ λόγον. Εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος
it statement If for there-is man true the statement
ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε·
by-which we-say that there-is man And it-reciprocates at-least
εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος,
if for true the statement by-which we-say that there-is man
ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς
there-is man Is and the indeed true statement in-no-way
αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί
cause of-the to-be the thing the however thing appears
πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ
somehow cause of-the to-be true the statement by-the for to-be the
πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. Ὥστε
thing or not true the statement or false is-called So-that
κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται.
according-to five ways prior one than-another is-called

Things are simultaneous simply, and most properly, when they come to be at the same time. They are simultaneous by nature when their being reciprocates but neither causes the other, as double and half, and when they are species divided against one another under the same genus, as the winged, the footed, and the aquatic under animal. The genus is always prior to the species, since the sequence of being does not reverse: what is aquatic is an animal, but an animal need not be aquatic.

Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα, ὧν ἡ
Simultaneous and are-called simply indeed and most-properly of-which the
γένεσίς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ· οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον
coming-to-be is in the same time neither for prior
οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. Ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον
nor later is of-them Simultaneous and according-to the time
ταῦτα λέγεται. Φύσει δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν
these are-called By-nature and simultaneous as-many-as reciprocate indeed
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον
according-to the of-the to-be implication in-no-way but cause
θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου
the-one to-the-other of-the to-be is such-as for the double
καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος· ἀντιστρέφει μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα (διπλασίου
and the half they-reciprocate indeed for these double
γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν),
for being is half and half being double is
οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν.
neither but to-neither cause of-the to-be is
Καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα
And the(-things) from the same and genus divided-against
ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται. Ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ
one-another simultaneous by-the nature are-called To-be-divided-against and
λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν,
are-said one-another the(-things) according-to the same division

οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ
such-as the winged to-the footed and to-the aquatic these for
ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον
one-another are-divided-against from the same genus the for animal
διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἴς τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ
is-divided into these into both the winged and the footed and
τὸ ἔνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν
the aquatic and none at-least of-these prior or later
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
is but simultaneous by-the nature the such seem to-be
Διαιρεθείη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων εἰς εἴδη
Would-be-divided and — also each of-the such into species
πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον.
again such-as the footed and the winged and the aquatic
Ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ
Will-be then also-those simultaneous by-the nature as-many-as from
τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν. Τὰ
the same genus according-to the same division are The
δὲ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει
and genera than-the species always prior not for reciprocates
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν
according-to the of-the to-be implication such-as aquatic indeed
ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι.
being is animal animal but being not necessity aquatic to-be
Ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν
Simultaneous then by-the nature are-called as-many-as reciprocate indeed
κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον
according-to the of-the to-be implication in-no-way but cause
τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστι, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ
the one to-the other of-the to-be is and the(-things) from the

αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις· ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα,
same genus divided-against one-another simply and simultaneous
ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.
of-which the coming-to-be in the same time

XIV · MOTION

There are six kinds of motion: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. The others plainly differ, and alteration differs too, since what is affected is altered without growing or diminishing, and a square grows by a gnomon without being altered. Rest is contrary to motion in general, and to each motion its contrary: destruction to generation, diminution to increase, rest in place or change to the contrary place to change of place, and, it seems, rest in quality or change to the contrary quality to alteration.

Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ, γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις,
Of-motion and are species six coming-to-be destruction increase
μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.
diminution alteration the according-to place change
Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων
The indeed then other motions evident that different from-one-another
εἰσίν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ
are not for is the coming-to-be destruction nor at-least the
αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, ὡσαύτως
increase diminution nor the according-to place change likewise
δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει τινὰ
and also the others For but the alteration it-has some
ἀπορίαν, μή ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον
difficulty lest ever necessary it-be the(-thing) being-altered
κατά τινα τῶν λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Τοῦτο
according-to some of-the remaining motions to-be-altered This

δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστι· σχεδὸν γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη
but not true is nearly for according-to all the affections
ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν
or the most to-be-altered happens to-us of-no of-the
ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν· οὔτε γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον
other motions sharing neither for to-increase necessary
τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως
the(-thing) according-to affection moved nor to-diminish likewise
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ' ἑτέρα ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰς
and also for the others so-that other — would-be besides the
ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ αὐτή, ἔδει
other motions the alteration if for were the same it-was-necessary
τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι ἤ
the(-thing) being-altered at-once also to-increase or to-diminish or
τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη.
some of-the other to-follow motions but not necessity
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην
Likewise and also the(-thing) increasing or some other
κίνησιν κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἔδει· ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ
motion moved to-be-altered it-was-necessary but there-are some
αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται, οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον
increasing which not are-altered such-as the square
γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ
gnomon having-been-placed-around has-increased indeed more-altered but
οὐδὲν γεγένηται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
nothing has-become likewise and also for the others the
τοιούτων. Ὥσθ' ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλων.
such So-that different — would-be the motions from-one-another
Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κινήσει ἠρεμία ἐναντία, ταῖς δὲ
Is and simply indeed to-motion rest contrary to-the and
καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ καθ' ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά,
according-to each the according-to each to-coming-to-be indeed destruction

αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ
to-increase and diminution to-the and according-to place change the
κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία. Μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι ἡ
according-to place rest Most and seems to-be-opposed the
πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν
toward the contrary place change such-as to-the from-below
ἡ ἄνω, τῇ δὲ ἄνωθεν ἡ κάτω. Τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν
the upward to-the and from-above the downward To-the and remaining of-the
ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν
rendered motions not easy to-render what ever is
ἐναντίον, ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίον, εἰ μή τις
contrary it-seems and nothing to-be to-it contrary if not someone
καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμίαν ἀντιτιθείη
also for this the according-to the qualified rest should-oppose
ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολήν, καθάπερ
or the into the contrary of-the qualified change just-as
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ τόπον
also for the according-to place change the according-to place
ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν· ἔστι
rest or the into the contrary place change is
γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. Ὥστε
for the alteration change according-to the qualified So-that
ἀντικείσεται τῇ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ κατὰ τὸ
will-be-opposed to-the according-to the qualified motion the according-to the
ποιὸν ἠρεμία ἢ ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή,
qualified rest or the into the contrary of-the qualified change
οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γίνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίνεσθαι· ἀλλοιοῦται
such-as the white to-become to-the black to-become it-is-altered
γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γινομένης.
for into the contraries of-the qualified change coming-about

Having is said in several ways: as a state, disposition, or other quality, as we are said to have knowledge or virtue; as a quantity, a height; as things on the body, a cloak or a tunic; as in a part, a ring on a hand; as a part, a hand or foot; as in a container, wine in a jar; as a possession, a house or a field; and as a man is said to have a wife, the most remote way, since it means only that he lives with her. There may be others, but the usual ones have been counted.

Τὸ δὲ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται. Ἢ γὰρ
The and to-have according-to more ways is-said Either for
ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ
as state and disposition or other some quality we-are-said for
καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν. Ἢ ὡς ποσόν, οἷον
also knowledge some to-have and virtue Or as quantity such-as
ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος· λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυ
which happens someone having size he-is-said for three-cubits
μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ. Ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα,
size to-have or four-cubits Or as the(-things) about the body
οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα. Ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ
such-as cloak or tunic Or as in part such-as in hand
δακτύλιον. Ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα. Ἢ ὡς ἐν
ring Or as part such-as hand or foot Or as in
ἀγγείῳ, οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον
vessel such-as the bushel the wheat or the jar
τὸν οἶνον· οἶνον γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ
the wine wine for to-have the jar is-said and the
μέδιμνος πυρούς· ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν
bushel wheat these then all to-have are-said as in
ἀγγείῳ. Ἢ ὡς κτῆμα· ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν ἢ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα.
vessel Or as property to-have for house or field we-are-said

Λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα· ἔοικε
We-are-said and also wife to-have and the wife husband it-seems
δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν· οὐδὲν
but most-foreign the now said way of-the to-have nothing
γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχει γυναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ.
for other by-the he-has wife we-signify than that he-lives-with(-her)
Ἴσως δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι·
Perhaps and — also other some might-appear of-the to-have ways
οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται.
the but accustomed to-be-said nearly all have-been-enumerated

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ARISTOTLE

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ

On Interpretation

The inquiry must first establish what a name and a verb are, then negation, affirmation, assertion, and statement. Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks of spoken sounds; letters and sounds differ among men, but the affections, and the things they are likenesses of, are the same for all, as the treatise on the soul says. As a thought may be without truth or falsity, so names and verbs alone, like man or white, are neither true nor false: goat-stag signifies something, but is not true or false until being or not being is added, simply or with a time.

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα
First one-must to-establish what name and what verb then
τί ἐστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ
what is negation and affirmation and assertion and
λόγος.
statement
Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
Are indeed then the(-things) in the voice of-the in the soul
παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν
affections symbols and the(-things) written of-the(-things) in
τῇ φωνῇ. Καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ
the voice And just-as not-even letters for-all the same nor
φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, ταὐτὰ
sounds the same of-which however these signs primarily the-same
πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα,
for-all affections of-the soul and of-which these likenesses
πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται
things already the-same About indeed then these it-has-been-said
ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς· ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας. Ἔστι
in the(-treatises) about soul of-other for study Is
δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁτὲ μὲν νόημα ἄνευ τοῦ
and just-as in the soul at-one-time indeed thought without the

ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη
to-be-true or to-be-false at-another-time and already to-which necessity
τούτων ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ· περὶ γὰρ
of-these to-belong the-one so also in the voice about for
σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. Τὰ
combination and division is the false and the true The
μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοικε τῷ ἄνευ
indeed then names themselves and the verbs resemble the without
συνθέσεως καὶ διαιρέσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ
combination and division thought such-as the man or the
λευκόν, ὅταν μὴ προστεθῇ τι· οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος οὔτε
white whenever not is-added something neither for false nor
ἀληθές πω. Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦδε· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τραγέλαφος
true yet Sign and is of-this also for the goat-stag
σημαίνει μέν τι, οὔπω δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ
signifies indeed something not-yet but true or false if not the
εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ χρόνον.
to-be or not to-be is-added either simply or according-to time

A name is a sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which signifies separately: in Kallippos the hippos *means nothing by itself, though it does in* kalos hippos*, and in a compound the part aims at a meaning without signifying separately. It is by convention because no name is so by nature, only when it becomes a symbol; the inarticulate noises of beasts reveal something, but none is a name. Not-man is no name but an indefinite name. Of Philo and to Philo are cases of a name, since with is, was, or will be they say nothing true or false.*

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην
Name indeed then is sound significant according-to convention
ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν
without time of-which no part is significant
κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ
separated in for the Kallippos the hippos nothing itself
καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καλὸς ἵππος.
by itself signifies just-as in the phrase the kalos hippos
Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως
Not indeed not-even just-as in the simple names so
ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς συμπεπλεγμένοις· ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ
it-is also in the compound in those indeed for the
μέρος οὐδαμῶς σημαντικόν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις βούλεται μέν,
part in-no-way significant in but these it-means indeed
ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπακτροκέλης τὸ
but of-nothing separated such-as in the epaktrokelēs the
κέλης οὐδὲν σημαίνει καθ' ἑαυτό. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην,
kelēs nothing signifies by itself The and according-to convention
ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται
because by-nature of-the names none is but when it-becomes

σύμβολον, ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμματοι
symbol since show at-least something also the inarticulate
ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὄνομα.
noises such-as of-beasts of-which none is name
Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὄνομα. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κεῖται
The and not man not name Not indeed not-even is-established
ὄνομα ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό· οὔτε γὰρ λόγος οὔτε
name what ever one-must to-call it neither for phrase nor
ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν. Ἀλλ' ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον, ὅτι ὁμοίως
negation is But let-it-be name indefinite because alike
ἐφ' ὁτουοῦν ὑπάρχει καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος. Τὸ δὲ
for anything-whatever it-belongs both being and not being The and
Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ
of-Philo or to-Philo and as-many-as such not names but
πτώσεις ὀνόματος. Λόγος δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
cases of-name Account and is of-it the indeed other
κατὰ τὰ αὐτά· ὅτι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται οὐκ
according-to the same that but with the is or was or will-be not
ἀληθεύει ἢ ψεύδεται, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἀεί· οἷον Φίλωνός ἐστιν
is-true or is-false the but name always such-as of-Philo is
ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲν γάρ πω οὔτε ἀληθεύει οὔτε ψεύδεται.
or not is nothing for yet neither is-true nor is-false

A verb additionally signifies time, no part of it signifies separately, and it is always a sign of things said of something else. Is not healthy is no verb but an indefinite verb, and was healthy and will be healthy are cases of a verb, signifying the time around the present. Said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something, since the speaker stops his thought and the hearer rests; but they do not yet signify whether a thing is or not. Even being, said bare, is nothing by itself, but additionally signifies a combination, which cannot be thought without the things combined.

Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος
Verb and is the(-thing) additionally-signifying time of-which part
οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ'
none signifies separately and is always of-the(-things) of
ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον. Λέγω δ' ὅτι προσσημαίνει
other said sign I-mean and that it-additionally-signifies
χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα·
time such-as health indeed name the but is-healthy verb
προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν
it-additionally-signifies for the now to-belong And always of-the(-things)
καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ'
of other said sign it-is such-as of-the(-things) of
ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.
subject or in subject
Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει καὶ τὸ οὐ κάμνει οὐ ῥῆμα λέγω·
The and not is-healthy and the not is-ill not verb I-call
προσσημαίνει μὲν γὰρ χρόνον καὶ ἀεὶ κατά τινος ὑπάρχει,
it-additionally-signifies indeed for time and always of something belongs
τῇ δὲ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα οὐ κεῖται· ἀλλ' ἔστω ἀόριστον
for-the but difference name not is-established but let-it-be indefinite
ῥῆμα, ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ' ὁτουοῦν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ὄντος καὶ μὴ
verb because alike for anything-whatever it-belongs both being and not

ὄντος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑγίαινεν ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ οὐ ῥῆμα,
being Likewise and also the was-healthy or the will-be-healthy not verb
ἀλλὰ πτῶσις ῥήματος· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ
but case of-verb it-differs and from-the verb because the
μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ τὸ πέριξ.
indeed the present additionally-signifies time the(-ones) and the around
Αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά
Themselves indeed then by themselves said the verbs names
ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι (ἵστησι γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν,
are and signify something stops for the speaker the thought
καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν), ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, οὔπω
and the hearer has-rested but whether it-is or not not-yet
σημαίνει· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ
it-signifies not-even for the to-be or not to-be sign is of-the
πράγματος, οὐδ' ἐὰν τὸ ὂν εἴπῃς αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ψιλόν.
thing not-even if the being you-say itself by itself bare
Αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι, προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν
Itself indeed for nothing is it-additionally-signifies and combination
τινα, ἣν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι.
some which without the(-things) combined not it-is-possible to-think

A statement is a significant sound some part of which signifies separately, as an expression, not as an affirmation. Every statement signifies, not as a tool of nature but by convention, but not every one is assertive: only one in which truth or falsity is found, and a prayer is a statement but neither true nor false. The others are left aside, since they belong rather to rhetoric or poetics; the assertive statement belongs to the present inquiry.

Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν
Statement and is sound significant according-to convention of-which of-the
μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾽
parts something significant is separated as saying but
οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. Λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος
not as affirmation or negation I-mean and such-as man
σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ᾽
signifies indeed something but not that it-is or not it-is but
ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ. Ἀλλ᾽
it-will-be affirmation or negation if something be-added But
οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μῦς
not of-the man syllable one Not-even for in the mys
τὸ ῦς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνή ἐστι νῦν μόνον. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς
the ys significant but sound is now only In and the
διπλοῖς σημαίνει μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὡς προείρηται.
double it-signifies indeed but not by itself as has-been-said-before
Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον
Is and statement every indeed significant not as instrument
δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς προείρηται, κατὰ συνθήκην. Ἀποφαντικὸς
and but as has-been-said-before according-to convention Assertoric
δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.
but not every but in which the to-be-true or to-be-false belongs
Οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ᾽
Not in all but it-belongs such-as the prayer statement indeed but

οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν·
neither true nor false The indeed then others let-be-dismissed
ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ
of-rhetoric for or of-poetics more-proper the inquiry the but
ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.
assertoric of-the present study

V · SIMPLE AND COMPOUND STATEMENTS

The first single assertive statement is the affirmation, then the negation, and all the others are one by conjunction. Every assertive statement must contain a verb or a case of one, since the account of man is not yet assertive without is or was or will be. A statement is one if it reveals one thing or is one by conjunction, many if it reveals many things or is unconnected. The simple statement is a significant sound about whether something belongs or does not, as the times are divided.

Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα
Is and one first statement assertoric affirmation then
ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς. Ἀνάγκη δὲ
negation the and others all by-conjunction one Necessity and
πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως
every statement assertoric from verb to-be or case
ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν
of-verb also for the of-the man account if not the is
ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἤ τι τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὔπω λόγος
or was or will-be or something such be-added not-yet statement
ἀποφαντικός. Διότι δὴ ἕν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πολλὰ τὸ
assertoric Why indeed one something it-is but not many the
ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ σύνεγγυς εἰρῆσθαι εἷς
animal footed two-footed not for indeed by-the near to-be-said one
ἔσται. Ἔστι δὲ ἄλλης πραγματείας τοῦτο εἰπεῖν. Ἔστι
it-will-be It-is and of-other study this to-say Is

δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ
and one statement assertoric either the(-one) one showing or the(-one)
συνδέσμῳ εἷς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ
by-conjunction one many and the(-ones) many and not one or the
ἀσύνδετοι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα φάσις ἔστω μόνον,
unconjoined The indeed then name or verb saying let-it-be only
ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὕτω δηλοῦντά τι τῇ
since not it-is-possible to-say so showing something with-the
φωνῇ ὥστε ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐρωτῶντός τινος, ἢ μή,
voice so-as to-assert whether asking someone or not
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν προαιρούμενον. Τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἁπλῆ ἐστὶν
but oneself choosing Of-these and the indeed simple is
ἀπόφανσις, οἷον τὶ κατά τινος ἢ τὶ ἀπό τινος, ἡ
assertion such-as something of something or something from something the
δὲ ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένη οἷον λόγος τις ἤδη σύνθετος.
and from these composed such-as statement some already composite
Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀπόφανσις φωνὴ σημαντικὴ περὶ τοῦ
Is and the simple assertion sound significant about the
ὑπάρχειν τι ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διῄρηνται.
to-belong something or not to-belong as the times have-been-divided

An affirmation is a statement of something about something, a negation a statement of something away from something. Since it is possible to state what belongs as not belonging and what does not as belonging, and so with the times outside the present, everything affirmed can be denied and everything denied affirmed. So every affirmation has an opposite negation, and the pair is a contradiction, provided the same is said of the same, not homonymously, with the other qualifications made against sophistical trickery.

Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος κατά τινος.
Affirmation and is assertion of-something of something
Ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος. Ἐπεὶ
Negation and is assertion of-something from something Since
δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον
and it-is-possible also the belonging to-assert as not belonging
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς
and the not belonging as belonging and the belonging as
ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον, καὶ περὶ τοὺς
belonging and the not belonging as not belonging and about the
ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν χρόνους ὡσαύτως, ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο
outside and the now times likewise everything — would-be-possible
καὶ ὃ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησέ
both what affirmed someone to-deny and what denied
τις καταφῆσαι. Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πάσῃ καταφάσει ἐστὶν
someone to-affirm So-that clear that to-every affirmation is
ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη καὶ πάσῃ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις.
negation opposed and to-every negation affirmation
Καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ
And let-be contradiction this affirmation and negation the
ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ
opposed I-mean and to-be-opposed the of-the same of

τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν
the same not homonymously and also as-many-as other of-the
τοιούτων προσδιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις.
such we-further-specify against the sophistical annoyances

VII · UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

Some things are universal, predicated of many, like man, and some particular, like Callias. Affirmation and negation of a universal taken universally, every man is white and no man is white, are contraries; of a universal not taken universally, man is white and man is not white, are not, though they look it. Every man is white and not every man is white are contradictories, one of which must be true; contraries cannot both be true, but their subcontraries can be. So it has been said which affirmation and negation are opposed, and which pair is a contradiction.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ
Since and are the indeed universal of-the things the and
καθ' ἕκαστον (λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων
according-to each I-call and universal indeed what for more
πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μή, οἷον
is-natural to-be-predicated according-to each and what not such-as
ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ'
man indeed of-the universals Callias and of-the according-to
ἕκαστον)· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχει τι ἢ μὴ
each necessity and to-assert that belongs something or not
ὁτὲ μὲν τῶν καθόλου τινί, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν καθ'
at-one-time indeed of-the universals to-some at-another-time and of-the according-to
ἕκαστον. Ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καθόλου ἀποφαίνηται ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου
each If indeed then universally one-should-assert for the universal
ὅτι ὑπάρχει τι ἢ μή, ἔσονται ἐναντίαι αἱ ἀποφάνσεις.
that belongs something or not will-be contrary the assertions

Λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι καθόλου, οἷον πᾶς
I-mean and for the universal to-assert universally such-as every
ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. Ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν
man white no man white Whenever and for the
καθόλου μέν, μὴ καθόλου δέ, αὗται μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι,
universals indeed not universally but these indeed not are contrary
τὰ μέντοι δηλούμενα ἔστιν εἶναι ἐναντία ποτέ. Λέγω
the(-things) however shown it-is-possible to-be contrary sometimes I-mean
δὲ τὸ μὴ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου, οἷον ἔστι
and the not universally to-assert for the universals such-as is
λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος· καθόλου γὰρ
white man not is white man universal for
ὄντος τοῦ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ὡς καθόλου κέχρηται τῇ ἀποφάνσει·
being the man not as universal it-has-used the assertion
τὸ γὰρ πᾶς οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καθόλου.
the for every not the universal signifies but that universally
Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου κατηγορεῖν τὸ καθόλου
For and the predicate universal to-predicate the universal
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· οὐδεμία γὰρ κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν
not is true no for affirmation true will-be in
ᾗ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ καθόλου κατηγορεῖται,
which of-the predicate universal the universal is-predicated
οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν ζῷον. Ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν οὖν
such-as is every man every animal To-be-opposed indeed then
κατάφασιν ἀποφάσει λέγω ἀντιφατικῶς τὴν τὸ καθόλου
affirmation to-negation I-say contradictorily the(-one) the universal
σημαίνουσαν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐ καθόλου, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος
signifying to-the same that not universally such-as every man
λευκός — οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος
white not every man white no man
λευκός — ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός· ἐναντίως δὲ τὴν τοῦ
white is some man white contrarily and the of-the

καθόλου κατάφασιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ καθόλου ἀπόφασιν, οἷον
universal affirmation and the of-the universal negation such-as
πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, πᾶς
every man white no man white every
ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος — οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος. Διὸ ταύτας
man just no man just Wherefore these
μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ἀντικειμένας
indeed not possible — at-once true to-be the(-ones) but opposed
αὐταῖς ἐνδέχεταί ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι,
to-them it-is-possible sometimes for the same at-once true to-be
οἷον οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός καὶ ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός.
such-as not every man white and is some man white
Ὅσαι μὲν οὖν ἀντιφάσεις τῶν καθόλου εἰσὶ καθόλου,
As-many-as indeed then contradictions of-the universals are universally
ἀνάγκη τὴν ἑτέραν ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἢ ψευδῆ, καὶ ὅσαι ἐπὶ
necessity the one true to-be or false and as-many-as for
τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός — οὐκ
the according-to each such-as is Socrates white not
ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός· ὅσαι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου μέν,
is Socrates white as-many-as but for the universals indeed
μὴ καθόλου δέ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἡ μὲν ἀληθὴς ἡ δὲ ψευδής.
not universally but not always the indeed true the and false
Ἅμα γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκὸς
At-once for true it-is to-say that is man white
καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, καὶ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος
and that not is man white and is man
καλὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καλός. Εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρός, καὶ
fine and not is man fine If for ugly also
οὐ καλός· καὶ εἰ γίνεταί τι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. Δόξειε δ'
not fine and if comes-to-be something also not it-is It-would-seem and
ἂν ἐξαίφνης ἄτοπον εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι σημαίνειν τὸ
— suddenly strange to-be because-of the to-appear to-signify the

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἅμα καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος
not is man white at-once also that no man
λευκός· τὸ δὲ οὔτε ταὐτὸν σημαίνει οὔθ' ἅμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
white the but neither the-same signifies nor at-once of necessity
Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ μία ἀπόφασις μιᾶς καταφάσεώς ἐστι· τὸ
Evident and that also one negation of-one affirmation is the
γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ ἀποφῆσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν ὅπερ κατέφησεν
for same one-must to-deny the negation which-very affirmed
ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά
the affirmation and from the same either of-the according-to each
τινος ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν καθόλου τινός, ἢ ὡς καθόλου ἢ ὡς
something or from the universal something either as universal or as
μὴ καθόλου. Λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός — οὐκ
not universal I-mean and such-as is Socrates white not
ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. Ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλου
is Socrates white If but other something or from other
τὸ αὐτό, οὐχ ἡ ἀντικειμένη ἀλλ' ἔσται ἐκείνης ἑτέρα. Τῇ
the same not the opposite but will-be from-that different To-the
δὲ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἡ οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, τῇ
and every man white the not every man white to-the
δὲ τὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἡ οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός· τῇ
and some man white the no man white to-the
δὲ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἡ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός.
and is man white the not is man white
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μιᾷ καταφάσει μία ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται
That indeed then to-one affirmation one negation is-opposed
ἀντιφατικῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, εἴρηται· καὶ ὅτι αἱ
contradictorily and which are these has-been-said and that the
ἐναντίαι ἄλλαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, εἴρηται· καὶ ὅτι
contraries others and which are these has-been-said and that

οὐ πᾶσα ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς ἀντίφασις, καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ
not every true or false contradiction and because-of what and
πότε ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.
when true or false

VIII · ONE AFFIRMATION

An affirmation or negation is one when it signifies one thing of one thing, the subject universal and taken universally or not: every man is white. But if one name is set on two things that make no one thing, as if cloak were the name of horse and man, the affirmation is not one, for cloak is white then says horse and man is white, which is many. So with these too it is not necessary that one of the contradictory pair be true and the other false.

Μία δέ ἐστι κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἡ ἓν καθ'
One and is affirmation and negation the(-one) one of
ἑνὸς σημαίνουσα, ἢ καθόλου ὄντος καθόλου ἢ μὴ
one signifying either universal being universally or not
ὁμοίως, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστιν — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς
likewise such-as every man white is not is every
ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός — οὐκ ἔστιν
man white is man white not is
ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός — ἔστι τις
man white no man white is some
ἄνθρωπος λευκός, εἰ τὸ λευκὸν ἓν σημαίνει. Εἰ δὲ δυοῖν ἓν
man white if the white one signifies If and for-two one
ὄνομα κεῖται, ἐξ ὧν μή ἐστιν ἕν, οὐ μία κατάφασις οὐδὲ
name is-set from which not is one not one affirmation nor
ἀπόφασις μία, οἷον εἴ τις θεῖτο ὄνομα ἱμάτιον ἵππῳ καὶ
negation one such-as if someone should-set name cloak for-horse and
ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ ἔστιν ἱμάτιον λευκόν, αὕτη οὐ μία κατάφασις
for-man the is cloak white this not one affirmation

οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις μία. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ
nor negation one Nothing for differs this to-say than
ἔστιν ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος λευκός. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει
is horse and man white This and nothing differs
τοῦ εἰπεῖν ἔστιν ἵππος λευκὸς καὶ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός.
from-the to-say is horse white and is man white
Εἰ οὖν αὗται πολλὰ σημαίνουσι καὶ εἰσὶ πολλαί, δῆλον
If then these many-things signify and are many clear
ὅτι καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἤτοι πολλὰ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει· οὐ γάρ
that also the first either many-things or nothing signifies not for
ἐστιν ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππος. Ὥστε οὐδ' ἐν ταύταις
is the particular man horse So-that not-even in these
ἀνάγκη τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι ἀντίφασιν.
necessity the indeed true the and false to-be contradiction

IX · THE SEA BATTLE

For what is and what has been, one of an affirmation and its negation must be true and the other false; for particulars in the future, not so. If every such statement were already true or false, all things would happen of necessity and nothing by chance, and there would be no need to deliberate. Yet deliberating and acting are starting points of what is to come, and much can be and not be, as a cloak can be cut and yet wear out first. A sea battle tomorrow must either happen or not, but neither is necessary, so one statement will be true, but not determinately.

Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ γενομένων ἀνάγκη τὴν
For indeed then the being and having-come-about necessity the
κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ
affirmation or the negation true or false to-be and for
μὲν τῶν καθόλου ὡς καθόλου ἀεὶ τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ
indeed the universals as universal always the one true the other

ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,
false to-be and for the according-to each just-as has-been-said
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου μὴ καθόλου λεχθέντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη·
for but the universals not universally said not necessity
εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα
it-has-been-said and also about these For but the according-to each
καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως. Εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ
and future not likewise If for every affirmation and
ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ
negation true or false also everything necessity to-belong or
μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ ὁ μὲν φήσει ἔσεσθαί τι ὁ δὲ
not to-belong so-that if the one will-say to-be-going-to-be something the other
μὴ φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀληθεύειν τὸν
not will-say the same this clear that necessity to-be-true the
ἕτερον αὐτῶν, εἰ πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ
one of-them if every affirmation and negation true or
ψευδής. Ἄμφω γὰρ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
false Both for not will-belong at-once for the such
Εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν ἢ ὅτι οὐ λευκόν ἐστιν,
If for true to-say that white or that not white it-is
ἀνάγκη εἶναι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκόν, καὶ εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν ἢ οὐ
necessity to-be white or not white and if it-is white or not
λευκόν, ἀληθὲς ἦν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι· καὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει,
white true it-was to-affirm or to-deny and if not it-belongs
ψεύδεται, καὶ εἰ ψεύδεται, οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἢ
one-is-false and if one-is-false not it-belongs so-that necessity either
τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἢ ψευδῆ.
the affirmation or the negation true to-be or false
Οὐδὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔθ'
Nothing then neither is nor comes-about nor by chance nor
ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
whichever chanced nor will-be or not will-be but of necessity

ἅπαντα καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν. Ἢ γὰρ ὁ φὰς
all and not whichever chanced Either for the(-one) affirming
ἀληθεύσει ἢ ὁ ἀποφάς. Ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο
will-be-true or the(-one) denying Likewise for — it-would-come-about
ἢ οὐκ ἐγίνετο· τὸ γὰρ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
or not it-would-come-about the for whichever chanced nothing more
οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἕξει. Ἔτι εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν νῦν,
so than not so is or will-be Further if is white now
ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν πρότερον ὅτι ἔσται λευκόν, ὥστε ἀεὶ
true it-was to-say before that it-will-be white so-that always
ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὁτιοῦν τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἔστιν
true it-was to-say anything-whatever of-the(-things) come-about that it-is
ἢ ἔσται. Εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ
or will-be If and always true it-was to-say that it-is or will-be not
οἷόν τε τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεσθαι. Ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷόν
possible — this not to-be nor not to-be-going-to-be What and not possible
τε μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι· ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ
— not to-come-about impossible not to-come-about what and impossible not
γενέσθαι, ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι. Ἅπαντα οὖν τὰ ἐσόμενα
to-come-about necessity to-come-about All then the(-things) going-to-be
ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ
necessary to-come-about Nothing then whichever chanced nor by
τύχης ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
chance will-be if for by chance not of necessity
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὡς οὐδέτερόν γε ἀληθὲς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν,
But indeed not-even as neither at-least true it-is-possible to-say
οἷον ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε οὐκ ἔσται. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης
such-as that neither it-will-be nor not it-will-be First indeed for being
τῆς καταφάσεως ψευδοῦς ἡ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἀληθής, καὶ
the affirmation false the negation not true and
ταύτης ψευδοῦς οὔσης τὴν κατάφασιν συμβαίνει μὴ ἀληθῆ
this false being the affirmation it-follows not true

εἶναι. Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκὸν καὶ μέγα,
to-be And besides these if true to-say that white and great
δεῖ ἄμφω ὑπάρχειν. Εἰ δὲ ὑπάρξει εἰς αὔριον, ὑπάρξει
one-must both to-belong If and it-will-belong to tomorrow it-will-belong
εἰς αὔριον. Εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔσται μήτε μὴ ἔσται αὔριον, οὐκ
to tomorrow If and neither it-will-be nor not will-be tomorrow not
ἂν εἴη τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν, οἷον ναυμαχία· δέοι
— would-be the whichever chanced such-as sea-battle it-would-be-necessary
γὰρ ἂν μήτε γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον μήτε μὴ γενέσθαι.
for — neither to-come-about sea-battle tomorrow nor not to-come-about
Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
The indeed indeed following absurdities these and such
ἕτερα, εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως ἢ
others if-indeed of-every affirmation and negation either
ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν
for the universals said as universal or for the
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν
according-to each necessity of-the opposites to-be the one
ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι
true the other false nothing and whichever chanced to-be
ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ πάντα εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ
in the coming-about but all to-be and to-come-about of
ἀνάγκης. Ὥστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι ἂν οὔτε
necessity So-that neither to-deliberate would-be-necessary — nor
πραγματεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται τοδί,
to-take-trouble that if indeed this we-should-do will-be this
ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται τοδί. Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς
if and not this not will-be this Nothing for prevents also to
μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι τὸν δὲ
ten-thousandth year the one to-say this to-be-going-to-be the other
μὴ φάναι, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσεσθαι ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν
not to-say so-that of necessity to-be-going-to-be whichever of-them

ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν τότε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει,
true it-was to-say then But indeed not-even this makes-a-difference
εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον· δῆλον γὰρ
whether some said the contradiction or not said clear for
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει τὰ πράγματα, κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ
that so are the things even-if not the one should-affirm
τι ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι
something the other should-deny not-even for because-of the to-be-affirmed
ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδ' εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος
or to-be-denied will-it-be or not will-it-be nor to ten-thousandth year
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ
more than in any-whatever time So-that if in all the
χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον
time so it-was so-as the one to-be-said-truly necessary
ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων ἀεὶ
was this to-come-about and each of-the(-things) come-about always
οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γὰρ
so was so-as of necessity to-come-about What both for
ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι·
truly said someone that it-will-be not possible — not to-come-about
καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.
and the coming-about true it-was to-say always that it-will-be
Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα — ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ
If indeed these-things impossible we-see for that there-is beginning
τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ
of-the(-things) going-to-be both from the to-deliberate and from the
πρᾶξαί τι, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ
to-do something and that wholly there-is in the(-things) not always
ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως· ἐν οἷς ἄμφω
actualizing the possible to-be and not likewise in which both
ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
it-is-possible both the to-be and the not to-be so-that also the

γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. Καὶ πολλὰ ἡμῖν δῆλά
to-come-about and the not to-come-about And many-things to-us clear
ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον ὅτι τουτὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν
are so being such-as that this-here the cloak possible
ἐστι διατμηθῆναι καὶ οὐ διατμηθήσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν
is to-be-cut-through and not will-be-cut-through but before
κατατριβήσεται. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν·
will-be-worn-out Likewise and also the not to-be-cut-through possible
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι,
not for — would-belong the before it to-be-worn-out
εἴγε μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι. Ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ
if-indeed not possible were the not to-be-cut-through So-that also for
τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι κατὰ δύναμιν λέγονται
the other comings-to-be as-many-as according-to capacity are-said
τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης
the such Evident then that not all of necessity
οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε, καὶ
either is or comes-about but the indeed whichever chanced and
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθής, τὰ
nothing more the affirmation than the negation true the
δὲ μᾶλλον μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον, οὐ μὴν
and more indeed and as on the most-part the-one not indeed
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.
but it-is-possible to-come-about also the-other the-one and not
Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι
The indeed then to-be the being when it-is and the not being not to-be
ὅταν μὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μὴν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη
when not it-is necessity not indeed neither the being all necessity
εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν
to-be nor the not being not to-be Not for the-same is the being
ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅτε ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἐξ
all to-be of necessity when it-is and the simply to-be of

ἀνάγκης. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
necessity Likewise and also for the not being And for the
ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν
contradiction the same account To-be indeed or not to-be everything
ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσεσθαί γε ἢ μή· οὐ μέντοι διελόντα
necessity and to-be-going-to-be at-least or not not however having-divided
γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. Λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀνάγκη μὲν
at-least to-say the-one necessary I-mean and such-as necessity indeed
ἔσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι
to-be-going-to-be sea-battle tomorrow or not to-be-going-to-be not however
ἔσεσθαί γε αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ
to-be-going-to-be at-least tomorrow sea-battle necessary nor not
γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μέντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον. Ὥστ᾽
to-come-about to-come-about however or not to-come-about necessary So-that
ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα, δῆλον
since alike the statements true just-as the things clear
ὅτι ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε καὶ τἀναντία
that as-many-as so are so-as whichever chanced also the-contraries
ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἀντίφασιν.
to-be-possible necessity alike to-be also the contradiction
Ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ οὖσιν ἢ μὴ ἀεὶ
Which-very happens for the(-things) not always being or not always
μὴ οὖσιν. Τούτων γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν θάτερον μόριον τῆς
not being Of-these for necessity indeed the-one part of-the
ἀντιφάσεως ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μέντοι τόδε ἢ τόδε
contradiction true to-be or false not however this or this
ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ
but whichever chanced and more indeed true the one not
μέντοι ἤδη ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ. Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη
however already true or false So-that clear that not necessity
πάσης καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὴν
of-every affirmation and negation of-the opposites the

μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
one true the other false to-be not for just-as in-the-case-of
τῶν ὄντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων μὲν
the being so it-is also for the not being indeed
δυνατῶν δὲ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
possible but to-be or not to-be but just-as has-been-said

X · IS AS A THIRD TERM

An affirmation says something of something, with a name or an indefinite name as its subject, and there is no affirmation or negation without a verb. When is is added as a third element, there are two oppositions: a man is just against a man is not just, and a man is not-just against a man is not not-just, arranged as in the Analytics*; the same holds with every man, and two more arise with not-man as subject. Indefinite names and verbs are not negations. Transposing name and verb, as in man is white and white is man, changes neither affirmation nor negation.*

Ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστί τι κατά τινος ἡ κατάφασις σημαίνουσα,
Since and is something of something the affirmation signifying
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἢ ὄνομα ἢ τὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἓν δὲ δεῖ
this and is either name or the nameless one and one-must
εἶναι καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει (τὸ δὲ ὄνομα
to-be also of one the(-thing) in the affirmation the and name
εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἀνώνυμον πρότερον· τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος
has-been-said and the nameless before the for not man
ὄνομα μὲν οὐ λέγω ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ὄνομα· ἓν γάρ πως
name indeed not I-call but indefinite name one for somehow
σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει οὐ
it-signifies also the indefinite just-as also the not is-healthy not
ῥῆμα ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ῥῆμα), ἔσται πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ
verb but indefinite verb will-be every affirmation and

ἀπόφασις ἢ ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος ἢ ἐξ ἀορίστου
negation either from name and verb or from indefinite
ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος. Ἄνευ δὲ ῥήματος οὐδεμία κατάφασις
name and verb Without and verb no affirmation
οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις· τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἦν ἢ γίνεται, ἢ
nor negation the for is or will-be or was or comes-to-be or
ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα ἐκ τῶν κειμένων ἐστί·
as-many-as other such verbs from the established(-points) are
προσσημαίνει γὰρ χρόνον. Ὥστε πρώτη ἔσται κατάφασις
they-additionally-signify for time So-that first will-be affirmation
καὶ ἀπόφασις τὸ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος,
and negation the is man not is man
εἶτα ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος,
then is not man not is not man
πάλιν ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος,
again is every man not is every man
ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.
is every not man not is every not man
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς δὲ χρόνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Ὅταν δὲ
And for the outside and times the same account Whenever and
τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγορῆται, ἤδη διχῶς λέγονται αἱ
the is third is-predicated-additionally already in-two-ways are-said the
ἀντιθέσεις. Λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ ἔστι
oppositions I-mean and such-as is just man the is
τρίτον φημὶ συγκεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταφάσει.
third I-say to-be-combined name or verb in the affirmation
Ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο τέτταρα ἔσται ταῦτα, ὧν τὰ μὲν
So-that because-of this four will-be these of-which the indeed
δύο πρὸς τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν ἕξει κατὰ τὸ
two toward the affirmation and negation will-be according-to the
στοιχοῦν ὡς αἱ στερήσεις, τὰ δὲ δύο οὔ. Λέγω δ' ὅτι τὸ
sequence as the privations the and two not I-mean and that the

ἔστιν ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται ἢ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ, ὥστε
is either to-the just will-be-added or to-the not just so-that
καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις. Τέτταρα οὖν ἔσται. Νοοῦμεν δὲ τὸ
also the negation Four then will-be We-understand and the(-thing)
λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων. Ἔστι δίκαιος
said from the(-things) written-below Is just
ἄνθρωπος· ἀπόφασις τούτου, οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος.
man negation of-this not is just man
Ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τούτου ἀπόφασις, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ
Is not just man of-this negation not is not
δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος. Τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι
just man The for is here and the not is
τῷ δικαίῳ προσκείσεται καὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ. Ταῦτα μὲν
to-the just will-be-added and to-the not just These indeed
οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγεται, οὕτω τέτακται.
then just-as in the Analytics is-said so are-arranged
Ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει κἂν καθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ᾖ ἡ κατάφασις,
Likewise and it-is even-if universal of-the name be the affirmation
οἷον πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος. Ἀπόφασις τούτου, οὐ
such-as every is man just Negation of-this not
πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος. Πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος οὐ
every is man just Every is man not
δίκαιος — οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιος. Πλὴν οὐχ
just not every is man not just Except not
ὁμοίως τὰς κατὰ διάμετρον ἐνδέχεται συναληθεύειν·
likewise the(-ones) according-to diagonal it-is-possible to-be-true-together
ἐνδέχεται δὲ ποτέ. Αὗται μὲν οὖν δύο ἀντίκεινται, ἄλλαι
it-is-possible but sometimes These indeed then two are-opposed others
δὲ δύο πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι
and two toward the not man as subject something
προστεθέν· ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ ἔστι δίκαιος
added is just not man not is just

οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐκ
not man is not just not man not
ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. Πλείους δὲ τούτων οὐκ
is not just not man More and than-these not
ἔσονται ἀντιθέσεις. Αὗται δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνων αὐταὶ καθ'
will-be oppositions These and apart from-those themselves by
ἑαυτὰς ἔσονται, ὡς ὀνόματι τῷ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος χρώμεναι.
themselves will-be as name the not man using
Ἐφ' ὅσων δὲ τὸ ἔστι μὴ ἁρμόττει, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ
For as-many-as but the is not fits such-as for the
ὑγιαίνει καὶ βαδίζει, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ οὕτω
is-healthy and walks for these the same it-does so
τιθέμενον ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ ἔστι προσήπτετο, οἷον ὑγιαίνει
placed as — if the is were-attached such-as is-healthy
πᾶς ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὑγιαίνει
every man not is-healthy every man is-healthy
πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.
every not man not is-healthy every not man
Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὔ,
Not for is the not every man must-be-said but the not
τὴν ἀπόφασιν, τῷ ἄνθρωπος προσθετέον. Τὸ γὰρ πᾶς
the negation to-the man must-be-added The for every
οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου. Δῆλον δὲ
not the universal signifies but that universally Clear and
ἐκ τοῦδε, ὑγιαίνει ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει ἄνθρωπος,
from this is-healthy man not is-healthy man
ὑγιαίνει οὐκ ἄνθρωπος — οὐχ ὑγιαίνει οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.
is-healthy not man not is-healthy not man
Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνων διαφέρει τῷ μὴ καθόλου εἶναι. Ὥστε
These for from-those differ by-the not universal to-be So-that
τὸ πᾶς ἢ οὐδείς οὐδὲν ἄλλο προσσημαίνει ἢ ὅτι καθόλου
the every or no nothing else additionally-signifies than that universally

τοῦ ὀνόματος ἢ κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν. Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα
of-the name either affirmation or negation The and others
τὰ αὐτὰ δεῖ προστιθέναι.
the same one-must to-add
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐναντία ἀπόφασίς ἐστι τῇ ἅπαν ἐστὶ ζῷον
Since and contrary negation is to-the every is animal
δίκαιον ἡ σημαίνουσα ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι ζῷον δίκαιον,
just the(-one) signifying that no is animal just
αὗται μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔσονται οὔτε ἀληθεῖς
these indeed evident that never will-be either true
ἅμα οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀντικείμεναι ταύταις
at-once or for the same the but opposed to-these
ἔσονταί ποτε, οἷον οὐ πᾶν ζῷον δίκαιον καὶ ἔστι
will-be sometimes such-as not every animal just and is
τι ζῷον δίκαιον. Ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ αὗται, τῇ μὲν πᾶς
some animal just Follow and these to-the indeed every
ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιός ἐστιν ἡ οὐδείς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος
man not just is the no is man
δίκαιος, τῇ δὲ ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος ἡ ἀντικειμένη
just to-the and is some man just the opposed
ὅτι οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὐ δίκαιος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί
that not every man is not just necessity for to-be
τινα. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον,
some Evident and also that for indeed the according-to each
εἰ ἀληθὲς ἐρωτηθέντα ἀποφῆσαι, ὅτι καὶ καταφῆσαι
if true being-asked to-deny that also to-affirm
ἀληθές· οἷον ἆρά γε Σωκράτης σοφός; οὔ. Σωκράτης
true such-as then at-least Socrates wise no Socrates
ἄρα οὐ σοφός. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἡ
then not wise For but the universals not true the
ὁμοίως λεγομένη, ἀληθὴς δὲ ἡ ἀπόφασις, οἷον ἆρά γε
likewise said true but the negation such-as then at-least

πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σοφός; οὔ. Πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος οὐ σοφός·
every man wise no Every then man not wise
τοῦτο γὰρ ψεῦδος. Ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος σοφός
this for false But the not every then man wise
ἀληθές· αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντικειμένη, ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ἐναντία.
true this and is the opposed that and the contrary
Αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἀόριστα ἀντικείμεναι ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα,
The and according-to the indefinite opposed names and verbs
οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μὴ δίκαιος, ὥσπερ ἀποφάσεις
such-as for the not man and not just just-as negations
ἄνευ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος δόξειαν ἂν εἶναι. Οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ·
without name and verb would-seem — to-be Not they-are but
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν ἀνάγκη ἢ ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὁ
always for to-be-true necessity or to-be-false the negation the(-one)
δ' εἰπὼν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰπόντος
and having-said not man nothing more than-the(-one) having-said
ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧττον ἠλήθευκέ τι ἢ ἔψευσται, ἐὰν
man but even less has-been-true something or has-been-false if
μήτι προστεθῇ. Σημαίνει δὲ τὸ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος
not-something be-added Signifies and the is every not man
δίκαιος οὐδεμιᾷ ἐκείνων ταὐτόν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀντικειμένη ταύτῃ ἡ
just to-none of-those the-same nor the opposed to-this the
οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος· τὸ δὲ πᾶς οὐ δίκαιος οὐκ
not is every not man just the and every not just not
ἄνθρωπος τῷ οὐδεὶς δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ταὐτὸν σημαίνει.
man to-the no just not man the-same signifies
Μετατιθέμενα δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν
Transposed and the names and the verbs the-same
σημαίνει, οἷον ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος
signify such-as is white man is man
λευκός. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστι, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείους ἔσονται
white If for not this is of-the same more will-be

ἀποφάσεις. Ἀλλ' ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι μία μιᾶς. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι
negations But it-had-been-shown that one of-one Of-the indeed for is
λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἀπόφασις τὸ οὐκ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος·
white man negation the not is white man
τοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, εἰ μὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ ἔστι
of-the and is man white if not the same it-is with-the is
λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσται ἀπόφασις ἤτοι τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ
white man will-be negation either the not is not
ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἢ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός. Ἀλλ' ἡ
man white or the not is man white But the
ἑτέρα μέν ἐστιν ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἔστιν οὐκ ἄνθρωπος λευκός,
one indeed is negation of-the is not man white
ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ τοῦ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὥστε ἔσονται δύο
the other and of-the is white man so-that will-be two
μιᾶς. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μετατιθεμένου τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ
of-one That indeed then being-transposed the name and the
ῥήματος ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, δῆλον.
verb the same comes-about affirmation and negation clear

To affirm or deny one thing of many, or many of one, is not one affirmation unless the many reveal one thing. A dialectical question asks for one premise or one part of a contradiction, so a question with many answers is not one, and asking what a thing is is not dialectical. Some predicates said separately combine into one, as animal and two-footed, and some do not, as good and shoemaker. What is true with an addition is true simply only when the addition holds no opposite and is not accidental: a dead man is not a man, and Homer is a poet but is not simply; what is not is an object of opinion, but not therefore something that is.

Τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν ἢ πολλὰ καθ' ἑνὸς καταφάναι ἢ
The and one of many or many of one to-affirm or
ἀποφάναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἕν τι ᾖ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν
to-deny if not one something be the(-thing) from the many
δηλούμενον, οὐκ ἔστι κατάφασις μία οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις. Λέγω
shown not is affirmation one nor negation I-mean
δὲ ἓν οὐκ ἐὰν ὄνομα ἓν ᾖ κείμενον, μὴ ᾖ δὲ ἕν τι ἐξ
and one not if name one be established not be but one something from
ἐκείνων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν
those such-as the man perhaps is both animal and two-footed
καὶ ἥμερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν τι γίνεται ἐκ τούτων· ἐκ
and tame but also one something comes-to-be from these from
δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ βαδίζειν οὐχ ἕν.
but the white and the man and the to-walk not one
Ὥστε οὔτ' ἐὰν ἕν τι κατὰ τούτων καταφήσῃ τις μία
So-that neither if one something of these should-affirm someone one
κατάφασις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ μὲν μία καταφάσεις δὲ πολλαί,
affirmation but sound indeed one affirmations but many
οὔτε ἐὰν καθ' ἑνὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως πολλαί. Εἰ οὖν
nor if of one these but likewise many If then
ἡ ἐρώτησις ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἀποκρίσεώς ἐστιν αἴτησις, ἢ
the questioning the dialectical of-answer is request either

τῆς προτάσεως ἢ θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἡ δὲ
of-the premise or of-the-one part of-the contradiction the and
πρότασις ἀντιφάσεως μιᾶς μόριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόκρισις
premise of-contradiction one part not — would-be answer
μία πρὸς ταῦτα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία, οὐδ' ἐὰν ᾖ
one toward these not-even for the questioning one not-even if it-be
ἀληθής. Εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἅμα
true It-has-been-said and in the Topics about them At-once
δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐρώτησίς ἐστι διαλεκτική·
and clear that not-even the what it-is questioning is dialectical
δεῖ γὰρ δεδόσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἑλέσθαι
one-must for to-have-been-granted from the questioning to-choose
ὁπότερον βούλεται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μόριον ἀποφήνασθαι.
whichever he-wishes of-the contradiction part to-assert
Ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα προσδιορίσαι πότερον τόδε
But one-must the(-one) questioning to-specify whether this
ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ οὐ τοῦτο.
is the man or not this
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν κατηγορεῖται συντιθέμενα, ὡς ἓν τὸ
Since and the(-ones) indeed are-predicated being-combined as one the
πᾶν κατηγόρημα τῶν χωρὶς κατηγορουμένων, τὰ
whole predicate of-the(-things) separately predicated the(-ones)
δ' οὔ, τίς ἡ διαφορά; κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀληθὲς
and not what the difference of for the man true
εἰπεῖν καὶ χωρὶς ζῷον καὶ χωρὶς δίπουν, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς
to-say both separately animal and separately two-footed and these as
ἕν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκόν, καὶ ταῦθ' ὡς ἕν. Ἀλλ' οὐχί,
one and man and white and these as one But not
εἰ σκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεὺς ἀγαθός. Εἰ γάρ, ὅτι
if shoemaker and good also shoemaker good If for because
ἑκάτερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ
each true to-be one-must also the both many and

ἄτοπα ἔσται. Κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος
absurd will-be Of for the man both the man
ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἅπαν. Πάλιν εἰ τὸ
true and the white so-that also the whole Again if the
λευκὸν αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἅπαν, ὥστε ἔσται ἄνθρωπος λευκὸς
white itself also the whole so-that will-be man white
λευκός, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. Καὶ πάλιν μουσικὸς λευκὸς
white and this to infinity And again musical white
βαδίζων· καὶ ταῦτα πολλάκις πεπλεγμένα εἰς ἄπειρον.
walking and these many-times interwoven to infinity
Ἔτι εἰ ὁ Σωκράτης Σωκράτης καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ
Further if the Socrates Socrates and man also
Σωκράτης Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
Socrates Socrates man And if man and
δίπους, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος δίπους.
two-footed also man man two-footed
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴ τις ἁπλῶς φήσει τὰς συμπλοκὰς
That indeed then if someone simply will-say the combinations
γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ συμβαίνει λέγειν ἄτοπα, δῆλον· ὅπως δὲ
to-come-about many-things it-follows to-say absurd clear how but
θετέον, λέγομεν νῦν. Τῶν δὴ κατηγορουμένων, καὶ ἐφ'
one-must-posit we-say now Of-the indeed predicated and on
οἷς κατηγορεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅσα μὲν λέγεται κατὰ
which to-be-predicated it-happens as-many-as indeed are-said according-to
συμβεβηκὸς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ θάτερον κατὰ θατέρου,
accident either of the same or the-one of the-other
ταῦτα οὐκ ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστι καὶ μουσικός,
these not will-be one such-as man white is and musical
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικόν· συμβεβηκότα γὰρ
but not one the white and the musical accidents for
ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ. Οὐδ' εἰ τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν,
both to-the same Nor if the white musical true to-say

ὅμως οὐκ ἔσται τὸ μουσικὸν λευκὸν ἕν τι· κατὰ
nevertheless not will-be the musical white one something according-to
συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τὸ μουσικὸν λευκόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
accident for the musical white so-that not will-be the
λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἕν τι. Διὸ οὐδ' ὁ σκυτεὺς ἁπλῶς
white musical one something Wherefore not-even the shoemaker simply
ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ ζῷον δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ἔτι
good but animal two-footed not for according-to accident Further
οὐδ' ὅσα ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ. Διὸ οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν
not-even as-many-as inhere in the other Wherefore neither the white
πολλάκις οὔτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν ἢ δίπουν·
many-times nor the man man animal is or two-footed
ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν.
inhere for in the man the animal and the two-footed
Ἀληθὲς δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἁπλῶς, οἷον
True and it-is to-say of the particular also simply such-as
τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸν τινὰ λευκὸν
the particular man man or the particular white
ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον λευκόν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν
man man white not always but but whenever indeed
ἐν τῷ προσκειμένῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τι ἐνυπάρχῃ
in the added of-the opposites something inheres
ᾧ ἕπεται ἀντίφασις, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, οἷον
on-which follows contradiction not true but false such-as
τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ
the dead man man to-say whenever but not
ἐνυπάρχῃ, ἀληθές. Ἢ ὅταν μὲν ἐνυπάρχῃ, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀληθές,
it-inheres true Or whenever indeed it-inheres always not true
ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχῃ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός
whenever but not it-inheres not always true just-as Homer
ἐστί τι, οἷον ποιητής. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔ; κατὰ
is something such-as poet So then also is or not according-to

συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ ἔστιν· ὅτι
accident for is-predicated of-the Homer the is because
γὰρ ποιητής ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτό, κατηγορεῖται κατὰ
for poet he-is but not by itself is-predicated of
τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ ἔστιν. Ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κατηγορίαις μήτε
the Homer the is So-that in as-many-as predications neither
ἐναντιότης ἔνεστιν, ἐὰν λόγοι ἀντ᾽ ὀνομάτων λέγωνται,
contrariety is-in if accounts instead-of names be-said
καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ κατηγορῆται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
and by themselves be-predicated and not according-to accident
ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ τὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς ἔσται εἰπεῖν. Τὸ
for these the something also simply true will-be to-say The
δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὄν τι·
and not being because opinable not true to-say being something
δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.
opinion for of-it not is that it-is but that not it-is

XII · POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY

How do the negations of possible to be and necessary to be stand? If the negation were formed as with simple statements, by adding not to the to be, the negation of possible to be would be possible not to be. But what can be cut can also not be cut, so both are true and they are not contradictory. Rather, to be is here the subject and possible the addition, so the negation of possible to be is not possible to be, and of possible not to be, not possible not to be; and so it is with admissible, impossible, necessary, and true.

Τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων σκεπτέον ὅπως ἔχουσιν αἱ
These and having-been-determined one-must-examine how are the
ἀποφάσεις καὶ καταφάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἱ τοῦ δυνατὸν
negations and affirmations toward one-another the(-ones) of-the possible

εἶναι καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ
to-be and not possible and admissible and not admissible and
περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου τε καὶ ἀναγκαίου· ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίας τινάς.
about the impossible both and necessary it-has for difficulties some
Εἰ γὰρ τῶν συμπλεκομένων αὗται ἀλλήλαις ἀντίκεινται
If for of-the(-things) combined these to-one-another are-opposed
ἀντιφάσεις, ὅσαι κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τάττονται,
contradictions as-many-as according-to the to-be and not to-be are-arranged
οἷον τοῦ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον,
such-as of-the to-be man negation the not to-be man
οὐ τὸ εἶναι μὴ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον
not the to-be not man and of-the to-be white man
τὸ μὴ εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ εἶναι μὴ λευκὸν
the not to-be white man but not the to-be not white
ἄνθρωπον. Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις,
man If for of every the affirmation or the negation
τὸ ξύλον ἔσται ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν εἶναι μὴ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον. Εἰ
the wood will-be true to-say to-be not white man If
δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως, καὶ ὅσοις τὸ εἶναι μὴ προστίθεται, τὸ
and this so also for-as-many-as the to-be not is-added the
αὐτὸ ποιήσει τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶναι λεγόμενον, οἷον τοῦ
same will-do the(-thing) instead-of the to-be said such-as of-the
ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει οὐ τὸ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἀπόφασις
man walks not the not man walks negation
ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ βαδίζει ἄνθρωπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει
will-be but the not walks man nothing for differs
εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον βαδίζειν ἢ ἄνθρωπον βαδίζοντα εἶναι.
to-say man to-walk or man walking to-be
Ὥστε εἰ οὕτως πανταχοῦ, καὶ τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀπόφασις
So-that if so everywhere also of-the possible to-be negation
ἔσται τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι.
will-be the possible not to-be but not the not possible to-be

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνασθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· πᾶν
Seems and the same to-be-able both to-be and not to-be every
γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν τέμνεσθαι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν
for the(-thing) possible to-be-cut or to-walk also not to-walk
καὶ μὴ τέμνεσθαι δυνατόν. Λόγος δέ, ὅτι ἅπαν τὸ οὕτω
and not to-be-cut possible Reason and that all the so
δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥστε ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ
possible not always actualizes so-that will-belong to-it also the
ἀπόφασις· δύναται γὰρ καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν τὸ βαδιστικὸν
negation it-is-able for also not to-walk the able-to-walk
καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὁρατόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον κατὰ
and not to-be-seen the visible But indeed impossible of
τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύεσθαι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις· οὐκ
the same to-be-true the opposed sayings not
ἄρα τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀπόφασίς ἐστι τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ
then of-the possible to-be negation is the possible not
εἶναι. Συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ φάναι καὶ
to-be It-follows for from these either the same to-affirm and
ἀποφάναι ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι
to-deny at-once and of the same or not according-to the to-be
καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὰ προστιθέμενα γίνεσθαι φάσεις καὶ
and not to-be the(-things) added to-become affirmations and
ἀποφάσεις. Εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἀδύνατον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αἱρετόν.
negations If then that impossible this — would-be to-be-chosen
Ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόφασις τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν
Is then negation of-the possible to-be the not possible
εἶναι. Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι·
to-be The and same account also about the admissible to-be
καὶ γὰρ τούτου ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι. Καὶ
also for of-this negation the not admissible to-be And
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοιοτρόπως, οἷον ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ
for the others and in-like-manner such-as of-necessary both and

ἀδυνάτου. Γίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι
impossible Come-about for just-as in-the-case-of those the to-be
καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι προσθέσεις, τὰ δ' ὑποκείμενα πράγματα
and the not to-be additions the and underlying things
τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν
the indeed white the and man so here the indeed
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ὡς ὑποκείμενον γίνεται, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι
to-be and not to-be as subject becomes the and to-be-able
καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι προσθέσεις διορίζουσαι, ὥσπερ ἐπ'
and the to-be-admissible additions determining just-as in-the-case-of
ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος,
those the to-be and not to-be the true and the false
ὁμοίως αὗται ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι οὐ δυνατόν.
likewise these for the to-be possible and to-be not possible
Τοῦ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἀπόφασις οὐ τὸ οὐ δυνατὸν
Of-the and possible not to-be negation not the not possible
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ δυνατὸν
to-be but the not possible not to-be and of-the possible
εἶναι οὐ τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι.
to-be not the possible not to-be but the not possible to-be
Διὸ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν ἂν δόξειαν ἀλλήλαις αἱ τοῦ
Wherefore also to-follow — would-seem one-another the(-ones) of-the
δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δυνατὸν
possible to-be and possible not to-be the for same possible
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεις ἀλλήλων αἱ τοιαῦται,
to-be and not to-be not for contradictions of-one-another the such
τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνατὸν
the possible to-be and possible not to-be But the possible
εἶναι καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἅμα
to-be and not possible to-be never for the same at-once
ἀληθεύονται· ἀντίκεινται γάρ. Οὐδέ γε τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ
are-true they-are-opposed for Nor at-least the possible not

εἶναι καὶ οὐ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
to-be and not possible not to-be never at-once for the same
ἀληθεύονται. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπόφασις
are-true Likewise and also of-the necessary to-be negation
οὐ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι·
not the necessary not to-be but the not necessary to-be
τοῦ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι.
of-the and necessary not to-be the not necessary not to-be
Καὶ τοῦ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
And of-the impossible to-be not the impossible not to-be but
τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι· τοῦ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι τὸ οὐκ
the not impossible to-be of-the and impossible not to-be the not
ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι. Καὶ καθόλου δέ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ
impossible not to-be Also universally and just-as has-been-said the
μὲν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δεῖ τιθέναι ὡς τὰ ὑποκείμενα,
indeed to-be and not to-be one-must to-set as the subjects
κατάφασιν δὲ καὶ ἀπόφασιν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα πρὸς τὸ
affirmation but and negation these making toward the
εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι συντάττειν. Καὶ ταύτας οἴεσθαι χρὴ
to-be and not to-be to-arrange And these to-think one-must
εἶναι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, δυνατόν — οὐ δυνατόν,
to-be the opposed sayings possible not possible
ἐνδεχόμενον — οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀδύνατον — οὐκ ἀδύνατον,
admissible not admissible impossible not impossible
ἀναγκαῖον — οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀληθές — οὐκ ἀληθές.
necessary not necessary true not true

The sequences follow if one sets them out so: from possible to be follow admissible to be, not impossible, and not necessary to be; from not possible to be follow not admissible, necessary not to be, and impossible to be. But the necessary needs correcting: from possible to be follows not necessary not to be. Some capacities are irrational, like fire's to heat, and some rational, able to do contraries; what is necessary is actual. Some things are actualities without capacity, like the primary substances; others are actual with capacity, prior in nature but later in time; others never actual, only potential.

Καὶ αἱ ἀκολουθήσεις δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίνονται οὕτω
Also the implications and according-to reason come-about so
τιθεμένοις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι
for-the(-ones)-setting to-the indeed for possible to-be the to-be-admissible
εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον
to-be and this to-that reciprocates and the not impossible
εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· τῷ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ
to-be and the not necessary to-be to-the and possible not
εἶναι καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι
to-be and admissible not to-be the not necessary not to-be
καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι
and the not impossible not to-be to-the and not possible to-be
καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ
and not admissible to-be the necessary not to-be and the
ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι καὶ μὴ
impossible to-be to-the and not possible not to-be and not
ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον
admissible not to-be the necessary to-be and the impossible
μὴ εἶναι. Θεωρείσθω δὲ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς ὡς λέγομεν.
not to-be Let-it-be-considered and from the table as we-say

δυνατὸν εἶναι οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι οὐκ
possible to-be not possible to-be admissible to-be not
ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐκ
admissible to-be not impossible to-be impossible to-be not
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι οὐ
necessary to-be necessary not to-be possible not to-be not
δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον
possible not to-be admissible not to-be not admissible
μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι οὐκ
not to-be not impossible not to-be impossible not to-be not
ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.
necessary not to-be necessary to-be

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ
The indeed then impossible and not impossible to-the admissible
καὶ δυνατῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχομένῳ καὶ μὴ δυνατῷ ἀκολουθεῖ
and possible and not admissible and not possible follow
μὲν ἀντιφατικῶς, ἀντεστραμμένως δέ· τῷ μὲν γὰρ
indeed contradictorily conversely but to-the indeed for
δυνατὸν εἶναι ἡ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἀκολουθεῖ, τῇ
possible to-be the negation of-the impossible follows to-the
δὲ ἀποφάσει ἡ κατάφασις· τῷ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι
and negation the affirmation to-the for not possible to-be
τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι· κατάφασις γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι,
the impossible to-be affirmation for the impossible to-be
τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀπόφασις. Τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον
the but not impossible to-be negation The and necessary
πῶς, ὀπτέον. Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἱ
how must-be-viewed Evident indeed that not so it-is but the
ἐναντίαι ἕπονται· αἱ δ' ἀντιφάσεις χωρίς. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
contraries follow the and contradictions separately Not for is
ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι·
negation of-the necessity not to-be the not necessity to-be

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀληθεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀμφοτέρας·
it-is-possible for to-be-true in-the-case-of the same both
τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Αἴτιον δὲ
the for necessary not to-be not necessary to-be Cause and
τοῦ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως τοῖς ἑτέροις, ὅτι
of-the not to-follow the necessary likewise to-the others that
ἐναντίως τὸ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ ἀποδίδοται, τὸ αὐτὸ
contrarily the impossible to-the necessary is-rendered the same
δυνάμενον. Εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο οὐκ
meaning If for impossible to-be necessary this not
εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη
to-be but not to-be if and impossible not to-be this necessity
εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ ἐκεῖνα ὁμοίως τῷ δυνατῷ καὶ μή, ταῦτα ἐξ
to-be so-that if those likewise to-the possible and not these from
ἐναντίας, ἐπεὶ οὐ σημαίνει γε ταὐτὸν τό τε ἀναγκαῖον
contrary since not signifies at-least the-same the both necessary
καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀντεστραμμένως.
and the impossible but just-as has-been-said conversely
Ἢ ἀδύνατον οὕτως κεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἀντιφάσεις;
Or impossible so to-be-placed the of-the necessary contradictions
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δυνατὸν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μή, ἡ
the indeed for necessary to-be possible to-be if for not the
ἀπόφασις ἀκολουθήσει· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι·
negation will-follow necessity for either to-affirm or to-deny
ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀδύνατον ἄρα
so-that if not possible to-be impossible to-be impossible then
εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ
to-be the necessary to-be which-very absurd But indeed to-the
γε δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ, τούτῳ
at-least possible to-be the not impossible to-be follows to-this
δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον
and the not necessary to-be so-that it-follows the necessary

εἶναι μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
to-be not necessary to-be which-very absurd But indeed not-even
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ
the necessary to-be follows to-the possible to-be nor the
ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται συμβαίνειν,
necessary not to-be to-the indeed for both it-is-possible to-happen
τούτων δὲ ὁπότερον ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐκεῖνα ἀληθῆ.
of-these but whichever — true be no-longer will-be those true
Ἅμα γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ
At-once for possible to-be and not to-be if but necessity to-be or
μὴ εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσται δυνατὸν ἄμφω. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὸ οὐκ
not to-be not will-be possible both It-remains then the not
ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι. Τοῦτο
necessary not to-be to-follow to-the possible to-be This
γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ αὕτη
for true also of the necessary to-be And for this
γίνεται ἀντίφασις τῇ ἑπομένῃ τῷ οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι· ἐκείνῳ
becomes contradiction to-the following to-the not possible to-be to-that
γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι,
for follows the impossible to-be and necessary not to-be
οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις τὸ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι. Ἀκολουθοῦσί
of-which the negation the not necessary not to-be Follow
τε ἄρα καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀντιφάσεις κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον
both then also these the contradictions according-to the said
τρόπον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει τιθεμένων οὕτως.
way and nothing impossible follows being-set so
Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ
Would-be-puzzled and — someone whether to-the necessary to-be the
δυνατὸν εἶναι ἕπεται. Εἴ τε γὰρ μὴ ἕπεται, ἡ ἀντίφασις
possible to-be follows If both for not it-follows the contradiction
ἀκολουθήσει, τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι· καὶ εἴ τις ταύτην
will-follow the not possible to-be and if someone this

μὴ φήσειεν εἶναι ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ
not should-say to-be contradiction necessity to-say the possible not
εἶναι· ἅπερ ἄμφω ψευδῆ κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ
to-be which-very both false of the necessary to-be But
μὴν πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι δοκεῖ δυνατὸν τέμνεσθαι καὶ μὴ
indeed again the same to-be seems possible to-be-cut and not
τέμνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε ἔσται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον
to-be-cut and to-be and not to-be so-that will-be the necessary
εἶναι ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος. Φανερὸν
to-be admissible not to-be this but false Evident
δὴ ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ
indeed that not every the possible either to-be or to-walk also
τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύναται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐφ' ὧν οὐκ ἀληθές,
the opposites is-capable-of but there-are for which not true
πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατὰ λόγον δυνατῶν, οἷον
first indeed for the not according-to reason possible such-as
τὸ πῦρ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄλογον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν
the fire capable-of-heating and has power irrational The indeed then
μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων,
with reason powers the same of-more and of-the contraries
αἱ δ' ἄλογοι οὐ πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ πῦρ οὐ
the but irrational not all but just-as has-been-said the fire not
δυνατὸν θερμαίνειν καὶ μή, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνεργεῖ ἀεί.
possible to-heat and not nor as-many-as others actualize always
Ἔνια μέντοι δύναται καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις
Some however can also of-the according-to the irrational powers
ἅμα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δέξασθαι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τούτου
at-once the opposites to-receive But this indeed of-this
χάριν εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν ἀντικειμένων,
for-the-sake has-been-said that not every power of-the opposites
οὐδ' ὅσαι λέγονται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος. Ἔνιαι δὲ
nor as-many-as are-said according-to the same species Some and

δυνάμεις ὁμώνυμοί εἰσιν. Τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν οὐχ ἁπλῶς
powers homonymous are The for possible not simply
λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, οἷον
is-said but the indeed because true as in-actuality being such-as
δυνατὸν βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν εἶναι ὅτι
possible to-walk because he-walks and wholly possible to-be because
ἤδη ἔστι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ὃ λέγεται εἶναι δυνατόν, τὸ
already it-is according-to actuality what is-said to-be possible the
δὲ ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν, οἷον δυνατὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅτι
and because it-might-act — such-as possible to-be to-walk because
βαδίσειεν ἄν. Καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς κινητοῖς ἐστὶ μόνοις
he-might-walk — And this indeed for the movable is alone
ἡ δύναμις, ἐκείνη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. Ἄμφω δὲ
the power that and also for the immovable Both and
ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι βαδίζειν ἢ εἶναι, καὶ
true to-say the not impossible to-be to-walk or to-be also
τὸ βαδίζον ἤδη καὶ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ τὸ βαδιστικόν. Τὸ μὲν
the walking already and actualizing and the able-to-walk The indeed
οὖν οὕτω δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀληθὲς κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἁπλῶς
then so possible not true of the necessary simply
εἰπεῖν, θάτερον δὲ ἀληθές. Ὥστε ἐπεὶ τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ
to-say the-other but true So-that since to-the in part the
καθόλου ἕπεται, τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντι ἕπεται τὸ δύνασθαι
universal follows to-the of necessity being follows the to-be-able
εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι πᾶν. Καὶ ἔστι δὴ ἀρχὴ ἴσως τὸ
to-be not however every And is indeed beginning perhaps the
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον πάντων ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,
necessary and not necessary of-all either to-be or not to-be
καὶ τἆλλα ὡς τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦντα ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ.
and the-others as these following to-examine one-must

Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὂν
Evident indeed from the(-things) said that the of necessity being
κατ᾽ ἐνέργειάν ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ πρότερα τὰ ἀΐδια, καὶ ἡ
in actuality is so-that if prior the eternal also the
ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως προτέρα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ δυνάμεως
actuality than-potentiality prior And the(-ones) indeed without potentiality
ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν, οἷον αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ μετὰ
actualities are such-as the primary substances the(-ones) and with
δυνάμεως, ἃ τῇ μὲν φύσει πρότερα τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ ὕστερα,
potentiality which by-the indeed nature prior by-the but time later
τὰ δὲ οὐδέποτε ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις μόνον.
the(-ones) and never actualities are but potentialities only

XIV · THE CONTRARY OF AN AFFIRMATION

Is an affirmation contrary to a negation, or to another affirmation: is every man is just contrary to no man is just, or to every man is unjust? The belief that the good is not good is false about what belongs to it in itself, the belief that it is bad about what belongs by accident, so the first is more false and is the contrary of the true belief. So the contrary of a universal affirmation is the universal negation; and a true belief or statement is never contrary to a true one, since contraries cannot belong to the same thing at once.

