

MEDIEVAL LATIN SERIES • VOLUME 18

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

THOMAS AQUINAS

Summa Theologiae

On God: The First Part, Questions 1–13

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation
preserving the original word order




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CONTENTS

Prologue	9
I · On Sacred Doctrine	11
1 · Whether Another Doctrine Is Needed Besides Philosophy	12
2 · Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science	17
3 · Whether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science	20
4 · Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science	23
5 · Whether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler Than the Other Sciences	25
6 · Whether This Doctrine Is Wisdom	29
7 · Whether God Is the Subject of This Science	34
8 · Whether This Doctrine Is Argumentative	37
9 · Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors	43
10 · Whether One Letter of Scripture Has Several Senses	48
II · On God: Whether God Exists	55
1 · Whether God's Existence Is Self-Evident	57
2 · Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists	62
3 · Whether God Exists	66
III · On the Simplicity of God	75
1 · Whether God Is a Body	77

2 · Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form	83
3 · Whether God Is the Same as His Essence or Nature	87
4 · Whether Essence and Being Are the Same in God	91
5 · Whether God Is in Any Genus	95
6 · Whether There Are Accidents in God	100
7 · Whether God Is Altogether Simple	103
8 · Whether God Enters the Composition of Other Things	107
IV · On the Perfection of God	113
1 · Whether God Is Perfect	114
2 · Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in God	118
3 · Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God	123
V · On Good in General	129
1 · Whether Good Differs in Reality from Being	130
2 · Whether Good Is Prior to Being in Notion	134
3 · Whether Every Being Is Good	139
4 · Whether Good Has the Notion of Final Cause	143
5 · Whether the Notion of Good Lies in Mode, Species, and Order	147
6 · Whether Good Divides into Honorable, Useful, and Delightful	153
VI · On the Goodness of God	157
1 · Whether to Be Good Belongs to God	158
2 · Whether God Is the Highest Good	161
3 · Whether to Be Good Through Essence Is Proper to God	165
4 · Whether All Things Are Good by the Divine Goodness	169
VII · On the Infinity of God	173
1 · Whether God Is Infinite	174
2 · Whether Anything Besides God Can Be Infinite in Essence	178

3 · Whether Anything Can Be Actually Infinite in Magnitude	182
4 · Whether There Can Be an Infinite Multitude in Things	189
VIII · On the Existence of God in Things	195
1 · Whether God Is in All Things	196
2 · Whether God Is Everywhere	200
3 · Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence, and Power . .	205
4 · Whether to Be Everywhere Is Proper to God	211
IX · On the Immutability of God	217
1 · Whether God Is Altogether Immutable	218
2 · Whether to Be Immutable Is Proper to God	222
X · On the Eternity of God	229
1 · Whether Eternity Is Fittingly Defined	230
2 · Whether God Is Eternal	235
3 · Whether to Be Eternal Is Proper to God	239
4 · Whether Eternity Differs from Time	242
5 · On the Difference of Aeviternity and Time	248
6 · Whether There Is Only One Aeviternity	254
XI · On the Unity of God	261
1 · Whether One Adds Anything to Being	262
2 · Whether One and Many Are Opposed	267
3 · Whether God Is One	273
4 · Whether God Is Most One	277
XII · How God Is Known by Us	281
1 · Whether a Created Intellect Can See God's Essence	283
2 · Whether God's Essence Is Seen Through a Created Likeness . .	288

3 · Whether God's Essence Can Be Seen by the Bodily Eye	293
4 · Whether a Created Intellect Can See God's Essence by Nature . . .	298
5 · Whether a Created Intellect Needs Created Light to See God . . .	305
6 · Whether One Sees God's Essence Better Than Another	309
7 · Whether Those Who See God's Essence Comprehend Him	313
8 · Whether Those Who See God See All Things in Him	320
9 · Whether What Is Seen in God Is Seen Through Likenesses	325
10 · Whether Those Who See God See at Once All They See in Him . .	330
11 · Whether Anyone Can See God's Essence in This Life	333
12 · Whether God Can Be Known by Natural Reason in This Life . .	339
13 · Whether Grace Gives a Higher Knowledge Than Reason	342
XIII · On the Names of God	347
1 · Whether God Can Be Named by Us	349
2 · Whether Any Name Is Said of God Substantially	354
3 · Whether Any Name Is Said of God Properly	361
4 · Whether the Names Said of God Are Synonyms	365
5 · Whether Names Are Said of God and Creatures Univocally	370
6 · Whether Names Are Said First of Creatures	377
7 · Whether Names of Relation to Creatures Are Said in Time	383
8 · Whether This Name God Is a Name of Nature	394
9 · Whether This Name God Is Communicable	398
10 · Whether the Name God Is Said Univocally in Every Use	405
11 · Whether He Who Is Is the Most Proper Name of God	411
12 · Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God . .	416

Prologus

PROLOGUE

Thomas states his purpose: to hand on what belongs to the Christian religion in a way that suits beginners, as the Apostle gave milk to little ones. Novices are hindered by useless questions, articles, and arguments, by an order set by the books expounded or the chance of disputation rather than by the discipline, and by repetition that breeds weariness and confusion. He will treat sacred doctrine briefly and clearly, trusting in divine help.

Quia catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provecos debet
because catholic of-truth the-teacher not only the-advanced ought
instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire,
to-instruct but to him it-pertains also beginners to-teach
secundum illud Apostoli I ad Corinth. III: tanquam parvulis
according-to that of-the-Apostle I to Corinthians III as to-little-ones
in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam; propositum
in Christ milk to-you to-drink I-gave not food the-purpose
nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad
of-our intention in this work is those-things which to
Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere,
the-Christian religion pertain in-that way to-hand-down
secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium.
according as it-befits to the-instruction of-beginners
Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae novitios, in his
we-have-considered for of-this doctrine the-novices in those-things
quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum impediri: partim
which by various-men written are very-much to-be-hindered partly
quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum,
indeed on-account-of the-multiplication of-useless questions
articulorum et argumentorum; partim etiam quia ea
articles and arguments partly also because those-things

quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum, non traduntur
which are necessary for-such-ones for knowing not are-handed-down
 secundum ordinem disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat
according-to the-order of-the-discipline but according as required
 librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio
of-books the-exposition or according as itself offered the-occasion
 disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio
of-disputing partly indeed because of-the-same frequent the-repetition
 et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum.
both weariness and confusion generated in the-minds of-the-bearers
 Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi evitare studentes,
these-things therefore and other-things of-this-kind to-avoid striving
 tentabimus, cum confidentia divini auxilii, ea quae ad
we-shall-try with confidence of-divine help those-things which to
 sacram doctrinam pertinent, breviter ac dilucide prosequi,
sacred doctrine pertain briefly and clearly to-pursue
 secundum quod materia patietur.
according as the-matter will-allow

De sacra doctrina, qualis sit, et ad quae se extendat

I · ON SACRED DOCTRINE

To keep the inquiry within fixed limits, Thomas first asks what sacred doctrine is and how far it extends. He lists ten articles: its necessity; whether it is a science; whether it is one science or several; whether speculative or practical; how it compares with other sciences; whether it is wisdom; what its subject is; whether it argues; whether it should use metaphors; and whether Scripture has several senses.

Et ut intentio nostra sub aliquibus certis limitibus
and that intention our within some fixed limits
comprehendatur, necessarium est primo investigare de ipsa
may-be-comprehended necessary it-is first to-investigate about the-very
sacra doctrina, qualis sit, et ad quae se extendat.
sacred doctrine of-what-kind it-is and to what-things itself it-extends

Circa quae quaerenda sunt decem.

concerning which to-be-inquired are ten

Primo: de necessitate huius doctrinae.

first about the-necessity of-this doctrine

Secundo: utrum sit scientia.

second whether it-is a-science

Tertio: utrum sit una vel plures.

third whether it-is one or several

Quarto: utrum sit speculativa vel practica.

fourth whether it-is speculative or practical

Quinto: de comparatione eius ad alias scientias.

fifth about the-comparison of-it to other sciences

Sexto: utrum sit sapientia.

sixth whether it-is wisdom

Septimo: quid sit subiectum eius.

seventh what is the-subject of-it

Octavo: *utrum sit argumentativa.*

eighth whether it-is argumentative

Nono: *utrum uti debeat metaphoricis vel symbolicis*

ninth whether to-use it-ought metaphorical or symbolic

locutionibus.

expressions

Decimo: *utrum Scriptura Sacra huius doctrinae sit secundum*

tenth whether Scripture Sacred of-this doctrine is according-to

plures sensus exponenda.

several senses to-be-expounded

Utrum sit necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi

1 • WHETHER ANOTHER DOCTRINE IS NEEDED BESIDES PHILOSOPHY

The objections hold that man should not seek what is above reason, and that reason's disciplines cover all being, even God, so nothing more is needed. Thomas answers that man is ordered to God as to an end beyond reason, and an end must be known beforehand; so salvation required revelation. Even truths about God that reason can reach would come to few, late, and mixed with error, so they too were revealed. What is above reason is received by faith, and theology differs in kind from philosophy's.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit necessarium,

to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not it-is necessary

praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi. Ad

besides philosophical disciplines another doctrine to-be-had to

ea enim quae supra rationem sunt, homo non debet conari,

those-things for which above reason are man not ought to-strive

secundum illud Eccli. III: altiora te ne quaesieris.

according-to that Ecclesiasticus III higher-things than-you not you-should-seek

Sed ea quae rationi subduntur, sufficienter traduntur
but those-things which to-reason are-subjected sufficiently are-handed-down
 in philosophicis disciplinis. Superfluum igitur videtur, praeter
in philosophical disciplines superfluous therefore it-seems besides
 philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi.

philosophical disciplines another doctrine to-be-had

2. Praeterea, doctrina non potest esse nisi de ente: nihil

2 further doctrine not can to-be except about being nothing

enim scitur nisi verum, quod cum ente convertitur. Sed

for is-known except the-true which with being is-convertible but

de omnibus entibus tractatur in philosophicis disciplinis,

about all beings it-is-treated in philosophical disciplines

et etiam de Deo: unde quaedam pars philosophiae dicitur

and even about God whence a-certain part of-philosophy is-called

theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per Philosophum

theology or science divine as is-plain through the-Philosopher

in VI Metaphys. Non fuit igitur necessarium, praeter

in VI Metaphysics not it-was therefore necessary besides

philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi.

philosophical disciplines another doctrine to-be-had

Sed contra est quod dicitur II ad Tim. III: omnis scriptura

but against is that it-is-said II to Timothy III all scripture

divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum,

divinely inspired useful is for teaching for reproving

ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum ad iustitiam. Scriptura

for correcting for instructing in justice scripture

autem divinitus inspirata non pertinet ad philosophicas

moreover divinely inspired not pertains to philosophical

disciplinas, quae sunt secundum rationem humanam inventae.

disciplines which are according-to reason human discovered

Utile igitur est, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, esse aliam
useful therefore it-is besides philosophical disciplines to-be another
 scientiam divinitus inspiratam.

science divinely inspired

Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium fuit ad humanam

I-answer it-must-be-said that necessary it-was for human

salutem, esse doctrinam quandam secundum revelationem

salvation to-be a-doctrine certain according-to revelation

divinam, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae ratione humana

divine besides philosophical disciplines which by-reason human

investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum

are-investigated first indeed because man is-ordered to God

sicut ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis

as to a-certain end which the-comprehension of-reason

excedit, secundum illud Isaiae LXIV: oculus non vidit Deus

exceeds according-to that of-Isaiah LXIV the-eye not has-seen O-God

absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te. Finem autem

without you what-things you-have-prepared for-those-loving you the-end moreover

oportet esse praecognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones

it-is-necessary to-be foreknown to-men who their intentions

et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit

and actions ought to-direct to the-end whence necessary it-was

homini ad salutem, quod ei nota fierent quaedam per

for-man for salvation that to-him known should-become certain-things through

revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt.

revelation divine which reason human exceed

Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione humana investigari

for those-things even which about God by-reason human to-be-investigated

possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione

can necessary it-was man to-be-instructed by-revelation

divina. Quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata,

divine because the-truth about God through reason investigated

a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione
by few and through a-long time and with the-admixture
 multorum errorum, homini proveniret: a cuius tamen
of-many errors to-man would-come on of-which yet
 veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in
truth the-knowledge depends whole of-man the-salvation which in
 Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et
God is that therefore salvation to-men both more-fittingly and
 certius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis
more-certainly may-come necessary it-was that about divine-things
 per divinam revelationem instruantur.

through divine revelation they-should-be-instructed
 Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas,
necessary therefore it-was besides philosophical disciplines
 quae per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per
which through reason are-investigated sacred doctrine through
 revelationem haberi.

revelation to-be-had
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet ea quae
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although those-things which
 sunt altiora hominis cognitione, non sint ab homine
are higher of-man than-the-knowledge not may-be by man
 per rationem inquirenda, sunt tamen, a Deo revelata,
through reason to-be-inquired they-are yet by God revealed
 suscipienda per fidem. Unde et ibidem subditur:
to-be-received through faith whence also in-the-same-place it-is-added
 plurima supra sensum hominum ostensa sunt tibi. Et
very-many-things above the-sense of-men shown are to-you and
 in huiusmodi sacra doctrina consistit.
in things-of-this-kind sacred doctrine consists

Ad secundum dicendum quod diversa ratio cognoscibilis
to the-second it-must-be-said that a-diverse notion of-the-knowable
 diversitatem scientiarum inducit. Eandem enim conclusionem
diversity of-sciences induces the-same for conclusion
 demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, puta quod terra
demonstrates the-astronomer and the-natural-scientist for-example that the-earth
 est rotunda: sed astrologus per medium mathematicum,
is round but the-astronomer through a-middle mathematical
 idest a materia abstractum; naturalis autem per
that-is from matter abstracted the-natural-scientist but through
 medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet
a-middle about matter considered whence nothing prohibits
 de eisdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae
about the-same things about which philosophical disciplines
 tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis
treat according as they-are knowable by-the-light of-natural
 rationis, et aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod
reason also another science to-treat according as
 cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis. Unde theologia
they-are-known by-the-light of-divine revelation whence theology
 quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet, differt secundum genus
which to sacred doctrine pertains differs according-to genus
 ab illa theologia quae pars philosophiae ponitur.
from that theology which part of-philosophy is-placed

Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia

2 • WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE

Against it: every science proceeds from self-evident principles, and the articles of faith are not self-evident; and science is not of singulars, yet Scripture tells of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thomas answers that some sciences proceed from principles known by a higher science, as perspective from geometry and music from arithmetic. Sacred doctrine proceeds from principles known by the science of God and the blessed, believing them as revealed by God; its singulars serve as examples and as warrants of authority.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra doctrina
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred doctrine
non sit scientia. Omnis enim scientia procedit ex principiis
not is a-science every for science proceeds from principles
per se notis. Sed sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis
through themselves known but sacred doctrine proceeds from the-articles
fidei, qui non sunt per se noti, cum non ab omnibus
of-faith which not are through themselves known since not by all
concedantur: non enim omnium est fides, ut dicitur II
they-are-granted not for of-all is faith as it-is-said II
Thessalon. III. Non igitur sacra doctrina est scientia.

Thessalonians III not therefore sacred doctrine is a-science

2. Praeterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina
2 further science not is of-singulars but sacred doctrine
tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahae, Isaac
treats about singulars for-example about the-deeds of-Abraham Isaac
et Iacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia.
and Jacob and similar-things therefore sacred doctrine not is a-science
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trinitate: Huic
but against is that Augustine says XIV on the-Trinity to-this
scientiae attribuitur illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima
science is-attributed that only by-which faith most-salutary

gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. Hoc autem ad
is-begotten is-nourished is-defended is-strengthened this moreover to
 nullam scientiam pertinet nisi ad sacram doctrinam. Ergo
no science pertains except to sacred doctrine therefore
 sacra doctrina est scientia.

sacred doctrine is a-science

Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed
I-answer it-must-be-said sacred doctrine to-be a-science but
 sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam
to-be-known it-is that twofold is of-sciences the-genus some
 enim sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali
for are which proceed from principles known by-the-light natural
 intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et huiusmodi.

of-the-intellect as arithmetic geometry and things-of-this-kind

Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis notis
some but are which proceed from principles known
 lumine superioris scientiae: sicut perspectiva procedit ex
by-the-light of-a-higher science as perspective proceeds from
 principiis notificatis per geometriam, et musica ex principiis
principles made-known through geometry and music from principles
 per arithmetica notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est

through arithmetic known and in-this way sacred doctrine is
 scientia: quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris
a-science because it-proceeds from principles known by-the-light of-a-higher
 scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde

science which namely is the-science of-God and of-the-blessed whence

sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico,
as music believes the-principles handed-down to-it by the-arithmetician

ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.

so doctrine sacred believes the-principles revealed to-it by God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principia cuiuslibet
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-principles of-any
 scientiae vel sunt nota per se, vel reducuntur ad
science either are known through themselves or are-reduced to
 notitiam superioris scientiae. Et talia sunt principia sacrae
the-knowledge of-a-higher science and such are the-principles of-sacred
 doctrinae, ut dictum est.

doctrine as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod singularia traduntur in
to the-second it-must-be-said that singulars are-handed-down in
 sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principaliter tractetur:
sacred doctrine not because about them principally it-may-be-treated
 sed introducuntur tum in exemplum vitae, sicut in scientiis
but they-are-introduced both in example of-life as in sciences
 moralibus; tum etiam ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum
moral both also for declaring the-authority of-the-men
 per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, super quam
through whom to us revelation divine proceeded upon which
 fundatur sacra scriptura seu doctrina.

is-founded sacred scripture or doctrine

Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia

3 · WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS ONE SCIENCE

The objections say Creator and creature fall under no one genus, and that angels, bodies, and morals belong to different sciences. Thomas answers that a power or habit is one by the formal aspect of its object, as color unites man, ass, and stone for sight. Whatever is divinely revealable shares one formal aspect, so the doctrine is one, an impression of God's own single science.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra doctrina
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred doctrine
non sit una scientia. Quia secundum Philosophum in I
not is one science because according-to the-Philosopher in I
Poster., una scientia est quae est unius generis subiecti.
Posterior-Analytics one science is which is of-one genus of-subject
Creator autem et creatura, de quibus in sacra doctrina
the-Creator moreover and the-creature about which in sacred doctrine
tractatur, non continentur sub uno genere subiecti. Ergo
it-is-treated not are-contained under one genus of-subject therefore
sacra doctrina non est una scientia.
sacred doctrine not is one science

2. Praeterea, in sacra doctrina tractatur de angelis, de
2 further in sacred doctrine it-is-treated about angels about
creaturis corporalibus, de moribus hominum. Huiusmodi
creatures bodily about the-morals of-men things-of-this-kind
autem ad diversas scientias philosophicas pertinent. Igitur
moreover to diverse sciences philosophical pertain therefore
sacra doctrina non est una scientia.
sacred doctrine not is one science

Sed contra est quod Sacra Scriptura de ea loquitur sicut
but against is that Sacred Scripture about it speaks as
 de una scientia: dicitur enim Sap. X: dedit illi scientiam
about one science it-is-said for Wisdom X he-gave to-him the-science
 sanctorum.

of-the-holy

Respondeo dicendum sacram doctrinam unam scientiam esse.

I-answer it-must-be-said sacred doctrine one science to-be

Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus considerata secundum

is for the-unity of-a-power and habit to-be-considered according-to

obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem

the-object not indeed materially but according-to the-notion

formalem obiecti: puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt

formal of-the-object for-example man ass and stone agree

in una formali ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus.

in one formal notion of-the-colored which is the-object of-sight

Quia igitur sacra scriptura considerat aliqua secundum

because therefore sacred scripture considers some-things according

quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est,

as they-are divinely revealed according as said it-is

omnia quaecumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant

all whatsoever are divinely revealable communicate

in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae. Et ideo

in one notion formal of-the-object of-this science and therefore

comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sicut sub scientia una.

they-are-comprehended under sacred doctrine as under science one

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra doctrina non

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that sacred doctrine not

determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex aequo: sed

determines about God and about creatures on equal-terms but

de Deo principaliter, et de creaturis secundum quod

about God principally and about creatures according as

referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem. Unde
they-are-referred to God as to the-principle or the-end whence
 unitas scientiae non impeditur.

the-unity of-the-science not is-impeded

Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet inferiores
to the-second it-must-be-said that nothing prohibits lower
 potentias vel habitus diversificari circa illas materias, quae
powers or habits to-be-diversified about those matters which
 communiter cadunt sub una potentia vel habitu superiori: quia
commonly fall under one power or habit higher because
 superior potentia vel habitus respicit obiectum sub universali
a-higher power or habit regards the-object under a-more-universal
 ratione formali. Sicut obiectum sensus communis est sensibile,
notion formal as the-object of-sense common is the-sensible
 quod comprehendit sub se visibile et audibile: unde sensus
which comprehends under itself the-visible and the-audible whence sense
 communis, cum sit una potentia, extendit se ad omnia obiecta
common since it-is one power extends itself to all the-objects
 quinque sensuum. Et similiter ea quae in diversis scientiis
of-the-five senses and similarly those-things which in diverse sciences
 philosophicis tractantur, potest sacra doctrina, una existens,
philosophical are-treated can sacred doctrine one existing
 considerare sub una ratione, inquantum scilicet sunt divinitus
to-consider under one notion inasmuch-as namely they-are divinely
 revelabilia: ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam
revealable so-that thus sacred doctrine may-be as-it-were a-certain
 impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium.
impression of-divine science which is one and simple of-all-things

Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica

4 • WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE

James bids us be doers of the word, and the law belongs to moral science; so it seems practical. Yet it is chiefly about God, whose works men are. Thomas answers that, being one, it embraces what the philosophical sciences divide into speculative and practical, as God knows himself and his works in one knowledge. It is more speculative, since it treats divine things before human acts.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra doctrina sit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred doctrine is
scientia practica. Finis enim practicae est operatio, secundum
science practical the-end for of-practical is operation according-to
Philosophum in II Metaphys. Sacra autem doctrina ad
the-Philosopher in II Metaphysics sacred moreover doctrine to
operationem ordinatur, secundum, illud Iac. I: estote
operation is-ordered according-to that of-James I be
factores verbi, et non auditores tantum. Ergo sacra
doers of-the-word and not bearers only therefore sacred
doctrina est practica scientia.
doctrine is practical science

2. Praeterea, sacra doctrina dividitur per legem veterem et
2 further sacred doctrine is-divided through the-law old and
novam. Lex autem pertinet ad scientiam moralem, quae est
new the-law moreover pertains to science moral which is
scientia practica. Ergo sacra doctrina est scientia practica.
science practical therefore sacred doctrine is science practical
Sed contra, omnis scientia practica est de rebus operabilibus
but against every science practical is about things operable
ab homine; ut moralis de actibus hominum, et aedificativa
by man as moral about the-acts of-men and building

de aedificiis. Sacra autem doctrina est principaliter de
about buildings sacred moreover doctrine is principally about
 Deo, cuius magis homines sunt opera. Non ergo est
God of-whom rather men are the-works not therefore it-is
 scientia practica, sed magis speculativa.

science practical but rather speculative

Respondeo dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est,
I-answer it-must-be-said that sacred doctrine as said it-is
 una existens, se extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad
one existing itself extends to those-things which pertain to
 diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem formalem
diverse sciences philosophical on-account-of the-notion formal
 quam in diversis attendit: scilicet prout sunt divino
which in diverse-things it-attends-to namely according-as they-are by-divine
 lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis
light knowable whence although in sciences philosophical
 alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina
one is speculative and another practical sacred yet doctrine
 comprehendit sub se utramque; sicut et Deus eadem
comprehends under itself each as also God by-the-same
 scientia se cognoscit, et ea quae facit.

science himself knows and the-things which he-makes

Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica: quia principalius
more yet it-is speculative than practical because more-principally
 agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de
it-treats about things divine than about acts human about
 quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad
which it-treats according as through them is-ordered man to
 perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit.
the-perfect of-God knowledge in which eternal blessedness consists

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

and through this is-plain the-response to the-objections

Utrum sacra doctrina sit dignior aliis scientiis

5 · WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN THE OTHER SCIENCES

Its principles admit doubt, and it borrows from philosophy, as Jerome says the ancient teachers did. Thomas answers that it surpasses the speculative sciences in certainty, which rests on divine light, and in its matter, which transcends reason; and it surpasses the practical sciences in its end, eternal blessedness. Doubt comes from our weak intellect, like the owl's eye before the sun. It uses other sciences as handmaids, not as superiors.

Ad quantum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra doctrina
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred doctrine
non sit dignior aliis scientiis. Certitudo enim pertinet
not is more-worthy than-other sciences certitude for pertains
ad dignitatem scientiae. Sed aliae scientiae, de quarum
to the-worthiness of-a-science but other sciences about whose
principiis dubitari non potest, videntur esse certiores sacra
principles to-be-doubted not can seem to-be more-certain than-sacred
doctrina, cuius principia, scilicet articuli fidei, dubitationem
doctrine whose principles namely the-articles of-faith doubt
recipiunt. Aliae igitur scientiae videntur ista digniores.
admit other therefore sciences seem than-it more-worthy

2. Praeterea, inferioris scientiae est a superiori accipere,
2 further of-a-lower science it-is from a-higher to-receive
sicut musicus ab arithmetico. Sed sacra doctrina accipit
as the-musician from the-arithmetician but sacred doctrine receives
aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis: dicit enim Hieronymus
something from philosophical disciplines says for Jerome
in epistola ad Magnum Oratorem Urbis Romae, quod
in the-letter to Magnus Orator of-the-City of-Rome that
doctores antiqui intantum philosophorum doctrinis atque
the-teachers ancient so-much of-the-philosophers with-the-doctrines and

sententiis suos resperserunt libros, ut nescias quid in
opinions their sprinkled books that you-know-not what in
 illis prius admirari debeas, eruditionem saeculi, an scientiam
them first to-admire you-ought the-learning of-the-age or the-science
 Scripturarum. Ergo sacra doctrina est inferior aliis scientiis.

of-the-Scriptures therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to-other sciences

Sed contra est quod aliae scientiae dicuntur ancillae huius,

but against is that other sciences are-called handmaids of-this

Prov. IX: misit ancillas suas vocare ad arcem.

Proverbs IX she-sent handmaids her to-call to the-citadel

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ista scientia quantum ad

I-answer it-must-be-said that since this science as-far to

aliquid sit speculativa, et quantum ad aliquid sit practica,

something is speculative and as-far to something is practical

omnes alias transcendit tam speculativas quam practicas.

all others it-transcends as-much speculative as practical

Speculativarum enim scientiarum una altera dignior dicitur,

of-speculative for sciences one than-another more-worthy is-called

tum propter certitudinem, tum propter dignitatem materiae.

both on-account-of certitude and on-account-of the-worthiness of-the-matter

Et quantum ad utrumque, haec scientia alias speculativas

and as-far to each this science the-other speculative

scientias excedit. Secundum certitudinem quidem, quia aliae

sciences exceeds according-to certitude indeed because other

scientiae certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis

sciences certitude have from the-natural light of-reason

humanae, quae potest errare: haec autem certitudinem habet ex

human which can to-err this moreover certitude has from

lumine divinae scientiae, quae decipi non potest. Secundum

the-light of-divine science which to-be-deceived not can according-to

dignitatem vero materiae, quia ista scientia est principaliter de

the-worthiness but of-the-matter because this science is principally about

his quae sua altitudine rationem transcendunt: aliae vero
those-things which by-their height reason transcend other but
 scientiae considerant ea tantum quae rationi subduntur.

sciences consider those-things only which to-reason are-subjected

Practicarum vero scientiarum illa dignior est, quae ad

of-practical but sciences that more-worthy is which to

ulteriore finem ordinatur, sicut civilis militari: nam

a-further end is-ordered as the-civil than-the-military for

bonum exercitus ad bonum civitatis ordinatur. Finis autem

the-good of-the-army to the-good of-the-city is-ordered the-end moreover

huius doctrinae in quantum est practica, est beatitudo aeterna,

of-this doctrine inasmuch-as it-is practical is blessedness eternal

ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines

to which as to the-last end are-ordered all other ends

scientiarum practicarum. Unde manifestum est, secundum

of-sciences practical whence manifest it-is according-to

omnem modum, eam digniorem esse aliis.

every way it more-worthy to-be than-others

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that nothing prohibits that which is

certius secundum naturam, esse quoad nos minus certum,

more-certain according-to nature to-be as-to us less certain

propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, qui se habet ad

on-account-of the-weakness of-intellect our which itself holds to

manifestissima naturae, sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis,

the-most-manifest-things of-nature as the-eye of-the-owl to the-light of-the-sun

sicut dicitur in II Metaphys. Unde dubitatio quae accidit in

as it-is-said in II Metaphysics whence the-doubt which happens in

aliquibus circa articulos fidei, non est propter incertitudinem

some about the-articles of-faith not is on-account-of the-uncertainty

rei, sed propter debilitatem intellectus humani. Et

of-the-thing but on-account-of the-weakness of-intellect human and

tamen minimum quod potest haberi de cognitione rerum
yet the-least which can to-be-had about the-knowledge of-things
 altissimarum, desiderabilius est quam certissima cognitio quae
most-high more-desirable is than the-most-certain knowledge which
 habetur de minimis rebus, ut dicitur in XI de Animalibus.

is-had about the-least things as it-is-said in XI on Animals

Ad secundum dicendum quod haec scientia accipere potest
to the-second it-must-be-said that this science to-receive can
 aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate
something from philosophical disciplines not that from necessity

eis indigeat, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum
them it-may-need but for greater manifestation of-those-things

quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua
which in this science are-handed-down not for it-receives its

principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per
principles from other sciences but immediately from God through

revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam
revelation and therefore not it-receives from other sciences as

a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et
from superiors but it-uses them as inferiors and

ancillis; sicut architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, ut
handmaids as architectonic-sciences use subordinate-ones as

civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non
the-civil the-military and this itself that thus it-uses them not

est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius, sed propter
is on-account-of the-defect or insufficiency of-it but on-account-of

defectum intellectus nostri; qui ex his quae per
the-defect of-intellect our which from those-things which through

naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae)
natural reason from which proceed other sciences

cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quae sunt
are-known more-easily is-led-by-the-hand into those-things which are
 supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur.
above reason which in this science are-handed-down

Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia

6 · WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS WISDOM

The objections: it takes its principles from elsewhere, does not prove other sciences' principles, and is acquired by study, while wisdom is a gift of the Spirit. Thomas answers that the wise man orders and judges by the highest cause, and this doctrine treats God as the highest cause, not only as the philosophers knew him through creatures but as he alone knows himself and reveals himself to others. It judges the other sciences, and wisdom by study differs from wisdom by inclination, the Spirit's gift.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec doctrina non
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this doctrine not
 sit sapientia. Nulla enim doctrina quae supponit sua principia
is wisdom no for doctrine which supposes its principles
 aliunde, digna est nomine sapientiae: quia sapientis est
from-elsewhere worthy is of-the-name of-wisdom because of-the-wise-man it-is
 ordinare, et non ordinari (I Metaphys.). Sed haec doctrina
to-order and not to-be-ordered I Metaphysics but this doctrine
 supponit principia sua aliunde, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo
supposes principles its from-elsewhere as from things-said is-plain therefore
 haec doctrina non est sapientia.
this doctrine not is wisdom

2. Praeterea, ad sapientiam pertinet probare principia aliarum
2 further to wisdom it-pertains to-prove the-principles of-other
 scientiarum: unde ut caput dicitur scientiarum, ut VI
sciences whence as the-head it-is-called of-sciences as VI

Ethic. patet. Sed haec doctrina non probat principia aliarum
Ethics is-plain but this doctrine not proves the-principles of-other
 scientiarum. Ergo non est sapientia.

sciences therefore not it-is wisdom

3. Praeterea, haec doctrina per studium acquiritur. Sapientia
3 further this doctrine through study is-acquired wisdom
 autem per infusionem habetur: unde inter septem dona
but through infusion is-had whence among the-seven gifts
 Spiritus Sancti connumeratur, ut patet Isaiae XI. Ergo
of-the-Spirit Holy it-is-numbered as is-plain Isaiah XI therefore
 haec doctrina non est sapientia.

this doctrine not is wisdom

Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. IV, in principio legis:

but against is that it-is-said Deuteronomy IV in the-beginning of-the-law
 haec est nostra sapientia et intellectus coram populis.

this is our wisdom and understanding before the-peoples

Respondeo dicendum quod haec doctrina maxime sapientia

I-answer it-must-be-said that this doctrine most-of-all wisdom

est inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quidem in aliquo

is among all wisdoms human not indeed in some

genere tantum, sed simpliciter. Cum enim sapientis sit

genus only but simply since for of-the-wise-man it-is

ordinare et iudicare, iudicium autem per altiore causam

to-order and to-judge judgment moreover through a-higher cause

de inferioribus habeatur; ille sapiens dicitur in unoquoque

about lower-things is-had that-one wise is-called in each

genere, qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis. Ut

genus who considers the-cause highest of-that genus as

in genere aedificii, artifex qui disponit formam domus,

in the-genus of-building the-artificer who disposes the-form of-the-house

dicitur sapiens et architector, respectu inferiorum artificum,

is-called wise and the-architect with-respect-to the-lower artificers

qui dolant ligna vel parant lapides: unde dicitur I Cor.

who hew timbers or prepare stones whence it-is-said I Corinthians

III: ut sapiens architector fundamentum posui. Et rursus,

III as a-wise architect the-foundation I-have-laid and again

in genere totius humanae vitae, prudens sapiens dicitur,

in the-genus of-the-whole of-human life the-prudent-man wise is-called

inquantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem: unde

inasmuch-as he-orders human acts to the-due end whence

dicitur Prov. X: sapientia est viro prudentia. Ille igitur

it-is-said Proverbs X wisdom is to-a-man prudence that-one therefore

qui considerat simpliciter altissimam causam totius universi,

who considers simply the-highest cause of-the-whole universe

quae Deus est, maxime sapiens dicitur: unde et sapientia

which God is most-of-all wise is-called whence also wisdom

dicitur esse divinorum cognitio, ut patet per Augustinum,

is-said to-be of-divine-things the-knowledge as is-plain through Augustine

XII de Trinitate. Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat

XII on the-Trinity sacred moreover doctrine most-properly determines

de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa: quia non solum

about God according as he-is the-highest cause because not only

quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod

as-far to that which is through creatures knowable which

philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. I: quod notum est

the-philosophers knew as it-is-said Romans I what known is

Dei, manifestum est illis); sed etiam quantum ad id quod

of-God manifest is to-them but also as-far to that which

notum est sibi soli de seipso, et aliis per revelationem

known is to-himself alone about himself and to-others through revelation

communicatum. Unde sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia.

communicated whence sacred doctrine most-of-all is-called wisdom

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra doctrina non supponit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that sacred doctrine not supposes
 sua principia ab aliqua scientia humana: sed a scientia divina,
its principles from some science human but from science divine
 a qua, sicut a summa sapientia, omnis nostra cognitio ordinatur.

by which as by the-highest wisdom all our knowledge is-ordered
 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliarum scientiarum principia
to the-second it-must-be-said that of-other sciences the-principles
 vel sunt per se nota, et probari non possunt:
either are through themselves known and to-be-proved not can
 vel per aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in aliqua
or through some reason natural are-proved in some
 alia scientia. Propria autem huius scientiae cognitio est,
other science proper moreover of-this science knowledge is
 quae est per revelationem: non autem quae est
that-which is through revelation not but that-which is
 per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam
through natural reason and therefore not it-pertains to it
 probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare
to-prove the-principles of-other sciences but only to-judge
 de eis: quidquid enim in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati
about them whatever for in other sciences is-found to-the-truth
 huius scientiae repugnans, totum condemnatur ut falsum:
of-this science repugnant the-whole is-condemned as false
 unde dicitur II Cor. X: consilia destruentes, et omnem
whence it-is-said II Corinthians X counsels destroying and every
 altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei.

height exalting itself against the-science of-God
 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum iudicium ad sapientem
to the-third it-must-be-said that since judgment to the-wise-man
 pertineat, secundum duplicem modum iudicandi, dupliciter
pertains according-to a-twofold way of-judging in-two-ways

sapientia accipitur. Contingit enim aliquem iudicare, uno
wisdom is-taken it-happens for someone to-judge in-one
 modo per modum inclinationis: sicut qui habet habitum
way through the-mode of-inclination as he-who has the-habit
 virtutis, recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum
of-virtue rightly judges about those-things which are according-to
 virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur: unde et in
virtue to-be-done inasmuch-as to them he-is-inclined whence also in
 X Ethic. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula
X Ethics it-is-said that the-virtuous-man is the-measure and rule
 actuum humanorum. Alio modo, per modum cognitionis:
of-acts human in-another way through the-mode of-knowledge
 sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali, posset iudicare de
as someone instructed in science moral could to-judge about
 actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem non haberet. Primus igitur
the-acts of-virtue even if virtue not he-had the-first therefore
 modus iudicandi de rebus divinis, pertinet ad sapientiam quae
way of-judging about things divine pertains to wisdom which
 ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti, secundum illud I Cor. II:
is-posed a-gift of-the-Spirit Holy according-to that I Corinthians II
 spiritualis homo iudicat omnia, etc.: et Dionysius dicit, II
the-spiritual man judges all-things etc and Dionysius says II
 cap. de Divinis Nominibus: Hierotheus doctus est non solum
chapter on Divine Names Hierotheus taught is not only
 discens, sed et patiens divina. Secundus autem modus
learning but also suffering divine-things the-second but way
 iudicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam, secundum quod per
of-judging pertains to this doctrine according as through
 studium habetur; licet eius principia ex revelatione habeantur.
study it-is-had although its principles from revelation are-had

Utrum Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae

7 · WHETHER GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE

We cannot know what God is, and Scripture treats many things besides God. Thomas answers that the subject of a science is that under whose aspect everything in it is considered, as color for sight. Sacred doctrine treats all things under the aspect of God, as God himself or as ordered to him. In place of a definition it uses his effects, of nature or of grace.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
subiectum huius scientiae. In qualibet enim scientia oportet
the-subject of-this science in any for science it-is-necessary
supponere de subiecto quid est, secundum Philosophum
to-suppose about the-subject what it-is according-to the-Philosopher
in I Poster. Sed haec scientia non supponit de Deo
in I Posterior-Analytics but this science not supposes about God
quid est: dicit enim Damascenus: in Deo quid est, dicere
what he-is says for Damascene in God what he-is to-say
impossibile est. Ergo Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae.
impossible is therefore God not is the-subject of-this science
2. Praeterea, omnia quae determinantur in aliqua scientia,
2 further all-things which are-determined in some science
comprehenduntur sub subiecto illius scientiae. Sed in sacra
are-comprehended under the-subject of-that science but in sacred
scriptura determinatur de multis aliis quam de Deo,
scripture it-is-determined about many other-things than about God
puta de creaturis, et de moribus hominum. Ergo
for-example about creatures and about the-morals of-men therefore
Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae.
God not is the-subject of-this science

Sed contra, illud est subiectum scientiae, de quo est
but against that is the-subject of-a-science about which is
 sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de
the-discourse in the-science but in this science is-made discourse about
 Deo: dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo
God it-is-called for theology as-it-were discourse about God therefore
 Deus est subiectum huius scientiae.

God is the-subject of-this science

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est subiectum huius
I-answer it-must-be-said that God is the-subject of-this
 scientiae. Sic enim se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut
science thus for itself has the-subject to the-science as
 obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum. Proprie autem illud
the-object to the-power or habit properly moreover that
 assignatur obiectum alicuius potentiae vel habitus, sub cuius
is-assigned the-object of-some power or habit under whose
 ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum: sicut
notion all-things are-referred to the-power or habit as
 homo et lapis referuntur ad visum inquantum sunt colorata,
man and stone are-referred to sight inasmuch-as they-are colored
 unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus. Omnia autem
whence the-colored is the-proper object of-sight all-things moreover
 pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei: vel quia
are-treated in sacred doctrine under the-notion of-God either because
 sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut
they-are the-very God or because they-have order to God as
 ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit
to the-principle and end whence it-follows that God truly is
 subiectum huius scientiae. – Quod etiam manifestum fit
the-subject of-this science which also manifest becomes
 ex principiis huius scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est
from the-principles of-this science which are the-articles of-faith which is

de Deo: idem autem est subiectum principiorum et totius
about God the-same moreover is the-subject of-the-principles and of-the-whole
 scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis.
science since the-whole science in-power is-contained in the-principles
 Quidam vero, attendentes ad ea quae in ista scientia
some but attending to those-things which in this science
 tractantur, et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur,
are-treated and not to the-notion according-to which they-are-considered
 assignaverunt aliter subiectum huius scientiae: vel res et
assigned otherwise the-subject of-this science either things and
 signa; vel opera reparationis; vel totum Christum, idest
signs or the-works of-restoration or the-whole Christ that-is
 caput et membra. De omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista
the-head and members about all for these it-is-treated in this
 scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum.

science but according-to order to God
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet de Deo non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although about God not
 possimus scire quid est, utimur tamen eius effectum, in hac
we-can to-know what he-is we-use yet his effect in this
 doctrina, vel naturae vel gratiae, loco definitionis, ad ea
doctrine either of-nature or of-grace in-place of-a-definition for those-things
 quae de Deo in hac doctrina considerantur: sicut et in
which about God in this doctrine are-considered as also in
 aliquibus scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa
some sciences philosophical is-demonstrated something about a-cause
 per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco definitionis causae.

through the-effect by-taking the-effect in-place of-the-definition of-the-cause
 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia alia quae
to the-second it-must-be-said that all other-things which
 determinantur in sacra doctrina, comprehenduntur sub Deo:
are-determined in sacred doctrine are-comprehended under God

non ut partes vel species vel accidentia, sed ut ordinata
not as parts or species or accidents but as ordered
 aliquid ad ipsum.

in-some-way to him

Utrum haec doctrina sit argumentativa

8 · WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS ARGUMENTATIVE

Ambrose bids us take away arguments where faith is sought, and argument from authority is the weakest. Thomas answers that, like other sciences, it argues from its principles, not for them, as Paul proves the general resurrection from Christ's. Against a denier it refutes objections. Argument from revealed authority is the strongest; reason serves faith as nature serves grace, and canonical Scripture alone binds by necessity.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec doctrina
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this doctrine
 non sit argumentativa. Dicit enim Ambrosius in libro I
not is argumentative says for Ambrose in the-book I
 de Fide Catholica: tolle argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur.

on the-Faith Catholic take-away arguments where faith is-sought

Sed in hac doctrina praecipue fides quaeritur: unde dicitur
but in this doctrine especially faith is-sought whence it-is-said
 Ioan. XX: haec scripta sunt ut credatis. Ergo sacra
John XX these-things written are that you-may-believe therefore sacred
 doctrina non est argumentativa.

doctrine not is argumentative

2. Praeterea, si sit argumentativa, aut argumentatur ex

2 further if it-is argumentative either it-argues from

auctoritate, aut ex ratione. Si ex auctoritate, non videtur

authority or from reason if from authority not it-seems

hoc congruere eius dignitati: nam locus ab auctoritate
this to-befit its dignity for the-topic from authority
 est infirmissimus, secundum Boetium. Si etiam ex ratione,
is weakest according-to Boethius if also from reason
 hoc non congruit eius fini: quia secundum Gregorium in
this not befits its end because according-to Gregory in
 homilia, fides non habet meritum, ubi humana ratio praebet
a-homily faith not has merit where human reason offers
 experimentum. Ergo sacra doctrina non est argumentativa.
proof therefore sacred doctrine not is argumentative
 Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Titum I, de episcopo:
but against is that it-is-said to Titus I about the-bishop
 amplectentem eum qui secundum doctrinam est, fidelem
embracing that which according-to doctrine is faithful
 sermonem, ut potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana,
word that able he-may-be to-exhort in doctrine sound
 et eos qui contradicunt arguere.
and those who contradict to-refute
 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut aliae scientiae non
I-answer it-must-be-said that as other sciences not
 argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis
argue for their principles to-be-proved but from principles
 argumentantur ad ostendendum alia in ipsis scientiis; ita
they-argue for showing other-things in the-very sciences so
 haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda,
this doctrine not argues for its principles to-be-proved
 quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid
which are the-articles of-faith but from them it-proceeds to something
 aliud ostendendum; sicut Apostolus, I ad Cor. XV,
else to-be-shown as the-Apostle I to Corinthians XV

ex resurrectione Christi argumentatur ad resurrectionem
from the-resurrection of-Christ argues to the-resurrection
 communem probandam.

common to-be-proved

Sed tamen considerandum est in scientiis philosophicis, quod
but yet to-be-considered it-is in sciences philosophical that
 inferiores scientiae nec probant sua principia, nec contra

lower sciences neither prove their principles nor against

negantem principia disputant, sed hoc relinquunt superiori
one-denying the-principles dispute but this they-leave to-a-higher

scientiae: suprema vero inter eas, scilicet metaphysica,

science the-highest but among them namely metaphysics

disputat contra negantem sua principia, si adversarius aliquid
disputes against one-denying its principles if the-adversary something

concedit: si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo

concedes if but nothing concedes not it-can with him

disputare, potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius. Unde sacra

to-dispute it-can yet to-solve the-reasons of-him whence sacred

scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante

scripture since not it-has a-superior disputes with one-denying

sua principia: argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid

its principles by-arguing indeed if the-adversary something

concedat eorum quae per divinam revelationem habentur;

concedes of-those-things which through divine revelation are-had

sicut per auctoritates sacrae doctrinae disputamus contra

as through the-authorities of-sacred doctrine we-dispute against

haereticos, et per unum articulum contra negantes alium.

heretics and through one article against those-denying another

Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum quae divinitus

if but the-adversary nothing believes of-those-things which divinely

revelantur, non remanet amplius via ad probandum articulos

are-revealed not remains any-longer a-way for proving the-articles

fidei per rationes, sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas
of-faith through reasons but for solving the-reasons if any
 inducit, contra fidem. Cum enim fides infallibili veritati
be-brings-in against faith since for faith on-infallible truth
 innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari
rests impossible moreover it-is about the-true to-be-demonstrated
 contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem
the-contrary manifest it-is the-proofs which against faith
 inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.
are-brought-in not to-be demonstrations but soluble arguments
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet argumenta rationis
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although the-arguments of-reason
 humanae non habeant locum ad probandum quae fidei
human not have place for proving what-things of-faith
 sunt, tamen ex articulis fidei haec doctrina ad alia
are yet from the-articles of-faith this doctrine to other-things
 argumentatur, ut dictum est.

argues as said it-is
 Ad secundum dicendum quod argumentari ex auctoritate
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-argue from authority
 est maxime proprium huius doctrinae: eo quod
is most-of-all proper of-this doctrine for-the-reason that
 principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur, et sic
the-principles of-this doctrine through revelation are-had and thus
 oportet quod credatur auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio
it-is-necessary that it-be-believed to-the-authority of-those to-whom revelation
 facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati huius doctrinae: nam
made was nor this derogates from-the-dignity of-this doctrine for
 licet locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione
although the-topic from authority which is-founded upon reason

humana, sit infirmissimus; locus tamen ab auctoritate quae
human is weakest the-topic yet from authority which
 fundatur super revelatione divina, est efficacissimus.

is-founded upon revelation divine is most-efficacious

Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana: non quidem

uses yet sacred doctrine even reason human not indeed

ad probandum fidem, quia per hoc tolleretur meritum

for proving faith because through this would-be-taken-away the-merit

fidei; sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia quae traduntur

of-faith but for making-manifest some other-things which are-banded-down

in hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed

in this doctrine since for grace not takes-away nature but

perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut

perfects it-is-necessary that natural reason serve faith as

et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. Unde et

also the-natural inclination of-the-will obeys charity whence also

Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. X: in captivitatem redigentes

the-Apostle says II to Corinthians X into captivity bringing

omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. Et inde est quod

every understanding into the-obedience of-Christ and thence it-is that

etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi

even the-authorities of-the-philosophers sacred doctrine uses where

per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt; sicut

through reason natural the-truth to-know they-could as

Paulus, Actuum XVII, inducit verbum Arati, dicens: sicut

Paul in-Acts XVII brings-in the-word of-Aratus saying as

et quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt, genus Dei sumus.

also some of-the-poets your have-said the-race of-God we-are

Sed tamen sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur

but yet sacred doctrine such authorities uses

quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus

as-it-were extraneous arguments and probable the-authorities

autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate

moreover of-canonical Scripture it-uses properly from necessity

argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum

by-arguing the-authorities moreover of-other teachers

ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter.

of-the-church as-it-were by-arguing from proper-grounds but probably

Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis

rests for faith our on-the-revelation to-the-Apostles and Prophets

factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt: non autem revelationi,

made who the-canonical books wrote not but on-the-revelation

si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta. Unde dicit Augustinus,

if any was to-other teachers made whence says Augustine

in epistola ad Hieronymum: Solis eis Scripturarum libris

in the-letter to Jerome to-only those of-the-Scriptures books

qui canonici appellantur, didici hunc honorem deferre,

which canonical are-called I-have-learned this honor to-pay

ut nullum auctorem eorum in scribendo errasse aliquid

that no author of-them in writing to-have-erred anything

firmissime credam. Alios autem ita lego, ut, quantalibet

most-firmly I-may-believe others moreover thus I-read that however-much

sanctitate doctrinaque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem,

by-holiness and-by-doctrine they-may-excel not therefore true I-may-think

quod ipsi ita senserunt vel scripserunt.

because they-themselves so thought or wrote

Utrum sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris

9 • WHETHER HOLY SCRIPTURE SHOULD USE METAPHORS

Likenesses belong to poetry, the lowest doctrine, and they hide the truth. Thomas answers that God provides for each thing by its nature, and man comes to the intelligible through the sensible, so spiritual things are taught under bodily metaphors, which also reach the unlearned. The divine ray is not lost under its veils. Base figures suit better than noble ones, for three reasons: they mislead less, they fit our knowledge of what God is not, and they hide truth from the unworthy.

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra Scriptura non
to the-ninth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred Scripture not
debeat uti metaphoris. Illud enim quod est proprium infimae
ought to-use metaphors that for which is proper of-the-lowest
doctrinae, non videtur competere huic scientiae, quae inter alias
doctrine not seems to-befit this science which among others
tenet locum supremum, ut iam dictum est. Procedere autem
holds place highest as already said it-is to-proceed moreover
per similitudines varias et repraesentationes, est proprium
through likenesses various and representations is proper
poeticae, quae est infima inter omnes doctrinas. Ergo huiusmodi
of-poetics which is lowest among all doctrines therefore such
similitudinibus uti, non est conveniens huic scientiae.
likenesses to-use not is fitting for-this science

2. Praeterea, haec doctrina videtur esse ordinata ad veritatis
2 further this doctrine seems to-be ordered to of-truth
manifestationem: unde et manifestatoribus eius praemium
the-manifestation whence also to-the-manifesters of-it a-reward
promittitur, Eccli. XXIV: qui elucidant me, vitam
is-promised Ecclesiasticus XXIV they-who elucidate me life
aeternam habebunt. Sed per huiusmodi similitudines veritas
eternal will-have but through such likenesses truth

occultatur. Non ergo competit huic doctrinae divina
is-bidden not therefore it-befits this doctrine divine-things
 tradere sub similitudine corporalium rerum.

to-hand-down under the-likeness of-bodily things

3. Praeterea, quantò aliquae creaturae sunt sublimiores, tanto

3 further by-how-much some creatures are more-sublime by-so-much

magis ad divinam similitudinem accedunt. Si igitur aliquae ex

more to divine likeness they-approach if therefore some of

creaturis transumerentur ad Deum, tunc oporteret talem

creatures were-transferred to God then it-would-be-necessary such

transumptionem maxime fieri ex sublimioribus creaturis, et

transference most-of-all to-be-made from the-more-sublime creatures and

non ex infimis. Quod tamen in Scripturis frequenter invenitur.

not from the-lowest which yet in the-Scriptures frequently is-found

Sed contra est quod dicitur Osee XII: Ego visionem multiplicavi

but against is that it-is-said Hosea XII I vision have-multiplied

eis, et in manibus prophetarum assimilatus sum.

for-them and in the-hands of-the-prophets likened I-have-been

Tradere autem aliquid sub similitudine, est metaphoricum.

to-hand-down moreover something under a-likeness is metaphorical

Ergo ad sacram doctrinam pertinet uti metaphoris.

therefore to sacred doctrine it-pertains to-use metaphors

Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens est sacrae Scripturae

I-answer it-must-be-said that fitting it-is for-sacred Scripture

divina et spiritualia sub similitudine corporalium tradere.

divine and spiritual-things under the-likeness of-bodily-things to-hand-down

Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum

God for for-all provides according as it-befits their

naturae. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia

nature it-is moreover natural to-man that through sensible-things

ad intelligibilia veniat: quia omnis nostra cognitio a

to intelligible-things be-come because all our knowledge from

sensu initium habet. Unde convenienter in sacra Scriptura
sense beginning has whence fittingly in sacred Scripture
 traduntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium. Et
are-handed-down to-us spiritual-things under metaphors of-bodily-things and
 hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Caelestis Hierarchiae:
this is what says Dionysius I chapter of-the-Celestial Hierarchy
 Impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi
impossible it-is for-us otherwise to-shine the-divine ray except
 varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum.
by-the-variety of-sacred veils veiled-around
 Convenit etiam sacrae Scripturae, quae communiter omnibus
it-befits also sacred Scripture which commonly to-all
 proponitur (secundum illud ad Rom. I: sapientibus et
is-proposed according-to that to Romans I to-the-wise and
 insipientibus debitor sum), ut spiritualia sub similitudinibus
to-the-foolish a-debtor I-am that spiritual-things under likenesses
 corporalium proponantur; ut saltem vel sic rudes eam
of-bodily-things be-proposed that at-least even thus the-uneducated it
 capiant, qui ad intelligibilia secundum se capienda non
may-grasp who for intelligible-things according-to themselves to-be-grasped not
 sunt idonei.

are fit

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poeta utitur metaphoris
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-poet uses metaphors
 propter repraesentationem: repraesentatio enim naturaliter
on-account-of representation representation for naturally
 homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris
to-man delightful is but sacred doctrine uses metaphors
 propter necessitatem et utilitatem, ut dictum est.
on-account-of necessity and utility as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod radius divinae revelationis non
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-ray of-divine revelation not
destruitur propter figuras sensibiles quibus circumvelatur,
is-destroyed on-account-of the-figures sensible with-which it-is-veiled-around
ut dicit Dionysius, sed remanet in sua veritate; ut mentes
as says Dionysius but it-remains in its truth so-that the-minds
quibus fit revelatio, non permittat in similitudinibus
to-which is-made revelation not it-permits in likenesses
permanere, sed elevet eas ad cognitionem intelligibilium;
to-remain but it-raises them to the-knowledge of-intelligible-things
et per eos quibus revelatio facta est, alii etiam
and through those to-whom revelation made it-has-been others also
circa haec instruantur. Unde ea quae in uno loco
about these-things may-be-instructed whence those-things which in one place
Scripturae traduntur sub metaphoris, in aliis locis expressius
of-Scripture are-handed-down under metaphors in other places more-expressly
exponuntur. Et ipsa etiam occultatio figurarum utilis est,
are-expounded and the-very also concealment of-figures useful is
ad exercitium studiosorum, et contra irrisiones infidelium,
for the-exercise of-the-studious and against the-mockeries of-unbelievers
de quibus dicitur, Matth. VII: nolite sanctum dare canibus.
about whom it-is-said Matthew VII do-not the-holy to-give to-dogs
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut docet Dionysius, cap. II
to the-third it-must-be-said that as teaches Dionysius chapter II
Cael. Hier., magis est conveniens quod divina in Scripturis
Celestial Hierarchy more is fitting that divine-things in the-Scriptures
tradantur sub figuris vilium corporum, quam corporum
be-handed-down under the-figures of-vile bodies than of-bodies
nobilium. Et hoc propter tria. Primo, quia per hoc
noble and this on-account-of three-things first because through this
magis liberatur humanus animus ab errore. Manifestum enim
more is-freed the-human mind from error manifest for

apparet quod haec secundum proprietatem non dicuntur de
it-appears that these-things according-to proper-sense not are-said of
 divinis: quod posset esse dubium, si sub figuris nobilium
divine-things which could to-be doubtful if under the-figures of-noble
 corporum describerentur divina; maxime apud illos qui
bodies were-described divine-things especially among those who
 nihil aliud a corporibus nobilius excogitare noverunt. –
nothing other than bodies nobler to-think-out know
 Secundo, quia hic modus convenientior est cognitioni quam
second because this mode more-fitting is to-the-knowledge which
 de Deo habemus in hac vita. Magis enim manifestatur
about God we-have in this life more for is-manifested
 nobis de ipso quid non est, quam quid est: et ideo
to-us about him what not he-is than what he-is and therefore
 similitudines illarum rerum quae magis elongantur a Deo,
likenesses of-those things which more are-removed from God
 veriozem nobis faciunt aestimationem quod sit supra illud
truer for-us make the-estimation that he-is above that
 quod de Deo dicimus vel cogitamus. – Tertio, quia per
which about God we-say or think third because through
 huiusmodi, divina magis occultantur indignis.
such-things divine-things more are-hidden from-the-unworthy

Utrum sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus

10 • WHETHER ONE LETTER OF SCRIPTURE HAS SEVERAL SENSES

Many senses seem to breed confusion. Thomas answers that God, the author, signifies not only by words but by the things themselves, so beyond the literal sense there is a spiritual one: allegorical, moral, and anagogical. Since God comprehends all at once, even the literal sense of one letter may be several, as Augustine says. All rest on the literal, from which alone argument is drawn, and nothing necessary to faith lies only in the spiritual sense. The parabolic sense belongs to the literal.

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacra Scriptura
to the-tenth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that sacred Scripture
sub una littera non habeat plures sensus, qui sunt
under one letter not has several senses which are
historicus vel litteralis, allegoricus, tropologicus sive moralis,
historical or literal allegorical tropological or moral
et anagogicus. Multiplicitas enim sensuum in una scriptura
and anagogical the-multiplicity for of-senses in one scripture
parit confusionem et deceptionem, et tollit arguendi
begets confusion and deception and takes-away of-arguing
firmitatem: unde ex multiplicibus propositionibus non
the-firmness whence from multiple propositions not
procedit argumentatio, sed secundum hoc aliquae fallaciae
proceeds argumentation but according-to this some fallacies
assignantur. Sacra autem Scriptura debet esse efficax ad
are-assigned sacred moreover Scripture ought to-be efficacious for
ostendendam veritatem absque omni fallacia. Ergo non
showing truth without any fallacy therefore not
debent in ea sub una littera plures sensus tradi.
ought in it under one letter several senses to-be-handed-down

2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de Utilitate credendi,

2 further Augustine says in the-book on the-Utility of-believing
quod Scriptura quae Testamentum Vetus vocatur, quadrifariam
that the-Scripture which Testament Old is-called in-four-ways

traditur: scilicet, secundum historiam, secundum aetiologiam,
is-handed-down namely according-to history according-to aetiology

secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam. Quae quidem

according-to analogy according-to allegory which indeed

quatuor a quatuor praedictis videntur esse aliena omnino.

four from the-four aforesaid seem to-be alien altogether

Non igitur conveniens videtur quod eadem littera sacrae

not therefore fitting it-seems that the-same letter of-sacred

Scripturae secundum quatuor sensus praedictos exponatur.