Πότερον δὲ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἡ κατάφασις τῇ ἀποφάσει
Whether and contrary is the affirmation to-the negation
ἢ ἡ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῷ
or the affirmation to-the affirmation and the statement to-the
λόγῳ ὁ λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ οὐδεὶς
statement the(-one) saying that every man just to-the no
ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, ἢ τὸ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ πᾶς
man just or the every man just to-the every

ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, οἷον ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος — οὐκ ἔστι
man unjust such-as is Callias just not is
Καλλίας δίκαιος — Καλλίας ἄδικός ἐστι· ποτέρα δὴ
Callias just Callias unjust is which indeed
ἐναντία τούτων; εἰ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ ἀκολουθεῖ
contrary of-these if for the(-things) indeed in the voice follow
τοῖς ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐναντία δόξα ἡ
the(-things) in the thought there and contrary opinion the(-one)
τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῇ πᾶς
of-the contrary such-as that every man just to-the every
ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καταφάσεων
man unjust also for the in the voice affirmations
ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐκεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα
necessity likewise to-be If and not there the of-the contrary opinion
ἐναντία ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἡ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει ἔσται
contrary is not-even the affirmation to-the affirmation will-be
ἐναντία, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ εἰρημένη ἀπόφασις. Ὥστε σκεπτέον
contrary but the said negation So-that one-must-examine
ποία δόξα ἀληθὴς ψευδεῖ δόξῃ ἐναντία, πότερον ἡ
what-sort opinion true to-false opinion contrary whether the(-one)
τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ ἡ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι δοξάζουσα.
of-the negation or the(-one) the contrary to-be opining
Λέγω δὲ ὧδε. Ἔστι τις δόξα ἀληθὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι
I-mean and thus There-is some opinion true of-the good that
ἀγαθόν, ἄλλη δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ψευδής, ἑτέρα δὲ ὅτι
good other and that not good false another and that
κακόν. Ποτέρα δὴ τούτων ἐναντία τῇ ἀληθεῖ; καὶ εἰ ἔστι
bad Which indeed of-these contrary to-the true and if is
μία, καθ᾽ ὁποτέραν ἡ ἐναντία; τὸ μὲν δὴ τούτῳ
one according-to which-of-the-two the contrary the indeed indeed by-this
οἴεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων
to-think the contrary opinions to-have-been-defined by-the of-the contraries

εἶναι, ψεῦδος· τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ
to-be false of-the for good that good and of-the bad
ὅτι κακὸν ἡ αὐτὴ ἴσως καὶ ἀληθὴς ἔσται, εἴτε πλείους
that bad the same perhaps and true will-be whether more
εἴτε μία ἐστίν. Ἐναντία δὲ ταῦτα. Ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ ἐναντίων
or one it-is Contrary and these But not by-the of-contraries
εἶναι ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐναντίως. Εἰ δὴ ἔστι
to-be contrary but rather by-the contrarily If indeed is
μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν δόξα, ἄλλη δ' ὅτι οὐκ
indeed of-the good that it-is good opinion another and that not
ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο τι ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει οὐδ' οἷόν
good is and other something which not belongs nor possible
τε ὑπάρξαι, τῶν μὲν δὴ ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν θετέον, οὔτε
— to-belong of-the indeed indeed others none one-must-posit neither
ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον δοξάζουσιν οὔθ' ὅσαι
as-many-as to-belong the not belonging opine nor as-many-as
μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον (ἄπειροι γὰρ ἀμφότεραι, καὶ
not to-belong the belonging infinite for both and
ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν δοξάζουσι τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ ὅσαι μὴ
as-many-as to-belong opine the not belonging and as-many-as not
ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον), ἀλλ' ἐν ὅσαις ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπάτη.
to-belong the belonging but in as-many-as is the deception
Αὗται δέ εἰσιν ἐξ ὧν αἱ γενέσεις. Ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων
These and are from which the comings-to-be From the opposites
δὲ αἱ γενέσεις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπάται. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
and the comings-to-be so-that also the deceptions If then the good
καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ
both good and not bad is and the indeed by itself the
δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (συμβέβηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὐ κακῷ
and according-to accident it-happens for to-it not bad
εἶναι), μᾶλλον δὲ ἑκάστου ἀληθὴς ἡ καθ' ἑαυτό, καὶ
to-be more and of-each true the(-one) by itself also

ψευδής, εἴπερ καὶ ἀληθής. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν
false if-indeed also true The indeed then that not good
τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχοντος ψευδής, ἡ δὲ
the good of-the by itself belonging false the and
τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ὥστε μᾶλλον
of-the that bad of-the according-to accident So-that more
ἂν εἴη ψευδὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ
— would-be false of-the good the(-one) of-the negation than
ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα. Διέψευσται δὲ μάλιστα περὶ
the(-one) of-the contrary opinion Is-deceived and most about
ἕκαστον ὁ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχων δόξαν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία
each the(-one) the contrary having opinion the for contraries
τῶν πλεῖστον διαφερόντων περὶ τὸ αὐτό. Εἰ οὖν
of-the(-things) most differing about the same If then
ἐναντία μὲν τούτων ἡ ἑτέρα, ἐναντιωτέρα δὲ ἡ τῆς
contrary indeed of-these the one more-contrary and the(-one) of-the
ἀντιφάσεως, δῆλον ὅτι αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἐναντία. Ἡ δὲ
contradiction clear that this — would-be contrary The and
τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμπεπλεγμένη ἐστί· καὶ γὰρ
of-the that bad the good combined is also for
ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη ἴσως ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτόν.
that not good necessity perhaps to-suppose the same(-man)
Ἔτι δέ, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως δεῖ ἔχειν, καὶ
Further and if also for the others likewise one-must to-be also
ταύτῃ ἂν δόξειε καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι· ἢ γὰρ πανταχοῦ
in-this-way — it-would-seem well to-have-been-said either for everywhere
τὸ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἢ οὐδαμοῦ. Ὅσοις δὲ μή ἐστιν
the(-one) of-the contradiction or nowhere For-as-many-as and not is
ἐναντία, περὶ τούτων ἔστι μὲν ψευδὴς ἡ τῇ ἀληθεῖ
contrary about these is indeed false the(-one) to-the true
ἀντικειμένη, οἷον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἄνθρωπον
opposed such-as the(-one) the man not man

οἰόμενος διέψευσται. Εἰ οὖν αὗται ἐναντίαι, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
thinking is-deceived If then these contraries also the others
αἱ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως. Ἔτι ὁμοίως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
the(-ones) of-the contradiction Further likewise is the(-one) of-the good
ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ
that good and the(-one) of-the not good that not good and
πρὸς ταύταις ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ
besides these the(-one) of-the good that not good and the(-one)
τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Τῇ οὖν τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι
of-the not good that good To-the then of-the not good that
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἀληθεῖ οὔσῃ δόξῃ τίς ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐναντία; οὐ
not good true being opinion which — would-be the contrary not
γὰρ δὴ ἡ λέγουσα ὅτι κακόν· ἅμα γὰρ ἄν ποτε
for indeed the(-one) saying that bad at-once for — sometimes
εἴη ἀληθής, οὐδέποτε δὲ ἀληθὴς ἀληθεῖ ἐναντία· ἔστι γάρ
would-be true never and true to-true contrary is for
τι μὴ ἀγαθὸν κακόν, ὥστε ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι.
something not good bad so-that it-is-possible at-once true to-be
Οὐδ' αὖ ἡ ὅτι οὐ κακόν· ἀληθὴς γὰρ καὶ αὕτη. Ἅμα
Nor in-turn the(-one) that not bad true for also this At-once
γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἂν εἴη. Λείπεται οὖν τῇ τοῦ μὴ
for also these — would-be It-remains then to-the(-one) of-the not
ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντία ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι
good that not good contrary the(-one) of-the not good that
ἀγαθόν· ψευδὴς γὰρ αὕτη. Ὥστε καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι
good false for this So-that also the(-one) of-the good that
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Φανερὸν δὲ
not good to-the(-one) of-the good that good Evident and
ὅτι οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ' ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν·
that nothing will-differ not-even if universally we-should-set the affirmation
ἡ γὰρ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐναντία ἔσται, οἷον τῇ δόξῃ τῇ
the for universal negation contrary will-be such-as to-the opinion the

δοξαζούσῃ ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ ὅτι
opining that every what — be good good is the(-one) that
οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν,
nothing of-the goods good The for of-the good that good
εἰ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ ὅτι ὃ ἂν
if universally the good the same is with-the that what —
ᾖ ἀγαθὸν δοξαζούσῃ ὅτι ἀγαθόν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει
be good opining that good this and nothing differs
τοῦ ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
from-the that every what — be good good is Likewise and also
ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ. Ὥστε εἴπερ ἐπὶ δόξης οὕτως ἔχει, εἰσὶ
for the not good So-that if-indeed for opinion so it-is are
δὲ αἱ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καταφάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις σύμβολα
and the(-ones) in the voice affirmations and negations symbols
τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ καταφάσει ἐναντία μὲν
of-the(-things) in the soul clear that also to-affirmation contrary indeed
ἀπόφασις ἡ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθόλου, οἷον τῇ ὅτι πᾶν
negation the(-one) about the same universal such-as to-the that every
ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς ἡ ὅτι οὐδὲν
good good or that every man good the(-one) that nothing
ἢ οὐδείς, ἀντιφατικῶς δὲ ὅτι ἢ οὐ πᾶν ἢ οὐ πᾶς. Φανερὸν
or no-one contradictorily and that or not every or not every-one Evident
δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἀληθῆ ἀληθεῖ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐναντίαν εἶναι οὔτε
and that also true to-true not it-is-possible contrary to-be neither
δόξαν οὔτε ἀπόφασιν. Ἐναντίαι μὲν γὰρ αἱ περὶ τὰ
opinion nor negation Contraries indeed for the(-ones) about the
ἀντικείμενα, περὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν τὸν αὐτόν·
opposites about these but it-is-possible to-be-true the same(-man)
ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ.
at-once but not it-is-possible the contraries to-belong to-the same

ARISTOTLE

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ

Sophistical Refutations

Aristotle turns to sophistical refutations, which seem refutations but are fallacies. Some arguments are real syllogisms and some only seem so, as some men are fit and others only puffed up, and litharge and tin look like silver. The commonest cause is names: names are finite and things infinite, so one name signifies many things, and the unskilled are cheated as by experts with counters. Since the sophist makes money from apparent wisdom, he must seek arguments that make him seem to do the wise man's work: not to lie, and to expose the liar.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων
About and the sophistical refutations and the apparent
μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων
indeed refutations being but fallacies but not refutations
λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.
let-us-speak having-begun according-to nature from the first-things
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ὄντες
That indeed then some indeed are syllogisms others and not being
δοκοῦσι, φανερόν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
seem evident Just-as for also in-the-case-of the others
τοῦτο γίνεται διά τινος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων
this comes-about through some likeness also for the arguments
ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν οἱ μὲν ἔχουσιν εὖ, οἱ
likewise it-is And for the condition some indeed have well others
δὲ φαίνονται, φυλετικῶς φυσήσαντες καὶ ἐπισκευάσαντες
and appear tribe-fashion having-puffed-up and having-dressed-up
αὑτούς, καὶ καλοὶ οἱ μὲν διὰ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται,
themselves and fine some indeed through beauty others and appear
κομμώσαντες αὑτούς. Ἐπί τε τῶν ἀψύχων ὡσαύτως· καὶ
having-embellished themselves For and the inanimate likewise also
γὰρ τούτων τὰ μὲν ἄργυρος τὰ δὲ χρυσός ἐστιν ἀληθῶς,
for of-these the indeed silver the and gold is truly

τὰ δ' ἔστι μὲν οὔ, φαίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἷον
the and is indeed not appears but according-to the perception such-as
τὰ μὲν λιθαργύρινα καὶ τὰ καττιτέρινα ἀργυρᾶ, τὰ δὲ
the indeed of-litharge and the of-tin silver the and
χολοβάφινα χρυσᾶ. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς
gall-dyed gold The same and way also syllogism
καὶ ἔλεγχος ὁ μὲν ἔστιν, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔστι μέν, φαίνεται δὲ
and refutation the indeed is the and not is indeed appears but
διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες
because-of the inexperience the for inexperienced just-as — standing-off
πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν
from-afar view The indeed for syllogism from some
ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης
is set so-that to-say other something of necessity
τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἔλεγχος δὲ
than-the(-things) laid-down through the(-things) laid-down refutation and
συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος.
syllogism with contradiction of-the conclusion
Οἱ δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὔ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς
They and this do indeed not seem but through many
αἰτίας, ὧν εἷς τόπος εὐφυέστατός ἐστι καὶ δημοσιώτατος
causes of-which one topic most-natural is and most-common
ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὰ
the(-one) through the names Since for not it-is-possible themselves
τὰ πράγματα διαλέγεσθαι φέροντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν
the things to-converse bringing but the names
ἀντὶ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμεθα συμβόλοις, τὸ
instead-of the things we-use as-symbols the(-thing)
συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
happening for the names also for the things
ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων τοῖς
we-think to-happen just-as for the counters for-the(-ones)

λογιζομένοις. Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα
reckoning The but not is like The indeed for names
πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα
are-limited and the of-the phrases multitude the but things
τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄπειρά ἐστιν. Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν
in-the number infinite are Necessary then more the same
λόγον καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν. Ὥσπερ οὖν κἀκεῖ
phrase and the-name the one to-signify Just-as then also-there
οἱ μὴ δεινοὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιστημόνων
the(-ones) not clever the counters to-move by the knowing
παρακρούονται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ
are-misled the same way also for the arguments the(-ones)
τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς δυνάμεως ἄπειροι παραλογίζονται καὶ
of-the names of-the power inexperienced are-misled-in-reasoning both
αὐτοὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ ἄλλων ἀκούοντες. Διὰ μὲν οὖν
themselves conversing and others hearing Through indeed then
ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὰς λεχθησομένας ἔστι καὶ
this the cause and the(-causes) going-to-be-said there-is both
συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος μὲν οὐκ ὢν δέ.
syllogism and refutation apparent indeed not being but
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τισι μᾶλλον πρὸ ἔργου τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι
Since and it-is for-some more before work the to-seem to-be
σοφοῖς ἢ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ
wise than the to-be and not to-seem is for the sophistic
φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ' οὔ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς
apparent wisdom being but not and the sophist money-maker
ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσης), δῆλον ὅτι
from apparent wisdom but not being clear that
ἀναγκαῖον τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον δοκεῖν ποιεῖν
necessary for-these also the of-the wise work to-seem to-do
μᾶλλον ἢ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν. Ἔστι δ' ὡς ἓν πρὸς ἓν
rather than to-do and not to-seem It-is and as one to one

εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ εἰδότος ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν
to-say work about each of-the knowing to-not-lie indeed himself
περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι·
about what he-knows the and lying to-expose to-be-able
Ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι δοῦναι λόγον,
These and are the indeed in the to-be-able to-give account
τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τοὺς βουλομένους
the and in the to-take Necessity then the(-ones) wishing
σοφιστεύειν τὸ τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων γένος ζητεῖν· πρὸ
to-play-the-sophist the of-the said arguments genus to-seek before
ἔργου γάρ ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη δύναμις ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι
work for it-is the for such power will-make to-appear
σοφόν, οὗ τυγχάνουσι τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔχοντες.
wise which they-happen the choice having
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι
That indeed then is some such of-arguments genus and that
τοιαύτης ἐφίενται δυνάμεως οὓς καλοῦμεν σοφιστάς, δῆλον.
such they-aim-at power whom we-call sophists clear
Πόσα δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τῶν λόγων τῶν σοφιστικῶν, καὶ ἐκ
How-many and are species of-the arguments of-the sophistical and from
πόσων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη συνέστηκε, καὶ πόσα
how-many in-the number the power this is-composed and how-many
μέρη τυγχάνει τῆς πραγματείας ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
parts happen of-the study being and about the others
τῶν συντελούντων εἰς τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἤδη λέγωμεν.
the contributing to the art this already let-us-speak

Arguments used in discussion are of four kinds. Didactic ones reason from each subject's own principles, not from the answerer's opinions; dialectical ones from reputable opinions to a contradiction; examining ones from what the answerer believes and anyone claiming knowledge must know; and eristic ones reason, or seem to reason, from what seems reputable but is not. Demonstrations are treated in the Analytics*, dialectic and examination elsewhere; now the competitive and eristic.*

Ἔστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα
There-are indeed of-the in the to-converse arguments four
γένη, διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ
genera didactic and dialectical and examinational and
ἐριστικοί, διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων
eristic didactic indeed the(-ones) from the proper
ἀρχῶν ἑκάστου μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ
principles of-each study and not from the of-the
ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογιζόμενοι (δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν
answerer opinions syllogizing one-must for to-trust
τὸν μανθάνοντα), διαλεκτικοὶ δ' οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων
the learner dialectical and the(-ones) from the reputable
συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεως, πειραστικοὶ δ' οἱ ἐκ
syllogistic of-contradiction examinational and the(-ones) from
τῶν δοκούντων τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ καὶ ἀναγκαίων
the(-things) seeming to-the answerer and necessary
εἰδέναι τῷ προσποιουμένῳ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
to-know for-the(-one) pretending to-have the knowledge
(ὃν τρόπον δέ, διώρισται ἐν ἑτέροις), ἐριστικοὶ
in-what way but has-been-determined in others eristic
δ' οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ
and the(-ones) from the apparent reputable not being but
συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. Περὶ μὲν οὖν
syllogistic or apparently syllogistic About indeed then

τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ
the demonstrative in the Analytics it-has-been-said about and
τῶν διαλεκτικῶν καὶ πειραστικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Περὶ
the dialectical and examinational in the others About
δὲ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν νῦν λέγωμεν.
and the competitive and eristic now let-us-speak

III · FIVE AIMS

Those who compete in arguments aim at five things: refutation, falsehood, paradox, solecism, and fifth, making the opponent babble, that is, say the same thing many times. Most of all they wish to appear to refute; second, to show him saying something false; third, to lead him into paradox; fourth, to make him speak ungrammatically; and last, to make him repeat himself.

Πρῶτον δὴ ληπτέον πόσων στοχάζονται οἱ ἐν
First indeed must-be-grasped how-many-things aim-at the(-ones) in
τοῖς λόγοις ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ διαφιλονεικοῦντες. Ἔστι δὲ
the arguments contending and contending-for-victory Are and
πέντε ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἔλεγχος καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ παράδοξον
five these in-the number refutation and falsehood and paradox
καὶ σολοικισμὸς καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχῆσαι τὸν
and solecism and fifth the to-make to-babble the
προσδιαλεγόμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι
interlocutor this and is the often to-be-compelled
ταὐτὸ λέγειν· ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἕκαστον
the-same to-say or the not being but the apparent each
εἶναι τούτων. Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι
to-be of-these Most indeed for they-choose to-appear
ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενόν τι δεικνύναι, τρίτον
refuting second and lying something to-show third

εἰς παράδοξον ἄγειν, τέταρτον δὲ σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν· τοῦτο
into paradox to-lead fourth and to-commit-solecism to-make this
δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου
and is the to-make by-the expression to-speak-barbarously from the argument
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· τελευταῖον δὲ τὸ πλεονάκις ταὐτὸ λέγειν.
the answerer last and the more-often the-same to-say

IV · FALLACIES OF LANGUAGE

Refutations are of two kinds, dependent on language or outside it. Those dependent on language are six: homonymy, amphiboly, combination, division, accent, and form of expression. Homonymy: those who know learn, since the grammarians learn what is dictated. Amphiboly: I wish the enemy to capture me. Combination: a man can walk while sitting. Division: five is two and three. Accent is hard to use in unwritten argument, but Homer offers cases. Form of expression makes unlike things sound alike, so that a quality is expressed like a quantity, or being affected like acting. Those outside language are seven, from accident to making many questions one.

Τρόποι δ' εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι
Ways and are of-the indeed refuting two the(-ones) indeed for are
παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως. Ἔστι δὲ
depending-on the expression the(-ones) and outside of-the expression Are and
τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἓξ
the(-ones) indeed depending-on the expression producing the impression six
τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις,
in-the number these and are homonymy amphiboly combination
διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως. Τούτου δὲ πίστις ἥ
division accent form of-expression Of-this and proof the
τε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμός, ἄν τε ληφθῇ τις
both through the induction and syllogism if both be-taken some
ἄλλος, καὶ ὅτι τοσαυταχῶς ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις
other and that so-many-ways — by-the same names and phrases

μὴ ταὐτὸ δηλώσαιμεν. Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
not the-same we-might-show Are and depending-on indeed the homonymy
οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ
the such of-the arguments such-as that learn the(-ones)
ἐπιστάμενοι· τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν οἱ
knowing the(-things) for dictated learn the
γραμματικοί. Τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι
grammarians The for to-learn homonymous the both to-understand
χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ
using the knowledge and the to-acquire knowledge And
πάλιν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθά· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ
again that the bad-things good the(-things) for needful good the
δὲ κακὰ δέοντα. Διττὸν γὰρ τὸ δέον, τό τ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον,
and bad-things needful Double for the needful the both necessary
ὃ συμβαίνει πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν (ἔστι γὰρ κακόν
which happens often also for the bad-things is for bad
τι ἀναγκαῖον), καὶ τἀγαθὰ δὲ δέοντά φαμεν εἶναι.
something necessary and the-goods and needful we-say to-be
Ἔτι τὸν αὐτὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι, καὶ κάμνειν καὶ
Further the same to-sit and to-stand and to-be-ill and
ὑγιαίνειν. Ὅσπερ γὰρ ἀνίστατο, ἕστηκεν, καὶ ὅσπερ
to-be-healthy Whoever for was-standing-up stands and whoever
ὑγιάζετο, ὑγιαίνει· ἀνίστατο δ᾽ ὁ καθήμενος καὶ
was-being-healed is-healthy was-standing-up and the sitting and
ὑγιάζετο ὁ κάμνων. Τὸ γὰρ τὸν κάμνοντα ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν
was-being-healed the ill The for the ill whatever to-do
ἢ πάσχειν οὐχ ἓν σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν ὅτι ὁ νῦν
or to-suffer not one signifies but at-one-time indeed that the now
κάμνων ἢ καθήμενος, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ὃς ἔκαμνε πρότερον.
ill or sitting at-another-time and who was-ill before
Πλὴν ὑγιάζετο μὲν καὶ κάμνων καὶ ὁ κάμνων· ὑγιαίνει
Except was-being-healed indeed both ill and the ill is-healthy

δ᾽ οὐ κάμνων, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ κάμνων, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ
and not ill but the ill not now but the(-one)
πρότερον. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν οἱ τοιοίδε, τὸ
before Depending-on and the amphiboly the such the
βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους. Καὶ ἆρ᾽ ὅ τις
to-wish to-take me the enemies And then what someone
γινώσκει, τοῦτο γινώσκει; καὶ γὰρ τὸν γινώσκοντα καὶ
knows this knows also for the knower and
τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἐνδέχεται ὡς γινώσκοντα σημῆναι τούτῳ
the known it-is-possible as knowing to-signify by-this
τῷ λόγῳ. Καὶ ἆρα ὃ ὁρᾷ τις, τοῦτο ὁρᾷ; ὁρᾷ δὲ τὸν
the phrase And then what sees someone this sees he-sees and the
κίονα, ὥστε ὁρᾷ ὁ κίων. Καὶ ἆρα ὃ σὺ φὴς εἶναι, τοῦτο
pillar so-that sees the pillar And then what you say to-be this
σὺ φὴς εἶναι; φὴς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἄρα φὴς λίθος εἶναι.
you say to-be you-say and stone to-be you then say stone to-be
Καὶ ἆρ᾽ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα
And then is-it-possible silent to-speak double for also the silent
λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα.
to-speak the both the speaker to-be-silent and the the(-things) spoken
Εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ
Are and three ways of-the(-ones) depending-on the homonymy and
τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, εἷς μὲν ὅταν ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα
the amphiboly one indeed when either the phrase or the-name
κυρίως σημαίνῃ πλείω, οἷον ἀετὸς καὶ κύων· εἷς δὲ ὅταν
properly signifies more such-as eagle and dog one and when
εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν· τρίτος δὲ ὅταν τὸ συντεθὲν
accustomed we-are so to-speak third and when the combined
πλείω σημαίνῃ, κεχωρισμένον δὲ ἁπλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἐπίσταται
more signifies separated but simply such-as the knows
γράμματα. Ἑκάτερον μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἕν τι σημαίνει,
letters Each indeed for if it-chanced one something signifies

τὸ ἐπίσταται καὶ τὰ γράμματα· ἄμφω δὲ πλείω, ἢ τὸ τὰ
the knows and the letters both but more either the the
γράμματα αὐτὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἢ τῶν γραμμάτων ἄλλον.
letters themselves knowledge to-have or of-the letters other
Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀμφιβολία καὶ ὁμωνυμία παρὰ τούτους
The indeed then amphiboly and homonymy depending-on these
τοὺς τρόπους ἐστίν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὰ
the ways is depending-on and the combination the(-ones)
τοιάδε, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ
such such-as the to-be-able sitting to-walk and not
γράφοντα γράφειν. Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ σημαίνει, ἂν διελών
writing to-write Not for the-same signifies if having-divided
τις εἴπῃ καὶ συνθείς, ὡς δυνατὸν τὸν καθήμενον
someone should-say and having-combined that possible the sitting
βαδίζειν καὶ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν· καὶ τοῦθ' ὡσαύτως
to-walk and not writing to-write and this likewise
ἄν τις συνθῇ, τὸν μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν· σημαίνει γὰρ
if someone combine the not writing to-write it-signifies for
ὡς ἔχει δύναμιν τοῦ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
that he-has power of-the not writing to-write If but not
συνθῇ, ὅτι ἔχει δύναμιν, ὅτε οὐ γράφει, τοῦ γράφειν. Καὶ
he-combine that he-has power when not he-writes of-the to-write And
μανθάνει νῦν γράμματα, εἴπερ ἐμάνθανεν ἃ ἐπίσταται.
he-learns now letters if-indeed he-was-learning what he-knows
Ἔτι τὸ ἓν μόνον δυνάμενον φέρειν πολλὰ δύνασθαι φέρειν.
Further the one only being-able to-carry many to-be-able to-carry
Παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὅτι τὰ πέντ' ἐστὶ δύο καὶ
Depending-on and the division that the five is two and
τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἴσον· τοσοῦτον
three and odd and even and the greater equal so-much
γὰρ καὶ ἔτι πρός. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος διῃρημένος καὶ
for and further besides The for same phrase divided and

συγκείμενος οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν ἂν δόξειεν, οἷον
combined not always the-same to-signify — would-seem such-as
Ἐγώ σ' ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ Πεντήκοντ'
I you made slave being free and the Fifty
ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
of-men hundred left godlike Achilles
Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ
Depending-on and the accent in indeed the(-arguments) without
γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ
writing dialectical not easy to-make argument in but
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν
the written and poems more such-as also the
Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς
Homer some correct against the(-ones) refuting as
ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα Τὸ μὲν οὗ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
absurdly having-spoken The indeed where it-rots by-rain
Λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ, λέγοντες τὸ οὗ ὀξύτερον.
They-solve for it by-the accent saying the ou more-acute
Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ
And the about the dream of-the Agamemnon that not
αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν Δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι,
himself the Zeus said We-grant and to-him glory to-win
ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν
but to-the dream he-enjoined to-grant The(-things) indeed then
τοιαῦτα παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐστίν.
such depending-on the accent are
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν, ὅταν
The(-ones) and depending-on the form of-the expression happen when
τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸ ὡσαύτως ἑρμηνεύηται, οἷον τὸ ἄρρεν θῆλυ ἢ
the not same likewise is-expressed such-as the male female or
τὸ θῆλυ ἄρρεν, ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ θάτερον τούτων, ἢ πάλιν τὸ
the female male or the intermediate one of-these or again the

ποιὸν ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ποιόν, ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν πάσχον ἢ τὸ
qualified quantity or the quantity qualified or the acting being-affected or the
διακείμενον ποιεῖν, καὶ τἆλλα δ', ὡς διῄρηται πρότερον.
disposed to-act and the-others and as has-been-divided before
Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ τῶν ποιεῖν ὂν ὡς τῶν ποιεῖν τι
It-is-possible for the not of-the to-act being as of-the to-act something
τῇ λέξει σημαίνειν. Οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὁμοίως τῷ
by-the expression to-signify Such-as the to-be-healthy alike by-the
σχήματι τῆς λέξεως λέγεται τῷ τέμνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν·
form of-the expression is-said with-the to-cut or to-build
καίτοι τὸ μὲν ποιόν τι καὶ διακείμενόν πως δηλοῖ, τὸ
and-yet the indeed qualified something and disposed somehow shows the
δὲ ποιεῖν τι. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
but to-act something The same and way also for the others
Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔλεγχοι ἐκ τούτων τῶν
The indeed then depending-on the expression refutations from these the
τόπων εἰσίν· τῶν δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν
topics are of-the(-ones) and outside of-the expression fallacies
εἴδη ἐστὶν ἑπτά, ἓν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον
species are seven one indeed depending-on the accident second
δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ
and the simply or not simply but in-some-respect or where or
ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ
when or relative something to-be-said third and the(-one) depending-on
τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ
the of-the refutation ignorance fourth and the(-one) depending-on
τὸ ἑπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ
the consequent fifth and the(-one) depending-on the in beginning
λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι,
to-assume sixth and the not cause as cause to-set
ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν.
seventh and the the more questions one to-make

Seven depend on what lies outside language. Accident: Coriscus is other than a man, being other than Socrates. Speaking simply or with a qualification: the Indian, black but white in his teeth. Ignorance of what refutation is: double and not double. The consequent, assuming that what follows converts, as if the ground being wet meant it had rained. Begging the original point; taking a non-cause as cause, as in the argument that soul and life are not the same; and making many questions into one, as when things some good and some not are asked to be all good or not good.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς παραλογισμοί εἰσιν, ὅταν
The indeed then depending-on the accident fallacies are when
ὁμοίως ὁτιοῦν ἀξιωθῇ τῷ πράγματι καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι
likewise anything is-claimed to-the thing and to-the accident
ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πολλὰ συμβέβηκεν,
to-belong Since for to-the same many-things are-accidents
οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις, καὶ καθ' οὗ
not necessity to-all the predicated and of which
κατηγορεῖται, ταῦτα πάντα ὑπάρχειν. Οἷον εἰ ὁ Κορίσκος
it-is-predicated these all to-belong Such-as if the Coriscus
ἕτερον ἀνθρώπου, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἕτερος· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος.
other than-man himself than-himself other he-is for man
Ἢ εἰ Σωκράτους ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος, ἕτερον
Or if than-Socrates other the and Socrates man other
ἀνθρώπου φασὶν ὡμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκέναι,
than-man they-say he-has-agreed because-of the to-be-accident
οὗ ἔφησεν ἕτερον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον.
than-whom he-said other to-be this to-be man
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς τόδε ἢ πῇ λέγεσθαι
The(-ones) and depending-on the simply this or in-some-respect to-be-said
καὶ μὴ κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἁπλῶς
and not properly when the in part said as simply

εἰρημένον ληφθῇ, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστι δοξαστόν, ὅτι
stated be-taken such-as if the not being is opinable that
τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναί τέ τι καὶ
the not being is not for the-same to-be both something and
εἶναι ἁπλῶς. Ἢ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄν, εἰ τῶν
to-be simply Or again that the being not is being if of-the
ὄντων τι μή ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος. Οὐ γὰρ
beings something not is such-as if not man Not for
ταὐτὸ μὴ εἶναί τι καὶ ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι· φαίνεται δὲ
the-same not to-be something and simply not to-be it-appears but
διὰ τὸ πάρεγγυς τῆς λέξεως, καὶ μικρὸν διαφέρειν τὸ
because-of the nearness of-the expression and little to-differ the
εἶναί τι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι τοῦ μὴ
to-be something from-the to-be and the not to-be something from-the not
εἶναι. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ τὸ
to-be Likewise and also the depending-on the in-some-respect and the
ἁπλῶς. Οἷον εἰ ὁ Ἰνδὸς ὅλος μέλας ὢν λευκός ἐστι τοὺς
simply Such-as if the Indian wholly black being white is the
ὀδόντας· λευκὸς ἄρα καὶ οὐ λευκός ἐστιν. Ἢ εἰ ἄμφω
teeth white then and not white be-is Or if both
πῇ, ὅτι ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐπ᾽
in-some-respect that at-once the contraries belong The and such for
ἐνίων μὲν παντὶ θεωρῆσαι ῥᾴδιον, οἷον εἰ λαβὼν τὸν
some indeed for-everyone to-observe easy such-as if having-taken the
Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα τοὺς ὀδόντας ἔροιτ᾽ εἰ λευκός·
Ethiopian to-be black the teeth one-should-ask if white
εἰ οὖν ταύτῃ λευκός, ὅτι μέλας καὶ οὐ μέλας, οἴοιτο
if then in-this-way white that black and not black be-might-think
διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς τελειώσας τὴν ἐρώτησιν. Ἐπ᾽
to-have-argued syllogistically having-completed the questioning For
ἐνίων δὲ λανθάνει πολλάκις, ἐφ᾽ ὅσων, ὅταν πῇ
some but it-escapes-notice often for as-many-as when in-some-respect

λέγηται, κἂν τὸ ἁπλῶς δόξειεν ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ὅσοις
it-is-said even the simply would-seem to-follow and in as-many-as
μὴ ῥᾴδιον θεωρῆσαι πότερον αὐτῶν κυρίως ἀποδοτέον.
not easy to-observe which of-them properly must-be-rendered
Γίνεται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν οἷς ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τὰ
Comes-about and the such in which likewise belong the
ἀντικείμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ ἄμφω ἢ μηδέτερον δοτέον
opposites it-seems for either both or neither must-be-granted
ἁπλῶς εἶναι κατηγορεῖν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ λευκὸν
simply to-be to-predicate such-as if the indeed half white
τὸ δ' ἥμισυ μέλαν, πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν;
the and half black whether white or black
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ διωρίσθαι τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς
The(-ones) and depending-on the not to-have-been-defined what is syllogism
ἢ τί ἔλεγχος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν γίνονται τοῦ
or what refutation but depending-on the deficiency come-about of-the
λόγου· ἔλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ
account refutation indeed for contradiction of-the same and one not
ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συνωνύμου
of-name but of-thing and of-name not synonymous
ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ
but of-the same from the(-things) granted of necessity not
συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς
being-counted-in the in beginning according-to the-same and relative-to
ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
the-same and likewise and in the same time The same and
τρόπον καὶ τὸ ψεύσασθαι περί τινος. Ἔνιοι δὲ ἀπολιπόντες
way also the to-lie about something Some and having-left-out
τι τῶν λεχθέντων φαίνονται ἐλέγχειν, οἷον ὅτι
something of-the(-things) said appear to-refute such-as that
ταὐτὸ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον· τὰ γὰρ δύο τοῦ μὲν
the-same double and not double the for two of-the indeed

ἑνὸς διπλάσια, τῶν δὲ τριῶν οὐ διπλάσια. Ἢ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ
one double of-the but three not double Or if the same
τοῦ αὐτοῦ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ
of-the same double and not double but not according-to
ταὐτό· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μῆκος διπλάσιον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
the-same according-to indeed for the length double according-to but the
πλάτος οὐ διπλάσιον. Ἢ εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ
breadth not double Or if of-the same and according-to the-same and
ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἅμα· διόπερ ἐστὶ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.
likewise but not at-once wherefore it-is apparent refutation
Ἕλκοι δ᾽ ἄν τις τοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν.
Would-drag and — someone this also into the(-ones) depending-on the expression
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν γίνονται μὲν
The(-ones) and depending-on the in beginning to-assume come-about indeed
οὕτως καὶ τοσαυταχῶς ὁσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
so and in-as-many-ways as it-is-possible the from beginning
αἰτεῖσθαι, φαίνονται δ᾽ ἐλέγχειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
to-beg they-appear and to-refute because-of the not to-be-able
συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον.
to-see-together the same and the different
Ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι
The and depending-on the consequent refutation because-of the to-think
ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἀκολούθησιν. Ὅταν γὰρ τοῦδε ὄντος ἐξ
to-convert the implication When for this being of
ἀνάγκης τοδὶ ᾖ, καὶ τοῦδε ὄντος οἴονται καὶ θάτερον
necessity this be also this being they-think also the-other
εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ὅθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς
to-be of necessity Whence also the about the opinion from the
αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. Πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι
perception deceptions come-about Often for the bile honey
ὑπέλαβον διὰ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα τῷ μέλιτι·
they-supposed because-of the to-follow the yellow color to-the honey

καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τὴν γῆν ὕσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον,
and since it-happens the earth having-rained to-become soaked
κἂν ᾖ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὑσαι. Τὸ δ' οὐκ
and-if it-be soaked we-suppose to-have-rained This but not
ἀναγκαῖον. Ἔν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον
necessary In both the rhetorical the according-to the sign
ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων εἰσίν. Βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι
demonstrations from the consequents are Wishing for to-show
ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ
that adulterer the consequent they-took that dandy or
ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁρᾶται πλανώμενος. Πολλοῖς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν
that by-night he-is-seen wandering To-many but these indeed
ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγορούμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. Ὁμοίως δὲ
belong the but predicated not belongs Likewise and
καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οἷον ὁ Μελίσσου λόγος ὅτι
also in the syllogistic such-as the of-Melissus argument that
ἄπειρον τὸ ἅπαν, λαβὼν τὸ μὲν ἅπαν ἀγένητον (ἐκ
infinite the all having-taken the indeed all ungenerated from
γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι), τὸ δὲ γενόμενον ἐξ
for not being nothing — would-come-to-be the and having-come-to-be from
ἀρχῆς γενέσθαι. Εἰ μὴ οὖν γέγονεν, ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει
beginning to-have-come-to-be If not then it-has-come-to-be beginning not has
τὸ πᾶν, ὥστ' ἄπειρον. Οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν·
the whole so-that infinite Not necessity but this to-follow
οὐ γὰρ εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἅπαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, καὶ εἴ τι
not for if the having-come-to-be all beginning has also if something
ἀρχὴν ἔχει, γέγονεν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὁ πυρέττων
beginning has it-has-come-to-be just-as not-even if the feverish
θερμός, καὶ τὸν θερμὸν ἀνάγκη πυρέττειν.
hot also the hot necessity to-be-feverish

Ὁ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον, ὅταν προσληφθῇ
The and depending-on the not cause as cause when be-assumed-in-addition
τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνο γινομένου τοῦ ἐλέγχου. Συμβαίνει
the not-cause as from that coming-about of-the refutation Happens
δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοῖς· ἐν
and the such in the to the impossible syllogisms in
τούτοις γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀναιρεῖν τι τῶν κειμένων.
these for necessary to-destroy something of-the(-things) laid-down
Ἐὰν οὖν ἐγκαταριθμηθῇ ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἐρωτήμασι
If then it-be-counted-in among the necessary questions
πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀδύνατον, δόξει παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι
toward the resulting impossible it-will-seem from this to-come-about
πολλάκις ὁ ἔλεγχος, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ
often the refutation such-as that not is soul and life
ταὐτόν· εἰ γὰρ φθορᾷ γένεσις ἐναντίον, καὶ τῇ τινὶ
the-same if for to-destruction coming-to-be contrary also to-the particular
φθορᾷ ἔσται τις γένεσις ἐναντίον· ὁ δὲ θάνατος φθορά
destruction will-be some coming-to-be contrary the and death destruction
τις καὶ ἐναντίον ζωῇ, ὥστε γένεσις ἡ ζωὴ καὶ τὸ ζῆν
some and contrary to-life so-that coming-to-be the life and the to-live
γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα ταὐτὸν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
to-come-to-be this but impossible not then the-same the soul and
ἡ ζωή. Οὐ δὴ συλλελόγισται· συμβαίνει γάρ, κἂν μή
the life Not indeed it-has-been-syllogized it-follows for even-if not
τις ταὐτὸ φῇ τὴν ζωὴν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ
someone the-same says the life with-the soul the impossible but
μόνον ἐναντίον ζωὴν μὲν θανάτῳ ὄντι φθορᾷ, φθορᾷ δὲ
only contrary life indeed to-death being destruction to-destruction and
γένεσιν. Ἀσυλλόγιστοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι
coming-to-be Unsyllogized indeed then simply not are the such

λόγοι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἀσυλλόγιστοι. Καὶ λανθάνει
arguments toward but the proposed unsyllogized And it-escapes-notice
πολλάκις οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸ τοιοῦτον.
often not less themselves the questioners the such
Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον καὶ παρὰ τὸ μὴ
The indeed then depending-on the consequent and depending-on the not
αἴτιον λόγοι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ δύο
cause arguments such are the(-ones) but depending-on the the two
ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν, ὅταν λανθάνῃ πλείω ὄντα καὶ ὡς
questions one to-make when it-escapes-notice more being and as
ἑνὸς ὄντος ἀποδοθῇ ἀπόκρισις μία. Ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ῥᾴδιον
of-one being be-given answer one For some indeed then easy
ἰδεῖν ὅτι πλείω καὶ ὅτι οὐ δοτέον ἀπόκρισιν, οἷον πότερον
to-see that more and that not must-be-given answer such-as whether
ἡ γῆ θάλαττά ἐστιν ἢ ὁ οὐρανός; ἐπ' ἐνίων δ' ἧττον, καὶ
the earth sea is or the heaven for some but less and
ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος ἢ ὁμολογοῦσι τῷ μὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ
as of-one being either they-agree by-the not to-answer the(-thing)
ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἐλέγχεσθαι φαίνονται, οἷον ἆρ' οὗτος καὶ
asked or to-be-refuted they-appear such-as then this and
οὗτός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; ὥστ' ἄν τις τύπτῃ τοῦτον καὶ
this is man so-that if someone strike this and
τοῦτον, ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπους τυπτήσει. Ἢ πάλιν,
this man but not men he-will-strike Or again
ὧν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθά, πάντα
of-which the indeed are good the and not good all
ἀγαθὰ ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθά; ὁπότερον γὰρ ἂν φῇ, ἔστι μὲν
good or not good whichever for — one-says it-is-possible indeed
ὡς ἔλεγχον ἢ ψεῦδος φαινόμενον δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν· τὸ
as refutation or falsehood apparent it-would-seem — to-make the
γὰρ φάναι τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τῶν
for to-say of-the not good something to-be good or of-the

ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθὸν ψεῦδος. Ὁτὲ δὲ προσληφθέντων
good not good false Sometimes and having-been-assumed-in-addition
τινῶν κἂν ἔλεγχος γίνοιτο ἀληθινός, οἷον εἴ τις
certain-things even refutation would-come-about genuine such-as if someone
δοίη ὁμοίως ἓν καὶ πολλὰ λέγεσθαι λευκὰ καὶ γυμνὰ
should-grant likewise one and many to-be-called white and naked
καὶ τυφλά. Εἰ γὰρ τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν πεφυκὸς δ'
and blind If for blind the not having sight being-natural but
ἔχειν, καὶ τυφλὰ ἔσται τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ὄψιν πεφυκότα
to-have also blind will-be the(-ones) not having sight being-natural
δ' ἔχειν. Ὅταν οὖν τὸ μὲν ἔχῃ τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ, τὰ ἄμφω
but to-have When then the indeed has the and not has the both
ἔσται ἢ ὁρῶντα ἢ τυφλά· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
will-be either seeing or blind which-very impossible

VI · EVERY FALLACY MISSES REFUTATION

All these fallacies can be traced to ignorance of what refutation is, since each misses a part of its definition. Those of language give only an apparent contradiction, for a refutation needs the same thing and not merely the same name: proving a mantle proves nothing about a cloak. Accident fails because what holds of a triangle as triangle does not hold of it as figure, and so experts are refuted by the ignorant. The consequent is a kind of accident, and the rest omit something from the definition of syllogism or refutation.

Ἢ δὴ οὕτως διαιρετέον τοὺς φαινομένους συλλογισμοὺς
Either indeed so must-be-divided the apparent syllogisms
καὶ ἐλέγχους, ἢ πάντας ἀνακτέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου
and refutations or all must-be-referred to the of-the refutation
ἄγνοιαν, ἀρχὴν ταύτην ποιησαμένους· ἔστι γὰρ ἅπαντας
ignorance beginning this having-made it-is-possible for all

ἀναλῦσαι τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου
to-resolve the said ways into the of-the refutation
διορισμόν. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἀσυλλόγιστοι· δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ
definition First indeed if unsyllogized one-must for from
τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνειν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐξ
the laid-down to-follow the conclusion so-as to-say of
ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. Ἔπειτα καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη
necessity but not to-appear Then also according-to the parts
τοῦ διορισμοῦ. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει οἱ μέν εἰσι
of-the definition Of-the indeed for in the expression some indeed are
παρὰ τὸ διττόν, οἷον ἥ τε ὁμωνυμία καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ
depending-on the double such-as the both homonymy and the phrase and
ἡ ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (σύνηθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς τόδε τι
the likeness-of-form customary for the all as this something
σημαίνειν), ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις καὶ προσῳδία τῷ
to-signify the and combination and division and accent by-the
μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἢ τοὔνομα διαφέρον. Ἔδει
not the same to-be the phrase or the-name differing It-was-necessary
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ταὐτόν, εἰ μέλλει
and also this just-as also the thing the-same if it-is-going
ἔλεγχος ἢ συλλογισμὸς ἔσεσθαι, οἷον εἰ λώπιον, μὴ ἱμάτιον
refutation or syllogism to-be such-as if mantle not cloak
συλλογίσασθαι ἀλλὰ λώπιον. Ἀληθὲς μὲν γὰρ κἀκεῖνο,
to-syllogize but mantle True indeed for also-that
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ συλλελόγισται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐρωτήματος δεῖ, ὅτι
but not it-has-been-syllogized but still of-question there-is-need that
ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸν ζητοῦντα τὸ διὰ τί.
the-same it-signifies for the seeking the because-of what
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρισθέντος τοῦ
The(-ones) and depending-on the accident having-been-defined the
συλλογισμοῦ φανεροὶ γίνονται. Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὁρισμὸν
syllogism evident become The same for definition

δεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχου γίνεσθαι, πλὴν προσκεῖσθαι τὴν
one-must also of-the refutation to-come-about except to-be-added the
ἀντίφασιν· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως. Εἰ οὖν
contradiction the for refutation syllogism of-contradiction If then
μή ἐστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οὐ γίνεται ἔλεγχος.
not is syllogism of-the accident not comes-about refutation
Οὐ γὰρ εἰ τούτων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τόδ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ
Not for if these being necessity this to-be this and is
λευκόν, ἀνάγκη λευκὸν εἶναι διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν. Οὐδ'
white necessity white to-be because-of the syllogism Nor
εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον δυοῖν ὀρθαῖν ἴσας ἔχει, συμβέβηκε δ' αὐτῷ
if the triangle to-two right-angles equal has it-is-accident and to-it
σχήματι εἶναι ἢ πρώτῳ ἢ ἀρχῇ, ὅτι σχῆμα ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ
figure to-be or first or principle that figure or principle or
πρῶτον τοῦτο. Οὐ γὰρ ᾗ σχῆμα οὐδ' ᾗ πρῶτον,
first this Not for in-so-far-as figure nor in-so-far-as first
ἀλλ' ᾗ τρίγωνον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
but in-so-far-as triangle the demonstration Likewise and also for the
ἄλλων. Ὥστ' εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
others So-that if the refutation syllogism some not — would-be
ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος. Ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ
the according-to accident refutation But depending-on this also the
τεχνῖται καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων
craftsmen and wholly the knowers by the unknowing
ἐλέγχονται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ποιοῦνται τοὺς
are-refuted according-to accident for they-make the
συλλογισμοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εἰδότας. Οἱ δ' οὐ δυνάμενοι διαιρεῖν
syllogisms against the knowing They and not being-able to-divide
ἢ ἐρωτώμενοι διδόασιν ἢ οὐ δόντες οἴονται δεδωκέναι.
either being-asked grant or not having-granted think to-have-granted

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ ἁπλῶς, ὅτι οὐ τοῦ
The(-ones) and depending-on the in-some-respect and simply because not of-the
αὐτοῦ ἡ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις. Τοῦ γὰρ πῇ
same the affirmation and the negation Of-the for in-some-respect
λευκοῦ τὸ πῇ οὐ λευκόν, τοῦ δ' ἁπλῶς λευκοῦ τὸ
white the in-some-respect not white of-the and simply white the
ἁπλῶς οὐ λευκὸν ἀπόφασις. Εἰ οὖν δόντος πῇ εἶναι
simply not white negation If then having-granted in-some-respect to-be
λευκὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένου λαμβάνει, οὐ ποιεῖ ἔλεγχον,
white as simply said be-takes not be-makes refutation
φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἔλεγχος.
it-appears but because-of the ignorance of-the what is refutation
Φανερώτατοι δὲ πάντων οἱ πρότερον λεχθέντες
Most-evident and of-all the(-ones) before said
παρὰ τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν· διὸ καὶ
depending-on the of-the refutation definition wherefore also
προσηγορεύθησαν οὕτως· παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τὴν
they-were-named so depending-on for of-the account the
ἔλλειψιν ἡ φαντασία γίνεται, καὶ διαιρουμένοις οὕτως
deficiency the appearance comes-about and for-the(-ones)-dividing so
κοινὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις θετέον τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἔλλειψιν.
common for all these must-be-set the of-the account deficiency
Οἵ τε παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ
The(-ones) both depending-on the to-assume the in beginning and
τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι δῆλοι διὰ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ.
the not-cause as cause to-set clear through the definition
Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα τῷ ταῦτ' εἶναι αἴτια τοῦ
One-must for the conclusion by-the these to-be causes of-the
συμβαίνειν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀναιτίοις· καὶ πάλιν
to-follow which-very not was in the not-causes and again

μὴ ἀριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν
not being-counted the from beginning which-very not have
οἱ παρὰ τὴν αἴτησιν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.
the(-ones) depending-on the begging of-the in beginning
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ
The(-ones) and depending-on the consequent part are of-the
συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ ἑπόμενον συμβέβηκε, διαφέρει δὲ
accident the for consequent is-accident it-differs but
τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ἔστιν ἐφ'
from-the accident that the indeed accident it-is-possible for
ἑνὸς μόνου λαβεῖν, οἷον ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ μέλι καὶ
one alone to-take such-as the-same to-be the yellow and honey and
τὸ λευκὸν καὶ κύκνον, τὸ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν·
the white and swan the but consequent always in more
τὰ γὰρ ἑνὶ ταὐτῷ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι ταὐτά·
the for to-one the-same the-same also to-one-another we-claim to-be the-same
διὸ γίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλεγχος. Ἔστι δ' οὐ
wherefore comes-about depending-on the consequent refutation It-is but not
πάντως ἀληθές, οἷον ἂν ᾖ λευκὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
altogether true such-as if it-be white according-to accident
καὶ γὰρ ἡ χιὼν καὶ ὁ κύκνος τῷ λευκῷ ταὐτόν. Ἢ
also for the snow and the swan with-the white the-same Or
πάλιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ Μελίσσου λόγῳ, τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι λαμβάνει
again as in the of-Melissus argument the same to-be takes
τὸ γεγονέναι καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ ἴσοις γίνεσθαι καὶ
the to-have-come-to-be and beginning to-have or the to-equals to-come-about and
ταὐτὸ μέγεθος λαμβάνειν. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔχει
the-same size to-take That for the having-come-to-be has
ἀρχήν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν γεγονέναι ἀξιοῖ, ὡς ἄμφω
beginning also the having beginning to-have-come-to-be he-claims as both
ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, τό τε γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ
the-same being by-the beginning to-have the both having-come-to-be and the

πεπερασμένον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων γινομένων εἰ
limited Likewise and also for the equals coming-about if
τὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἓν λαμβάνοντα ἴσα γίνεται,
the(-things) the same size and one taking equal become
καὶ τὰ ἴσα γινόμενα ἓν μέγεθος λαμβάνει. Ὥστε τὸ
also the equal becoming one size take So-that the
ἑπόμενον λαμβάνει. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς
consequent he-takes Since then the depending-on the accident
ἔλεγχος ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἐλέγχου, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ὁ
refutation in the ignorance of-the refutation evident that also the
παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλως.
depending-on the consequent Must-be-examined and this also otherwise
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν ἐν
The(-ones) and depending-on the the more questions one to-make in
τῷ μὴ διαρθροῦν ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ διαιρεῖν τὸν τῆς προτάσεως
the not to-articulate us or not to-divide the of-the premise
λόγον. Ἡ γὰρ πρότασίς ἐστιν ἓν καθ' ἑνός. Ὁ γὰρ
account The for premise is one of one The for
αὐτὸς ὅρος ἑνὸς μόνου καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον
same definition of-one alone and simply of-the thing such-as
ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἑνὸς μόνου ἀνθρώπου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
of-man and of-one alone man likewise and also for the
ἄλλων. Εἰ οὖν μία πρότασις ἡ ἓν καθ' ἑνὸς ἀξιοῦσα,
others If then one premise the(-one) one of one claiming
καὶ ἁπλῶς ἔσται πρότασις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐρώτησις. Ἐπεὶ δ'
also simply will-be premise the such questioning Since and
ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων, ὁ δ' ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός,
the syllogism from premises the and refutation syllogism
καὶ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσται ἐκ προτάσεων. Εἰ οὖν ἡ πρότασις ἓν
also the refutation will-be from premises If then the premise one
καθ' ἑνός, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοίᾳ·
of one evident that also this in the of-the refutation ignorance

φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναι πρότασις ἡ οὐκ οὖσα πρότασις. Εἰ
it-appears for to-be premise the(-one) not being premise If
μὲν οὖν δέδωκεν ἀπόκρισιν ὡς πρὸς μίαν ἐρώτησιν, ἔσται
indeed then he-has-given answer as to one question will-be
ἔλεγχος, εἰ δὲ μὴ δέδωκεν ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, φαινόμενος
refutation if but not he-has-given but appears apparent
ἔλεγχος. Ὥστε πάντες οἱ τόποι πίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ
refutation So-that all the topics fall into the of-the
ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν,
refutation ignorance the(-ones) indeed then depending-on the expression
ὅτι φαινομένη ἀντίφασις, ὅπερ ἦν ἴδιον τοῦ ἐλέγχου,
because apparent contradiction which-very was proper of-the refutation
οἱ δ' ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὅρον.
the(-ones) and others depending-on the of-the syllogism definition

VII · HOW DECEPTION COMES ABOUT

Homonymy and ambiguous phrases deceive because we cannot divide what is said in many ways. Combination, division, and accent deceive because we think the change makes no difference. Form of expression deceives through likeness of wording, since it is hard to tell what is said in the same way from what is said otherwise. Deception comes more easily in discussion with another than alone, which is why this fallacy counts among those of language. Accident deceives because we cannot tell same from other, the consequent because we think it converts, and the rest because a small omission escapes notice.

Ἡ δ' ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
The and deception comes-about of-the(-ones) indeed depending-on the homonymy
καὶ τὸν λόγον τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διαιρεῖν τὸ πολλαχῶς
and the phrase by-the not to-be-able to-divide the in-many-ways
λεγόμενον (ἔνια γὰρ οὐκ εὔπορον διελεῖν, οἷον τὸ ἓν καὶ
said some for not easy to-divide such-as the one and

τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν), τῶν δὲ παρὰ σύνθεσιν
the being and the same of-the(-ones) and depending-on combination
καὶ διαίρεσιν τῷ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν συντιθέμενον
and division by-the nothing to-think to-differ combined
ἢ διαιρούμενον τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων.
or divided the phrase just-as for the most
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν· οὐ γὰρ
Likewise and also of-the(-ones) depending-on the accent not for
ἄλλο δοκεῖ σημαίνειν ἀνιέμενος καὶ ἐπιτεινόμενος ὁ λόγος,
other it-seems to-signify lowered and raised the phrase
ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν. Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ
for none or not for many Of-the(-ones) and depending-on the
σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς λέξεως. Χαλεπὸν γὰρ
form because-of the likeness of-the expression Difficult for
διελεῖν ποῖα ὡσαύτως καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως λέγεται·
to-distinguish what-sort in-the-same-way and what-sort as differently are-said
σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγύς ἐστι
nearly for the(-one) this able to-do near is
τοῦ θεωρεῖν τἀληθές, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐπίσταται συνεπινεύειν,
to-the to-see the-truth most and he-knows to-nod-assent
ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε
that every the predicated of-something we-suppose this
τι καὶ ὡς ἓν ὑπακούομεν· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ
something and as one we-understand to-the for one and to-the substance
μάλιστα δοκεῖ παρέπεσθαι τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν.
most seems to-follow-along the this something and the being
Διὸ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν οὗτος ὁ τρόπος
Wherefore also of-the(-ones) depending-on the expression this the way
θετέος, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται
must-be-set first indeed because more the deception comes-about
μετ᾽ ἄλλων σκοπουμένοις ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτούς (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
with others for-the(-ones)-examining than by themselves the indeed for

μετ᾽ ἄλλου σκέψις διὰ λόγων, ἡ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν οὐχ
with another examination through words the but by himself not
ἧττον δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος), εἶτα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν
less through itself the thing then also by himself
ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ποιῆται τὴν
to-be-deceived it-happens when on the word he-makes the
σκέψιν· ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀπάτη ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἡ
examination further the indeed deception from the likeness the
δ᾽ ὁμοιότης ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ
and likeness from the expression Of-the(-ones) and depending-on the
συμβεβηκὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν τὸ ταὐτὸν
accident because-of the not to-be-able to-discern the same
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μηδὲ τοῖς ποίοις
and the other and one and many nor for-the what-sort
τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ τῷ πράγματι
of-the predicates all the-same also to-the thing
συμβέβηκεν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον·
are-accidents Likewise and also of-the(-ones) depending-on the consequent
μέρος γάρ τι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἑπόμενον. Ἔτι καὶ
part for some of-the accident the consequent Further also
ἐπὶ πολλῶν φαίνεται καὶ ἀξιοῦται οὕτως, εἰ τόδε ἀπὸ
for many it-appears and is-claimed so if this from
τοῦδε μὴ χωρίζεται, μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρίζεσθαι θάτερον.
this not is-separated nor from the-other to-be-separated the-one
Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν
Of-the(-ones) and depending-on the deficiency of-the account and of-the(-ones)
παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἡ
depending-on the in-some-respect and simply in the by little the
ἀπάτη· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν προσσημαῖνον τὸ τὶ ἢ πῇ
deception as for nothing additionally-signifying the some or in-some-respect
ἢ πῶς ἢ τὸ νῦν καθόλου συγχωροῦμεν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
or how or the now universally we-concede Likewise and also

ἐπὶ τῶν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν ἀναιτίων,
for the(-ones) the in beginning assuming and the not-causes
καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ὡς ἓν ποιοῦσιν· ἐν
and as-many-as the more questions as one make in
ἅπασι γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν· οὐ γὰρ
all for the deception because-of the by little not for
διακριβοῦμεν οὔτε τῆς προτάσεως οὔτε τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ
we-make-precise neither of-the premise nor of-the syllogism
τὸν ὅρον διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.
the definition because-of the said cause

VIII · SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS PROPER

Knowing what makes syllogisms appear, we know what makes sophistical syllogisms and refutations: those only apparent, and those real but only seeming proper to the matter. Examining, a part of dialectic, exposes an answerer's ignorance; sophistical refutations, even when they reach the contradiction, do not make clear whether he is ignorant, since they trip up the knower too. Their sources are the failures of each part of a genuine refutation, so they are as many as the fallacies named, and a sophistical refutation is a refutation not simply but relative to the one questioned.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔχομεν παρ' ὅσα γίνονται οἱ φαινόμενοι
Since and we-have from how-many-things come-about the apparent
συλλογισμοί, ἔχομεν καὶ παρ' ὁπόσα οἱ σοφιστικοὶ
syllogisms we-have also from how-many the sophistical
γένοιντ' ἂν συλλογισμοὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι. Λέγω δὲ
might-come-about — syllogisms and refutations I-mean and
σοφιστικὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ συλλογισμὸν οὐ μόνον τὸν
sophistical refutation and syllogism not only the
φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν ἢ ἔλεγχον, μὴ ὄντα δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
apparent syllogism or refutation not being though but also

τὸν ὄντα μέν, φαινόμενον δὲ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος. Εἰσὶ
the being indeed apparent but proper to-the matter Are
δ' οὗτοι οἱ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐλέγχοντες καὶ
and these the(-ones) not according-to the matter refuting and
δεικνύντες ἀγνοοῦντας, ὅπερ ἦν τῆς πειραστικῆς. Ἔστι
showing ignorant which-very was of-the examinational Is
δ' ἡ πειραστικὴ μέρος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· αὕτη δὲ δύναται
and the examinational part of-the dialectic this and is-able
συλλογίζεσθαι ψεῦδος δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ διδόντος τὸν
to-syllogize falsehood through ignorance of-the(-one) giving the
λόγον. Οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, ἂν καὶ συλλογίζωνται
account The and sophistical refutations if even they-syllogize
τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ ποιοῦσι δῆλον εἰ ἀγνοεῖ· καὶ γὰρ
the contradiction not make clear whether he-is-ignorant also for
τὸν εἰδότα ἐμποδίζουσι τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις.
the knowing they-hinder with-these the arguments
Ὅτι δ' ἔχομεν αὐτοὺς τῇ αὐτῇ μεθόδῳ, δῆλον· παρ'
That and we-have them by-the same method clear from
ὅσα γὰρ φαίνεται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὡς ἠρωτημένα
how-many-things for it-appears to-the hearers as having-been-asked
συλλελογίσθαι, παρὰ ταῦτα κἂν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ δόξειεν,
to-have-been-syllogized from these also to-the answerer it-would-seem
ὥστ' ἔσονται συλλογισμοὶ ψευδεῖς διὰ τούτων ἢ πάντων
so-that will-be syllogisms false through these either all
ἢ ἐνίων· ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἴεται δεδωκέναι, κἂν
or some what for not having-been-asked he-thinks to-have-granted also
ἐρωτηθεὶς θείη. Πλὴν ἐπί γέ τινων ἅμα συμβαίνει
having-been-asked he-would-grant Except for at-least some at-once it-happens
προσερωτᾶν τὸ ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμφανίζειν, οἷον ἐν
to-ask-further the lacking and the falsehood to-expose such-as in
τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμόν. Εἰ οὖν
the(-ones) depending-on the expression and the solecism If then

οἱ παραλογισμοὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως παρὰ τὸν φαινόμενον
the fallacies of-the contradiction depending-on the apparent
ἔλεγχόν εἰσι, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ τοσαῦτα ἂν καὶ τῶν
refutation are clear that from so-many-things — also of-the
ψευδῶν εἴησαν συλλογισμοὶ παρ᾽ ὅσα καὶ ὁ φαινόμενος
false would-be syllogisms from as-many-as also the apparent
ἔλεγχος. Ὁ δὲ φαινόμενος παρὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ·
refutation The and apparent depending-on the parts of-the genuine
ἑκάστου γὰρ ἐκλείποντος φανείη ἂν ἔλεγχος, οἷον ὁ
each for failing would-appear — refutation such-as the(-one)
παρὰ τὸ μὴ συμβαῖνον διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ εἰς τὸ
depending-on the not following because-of the argument the(-one) into the
ἀδύνατον καὶ ὁ τὰς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ποιῶν παρὰ
impossible and the(-one) the two questions one making depending-on
τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁ παρὰ
the premise and instead-of the by itself the(-one) depending-on
τὸ συμβεβηκός, καὶ τὸ τούτου μόριον, ὁ παρὰ τὸ
the accident and the of-this part the(-one) depending-on the
ἑπόμενον· ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ
consequent further the not for the thing but for the
λόγου συμβαίνειν· εἶτ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθόλου τὴν ἀντίφασιν
word to-follow then instead-of the universal the contradiction
καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως παρά
and according-to the-same and relative-to the-same and likewise depending-on
τε τὸ ἐπί τι ἢ παρ᾽ ἕκαστον τούτων· ἔτι
both the in-relation-to something or depending-on each of-these further
παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἐναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ ἐν
depending-on the not being-counted-in the in beginning the in
ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν. Ὥστ᾽ ἔχοιμεν ἂν παρ᾽ ὅσα
beginning to-assume So-that we-would-have — depending-on how-many-things

γίνονται οἱ παραλογισμοί· παρὰ πλείω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν
come-about the fallacies from more indeed for not —
εἶεν, παρὰ δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἔσονται πάντες.
they-would-be from and the(-things) said will-be all
Ἔστι δ' ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἔλεγχος, ἀλλὰ
Is and the sophistical refutation not simply refutation but
πρός τινα· καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὡσαύτως. Ἂν μὲν γὰρ
relative-to someone and the syllogism likewise If indeed for
μὴ λάβῃ ὅ τε παρὰ τὸ ὁμώνυμον ἓν σημαίνειν καὶ
not be-take the(-one) both depending-on the homonymous one to-signify and
ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιοσχημοσύνην τὸ μόνον τόδε καὶ οἱ
the(-one) depending-on the likeness-of-form the only this and the
ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως, οὔτ' ἔλεγχοι οὔτε συλλογισμοὶ ἔσονται, οὔθ'
others likewise neither refutations nor syllogisms will-be neither
ἁπλῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτώμενον· ἐὰν δὲ λάβωσι, πρὸς
simply nor relative-to the questioned if and they-take relative-to
μὲν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἔσονται, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐκ ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ
indeed the questioned they-will-be simply but not they-will-be not for
ἓν σημαῖνον εἰλήφασιν, ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον, καὶ παρὰ τοῦδε.
one signifying they-have-taken but apparent and from this-one

The ways men are refuted cannot be grasped without knowing everything that is, since the sciences are perhaps infinite and each has its own true and false refutations, as one may refute a man who says the diagonal is commensurable. The dialectician grasps only the refutations common to every art: knowing the sources of reputable syllogisms, he knows those of refutations and of their solutions, real or apparent, dialectical, apparently dialectical, or examining.

Παρὰ πόσα δ' ἐλέγχονται οἱ ἐλεγχόμενοι,
From how-many-things and are-refuted the(-ones) being-refuted
οὐ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν ὄντων
not one-must to-try to-grasp without the of-the beings
ἐπιστήμης ἁπάντων. Τοῦτο δ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης·
knowledge all This and of-no is art
ἄπειροι γὰρ ἴσως αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ αἱ
infinite for perhaps the sciences so-that clear that also the
ἀποδείξεις. Ἔλεγχοι δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ὅσα γὰρ
demonstrations Refutations and are also true as-many-as for
ἔστιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἔστι καὶ ἐλέγξαι τὸν θέμενον τὴν
it-is-possible to-demonstrate it-is-possible also to-refute the(-one) having-posited the
ἀντίφασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οἷον εἰ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον
contradiction of-the true such-as if commensurable the diagonal
ἔθηκεν, ἐλέγξειεν ἄν τις τῇ ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος.
he-posited would-refute — someone by-the demonstration that incommensurable
Ὥστε πάντων δεήσει ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
So-that of-all it-will-be-necessary knowers to-be the indeed for
ἔσονται παρὰ τὰς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ τούτων
will-be depending-on the in geometry principles and the of-these
συμπεράσματα, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἰατρικῇ, οἱ δὲ
conclusions the and depending-on the(-ones) in medicine the(-ones) and
παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ
depending-on the(-ones) of-the other sciences But indeed also the

ψευδεῖς ἔλεγχοι ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπείροις· καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ
false refutations likewise in infinites according-to each for
τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδὴς συλλογισμός, οἷον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν
art is false syllogism such-as according-to geometry
ὁ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὁ ἰατρικός. Λέγω
the geometrical and according-to medicine the medical I-mean
δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνης ἀρχάς.
and the according-to the art the according-to the of-that principles
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν
Clear then that not of-all the refutations but of-the(-ones)
παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτέον τοὺς τόπους· οὗτοι
depending-on the dialectic must-be-grasped the topics these
γὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἅπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν. Καὶ τὸν
for common for every art and power And the
μὲν καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἐπιστήμονός
indeed according-to each knowledge refutation of-the knower
ἐστι θεωρεῖν, εἴτε μὴ ὢν φαίνεται εἴτ᾽ ἔστι, διὰ τί
is to-observe whether not being it-appears or it-is because-of what
ἔστι· τὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν τέχνην τῶν
it-is the but from the common and under no art of-the
διαλεκτικῶν. Εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἔνδοξοι συλλογισμοὶ
dialecticians If for we-have from which the reputable syllogisms
περὶ ὁτιοῦν, ἔχομεν ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἔλεγχοι· ὁ γὰρ
about anything-whatever we-have from which the refutations the for
ἔλεγχός ἐστιν ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός, ὥστ᾽ ἢ εἷς ἢ δύο
refutation is of-contradiction syllogism so-that either one or two
συλλογισμοὶ ἀντιφάσεως ἔλεγχός ἐστιν. Ἔχομεν ἄρα παρ᾽
syllogisms of-contradiction refutation is We-have then from
ὁπόσα πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχομεν, καὶ
how-many-things all are the such If and this we-have also
τὰς λύσεις ἔχομεν· αἱ γὰρ τούτων ἐνστάσεις λύσεις εἰσίν.
the solutions we-have the for of-these objections solutions are

Ἔχομεν δέ, παρ᾽ ὁπόσα γίνονται, καὶ τοὺς φαινομένους,
We-have and from how-many-things come-about also the apparent
φαινομένους δὲ οὐχ ὁτῳοῦν ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε·
apparent but not to-anyone-whatever but to-the such
ἀόριστα γάρ ἐστιν, ἐάν τις σκοπῇ παρ᾽ ὁπόσα
indefinite for they-are if someone examine from how-many-things
φαίνονται τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ
they-appear to-the chance-comers So-that evident that of-the dialectician
ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι λαβεῖν παρ᾽ ὅσα γίνεται διὰ
is the to-be-able to-grasp from how-many-things comes-about through
τῶν κοινῶν ἢ ὢν ἔλεγχος ἢ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος, καὶ
the common either being refutation or apparent refutation and
ἢ διαλεκτικὸς ἢ φαινόμενος διαλεκτικὸς ἢ πειραστικός.
either dialectical or apparently dialectical or examinational

X · AGAINST THE NAME, AGAINST THE THOUGHT

Some distinguish arguments directed at the name from those directed at the thought, but there is no such kind. Arguing against the name is only using a term in a sense other than the one the answerer granted, so whether an argument is one or the other depends on how the answerer took it, as Zeno's argument that all is one, the triangle, and speaking while silent show. Since a refutation is a syllogism, syllogism must be treated first, and an apparent refutation's fault lies in the syllogism, the contradiction, or both. Teaching, unlike dialectic, does not proceed by questions.