Scripture according-to four senses aforesaid be-expounded

3. Praeterea, praeter praedictos sensus, invenitur sensus

3 further besides the-aforesaid senses is-found the-sense

parabolicus, qui inter illos sensus quatuor non continetur.

parabolic which among those senses four not is-contained

Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, XX Moraliū: Sacra

but against is that says Gregory XX of-the-Morals sacred

Scriptura omnes scientias ipso locutionis suae more

Scripture all sciences by-the-very of-speech its manner

transcendit: quia uno eodemque sermone, dum narrat

transcends because in-one and-the-same discourse while it-narrates

gestum, prodit mysterium.

a-deed it-reveals a-mystery

Respondeo dicendum quod auctor sacrae Scripturae est

I-answer it-must-be-said that the-author of-sacred Scripture is

Deus, in cuius potestate est ut non solum voces ad

God in whose power it-is that not only words for

significandum accomodat (quod etiam homo facere potest),

signifying be-may-adapt which also man to-do can

sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis
but also things themselves and therefore since in all sciences
 voces significant, hoc habet proprium ista scientia, quod
words signify this has as-proper this science that
 ipsae res significatae per voces, etiam significant aliquid.
the-very things signified through words also signify something
 Illa ergo prima significatio, qua voces significant res,
that therefore first signification by-which words signify things
 pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel
pertains to the-first sense which is the-sense historical or
 litteralis. Illa vero significatio qua res significatae per
literal that but signification by-which the-things signified through
 voces, iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis;
words again things other signify is-called the-sense spiritual
 qui super litteralem fundatur, et eum supponit.
which upon the-literal is-founded and it presupposes
 Hic autem sensus spiritualis trifariam dividitur. Sicut enim dicit
this moreover sense spiritual in-three-ways is-divided as for says
 Apostolus, ad Hebr. VII, lex vetus figura est novae legis: et
the-Apostle to Hebrews VII the-law old the-figure is of-the-new law and
 ipsa nova lex, ut dicit Dionysius in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia,
the-very new law as says Dionysius in the-Ecclesiastical Hierarchy
 est figura futurae gloriae: in nova etiam lege, ea quae
is the-figure of-future glory in the-new also law those-things which
 in capite sunt gesta, sunt signa eorum quae nos agere
in the-head are done are signs of-those-things which we to-do
 debemus. Secundum ergo quod ea quae sunt veteris legis,
ought according-to therefore that those-things which are of-the-old law
 significant ea quae sunt novae legis, est sensus allegoricus:
signify those-things which are of-the-new law is the-sense allegorical
 secundum vero quod ea quae in Christo sunt facta, vel in
according-to but that those-things which in Christ are done or in

his quae Christum significant, sunt signa eorum quae
those-things which Christ signify are signs of-those-things which
 nos agere debemus, est sensus moralis: prout vero significant
we to-do ought is the-sense moral according-as but they-signify
 ea quae sunt in aeterna gloria, est sensus anagogicus.

those-things which are in eternal glory is the-sense anagogical

Quia vero sensus litteralis est, quem auctor intendit:

because but the-sense literal is which the-author intends

auctor autem sacrae Scripturae Deus est, qui omnia simul

the-author moreover of-sacred Scripture God is who all-things at-once

suo intellectu comprehendit: non est inconveniens, ut dicit

by-his intellect comprehends not is unfitting as says

Augustinus XII Confessionum, si etiam secundum litteralem

Augustine XII of-the-Confessions if even according-to the-literal

sensum in una littera Scripturae plures sint sensus.

sense in one letter of-Scripture several are senses

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multiplicitas horum

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-multiplicity of-these

sensuum non facit aequivocationem, aut aliam speciem

senses not makes equivocation or another species

multiplicitatis: quia, sicut iam dictum est, sensus isti non

of-multiplicity because as already said it-is senses these not

multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa significet;

are-multiplied on-account-of this that one word many-things may-signify

sed quia ipsae res significatae per voces, aliarum rerum

but because the-very things signified through words of-other things

possunt esse signa. Et ita etiam nulla confusio sequitur in

can to-be signs and thus also no confusion follows in

sacra Scriptura: cum omnes sensus fundentur super unum,

sacred Scripture since all senses are-founded upon one

scilicet litteralem; ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum, non

namely the-literal from which alone can be-drawn an-argument not

autem ex his quae secundum allegoriam dicuntur, ut dicit
but from those-things which according-to allegory are-said as says
 Augustinus in epistola contra Vincentium Donatistam. Non
Augustine in the-letter against Vincent the-Donatist not
 tamen ex hoc aliquid deperit sacrae Scripturae: quia nihil sub
yet from this anything perishes to-sacred Scripture because nothing under
 spirituali sensu continetur fidei necessarium, quod Scriptura
the-spiritual sense is-contained to-faith necessary which Scripture
 per litteralem sensum alicubi manifeste non tradat.
through the-literal sense somewhere manifestly not may-band-down
 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa tria, historia, aetiologia,
to the-second it-must-be-said that those three history aetiology
 analogia, ad unum litteralem sensum pertinent. Nam historia
analogy to one literal sense pertain for history
 est, ut ipse Augustinus exponit, cum simpliciter aliquid
is as himself Augustine expounds when simply something
 proponitur: aetiologia vero, cum causa dicti assignatur,
is-proposed aetiology but when the-cause of-the-thing-said is-assigned
 sicut cum Dominus assignavit causam quare Moyses permisit
as when the-Lord assigned the-cause why Moses permitted
 licentiam repudiandi uxores, scilicet propter duritiam cordis
the-license of-repudiating wives namely on-account-of the-hardness of-heart
 ipsorum, Matt. XIX: analogia vero est, cum veritas unius
of-them Matthew XIX analogy but is when the-truth of-one
 Scripturae ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare. Sola
Scripture is-shown to-the-truth of-another not to-be-repugnant only
 autem allegoria, inter illa quatuor, pro tribus spiritualibus
moreover allegory among those four for the-three spiritual
 sensibus ponitur. Sicut et Hugo de Sancto Victore sub
senses is-placed as also Hugh of Saint Victor under
 sensu allegorico etiam anagogicum comprehendit, ponens
the-sense allegorical also the-anagogical comprehends placing

in tertio suarum Sententiarum solum tres sensus, scilicet
in the-third of-his Sentences only three senses namely
 historicum, allegoricum et tropologicum.

the-historical the-allegorical and the-tropological

Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus parabolicus sub litterali
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-sense parabolic under the-literal
 continetur: nam per voces significatur aliquid proprie, et
is-contained for through words is-signified something properly and
 aliquid figurative; nec est litteralis sensus ipsa figura, sed id
something figuratively nor is the-literal sense the-very figure but that
 quod est figuratum. Non enim cum Scriptura nominat Dei
which is figured not for when Scripture names of-God
 brachium, est litteralis sensus quod in Deo sit membrum
the-arm is the-literal sense that in God there-is a-member
 huiusmodi corporale: sed id quod per hoc membrum
of-this-kind bodily but that which through this member
 significatur, scilicet virtus operativa. In quo patet quod sensui
is-signified namely the-power operative in which is-plain that to-the-sense
 litterali sacrae Scripturae nunquam potest subesse falsum.
literal of-sacred Scripture never can to-underlie the-false

De Deo, an Deus sit

II · ON GOD: WHETHER GOD EXISTS

Since sacred doctrine chiefly teaches the knowledge of God, Thomas plans the work: first God, then the rational creature's movement toward God, then Christ, our way to God. The treatment of God has three parts: the divine essence, the distinction of Persons, and the procession of creatures. On the essence he asks first whether God exists, in three articles: whether it is self-evident, whether it can be demonstrated, and whether God exists.

Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est
because therefore the-principal intention of-this sacred doctrine is
Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in
of-God the-knowledge to-hand-down and not only according as in
se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et
himself he-is but also according as he-is the-principle of-things and
finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis
the-end of-them and especially of-rational creature as from things-said
est manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes,
is manifest for of-this doctrine the-exposition intending
primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis
first we-shall-treat about God second about the-movement of-the-rational
creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum
creature toward God third about Christ who according
quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum.
as man the-way is for-us of-tending toward God
Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque
the-consideration moreover about God threefold will-be first for
considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent;
we-shall-consider those-things which to the-essence divine pertain
secundo, ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem Personarum;
second those-things which pertain to the-distinction of-the-Persons

tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab
third those-things which pertain to the-procession of-creatures from
 ipso.

him

Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est
about the-essence but divine first to-be-considered it-is
 an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo
whether God is second how he-is or rather how
 non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad
not he-is third to-be-considered it-will-be about those-things which to
 operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de
the-operation of-him pertain namely about science and about
 voluntate et potentia.

will and power

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

about the-first are-asked three

Primo: utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

first whether God to-be is through itself known

Secundo: utrum sit demonstrabile.

second whether it-is demonstrable

Tertio: an Deus sit.

third whether God is

Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum

1 • WHETHER GOD'S EXISTENCE IS SELF-EVIDENT

Knowledge of God seems implanted in all, as Damascene says; the name, that than which nothing greater can be signified, seems to prove itself; and truth, which God is, cannot be denied. Thomas distinguishes what is self-evident in itself from what is self-evident to us. God is his own being, so the proposition is self-evident in itself, but not to us, who do not know what God is; nor does understanding the name prove the thing exists.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God to-be is
per se notum. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se
through itself known those-things for to-us are-said through themselves
nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de
known whose knowledge in-us naturally is-in as is-plain about
primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus in principio
the-first principles but as says Damascene in the-beginning
libri sui, omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est
of-book his in-all the-knowledge of-existing God naturally is
inserta. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
implanted therefore God to-be is through itself known

2. Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae
2 further those-things are-said to-be through themselves known which
statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur: quod Philosophus
at-once known the-terms are-known which the-Philosopher
attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster.:
attributes to-the-first of-demonstration principles in I Posterior-Analytics
scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur
known for what is the-whole and what the-part at-once it-is-known
quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid
that every whole greater is than-its part but understood what

significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est.

may-signify this name God at-once it-is-had that God is

Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari

is-signified for by-this name that than-which greater to-be-signified

non potest: maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu,

not can greater moreover is what is in reality and in-understanding

quam quod est in intellectu tantum: unde cum, intellecto

than what is in understanding only whence since understood

hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam

this name God at-once it-is in understanding it-follows also

quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.

that it-is in reality therefore God to-be is through itself known

3. Praeterea, veritatem esse est per se notum: quia qui

3 further truth to-be is through itself known because he-who

negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse: si enim veritas

denies truth to-be concedes truth to-be if for truth

non est, verum est veritatem non esse. Si autem est

not is true it-is truth not to-be if moreover there-is

aliquid verum, oportet quod veritas sit. Deus autem est

something true it-is-necessary that truth be God moreover is

ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV: Ego sum via, veritas et vita.

the-very truth John XIV I am the-way the-truth and the-life

Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.

therefore God to-be is through itself known

Sed contra, nullus potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est

but against no-one can to-think the-opposite of-that which is

per se notum, ut patet per Philosophum, in IV Metaphys.

through itself known as is-plain through the-Philosopher in IV Metaphysics

et I Poster., circa prima demonstrationis principia.

and I Posterior-Analytics about the-first of-demonstration principles

Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius quod est Deum esse,

to-be-thought moreover can the-opposite of-that which is God to-be

secundum illud Psalmi LII: Dixit insipiens in corde suo,
according-to that of-the-Psalm LII said the-fool in heart his
 non est Deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum.
not is God therefore God to-be not is through itself known
 Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se
I-answer it-must-be-said that it-happens something to-be through itself
 notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se et non quoad
known in-two-ways in-one way according-to itself and not as-to
 nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc
us in-another way according-to itself and as-to us from this
 enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum
for some proposition is through itself known that the-predicate
 includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal: nam
is-included in the-notion of-the-subject as man is animal for
 animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus
animal is of the-notion of-man if therefore known be to-all
 de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit
about the-predicate and about the-subject what it-is proposition that will-be
 omnibus per se nota: sicut patet in primis demonstrationum
to-all through itself known as is-plain in the-first of-demonstrations
 principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae
principles whose terms are certain common-things which
 nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et
no-one is-ignorant-of as being and not being whole and part and
 similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato
similar-things if but among some known not be about the-predicate
 et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est,
and subject what it-is the-proposition indeed as-far in itself it-is
 erit per se nota: non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum
will-be through itself known not yet among those who the-predicate
 et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit,
and subject of-the-proposition are-ignorant-of and therefore it-happens

ut dicit Boetius in libro de Hebdomadibus, quod quaedam
as says Boethius in the-book on the-Hebdomads that some
 sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae,
are common of-the-mind conceptions and through themselves known
 apud sapientes tantum, ut incorporea in loco non esse.

among the-wise only as incorporeal-things in place not to-be

Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est,
I-say therefore that this proposition God is as-far in itself it-is
 per se nota est: quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto;

through itself known is because the-predicate is the-same with the-subject

Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non
God for is his-own to-be as below will-be-plain but because we not
 scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota: sed

know about God what he-is not it-is to-us through itself known but

indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad
it-needs to-be-demonstrated through those-things which are more known as-to
 nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.

us and less known as-to nature namely through effects

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that to-know God to-be

in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis

in something common under a-certain confusion is in-us

naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis

naturally implanted inasmuch-as namely God is of-man

beatitudo: homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et

the-blessedness man for naturally desires blessedness and

quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur

what naturally is-desired by man naturally is-known

ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum

by the-same but this not is simply to-know God

esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum,

to-be as to-know one-coming not is to-know Peter

quamvis sit Petrus veniens: multi enim perfectum hominis
although it-be Peter coming many for the-perfect of-man
 bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero
good which is blessedness reckon riches some but
 voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.

pleasures some moreover something else
 Ad secundum dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc
to the-second it-must-be-said that perhaps he who hears this
 nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius
name God not understands to-be-signified something than-which greater
 cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse
to-be-thought not can since some have-believed God to-be
 corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine
a-body granted even that anyone may-understand by-this name
 Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius
God to-be-signified this which is-said namely that than-which greater
 cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur
to-be-thought not can not yet on-account-of this it-follows
 quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse
that he-may-understand that which is-signified through the-name to-be
 in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum.
in of-things the-nature but in the-apprehension of-the-intellect only
 Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod
nor can it-be-argued that it-is in reality unless it-were-granted that
 sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest:
there-is in reality something than-which greater to-be-thought not can
 quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.
which not is granted by those-positing God not to-be

Ad tertium dicendum quod veritatem esse in communi,
 to the-third it-must-be-said that truth to-be in common
 est per se notum: sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non
 is through itself known but the-first truth to-be this not
 est per se notum quoad nos.
 is through itself known as-to us

Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile

2 · WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD EXISTS

Faith concerns what is not seen, and we cannot know what God is. Thomas answers that besides demonstration from cause there is demonstration from effect, and any effect shows its cause exists. So God's existence can be demonstrated from his effects. It is a preamble to the articles of faith, not an article; the name's meaning serves as the middle term, though effects cannot show his essence.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse
 to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God to-be
 non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim esse est articulus fidei.
 not is demonstrable God for to-be is an-article of-faith
 Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrabilia: quia
 but those-things which are of-faith not are demonstrable because
 demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus
 demonstration makes to-know faith but about not appearing-things
 est, ut patet per Apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum
 is as is-plain through the-Apostle to Hebrews XI therefore God
 esse non est demonstrabile.
 to-be not is demonstrable

2. Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est.

2 further the-middle of-demonstration is that what is
 Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum
 but about God not we-can to-know what he-is but only

quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus
what not be-is as says Damascene therefore not we-can
 demonstrare Deum esse.

to-demonstrate God to-be

3. Praeterea, si demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi
3 further if it-were-demonstrated God to-be this not would-be except
 ex effectibus eius. Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati
from effects his but the-effects his not are proportioned
 ei: cum ipse sit infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem
to-him since he be infinite and the-effects finite of-the-finite but
 ad infinitum non est proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit
to the-infinite not is proportion since therefore a-cause not can
 demonstrari per effectum sibi non proportionatum, videtur
to-be-demonstrated through an-effect to-it not proportioned it-seems
 quod Deum esse non possit demonstrari.

that God to-be not can to-be-demonstrated

Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I: invisibilia
but against is that the-Apostle says to Romans I the-invisible-things
 Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.

of-God through those-things which made are understood are-clearly-seen

Sed hoc non esset, nisi per ea quae facta sunt,
but this not would-be unless through those-things which made are
 posset demonstrari Deum esse: primum enim quod oportet
could to-be-demonstrated God to-be the-first for which it-is-necessary
 intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.

to-be-understood about something is whether it-is

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una
I-answer it-must-be-said that twofold is demonstration one
 quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid: et haec est
which is through the-cause and is-called because-of what and this is
 per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur
through things-prior simply another is through the-effect and is-called

demonstratio quia: et haec est per ea quae sunt priora
demonstration that and this is through those-things which are prior
 quoad nos: cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior
as-to us when for an-effect some to-us is more-manifest
 quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem
than its cause through the-effect we-proceed to the-knowledge
 causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari
of-the-cause from any moreover effect can to-be-demonstrated
 propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis
the-proper cause of-it to-be if yet its effects be more
 noti quoad nos): quia, cum effectus dependeat a causa,
known as-to us because since effects depend on the-cause
 posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum
posited the-effect necessary it-is the-cause to-pre-exist whence God
 esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos,
to-be according as not it-is through itself known as-to us
 demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.

demonstrable is through effects to-us known
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that God to-be and other-things
 huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de
of-this-kind which through reason natural known can to-be about
 Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I, non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula
God as it-is-said Romans I not are articles of-faith but preambles
 ad articulos: sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem,
to the-articles thus for faith presupposes knowledge natural
 sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen
as grace nature and as perfection the-perfectible nothing yet
 prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile,
prohibits that which according-to itself demonstrable is and knowable
 ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit.
by someone to-be-accepted as believable who demonstration not grasps

Ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per
to the-second it-must-be-said that when is-demonstrated a-cause through
 effectum, necesse est uti effectum loco definitionis causae, ad
an-effect necessary it-is to-use the-effect in-place of-the-definition of-the-cause for
 probandum causam esse: et hoc maxime contingit in Deo.
proving the-cause to-be and this most-of-all happens in God
 Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro
because for proving something to-be necessary it-is to-take for
 medio quid significet nomen, non autem quod quid est: quia
the-middle what may-signify the-name not but that what is because
 quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina
the-question what it-is follows on the-question whether it-is the-names
 autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur:
moreover of-God are-imposed from effects as afterward will-be-shown
 unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere
whence in-demonstrating God to-be through the-effect to-take
 possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus.
we-can for the-middle what may-signify this name God
 Ad tertium dicendum quod per effectus non proportionatos
to the-third it-must-be-said that through effects not proportioned
 causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi:
to-the-cause not can perfect knowledge about the-cause to-be-had
 sed tamen ex quocumque effectum potest manifeste nobis
but yet from any-whatever effect can manifestly to-us
 demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex effectibus
to-be-demonstrated the-cause to-be as said it-is and thus from the-effects
 Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse: licet per eos non
of-God can to-be-demonstrated God to-be although through them not
 perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.
perfectly we-can him to-know according-to his essence

Utrum Deus sit

3 • WHETHER GOD EXISTS

Against it: if God were infinite good there would be no evil, and nature and human reason or will explain everything. Thomas gives five ways: from motion to a first unmoved mover; from efficient causes to a first cause; from things that can be and not be to a necessary being; from grades of perfection to a highest; and from the governance of things to an intelligence directing them. With Augustine, God draws good even out of evil; nature acts under a higher agent's direction, and reason and will, being mutable, lead back to an unmoved, necessary first principle.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is because
si unum contrariorum fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur
if one of-contraries were infinite totally will-be-destroyed
aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod
the-other but this is-understood in this name God namely that
sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si ergo Deus esset, nullum
be-is a-certain good infinite if therefore God were no
malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in mundo. Ergo
evil would-be-found is-found but evil in the-world therefore
Deus non est.

God not is

2. Praeterea, quod potest compleri per pauciora principia,
2 further what can to-be-accomplished through fewer principles
non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quae apparent in
not is-done through more but it-seems that all-things which appear in
mundo, possunt compleri per alia principia, supposito quod
the-world can to-be-accomplished through other principles supposing that
Deus non sit: quia ea quae sunt naturalia, reducuntur
God not is because those-things which are natural are-reduced
in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae sunt a
to a-principle which is nature those-things but which are from

proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana
purpose are-reduced to a-principle which is reason human
 vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.

or will no therefore necessity is to-posit God to-be

Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei:

but against is that it-is-said Exodus III from the-person of-God

Ego sum qui sum.

I am who I-am

Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari

I-answer it-must-be-said that God to-be in-five ways to-be-proved

potest. Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex

can the-first moreover and more-manifest way is which is-taken from

parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua

the-side of-motion certain it-is for and by-sense it-is-evident some-things

moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab

to-be-moved in this world every-thing moreover which is-moved by

alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est

another is-moved nothing for is-moved except according as it-is

in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur: movet autem aliquid

in potency to that toward which it-is-moved moves but something

secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam

according as it-is in-act to-move for nothing other is than

educere aliquid de potentia in actum: de potentia autem

to-lead-out something from potency into act from potency but

non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens

not can something to-be-reduced into act except through some being

in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est

in act as the-hot in act as fire makes wood which is

calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet

hot in potency to-be in-act hot and through this it-moves

et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul

and alters it not but is possible that the-same be at-once

in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum
in act and potency according-to the-same but only according-to
 diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul
diverse-respects what for is hot in act not can at-once
 esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia.
to-be hot in potency but it-is at-once cold in potency
 Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem
impossible it-is therefore that according-to the-same and in-the-same
 modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum.
way something be moving and moved or that it-move itself
 Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si
every-thing therefore which is-moved it-is-necessary by another to-be-moved if
 ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab
therefore that by which it-is-moved be-moved it-is-necessary also itself by
 alio moveri; et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in
another to-be-moved and that by another here but not it-is to-proceed to
 infinitum: quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per
infinity because thus not would-be some first mover and by
 consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda
consequence neither any other mover because movers second
 non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente,
not move except through this that they-are moved by the-first mover
 sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a
as a-staff not moves except through this that it-is moved by
 manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens,
the-hand therefore necessary it-is to-arrive at some first mover
 quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.
which by none is-moved and this all understand God
 Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus
the-second way is from the-notion of-cause efficient we-find
 enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium:
for in these sensible-things to-be an-order of-causes efficient

nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit
 nor yet is-found nor is possible that something be
 causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso,
 the-cause efficient of-itself itself because thus it-would-be prior to-itself
 quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in
 which is impossible not but is it-possible that in
 causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus
 causes efficient one-proceed to infinity because in all
 causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii,
 causes efficient ordered the-first is the-cause of-the-middle
 et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura
 and the-middle is the-cause of-the-last whether the-middles be several
 sive unum tantum: remota autem causa, removetur effectus:
 or one only removed but the-cause is-removed the-effect
 ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit
 therefore if not there-be a-first in causes efficient not will-be
 ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in
 a-last nor a-middle but if one-proceed to infinity in
 causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens: et sic
 causes efficient not will-be a-first cause efficient and thus
 non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae:
 not will-be either effect last or causes efficient intermediate
 quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam
 which is-plain to-be false therefore it-is necessary to-posit some
 causam efficientem primam: quam omnes Deum nominant.
 cause efficient first which all God name
 Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario: quae talis est.
 the-third way is taken from the-possible and the-necessary which such is
 Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae suntabilia esse et
 we-find for in things some which are possible to-be and
 non esse: cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi,
 not to-be since some are-found to-be-generated and to-be-corrrupted

et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile
and by consequence possible to-be and not to-be impossible
 est autem omnia quae sunt talia, semper esse: quia quod
it-is moreover all-things which are such always to-be because what
 possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia
possible is not to-be at-some-time not is if therefore all-things
 sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si
are possible not to-be at-some-time nothing was in things but if
 hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset: quia quod non est,
this is true even now nothing would-be because what not is
 non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil
not begins to-be except through something which is if therefore nothing
 fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic
was being impossible it-was that anything should-begin to-be and thus
 modo nihil esset: quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia
now nothing would-be which is-plain to-be false not therefore all
 entia sunt possibilia: sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium
beings are possible but it-is-necessary something to-be necessary
 in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae
in things every moreover necessary-thing either has a-cause of-its
 necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile
necessity from-elsewhere or not has not it-is but possible
 quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quae habent
that one-proceed to infinity in necessary-things which have
 causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut
a-cause of-their necessity as neither in causes efficient as
 probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per
proved it-is therefore necessary it-is to-posit something which is through
 se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed
itself necessary not having a-cause of-necessity from-elsewhere but
 quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.
which is the-cause of-necessity to-others which all call God

Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur.

the-fourth way is-taken from the-grades which in things are-found

Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et

is-found for in things something more and less good and

verum, et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et

true and noble and thus of others of-this-kind but more and

minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant

less are-said of diverse-things according as they-approach

diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum

in-diverse-ways to something which most is as more hot

est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur

is that-which more approaches to-the-most hot there-is therefore

aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum,

something which is truest and best and noblest

et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime

and by consequence most being for those-things-which are most

vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem

true are most beings as it-is-said II Metaphysics what moreover

dicatur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae

is-called most such in some genus is the-cause of-all which

sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est

are of-that genus as fire which is most hot is

causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo

the-cause of-all hot-things as in the-same book it-is-said therefore

est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et

there-is something which to-all beings is the-cause of-the-to-be and

bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum.

of-goodness and of-every perfection and this we-call God

Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim

the-fifth way is-taken from the-governance of-things we-see for

quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia,

that some-things which knowledge lack namely bodies natural

operantur propter finem: quod apparet ex hoc quod semper
operate for an-end which appears from this that always
 aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur
or more-frequently in-the-same way they-operate so-that they-may-attain
 id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed
that which is best whence it-is-plain that not by chance but
 ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non
from intention they-arrive at the-end those-things moreover which not
 habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab
have knowledge not tend toward an-end unless directed by
 aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante.
some-one knowing and understanding as the-arrow by the-archer
 Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales
therefore there-is something intelligent by whom all things natural
 ordinantur ad finem: et hoc dicimus Deum.

are-ordered to an-end and this we-call God
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as says Augustine
 in Enchiridio: Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo modo
in the-Enchiridion God since he-is supremely good in-no way
 sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo
would-allow anything of-evil to-be in works his unless he-were so
 omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo.
omnipotent and good that well he-might-make even out-of evil
 Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse
this therefore to the-infinite of-God goodness pertains that to-be
 permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.

he-permits evils and from them draws-out goods
 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum natura propter
to the-second it-must-be-said that since nature for
 determinatum finem operetur ex directione alicuius superioris
a-determinate end operates from the-direction of-some higher

agentis, necesse est ea quae a natura fiunt, etiam
agent necessary it-is those-things which by nature are-done also
 in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. Similiter
into God to-reduce as into the-first cause similarly
 etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere
also those-things-which from purpose are-done it-is-necessary to-reduce
 in aliquam altiore causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas
into some higher cause which not is reason and will
 humana: quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia;
human because these-things mutable are and defectible
 oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci
it-is-necessary moreover all-things movable and to-fail possible to-be-reduced
 in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se
into some first principle immobile and through itself
 necessarium, sicut ostensum est.
necessary as shown it-is

De Dei simplicitate

III · ON THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

Knowing that God exists, we cannot know what he is, only what he is not; so Thomas will treat how God is not, then how he is known, then how named. Removing from God what does not befit him, he will treat God's simplicity, perfection, infinity, immutability, and unity. On simplicity he asks eight articles: whether God is a body; whether he is composed of form and matter, of essence and subject, of essence and being, of genus and difference, or of subject and accident; whether he is composite in any way; and whether he enters into composition with other things.

Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo
known about something whether it-is to-be-inquired it-remains how
sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire
it-is that it-may-be-known about it what it-is but because about God to-know
non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus
not we-can what he-is but what not he-is not we-can
considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non
to-consider about God how he-is but rather how not
sit. Primo ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo,
he-is first therefore to-be-considered it-is how not he-is second
quomodo a nobis cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur.
how by us he-is-known third how he-is-named
Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, removendo ab
it-can moreover be-shown about God how not he-is by-removing from
eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem,
him those-things which to-him not belong such-as composition
motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiratur de
motion and other-things of-this-kind first therefore let-it-be-inquired about
simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio.
the-simplicity of-him through which is-removed from him composition
Et quia simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et
and because simple-things in things bodily are imperfect and

partes, secundo inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de
parts second it-will-be-inquired about the-perfection of-him third about
 infinitate eius; quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate.
the-infinity of-him fourth about the-immutability fifth about the-unity

Circa primum quaeruntur octo.

concerning the-first are-asked eight

Primo: utrum Deus sit corpus.

first whether God is a-body

Secundo: utrum sit in eo compositio formae et materiae.

second whether there-is in him composition of-form and of-matter

Tertio: utrum sit in eo compositio quidditatis, sive

third whether there-is in him composition of-quiddity or

essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti.

of-essence or of-nature and of-subject

Quarto: utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia

fourth whether there-is in him composition which is from essence

et esse.

and to-be

Quinto: utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae.

fifth whether there-is in him composition of-genus and of-difference

Sexto: utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis.

sixth whether there-is in him composition of-subject and of-accident

Septimo: utrum sit quocumque modo compositus, vel

seventh whether he-is in-any way composite or

totaliter simplex.

totally simple

Octavo: utrum veniat in compositionem cum aliis.

eighth whether he-comes into composition with other-things

Utrum Deus sit corpus

1 · WHETHER GOD IS A BODY

Scripture gives God height and depth, an image, arms and eyes, a seat, and movement toward him. Thomas answers that God is no body: no body moves without being moved, but God is the first unmoved mover; the first being is pure act, and every body is in potency; and God is noblest of beings, whereas a living body lives by something nobler than body. Scripture speaks of spiritual things through bodily likenesses.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus.

to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God is a-body

Corpus enim est quod habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra

a-body for is what has triple dimension but sacred

Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam dimensionem: dicitur enim

Scripture attributes to-God triple dimension it-is-said for

Iob XI: excelsior caelo est, et quid facies? profundior

Job XI higher than-heaven he-is and what will-you-do deeper

inferno, et unde cognosces? longior terra mensura eius,

than-hell and whence will-you-know longer than-the-earth the-measure of-him

et latior mari. Ergo Deus est corpus.

and broader than-the-sea therefore God is a-body

2. Praeterea, omne figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit

2 further every-thing figured is a-body since figure is

qualitas circa quantitatem. Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus,

a-quality about quantity but God seems to-be figured

cum scriptum sit Gen. I: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem

since written it-is Genesis I let-us-make man to the-image

et similitudinem nostram: figura enim imago dicitur,

and likeness our figure for image is-called

secundum illud Hebr. I: cum sit splendor gloriae, et
according-to that Hebrews I since be-is the-brightness of-glory and
 figura substantiae eius, idest imago. Ergo Deus est corpus.

the-figure of-the-substance of-him that-is the-image therefore God is a-body

3. Praeterea, omne quod habet partes corporeas, est

3 further every-thing which has parts bodily is

corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit Deo partes corporeas: dicitur

a-body but Scripture attributes to-God parts bodily it-is-said

enim Iob XL: si habes brachium ut Deus; et in Psalmo:

for Job XL if you-have an-arm as God and in the-Psalm

oculi Domini super iustos; et, dextera Domini fecit

the-eyes of-the-Lord upon the-just and the-right-hand of-the-Lord has-wrought

virtutem. Ergo Deus est corpus.

strength therefore God is a-body

4. Praeterea, situs non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea

4 further posture not belongs except to-a-body but those-things

quae ad situm pertinent, in Scripturis dicuntur de Deo:

which to posture pertain in the-Scriptures are-said of God

dicitur enim Isaiae VI: vidi Dominum sedentem; et Isaiae

it-is-said for Isaiah VI I-saw the-Lord sitting and Isaiah

III: stat ad iudicandum Dominus. Ergo Deus est corpus.

III stands for judging the-Lord therefore God is a-body

5. Praeterea, nihil potest esse terminus localis a quo

5 further nothing can to-be the-term local from which

vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel aliquod corporeum. Sed

or to which unless it-be a-body or something bodily but

Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus localis ut ad quem,

God in Scripture is-said to-be the-term local as to which

secundum illud Psalmi: accedite ad eum, et illuminamini;

according-to that of-the-Psalm approach to him and be-enlightened

et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII: recedentes
and as from which according-to that Jeremiah XVII those-withdrawing
a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.
from you in the-earth will-be-written therefore God is a-body
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. IV: Spiritus est Deus.
but against is that it-is-said John IV spirit is God
Respondeo dicendum absolute Deum non esse corpus.
I-answer it-must-be-said absolutely God not to-be a-body
Quod tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia nullum
which in-three-ways to-be-shown can first indeed because no
corpus movet non motum: ut patet inducendo per singula.
body moves not moved as is-plain by-inducing through single-cases
Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum movens
shown it-is moreover above that God is the-first mover
immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus.
unmoved whence manifest it-is that God not is a-body
Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse
second because necessary it-is that which is the-first being to-be
in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno
in act and in-no way in potency although for in one
et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit
and the-same which goes-out from potency into act prior is
potentia quam actus tempore, simpliciter tamen actus prior
potency than act in-time simply yet act prior
est potentia: quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in
is than-potency because what is in potency not is-reduced into
actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est autem supra
act except through a-being in-act shown it-is moreover above
quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in
that God is the-first being impossible it-is therefore that in
Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in
God there-be anything in potency every moreover body is in

potentia: quia continuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile
potency because the-continuous inasmuch-as such divisible
 est in infinitum. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.
is to infinity impossible it-is therefore God to-be a-body
 Tertio, quia Deus est id quod est nobilissimum in entibus,
third because God is that which is noblest among beings
 ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile est autem aliquod corpus
as from things-said is-plain impossible it-is moreover any body
 esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus aut est vivum,
to-be noblest among beings because a-body either is living
 aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est quod
or not living a-body moreover living manifest it-is that
 est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit
it-is nobler than-a-body not living a-body moreover living not lives
 inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret: oportet
inasmuch-as a-body because thus every body would-live it-is-necessary
 igitur quod vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum
therefore that it-live through something other as body our
 vivit per animam. Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est
lives through the-soul that moreover through which lives a-body is
 nobilius quam corpus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.
nobler than the-body impossible it-is therefore God to-be a-body
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as above said
 est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis spiritualia et divina
it-is sacred Scripture hands-down to-us spiritual-things and divine-things
 sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum trinam
under likenesses of-bodily-things whence when triple
 dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis
dimension to-God it-attributes under the-likeness of-quantity
 corporeae, quantitatem virtualement ipsius designat: utpote
bodily the-quantity virtual of-him it-designates such-as

per profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta;
through depth the-power for knowing hidden-things
 per altitudinem, excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per
through height the-excellence of-power over all-things through
 longitudinem, durationem sui esse; per latitudinem,
length the-duration of-his to-be through breadth
 affectum dilectionis ad omnia. – Vel, ut dicit Dionysius,
the-affection of-love toward all-things or as says Dionysius
 cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur
chapter IX on Divine Names through the-depth of-God is-understood
 incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem,
the-incomprehensibility of-his essence through the-length
 processus virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem
the-procession of-the-power of-him all-things penetrating through the-breadth
 vero, superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub
but the-over-extension of-him to all-things inasmuch-as namely under
 eius protectione omnia continentur.
his protection all-things are-contained
 Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad
to the-second it-must-be-said that man is-said to-be to
 imaginem Dei, non secundum corpus, sed secundum
the-image of-God not according-to the-body but according-to
 id quo homo excellit alia animalia: unde, Gen. I,
that by-which man excels other animals whence Genesis I
 postquam dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem
after said it-was let-us-make man to the-image
 et similitudinem nostram, subditur: ut praesit piscibus
and likeness our it-is-added that he-may-rule-over the-fishes
 maris, etc. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum
of-the-sea etc excels moreover man all animals as-far

ad rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et
to reason and intellect whence according-to intellect and
 rationem, quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.

reason which are incorporeal man is to the-image of-God

Ad tertium dicendum quod partes corporeae attribuuntur

to the-third it-must-be-said that parts bodily are-attributed

Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum actuum, secundum quamdam

to-God in the-Scriptures by-reason of-their acts according-to a-certain

similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est videre: unde oculus

likeness as the-act of-the-eye is to-see whence the-eye

de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad videndum modo

of God said signifies the-power of-him for seeing in-a-mode

intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis partibus.

intelligible not sensible and similar it-is about other parts

Ad quartum dicendum quod etiam ea quae ad

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that also those-things which to

situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi secundum

posture pertain not are-attributed to-God except according-to

quamdam similitudinem: sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam

a-certain likeness as he-is-called sitting on-account-of his

immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam

immobility and authority and standing on-account-of his

fortitudinem ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.

strength for vanquishing every-thing which opposes

Ad quintum dicendum quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus

to the-fifth it-must-be-said that to God not one-approaches by-steps

corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis: et

bodily since everywhere he-is but by-affections of-the-mind and

eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic accessus et recessus,

in-the-same way from him one-withdraws and thus approach and withdrawal

sub similitudine localis motus, designant spirituales affectum.

under the-likeness of-local motion designate spiritual affection

Utrum in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae

2 • WHETHER GOD IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM

Scripture speaks of God's soul and of his anger, and matter seems to individuate him. Thomas answers that there is no matter in God: matter is potency, but God is pure act; a composite is good by participation, but God is good by essence; and the first agent must be form through itself. Soul and anger are said of God by likeness of act and effect, and a subsisting form, which God is, is individuated by not being received in another.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that in God there-is
compositio formae et materiae. Omne enim quod habet
composition of-form and of-matter every-thing for which has
animam, est compositum ex materia et forma: quia anima
a-soul is composed from matter and form because the-soul
est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo:
is the-form of-the-body but Scripture attributes a-soul to-God
introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei: iustus autem
it-is-brought-in for to Hebrews X from the-person of-God the-just-man moreover
meus ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit
my from faith lives but if he-withdraw himself not he-will-please
animae meae. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.
soul my therefore God is composed from matter and form

2. Praeterea, ira, gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones
2 further anger joy and things-of-this-kind are passions
coniuncti, ut dicitur I de Anima. Sed huiusmodi
of-the-composite as it-is-said I on the-Soul but things-of-this-kind
attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura: dicitur enim in Psalmo:
are-attributed to-God in Scripture it-is-said for in the-Psalm

iratus est furore Dominus in populum suum. Ergo Deus
angered is with-fury the-Lord against people his therefore God
 ex materia et forma est compositus.

from matter and form is composed

3. Praeterea, materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus
3 further matter is the-principle of-indivduation but God
 videtur esse individuum: non enim de multis praedicatur.

seems to-be individual not for of many he-is-predicated

Ergo est compositus ex materia et forma.

therefore he-is composed from matter and form

Sed contra, omne compositum ex materia et forma est
but against every-thing composed from matter and form is
 corpus: quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo inhaeret

a-body quantity for dimensive is which first inheres

materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut ostensum est. Ergo

in-matter but God not is a-body as shown it-is therefore

Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.

God not is composed from matter and form

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est in Deo esse

I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is in God to-be

materiam. Primo quidem, quia materia est id quod est in

matter first indeed because matter is that which is in

potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est purus actus,

potency shown it-is moreover that God is pure act

non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde impossibile est

not having anything of potentiality whence impossible it-is

quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma.

that God be composed from matter and form

Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma

second because every-thing composed from matter and form

est perfectum et bonum per suam formam: unde oportet

is perfect and good through its form whence it-is-necessary

quod sit bonum per participationem, secundum quod
that it-be good through participation according as
 materia participat formam. Primum autem quod est bonum
matter participates form the-first moreover which is good
 et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per
and best which God is not is good through
 participationem: quia bonum per essentiam, prius est
participation because good through essence prior is
 bono per participationem. Unde impossibile est quod
than-good through participation whence impossible it-is that
 Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma.

God be composed from matter and form
 Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam formam:
third because each agent acts through its form
 unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam,
whence according as something itself has to its form
 sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum
so itself it-has to this that it-be an-agent that-which therefore first
 est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per
is and through itself an-agent it-is-necessary that it-be first and through
 se forma. Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima
itself form God moreover is the-first agent since he-is the-first
 causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur per essentiam
cause efficient as shown it-is he-is therefore through essence
 suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.

his form and not composed from matter and form
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that a-soul is-attributed to-God
 per similitudinem actus. Quod enim volumus aliquid nobis,
through likeness of-act that for we-will something for-us

ex anima nostra est: unde illud dicitur esse placitum

from soul our it-is whence that is-said to-be pleasing

animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.

to-the-soul of-God which is pleasing to-the-will of-him

Ad secundum dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi

to the-second it-must-be-said that anger and things-of-this-kind

attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus: quia

are-attributed to-God according-to the-likeness of-effect because

enim proprium est irati punire, ira eius punitio

for proper it-is of-one-angered to-punish anger his punishment

metaphorice vocatur.

metaphorically is-called

Ad tertium dicendum quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in

to the-third it-must-be-said that forms which are receivable in

materia, individuuntur per materiam, quae non potest esse

matter are-individuated through matter which not can to-be

in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans: forma vero,

in another since it-is the-first subject underlying form but

quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi

as-far it-is of itself unless something else impede to-be-received

potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est receptibilis

can by several but that form which not is receivable

in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso

in matter but is through itself subsisting from this itself

individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio: et huiusmodi

is-individuated that not it-can to-be-received in another and such

forma est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.

form is God whence not it-follows that he-have matter

Utrum sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel natura

3 · WHETHER GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE OR NATURE

Deity is said to be in God, and creatures, his effects, differ from their natures. Thomas answers that in things of matter and form the individual includes matter and accidents that the nature does not, so man is not his humanity. Where forms are not individuated by matter, the subsisting form is its own nature; so God is his own deity, his own life, and whatever else is predicated of him.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem

to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not is the-same

Deus quod sua essentia vel natura. Nihil enim est in

God as his essence or nature nothing for is in

seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae est deitas, dicitur

itself but the-essence or nature of-God which is deity is-said

esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit idem quod

to-be in God therefore it-seems that God not is the-same as

sua essentia vel natura.

his essence or nature

2. Praeterea, effectus assimilatur suae causae: quia omne

2 further the-effect is-likened to-its cause because every

agens agit sibi simile. Sed in rebus creatis non est idem

agent makes to-itself like but in things created not is the-same

suppositum quod sua natura: non enim idem est homo quod

the-suppositum as its nature not for the-same is man as

sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua deitas.

his humanity therefore nor God is the-same as his deity

Contra, de Deo dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod

against about God it-is-said that he-is life and not only that

est vivens, ut patet Ioan. XIV: Ego sum via, veritas et

he-is living as is-plain John XIV I am the-way the-truth and

vita. Sicut autem se habet vita ad viventem, ita deitas

the-life as moreover itself has life to the-living-one so deity

ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.

to God therefore God is the-very deity

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia

I-answer it-must-be-said that God is the-same as his essence

vel natura. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus

or nature for whose understanding to-be-known it-is that in things

compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant

composed from matter and form necessary it-is that differ

natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura

nature or essence and suppositum because the-essence or nature

comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione

comprehends in itself those-things only which fall in the-definition

speciei: sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae

of-the-species as humanity comprehends in itself those-things which

cadunt in definitione hominis: his enim homo est homo,

fall in the-definition of-man by-these for man is man

et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est

and this signifies humanity this namely by-which man is

homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus

man but matter individual with accidents all

individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei: non

individuating it not falls in the-definition of-the-species not

enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa,

for fall in the-definition of-man these fleshes and these bones

aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae

or whiteness or blackness or anything of-this-kind whence these

carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam,

fleshes and these bones and the-accidents designating this matter

non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est

not are-enclosed in humanity and yet in that which is

homo, includuntur: unde id quod est homo, habet in se
man they-are-included whence that which is man has in itself
 aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est
something which not has humanity and on-account-of this not is
 totaliter idem homo et humanitas: sed humanitas significatur
totally the-same man and humanity but humanity is-signified
 ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent
as the-part formal of-man because the-principles defining have
 se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis.

themselves formally with-respect-to the-matter individuating

In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma,
in those therefore which not are composed from matter and form
 in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualement,
in which individuation not is through matter individual
 idest per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se
that-is through this matter but the-very forms through themselves
 individuuntur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita
are-individuated it-is-necessary that the-very forms be supposita
 subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura.

subsisting whence in them not differ suppositum and nature

Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et
and thus since God not is composed from matter and
 forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas,
form as shown it-is it-is-necessary that God be his deity
 sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.

his life and whatever else thus of God is-predicated

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that about things simple to-speak
 non possumus, nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus
not we-can except through the-mode of-composite-things from which
 cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo loquentes, utimur
knowledge we-receive and therefore about God speaking we-use

nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius subsistentiam,

names concrete that we-may-signify his subsistence

quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita: et utimur

because among us not subsist except composite-things and we-use

nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. Quod

names abstract that we-may-signify his simplicity what

ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in

therefore is-said deity or life or something of-this-kind to-be in

Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione

God to-be-referred is to the-diversity which is in the-acceptance

intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.

of-intellect our and not to any diversity of-the-thing

Ad secundum dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur

to the-second it-must-be-said that the-effects of-God imitate

ipsum, non perfecte, sed secundum quod possunt. Et hoc

him not perfectly but according as they-can and this

ad defectum imitationis pertinet, quod id quod est simplex

to the-defect of-imitation pertains that that which is simple

et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per multa: et

and one not can to-be-represented except through many-things and

sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in

thus happens in them composition from which it-comes that in

eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.

them not is the-same suppositum as nature

Utrum in Deo sit idem essentia et esse

4 • WHETHER ESSENCE AND BEING ARE THE SAME IN GOD

If nothing were added to God's being, it would seem to be common being; and we know that God is, not what he is. Thomas answers that God is his own being: whatever is other than a thing's essence is caused, and God is the first cause; being is the actuality of every essence, and God has no potency; and what has being without being it is a being only by participation. Divine being excludes addition, while common being merely does not include it; and we know the proposition "God is" to be true, not his act of being.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that in God not
sit idem essentia et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad
is the-same essence and to-be if for this be then to
esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui nulla fit
the-to-be divine nothing is-added but the-to-be to-which no is-made
additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur:
addition is the-to-be common which of all is-predicated
sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de
it-follows therefore that God is being common predicable of
omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV:
all this but is false according-to that Wisdom XIV
incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt.
the-incommunicable name to-wood and stones they-imposed
Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia.
therefore the-to-be of-God not is his essence

2. Praeterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum
2 further about God to-know we-can whether he-is as above said
est. Non autem possumus scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem
it-is not but we-can to-know what he-is therefore not is the-same
esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, sive quidditas vel natura.
the-to-be of-God and that what is of-him or quiddity or nature

Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin.: esse
but against is that Hilary says in VII on the-Trinity to-be
 non est accidens in Deo, sed subsistens veritas. Id ergo
not is an-accident in God but subsisting truth that therefore
 quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse.

which subsists in God is his to-be

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia,

I-answer it-must-be-said that God not only is his essence

ut ostensum est, sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem

as shown it-is but also his to-be which indeed

multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid

in-many-ways to-be-shown can first indeed because whatever

est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse

is in something which is besides the-essence of-it it-is-necessary to-be

causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria

caused either by the-principles of-the-essence as accidents proper

consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et

following the-species as risible follows man and

causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo

is-caused from the-principles essential of-the-species or by something

exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum

exterior as heat in water is-caused by fire if therefore the-very

esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod

to-be of-a-thing be other than its essence necessary it-is that

esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel

the-to-be of-that thing either be caused by something exterior or

a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem

by the-principles essential of-the-same thing impossible it-is moreover

quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus

that to-be be caused only from the-principles essential

rei: quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa

of-the-thing because no thing suffices that it-be to-itself the-cause

essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud
of-being if it-have to-be caused it-is-necessary therefore that that
 cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum
whose to-be is other than essence its have to-be caused
 ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo: quia Deum
by another this but not can to-be-said of God because God
 dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est
we-say to-be the-first cause efficient impossible it-is
 ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia.
therefore that in God be one-thing to-be and another his essence
 Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae:
second because to-be is the-actuality of-every form or nature
 non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi
not for goodness or humanity is-signified in act except
 prout significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum
according-as we-signify it to-be it-is-necessary therefore that the-very
 esse comparatur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut
to-be be-compared to the-essence which is other than it as
 actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale,
act to potency since therefore in God nothing is potential
 ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo
as shown it-is above it-follows that not is other in him
 essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse.
essence than his to-be his therefore essence is his to-be
 Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est
third because as that which has fire and not is
 ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet
fire is fiery through participation so that which has
 esse et non est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus
to-be and not is to-be is a-being through participation God
 autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit
moreover is his essence as shown it-is if therefore not be-be

suum esse, erit ens per participationem, et non per
his to-be be-will-be a-being through participation and not through
 essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens: quod absurdum est
essence not therefore be-will-be the-first being which absurd is
 dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.

to-say is therefore God his to-be and not only his essence

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that something to-which not is-made
 additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione
addition can to-be-understood in-two-ways in-one way that of the-notion
 eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis
of-it it-be that not be-made to-it addition as of the-notion of-animal
 irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur
irrational it-is that it-be without reason in-another way is-understood
 aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione
something to-which not is-made addition because not it-is of the-notion
 eius quod sibi fiat additio: sicut animal commune est sine
of-it that to-it be-made addition as animal common is without
 ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat
reason because not it-is of the-notion of-animal common that it-have
 rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione.

reason but neither of the-notion of-it is that it-lack reason

Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum:

in-the-first therefore way to-be without addition is the-to-be divine

secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.

in-the-second way to-be without addition is the-to-be common

Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur: uno
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-be in-two-ways is-said in-one
 modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat

way it-signifies the-act of-being in-another way it-signifies

compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens

the-composition of-a-proposition which the-soul devises joining

praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse,
the-predicate to-the-subject in-the-first therefore way by-taking to-be
 non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam:
not we-can to-know the-to-be of-God as neither his essence
 sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio
but only in-the-second way we-know for that this proposition
 quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est.
which we-form about God when we-say God is true is
 Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.
and this we-know from his effects as above said it-is

Utrum Deus sit in genere aliquo

5 · WHETHER GOD IS IN ANY GENUS

Substance, being through itself, seems to fit God, and God is said to measure substances. Thomas answers that God is not a species in a genus, since genus and difference relate as potency and act; his genus would have to be being, which is no genus; and things in one genus differ in being, which in God is not other than essence. Nor is he in a genus as its principle.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God is in genus
 aliquo. Substantia enim est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem
some substance for is being through itself subsisting this moreover
 maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae.
most-of-all belongs to-God therefore God is in the-genus of-substance
 2. Praeterea, unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui
2 further each-thing is-measured through something of-its
 generis; sicut longitudines per longitudinem, et numeri per
genus as lengths by length and numbers by
 numerum. Sed Deus est mensura omnium substantiarum,
number but God is the-measure of-all substances

ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo Deus
as is-plain through the-Commentator X Metaphysics therefore God
 est in genere substantiae.

is in the-genus of-substance

Sed contra, genus est prius, secundum intellectum, eo
but against the-genus is prior according-to understanding than-that
 quod in genere continetur. Sed nihil est prius Deo, nec
which in the-genus is-contained but nothing is prior to-God neither
 secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum. Ergo Deus
according-to the-thing nor according-to understanding therefore God
 non est in aliquo genere.

not is in any genus

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter.

I-answer it-must-be-said that something is in a-genus in-two-ways

Uno modo, simpliciter et proprie; sicut species, quae sub
in-one way simply and properly as the-species which under
 genere continentur. Alio modo, per reductionem, sicut
the-genus are-contained in-another way through reduction as
 principia et privationes: sicut punctus et unitas reducuntur
principles and privations as the-point and unity are-reduced
 ad genus quantitatis, sicut principia; caecitas autem, et
to the-genus of-quantity as principles blindness but and
 omnis privatio, reducitur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro
every privation is-reduced to the-genus of-its habit in-neither
 autem modo Deus est in genere.

but way God is in a-genus

Quod enim non possit esse species alicuius generis, tripliciter
that for not he-can to-be a-species of-any genus in-three-ways
 ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia species constituitur ex
to-be-shown can first indeed because a-species is-constituted from
 genere et differentia. Semper autem id a quo sumitur
genus and difference always moreover that from which is-taken

differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde
the-difference constituting the-species itself stands to that whence
 sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. Animal enim
is-taken the-genus as act to potency animal for
 sumitur a natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc
is-taken from nature sensitive through the-mode of-concretion this
 enim dicitur animal, quod naturam sensitivam habet: rationale
for is-called animal which nature sensitive has rational
 vero sumitur a natura intellectiva, quia rationale est quod
but is-taken from nature intellective because rational is what
 naturam intellectivam habet: intellectivum autem comparatur ad
nature intellective has the-intellective moreover is-compared to
 sensitivum, sicut actus ad potentiam. Et similiter manifestum
the-sensitive as act to potency and similarly manifest
 est in aliis. Unde, cum in Deo non adiungatur potentia
it-is in others whence since in God not is-joined potency
 actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere tanquam species.
to-act impossible it-is that he-is in a-genus as species
 Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut
second because since the-to-be of-God is his essence as
 ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret
shown it-is if God were in some genus it-would-be-necessary
 quod genus eius esset ens: nam genus significat essentiam
that the-genus of-him were being for the-genus signifies the-essence
 rei, cum praedicetur in eo quod quid est. Ostendit
of-the-thing since it-is-predicated in that that what is shows
 autem Philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens non potest
moreover the-Philosopher in III Metaphysics that being not can
 esse genus alicuius: omne enim genus habet differentias quae
to-be the-genus of-anything every for genus has differences which
 sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem differentia posset
are outside the-essence of-the-genus no but difference could

inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non potest esse
to-be-found which would-be outside being because not being not can to-be
 differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in genere.

a-difference whence it-remains that God not is in a-genus

Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant

third because all-things which are in genus one communicate

in quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis

in the-quiddity or essence of-the-genus which is-predicated of them

in eo quod quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse: non

in that that what is they-differ moreover according-to to-be not

enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis

for the-same is the-to-be of-man and of-horse nor of-this man

et illius hominis. Et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt

and of-that man and thus it-is-necessary that whatever-things are

in genere, differant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest

in a-genus differ in them to-be and that what is that-is

essentia. In Deo autem non differt, ut ostensum est. Unde

essence in God but not it-differs as shown it-is whence

manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut species.

manifest it-is that God not is in a-genus as species

Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias;

and from this is-plain that not he-has genus nor differences

neque est definitio ipsius; neque demonstratio, nisi per

nor is definition of-him nor demonstration except through

effectum: quia definitio est ex genere et differentia,

the-effect because definition is from genus and difference

demonstrationis autem medium est definitio.

of-demonstration moreover the-middle is definition

Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per reductionem ut

that moreover God not is in a-genus through reduction as

principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium quod

principle manifest it-is from that that a-principle which

reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus

is-reduced to some genus not itself extends beyond genus

illud: sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis

that as the-point not is the-principle except of-quantity

continuae, et unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem

continuous and unity of-quantity discrete God moreover

est principium totius esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non

is the-principle of-all to-be as below will-be-shown whence not

continetur in aliquo genere sicut principium.

be-is-contained in any genus as principle

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantiae nomen non

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that of-substance the-name not

significat hoc solum quod est per se esse: quia hoc quod

signifies this alone which is through itself to-be because this which

est esse, non potest per se esse genus, ut ostensum est.

is to-be not can through itself to-be a-genus as shown it-is

Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse, idest per

but it-signifies an-essence to-which it-belongs thus to-be that-is through

se esse: quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et

itself to-be which yet to-be not is the-very its essence and

sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae.

thus is-plain that God not is in the-genus of-substance

Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de

to the-second it-must-be-said that objection that proceeds about

mensura proportionata: hanc enim oportet esse homogeam

measure proportioned this for it-is-necessary to-be homogeneous

mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura proportionata alicui.

with-the-measured God moreover not is measure proportioned to-anything

Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod unumquodque

be-is-called yet the-measure of-all from this that each-thing

tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat.

so-much has of to-be as-much-as to-him it-approaches

Utrum in Deo sint aliqua accidentia

6 · WHETHER THERE ARE ACCIDENTS IN GOD

Wisdom and virtue are accidents in us but attributed to God, and every genus of accidents has a first. Thomas answers that God can have no accidents: a subject stands to its accidents as potency to act; God is his own being, to which nothing can be added; and what is through itself is prior to what is through accident. Wisdom is not said univocally of God and of us.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that in God there-are some
accidentia. Substantia enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur
accidents substance for to-nothing is accident as it-is-said
in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno est accidens, non potest in
in I Physics what therefore in one is accident not can in
alio esse substantia: sicut probatur quod calor non sit forma
another to-be substance as it-is-proved that heat not is the-form
substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est accidens. Sed sapientia,
substantial of-fire because in others it-is accident but wisdom
virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt accidentia, Deo
virtue and things-of-this-kind which in us are accidents to-God
attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.
are-attributed therefore also in God there-are accidents

2. Praeterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa
2 further in any genus there-is one first many
autem sunt genera accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum
moreover are the-genera of-accidents if therefore the-firsts of-those
generum non sunt in Deo, erunt multa prima extra
genera not are in God there-will-be many firsts outside
Deum: quod est inconveniens.
God which is unfitting

Sed contra, omne accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non
but against every accident in a-subject is God but not
 potest esse subiectum: quia forma simplex non potest esse
can to-be a-subject because form simple not can to-be
 subiectum, ut dicit Boetius in lib. de Trin. Ergo in
a-subject as says Boethius in the-book on the-Trinity therefore in
 Deo non potest esse accidens.

God not can to-be accident

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste
I-answer it-must-be-said that according-to the-premises manifestly
 apparet quod in Deo accidens esse non potest. Primo
it-appears that in God accident to-be not can first
 quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens, sicut
indeed because the-subject is-compared to the-accident as
 potentia ad actum: subiectum enim secundum accidens est
potency to act the-subject for according-to the-accident is
 aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino
in-some way in act to-be moreover in potency altogether
 removetur a Deo, ut ex praedictis patet.

is-removed from God as from the-aforesaid is-plain

Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse: et, ut Boetius dicit
second because God is his to-be and as Boethius says
 in lib. de Hebdomad., licet id quod est, aliquid aliud
in the-book on the-Hebdomads although that which is something other
 possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud
can to-have added yet the-very to-be nothing other
 adiunctum habere potest: sicut quod est calidum, potest
added to-have can as what is hot can
 habere aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed
to-have something extraneous than hot as whiteness but
 ipse calor nihil habet praeter calorem.

the-very heat nothing has besides heat

Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est eo
third because every-thing which is through itself prior is to-that
 quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter
which is through accident whence since God is simply
 primum ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens.
the-first being in him not can to-be anything through accident
 – Sed nec accidentia per se in eo esse possunt,
but neither accidents through themselves in him to-be can
 sicut risibile est per se accidens hominis. Quia huiusmodi
as risible is through itself an-accident of-man because such
 accidentia causantur ex principiis subiecti: in Deo autem
accidents are-caused from the-principles of-the-subject in God but
 nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa prima. Unde
nothing can to-be caused since he-is the-cause first whence
 relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.

it-remains that in God no is accident
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that virtue and wisdom not
 univoce dicuntur de Deo et de nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde
univocally are-said of God and of us as below will-be-plain whence
 non sequitur quod accidentia sint in Deo, sicut in nobis.

not it-follows that accidents are in God as in us
 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior
to the-second it-must-be-said that since substance is prior
 accidentibus, principia accidentium reducuntur in principia
to-accidents the-principles of-accidents are-reduced to the-principles
 substantiae sicut in priora. Quamvis Deus non sit primum
of-substance as into prior-things although God not is the-first
 contentum in genere substantiae, sed primum extra omne
contained in the-genus of-substance but first outside every
 genus, respectu totius esse.

genus with-respect-to all to-be

Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex

7 • WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER SIMPLE

Creatures that imitate God are composite, and among us composite things are better than simple. Thomas answers that God is altogether simple, as the earlier articles show; and further because every composite is later than its parts and depends on a cause, contains potency and act, and is something its parts are not. Hilary says God, who is power, is not made up of weaknesses.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
omnino simplex. Ea enim quae sunt a Deo, imitantur
altogether simple those-things for which are from God imitate
ipsum: unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et a primo
him whence from the-first being are all beings and from the-first
bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil
good are all goods but in things which are from God nothing
est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.
is altogether simple therefore God not is altogether simple
2. Praeterea, omne quod est melius, Deo attribuendum
2 further every-thing which is better to-God to-be-attributed
est. Sed, apud nos, composita sunt meliora simplicibus:
is but among us composite-things are better than-simple-things
sicut corpora mixta elementis, et elementa suis partibus.
as bodies mixed than-elements and elements than-their parts
Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino simplex.
therefore not is to-be-said that God is altogether simple
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod
but against is that Augustine says VI on the-Trinity that
Deus vere et summe simplex est.
God truly and supremely simple is

Respondeo dicendum quod Deum omnino esse simplicem,
I-answer it-must-be-said that God altogether to-be simple
 multipliciter potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem per
in-many-ways can to-be manifest first indeed through
 supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio, neque
the-above-said since for in God not there-is composition neither
 quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio
of-quantitative parts because a-body not be-is nor composition
 formae et materiae: neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum;
of-form and of-matter nor in him is other nature and suppositum
 neque aliud essentia et esse: neque in eo sit compositio generis
nor other essence and to-be nor in him is composition of-genus
 et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis: manifestum est
and of-difference nor of-subject and of-accident manifest it-is
 quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino simplex.
that God in-no way composite is but is altogether simple
 Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis
second because every composite is posterior to-its
 componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est
components and dependent on them God but is
 primum ens, ut supra ostensum est.
the-first being as above shown it-is
 Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet: quae enim
third because every composite a-cause has those-which for
 secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod
according-to themselves diverse are not come-together into some
 unum, nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus
one except through some cause uniting them God
 autem non habet causam, ut supra ostensum est, cum sit
but not has a-cause as above shown it-is since he-is
 prima causa efficiens.
the-first cause efficient

Quarto, quia in omni composito oportet esse potentiam

fourth because in every composite it-is-necessary to-be potency

et actum, quod in Deo non est: quia vel una partium

and act which in God not is because either one of-the-parts

est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem omnes partes sunt

is act with-respect-to another or at-least all the-parts are

sicut in potentia respectu totius.

as in potency with-respect-to the-whole

Quinto, quia omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit

fifth because every composite is something which not belongs

alicui suarum partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium,

to-any of-its parts and indeed in wholes of-dissimilar parts

manifestum est: nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque

manifest it-is none for of-the-parts of-man is man nor

aliqua partium pedis est pes. In totis vero similium partium,

any of-the-parts of-the-foot is the-foot in wholes but of-similar parts

licet aliquid quod dicitur de toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars

although something which is-said of the-whole be-said of the-part as a-part

aeris est aer, et aquae aqua; aliquid tamen dicitur de toto,

of-air is air and of-water water something yet is-said of the-whole

quod non convenit alicui partium: non enim si tota aqua

which not belongs to-any of-the-parts not for if the-whole water

est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in omni composito est

is two-cubits also a-part of-it thus therefore in every composite there-is

aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi possit dici

something which not is it-itself this moreover even-if it-can to-be-said

de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod non

of the-one-having form that namely it-has something which not

est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad

is it-itself for-example in the-white is something which not pertains to

rationem albi): tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde,

the-notion of-white yet in the-very form nothing is alien whence

cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo

since God is the-very form or rather the-very to-be in-no way

compositus esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius,

composite to-be can and this reason touches Hilary

VII de Trin., dicens: Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis

VII on the-Trinity saying God who power is from weak-things

non continetur: neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur.

not is-held-together nor who light is from obscure-things is-fitted-together

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt a

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that those-things which are from

Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata primam causam. Est

God imitate God as caused-things the-first cause it-is

autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo modo

moreover this of the-notion of-the-caused that it-be in-some way

compositum: quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam

composite because at least the-to-be of-it is other than

quod quid est, ut infra patebit.

that what is as below will-be-plain

Ad secundum dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt

to the-second it-must-be-said that among us composite-things are

meliora simplicibus, quia perfectio bonitatis creaturae non

better than-simple-things because the-perfection of-the-goodness of-a-creature not

invenitur in uno simplici, sed in multis. Sed perfectio divinae

is-found in one simple but in many but the-perfection of-divine

bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, ut infra ostendetur.

goodness is-found in one simple as below will-be-shown

Utrum Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat

8 • WHETHER GOD ENTERS THE COMPOSITION OF OTHER THINGS

Dionysius calls God the being of all things, Augustine calls the Word a form, and God and prime matter seem not to differ. Thomas rejects three errors: that God is the soul of the world; that he is the formal principle of all things; and that he is prime matter, the error of David of Dinant. God is the first efficient cause, the first agent, and the first being, so he cannot be part of a composite.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God into
compositionem aliorum veniat. Dicit enim Dionysius,
the-composition of-other-things comes says for Dionysius
IV cap. Cael. Hier.: esse omnium est, quae super
IV chapter Celestial Hierarchy the-to-be of-all-things is which above
esse est deitas. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem
to-be is the-deity but the-to-be of-all-things enters the-composition
uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.
of-each-one therefore God into the-composition of-other-things comes

2. Praeterea, Deus est forma: dicit enim Augustinus, in
2 further God is form says for Augustine in
libro de Verbis Domini, quod Verbum Dei (quod est
the-book on the-Words of-the-Lord that the-Word of-God which is
Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma est pars
God is a-form certain not formed but form is part
compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.
of-a-composite therefore God is part of-some composite

3. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt
3 further whatever-things are and in-no way differ are
idem. Sed Deus et materia prima sunt, et nullo modo
the-same but God and matter prime are and in-no way

differunt. Ergo penitus sunt idem. Sed materia prima
differ therefore entirely they-are the-same but matter prime
 intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus. – Probatio
enters the-composition of-things therefore also God proof
 mediae: quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis differunt,
of-the-middle whatever-things differ by-some differences differ
 et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia
and so it-is-necessary them to-be composite but God and matter
 prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.
prime are altogether simple therefore in-no way they-differ
 Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div.
but against is that says Dionysius II chapter on Divine
 Nom., quod neque tactus est eius (scilicet Dei), neque
Names that neither touch is of-him namely of-God nor
 alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi communio. – Praeterea,
other some for parts of-mingling communion further
 dicitur in libro de Causis, quod causa prima regit omnes
it-is-said in the-book on Causes that the-cause first rules all
 res, praeterquam commisceatur eis.

things otherwise-than it-be-mingled with-them

Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores.

I-answer it-must-be-said that about this there-were three errors

Quidam enim posuerunt quod Deus esset anima mundi, ut
some for posited that God was the-soul of-the-world as
 patet per Augustinum in lib. VII de Civitate Dei: et ad hoc
is-plain through Augustine in book VII on the-City of-God and to this
 etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam
also is-reduced what some said God to-be the-soul
 primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium
of-the-first heaven others moreover said God to-be the-principle
 formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio
formal of-all things and this is-said to-have-been the-opinion

Almarianorum. Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui
of-the-Amalricians but the-third error was of-David of Dinant who
 stultissime posuit Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim
most-foolishly posited God to-be matter prime all for
 haec manifestam continent falsitatem: neque est possibile
these-things manifest contain falsity nor is it-possible
 Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire, nec
God in-any way into the-composition of-anything to-come neither
 sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale.
as principle formal nor as principle material
 Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam
first indeed because above we-said God to-be the-first
 causam efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei
cause efficient the-cause moreover efficient with the-form of-the-thing
 factae non incidit in idem numero, sed solum in idem
made not coincides in the-same in-number but only in the-same
 specie: homo enim generat hominem. Materia vero cum
in-species man for generates man matter but with
 causa efficiente non incidit in idem numero, nec in idem
the-cause efficient not coincides in the-same in-number nor in the-same
 specie: quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in actu.
in-species because this is in potency that but in act
 Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius
second because since God is the-first cause efficient his
 est primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in
it-is first and through himself to-act that-which moreover comes into
 compositionem alicuius, non est primo et per se agens,
the-composition of-something not is first and through itself agent
 sed magis compositum: non enim manus agit, sed homo
but rather the-composite not for the-hand acts but the-man

per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem. Unde Deus
through the-hand and fire beats through heat whence God
 non potest esse pars alicuius compositi.

not can to-be part of-any composite

Tertio, quia nulla pars compositi potest esse simpliciter

third because no part of-a-composite can to-be simply

prima in entibus; neque etiam materia et forma, quae

first among beings nor even matter and form which

sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia est in

are the-first parts of-composites for matter is in

potentia: potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut

potency potency moreover is posterior to-act simply as

ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est

from things-said is-plain form moreover which is part of-a-composite is

forma participata: sicut autem participans est posterius eo

form participated as moreover the-participant is posterior to-that

quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut

which is through essence so also the-very participated as

ignis in ignitis est posterior eo quod est per essentiam.

fire in fiery-things is posterior to-that which is through essence

Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens simpliciter.

shown it-is moreover that God is the-first being simply

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-deity is-said to-be

omnium effective et exemplariter: non autem per essentiam.

of-all-things effectively and exemplarily not but through essence

Ad secundum dicendum quod Verbum est forma exemplaris:

to the-second it-must-be-said that the-Word is form exemplar

non autem forma quae est pars compositi.

not but form which is part of-a-composite

Ad tertium dicendum quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus
to the-third it-must-be-said that simple-things not differ by-some
 aliis differentiis: hoc enim compositorum est. Homo enim
other differences this for of-composites is man for
 et equus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis: quae
and horse differ by-rational and irrational differences which
 quidem differentiae non differunt amplius ab invicem aliis
indeed differences not differ further from one-another by-other
 differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, non proprie dicuntur
differences whence if be-made force in the-word not properly they-are-said
 differre, sed diversa esse: nam, secundum Philosophum X
to-differ but diverse to-be for according-to the-Philosopher X
 Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne differens
Metaphysics diverse absolutely is-said but every-thing differing
 aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima
by-something differs whence if be-made force in the-word matter prime
 et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde
and God not differ but are diverse by-themselves whence
 non sequitur quod sint idem.
not it-follows that they-are the-same

De Dei perfectione

IV · ON THE PERFECTION OF GOD

After God's simplicity, Thomas turns to his perfection, and since a thing is called good as it is perfect, he will treat the divine perfection first and then God's goodness. On perfection he asks three articles: whether God is perfect; whether he is universally perfect, having in himself the perfections of all things; and whether creatures can be said to be like God.

Post considerationem divinae simplicitatis, de perfectione
after the-consideration of-divine simplicity about the-perfection
ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia unumquodque, secundum
of-the-very God to-be-said it-is and because each-thing according
quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo agendum est
as perfect it-is so is-called good first to-be-treated it-is
de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate.
about perfection divine second about his goodness

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

concerning the-first are-asked three

Primo: utrum Deus sit perfectus.

first whether God is perfect

Secundo: utrum Deus sit universaliter perfectus, omnium in
second whether God is universally perfect of-all-things in
se perfectiones habens.

himself the-perfections having

Tertio: utrum creaturae similes Deo dici possint.

third whether creatures like to-God to-be-said can

Utrum Deus sit perfectus

1 • WHETHER GOD IS PERFECT

Perfect seems to mean made, and first principles, like seed, are imperfect; being itself seems the most common and so the least perfect. Thomas answers that the ancient philosophers who called the first principle imperfect took it to be material; but God is the first efficient principle, most in act and so most perfect. Being itself is the actuality of all things and is received, not receiving.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be perfect not
conveniat Deo. Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum.

belongs to-God perfect for is-called as-it-were totally made
Sed Deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.
but to-God not belongs to-be made therefore nor to-be perfect

2. Praeterea, Deus est primum rerum principium. Sed principia
2 further God is the-first of-things principle but the-principles
rerum videntur esse imperfecta: semen enim est principium
of-things seem to-be imperfect seed for is the-principle
animalium et plantarum. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.

of-animals and of-plants therefore God is imperfect

3. Praeterea, ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est
3 further shown it-is above that the-essence of-God is
ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse videtur esse imperfectissimum:

the-very to-be but the-very to-be seems to-be most-imperfect
cum sit communissimum, et recipiens omnium additiones.

since it-is most-common and receiving of-all-things the-additions

Ergo Deus est imperfectus.

therefore God is imperfect

Sed contra est quod dicitur Matt. V: estote perfecti, sicut
but against is that it-is-said Matthew V be perfect as
 et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est.

also Father your heavenly perfect is

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus narrat in XII

I-answer it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher relates in XII

Metaphys., quidam antiqui philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici

Metaphysics some ancient philosophers namely the-Pythagoreans

et Speusippus, non attribuerunt optimum et perfectissimum

and Speusippus not attributed the-best and most-perfect

primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia philosophi antiqui

to-the-first principle of-which the-reason is because the-philosophers ancient

consideraverunt principium materiale tantum: primum autem

considered the-principle material only the-first moreover

principium materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim

principle material most-imperfect is since for

materia, inquantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet

matter inasmuch-as such is in potency it-is-necessary

quod primum principium materiale sit maxime in potentia;

that the-first principle material be most in potency

et ita maxime imperfectum.

and so most imperfect

Deus autem ponitur primum principium, non materiale,

God but is-positied the-first principle not material

sed in genere causae efficientis: et hoc oportet esse

but in the-genus of-cause efficient and this it-is-necessary to-be

perfectissimum. Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi,

most-perfect as for matter inasmuch-as such

est in potentia; ita agens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu.

is in potency so the-agent inasmuch-as such is in act

Unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse in

whence the-first principle active it-is-necessary most to-be in

actu: et per consequens maxime esse perfectum. Secundum
act and by consequence most to-be perfect according-to
 hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod
this for is-said something to-be perfect according as
 est actu: nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest
it-is in-act for perfect is-called that-to-which nothing is-lacking
 secundum modum suae perfectionis.

according-to the-mode of-its perfection

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as says Gregory
 balbutiendo ut possumus, excelsa Dei resonamus: quod
by-stammering as we-can the-lofty-things of-God we-echo what
 enim factum non est, perfectum proprie dici non potest. Sed
for made not is perfect properly to-be-said not can but
 quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse aliquid perfectum,
because in those-things which are-made then is-said to-be something perfect
 cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur hoc nomen
when from potency it-is-led-out into act is-transferred this name
 perfectum, ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse
perfect for signifying all that to-which not is-lacking to-be
 in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.
in act whether this it-have through the-mode of-making or not
 Ad secundum dicendum quod principium materiale, quod
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-principle material which
 apud nos imperfectum invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter
among us imperfect is-found not can to-be simply
 primum, sed praeceditur ab alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet
first but it-is-preceded by another perfect for the-seed although
 sit principium animalis generati ex semine, tamen habet ante
it-be the-principle of-the-animal generated from seed yet it-has before
 se animal vel plantam unde deciditur. Oportet enim ante id
itself the-animal or plant whence it-is-cut-off it-is-necessary for before that

quod est in potentia, esse aliquid actu: cum ens in potentia

which is in potency to-be something in-act since a-being in potency

non reducatur in actum, nisi per aliquid ens in actu.

not is-reduced into act except through some being in act

Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum

to the-third it-must-be-said that the-very to-be is most-perfect

omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet

of-all it-is-compared for to all-things as act nothing for has

actualitatem, nisi inquantum est: unde ipsum esse est actualitas

actuality except inasmuch-as it-is whence the-very to-be is the-actuality

omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non

of-all things and even of-the-very forms whence not

comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum: sed magis

it-is-compared to other-things as receiving to received but rather

sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis,

as received to receiving when for I-say the-to-be of-man

vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut

or of-horse or of-anything other the-very to-be is-considered as

formale et receptum: non autem ut illud cui competit esse.

formal and received not but as that to-which belongs to-be

Utrum in Deo sint perfectiones omnium rerum

2 · WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD

God is simple while the perfections of things are many and opposed, and life and wisdom seem more than being. Thomas answers that whatever perfection is in an effect pre-exists in its efficient cause, in God in a more eminent way; and since God is subsisting being itself, he can lack no perfection of being. What is opposed in things pre-exists in him as one.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that in God not
sint perfectiones omnium rerum. Deus enim simplex est,
are the-perfections of-all things God for simple is
ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt multae et
as shown it-is but the-perfections of-things are many and
diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones rerum.
diverse therefore in God not are all the-perfections of-things

2. Praeterea, opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed
2 further opposites not can to-be in the-same but
perfectiones rerum sunt oppositae: unaquaeque enim species
the-perfections of-things are opposed each for species
perficitur per suam differentiam specificam; differentiae autem
is-perfected through its difference specific the-differences moreover
quibus dividitur genus et constituuntur species, sunt oppositae.
by-which is-divided the-genus and are-constituted the-species are opposed

Cum ergo opposita non possint simul esse in eodem,
since therefore opposites not can at-once to-be in the-same
videtur quod non omnes rerum perfectiones sint in Deo.
it-seems that not all of-things the-perfections are in God

3. Praeterea, vivens est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens

3 further the-living is more-perfect than being and the-wise

quam vivens: ergo et vivere est perfectius quam esse,

than the-living therefore also to-live is more-perfect than to-be

et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est ipsum esse.

and to-be-wise than to-live but the-essence of-God is the-very to-be

Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae,

therefore not he-has in himself the-perfection of-life and of-wisdom

et alias huiusmodi perfectiones.

and other such perfections

Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom.,

but against is that says Dionysius chapter V on Divine Names

quod Deus in uno existentia omnia praehabet.

that God in one existing all-things pre-possesses

Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium

I-answer it-must-be-said that in God are the-perfections of-all

rerum. Unde et dicitur universaliter perfectus: quia non

things whence also he-is-called universally perfect because not

deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae inveniatur in aliquo genere,

is-lacking to-him any nobility which may-be-found in any genus

ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et hoc quidem ex

as says the-Commentator in V Metaphysics and this indeed from

duobus considerari potest.

two-things to-be-considered can

Primo quidem, per hoc quod quidquid perfectionis est in

first indeed through this that whatever of-perfection is in

effectu, oportet inveniri in causa effectiva: vel secundum

the-effect it-is-necessary to-be-found in the-cause effective either according-to

eandem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut homo generat

the-same notion if it-be an-agent univocal as man generates

hominem; vel eminentiori modo, si sit, agens aequivocum,

man or in-a-more-eminent mode if it-be an-agent equivocal

sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur
as in the-sun is the-likeness of-those-things which are-generated
per virtutem solis. Manifestum est enim quod effectus
through the-power of-the-sun manifest it-is for that the-effect
praeexistit virtute in causa agente: praeexistere autem in
pre-exists in-power in the-cause acting to-pre-exist moreover in
virtute causae agentis, non est praeexistere imperfectiori
the-power of-the-cause acting not is to-pre-exist in-a-more-imperfect
modo, sed perfectiori; licet praeexistere in potentia causae
mode but more-perfect although to-pre-exist in the-potency of-the-cause
materialis, sit praeexistere imperfectiori modo: eo
material is to-pre-exist in-a-more-imperfect mode for-the-reason
quod materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est imperfecta; agens
that matter inasmuch-as such is imperfect the-agent
vero, inquantum huiusmodi, est perfectum. Cum ergo Deus
but inasmuch-as such is perfect since therefore God
sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum
is the-first cause effective of-things it-is-necessary of-all things
perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem
the-perfections to-pre-exist in God according-to a-more-eminent
modum. Et hanc rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de
mode and this reason touches Dionysius chapter V on
Div. Nom., dicens de Deo quod non hoc quidem est,
Divine Names saying about God that not this indeed he-is
hoc autem non est: sed omnia est, ut omnium causa.
this but not he-is but all-things he-is as of-all the-cause
Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus
second but from this that above shown it-is that God
est ipsum esse per se subsistens: ex quo oportet quod
is the-very to-be through itself subsisting from which it-is-necessary that
totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est
the-whole perfection of-being in himself he-contain manifest it-is

enim quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem
for that if some hot-thing not have the-whole perfection
 calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum
of-the-hot this therefore is because heat not is-participated according-to
 perfectam rationem: sed si calor esset per se subsistens,
the-perfect notion but if heat were through itself subsisting
 non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde, cum
not could to-it anything to-be-lacking of the-power of-heat whence since
 Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi
God is the-very to-be subsisting notbing of the-perfection of-being
 potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent
can to-him to-be-lacking of-all moreover the-perfections pertain
 ad perfectionem essendi: secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta
to the-perfection of-being according-to this for some-things perfect
 sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod
are that in-some way to-be they-have whence it-follows that
 nullius rei perfectio Deo desit. Et hanc etiam rationem
of-no thing the-perfection to-God is-lacking and this also reason
 tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod
touches Dionysius chapter V on Divine Names saying that
 Deus non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et
God not in-a-certain-way is existing but simply and
 incircumscripse totum in seipso uniformiter esse praeaccipit:
uncircumscribedly the-whole in himself uniformly to-be he-pre-receives
 et postea subdit quod ipse est esse subsistentibus.
and afterward he-adds that he is the-to-be to-subsisting-things
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut sol, ut dicit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as the-sun as says
 Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., sensibilibus substantias
Dionysius chapter V on Divine Names of-sensible-things the-substances
 et qualitates multas et diferentes, ipse unus existens et
and qualities many and different it one existing and

uniformiter lucendo, in seipso uniformiter praeaccipit; ita
uniformly by-shining in itself uniformly pre-receives so
 multo magis in causa omnium necesse est praeeistere
much more in the-cause of-all necessary it-is to-pre-exist
 omnia secundum naturalem unionem. Et sic, quae
all-things according-to natural union and thus the-things-which
 sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeeistunt
are diverse and opposite in themselves in God pre-exist
 ut unum, absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.

as one without detriment of-the-simplicity of-him

Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.

and through this is-plain the-solution to the-second

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in eodem capite idem
to the-third it-must-be-said that as in the-same chapter the-same

Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse sit perfectius quam

Dionysius says although the-very to-be be more-perfect than

vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si considerentur

life and the-very life than the-very wisdom if they-be-considered

secundum quod distinguuntur ratione: tamen vivens est

according as they-are-distinguished in-reason yet the-living is

perfectius quam ens tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et

more-perfect than being only because the-living also is a-being and

sapiens est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non includat

the-wise is a-being and living although therefore being not include

in se vivens et sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud

in itself the-living and the-wise because not it-is-necessary that that

quod participat esse, participet ipsum secundum omnem

which participates to-be participate it according-to every

modum essendi: tamen ipsum esse Dei includit in se

mode of-being yet the-very to-be of-God includes in itself

vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus essendi
life and wisdom because none of the-perfections of-being
 potest deesse ei quod est ipsum esse subsistens.
can to-be-lacking to-that which is the-very to-be subsisting

Utrum aliqua creatura possit esse similis Deo

3 · WHETHER ANY CREATURE CAN BE LIKE GOD

The psalm says none is like God, and likeness seems to require a common genus or form. Thomas distinguishes likenesses: in the same form and degree, in the same form by more and less, and in the same form but not the same notion, as with agents that are not univocal. God is outside every genus, so creatures are like him only by analogy, as beings to the first universal principle of being. God is not like the creature.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that no creature
 possit esse similis Deo. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: non est
can to-be like to-God it-is-said for in the-Psalm not is
 similis tui in diis, Domine. Sed inter omnes creaturas,
like to-you among the-gods O-Lord but among all creatures
 excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii participative. Multo
more-excellent are those-which are-called gods participatively much
 ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo similes.
therefore less other creatures can to-be-called to-God like

2. Praeterea, similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est
2 further likeness is a-comparison certain not is
 autem comparatio eorum quae sunt diversorum generum;
but comparison of-those-things which are of-diverse genera
 ergo nec similitudo: non enim dicimus quod dulcedo sit
therefore nor likeness not for we-say that sweetness is

similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem generis cum
like to-whiteness but no creature is of-the-same genus with
 Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est.
God since God not is in a-genus as above shown it-is
 Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.

therefore no creature is like to-God

3. Praeterea, similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma.

3 further like are-called the-things-which agree in form

Sed nihil convenit cum Deo in forma: nullius enim rei
but nothing agrees with God in form of-no for thing
 essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius Dei. Ergo nulla creatura
the-essence is the-very to-be except of-alone God therefore no creature
 potest esse similis Deo.

can to-be like to-God

4. Praeterea, in similibus est mutua similitudo: nam simile

4 further in like-things there-is mutual likeness for like

est simili simile. Si igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo,
is to-the-like like if therefore some creature is like to-God
 et Deus erit similis alicui creaturae. Quod est contra id
also God will-be like to-some creature which is against that
 quod dicitur Isaiae XL: cui similem fecistis Deum?

which is-said Isaiah XL to-whom like have-you-made God

Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I: Faciamus hominem ad

but against is that it-is-said Genesis I let-us-make man to

imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et I Ioann. III: cum

the-image and likeness our and I John III when

apparuerit, similes ei erimus.

he-will-have-appeared like to-him we-shall-be

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum similitudo attendatur

I-answer it-must-be-said that since likeness is-attended

secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma,

according-to agreement or communication in form

multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos modos
manifest *is* *likeness* *according-to* *many* *ways*
 communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae
of-communicating *in* *form* *some* *for* *are-called* *like* *which*
 communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et
communicate *in* *the-same* *form* *according-to* *the-same* *notion* *and*
 secundum eundem modum: et haec non solum dicuntur similia,
according-to *the-same* *mode* *and* *these* *not* *only* *are-called* *like*
 sed aequalia in sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba,
but *equal* *in* *their* *likeness* *as* *two* *equally* *white*
 dicuntur similia in albedine. Et haec est perfectissima similitudo.

are-called *like* *in* *whiteness* *and* *this* *is* *the-most-perfect* *likeness*

– Alio modo dicuntur similia, quae communicant in forma
in-another *way* *are-called* *like* *which* *communicate* *in* *form*
 secundum eandem rationem, et non secundum eundem
according-to *the-same* *notion* *and* *not* *according-to* *the-same*
 modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album
mode *but* *according-to* *more* *and* *less* *as* *the-less* *white*
 dicitur simile magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta.

is-called *like* *to-the-more* *white* *and* *this* *is* *likeness* *imperfect*

– Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant
in-the-third *way* *are-called* *some-things* *like* *which* *communicate*
 in eadem forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem; ut
in *the-same* *form* *but* *not* *according-to* *the-same* *notion* *as*
 patet in agentibus non univocis. Cum enim omne agens agat
is-plain *in* *agents* *not* *univocal* *since* *for* *every* *agent* *acts*
 sibi simile inquantum est agens, agit autem unumquodque
to-itself *like* *inasmuch-as* *it-is* *an-agent* *acts* *moreover* *each-thing*
 secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in effectu sit
according-to *its* *form* *necessary* *it-is* *that* *in* *the-effect* *there-be*
 similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum in
a-likeness *of-the-form* *of-the-agent* *if* *therefore* *the-agent* *be* *contained* *in*

eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens
the-same species with its effect there-will-be likeness between maker
 et factum in forma, secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut
and made in form according-to the-same notion of-species as
 homo generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum
man generates man if but the-agent not be contained
 in eadem specie, erit similitudo, sed non secundum
in the-same species there-will-be likeness but not according-to
 eandem rationem speciei: sicut ea quae generantur ex
the-same notion of-species as those-things which are-generated from
 virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam similitudinem
the-power of-the-sun approach indeed to some likeness
 solis, non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum
of-the-sun not yet so-that they-receive the-form of-the-sun according-to
 similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis.
likeness of-species but according-to likeness of-genus
 Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur,
if therefore there-be some agent which not in a-genus is-contained
 effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem
the-effects of-it still more will-approach remotely to the-likeness
 formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participant similitudinem
of-the-form of-the-agent not yet so that they-participate the-likeness
 formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut
of-the-form of-the-agent according-to the-same notion of-species or
 generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum
of-genus but according-to some analogy as the-very
 esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quae
to-be is common to-all and in-this way those-things which
 sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut
are from God are-likened to-him inasmuch-as they-are beings as
 primo et universali principio totius esse.
to-the-first and universal principle of-the-whole to-be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap.
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as says Dionysius chapter
 IX de Div. Nom., cum sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse
IX on Divine Names when sacred Scripture says something not to-be
 simile Deo, non est contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem
like to-God not it-is contrary to-assimilation to him the-same
 enim sunt similia Deo, et dissimilia: similia quidem secundum
for are like to-God and unlike like indeed according
 quod imitantur ipsum, prout contingit eum imitari qui non
as they-imitate him according-as it-happens him to-imitate who not
 perfecte imitabilis est; dissimilia vero, secundum quod deficiunt
perfectly imitable is unlike but according as they-fall-short
 a sua causa; non solum secundum intensionem et remissionem,
of their cause not only according-to intension and remission
 sicut minus album deficit a magis albo; sed quia non est
as the-less white falls-short of the-more white but because not there-is
 convenientia nec secundum speciem nec secundum genus.
agreement neither according-to species nor according-to genus
 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad
to the-second it-must-be-said that God not himself has to
 creaturas sicut res diversorum generum: sed sicut id quod
creatures as things of-diverse genera but as that which
 est extra omne genus, et principium omnium generum.
is outside every genus and the-principle of-all genera
 Ad tertium dicendum quod non dicitur esse similitudo
to the-third it-must-be-said that not is-said to-be likeness
 creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma
of-the-creature to God on-account-of communicating in form
 secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei: sed secundum
according-to the-same notion of-genus and of-species but according-to

analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per
analogy only according-as namely God is being through
 essentiam, et alia per participationem.

essence and other-things through participation

Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that although in-some way it-be-conceded
 quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo concedendum

that a-creature is like to-God in-no yet way to-be-conceded

est quod Deus sit similis creaturae: quia, ut dicit Dionysius
is that God is like to-a-creature because as says Dionysius
 cap. IX de Div. Nom., in his quae unius ordinis sunt,

chapter IX on Divine Names in those-things which of-one order are

recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et causato:
is-received mutual likeness not but in the-cause and the-caused

dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e

we-say for that the-image is like to-the-man and not from

converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura
the-converse and similarly to-be-said it-can in-some way that the-creature
 sit similis Deo: non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.

is like to-God not yet that God is like to-the-creature

De bono in communi

V · ON GOOD IN GENERAL

Thomas inquires about the good, first in general, then about God's goodness. He asks six articles on the good in general: whether good and being are the same in reality; which is prior in notion; whether every being is good; to which cause good belongs; whether it consists in mode, species, and order; and how it is divided into honorable, useful, and delightful.

Deinde quaeritur de bono: et primo de bono in
next it-is-inquired about the-good and first about the-good in
communi; secundo de bonitate Dei.

common second about the-goodness of-God

Circa primum quaeruntur sex.

concerning the-first are-asked six

Primo: utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem.

first whether good and being are the-same according-to reality

Secundo: supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit

second supposing that they-differ in-notion only which is

prius secundum rationem, utrum bonum vel ens.

prior according-to notion whether good or being

Tertio: supposito quod ens sit prius, utrum omne ens sit

third supposing that being is prior whether every being is

bonum.

good

Quarto: ad quam causam ratio boni reducatur.

fourth to which cause the-notion of-good is-reduced

Quinto: utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et

fifth whether the-notion of-good consists in mode species and

ordine.

order

Sexto: quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et
sixth how is-divided the-good into the-honorable the-useful and
 delectabile.

the-delightful

Utrum bonum differat secundum rem ab ente

1 · WHETHER GOOD DIFFERS IN REALITY FROM BEING

Boethius distinguishes being good from being, and good admits more and less while being does not. Thomas answers that good and being are the same in reality and differ in notion: good adds desirability. A thing is called being simply by its substantial being and good simply by its final perfection, so each is said of the other only in some respect, as Boethius means.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that good differs
 secundum rem ab ente. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de
according-to reality from being says for Boethius in the-book on
 Hebdom.: intueor in rebus aliud esse quod sunt bona, et aliud
the-Hebdomads I-perceive in things other to-be that they-are good and other
 esse quod sunt. Ergo bonum et ens differunt secundum rem.
to-be that they-are therefore good and being differ according-to reality

2. Praeterea, nihil informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur
2 further nothing is-informed by-itself but good is-said
 per informationem entis, ut habetur in Commento libri
through the-informing of-being as is-had in the-Commentary of-the-book
 de Causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.
on Causes therefore good differs according-to reality from being

3. Praeterea, bonum suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem
3 further good admits more and less to-be but
 non suscipit magis et minus. Ergo bonum differt secundum
not admits more and less therefore good differs according-to
 rem ab ente.

reality from being

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Doctrina
but against is that Augustine says in the-book on Doctrine
 Christiana, quod inquantum sumus, boni sumus.

Christian that inasmuch-as we-are good we-are

Respondeo dicendum quod bonum et ens sunt idem
I-answer it-must-be-said that good and being are the-same
 secundum rem: sed differunt secundum rationem tantum.

according-to reality but they-differ according-to notion only

Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod
which thus is-plain the-notion for of-good in this consists that
 aliquid sit appetibile: unde Philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit quod
something be appetible whence the-Philosopher in I Ethics says that

bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod
the-good is what all desire manifest it-is moreover that
 unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum:

each-thing is appetible according as it-is perfect

nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem
for all desire their perfection so-far is moreover
 perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum

perfect each-thing as-far-as it-is in-act whence manifest

est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse
it-is that so-far is something good as-far-as it-is being to-be
 enim est actualitas omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde
for is the-actuality of-every thing as from the-above is-plain whence

manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum
manifest it-is that good and being are the-same according-to
 rem: sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.
reality but good says the-notion of-the-appetible which not says being
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although good and being
 sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum
are the-same according-to reality because yet they-differ according-to
 rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter,
notion not in-the-same way is-said something being simply
 et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse
and good simply for since being says something properly to-be
 in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam;
in act act moreover properly order has to potency
 secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod
according-to this simply something is-called being according as
 primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc
first it-is-distinguished from that which is in potency only this
 autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per
moreover is the-to-be substantial of-thing each whence through
 suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter.
its to-be substantial is-called each-thing being simply
 Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum
through acts moreover superadded is-said something to-be in-some
 quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid: non
respect as to-be white signifies to-be in-some respect not
 enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum
for to-be white takes-away to-be in potency simply since
 adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit
it-comes to-a-thing already pre-existing in act but good says
 rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile: et per consequens
the-notion of-the-perfect which is appetible and by consequence

dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum,
it-says the-notion of-the-last whence that which is lastly perfect
 dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam
is-called good simply that-which moreover not has the-last
 perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam
perfection which it-ought to-have although it-have some
 perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum
perfection inasmuch-as it-is in-act not yet is-called perfect
 simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. – Sic
simply nor good simply but in-some respect thus
 ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur
therefore according-to the-first to-be which is substantial is-called
 aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest
something being simply and good in-some respect that-is
 inquantum est ens: secundum vero ultimum actum, dicitur
inasmuch-as it-is being according-to but the-last act is-called
 aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo
something being in-some respect and good simply thus therefore
 quod dicit Boetius, quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona,
what says Boetius that in things other is that they-are good
 et aliud quod sunt, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad
and other that they-are to-be-referred is to to-be good and to
 esse simpliciter: quia secundum primum actum est aliquid
to-be simply because according-to the-first act is something
 ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et
being simply and according-to the-last good simply and
 tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum:
yet according-to the-first act it-is in-a-way good
 et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens.
and according-to the-last act it-is in-a-way being

Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum dicitur per
to the-second it-must-be-said that good is-said through
 informationem, prout accipitur bonum simpliciter,
informing according-as is-taken good simply
 secundum ultimum actum.

according-to the-last act

Et similiter dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur
and similarly it-must-be-said to the-third that good is-said
 secundum magis et minus, secundum actum supervenientem;
according-to more and less according-to an-act supervening
 puta secundum scientiam vel virtutem.

for-example according-to science or virtue

Utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam ens

2 · WHETHER GOOD IS PRIOR TO BEING IN NOTION

Dionysius names God good before being, and good seems to extend further, even to nonbeing. Thomas answers that being is prior in notion, since it is the first thing the intellect conceives, as sound is the first audible. Good comes first in causing, as the end moves the agent, and in that sense the Platonists and Dionysius place it first.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that good according-to
 rationem sit prius quam ens. Ordo enim nominum est
notion is prior than being the-order for of-names is
 secundum ordinem rerum significatarum per nomina. Sed
according-to the-order of-the-things signified through the-names but
 Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum quam
Dionysius among other names of-God first places good than

ens, ut patet in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum
being as is-plain in III chapter on Divine Names therefore good
 secundum rationem est prius quam ens.

according-to notion is prior than being

2. Praeterea, illud est prius secundum rationem, quod ad
 2 *further that is prior according-to notion which to*
 plura se extendit. Sed bonum ad plura se extendit quam
more-things itself extends but good to more-things itself extends than
 ens: quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom., bonum se
being because as says Dionysius V chapter on Divine Names good itself
 extendit ad existentia et non existentia, ens vero ad existentia
extends to existing-things and non existing-things being but to existing-things
 tantum. Ergo bonum est prius secundum rationem quam ens.
only therefore good is prior according-to notion than being

3. Praeterea, quod est universalius, est prius secundum
 3 *further what is more-universal is prior according-to*
 rationem. Sed bonum videtur universalius esse quam ens:
notion but good seems more-universal to-be than being
 quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis; quibusdam autem
because good has the-notion of-the-appetible to-some moreover
 appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth. XXVI,
appetible is the-very not to-be it-is-said for Matthew XXVI
 de Iuda: bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset etc.
about Judas good it-was for-him if born not be-had-been etc
 Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.

therefore good is prior than being according-to notion

4. Praeterea, non solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et
 4 *further not only to-be is appetible but also life and*
 sapientia, et multa huiusmodi: et sic videtur quod esse sit
wisdom and many such-things and thus it-seems that to-be is

quoddam particulare appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum

a-certain particular appetible and good universal good

ergo simpliciter est prius secundum rationem quam ens.

therefore simply is prior according-to notion than being

Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de Causis, quod prima

but against is that it-is-said in the-book on Causes that the-first

rerum creatarum est esse.

of-things created is to-be

Respondeo dicendum quod ens secundum rationem est prius

I-answer it-must-be-said that being according-to notion is prior

quam bonum. Ratio enim significata per nomen, est id

than good the-notion for signified through the-name is that

quod concipit intellectus de re, et significat illud per

which conceives the-intellect about the-thing and it-signifies it through

vocem: illud ergo est prius secundum rationem, quod prius

the-word that therefore is prior according-to notion which first

cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in conceptione

falls in the-conception of-the-intellect first moreover in the-conception

intellectus cadit ens: quia secundum hoc unumquodque

of-the-intellect falls being because according-to this each-thing

cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX

knowable is inasmuch-as it-is in-act as is-said in IX

Metaphys. Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus: et

Metaphysics whence being is the-proper object of-the-intellect and

sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile.

thus it-is the-first intelligible as sound is the-first audible

Ita ergo secundum rationem prius est ens quam bonum.

so therefore according-to notion prior is being than good

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Dionysius determines about

divinis nominibus secundum quod important circa Deum

divine names according as they-import about God

habitudinem causae: nominamus enim Deum, ut ipse dicit,
the-relation of-cause we-name for God as he says
 ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum autem, cum
from creatures as a-cause from effects good moreover since
 habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis:
it-has the-notion of-the-appetible imports the-relation of-cause final
 cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi propter
whose causality first is because the-agent not acts except for
 finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam: unde dicitur
an-end and by the-agent matter is-moved to form whence it-is-said
 quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic, in causando, bonum
that the-end is the-cause of-causes and thus in causing good
 est prius quam ens, sicut finis quam forma: et hac ratione,
is prior than being as the-end than the-form and by-this reason
 inter nomina significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur
among the-names signifying causality divine first is-placed
 bonum quam ens. – Et iterum quia, secundum Platonicos, qui,
good than being and again because according-to the-Platonists who
 materiam a privatione non distinguentes, dicebant materiam
matter from privation not distinguishing said matter
 esse non ens, ad plura se extendit participatio boni
to-be non being to more-things itself extends the-participation of-good
 quam participatio entis. Nam materia prima participat bonum,
than the-participation of-being for matter prime participates good
 cum appetat ipsum (nihil autem appetit nisi simile sibi):
since it-desires it nothing moreover desires except the-like to-itself
 non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et ideo
not but it-participates being since it-is-posed non being and therefore
 dicit Dionysius quod bonum extenditur ad non existentia.
says Dionysius that good is-extended to non existing-things

Unde patet solutio ad secundum. – Vel dicendum quod
whence is-plain the-solution to the-second or it-must-be-said that
 bonum extenditur ad existentia et non existentia, non
good is-extended to existing-things and non existing-things not
 secundum praedicationem, sed secundum causalitatem: ut
according-to predication but according-to causality so-that
 per non existentia intelligamus, non ea simpliciter quae
by non existing-things we-may-understand not those simply which
 penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et non
entirely not are but those which are in potency and not
 in actu: quia bonum habet rationem finis, in quo non
in act because good has the-notion of-end in which not
 solum quiescunt quae sunt in actu, sed ad ipsum
only rest the-things-which are in act but to it
 etiam ea moventur quae in actu non sunt, sed in
also those-things are-moved which in act not are but in
 potentia tantum. Ens autem non importat habitudinem causae
potency only being moreover not imports the-relation of-cause
 nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel exemplaris: cuius
except formal only either inhering or exemplar whose
 causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt in actu.
causality not itself extends except to those-things which are in act
 Ad tertium dicendum quod non esse secundum se non
to the-third it-must-be-said that not to-be according-to itself not
 est appetibile, sed per accidens: inquantum scilicet ablatio
is appetible but through accident inasmuch-as namely the-removal
 alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod malum quidem aufertur
of-some evil is appetible which evil indeed is-removed
 per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est appetibilis, nisi
through not to-be the-removal but of-evil not is appetible except
 inquantum per malum privatur quodam esse. Illud igitur
inasmuch-as through the-evil one-is-deprived of-a-certain to-be that therefore

quod per se est appetibile, est esse: non esse vero per
which through itself is appetible is to-be not to-be but through
 accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur,
accident only inasmuch-as namely a-certain to-be is-desired
 quo homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per
of-which man not bears to-be-deprived and thus also through
 accidens non esse dicitur bonum.

accident not to-be is-called good
 Ad quartum dicendum quod vita et scientia, et alia
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that life and science and other
 huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in actu: unde in
such-things so are-desired as they-are in act whence in
 omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est appetibile
all is-desired a-certain to-be and thus nothing is appetible
 nisi ens: et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi ens.
except being and by consequence nothing is good except being

Utrum omne ens sit bonum

3 • WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD

Good seems to contract being as other categories do, and some beings are evil, and prime matter and mathematical objects seem not good. Thomas answers that every being, insofar as it is, is in act and so in some way perfect and desirable. Evil is the lack of some being, matter is good only in potency, and mathematics abstracts from the end.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not every being is
 bonum. Bonum enim addit supra ens, ut ex dictis patet.
good good for adds over being as from things-said is-plain
 Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra ens, contrahunt
those-things but which add something over being contract

ipsum: sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et alia huiusmodi.

it as substance quantity quality and other such-things

Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.

therefore good contracts being not therefore every being is good

2. Praeterea, nullum malum est bonum: Isaiae V, Vae qui

2 further no evil is good Isaiah V woe you-who

dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum. Sed aliquod ens

call evil good and good evil but some being

dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.

is-called evil therefore not every being is good

3. Praeterea, bonum habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia

3 further good has the-notion of-the-appetible but matter

prima non habet rationem appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum.

prime not has the-notion of-the-appetible but of-the-desiring only

Ergo materia prima non habet rationem boni. Non igitur

therefore matter prime not has the-notion of-good not therefore

omne ens est bonum.

every being is good

4. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod

4 further the-Philosopher says in III Metaphysics that

in mathematicis non est bonum. Sed mathematica sunt

in mathematical-things not is good but mathematical-things are

quaedam entia: alioquin de eis non esset scientia. Ergo

certain beings otherwise about them not would-be science therefore

non omne ens est bonum.

not every being is good

Sed contra, omne ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura.

but against every being which not is God is of-God a-creature

Sed omnis creatura Dei est bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV

but every creature of-God is good as it-is-said I to Timothy IV

cap.: Deus vero est maxime bonus. Ergo omne ens est bonum.

chapter God but is most good therefore every being is good

Respondeo dicendum quod omne ens, inquantum est ens,

I-answer it-must-be-said that every being inasmuch-as it-is being

est bonum. Omne enim ens, inquantum est ens, est in

is good every for being inasmuch-as it-is being is in

actu, et quodammodo perfectum: quia omnis actus perfectio

act and in-a-way perfect because every act a-perfection

quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis

certain is the-perfect but has the-notion of-the-appetible

et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens,

and of-good as from things-said is-plain whence it-follows every being

inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.

inasmuch-as such good to-be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that substance quantity and

qualitas, et ea quae sub eis continentur, contrahunt

quality and those-things which under them are-contained contract

ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem seu naturam.

being by-applying being to some quiddity or nature

Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens: sed rationem

thus but not adds anything good over being but the-notion

tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi esse

only of-the-appetible and of-perfection which belongs to-the-very to-be

in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.

in whatever nature it-be whence good not contracts being

Ad secundum dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum

to the-second it-must-be-said that no being is-called evil

inquantum est ens, sed inquantum caret quodam esse: sicut

inasmuch-as it-is being but inasmuch-as it-lacks a-certain to-be as

homo dicitur malus inquantum caret esse virtutis, et

a-man is-called evil inasmuch-as he-lacks the-to-be of-virtue and

oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret acumine visus.

an-eye is-called evil inasmuch-as it-lacks sharpness of-sight

Ad tertium dicendum quod materia prima, sicut non est
to the-third it-must-be-said that matter prime as not is
 ens nisi in potentia, ita nec bonum nisi in potentia.

being except in potency so neither good except in potency

Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit quod materia

although according-to the-Platonists to-be-said it-can that matter

prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed

prime is non being on-account-of the-privation joined but

tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel

yet it-participates something of good namely the-very order or

aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod

aptitude to good and therefore not belongs to-it that

sit appetibile, sed quod appetat.

it-be appetible but that it-desire

Ad quartum dicendum quod mathematica non subsistunt

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that mathematical-things not subsist

separata secundum esse: quia si subsisterent, esset

separate according-to to-be because if they-subsisted there-would-be

in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt autem

in them good namely the-very to-be of-them they-are but

mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout

mathematical-things separate according-to notion only according-as

abstrahuntur a motu et a materia: et sic abstrahuntur

they-are-abstracted from motion and from matter and thus they-are-abstracted

a ratione finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est

from the-notion of-end which has the-notion of-mover not it-is

autem inconueniens quod in aliquo ente secundum rationem

but unfitting that in some being according-to notion

non sit bonum vel ratio boni: cum ratio entis sit

not there-be good or the-notion of-good since the-notion of-being is

prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.

prior than the-notion of-good as above said it-is

Utrum bonum habeat rationem causae finalis

4 • WHETHER GOOD HAS THE NOTION OF FINAL CAUSE

Good is praised as beautiful, which belongs to form, it is said to diffuse itself, as an efficient cause does, and Augustine says we are because God is good. Thomas answers that good is what all desire, so it has the notion of end, though it presupposes efficient and formal cause: what is first in causing is last in the caused. The beautiful is the same thing as the good but regards knowing, and so pertains to form; Augustine's saying refers to the final cause.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that good not has
rationem causae finalis, sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit
the-notion of-cause final but rather of-the-others as for says
Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.: bonum laudatur ut
Dionysius IV chapter on Divine Names good is-praised as
pulchrum. Sed pulchrum importat rationem causae formalis.
beautiful but the-beautiful imports the-notion of-cause formal
Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.

therefore good has the-notion of-cause formal

2. Praeterea, bonum est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis

2 further good is diffusive of-its to-be as from the-words

Dionysii accipitur, quibus dicit quod bonum est ex quo omnia
of-Dionysius is-taken in-which he-says that good is from which all-things
subsistunt et sunt. Sed esse diffusivum importat rationem
subsist and are but to-be diffusive imports the-notion
causae efficientis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae efficientis.

of-cause efficient therefore good has the-notion of-cause efficient

3. Praeterea, dicit Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod quia
3 further says Augustine in I on Doctrine Christian that because
 Deus bonus est, nos sumus. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa
God good is we are but from God we-are as from a-cause
 efficiente. Ergo bonum importat rationem causae efficientis.
efficient therefore good imports the-notion of-cause efficient
 Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod
but against is that the-Philosopher says in II Physics that
 illud cuius causa est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum.
that of-which the-sake is is as the-end and the-good of-the-others
 Bonum ergo habet rationem causae finalis.
good therefore has the-notion of-cause final
 Respondeo dicendum quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia
I-answer it-must-be-said that since good is what all
 appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est
desire this moreover has the-notion of-end manifest it-is
 quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen ratio
that good the-notion of-end imports but yet the-notion
 boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem
of-good presupposes the-notion of-cause efficient and the-notion
 causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in
of-cause formal we-see for that that which is first in
 causando, ultimum est in causato: ignis enim primo calefacit
causing last is in the-caused fire for first beats
 quam formam ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne
than the-form of-fire it-induces since yet heat in fire
 consequatur formam substantialem. In causando autem, primum
follows the-form substantial in causing moreover first
 invenitur bonum et finis, qui movet efficientem; secundo,
is-found the-good and the-end which moves the-efficient second
 actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio advenit forma.
the-action of-the-efficient moving to the-form third comes the-form

Unde e converso esse oportet in causato: quod primum sit
whence from the-converse to-be it-is-necessary in the-caused that first be
 ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo consideratur in ea
the-very form through which it-is being second is-considered in it
 virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in esse (quia
the-power effective according as it-is perfect in the-to-be because
 unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi simile
each-thing then perfect is when it-can to-itself like
 facere, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio consequitur
to-make as says the-Philosopher in IV Meteorology third follows
 ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.

the-notion of-good through which in being perfection is-founded
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-beautiful and the-good in
 subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundantur,
subject indeed are the-same because upon the-same thing they-are-founded
 scilicet super formam: et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut
namely upon form and on-account-of this good is-praised as
 pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum proprie respicit
beautiful but in-notion they-differ for good properly regards
 appetitum: est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo
the-appetite it-is for good what all desire and therefore
 habet rationem finis: nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus
it-has the-notion of-end for appetite is as-it-were a-certain motion
 ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam:
toward the-thing the-beautiful but regards the-power cognitive
 pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum
beautiful for are-called the-things-which seen please whence the-beautiful
 in debita proportionem consistit: quia sensus delectatur in rebus
in due proportion consists because sense delights in things
 debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus
duly proportioned as in to-itself like-things for also sense

ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia
a-reason certain is and every power cognitive and because
 cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit
knowledge is-made through assimilation likeness moreover regards
 formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis.
form the-beautiful properly pertains to the-notion of-cause formal
 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui
to the-second it-must-be-said that good is-called diffusive of-its
 esse, eo modo quo finis dicitur movere.
to-be in-that way in-which the-end is-said to-move
 Ad tertium dicendum quod quilibet habens voluntatem,
to the-third it-must-be-said that anyone having will
 dicitur bonus inquantum habet bonam voluntatem: quia
is-called good inasmuch-as he-has good will because
 per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis sunt. Unde
through the-will we-use all-things which in us are whence
 non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum: sed
not is-called a-good man who has a-good intellect but
 qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem
who has a-good will the-will moreover regards the-end
 ut obiectum proprium: et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est
as object proper and thus what is-said because God is
 bonus, sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.
good we-are is-referred to the-cause final

Utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine

5 · WHETHER THE NOTION OF GOOD LIES IN MODE, SPECIES, AND ORDER

These three seem to belong to being, to need their own mode, species, and order, and to be lost wholly by evil. Thomas answers that a thing is good as perfect, and perfection requires a form, what the form presupposes, and what follows from it: mode, species, and order, with Wisdom's number, weight, and measure. Evil removes only some mode, species, and order.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-notion of-good not
consistat in modo, specie et ordine. Bonum enim et ens
consists in mode species and order good for and being
ratione differunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed modus, species et
in-notion differ as above said it-is but mode species and
ordo pertinere ad rationem entis videntur: quia, sicut dicitur
order to-pertain to the-notion of-being seem because as it-is-said
Sap. XI, omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti,
Wisdom XI all-things in number weight and measure you-have-disposed
ad quae tria reducuntur species, modus et ordo: quia, ut
to which three are-reduced species mode and order because as
dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad litteram: mensura omni
says Augustine IV on Genesis to the-letter measure to-every
rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet,
thing a-mode prefixes and number to-every thing species provides
et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit.
and weight every thing to rest and stability draws
Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.
therefore the-notion of-good not consists in mode species and order

2. Praeterea, ipse modus, species et ordo bona quaedam

2 further the-very mode species and order goods certain
sunt. Si ergo ratio boni consistit in modo, specie
are if therefore the-notion of-good consists in mode species
et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus habeat modum,
and order it-is-necessary also that mode have mode
speciem et ordinem: et similiter species et ordo. Ergo
species and order and similarly species and order therefore
procederetur in infinitum.

it-would-be-proceeded to infinity

3. Praeterea, malum est privatio modi et speciei et

3 further evil is the-privation of-mode and of-species and
ordinis. Sed malum non tollit totaliter bonum. Ergo
of-order but evil not takes-away totally good therefore
ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.

the-notion of-good not consists in mode species and order

4. Praeterea, illud in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest

4 further that in which consists the-notion of-good not can
dici malum. Sed dicitur malus modus, mala species,
to-be-called evil but is-called an-evil mode an-evil species
malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo,
an-evil order therefore the-notion of-good not consists in mode
specie et ordine.

species and order

5. Praeterea, modus, species et ordo ex pondere, numero et

5 further mode species and order by weight number and
mensura causantur, ut ex auctoritate Augustini inducta patet.

measure are-caused as from the-authority of-Augustine brought-in is-plain

Non autem omnia bona habent pondus, numerum et mensuram:

not but all goods have weight number and measure

dicunt enim Ambrosius, in Hexaameron, quod lucis natura est,

says for Ambrose in the-Hexaameron that of-light the-nature is

ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in mensura creata sit.

that not in number not in weight not in measure created it-be

Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine.

not therefore the-notion of-good consists in mode species and order

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Natura

but against is that says Augustine in the-book on the-Nature

Boni: Haec tria, modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia

of-Good these three mode species and order as general

bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis: et ita, haec tria ubi

goods are in things by God made and so these three where

magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi parva, parva bona

great they-are great goods are where small small goods

sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est. Quod non esset, nisi

are where none no good is which not would-be unless

ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni consistit

the-notion of-good in them consisted therefore the-notion of-good consists

in modo, specie et ordine.

in mode species and order

Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur bonum,

I-answer it-must-be-said that each-thing is-called good

inquantum est perfectum: sic enim est appetibile, ut supra

inasmuch-as it-is perfect so for it-is appetible as above

dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest

said it-is perfect moreover is-called that-to-which nothing is-lacking

secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque

according-to the-mode of-its perfection since moreover each-thing

sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit

is that which it-is through its form form moreover presupposes

quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur;

certain-things and certain-things to it from necessity follow

ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est

for this that something be perfect and good necessary it-is

quod formam habeat, et ea quae praexiguntur ad eam,
that form it-have and those-things which are-pre-required to it
 et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexigitur autem
and those-things which follow to it is-pre-required moreover
 ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu
to the-form the-determination or commensuration of-the-principles either
 materialium, seu efficientium ipsam: et hoc significatur per
material or effecting it and this is-signified by
 modum: unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa
mode whence it-is-said that measure the-mode prefixes the-very
 autem forma significatur per speciem: quia per formam
moreover form is-signified by species because through form
 unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur
each-thing in species is-constituted and on-account-of this it-is-said
 quod numerus speciem praebet: quia definitiones significantes
that number species provides because definitions signifying
 speciem sunt sicut numeri, secundum Philosophum in VIII
species are as numbers according-to the-Philosopher in VIII
 Metaphys.; sicut enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem
Metaphysics as for unity added or subtracted varies the-species
 numeri, ita in definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta.
of-number so in definitions the-difference added or subtracted
 Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad
to the-form moreover follows inclination to the-end or to
 actionem, aut ad aliquid huiusmodi: quia unumquodque,
action or to something of-this-kind because each-thing
 inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in id quod sibi
inasmuch-as it-is in-act acts and tends into that which to-itself
 convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad pondus
is-suitable according-to its form and this pertains to weight

et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit
and order whence the-notion of-good according as it-consists
 in perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.

in perfection consists also in mode species and order

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that these three not follow

ens, nisi inquantum est perfectum: et secundum hoc est
being except inasmuch-as it-is perfect and according-to this it-is
 bonum.

good

Ad secundum dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo

to the-second it-must-be-said that mode species and order in-that

modo dicuntur bona, sicut et entia: non quia ipsa sint

way are-called goods as also beings not because they-themselves be

quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia sunt et entia et

as-it-were subsisting-things but because by-them other-things are both beings and

bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua alia,

goods whence not it-is-necessary that they have some other-things

quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi

by-which they-be good not for so are-called goods as-if

formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua

formally by-others they-be good but because by-them formally some-things

sunt bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo

are good as whiteness not is-called being because it by-something

sit, sed quia ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.

is but because by-it something is in-some respect namely white

Ad tertium dicendum quod quodlibet esse est secundum

to the-third it-must-be-said that every to-be is according-to

formam aliquam: unde secundum quodlibet esse rei,

form some whence according-to every to-be of-the-thing

consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo: sicut homo habet

follow it mode species and order as a-man has

speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et similiter

species mode and order inasmuch-as he-is man and similarly

inquantum est albus, habet similiter modum, speciem et

inasmuch-as he-is white he-has similarly mode species and

ordinem; et inquantum est virtuosus, et inquantum est sciens,

order and inasmuch-as he-is virtuous and inasmuch-as he-is knowing

et secundum omnia quae de ipso dicuntur. Malum autem

and according-to all-things which of him are-said evil moreover

privat quodam esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus: unde

deprives of-a-certain to-be as blindness deprives of-the-to-be of-sight whence

non tollit omnem modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum

not it-takes-away every mode species and order but only

modum, speciem et ordinem quae consequuntur esse visus.

the-mode species and order which follow the-to-be of-sight

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that as says Augustine in

libro de Natura Boni, omnis modus, inquantum modus,

the-book on the-Nature of-Good every mode inasmuch-as mode

bonus est (et sic potest dici de specie et ordine): sed

good is and thus can to-be-said of species and order but

malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo

an-evil mode or an-evil species or an-evil order either therefore

dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia

are-called because less they-are than to-be they-should-have or because

non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt;

not to-those things they-are-adapted to-which to-be-adapted they-are

ut ideo dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua.

so-that therefore they-be-called evil because they-are alien and incongruous

Ad quintum dicendum quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine

to the-fifth it-must-be-said that the-nature of-light is-said to-be without

numero et pondere et mensura, non simpliciter, sed per

number and weight and measure not simply but by

comparationem ad corporalia: quia virtus lucis ad omnia
comparison to bodily-things because the-power of-light to all
 corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas activa primi
bodily-things itself extends inasmuch-as it-is the-quality active of-the-first
 corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.
body altering namely of-heaven

Utrum convenienter dividatur bonum
 per honestum, utile et delectabile

6 · WHETHER GOOD DIVIDES INTO HONORABLE, USEFUL, AND
 DELIGHTFUL

Good seems divided by the ten categories, the three overlap, and the useful is good only for something else. Thomas answers that, taking motion as the model, the useful is a means toward a further end, the honorable is desired for itself, and the delightful is the rest of appetite in what it has attained. The division is of notions, said analogically.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not fittingly
 dividatur bonum per honestum, utile et delectabile.
is-divided good by the-honorable the-useful and the-delightful
 Bonum enim, sicut dicit Philosophus in I Ethic., dividitur
good for as says the-Philosopher in I Ethics is-divided
 per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem, utile et
by the-ten predicaments the-honorable moreover the-useful and
 delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo
the-delightful to-be-found can in one predicament therefore
 non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.
not fittingly by these is-divided good

2. Praeterea, omnis divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria
 2 further every division is-made by opposites but these three
 non videntur esse opposita: nam honesta sunt delectabilia,
 not seem to-be opposite for honorable-things are delightful
 nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod tamen oportet, si
 and-no dishonorable-thing is useful which yet it-must-be if
 divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur honestum
 the-division were-made by opposites so-that would-be-opposed the-honorable
 et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de Officiis.
 and the-useful as also says Tully in the-book on Duties
 Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.

therefore the-aforsaid division not is fitting

3. Praeterea, ubi unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum
 3 further where one on-account-of another there one only
 est. Sed utile non est bonum nisi propter delectabile
 is but the-useful not is good except on-account-of the-delightful
 vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi contra
 or the-honorable therefore not ought the-useful to-be-divided against
 delectabile et honestum.

the-delightful and the-honorable

Sed contra est quod Ambrosius, in libro de Officiis, utitur
 but against is that Ambrose in the-book on Duties uses
 ista divisione boni.

this division of-good

Respondeo dicendum quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse
 I-answer it-must-be-said that this division properly seems to-be
 boni humani. Si tamen altius et communius rationem boni
 of-good human if yet more-highly and more-commonly the-notion of-good
 consideremus, invenitur haec divisio proprie competere bono,
 we-consider is-found this division properly to-befit good
 secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est aliquid, inquantum
 according as good it-is for good is something inasmuch-as

est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus. Cuius quidem
it-is appetible and the-term of-the-motion of-appetite of-which indeed
 motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione motus
motion the-termination to-be-considered can from the-consideration of-the-motion
 corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis naturalis,
of-a-body natural is-terminated moreover the-motion of-a-body natural
 simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam ad
simply indeed at the-last in-some respect but also at
 medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum,
the-middle through which one-goes to the-last which terminates the-motion
 et dicitur aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem
and is-called some term of-motion inasmuch-as some part
 motus terminat. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus,
of-the-motion it-terminates that moreover which is the-last term of-motion
 potest accipi dupliciter: vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote
can be-taken in-two-ways either the-very thing into which it-tends as
 locus vel forma; vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu
place or form or rest in thing that thus therefore in the-motion
 appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus
of-appetite that which is appetible terminating the-motion of-appetite
 secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud,
in-some respect as a-middle through which it-tends into another
 vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum, terminans
is-called useful that moreover which is-desired as last terminating
 totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam
totally the-motion of-appetite as a-certain thing into which
 per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum: quia honestum
through itself the-appetite tends is-called honorable because the-honorable
 dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat
is-called what through itself is-desired that moreover which terminates
 motum appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.
the-motion of-appetite as rest in the-thing desired is delight

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that good inasmuch-as it-is
idem subiecto cum ente, dividitur per decem praedicamenta:
the-same in-subject with being is-divided by the-ten predicaments
sed secundum propriam rationem, competit sibi ista divisio.
but according-to its-proper notion befits it this division
Ad secundum dicendum quod haec divisio non est per
to the-second it-must-be-said that this division not is by
oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen
opposite things but by opposite notions are-called yet
illa proprie delectabilia, quae nullam habent aliam rationem
those properly delightful which no have other notion
appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, cum aliquando sint et
of-appetibility except delight since sometimes they-are both
noxia et inhonesta. Utilia vero dicuntur, quae non habent
harmful and dishonorable useful but are-called those-which not have
in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut sunt
in themselves whence they-may-be-desired but are-desired only as they-are
ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta
leading into another as the-taking of-medicine bitter honorable
vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.
but are-called those-which in themselves have whence they-may-be-desired
Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum non dividitur in ista
to the-third it-must-be-said that good not is-divided into these
tria sicut univocum aequaliter de his praedicatum: sed sicut
three as a-univocal equally of these predicated but as
analogum, quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius.
an-analogue which is-predicated according-to prior and posterior
Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et secundo de
by prior for it-is-predicated of the-honorable and secondarily of
delectabili; tertio de utili.
the-delightful thirdly of the-useful

De bonitate Dei

VI • ON THE GOODNESS OF GOD

Thomas next inquires into the goodness of God, in four articles: whether to be good belongs to God; whether God is the highest good; whether he alone is good through his essence; and whether all things are good by the divine goodness.

Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei.

next it-is-inquired about the-goodness of-God

Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

and about this are-asked four

Primo: utrum esse bonum conveniat Deo.

first whether to-be good belongs to-God

Secundo: utrum Deus sit summum bonum.

second whether God is the-highest good

Tertio: utrum ipse solus sit bonus per suam essentiam.

third whether he alone is good through his essence

Quarto: utrum omnia sint bona bonitate divina.

fourth whether all-things are good by-goodness divine

Utrum esse bonum Deo conveniat

1 · WHETHER TO BE GOOD BELONGS TO GOD

Good seems to consist in mode, species, and order, which do not fit the immeasurable God, and not all things know him to desire him. Thomas answers that each thing desires its perfection, which is a likeness of its agent; so God, the first efficient cause, has the notion of good. All things desire God in desiring their own perfection, rational creatures by knowing him, others by sense in his likenesses, others by natural appetite.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be good not
conveniat Deo. Ratio enim boni consistit in modo, specie
belongs to-God the-notion for of-good consists in mode species
et ordine. Haec autem non videntur Deo convenire: cum
and order these moreover not seem to-God to-belong since
Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur. Ergo
God immense is and to anything not is-ordered therefore
esse bonum non convenit Deo.

to-be good not belongs to-God

2. Praeterea, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum
2 further good is what all desire but God
non omnia appetunt: quia non omnia cognoscunt ipsum;
not all desire because not all know him
nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse bonum non
nothing moreover is-desired except known therefore to-be good not
convenit Deo.

belongs to-God

Sed contra est quod dicitur Thren. III: Bonus est
but against is that it-is-said Lamentations III good is
Dominus sperantibus in eum, animae quaerenti illum.

the-Lord to-those-hoping in him to-the-soul seeking him

Respondeo dicendum quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit.

I-answer it-must-be-said that good to-be especially to-God belongs

Bonum enim aliquid est, secundum quod est appetibile.

good for something is according as it-is appetible

Unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem. Perfectio

each-thing moreover desires its perfection the-perfection

autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis: cum

moreover and form of-the-effect is a-certain likeness of-the-agent since

omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum agens est appetibile,

every agent makes to-itself like whence the-very agent is appetible

et habet rationem boni: hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur,

and has the-notion of-good this for is what of it is-desired

ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa

that its likeness be-participated since therefore God is the-first cause

effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit ratio

effective of-all-things manifest it-is that to-him belongs the-notion

boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom.,

of-good and appetible whence Dionysius in the-book on Divine Names

attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens

attributes good to-God as to-the-first cause efficient saying

quod bonus dicitur Deus, sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt.

that good is-called God as from whom all-things subsist

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod habere modum, speciem

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that to-have mode species

et ordinem, pertinet ad rationem boni causati. Sed bonum

and order pertains to the-notion of-good caused but good

in Deo est sicut in causa: unde ad eum pertinet imponere

in God is as in the-cause whence to him it-pertains to-impose

aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista tria sunt

on-others mode species and order whence these three are

in Deo sicut in causa.

in God as in the-cause

Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias
to the-second it-must-be-said that all-things by-desiring their-own
 perfectiones, appetunt ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones
perfections desire the-very God inasmuch-as the-perfections
 omnium rerum sunt quaedam similitudines divini esse, ut
of-all things are certain likenesses of-the-divine to-be as
 ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae Deum appetunt,
from things-said is-plain and thus of-those-things which God desire
 quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum: quod est
some know him according-to himself which is
 proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt
proper of-the-creature rational some but know
 aliquas participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur
some participations of-his goodness which also is-extended
 usque ad cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum
even to knowledge sensible some but appetite
 naturalem habent absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad
natural have without knowledge as inclined to
 suos fines ab alio superiori cognoscente.
their ends by another higher knowing

Utrum Deus sit summum bonum

2 · WHETHER GOD IS THE HIGHEST GOOD

Highest seems to add something and so to compose, and it compares God with things of another genus. Thomas answers that God is the highest good simply, since all desired perfections flow from him not as from a univocal agent but in a more excellent way. Highest adds only a relation, which is real in creatures and not in God, and God compares to all by excess.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
summum bonum. Summum enim bonum addit aliquid supra
the-highest good the-highest for good adds something over
bonum: alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed omne quod se
good otherwise to-every good it-would-belong but every-thing which itself
habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo summum
has by addition to something is composite therefore the-highest
bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut
good is composite but God is supremely simple as
supra ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.
above shown it-is therefore God not is the-highest good

2. Praeterea, bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicit
2 further good is what all desire as says
Philosophus. Sed nihil aliud est quod omnia appetunt,
the-Philosopher but nothing else is which all desire
nisi solus Deus, qui est finis omnium. Ergo nihil aliud
except alone God who is the-end of-all-things therefore nothing else
est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur per id quod
is good except God which also appears through that which
dicitur Matth. XIX: nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. Sed
is-said Matthew XIX no-one good except alone God but

summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum
highest is-said in comparison of-others as the-highest
 calidum in comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non
hot in comparison to all hot-things therefore God not
 potest dici summum bonum.

can to-be-called the-highest good

3. Praeterea, summum comparationem importat. Sed

3 further highest comparison imports but

quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt comparabilia;

the-things-which not are of-one genus not are comparable

sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor quam

as sweetness unfittingly is-called greater or less than

linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis

a-line since therefore God not is in the-same genus with other

bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non

goods as from the-above is-plain it-seems that God not

possit dici summum bonum respectu eorum.

can to-be-called the-highest good with-respect-to them

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod

but against is that says Augustine I on the-Trinity that

Trinitas divinarum personarum est summum bonum, quod

the-Trinity of-the-divine persons is the-highest good which

purgatissimis mentibus cernitur.

by-most-purified minds is-discerned

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est summum bonum

I-answer it-must-be-said that God is the-highest good

simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo genere vel ordine rerum. Sic

simply and not only in some genus or order of-things thus

enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum est, inquantum omnes

for good to-God is-attributed as said it-is inasmuch-as all

perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut a prima causa.

perfections desired flow-out from him as from the-first cause

Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut ex
not but they-flow-out from him as from an-agent univocal as from
 superioribus patet: sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum
the-above is-plain but as from an-agent which not agrees with
 suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis.
its effects neither in the-notion of-species nor in the-notion of-genus

Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur
the-likeness moreover of-the-effect in the-cause indeed univocal is-found
 uniformiter: in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius,
uniformly in the-cause but equivocal is-found more-excellently
 sicut calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic
as heat in-a-more-excellent way is in the-sun than in fire thus
 ergo oportet quod, cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima
therefore it-is-necessary that since good is in God as in the-first
 causa omnium non univoca, quod sit in eo excellentissimo
cause of-all not univocal that it-be in him in-the-most-excellent
 modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum bonum.

way and on-account-of this he-is-called the-highest good
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod summum bonum addit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that highest good adds
 super bonum, non rem aliquam absolutam, sed relationem
over good not a-thing any absolute but a-relation
 tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo dicitur relative ad
only the-relation moreover by-which something of God is-said relatively to
 creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in creatura; in Deo vero
creatures not is really in God but in the-creature in God but
 secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative dicitur ad scientiam,
according-to reason as the-knowable relatively is-said to science
 non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia scientia refertur ad
not because to it it-is-referred but because science is-referred to

ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono sit
it and thus not it-is-necessary that in the-highest good there-be
 aliqua compositio: sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.
any composition but only that other-things fall-short of it
 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur bonum est quod
to the-second it-must-be-said that when it-is-said good is what
 omnia appetunt, non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum
all desire not so it-is-understood as-if each good
 ab omnibus appetatur: sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem
by all is-desired but because whatever is-desired the-notion
 boni habet. – Quod autem dicitur, nemo bonus nisi solus
of-good has what moreover is-said no-one good except alone
 Deus, intelligitur de bono per essentiam, ut post dicitur.
God is-understood of good through essence as afterward will-be-said
 Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae non sunt in eodem
to the-third it-must-be-said that those-things which not are in the-same
 genere, si quidem sint in diversis generibus contenta, nullo
genus if indeed they-be in diverse genera contained in-no
 modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem negatur esse in
way comparable are of God but is-denied to-be in
 eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in quodam
the-same genus with other goods not that he be in some
 alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium
other genus but because he is outside genus and the-principle
 omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et
of-every genus and thus he-is-compared to others by excess and
 huiusmodi comparisonem importat summum bonum.
such comparison imports the-highest good

Utrum esse bonum per essentiam sit proprium Dei

3 • WHETHER TO BE GOOD THROUGH ESSENCE IS PROPER TO GOD

Every being seems good through its essence, as it is one through its essence. Thomas answers that a thing's perfection is threefold: its being, its added accidents, and its attaining its end. God alone has all three by his essence, being his own being, having no accidents, and ordered to no further end. A creature's goodness is added to its essence.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be good through
essentiam non sit proprium Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur
essence not is proper of-God as for one is-convertible
cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra habitum est. Sed omne ens
with being so also good as above held it-is but every being
est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per Philosophum in
is one through its essence as is-plain through the-Philosopher in
IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam essentiam.

IV Metaphysics therefore every being is good through its essence
2. Praeterea, si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum
2 further if good is what all-things desire since the-very
esse sit desideratum ab omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei
to-be is desired by all the-very to-be of-any thing
est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet res est ens per suam
is its good but any thing is being through its
essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per suam essentiam.
essence therefore any thing is good through its essence

3. Praeterea, omnis res per suam bonitatem est bona.

3 further every thing through its goodness is good
Si igitur aliqua res est quae non sit bona per suam
if therefore some thing there-is which not is good through its

essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit sua essentia.

essence it-will-be-necessary that its goodness not be its essence

Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod

that therefore goodness since it-is a-being certain it-is-necessary that

sit bona: et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa

it-be good and if indeed by-another goodness again about that

bonitate quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum:

goodness it-will-be-asked either therefore it-will-be to-proceed to infinity

aut venire ad aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per

or to-come to some goodness which not will-be good through

aliam bonitatem. Eadem ergo ratione standum est in

another goodness by-the-same therefore reason to-be-stopped it-is at

primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona per suam essentiam.

the-first thing therefore any is good through its essence

Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad.,

but against is that says Boethius in the-book on the-Hebdomads

quod alia omnia a Deo sunt bona per participationem.

that other all-things than God are good through participation

Non igitur per essentiam.

not therefore through essence

Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est bonus per suam

I-answer it-must-be-said that alone God is good through his

essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod

essence each-thing for is-called good according as

est perfectum. Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima

it-is perfect the-perfection moreover of-some thing threefold is the-first

quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. Secunda

indeed according as in its to-be it-is-constituted the-second

vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur, ad suam

but according-as to-it some accidents are-superadded for its

perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia vero perfectio alicuius

perfect operation necessary the-third but perfection of-something

est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem. Utpote
is through this that something other it-attains as an-end for-example
 prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod habet per suam
the-first perfection of-fire consists in the-to-be which it-has through its
 formam substantialem: secunda vero eius perfectio consistit
form substantial the-second but its perfection consists
 in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi: tertia
in heat lightness and dryness and things-of-this-kind the-third
 vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit.
but perfection of-it is according as in place its it-rests
 Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum
this moreover threefold perfection to-no created-thing belongs according-to
 suam essentiam, sed soli Deo: cuius solius essentia est suum
its essence but to-alone God whose alone essence is his
 esse; et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae
to-be and to-whom not come any accidents but the-things-which
 de aliis dicuntur accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter,
of others are-said accidentally to-him belong essentially
 ut esse potentem, sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis
as to-be powerful wise and things-of-this-kind as from things-said
 patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem: sed
is-plain he also to nothing other is-ordered as to an-end but
 ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod
he is the-last end of-all things whence manifest it-is that
 solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secundum suam
alone God has every-kind-of perfection according-to his
 essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.
essence and therefore he alone is good through his essence
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unum non importat
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that one not imports
 rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique
the-notion of-perfection but of-indivision only which to-each

rei competit secundum suam essentiam. Simplicium autem
thing belongs according-to its essence of-simple-things moreover
 essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et potentia: compositorum
the-essences are undivided both in-act and in-potency of-composites
 vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum tantum. Et
but the-essences are undivided according-to act only and
 ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam
therefore it-is-necessary that any thing be one through its
 essentiam: non autem bona, ut ostensum est.

essence not but good as shown it-is
 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit
to the-second it-must-be-said that although each-thing be
 bonum inquantum habet esse, tamen essentia rei creatae
good inasmuch-as it-has to-be yet the-essence of-a-thing created
 non est ipsum esse: et ideo non sequitur quod res
not is the-very to-be and therefore not it-follows that a-thing
 creata sit bona per suam essentiam.

created is good through its essence
 Ad tertium dicendum quod bonitas rei creatae non est
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-goodness of-a-thing created not is
 ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid superadditum; vel ipsum
the-very its essence but something superadded either the-very
 esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem.

to-be its or some perfection superadded or order to the-end
 Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita dicitur bona sicut
the-very yet goodness thus superadded is-called good as
 et ens: hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea est
also being by-this moreover reason it-is-called being because by-it something
 aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione
is not because it by-some other is whence by-this reason

dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum: non quia ipsa
it-is-called good because by-it is something good not because it
 habeat aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.
has some other goodness by-which it-be good

Utrum omnia sint bona bonitate divina

4 · WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE GOOD BY THE DIVINE GOODNESS

Augustine bids us see the good of every good, and Boethius calls things good by their order to God. Thomas sets out Plato's separate ideas, which Aristotle disproved for the species of natural things, though, as Aristotle too agrees, there is a first good through its essence. Things are good by the divine goodness as exemplar, efficient, and final cause, and formally by a likeness inhering in each.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that all-things are good
 bonitate divina. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII de Trin.:
by-goodness divine says for Augustine VIII on the-Trinity
 Bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle hoc et tolle illud, et
good this and good that take-away this and take-away that and
 vide ipsum bonum, si potes: ita Deum videbis, non alio
see the-very good if you-can thus God you-will-see not by-another
 bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Sed unumquodque
good good but the-good of-every good but each-thing
 est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum
is good by-its-own good therefore each-thing is good
 ipso bono quod est Deus.
by-the-very good which is God

2. Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia

2 further as says Boethius in the-book on the-Hebdomads all-things

dicuntur bona inquantum ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione

are-called good inasmuch-as they-are-ordered to God and this by-reason

bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia sunt bona bonitate divina.

of-goodness divine therefore all-things are good by-goodness divine

Sed contra est quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt.

but against is that all-things are good inasmuch-as they-are

Sed non dicuntur omnia entia per esse divinum, sed

but not are-called all-things beings through the-to-be divine but

per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonitate

through the-to-be proper therefore not all-things are good by-goodness

divina, sed bonitate propria.

divine but by-goodness proper

Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae

I-answer it-must-be-said that nothing prohibits in those-things which

relationem important, aliquid ab extrinseco denominari; sicut

relation import something from an-extrinsic to-be-denominated as

aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et mensuratum a

something is-denominated placed from place and measured from

mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa fuit

measure about but those-things which absolutely are-said diverse was

opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas;

the-opinion Plato for posited of-all things the-species separate

et quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species

and that from them individuals are-denominated as-it-were the-species

separatas participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo

separate by-participating as for-example that Socrates is-called man

secundum ideam hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam

according-to the-idea of-man separate and as he-posed the-idea

hominis et equi separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem

of-man and of-horse separate which he-called through itself man

et per se equum, ita ponebat ideam entis et ideam unius
and through itself horse so he-posited the-idea of-being and the-idea of-one
 separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et per se unum: et
separate which he-called through itself being and through itself one and
 eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel unum. Hoc
by-its participation each-thing is-called being or one this
 autem quod est per se ens et per se unum, ponebat
moreover which is through itself being and through itself one he-posited
 esse summum bonum. Et quia bonum convertitur cum ente,
to-be the-highest good and because good is-convertible with being
 sicut et unum, ipsum per se bonum dicebat esse Deum,
as also one the-very through itself good he-said to-be God
 a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis. –
from whom all-things are-called good through the-mode of-participation
 Et quamvis haec opinio irrationalis videatur quantum ad hoc,
and although this opinion irrational may-seem as-far to this
 quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se
that he-posited the-species of-things natural separate through themselves
 subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc
subsisting as Aristotle in-many-ways proves yet this
 absolute verum est, quod aliquid est primum, quod per suam
absolutely true is that something is first which through its
 essentiam est ens et bonum, quod dicimus Deum, ut ex
essence is being and good which we-call God as from
 superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles.
the-above is-plain with-this also opinion agrees Aristotle
 A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono,
from the-first therefore through its essence being and good
 unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum
each-thing can to-be-called good and being inasmuch-as
 participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet
it-participates it through the-mode of-a-certain assimilation although

remote et deficienter, ut ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo
remotely and deficiently as from the-above is-plain thus therefore
 unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo
each-thing is-called good by-goodness divine as by-the-first
 principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis.

principle exemplar effective and final of-all goodness
 Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine
nevertheless yet each-thing is-called good by-the-likeness
 divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua
of-divine goodness in-it inhering which is formally its
 bonitas denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium;
goodness denominating it and thus there-is goodness one of-all
 et etiam multae bonitates.

and also many goodnesses

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

and through this is-plain the-response to the-objections

De infinitate Dei

VII · ON THE INFINITY OF GOD

After the divine perfection, Thomas considers God's infinity and his existence in things, for God is everywhere as uncircumscribed and infinite. He asks four articles: whether God is infinite; whether anything else is infinite in essence; whether anything is infinite in magnitude; and whether there can be an infinite multitude.

Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum
after the-consideration of-divine perfection to-be-considered
est de eius infinitate, et de existentia eius in rebus:
it-is about his infinity and about the-existence of-him in things
attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus
it-is-attributed for to-God that he-is everywhere and in all
rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus.

things inasmuch-as he-is uncircumscribable and infinite

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.

concerning the-first are-asked four

Primo: utrum Deus sit infinitus.

first whether God is infinite

Secundo: utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum
second whether anything besides him is infinite according-to
essentiam.

essence

Tertio: utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum
third whether anything can to-be infinite according-to
magnitudinem.

magnitude

Quarto: utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum
fourth whether there-can to-be an-infinite in things according-to
multitudinem.

multitude

Utrum Deus sit infinitus

1 · WHETHER GOD IS INFINITE

The infinite seems imperfect, a matter of quantity, and God is this and not that. Thomas answers that matter is limited by form and form by matter; the infinite of matter is imperfect, but form not limited by matter is perfect. God's being is received in nothing but subsists, so he is infinite and perfect, distinguished from all by that very fact.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
infinitus. Omne enim infinitum est imperfectum: quia habet
infinite every for infinite is imperfect because it-has
rationem partis et materiae, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed
the-notion of-part and of-matter as it-is-said in III Physics but
Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est infinitus.

God is most-perfect therefore not he-is infinite

2. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in I Physic., finitum
2 further according-to the-Philosopher in I Physics finite
et infinitum conveniunt quantitati. Sed in Deo non est
and infinite belong to-quantity but in God not is
quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut supra ostensum est.
quantity since not he-is a-body as above shown it-is
Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.

therefore not belongs to-him to-be infinite

3. Praeterea, quod ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum
3 further what so is here that not elsewhere is finite
secundum locum: ergo quod ita est hoc quod non est
according-to place therefore what so is this that not it-is
aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam. Sed Deus est hoc,
another is finite according-to substance but God is this

et non est aliud: non enim est lapis nec lignum. Ergo
and not is another not for he-is stone nor wood therefore
 Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.

God not is infinite according-to substance

Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, quod Deus est
but against is that says Damascene that God is
 infinitus et aeternus et incircumscribibilis.

infinite and eternal and uncircumscribable

Respondeo dicendum quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt

I-answer it-must-be-said that all ancient philosophers attribute

infinitum primo principio, ut dicitur in III Physic.: et hoc
the-infinite to-the-first principle as it-is-said in III Physics and this

rationabiliter, considerantes res effluere a primo principio in
reasonably considering things to-flow-out from the-first principle to

infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt circa naturam primi
infinity but because some erred about the-nature of-the-first

principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa infinitatem ipsius.
principle the-consequence was that they-erred about the-infinity of-it

Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam, consequenter
because for they-positd the-first principle matter consequently

attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem; dicentes
they-attributed to-the-first principle infinity material saying

aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum.

some body infinite to-be the-first principle of-things

Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo
to-be-considered it-is therefore that infinite is-called something from this

quod non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia
that not it-is finite is-limited moreover in-a-way both matter

per formam, et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per
by form and form by matter matter indeed by

formam, inquantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in
form inasmuch-as matter before it-receives form is in

potentia ad multas formas: sed cum recipit unam, terminatur
potency to many forms but when it-receives one it-is-terminated
 per illam. Forma vero finitur per materiam, inquantum forma,
by that form but is-finited by matter inasmuch-as form
 in se considerata, communis est ad multa: sed per
in itself considered common is to many-things but through
 hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate
this that it-is-received in matter it-becomes the-form determinately
 huius rei. — Materia autem perficitur per formam per
of-this thing matter moreover is-perfected by form by
 quam finitur: et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur
which it-is-finited and therefore infinite according as it-is-attributed
 materiae, habet rationem imperfecti; est enim quasi materia
to-matter has the-notion of-the-imperfect it-is for as-it-were matter
 non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per
not having form form but not is-perfected by
 materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo contrahitur:
matter but rather by it its amplitude is-contracted
 unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae
whence infinite according as itself holds from the-side of-form
 non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti.
not determined by matter has the-notion of-the-perfect
 Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum
that moreover which is most formal of-all is the-very
 esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum
to-be as from the-above is-plain since therefore the-to-be divine
 non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse
not is to-be received in anything but he be his to-be
 subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod
subsisting as above shown it-is manifest it-is that
 ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.
the-very God is infinite and perfect

Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

and through this is plain the-response to the-first

Ad secundum dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est

to the-second it-must-be-said that the-term of-quantity is

sicut forma ipsius: cuius signum est, quod figura, quae

as the-form of-it of-which a-sign is that figure which

consistit in terminatione quantitatis, est quaedam forma

consists in the-termination of-quantity is a-certain form

circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum quod competit quantitati,

about quantity whence infinite which belongs to-quantity

est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae: et tale

is infinite which itself holds from the-side of-matter and such

infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.

infinite not is-attributed to-God as said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est

to the-third it-must-be-said that from this very that the-to-be of-God is

per se subsistens non receptum in aliquo, prout dicitur

through itself subsisting not received in anything according-as it-is-called

infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, et alia remouentur

infinite it-is-distinguished from all others and other-things are-removed

ab eo: sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc ipso quod non

from him as if there-were whiteness subsisting from this very that not

esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente in subiecto.

it-were in another it-would-differ from every whiteness existing in a-subject

Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam

2 · WHETHER ANYTHING BESIDES GOD CAN BE INFINITE IN ESSENCE

An infinite power seems to produce an infinite effect, the intellect grasps infinite singulars, and prime matter is infinite. Thomas answers that a creature can be infinite only in some respect: matter under one form remains in potency to many accidental forms, and a created form subsisting without matter, as some hold the angels are, still has received being. Not even God can make what is simply infinite, since that would be unmade, and prime matter's potency extends only to natural forms.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that something other
quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam. Virtus
than God can to-be infinite through essence the-power
enim rei proportionatur essentiae eius. Si igitur essentia
for of-a-thing is-proportioned to-the-essence of-it if therefore the-essence
Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus sit infinita.
of-God is infinite it-is-necessary that his power be infinite
Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum quantitas
therefore it-can to-produce an-effect infinite since the-quantity
virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.
of-power through the-effect is-known

2. Praeterea, quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet
2 further whatever has power infinite has
essentiam infinitam. Sed intellectus creatus habet virtutem
essence infinite but the-intellect created has power
infinitam: apprehendit enim universale, quod se potest
infinite it-apprehends for the-universal which itself can

extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo omnis substantia
to-extend to infinite singulars therefore every substance
 intellectualis creata est infinita.

intellectual created is infinite

3. Praeterea, materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra
3 further matter prime other is than God as above
 ostensum est. Sed materia prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid
shown it-is but matter prime is infinite therefore something
 aliud praeter Deum potest esse infinitum.

other besides God can to-be infinite

Sed contra est quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio
but against is that the-infinite not can to-be from a-principle
 aliquo, ut dicitur in III Physic. Omne autem quod est
any as it-is-said in III Physics every-thing moreover which is
 praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex primo principio. Ergo
besides God is from God as from the-first principle therefore
 nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse infinitum.

nothing which is besides God can to-be infinite

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse
I-answer it-must-be-said that something besides God can to-be
 infinitum secundum quid, sed non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur
infinite in-some respect but not simply if for we-speak
 de infinito secundum quod competit materiae, manifestum
about the-infinite according as it-belongs to-matter manifest
 est quod omne existens in actu, habet aliquam formam: et
it-is that every-thing existing in act has some form and
 sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed quia materia,
thus the-matter of-it is terminated by form but because matter
 secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet in
according as it-is under one form substantial remains in
 potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum
potency to many forms accidental what is finite

simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid: utpote lignum

simply can to-be infinite in-some respect as wood

est finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum

is finite according-to its form but yet it-is infinite

secundum quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas.

in-some respect inasmuch-as it-is in potency to figures infinite

Si autem loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit

if but we-speak about the-infinite according as it-belongs

formae, sic manifestum est quod illa quorum formae

to-form so manifest it-is that those-things whose forms

sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter finita, et nullo modo

are in matter are simply finite and in-no way

infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae

infinite if but there-be some forms created not received

in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam

in matter but through themselves subsisting as some

de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum

about the-angels opine they-will-be indeed infinite in-some

quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque

respect inasmuch-as such forms not are-terminated nor

contrahuntur per aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic

are-contracted by any matter but because the-form created thus

subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod

subsisting has to-be and not is its to-be necessary it-is that

ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam

the-very its to-be be received and contracted to a-determinate

naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter.

nature whence not it-can to-be infinite simply

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that this is against the-notion

facti, quod essentia rei sit ipsum esse eius, quia

of-the-made that the-essence of-the-thing be the-very to-be of-it because

esse subsistens non est esse creatum: unde contra rationem
to-be subsisting not is to-be created whence against the-notion

facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut ergo

of-the-made it-is that it-be simply infinite as therefore

Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest

God although he-have power infinite not yet can

facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria

to-make something not made this for would-be contradictories

esse simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.

to-be at-once so not can to-make something infinite simply

Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus

to the-second it-must-be-said that this very that the-power

intellectus extendit se quodammodo ad infinita, procedit

of-the-intellect extends itself in-a-way to infinite-things proceeds

ex hoc quod intellectus est forma non in materia; sed

from this that the-intellect is a-form not in matter but

vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae angelorum; vel

either totally separate as are the-substances of-angels or

ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus alicuius

at least the-power intellective which not is the-act of-any

organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.

organ in the-soul intellective to-the-body joined

Ad tertium dicendum quod materia prima non existit in

to the-third it-must-be-said that matter prime not exists in

rerum natura per seipsam, cum non sit ens in actu, sed

of-things the-nature through itself since not it-is being in act but

potentia tantum: unde magis est aliquid concreatum, quam

in-potency only whence rather it-is something concreanted than

creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam secundum

created nevertheless yet matter prime even according-to

potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum quid:

potency not is infinite simply but in-some respect
 quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas naturales.
because its potency not itself extends except to forms natural

Utrum possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem

3 · WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE ACTUALLY INFINITE IN MAGNITUDE

The geometer posits infinite lines, and magnitude seems divisible and so increasable without end. Thomas answers that a natural body has a determinate form and so a determinate quantity, and an infinite body could have no natural motion, straight or circular. A mathematical body, imagined actual, has a figure and so a bound. The infinite of quantity lies in division, not in addition.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid

to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that there-can to-be something
 infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim
infinite in-act according-to magnitude in sciences for

mathematicis non invenitur falsum: quia abstrahentium non est

mathematical not is-found the-false because of-those-abstracting not is
 mendacium, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae
a-lie as it-is-said in II Physics but the-sciences mathematical

utuntur infinito secundum magnitudinem: dicit enim geometra

use the-infinite according-to magnitude says for the-geometer

in suis demonstrationibus, sit linea talis infinita. Ergo non

in his demonstrations let-there-be a-line such infinite therefore not

est impossibile aliquid esse infinitum secundum magnitudinem.

is it-impossible something to-be infinite according-to magnitude

2. Praeterea, id quod non est contra rationem alicuius,
 2 further that which not is against the-notion of-something
 non est impossibile convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non
 not is it-impossible to-belong to-it but to-be infinite not
 est contra rationem magnitudinis: sed magis finitum et
 is against the-notion of-magnitude but rather finite and
 infinitum videntur esse passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est
 infinite seem to-be properties of-quantity therefore not is
 impossibile aliquam magnitudinem esse infinitam.

it-impossible some magnitude to-be infinite
 3. Praeterea, magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum: sic enim
 3 further magnitude divisible is to infinity thus for
 definitur continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut
 is-defined the-continuous which is to infinity divisible as
 patet in III Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa
 is-plain in III Physics but contraries apt are to-come-about about
 idem. Cum ergo divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni
 the-same since therefore to-division is-opposed addition and to-diminution
 augmentum, videtur quod magnitudo possit crescere in
 increase it-seems that magnitude can to-grow to
 infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse magnitudinem infinitam.

infinity therefore possible it-is to-be a-magnitude infinite
 4. Praeterea, motus et tempus habent quantitatem et
 4 further motion and time have quantity and
 continuitatem a magnitudine super quam transit motus, ut
 continuity from the-magnitude over which passes motion as
 dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra rationem temporis
 is-said in IV Physics but not it-is against the-notion of-time
 et motus quod sint infinita: cum unumquodque indivisibile
 and of-motion that they-be infinite since each indivisible
 signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium et
 marked in time and motion circular is beginning and

finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod
end therefore neither against the-notion of-magnitude it-will-be that
 sit infinita.

it-be infinite

Sed contra, omne corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne
but against every body a-surface has but every
 corpus superficiem habens est finitum: quia superficies est
body a-surface having is finite because the-surface is
 terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne corpus est finitum.

the-term of-a-body finite therefore every body is finite

Et similiter potest dici de superficie et linea. Nihil est
and similarly can to-be-said of surface and line nothing is
 ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.

therefore infinite according-to magnitude

Respondeo dicendum quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum
I-answer it-must-be-said that one-thing is to-be infinite according-to
 suam essentiam, et secundum magnitudinem. Dato enim quod

its essence and according-to magnitude granted for that
 esset aliquid corpus infinitum secundum magnitudinem,

there-were some body infinite according-to magnitude

utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset infinitum secundum

as fire or air not yet it-would-be infinite according-to

essentiam: quia essentia sua esset terminata ad aliquam

essence because essence its would-be terminated to some

speciem per formam, et ad aliquid individuum per materiam.

species by form and to some individual by matter

Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est

and therefore held from the-premises that no creature is

infinita secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum

infinite according-to essence still it-remains to-inquire whether

aliquid creatum sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem.

something created is infinite according-to magnitude

Sciendum est igitur quod corpus, quod est magnitudo
to-be-known it-is therefore that body which is magnitude
 completa, dupliciter sumitur: scilicet mathematice, secundum
complete in-two-ways is-taken namely mathematically according
 quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et naturaliter,
as is-considered in it alone quantity and naturally
 secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et
according as is-considered in it matter and form and
 de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum
about body indeed natural that not it-can to-be infinite
 in actu, manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam
in act manifest it-is for every body natural some
 formam substantialem habet determinatam: cum igitur ad
form substantial has determinate since therefore on
 formam substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est
form substantial follow accidents necessary it-is
 quod ad determinatam formam consequantur determinata
that on a-determinate form follow determinate
 accidentia; inter quae est quantitas. Unde omne corpus
accidents among which is quantity whence every body
 naturale habet determinatam quantitatem et in maius et in
natural has determinate quantity both to greater and to
 minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod corpus naturale infinitum
less whence impossible it-is some body natural infinite
 esse. – Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne corpus
to-be this also from motion is-plain because every body
 naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem
natural has some motion natural a-body moreover
 infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem: nec
infinite not could to-have any motion natural neither
 rectum, quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi
straight because nothing is-moved naturally by-motion straight except

cum est extra suum locum, quod corpori infinito accidere
when it-is outside its place which to-a-body infinite to-happen
 non posset; occuparet enim omnia loca, et sic indifferenter
not could it-would-occupy for all places and thus indifferently
 quilibet locus esset locus eius. Et similiter etiam neque
any place would-be the-place of-it and similarly also neither
 secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu circulari oportet
according-to motion circular because in motion circular it-is-necessary
 quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in quo fuit
that one part of-the-body be-transferred to the-place in which was
 alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur infinitum,
another part which in a-body circular if it-be-positied infinite
 esse non posset: quia duae lineae protractae a centro,
to-be not could because two lines drawn from the-center
 quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius
by-how-much farther they-are-drawn from the-center by-so-much farther
 distant ab invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum,
they-stand-apart from one-another if therefore the-body were infinite
 in infinitum lineae distarent ab invicem, et sic una
to infinity the-lines would-stand-apart from one-another and thus one
 nunquam posset pervenire ad locum alterius.
never could to-arrive at the-place of-the-other
 De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si
about body also mathematical the-same reason is because if
 imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet
we-imagine a-body mathematical existing in-act it-is-necessary
 quod imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma: quia nihil est
that we-imagine it under some form because nothing is
 actu nisi per suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti,
in-act except through its form whence since the-form of-the-quantified
 inquantum huiusmodi, sit figura, oportebit quod habeat
inasmuch-as such is figure it-will-be-necessary that it-have

aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum: est enim figura,
some figure and thus it-will-be finite it-is for figure
 quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.

which by-a-term or by-terms is-comprehended

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod geometer non indiget
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-geometer not needs
 sumere aliquam lineam esse infinitam actu: sed indiget

to-assume some line to-be infinite in-act but he-needs

accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a qua possit subtrahi
to-take some line finite in-act from which can be-subtracted
 quantum necesse est: et hanc nominat lineam infinitam.

as-much-as necessary it-is and this he-names a-line infinite

Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra
to the-second it-must-be-said that although infinite not be against
 rationem magnitudinis in communi, est tamen contra rationem

the-notion of-magnitude in common it-is yet against the-notion

cuiuslibet speciei eius: scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis
of-any species of-it namely against the-notion of-magnitude
 bicubitae vel tricubitae, sive circularis vel triangularis, et

two-cubit or three-cubit or circular or triangular and

similium. Non autem est possibile in genere esse quod in nulla
similar-things not but is it-possible in the-genus to-be what in no
 specie est. Unde non est possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem

species is whence not it-is possible to-be some magnitude

infinitam, cum nulla species magnitudinis sit infinita.

infinite since no species of-magnitude is infinite

Ad tertium dicendum quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati,
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-infinite which belongs to-quantity

ut dictum est, se tenet ex parte materiae. Per divisionem
as said it-is itself holds from the-side of-matter through division

autem totius acceditur ad materiam, nam partes se

moreover of-the-whole one-approaches to matter for parts themselves

habent in ratione materiae: per additionem autem acceditur ad
have in the-notion of-matter through addition moreover one-approaches to
 totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non invenitur
the-whole which itself has in the-notion of-form and therefore not is-found
 infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione tantum.
the-infinite in the-addition of-magnitude but in division only
 Ad quartum dicendum quod motus et tempus non sunt
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that motion and time not are
 secundum totum in actu, sed successive: unde habent potentiam
according-to the-whole in act but successively whence they-have potency
 permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo est tota in actu. Et ideo
mixed with-act but magnitude is whole in act and therefore
 infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se tenet ex parte
the-infinite which belongs to-quantity and itself holds from the-side
 materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non autem totalitati
of-matter is-repugnant to-the-totality of-magnitude not but to-the-totality
 temporis vel motus: esse enim in potentia convenit materiae.
of-time or of-motion to-be for in potency belongs to-matter

Utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem

4 • WHETHER THERE CAN BE AN INFINITE MULTITUDE IN THINGS

Number can be multiplied without end, and figures are infinite in species. Avicenna and Algazel allowed an infinite multitude by accident, like the smith's broken hammers. Thomas answers that every multitude belongs to some species of number, none of which is infinite, and creation falls under a certain number. An infinite multitude exists only in potency, by successive addition.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that possible it-is to-be
multitudinem infinitam secundum actum. Non enim est
a-multitude infinite according-to act not for is
impossibile id quod est in potentia reduci ad actum.

it-impossible that which is in potency to-be-reduced to act

Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo non est
but number is to infinity multipliable therefore not is
impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.

it-impossible to-be a-multitude infinite in act

2. Praeterea, cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod

2 further of-any species possible it-is to-be some

individuum in actu. Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo
individual in act but the-species of-figure are infinite therefore
possibile est esse infinitas figuras in actu.

possible it-is to-be infinite figures in act

3. Praeterea, ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non

3 further those-things which not are-opposed to one-another not

impediunt se invicem. Sed, posita aliqua multitudine rerum,

impede themselves mutually but posited some multitude of-things

adhuc possunt fieri alia multa quae eis non opponuntur:

still can to-be-made other many-things which to-them not are-opposed

ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum simul esse cum eis,
therefore not is impossible some again at-once to-be with them
 et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse infinita in actu.

and thus to infinity therefore possible it-is to-be infinite-things in act

Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XI: omnia in pondere,
but against is that it-is-said Wisdom XI all-things in weight
 numero et mensura disposuisti.

number and measure you-have-disposed

Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio.

I-answer it-must-be-said that about this there-was a-two-fold opinion

Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et Algazel, dixerunt quod
some for as Avicenna and Algazel said that

impossibile est esse multitudinem actu infinitam per se:
impossible it-is to-be a-multitude in-act infinite through itself

sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non est
but infinite through accident a-multitude to-be not is

impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se,
impossible is-said for a-multitude to-be infinite through itself

quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et
when it-is-required for something that a-multitude infinite be and

hoc est impossibile esse: quia sic oporteret quod
this is impossible to-be because thus it-would-be-necessary that

aliquid dependeret ex infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam
something depended on infinite-things whence its generation never

compleretur, cum non sit infinita pertransire. Per

would-be-completed since not it-is-possible infinite-things to-pass-through through

accidens autem dicitur multitudo infinita, quando non
accident moreover is-called a-multitude infinite when not

requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis, sed accidit ita
is-required for something infinity of-multitude but it-happens so

esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione fabri,

to-be and this thus to-be-made-manifest can in the-operation of-the-smith

ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod
for which a-certain multitude is-required through itself namely that
 sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et
there-be art in the-soul and a-hand moving and a-bammer and
 si haec in infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrilis
if these to infinity were-multiplied never the-work smith's
 compleretur: quia dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo
would-be-completed because it-would-depend on infinite causes but the-multitude
 martellorum quae accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et
of-hammers which happens from this that one is-broken and
 accipitur aliud, est multitudo per accidens: accidit enim
is-taken another is a-multitude through accident it-happens for
 quod multis martellis operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno
that with-many hammers he-work and nothing it-differs whether with-one
 vel duobus vel pluribus operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito
or with-two or with-more he-work or with-infinite if for-infinite
 tempore operaretur. Per hunc igitur modum, posuerunt quod
time he-worked by this therefore way they-posed that
 possibile est esse actu multitudinem infinitam per accidens.
possible it-is to-be in-act a-multitude infinite through accident
 Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem multitudinem oportet
but this is impossible because every multitude it-is-necessary
 esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species autem multitudinis
to-be in some species of-multitude the-species moreover of-multitude
 sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem species numeri
are according-to the-species of-numbers no moreover species of-number
 est infinita: quia quilibet numerus est multitudo mensurata per
is infinite because any number is a-multitude measured by
 unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem infinitam actu,
one whence impossible it-is to-be a-multitude infinite in-act
 sive per se, sive per accidens. – Item, multitudo in rerum
whether through itself or through accident likewise multitude in of-things

natura existens est creata: et omne creatum sub aliqua
the-nature existing is created and every-thing created under some
 certa intentione creantis comprehenditur: non enim in vanum
certain intention of-the-creator is-comprehended not for in vain
 agens aliquod operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo
agent any works whence necessary it-is that under a-certain
 numero omnia creata comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo
number all-things created be-comprehended impossible it-is therefore
 esse multitudinem infinitam in actu, etiam per accidens.

to-be a-multitude infinite in act even through accident
 Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in potentia, possibile
but to-be a-multitude infinite in potency possible
 est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur divisionem
it-is because the-increase of-multipitude follows the-division
 magnitudinis: quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto
of-magnitude by-how-much for something more is-divided by-so-much
 plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum
more-things according-to number result whence as the-infinite
 invenitur in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur
is-found in potency in the-division of-the-continuous because it-is-proceeded
 ad materiam, ut supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam
to matter as above shown it-is by-the-same reason also
 infinitum invenitur in potentia in additione multitudinis.

the-infinite is-found in potency in the-addition of-multipitude
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque quod est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that each-thing which is
 in potentia, reducitur in actum secundum modum sui esse:
in potency is-reduced into act according-to the-mode of-its to-be
 dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit tota simul, sed
the-day for not is-reduced into act so-that it-be whole at-once but
 successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non reducitur
successively and similarly the-infinite of-multipitude not is-reduced

in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive: quia post
into act so-that it-be whole at-once but successively because after
 quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in
any multitude can be-taken another multitude to
 infinitum.

infinity

Ad secundum dicendum quod species figurarum habent
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-species of-figures have
 infinitatem ex infinitate numeri: sunt enim species figurarum,
infinity from the-infinity of-number are for the-species of-figures
 trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo
three-sided four-sided and so on whence as the-multitude
 infinita numerabilis non reducitur in actum quod sit tota
infinite numerable not is-reduced into act that it-be whole
 simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.

at-once so neither the-multitude of-figures

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet, quibusdam positis,
to the-third it-must-be-said that although some-things posited
 alia poni non sit eis oppositum; tamen infinita
other-things to-be-posed not be to-them opposite yet infinite-things
 poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde non
to-be-posed is-opposed to-any species of-multitude whence not
 est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.
it-is possible to-be some multitude in-act infinite

De existentia Dei in rebus

VIII · ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

Since being everywhere and in all things seems to belong to the infinite, Thomas asks whether it belongs to God, in four articles: whether God is in all things; whether God is everywhere; whether he is everywhere by essence, power, and presence; and whether being everywhere is proper to God.

Quia vero infinito convenire videtur quod ubique et in
because but to-the-infinite to-belong it-seems that everywhere and in
omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo conveniat.

all-things it-be to-be-considered it-is whether this to-God belongs

Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

and about this are-asked four

Primo: utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus.

first whether God is in all things

Secundo: utrum Deus sit ubique.

second whether God is everywhere

Tertio: utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam

third whether God is everywhere through essence and power

et praesentiam.

and presence

Quarto: utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.

fourth whether to-be everywhere is proper of-God

Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus

1 · WHETHER GOD IS IN ALL THINGS

God is above all things, contains rather than is contained, and seems absent from demons. Thomas answers that God is in all things not as part of their essence but as an agent present to what it acts on. Being is his proper effect, caused as long as things exist, and being is most intimate to each thing; so God is in all things, intimately. Demons, as things, have their nature from him.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is in
omnibus rebus. Quod enim est supra omnia, non est in
all things what for is above all-things not is in
omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra omnia, secundum illud
all things but God is above all-things according-to that
Psalmi: Excelsus super omnes gentes Dominus, etc. Ergo
of-the-Psalm high above all nations the-Lord etc therefore
Deus non est in omnibus rebus.

God not is in all things

2. Praeterea, quod est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed
2 further what is in something is-contained by it but
Deus non continetur a rebus, sed magis continet res. Ergo
God not is-contained by things but rather contains things therefore
Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res sunt in eo. Unde
God not is in things but rather things are in him whence
Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., dicit quod
Augustine in the-book of-Eighty three Questions says that
in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi.
in him rather are all-things than he somewhere

3. Praeterea, quanto aliquid agens est virtuosius, tanto ad
 3 further by-how-much some agent is more-powerful by-so-much to
 magis distans eius actio procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum
 the-more distant its action proceeds but God is the-most-powerful
 agens. Ergo eius actio pertingere potest ad ea etiam
 agent therefore his action to-reach can to those-things even
 quae ab ipso distant: nec oportet quod sit in omnibus.

which from him are-distant nor it-is-necessary that be-be in all-things

4. Praeterea, daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est
 4 further demons things some are nor yet God is
 in daemonibus: non enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut
 in demons not for is agreement of-light with darkness as
 dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.

it-is-said II to Corinthians VI therefore God not is in all things

Sed contra, ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus
 but against wherever operates something there it-is but God
 operatur in omnibus, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI: omnia
 operates in all-things according-to that Isaiah XXVI all
 opera nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine. Ergo Deus
 works our wrought you-have in us O-Lord therefore God
 est in omnibus rebus.

is in all things

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non
 I-answer it-must-be-said that God is in all things not
 quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut
 indeed as part of-the-essence or as accident but as
 agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens
 an-agent is-present to-that in which it-acts it-is-necessary for every agent
 coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud
 to-be-joined to-that in which immediately it-acts and by-its power that
 contingere: unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et
 to-touch whence in VII Physics it-is-proved that the-moved and

movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse
the-mover it-is-necessary to-be together since moreover God is the-very to-be
 per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius
through his essence it-is-necessary that to-be created be the-proper
 effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc
effect of-him as to-ignite is the-proper effect of-fire this
 autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando
moreover effect causes God in things not only when
 primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut
first to-be they-begin but as-long-as in the-to-be they-are-conserved as
 lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus
light is-caused in the-air by the-sun as-long-as the-air illuminated
 manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet
remains as-long-as therefore a-thing has to-be so-long it-is-necessary
 quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet.
that God be-present to-it according-to the-mode in-which to-be it-has
 Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et
to-be moreover is that which is more intimate to-anything and
 quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu
which more-deeply all-things is-in since it-is formal with-respect-to
 omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet.
all-things which in the-thing are as from above things-said is-plain
 Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime.
whence it-is-necessary that God be in all things and intimately
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that God is above all-things
 per excellentiam suae naturae: et tamen est in omnibus
through the-excellence of-his nature and yet he-is in all
 rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra dictum est.
things as causing of-all-things the-to-be as above said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse
to the-second it-must-be-said that although bodily-things be-said to-be
 in aliquo sicut in continente, tamen spiritualia continent
in something as in a-container yet spiritual-things contain
 ea in quibus sunt, sicut anima continet corpus. Unde
those-things in which they-are as the-soul contains the-body whence
 et Deus est in rebus sicut continens res. Tamen, per
also God is in things as containing things yet through
 quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia esse in
a-certain likeness of-bodily-things are-said all-things to-be in
 Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.

God inasmuch-as they-are-contained by him

Ad tertium dicendum quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque
to the-third it-must-be-said that of-no agent however-much
 virtuosi, actio procedit ad aliquid distans, nisi inquantum
powerful the-action proceeds to something distant except inasmuch-as
 in illud per media agit. Hoc autem ad maximam virtutem
in that through means it-acts this moreover to the-greatest power
 Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit. Unde nihil
of-God pertains that immediately in all-things he-acts whence nothing
 est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat.

is distant from him as-if in itself it God not have

Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem
are-said yet things to-be-distant from God through dissimilarity
 naturae vel gratiae: sicut et ipse est super omnia per
of-nature or of-grace as also he is above all-things through
 excellentiam suae naturae.

the-excellence of-his nature

Ad quartum dicendum quod in daemonibus intelligitur et
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that in demons is-understood both
 natura, quae est a Deo, et deformitas culpae, quae non
the-nature which is from God and the-deformity of-fault which not

est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute concedendum quod
is from him and therefore not it-is absolutely to-be-conceded that
 Deus sit in daemonibus, sed cum hac additione, inquantum
God is in demons but with this addition inasmuch-as
 sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam
they-are things certain in things moreover which name nature
 non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.
not deformed absolutely to-be-said it-is God to-be

Utrum Deus sit ubique

2 · WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE

Incorporeal things are not in place, an indivisible cannot be in many places, and what is wholly somewhere is nowhere else. Thomas answers that God is in every place, giving it being and power, and fills every place not as a body excluding others but by giving being to all that fills it. An indivisible outside the genus of the continuous is where its power reaches, and since God's wholeness is of essence, not of quantity, he is, like the soul in the body, whole in each.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
 ubique. Esse enim ubique significat esse in omni loco. Sed
everywhere to-be for everywhere signifies to-be in every place but
 esse in omni loco non convenit Deo, cui non convenit
to-be in every place not belongs to-God to-whom not belongs
 esse in loco: nam incorporalia, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de
to-be in place for incorporeal-things as says Boethius in the-book on
 Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est ubique.
the-Hebdomads not are in place therefore God not is everywhere

2. Praeterea, sicut se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se
2 further as itself has time to successive-things so itself
 habet locus ad permanentia. Sed unum indivisibile actionis
has place to permanent-things but one indivisible of-action
 vel motus, non potest esse in diversis temporibus. Ergo
or of-motion not can to-be in diverse times therefore
 nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum permanentium,
neither one indivisible in the-genus of-things permanent
 potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non
can to-be in all places the-to-be moreover divine not
 est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in
is successive but permanent therefore God not is in
 pluribus locis. Et ita non est ubique.
several places and so not he-is everywhere

3. Praeterea, quod est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra
3 further what is whole somewhere nothing of-it is outside
 locum illum. Sed Deus, si est in aliquo loco, totus est
place that but God if he-is in some place whole he-is
 ibi: non enim habet partes. Ergo nihil eius est extra
there not for he-has parts therefore nothing of-him is outside
 locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.
place that therefore God not is everywhere

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII: caelum et terram
but against is that it-is-said Jeremiah XXIII heaven and earth
 ego impleo.

I fill

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse
I-answer it-must-be-said that since place is a-thing certain to-be
 aliquid in loco potest intelligi dupliciter: vel per modum
something in place can to-be-understood in-two-ways either through the-mode
 aliarum rerum, idest sicut dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus
of-other things that-is as is-said something to-be in other things

quocumque modo, sicut accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per
in-whatever way as the-accidents of-place are in place or through
 modum proprium loci, sicut locata sunt in loco. Utroque
the-mode proper of-place as placed-things are in place in-each
 autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est in omni loco, quod
moreover way according-to something God is in every place which
 est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in omnibus rebus,
is to-be everywhere first indeed as he-is in all things
 ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem: sic enim est
as giving to-them to-be and power and operation thus for he-is
 in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item,
in every place as giving to-it to-be and power locative likewise
 locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum: et Deus
placed-things are in place inasmuch-as they-fill place and God
 omnem locum replet. Non sicut corpus: corpus enim dicitur
every place fills not as a-body a-body for is-said
 replere locum, inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus;
to-fill place inasmuch-as not it-suffers with-itself another body
 sed per hoc quod Deus est in aliquo loco, non excluditur
but through this that God is in some place not is-excluded
 quin alia sint ibi: imo per hoc replet omnia loca,
but-that other-things be there nay through this he-fills all places
 quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca.
that he-gives to-be to-all placed-things which fill all places
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod incorporea non sunt in
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that incorporeal-things not are in
 loco per contactum quantitatis dimensionae, sicut corpora:
place through contact of-quantity dimensive as bodies
 sed per contactum virtutis.
but through contact of-power

Ad secundum dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-indivisible is twofold one
 quod est terminus continui, ut punctus in permanentibus,
which is the-term of-the-continuous as the-point in permanent-things
 et momentum in successivis. Et huiusmodi indivisibile,
and the-moment in successive-things and such indivisible
 in permanentibus, quia habet determinatum situm, non
in permanent-things because it-has determinate position not
 potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel in pluribus locis:
can to-be in several parts of-place or in several places
 et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus, quia habet
and similarly the-indivisible of-action or of-motion because it-has
 determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest esse
determinate order in motion or action not can to-be
 in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est,
in several parts of-time another moreover indivisible is
 quod est extra totum genus continui: et hoc modo
which is outside the-whole genus of-the-continuous and in-this way
 substantiae incorporeae, ut Deus, angelus et anima, dicuntur
substances incorporeal as God angel and soul are-said
 esse indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad
to-be indivisible such therefore indivisible not is-applied to
 continuum sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua
the-continuous as something of-it but inasmuch-as it-touches it by-its
 virtute. Unde secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere
power whence according as the-power its itself can to-extend
 ad unum vel multa, ad parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc
to one or many-things to small or great according-to this
 est in uno vel pluribus locis, et in loco parvo vel magno.
it-is in one or several places and in place small or great

Ad tertium dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium.

to the-third it-must-be-said that whole is-said with-respect-to parts

Est autem duplex pars: scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia

there-is moreover twofold part namely part of-essence as form and

partes speciei; et etiam pars quantitatis, in quam scilicet

matter are-called parts of-the-composite and genus and difference

dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo est totum in aliquo

parts of-the-species and also part of-quantity into which namely

loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse extra locum illum:

is-divided some quantity what therefore is whole in some

quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati loci,

place by-totality of-quantity not can to-be outside place that

unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas

because the-quantity of-the-placed is-commensurated to-the-quantity of-the-place

loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati

whence not there-is totality of-quantity if not there-be totality

loci. Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate

of-place but totality of-essence not is-commensurated to-totality

essentiae in aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet

of-essence in something in-no way be outside it as appears

etiam in formis accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens

also in forms accidental which according-to accident

quantitatem habent: albedo enim est tota in qualibet parte

quantity have whiteness for is whole in any part

superficie, si accipiatur totalitas essentiae, quia secundum

of-the-surface if be-taken totality of-essence because according-to

perfectam rationem suae speciei invenitur in qualibet parte

the-perfect notion of-its species it-is-found in any part

superficie; si autem accipiatur totalitas secundum quantitatem,

of-the-surface if but be-taken totality according-to quantity

quam habet per accidens, sic non est tota in qualibet parte
which it-has through accident thus not it-is whole in any part
 superficiei. In substantiis autem incorporeis non est totalitas,
of-the-surface in substances moreover incorporeal not is totality
 nec per se nec per accidens, nisi secundum perfectam
neither through itself nor through accident except according-to the-perfect
 rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est tota in qualibet
notion of-essence and therefore as the-soul is whole in any
 parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis.
part of-the-body so God whole is in all and singular-things

Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam,
 praesentiam et potentiam

3 · WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE BY ESSENCE, PRESENCE, AND POWER

These modes seem wrongly assigned and to overlap. Thomas answers that God is in all things as an agent, and in the rational creature specially by grace, as known and loved. Against the Manichees he is in all things by power, against those who denied his providence by presence, and against those who made creation mediate by essence. Grace alone gives a singular mode; union, another.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that badly are-assigned
 modi existendi Deum in rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est
the-modes of-existing of-God in things when it-is-said that God is
 in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam.
in all things through essence power and presence
 Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod essentialiter est
that for through essence is in something which essentially is
 in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus: non enim
in it God moreover not is essentially in things not for

est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod

he-is of the-essence of-any thing therefore not ought to-be-said that

Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.