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν λόγων ἣν λέγουσί τινες, τὸ
Not is and difference of-the arguments which say some the
εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς
to-be the indeed toward the-name arguments others and toward
τὴν διάνοιαν· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἄλλους μὲν
the thought absurd for the to-suppose others indeed

εἶναι πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν,
to-be toward the-name arguments others and toward the thought
ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς αὐτούς. Τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν
but not the same What for is the not toward the
διάνοιαν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν μὴ χρῆται τῷ ὀνόματι, οἰόμενος
thought but except when not one-uses the name thinking
ἐρωτᾶσθαι, ἐφ' ᾧ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος ἔδωκεν; τὸ δ'
to-be-asked for which the(-one) asked granted the and
αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τοὔνομα. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
same this is also toward the-name The and toward the
διάνοιαν, ὅταν ἐφ' ᾧ ἔδωκεν διανοηθείς. Εἰ δή τις
thought when for which he-granted having-thought If indeed someone
πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος οἴοιτο ἓν σημαίνειν
more signifying the name should-think one to-signify
καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, οἷον ἴσως τὸ ὂν
both the asker and the(-one) asked such-as perhaps the being
ἢ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ
or the one many signifies but both the answerer and
ὁ ἐρωτῶν Ζήνων ἓν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἠρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν
the asker Zeno one thinking to-be asked and is
ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἓν πάντα, οὗτος πρὸς τοὔνομα ἔσται ἢ
the argument that one all this toward the-name will-be or
πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος.
toward the thought of-the(-one) asked having-conversed
Εἰ δέ γέ τις πολλὰ οἴεται σημαίνειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς
If but at-least someone many thinks to-signify clear that not toward
τὴν διάνοιαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐστὶ
the thought First indeed for about the such is
λόγους τὸ πρὸς τοὔνομα καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ὅσοι
arguments the toward the-name and toward the thought as-many-as
πλείω σημαίνουσιν, εἶτα περὶ ὁντινοῦν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν
more signify then about any-whatever it-is not for in

τῷ λόγῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
the argument is the toward the thought to-be but in the
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα.
the answerer to-be-disposed somehow toward the(-things) granted
Εἶτα πρὸς τοὔνομα πάντας ἐνδέχεται αὐτοὺς εἶναι. Τὸ
Then toward the-name all it-is-possible them to-be The
γὰρ πρὸς τοὔνομα τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναί ἐστιν
for toward the-name the not toward the thought to-be is
ἐνταῦθα. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντες, ἔσονταί τινες ἕτεροι οὔτε πρὸς
here If for not all will-be some others neither toward
τοὔνομα οὔτε πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· οἱ δέ φασι πάντας, καὶ
the-name nor toward the thought they but say all and
διαιροῦνται ἢ πρὸς τοὔνομα ἢ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι
divide either toward the-name or toward the thought to-be
πάντας, ἄλλους δ' οὔ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσοι συλλογισμοί εἰσι
all others but not But indeed as-many-as syllogisms are
παρὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς, τούτων εἰσί τινες οἱ παρὰ
depending-on the in-more-ways of-these are some the(-ones) depending-on
τοὔνομα. Ἀτόπως μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἴρηται τὸ παρὰ
the-name Absurdly indeed for also has-been-said the depending-on
τοὔνομα φάναι πάντας τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν· ἀλλ'
the-name to-say all the(-ones) depending-on the expression but
οὖν εἰσί τινες παραλογισμοὶ οὐ τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον
then are some fallacies not by-the the answerer
πρὸς τούτους ἔχειν πως, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιονδὶ ἐρώτημα
toward these to-be-disposed somehow but by-the such question
τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν ἔχειν, ὃ πλείω σημαίνει.
the argument itself to-have which more signifies
Ὅλως τε ἄτοπον τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ
Generally and absurd the about refutation to-converse but not
πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός
before about syllogism the for refutation syllogism

ἐστιν, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ πρότερον ἢ περὶ
is so-that one-must also about syllogism before than about
ψευδοῦς ἐλέγχου· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος
false refutation is for the such refutation apparent
συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως. Διὸ ἢ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ
syllogism of-contradiction Wherefore either in the syllogism
ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκεῖσθαι γὰρ
will-be the cause or in the contradiction to-be-added for
δεῖ τὴν ἀντίφασιν), ὁτὲ δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ἂν ᾖ
one-must the contradiction sometimes and in both if it-is
φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιγῶντα λέγειν
apparent refutation Is and the indeed of-the silent to-speak
ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ὁ δέ, ἃ μὴ
in the contradiction not in the syllogism the and what not
ἔχοι τις, δοῦναι, ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἡ Ὁμήρου
should-have someone to-give in both the and that the of-Homer
ποίησις σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ κύκλου ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ. Ὁ
poetry figure through the circle in the syllogism The
δ' ἐν μηδετέρῳ ἀληθὴς συλλογισμός.
and in neither true syllogism
Ἀλλὰ δὴ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἦλθε, πότερον οἱ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι
But indeed whence the argument came whether the in the mathematics
λόγοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιάν εἰσιν ἢ οὔ; καὶ εἴ τινι δοκεῖ
arguments toward the thought are or not and if to-someone it-seems
πολλὰ σημαίνειν τὸ τρίγωνον, καὶ ἔδωκε μὴ ὡς τοῦτο
many-things to-signify the triangle and he-granted not as this
τὸ σχῆμα ἐφ' οὗ συνεπεράνατο ὅτι δύο ὀρθαί, πότερον
the figure for which he-concluded that two right-angles whether
πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὗτος διείλεκται τὴν ἐκείνου ἢ οὔ;
toward the thought this-one has-conversed the of-that-one or not

Ἔτι εἰ πολλὰ μὲν σημαίνει τοὔνομα, ὁ δὲ μὴ νοεῖ
Further if many-things indeed signifies the-name the and not perceives
μηδ' οἴεται, πῶς οὗτος οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν διείλεκται; ἢ
nor thinks how this-one not toward the thought has-conversed or
πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν πλὴν διδόναι διαίρεσιν, εἶτ' ἐρωτήσειέ
how one-must to-ask except to-give division or should-ask
τις εἰ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν
someone whether it-is-possible silent to-speak or not or it-is indeed
ὡς οὔ, ἔστι δ' ὡς ναί; εἰ δή τις δοίη
in-a-way not it-is and in-a-way yes if indeed someone should-grant
μηδαμῶς, ὁ δὲ διαλεχθείη, ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
in-no-way the and should-converse then not toward the thought
διείλεκται; καίτοι ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ τῶν παρὰ τοὔνομα
has-he-conversed and-yet the argument seems of-the(-ones) depending-on the-name
εἶναι. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ γένος τι λόγων τὸ πρὸς τὴν
to-be Not then is genus some of-arguments the toward the
διάνοιαν. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομά εἰσι· καὶ τοιοῦτοι
thought But the indeed toward the-name are and such
οὐ πάντες, οὐχ ὅτι οἱ ἔλεγχοι, ἀλλ' οὐδ' οἱ φαινόμενοι
not all not only the refutations but not-even the apparent
ἔλεγχοι. Εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μὴ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν φαινόμενοι
refutations There-are for also not depending-on the expression apparent
ἔλεγχοι, οἷον οἱ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ἕτεροι.
refutations such-as the depending-on the accident and others
Εἰ δέ τις ἀξιοῖ διαιρεῖν, ὅτι λέγω δὲ σιγῶντα λέγειν
If and someone claims to-divide that I-mean and silent to-speak
τὰ μὲν ὠδὶ τὰ δ' ὠδί· ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον
the indeed thus the and thus but this at-least is first
μὲν ἄτοπον, τὸ ἀξιοῦν (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ
indeed absurd the to-claim sometimes for not seems the(-thing)
ἐρωτώμενον πολλαχῶς ἔχειν, ἀδύνατον δὲ διαιρεῖν ὃ
asked in-many-ways to-be impossible and to-divide what

μὴ οἴεται)· ἔπειτα τὸ διδάσκειν τί ἄλλο ἔσται; φανερὸν
not he-thinks then the to-teach what other will-it-be evident
γὰρ ποιήσει ὡς ἔχει τῷ μήτ' ἐσκεμμένῳ μήτ' εἰδότι
for he-will-make how it-is to-the(-one) neither having-examined nor knowing
μήθ' ὑπολαμβάνοντι ὅτι ἄλλως λέγεται. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
nor supposing that otherwise it-is-said Since also in the
μὴ διπλοῖς τί κωλύει τοῦτο παθεῖν; ἆρα ἴσαι αἱ μονάδες
not double what prevents this to-suffer then equal the units
ταῖς δυάσιν ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσιν; εἰσὶ δὲ δυάδες αἱ μὲν ὠδὶ
to-the twos in the four are and twos the indeed thus
ἐνοῦσαι αἱ δὲ ὠδί. Καὶ ἆρα τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη ἢ
inhering the and thus And then of-the contraries one knowledge or
οὔ; ἔστι δ' ἐναντία τὰ μὲν γνωστὰ τὰ δ' ἄγνωστα. Ὥστ'
not are and contraries the indeed knowable the and unknown So-that
ἔοικεν ἀγνοεῖν ὁ τοῦτο ἀξιῶν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ διδάσκειν
seems to-be-ignorant the(-one) this claiming that different the to-teach
τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν διδάσκοντα μὴ
from-the to-converse and that one-must the indeed teacher not
ἐρωτᾶν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δῆλα ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐρωτᾶν.
to-ask but himself clear to-make the and to-ask

Demanding yes or no belongs to examining, not proving, and examining tests the one who pretends to know. Contentious reasoning is an apparent syllogism about what dialectic examines, even with a true conclusion: Bryson's squaring of the circle is contentious, the false diagram of the lunes only bad geometry. Its users fight foul to win, and sophists do the same for money. Since dialectic, unlike geometry, has no defined genus, a man may examine without knowing the art, and the contentious man errs about every genus.

Ἔτι τὸ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀξιοῦν οὐ δεικνύντος
Further the to-affirm or to-deny to-claim not of-one-demonstrating
ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πεῖραν λαμβάνοντος. Ἡ γὰρ πειραστικὴ ἐστι
is but a-trial of-one-taking The for examinational is
διαλεκτική τις καὶ θεωρεῖ οὐ τὸν εἰδότα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα
dialectic some and observes not the knowing but the ignorant
καὶ προσποιούμενον. Ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρῶν
and pretending The indeed then according-to the thing observing
τὰ κοινὰ διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο φαινομένως ποιῶν
the common dialectician the and this apparently doing
σοφιστικός. Καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικός ἐστιν
sophistical And syllogism eristic and sophistical is
εἷς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, περὶ ὧν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ
one indeed the apparent syllogism about which the dialectic
πειραστική ἐστι, κἂν ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ᾖ· τοῦ γὰρ
examinational is even-if true the conclusion be of-the for
διὰ τί ἀπατητικός ἐστι· καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κατὰ
because-of what deceptive it-is and as-many-as not being according-to
τὴν ἑκάστου μέθοδον παραλογισμοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι κατὰ
the of-each method fallacies seem to-be according-to
τὴν τέχνην. Τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά (κατὰ
the art The for false-diagrams not eristic according-to

γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην οἱ παραλογισμοί), οὐδέ γ' εἴ
for the(-things) under the art the fallacies nor at-least if
τί ἐστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθές, οἷον τὸ Ἱπποκράτους
anything is false-diagram about true such-as the of-Hippocrates
ἢ ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων. Ἀλλ' ὡς Βρύσων
or the squaring the through the lunes But as Bryson
ἐτετραγώνιζε τὸν κύκλον, εἰ καὶ τετραγωνίζεται ὁ κύκλος,
squared the circle if even is-squared the circle
ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, διὰ τοῦτο σοφιστικός.
but because not according-to the thing because-of this sophistical
Ὥστε ὅ τε περὶ τῶνδε φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς
So-that the both about these apparent syllogism eristic
λόγος, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός,
argument and the according-to the thing apparent syllogism
κἂν ᾖ συλλογισμός, ἐριστικὸς λόγος· φαινόμενος γάρ
even-if it-be syllogism eristic argument apparent for
ἐστι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστ' ἀπατητικὸς καὶ ἄδικος.
it-is according-to the thing so-that deceptive and unjust
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἀγῶνι ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν
Just-as for the in contest injustice form some has and is
ἀδικομαχία τις, οὕτως ἐν ἀντιλογίᾳ ἀδικομαχία ἡ ἐριστική
foul-fighting some so in disputation foul-fighting the eristic
ἐστιν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι
is there both for the(-ones) at-all-costs to-win choosing
πάντων ἅπτονται καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἐριστικοί. Οἱ μὲν οὖν
all lay-hold-of and here the eristics The indeed then
τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ
of-the victory itself for-the-sake such eristic men and
φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς
contentious seem to-be the and of-reputation for-the-sake of-the toward
χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστική ἐστιν, ὥσπερ
money-making sophistical the for sophistic is just-as

εἴπομεν, χρηματιστική τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης, διὸ
we-said money-making some from wisdom apparent wherefore
φαινομένης ἀποδείξεως ἐφίενται. Καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν
apparent demonstration they-aim-at And of-the arguments the same
μέν εἰσιν οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν
indeed are the contentious and sophists but not of-the same
ἕνεκεν. Καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἔσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ
for-the-sake And argument the same indeed will-be sophistical and
ἐριστικός, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν νίκης
eristic but not according-to the-same but in-so-far-as indeed of-victory
φαινομένης, ἐριστικός, ᾗ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός· καὶ
apparent eristic in-so-far-as and of-wisdom sophistical and
γὰρ ἡ σοφιστική ἐστι φαινομένη σοφία τις ἀλλ' οὐκ οὖσα.
for the sophistic is apparent wisdom some but not real
Ὁ δ' ἐριστικός ἐστί πως οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν
The and eristic is somehow so disposed toward the dialectician
ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικόν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν
as the false-diagrammer toward the geometer from for the
αὐτῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ παραλογίζεται καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος
same as-the dialectic he-misleads and the false-diagrammer
τὸν γεωμέτρην. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐριστικός, ὅτι ἐκ
the geometer But the(-one) indeed not eristic because from
τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ συμπερασμάτων τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην
the principles and conclusions the(-ones) under the art
ψευδογραφεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπὸ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν περὶ μὲν
he-draws-falsely the(-one) and under the dialectic about indeed
τἆλλα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστι δῆλον. Οἷον ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς
the-other-things that eristic he-is clear Such-as the squaring
ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων οὐκ ἐριστικός, ὁ δὲ Βρύσωνος
the indeed through the lunes not eristic the and of-Bryson
ἐριστικός· καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν ἀλλ'
eristic and the indeed not it-is-possible to-transfer but

ἢ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν μόνον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
except to geometry only because-of the from the proper
εἶναι ἀρχῶν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς πολλούς, ὅσοι μὴ ἴσασι τὸ
to-be principles the and to many as-many-as not know the
δυνατὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον· ἁρμόσει γάρ. Ἢ ὡς
possible in each and the impossible it-will-fit for Or as
Ἀντιφῶν ἐτετραγώνιζεν. Ἢ εἴ τις μὴ φαίη βέλτιον εἶναι
Antiphon squared Or if someone not should-say better to-be
ἀπὸ δείπνου περιπατεῖν διὰ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, οὐκ
after dinner to-walk because-of the of-Zeno argument not
ἰατρικός· κοινὸς γάρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν πάντῃ ὁμοίως εἶχεν
medical common for If indeed then in-every-way likewise were-disposed
ὁ ἐριστικὸς πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τῷ ψευδογράφῳ πρὸς
the eristic toward the dialectician as-the false-diagrammer toward
τὸν γεωμέτρην, οὐκ ἂν ἦν περὶ ἐκείνων ἐριστικός.
the geometer not — he-would-be about those eristic
Νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διαλεκτικὸς περὶ γένος τι ὡρισμένον,
Now but not is the dialectician about genus some defined
οὐδὲ δεικτικὸς οὐδενός, οὐδὲ τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ καθόλου. Οὔτε
nor demonstrative of-anything nor such as the universal Neither
γάρ ἐστιν ἅπαντα ἐν ἑνί τινι γένει, οὔτε εἰ εἴη, οἷόν τε
for are all in one some genus nor if it-were possible —
ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ ὄντα. Ὥστ' οὐδεμία τέχνη
under the same principles to-be the beings So-that no art
τῶν δεικνυουσῶν τινὰ φύσιν ἐρωτητική ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ
of-the(-ones) demonstrating some nature interrogative is not for
ἔξεστιν ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων δοῦναι· συλλογισμὸς γὰρ
it-is-possible whichever of-the parts to-grant syllogism for
οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρωτητική ἐστιν.
not comes-about from both The but dialectic interrogative is
Εἰ δ' ἐδείκνυεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πρῶτα καὶ
If and it-demonstrated if even not all but the at-least first and

τὰς οἰκείας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἂν ἠρώτα. Μὴ διδόντας γὰρ οὐκ
the proper principles not — it-would-ask Not granting for not
ἂν ἔτι εἶχεν ἐξ ὧν ἔτι διαλέξεται πρὸς τὴν ἔνστασιν.
— still it-would-have from which still it-will-argue against the objection
Ἡ δ' αὐτὴ καὶ πειραστική. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πειραστικὴ
The and same also examinational Nor for the examinational
τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ γεωμετρία, ἀλλ' ἣν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ
such is as the geometry but which — might-have even
μὴ εἰδώς τις. Ἔξεστι γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν καὶ τὸν μὴ
not knowing someone It-is-possible for trial to-take also the not
εἰδότα τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦ μὴ εἰδότος, εἴπερ καὶ δίδωσιν οὐκ
knowing the thing of-the not knowing if-indeed also he-grants not
ἐξ ὧν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων,
from what he-knows nor from the proper but from the consequents
ὅσα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἃ εἰδότα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ
as-many-as such are which knowing indeed nothing prevents not
εἰδέναι τὴν τέχνην, μὴ εἰδότα δ' ἀνάγκη ἀγνοεῖν.
to-know the art not knowing but necessity to-be-ignorant
Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ὡρισμένου ἡ πειραστικὴ
So-that evident that of-nothing defined the examinational
ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. Διὸ καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐστί· πᾶσαι γὰρ
knowledge is Wherefore also about all it-is all for
αἱ τέχναι χρῶνται καὶ κοινοῖς τισίν. Διὸ πάντες καὶ οἱ
the arts use also common some Wherefore all also the
ἰδιῶται τρόπον τινὰ χρῶνται τῇ διαλεκτικῇ καὶ πειραστικῇ·
laymen in-way some use the dialectic and examinational
πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀνακρίνειν τοὺς
all for up-to a-point attempt to-question the(-ones)
ἐπαγγελλομένους. Ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ κοινά· ταῦτα γὰρ
professing These and are the common these for
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἴσασιν αὐτοί, κἂν δοκῶσι λίαν ἔξω λέγειν.
not less know they-themselves even-if they-seem very outside to-speak

Ἐλέγχουσιν οὖν ἅπαντες· ἀτέχνως γὰρ μετέχουσι τούτου
They-refute then all without-art for they-partake of-this
οὗ ἐντέχνως ἡ διαλεκτική ἐστι, καὶ ὁ τέχνῃ συλλογιστικῇ
of-which with-art the dialectic is and the by-art syllogistic
πειραστικὸς διαλεκτικός. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ πολλὰ μὲν ταῦτα
examinational dialectician Since and are many indeed these
καὶ κατὰ πάντων, οὐ τοιαῦτα δ' ὥστε φύσιν τινὰ εἶναι καὶ
and of all not such but so-as nature some to-be and
γένος, ἀλλ' οἷον αἱ ἀποφάσεις, τὰ δ' οὐ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ ἴδια,
genus but as the negations the and not such but proper
ἔστιν ἐκ τούτων περὶ ἁπάντων πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, καὶ
it-is-possible from these about all trial to-take and
εἶναι τέχνην τινά, καὶ μὴ τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαι αἱ δεικνύουσαι.
to-be art some and not such to-be as the demonstrating
Διόπερ ὁ ἐριστικὸς οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχων πάντῃ ὡς ὁ
Wherefore the eristic not is so disposed in-every-way as the
ψευδογράφος· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται παραλογιστικὸς ἐξ ὡρισμένου
false-diagrammer not for will-be misleading from defined
τινὸς γένους ἀρχῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ πᾶν γένος ἔσται ὁ ἐριστικός.
some genus principles but about every genus will-be the eristic
Τρόποι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὗτοι τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων·
Ways indeed then are these of-the sophistical refutations
ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τούτων
that and it-is of-the dialectician the to-observe about these
καὶ δύνασθαι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· ἡ γὰρ περὶ
and to-be-able these to-do not difficult to-see the for about
τὰς προτάσεις μέθοδος ἅπασαν ἔχει ταύτην τὴν θεωρίαν.
the premises method all has this the study

To show the opponent saying something false or lead him into paradox, question him with no thesis laid down, as one wishing to learn, since men who speak at random err more. Ask what his school says against common opinion; set men's professed opinions against their hidden wishes, as they praise a noble death and wish for a pleasant life; or set convention against nature, as Callicles does in the Gorgias. Some questions, like whether to obey the wise or one's father, make either answer paradoxical.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐλέγχων εἴρηται τῶν φαινομένων·
And about indeed the refutations it-has-been-said the apparent
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ψευδόμενόν τι δεῖξαι καὶ τὸν λόγον εἰς
about and the lying something to-show and the argument into
ἄδοξον ἀγαγεῖν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν δεύτερον τῆς σοφιστικῆς
unreputable to-lead this for was second of-the sophistical
προαιρέσεως) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ πυνθάνεσθαί πως
purpose first indeed then from the to-inquire somehow
καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως συμβαίνει μάλιστα. Τὸ γὰρ πρὸς
and through the questioning it-happens most The for toward
μηδὲν ὁρίσαντα κείμενον ἐρωτᾶν θηρευτικόν ἐστι τούτων·
nothing having-defined laid-down to-ask apt-for-hunting is of-these
εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγοντες ἁμαρτάνουσι μᾶλλον· εἰκῇ δὲ
at-random for speaking they-err more at-random and
λέγουσιν, ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχωσι προκείμενον. Τό τε ἐρωτᾶν
they-speak when nothing they-have proposed The both to-ask
πολλά, κἂν ὡρισμένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ διαλέγεται, καὶ τὸ
many-things even-if defined it-be toward what he-converses and the
τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγειν ἀξιοῦν ποιεῖ τιν᾽ εὐπορίαν τοῦ
the(-things) seeming to-say to-claim makes some facility of-the
εἰς ἄδοξον ἀγαγεῖν ἢ ψεῦδος· ἐάν τε ἐρωτώμενος φῇ
into unreputable to-lead or falsehood if both being-asked he-affirm

ἢ ἀποφῇ τούτων τι, ἄγειν πρὸς ἃ ἐπιχειρήματος
or deny of-these something to-lead toward what of-attack
εὐπορεῖ. Δυνατὸν δὲ νῦν ἧττον κακουργεῖν διὰ τούτων ἢ
he-has-plenty It-is-possible but now less to-do-mischief through these than
πρότερον· ἀπαιτοῦνται γὰρ τί τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ.
before they-are-asked-back for what this toward the in beginning
Στοιχεῖον δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν ἢ ψεύδους τινὸς ἢ ἀδόξου τὸ
Element and of-the to-hit either falsehood some or unreputable the
μηδεμίαν εὐθὺς ἐρωτᾶν θέσιν, ἀλλὰ φάσκειν ἐρωτᾶν μαθεῖν
no at-once to-ask thesis but to-say to-ask to-learn
βουλόμενον· χώραν γὰρ ἐπιχειρήματος ἡ σκέψις ποιεῖ.
wishing room for of-attack the inquiry makes
Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ψευδόμενον δεῖξαι ἴδιος τόπος ὁ σοφιστικός,
For and the lying to-show proper topic the sophistical
τὸ ἄγειν πρὸς τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἃ εὐπορεῖ λόγων·
the to-lead toward such toward which he-has-plenty of-arguments
ἔσται δὲ καὶ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν,
it-will-be-possible and both well and not well this to-do
καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
just-as was-said before
Πάλιν πρὸς τὸ παράδοξα λέγειν σκοπεῖν ἐκ τίνος γένους
Again for the paradoxes to-say to-consider from what genus
ὁ διαλεγόμενος, εἶτ' ἐπερωτᾶν ὧ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὗτοι
the(-one) conversing then to-ask what to-the many these
λέγουσι παράδοξον· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκάστοις τι τοιοῦτον.
say paradoxical is for for-each something such
Στοιχεῖον δὲ τούτων τὸ τὰς ἑκάστων εἰληφέναι θέσεις
Element and of-these the the of-each to-have-taken theses
ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν. Λύσις δὲ καὶ τούτων ἡ προσήκουσα
in the premises Solution and also of-these the befitting

φέρεται τὸ ἐμφανίζειν ὅτι οὐ διὰ τὸν λόγον συμβαίνει
is-brought the to-make-plain that not because-of the argument follows
τὸ ἄδοξον· ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ βούλεται ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος.
the unreputable always but this also wishes the(-one) contending
Ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῶν βουλήσεων καὶ τῶν φανερῶν δοξῶν. Οὐ
Further and from the wishes and the open opinions Not
γὰρ ταὐτὰ βούλονταί τε καὶ φασίν, ἀλλὰ λέγουσι μὲν
for the-same-things they-wish both and say but they-say indeed
τοὺς εὐσχημονεστάτους τῶν λόγων, βούλονται δὲ τὰ
the most-decorous of-the words they-wish and the(-things)
φαινόμενα λυσιτελεῖν, οἷον τεθνάναι καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ
appearing to-profit such-as to-die nobly rather than
ζῆν ἡδέως φασὶ δεῖν καὶ πένεσθαι δικαίως μᾶλλον
to-live pleasantly they-say to-be-necessary and to-be-poor justly rather
ἢ πλουτεῖν αἰσχρῶς, βούλονται δὲ τἀναντία. Τὸν μὲν
than to-be-rich shamefully they-wish but the-opposites The(-one) indeed
οὖν λέγοντα κατὰ τὰς βουλήσεις εἰς τὰς φανερὰς δόξας
then speaking according-to the wishes into the open opinions
ἀκτέον, τὸν δὲ κατὰ ταύτας εἰς τὰς ἀποκεκρυμμένας·
must-be-led the(-one) and according-to these into the hidden
ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον παράδοξα λέγειν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς
in-both-ways for necessary paradoxes to-say either for toward
τὰς φανερὰς ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἀφανεῖς δόξας ἐροῦσιν ἐναντία.
the open or toward the hidden opinions they-will-say contraries
Πλεῖστος δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν,
Most-extensive and topic is of-the to-make paradoxes to-say
ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων,
just-as also the Callicles in the Gorgias is-written saying
καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι δὲ πάντες ᾤοντο συμβαίνειν, παρὰ
and the ancients and all thought to-happen depending-on
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον· ἐναντία γὰρ
the according-to nature and according-to the law contraries for

εἶναι φύσιν καὶ νόμον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κατὰ νόμον
to-be nature and law and the justice according-to law
μὲν εἶναι καλὸν κατὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ καλόν. Δεῖν οὖν
indeed to-be fine according-to nature but not fine One-must then
πρὸς μὲν τὸν εἰπόντα κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ νόμον
toward indeed the(-one) having-spoken according-to nature according-to law
ἀπαντᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν
to-meet toward and the(-one) according-to law to the nature
ἄγειν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ εἶναι λέγειν παράδοξα. Ἦν δὲ
to-lead in-both-ways for to-be to-say paradoxes Was and
τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ
the indeed according-to nature to-them the true the and according-to
νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι,
law the to-the many seeming So-that clear that also-those
καθάπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν, ἢ ἐλέγξαι ἢ παράδοξα λέγειν
just-as also the(-ones) now either to-refute or paradoxes to-say
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖν.
the answerer attempted to-make
Ἔνια δὲ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἔχει ἀμφοτέρως ἄδοξον εἶναι
Some and of-the questions have in-both-ways unreputable to-be
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, οἷον πότερον τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ τῷ πατρὶ
the answer such-as whether to-the wise or to-the father
δεῖ πείθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν ἢ τὰ δίκαια,
one-must to-obey and the advantageous-things to-do or the just-things
καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι αἱρετώτερον ἢ βλάπτειν. Δεῖ δ' ἄγειν
and to-be-wronged more-choiceworthy than to-harm One-must and to-lead
εἰς τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐναντία, ἐὰν μὲν
into the(-things) to-the many and to-the wise contrary if indeed
λέγῃ τις ὡς οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς τὰ τοῖς
should-speak someone as the(-ones) about the arguments into the(-things) to-the
πολλοῖς, ἐὰν δ' ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐν λόγῳ.
many if but as the many to the(-things) to-the(-ones) in argument

Φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸν εὐδαίμονα δίκαιον
They-say for the(-ones) indeed of necessity the happy just
εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἄδοξον τὸ βασιλέα μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.
to-be to-the and many unreputable the king not to-be-happy
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἰς τὰ οὕτως ἄδοξα συνάγειν τὸ
Is and the into the(-things) so unreputable to-bring-together the
αὐτὸ τῷ εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ νόμον
same with-the into the according-to nature and according-to law
ὑπεναντίωσιν ἄγειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νόμος δόξα τῶν πολλῶν,
opposition to-lead the indeed for law opinion of-the many
οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν λέγουσιν.
the and wise according-to nature and according-to truth speak

XIII · BABBLING

Paradoxes, then, are sought from these places. Every argument that makes the answerer babble assumes that a name and its account are the same, so that if double is double of half, double is double of half of half. They work with relative terms, and with terms whose account includes their subject: if snub is concavity of a nose, a snub nose is a nose nose concave. Sometimes they only appear to succeed, because the questioner never asks whether double alone signifies anything, and the same name seems to signify the same thing.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν παράδοξα ἐκ τούτων δεῖ ζητεῖν τῶν
And the indeed paradoxes from these one-must to-seek the
τόπων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχεῖν, ὃ μὲν λέγομεν
topics about and the to-make to-babble what indeed we-mean
τὸ ἀδολεσχεῖν, εἰρήκαμεν ἤδη. Πάντες δὲ οἱ τοιοίδε
the to-babble we-have-said already All and the such
λόγοι τοῦτο βούλονται ποιεῖν· εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὄνομα
arguments this wish to-do if nothing differs the name

ἢ τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν, διπλάσιον δὲ καὶ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος
or the account to-say double and also double of-half
ταὐτό, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, ἔσται ἡμίσεος
the-same if then is of-half double it-will-be of-half
ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον. Καὶ πάλιν ἂν ἀντὶ τοῦ διπλάσιον
of-half double And again if instead-of the double
διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος τεθῇ, τρὶς ἔσται εἰρημένον, ἡμίσεος
double of-half be-set three-times it-will-be said of-half
ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον. Καὶ ἆρά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία
of-half of-half double And then is the desire
ἡδέος; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὄρεξις ἡδέος· ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ
of-the-pleasant this and is appetite of-the-pleasant is then the
ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἡδέος.
desire appetite of-the-pleasant of-the-pleasant
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἔν τε τοῖς πρός
Are and all the such of-the arguments in both the relative
τι, ὅσα μὴ μόνον τὰ γένη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ πρός
something as-many-as not only the genera but also themselves relative
τι λέγεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀποδίδοται. Οἷον ἥ
something are-said and to the same and one are-rendered Such-as the
τε ὄρεξις τινὸς ὄρεξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία,
both appetite of-something appetite and the desire of-something desire
καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον καὶ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος.
and the double of-something double and double of-half
Καὶ ὅσων ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ὄντων πρός τι ὅλως, ὧν
And of-as-many-as the substance not being relative something at-all of-which
εἰσὶν ἕξεις ἢ πάθη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῶν
they-are states or affections or something such in the account of-them
προσδηλοῦται κατηγορουμένων ἐπὶ τούτοις. Οἷον τὸ περιττὸν
is-shown-as-well being-predicated of these Such-as the odd
ἀριθμὸς μέσον ἔχων· ἔστι δ' ἀριθμὸς περιττός· ἔστιν ἄρα
number middle having is and number odd is then

ἀριθμὸς μέσον ἔχων ἀριθμός. Καὶ εἰ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης
number middle having number And if the snub concavity
ῥινός ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ ῥὶς σιμή, ἔστιν ἄρα ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη.
of-nose is is and nose snub is then nose nose concave
Φαίνονται δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐνίοτε διὰ τὸ μὴ
They-appear and to-do not doing sometimes because-of the not
προσπυνθάνεσθαι εἰ σημαίνει τι καθ' αὑτὸ λεχθὲν τὸ
to-ask-further whether signifies something by itself said the
διπλάσιον ἢ οὐδέν, καὶ εἴ τι σημαίνει, πότερον τὸ αὐτὸ
double or nothing and if something it-signifies whether the same
ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγειν εὐθύς. Ἀλλὰ φαίνεται
or other but the conclusion to-state at-once But it-appears
διὰ τὸ τὸ ὄνομα ταὐτὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ σημαίνειν.
because-of the the name the-same to-be the-same also to-signify

XIV · SOLECISM

Solecism can be committed, seem committed when it is not, or not seem when it is: if Protagoras was right that mēnis *is masculine,* oulomenēn *is a solecism no one hears. Apparent solecisms come mostly from* touto*, which is neither masculine nor feminine and stands for both* houtos *and* touton*, so one must say "is Coriscus" but "to be Coriscon"; names of things like* xylon *behave alike. The questioner tries to draw the solecism from these cases; the order of questions comes next.*

Σολοικισμὸς δ' οἷον μέν ἐστιν εἴρηται πρότερον.
Solecism and of-what-sort indeed it-is has-been-said before
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα φαίνεσθαι
It-is-possible and this both to-do and not doing to-appear
καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν,
and doing not to-seem just-as the Protagoras said
εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πήληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων
if the mēnis and the pēlēx masculine is the indeed for saying

οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ
oulomenēn commits-solecism indeed according-to that-one not appears but
τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σολοικίζει.
to-the others the and oulomenon appears indeed but not commits-solecism
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κἂν τέχνῃ τις τοῦτο δύναιτο ποιεῖν·
Clear then that even by-art someone this could to-do
διὸ πολλοὶ τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμὸν
wherefore many of-the arguments not syllogizing solecism
φαίνονται συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις.
appear to-syllogize just-as in the refutations
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες σχεδὸν οἱ φαινόμενοι σολοικισμοὶ παρὰ
Are and all nearly the apparent solecisms depending-on
τὸ τόδε, καὶ ὅταν ἡ πτῶσις μήτε ἄρρεν μήτε θῆλυ δηλοῖ
the tode and when the case neither masculine nor feminine shows
ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξύ. Τὸ μὲν οὗτος ἄρρεν σημαίνει, τὸ δ᾽
but the intermediate The indeed houtos masculine signifies the and
αὕτη θῆλυ· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο θέλει μὲν τὸ μεταξὺ σημαίνειν,
hautē feminine the and touto wishes indeed the intermediate to-signify
πολλάκις δὲ σημαίνει κἀκείνων ἑκάτερον, οἷον τί τοῦτο;
often but signifies also-of-those each such-as what this
Καλλιόπη, ξύλον, Κορίσκος. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ
Calliope xylon Coriscus Of-the indeed then masculine and of-the
θήλεος διαφέρουσιν αἱ πτώσεις ἅπασαι, τοῦ δὲ μεταξὺ
feminine differ the cases all of-the but intermediate
αἱ μὲν αἱ δ᾽ οὔ. Δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο,
the(-ones) indeed the(-ones) and not Granted indeed often this
συλλογίζονται ὡς εἰρημένου τοῦτον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην
they-syllogize as said touton likewise and also other
πτῶσιν ἀντ᾽ ἄλλης. Ὁ δὲ παραλογισμὸς γίνεται διὰ
case instead-of another The and fallacy comes-about because-of
τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλειόνων πτώσεων· τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο
the common to-be the touto of-more cases the for touto

σημαίνει ὁτὲ μὲν οὗτος ὁτὲ δὲ τοῦτον. Δεῖ δ'
signifies at-one-time indeed houtos at-another-time and touton One-must and
ἐναλλὰξ σημαίνειν, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ ἔστι τὸ οὗτος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ
alternately to-signify with indeed the is the houtos with but the
εἶναι τὸ τοῦτον, οἷον ἔστι Κορίσκος, εἶναι Κορίσκον. Καὶ
to-be the touton such-as is Coriscus to-be Coriscon And
ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων
for the feminine names likewise and for the called
μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν.
indeed things having but feminine or masculine name
Ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾷ, ταῦτα μόνα
As-many-as for into the o and the n end these alone
σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν, οἷον ξύλον, σχοινίον, τὰ δὲ μὴ
of-thing have name such-as xylon schoinion the(-ones) and not
οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ
so masculine or feminine of-which some we-apply to the
σκεύη, οἷον ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοὔνομα, κλίνη δὲ θῆλυ.
things such-as askos indeed masculine the-name klinē but feminine
Διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ
Wherefore also for the such likewise the is and the
εἶναι διοίσει. Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὅμοιός ἐστιν ὁ σολοικισμὸς
to-be will-differ And in-way some like is the solecism
τοῖς παρὰ τὸ τὰ μὴ ὅμοια ὁμοίως λεγομένοις ἐλέγχοις.
to-the depending-on the the not like alike said refutations
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τούτοις
Just-as for to-those in-the-case-of the things to-these
ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων συμπίπτει σολοικίζειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ
for the names it-happens to-commit-solecism man for
καὶ λευκὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὄνομά ἐστιν.
and white both thing and name is

Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸν σολοικισμὸν πειρατέον ἐκ τῶν
Evident then that the solecism one-must-try from the
εἰρημένων πτώσεων συλλογίζεσθαι.
said cases to-syllogize
Εἴδη μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν λόγων καὶ μέρη
Species indeed then these of-the competitive arguments and parts
τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τρόποι οἱ εἰρημένοι. Διαφέρει δ' οὐ
of-the species and ways the(-ones) said It-differs and not
μικρόν, ἐὰν ταχθῇ πως τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν
little if be-arranged somehow the(-things) about the questioning
πρὸς τὸ λανθάνειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς. Ἐφεξῆς
toward the escaping-notice just-as in the dialectical Next
οὖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ταῦτα πρῶτον λεκτέον.
then to-the(-things) said these first must-be-said

XV · ARRANGING THE QUESTIONS

Length helps refute, since it is hard to see much at once; so do speed and anger, for angry men guard themselves less. Mix the order of questions, hide the conclusion, ask in the negative as though wishing the contrary, and after an induction use the universal as granted. The most sophistical trick is to announce an unproved conclusion as if proved. Look for inconsistencies with what he has said or with those he approves, ask so that either answer refutes or is paradoxical, and treat some points as already agreed.

Ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τὸ ἐλέγχειν ἓν μὲν μῆκος· χαλεπὸν γὰρ
Is indeed for the to-refute one indeed length difficult for
ἅμα πολλὰ συνορᾶν. Εἰς δὲ τὸ μῆκος τοῖς προειρημένοις
at-once many-things to-see-together Into and the length the aforesaid
στοιχείοις χρηστέον. Ἓν δὲ τάχος· ὑστερίζοντες γὰρ ἧττον
elements one-must-use One and speed lagging-behind for less

προορῶσιν. Ἔτι δ' ὀργὴ καὶ φιλονεικία· ταραττόμενοι
they-foresee Further and anger and contentiousness being-disturbed
γὰρ ἧττον δύνανται φυλάττεσθαι πάντες. Στοιχεῖα δὲ τῆς
for less are-able to-be-on-guard all Elements and of-the
ὀργῆς τό τε φανερὸν ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν καὶ
anger the both open oneself to-make wishing to-do-wrong and
τὸ παράπαν ἀναισχυντεῖν. Ἔτι τὸ ἐναλλὰξ τὰ ἐρωτήματα
the altogether to-be-shameless Further the alternately the questions
τιθέναι, ἐάν τε πρὸς ταὐτὸ πλείους τις ἔχῃ λόγους, ἐάν τε
to-set if both toward the-same more someone have arguments if both
καὶ ὅτι οὕτως καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως· ἅμα γὰρ συμβαίνει ἢ
also that so and that not so at-once for it-happens either
πρὸς πλείω ἢ πρὸς τἀναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν. Ὅλως
toward more or toward the-contraries to-make the guard Wholly
δὲ πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κρύψιν λεχθέντα πρότερον
and all the(-things) for the concealment said before
χρήσιμα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγωνιστικοὺς λόγους· ἡ γὰρ κρύψις
useful also against the competitive arguments the for concealment
ἐστὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν χάριν, τὸ δὲ λαθεῖν τῆς ἀπάτης.
is of-the to-escape-notice for-the-sake the and to-escape-notice of-the deception
Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνανεύοντας ἅττ' ἂν οἰηθῶσιν εἶναι πρὸς
Against and the(-ones) refusing whatever — they-think to-be for
τὸν λόγον, ἐξ ἀποφάσεως ἐρωτητέον, ὡς τοὐναντίον
the argument from negation one-must-ask as the-opposite
βουλόμενον, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦντα τὴν ἐρώτησιν· ἀδήλου
wishing or even from equal making the questioning unclear
γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ τί βούλεται λαβεῖν ἧττον δυσκολαίνουσιν.
for being of-the what he-wishes to-take less they-are-difficult
Ὅταν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν διδῷ τις τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον,
When both for the parts grants someone the according-to each
ἐπάγοντα τὸ καθόλου πολλάκις οὐκ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ'
inducing the universal often not one-must-ask but

ὡς δεδομένῳ χρηστέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἴονται καὶ αὐτοὶ
as granted one-must-use sometimes for they-think also themselves
δεδωκέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι φαίνονται διὰ τὴν τῆς
to-have-granted and to-the hearers they-appear because-of the of-the
ἐπαγωγῆς μνείαν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἠρωτημένα μάτην. Ἐν οἷς
induction mention as not — having-been-asked in-vain In which
τε μὴ ὀνόματι σημαίνεται τὸ καθόλου, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁμοιότητι
both not by-name is-signified the universal but the likeness
χρηστέον πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιότης
one-must-use toward the advantageous escapes-notice for the likeness
πολλάκις. Πρός τε τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρότασιν τοὐναντίον
often For both the to-take the premise the-opposite
παραβάλλοντα χρὴ πυνθάνεσθαι. Οἷον εἰ δέοι
setting-beside one-must to-inquire Such-as if it-were-necessary
λαβεῖν ὅτι δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ πείθεσθαι, πότερον
to-take that one-must all-things to-the father to-obey whether
ἅπαντα δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πάντ' ἀπειθεῖν;
all-things one-must to-obey the parents or all-things to-disobey
καὶ τὸ πολλάκις πολλά, πότερον πολλὰ συγχωρητέον
and the many-times many whether many must-be-conceded
ἢ ὀλίγα; μᾶλλον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη, δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι
or few rather for if-indeed necessity it-would-seem — to-be
πολλά· παρατιθεμένων γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ μείζων
many being-set-beside for near the contraries both greater
καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεται καὶ χείρω καὶ βελτίω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
and great appear and worse and better to-the men
Σφόδρα δὲ καὶ πολλάκις ποιεῖ δοκεῖν ἐληλέγχθαι τὸ
Strongly and also often makes to-seem to-have-been-refuted the
μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων, τὸ
most sophistical trick of-the questioners the
μηδὲν συλλογισαμένους μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον,
nothing having-syllogized not question to-make the last

ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλελογισμένους, οὐκ
but conclusively to-say as having-syllogized not
ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό.
then this and that
Σοφιστικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ κειμένου παραδόξου τὸ φαινόμενον
Sophistical and also the being-laid-down paradox the apparent
ἀξιοῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι προκειμένου τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
to-claim to-answer being-proposed the seeming from beginning
καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν τῶν τοιούτων οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι, πότερόν
and the questioning of-the such so to-make whether
σοι δοκεῖ; ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἂν ᾖ τὸ ἐρώτημα ἐξ ὧν ὁ
to-you it-seems necessity for if be the question from which the
συλλογισμός, ἢ ἔλεγχον ἢ παράδοξον γίνεσθαι, δόντος
syllogism either refutation or paradox to-come-about having-granted
μὲν ἔλεγχον, μὴ δόντος δὲ μηδὲ δοκεῖν φάσκοντος
indeed refutation not having-granted but not-even to-seem saying
ἄδοξον, μὴ δόντος δὲ δοκεῖν δ' ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλεγχοειδές.
unreputable not having-granted but to-seem but agreeing refutation-like
Ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
Further just-as also in the rhetorical also in the
ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς
refutational likewise the inconsistencies must-be-observed either against
τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα, ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ
the(-things) by himself said or against whom he-agrees
καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν, ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς δοκοῦντας
well to-speak or to-act further against the(-ones) seeming
τοιούτους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πλείστους
such or against the similar or against the most
ἢ πρὸς πάντας. Ὥσπερ τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι πολλάκις,
or against all Just-as both also answering often
ὅταν ἐλέγχωνται, ποιοῦσι διττόν, ἂν μέλλῃ συμβαίνειν
when they-are-refuted make double if it-be-going to-happen

ἐλεγχθήσεσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶντας χρηστέον ποτὲ τούτῳ
to-be-refuted also questioning one-must-use sometimes this
πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους, ἂν ὠδὶ μὲν συμβαίνῃ ὠδὶ
against the(-ones) objecting if this-way indeed it-happen that-way
δὲ μή, ὅτι οὕτως εἴληφεν, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν
and not that so he-has-taken such-as the Cleophon does in
τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀφισταμένους τοῦ
the Mandrobulus One-must and also withdrawing from-the
λόγου τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐπιτέμνειν, καὶ
argument the rest of-the attacks to-cut-short and
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον, ἂν προαισθάνηται, προενίστασθαι καὶ
the answerer if he-perceive-beforehand to-object-beforehand and
προαγορεύειν. Ἐπιχειρητέον δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα
to-announce-beforehand One-must-attack and sometimes also against other-things
τοῦ εἰρημένου, ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαβόντας, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς
than-the(-thing) said that having-taken if not against
τὸ κείμενον ἔχῃ τις ἐπιχειρεῖν· ὅπερ ὁ Λυκόφρων
the(-thing) laid-down be-able someone to-attack which-very the Lycophron
ἐποίησε προβληθέντος λύραν ἐγκωμιάζειν. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς
did it-having-been-proposed lyre to-praise Against and the(-ones)
ἀπαιτοῦντας πρός τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ δεῖν
demanding against something to-attack since it-seems to-be-necessary
ἀποδιδόναι τὴν αἰτίαν, λεχθέντων δ' ἐνίων εὐφυλακτότερον
to-render the cause having-been-said and some safer
τὸ καθόλου συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις, λέγειν τὴν
the universally following in the refutations to-say the
ἀντίφασιν, ὅ τι ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι, ἢ ὃ ἀπέφησε φῆσαι,
contradiction what ever he-affirmed to-deny or what he-denied to-affirm
ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὐχ ἡ
but not that of-the contraries the same knowledge or not the

αὐτή. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν·
same Not one-must and the conclusion premise-wise to-ask
ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμολογουμένῳ χρηστέον.
some and not-even must-be-asked but as agreed one-must-use

XVI · ANSWERING

Such arguments are useful first for philosophy, in two ways: they make us better at seeing in how many ways each thing is said, and they guard our own inquiries, since one easily misled by another will often mislead himself. Third, they serve reputation, since one who blames arguments without saying what is wrong with them seems annoyed from inexperience, not for truth's sake. To know a solution is not to give it on the spot: we miss what we know in another form, and practice brings speed.

Ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέον ἐν ταῖς
From which indeed then the questions and how one-must-ask in the
ἀγωνιστικαῖς διατριβαῖς, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ ἀποκρίσεως,
competitive exercises has-been-said about and answer
καὶ πῶς χρὴ λύειν καὶ τί, καὶ πρὸς τίνα χρῆσιν οἱ
and how one-must to-solve and what and for what use the
τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ὠφέλιμοι, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
such of-the arguments useful after these-things must-be-said
Χρήσιμοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πρὸς μὲν φιλοσοφίαν διὰ δύο.
Useful indeed then are for indeed philosophy for two-things
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενοι παρὰ
First indeed for as on the most-part coming-about depending-on
τὴν λέξιν ἄμεινον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ποσαχῶς
the expression better to-be they-make with-regard-to the in-how-many-ways
ἕκαστον λέγεται, καὶ ποῖα ὁμοίως καὶ ποῖα ἑτέρως ἐπί
each is-said and what-sort alike and what-sort differently for
τε τῶν πραγμάτων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
both the things happens and for the names

Δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὑτὸν ζητήσεις· ὁ γὰρ ὑφ'
Second and for the by oneself inquiries the(-one) for by
ἑτέρου ῥᾳδίως παραλογιζόμενος καὶ τοῦτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος
another easily misled and this not perceiving
κἂν αὐτὸς ὑφ' αὑτοῦ τοῦτο πάθοι πολλάκις. Τρίτον
even himself by himself this would-suffer often Third
δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔτι πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ περὶ πάντα
and also the remaining further for reputation the about all
γεγυμνάσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ἀπείρως ἔχειν· τὸ
to-have-been-trained to-seem and of-nothing inexperienced to-be the
γὰρ κοινωνοῦντα λόγων ψέγειν λόγους, μηδὲν ἔχοντα
for sharing in-arguments to-blame arguments nothing being-able
διορίζειν περὶ τῆς φαυλότητος αὐτῶν, ὑποψίαν δίδωσι τοῦ
to-distinguish about the badness of-them suspicion gives of-the
δοκεῖν δυσχεραίνειν οὐ διὰ τἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν.
to-seem to-be-annoyed not through the-truth but through inexperience
Ἀποκρινομένοις δὲ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους
For-answerers and how one-must-meet against the such
λόγους, φανερόν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐξ ὧν
arguments evident if-indeed rightly we-have-said before from which
εἰσὶν οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷ πυνθάνεσθαι πλεονεξίας
are the fallacies and the in the inquiring advantages
ἱκανῶς διείλομεν. Οὐ ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ λαβόντα τε τὸν λόγον
sufficiently we-distinguished Not the-same and is having-taken both the argument
ἰδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν, καὶ ἐρωτώμενον ἀπαντᾶν
to-see and to-solve the badness and being-asked to-meet
δύνασθαι ταχέως. Ὃ γὰρ ἴσμεν, πολλάκις μετατιθέμενον
to-be-able quickly What for we-know often being-transposed
ἀγνοοῦμεν. Ἔτι δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ θᾶττον καὶ
we-are-ignorant-of Further and just-as in the others the quicker and
τὸ βραδύτερον ἐκ τοῦ γεγυμνάσθαι γίνεται μᾶλλον, οὕτω
the slower from the to-have-been-trained comes-about more so

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει, ὥστε, ἂν δῆλον μὲν ἡμῖν ᾖ,
also for the arguments it-is so-that if clear indeed to-us it-be
ἀμελέτητοι δ' ὦμεν, ὑστεροῦμεν τῶν καιρῶν πολλάκις.
unpracticed but we-be we-fall-behind the opportunities often
Συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ
It-happens and sometimes just-as in the diagrams also
γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν·
for there having-analyzed sometimes to-put-together again we-are-unable
οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ' ὃ ὁ λόγος
so also in the refutations knowing depending-on what the argument
συμβαίνει συνεῖραι διαλῦσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν.
follows to-string-together to-dissolve the argument we-are-at-a-loss

XVII · APPARENT SOLUTIONS

As one must sometimes reason plausibly rather than truly, so one must sometimes solve plausibly rather than truly. Against homonymy and amphiboly the answerer should distinguish at once, since an undistinguished answer looks refuted; correcting to this Coriscus is no help, and two questions never take one answer. Grant the reputable with let it be, refuse what comes near the original point, object when a universal is taken by comparison, concede no curt question simply, grant the lesser premise first, and forewarn of objections foreseen.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ συλλογίζεσθαί φαμεν ἐνδόξως
First indeed then just-as to-syllogize we-say reputably
ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῶς προαιρεῖσθαι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ
sometimes rather than truly to-choose one-must so also
λυτέον ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἐνδόξως ἢ κατὰ τἀληθές. Ὅλως
must-be-solved sometimes rather reputably than according-to the-truth Wholly
γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχετέον οὐχ ὡς ἐλέγχοντας ἀλλ'
for against the eristics one-must-fight not as refuting but

ὡς φαινομένους· οὐ γάρ φαμεν συλλογίζεσθαί γε αὐτούς,
as appearing not for we-say to-syllogize at-least them
ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν διορθωτέον. Εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἔλεγχος
so-that toward the not to-seem one-must-correct If for is the refutation
ἀντίφασις μὴ ὁμώνυμος ἔκ τινων, οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι
contradiction not homonymous from some nothing — it-would-be-necessary
διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τἀμφίβολα καὶ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ
to-distinguish against the-ambiguities and the homonymy not for it-makes
συλλογισμόν. Ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν προσδιαιρετέον
syllogism But of-nothing other for-the-sake one-must-distinguish-further
ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι τὸ συμπέρασμα φαίνεται ἐλεγχοειδές. Οὔκουν
but than that the conclusion appears refutation-like Not-then
τὸ ἐλεγχθῆναι ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εὐλαβητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γ'
the to-be-refuted but the to-seem one-must-beware since the at-least
ἐρωτᾶν ἀμφίβολα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν,
to-ask ambiguities and the(-things) depending-on the homonymy
ὅσαι τ' ἄλλαι τοιαῦται παρακρούσεις, καὶ τὸν ἀληθινὸν
as-many-as both other such deceptions also the genuine
ἔλεγχον ἀφανίζει καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐλεγχόμενον
refutation obscures and the refuted and not refuted
ἄδηλον ποιεῖ. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ τέλει συμπεραναμένου
unclear makes Since for it-is-possible at end having-concluded
μὴ ὅπερ ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὁμωνύμως, εἰ
not what-very he-affirmed to-deny to-say but homonymously if
καὶ ὅτι μάλιστ' ἔτυχεν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν φέρων, ἄδηλον εἰ
even as most it-happened at the-same carrying unclear whether
ἐλήλεγκται· ἄδηλον γὰρ εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει νῦν.
he-has-been-refuted unclear for whether true he-says now
Εἰ δὲ διελὼν ἤρετο τὸ ὁμώνυμον ἢ τὸ ἀμφίβολον,
If but having-distinguished he-asked the homonymous or the ambiguous
οὐκ ἂν ἄδηλος ἦν ὁ ἔλεγχος. Ὅ τ' ἐπιζητοῦσι νῦν
not — unclear would-be the refutation What both they-seek now

μὲν ἧττον πρότερον δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐριστικοί, τὸ ἢ ναί ἢ
indeed less before but more the eristics the either yes or
οὔ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ἐγίνετ' ἄν. Νῦν
no to-answer the questioned would-have-come-about — Now
δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐρωτᾶν τοὺς πυνθανομένους ἀνάγκη
but because-of the not well to-ask the inquirers necessity
προσαποκρίνεσθαί τι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, διορθοῦντα τὴν
to-answer-in-addition something the questioned correcting the
μοχθηρίαν τῆς προτάσεως, ἐπεὶ διελομένου γε ἱκανῶς
badness of-the premise since having-distinguished at-least sufficiently
ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.
either yes or no necessity to-say the answerer
Εἰ δέ τις ὑπολήψεται τὸν κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν ἔλεγχον
If and someone will-suppose the according-to homonymy refutation
εἶναι, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔσται διαφυγεῖν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι
to-be in-way some not it-will-be-possible to-escape the to-be-refuted
τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἀναγκαῖον ὃ
the answerer in-the-case-of for the visible-things necessary what
ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι ὄνομα, καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησε φῆσαι. Ὡς γὰρ
he-affirmed to-deny name and what he-denied to-affirm As for
διορθοῦνταί τινες, οὐδὲν ὄφελος. Οὐ γὰρ Κορίσκον φασὶν εἶναι
correct some nothing benefit Not for Coriscus they-say to-be
μουσικὸν καὶ ἄμουσον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον μουσικὸν
musical and unmusical but this the Coriscus musical
καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον ἄμουσον. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔσται
and this the Coriscus unmusical The for same will-be
λόγος τὸ τὸν Κορίσκον τῷ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον ἄμουσον
phrase the the Coriscus as-the this the Coriscus unmusical
εἶναι ἢ μουσικόν· ὅπερ ἅμα φησί τε καὶ ἀπόφησιν.
to-be or musical which-very at-once he-affirms both and denies
Ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοὔνομα. Ὥστε
But perhaps not the-same it-signifies not-even for there the-name So-that

τί διαφέρει. Εἰ δὲ τῷ μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς λέγειν Κορίσκον
what does-it-differ If and to-the-one indeed the simply to-say Coriscus
ἀποδώσει, τῷ δὲ προσθήσει τὸ τινὰ ἢ τόνδε, ἄτοπον·
he-will-assign to-the-other but he-will-add the some or this absurd
οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον θατέρῳ· ὁποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
nothing for more to-the-one to-whichever for — nothing it-differs
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἄδηλος μέν ἐστιν ὁ μὴ
Not indeed but since unclear indeed is the(-one) not
διορισάμενος τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν πότερον ἐλήλεγκται ἢ οὐκ
having-distinguished the amphiboly whether he-has-been-refuted or not
ἐλήλεγκται, δέδοται δ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ διελεῖν,
has-been-refuted it-has-been-granted and in the arguments the to-distinguish
φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὴ διορίσαντα δοῦναι τὴν ἐρώτησιν
evident that the not having-distinguished to-grant the question
ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἁμάρτημά ἐστιν, ὥστε κἂν εἰ μὴ αὐτός, ἀλλ'
but simply error is so-that even if not himself but
ὅ γε λόγος ἐληλεγμένῳ ὅμοιός ἐστιν. Συμβαίνει μέντοι
the at-least argument to-one-refuted like is It-happens however
πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ὀκνεῖν διαιρεῖσθαι
often seeing the amphiboly to-hesitate to-distinguish
διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα προτεινόντων,
because-of the frequency of-the(-ones) the such putting-forward
ὅπως μὴ πρὸς ἅπαν δοκῶσι δυσκολαίνειν· εἶτ' οὐκ
so-that not toward everything they-may-seem to-be-obstructive then not
ἂν οἰηθέντων παρὰ τοῦτο γενέσθαι τὸν λόγον, πολλάκις
— having-thought through this to-come-about the argument often
ἀπήντησε παράδοξον. Ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ δέδοται διαιρεῖν,
has-met paradox So-that since it-has-been-granted to-distinguish
οὐκ ὀκνητέον, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
not one-must-hesitate just-as was-said before

Εἰ δὲ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα μὴ ἓν ποιεῖ τις ἐρώτημα,
If and the two questions not one makes someone question
οὐδ' ἂν ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν
not-even — the depending-on the homonymy and the amphiboly
ἐγίνετο παραλογισμός, ἀλλ' ἢ ἔλεγχος ἢ οὔ. Τί γὰρ
would-come-about fallacy but either refutation or not What for
διαφέρει ἐρωτῆσαι εἰ Καλλίας καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς μουσικοί
does-it-differ to-ask if Callias and Themistocles musical
εἰσιν ἢ εἰ ἀμφοτέροις ἓν ὄνομα ἦν ἑτέροις οὖσιν; εἰ γὰρ
are or if for-both one name were being different if for
πλείω δηλοῖ ἑνός, πλείω ἠρώτησεν. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ὀρθὸν πρὸς
more it-shows than-one more he-asked If then not right for
δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀξιοῦν λαμβάνειν ἁπλῶς,
two questions one answer to-claim to-take simply
φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδενὶ προσήκει τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἀποκρίνεσθαι
evident that to-none befits of-the homonyms to-answer
ἁπλῶς, οὐδ' εἰ κατὰ πάντων ἀληθές, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσί τινες.
simply not if of all true just-as claim some
Οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤρετο, Κορίσκος καὶ
Nothing for this differs than if he-asked Coriscus and
Καλλίας πότερον οἴκοι εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ οἴκοι, εἴτε παρόντων
Callias whether at-home they-are or not at-home whether being-present
ἀμφοῖν εἴτε μὴ παρόντων· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ πλείους αἱ
both or not being-present in-both-ways for more the
προτάσεις· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, διὰ τοῦτο μία ἡ
premises not for if true to-say because-of this one the
ἐρώτησις. Ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ μυρία ἕτερα ἐρωτηθέντα
question It-is-possible for also ten-thousand other asked
ἐρωτήματα ἅπαντα ἢ ναὶ ἢ οὒ ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλ'
questions all either yes or no true to-be to-say but
ὅμως οὐκ ἀποκριτέον μιᾷ ἀποκρίσει· ἀναιρεῖται γὰρ
nevertheless not one-must-answer with-one answer is-destroyed for

τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. Τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιον ὡς εἰ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα
the to-converse This and like as if also the same name
τεθείη τοῖς ἑτέροις. Εἰ οὖν μὴ δεῖ πρὸς δύο ἐρωτήσεις
should-be-set for-the different If then not one-must to two questions
μίαν ἀπόκρισιν διδόναι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν
one answer to-give evident that not-even for the
ὁμωνύμων τὸ ναί ἢ οὔ λεκτέον. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ εἰπὼν
homonyms the yes or no must-be-said Nor for the(-one) having-said
ἀποκέκριται ἀλλ' εἴρηκεν. Ἀλλ' ἀξιοῦνταί πως ἐν
has-answered but has-spoken But they-are-claimed somehow among
τοῖς διαλεγομένοις διὰ τὸ λανθάνειν τὸ συμβαῖνον.
the(-ones) conversing because-of the to-escape-notice the(-thing) following
Ὥσπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδ' ἔλεγχοί τινες ὄντες
Just-as then we-said since not-even refutations some being
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ λύσεις
seem to-be according-to the same way also solutions
δόξουσιν εἶναί τινες οὐκ οὖσαι λύσεις· ἃς δή φαμεν
will-seem to-be some not being solutions which indeed we-say
ἐνίοτε μᾶλλον δεῖν φέρειν ἢ τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐν τοῖς
sometimes rather one-must to-bring-forward than the true in the
ἀγωνιστικοῖς λόγοις καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ διττὸν ἀπαντήσει.
competitive arguments and the against the double meeting
Ἀποκριτέον δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δοκούντων τὸ ἔστω λέγοντα·
One-must-answer and for indeed the seeming the let-it-be saying
καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἥκιστα γίνοιτ' ἂν παρεξέλεγχος· ἂν
also for so least would-come-about — side-refutation if
δέ τι παράδοξον ἀναγκάζηται λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα
and something paradoxical he-be-compelled to-say here most
προσθετέον τὸ δοκεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὔτ' ἔλεγχος οὔτε
must-be-added the it-seems so for — neither refutation nor
παράδοξον γίνεσθαι δόξειεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐν
paradox to-come-about would-seem Since and how is-begged the in

ἀρχῇ δῆλον, οἴονται δὲ πάντες, ἂν ᾖ σύνεγγυς, ἀναιρετέον
beginning clear they-think and all if it-be near must-be-rejected
καὶ μὴ συγχωρητέον εἶναί ἔνια ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτοῦντος,
and not must-be-conceded to-be some as the in beginning begging
ὅταν τε τοιοῦτον ἀξιοῖ τις ὃ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν συμβαίνειν
when both such claims someone which necessary indeed to-follow
ἐκ τῆς θέσεως, ᾖ δὲ ψεῦδος ἢ ἄδοξον, ταὐτὸ λεκτέον·
from the thesis be and false or unreputable the-same must-be-said
τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνοντα τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ
the for of necessity following of-the same to-be seems
θέσεως. Ἔτι ὅταν τὸ καθόλου μὴ ὀνόματι ληφθῇ ἀλλὰ
thesis Further when the universal not by-name be-taken but
παραβολῇ, λεκτέον ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἐδόθη οὐδ' ὡς προὔτεινε
by-comparison must-be-said that not as it-was-granted nor as he-proposed
λαμβάνει· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεται πολλάκις ἔλεγχος.
he-takes also for from this comes-about often refutation
Ἐξειργόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ καλῶς δεδεῖχθαι
Being-shut-out and of-these to the not well to-have-been-shown
πορευτέον, ἀπαντῶντα κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.
one-must-proceed meeting according-to the said distinction
Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασιν ἀνάγκη
In indeed then the properly said names necessity
ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον. Ἃ δὲ
to-answer either simply or distinguishing What but
συνυπονοοῦντες τίθεμεν, οἷον ὅσα μὴ σαφῶς ἀλλὰ
understanding-along we-set such-as as-many-as not clearly but
κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει ὁ ἔλεγχος,
curtly are-asked from this happens the refutation
οἷον ἆρ' ὃ ἂν ᾖ Ἀθηναίων, κτῆμά ἐστιν Ἀθηναίων; Ναί.
such-as then what — be of-Athenians property is of-Athenians Yes
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπός
Likewise and also for the others But indeed the man

ἐστι τῶν ζῴων; Ναί. Κτῆμα ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων.
is of-the animals Yes Property then the man of-the animals
Τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῴων λέγομεν, ὅτι ζῷόν ἐστι, καὶ
The for man of-the animals we-say because animal he-is and
Λύσανδρον τῶν Λακώνων, ὅτι Λάκων. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν
Lysander of-the Laconians because Laconian Clear then that in
οἷς ἀσαφὲς τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἁπλῶς.
which unclear the(-thing) put-forward not one-must-concede simply
Ὅταν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν θατέρου μὲν ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης θάτερον
When and two being of-the-one indeed being of necessity the-other
εἶναι δοκῇ, θατέρου δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐρωτώμενον
to-be seem of-the-other but this not of necessity being-asked
πρότερον δεῖ τὸ ἔλαττον διδόναι· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ
first one-must the less to-grant harder for
συλλογίσασθαι ἐκ πλειόνων. Ἐὰν δ' ἐπιχειρῇ ὅτι τῷ
to-syllogize from more If and he-attempt that to-the
μέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἂν ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς
indeed is contrary to-the but not is if the argument true
ᾖ, ἐναντίον φάναι, ὄνομα δὲ μὴ κεῖσθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου.
be contrary to-say name but not to-be-established of-the other
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια μὲν ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν μὴ
Since and some indeed of-what say the many the not
συγχωροῦντα ψεύδεσθαι ἂν φαῖεν ἔνια δ' οὔ, οἷον
conceding to-lie — they-would-say some and not such-as
ὅσα ἀμφιδοξοῦσιν (πότερον γὰρ φθαρτὴ ἢ ἀθάνατος ἡ
as-many-as they-dispute whether for perishable or immortal the
ψυχὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὐ διώρισται τοῖς πολλοῖς) ἐν οἷς οὖν
soul of-the animals not is-determined by-the many in which then
ἄδηλον ποτέρως εἴωθε λέγεσθαι τὸ προτεινόμενον,
unclear in-which-way it-is-wont to-be-said the(-thing) put-forward
πότερον ὡς αἱ γνῶμαι (καλοῦσι γὰρ γνώμας καὶ τὰς
whether as the maxims they-call for maxims also the

ἀληθεῖς δόξας καὶ τὰς ὅλας ἀποφάσεις), ἢ ὡς ἡ διάμετρος
true opinions and the whole assertions or as the diagonal
ἀσύμμετρος. Ἔτι οὗ τἀληθὲς ἀμφιδοξεῖται, μάλιστα
incommensurable Further where the-truth is-disputed most
μεταφέρων ἄν τις λανθάνοι τὰ ὀνόματα περὶ τούτων.
transferring — someone might-escape-notice the names about these
Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρως ἔχει τἀληθές,
Through indeed for the unclear to-be in-which-way is the-truth
οὐ δόξει σοφίζεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν οὐ δόξει
not he-will-seem to-sophisticate through and the to-dispute not he-will-seem
ψεύδεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιήσει τὸν λόγον ἀνεξέλεγκτον.
to-lie the and metaphor will-make the argument irrefutable
Ἔτι ὅσα ἄν τις προαισθάνηται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων,
Further as-many-as — someone should-foresee of-the questions
προενστατέον καὶ προαγορευτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
one-must-object-beforehand and one-must-announce-beforehand so for —
μάλιστα τὸν πυνθανόμενον κωλύσειεν.
most the inquirer would-binder

XVIII · THE TRUE SOLUTION

A true solution exposes a false syllogism, showing which question gives rise to the falsehood. A false syllogism may conclude falsely or only seem to conclude, so it is solved by taking away a premise or by distinguishing. It is hard to see a fault in advance, and easier at leisure.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς
Since and is the indeed correct solution exposure of-false
συλλογισμοῦ, παρ' ὁποίαν ἐρώτησιν συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος,
syllogism from what-sort question follows the falsehood
ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς συλλογισμὸς λέγεται διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ εἰ
the and false syllogism is-said in-two-ways either for if

συλλελόγισται ψεῦδος, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὢν συλλογισμὸς δοκεῖ
it-has-syllogized falsehood or if not being syllogism it-seems
εἶναι συλλογισμός), εἴη ἂν ἥ τε εἰρημένη νῦν λύσις καὶ
to-be syllogism would-be — the both said now solution and
ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογισμοῦ παρὰ τί φαίνεται τῶν
the(-one) of-the apparent syllogism from what it-appears of-the
ἐρωτημάτων διόρθωσις. Ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς
questions correction So-that it-happens of-the arguments the
μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινομένους
indeed syllogized destroying the(-ones) and apparent
διελόντα λύειν. Πάλιν δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν συλλελογισμένων
distinguishing to-solve Again and since of-the syllogized
λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθὲς οἱ δὲ ψεῦδος ἔχουσι τὸ
arguments the(-ones) indeed true the(-ones) and falsehood have the
συμπέρασμα, τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδεῖς
conclusion the(-ones) indeed according-to the conclusion false
διχῶς ἐνδέχεται λύειν· καὶ γὰρ τῷ ἀνελεῖν τι τῶν
in-two-ways it-is-possible to-solve both for by-the to-destroy something of-the
ἠρωτημένων, καὶ τῷ δεῖξαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον οὐχ οὕτως·
asked-things and by-the to-show the conclusion holding not so
τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς προτάσεις τῷ ἀνελεῖν τι μόνον·
the(-ones) and according-to the premises by-the to-destroy something only
τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. Ὥστε τοῖς βουλομένοις
the for conclusion true So-that for-the(-ones) wishing
λύειν λόγον πρῶτον μὲν σκεπτέον εἰ συλλελόγισται
to-solve argument first indeed one-must-examine whether it-has-syllogized
ἢ ἀσυλλόγιστος, εἶτα πότερον ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ
or unsyllogized then whether true the conclusion or
ψεῦδος, ὅπως ἢ διαιροῦντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες λύωμεν, καὶ
false so-that either distinguishing or destroying we-may-solve and
ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
destroying either thus or thus just-as was-said before

Διαφέρει δὲ πλεῖστον ἐρωτώμενόν τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον· τὸ
It-differs and most being-asked both and not to-solve argument the
μὲν γὰρ προϊδεῖν χαλεπόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἰδεῖν ῥᾷον.
indeed for to-foresee difficult the and at leisure to-see easier

XIX · HOMONYMY AND AMPHIBOLY

Of refutations through homonymy and amphiboly, some have a question that signifies more than one thing, others a conclusion that does. An ambiguous conclusion refutes only if the contradiction is added, as in the blind seeing. A double sense should be answered at the start: it is in a way, and in a way not. If it slipped by, correct it at the end: is it possible to speak of the silent? No, but of this man while silent, yes. Ambiguous premises are met alike, as with knowing together what one knows. In general, insist that he denied the name, not the thing, so there is no refutation.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν
Of-the indeed then depending-on the homonymy and the amphiboly
ἐλέγχων οἱ μὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων τι πλείω
refutations some indeed have of-the questions something more
σημαῖνον, οἱ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον,
signifying others and the conclusion in-many-ways said
οἷον ἐν μὲν τῷ σιγῶντα λέγειν τὸ συμπέρασμα διττόν, ἐν
such-as in indeed the silent to-speak the conclusion double in
δὲ τῷ συνεπίστασθαι τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἓν τῶν ἐρωτημάτων
and the to-know-together the knowing one of-the questions
ἀμφίβολον. Καὶ τὸ διττὸν ὁτὲ μὲν ἔστιν, ὁτὲ δ' οὐκ
ambiguous And the double sometimes indeed is sometimes and not
ἔστιν ἀλλὰ σημαίνει τὸ διττὸν τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δ' οὐκ ὄν.
is but signifies the double the indeed being the and not being

Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ τέλει τὸ πολλαχῶς, ἂν μὴ
For-as-many-as indeed then in the end the in-many-ways if not
προσλάβῃ τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ γίνεται ἔλεγχος, οἷον ἐν τῷ
it-take-in-addition the contradiction not comes-about refutation such-as in the
τὸν τυφλὸν ὁρᾶν· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεως οὐκ ἦν ἔλεγχος.
the blind to-see without for contradiction not was refutation
Ὅσοις δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη προαποφῆσαι
For-as-many-as and in the questions not necessity to-deny-beforehand
τὸ διττόν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος.
the double not for toward this but because-of this the argument
Ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν οὖν τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ ὄνομα καὶ λόγον οὕτως
In beginning indeed then the double both name and phrase so
ἀποκριτέον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ὥσπερ τὸ
must-be-answered that it-is in-a-way it-is and in-a-way not just-as the
σιγῶντα λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. Καὶ
silent to-speak that it-is in-a-way it-is and in-a-way not And
τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἅ, ἔστι δ' ἃ οὔ· τὰ
the needful-things must-be-done there-are which there-are and which not the
γὰρ δέοντα λέγεται πολλαχῶς. Ἐὰν δὲ λάθῃ, ἐπὶ
for needful-things are-said in-many-ways If and it-escape-notice at
τέλει προστιθέντα τῇ ἐρωτήσει διορθωτέον· ἆρ' ἔστι
end adding to-the question one-must-correct then is-it-possible
σιγῶντα λέγειν; Οὔ, ἀλλὰ τόνδε σιγῶντα. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς
silent to-speak No but this-one silent And in the
ἔχουσι δὲ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν ὁμοίως. Οὐκ
having and the in-more-ways in the premises likewise Not
ἄρα συνεπίστανται ὅτι ἐπίστανται; Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ
then do-they-know-together what they-know Yes but not the(-ones)
οὕτως ἐπιστάμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι
so knowing not for the-same is that not it-is-possible
συνεπίστασθαι καὶ ὅτι τοὺς ὧδὶ ἐπισταμένους οὐκ ἔστιν.
to-know-together and that the(-ones) thus knowing not it-is-possible

Ὅλως τε μαχετέον, ἂν καὶ ἁπλῶς συλλογίζηται, ὅτι οὐχ
Wholly both one-must-fight if even simply he-syllogize that not
ὃ ἔφησεν ἀπέφησε πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ᾽ ὄνομα· ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἔλεγχος.
what he-affirmed he-denied thing but name so-that not refutation

XX · COMBINATION AND DIVISION

Combination and division are solved by saying the contrary of the conclusion when the phrase signifies differently divided and combined; the answerer must divide. Division is not ambiguity, since a divided phrase is not the same phrase, so not all refutations depend on ambiguity. Euthydemus' arguments are of this kind: do you, now in Sicily, know of triremes in Piraeus? Can a good shoemaker be bad? Some solve the lyre-player argument otherwise, but badly, since their solution does not fit every way of asking it.