God is in things through essence presence and power

2. Praeterea, hoc est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet

2 further this is to-be present to-any thing namely

non deesse illi. Sed hoc est Deum esse per essentiam

not to-be-lacking to-it but this is God to-be through essence

in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui rei. Ergo idem est

in things namely not to-be-lacking to-any thing therefore the-same is

esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et praesentiam.

to-be God in all-things through essence and presence

Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per

superfluous therefore it-was to-say that God is in things through

essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.

essence presence and power

3. Praeterea, sicut Deus est principium omnium rerum per

3 further as God is the-principle of-all things through

suam potentiam, ita per scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non

his power so through science and will but not

dicitur Deus esse in rebus per scientiam et voluntatem.

is-said God to-be in things through science and will

Ergo nec per potentiam.

therefore neither through power

4. Praeterea, sicut gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita

4 further as grace is a-certain perfection superadded

substantiae rei, ita multae sunt aliae perfectiones

to-the-substance of-a-thing so many are other perfections

superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur esse speciali modo in

superadded if therefore God is-said to-be in-a-special way in

quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum quamlibet

some through grace it-seems that according-to any

perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum
perfection ought to-be-taken a-special mode of-being of-God
 in rebus.

in things

Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic.,
but against is that Gregory says on the-Song of-Songs
 quod Deus communi modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia,
that God in-a-common way is in all things by-presence
 potentia et substantia: tamen familiari modo dicitur esse
power and substance yet in-a-familiar way he-is-said to-be
 in aliquibus per gratiam.

in some through grace

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua
I-answer it-must-be-said that God is-said to-be in a-thing some
 dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis: et
in-two-ways in-one way through the-mode of-a-cause acting and
 sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo,
thus he-is in all things created by him in-another way
 sicut obiectum operationis est in operante: quod proprium
as the-object of-an-operation is in the-one-operating which proper
 est in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est
is in the-operations of-the-soul according as the-known is
 in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur
in the-knower and the-desired in the-desirer in-this therefore
 secundo modo, Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura,
second way God specially is in the-rational creature
 quae cognoscit et diligit illum actu vel habitu. Et quia
which knows and loves him in-act or by-habit and because
 hoc habet rationalis creatura per gratiam, ut infra patebit,
this has the-rational creature through grace as below will-be-plain
 dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam.

he-is-said to-be in-this way in the-saints through grace

In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, considerandum
in things but other by him created how he-is to-be-considered
 est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex
it-is from those-things which in things human to-be are-said the-king
 enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam,
for is-said to-be in the-whole kingdom his through his power
 licet non sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam,
although not he-be everywhere present through presence but his
 dicitur aliquid esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius
is-said something to-be in all-things which in the-view of-him
 sunt; sicut omnia quae sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse
are as all-things which are in some house are-said to-be
 praesentia alicui, qui tamen non est secundum substantiam
present to-someone who yet not is according-to substance
 suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum vero substantiam
his in any part of-the-house according-to but substance
 vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo eius
or essence is-said something to-be in the-place in which its
 substantia habetur.

substance is-had

Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei, qui dixerunt divinae
there-were therefore some namely the-Manichees who said to-divine
 potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et incorporalia:abilia
power subject spiritual-things to-be and incorporeal-things visible-things
 vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant potestati principii
but and bodily-things subject to-be they-said to-the-power of-a-principle
 contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod Deus sit
contrary against these therefore it-is-necessary to-say that God is
 in omnibus per potentiam suam. – Fuerunt vero alii, qui
in all-things through power his there-were but others who
 licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen
although they-believed all-things to-be subject to-divine power yet

providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non
providence divine even to these lower bodies not
 extendebant: ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII: circa
extended from whose person it-is-said Job XXII around
 cardines caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat. Et contra
the-hinges of-heaven he-walks nor our-things he-considers and against
 hos oportuit dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam
these it-was-necessary to-say that he-is in all-things through his
 praesentiam. – Fuerunt vero alii, qui licet dicerent omnia
presence there-were but others who although they-said all-things
 ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen posuerunt omnia non
to God's providence to-pertain yet posited all-things not
 immediate esse a Deo creata: sed quod immediate creavit
immediately to-be by God created but that immediately he-created
 primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos
the-first creatures and these created others and against these
 oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.
it-is-necessary to-say that he-is in all-things through essence
 Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia
thus therefore he-is in all-things through power inasmuch-as all-things
 eius potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus,
to-his power are-subjected he-is through presence in all-things
 inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est
inasmuch-as all-things naked are and open to-the-eyes of-him he-is
 in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus
in all-things through essence inasmuch-as he-is-present to-all-things
 ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.

as the-cause of-being as said it-is

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that God is-said to-be in
 omnibus per essentiam, non quidem rerum, quasi sit de
all-things through essence not indeed of-things as-if he-be of

essentia earum: sed per essentiam suam, quia substantia
the-essence of-them but through essence his because substance

sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.

his is-present to-all-things as the-cause of-being as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens

to the-second it-must-be-said that something can to-be-said present

alicui, inquantum subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen

to-something inasmuch-as it-lies-under its view which yet

distat ab eo secundum suam substantiam, ut dictum est.

is-distant from it according-to its substance as said it-is

Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni: scilicet per

and therefore it-was-necessary two modes to-be-positd namely through

essentiam, et praesentiam.

essence and presence

Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis

to the-third it-must-be-said that of the-notion of-science and of-will

est, quod scitum sit in sciente, et volitum in volente:

it-is that the-known be in the-knower and the-willed in the-willer

unde secundum scientiam et voluntatem, magis res sunt

whence according-to science and will rather things are

in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de ratione potentiae

in God than God in things but of the-notion of-power

est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud: unde secundum

it-is that it-be the-principle of-acting on another whence according-to

potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori.

power the-agent is-compared and is-applied to-a-thing exterior

Et sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.

and thus through power can to-be-said the-agent to-be in another

Ad quartum dicendum quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that no other perfection superadded

substantiae, facit Deum esse in aliquo sicut obiectum

to-substance makes God to-be in something as the-object

cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia: et ideo sola gratia facit
known and loved except grace and therefore alone grace makes
 singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem
a-singular mode of-being of-God in things there-is moreover
 alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per
another singular mode of-being of-God in man through
 unionem: de quo modo suo loco agetur.
union about which mode in-its place it-will-be-treated

Utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei

4 · WHETHER TO BE EVERYWHERE IS PROPER TO GOD

The universal, prime matter, number, the universe, an infinite body, and the soul all seem to be everywhere. Thomas answers that to be everywhere first and through itself is proper to God: whatever places are posited, he must be in each, not by parts but wholly. The others are everywhere only by parts, by accident, or under supposition.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be everywhere not is
 proprium Dei. Universale enim, secundum Philosophum, est
proper of-God the-universal for according-to the-Philosopher is
 ubique et semper: materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus
everywhere and always matter also prime since it-is in all
 corporibus, est ubique. Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut
bodies is everywhere neither moreover of-these is God as
 ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse ubique non est proprium Dei.
from the-premises is-plain therefore to-be everywhere not is proper of-God

2. Praeterea, numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum

2 further number is in numbered-things but the-whole universe
 est constitutum in numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis
is constituted in number as is-plain Wisdom XI therefore some
 numerus est, qui est in toto universo: et ita ubique.

number there-is which is in the-whole universe and so everywhere

3. Praeterea, totum universum est quoddam totum corpus

3 further the-whole universe is a-certain whole body
 perfectum, ut dicitur in I Caeli et Mundi. Sed totum
perfect as it-is-said in I on-Heaven and the-World but the-whole
 universum est ubique: quia extra ipsum nullus locus est.

universe is everywhere because outside it no place is

Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.

not therefore alone God is everywhere

4. Praeterea, si aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus

4 further if some body were infinite no place
 esset extra ipsum. Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse
would-be outside it therefore it-would-be everywhere and thus to-be
 ubique non videtur proprium Dei.

everywhere not seems proper of-God

5. Praeterea, anima, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin.,

5 further the-soul as says Augustine in VI on the-Trinity
 est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte. Si
is whole in the-whole body and whole in any of-its part if
 ergo non esset in mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima

therefore not there-were in the-world except one only animal the-soul
 eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non est proprium Dei.

of-it would-be everywhere and thus to-be everywhere not is proper of-God

6. Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum,

6 further as Augustine says in the-letter to Volusianus

anima ubi videt, ibi sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et

the-soul where it-sees there it-senses and where it-senses there it-lives and

ubi vivit, ibi est. Sed anima videt quasi ubique: quia
where it-lives there it-is but the-soul sees as-it-were everywhere because
 successive videt etiam totum caelum. Ergo anima est ubique.
successively it-sees even the-whole heaven therefore the-soul is everywhere
 Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de Spiritu
but against is that Ambrose says in the-book on the-Spirit
 Sancto: Quis audeat creaturam dicere Spiritum Sanctum,
Holy who would-dare a-creature to-call the-Spirit Holy
 qui in omnibus et ubique et semper est; quod utique
who in all-things and everywhere and always is which surely
 divinitatis est proprium?

of-divinity is proper

Respondeo dicendum quod esse ubique primo et per se, est
I-answer it-must-be-said that to-be everywhere first and through itself is
 proprium Dei. Dico autem esse ubique primo, quod secundum
proper of-God I-say moreover to-be everywhere first which according-to
 se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset ubique, secundum
itself whole is everywhere if anything for were everywhere according-to
 diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non esset primo
diverse parts in diverse places existing not it-would-be first
 ubique: quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae, non
everywhere because what belongs to-something by-reason of-a-part its not
 convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non
belongs to-it first as if a-man is white in-tooth whiteness not
 convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per
belongs first to-the-man but to-the-tooth to-be moreover everywhere through
 se dico id cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens,
itself I-call that to-which not belongs to-be everywhere through accident
 propter aliquam suppositionem factam: quia sic granum
on-account-of some supposition made because thus a-grain
 milii esset ubique, supposito quod nullum aliud corpus esset.
of-millet would-be everywhere supposing that no other body were

Per se igitur convenit esse ubique alicui, quando tale
through itself therefore it-belongs to-be everywhere to-something when such
 est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur illud esse ubique.

it-is that any position made it-follows it to-be everywhere

Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque loca
and this properly belongs to-God because however-many places
 ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae
be-positied even if there-were-positied infinite besides these which
 sunt, oporteret in omnibus esse Deum: quia nihil

are it-would-be-necessary in all to-be God because nothing

potest esse nisi per ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo

can to-be except through him thus therefore to-be everywhere first

et per se convenit Deo, et est proprium eius: quia

and through itself belongs to-God and is proper of-him because

quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in quolibet sit

however-many places be-positied it-is-necessary that in any be

Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.

God not according-to part but according-to himself

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale et materia

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-universal and matter

prima sunt quidem ubique, sed non secundum idem esse.

prime are indeed everywhere but not according-to the-same to-be

Ad secundum dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens,

to the-second it-must-be-said that number since it-is an-accident

non est per se, sed per accidens, in loco. Nec est

not is through itself but through accident in place nor is

totus in quolibet numerorum, sed secundum partem. Et

whole in any of-the-numbered but according-to part and

sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se ubique.

thus not it-follows that it-be first and through itself everywhere

Ad tertium dicendum quod totum corpus universi est
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-whole body of-the-universe is
 ubique, sed non primo: quia non totum est in quolibet
everywhere but not first because not whole it-is in any
 loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum per se: quia
place but according-to its parts nor again through itself because
 si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.

if there-were-posed some other places not it-would-be in them

Ad quartum dicendum quod, si esset corpus infinitum,
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that if there-were a-body infinite
 esset ubique; sed secundum suas partes.

it-would-be everywhere but according-to its parts

Ad quintum dicendum quod, si esset unum solum animal,
to the-fifth it-must-be-said that if there-were one only animal
 anima eius esset ubique primo quidem, sed per accidens.
the-soul of-it would-be everywhere first indeed but through accident

Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre,
to the-sixth it-must-be-said that when it-is-said the-soul somewhere to-see
 potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc
it-can to-be-understood in-two-ways in-one way according as this
 adverbium alicubi determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti.

adverb somewhere determines the-act of-seeing from the-side of-the-object

Et sic verum est quod, dum caelum videt, in caelo videt: et
and thus true it-is that while the-heaven it-sees in heaven it-sees and
 eadem ratione in caelo sentit. Non tamen sequitur quod in
by-the-same reason in heaven it-senses not yet it-follows that in
 caelo vivat vel sit: quia vivere et esse non important actum
heaven it-live or be because to-live and to-be not import an-act
 transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo potest
passing into an-exterior object in-another way it-can
 intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum
to-be-understood according as the-adverb determines the-act

videntis, secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est
of-the-seer according as it-goes-out from the-seer and thus true it-is
 quod anima ubi sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum
that the-soul where it-senses and sees there it-is and lives according-to
 istum modum loquendi. Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.
this mode of-speaking and so not it-follows that it-be everywhere

De Dei immutabilitate

IX • ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

Thomas next considers immutability and eternity, which follows from immutability. On immutability he asks two articles: whether God is altogether immutable, and whether being immutable is proper to God.

Consequenter considerandum est de immutabilitate et
consequently to-be-considered it-is about immutability and
aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem consequitur.

eternity divine which immutability follows

Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo.

concerning immutability but are-asked two

Primo: utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis.

first whether God is altogether immutable

Secundo: utrum esse immutabile sit proprium Dei.

second whether to-be immutable is proper of-God

Utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis

1 · WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE

Augustine says the creator Spirit moves himself, the Book of Wisdom calls wisdom more mobile than all things, and James speaks of drawing near to God. Thomas answers that God is altogether immutable: he is pure act without potency; he is simple, while what changes is partly composite; and being infinite, he can acquire nothing. Motion is said of him by likeness, as wisdom spreads its likeness down to the lowest things.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is altogether
immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo
immutable whatever for moves itself is in-some way
mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, VIII super Genesim
mutable but as says Augustine VIII on Genesis
ad litteram: Spiritus creator movet se nec per tempus
to the-letter the-Spirit creator moves himself neither through time
nec per locum. Ergo Deus est aliquo modo mutabilis.
nor through place therefore God is in-some way mutable

2. Praeterea, Sap. VII dicitur de sapientia quod est
2 further Wisdom VII it-is-said about wisdom that it-is
mobiliior omnibus mobilibus. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia.
more-mobile than-all mobile-things but God is the-very wisdom
Ergo Deus est mobilis.
therefore God is mobile

3. Praeterea, appropinquari et elongari motum significant.
3 further to-be-approached and to-be-withdrawn motion signify
Huiusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura: Iac. IV:
such-things moreover are-said of God in Scripture James IV

appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Ergo Deus
approach to-God and he-will-approach to-you therefore God
 est mutabilis.

is mutable

Sed contra est quod dicitur Malach. III: Ego Deus, et non
but against is that it-is-said Malachi III I God and not
 mutor.

I-am-changed

Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum

I-answer it-must-be-said that from the-premises it-is-shown God

esse omnino immutabilem. Primo quidem, quia supra

to-be altogether immutable first indeed because above

ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus:

shown it-is to-be some first being which God we-call

et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum

and that such first being it-is-necessary to-be pure

actum absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod

act without admixture of-any potency for-the-reason that

potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem quod

potency simply is posterior to-act every-thing moreover which

quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex

in-whatever way is-changed is in-some way in potency from

quo patet quod impossibile est Deum aliquo modo mutari.

which is-plain that impossible it-is God in-any way to-be-changed

Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid

second because every-thing which is-moved as-far to something

manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit: sicut quod movetur

remains and as-far to something passes as what is-moved

de albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et

from whiteness to blackness remains according-to substance and

sic in omni eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio.

thus in every that which is-moved is-observed some composition

Ostensum est autem supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio,

shown it-is moreover above that in God no is composition

sed est omnino simplex. Unde manifestum est quod Deus

but he-is altogether simple whence manifest it-is that God

moveri non potest.

to-be-moved not can

Tertio, quia omne quod movetur, motu suo aliquid

third because every-thing which is-moved by-motion its something

acquirat, et pertingit ad illud ad quod prius non pertingebat.

acquires and reaches to that to which before not it-reached

Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se

God but since he-is infinite comprehending in himself

omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest

all the-plenitude of-perfection of-all to-be not can

aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod prius

anything to-acquire nor to-extend himself to anything to which before

non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus.

not he-reached whence in-no way to-him belongs motion

– Et inde est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa

and thence it-is that some of-the-ancients as-if by the-very

veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.

truth compelled posited the-first principle to-be immobile

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Augustine there speaks

secundum modum quo Plato dicebat primum movens

according-to the-mode in-which Plato said the-first mover

movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans motum;

to-move itself every operation naming motion

secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare

according as even the-very to-understand and to-will and to-love

motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat

motions certain are-called because therefore God understands and loves

seipsum, secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum:

himself according-to this they-said that God moves himself

non autem secundum quod motus et mutatio est existentis

not but according as motion and change is of-the-existing

in potentia, ut nunc loquimur de mutatione et motu.

in potency as now we-speak about change and motion

Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse

to the-second it-must-be-said that wisdom is-called mobile to-be

similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit

by-likeness according as its likeness it-diffuses

usque ad ultima rerum. Nihil enim esse potest, quod non

even to the-last of-things nothing for to-be can which not

procedat a divina sapientia per quamdam imitationem, sicut

proceeds from divine wisdom through a-certain imitation as

a primo principio effectivo et formali; prout etiam artificata

from the-first principle effective and formal as also artifacts

procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur inquantum

proceed from the-wisdom of-the-artificer thus therefore inasmuch-as

similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis,

the-likeness of-divine wisdom by-degrees proceeds from the-highest-things

quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad infima

which more participate of its likeness even to the-lowest

rerum, quae minus participant, dicitur esse quidam processus

of-things which less participate is-said to-be a-certain procession

et motus divinae sapientiae in res: sicut si dicamus solem

and motion of-divine wisdom into things as if we-say the-sun

procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius

to-proceed even to the-earth inasmuch-as the-ray of-light its

usque ad terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius,

even to the-earth reaches and in-this way expounds Dionysius

cap. I Cael. Hier., dicens quod omnis processus divinae
chapter I Celestial Hierarchy saying that every procession of-divine
 manifestationis venit ad nos a Patre luminum moto.

manifestation comes to us from the-Father of-lights moved

Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in
to the-third it-must-be-said that such-things are-said of God in
 Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum

the-Scriptures metaphorically as for is-said the-sun to-enter a-house

vel exire, inquantum radius eius pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur

or to-go-out inasmuch-as the-ray its reaches to the-house thus is-said

Deus appropinquare ad nos vel recedere a nobis, inquantum

God to-approach to us or to-withdraw from us inasmuch-as

percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.

we-perceive the-influence of-the-goodness of-him or from him we-fall-away

Utrum esse immutabile sit Dei proprium

2 · WHETHER TO BE IMMUTABLE IS PROPER TO GOD

Angels lack matter, the blessed have reached their end, and forms are invariable. Thomas answers that every creature is mutable by the Creator's power, who could reduce it to nothing; and by its own potency, whether in substantial being like lower bodies, in place like the heavenly bodies, or in choice and place like angels. God alone is immutable in every way.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile

to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be immutable

non sit proprium Dei. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II

not is proper of-God says for the-Philosopher in II

Metaphys., quod materia est in omni eo quod movetur.

Metaphysics that matter is in every that which is-moved

Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut angeli et animae,

but substances certain created as angels and souls

non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse
not have matter as to-some it-seems therefore to-be
 immutabile non est proprium Dei.

immutable not is proper of-God

2. Praeterea, omne quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem

2 further every-thing which is-moved is-moved for some

finem: quod ergo iam pervenit ad ultimum finem,

end what therefore already has-arrived at the-last end

non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam pervenerunt ad

not is-moved but some creatures already have-arrived at

ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae creaturae

the-last end as all the-blessed therefore some creatures

sunt immobiles.

are immobile

3. Praeterea, omne quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed

3 further every-thing which is mutable is variable but

formae sunt invariables: dicitur enim in libro Sex

forms are invariable it-is-said for in the-book of-the-Six

Principiorum, quod forma est simplici et invariabili essentia

Principles that form is in-simple and invariable essence

consistens. Ergo non est solius Dei proprium esse immutabile.

consisting therefore not is of-alone God proper to-be immutable

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Natura

but against is that says Augustine in the-book on the-Nature

Boni: solus Deus immutabilis est; quae autem fecit,

of-Good alone God immutable is the-things-which but be-made

quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia sunt.

because from nothing they-are mutable are

Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est omnino

I-answer it-must-be-said that alone God is altogether

immutabilis: omnis autem creatura aliquo modo est mutabilis.

immutable every but creature in-some way is mutable

Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid dici
to-be-known it-is for that mutable can something to-be-called
 dupliciter: uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est;
in-two-ways in-one way through a-potency which in itself is
 alio modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes
in-another way through a-potency which in another is all
 enim creaturae, antequam essent, non erant possibles esse
for creatures before they-were not were possible to-be
 per aliquam potentiam creatam, cum nullum creatum sit
through any potency created since no created-thing is
 aeternum: sed per solam potentiam divinam, inquantum
eternal but through the-sole power divine inasmuch-as
 Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem ex
God could them into the-to-be to-produce as moreover on
 voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex
the-will of-God it-depends that things into the-to-be he-produces so on
 voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat: non
the-will of-him it-depends that things in the-to-be he-conserves not
 enim aliter eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse
for otherwise them in the-to-be he-conserves than always to-them to-be
 dando; unde si suam actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in
by-giving whence if his action from-them he-withdrew all-things into
 nihilum redigerentur, ut patet per Augustinum, IV super
nothing would-be-reduced as is-plain through Augustine IV on
 Gen. ad litt. Sicut igitur in potentia Creatoris fuit ut res
Genesis to the-letter as therefore in the-power of-the-Creator it-was that things
 essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in potentia Creatoris
should-be before they-were in themselves so in the-power of-the-Creator
 est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic igitur
it-is after they-are in themselves that not they-be thus therefore
 per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt
through a-potency which is in another namely in God they-are

mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci
mutable inasmuch-as by him from nothing they-could to-be-produced
in esse, et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.
into the-to-be and from the-to-be they-can to-be-reduced into not the-to-be
Si autem dicatur aliquid mutabile per potentiam in ipso
if but be-called something mutable through a-potency in itself
existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo omnis creatura est
existing thus also in-some way every creature is
mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, scilicet activa
mutable there-is for in the-creature a-two-fold potency namely active
et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum quam
and passive I-call moreover the-potency passive according-to which
aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo
something attain can its perfection either in being
vel in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas
or in attaining the-end if therefore be-attended-to the-mutability
rei secundum potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus
of-a-thing according-to the-potency to to-be thus not in all
creaturis est mutabilitas: sed in illis solum in quibus illud
creatures is mutability but in those only in which that
quod est possibile in eis, potest stare cum non esse. Unde
which is possible in them can to-stand with not to-be whence
in corporibus inferioribus est mutabilitas et secundum esse
in bodies lower there-is mutability both according-to to-be
substantiale, quia materia eorum potest esse cum privatione
substantial because the-matter of-them can to-be with the-privation
formae substantialis ipsorum: et quantum ad esse accidentale,
of-the-form substantial of-them and as-far to to-be accidental
si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem accidentis; sicut
if the-subject suffer with-itself the-privation of-the-accident as
hoc subiectum, homo, compatiatur secum non album, et
this subject man suffers with-itself not white and

ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit
therefore he-can to-be-changed from white to not white if but there-be
 tale accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti,
such an-accident which follows the-principles essential of-the-subject
 privatio illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto: unde
the-privation of-that accident not can to-stand with the-subject whence
 subiectum non potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut
the-subject not can to-be-changed according-to that accident as
 nix non potest fieri nigra. – In corporibus vero caelestibus,
snow not can to-become black in bodies but heavenly
 materia non compatitur secum privationem formae, quia
matter not suffers with-itself the-privation of-form because
 forma perficit totam potentialitatem materiae: et ideo non
the-form perfects the-whole potentiality of-matter and therefore not
 sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale; sed secundum
they-are mutable according-to to-be substantial but according-to
 esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum privationem
to-be local because the-subject suffers with-itself the-privation
 huius loci vel illius. – Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia
of-this place or of-that substances but incorporeal because
 sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent
they-are the-very forms subsisting which yet themselves have
 ad esse ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur
to the-to-be of-themselves as potency to act not suffer
 secum privationem huius actus: quia esse consequitur
with-themselves the-privation of-this act because to-be follows
 formam, et nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc quod amittit
form and nothing is-corrupted except through this that it-loses
 formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non
form whence in the-very form not is potency to not
 esse: et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles et
to-be and therefore such substances are immutable and

invariables secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius,
invariable according-to to-be and this is what says Dionysius
 IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod substantiae intellectuales creatae
IV chapter on Divine Names that substances intellectual created
 mundaе sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut
clean are from generation and from all variation as
 incorporeales et immateriales. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex
incorporeal and immaterial but yet remains in them a-two-fold
 mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem:
mutability one according as they-are in potency to the-end
 et sic est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono
and thus there-is in them mutability according-to choice from good
 in malum, ut Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum,
to evil as Damascene says the-other according-to place
 in quantum virtute sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca
inasmuch-as by-power their finite they-can to-attain certain places
 quae prius non attingebant: quod de Deo dici non potest,
which before not they-attained which of God to-be-said not can
 qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra dictum est.
who by-his infinity all places fills as above said it-is
 Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem:
thus therefore in every creature there-is potency to change
 vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia;
either according-to to-be substantial as bodies corruptible
 vel secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia; vel
or according-to to-be local only as bodies heavenly or
 secundum ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad
according-to order to the-end and the-application of-power to
 diversa, sicut in angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae
diverse-things as in angels and universally all creatures
 communiter sunt mutabiles secundum potentiam Creantis,
commonly are mutable according-to the-power of-the-One-creating

in cuius potestate est esse et non esse earum. Unde,
in whose power is the-to-be and not to-be of-them whence
 cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, proprium
since God in-none of-these ways is mutable proper
 eius est omnino immutabilem esse.

of-him it-is altogether immutable to-be
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that objection that proceeds
 de eo quod est mutabile secundum esse substantiale vel
about that which is mutable according-to to-be substantial or
 accidentale: de tali enim motu philosophi tractaverunt.

accidental about such for motion the-philosophers treated
 Ad secundum dicendum quod angeli boni, supra
to the-second it-must-be-said that angels good above
 immutabilitatem essendi, quae competit eis secundum
the-immutability of-being which belongs to-them according-to
 naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex divina virtute:
nature have immutability of-choice from divine power
 tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum locum.

yet remains in them mutability according-to place
 Ad tertium dicendum quod formae dicuntur invariables,
to the-third it-must-be-said that forms are-called invariable
 quia non possunt esse subiectum variationis: subiiciuntur
because not they-can to-be the-subject of-variation they-are-subjected
 tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum secundum eas variatur.

yet to-variation inasmuch-as the-subject according-to them is-varied
 Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic variantur: non
whence is-plain that according as they-are so they-are-varied not
 enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi, sed
for are-called beings as-if they-were the-subject of-being but
 quia eis aliquid est.

because by-them something is

De Dei aeternitate
X · ON THE ETERNITY OF GOD

Thomas next inquires about eternity, in six articles: what eternity is; whether God is eternal; whether being eternal is proper to God; whether eternity differs from time; on the difference of aeviternity and time; and whether there is one aeviternity only, as there is one time and one eternity.

Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate.

next it-is-inquired about eternity

Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

and about this are-asked six

Primo: quid sit aeternitas.

first what is eternity

Secundo: utrum Deus sit aeternus.

second whether God is eternal

Tertio: utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei.

third whether to-be eternal is proper of-God

Quarto: utrum aeternitas differat a tempore.

fourth whether eternity differs from time

Quinto: de differentia aevi et temporis.

fifth about the-difference of-aeviternity and of-time

Sexto: utrum sit unum aevum tantum, sicut est unum

sixth whether there-is one aeviternity only as there-is one

tempus et una aeternitas.

time and one eternity

Utrum convenienter definiatur aeternitas, quod est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio

1 • WHETHER ETERNITY IS FITTINGLY DEFINED

Boethius defines eternity as the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life, and each term seems faulty. Thomas answers that as we know simple things through composite ones, we know eternity through time, the number of motion by before and after. What lacks motion has no before and after and no beginning or end; so eternity is interminable and whole at once, and its terms are defended.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not is fitting
definitio aeternitatis, quam Boetius ponit V de Consolatione,
the-definition of-eternity which Boethius posits V on Consolation
dicens quod aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul
saying that eternity is of-interminable life whole at-once
et perfecta possessio. Interminabile enim negative dicitur.
and perfect possession interminable for negatively is-said
Sed negatio non est de ratione nisi eorum quae sunt
but negation not is of the-notion except of-those-things which are
deficientia: quod aeternitati non competit. Ergo in definitione
deficient which to-eternity not belongs therefore in the-definition
aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.
of-eternity not ought to-be-placed interminable

2. Praeterea, aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio
2 further eternity a-duration certain signifies duration
autem magis respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit
moreover rather regards to-be than life therefore not ought
poni in definitione aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.
to-be-placed in the-definition of-eternity life but rather to-be

3. Praeterea, totum dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem
 3 further whole is-called what has parts this but
 aeternitati non convenit, cum sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter
 to-eternity not belongs since it-is simple therefore unfittingly
 dicitur tota.

it-is-called whole

4. Praeterea, plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec
 4 further many days not can to-be at-once nor
 plura tempora. Sed in aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies
 many times but in eternity in-the-plural are-said days
 et tempora: dicitur enim Micheae V: egressus eius ab
 and times it-is-said for Micah V the-going-forth of-him from
 initio, a diebus aeternitatis; et ad Rom., XVI cap.:
 the-beginning from the-days of-eternity and to Romans XVI chapter
 secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus aeternis taciti.
 according-to the-revelation of-the-mystery in-times eternal kept-silent
 Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.

therefore eternity not is whole at-once

5. Praeterea, totum et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur
 5 further whole and perfect are the-same posited therefore
 quod sit tota, superflue additur quod sit perfecta.

that it-is whole superfluously is-added that it-is perfect

6. Praeterea, possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas
 6 further possession to duration not pertains eternity
 autem quaedam duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est
 but a-certain duration is therefore eternity not is
 possessio.

possession

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium
 I-answer it-must-be-said that as into the-knowledge of-simple-things
 oportet nos venire per composita, ita in cognitionem
 it-is-necessary us to-come through composite-things so into the-knowledge

aeternitatis oportet nos venire per tempus; quod nihil
of-eternity it-is-necessary us to-come through time which nothing
 aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et posterius.
other is than the-number of-motion according-to before and after
 Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars
since for in any motion there-is succession and one part
 post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius
after another from this that we-number before and after
 in motu, apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam
in motion we-apprehend time which nothing other is than
 numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. In eo autem
the-number of-the-before and of-the-after in motion in that but
 quod caret motu, et semper eodem modo se habet, non
which lacks motion and always in-the-same way itself has not
 est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur ratio
it-is-possible to-take before and after as therefore the-notion
 temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris
of-time consists in the-numbering of-the-before and of-the-after
 in motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est
in motion so in the-apprehension of-the-uniformity of-that which is
 omnino extra motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.
altogether outside motion consists the-notion of-eternity
 Item, ea dicuntur tempore mensurari, quae principium
likewise those-things are-said by-time to-be-measured which a-beginning
 et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic.: et
and end have in time as it-is-said in IV Physics and
 hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur, est
this for-this-reason because in every that which is-moved it-is-possible
 accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero
to-take some beginning and some end what but

est omnino immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec
is altogether immutable as neither succession so neither
 principium aut finem habere potest.

beginning or end to-have can

Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex hoc quod
thus therefore from two-things is-made-known eternity first from this that
 id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest principio et
that which is in eternity is interminable that-is beginning and
 fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur). Secundo, per
end lacking so-that term to each be-referred second through
 hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens.

this that the-very eternity succession lacks whole at-once existing

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that simple-things are-accustomed
 per negationem definiri, sicut punctus est cuius pars
through negation to-be-defined as the-point is that-of-which part
 non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit de
not is which not for-this-reason is because negation be of
 essentia eorum: sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo
the-essence of-them but because intellect our which first
 apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire
apprehends composite-things into the-knowledge of-simple-things to-arrive
 non potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.

not can except through the-removal of-composition

Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum,
to the-second it-must-be-said that that which is truly eternal
 non solum est ens, sed vivens: et ipsum vivere se extendit
not only is being but living and the-very to-live itself extends
 quodammodo ad operationem, non autem esse. Protensio autem
in-a-way to operation not but to-be the-extension moreover

durationis videtur attendi secundum operationem, magis
of-duration seems to-be-attended according-to operation rather
 quam secundum esse: unde et tempus est numerus motus.

than according-to to-be whence also time is the-number of-motion

Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia
to the-third it-must-be-said that eternity is-called whole not because
 habet partes, sed inquantum nihil ei deest.

it-has parts but inasmuch-as nothing to-it is-lacking

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that as God since he-is
 incorporeus, nominibus rerum corporalium metaphorice in

incorporeal by-the-names of-things bodily metaphorically in

Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas, tota simul existens,

the-Scriptures is-named so eternity whole at-once existing

nominibus temporalibus successivis.

by-names temporal successive

Ad quintum dicendum quod in tempore est duo

to the-fifth it-must-be-said that in time it-is-possible two-things

considerare: scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est successivum;

to-consider namely the-very time which is successive

et nunc temporis, quod est imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota

and the-now of-time which is imperfect he-says therefore whole

simul, ad removendum tempus: et perfecta, ad excludendum

at-once for removing time and perfect for excluding

nunc temporis.

the-now of-time

Ad sextum dicendum quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter

to the-sixth it-must-be-said that that which is-possessioned firmly

et quiete habetur. Ad designandam ergo immutabilitatem

and quietly is-had for designating therefore the-immutability

et indeficientiam aeternitatis, usus est nomine possessionis.

and unfailingness of-eternity used he-has the-name of-possession

Utrum Deus sit aeternus

2 · WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL

Eternity seems made, God is said to be before and to reign beyond eternity, eternity is a measure, and Scripture uses past, present, and future tenses of him. Thomas answers that eternity follows immutability as time follows motion, so God, most immutable, is most eternal; indeed he is his own eternity, as he is his own essence. The standing now makes eternity in our apprehension, measure is said of him only as we apprehend him, and every tense is said of him because eternity includes all times.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
aeternus. Nihil enim factum potest dici de Deo. Sed
eternal nothing for made can to-be-said of God but
aeternitas est aliquid factum: dicit enim Boetius quod nunc
eternity is something made says for Boethius that the-now
fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatem; et
flowing makes time the-now standing makes eternity and
Augustinus dicit, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod
Augustine says in the-book of-Eighty three Questions that
Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est aeternus.
God is the-author of-eternity therefore God not is eternal

2. Praeterea, quod est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem,
2 further what is before eternity and after eternity
non mensuratur aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem,
not is-measured by-eternity but God is before eternity
ut dicitur in libro de Causis: et post aeternitatem; dicitur
as it-is-said in the-book on Causes and after eternity it-is-said
enim Exod. XV, quod Dominus regnabit in aeternum et
for Exodus XV that the-Lord will-reign for eternity and
ultra. Ergo esse aeternum non convenit Deo.
beyond therefore to-be eternal not belongs to-God

3. Praeterea, aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non
 3 further eternity a-measure certain is but to-God not
 convenit esse mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse
 belongs to-be measured therefore not belongs to-him to-be
 aeternum.

eternal

4. Praeterea, in aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel
 4 further in eternity not is present past or
 futurum, cum sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo
 future since it-is whole at-once as said it-is but of God
 dicuntur in Scripturis verba praesentis temporis, praeteriti
 are-said in the-Scriptures verbs of-present tense past
 vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est aeternus.

or future therefore God not is eternal

Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius: Aeternus Pater,
 but against is that says Athanasius eternal the-Father
 aeternus Filius, aeternus Spiritus Sanctus.

eternal the-Son eternal the-Spirit Holy

Respondeo dicendum quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur
 I-answer it-must-be-said that the-notion of-eternity follows
 immutabilitatem, sicut ratio temporis consequitur motum, ut
 immutability as the-notion of-time follows motion as
 ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit maxime immutabilis,
 from things-said is-plain whence since God is most immutable
 sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum est aeternus,
 to-him most belongs to-be eternal nor only is eternal
 sed est sua aeternitas: cum tamen nulla alia res sit sua
 but he-is his eternity since yet no other thing is its
 duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse
 duration because not it-is its to-be God but is his to-be
 uniforme: unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.
 uniform whence as he-is his essence so he-is his eternity

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-now standing is-said
 facere aeternitatem, secundum nostram apprehensionem. Sicut
to-make eternity according-to our apprehension as
 enim causatur in nobis apprehensio temporis, eo quod
for is-caused in us the-apprehension of-time for-the-reason that
 apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in nobis
we-apprehend the-flow of-the-very now so is-caused in us
 apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc
the-apprehension of-eternity inasmuch-as we-apprehend the-now
 stans – Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod Deus est
standing what moreover says Augustine that God is
 auctor aeternitatis, intelligitur de aeternitate participata: eo
the-author of-eternity is-understood of eternity participated in-that
 enim modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus,
for way communicates God his eternity to-some
 quo et suam immutabilitatem.
in-which also his immutability

Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur
and through this is-plain the-solution to the-second for God is-said
 esse ante aeternitatem, prout participatur a substantiis
to-be before eternity according-as it-is-participated by substances
 immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur, quod intelligentia
immaterial whence also in-the-same-place it-is-said that intelligence
 parificatur aeternitati. – Quod autem dicitur in Exodo, Dominus
is-made-equal to-eternity what moreover is-said in Exodus the-Lord
 regnabit in aeternum et ultra, sciendum quod aeternum
will-reign for eternity and beyond it-is-to-be-known that eternity
 accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia translatio. Sic
is-taken there for age as has another translation thus
 igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia durat ultra
therefore it-is-said that he-will-reign beyond eternity because he-endures beyond

quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem
any age that-is beyond any duration
 datam: nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet
given nothing is for other an-age than the-period of-any
 rei, ut dicitur in libro I de Caelo. – Vel dicitur etiam ultra
thing as it-is-said in the-book I on Heaven or he-is-said also beyond
 aeternum regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset
eternity to-reign because if even something other always were
 (ut motus caeli secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen
as the-motion of-heaven according-to some philosophers yet
 Deus ultra regnat, inquantum eius regnum est totum simul.
God beyond reigns inasmuch-as his reign is whole at-once
 Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam
to the-third it-must-be-said that eternity not is other than
 ipse Deus. Unde non dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit
the-very God whence not is-called God eternal as-if he-be
 aliquo modo mensuratus: sed accipitur ibi ratio mensurae
in-some way measured but is-taken there the-notion of-measure
 secundum apprehensionem nostram tantum.
according-to apprehension our only
 Ad quartum dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that verbs of-diverse tenses
 attribuuntur Deo, inquantum eius aeternitas omnia tempora
are-attributed to-God inasmuch-as his eternity all times
 includit: non quod ipse varietur per praesens, praeteritum
includes not that he be-varied through present past
 et futurum.
and future

Utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei

3 • WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL IS PROPER TO GOD

Daniel speaks of many eternities, hell's fire is called eternal, and necessary truths are eternal. Thomas answers that eternity is in God alone, but things share it as they share his immutability: some never cease, some are called eternal for lasting long though corruptible, and angels and the blessed share it more fully in the vision of the Word. Hell has time, not eternity; necessary truths are eternal only as they are in the eternal intellect, which is the divine intellect alone.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit

to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-be eternal not is

soli Deo proprium. Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod qui

to-alone God proper it-is-said for Daniel XII that they-who

ad iustitiam erudiunt plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas

to justice instruct very-many will-be as stars for perpetual

aeternitates. Non autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus

eternities not but there-would-be many eternities if alone

Deus esset aeternus. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus.

God were eternal not therefore alone God is eternal

2. Praeterea, Matth. XXV dicitur: Ite, maledicti, in ignem

2 further Matthew XXV it-is-said go cursed-ones into fire

aeternum. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus.

eternal not therefore alone God is eternal

3. Praeterea, omne necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt

3 further every necessary-thing is eternal but many-things are

necessaria; sicut omnia principia demonstrationis, et omnes

necessary as all the-principles of-demonstration and all

propositiones demonstrativae. Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.

propositions demonstrative therefore not alone God is eternal

Sed contra est quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam: Deus

but against is that says Jerome to Marcella God

solus est qui exordium non habet. Quidquid autem exordium

alone is who beginning not has whatever moreover beginning

habet, non est aeternum. Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.

has not is eternal alone therefore God is eternal

Respondeo dicendum quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo

I-answer it-must-be-said that eternity truly and properly in alone

Deo est. Quia aeternitas immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex

God is because eternity immutability follows as from

dictis patet: solus autem Deus est omnino immutabilis,

things-said is-plain alone moreover God is altogether immutable

ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen quod aliqua

as it-is above shown according yet as some-things

ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua

from him immutability receive according-to this some-things

eius aeternitatem participant.

his eternity participate

Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc immutabilitatem sortiuntur

some therefore as-far to this immutability obtain

a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt: et secundum hoc

from God that never to-be they-cess and according-to this

dicatur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat. Quaedam

it-is-said Ecclesiastes I of the-earth that for eternity it-stands some

etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem

also eternal in the-Scriptures are-called on-account-of the-length

durationis, licet corruptibilia sint: sicut in Psalmo dicuntur

of-duration although corruptible they-be as in the-Psalm are-called

montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur: de

the-mountains eternal and Deuteronomy XXXIII also it-is-said of

pomis collium aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant

the-fruits of-the-hills eternal some moreover more participate

de ratione aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem
of the-notion of-eternity inasmuch-as they-have untransmutability
 vel secundum esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem,
either according-to to-be or further according-to operation
 sicut angeli et beati, qui Verbo fruuntur: quia quantum
as the-angels and the-blessed who the-Word enjoy because as-far
 ad illam visionem Verbi, non sunt in sanctis volubiles
to that vision of-the-Word not are in the-saints shifting
 cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin. Unde et
thoughts as says Augustine XV on the-Trinity whence also
 videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum
those-seeing God are-said to-have life eternal according-to
 illud Ioann. XVII: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant etc.
that John XVII this is life eternal that they-may-know etc
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur multae
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that are-said many
 aeternitates, secundum quod sunt multi participantes
eternities according as there-are many participating
 aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.
eternity from the-very of-God contemplation
 Ad secundum dicendum quod ignis inferni dicitur aeternus
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-fire of-hell is-called eternal
 propter interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis
on-account-of interminability only there-is yet in the-punishments
 eorum transmutatio, secundum illud Iob XXIV: ad nimium
of-them transmutation according-to that Job XXIV to excessive
 calorem transibunt ab aquis nivium. Unde in inferno
heat they-will-pass from waters of-snows whence in hell
 non est vera aeternitas, sed magis tempus; secundum illud
not is true eternity but rather time according-to that
 Psalmi: erit tempus eorum in saecula.
of-the-Psalm will-be time of-them for ages

Ad tertium dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam
to the-third it-must-be-said that necessary signifies a-certain
 modum veritatis. Verum autem, secundum Philosophum, VI
mode of-truth the-true moreover according-to the-Philosopher VI
 Metaphys., est in intellectu. Secundum hoc igitur vera et
Metaphysics is in the-intellect according-to this therefore true and
 necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in intellectu aeterno,
necessary-things are eternal because they-are in an-intellect eternal
 qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non sequitur quod
which is the-intellect divine alone whence not it-follows that
 aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.
something outside God is eternal

Utrum aeternitas differat a tempore

4 · WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME

Two measures seem impossible at once unless one is part of the other, and the now of time stays the same. Thomas answers that eternity and time differ not only because time has a beginning and end, which is accidental, but because eternity is whole at once, the measure of permanent being, while time measures motion. The now of time is the same in subject but varies in notion.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that eternity not is
 aliud a tempore. Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras
other than time impossible it-is for two to-be measures
 durationis simul, nisi una sit pars alterius: non enim sunt
of-duration at-once unless one be part of-the-other not for are
 simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed dies et hora sunt
at-once two days or two hours but a-day and an-hour are
 simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et tempus
at-once because the-hour is part of-the-day but eternity and time

sunt simul: quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis

are at-once of-which each a-measure certain of-duration

importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia

imports since therefore eternity not is part of-time because

aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod

eternity exceeds time and includes it it-seems that

tempus sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.

time is part of-eternity and not other than eternity

2. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in IV Physic., nunc

2 further according-to the-Philosopher in IV Physics the-now

temporis manet idem in toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur

of-time remains the-same in the-whole time but this seems

constituere rationem aeternitatis, quod sit idem indivisibiliter

to-constitute the-notion of-eternity that it-be the-same indivisibly

se habens in toto decursu temporis. Ergo aeternitas est

itself having in the-whole course of-time therefore eternity is

nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud secundum

the-now of-time but the-now of-time not is other according-to

substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud

substance than time therefore eternity not is other

secundum substantiam a tempore.

according-to substance than time

3. Praeterea, sicut mensura primi motus est mensura

3 further as the-measure of-the-first motion is the-measure

omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV Physic., ita videtur

of-all motions as it-is-said in IV Physics so it-seems

quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis esse. Sed

that the-measure of-the-first to-be is the-measure of-every to-be but

aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum.

eternity is the-measure of-the-first to-be which is the-to-be divine

Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum

therefore eternity is the-measure of-every to-be but the-to-be of-things

corruptibilem mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est
corruptible is-measured by-time therefore time either is
 aeternitas, vel aliquid aeternitatis.

eternity or something of-eternity

Sed contra est quod aeternitas est tota simul: in tempore
but against is that eternity is whole at-once in time
 autem est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas
but there-is before and after therefore time and eternity
 non sunt idem.

not are the-same

Respondeo dicendum quod manifestum est tempus et
I-answer it-must-be-said that manifest it-is time and
 aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius diversitatis rationem
eternity not to-be the-same but of-this diversity the-reason
 quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas caret principio
some assigned from this that eternity lacks beginning
 et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec
and end time but has beginning and end but this
 est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato
is a-difference through accident and not through itself because granted
 quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum
that time always has-been and always future be according-to
 positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum,
the-position of-those who the-motion of-heaven posit sempiternal
 adhuc remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut
still will-remain a-difference between eternity and time as
 dicit Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas
says Boetius in the-book on Consolation from this that eternity
 est tota simul, quod tempori non convenit: quia aeternitas est
is whole at-once which to-time not belongs because eternity is
 mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus.
the-measure of-to-be permanent time but is the-measure of-motion

Si tamen praedicta differentia attendatur quantum ad
if yet the-aforesaid difference be-attended as-far to
 mensurata, et non quantum ad mensuras, sic habet
the-measured-things and not as-far to the-measures thus it-has
 aliquam rationem: quia solum illud mensuratur tempore,
some reason because only that is-measured by-time
 quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in IV
which has beginning and end in time as it-is-said in IV
 Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non
Physics whence if the-motion of-heaven always endured time not
 mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum
would-measure it according-to its whole duration since
 infinitum non sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet
the-infinite not is measurable but it-would-measure any
 circulationem, quae habet principium et finem in tempore.
circulation which has beginning and end in time
 Potest tamen et aliam rationem habere ex parte istarum
it-can yet also another reason to-have from the-side of-these
 mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et principium in potentia.
measures if be-taken end and beginning in potency
 Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, tamen possibile
because even granted that time always endure yet possible
 est signare in tempore et principium et finem, accipiendo
it-is to-mark in time both beginning and end by-taking
 aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem
some parts of-it as we-say the-beginning and end
 diei vel anni: quod non contingit in aeternitate.
of-a-day or of-a-year which not happens in eternity

Sed tamen istae differentiae consequuntur eam quae est
but yet these differences follow that which is
 per se et primo, differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas
through itself and first the-difference through this that eternity
 est tota simul, non autem tempus.

is whole at-once not but time

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reason that would-proceed if
 tempus et aeternitas essent mensurae unius generis: quod
time and eternity were measures of-one genus which
 patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est tempus et
is-plain to-be false from those-things of-which is time and
 aeternitas mensura.

eternity the-measure

Ad secundum dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-now of-time is the-same in-subject
 in toto tempore, sed differens ratione: eo quod, sicut
in the-whole time but differing in-notion for-the-reason that as
 tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili;
time corresponds to-motion so the-now of-time corresponds to-the-mobile
 mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed
the-mobile moreover is the-same in-subject in the-whole course of-time but
 differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est
differing in-notion inasmuch-as it-is here and there and this alternation is
 motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, secundum quod alternatur
motion similarly the-flow of-the-very now according as it-is-alternated
 ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem manet eadem et subiecto
in-notion is time eternity but remains the-same both in-subject
 et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem quod nunc temporis.
and in-notion whence eternity not is the-same as the-now of-time

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria
to the-third it-must-be-said that as eternity is the-proper
 mensura ipsius esse, ita tempus est propria mensura motus.
measure of-the-very to-be so time is the-proper measure of-motion
 Unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia
whence according as some to-be recedes from the-permanence
 essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit
of-being and is-subjected to-transmutation according-to this it-recedes
 ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum
from eternity and is-subjected to-time the-to-be therefore of-things
 corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur
corruptible because it-is transmutable not is-measured
 aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum
by-eternity but by-time time for measures not only
 quae transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia.
the-things-which are-transmuted in act but which are transmutable
 Unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae
whence not only it-measures motion but also rest which
 est eius quod natum est moveri, et non movetur.
is of-that which apt is to-be-moved and not is-moved

De differentia aevi et temporis

5 · ON THE DIFFERENCE OF AEVITERNITY AND TIME

Augustine says God moves the spiritual creature through time, and aeviternity seems to have before and after. Thomas answers that aeviternity is midway between eternity and time. Time measures what changes in its being; aeviternity measures beings unchangeable in substance but joined to change, as the heavens in place and angels in choice and thought; eternity admits no change at all. So time has before and after, aeviternity has none in itself though they can be joined to it, and eternity neither has nor admits them.

Ad quantum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that aeviternity not
sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super
is other than time says for Augustine VIII on
Gen. ad litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem
Genesis to the-letter that God moves the-creature spiritual
per tempus. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura spiritualium
through time but aeviternity is-said to-be the-measure of-spiritual
substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.
substances therefore time not differs from aeviternity

2. Praeterea, de ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et
2 further of the-notion of-time it-is that it-have before and
posterius: de ratione vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul,
after of the-notion but of-eternity it-is that it-be whole at-once
ut dictum est. Sed aevum non est aeternitas: dicitur enim
as said it-is but aeviternity not is eternity it-is-said for
Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna est ante aevum. Ergo non est
Ecclesiasticus I that wisdom eternal is before aeviternity therefore not is
totum simul, sed habet prius et posterius: et ita est tempus.
whole at-once but it-has before and after and so it-is time

3. Praeterea, si in aevo non est prius et posterius,
3 further if in aeviternity not is before and after
 sequitur quod in aeviternis non differat esse vel fuisse
it-follows that in aeviternal-things not differs to-be or to-have-been
 vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit impossibile aeviterna non
or future to-be since therefore it-is impossible aeviternal-things not
 fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea non futura esse.
to-have-been it-follows that impossible it-is them not future to-be
 Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in nihilum.
which false is since God can them to-reduce into nothing

4. Praeterea, cum duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex
4 further since the-duration of-aeviternal-things is infinite from
 parte post, si aevum sit totum simul, sequitur quod aliquod
the-side after if aeviternity be whole at-once it-follows that something
 creatum sit infinitum in actu: quod est impossibile. Non
created is infinite in act which is impossible not
 igitur aevum differt a tempore.
therefore aeviternity differs from time

Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius: qui tempus ab aevo
but against is that says Boethius who time from aeviternity
 ire iubes.
to-go you-bid

Respondeo dicendum quod aevum differt a tempore et
I-answer it-must-be-said that aeviternity differs from time and
 ab aeternitate, sicut medium existens inter illa. Sed horum
from eternity as a-middle existing between them but of-these
 differentiam aliqui sic assignant, dicentes quod aeternitas
the-difference some thus assign saying that eternity
 principio et fine caret; aevum habet principium, sed non finem;
beginning and end lacks aeviternity has a-beginning but not an-end
 tempus autem habet principium et finem. – Sed haec differentia
time but has beginning and end but this difference

est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est: quia si etiam semper
is through accident as above said it-is because if even always
 aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut aliqui ponunt;
aeviternal-things had-been and always future were as some posit
 vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo possibile esset;
or even if at-some-time they-failed which to-God possible would-be
 adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et tempore.

still aeviternity would-be-distinguished from eternity and time
 Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc
others but assign the-difference among these three through this
 quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem
that eternity not has before and after time but
 habet prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione;
has before and after with renewal and aging
 aevum habet prius et posterius sine innovatione et
aeviternity has before and after without renewal and
 veteratione. – Sed haec positio implicat contradictoria. Quod
aging but this position implies contradictories which
 quidem manifeste apparet, si innovatio et veteratio referantur
indeed manifestly appears if renewal and aging be-referred
 ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius et posterius durationis
to the-very measure since for before and after of-duration
 non possint esse simul, si aevum habet prius et posterius,
not can to-be at-once if aeviternity has before and after
 oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente, posterior de
it-is-necessary that the-prior part of-aeviternity receding the-posterior of
 novo adveniat: et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo, sicut
new come and thus there-will-be renewal in the-very aeviternity as
 in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur
in time if but they-be-referred to the-measured-things still follows
 inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore,
an-unfitting-thing from this for a-thing temporal grows-old by-time

quod habet esse transmutabile: et ex transmutabilitate
that it-has to-be transmutable and from the-transmutability
 mensurati, est prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex
of-the-measured is before and after in the-measure as is-plain from
 IV Physic. Si igitur ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile
IV Physics if therefore the-very aeviternal-thing not be able-to-age
 nec innovabile, hoc erit quia esse eius est intransmutabile.
nor able-to-be-renewed this will-be because to-be its is untransmutable
 Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius et posterius.
the-measure therefore of-it not will-have before and after
 Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse
it-is therefore to-be-said that since eternity is the-measure of-to-be
 permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia
permanent according as something recedes from permanence
 essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem
of-being according-to this it-recedes from eternity some moreover
 sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est
so recede from permanence of-being that the-to-be of-them is
 subiectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit:
the-subject of-transmutation or in transmutation consists
 et huiusmodi mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et
and such-things are-measured by-time as every motion and
 etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt
also the-to-be of-all corruptible-things some but recede
 minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in
less from permanence of-being because the-to-be of-them neither in
 transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum transmutationis:
transmutation consists nor is the-subject of-transmutation
 tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in actu vel in
yet they-have transmutation adjoined either in act or in
 potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum esse
potency as is-plain in bodies heavenly whose to-be

substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile
substantial is untransmutable yet to-be untransmutable
 habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter
they-have with transmutability according-to place and similarly
 patet de angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum
is-plain of angels that they-have to-be untransmutable with
 transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum
transmutability according-to choice as-far to their
 naturam pertinet; et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum
nature it-pertains and with transmutability of-understandings
 et affectionum, et locorum suo modo. Et ideo huiusmodi
and of-affections and of-places in-their way and therefore such-things
 mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter aeternitatem
are-measured by-aeternity which is the-middle between eternity
 et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec est
and time the-to-be moreover which measures eternity neither is
 mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. – Sic ergo tempus
mutable nor to-mutability adjoined thus therefore time
 habet prius et posterius: aevum autem non habet in se
has before and after aeternity but not has in itself
 prius et posterius, sed ei coniungi possunt: aeternitas autem
before and after but to-it be-joined they-can eternity but
 non habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.
not has before nor after nor them it-admits
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae spirituales,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that creatures spiritual
 quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio,
as-far to affections and understandings in which is succession
 mensurantur tempore. Unde et Augustinus ibidem dicit
are-measured by-time whence also Augustine in-the-same-place says
 quod per tempus moveri, est per affectiones moveri.
that through time to-be-moved is through affections to-be-moved

Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, mensurantur aevo.

as-far but to their to-be natural they-are-measured by-aeternity

Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant aeternitatem.

but as-far to the-vision of-glory they-participate eternity

Ad secundum dicendum quod aevum est totum simul:

to the-second it-must-be-said that aeternity is whole at-once

non tamen est aeternitas, quia compatitur secum prius et

not yet is eternity because it-suffers with-itself before and

posterius.

after

Ad tertium dicendum quod in ipso esse angeli in se

to the-third it-must-be-said that in the-very to-be of-an-angel in itself

considerato, non est differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed

considered not is a-difference of-past and future but

solum secundum adiunctas mutationes. Sed quod dicimus

only according-to adjoined changes but that we-say

angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse, differt secundum

an-angel to-be or to-have-been or future to-be differs according-to

acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit esse angeli

the-acceptance of-intellect our which takes the-to-be of-the-angel

per comparisonem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum

through comparison to diverse parts of-time and when

dicat angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo

it-says the-angel to-be or to-have-been it-supposes something with which

eius oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae: cum vero

its opposite not is-subject to-divine power when but

dicat futurum esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum

it-says future to-be not-yet it-supposes anything whence since

esse et non esse angeli subsit divinae potentiae, absolute

to-be and not to-be of-an-angel is-subject to-divine power absolutely

considerando, potest Deus facere quod esse angeli non

by-considering can God to-make that the-to-be of-an-angel not

sit futurum: tamen non potest facere quod non sit dum
be future yet not can to-make that not it-be while
 est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.

it-is or that not it-have-been after it-was

Ad quartum dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita,

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that the-duration of-aeviternity is infinite

quia non finitur tempore. Sic autem esse aliquod creatum

because not it-is-ended by-time thus moreover to-be something created

infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam alio, non est inconueniens.

infinite that not it-be-finited by-some other not is unfitting

Utrum sit unum aevum tantum

6 · WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE AEVITERNITY

Esdras speaks of aeviternities, and aeviternal things differ in kind, begin at different times, and do not depend on one another. Thomas finds the unity of time in the first motion, which measures all others. If spiritual substances proceed from God in grade and order, as Dionysius holds, all are measured by the first and simplest, so there is one aeviternity.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum

to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-is only

unum aevum. Dicitur enim in apocryphis Esdrae: maiestas

one aeviternity it-is-said for in the-apocrypha of-Esdras majesty

et potestas aevorum est apud te, Domine.

and power of-aeviternities is with you O-Lord

2. Praeterea, diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae.

2 further of-diverse genera diverse are the-measures

Sed quaedam aeviterna sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet

but some aeviternal-things are in the-genus of-bodily-things namely

corpora caelestia: quaedam vero sunt spirituales substantiae,
bodies heavenly some but are spiritual substances
 scilicet angeli. Non ergo est unum aevum tantum.

namely angels not therefore there-is one aeviternity only

3. Praeterea, cum aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum

3 further since aeviternity is a-name of-duration of-which-things

est unum aevum, est una duratio. Sed non omnium

is one aeviternity is one duration but not of-all

aeviternorum est una duratio: quia quaedam post alia esse

aeviternal-things is one duration because some after others to-be

incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est

begin as especially is-plain in souls human not there-is

ergo unum aevum tantum.

therefore one aeviternity only

4. Praeterea, ea quae non dependent ab invicem, non

4 further those-things which not depend on one-another not

videntur habere unam mensuram durationis: propter hoc

seem to-have one measure of-duration on-account-of this

enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum tempus,

for of-all temporal-things there-seems to-be one time

quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus

because of-all motions in-a-way the-cause is the-first

motus, qui prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non

motion which first by-time is-measured but aeviternal-things not

dependent ab invicem: quia unus angelus non est causa

depend on one-another because one angel not is the-cause

alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum tantum.

of-another not therefore there-is one aeviternity only

Sed contra, aevum est simplicius tempore, et propinquius

but against aeviternity is simpler than-time and nearer

se habens ad aeternitatem. Sed tempus est unum tantum.

itself having to eternity but time is one only

Ergo multo magis aevum.

therefore much more aeviternity

Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio:

I-answer it-must-be-said that about this there-is a-two-fold opinion

quidam enim dicunt quod est unum aevum tantum;

some for say that there-is one aeviternity only

quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit, oportet

some that many which but of-these truer be it-is-necessary

considerare ex causa unitatis temporis: in cognitionem

to-consider from the-cause of-the-unity of-time into the-knowledge

enim spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.

for of-spiritual-things through bodily-things we-arrive

Dicunt autem quidam esse unum tempus omnium

say moreover some there-to-be one time of-all

temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus

temporal-things on-account-of this that there-is one number

omnium numeratorum: cum tempus sit numerus, secundum

of-all numbered-things since time is a-number according-to

Philosophum. – Sed hoc non sufficit: quia tempus non

the-Philosopher but this not suffices because time not

est numerus ut abstractus extra numeratum, sed ut in

is a-number as abstracted outside the-numbered but as in

numerato existens: alioquin non esset continuus; quia

the-numbered existing otherwise not it-would-be continuous because

decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex numero,

ten ells of-cloth continuity have not from the-number

sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens
but from the-numbered the-number moreover in the-numbered existing
 non est idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum.

not is the-same of-all but diverse of-diverse-things

Unde alii assignant causam unitatis temporis ex unitate

whence others assign the-cause of-the-unity of-time from the-unity

aeternitatis, quae est principium omnis durationis. Et

of-eternity which is the-principle of-every duration and

sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si consideretur earum

thus all durations are one if be-considered their

principium: sunt vero multae, si consideretur diversitas eorum

principle they-are but many if be-considered the-diversity of-those

quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi principii. Alii

which receive duration from the-influx of-the-first principle others

vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte materiae

but assign the-cause of-the-unity of-time from the-side of-matter

primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura

prime which is the-first subject of-motion whose measure

est tempus. – Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur: quia

is time but neither assignment sufficient seems because

ea quae sunt unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime

those-things which are one in-principle or in-subject and especially

remoto, non sunt unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

remote not are one simply but in-some respect

Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis, unitas primi motus,

it-is therefore the-reason of-the-unity of-time the-unity of-the-first motion

secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes alii

according-to which since it-is most-simple all others

mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus

are-measured as it-is-said in X Metaphysics thus therefore time

ad illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad

to that motion is-compared not only as measure to

mensuratum, sed etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic
measured but also as accident to subject and thus
 ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad alios autem motus comparatur
from it it-receives unity to the-other but motions it-is-compared
 solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde secundum eorum
only as measure to measured whence according-to their
 multitudinem non multiplicatur: quia una mensura separata
multitude not is-multiplied because by-one measure separate
 multa mensurari possunt.

many-things to-be-measured can

Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod de substantiis
this therefore held it-is-to-be-known that about substances
 spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod
spiritual twofold was the-opinion some for said that
 omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut Origines
all proceeded from God in a-certain equality as Origen
 dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii
said or even many of-them as some posited others
 vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt
but said that all substances spiritual proceeded
 a Deo quodam gradu et ordine. Et hoc videtur sentire
from God in-a-certain degree and order and this seems to-hold
 Dionysius, qui dicit, cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter
Dionysius who says chapter X Celestial Hierarchy that among
 substantias spirituales sunt primae, mediae et ultimae, etiam
substances spiritual there-are first middle and last even
 in uno ordine angelorum. Secundum igitur primam opinionem,
in one order of-angels according-to therefore the-first opinion
 necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum
necessary it-is to-say that there-are many aeivernities according
 quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum
as there-are many aeivernal-things first equal according-to

autem secundam opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit
but the-second opinion it-is-necessary to-say that there-is
 unum aevum tantum: quia, cum unumquodque mensuretur
one aevernity only because since each-thing is-measured
 simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.,
by-the-simplest of-its genus as it-is-said in X Metaphysics
 oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur
it-is-necessary that the-to-be of-all aeviternal-things be-measured
 esse primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto
by-the-to-be of-the-first aeviternal-thing which so-much is simpler as-much-as
 prius. Et quia secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur,
prior and because the-second opinion truer is as below will-be-shown
 concedimus ad praesens unum esse aevum tantum.
we-concede for the-present one to-be aevernity only

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that aevernity sometimes is-taken
 pro saeculo, quod est periodus durationis alicuius rei: et
for age which is the-period of-duration of-some thing and
 sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut multa saecula.
thus are-said many aevaternities as many ages

Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et
to the-second it-must-be-said that although bodies heavenly and
 spiritualia differant in genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc,
spiritual-things differ in the-genus of-nature yet they-agree in this
 quod habent esse intransmutabile. Et sic mesurantur aevo.
that they-have to-be untransmutable and thus they-are-measured by-aevernity

Ad tertium dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul
to the-third it-must-be-said that not all temporal-things at-once
 incipiunt, et tamen omnium est unum tempus, propter
begin and yet of-all is one time on-account-of
 primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic omnia aeviterna
the-first which is-measured by-time and thus all aeviternal-things

habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non omnia
have one aeviternity on-account-of the-first even if not all
 simul incipiant.

at-once begin

Ad quartum dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that for this that some-things
 mensurentur per aliquod unum, non requiritur quod illud
be-measured by something one not is-required that that
 unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit simplicius.
one be the-cause of-all of-them but that it-be simpler

De unitate Dei
XI · ON THE UNITY OF GOD

After these, Thomas considers the divine unity, in four articles: whether one adds anything to being; whether one and many are opposed; whether God is one; and whether he is most one.