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν
Evident and also the(-ones) depending-on the division and combination
πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιρούμενος καὶ συντιθέμενος ὁ
how must-be-solved if for divided and combined the
λόγος ἕτερον σημαίνῃ, συμπεραινομένου τοὐναντίον λεκτέον.
phrase other it-signify being-concluded the-opposite must-be-said
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ
Are and all the such arguments depending-on the combination or
διαίρεσιν. Ἆρ᾽ ᾧ εἶδες σὺ τοῦτον τυπτόμενον, τούτῳ
division Then with-what you-saw you this-one being-struck with-this
ἐτύπτετο οὗτος; καὶ ᾧ ἐτύπτετο, τούτῳ σὺ εἶδες; Ἔχει
was-struck this-one and with-what he-was-struck with-this you saw It-has
μὲν οὖν τι κἀκ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐρωτημάτων, ἀλλ᾽
indeed then something also-from the ambiguous questions but
ἔστι παρὰ σύνθεσιν. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι διττὸν τὸ παρὰ
it-is depending-on combination Not for is double the depending-on

τὴν διαίρεσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος γίνεται διαιρούμενος,
the division not for the same phrase comes-about divided
εἴπερ μὴ καὶ τὸ ὄρος καὶ ὅρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν
if-indeed not also the oros and horos by-the accent said
σημαίνει ἕτερον. Ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταὐτὸν
signifies other But in indeed the written the-same
ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ
name whenever from the same letters written it-be
καὶ ὡσαύτως, κἀκεῖ δ' ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ
and likewise also-there and already marks they-make the
δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά. Ὥστ' οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ
and pronounced not the-same So-that not double the depending-on
διαίρεσιν. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ ἔλεγχοι
division Evident and also that not all the refutations
παρὰ τὸ διττόν, καθάπερ τινές φασιν.
depending-on the double just-as some say
Διαιρετέον οὖν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἰδεῖν
Must-be-divided then by-the answerer not for the-same to-see
τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον καὶ τὸ φάναι ἰδεῖν τοῖς
with-the eyes being-struck and the to-say to-see with-the
ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, ἆρ'
eyes being-struck Also the of-Euthydemus and argument then
οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὔσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὤν;
do-you-know you now being in Piraeus triremes in Sicily being
Καὶ πάλιν, ἆρ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν
And again then is-it-possible good being shoemaker bad
εἶναι; εἴη δ' ἄν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός·
to-be might-be and — someone good being shoemaker bad
ὥστ' ἔσται ἀγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός. Ἆρ' ὧν αἱ
so-that will-be good shoemaker bad Then of-which the
ἐπιστῆμαι σπουδαῖαι, σπουδαῖα τὰ μαθήματα; Τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ
knowledges serious serious the learnings Of-the and bad

σπουδαῖον τὸ μάθημα· σπουδαῖον ἄρα μάθημα τὸ κακόν.
serious the learning serious then learning the bad
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κακὸν καὶ μάθημα τὸ κακόν, ὥστε κακὸν
But indeed both bad and learning the bad so-that bad
μάθημα τὸ κακόν. Ἀλλ' ἐστὶ κακῶν σπουδαία ἐπιστήμη.
learning the bad But is of-bad-things serious knowledge
Ἆρ' ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας; Γέγονας ἄρα
Then true to-say now that you have-been-born You-have-been-born then
νῦν. Ἢ ἄλλο σημαίνει διαιρεθέν· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν νῦν
now Or other-thing it-signifies divided true for to-say now
ὅτι σὺ γέγονας, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν γέγονας. Ἆρ' ὡς δύνασαι
that you have-been-born but not now you-have-been-born Then as you-are-able
καὶ ἃ δύνασαι, οὕτως καὶ ταῦτα ποιήσαις ἄν; Οὐ
and what you-are-able so also these-things you-would-do — Not
κιθαρίζων δ' ἔχεις δύναμιν τοῦ κιθαρίζειν· κιθαρίσαις
playing-the-lyre and you-have power of-the to-play-the-lyre you-would-play-the-lyre
ἂν ἄρα οὐ κιθαρίζων. Ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ
— then not playing-the-lyre Or not of-this he-has the power of-the
οὐ κιθαρίζων κιθαρίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅτε οὐ ποιεῖ, τοῦ ποιεῖν.
not playing-the-lyre to-play-the-lyre but when not he-does of-the to-do
Λύουσι δέ τινες τοῦτον καὶ ἄλλως. Εἰ γὰρ ἔδωκεν
Solve and some this also otherwise If for he-granted
ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν, οὔ φασι συμβαίνειν μὴ κιθαρίζοντα
as he-is-able to-do not they-say to-follow not playing-the-lyre
κιθαρίζειν· οὐ γὰρ πάντως ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν, δεδόσθαι
to-play-the-lyre not for altogether as he-is-able to-do to-have-been-granted
ποιήσειν· οὐ ταὐτὸν δ' εἶναι ὡς δύναται καὶ πάντως ὡς
he-will-do not the-same and to-be as he-is-able and altogether as
δύναται ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λύουσιν· τῶν
he-is-able to-do But evident that not well they-solve of-the
γὰρ παρὰ ταὐτὸν λόγων ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις, αὕτη δ' οὐχ
for depending-on the-same arguments the same solution this but not

ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ πάντας οὐδὲ πάντως ἐρωτωμένους, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι
will-fit for all nor altogether being-asked but it-is
πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον.
toward the asker not toward the argument

XXI · ACCENT

There are no arguments from accent, written or spoken, except perhaps a few, such as this: is where-you-lodge a house? Yes. Is not-you-lodge the negation of you-lodge? Yes. You said where-you-lodge is a house, so a house is a negation. The solution is plain, since where and not differ only in accent, and a word does not signify the same pronounced with a sharper or a heavier accent.

Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν λόγοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, οὔτε
Depending-on and the accent arguments indeed not are neither
τῶν γεγραμμένων οὔτε τῶν λεγομένων, πλὴν εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι
of-the written nor of-the spoken except if some few
γένοιντ᾽ ἄν, οἷον οὗτος ὁ λόγος. Ἆρά γ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ
might-come-about — such-as this the argument Then at-least is the where
καταλύεις οἰκία; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν τὸ οὐ καταλύεις τοῦ καταλύεις
you-lodge house Yes Therefore the not you-lodge of-the you-lodge
ἀπόφασις; Ναί. Ἔφησας δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ οὗ καταλύεις
negation Yes You-said and to-be the where you-lodge
οἰκίαν· ἡ οἰκία ἄρα ἀπόφασις. Ὡς δὴ λυτέον, δῆλον·
house the house then negation As indeed must-be-solved clear
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει ὀξύτερον τὸ δὲ βαρύτερον ῥηθέν.
not for the-same signifies more-acute the and graver said

Arguments that say unlike things alike are met with the kinds of categories. Seeing is said like doing but is an undergoing, so seeing and having seen at once refutes no one who denied doing and having done at once. So with the false and true statement, slow learning, the day's walk, and the third man: a common predicate signifies not a this but a quality, relative, or quantity.

Δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ὡσαύτως λέγεσθαι τὰ
Clear and also the(-ones) depending-on the likewise to-be-said the
μὴ ταὐτὰ πῶς ἀπαντητέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχομεν τὰ γένη τῶν
not same how one-must-meet since we-have the genera of-the
κατηγοριῶν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν ἐρωτηθεὶς μὴ ὑπάρχειν
categories The indeed for granted being-asked not to-belong
τι τούτων ὅσα τί ἐστι σημαίνει· ὁ δ' ἔδειξεν
something of-these as-many-as what it-is signify the and showed
ὑπάρχον τι τῶν πρός τι ἢ ποσῶν, δοκούντων δὲ
belonging something of-the relative something or of-quantities seeming but
τί ἐστι σημαίνειν διὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ.
what it-is to-signify because-of the expression such-as in this the argument
Ἆρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; Οὔ.
Then it-is-possible the same at-once to-do both and to-have-done No
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρᾶν γέ τι ἅμα καὶ ἑωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ
But indeed to-see at-least something at-once and to-have-seen the same
καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται. Ἆρ' ἐστί τι τῶν πάσχειν
and according-to the-same it-is-possible Then is something of-the to-be-affected
ποιεῖν τι; Οὔ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τέμνεται καίεται αἰσθάνεται
to-do something No Therefore the is-cut is-burned perceives
ὁμοίως λέγεται, καὶ πάντα πάσχειν τι σημαίνει· πάλιν
alike is-said and all to-be-affected something signify again
δὲ τὸ λέγειν τρέχειν ὁρᾶν ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις λέγεται· ἀλλὰ
and the to-speak to-run to-see alike to-one-another is-said but

μὴν τό γ' ὁρᾶν αἰσθάνεσθαί τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ
indeed the at-least to-see to-perceive something is so-that also
πάσχειν τι ἅμα καὶ ποιεῖν. Εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖ δοὺς
to-be-affected something at-once and to-do If and someone there having-granted
μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα ταὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πεποιηκέναι, τὸ ὁρᾶν
not to-be-possible at-once the-same to-do and to-have-done the to-see
καὶ ἑωρακέναι φαίη ἐγχωρεῖν, οὔπω ἐλήλεγκται, εἰ μὴ
and to-have-seen should-say to-be-possible not-yet he-has-been-refuted if not
λέγοι τὸ ὁρᾶν ποιεῖν τι ἀλλὰ πάσχειν· προσδεῖ
he-should-say the to-see to-do something but to-be-affected there-is-further-need
γὰρ τούτου τοῦ ἐρωτήματος· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος
for of-this the question but by the hearer
ὑπολαμβάνεται δεδωκέναι, ὅτε τὸ τέμνειν ποιεῖν τι καὶ
it-is-supposed to-have-granted when the to-cut to-do something and
τὸ τετμηκέναι πεποιηκέναι ἔδωκε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ὁμοίως
the to-have-cut to-have-done he-granted and as-many-as other alike
λέγεται. Τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν αὐτὸς προστίθησιν ὁ ἀκούων ὡς
are-said The for remaining himself adds the hearer as
ὁμοίως λεγόμενον· τὸ δὲ λέγεται μὲν οὐχ ὁμοίως, φαίνεται
alike said the but is-said indeed not alike it-appears
δὲ διὰ τὴν λέξιν. Τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ συμβαίνει ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς
but because-of the expression The same and happens which-very in the
ὁμωνυμίαις· οἴεται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις ὁ ἀγνὼς
homonymies thinks for in the homonyms the(-one) unacquainted
τῶν λόγων ὃ ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι πρᾶγμα, οὐκ ὄνομα·
with-the arguments what he-affirmed to-have-denied thing not name
τὸ δὲ ἔτι προσδεῖ ἐρωτήματος, εἰ ἐφ' ἓν βλέπων
the but still there-is-further-need of-question if at one looking
λέγει τὸ ὁμώνυμον· οὕτως γὰρ δόντος ἔσται ἔλεγχος.
he-says the homonym so for having-granted will-be refutation

Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἵδε οἱ λόγοι τούτοις, εἰ ὅ τις ἔχων
Like and also these the arguments to-these if what one having
ὕστερον μὴ ἔχει ἀπέβαλεν· ὁ γὰρ ἕνα μόνον ἀποβαλὼν
later not has he-has-lost the(-one) for one only having-lost
ἀστράγαλον οὐχ ἕξει δέκα ἀστραγάλους. Ἢ ὃ μὲν μὴ
knucklebone not will-have ten knucklebones Or what indeed not
ἔχει πρότερον ἔχων, ἀποβέβληκεν, ὅσον δὲ μὴ ἔχει ἢ
he-has before having he-has-lost as-much-as but not he-has or
ὅσα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα ἀποβαλεῖν. Ἐρωτήσας οὖν ὃ
as-many-as not necessity so-many to-have-lost Having-asked then what
ἔχει, συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅσα· τὰ γὰρ δέκα ποσά. Εἰ οὖν
he-has he-concludes for the as-many-as the for ten quantities If then
ἤρετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰ ὅσα τις μὴ ἔχει πρότερον ἔχων,
he-had-asked from beginning if as-many-as one not has before having
ἆρά γε ἀποβέβληκε τοσαῦτα, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔδωκεν,
then at-least he-has-lost so-many no-one — would-have-granted
ἀλλ' ἢ τοσαῦτα ἢ τούτων τι. Καὶ ὅτι δοίη ἄν τις
but either so-many or of-these some And that would-give — someone
ὃ μὴ ἔχει. Οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἕνα μόνον ἀστράγαλον. Ἢ οὐ
what not he-has Not for he-has one only knucklebone Or not
δέδωκεν ὃ οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκ εἶχε, τὸν ἕνα. Τὸ γὰρ
he-has-given what not he-had but as not he-had the one The for
μόνον οὐ τόδε σημαίνει οὐδὲ τοιόνδε οὐδὲ τοσόνδε, ἀλλ'
only not this signifies nor such nor so-much but
ὡς ἔχει πρός τι, οἷον ὅτι οὐ μετ' ἄλλου. Ὥσπερ οὖν
as it-is relative-to something such-as that not with other Just-as then
εἰ ἤρετο ἆρ' ὃ μή τις ἔχει δοίη ἄν, μὴ φάντος
if he-asked then what not someone has would-he-give — not having-said
δὲ ἔροιτο εἰ δοίη ἄν τίς τι ταχέως μὴ ἔχων
and he-should-ask if would-give — someone something quickly not having
ταχέως, φήσαντος δὲ συλλογίζοιτο ὅτι δοίη ἄν τις ὃ
quickly having-said and he-should-syllogize that would-give — someone what

μὴ ἔχει. Καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται· τὸ γὰρ ταχέως
not he-has And evident that not he-has-syllogized the for quickly
οὐ τόδε διδόναι ἀλλ' ὧδε διδόναι ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ μὴ ἔχει
not this to-give but thus to-give is as and not has
τις, δοίη ἄν, οἷον ἡδέως ἔχων δοίη ἂν λυπηρῶς.
someone would-give — such-as pleasantly having would-give — painfully
Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοίδε πάντες. Ἆρ' ᾗ μὴ ἔχει χειρὶ
Like and also the such all Then with-which not he-has hand
τύπτοι ἄν; ἢ ᾧ μὴ ἔχει ὀφθαλμῷ ἴδοι ἄν; Οὐ
would-he-strike — or with-which not he-has eye would-he-see — Not
γὰρ ἔχει ἕνα μόνον. Λύουσι μὲν οὖν τινὲς λέγοντες καὶ ὡς
for he-has one only Solve indeed then some saying also as
ἔχει ἕνα μόνον καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν ὁ
has one only both eye and other anything-whatever the(-one)
πλείω ἔχων. Οἱ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὃ ἔχει ἔλαβεν· ἐδίδου γὰρ
more having They and also as what he-has he-took was-giving for
μίαν μόνον οὗτος ψῆφον· καὶ οὗτός γ' ἔχει, φασί, μίαν
one only this-one pebble and this-one at-least has they-say one
μόνην παρὰ τούτου ψῆφον. Οἱ δ' εὐθὺς τὴν ἐρώτησιν
only from this-one pebble They and at-once the question
ἀναιροῦντες, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ὃ μὴ ἔλαβεν ἔχειν, οἷον οἶνον
destroying that it-is-possible what not he-took to-have such-as wine
λαβόντα ἡδύν, διαφθαρέντος ἐν τῇ λήψει, ἔχειν ὀξύν. Ἀλλ'
having-taken sweet having-been-spoiled in the taking to-have sour But
ὅπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, οὗτοι πάντες οὐ πρὸς τὸν
which-very was-said also before these all not against the
λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον λύουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν αὕτη
argument but against the man solve If for were this
λύσις, δόντα τὸ ἀντικείμενον οὐχ οἷόν τε λύειν, καθάπερ
solution having-granted the opposite not possible — to-solve just-as
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οἷον εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὃ ἔστι δ' ὃ οὔ, ᾗ
for the others such-as if is indeed in-a-way it-is and in-a-way not the

λύσις, ἂν ἁπλῶς δῷ λέγεσθαι, συμπεραίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
solution if simply he-grant to-be-said it-is-concluded if but not
συμπεραίνηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη λύσις· ἐν δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις
it-is-concluded not — would-be solution in and the aforesaid
πάντων διδομένων οὐδέ φαμεν γίνεσθαι συλλογισμόν.
all being-granted not-even we-say to-come-about syllogism
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἵδ' εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων. Ἆρ' ὃ γέγραπται,
Further and also these are of-these the arguments Then what has-been-written
ἔγραφέ τις; Γέγραπται δὲ νῦν ὅτι σὺ κάθησαι, ψευδὴς
wrote someone Has-been-written and now that you sit false
λόγος· ἦν δ' ἀληθής, ὅτ' ἐγράφετο· ἅμα ἄρα ἐγράφετο
statement was but true when it-was-being-written at-once then was-being-written
ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής. Τὸ γὰρ ψευδῆ ἢ ἀληθῆ λόγον ἢ δόξαν
false and true The for false or true statement or opinion
εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε σημαίνει· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος
to-be not this but such signifies the for same account
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. Καὶ ἆρ' ὃ μανθάνει ὁ μανθάνων, τοῦτ'
also for the opinion And then what learns the learner this
ἐστὶν ὃ μανθάνει; Μανθάνει δέ τις τὸ βραδὺ ταχύ. Οὐ
is what he-learns Learns and someone the slow quick Not
τοίνυν ὃ μανθάνει ἀλλ' ὡς μανθάνει εἴρηκεν. Καὶ ἆρ' ὃ
then what he-learns but how he-learns he-has-said And then what
βαδίζει τις πατεῖ; Βαδίζει δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην. Ἢ οὐχ
walks someone he-treads Walks and the day whole Or not
ὃ βαδίζει ἀλλ' ὅτε βαδίζει εἴρηκεν· οὐδ' ὅταν τὴν κύλικα
what he-walks but when he-walks he-has-said nor when the cup
πίνειν, ὃ πίνει ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ. Καὶ ἆρ' ὅ τις οἶδεν ἢ
to-drink what he-drinks but from which And then what someone knows either
μαθὼν ἢ εὑρὼν οἶδεν; Ὧν δὲ τὸ μὲν εὗρε τὸ δ'
having-learned or having-found he-knows Of-which and the indeed he-found the and
ἔμαθε, τὰ ἄμφω οὐδέτερον. Ἢ ὃ μὲν ἅπαν, τὸ δ' ἅπαντα.
learned the both neither Or what indeed every the and all

Καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς
And that there-is some third man besides himself and the
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. Τὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κοινὸν
according-to each The for man and every the common
οὐ τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε τι ἢ πρός τι ἢ πῶς
not this something but such something or relative something or how
ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι σημαίνει. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
or of-the such something signifies Likewise and also for the
Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός, πότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;
Coriscus and Coriscus musical whether the-same or other
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ
The indeed for this something the and such signifies so-that not
ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἐκθέσθαι· οὐ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν τρίτον
it-is-possible it to-set-out not the to-set-out and makes the third
ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι εἶναι συγχωρεῖν.
man but the which-very this something to-be to-concede
Οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τόδε τι εἶναι, ὅπερ Καλλίας καὶ
Not for it-will-be this something to-be which-very Callias and
ὅπερ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. Οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις τὸ ἐκτιθέμενον μὴ
which-very man is Nor if someone the set-out not
ὅπερ τόδε τι εἶναι λέγοι ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ποιόν, οὐδὲν
which-very this something to-be should-say but which-very qualified nothing
διοίσει· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἕν τι, οἷον ὁ
will-differ will-be for the besides the many one something such-as the
ἄνθρωπος. Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι οὐ δοτέον τόδε τι εἶναι
man Evident then that not must-be-granted this something to-be
τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ποιὸν
the(-thing) in-common predicated for all but either qualified
ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι σημαίνειν.
or relative something or quantity or of-the such something to-signify

In arguments that depend on language, the solution always lies in the opposite of what the argument depends on: if it depends on combination, divide; if on division, combine; if on an acute accent, read the grave, and the reverse. With homonymy and amphiboly, use the opposite sense: if one is made to say that what he denied is animate, show how it is animate. Likeness of expression is met the same way: one may give what one does not have, but only in the way one lacks it, as a single knucklebone; one knows what one learned, but not all one knows; and one treads what one walks on, but not the time one walks.

Ὅλως δ' ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν λόγοις ἀεὶ κατὰ
Wholly and in the depending-on the expression arguments always according-to
τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἔσται ἡ λύσις ἢ παρ' ὅ ἐστιν
the opposite will-be the solution than depending-on which is
ὁ λόγος. Οἷον εἰ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ὁ λόγος, ἡ λύσις
the argument Such-as if depending-on combination the argument the solution
διελόντι, εἰ δὲ παρὰ διαίρεσιν, συνθέντι. Πάλιν εἰ
for-one-dividing if and depending-on division for-one-combining Again if
παρὰ προσῳδίαν ὀξεῖαν, ἡ βαρεῖα προσῳδία λύσις, εἰ
depending-on accent acute the grave accent solution if
δὲ παρὰ βαρεῖαν, ἡ ὀξεῖα. Εἰ δὲ παρ' ὁμωνυμίαν,
and depending-on grave the acute If and depending-on homonymy
ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὄνομα εἰπόντα λύειν, οἷον εἰ
it-is-possible the opposite name saying to-solve such-as if
ἔμψυχον συμβαίνει λέγειν, ἀποφήσαντα μὴ εἶναι, δηλοῦν
animate it-happens to-say having-denied not to-be to-show
ὡς ἔστιν ἔμψυχον· εἰ δ' ἄψυχον ἔφησεν, ὁ δ' ἔμψυχον
that it-is animate if and inanimate he-affirmed he and animate
συνελογίσατο, λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν ἄψυχον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
syllogized to-say that it-is inanimate Likewise and also
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμφιβολίας. Εἰ δὲ παρ' ὁμοιότητα λέξεως, τὸ
for the amphiboly If and depending-on likeness of-expression the

ἀντικείμενον ἔσται λύσις. Ἆρ᾽ ὃ μὴ ἔχει, δοίη ἄν τις;
opposite will-be solution Then what not he-has would-give — someone
ἢ οὐχ ὃ μὴ ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον ἕνα μόνον
or not what not he-has but as not he-has such-as one only
ἀστράγαλον. Ἆρ᾽ ὃ ἐπίσταται, μαθὼν ἢ εὑρὼν
knucklebone Then what he-knows having-learned or having-found
ἐπίσταται; ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἃ ἐπίσταται. Καὶ εἰ ὃ βαδίζει
he-knows but not what he-knows And if what he-walks
πατεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅτε. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
he-treads but not when Likewise and also for the others

XXIV · ACCIDENT

Against arguments from accident one solution serves all: what is true of a thing's accident need not be true of the thing, since only things one in substance have all the same attributes. So if I know Coriscus but not the man approaching, I do not both know and not know the same thing. Some answer that one can know and not know a thing in different respects, but that fails in other cases, and exposing an error is not always the solution, as with Zeno's argument. Those who call every number few, or plead double meaning in "your child" or "something of evils is good", also err: the fault is accident or qualification.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς μία μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ
Against and the(-ones) depending-on the accident one indeed the same
λύσις πρὸς ἅπαντας. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδιόριστόν ἐστι τὸ πότε
solution against all Since for undetermined is the when
λεκτέον ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
must-be-said for the thing when for the accident
ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων μὲν δοκεῖ καὶ φασίν, ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δ᾽
it-belongs and for some indeed it-seems and they-say for some but
οὔ φασιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ῥητέον οὖν συμβιβασθέντας
not they-say necessary to-be must-be-said then having-been-brought-together

ὁμοίως πρὸς ἅπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Ἔχειν δὲ δεῖ
likewise against all that not necessary To-have and one-must
προφέρειν τὸ οἷον. Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοίδε τῶν λόγων
to-bring-forward the such-as Are and all the such of-the arguments
παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός. Ἆρ᾽ οἶδας ὃ μέλλω σε
depending-on the accident Then do-you-know what I-am-going you
ἐρωτᾶν; Ἆρ᾽ οἶδας τὸν προσιόντα ἢ τὸν ἐγκεκαλυμμένον;
to-ask Then do-you-know the approaching or the veiled
Ἆρ᾽ ὁ ἀνδριὰς σόν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ;
Then the statue your is work or your the dog father
Ἆρα τὰ ὀλιγάκις ὀλίγα ὀλίγα; Φανερὸν γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι
Then the few-times few few Evident for in all
τούτοις ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κατὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
these that not necessity the of the accident
καὶ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθεύεσθαι· μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς
also of the thing to-be-true to-alone for the
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἓν οὖσιν ἅπαντα δοκεῖ
according-to the substance indistinguishable and one being all seems
ταὐτὰ ὑπάρχειν· τῷ δ᾽ ἀγαθῷ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ
the-same to-belong to-the and to-good not the-same is to-good
τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ μέλλοντι ἐρωτᾶσθαι, οὐδὲ τῷ προσιόντι ἢ
both to-be and to-going-to to-be-asked nor to-the approaching or
ἐγκεκαλυμμένῳ προσιόντι τε εἶναι καὶ Κορίσκῳ· ὥστ᾽ οὐκ
veiled approaching both to-be and to-Coriscus so-that not
εἰ οἶδα τὸν Κορίσκον, ἀγνοῶ δὲ τὸν προσιόντα, τὸν
if I-know the Coriscus I-am-ignorant-of and the approaching the
αὐτὸν οἶδα καὶ ἀγνοῶ· οὐδ᾽ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐμόν, ἔστι
same I-know and am-ignorant-of nor if this is mine is
δ᾽ ἔργον, ἐμόν ἐστιν ἔργον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κτῆμα ἢ πρᾶγμα
and work mine is work but either property or thing
ἢ ἄλλο τι. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
or other something The same and way also for the others

Λύουσι δέ τινες ἀναιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν· φασὶ γὰρ
Solve and some destroying the question they-say for
ἐνδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ πρᾶγμα εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ
to-be-possible the-same thing to-know and to-be-ignorant-of but not
κατὰ ταὐτό· τὸν οὖν προσιόντα οὐκ εἰδότες, τὸν δὲ
according-to the-same the then approaching not knowing the but
Κορίσκον εἰδότες, ταὐτὸ μὲν εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν φασίν,
Coriscus knowing the-same indeed to-know and to-be-ignorant-of they-say
ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό. Καίτοι πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἤδη
but not according-to the-same And-yet first indeed just-as already
εἴπομεν, δεῖ τῶν παρὰ ταὐτὸ λόγων τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι
we-said one-must of-the depending-on the-same arguments the same to-be
διόρθωσιν· αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔσται, ἄν τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι
correction this but not will-be if someone not for the to-know
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἢ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξίωμα λαμβάνῃ,
but for the to-be or how to-be the same claim take
οἷον εἰ ὅδε ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἔστι δὲ σός· εἰ γὰρ ἐπ'
such-as if this-one is father is and yours if for in-the-case-of
ἐνίων τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ
some this is true and it-is-possible the-same to-know and
ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. Οὐδὲν δὲ
to-be-ignorant-of but here nothing shares the said Nothing and
κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πλείους μοχθηρίας ἔχειν. Ἀλλ' οὐχ
prevents the same argument more defects to-have But not
ἡ πάσης ἁμαρτίας ἐμφάνισις λύσις ἐστίν· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ ὅτι
the of-every error exposure solution is it-is-possible for that
μὲν ψεῦδος συλλελόγισται δεῖξαί τινα, παρ' ὃ δὲ μὴ
indeed falsehood has-been-syllogized to-show someone depending-on what but not
δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινηθῆναι.
to-show such-as the of-Zeno argument that not it-is-possible to-be-moved

Ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις ἐπιχειροίη συνάγειν ὡς ἀδύνατον,
So-that even if someone should-attempt to-conclude that impossible
ἁμαρτάνει, κἂν εἰ μυριάκις ᾖ συλλελογισμένος· οὐ
he-errs even if ten-thousand-times he-has syllogized not
γάρ ἐστιν αὕτη λύσις. Ἦν γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς
for is this solution Was for the solution exposure of-false
συλλογισμοῦ, παρ' ὃ ψευδής· εἰ οὖν μὴ συλλελόγισται
syllogism depending-on what false if then not he-has-syllogized
ἢ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐπιχειρεῖ συνάγειν, ἡ ἐκείνου
or also true or false he-attempts to-conclude the of-that
δήλωσις λύσις ἐστίν. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπ' ἐνίων οὐδὲν
showing solution is Perhaps and also this for some nothing
κωλύει συμβαίνειν· πλὴν ἐπί γε τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦτο
prevents to-happen except for at-least these not-even this
δόξειεν ἄν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος οἶδε,
would-seem — also for the Coriscus that Coriscus he-knows
καὶ τὸ προσιὸν ὅτι προσιόν. Ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ
and the approaching that approaching To-be-possible and seems the
αὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μή, οἷον ὅτι μὲν λευκὸν εἰδέναι, ὅτι
same to-know and not such-as that indeed white to-know that
δὲ μουσικὸν μὴ γνωρίζειν· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶδε καὶ
but musical not to-recognize so for the same he-knows and
οὐκ οἶδεν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν. Τὸ δὲ προσιὸν καὶ
not he-knows but not according-to the-same The and approaching and
Κορίσκον, καὶ ὅτι προσιὸν καὶ ὅτι Κορίσκος, οἶδεν.
Coriscus both that approaching and that Coriscus he-knows
Ὁμοίως δ' ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες, ὅτι
Likewise and err also the(-ones) solving that
ἅπας ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος, ὥσπερ οὓς εἴπομεν· εἰ γὰρ
every number few just-as whom we-said if for
μὴ συμπεραινομένου, τοῦτο παραλιπόντες, ἀληθὲς
not being-concluded this having-left-out true

συμπεπεράνθαι φασί, πάντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν καὶ
to-have-been-concluded they-say all for to-be both many and
ὀλίγον, ἁμαρτάνουσιν.
few they-err
Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διττῷ λύουσι τοὺς συλλογισμούς, οἷον
Some and also by-the double solve the syllogisms such-as
ὅτι σός ἐστι πατὴρ ἢ υἱὸς ἢ δοῦλος. Καίτοι φανερὸν ὡς
that yours is father or son or slave And-yet evident that
εἰ παρὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι φαίνεται ὁ ἔλεγχος,
if depending-on the in-many-ways to-be-said appears the refutation
δεῖ τοὔνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον κυρίως εἶναι πλειόνων· τὸ δὲ
one-must the-name or the phrase properly to-be of-more the and
τόνδ' εἶναι τοῦδε τέκνον οὐδεὶς λέγει κυρίως, εἰ δεσπότης
this to-be of-this child no-one says properly if master
ἐστὶ τέκνου· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ σύνθεσίς
is of-child but depending-on the accident the combination
ἐστιν. Ἆρ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο σόν; Ναί. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τέκνον·
is Then is this yours Yes Is and this child
σὸν ἄρα τοῦτο τέκνον· ὅτι συμβέβηκεν εἶναι καὶ σὸν
yours then this child because it-happens to-be both yours
καὶ τέκνον, ἀλλ' οὐ σὸν τέκνον.
and child but not your child
Καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῶν κακῶν τι ἀγαθόν· ἡ γὰρ φρόνησίς
And the to-be of-the bad-things something good the for prudence
ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη τῶν κακῶν. Τὸ δὲ τοῦτο τούτων εἶναι
is knowledge of-the bad-things The but this of-these to-be
οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ κτῆμα. Εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλαχῶς
not is-said in-many-ways but property If but then in-many-ways
(καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῴων φαμὲν εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὔ
also for the man of-the animals we-say to-be but not
τι κτῆμα) καὶ ἐάν τι πρὸς τὰ κακὰ λέγηται
at-all property and if something with-reference-to the bad-things be-said

ὡς τινός, διὰ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ
as of-something because-of this of-the bad-things it-is but not
τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν. Παρὰ τὸ πῇ οὖν καὶ ἁπλῶς
this of-the bad-things Depending-on the in-some-respect then and simply
φαίνεται. Καίτοι ἐνδέχεται ἴσως ἀγαθὸν εἶναί τι τῶν
it-appears And-yet it-is-possible perhaps good to-be something of-the
κακῶν διττῶς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τούτου, ἀλλ' εἴ τι
bad-things in-two-ways but not for the argument this but if some
δοῦλον εἴη ἀγαθὸν μοχθηροῦ, μᾶλλον. Ἴσως δ' οὐδ'
slave should-be good of-wicked-one rather Perhaps but not-even
οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τούτου, ἀγαθὸν τούτου ἅμα.
so not for if good also of-this good of-this at-once
Οὐδὲ τὸ τὸν ἄνθρωπον φάναι τῶν ζῴων εἶναι οὐ λέγεται
Nor the the man to-say of-the animals to-be not is-said
πολλαχῶς· οὐ γὰρ εἴ ποτέ τι σημαίνομεν ἀφελόντες,
in-many-ways not for if ever something we-signify having-removed
τοῦτο λέγεται πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἥμισυ εἰπόντες τοῦ
this is-said in-many-ways also for the half saying of-the
ἔπους δός μοι Ἰλιάδα σημαίνομεν, οἷον τὸ Μῆνιν ἄειδε θέα.
verse give me Iliad we-signify such-as the Wrath sing goddess

Arguments that turn on saying something in some respect, place, manner, or relation, and not simply, are solved by examining the conclusion against its contradiction. Can what is not be? Can one keep and break an oath at once? The one who swears to break his oath keeps it only in this respect. Is health or wealth good? Not for the fool. Is the just more choiceworthy than the unjust? To die unjustly is. Nothing prevents a thing being so simply and not in some respect.

Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ κυρίως τόδε ἢ πῇ ἢ ποῦ
The(-ones) and depending-on the properly this or in-some-respect or somewhere
ἢ πῶς ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, λυτέον
or somehow or relative something to-be-said and not simply must-be-solved
σκοποῦντι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, εἰ
for-one-examining the conclusion relative-to the contradiction whether
ἐνδέχεται τούτων τι πεπονθέναι. Τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία
it-is-possible of-these something to-have-undergone The-things for contraries
καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα καὶ φάσιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν ἁπλῶς μὲν
and the opposites and affirmation and negation simply indeed
ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ, πῇ μέντοι ἑκάτερον
impossible to-belong to-the same in-some-respect however each-of-the-two
ἢ πρός τι ἢ πῶς, ἢ τὸ μὲν πῇ τὸ δ'
or relative something or somehow or the indeed in-some-respect the and
ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν κωλύει. Ὥστ' εἰ τόδε μὲν ἁπλῶς τόδε δὲ
simply nothing prevents So-that if this indeed simply this and
πῇ, οὔπω ἔλεγχος. Τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι
in-some-respect not-yet refutation This and in the conclusion
θεωρητέον πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν.
must-be-considered relative-to the contradiction
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τοῦτ' ἔχοντες. Ἆρ'
Are and all the such arguments this having Then
ἐνδέχεται τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι; Ἀλλὰ μήν ἔστι γέ τι μὴ
is-it-possible the not being to-be But surely is at-least something not

ὄν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τι
being Likewise and also the being not will-be not for will-be something
τῶν ὄντων. Ἆρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα εὐορκεῖν
of-the beings Then is-it-possible the same at-once to-keep-his-oath
καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν; Ἆρ' ἐγχωρεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ
and to-break-his-oath Then is-it-admissible the same at-once the same
πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀπειθεῖν; Ἢ οὔτε τὸ εἶναί τι καὶ εἶναι
to-obey and to-disobey Or neither the to-be something and to-be
ταὐτόν; Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ εἰ ἔστι τι, καὶ ἔστιν
the-same The and not being not if is something also is
ἁπλῶς· οὔτ' εἰ εὐορκεῖ τόδε ἢ τῇδε, ἀνάγκη καὶ
simply nor if he-keeps-his-oath in-this or in-this-way necessity also
εὐορκεῖν, ὁ δ' ὀμόσας ἐπιορκήσειν εὐορκεῖ ἐπιορκῶν
to-keep-his-oath the and having-sworn to-break-his-oath keeps-his-oath breaking-his-oath
τοῦτο μόνον, εὐορκεῖ δὲ οὔ· οὐδ' ὁ ἀπειθῶν πείθεται,
this only keeps-his-oath and not nor the disobeying obeys
ἀλλά τι πείθεται. Ὅμοιος δ' ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ
but something obeys Like and the argument also about the
ψεύδεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθεύειν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
to-lie the same at-once and to-speak-truly but because-of the
μὴ εἶναι εὐθεώρητον, ποτέρως ἄν τις ἀποδοίη τὸ
not to-be easy-to-see in-which-of-two-ways — one would-render the
ἁπλῶς ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, δύσκολον φαίνεται. Κωλύει
simply to-speak-truly or to-lie hard it-appears Prevents
δ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς μὲν εἶναι ψευδῆ, πῇ δ'
and it nothing simply indeed to-be false in-some-respect and
ἀληθῆ ἢ τινός, καὶ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τινά, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή.
true or of-something and to-be true in-some-things true and not
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι καὶ ποῦ
Likewise and also in-the-case-of the relative something and somewhere
καὶ πότε· πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τοῦτο
and sometime all for the such arguments depending-on this

συμβαίνουσιν. Ἆρ' ἡ ὑγίεια ἢ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν; Ἀλλὰ
come-about Then the health or the wealth good But
τῷ ἄφρονι καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθὸν
to-the senseless-man and not rightly using not good good
ἄρα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. Ἆρα τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ δύνασθαι ἐν
then and not good Then the to-be-healthy or to-have-power in
πόλει ἀγαθόν; Ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε οὐ βέλτιον· ταὐτὸν ἄρα τῷ
a-city good But there-is when not better the-same then to-the
αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. Ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἁπλῶς
same good and not good Or nothing prevents simply
ὂν ἀγαθὸν τῷδε μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τῷδε μὲν
being good to-this-man not to-be good or to-this-man indeed
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν ἢ οὐκ ἐνταῦθ' ἀγαθόν. Ἆρ' ὃ μὴ
good but not now or not here good Then what not
βούλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος, κακόν; Ἀποβαλεῖν δ' οὐ βούλεται
would-wish — the wise-man bad To-throw-away and not he-wishes
τἀγαθόν· κακὸν ἄρα τἀγαθόν. Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν
the-good bad then the-good Not for the-same to-say
τἀγαθὸν εἶναι κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν τἀγαθόν. Ὁμοίως
the-good to-be bad and the to-throw-away the-good Likewise
δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου λόγος. Οὐ γὰρ εἰ κακόν ἐστιν
and also the of-the thief argument Not for if bad is
ὁ κλέπτης, καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν ἐστὶ κακόν· οὔκουν τὸ κακὸν
the thief also the to-take is bad not-therefore the bad
βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν.
he-wishes but the-good the for to-take good good
Καὶ ἡ νόσος κακόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν νόσον.
And the disease bad is but not the to-throw-away disease
Ἆρα τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου καὶ τὸ δικαίως τοῦ ἀδίκως
Then the just than-the unjust and the justly than-the unjustly
αἱρετώτερον; Ἀλλ' ἀποθανεῖν ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον. Ἆρα
more-choiceworthy But to-die unjustly more-choiceworthy Then

δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔχειν ἕκαστον; Ἃ δ' ἄν
just is the-things his-own to-have each What-things and —
τις κρίνῃ κατὰ δόξαν τὴν αὑτοῦ, κἂν ᾖ ψευδῆ, κύριά
one judges according-to opinion the his-own even-if it-be false authoritative
ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.
are from the law the same then just and not just
Καὶ πότερα δεῖ κρίνειν τὸν τὰ δίκαια λέγοντα ἢ τὸν
And which-of-the-two one-must to-judge-for the the just-things saying or the
τὰ ἄδικα; Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν ἀδικούμενον δίκαιόν ἐστιν
the unjust-things But surely also the wronged-man just it-is
ἱκανῶς λέγειν ἃ ἔπαθεν· ταῦτα δ' ἦν ἄδικα. Οὐ γὰρ
sufficiently to-tell what he-suffered these-things and were unjust Not for
εἰ παθεῖν τι ἀδίκως αἱρετόν, τὸ ἀδίκως αἱρετώτερον
if to-suffer something unjustly choiceworthy the unjustly more-choiceworthy
τοῦ δικαίως· ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ δικαίως, τοδὶ μέντοι
than-the justly but simply indeed the justly in-this-case however
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. Καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὑτοῦ
nothing prevents unjustly or justly And the to-have the-things his-own
δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ τἀλλότρια οὐ δίκαιον· κρίσιν μέντοι ταύτην
just the and the-things-of-others not just judgment however this
δικαίαν εἶναι οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ἂν ᾖ κατὰ δόξαν τοῦ
just to-be nothing prevents such-as — it-be according-to opinion of-the
κρίναντος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιον τοδὶ ἢ ὠδί, καὶ ἁπλῶς
having-judged not for if just in-this-case or in-this-way also simply
δίκαιον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄδικα ὄντα οὐδὲν κωλύει λέγειν
just Likewise and also unjust-things being nothing prevents to-say
γε αὐτὰ δίκαιον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ εἰ λέγειν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη
at-least them just to-be not for if to-say just necessity
δίκαια εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὠφέλιμον λέγειν, ὠφέλιμα.
just-things to-be just-as not-even if beneficial to-say beneficial-things
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων. Ὥστ' οὐκ εἰ τὰ
Likewise and also in-the-case-of the just-things So-that not if the-things

λεγόμενα ἄδικα, ὁ λέγων ἄδικα νικᾷ· λέγει γὰρ
said unjust the-man saying unjust-things wins he-says for
ἃ λέγειν ἐστὶ δίκαια, ἁπλῶς δὲ καὶ παθεῖν ἄδικα.
what-things to-say is just-things simply and also to-suffer unjust-things

XXVI · IGNORANCE OF REFUTATION

Arguments that depend on the definition of refutation are met by examining the conclusion against its contradiction, to see whether it concerns the same thing, in the same respect, relation, manner, and time. If asked at the start, one should not grant that the same thing cannot be double and not double, but say that it can, though not in the way agreed for a refutation. Does one who knows Coriscus know he is musical? Is four cubits greater than three, and so greater than itself?

Τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου,
To-the(-ones) and depending-on the definition coming-about of-the refutation
καθάπερ ὑπεγράφη πρότερον, ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ
just-as it-was-sketched before must-be-met by-examining the
συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ
conclusion relative-to the contradiction how will-be the same
καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως
and according-to the same and relative-to the same and in-the-same-way
καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. Ἐὰν δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ προσέρηται,
and in the same time If and in beginning he-asks-in-addition
οὐχ ὁμολογητέον ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι διπλάσιον
not must-be-agreed that impossible the same to-be double
καὶ μὴ διπλάσιον, ἀλλὰ φατέον, μὴ μέντοι ὡδί, ὥς
and not double but must-say not however in-this-way as
ποτ' ἦν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι διωμολογημένον. Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες
once was the to-be-refuted agreed Are and all
οἵδ' οἱ λόγοι παρὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο. Ἆρ' ὁ εἰδὼς ἕκαστον
these the arguments depending-on the such Then the knowing each

ὅτι ἕκαστον, οἶδε τὸ πρᾶγμα; Καὶ ὁ ἀγνοῶν ὡσαύτως;
that each knows the thing And the being-ignorant in-the-same-way
Εἰδὼς δέ τις τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος, ἀγνοοίη ἂν
Knowing and one the Coriscus that Coriscus would-be-ignorant —
ὅτι μουσικός, ὥστε ταὐτὸ ἐπίσταται καὶ ἀγνοεῖ. Ἆρα
that musical so-that the-same he-knows and is-ignorant-of Then
τὸ τετράπηχυ τοῦ τριπήχεος μεῖζον; Γένοιτο δ' ἂν
the four-cubit than-the three-cubit greater Would-come-about and —
ἐκ τριπήχους τετράπηχυ κατὰ τὸ μῆκος· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον
from three-cubit four-cubit according-to the length the and greater
ἐλάττονος μεῖζον· αὐτὸ ἄρα αὑτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον.
than-lesser greater itself then than-itself greater and lesser

XXVII · BEGGING THE QUESTION

Against arguments that beg the original point, the answerer who sees it should not grant it, even if it is reputable, but say plainly what is being done. If it escapes him, he should turn the fault back on the questioner as not having argued, since a refutation must be without the original point. He should also say he granted it not to be used so, but for arguing against its contrary, or for side refutations.

Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν
The(-ones) and depending-on the to-ask and to-take the in
ἀρχῇ πυνθανομένῳ μέν, ἂν ᾖ δῆλον, οὐ δοτέον,
beginning for-one-inquiring indeed if it-be clear not must-be-granted
οὐδ' ἂν ἔνδοξον ᾖ, λέγοντα τἀληθές. Ἂν δὲ λάθῃ, τὴν
nor if reputable it-be saying the-truth If and it-escape the
ἄγνοιαν διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν τοιούτων λόγων εἰς
ignorance because-of the badness of-the such arguments on-to
τὸν ἐρωτῶντα μεταστρεπτέον ὡς οὐ διειλεγμένον· ὁ γὰρ
the questioner must-be-turned-back as not having-argued the for

ἔλεγχος ἄνευ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Εἶθ' ὅτι ἐδόθη οὐχ ὡς
refutation without the from beginning Next that it-was-granted not as
τούτῳ χρησομένου, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τοῦτο συλλογιουμένου
this going-to-use but as relative-to this going-to-syllogize
τοὐναντίον, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν παρεξελέγχων.
the-contrary or in-the-case-of the side-refutations

XXVIII · THE CONSEQUENT

Those who force a conclusion through the consequent must be shown up in the argument itself. Sequence is twofold: the universal follows the particular, as animal follows man, and opposites follow opposites, if this follows that. Melissus' argument is of this kind: if what has come to be has a beginning, the ungenerated has none, so if the heaven is ungenerated it is infinite. But it does not follow, for the sequence runs the other way.

Καὶ τοὺς διὰ τοῦ παρεπομένου συμβιβάζοντας ἐπ' αὐτοῦ
And the(-ones) through the consequent forcing-together in very
τοῦ λόγου δεικτέον. Ἔστι δὲ διττὴ ἡ τῶν ἑπομένων
the argument must-be-shown Is and twofold the of-the following-things
ἀκολούθησις. Ἢ γὰρ ὡς τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καθόλου, οἷον
sequence Either for as to-the in part the universal such-as
ἀνθρώπῳ ζῷον· ἀξιοῦται γάρ, εἰ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε, καὶ τόδ'
man animal it-is-claimed for if this with this also this
εἶναι μετὰ τοῦδε. Ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις· εἰ γὰρ τόδε τῷδε
to-be with this Or according-to the oppositions if for this this
ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Παρ' ὃ
follows to-the opposite the opposite Depending-on which
καὶ ὁ τοῦ Μελίσσου λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔχει ἀρχήν,
also the of-the Melissus argument if for the having-come-to-be has beginning

τὸ ἀγένητον ἀξιοῖ μὴ ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανός,
the ungenerated he-claims not to-have so-that if ungenerated the heaven
καὶ ἄπειρος. Τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ ἡ ἀκολούθησις.
also infinite This and not is reversed for the sequence

XXIX · FALSE CAUSE

Where something is added to reach the conclusion, see whether the impossible follows no less when it is taken away. If so, the answerer must make this plain and say that he granted the point not as believing it but for the sake of argument, while the questioner has used it for nothing in the argument.

Ὅσοι τε παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναι τι συλλογίζονται,
As-many-as and depending-on the to-add something syllogize
σκοπεῖν εἰ ἀφαιρουμένου συμβαίνει μηδὲν ἧττον τὸ
to-examine whether being-taken-away it-follows nothing less the
ἀδύνατον. Κἄπειτα τοῦτο ἐμφανιστέον, καὶ λεκτέον ὡς
impossible And-then this must-be-made-plain and must-be-said that
ἔδωκεν οὐχ ὡς δοκοῦν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὁ
he-granted not as seeming but as relative-to the argument the
δὲ κέχρηται οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον.
and has-used nothing relative-to the argument

Against those who make many questions into one, one must distinguish at the start. A question is one if it has one answer, one thing of one, affirmed or denied. When a predicate belongs to all the subjects, no harm results from a single answer, but when it belongs to some and not others, one must guard: if one is good and the other bad, the two are both good and bad and neither. Answering one of one, the impossible will not follow.

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιοῦντας εὐθὺς
Against and the(-ones) the more questions one making straightway
ἐν ἀρχῇ διοριστέον. Ἐρώτησις γὰρ μία πρὸς ἣν μία
in beginning must-distinguish Question for one relative-to which one
ἀπόκρισίς ἐστιν, ὥστ᾽ οὔτε πλείω καθ᾽ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἓν κατὰ
answer is so-that neither more of one nor one of
πολλῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς φατέον ἢ ἀποφατέον. Ὥσπερ
many but one of one must-affirm or must-deny Just-as
δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων ὁτὲ μὲν ἀμφοῖν ὁτὲ δ᾽
and in-the-case-of the homonyms sometimes indeed to-both sometimes and
οὐδετέρῳ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε μὴ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος
to-neither it-belongs so-that not simple being the question
ἁπλῶς ἀποκρινομένοις οὐδὲν συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ὁμοίως
simply for-those-answering nothing results to-suffer likewise
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὰ πλείω τῷ ἑνὶ
also in-the-case-of these When indeed then the more to-the one
ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχῃ, τῷ ἁπλῶς δόντι
or the one to-the many belong to-the-one simply having-granted
καὶ ἁμαρτόντι ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίωμα
and having-erred this the error no contrariety
συμβαίνει· ὅταν δὲ τῷ μὲν τῷ δὲ μή, ἢ πλείω
results when and to-the indeed to-the and not or more
κατὰ πλειόνων, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ὑπάρχει ἀμφότερα
of more and it-is in-a-way belong both

ἀμφοτέροις, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει πάλιν, ὥστε τοῦτ'
to-both it-is and in-a-way not belong again so-that this
εὐλαβητέον. Οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς λόγοις. Εἰ τὸ μέν
must-be-guarded-against Such-as in these the arguments If the indeed
ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακόν, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν
is good the and bad that these true to-say good
καὶ κακὸν καὶ πάλιν μήτ' ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ
and bad and again neither good nor bad not is for
ἑκάτερον ἑκάτερον, ὥστε ταὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ οὔτ'
each each so-that the-same good and bad and neither
ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. Καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ταὐτόν,
good nor bad And if each itself to-itself the-same
καὶ ἄλλου ἕτερον· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἄλλοις ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' αὑτοῖς,
and from-other different since and not to-others the-same but to-themselves
καὶ ἕτερα αὑτῶν, ταὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτά. Ἔτι
and different from-themselves the-same to-themselves different and the-same Further
εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν κακὸν γίνεται, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
if the indeed good bad becomes the and bad good
ἐστιν, δύο γένοιτ' ἄν. Δυοῖν τε καὶ ἀνίσων ἑκάτερον
is two would-come-about — Of-two and also unequal each
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἴσον, ὥστε ἴσα καὶ ἄνισα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.
itself to-itself equal so-that equal and unequal they to-themselves
Ἐμπίπτουσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι καὶ εἰς ἄλλας λύσεις· καὶ γὰρ
Fall-into indeed then these also into other solutions also for
τὸ ἄμφω καὶ τὸ ἅπαντα πλείω σημαίνει· οὔκουν ταὐτόν,
the both and the all more signifies not-therefore the-same
πλὴν ὄνομα, συμβαίνει φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι· τοῦτο δ'
except name it-results to-affirm and to-deny this and
οὐκ ἦν ἔλεγχος. Ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι μὴ μιᾶς ἐρωτήσεως
not was refutation But evident that not of-one question

τῶν πλειόνων γινομένων, ἀλλ' ἓν καθ' ἑνὸς φάντος
of-the more coming-about but one of one having-affirmed
ἢ ἀποφάντος, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἀδύνατον.
or having-denied not will-be the impossible

XXXI · BABBLING AGAIN

Against those who lead the answerer to say the same thing many times, one must not grant that relative terms signify anything when separated, as double without of half, though the half appears in the double. Nor is the genus knowledge the same as the species medical knowledge. Concave signifies the same in snub nose and bandy leg, but added to nose it means snub; so there is nothing absurd if a snub nose is a nose with the concavity of a nose.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπαγόντων εἰς ταὐτὸ πολλάκις εἰπεῖν,
About and the(-ones) leading-on into the-same many-times to-say
φανερὸν ὡς οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων
evident that not must-be-granted of-the relative something said-things
σημαίνειν τι χωριζομένας καθ' αὑτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας,
to-signify something being-separated by themselves the predications
οἷον διπλάσιον ἄνευ τοῦ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος, ὅτι
such-as double without the double of-half because
ἐμφαίνεται. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ δέκα ἐν τοῖς ἑνὸς δέουσι δέκα καὶ
it-is-manifest-in And for the ten in the of-one lacking ten and
τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει
the to-do in the not to-do and wholly in the negation
ἡ φάσις· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ εἴ τις λέγοι τοδὶ μὴ εἶναι
the affirmation but nevertheless not if one should-say this not to-be
λευκόν, λέγει αὐτὸ λευκὸν εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ διπλάσιον οὐδὲ
white he-says it white to-be The and double not-even
σημαίνει οὐδὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει· εἰ δ'
signifies anything perhaps just-as not-even the in the half if and

ἄρα καὶ σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτὸ καὶ συνῃρημένον. Οὐδ᾽ ἡ
then also it-signifies but not the-same also combined Nor the
ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῷ εἴδει, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη,
knowledge in the species such-as if is the medical knowledge
ὅπερ τὸ κοινόν· ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἦν ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ. Ἐν
which-very the common that and was knowledge of-the-knowable In
δὲ τοῖς δι᾽ ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουμένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον,
and the through which is-shown predicated-things this must-be-said
ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρὶς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον.
that not the same separately and in the account the thing-shown
Τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινῇ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ
The for concave in-common indeed the same shows in-the-case-of the
σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ῥοικοῦ, προστιθέμενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει,
snub and the bowlegged being-added and nothing prevents
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῇ ῥινὶ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκέλει συμβαίνει· ἔνθα
but the indeed to-the nose the and to-the leg it-belongs there
μὲν γὰρ τὸ σιμόν, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ῥαιβὸν σημαίνει· καὶ οὐδὲν
indeed for the snub there and the bandy it-signifies and nothing
διαφέρει εἰπεῖν ῥὶς σιμὴ ἢ ῥὶς κοίλη. Ἔτι οὐ δοτέον
differs to-say nose snub or nose concave Further not must-be-granted
τὴν λέξιν κατ᾽ εὐθύ· ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστιν. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ
the expression according-to straight falsehood for it-is Not for is the
σιμὸν ῥὶς κοίλη ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς τοδί, οἷον πάθος, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν
snub nose concave but of-nose this such-as affection so-that nothing
ἄτοπον, εἰ ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ ῥίς ἐστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα ῥινός.
absurd if the nose the snub nose is having concavity of-nose

XXXII · SOLECISMS

Solecisms are solved on the arguments themselves. Is what you truly say so? You say it is a stone, so it is "a stone": the argument plays the neuter against the masculine. With wood, which is neither, no solecism arises; but stone and "he" are masculine. Asked whether he is she, and then whether he is not Coriscus, the answerer seems forced to say "he is she", but nothing is proved unless he grants that "Coriscus" means "she". So too with the shield, Cleon, and "do you know this, and this is a stone?" Such arguments appear to prove solecisms but do not.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σολοικισμῶν παρ' ὅ τι μὲν φαίνονται
About and the solecisms depending-on what ever indeed they-appear
συμβαίνειν, εἴπομεν πρότερον, ὡς δὲ λυτέον, ἐπ' αὐτῶν
to-come-about we-said before how and must-be-solved in very
τῶν λόγων ἔσται φανερόν. Ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοίδε τοῦτο
the arguments will-be evident All for the such this
βούλονται κατασκευάζειν. Ἆρ' ὃ λέγεις ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἔστι
wish to-establish Then what you-say truly also is
τοῦτο ἀληθῶς; Φῄς δ' εἶναί τι λίθον· ἔστιν ἄρα
this truly You-say and to-be something stone is then
τι λίθον. Ἢ τὸ λέγειν λίθον οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν ὃ ἀλλ'
something stone Or the to-say stone not is to-say ho but
ὅν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦτον· εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις, ἆρ' ὃν
hon nor touto but touton if then should-ask one then whom
ἀληθῶς λέγεις, ἔστι τοῦτον, οὐκ ἂν δοκοίη ἑλληνίζειν,
truly you-say is him not — he-would-seem to-speak-Greek
ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ἔροιτο, ἆρ' ἣν λέγεις εἶναι, ἔστιν
just-as not-even if he-should-ask then whom-(she) you-say to-be is
οὗτος; Ξύλον δ' εἶπεν οὗτος, ἢ ὅσα μήτε θῆλυ μήτ'
he Wood and he-said he or as-many-as neither feminine nor
ἄρρεν σημαίνει, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Διὸ καὶ οὐ γίνεται
masculine signify nothing differs Wherefore also not comes-about

σολοικισμός, εἰ ὃ λέγεις εἶναι, ἔστι τοῦτο; ξύλον δὲ λέγεις
solecism if what you-say to-be is this wood and you-say
εἶναι· ἔστιν ἄρα ξύλον. Ὁ δὲ λίθος καὶ τὸ οὗτος ἄρρενος
to-be is then wood The and stone and the houtos of-masculine
ἔχει κλῆσιν. Εἰ δή τις ἔροιτο, ἆρ' οὗτός ἐστιν αὕτη;
has designation If indeed one should-ask then he is she
εἶτα πάλιν, τί δ'; οὐχ οὗτός ἐστι Κορίσκος; εἶτ' εἴπειεν,
next again what and not he is Coriscus next he-should-say
ἔστιν ἄρα οὗτος αὕτη, οὐ συλλελόγισται τὸν σολοικισμόν,
is then he she not has-been-syllogized the solecism
οὐδ' εἰ τὸ Κορίσκος σημαίνει ὅπερ αὕτη, μὴ δίδωσι δὲ
not-even if the Coriscus signifies which-very hautē not grants and
ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο προσερωτηθῆναι. Εἰ δὲ
the-answerer but one-must this to-be-asked-in-addition If and
μήτ' ἔστιν μήτε δίδωσιν, οὐ συλλελόγισται οὔτε τῷ ὄντι οὔτε
neither it-is nor he-grants not it-has-been-syllogized neither in-the reality nor
πρὸς τὸν ἠρωτημένον. Ὁμοίως οὖν δεῖ κἀκεῖ τὸν λίθον
relative-to the-one questioned Likewise then one-must there-too the stone
σημαίνειν οὗτος. Εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔστι μήτε δίδοται, οὐ λεκτέον τὸ
to-signify houtos If and neither it-is nor it-is-granted not must-be-said the
συμπέρασμα· φαίνεται δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἀνόμοιον πτῶσιν
conclusion it-appears and depending-on the the unlike case
τοῦ ὀνόματος ὁμοίαν φαίνεσθαι. Ἆρ' ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι
of-the noun alike to-appear Then true is-it to-say that
ἔστιν αὕτη, ὅπερ εἶναι φῂς αὐτήν; εἶναι δὲ φῂς ἀσπίδα·
is she which-very to-be you-say her to-be and you-say shield
ἔστιν ἄρα αὕτη ἀσπίδα. Ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὴ τὸ αὕτη
is then she shield Or not necessity if not the hautē
ἀσπίδα σημαίνει ἀλλ' ἀσπίς, τὸ δ' ἀσπίδα ταύτην. Οὐδ' εἰ
aspida signifies but aspis the and aspida tautēn Nor if
ὃ φῂς εἶναι τοῦτον, ἐστὶν οὗτος, φῂς δ' εἶναι Κλέωνα,
what you-say to-be him is he you-say and to-be Cleon

ἔστιν ἄρα οὗτος Κλέωνα· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὗτος Κλέωνα·
is then he Cleon not for is he Cleon
εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ὅ φημι εἶναι τοῦτον, ἔστιν οὗτος, οὐ
it-has-been-said for that what I-say to-be him is he not
τοῦτον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἑλληνίζοι οὕτως τὸ ἐρώτημα λεχθέν.
him nor for — would-speak-Greek thus the question said
Ἆρ' ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ λίθος· ἐπίστασαι ἄρα
Then do-you-know this this and is stone you-know then
λίθος. Ἢ οὐ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἆρ' ἐπίστασαι
stone Or not the-same signifies the touto in the then do-you-know
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο δὲ λίθος, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ
this and in the touto and stone but in indeed the first
τοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ οὗτος. Ἆρ' οὖ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις,
touton in and the later houtos Then of-what knowledge you-have
ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο; ἐπιστήμην δ' ἔχεις λίθου· ἐπίστασαι
do-you-know this knowledge and you-have of-stone you-know
ἄρα λίθου. Ἢ τὸ μὲν τούτου λίθου λέγεις, τὸ δὲ τοῦτον
then of-stone Or the indeed toutou lithou you-say the and touton
λίθον· ἐδόθη δ', οὗ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασθαι, οὐ
lithon it-was-granted and of-what knowledge you-have to-know not
τούτου, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ὥστ' οὐ λίθου ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον.
toutou but touto so-that not of-stone but the stone
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογίζονται
That indeed then the such of-the arguments not syllogize
σολοικισμὸν ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, καὶ διὰ τί τε φαίνονται καὶ
solecism but appear-to and because-of what and they-appear and
πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς αὐτούς, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
how must-be-met against them evident from the things-said

Some arguments are easy and some hard to see through, though the same in kind; the jokes about the cow and the north wind are plain to anyone, while others baffle the most experienced. The sharpest perplex most, doing away with the most reputable premise from premises equally reputable. Aristotle then summarizes the work: the faculty of reasoning from reputable opinions, with its defense and the fallacies. Rhetoric had a long history before him, from Tisias to Theodorus, but on reasoning he found nothing, and asks his hearers' pardon for gaps and thanks for discoveries.

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ
One-must and also to-observe that of-all the arguments the(-ones)
μέν εἰσι ῥᾴους κατιδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ
indeed are easier to-see-through the(-ones) and harder depending-on
τί καὶ ἐν τίνι παραλογίζονται τὸν ἀκούοντα, πολλάκις
what and in what they-mislead the hearer often
οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνοις ὄντες. Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον δεῖ
the same as-those being The same for argument one-must
καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταὐτὸ γινόμενον· ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ
to-call the-one depending-on the-same coming-about the same and
λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς δὲ
argument to-the(-ones) indeed depending-on the expression to-the(-ones) and
παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς δὲ παρ' ἕτερον
depending-on the accident to-the(-ones) and depending-on other
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἕκαστον
would-seem — to-be because-of the being-transferred each
μὴ ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον. Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ
not alike to-be clear Just-as then in the depending-on
τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι
the homonymy which-very seems way most-simple to-be
τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσίν
of-the fallacies the(-ones) indeed even to-the chance-comers

ἐστι δῆλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοῖοι
are clear also for the arguments nearly the laughable
πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετο
all are depending-on the expression such-as a-man was-carrying
κατὰ κλίμακος δίφρον, καὶ ὅπου στέλλεσθε; Πρὸς
down a-ladder a-chair and where are-you-setting-out Towards
τὴν κεραίαν. Καὶ ποτέρα τῶν βοῶν ἔμπροσθεν
the yard-arm And which-of-the-two of-the cows in-front
τέξεται; Οὐδετέρα, ἀλλ᾽ ὄπισθεν ἄμφω. Καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ
will-calve Neither but behind both And clean the
βορέας; Οὐ δῆτα· ἀπεκτόνηκε γὰρ τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ τὸν
north-wind Not indeed he-has-killed for the beggar and the
ὠνούμενον.
buyer
Ἆρ᾽ Εὔαρχος; Οὐ δῆτα, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀπολλωνίδης.) Τὸν
Then Euarchus Not indeed but Apollonides The
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι.
same and way also of-the others nearly the most
Τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν·
The(-ones) and even the most-experienced appear to-escape
σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ τῶν
sign and of-these that they-fight often about the
ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸν σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων
names such-as whether the-same signifies of all
τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἢ ἕτερον. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ
the being and the one or different To-the(-ones) indeed for it-seems
ταὐτὸν σημαίνειν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· οἱ δὲ τὸν
the-same to-signify the being and the one the-others and the
Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ
of-Zeno argument and of-Parmenides solve because-of the
πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν. Ὁμοίως
in-many-ways to-say the one to-be-said and the being Likewise

δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
and also about the accident and about the others
ἕκαστον οἱ μὲν ἔσονται ῥᾴους ἰδεῖν οἱ δὲ
each the(-ones) indeed will-be easier to-see the(-ones) and
χαλεπώτεροι τῶν λόγων· καὶ λαβεῖν ἐν τίνι γένει, καὶ
harder of-the arguments and to-grasp in what genus and
πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁμοίως περὶ
whether refutation or not refutation not easy likewise about
πάντων.
all

Ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα·
Is and sharp argument whichever to-be-at-a-loss makes most
δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα. Ἀπορία δ' ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ
bites for this most Perplexity and is twofold the
μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ
indeed in the syllogized-arguments what ever should-do-away-with
τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς
one of-the questions the and in the eristic-ones how
εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν. Διόπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς
should-say one the thing-proposed Wherefore in the syllogistic-ones
οἱ δριμύτεροι λόγοι ζητεῖν μᾶλλον ποιοῦσιν. Ἔστι
the sharper arguments to-inquire more make Is
δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι
and syllogistic indeed argument sharpest if from as
μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ.
most-possible seeming-things as most-possible reputable it-does-away-with
Εἷς γὰρ ὢν ὁ λόγος μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως
One for being the argument being-transposed the contradiction
ἅπαντας ὁμοίους ἕξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ
all alike will-have the syllogisms always for from
ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει,
reputable-things likewise reputable will-do-away-with or will-establish

διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος
wherefore to-be-at-a-loss necessary Most indeed then the such
δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν τοῖς
sharp the-one from equal-footing the conclusion making with-the
ἐρωτήμασι, δεύτερος δ' ὁ ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίων· οὗτος
questions second and the-one from all alike-things this
γὰρ ὁμοίως ποιήσει ἀπορεῖν ὁποῖον τῶν ἐρωτημάτων
for alike will-make to-be-at-a-loss which of-the questions
ἀναιρετέον. Τοῦτο δὲ χαλεπόν· ἀναιρετέον μὲν
must-be-done-away-with This and hard must-be-done-away-with indeed
γάρ, ὅ τι δ' ἀναιρετέον, ἄδηλον. Τῶν δ' ἐριστικῶν
for what ever and must-be-done-away-with unclear Of-the and eristic
δριμύτατος μὲν ὁ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἄδηλος πότερον
sharpest indeed the-one first straightway unclear whether
συλλελόγισται ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον παρὰ ψεῦδος ἢ
it-has-been-syllogized or not and whether depending-on falsehood or
διαίρεσίν ἐστιν ἡ λύσις, δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
division is the solution second and of-the others
ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν
the-one clear indeed that depending-on division or doing-away
ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ' ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων
is not evident and being through which of-the things-asked
ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη
doing-away or division to-be-solved it-is but whether this
παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων
depending-on the conclusion or depending-on some of-the questions
ἐστίν.
it-is
Ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν ὁ μὴ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐήθης
Sometimes indeed then the not syllogized argument simple
ἐστίν, ἐὰν ᾖ λίαν ἄδοξα ἢ ψευδῆ τὰ λήμματα·
is if it-be too unreputable or false the assumptions

ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι. Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
sometimes and not worthy to-be-despised When indeed for
ἐλλείπῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτημάτων, περὶ οὗ ὁ
it-lacks something of-the such questions about which the
λόγος καὶ δι' ὅ, καὶ μὴ προσλαβὼν τοῦτο
argument and because-of which and not having-taken-in-addition this
καὶ μὴ συλλογισάμενος εὐήθης ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅταν
and not having-syllogized simple the syllogism when
δὲ τῶν ἔξωθεν, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ'
and of-the outside-things not easily-despised in-no-way but
ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικής, ὁ δ' ἐρωτῶν ἠρώτηκεν οὐ
the indeed argument fair the and questioner has-asked not
καλῶς.
well

Ἔστι τε, ὥσπερ λύειν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸν
It-is-possible and just-as to-solve sometimes indeed against the
λόγον ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὴν
argument sometimes and against the questioner and the
ἐρώτησιν ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, ὁμοίως
question sometimes and against neither of-these likewise
καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ἔστι καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν
also to-ask it-is and to-syllogize both against the
θέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸν
thesis and against the answerer and against the
χρόνον, ὅταν ᾖ πλείονος χρόνου δεομένη ἡ λύσις
time when it-be of-more time needing the solution
ἢ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τὸ διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν
than the present occasion the to-argue against the
λύσιν.
solution

Ἐκ πόσων μὲν οὖν καὶ ποίων γίνονται τοῖς διαλεγομένοις
From how-many indeed then and of-what-sort come-about for-the arguers
οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ πῶς δείξομέν τε ψευδόμενον καὶ
the fallacies and how we-shall-show both lying and
παράδοξα λέγειν ποιήσομεν, ἔτι δ' ἐκ τίνων συμβαίνει
paradoxes to-say we-shall-make further and from what comes-about
ὁ συλλογισμός, καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέον καὶ τίς ἡ τάξις
the syllogism and how must-be-asked and what the order
τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἔτι πρὸς τί χρήσιμοι πάντες εἰσὶν
of-the questions further for what useful all are
οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι, καὶ περὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἁπλῶς τε πάσης
the such arguments and about answering simply both all
καὶ πῶς λυτέον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς συλλογισμούς,
and how must-be-solved the arguments and the syllogisms
εἰρήσθω περὶ ἁπάντων ἡμῖν ταῦτα. Λοιπὸν δὲ
let-them-have-been-said about all by-us these-things Remaining and
περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ἀναμνήσασιν εἰπεῖν
about the from beginning proposal having-reminded-ourselves to-say
τι βραχὺ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς
something brief about it and end to-put to-the
εἰρημένοις.
things-said

Προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν δύναμίν τινα συλλογιστικὴν
We-chose indeed then to-find capacity some syllogistic
περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς
about the thing-proposed from the existing as
ἐνδοξοτάτων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καθ'
most-reputable this for work is of-the dialectic by
αὑτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς. Ἐπεὶ δὲ προσκατασκευάζεται
itself and of-the examinational Since and it-is-further-equipped
πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς
for it because-of the of-the sophistic neighborhood that

οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς ἀλλὰ
not only test it-can to-take dialectically but
καὶ ὡς εἰδώς, διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον τὸ λεχθὲν
also as knowing because-of this not only the stated
ἔργον ὑπεθέμεθα τῆς πραγματείας, τὸ λόγον δύνασθαι
work we-set-down of-the study the argument to-be-able
λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν
to-take but also how argument sustaining we-shall-guard
τὴν θέσιν ὡς δι' ἐνδοξοτάτων ὁμοτρόπως. Τὴν δ'
the thesis as through most-reputable in-like-manner The and
αἰτίαν εἰρήκαμεν τούτου, ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης
cause we-have-told of-this since also because-of this Socrates
ἠρώτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.
asked but not answered he-acknowledged for not to-know
Δεδήλωται δ' ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καὶ πρὸς πόσα
It-has-been-shown and in the earlier-things both in-respect-of how-many
καὶ ἐκ πόσων τοῦτο ἔσται, καὶ ὅθεν εὐπορήσομεν
and from how-many this will-be and whence we-shall-be-well-supplied
τούτων, ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἐρωτητέον ἢ τακτέον τὴν
with-these further and how must-be-asked or must-be-arranged the
ἐρώτησιν πᾶσαν, καὶ περί τε ἀποκρίσεων καὶ λύσεων
questioning all and about both answers and solutions
τῶν πρὸς τοὺς συλλογισμούς. Δεδήλωται δὲ καὶ περὶ
the against the syllogisms It-has-been-shown and also about
τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων
the other-things as-many-as of-the same method of-the arguments
ἐστίν.
are
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ τῶν παραλογισμῶν διεληλύθαμεν,
In-addition and to-these about the fallacies we-have-gone-through
ὥσπερ εἰρήκαμεν ἤδη πρότερον. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει
just-as we-have-said already before That indeed then it-has

τέλος ἱκανῶς ἃ προειλόμεθα, φανερόν· δεῖ δ'
end sufficiently what we-chose evident one-must and
ἡμᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ ταύτην τὴν
us not to-have-escaped the having-happened about this the
πραγματείαν. Τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντων τὰ
study Of-the for being-found all the(-ones)
μὲν παρ' ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ
indeed from others taken earlier worked-out by
μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον·
part have-advanced by the having-taken-over later
τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον
the(-ones) and from the-start being-found small the first
ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ
advance to-take are-wont more-useful however much
τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως
than-the later from them growth Greatest for perhaps
ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον·
beginning of-all just-as it-is-said wherefore also hardest
ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον
by-as-much for most-powerful in-the capacity by-so-much smallest
ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. Ταύτης
being in-the magnitude hardest it-is to-be-seen This
δ' εὑρημένης ῥᾷον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ
and having-been-found easier the to-add and to-increase the
λοιπόν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους
remainder is which-very also about the rhetorical speeches
συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας.
has-happened nearly and also about the other all arts
Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ
The(-ones) indeed for the beginnings having-found altogether to
μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες
small some-distance advanced the(-ones) and now being-in-repute

παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ
having-taken-over from many as-it-were from succession by
μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ
part having-advanced thus have-increased Tisias indeed after
τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος
the first Thrasymachus and after Tisias Theodorus
δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηνόχασι
and after him and many many-things have-contributed
μέρη· διόπερ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔχειν τι πλῆθος τὴν
parts wherefore nothing wonderful to-have some bulk the
τέχνην.
art
Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ
Of-this and the study not the indeed was the and not
ἦν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. Καὶ
was worked-out-beforehand but nothing altogether existed And
γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων
for of-the about the eristic arguments working-for-pay
ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ.
alike some was the training to-the of-Gorgias practice
Λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς
Speeches for the(-ones) indeed rhetorical the-others and interrogative
ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν
they-gave to-learn-by-heart into which most-often to-fall
ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ ταχεῖα
they-thought each-party the of-one-another arguments Wherefore quick
μὲν ἄτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι
indeed artless and was the teaching for-the learners
παρ' αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς
from them not for art but the-things from the
τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
art giving to-educate they-supposed just-as — if one

ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν
knowledge professing to-hand-on towards the nothing to-suffer
τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ'
the feet then shoemaking indeed not should-teach nor
ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ
whence he-will-be-able to-procure the such-things should-give and many
γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων· οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε
kinds of-all-sorts of-shoes this-man for has-helped
μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν. Καὶ
indeed towards the need art and not be-handed-on And
περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ
about indeed the rhetorical-things existed many and old the
λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν
things-said about and the to-syllogize altogether nothing
εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες
we-had earlier other to-say but than by-practice searching
πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν. Εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν
much time we-toiled If and it-appears having-viewed to-you
ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ
that from such from beginning existing to-be-in-a-state the
μέθοδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ
method sufficiently beside the other studies the from
παραδόσεως ηὐξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν
tradition having-been-increased remaining — would-be of-all you
ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς
or the having-listened work to-the indeed having-been-left-out of-the
μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ' εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν
method pardon to-the and having-been-found much to-have
χάριν.
gratitude