Post praemissa, considerandum est de divina unitate.

after the-premises to-be-considered it-is about divine unity

Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

and about this are-asked four

Primo: utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens.

first whether one adds anything over being

Secundo: utrum opponantur unum et multa.

second whether are-opposed one and many

Tertio: utrum Deus sit unus.

third whether God is one

Quarto: utrum sit maxime unus.

fourth whether he-is most one

Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens

1 • WHETHER ONE ADDS ANYTHING TO BEING

One seems to belong to quantity, to divide being with many, and to be redundant if it adds nothing. Thomas answers that one adds only the negation of division, for one is undivided being, and each thing keeps its unity as it keeps its being. Pythagoras and Plato and, opposite them, Avicenna confused the one convertible with being with the one that begins number.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that one adds something
supra ens. Omne enim quod est in aliquo genere determinato,
over being every-thing for which is in some genus determinate
se habet ex additione ad ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed
itself has by addition to being which goes-around all genera but
unum est in genere determinato: est enim principium numeri,
one is in a-genus determinate it-is for the-principle of-number
qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.
which is a-species of-quantity therefore one adds something over being
2. Praeterea, quod dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex
2 further what divides something common itself has by
additione ad illud. Sed ens dividitur per unum et multa.
addition to it but being is-divided by one and many
Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.
therefore one adds something over being

3. Praeterea, si unum non addit supra ens, idem esset
3 further if one not adds over being the-same it-would-be
dicere unum et ens. Sed nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo
to-say one and being but triflingly is-said being being therefore

nugatio esset dicere ens unum: quod falsum est. Addit

trifling it-would-be to-say being one which false is adds

igitur unum supra ens.

therefore one over being

Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div.

but against is that says Dionysius last chapter on Divine

Nom.: nihil est existentium non participans uno: quod non

Names nothing is of-existing-things not participating in-one which not

esset, si unum adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum.

would-be if one added over being which would-contract it

Ergo unum non habet se ex additione ad ens.

therefore one not has itself by addition to being

Respondeo dicendum quod unum non addit supra ens

I-answer it-must-be-said that one not adds over being

rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis: unum

a-thing any but only the-negation of-division one

enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et ex hoc

for nothing other signifies than being undivided and from this

ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne

itself it-appears that one is-convertible with being for every

ens aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est

being either is simple or composite what moreover is

simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem

simple is undivided both in-act and in-potency what moreover

est compositum, non habet esse quandiu partes eius sunt

is composite not has to-be as-long-as the-parts of-it are

divisae, sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum

divided but after they-constitute and compose the-very

compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse cuiuslibet

composite whence manifest it-is that the-to-be of-any

rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod unumquodque,
thing consists in indivision and thence it is that each-thing
 sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.

as it-guards its to-be so it-guards its unity

Ad primum igitur dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that some thinking the-same to-be
 unum quod convertitur cum ente, et quod est principium
the-one which is-convertible with being and that-which is the-principle
 numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias positiones. Pythagoras enim
of-number divided were into contrary positions Pythagoras for
 et Plato, videntes quod unum quod convertitur cum ente,
and Plato seeing that the-one which is-convertible with being
 non addit aliquam rem supra ens, sed significat substantiam
not adds any thing over being but signifies the-substance
 entis prout est indivisa, existimaverunt sic se habere
of-being according-as it-is undivided reckoned so itself to-have
 de uno quod est principium numeri. Et quia numerus
about the-one which is the-principle of-number and because number
 componitur ex unitatibus, crediderunt quod numeri essent
is-composed from units they-believed that numbers were
 substantiae omnium rerum. – E contrario autem Avicenna,
the-substances of-all things from the-contrary but Avicenna
 considerans quod unum quod est principium numeri, addit
considering that the-one which is the-principle of-number adds
 aliquam rem supra substantiam entis (alias numerus ex
some thing over the-substance of-being otherwise number from
 unitatibus compositus non esset species quantitatis), credidit
units composed not would-be a-species of-quantity believed
 quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, addat rem aliquam
that the-one which is-convertible with being adds a-thing some
 supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra hominem. – Sed
over the-substance of-being as white over man but

hoc manifeste falsum est: quia quaelibet res est una per
this manifestly false is because any thing is one through
 suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una
its substance if for through something other were one
 quaelibet res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum
any thing since that again is one if it-were again
 unum per aliquid aliud, esset abire in infinitum. Unde
one through something other it-would-be to-go to infinity whence
 standum est in primo. – Sic igitur dicendum est quod
to-be-stopped it-is at the-first thus therefore to-be-said it-is that
 unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit aliquam rem
the-one which is-convertible with being not adds any thing
 supra ens: sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit
over being but the-one which is the-principle of-number adds
 aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.

something over being to the-genus of-quantity pertaining

Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est
to the-second it-must-be-said that nothing prohibits that which is
 uno modo divisum, esse alio modo indivisum; sicut quod
in-one way divided to-be in-another way undivided as what
 est divisum numero, est indivisum secundum speciem: et sic
is divided in-number is undivided according-to species and thus
 contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio modo multa.

it-happens something to-be in-one way one in-another way many

Sed tamen si sit indivisum simpliciter; vel quia est indivisum
but yet if it-be undivided simply either because it-is undivided
 secundum id quod pertinet ad essentiam rei, licet
according-to that which pertains to the-essence of-the-thing although
 sit divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt extra essentiam
it-be divided as-far to those-things which are outside the-essence
 rei, sicut quod est unum subiecto et multa secundum
of-the-thing as what is one in-subject and many according-to

accidentia; vel quia est indivisum in actu, et divisum in
accidents or because it-is undivided in act and divided in
 potentia, sicut quod est unum toto et multa secundum
potency as what is one in-the-whole and many according-to
 partes: huiusmodi erit unum simpliciter, et multa secundum
parts such-a-thing will-be one simply and many in-some
 quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum secundum
respect if but something from the-converse be undivided in-some
 quid, et divisum simpliciter; utpote quia est divisum
respect and divided simply as because it-is divided
 secundum essentiam, et indivisum secundum rationem, vel
according-to essence and undivided according-to notion or
 secundum principium sive causam: erit multa simpliciter,
according-to principle or cause it-will-be many simply
 et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt multa numero
and one in-some respect as the-things-which are many in-number
 et unum specie, vel unum principio. Sic igitur ens dividitur
and one in-species or one in-principle thus therefore being is-divided
 per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa
by one and many as-it-were by one simply and many
 secundum quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non containeretur
in-some respect for also the-very multitude not would-be-contained
 sub ente, nisi containeretur aliquo modo sub uno. Dicit enim
under being unless it-were-contained in-some way under one says for
 Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., quod non est multitudo
Dionysius last chapter on Divine Names that not there-is multitude
 non participans uno: sed quae sunt multa partibus, sunt
not participating in-one but the-things-which are many in-parts are
 unum toto; et quae sunt multa accidentibus, sunt
one in-the-whole and the-things-which are many in-accidents are
 unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt unum
one in-subject and the-things-which are many in-number are one

specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere;
in-species and the-things-which are in-species many are one in-genus
 et quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio.
and the-things-which are many in-processions are one in-principle
 Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum
to the-third it-must-be-said that therefore not is trifling when
 dicitur ens unum, quia unum addit aliquid secundum
it-is-said being one because one adds something according-to
 rationem supra ens.
notion over being

Utrum unum et multa opponantur

2 · WHETHER ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED

Every multitude is in some way one, and one composes multitude, while the few, not one, is opposed to much. Thomas answers that the one that begins number is opposed to multitude as measure to measured, and the one convertible with being by privation, as undivided to divided. Being is grasped first, then division, then one, then multitude.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that one and many
 non opponantur. Nullum enim oppositum praedicatur de suo
not are-opposed no for opposite is-predicated of its
 opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est quodammodo unum, ut
opposite but every multitude is in-a-way one as
 ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur multitudini.
from the-aforesaid is-plain therefore one not is-opposed to-multitude

2. Praeterea, nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito.

2 further no opposite is-constituted from its opposite

Sed unum constituit multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur

but one constitutes multitude therefore not is-opposed

multitudini.

to-multipitude

3. Praeterea, unum uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur

3 further one to-one is opposite but to-much is-opposed

paucum. Ergo non opponitur ei unum.

little therefore not is-opposed to-it one

4. Praeterea, si unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei

4 further if one is-opposed to-multipitude it-is-opposed to-it

sicut indivisum diviso: et sic opponetur ei ut privatio

as the-undivided to-the-divided and thus it-will-be-opposed to-it as privation

habitu. Hoc autem videtur inconueniens: quia sequeretur

to-habit this moreover seems unfitting because it-would-follow

quod unum sit posterius multitudine, et definiatur per

that one is posterior to-multipitude and is-defined through

eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum. Unde

it since yet multitude is-defined through one whence

erit circulus in definitione: quod est inconueniens. Non

there-will-be a-circle in the-definition which is unfitting not

ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.

therefore one and many are opposite

Sed contra, quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa

but against of-which-things the-notions are opposite they-themselves

sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius consistit in indivisibilitate:

are opposite but the-notion of-one consists in indivisibility

ratio vero multitudinis divisionem continet. Ergo unum

the-notion but of-multipitude division contains therefore one

et multa sunt opposita.

and many are opposite

Respondeo dicendum quod unum opponitur multis, sed
I-answer it-must-be-said that one is-opposed to-many but
 diversimode. Nam unum quod est principium numeri,
diversely for the-one which is the-principle of-number
 opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut mensura
is-opposed to-multitude which is number as measure
 mensurato: unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et
to-the-measured one for has the-notion of-first measure and
 numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X
number is multitude measured by one as is-plain from X
 Metaphys. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur
Metaphysics the-one but which is-convertible with being is-opposed
 multitudini per modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.
to-multitude through the-mode of-privation as the-undivided to-the-divided
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that no privation takes-away
 totaliter esse, quia privatio est negatio in subiecto, secundum
totally to-be because privation is negation in a-subject according-to
 Philosophum. Sed tamen omnis privatio tollit aliquod
the-Philosopher but yet every privation takes-away some
 esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae communitatis, accidit
to-be and therefore in being by-reason of-its commonness it-happens
 quod privatio entis fundatur in ente: quod non accidit in
that the-privation of-being is-founded in being which not happens in
 privationibus formarum specialium, ut visus vel albedinis, vel
privations of-forms special as of-sight or of-whiteness or
 alicuius huiusmodi. Et sicut est de ente, ita est de uno et
of-anything of-this-kind and as it-is of being so it-is of one and
 bono, quae convertuntur cum ente: nam privatio boni fundatur
good which are-convertible with being for the-privation of-good is-founded
 in aliquo bono, et similiter remotio unitatis fundatur in aliquo
in some good and similarly the-removal of-unity is-founded in some

uno. Et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum,
one and thence it-happens that multitude is a-certain one
 et malum est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens.
and evil is a-certain good and non being is a-certain being
 Non tamen oppositum praedicatur de opposito: quia alterum
not yet the-opposite is-predicated of the-opposite because one
 horum est simpliciter, et alterum secundum quid. Quod enim
of-these is simply and the-other in-some respect what for
 secundum quid est ens, ut in potentia, est non ens simpliciter,
in-some respect is being as in potency is non being simply
 idest actu: vel quod est ens simpliciter in genere substantiae,
that-is in-act or what is being simply in the-genus of-substance
 est non ens secundum quid, quantum ad aliquod esse
is non being in-some respect as-far to some to-be
 accidentale. Similiter ergo quod est bonum secundum quid,
accidental similarly therefore what is good in-some respect
 est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter quod est
is evil simply or from the-converse and similarly what is
 unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e converso.
one simply is many in-some respect and from the-converse
 Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est totum: quoddam
to the-second it-must-be-said that twofold is the-whole a-certain
 homogenum, quod componitur ex similibus partibus; quoddam
homogeneous which is-composed from similar parts a-certain
 vero heterogenum, quod componitur ex dissimilibus partibus.
but heterogeneous which is-composed from dissimilar parts
 In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum constituitur ex
in any moreover whole homogeneous the-whole is-constituted from
 partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet pars aquae
parts having the-form of-the-whole as any part of-water
 est aqua: et talis est constitutio continui ex suis partibus.
is water and such is the-constitution of-the-continuous from its parts

In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret forma

in any moreover whole heterogeneous any part lacks the-form

totius: nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars

of-the-whole no for part of-a-house is a-house nor any part

hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum

of-a-man is a-man and such a-whole is multitude inasmuch-as

ergo pars eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur

therefore a-part of-it not has the-form of-multitude is-composed

multitudo ex unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus:

multitude from units as a-house from non houses

non quod unitates constituent multitudinem secundum id

not that units constitute multitude according-to that

quod habent de ratione indivisionis, prout opponuntur

which they-have of the-notion of-indivision according-as they-are-opposed

multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod habent de entitate: sicut

to-multitude but according-to this that they-have of entity as

et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc quod sunt

also the-parts of-a-house constitute the-house through this that they-are

quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.

certain bodies not through this that they-are non houses

Ad tertium dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno

to the-third it-must-be-said that much is-taken in-two-ways in-one

modo, absolute: et sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum

way absolutely and thus it-is-opposed to-one in-another way according

quod importat excessum quendam: et sic opponitur pauco.

as it-imports excess a-certain and thus it-is-opposed to-little

Unde primo modo duo sunt multa; non autem secundo.

whence in-the-first way two are many not but in-the-second

Ad quartum dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis,

to the-fourth it-must-be-said that one is-opposed privatively to-many

inquantum in ratione multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde

inasmuch-as in the-notion of-many it-is that they-be divided whence

oportet quod divisio sit prius unitate, non simpliciter, sed
it-is-necessary that division be prior to-unity not simply but
 secundum rationem nostrae apprehensionis. Apprehendimus
according-to the-notion of-our apprehension we-apprehend
 enim simplicia per composita: unde definimus punctum,
for simple-things through composite-things whence we-define the-point
 cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae. Sed multitudo,
that-of-which a-part not is or the-principle of-a-line but multitude
 etiam secundum rationem, consequenter se habet ad unum:
also according-to notion consequently itself has to one
 quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis,
because divided-things not we-understand to-have the-notion of-multipitude
 nisi per hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem.
except through this that to-each of-the-divided we-attribute unity
 Unde unum ponitur in definitione multitudinis: non autem
whence one is-placed in the-definition of-multipitude not but
 multitudo in definitione unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu
multipitude in the-definition of-one but division falls in the-intellect
 ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita quod primo cadit in intellectu
from the-very negation of-being so that first falls in the-intellect
 ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est illud ens, et sic secundo
being second that this being not is that being and thus second
 apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum; quarto, multitudinem.
we-apprehend division third one fourth multipitude

Utrum Deus sit unus

3 · WHETHER GOD IS ONE

Paul speaks of many gods, and neither kind of one seems to befit God; against it, Deuteronomy says the Lord is one. Thomas proves God is one from his simplicity, since what makes him God makes him this God; from his infinite perfection, since two gods would differ and one would lack something; and from the unity of the world, whose order requires one orderer. Paul reports the error of those who worshiped many gods.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus.

to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is one

Dicitur enim I ad Cor. VIII: siquidem sunt dii multi

it-is-said for I to Corinthians VIII if-indeed there-are gods many

et domini multi.

and lords many

2. Praeterea, unum quod est principium numeri, non potest

2 further the-one which is the-principle of-number not can

praedicari de Deo, cum nulla quantitas de Deo praedicetur.

to-be-predicated of God since no quantity of God is-predicated

Similiter nec unum quod convertitur cum ente: quia importat

similarly neither the-one which is-convertible with being because it-imports

privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio est, quae Deo

privation and every privation imperfection is which to-God

non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit unus.

not belongs not is therefore to-be-said that God is one

Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI: Audi, Israel,

but against is that it-is-said Deuteronomy VI hear O-Israel

Dominus Deus tuus unus est.

the-Lord God your one is

Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus
I-answer it-must-be-said that God to-be one from three-things
 demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius simplicitate. Manifestum
is-demonstrated first indeed from his simplicity manifest
 est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare est hoc aliquid,
it-is for that that whence some singular is this something
 nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim unde
in-no way is to-many communicable that for whence
 Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest: sed id unde
Socrates is man to-many to-be-communicated can but that whence
 est hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si
he-is this man not can to-be-communicated except to-one only if
 ergo Socrates per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo,
therefore Socrates through that were man through which he-is this man
 sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates, ita non possent esse
as not can to-be several Socrateses so not could to-be
 plures homines. Hoc autem convenit Deo: nam ipse Deus est
several men this moreover belongs to-God for the-very God is
 sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum igitur idem est
his nature as above shown it-is according-to therefore the-same he-is
 Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur esse plures Deos.
God and this God impossible it-is therefore to-be several Gods
 Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. Ostensum
second but from the-infinity of-his perfection shown
 est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam
it-is for above that God comprehends in himself the-whole
 perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret
perfection of-being if therefore there-were several gods it-would-be-necessary
 eos differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non
them to-differ something therefore would-belong to-one which not
 alteri. Et si hoc esset privatio, non esset simpliciter
to-the-other and if this were privation not he-would-be simply

perfectus: si autem hoc esset perfectio, alteri eorum
perfect if but this were perfection to-the-other of-them
 deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures Deos. Unde et
it-would-be-lacking impossible it-is therefore to-be several Gods whence also
 antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate, ponentes
the-ancient philosophers as-if by the-very compelled truth positing
 principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.
a-principle infinite posited one only principle
 Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt,
third from the-unity of-the-world all-things for which are
 inveniuntur esse ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam
are-found to-be ordered to one-another while some
 quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem diversa sunt, in
to-others are-subservient the-things-which moreover diverse are into
 unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno
one order not would-come-together unless by some one
 ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum
they-were-ordered better for many-things are-reduced into one
 ordinem per unum, quam per multa: quia per se unius
order by one than by many because through itself of-one
 unum est causa, et multa non sunt causa unius nisi per
one is the-cause and many not are the-cause of-one except through
 accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt aliquo modo unum. Cum
accident inasmuch-as namely they-are in-some way one since
 igitur illud quod est primum, sit perfectissimum et per se,
therefore that which is first is most-perfect and through itself
 non per accidens, oportet quod primum reducens omnia
not through accident it-is-necessary that the-first reducing all-things
 in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est Deus.
into one order be one only and this is God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that are-said gods many according-to
 errorem quorundam qui multos deos colebant, existimantes
the-error of-some who many gods worshiped reckoning
 planetas et alias stellas esse deos, vel etiam singulas
the-planets and the-other stars to-be gods or even the-individual
 partes mundi. Unde subdit: nobis autem unus Deus, etc.

parts of-the-world whence he-adds to-us but one God etc

Ad secundum dicendum quod unum secundum quod est

to the-second it-must-be-said that one according as it-is
 principium numeri, non praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de
the-principle of-number not is-predicated of God but only of
 his quae habent esse in materia. Unum enim quod est

those-things which have to-be in matter the-one for which is
 principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum; quae habent

the-principle of-number is of the-genus of-mathematical-things which have
 esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia

to-be in matter but are according-to notion from matter
 abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam

abstracted the-one but which is-convertible with being is something
 metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia.

metaphysical which according-to to-be not depends on matter

Et licet in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum

and although in God not is any privation yet according-to

modum apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi

the-mode of-apprehension our not he-is-known by us except

per modum privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet

through the-mode of-privation and removal and thus nothing prohibits

aliqua privative dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est

some-things privatively said of God to-be-predicated as that he-is

incorporeus, infinitus. Et similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.

incorporeal infinite and similarly of God it-is-said that he-is one

Utrum Deus sit maxime unus

4 · WHETHER GOD IS MOST ONE

Privation admits no more or less, and the point and unity seem most indivisible. Thomas answers that what is most one must be both most being and most undivided, and God is both: subsisting being itself, determined by no nature, and divided neither in act nor in potency. Point and unity have being only in a subject.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that God not is
maxime unus. Unum enim dicitur secundum privationem
most one one for is-said according-to the-privation
divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit magis et minus. Ergo
of-division but privation not admits more and less therefore
Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae sunt unum.

God not is-called more one than other-things which are one
2. Praeterea, nihil videtur esse magis indivisibile quam
2 further nothing seems to-be more indivisible than
id quod est indivisibile actu et potentia, cuiusmodi est
that which is indivisible in-act and in-potency of-which-kind is
punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur aliquid magis
the-point and unity but so-far is-called something more
unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est magis
one as-far-as it-is indivisible therefore God not is more
unum quam unitas et punctus.
one than unity and the-point

3. Praeterea, quod est per essentiam bonum, est maxime
3 further what is through essence good is most
bonum: ergo quod est per essentiam suam unum, est maxime
good therefore what is through essence its one is most
unum. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet
one but every being is one through its essence as is-plain

per Philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est maxime

through the-Philosopher in IV Metaphysics therefore every being is most

unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia entia.

one God therefore not is more one than other beings

Sed contra est quod dicit Bernardus, quod inter omnia quae

but against is that says Bernard that among all-things which

unum dicuntur, arcem tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis.

one are-called the-citadel holds the-unity of-the-divine Trinity

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad

I-answer it-must-be-said that since one is being undivided for

hoc quod aliquid sit maxime unum, oportet quod sit et

this that something be most one it-is-necessary that it-be both

maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque autem competit

most being and most undivided each moreover belongs

Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens aliquod

to-God he-is for most being inasmuch-as he-is not having any

esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed

to-be determined through any nature to-which it-comes but

est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum.

he-is the-very to-be subsisting in-all ways undetermined

Est autem maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu

he-is moreover most undivided inasmuch-as neither is-divided in-act

neque potentia, secundum quemcunque modum divisionis,

nor in-potency according-to whatever mode of-division

cum sit omnibus modis simplex, ut supra ostensum est.

since he-is in-all ways simple as above shown it-is

Unde manifestum est quod Deus est maxime unus.

whence manifest it-is that God is most one

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although privation according-to

se non recipiat magis et minus, tamen secundum quod eius

itself not admit more and less yet according as its

oppositum recipit magis et minus, etiam ipsa privativa
opposite admits more and less also the-very privative-things
 dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum igitur quod
are-said according-to more and less according therefore as
 aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus, vel nullo
something is more divided or divisible or less or in-no
 modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel
way according-to this something is-called more and less or
 maxime unum.

most one

Ad secundum dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-point and unity which is
 principium numeri, non sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant
the-principle of-number not are most beings since not they-have
 esse nisi in subiecto aliquo. Unde neutrum eorum est
to-be except in a-subject some whence neither of-them is
 maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est maxime unum,
most one as for the-subject not is most one
 propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec accidens.

on-account-of the-diversity of-accident and of-subject so neither the-accident

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum
to the-third it-must-be-said that although every being is one
 per suam substantiam, non tamen se habet aequaliter
through its substance not yet itself has equally
 substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam unitatem: quia substantia
the-substance of-anything for causing unity because the-substance
 quorundam est ex multis composita, quorundam vero non.
of-some is from many composed of-some but not

Quomodo Deus a nobis cognoscatur

XII · HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US

Having considered how God is in himself, Thomas asks how he is in our knowledge, that is, how creatures know him. He lists thirteen articles: whether a created intellect can see God's essence, and through what; whether bodily eyes can; whether natural power suffices or needs created light; degrees of vision; comprehension; what is seen in God and how; whether anyone sees God's essence in this life; and knowledge of God by reason and by grace.

Quia in superioribus consideravimus qualiter Deus sit
because in the-above we-have-considered how God is
secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in
according-to himself it-remains to-be-considered how he-is in
cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis.
knowledge our that-is how he-is-known by creatures

Et circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim.

and about this are-asked thirteen

Primo: utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit videre essentiam

first whether any intellect created can to-see the-essence

Dei.

of-God

Secundo: utrum Dei essentia videatur ab intellectu per

second whether God's essence is-seen by the-intellect through

aliquam speciem creatam.

some species created

Tertio: utrum oculo corporeo Dei essentia possit videri.

third whether by-the-eye bodily God's essence can to-be-seen

Quarto: utrum aliqua substantia intellectualis creata ex suis

fourth whether any substance intellectual created from its

naturalibus sufficiens sit videre Dei essentiam.

natural-powers sufficient is to-see God's essence

Quinto: utrum intellectus creatus ad videndam Dei essentiam

fifth whether the-intellect created for seeing God's essence

indigeat aliquo lumine creato.

needs some light created

Sexto: utrum videntium essentiam Dei unus alio

sixth whether of-those-seeing the-essence of-God one than-another

perfectius videat.

more-perfectly sees

Septimo: utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit comprehendere

seventh whether any intellect created can to-comprehend

Dei essentiam.

God's essence

Octavo: utrum intellectus creatus videns Dei essentiam,

eighth whether the-intellect created seeing God's essence

omnia in ipsa cognoscat.

all-things in it knows

Nono: utrum ea quae ibi cognoscit, per aliquas

ninth whether those-things which there it-knows through some

similitudines cognoscat.

likenesses it-knows

Decimo: utrum simul cognoscat omnia quae in Deo videt.

tenth whether at-once it-knows all-things which in God it-sees

Undecimo: utrum in statu huius vitae possit aliquis homo

eleventh whether in the-state of-this life can any man

essentiam Dei videre.

the-essence of-God to-see

Duodecimo: utrum per rationem naturalem Deum in hac

twelfth whether through reason natural God in this

vita possimus cognoscere.

life we-can to-know

Tertiodecimo: utrum, supra cognitionem naturalis rationis,
thirteenth wether above the-knowledge of-natural reason
 sit in praesenti vita aliqua cognitio Dei per gratiam.
there-is in the-present life any knowledge of-God through grace

Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus
 possit Deum videre per essentiam

1 · WHETHER A CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE GOD'S ESSENCE

Chrysostom says no one has seen God, Dionysius that he is beyond sense and knowledge, and the infinite is unknown. Thomas answers that God, pure act, is most knowable in himself, though he may exceed our intellect as the sun the bat's eye. To deny that the blessed see God would make blessedness impossible or place it elsewhere than in God, and leave man's natural desire to know the first cause empty. Chrysostom and Dionysius speak of comprehension, not of vision.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that no intellect
 creatus possit Deum per essentiam videre. Chrysostomus
created can God through essence to-see Chrysostom
 enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud quod dicitur Ioan.
for on John expounding that which is-said John
 I, Deum nemo vidit unquam, sic dicit: Ipsum quod est
I God no-one has-seen ever thus says that-very which is
 Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec angeli viderunt nec
God not only the-prophets but not-even the-angels have-seen nor
 archangeli: quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre
the-archangels what for of-creatable is nature how to-see
 poterit quod increabile est? Dionysius etiam, I cap. de
will-be-able what uncreatable is Dionysius also I chapter on

Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit: neque sensus est eius,
Divine Names speaking about God says neither sense is of-him
 neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia.

nor imagination nor opinion nor reason nor science

2. Praeterea, omne infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est
 2 further every infinite inasmuch-as such is
 ignotum. Sed Deus est infinitus, ut supra ostensum est.

unknown but God is infinite as above shown it-is

Ergo secundum se est ignotus.

therefore according-to himself he-is unknown

3. Praeterea, intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi

3 further the-intellect created not is cognitive except

existentium: primum enim quod cadit in apprehensione

of-existing-things the-first for which falls in the-apprehension

intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non est existens, sed supra

of-the-intellect is being but God not is existing but above

existentia, ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non est intelligibilis;

existing-things as says Dionysius therefore not he-is intelligible

sed est supra omnem intellectum.

but he-is above every intellect

4. Praeterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse

4 further of-the-knower to the-known it-is-necessary there-to-be

aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio

some proportion since the-known is the-perfection

cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellectus creati ad

of-the-knower but no is proportion of-the-intellect created to

Deum: quia in infinitum distant. Ergo intellectus creatus

God because to infinity they-are-distant therefore the-intellect created

non potest videre essentiam Dei.

not can to-see the-essence of-God

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III: videbimus eum
but against is that it-is-said I John III we-shall-see him
 sicuti est.

as he-is

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile

I-answer it-must-be-said that since each-thing is knowable

secundum quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus

according as it-is in act God who is act pure

absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est,

without all admixture of-potency as-far in himself he-is

maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile

most knowable is but what is most knowable

in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter

in itself to-some intellect knowable not is on-account-of

excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum: sicut sol, qui est

the-excess of-the-intelligible over the-intellect as the-sun which is

maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter

most visible to-be-seen not can by the-bat on-account-of

excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt

the-excess of-light this therefore attending some posited

quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest.

that no intellect created the-essence of-God to-see can

Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis

but this unfittingly is-said since for the-last of-man

beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est

blessedness in the-highest his operation consists which is

operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest

the-operation of-the-intellect if never the-essence of-God to-see can

intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in

the-intellect created either never blessedness will-obtain or in

alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum

another its blessedness will-consist than in God which is alien

a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae,
from faith in him for is the-last perfection of-the-rational creature
 quod est ei principium essendi: intantum enim unumquodque
which is to-it the-principle of-being so-far for each-thing
 perfectum est, inquantum ad suum principium attingit. –
perfect is as-far-as to its principle it-attains

Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale
similarly also it-is beyond reason is-in for man a-natural
 desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et
desire of-knowing the-cause when he-beholds the-effect and
 ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus
from this wonder in men arises if therefore the-intellect
 rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam
of-the-rational creature to-reach not could to the-first cause
 rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter
of-things there-will-remain an-empty desire of-nature whence simply
 concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.

to-be-conceded it-is that the-blessed God's essence see
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that each authority speaks
 de visione comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius
of the-vision of-comprehension whence premises Dionysius
 immediate ante verba proposita, dicens: omnibus ipse est
immediately before the-words proposed saying to-all he is
 universaliter incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est, etc.
universally incomprehensible and neither sense is etc

Et Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit:
and Chrysostom a-little after the-words aforesaid adds
 visionem hic dicit certissimam Patris considerationem et
vision here he-calls the-most-certain of-the-Father consideration and
 comprehensionem, tantam quantam Pater habet de Filio.
comprehension so-great as-great-as the-Father has of the-Son

Ad secundum dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-infinite which itself holds
 ex parte materiae non perfectae per formam, ignotum est
from the-side of-matter not perfected by form unknown is
 secundum se: quia omnis cognitio est per formam. Sed
according-to itself because all knowledge is through form but
 infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non limitatae per
the-infinite which itself holds from the-side of-form not limited by
 materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus
matter is according-to itself most known thus moreover God
 est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus patet.
is infinite and not in-the-first way as from the-above is-plain

Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non
to the-third it-must-be-said that God not thus is-called not
 existens, quasi nullo modo sit existens: sed quia est supra
existing as-if in-no way he-be existing but because he-is above
 omne existens, inquantum est suum esse. Unde ex hoc non
every existing-thing inasmuch-as he-is his to-be whence from this not
 sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed quod omnem
it-follows that in-no way he-can to-be-known but that all
 cognitionem excedat: quod est ipsum non comprehendi.
knowledge he-exceeds which is him not to-be-comprehended

Ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that proportion is-said in-two-ways in-one
 modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum
way a-certain relation of-one quantity to another according-to
 quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis.
which double triple and equal are species of-proportion

Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio
in-another way any relation of-one to another proportion
 dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum,
is-called and thus there-can to-be proportion of-the-creature to God

inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et
inasmuch-as itself is-related to him as effect to cause and
 ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus
as potency to act and according-to this the-intellect created
 proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum.
proportioned to-be can for knowing God

Utrum essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur

2 · WHETHER GOD'S ESSENCE IS SEEN THROUGH A CREATED LIKENESS

John says we shall be like him, and knowing seems to need a likeness. Thomas answers that seeing needs a visive power and the union of the thing seen with the seer. On the side of power a created likeness is needed, the light of glory; but no created species can represent God's essence, which is uncircumscribed being itself, so that essence is united to the intellect immediately.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-essence of-God by
 intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur
the-intellect created through some likeness is-seen it-is-said
 enim I Ioan. III: scimus quoniam, cum apparuerit,
for I John III we-know that when he-will-have-appeared
 similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est.
like to-him we-shall-be and we-shall-see him as he-is
 2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin.: cum Deum
2 further Augustine says IX on the-Trinity when God
 novimus, fit aliqua Dei similitudo in nobis.
we-know there-is-made some of-God likeness in us

3. Praeterea, intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu,

3 further the-intellect in act is the-intelligible in act

sicut sensus in actu est sensibilis in actu. Hoc autem non

as sense in act is the-sensible in act this moreover not

est nisi inquantum informatur sensus similitudine rei

is except inasmuch-as is-informed sense by-the-likeness of-the-thing

sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei intellectae.

sensible and the-intellect by-the-likeness of-the-thing understood

Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu, oportet

therefore if God by the-intellect created is-seen in act it-is-necessary

quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.

that through some likeness be-be-seen

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum

but against is that says Augustine XV on the-Trinity that when

Apostolus dicit «videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate»,

the-Apostle says we-see now through a-mirror and in an-enigma

speculi et aenigmatis nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab

of-mirror and of-enigma by-the-name whatever likenesses by

ipso significatae intelligi possunt, quae accommodatae sunt

him signified to-be-understood can which adapted are

ad intelligendum Deum. Sed videre Deum per essentiam non

for understanding God but to-see God through essence not

est visio aenigmatica vel specularis, sed contra eam dividitur.

is vision enigmatic or mirror-like but against it it-is-divided

Ergo divina essentia non videtur per similitudines.

therefore the-divine essence not is-seen through likenesses

Respondeo dicendum quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem

I-answer it-must-be-said that for vision as-much sensible

quam intellectualem, duo requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva,

as intellectual two-things are-required namely the-power visive

et unio rei visae cum visu: non enim fit visio

and the-union of-the-thing seen with the-sight not for is-made vision

in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est
in act except through this that the-thing seen in-a-way is
 in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod
in the-seer and in things indeed bodily it-appears that
 res visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam,
the-thing seen not can to-be in the-seer through its essence
 sed solum per suam similitudinem: sicut similitudo lapidis
but only through its likeness as the-likeness of-the-stone
 est in oculo, per quam fit visio in actu, non autem
is in the-eye through which is-made vision in act not but
 ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem esset una et eadem
the-very substance of-the-stone if but there-were one and the-same
 res, quae esset principium visivae virtutis, et quae esset
thing which were the-principle of-the-visive power and which were
 res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem
the-thing seen it-would-be-necessary the-seer from that thing both the-power
 visivam habere, et formam per quam videret.
visive to-have and the-form through which he-would-see
 Manifestum est autem quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae
manifest it-is moreover that God both is the-author of-intellective
 virtutis, et ab intellectu videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva
power and by the-intellect to-be-seen can and since the-very intellective
 virtus creaturae non sit Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit
power of-the-creature not is God's essence it-remains that it-is
 aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est primus intellectus.
some participated likeness of-him who is the-first intellect
 Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quoddam
whence also the-power intellectual of-the-creature a-light certain
 intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum: sive
intelligible is-called as-if from the-first light derived whether
 hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de aliqua perfectione
this be-understood of the-power natural or of some perfection

superaddita gratiae vel gloriae. Requiritur ergo ad videndum
superadded of-grace or of-glory there-is-required therefore for seeing

Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae,
God some of-God likeness from the-side of-the-visive power
 qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum.

by-which namely the-intellect be efficacious for seeing God

Sed ex parte visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo
but from the-side of-the-seen thing which necessary it-is in-some way

uniri videnti, per nullam similitudinem creatam Dei
to-be-united to-the-seer through no likeness created God's
 essentia videri potest. Primo quidem, quia, sicut dicit
essence to-be-seen can first indeed because as says

Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., per similitudines inferioris
Dionysius I chapter on Divine Names through the-likenesses of-a-lower
 ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci: sicut
order of-things in-no way higher-things can to-be-known as

per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei
through the-species of-a-body not can to-be-known the-essence of-a-thing

incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam
incorporeal much therefore less through species created

quamcumque potest essentia Dei videri. – Secundo, quia
whatever can the-essence of-God to-be-seen second because
 essentia Dei est ipsum esse eius, ut supra ostensum est: quod
the-essence of-God is the-very to-be of-him as above shown it-is which

nulli formae creatae competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua
to-no form created to-belong can not can therefore any
 forma creata esse similitudo repraesentans videnti Dei essentiam.
form created to-be a-likeness representing to-the-seer God's essence

– Tertio, quia divina essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum,
third because the-divine essence is something uncircumscribed
 continens in se supereminenter quidquid potest significari
containing in itself super-eminently whatever can to-be-signified

vel intelligi ab intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per
or to-be-understood by the-intellect created and this in-no way through
 aliquam speciem creatam repraesentari potest: quia omnis
any species created to-be-represented can because every
 forma creata est determinata secundum aliquam rationem
form created is determined according-to some notion
 vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius esse, vel alicuius
either of-wisdom or of-power or of-the-very to-be or of-something
 huiusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem videri,
of-this-kind whence to-say God through a-likeness to-be-seen
 est dicere divinam essentiam non videri: quod est erroneum.
is to-say the-divine essence not to-be-seen which is erroneous
 Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur
it-must-be-said therefore that for seeing God's essence is-required
 aliqua similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen
some likeness from the-side of-the-visive power namely the-light
 gloriae, confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum: de quo
of-glory strengthening the-intellect for seeing God about which
 dicitur in Psalmo: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Non autem
it-is-said in the-Psalm in light your we-shall-see light not but
 per aliquam similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest,
through any likeness created God's essence to-be-seen can
 quae ipsam divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est.
which the-very divine essence may-represent as in itself it-is
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that authority that speaks of
 similitudine quae est per participationem luminis gloriae.
the-likeness which is through participation of-the-light of-glory
 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de
to the-second it-must-be-said that Augustine there speaks of
 cognitione Dei quae habetur in via.
the-knowledge of-God which is-had on the-way

Ad tertium dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-divine essence is the-very
 esse. Unde, sicut aliae formae intelligibiles quae non sunt
to-be whence as other forms intelligible which not are
 suum esse, uniuntur intellectui secundum aliquod esse quo
their to-be are-united to-the-intellect according-to some to-be by-which
 informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt ipsum in actu; ita
they-inform the-very intellect and make it in act so
 divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut intellectum in
the-divine essence is-united to-the-intellect created as the-understood in
 actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu.
act through itself making the-intellect in act

Utum essentia Dei videri possit oculis corporalibus

3 · WHETHER GOD'S ESSENCE CAN BE SEEN BY THE BODILY EYE

Job says he will see God in his flesh, Augustine allows glorified eyes great power, and Isaiah saw the Lord seated. Thomas answers that every sense power is the act of a bodily organ and reaches only bodies, so God, being incorporeal, is seen by the intellect alone. Job means that he will see God while in the flesh after the resurrection, and that the eye of the mind sees him; Augustine speaks conditionally, of God seen at once by the intellect in renewed bodies, as life is seen; Isaiah saw an imaginary form.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-essence of-God
 videri possit oculo corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX: in
to-be-seen can by-the-eye bodily it-is-said for Job XIX in
 carne mea videbo Deum, etc.; et XLII: auditu auris
flesh my I-shall-see God etc and XLII by-the-hearing of-the-ear
 audiui te, nunc autem oculus meus videt te.
I-have-heard you now but eye my sees you

2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Civitate Dei, cap.

2 further Augustine says in-the-last on the-City of-God chapter

XXIX: Vis itaque praepollentior oculorum erit illorum

XXIX the-power therefore more-excelling of-the-eyes will-be of-those

(scilicet glorificatorum), non ut acutius videant quam

namely of-the-glorified not that more-sharply they-may-see than

quidam perhibentur videre serpentes vel aquilae (quantalibet

some are-reported to-see serpents or eagles with-whatever

enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia vigeant, nihil aliud

for keenness of-discerning the-same animals may-thrive nothing other

possunt videre quam corpora), sed ut videant et incorporea.

they-can to-see than bodies but that they-may-see also incorporeal-things

Quicumque autem potest videre incorporea, potest elevari ad

whoever moreover can to-see incorporeal-things can to-be-raised for

videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest videre Deum.

seeing God therefore the-eye glorified can to-see God

3. Praeterea, Deus potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria:

3 further God can to-be-seen by man in-vision imaginary

dicatur enim Isaiae VI: vidi Dominum sedentem super solium,

it-is-said for Isaiah VI I-saw the-Lord sitting upon a-throne

etc. Sed visio imaginaria a sensu originem habet: phantasia

etc but vision imaginary from sense origin has imagination

enim est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur

for is a-motion made by sense according-to act as it-is-said

in III de Anima. Ergo Deus sensibili visione videri potest.

in III on the-Soul therefore God by-sensible vision to-be-seen can

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Videndo

but against is that says Augustine in the-book on Seeing

Deum ad Paulinam: Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac

God to Paulina God no-one has-seen ever either in this

vita, sicut ipse est; vel in angelorum vita, sicut visibilia
life as he is or in of-angels the-life as visible-things
 ista quae corporali visione cernuntur.

these which by-bodily vision are-discerned

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est Deum videri

I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is God to-be-seen

sensu visus, vel quocumque alio sensu aut potentia

by-the-sense of-sight or by-any other sense or power

sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi est

of-the-sensitive part every for power of-this-kind is

actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicitur. Actus autem

the-act of-a-bodily organ as below will-be-said the-act moreover

proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Unde nulla huiusmodi

is-proportioned to-that of-which it-is the-act whence no such

potentia potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem

power can itself to-extend beyond bodily-things God moreover

incorporeus est, ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu

incorporeal is as above shown it-is whence neither by-sense

nec imaginatione videri potest, sed solo intellectu.

nor by-imagination to-be-seen can but alone by-the-intellect

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur in carne mea

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that when it-is-said in flesh my

videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum, non intelligitur quod oculo

I-shall-see God Savior my not is-understood that by-the-eye

carnis sit Deum visurus: sed quod in carne existens, post

of-the-flesh he-is God about-to-see but that in flesh existing after

resurrectionem, visurus sit Deum. – Similiter quod dicitur,

the-resurrection about-to-see he-is God similarly what is-said

nunc oculus meus videt te, intelligitur de oculo mentis:

now eye my sees you is-understood of the-eye of-the-mind

sicut Ephes. I dicit Apostolus: det vobis spiritum
as Ephesians I says the-Apostle may-be-give to-you the-spirit
 sapientiae in agnitione eius, illuminatos oculos cordis vestri.
of-wisdom in the-knowledge of-him enlightened the-eyes of-heart your
 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo
to the-second it-must-be-said that Augustine speaks by-inquiring
 in verbis illis, et sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod
in words those and under condition which is-plain from this that
 praemittitur: Longe itaque potentiae alterius erunt (scilicet
is-premised far therefore of-power other they-will-be namely
 oculi glorificati), si per eos videbitur incorporea illa natura.
the-eyes glorified if through them will-be-seen incorporeal that nature
 Sed postmodum hoc determinat, dicens: Valde credibile est sic
but afterward this he-determines saying very believable it-is thus
 nos visuros mundana tunc corpora caeli novi et terrae novae,
we about-to-see the-worldly then bodies of-heaven new and of-earth new
 ut Deum ubique praesentem, et universa etiam corporalia
that God everywhere present and all-things even bodily
 gubernantem, clarissima perspicuitate videamus; non sicut nunc
governing with-clearer transparency we-may-see not as now
 invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta
the-invisible-things of-God through those-things which made are understood
 conspiciuntur; sed sicut homines, inter quos viventes motusque
are-clearly-seen but as men among whom living and-motions
 vitales exerentes vivimus, mox ut aspicimus, non credimus
vital exercising we-live as-soon as we-look-at not we-believe
 vivere, sed videmus. Ex quo patet quod hoc modo intelligit
to-live but we-see from which is-plain that in-this way he-understands
 oculos glorificatos Deum visuros, sicut nunc oculi nostri vident
the-eyes glorified God about-to-see as now the-eyes our see
 alicuius vitam. Vita autem non videtur oculo corporali, sicut
of-someone the-life life moreover not is-seen by-the-eye bodily as

per se visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens: quod quidem
through itself visible but as sensible through accident which indeed
a sensu non cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua
by sense not is-known but at-once with sense by some
alia virtute cognoscitiva. Quod autem statim, visis corporibus,
other power cognitive that moreover at-once seen bodies
divina praesentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex
the-divine presence from them be-known by the-intellect from
duobus contingit: scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus; et
two-things it-happens namely from the-perspicacity of-the-intellect and
ex refulgentia divinae claritatis in corporibus innovatis.
from the-refulgence of-divine brightness in bodies renewed
Ad tertium dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non
to the-third it-must-be-said that in vision imaginary not
videtur Dei essentia: sed aliqua forma in imaginatione
is-seen God's essence but some form in the-imagination
formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum aliquem modum
is-formed representing God according-to some mode
similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per
of-likeness according-as in the-Scriptures divine divine-things through
res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.
things sensible metaphorically are-described

Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus per sua
naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit

4 • WHETHER A CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE GOD'S ESSENCE BY NATURE

An angel is called a clear mirror of God's beauty and knows itself naturally. Thomas answers that knowledge follows the knower's mode: sense knows singulars in matter, our intellect abstracted natures, angels natures not in matter. To know subsisting being itself is natural to God alone, so no creature sees God's essence except by grace, though created intellect can be raised to it.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that some intellect
creatus per sua naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit.
created by its natural-powers the-divine essence to-see can

Dicit enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., quod angelus
says for Dionysius chapter IV on Divine Names that an-angel
est speculum purum, clarissimum, suscipiens totam, si fas
is a-mirror pure most-clear receiving the-whole if lawful
est dicere, pulchritudinem Dei. Sed unumquodque videtur
it-is to-say beauty of-God but each-thing is-seen
dum videtur eius speculum. Cum igitur angelus per sua
while is-seen its mirror since therefore an-angel by its
naturalia intelligat seipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua
natural-powers it-understands itself it-seems that also by its
naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.
natural-powers it-understands the-divine essence

2. Praeterea, illud quod est maxime visibile, fit minus
2 further that which is most visible becomes less
visibile nobis propter defectum nostri visus, vel corporalis
visible to-us on-account-of the-defect of-our sight either bodily
vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus angeli non patitur aliquem
or intellectual but the-intellect of-an-angel not suffers any

defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit maxime
defect since therefore God according-to himself is most
 intelligibilis, videtur quod ab angelo sit maxime intelligibilis.

intelligible it-seems that by an-angel he-is most intelligible
 Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia intelligere
if therefore other intelligible-things by its natural-powers to-understand
 potest, multo magis Deum.

it-can much more God

3. Praeterea, sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad
 3 *further sense bodily not can to-be-raised for*
 intelligendam substantiam incorpoream, quia est supra eius

understanding substance incorporeal because it-is above its

naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per essentiam sit supra

nature if therefore to-see God through essence be above

naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur quod nullus

the-nature of-any intellect created it-seems that no

intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam pertingere possit:

intellect created for seeing God's essence to-reach can

quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet. Videtur ergo

which is erroneous as from the-above-said is-plain it-seems therefore

quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam videre.

that to-the-intellect created it-is natural the-divine essence to-see

Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VI: gratia Dei vita

but against is that it-is-said Romans VI the-grace of-God life

aeterna. Sed vita aeterna consistit in visione divinae essentiae,

eternal but life eternal consists in the-vision of-the-divine essence

secundum illud Ioan. XVII: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant

according-to that John XVII this is life eternal that they-may-know

te solum verum Deum, etc. Ergo videre Dei essentiam

you alone true God etc therefore to-see God's essence

convenit intellectui creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.

belongs to-the-intellect created through grace and not through nature

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is that any
 intellectus creatus per sua naturalia essentiam Dei videat.
intellect created by its natural-powers the-essence of-God see
 Cognitio enim contingit secundum quod cognitum est in
knowledge for happens according as the-known is in
 cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum
the-knower the-known moreover is in the-knower according-to
 modum cognoscentis. Unde cuiuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est
the-mode of-the-knower whence of-any knower the-knowledge is
 secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicuius
according-to the-mode of-its nature if therefore the-mode of-being of-some
 rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet
thing known exceed the-mode of-the-nature of-the-knower it-is-necessary
 quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis.
that the-knowledge of-that thing be above the-nature of-that knower
 Est autem multiplex modus essendi rerum. Quaedam enim
there-is moreover a-manifold mode of-being of-things some for
 sunt, quorum natura non habet esse nisi in hac materia
are whose nature not has to-be except in this matter
 individuali: et huiusmodi sunt omnia corporalia. Quaedam
individual and such are all bodily-things some
 vero sunt, quorum naturae sunt per se subsistentes,
but are whose natures are through themselves subsisting
 non in materia aliqua, quae tamen non sunt suum esse,
not in matter any which yet not are their to-be
 sed sunt esse habentes: et huiusmodi sunt substantiae
but are to-be having and such are the-substances
 incorporeae, quas angelos dicimus. Solius autem Dei proprius
incorporeal which angels we-call of-only moreover God the-proper
 modus essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens.
mode of-being is that he-be his to-be subsisting

Ea igitur quae non habent esse nisi in materia individuali,
those-things therefore which not have to-be except in matter individual
 cognoscere est nobis connaturale: eo quod anima nostra,
to-know is to-us connatural for-the-reason that soul our
 per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius materiae. Quae
by which we-know is the-form of-some matter which
 tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae est actus
yet has two powers cognitive one which is the-act
 alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est cognoscere
of-some bodily organ and to-this connatural it-is to-know
 res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali: unde sensus
things according as they-are in matter individual whence sense
 non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscitiva
not knows except singulars the-other but power cognitive
 eius est intellectus, qui non est actus alicuius organi corporalis.
of-it is the-intellect which not is the-act of-any organ bodily
 Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas,
whence by the-intellect connatural it-is to-us to-know natures
 quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali;
which indeed not have to-be except in matter individual
 non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individuali,
not yet according as they-are in matter individual
 sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem
but according as they-are-abstracted from it by the-consideration
 intellectus. Unde secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere
of-the-intellect whence according-to the-intellect we-can to-know
 huiusmodi res in universali: quod est supra facultatem
such things in universal which is above the-faculty
 sensus. – Intellectui autem angelico connaturale est cognoscere
of-sense to-the-intellect moreover angelic connatural it-is to-know
 naturas non in materia existentes. Quod est supra naturalem
natures not in matter existing which is above the-natural

facultatem intellectus animae humanae, secundum statum
faculty of-the-intellect of-the-soul human according-to the-state

praesentis vitae, quo corpori unitur.

of-the-present life by-which to-the-body it-is-united

Relinquitur ergo quod cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens,

it-remains therefore that to-know the-very to-be subsisting

sit connaturale soli intellectui divino, et quod sit supra

is connatural to-the-only intellect divine and that it-is above

facultatem naturalem cuiuslibet intellectus creati: quia nulla

the-faculty natural of-any intellect created because no

creatura est suum esse, sed habet esse participatum. Non

creature is its to-be but has to-be participated not

igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videre,

therefore can the-intellect created God through essence to-see

nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui

except inasmuch-as God through his grace himself to-the-intellect

creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.

created joins as intelligible by it

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that this mode of-knowing

Deum, est angelo connaturalis, ut scilicet cognoscat

God is to-the-angel connatural so-that namely it-know

eum per similitudinem eius in ipso angelo refulgentem.

him through the-likeness of-him in the-very angel shining

Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam,

but to-know God through any likeness created

non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est.

not is to-know the-essence of-God as above shown it-is

Unde non sequitur quod angelus per sua naturalia possit

whence not it-follows that an-angel by its natural-powers can

cognoscere essentiam Dei.

to-know the-essence of-God

Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus angeli non habet
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-intellect of-an-angel not has
 defectum, si defectus accipiat privative, ut scilicet careat
defect if defect be-taken privatively so-that namely it-lack
 eo quod habere debet. Si vero accipiat negative, sic
that which to-have it-ought if but it-be-taken negatively thus
 quaelibet creatura invenitur deficiens, Deo comparata, dum
any creature is-found deficient to-God compared while
 non habet illam excellentiam quae invenitur in Deo.
not it-has that excellence which is-found in God

Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-sense of-sight because altogether
 materialis est, nullo modo elevari potest ad aliquid
material it-is in-no way to-be-raised can to anything
 immateriale. Sed intellectus noster vel angelicus, quia
immaterial but intellect our or angelic because
 secundum naturam a materia aliquiditer elevatus est, potest
according-to nature from matter in-some-way raised it-is can
 ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius elevari.
beyond its nature through grace to something higher to-be-raised

Et huius signum est, quia visus nullo modo potest in
and of-this the-sign is that sight in-no way can in
 abstractione cognoscere id quod in concrezione cognoscit:
abstraction to-know that which in concrection it-knows
 nullo enim modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc.
in-no for way it-can to-perceive a-nature except as this

Sed intellectus noster potest in abstractione considerare quod
but intellect our can in abstraction to-consider what
 in concrezione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes
in concrection it-knows even-if for it-know things having
 formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque,
form in matter yet it-resolves the-composite into each

et considerat ipsam formam per se. Et similiter intellectus
and considers the-very form through itself and similarly the-intellect
 angeli, licet connaturale sit ei cognoscere esse concretum
of-an-angel although connatural it-be to-it to-know to-be concrete
 in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse secernere per
in some nature yet it-can the-very to-be to-separate by
 intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et aliud
the-intellect while it-knows that one-thing is it-itself and another
 est suum esse. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam
is its to-be and therefore since the-intellect created through its
 naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse
nature apt be to-apprehend form concrete and to-be
 concretum in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam,
concrete in abstraction through the-mode of-resolution a-certain
 potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam
it-can through grace to-be-raised that it-know substance
 separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens.
separate subsisting and to-be separate subsisting

Utrum intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam aliquo creato lumine indigeat

5 · WHETHER A CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS CREATED LIGHT TO SEE GOD

God is light himself, and a medium seems to bar seeing his essence; but the psalm says: in your light we shall see light. Thomas answers that what is raised beyond its nature needs a disposition above it. When God's essence becomes the intellect's form, grace adds a power of understanding, the light that makes the blessed deiform, as the Apocalypse and John's letter say. This light is no medium in which God is seen, but under which.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-intellect created
ad videndum essentiam Dei aliquo lumine creato non
for seeing the-essence of-God any light created not
indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se lucidum in rebus
needs that for which is through itself lucid in things
sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur: ergo
sensible other light not needs that it-be-seen therefore
nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo
neither in intelligible-things but God is light intelligible therefore
non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.
not he-is-seen through any light created

2. Praeterea, cum Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per
2 further when God is-seen through a-medium not is-seen through
suam essentiam. Sed cum videtur per aliquod lumen creatum,
his essence but when he-is-seen through some light created
videtur per medium. Ergo non videtur per suam essentiam.
he-is-seen through a-medium therefore not is-seen through his essence

3. Praeterea, illud quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui
3 further that which is created nothing prohibits to-some
creaturae esse naturale. Si ergo per aliquod lumen creatum
creature to-be natural if therefore through some light created

Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud lumen esse naturale
God's essence is-seen will-be-able that light to-be natural
 alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non indigebit aliquo
to-some creature and so that creature not will-need any
 alio lumine ad videndum Deum: quod est impossibile. Non
other light for seeing God which is impossible not
 est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad videndum
it-is therefore necessary that every creature for seeing
 Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat.

God's essence light superadded require
 Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo: in lumine tuo
but against is that it-is-said in the-Psalm in light your
 videbimus lumen.
we-shall-see light

Respondeo dicendum quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid
I-answer it-must-be-said that every-thing which is-raised to something
 quod excedit suam naturam, oportet quod disponatur
which exceeds its nature it-is-necessary that it-be-disposed
 aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam naturam: sicut, si
by-some disposition which be above its nature as if
 aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod disponatur
air ought to-receive the-form of-fire it-is-necessary that it-be-disposed
 aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis
by-some disposition for such form when moreover some
 intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia
intellect created sees God through essence the-very essence
 Dei fit forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet
of-God becomes the-form intelligible of-the-intellect whence it-is-necessary
 quod aliqua dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc
that some disposition supernatural to-it be-superadded for this
 quod elevetur in tantam sublimitatem. Cum igitur virtus
that it-be-raised into so-great sublimity since therefore the-power

naturalis intellectus creati non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam
natural of-the-intellect created not suffices for God's essence
 videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet quod ex divina gratia
to-be-seen as shown it-is it-is-necessary that from divine grace
 superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc augmentum
accrue-besides to-it the-power of-understanding and this increase
 virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus vocamus; sicut
of-power intellective the-illumination of-the-intellect we-call as
 et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et istud
also the-very intelligible is-called light or brightness and this
 est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc. XXI, quod claritas Dei
is the-light about which it-is-said Apocalypse XXI that the-glory of-God
 illuminabit eam, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium.
will-illumine it namely the-society of-the-blessed God seeing
 Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo
and according-to this light they-are-made deiform that-is to-God
 similes; secundum illud I Ioan. III: cum apparuerit,
like according-to that I John III when he-will-have-appeared
 similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est.
like to-him we-shall-be and we-shall-see him as he-is
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lumen creatum est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that light created is
 necessarium ad videndum Dei essentiam, non quod per
necessary for seeing God's essence not that through
 hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, quae secundum se
this light God's essence intelligible become which according-to itself
 intelligibilis est: sed ad hoc quod intellectus fiat potens ad
intelligible is but for this that the-intellect become able for
 intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior
understanding through the-mode in-which a-power becomes more-powerful
 ad operandum per habitum: sicut etiam et lumen corporale
for operating through a-habit as also even light bodily

necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium
necessary is in sight exterior inasmuch-as it-makes the-medium
 transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore.

transparent in act that it-can to-be-moved by color

Ad secundum dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur
to the-second it-must-be-said that light this not is-required
 ad videndum Dei essentiam quasi similitudo in qua Deus

for seeing God's essence as-it-were a-likeness in which God

videatur: sed quasi perfectio quaedam intellectus, confortans
be-seen but as-it-were a-perfection certain of-the-intellect strengthening
 ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici quod

it for seeing God and therefore it-can to-be-said that

non est medium in quo Deus videatur: sed sub quo
not it-is a-medium in which God is-seen but under which
 videtur. Et hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei.

be-is-seen and this not takes-away the-immediate vision of-God

Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-disposition to the-form of-fire

non potest esse naturalis nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde
not can to-be natural except to-one-having the-form of-fire whence

lumen glorie non potest esse naturale creaturae, nisi creatura
the-light of-glory not can to-be natural to-a-creature unless the-creature
 esset naturae divinae: quod est impossibile. Per hoc enim

were of-nature divine which is impossible through this for

lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, ut dictum est.

light becomes the-creature rational deiform as said it-is

Utrum videntium essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat

6 • WHETHER ONE SEES GOD'S ESSENCE BETTER THAN ANOTHER

We shall see him as he is, and one thing cannot be understood better by one than another; but star differs from star in brightness. Thomas answers that some will see God more perfectly, not by a better likeness but by a greater share of the light of glory, which he has who has more charity: where charity is greater, desire is greater, and desire makes ready to receive.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam

to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that of-those-seeing the-essence

Dei unus alio perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I

of-God one than-another more-perfectly not sees it-is-said for I

Ioan. III: videbimus eum sicuti est. Sed ipse uno modo

John III we-shall-see him as he-is but he in-one way

est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab omnibus. Non ergo

is therefore in-one way he-will-be-seen by all not therefore

perfectius et minus perfecte.

more-perfectly and less perfectly

2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro Octoginta trium

2 further Augustine says in the-book of-Eighty three

Qq., quod unam rem non potest unus alio plus

Questions that one thing not can one than-another more

intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per essentiam,

to-understand but all seeing God through essence

intelligunt Dei essentiam: intellectu enim videtur Deus,

understand God's essence by-intellect for is-seen God

non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam

not by-sense as above held it-is therefore of-those-seeing the-divine

essentiam unus alio non clarius videt.

essence one than-another not more-clearly sees

3. Praeterea, quod aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex
3 further that something than-another more-perfectly be-seen from
 duobus contingere potest: vel ex parte obiecti visibilis;
two-things to-happen can either from the-side of-the-object visible
 vel ex parte potentiae visivae videntis. Ex parte autem
or from the-side of-the-power visive of-the-seer from the-side moreover
 obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius in vidente
of-the-object through this that the-object more-perfectly in the-seer
 recipitur, scilicet secundum perfectiorem similitudinem. Quod
is-received namely according-to a-more-perfect likeness which
 in proposito locum non habet: Deus enim non per
in the-case-proposed place not has God for not through
 aliquam similitudinem, sed per eius essentiam praesens
any likeness but through his essence present
 est intellectui essentiam eius videnti. Relinquitur ergo
is to-the-intellect the-essence of-him seeing it-remains therefore
 quod, si unus alio perfectius eum videat, quod hoc sit
that if one than-another more-perfectly him see that this be
 secundum differentiam potentiae intellectivae. Et ita sequitur
according-to the-difference of-the-power intellective and so it-follows
 quod cuius potentia intellectiva naturaliter est sublimior,
that he-whose power intellective naturally is more-sublime
 clarius eum videat. Quod est inconueniens, cum hominibus
more-clearly him sees which is unfitting since to-men
 promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas angelorum.
is-promised in blessedness equality of-the-angels
 Sed contra est quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit,
but against is that life eternal in the-vision of-God consists
 secundum illud Ioan. XVII: haec est vita aeterna, etc. Ergo,
according-to that John XVII this is life eternal etc therefore
 si omnes aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna
if all equally God's essence see in life eternal

omnes erunt aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit Apostolus, I
all will-be equal of-which the-contrary says the-Apostle I
 Cor. XV: stella differt a stella in claritate.

Corinthians XV star differs from star in brightness

Respondeo dicendum quod videntium Deum per essentiam

I-answer it-must-be-said that of-those-seeing God through essence

unus alio perfectius eum videbit. Quod quidem non

one than-another more-perfectly him will-see which indeed not

erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in uno

will-be through any of-God likeness more-perfect in one

quam in alio: cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam

than in another since that vision not is future through any

similitudinem, ut ostensum est. Sed hoc erit per hoc, quod

likeness as shown it-is but this will-be through this that

intellectus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu facultatem ad

the-intellect of-one will-have greater power or faculty for

videndum Deum, quam alterius. Facultas autem videndi Deum

seeing God than of-another the-faculty moreover of-seeing God

non competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed

not belongs to-the-intellect created according-to its nature but

per lumen gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate

through the-light of-glory which the-intellect in a-certain deiformity

constituit, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde intellectus plus

establishes as from the-above is-plain whence the-intellect more

participans de lumine gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus

participating of the-light of-glory more-perfectly God will-see more

autem participabit de lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de

moreover will-participate of the-light of-glory he-who more has of

caritate: quia ubi est maior caritas, ibi est maius desiderium;

charity because where is greater charity there is greater desire

et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et

and desire in-a-way makes the-one-desiring apt and

paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit
prepared for the-reception of-the-desired whence he-who more will-have
 de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beator erit.

of charity more-perfectly God will-see and more-blessed will-be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that when it-is-said we-shall-see
 eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium sicuti determinat modum

him as he-is this adverb as determines the-mode

visionis ex parte rei visae; ut sit sensus, videbimus

of-vision from the-side of-the-thing seen so-that be the-sense we-shall-see

eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus,

him so to-be as he-is because the-very to-be of-him we-shall-see

quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis

which is his essence not but it-determines the-mode of-vision

ex parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus

from the-side of-the-seer so-that be the-sense that so will-be perfect

modus videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.

the-mode of-seeing as is in God perfect the-mode of-being

Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim

and through this also is-plain the-solution to the-second when for

dicatur quod rem unam unus alio melius non intelligit,

it-is-said that thing one one than-another better not understands

hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum rei intellectae:

this has truth if it-be-referred to the-mode of-the-thing understood

quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, non vere

because whoever understands a-thing to-be otherwise than it-is not truly

intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum intelligendi: quia

understands not but if it-be-referred to the-mode of-understanding because

intelligere unius est perfectius quam intelligere alterius.

the-understanding of-one is more-perfect than the-understanding of-another

Ad tertium dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-diversity of-seeing not will-be from
 parte obiecti, quia idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur,
the-side of-the-object because the-same object to-all will-be-presented
 scilicet Dei essentia: nec ex diversa participatione obiecti per
namely God's essence nor from diverse participation of-the-object through
 diferentes similitudines: sed erit per diversam facultatem
different likenesses but it-will-be through diverse faculty
 intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed gloriosam, ut dictum est.
of-the-intellect not indeed natural but glorious as said it-is

Utrum videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum comprehendant

7 · WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD'S ESSENCE COMPREHEND HIM

Paul speaks of comprehending, and Augustine calls comprehended what is seen whole. Thomas answers that to comprehend is to know a thing as far as it is knowable, as a triangle known by demonstration; God, infinitely knowable, cannot be so known by any created light. In a broader sense the blessed comprehend by attaining and holding him, one of the soul's three endowments with vision and enjoyment.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that those-seeing God through
 essentiam ipsum comprehendant. Dicit enim Apostolus, Philipp.
essence him comprehend says for the-Apostle Philippians
 III: sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam. Non autem
III I-follow moreover if in-any way I-may-comprehend not but
 frustra sequebatur: dicit enim ipse, I Cor. IX: sic curro, non
in-vain he-followed says for he I Corinthians IX so I-run not
 quasi in incertum. Ergo ipse comprehendit: et eadem ratione
as-if to the-uncertain therefore he comprehended and by-the-same reason
 alii, quos ad hoc invitat, dicens: sic currite, ut comprehendatis.
others whom to this he-invites saying so run that you-may-comprehend

2. Praeterea, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Videndo

2 further as says Augustine in the-book on Seeing

Deum ad Paulinam, illud comprehenditur, quod ita totum

God to Paulina that is-comprehended which so whole

videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem. Sed si Deus per

is-seen that nothing of-it is-hidden-from the-seer but if God through

essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et nihil eius latet

essence is-seen whole he-is-seen and nothing of-him is-hidden-from

videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque

the-seer since God is simple therefore by whoever

videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur.

he-is-seen through essence he-is-comprehended

3. Si dicatur quod videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra:

3 if it-be-said that he-is-seen whole but not wholly against

totaliter vel dicit modum videntis, vel modum rei visae.

wholly either says the-mode of-the-seer or the-mode of-the-thing seen

Sed ille qui videt Deum per essentiam, videt eum totaliter,

but he who sees God through essence sees him wholly

si significetur modus rei visae: quia videt eum sicuti

if be-signified the-mode of-the-thing seen because he-sees him as

est, ut dictum est. Similiter videt eum totaliter, si significetur

he-is as said it-is similarly he-sees him wholly if be-signified

modus videntis: quia tota virtute sua intellectus

the-mode of-the-seer because with-the-whole power its the-intellect

Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per

God's essence will-see any therefore seeing God through

essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet.

essence wholly him will-see therefore him he-will-comprehend

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII: Fortissime,

but against is that it-is-said Jeremiah XXXII O-most-strong

magne, potens, Dominus exercituum nomen tibi; magnus

great mighty Lord of-hosts the-name to-you great

consilio, et incomprehensibilis cogitatu. Ergo comprehendi
in-counsel and incomprehensible in-thought therefore to-be-comprehended
 non potest.

not can

Respondeo dicendum quod comprehendere Deum impossibile
I-answer it-must-be-said that to-comprehend God impossible
 est cuicumque intellectui creato: attingere vero mente
it-is for-any intellect created to-attain but with-the-mind
 Deum qualitercumque, magna est beatitudo, ut dicit
God in-whatever-way great is blessedness as says
 Augustinus.

Augustine

Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod illud comprehenditur,
for whose evidence to-be-known it-is that that is-comprehended
 quod perfecte cognoscitur. Perfecte autem cognoscitur, quod
which perfectly is-known perfectly moreover is-known what
 tantum cognoscitur, quantum est cognoscibile. Unde si
so-much is-known as-much-as it-is knowable whence if
 id quod est cognoscibile per scientiam demonstrativam,
that which is knowable through science demonstrative
 opinione teneatur ex aliqua ratione probabili concepta,
by-opinion be-held from some reason probable conceived
 non comprehenditur. Puta, si hoc quod est triangulum
not is-comprehended for-example if this which is a-triangle
 habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, aliquis sciat
to-have three angles equal to-two right-angles someone know
 per demonstrationem, comprehendit illud: si vero aliquis eius
by demonstration he-comprehends it if but someone of-it
 opinionem accipiat probabiliter, per hoc quod a sapientibus
the-opinion accept probably through this that by the-wise
 vel pluribus ita dicitur, non comprehendet ipsum, quia
or by-many so it-is-said not he-will-comprehend it because

non pertingit ad illum perfectum modum cognitionis, quo
not he-reaches to that perfect mode of-knowledge by-which
 cognoscibilis est.

knowable it-is

Nullus autem intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum
no moreover intellect created to-reach can to that
 perfectum modum cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo

perfect mode of-the-knowledge of-the-divine essence by-which

cognoscibilis est. Quod sic patet. Unumquodque enim sic

knowable it-is which thus is-plain each-thing for so

cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens actu. Deus igitur,

knowable is according as it-is being in-act God therefore

cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, infinite

whose to-be is infinite as above shown it-is infinitely

cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest

knowable is no moreover intellect created can

Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus

God infinitely to-know so-far for the-intellect created

divinam essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit,

the-divine essence more-perfectly or less perfectly knows

inquantum maiori vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur.

as-far-as with-greater or with-less light of-glory it-is-suffused

Cum igitur lumen gloriae creatum, in quocumque intellectu

since therefore the-light of-glory created in whatever intellect

creato receptum, non possit esse infinitum, impossibile est

created received not can to-be infinite impossible it-is

quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum infinite cognoscat.

that any intellect created God infinitely know

Unde impossibile est quod Deum comprehendat.

whence impossible it-is that God it-comprehend

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that comprehension is-said
 dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et proprie, secundum quod
in-two-ways in-one way strictly and properly according as
 aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic nullo modo
something is-included in the-comprehender and thus in-no way
 Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio: quia,
God is-comprehended neither by-intellect nor by-anything other because
 cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid
since he-is infinite by-no finite to-be-included can so-that something
 finitum eum infinite capiat, sicut ipse infinite est. Et
finite him infinitely may-grasp as he infinitely is and
 sic de comprehensione nunc quaeritur. — Alio modo
thus about comprehension now it-is-asked in-another way
 comprehensio largius sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio
comprehension more-broadly is-taken according as comprehension
 insecutioni opponitur. Qui enim attingit aliquem, quando
to-pursuit is-opposed he-who for attains someone when
 iam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum dicitur. Et sic Deus
already he-holds him to-comprehend him is-said and thus God
 comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant. III: tenui eum,
is-comprehended by the-blessed according-to that Song III I-held him
 nec dimittam. Et sic intelliguntur auctoritates Apostoli de
nor I-shall-let-go and thus are-understood the-authorities of-the-Apostle about
 comprehensione. — Et hoc modo comprehensio est una de
comprehension and in-this way comprehension is one of
 tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei; sicut visio fidei,
the-three endowments of-the-soul which corresponds to-hope as vision to-faith
 et fruitio caritati. Non enim, apud nos, omne quod videtur,
and fruition to-charity not for among us every-thing which is-seen
 iam tenetur vel habetur: quia videntur interdum distantia,
already is-held or is-had because are-seen sometimes distant-things

vel quae non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus

or which not are in power our nor again all-things

quae habemus, fruimur: vel quia non delectamur in eis; vel

whicb we-have we-enjoy either because not we-delight in them or

quia non sunt ultimus finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium

because not they-are the-last end of-desire our so-that desire

nostrum impleant et quietent. Sed haec tria habent beati

our they-may-fill and may-quiet but these three have the-blessed

in Deo: quia et vident ipsum; et videndo, tenent sibi

in God because both they-see him and by-seeing they-hold to-themselves

praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum videre; et

present in power having always him to-see and

tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium implente.

holding they-enjoy as the-last end desire filling

Ad secundum dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus

to the-second it-must-be-said that not on-account-of this God

incomprehensibilis dicitur, quasi aliquid eius sit quod non

incomprehensible is-called as-if something of-him be which not

videatur: sed quia non ita perfecte videtur, sicut visibilis

is-seen but because not so perfectly is-seen as visible

est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis propositio per aliquam

be-is as when some demonstrable proposition through some

probabilem rationem cognoscitur, non est aliquid eius quod non

probable reason is-known not is something of-it which not

cognoscatur, nec subiectum, nec praedicatum, nec compositio:

is-known neither subject nor predicate nor composition

sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur, sicut cognoscibilis

but the-whole not so perfectly is-known as knowable

est. Unde Augustinus, definiendo comprehensionem, dicit

it-is whence Augustine in-defining comprehension says

quod totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut

that the-whole is-comprehended by-seeing which so is-seen that

nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspecti
nothing of-it is-hidden-from the-seer or whose bounds be-surveyed
 possunt: tunc enim fines alicuius circumspectiuntur, quando
can then for the-bounds of-something are-surveyed when
 ad finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.
to the-end in the-mode of-knowing that thing one-arrives
 Ad tertium dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti:
to the-third it-must-be-said that wholly says the-mode of-the-object
 non quidem ita quod totus modus obiecti non cadat
not indeed so that the-whole mode of-the-object not fall
 sub cognitione; sed quia modus obiecti non est modus
under knowledge but because the-mode of-the-object not is the-mode
 cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per essentiam, videt
of-the-knower he-who therefore sees God through essence sees
 hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite cognoscibilis
this in him that infinitely he-exists and infinitely knowable
 est: sed hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut scilicet
is but this infinite mode not belongs to-him that namely
 ipse infinite cognoscat: sicut aliquis probabiliter scire potest
he infinitely know as someone probably to-know can
 aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam
some proposition to-be demonstrable although he it
 demonstrative non cognoscat.
demonstratively not knows

Utrum videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo videant

8 • WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL THINGS IN HIM

Gregory asks what they do not see who see the one who sees all things, and whoever sees a mirror seems to see what shines in it. Thomas answers that things are seen in God as effects in their cause, and the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects are seen; but none comprehends God, so none sees all he can do. Knowing God alone suffices for blessedness, as Augustine says.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that those-seeing God
per essentiam omnia in Deo videant. Dicit enim Gregorius,
through essence all-things in God see says for Gregory
in IV Dialog.: Quid est quod non videant, qui videntem
in IV Dialogues what is-there which not they-see who the-one-seeing
omnia vident? Sed Deus est videns omnia. Ergo qui
all-things see but God is seeing all-things therefore they-who
vident Deum, omnia vident.

see God all-things see
2. Item, quicumque videt speculum, videt ea quae
2 likewise whoever sees a-mirror sees those-things which
in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia quaecumque fiunt vel
in the-mirror shine-back but all-things whatever are-made or
fieri possunt, in Deo resplendent sicut in quodam speculo:
to-be-made can in God shine-back as in a-certain mirror
ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque videt
he for all-things in himself knows therefore whoever sees
Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.
God sees all-things which are and which to-be-made can

3. Praeterea, qui intelligit id quod est maius, potest

3 further he-who understands that which is greater can

intelligere minima, ut dicitur III de Anima. Sed omnia

to-understand the-least-things as it-is-said III on the-Soul but all-things

quae Deus facit vel facere potest, sunt minus quam eius

which God makes or to-make can are less than his

essentia. Ergo quicumque intelligit Deum, potest intelligere

essence therefore whoever understands God can to-understand

omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest.

all-things which God makes or to-make can

4. Praeterea, rationalis creatura omnia naturaliter scire desiderat.

4 further the-rational creature all-things naturally to-know desires

Si igitur videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur eius

if therefore by-seeing God not all-things it-know not is-quieted its

naturale desiderium: et ita, videndo Deum non erit beata.

natural desire and so by-seeing God not will-be blessed

Quod est inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum, omnia scit.

which is unfitting by-seeing therefore God all-things it-knows

Sed contra est quod angeli vident Deum per essentiam,

but against is that the-angels see God through essence

et tamen non omnia sciunt. Inferiores enim angeli purgantur

and yet not all-things know the-lower for angels are-purged

a superioribus a nescientia, ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap.

by the-higher from nescience as says Dionysius VII chapter

Cael. Hier. Ipsi etiam nesciunt futura contingentia et

Celestial Hierarchy they also know-not future contingents and

cogitationes cordium: hoc enim solius Dei est. Non ergo

the-thoughts of-hearts this for of-alone God is not therefore

quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.

whoever see God's essence see all-things

Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam
I-answer it-must-be-said that the-intellect created by-seeing the-divine
 essentiam, non videt in ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere
essence not sees in it all-things which makes God or to-make
 potest. Manifestum est enim quod sic aliqua videntur in
can manifest it-is for that thus some-things are-seen in
 Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia autem alia
God according as they-are in him all moreover other-things
 sunt in Deo, sicut effectus sunt virtute in sua causa. Sic igitur
are in God as effects are in-power in their cause thus therefore
 videntur alia in Deo, sicut effectus in sua causa. Sed
are-seen other-things in God as effects in their cause but
 manifestum est quod quanto aliqua causa perfectius videtur,
manifest it-is that by-how-much some cause more-perfectly is-seen
 tanto plures eius effectus in ipsa videri possunt. Qui enim
by-so-much more of-its effects in it to-be-seen can he-who for
 habet intellectum elevatum, statim, uno principio demonstrativo
has an-intellect raised at-once one principle demonstrative
 proposito, ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit:
proposed from it of-many conclusions knowledge receives
 quod non convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est, sed
which not belongs to-him who of-a-weaker intellect is but
 oportet quod ei singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus
it-is-necessary that to-him single-things be-explained that therefore intellect
 potest in causa cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes
can in the-cause to-know all the-cause's effects and all
 rationes effectuum, qui causam totaliter comprehendit. Nullus
the-reasons of-the-effects which the-cause totally comprehends no
 autem intellectus creatus totaliter Deum comprehendere potest,
moreover intellect created totally God to-comprehend can
 ut ostensum est. Nullus igitur intellectus creatus, videndo
as shown it-is no therefore intellect created by-seeing

Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae Deus facit vel potest

God can to-know all-things which God makes or can

facere: hoc enim esset comprehendere eius virtutem. Sed

to-make this for would-be to-comprehend his power but

horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto aliquis

of-those-things which God makes or to-make can by-so-much some

intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum videt.

intellect more-things knows by-how-much more-perfectly God it-sees

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Gregory speaks

quantum ad sufficientiam obiecti, scilicet Dei, quod, quantum

as-far to the-sufficiency of-the-object namely of-God which as-far

in se est, sufficienter continet omnia et demonstrat.

in himself he-is sufficiently contains all-things and shows

Non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns Deum omnia

not yet it-follows that each-one seeing God all-things

cognoscat: quia non perfecte comprehendit ipsum.

knows because not perfectly he-comprehends him

Ad secundum dicendum quod videns speculum, non est

to the-second it-must-be-said that one-seeing a-mirror not is

necessarium quod omnia in speculo videat, nisi speculum

necessary that all-things in the-mirror he-see unless the-mirror

visu suo comprehendat.

by-sight his he-comprehend

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet maius sit videre Deum

to the-third it-must-be-said that although greater it-be to-see God

quam omnia alia, tamen maius est videre sic Deum

than all other-things yet greater it-is to-see so God

quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam videre sic ipsum

that all-things in him be-known than to-see so him

quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura cognoscantur in

that not all-things but fewer or more be-known in

eo. Iam enim ostensum est quod multitudo cognitorum
him already for shown it-is that the-multitude of-things-known
 in Deo, consequitur modum videndi ipsum vel magis
in God follows the-mode of-seeing him either more
 perfectum vel minus perfectum.

perfect or less perfect

Ad quartum dicendum quod naturale desiderium rationalis
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that the-natural desire of-the-rational
 creaturae est ad sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad
creature is for knowing all those-things which pertain to
 perfectionem intellectus; et haec sunt species et genera rerum,
the-perfection of-the-intellect and these are the-species and genera of-things
 et rationes earum, quae in Deo videbit quilibet videns essentiam
and the-reasons of-them which in God will-see anyone seeing the-essence
 divinam. Cognoscere autem alia singularia, et cogitata et facta
divine to-know moreover other singulars and the-thoughts and deeds
 eorum, non est de perfectione intellectus creati, nec ad hoc
of-them not is of the-perfection of-the-intellect created nor to this
 eius naturale desiderium tendit: nec iterum cognoscere illa
its natural desire tends nor again to-know those-things
 quae nondum sunt, sed fieri a Deo possunt. Si tamen
which not-yet are but to-be-made by God can if yet
 solus Deus videretur, qui est fons et principium totius
alone God were-seen who is the-fount and principle of-all
 esse et veritatis, ita repletet naturale desiderium sciendi,
to-be and truth so he-would-fill the-natural desire of-knowing
 quod nihil aliud quaereretur, et beatus esset. Unde dicit
that nothing else would-be-sought and blessed he-would-be whence says
 Augustinus, V Confess.: Infelix homo qui scit omnia illa
Augustine V Confessions unhappy the-man who knows all those-things
 (scilicet creaturas), te autem nescit: beatus autem qui te scit,
namely creatures you but knows-not blessed but he-who you knows

etiam si illa nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non
even if those-things he-know-not he-who but you and those-things knows not
 propter illa beatior est, sed propter te solum beatus.
on-account-of those-things more-blessed is but on-account-of you alone blessed

Utrum ea quae videntur in Deo a videntibus divinam
 essentiam per aliquas similitudines videantur

9 · WHETHER WHAT IS SEEN IN GOD IS SEEN THROUGH LIKENESSES

All knowledge seems to come by likeness, and Paul remembered after his rapture what he had seen; but a mirror and what appears in it are seen by one species. Thomas answers that what the blessed see in God they see not through species but through the divine essence itself united to their intellect, for a thing is known either by its own likeness or by the likeness of what resembles it. Paul could form likenesses afterward, but that is another vision.

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae
to the-ninth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that those-things which
 videntur in Deo, a videntibus divinam essentiam per
are-seen in God by those-seeing the-divine essence through
 aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim cognitio est
some likenesses are-seen all for knowledge is
 per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum: sic enim
through the-assimilation of-the-knower to the-known thus for
 intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et sensus
the-intellect in act becomes the-understood in act and sense
 in actu sensibile in actu, inquantum eius similitudine
in act the-sensible in act inasmuch-as by-its likeness
 informatur, ut pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus
it-is-informed as the-pupil by-the-likeness of-color if therefore the-intellect

videntis Deum per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas
of-the-one-seeing God through essence understand in God some
 creaturas, oportet quod earum similitudinibus informetur.

creatures it-is-necessary that by-their likenesses it-be-informed

2. Praeterea, ea quae prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus.

2 further those-things which before we-have-seen by-memory we-hold

Sed Paulus, videns in raptu essentiam Dei, ut dicit

but Paul seeing in rapture the-essence of-God as says

Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litteram, postquam desiit

Augustine XII on Genesis to the-letter after he-ceased

essentiam Dei videre, recordatus est multorum quae in illo

the-essence of-God to-see remembered he-has many-things which in that

raptu viderat: unde ipse dicit quod audivit arcana verba, quae

rapture he-had-seen whence he says that he-heard secret words which

non licet homini loqui, II Cor. XII. Ergo oportet

not it-is-lawful for-man to-speak II Corinthians XII therefore it-is-necessary

dicere quod aliquae similitudines eorum quae recordatus

to-say that some likenesses of-those-things which remembered

est, in eius intellectu remanserint. Et eadem ratione,

he-has in his intellect remained and by-the-same reason

quando praesentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quae

when in-presence he-saw God's essence of-those-things which

in ipsa videbat, aliquas similitudines vel species habebat.

in it he-saw some likenesses or species he-had

Sed contra est quod per unam speciem videtur speculum,

but against is that through one species is-seen the-mirror

et ea quae in speculo apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur

and those-things which in the-mirror appear but all-things so are-seen

in Deo sicut in quodam speculo intelligibili. Ergo, si ipse

in God as in a-certain mirror intelligible therefore if the-very

Deus non videtur per aliquam similitudinem, sed per

God not is-seen through any likeness but through

suam essentiam; nec ea quae in ipso videntur, per
his essence neither those-things which in him are-seen through
 aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.

any likenesses or species are-seen

Respondeo dicendum quod videntes Deum per essentiam,
I-answer it-must-be-said that those-seeing God through essence

ea quae in ipsa essentia Dei vident, non vident per
those-things which in the-very essence of-God they-see not they-see through

aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam divinam intellectui
any species but through the-very essence divine to-the-intellect

eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unumquodque, secundum
of-them united so for is-known each-thing according

quod similitudo eius est in cognoscente. Sed hoc contingit
as the-likeness of-it is in the-knower but this happens

dupliciter. Cum enim quaecumque uni et eidem sunt similia,
in-two-ways since for whatever-things to-one and the-same are like

sibi invicem sint similia, virtus cognoscitiva dupliciter
to-themselves mutually are like the-power cognitive in-two-ways

assimilari potest alicui cognoscibili. Uno modo, secundum
to-be-assimilated can to-some knowable in-one way according-to

se, quando directe eius similitudine informatur: et tunc
itself when directly by-its likeness it-is-informed and then

cognoscitur illud secundum se. Alio modo, secundum quod
is-known that according-to itself in-another way according as

informatur specie alicuius quod est ei simile: et tunc non
it-is-informed by-the-species of-something which is to-it like and then not

dicitur res cognosci in seipsa, sed in suo simili. Alia enim
is-said the-thing to-be-known in itself but in its like other for

est cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquis homo in seipso, et
is the-knowledge by-which is-known some man in himself and

alia qua cognoscitur in sua imagine. Sic ergo, cognoscere
other by-which he-is-known in his image thus therefore to-know

res per earum similitudines in cognoscente existentes,
things through their likenesses in the-knower existing
 est cognoscere eas in seipsis, seu in propriis naturis: sed
is to-know them in themselves or in their-own natures but
 cognoscere eas prout earum similitudines praeexistunt in
to-know them according-as their likenesses pre-exist in
 Deo, est videre eas in Deo. Et hae duae cognitiones differunt.
God is to-see them in God and these two knowledges differ
 Unde secundum illam cognitionem qua res cognoscuntur a
whence according-to that knowledge by-which things are-known by
 videntibus Deum per essentiam in ipso Deo, non videntur
those-seeing God through essence in the-very God not are-seen
 per aliquas similitudines alias; sed per solam essentiam
through any likenesses other but through the-sole essence
 divinam intellectui praesentem, per quam et Deus videtur.
divine to-the-intellect present through which also God is-seen
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus videntis
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-intellect of-the-one-seeing
 Deum assimilatur rebus quae videntur in Deo, inquantum
God is-assimilated to-the-things which are-seen in God inasmuch-as
 unitur essentiae divinae, in qua rerum omnium similitudines
it-is-united to-the-essence divine in which of-things all the-likenesses
 praeexistunt.

pre-exist

Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae
to the-second it-must-be-said that some powers cognitive
 sunt, quae ex speciebus primo conceptis alias formare
are which from species first conceived others to-form
 possunt. Sicut imaginatio ex praeconceptis speciebus montis
can as the-imagination from preconceived species of-mountain
 et auri, format speciem montis aurei: et intellectus ex
and of-gold forms the-species of-a-mountain golden and the-intellect from

praeconceptis speciebus generis et differentiae, format rationem
preconceived species of-genus and of-difference forms the-notion
 speciei. Et similiter ex similitudine imaginis formare
of-the-species and similarly from the-likeness of-an-image to-form
 possumus in nobis similitudinem eius cuius est imago. Et
we-can in us the-likeness of-that of-which it-is the-image and
 sic Paulus, vel quicumque alius videns Deum, ex ipsa
thus Paul or whoever other seeing God from the-very
 visione essentiae divinae potest formare in se similitudines
vision of-the-essence divine can to-form in himself likenesses
 rerum quae in essentia divina videntur: quae remanserunt
of-things which in the-essence divine are-seen which remained
 in Paulo etiam postquam desiit Dei essentiam videre. Ista
in Paul even after he-ceased God's essence to-see this
 tamen visio, qua videntur res per huiusmodi species sic
yet vision by-which are-seen things through such species so
 conceptas, est alia a visione qua videntur res in Deo.
conceived is other than the-vision by-which are-seen things in God

Utrum videntes Deum per essentiam
simul videant omnia quae in ipso vident

10 • WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE AT ONCE ALL THEY SEE IN HIM

The Philosopher says we understand only one thing at a time, and Augustine says God moves the spiritual creature through time. Thomas answers that we understand many things at once when they are understood by one species, as the parts of a whole by the whole's species. Since all that is seen in God is seen through his one essence, it is seen at once and not successively.

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum
to the-tenth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that those-seeing God
per essentiam non simul videant omnia quae in ipso
through essence not at-once see all-things which in him
vident. Quia, secundum Philosophum, contingit multa
they-see because according-to the-Philosopher it-happens many-things
scire, intelligere vero unum. Sed ea quae videntur in
to-know to-understand but one but those-things which are-seen in
Deo, intelliguntur: intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non
God are-understood by-intellect for is-seen God therefore not
contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.
it-happens by those-seeing God at-once many-things to-be-seen in God
2. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram,
2 further Augustine says VIII on Genesis to the-letter
quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus, hoc
that God moves the-creature spiritual through time that
est per intelligentiam et affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis
is through understanding and affection but the-creature spiritual
est angelus, qui Deum videt. Ergo videntes Deum, successive
is the-angel who God sees therefore those-seeing God successively
intelligunt et afficiuntur: tempus enim successionem importat.
understand and are-affected time for succession imports

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Trin.:

but against is that Augustine says in-the-last on the-Trinity
 non erunt volubiles nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia
not will-be shifting our thoughts from some into others
 euntes atque redeuntes; sed omnem scientiam nostram uno
going and returning but all knowledge our in-one
 simul conspectu videbimus.

at-once view we-shall-see

Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae videntur in Verbo,

I-answer it-must-be-said that those-things which are-seen in the-Word
 non successive, sed simul videntur. Ad cuius evidentiam
not successively but at-once are-seen for whose evidence

considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non possumus
to-be-considered it-is that for-this-reason we at-once not can

multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species

many-things to-understand because many-things through diverse species

intelligimus; diversis autem speciebus non potest intellectus

we-understand by-diverse moreover species not can the-intellect

unus simul actu informari ad intelligendum per eas,

one at-once in-act to-be-informed for understanding through them

sicut nec unum corpus potest simul diversis figuris

as not-even one body can at-once with-diverse shapes

figurari. Unde contingit quod, quando aliqua multa

to-be-shaped whence it-happens that when some many-things

una specie intelligi possunt, simul intelliguntur: sicut

by-one species to-be-understood can at-once they-are-understood as

diversae partes alicuius totius, si singulae propriis speciebus

the-diverse parts of-some whole if each by-proper species

intelligantur, successive intelliguntur, et non simul; si autem

they-be-understood successively they-are-understood and not at-once if but

omnes intelligantur una specie totius, simul intelliguntur.

all they-be-understood by-one species of-the-whole at-once they-are-understood

Ostensum est autem quod ea quae videntur in Deo,
shown it-is moreover that those-things which are-seen in God
 non videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per
not are-seen singly through their likenesses but all through
 unam essentiam Dei. Unde simul, et non successive videntur.
the-one essence of-God whence at-once and not successively they-are-seen

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sic unum tantum
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that so one only
 intelligimus, inquantum una specie intelligimus. Sed multa
we-understand inasmuch-as by-one species we-understand but many-things
 una specie intellecta, simul intelliguntur: sicut in specie
by-one species understood at-once are-understood as in the-species
 hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in specie
of-man we-understand animal and rational and in the-species
 domus parietem et tectum.
of-house wall and roof

Ad secundum dicendum quod angeli, quantum ad
to the-second it-must-be-said that angels as-far to
 cognitionem naturalem, qua cognoscunt res per species
the-knowledge natural by-which they-know things through species
 diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia cognoscunt: et
diverse in-them implanted not at-once all-things they-know and
 sic moventur, secundum intelligentiam, per tempus. Sed
thus they-are-moved according-to understanding through time but
 secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.
according as they-see things in God at-once them they-see

Utrum aliquis in hac vita possit videre Deum per essentiam

11 · WHETHER ANYONE CAN SEE GOD'S ESSENCE IN THIS LIFE

Jacob saw God face to face, Moses spoke with him mouth to mouth, and Augustine says we judge all things in the unchanging truth. Thomas answers that the soul in this life knows naturally only what has form in matter, so a mere man cannot see God's essence unless separated from this mortal life. The replies refer Jacob's vision to a figure, grant that God raised the minds of Moses and Paul to his essence by a miracle, and hold that judging by a share of divine light is not seeing God's essence.

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac
to the-eleventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that someone in this
vita possit Deum per essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob,
life can God through essence to-see says for Jacob
Gen. XXXII: vidi Deum facie ad faciem. Sed videre facie
Genesis XXXII I-saw God face to face but to-see face
ad faciem, est videre per essentiam, ut patet per illud
to face is to-see through essence as is-plain through that
quod dicitur I Cor. XIII: videmus nunc per speculum
which is-said I Corinthians XIII we-see now through a-mirror
et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Ergo Deus
and in an-enigma then but face to face therefore God
in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.
in this life through essence to-be-seen can

2. Praeterea, Num. XII dicit Dominus de Moyse: ore ad os
2 further Numbers XII says the-Lord of Moses mouth to mouth
loquor ei, et palam, et non per aenigmata et figuras,
I-speak to-him and openly and not through enigmas and figures
videt Deum. Sed hoc est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo
he-sees God but this is to-see God through essence therefore
aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum per essentiam videre.
someone in the-state of-this life can God through essence to-see

3. Praeterea, illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per
 3 further that in which other all-things we-know and through
 quod de aliis iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum.

which of others we-judge is to-us according-to itself known

Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo cognoscimus. Dicit enim

but all-things even now in God we-know says for

Augustinus, XII Conf.: Si ambo videmus verum esse quod

Augustine XII Confessions if both we-see true to-be what

dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso

you-say and both we-see true to-be what I-say where I-ask

illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me: sed ambo

that do-we-see neither I in you nor you in me but both

in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili

in the-very which above minds our is unchangeable

veritate. Idem etiam, in libro de Vera Religione, dicit

truth the-same also in the-book on True Religion says

quod secundum veritatem divinam de omnibus iudicamus.

that according-to truth divine of all-things we-judge

Et XII de Trin. dicit quod rationis est iudicare de istis

and XII on the-Trinity he-says that of-reason it-is to-judge of these

corporalibus secundum rationes incorporeales et sempiternas:

bodily-things according-to reasons incorporeal and everlasting

quae nisi supra mentem essent, incommutabiles profecto

which unless above the-mind they-were unchangeable certainly

non essent. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum Deum videmus.

not they-would-be therefore also in this life the-very God we-see

4. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad

4 further according-to Augustine XII on Genesis to

litt., visione intellectuali videntur ea quae sunt in

the-letter by-vision intellectual are-seen those-things which are in

anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio intellectualis est

the-soul through their essence but vision intellectual is

de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas similitudines,
of things intelligible not through any likenesses
 sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo,
but through their essences as he in-the-same-place says therefore
 cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per
since God is through essence his in soul our through
 essentiam suam videtur a nobis.

essence his he-is-seen by us

Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII: non videbit
but against is that it-is-said Exodus XXXIII not will-see
 me homo et vivet. Glossa: Quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur,
me man and will-live the-Gloss as-long-as here mortally it-is-lived
 videri per quasdam imagines Deus potest; sed per
to-be-seen through certain images God can but through
 ipsam naturae suae speciem non potest.

the-very of-nature his form not can

Respondeo dicendum quod ab homine puro Deus videri per
I-answer it-must-be-said that by man mere God to-be-seen through
 essentiam non potest, nisi ab hac vita mortali separetur.

essence not can unless from this life mortal he-be-separated

Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, modus cognitionis
whose reason is because as above said it-is the-mode of-knowledge
 sequitur modum naturae rei cognoscentis. Anima autem

follows the-mode of-the-nature of-the-thing knowing soul moreover

nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materia
our as-long-as in this life we-live has to-be in matter

corporali: unde naturaliter non cognoscit aliqua nisi quae
bodily whence naturally not it-knows any-things except those-which

habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi cognosci
have form in matter or which through such-things to-be-known

possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum
can manifest it-is moreover that through the-natures of-things

materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest: ostensum
material the-divine essence to-be-known not can shown
 est enim supra quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque
it-is for above that the-knowledge of-God through whatever
 similitudinem creatam, non est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde
likeness created not is vision of-the-essence of-him whence
 impossibile est animae hominis secundum hanc vitam
impossible it-is for-the-soul of-man according-to this life
 viventis, essentiam Dei videre. – Et huius signum est, quod
living the-essence of-God to-see and of-this the-sign is that
 anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur,
soul our by-how-much more from bodily-things it-is-abstracted
 tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in
by-so-much of-intelligible-things abstract it-becomes more-capable whence in
 somniis et alienationibus a sensibus corporis, magis divinae
dreams and alienations from the-senses of-the-body more divine
 revelationes percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo
revelations are-perceived and foresights of-future-things that therefore
 anima elevetur usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est
the-soul be-raised even to the-highest of-intelligible-things which is
 essentia divina, esse non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.
the-essence divine to-be not can as-long-as this mortal life it-uses
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that according-to Dionysius
 IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in Scripturis dicitur aliquis
IV chapter Celestial Hierarchy so in the-Scriptures is-said someone
 Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt aliquae figurae, vel
God to-have-seen inasmuch-as formed were some figures either
 sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam similitudinem
sensible or imaginary according-to some likeness
 aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit Iacob, vidi
something divine representing what therefore says Jacob I-saw

Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est, non ad ipsam divinam

God face to face to-be-referred is not to the-very divine

essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus. Et

essence but to the-figure in which was-represented God and

hoc ipsum ad quandam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut

this itself to a-certain of-prophecy eminence pertains that

videatur persona Dei loquentis, licet imaginaria visione;

there-be-seen the-person of-God speaking although by-imaginary vision

ut infra patebit, cum de gradibus Prophetiae loquemur.

as below will-be-plain when about the-grades of-Prophecy we-shall-speak

– Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad designandam quandam eminentiam

or this says Jacob for designating a-certain eminence

intelligibilis contemplationis, supra communem statum.

of-intelligible contemplation above the-common state

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid

to the-second it-must-be-said that as God miraculously something

supernaturaliter in rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et

supernaturally in things bodily works so also even

supernaturaliter, et praeter communem ordinem, mentes

supernaturally and beyond the-common order the-minds

aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non sensibus carnis

of-some in this flesh living but not the-senses of-the-flesh

utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae elevavit; ut

using even to the-vision of-bis essence he-has-raised as

dicit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad litt., et in libro

says Augustine XII on Genesis to the-letter and in the-book

de Videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum,

on Seeing God of Moses who was the-master of-the-Jews

et Paulo, qui fuit magister Gentium. Et de hoc plenius

and of-Paul who was the-master of-the-Gentiles and about this more-fully

tractabitur, cum de Raptu agemus.

it-will-be-treated when about Rapture we-shall-treat

Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre,
to the-third it-must-be-said that all-things we-are-said in God to-see
 et secundum ipsum de omnibus iudicare, inquantum per
and according-to him of all-things to-judge inasmuch-as through
 participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et diiudicamus:
participation of-his light all-things we-know and discern
 nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quaedam
for also the-very light natural of-reason a-participation certain
 est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia sensibilia dicimus videre
is of-divine light as also all sensible-things we-say to-see
 et iudicare in sole, idest per lumen solis. Unde dicit
and to-judge in the-sun that-is through the-light of-the-sun whence says
 Augustinus, I Soliloquiorum: Disciplinarum spectamina videri
Augustine I of-the-Soliloquies of-the-disciplines the-sights to-be-seen
 non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur, videlicet
not can unless by-some as-it-were their-own sun they-be-illuminated namely
 Deo. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid sensibiliter, non est
God as therefore for seeing something sensibly not is
 necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita ad videndum aliquid
necessary that be-seen the-substance of-the-sun so for seeing something
 intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod videatur essentia Dei.
intelligibly not is necessary that be-seen the-essence of-God
 Ad quartum dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that vision intellectual is of-those-things
 quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in
which are in the-soul through their essence as intelligible-things in
 intellectu. Sic autem Deus est in anima beatorum, non autem in
the-intellect thus moreover God is in the-soul of-the-blessed not but in
 anima nostra; sed per praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.
soul our but through presence essence and power

Utrum per rationem naturalem Deum
in hac vita cognoscere possimus

12 · WHETHER GOD CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON IN THIS LIFE

Boethius says reason does not grasp simple form, and the intellect needs images. Thomas answers that our natural knowledge begins in sense, and sensible effects do not equal their cause; but from them we can know that God exists, that he is the cause of all, and that he is none of what he causes, not for defect but because he exceeds all. Natural knowledge belongs to good and wicked alike.

Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem
to the-twelfth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that by natural
rationem Deum in hac vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit
reason God in this life to-know not we-can says
enim Boetius, in libro de Consol., quod ratio non capit
for Boethius in the-book on Consolation that reason not grasps
simplicem formam. Deus autem maxime est simplex forma,
a-simple form God moreover most is a-simple form
ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius cognitionem ratio
as above shown it-is therefore to his knowledge reason
naturalis pervenire non potest.
natural to-arrive not can

2. Praeterea, ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit
2 further by-reason natural without a-phantasm nothing understands
anima, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed Dei, cum sit
the-soul as it-is-said in III on the-Soul but of-God since he-is
incorporeus, phantasma in nobis esse non potest. Ergo
incorporeal a-phantasm in us to-be not can therefore
cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione naturali.
to-be-known not can by us by-knowledge natural

3. Praeterea, cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem,
3 further the-knowledge which is through reason natural
 communis est bonis et malis, sicut natura eis communis
common is to-the-good and to-the-wicked as nature to-them common
 est. Sed cognitio Dei competit tantum bonis: dicit enim
is but the-knowledge of-God belongs only to-the-good says for
 Augustinus, I de Trin., quod mentis humanae acies in tam
Augustine I on the-Trinity that of-the-mind human the-edge in so
 excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per iustitiam fidei emundetur.
excellent a-light not is-fixed unless through the-justice of-faith it-be-cleansed
 Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem cognosci non potest.
therefore God through reason natural to-be-known not can
 Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. I: quod notum est Dei,
but against is that it-is-said Romans I what known is of-God
 manifestum est in illis, idest, quod cognoscibile est de
manifest is in them that-is what knowable is about
 Deo per rationem naturalem.

God through reason natural
 Respondeo dicendum quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu
I-answer it-must-be-said that natural our knowledge from sense
 principium sumit: unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio
its-beginning takes whence so-far itself our natural knowledge
 extendere potest, inquantum manuduci potest per sensibilia.
to-extend can as-far-as be-led-by-the-hand it-can through sensible-things
 Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus
from sensible-things but not can even to this intellect
 noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam videat: quia creaturae
our to-reach that the-divine essence it-see because creatures
 sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae non adaequantes.
sensible are effects of-God the-power of-the-cause not equaling
 Unde ex sensibilibus cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus
whence from of-sensible-things knowledge not can the-whole of-God power

cognosci: et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed
to-be-known and by consequence neither his essence to-be-seen but
 quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc
because they-are his effects on the-cause depending from them to this
 perducere possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut
be-led we-can that we-know about God whether he-is and that
 cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire
we-know about him those-things which necessary it-is to-him to-belong
 secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia
according as he-is the-first of-all cause exceeding all
 sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius
his caused-things whence we-know about him the-relation of-him
 ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et differentiam
to creatures that namely of-all he-is the-cause and the-difference
 creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum
of-creatures from him that namely he not is any of-those-things
 quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non remouentur
which by him are-caused and that these-things not are-removed
 ab eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.
from him on-account-of his defect but because he-super-exceeds
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio ad formam
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reason to form
 simplicem pertingere non potest, ut sciat de ea quid
simple to-reach not can so-that it-know about it what
 est: potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an est.
it-is it-can yet about it to-know so-that it-know whether it-is
 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione
to the-second it-must-be-said that God by-natural knowledge
 cognoscitur per phantasmata effectus sui.
is-known through the-phantasms of-effect his

Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam,
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-knowledge of-God through essence
 cum sit per gratiam, non competit nisi bonis: sed
since it-is through grace not belongs except to-the-good but
 cognitio eius quae est per rationem naturalem, potest
the-knowledge of-him which is through reason natural can
 competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus,
to-belong to-the-good and to-the-wicked whence says Augustine
 in libro Retractationum: Non approbo quod in oratione
in the-book of-Retractations not I-approve what in a-prayer
 dixi, «Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti»:
I-said O-God who not except the-clean the-true to-know you-have-willed
 responderi enim potest, multos etiam non mundos multa
to-be-answered for it-can many even not clean many-things
 scire vera, scilicet per rationem naturalem.
to-know true namely through reason natural

Utrum per gratiam habeatur altior cognitio Dei quam ea quae habetur per rationem naturalem

13 • WHETHER GRACE GIVES A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE THAN REASON

Dionysius says the best union with God is with one wholly unknown, and grace too uses images. Thomas answers that grace gives a more perfect knowledge: it strengthens the intellect's light and sometimes forms images or sensible signs that express divine things better, as the dove and the Father's voice at Christ's baptism. Faith is knowledge, but its assent is fixed not by the believer's own vision but by the vision of the one believed.

Ad decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam
to the-thirteenth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that through grace
 non habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per
not is-had a-higher knowledge of-God than that which is-had through

naturalem rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Mystica
natural reason says for Dionysius in the-book on Mystical
 Theologia, quod ille qui melius unitur Deo in hac vita, unitur
Theology that he who better is-united to-God in this life is-united
 ei sicut omnino ignoto: quod etiam de Moyse dicit, qui
to-him as altogether to-the-unknown which also of Moses he-says who
 tamen excellentiam quandam obtinuit in gratiae cognitione. Sed
yet excellence a-certain obtained in of-grace the-knowledge but
 coniungi Deo ignorando de eo quid est, hoc contingit etiam
to-be-joined to-God by-being-ignorant about him what he-is this happens also
 per rationem naturalem. Ergo per gratiam non plenius
through reason natural therefore through grace not more-fully
 cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem naturalem.
is-known by us God than through reason natural

2. Praeterea, per rationem naturalem in cognitionem
2 further through reason natural into the-knowledge
 divinorum pervenire non possumus, nisi per phantasmata:
of-divine-things to-arrive not we-can except through phantasms
 sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae. Dicit enim
so also neither according-to the-knowledge of-grace says for
 Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod impossibile est
Dionysius I chapter on Celestial Hierarchy that impossible it-is
 nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum
for-us otherwise to-shine the-divine ray except by-the-variety of-sacred
 velaminum circumvelatum. Ergo per gratiam non plenius
veils veiled-around therefore through grace not more-fully
 cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.
we-know God than through reason natural

3. Praeterea, intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo
3 further intellect our through the-grace of-faith to-God
 adhaeret. Fides autem non videtur esse cognitio: dicit enim
adheres faith moreover not seems to-be knowledge says for

Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea quae non videntur
Gregory in the-Homilies that those-things which not are-seen
 fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam non
faith have and not recognition therefore through grace not
 additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.

is-added to-us any more-excellent knowledge about God

Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, I Cor. II: nobis
but against is that says the-Apostle I Corinthians II to-us
 revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum, illa scilicet quae
has-revealed God through Spirit his those-things namely which
 nemo principum huius saeculi novit, idest philosophorum,
none of-the-princes of-this age knew that-is of-the-philosophers
 ut exponit Glossa.

as expounds the-Gloss

Respondeo dicendum quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio
I-answer it-must-be-said that through grace a-more-perfect knowledge
 de Deo habetur a nobis, quam per rationem naturalem.

about God is-bad by us than through reason natural

Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per naturalem rationem
which thus is-plain the-knowledge for which through natural reason
 habemus, duo requirit: scilicet, phantasmata ex sensibilibus

we-have two-things requires namely phantasms from sensible-things

accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius virtute

received and the-light natural intelligible by-whose power

intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et quantum

intelligible conceptions from them we-abstract and as-far

ad utrumque, iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem

to both is-helped human knowledge through the-revelation

gratiae. Nam et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per

of-grace for both the-light natural of-the-intellect is-strengthened through

infusionem luminis gratuiti. Et interdum etiam phantasmata in

the-infusion of-light gratuitous and sometimes also phantasms in

imaginatione hominis formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia

the-imagination of-man are-formed divinely more expressing

res divinas, quam ea quae naturaliter a sensibilibus

things divine than those-things which naturally from sensible-things

accipimus; sicut apparet in visionibus prophetalibus. Et

we-receive as appears in visions prophetic and

interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur divinitus,

sometimes also some things sensible are-formed divinely

aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut in

or even voices for something divine to-be-expressed as in

baptismo visus est Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae, et

the-baptism seen was the-Spirit Holy in the-form of-a-dove and

vox Patris audita est, Hic est Filius meus dilectus.

the-voice of-the-Father heard was this is Son my beloved

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet per revelationem

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although through the-revelation

gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et

of-grace in this life not we-know about God what he-is and

sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur; tamen plenius ipsum

thus to-him as-if unknown we-are-joined yet more-fully him

cognoscimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores effectus

we-know inasmuch-as more and more-excellent effects

eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua

of-him to-us are-demonstrated and inasmuch-as to-him some-things

attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis

we-attribute from revelation divine to which reason natural

non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.

not reaches as God to-be three and one

Ad secundum dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus, vel a

to the-second it-must-be-said that from phantasms either from

sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus

sense received according-to the-natural order or divinely

in imaginatione formatis, tanto excellentior cognitio
in the-imagination formed by-so-much more-excellent knowledge
 intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen intelligibile in homine
intellectual is-bad by-how-much the-light intelligible in man
 fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex phantasmatibus
stronger has-been and thus through revelation from phantasms
 plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini luminis.
fuller knowledge is-received from the-infusion of-divine light
 Ad tertium dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est,
to the-third it-must-be-said that faith knowledge a-certain is
 inquantum intellectus determinatur per fidem ad aliquod
inasmuch-as the-intellect is-determined through faith to some
 cognoscibile. Sed haec determinatio ad unum non procedit
knowable but this determination to one not proceeds
 ex visione credentis, sed a visione eius cui creditur. Et
from the-vision of-the-believer but from the-vision of-him who is-believed and
 sic, inquantum deest visio, deficit a ratione cognitionis
thus inasmuch-as is-lacking vision it-falls-short of the-notion of-knowledge
 quae est in scientia: nam scientia determinat intellectum ad
which is in science for science determines the-intellect to
 unum per visionem et intellectum primorum principiorum.
one through vision and the-understanding of-first principles

De nominibus Dei
XIII · ON THE NAMES OF GOD

Having considered how God is known, Thomas turns to the divine names, since we name a thing as we know it. He asks twelve articles: whether God can be named by us; whether names are said of him substantially, properly, and as synonyms; whether univocally or equivocally of God and creatures; if analogically, whether first of God or of creatures; whether some are said from time; whether the name God names a nature or an operation, whether it is communicable, and whether it is univocal or equivocal by nature, participation, and opinion; whether He Who Is is most proper; and whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

Consideratis his quae ad divinam cognitionem pertinent,
considered those-things which to divine knowledge pertain
procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum nominum:
to-be-proceeded it-is to the-consideration of-divine names
unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod
each-thing for is-named by us according as
ipsum cognoscimus.

it we-know
Circa hoc ergo quaeruntur duodecim.

about this therefore are-asked twelve
Primo: utrum Deus sit nominabilis a nobis.
first whether God is nameable by us

Secundo: utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo, praedicentur
second whether some names said of God are-predicated
de ipso substantialiter.
of him substantially

Tertio: utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo, proprie dicantur
third whether some names said of God properly are-said
de ipso; an omnia attribuantur ei metaphorice.
of him or all are-attributed to-him metaphorically

Quarto: utrum multa nomina dicta de Deo, sint synonyma.

fourth whether many names said of God are synonyms

Quinto: utrum nomina aliqua dicantur de Deo et creaturis

fifth whether names some are-said of God and creatures

univoce, vel aequivoce.

univocally or equivocally

Sexto: supposito quod dicantur analogice, utrum dicantur

sixth supposing that they-are-said analogically whether they-are-said

de Deo per prius, vel de creaturis.

of God by prior or of creatures

Septimo: utrum aliqua nomina dicantur de Deo ex tempore.

seventh whether some names are-said of God from time

Octavo: utrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen naturae, vel

eighth whether this name God is a-name of-nature or

operationis.

of-operation

Nono: utrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen communicabile.

ninth whether this name God is a-name communicable

Decimo: utrum accipiatur univoce vel aequivoce, secundum

tenth whether it-is-taken univocally or equivocally according

quod significat Deum per naturam, et per participationem,

as it-signifies God by nature and by participation

et secundum opinionem.

and according-to opinion

Undecimo: utrum hoc nomen Qui est sit maxime proprium

eleventh whether this name He-who is is most proper

nomen Dei.

name of-God

Duodecimo: utrum propositiones affirmativae possint formari

twelfth whether propositions affirmative can to-be-formed

de Deo.

about God

Utrum aliquod nomen Deo conveniat

1 · WHETHER GOD CAN BE NAMED BY US

Dionysius says God has no name, and nouns, verbs, and pronouns all carry conditions that do not befit him. Thomas answers that words signify concepts and concepts things, so God can be named as he is known: from creatures, as their principle, by excellence and removal, though no name expresses his essence as it is. We use concrete names for his subsistence and abstract names for his simplicity.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo

to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that no name to-God

conveniat. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod

belongs says for Dionysius I chapter on Divine Names that

neque nomen eius est, neque opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur:

neither name of-him is nor opinion and Proverbs XXX it-is-said

Quod nomen eius, et quod nomen filii eius, si nosti?

what the-name of-him and what the-name of-the-son of-him if you-know

2. Praeterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in

2 further every name either is-said in the-abstract or in

concreto. Sed nomina significantia in concreto, non competunt

the-concrete but names signifying in the-concrete not belong

Deo, cum simplex sit: neque nomina significantia in

to-God since simple he-is nor names signifying in

abstracto, quia non significant aliquid perfectum subsistens.

the-abstract because not they-signify anything perfect subsisting

Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de Deo.

therefore no name can to-be-said of God

3. Praeterea, nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate;

3 further nouns signify substance with quality

verba autem et participia significant cum tempore; pronomina

verbs but and participles signify with time pronouns

autem cum demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil
but with demonstration or relation of-which nothing
 competit Deo: quia sine qualitate est et sine omni
belongs to-God because without quality he-is and without every
 accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri non potest, ut
accident and without time and to-be-sensed not can so-that
 demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum relativa
to-be-demonstrated he-can nor relatively to-be-signified since relatives
 sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum,
are of-some aforesaid-things recalling either of-nouns
 vel participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo
or of-participles or of-pronouns demonstrative therefore
 Deus nullo modo potest nominari a nobis.

God in-no way can to-be-named by us
 Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. XV: Dominus quasi vir
but against is that it-is-said Exodus XV the-Lord as a-man
 pugnator, Omnipotens nomen eius.

fighter Almighty the-name of-him
 Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum,
I-answer it-must-be-said that according-to the-Philosopher
 voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum
words are signs of-understandings and understandings are of-things
 similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res
likenesses and thus is-plain that words are-referred to things
 significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus. Secundum
to-be-signified by-means-of the-conception of-the-intellect according-to
 igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a
therefore as something by us by-intellect to-be-known can so by
 nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus
us it-can to-be-named shown it-is moreover above that God
 in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam;
in this life not can by us to-be-seen through his essence

sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem

but be-is-known by us from creatures according-to the-relation

principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic

of-principle and through the-mode of-excellence and of-removal thus

igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis: non tamen ita

therefore he-can to-be-named by us from creatures not yet so

quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam

that the-name signifying him express the-divine essence

secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit

according as it-is as this name man expresses

sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est:

by-its signification the-essence of-man according as it-is

significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam;

it-signifies for its definition declaring its essence

ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.

the-notion for which signifies the-name is the-definition

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that for-that reason is-said

Deus non habere nomen, vel esse supra nominationem,

God not to-have a-name or to-be above naming

quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo intelligimus

because the-essence of-him is above that which of God we-understand

et voce significamus.

and by-word signify

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei

to the-second it-must-be-said that because from creatures into God's

cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus, nomina

knowledge we-come and from them him we-name the-names

quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod

which to-God we-attribute in-this way signify according-to that

competit creaturis materialibus, quarum cognitio est nobis

it-belongs to-creatures material whose knowledge is to-us

connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in huiusmodi
connatural as above said it-is and because in such
 creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia, sunt
creatures those-things which are perfect and subsisting are
 composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum
composite form but in them not is something complete
 subsistens, sed magis quo aliquid est: inde est quod omnia
subsisting but rather by-which something is thence it-is that all
 nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum
names by us imposed for signifying something complete
 subsistens, significant in concretione, prout competit
subsisting signify in concretion according-as it-belongs
 compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad significandas
to-composites the-ones-which but are-imposed for signifying
 formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed
forms simple signify something not as subsisting but
 ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo
as by-which something is as whiteness signifies as by-which
 aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et
something is white because therefore both God simple is and
 subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad
subsisting is we-attribute to-him both names abstract for
 significandam simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad
signifying the-simplicity of-him and names concrete for
 significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius: quamvis
signifying the-subsistence and perfection of-him although
 utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus
both names fall-short of the-mode of-him as intellect
 noster non cognoscit eum ut est, secundum hanc vitam.
our not knows him as he-is according-to this life

Ad tertium dicendum quod significare substantiam cum
to the-third it-must-be-said that to-signify substance with
 qualitate, est significare suppositum cum natura vel forma
quality is to-signify the-suppositum with a-nature or form
 determinata in qua subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur
determinate in which it-subsists whence as of God are-said
 aliqua in concretion, ad significandum subsistentiam et
some-things in concretion for signifying the-subsistence and
 perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam dictum est, ita dicuntur
perfection of-him as already said it-is so are-said
 de Deo nomina significantia substantiam cum qualitate.
of God names signifying substance with quality
 Verba vero et participia consignantia tempus dicuntur
verbs but and participles co-signifying time are-said
 de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus: sicut
of him from this that eternity includes every time as
 enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et
for simple subsisting-things not we-can to-apprehend and
 significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem
to-signify except through the-mode of-composite-things so simple
 aeternitatem non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere,
eternity not we-can to-understand or by-word to-express
 nisi per modum temporalium rerum; et hoc propter
except through the-mode of-temporal things and this on-account-of
 connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res compositas et
the-connaturality of-intellect our to things composite and
 temporales. Pronomina vero demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo,
temporal pronouns but demonstrative are-said of God
 secundum quod faciunt demonstrationem ad id quod
according as they-make demonstration to that which
 intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur: secundum enim quod
is-understood not to that which is-sensed according-to for as

a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub demonstratione cadit.

by us it-is-understood according-to this under demonstration it-falls

Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et participia

and thus according-to that mode in-which nouns and participles

et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum

and pronouns demonstrative of God are-said according-to

hoc et pronominibus relativis significari potest.

this also by-pronouns relative to-be-signified can

Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo substantialiter

2 · WHETHER ANY NAME IS SAID OF GOD SUBSTANTIALY

Damascene says names show what God is not, Dionysius that they praise his processions, and we do not know his substance. Thomas rejects the views of Maimonides, that such names remove something from God, as living means he is not like inanimate things, and of those who say good means he causes goodness. Such names signify God's substance, though imperfectly, as creatures represent him imperfectly; what we call goodness pre-exists in God in a higher way.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen

to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that no name

dicatur de Deo substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus:

is-said of God substantially says for Damascene

Oportet singulum eorum quae de Deo dicuntur, non

it-is-necessary each of-those-things which of God are-said not

quid est secundum substantiam significare, sed quid non est

what he-is according-to substance to-signify but what not he-is

ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam, aut aliquid eorum

to-show or a-relation certain or something of-those-things

quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem.

which follow the-nature or operation

2. Praeterea, dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom.:

2 further says Dionysius I chapter on Divine Names

Omnem sanctorum theologorum hymnum invenies, ad

every of-the-holy theologians hymn you-will-find according-to

bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et laudative Dei

the-good of-the-thearchy processions manifestatively and laudatively God's

nominationes dividendem: et est sensus, quod nomina quae in

namings dividing and is the-sense that the-names which in

divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum processus

divine praise the-holy doctors take-up according-to the-processions

ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum

of-the-very God are-distinguished but what signifies the-procession

alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo

of-some thing nothing signifies to its essence pertaining therefore

nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.

the-names said of God not are-said of him substantially

3. Praeterea, secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis,

3 further according-to this is-named something by us

secundum quod intelligitur. Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in

according as it-is-understood but not is-understood God by us in

hac vita secundum suam substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen

this life according-to his substance therefore neither any name

impositum a nobis, dicitur de Deo secundum suam substantiam.

imposed by us is-said of God according-to his substance

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin.: Deo hoc

but against is that says Augustine VI on the-Trinity to-God this

est esse, quod fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de

is to-be what strong to-be or wise to-be and if anything of

illa simplicitate dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur.

that simplicity you-should-say by-which his substance is-signified

Ergo omnia nomina huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.

therefore all names of-this-kind signify the-divine substance

Respondeo dicendum quod de nominibus quae de Deo
I-answer it-must-be-said that of names which of God
 dicuntur negative, vel quae relationem ipsius ad creaturam
are-said negatively or which the-relation of-him to the-creature
 significant, manifestum est quod substantiam eius nullo modo
signify manifest it-is that the-substance of-him in-no way
 significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab ipso, vel relationem
they-signify but the-removal of-something from him or the-relation
 eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum. Sed de nominibus
of-him to another or rather of-something to him but of names
 quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, sicut bonus,
which absolutely and affirmatively of God are-said as good
 sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt opinati.
wise and things-of-this-kind in-many-ways some have opined
 Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet
some for have-said that these all names although
 affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad
affirmatively of God they-be-said yet rather devised are for
 aliquid removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum
something to-be-removed from God than for something to-be-posed
 in ipso. Unde dicunt quod, cum dicimus Deum esse
in him whence they-say that when we-say God to-be
 viventem, significamus quod Deus non hoc modo est, sicut
living we-signify that God not in-this way is as
 res inanimatae: et similiter accipiendum est in aliis. Et
things inanimate and similarly to-be-taken it-is in others and
 hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. – Alii vero dicunt quod haec
this posited Rabbi Moses others but say that these
 nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad
names imposed are for signifying the-relation of-him to

creata: ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus
created-things so-that when we-say God is good be the-sense God
 est causa bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis.
is the-cause of-goodness in things and the-same reason is in others
 Sed utrumque istorum videtur esse inconueniens, propter
but each of-these seems to-be unfitting on-account-of
 tria. Primo quidem, quia secundum neutram harum
three-things first indeed because according-to neither of-these
 positionum posset assignari ratio quare quaedam nomina
positions could to-be-assigned a-reason why some names
 magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est causa
rather of God should-be-said than others thus for he-is the-cause
 corporum, sicut est causa bonorum: unde, si nihil aliud
of-bodies as he-is the-cause of-goods whence if nothing other
 significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa
is-signified when it-is-said God is good except God is the-cause
 bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus,
of-goods it-will-be-possible similarly to-be-said that God is a-body
 quia est causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod
because he-is the-cause of-bodies likewise through this that it-is-said that
 est corpus, removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum,
he-is a-body is-removed that not he-is a-being in potency only
 sicut materia prima. – Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia
as matter prime second because it-would-follow that all
 nomina dicta de Deo, per posterius dicerentur de ipso: sicut
names said of God by posterior would-be-said of him as
 sanum per posterius dicitur de medicina, eo quod
healthy by posterior is-said of medicine for-the-reason that
 significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in animali,
it-signifies this only that it-is the-cause of-health in the-animal
 quod per prius dicitur sanum. – Tertio, quia hoc est contra
which by prior is-called healthy third because this is against

intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt
the-intention of-those-speaking of God another-thing for they-intend
dicere, cum dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa
to-say when they-say God living than that he-is the-cause
vitae nostrae, vel quod differat a corporibus inanimatis.
of-life our or that he-differs from bodies inanimate
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod huiusmodi quidem nomina
and therefore otherwise to-be-said it-is that such indeed names
significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo
signify the-substance divine and are-predicated of God
substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Quod
substantially but they-fall-short of the-representation of-him which
sic patet. Significant enim sic nomina Deum, secundum quod
thus is-plain signify for so names God according as
intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. Intellectus autem noster,
intellect our knows him the-intellect moreover our
cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum,
since it-knows God from creatures so knows him
secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. Ostensum
according-to that creatures him represent shown
est autem supra quod Deus in se prae-habet omnes
it-is moreover above that God in himself pre-possesses all
perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter
the-perfections of-creatures as-being simply and universally
perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat,
perfect whence any creature insofar him represents
et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet:
and is to-him like inasmuch-as perfection some it-has
non tamen ita quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem
not yet so that it-represent him as something of-the-same
speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius
species or genus but as an-excelling principle from whose

forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem

form the-effects fall-short of-which yet some likeness

effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum

the-effects attain as the-forms of-bodies lower

repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc supra expositum est,

represent the-power solar and this above expounded it-is

cum de Perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur praedicta

when about the-Perfection divine it-was-treated thus therefore the-aforesaid

nomina divinam substantiam significant: imperfecte tamen,

names the-divine substance signify imperfectly yet

sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant.

as also creatures imperfectly it represent

Cum igitur dicitur Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus

when therefore it-is-said God is good not is the-sense God

est causa bonitatis, vel Deus non est malus: sed est sensus,

is the-cause of-goodness or God not is evil but it-is the-sense

id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praexistit in Deo,

that which goodness we-call in creatures pre-exists in God

et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem. Unde ex hoc

and this indeed according-to a-mode higher whence from this

non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum inquantum

not it-follows that to-God belongs to-be good inasmuch-as

causat bonitatem: sed potius e converso, quia est bonus,

he-causes goodness but rather from the-converse because he-is good

bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de

goodness to-things he-diffuses according-to that of-Augustine on

Doct. Christ.: inquantum bonus est, sumus.

Doctrine Christian inasmuch-as good he-is we-are

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Damascenus ideo

to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Damascene therefore

dicat quod haec nomina non significant quid est Deus,

says that these names not signify what is God

quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur quid est Deus
because by none of-these names is-expressed what is God
 perfecte: sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat, sicut
perfectly but each imperfectly him signifies as
 et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.

also creatures imperfectly him represent

Ad secundum dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud
to the-second it-must-be-said that in the-signification of-names one-thing
 est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum,
is sometimes from which is-imposed the-name for signifying
 et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur: sicut hoc
and that for which to-be-signified the-name is-imposed as this
 nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen
name stone is-imposed from that that it-hurts the-foot not yet
 imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem,
is-imposed for this to-be-signified that it-signify hurting the-foot
 sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin
but for signifying a-certain species of-bodies otherwise
 omne laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod
everything hurting the-foot would-be stone thus therefore to-be-said it-is that
 huiusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus
such divine names are-imposed indeed from the-processions
 deitatis: sicut enim secundum diversos processus perfectionum,
of-the-deity as for according-to diverse processions of-perfections
 creaturae Deum repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus
creatures God represent although imperfectly so intellect
 noster, secundum unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit
our according-to each procession God knows
 et nominat. Sed tamen haec nomina non imponit ad
and names but yet these names not it-imposes for
 significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum dicitur Deus est
signifying the-very processions so-that when it-is-said God is

vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita: sed ad significandum
living be the-sense from him proceeds life but for signifying
 ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita,
the-very of-things principle according-as in him pre-exists life
 licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.
although in-a-more-eminent way than it-be-understood or be-signified
 Ad tertium dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-essence of-God in this life
 cognoscere non possumus secundum quod in se est:
to-know not we-can according as in itself it-is
 sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod repraesentatur in
but we-know it according as it-is-represented in
 perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis imposita
the-perfections of-creatures and thus the-names by us imposed
 eam significant.
it signify

Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur de Deo proprie

3 • WHETHER ANY NAME IS SAID OF GOD PROPERLY

All names come from creatures, God is more truly denied than affirmed, and names imply bodily conditions. Thomas distinguishes the perfection signified from the mode of signifying. Names like being, good, and living belong to God properly as to what they signify, and more properly than to creatures, though not in their mode. Names like stone include a creaturely mode and are metaphors.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that no name
 dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia enim nomina quae de Deo
is-said of God properly all for names which of God
 dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut dictum est. Sed
we-say are from creatures received as said it-is but

nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, sicut
the-names of-creatures metaphorically are-said of God as
 cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi.

when it-is-said God is a-stone or a-lion or something of-this-kind

Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.

therefore all names said of God are-said metaphorically

2. Praeterea, nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo,

2 further no name properly is-said of something

a quo verius removetur quam de eo praedicetur. Sed

from which more-truly it-is-removed than of it it-is-predicated but

omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus, sapiens, et similia, verius

all such names good wise and similar more-truly

removentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet

are-removed from God than of him are-predicated as is-plain

per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum

through Dionysius II chapter Celestial Hierarchy therefore none

istorum nominum proprie dicitur de Deo.

of-these names properly is-said of God

3. Praeterea, nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi

3 further the-names of-bodies not are-said of God except

metaphorice, cum sit incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi

metaphorically since he-is incorporeal but all such

nomina implicant quasdam corporales condiciones: significant

names imply certain bodily conditions they-signify

enim cum tempore, et cum compositione, et cum aliis

for with time and with composition and with other

huiusmodi, quae sunt condiciones corporum. Ergo omnia

such-things which are the-conditions of-bodies therefore all

huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice.

such names are-said of God metaphorically

Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in lib. II de Fide:
but against is that says Ambrose in book II on the-Faith
 Sunt quaedam nomina, quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis
there-are certain names which evidently the-property of-divinity
 ostendunt; et quaedam quae perspicuam divinae maiestatis
show and some which the-clear of-divine majesty
 exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt, quae translativè per
express truth others but are which by-transference through
 similitudinem de Deo dicuntur. Non igitur omnia nomina
likeness of God are-said not therefore all names
 dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur proprie.
are-said of God metaphorically but some are-said properly
 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Deum
I-answer it-must-be-said that as said it-is God
 cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas
we-know from the-perfections proceeding into creatures
 ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum
from him which indeed perfections in God are according-to
 eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus autem
a-more-eminent mode than in creatures intellect moreover
 noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in
our in-that way apprehends them according as they-are in
 creaturis; et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per
creatures and according as it-apprehends so it-signifies through
 nomina. In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est
names in the-names therefore which to-God we-attribute it-is-possible
 duo considerare: scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas,
two-things to-consider namely the-perfections themselves signified
 ut bonitatem, vitam, et huiusmodi; et modum significandi.
as goodness life and such-things and the-mode of-signifying
 Quantum igitur ad id quod significant huiusmodi nomina,
as-far therefore to that which they-signify such names

proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie quam ipsis
properly belong to-God and more properly than to-the-very
 creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum vero ad
creatures and by prior are-said of him as-far but to
 modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo: habent
the-mode of-signifying not properly are-said of God they-have
 enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.

for a-mode of-signifying which to-creatures belongs
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam nomina
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that some names
 significant huiusmodi perfectiones a Deo procedentes in
signify such perfections from God proceeding into
 res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus imperfectus quo
things created in-this way that the-very mode imperfect by-which
 a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso nominis
by the-creature is-participated the-divine perfection in the-very of-the-name
 significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid materialiter
signified is-included as stone signifies something materially
 ens: et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo
being and such names not can to-be-attributed to-God
 nisi metaphorice. Quedam vero nomina significant ipsas
except metaphorically some but names signify the-very
 perfectiones absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus
perfections absolutely without this that any mode
 participandi claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum,
of-participating be-enclosed in their signification as being good
 vivens, et huiusmodi: et talia proprie dicuntur de Deo.
living and such-things and such properly are-said of God
 Ad secundum dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina
to the-second it-must-be-said that therefore such names
 dicit Dionysius negari a Deo, quia id quod significatur
says Dionysius to-be-denied of God because that which is-signified

per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo nomen
by the-name not belongs in-that way to-him in-which the-name
 significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit
signifies but in-a-more-excellent way whence in-the-same-place says
 Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.
Dionysius that God is above every substance and life
 Ad tertium dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie
to the-third it-must-be-said that those names which properly
 dicuntur de Deo, important conditiones corporales, non
are-said of God import conditions bodily not
 in ipso significato nominis, sed quantum ad modum
in the-very signified of-the-name but as-far to the-mode
 significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur,
of-signifying those but which metaphorically of God are-said
 important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo significato.
import a-condition bodily in the-very its signified

Utrum nomina dicta de Deo sint nomina synonyma

4 • WHETHER THE NAMES SAID OF GOD ARE SYNONYMS

They seem to signify altogether the same, and diverse notions with one reality seem empty. Thomas answers that our intellect, knowing God from creatures, forms many conceptions answering to the many perfections that pre-exist in God as one. The names signify one thing under many diverse notions, which are not empty, so they are not synonyms; God is one in reality and many in notion.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that these names said
 de Deo, sint nomina synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina
of God are names synonymous synonymous for names
 dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant. Sed ista nomina
are-called which altogether the-same signify but these names

dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant in Deo: quia
said of God altogether the-same signify in God because
 bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia. Ergo
the-goodness of-God is his essence and similarly wisdom therefore
 ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.

these names are altogether synonymous

2. Si dicatur quod ista nomina significant idem secundum
2 if it-be-said that these names signify the-same according-to
 rem, sed secundum rationes diversas, contra: Ratio cui
reality but according-to notions diverse against a-notion to-which
 non respondet aliquid in re, est vana; si ergo istae
not corresponds anything in reality is empty if therefore these
 rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod
notions are many and the-reality is one it-seems that
 rationes istae sint vanae.

the-notions these are empty

3. Praeterea, magis est unum quod est unum re et
3 further more is one what is one in-reality and
 ratione, quam quod est unum re et multiplex ratione.
in-notion than what is one in-reality and manifold in-notion
 Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non sit
but God is most one therefore it-seems that not he-is
 unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de
one in-reality and manifold in-notion and thus the-names said of
 Deo non significant rationes diversas: et ita sunt synonyma.

God not signify notions diverse and so they-are synonymous

Sed contra, omnia synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta,
but against all synonyms to-one-another mutually joined
 nugationem adducunt, sicut si dicatur vestis indumentum.

triviality bring as if it-be-said garment clothing

Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt synonyma, non
if therefore all names said of God are synonyms not

posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid huiusmodi;

could fittingly to-be-said God good or anything of-this-kind

cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII: Fortissime, magne,

since yet written it-is Jeremiah XXXII O-most-strong great

potens, Dominus exercituum nomen tibi.

mighty Lord of-hosts the-name to-you

Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo,

I-answer it-must-be-said that such names said of God

non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset videre,

not are synonyms which indeed easy it-would-be to-see

si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt inducta ad

if we-said that such names are brought-in for

removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae respectu

removing or for designating the-relation of-cause with-respect-to

creaturarum: sic enim essent diversae rationes horum

of-creatures thus for there-would-be diverse notions of-these

nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos

names according-to diverse-things denied or according-to diverse

effectus connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi

effects connoted but according as said it-is such

nomina substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte,

names the-substance divine to-signify although imperfectly

etiam plane apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes

also plainly it-appears according-to the-premisses that they-have notions

diversas. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio

diverse the-notion for which signifies the-name is the-conception

intellectus de re significata per nomen. Intellectus

of-the-intellect about the-thing signified by the-name intellect

autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad

moreover our since it-knows God from creatures forms for

intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionatas perfectionibus

understanding God conceptions proportioned to-the-perfections

procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Quae quidem perfectiones
proceeding from God into creatures which indeed perfections
 in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter: in creaturis vero
in God pre-exist unitedly and simply in creatures but
 recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur diversis
they-are-received dividedly and manifoldly as therefore to-diverse
 perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium,
perfections of-creatures corresponds one simple principle
 repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et
represented by diverse perfections of-creatures variously and
 multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus
manifoldly so to-various and manifold conceptions of-intellect
 nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi
our corresponds one altogether simple according-to such
 conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo
conceptions imperfectly understood and therefore the-names to-God
 attributa, licet significant unam rem, tamen, quia significant
attributed although they-signify one thing yet because they-signify
 eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.
it under notions many and diverse not are synonyms
 Et sic patet solutio ad primum: quia nomina synonyma
and thus is-plain the-solution to the-first because names synonymous
 dicuntur, quae significant unum secundum unam rationem.
are-called which signify one according-to one notion
 Quae enim significant rationes diversas unius rei, non primo
those-which for signify notions diverse of-one thing not first
 et per se unum significant: quia nomen non significat
and through themselves one signify because the-name not signifies
 rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut dictum est.
the-thing except by-means-of the-conception of-the-intellect as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes plures horum
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-notions many of-these
 nominum non sunt cassae et vanae: quia omnibus eis
names not are void and empty because to-all them
 respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia huiusmodi
corresponds one something simple through all such-things
 multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.

manifoldly and imperfectly represented

Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei
to the-third it-must-be-said that this very to the-perfect of-God
 unitatem pertinet, quod ea quae sunt multipliciter et
unity pertains that those-things which are manifoldly and
 divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt simpliciter et unite. Et ex
dividedly in others in him are simply and unitedly and from
 hoc contingit quod est unus re et plures secundum
this it-happens that he-is one in-reality and many according-to
 rationem: quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit
notion because intellect our so manifoldly apprehends
 eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.
him as things manifoldly him represent

Utrum ea quae de Deo dicuntur
et creaturis, univoce dicantur de ipsis

5 · WHETHER NAMES ARE SAID OF GOD AND CREATURES UNIVOCALLY

Every equivocal reduces to a univocal, man is made in God's likeness, and a measure is homogeneous with what it measures. Thomas answers that no name is univocal of God and creatures, nor purely equivocal, or nothing could be known of God from creatures; they are said by analogy, as healthy of medicine and of the animal.

Ad quantum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that those-things which
dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, univoce de ipsis dicantur.
are-said of God and creatures univocally of them are-said
Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad univocum, sicut multa
every for equivocal is-reduced to the-univocal as many
ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivoce dicitur de
to one for if this name dog equivocally is-said of
latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce
the-barking and the-marine it-is-necessary that of some univocally
dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus: aliter enim esset
it-be-said namely of all barking-ones otherwise for it-would-be
procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia
to-proceed to infinity there-are-found moreover some agents
univoca, quae conveniunt cum suis effectibus in nomine et
univocal which agree with their effects in name and
definitione, ut homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia
definition as man generates man some but agents
aequivoca, sicut sol causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit
equivocal as the-sun causes the-hot since yet it not is
calidus nisi aequivoce. Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad
hot except equivocally it-seems therefore that the-first agent to

quod omnia agentia reducuntur, sit agens univocum. Et ita,
which all agents are-reduced is an-agent univocal and so
 quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, univoce praedicantur.

the-things-which of God and creatures are-said univocally are-predicated

2. Praeterea, secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua

2 further according-to equivocals not is-attended any

similitudo. Cum igitur creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua

likeness since therefore of-creatures to God there-is some

similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I: Faciamus hominem ad

likeness according-to that Genesis I let-us-make man to

imaginem et similitudinem nostram, videtur quod aliquid

the-image and likeness our it-seems that something

univoce de Deo et creaturis dicatur.

univocally of God and creatures is-said

3. Praeterea, mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur

3 further the-measure is homogeneous with-the-measured as it-is-said

in X Metaphys. Sed Deus est prima mensura omnium entium,

in X Metaphysics but God is the-first measure of-all beings

ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est homogeneus creaturis.

as in-the-same-place it-is-said therefore God is homogeneous with-creatures

Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dici potest.

and so something univocally of God and creatures to-be-said can

Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem

but against whatever is-predicated of some according-to the-same

nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de

name and not according-to the-same notion is-predicated of

eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum

them equivocally but no name belongs to-God according-to

illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura: nam

that notion according-to which it-is-said of the-creature for

sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus

wisdom in creatures is a-quality not but in God the-genus

autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis.
moreover varied changes the-notion since it-is part of-the-definition

Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et
and the-same reason is in others whatever therefore of God and
 creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.

creatures is-said equivocally is-said

Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque
further God more is-distant from creatures than any

creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam
creatures from one-another but on-account-of the-distance of-some

creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari
creatures it-happens that nothing univocally of them to-be-predicted

potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo
can as of those-things which not agree in any

genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid
genus therefore much less of God and creatures anything

univoce praedicatur: sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.

univocally is-predicted but all-things are-predicted equivocally

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari

I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is something to-be-predicted

de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non
of God and creatures univocally because every effect not

adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem
equaling the-power of-the-cause acting receives the-likeness

agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter: ita
of-the-agent not according-to the-same notion but deficiently so

ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa
that what dividedly and manifoldly is in effects in the-cause

est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum
is simply and in-the-same way as the-sun according-to

unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis
one power multiform and various forms in these

inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est,
lower-things produces in-the-same way as above said it-is
 omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim
all of-things the-perfections which are in things created dividedly
 et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum
and manifoldly in God pre-exist unitedly thus therefore when
 aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur,
some name to perfection pertaining of a-creature is-said
 significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem
it-signifies that perfection as distinct according-to the-notion
 definitionis ab aliis: puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de
of-definition from others for-example when this name wise of
 homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam
man is-said we-signify some perfection distinct
 ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius,
from the-essence of-man and from the-power and from the-to-be of-him
 et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo
and from all such-things but when this name of God
 dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab
we-say not we-intend to-signify anything distinct from
 essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen
the-essence or power or to-be of-him and thus when this name
 sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et
wise of man is-said in-a-way it-circumscribes and
 comprehendit rem significatam: non autem cum dicitur de
comprehends the-thing signified not but when it-is-said of
 Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam,
God but it-leaves the-thing signified as uncomprehended
 et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod
and exceeding the-name's signification whence is-plain that
 non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo
not according-to the-same notion this name wise of God

et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde
and of man is-said and the-same reason is of others whence
 nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.

no name univocally of God and creatures is-predicated

Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia
but nor even purely equivocally as some have-said because
 secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de

according-to this from creatures nothing could to-be-known about

Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia

God nor to-be-demonstrated but always would-occur the-fallacy

Aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui
of-Equivocation and this is as-much against the-philosophers who

multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra
many-things demonstratively about God prove as also against

Apostolum dicentem, Rom. I: invisibilia Dei per

the-Apostle saying Romans I the-invisible-things of-God through

ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.

those-things which made are understood are-clearly-seen

Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo

to-be-said it-is therefore that such names are-said of God

et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod

and creatures according-to analogy that-is proportion which

quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus: vel quia multa

indeed in-two-ways happens in names either because many-things

habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina

have proportion to one as healthy is-said of medicine

et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem

and urine inasmuch-as each has order and proportion

ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero

to the-health of-the-animal of-which this indeed the-sign is that but

causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum,

the-cause or from this that one has proportion to the-other

sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum
as healthy is-said of medicine and the-animal inasmuch-as
 medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc
medicine is the-cause of-the-health which is in the-animal and in-this
 modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non
way some-things are-said of God and creatures analogically and not
 aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare
equivocally purely nor univocally not for we-can to-name
 Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid
God except from creatures as above said it-is and thus whatever
 dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est
is-said of God and creatures is-said according as there-is
 aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam,
some order of-the-creature to God as to the-principle and cause
 in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones.
in which pre-exist excellently all of-things the-perfections
 Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram
and this mode of-community middle is between pure
 aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim
equivocation and simple univocation neither for
 in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut
in those-things which analogically are-said there-is one notion as
 est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis;
there-is in univocals nor totally diverse as in equivocals
 sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas
but the-name which thus manifoldly is-said signifies diverse
 proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum,
proportions to something one as healthy of urine said
 significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum,
signifies a-sign of-the-health of-the-animal of medicine but said
 significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.
signifies the-cause of-the-same health

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that although in predication
 oporteat aequivoca ad univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus
it-be-necessary equivocal to univocal to-be-reduced yet in actions
 agens non univocum ex necessitate praecedit agens univocum.
the-agent not univocal of necessity precedes the-agent univocal
 Agens enim non univocum est causa universalis totius
the-agent for not univocal is the-cause universal of-the-whole
 speciei, ut sol est causa generationis omnium hominum.
species as the-sun is the-cause of-the-generation of-all men
 Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis
the-agent but univocal not is the-cause agent universal
 totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum
of-the-whole species otherwise it-would-be the-cause of-itself itself since
 sub specie contineatur): sed est causa particularis respectu
under the-species it-is-contained but it-is the-cause particular with-respect-to
 huius individui, quod in participatione speciei constituit.
this individual which in participation of-the-species it-constitutes
 Causa igitur universalis totius speciei non est agens
the-cause therefore universal of-the-whole species not is an-agent
 univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari.
univocal the-cause moreover universal is prior to-the-particular
 – Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit univocum,
this moreover agent universal although not it-be univocal
 non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret
not yet is altogether equivocal because thus not it-would-make
 sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum: sicut in
to-itself like but it-can to-be-called an-agent analogical as in
 praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum,
predications all univocal are-reduced to one first
 non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.
not univocal but analogical which is being

Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-likeness of-the-creature to God
 est imperfecta: quia etiam nec idem secundum genus
is imperfect because even not the-same according-to genus
 repraesentat, ut supra dictum est.

it-represents as above said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non est mensura
to the-third it-must-be-said that God not is a-measure
 proportionata mensuratis. Unde non oportet quod Deus
proportioned to-the-measured whence not it-is-necessary that God
 et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.

and creatures under one genus be-contained

Ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, concludunt quod non
those-things but which are to the-contrary conclude that not
 univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo et creaturis praedicentur:
univocally such names of God and creatures are-predicated
 non autem quod aequivoce.

not but that equivocally

Utrum nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo

6 • WHETHER NAMES ARE SAID FIRST OF CREATURES

We name things as we know them, and we know creatures first; names transferred to God, like lion and stone, belong first to creatures. Thomas answers that metaphors belong first to creatures. But names said essentially, like good and wise, belong first to God as to the thing signified, since the perfections flow from him, and first to creatures as to their imposition.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that names by prior
 dicantur de creaturis quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod
are-said of creatures than of God according-to for as

cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc illud nominamus; cum
we-know something according-to this it we-name since
 nomina, secundum Philosophum, sint signa intellectuum. Sed
names according-to the-Philosopher are signs of-understandings but
 per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo nomina
by prior we-know the-creature than God therefore names
 a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam Deo.
by us imposed by prior belong to-creatures than to-God
 2. Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom.,
2 further according-to Dionysius in the-book on Divine Names
 Deum ex creaturis nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis
God from creatures we-name but names from creatures
 translata in Deum, per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de
transferred to God by prior are-said of creatures than of
 Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. Ergo omnia nomina
God as lion stone and such-things therefore all names
 quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius de creaturis
which of God and of creatures are-said by prior of creatures
 quam de Deo dicuntur.

than of God are-said

3. Praeterea, omnia nomina quae communiter de Deo et
3 further all names which commonly of God and
 creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut
creatures are-said are-said of God as of the-cause of-all as
 dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de aliquo per causam, per
says Dionysius but what is-said of something through the-cause by
 posterius de illo dicitur: per prius enim dicitur animal sanum
posterior of it is-said by prior for is-called the-animal healthy
 quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo huiusmodi
than medicine which is the-cause of-health therefore such
 nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.

names by prior are-said of creatures than of God

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. III: Flecto genua mea ad
but against is that it-is-said Ephesians III I-bend knees my to
 Patrem Domini nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo
the-Father of-the-Lord our Jesus from whom all paternity in heaven
 et in terra nominatur. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus
and on earth is-named and the-same reason seems of names
 aliis quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi
other which of God and creatures are-said therefore such
 nomina per prius de Deo quam de creaturis dicuntur.
names by prior of God than of creatures are-said
 Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus nominibus quae de
I-answer it-must-be-said that in all names which of
 pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur
several analogically are-said necessary it-is that all be-said
 per respectum ad unum: et ideo illud unum oportet
through respect to one and therefore that one it-is-necessary
 quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia ratio quam
that be-placed in the-definition of-all and because the-notion which
 significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys.,
signifies the-name is the-definition as it-is-said in IV Metaphysics
 necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo quod
necessary it-is that that name by prior be-said of that which
 ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis,
is-placed in the-definition of-the-others and by posterior of the-others
 secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum
according-to the-order in-which they-approach to that first
 vel magis vel minus: sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali,
either more or less as healthy which is-said of the-animal
 cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae
falls in the-definition of-healthy which is-said of medicine which
 dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in
is-called healthy inasmuch-as it-causes health in the-animal and in

definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur sana
the-definition of-healthy which is-said of urine which is-called healthy
 inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis.

inasmuch-as it-is a-sign of-the-healthy of-the-animal

Sic ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur,
thus therefore all names which metaphorically of God are-said

per prius de creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo: quia dicta
by prior of creatures are-said than of God because said

de Deo, nihil aliud significant quam similitudines ad tales
of God nothing other they-signify than likenesses to such

creaturas. Sicut enim ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud
creatures as for to-laugh said of a-meadow nothing other

significat quam quod pratum similiter se habet in decore
signifies than that the-meadow similarly itself has in beauty

cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, secundum similitudinem
when it-flowers as a-man when he-laughs according-to likeness

proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de Deo, nihil aliud
of-proportion so the-name of-lion said of God nothing other

significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut fortiter
signifies than that God similarly himself has so-that strongly

operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet
he-works in his works as a-lion in its and thus is-plain

quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio
that according as they-are-said of God their signification

definiri non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur.
to-be-defined not can except through that which of creatures is-said

De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur
about other but names which not metaphorically are-said

de Deo, esset etiam eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo
of God there-would-be also the-same reason if they-were-said of God

causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt. Sic enim, cum
causally only as some posited thus for when

dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam Deus est
it-is-said God is good nothing other it-would-be than God is
 causa bonitatis creaturae: et sic hoc nomen bonum, dictum
the-cause of-the-goodness of-the-creature and thus this name good said
 de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae.
of God would-enclose in its understanding the-goodness of-the-creature
 Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo.
whence good by prior would-be-said of the-creature than of God
 Sed supra ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum
but above shown it-is that such names not only
 dicuntur de Deo causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim
are-said of God causally but also essentially when for
 dicitur Deus est bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur
it-is-said God is good or wise not only is-signified
 quod ipse sit causa sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in
that he be the-cause of-wisdom or of-goodness but that these in
 eo eminentius praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum
him more-eminently pre-exist whence according-to this to-be-said
 est quod, quantum ad rem significatam per nomen, per
it-is that as-far to the-thing signified by the-name by
 prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis: quia a Deo
prior they-are-said of God than of creatures because from God
 huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad
such perfections into creatures flow but as-far to
 impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis,
the-imposition of-the-name by prior by us they-are-imposed on-creatures
 quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent
which first we-know whence also the-mode of-signifying they-have
 qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.
which belongs to-creatures as above said it-is

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that objection that proceeds
 quantum ad impositionem nominis.

as-far to the-imposition of-the-name

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de
to the-second it-must-be-said that not is the-same reason of
 nominibus quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, et de aliis,
names which metaphorically of God are-said and of others
 ut dictum est.

as said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si
to the-third it-must-be-said that objection that would-proceed if
 huiusmodi nomina solum de Deo causaliter dicerentur et
such names only of God causally were-said and
 non essentialiter, sicut sanum de medicina.

not essentially as healthy of medicine

Utrum nomina quae important relationem
ad creaturas, dicantur de Deo ex tempore

7 · WHETHER NAMES OF RELATION TO CREATURES ARE SAID IN TIME

Lord and Creator seem to signify God's substance, which is eternal. Thomas distinguishes relations of reason, real relations on both sides, and relations real on one side only, as the knowable to knowledge, or a column called right only from an animal beside it. Creatures are really related to God, but God not really to them, so such names begin in time through the creature's change. Yet God is really Lord, since the creature's subjection is real, and was not Lord before he had a creature subject to him.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that names which
important relationem ad creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex
import relation to creatures not are-said of God from
tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divinam
time all for such names signify the-divine
substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde et Ambrosius dicit
substance as commonly it-is-said whence also Ambrose says
quod hoc nomen Dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est
that this name Lord is a-name of-power which is
divina substantia: et Creator significat Dei actionem, quae
the-divine substance and Creator signifies of-God action which
est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis,
is his essence but the-divine substance not is temporal
sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo
but eternal therefore such names not are-said of God
ex tempore, sed ab aeterno.
from time but from eternity

2. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest

2 further to-whatever belongs something from time can
dici factum: quod enim ex tempore est album, fit
to-be-called made what for from time is white becomes
album. Sed Deo non convenit esse factum. Ergo de Deo
white but to-God not belongs to-be made therefore of God
nihil praedicatur ex tempore.

nothing is-predicated from time

3. Praeterea, si aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore

3 further if some names are-said of God from time
propter hoc quod important relationem ad creaturas, eadem
on-account-of this that they-import relation to creatures the-same
ratio videtur de omnibus quae relationem ad creaturas important.

reason seems of all which relation to creatures import

Sed quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturas,

but some names importing relation to creatures

dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno: ab aeterno enim scivit creaturam

are-said of God from eternity from eternity for he-knew the-creature

et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, in caritate perpetua

and loved according-to that Jeremiah XXXI with charity everlasting

dilexi te. Ergo et alia nomina quae important relationem ad

I-have-loved you therefore also other names which import relation to

creaturas, ut Dominus et Creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno.

creatures as Lord and Creator are-said of God from eternity

4. Praeterea, huiusmodi nomina relationem significant.

4 further such names relation signify

Oportet igitur quod relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo,

it-is-necessary therefore that relation that either be something in God

vel in creatura tantum. Sed non potest esse quod sit in

or in the-creature only but not can to-be that it-be in

creatura tantum: quia sic Deus denominaretur Dominus

the-creature only because thus God would-be-denominated Lord

a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis; nihil autem
from the-relation opposite which is in creatures nothing moreover
 denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod
is-denominated from its opposite it-remains therefore that
 relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest
the-relation is also something in God but in God nothing can
 esse ex tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur
to-be from time since he is above time therefore it-seems
 quod huiusmodi nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.
that such names not are-said of God from time

5. Praeterea, secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative:

5 further according-to relation is-said something relatively
 puta secundum dominium dominus, sicut secundum
for-example according-to lordship lord as according-to
 albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio domini non est in Deo
whiteness white if therefore the-relation of-lordship not is in God
 secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, sequitur quod
according-to reality but only according-to reason it-follows that
 Deus non sit realiter Dominus: quod patet esse falsum.
God not is really Lord which is-plain to-be false

6. Praeterea, in relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum
 6 further in relatives which not are at-once in-nature one
 potest esse, altero non existente: sicut scibile existit, non
can to-be the-other not existing as the-knowable exists not
 existente scientia, ut dicitur in Praedicamentis. Sed relativa
existing science as it-is-said in the-Predicaments but the-relatives
 quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, non sunt simul natura.
which are-said of God and creatures not are at-once in-nature
 Ergo potest aliquid dici relative de Deo ad creaturam, etiam
therefore can something to-be-said relatively of God to the-creature even

creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi nomina, Dominus et
the-creature not existing and thus such names Lord and
 Creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex tempore.

Creator are-said of God from eternity and not from time
 Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod
but against is that says Augustine V on the-Trinity that
 haec relativa appellatio Dominus Deo convenit ex tempore.

this relative appellation Lord to-God belongs from time
 Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam nomina importantia
I-answer it-must-be-said that some names importing
 relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, et
relation to the-creature from time of God are-said and
 non ab aeterno.

not from eternity

Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt
for whose evidence to-be-known it-is that some posited
 relationem non esse rem naturae, sed rationis tantum.

relation not to-be a-thing of-nature but of-reason only
 Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae
which indeed appears to-be false from this that the-very
 res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem.

things a-natural order and relation have to one-another

Veruntamen sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo
nevertheless to-be-known it-is that since relation requires two
 extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res
extremes in-three-ways itself to-have it-can to this that it-be a-thing
 naturae et rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est
of-nature and of-reason sometimes for from each side it-is
 res rationis tantum: quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non
a-thing of-reason only when namely order or relation not
 potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem
can to-be between some-things except according-to the-apprehension

rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem.

of-reason only as when we-say the-same to-the-same the-same

Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum,

for according as reason apprehends twice something one

statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem

it-sets it as two and thus it-apprehends a-certain relation

ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus

of-it to itself and similarly it-is of all relations

quae sunt inter ens et non ens; quas format ratio,

which are between being and non being which forms reason

inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et

inasmuch-as it-apprehends non being as a-certain extreme and

idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum

the-same it-is of all relations which follow the-act

rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi.

of-reason as genus and species and such-things

Quaedam vero relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque

some but relations are as-far to each

extremum, res naturae: quando scilicet est habitudo inter

extreme things of-nature when namely there-is a-relation between

aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique. Sicut

some two according-to something really belonging to-each as

patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem,

is-plain of all relations which follow quantity

ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, et huiusmodi:

as great and small double and half and such-things

nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile est

for quantity is in each of-the-extremes and similar it-is

de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem,

of relations which follow action and passion

ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia.

as the-moving and the-movable father and son and similar-things

Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae,
sometimes but relation in one of-the-extremes is a-thing of-nature
 et in altero est res rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit
and in the-other is a-thing of-reason only and this happens
 quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis. Sicut sensus
whenever two extremes not are of-one order as sense
 et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile, quae quidem,
and science are-referred to the-sensible and the-knowable which indeed
 inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali existentes,
inasmuch-as they-are things certain in the-to-be natural existing
 sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis: et
are outside the-order of-the-to-be sensible and intelligible and
 ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum
therefore in science indeed and sense is relation real according
 quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res
as they-are-ordered for knowing or sensing things but the-things
 ipsae in se consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi.
themselves in themselves considered are outside order such
 Unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et
whence in them not is any relation really to science and
 sensum; sed secundum rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus
sense but according-to reason only inasmuch-as the-intellect
 apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus.
apprehends them as the-terms of-the-relations of-science and of-sense
 Unde Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod non dicuntur
whence the-Philosopher says in V Metaphysics that not are-said
 relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia, sed quia
relatively for-the-reason that they-themselves are-referred to others but because
 alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non dicitur de
others are-referred to them and similarly right not is-said of

columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram: unde
a-column except inasmuch-as it-is-placed to-an-animal to the-right whence
huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali.
such relation not is really in the-column but in the-animal
Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes
since therefore God is outside the-whole order of-the-creature and all
creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum
creatures are-ordered to him and not from the-converse manifest
est quod creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed
it-is that creatures really are-referred to the-very God but
in Deo non est aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed
in God not is any real relation of-him to creatures but
secundum rationem tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad
according-to reason only inasmuch-as creatures are-referred to
ipsum. Et sic nihil prohibet huiusmodi nomina importancia
him and thus nothing prohibits such names importing
relationem ad creaturam, praedicari de Deo ex tempore:
relation to the-creature to-be-predicated of God from time
non propter aliquam mutationem ipsius, sed propter
not on-account-of any change of-him but on-account-of
creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera animali,
the-creature's change as a-column becomes right to-an-animal
nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali translato.
no change about it existing but the-animal moved
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that relatives some are
imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut
imposed for signifying the-very relations relative as
dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi: et haec
lord servant father and son and such-things and these
dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero sunt imposita
are-called relative according-to to-be some but are imposed

ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines,
for signifying things which follow some relations
 sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia
as the-mover and the-moved the-head and the-beaded and others
 huiusmodi: quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur
such which are-called relative according-to saying thus therefore
 et circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda.
also about the-names divine this difference is to-be-considered
 Nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam,
for some signify the-very relation to the-creature
 ut Dominus. Et huiusmodi non significant substantiam
as Lord and such not signify the-substance
 divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt
divine directly but indirectly inasmuch-as they-presuppose
 ipsam: sicut dominium praesupponit potestatem, quae est
it as lordship presupposes power which is
 divina substantia. Quedam vero significant directe essentiam
the-divine substance some but signify directly the-essence
 divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem; sicut
divine and by consequence import a-relation as
 Salvator, Creator, et huiusmodi, significant actionem Dei,
Savior Creator and such-things signify the-action of-God
 quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex tempore
which is his essence both yet names from time
 de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important,
of God are-said as-far to the-relation which they-import
 vel principaliter vel consequenter: non autem quantum ad
either principally or consequently not but as-far to
 hoc quod significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.
this that they-signify the-essence either directly or indirectly

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo
to the-second it-must-be-said that as relations which of God
dicuntur ex tempore, non sunt in Deo nisi secundum
are-said from time not are in God except according-to
rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum esse dicitur de
reason so neither to-become nor made to-be is-said of
Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa ipsum
God except according-to reason no change about him
existente: sicut est id, Domine refugium factus es nobis.
existing as is that O-Lord a-refuge made you-are for-us
Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-operation of-the-intellect and of-the-will
est in operante: et ideo nomina quae significant relationes
is in the-operator and therefore names which signify relations
consequentes actionem intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo
following the-action of-the-intellect or of-the-will are-said of God
ab aeterno. Quae vero consequuntur actiones procedentes,
from eternity those-which but follow actions proceeding
secundum modum intelligendi, ad exteriores effectus, dicuntur
according-to the-mode of-understanding to exterior effects are-said
de Deo ex tempore, ut Salvator, Creator, et huiusmodi.
of God from time as Savior Creator and such-things
Ad quartum dicendum quod relationes significatae per
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that the-relations signified by
huiusmodi nomina quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt
such names which are-said of God from time are
in Deo secundum rationem tantum: oppositae autem relationes
in God according-to reason only the-opposite but relations
in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est inconueniens
in creatures are according-to reality nor is unfitting
quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus
that from relations really existing in the-thing God

denominetur: tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per
be-denominated yet according as are-co-understood by
 intellectum nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic
intellect our the-opposite relations in God so-that thus
 Deus dicatur relative ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur
God be-said relatively to the-creature because the-creature is-referred
 ad ipsum: sicut Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod
to him as the-Philosopher says in V Metaphysics that
 scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia refertur ad ipsum.
the-knowable is-said relatively because science is-referred to it

Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus
to the-fifth it-must-be-said that since by-that reason is-referred God
 ad creaturam, qua creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio
to the-creature by-which the-creature is-referred to him since the-relation
 subiectionis realiter sit in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non
of-subjection really is in the-creature it-follows that God not
 secundum rationem tantum, sed realiter sit Dominus. Eo
according-to reason only but really is Lord in-that
 enim modo dicitur Dominus, quo creatura ei subiecta est.
for way is-called Lord in-which the-creature to-him subject is

Ad sextum dicendum quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa
to the-sixth it-must-be-said that for knowing whether relatives
 sint simul natura vel non, non oportet considerare ordinem
are at-once in-nature or not not it-is-necessary to-consider the-order
 rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed significationes ipsorum
of-things of which relatives are-said but the-significations of-the-very
 relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu claudat aliud
relatives if for one in its understanding encloses the-other
 et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura: sicut duplum et
and from the-converse then they-are at-once in-nature as double and
 dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in
half father and son and similar-things if but one in

sui intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non
its understanding encloses the-other and not from the-converse then not
sunt simul natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et
they-are at-once in-nature and in-this way themselves have science and
scibile. Nam scibile dicitur secundum potentiam: scientia
the-knowable for the-knowable is-said according-to potency science
autem secundum habitum, vel secundum actum. Unde
but according-to habit or according-to act whence
scibile, secundum modum suae significationis, praexistit
the-knowable according-to the-mode of-its signification pre-exists
scientiae. Sed si accipiat scibile secundum actum, tunc
science but if be-taken the-knowable according-to act then
est simul cum scientia secundum actum: nam scitum non
it-is at-once with science according-to act for the-known not
est aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit
is anything unless there-be its science although therefore God be
prior creaturis, quia tamen in significatione Domini clauditur
prior to-creatures because yet in the-signification of-Lord is-enclosed
quod habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa,
that he-have a-servant and from the-converse these two relatives
Dominus et servus, sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non
Lord and servant are at-once in-nature whence God not
fuit Dominus, antequam haberet creaturam sibi subiectam.
was Lord before he-had a-creature to-himself subject

Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit nomen naturae

8 • WHETHER THIS NAME GOD IS A NAME OF NATURE

Damascene derives the name from running, burning, and beholding, which are operations, and the divine nature is unknown to us. Thomas answers that what a name is taken from may differ from what it signifies, as stone is named from hurting the foot. God is named from his universal providence, an operation, but the name is imposed to signify the divine nature, known through its effects as above all, the principle of all, and removed from all.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this name God not
sit nomen naturae. Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod
is a-name of-nature says for Damascene in I book that
Deus dicitur a theein, quod est currere, et fovere universa;
God is-called from theein which is to-run and to-cherish all-things
vel ab aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens
or from aethein that-is to-burn God for our a-fire consuming
est omnem malitiam); vel a theasthai, quod est considerare,
is all malice or from theasthai which is to-consider
omnia. Haec autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo
all-things these moreover all to operation pertain therefore
hoc nomen Deus operationem significat, et non naturam.

this name God operation signifies and not nature
2. Praeterea, secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis,
2 further according-to this something is-named by us
secundum quod cognoscitur. Sed divina natura est nobis
according as it-is-known but the-divine nature is to-us
ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non significat naturam divinam.
unknown therefore this name God not signifies the-nature divine

Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de Fide,
but against is that says Ambrose in the-book I on the-Faith
 quod Deus est nomen naturae.

that God is a-name of-nature

Respondeo dicendum quod non est semper idem id a
I-answer it-must-be-said that not is always the-same that from
 quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod
which is-imposed a-name for signifying and that for which
 significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam
to-be-signified the-name is-imposed as for the-substance

rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus,
of-a-thing from the-properties or operations of-it we-know

ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua
so the-substance of-a-thing we-denominate sometimes from some
 eius operatione vel proprietate: sicut substantiam lapidis
its operation or property as the-substance of-stone

denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit pedem;
we-denominate from some action of-it because it-hurts the-foot

non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum
not yet this name imposed is for signifying

hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua vero sunt
this action but the-substance of-stone if any but there-are
 quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus,
which according-to themselves are known to-us as heat cold

albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde
whiteness and such-things not from others are-denominated whence

in talibus idem est quod nomen significat, et id a
in such-things the-same is what the-name signifies and that from
 quo imponitur nomen ad significandum.
which is-imposed the-name for signifying

Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura, sed
because therefore God not is known to-us in his nature but
 innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his
becomes-known to-us from the-operations or effects of-him from these
 possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc
we-can him to-name as above said it-is whence this
 nomen Deus est nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo
name God is a-name of-operation as-far to that from which
 imponitur ad significandum. Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab
it-is-imposed for signifying it-is-imposed for this name from
 universali rerum providentia: omnes enim loquentes de Deo,
the-universal of-things providence all for those-speaking of God
 hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet providentiam
this intend to-name God which has providence
 universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap. de Div.
universal over things whence says Dionysius XII chapter on Divine
 Nom., quod deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et
Names that the-deity is that-which all-things sees with-providence and
 bonitate perfecta. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus
goodness perfect from this moreover operation this name God
 assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.
taken imposed is for signifying the-divine nature

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia quae posuit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that all-things which posited
 Damascenus, pertinent ad providentiam, a qua imponitur
Damascene pertain to providence from which is-imposed
 hoc nomen Deus ad significandum.

this name God for signifying

Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam
to the-second it-must-be-said that according as the-nature
 alicuius rei ex eius proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere
of-some thing from its properties and effects to-know

possumus, sic eam nomine possumus significare. Unde, quia
we-can so it by-name we-can to-signify whence because
 substantiam lapidis ex eius proprietate possumus cognoscere
the-substance of-stone from its property we-can to-know
 secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est lapis, hoc nomen lapis
according-to itself by-knowing what is stone this name stone
 ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se est, significat:
the-very of-stone nature according as in itself it-is signifies
 significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam scimus quid
it-signifies for the-definition of-stone through which we-know what
 est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio,
is stone the-notion for which signifies the-name is the-definition
 ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis divinam
as it-is-said in IV Metaphysics but from effects divine the-divine
 naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est,
nature not we-can to-know according-to that in itself it-is
 ut sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae
so-that we-know about it what it-is but through the-mode of-eminence
 et causalitatis et negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic
and of-causality and of-negation as above said it-is and thus
 hoc nomen Deus significat naturam divinam. Impositum
this name God signifies the-nature divine imposed
 est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid significandum supra omnia
is for name this for something to-be-signified above all-things
 existens, quod est principium omnium, et remotum ab
existing which is the-principle of-all-things and removed from
 omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum.
all-things this for intend to-signify those-naming God

Utrum hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile

9 • WHETHER THIS NAME GOD IS COMMUNICABLE

Peter speaks of sharing the divine nature, and the psalm calls men gods. Thomas answers that a name is properly communicable when its whole signification can belong to many, and by likeness when part of it can. Since the divine nature cannot be multiplied, the name God is incommunicable in reality, communicable by opinion and by likeness. A name for the very suppositum, as perhaps the Tetragrammaton, would be wholly incommunicable.

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus
to the-ninth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this name God
sit communicabile. Cuicumque enim communicatur res
is communicable to-whomever for is-communicated the-thing
significata per nomen, communicatur et nomen ipsum. Sed
signified by the-name is-communicated also the-name itself but
hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat divinam naturam,
this name God as said it-is signifies the-divine nature
quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II Pet. I:
which is communicable to-others according-to that II Peter I
magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc
great and precious promises to-us he-has-given that through this
efficiamur divinae consortes naturae. Ergo hoc nomen
we-may-be-made of-the-divine partakers nature therefore this name
Deus est communicabile.

God is communicable

2. Praeterea, sola nomina propria non sunt communicabilia.

2 further alone names proper not are communicable

Sed hoc nomen Deus non est nomen proprium, sed
but this name God not is a-name proper but
appellativum: quod patet ex hoc quod habet plurale,
appellative which is-plain from this that it-has a-plural

secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI: Ego dixi, dii estis. Ergo
according-to that of-the-Psalm LXXXI I said gods you-are therefore
 hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.

this name God is communicable

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione,
3 further this name God is-imposed from operation
 ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina quae imponuntur Deo ab
as said it-is but other names which are-imposed on-God from
 operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt communicabilia, ut
operations or from effects are communicable as
 bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus
good wise and such-things therefore also this name God
 est communicabile.

is communicable

Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV: incommunicabile
but against is that it-is-said Wisdom XIV the-incommunicable
 nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt; et loquitur de nomine
name on-wood and stones they-imposed and it-speaks of the-name
 deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile.

of-deity therefore this name God is a-name incommunicable

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod nomen potest esse
I-answer it-must-be-said that some name can to-be
 communicabile dupliciter: uno modo, proprie; alio modo,
communicable in-two-ways in-one way properly in-another way
 per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile est, quod
by likeness properly indeed communicable is what
 secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile
according-to the-whole signification of-the-name is communicable
 multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est
to-many by likeness but communicable is what is
 communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur
communicable according-to something of-those-things which are-included

in nominis significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie
in the-name's signification this for name lion properly
 communicatur omnibus illis in quibus invenitur natura quam
is-communicated to-all those in which is-found the-nature which
 significat hoc nomen leo: per similitudinem vero communicabile
signifies this name lion by likeness but communicable
 est illis qui participant aliquid leoninum, ut puta
it-is to-those who participate something lion-like as for-example
 audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones dicuntur.
boldness or strength who metaphorically lions are-called
 Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia,
for knowing moreover which names properly are communicable
 considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari
to-be-considered it-is that every form in a-suppositum singular
 existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel
existing by which it-is-individuated common is to-many either
 secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem: sicut natura
according-to reality or according-to reason at-least as nature
 humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem,
human common is to-many according-to reality and reason
 natura autem solis non est communis multis secundum
the-nature but of-the-sun not is common to-many according-to
 rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura
reality but according-to reason only can for the-nature
 solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens. Et hoc
of-the-sun to-be-understood as in several supposita existing and this
 ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei
therefore because the-intellect understands the-nature of-any species
 per abstractionem a singulari: unde esse in uno supposito
by abstraction from the-singular whence to-be in one suppositum
 singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum naturae
singular or in several is beside the-understanding of-the-nature

speciei: unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest
of-the-species whence preserved the-understanding of-the-nature of-the-species it-can
 intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso
to-be-understood as in several existing but the-singular from this itself
 quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne
that it-is singular is divided from all others whence every
 nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est
name imposed for signifying some singular is
 incommunicabile et re et ratione: non enim potest nec in
incommunicable both in-reality and reason not for can even in
 apprehensione cadere pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum
apprehension to-fall a-plurality of-this individual whence no
 nomen significans aliquod individuum, est communicabile
name signifying some individual is communicable
 multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut
to-many properly but only according-to likeness as
 aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, inquantum habet
someone metaphorically can to-be-called Achilles inasmuch-as he-has
 aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet fortitudinem.
something of the-properties of-Achilles namely strength
 Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod suppositum,
forms but which not are-individuated through some suppositum
 sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae subsistentes), si
but through themselves because namely they-are forms subsisting if
 intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, non possent
they-were-understood according as they-are in themselves not could
 communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per
to-be-communicated neither in-reality nor reason but perhaps by
 similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia
likeness as said it-is about individuals but because
 formas simplices per se subsistentes non possumus
forms simple through themselves subsisting not we-can

intelligere secundum quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad
to-understand according as they-are but we-understand them after
 modum rerum compositarum habentium formas in materia;
the-mode of-things composite having forms in matter
 ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis nomina concreta
therefore as said it-is we-impose on-them names concrete
 significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, quantum
signifying a-nature in some suppositum whence as-far-as
 pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus
it-pertains to the-notion of-names the-same notion is of names
 quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum
which by us are-imposed for signifying the-natures of-things
 compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur
composite and of names which by us are-imposed
 ad significandum naturas simplices subsistentes.

for signifying natures simple subsisting
 Unde, cum hoc nomen Deus impositum sit ad significandum
whence since this name God imposed is for signifying
 naturam divinam, ut dictum est; natura autem divina
the-nature divine as said it-is the-nature but divine
 multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est: sequitur quod
multipliable not is as above shown it-is it-follows that
 hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum rem,
this name God incommunicable indeed is according-to reality
 sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum
but communicable is according-to opinion just-as
 hoc nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem
this name sun would-be communicable according-to the-opinion
 ponentium multos soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal.
of-those-positing many suns and according-to this it-is-said Galatians
 IV: his qui natura non sunt dii, serviebatis; glossa: non
IV to-those who by-nature not are gods you-served the-gloss not

sunt dii natura, sed opinione hominum. – Est nihilominus
are gods by-nature but by-the-opinion of-men it-is nevertheless
 communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non secundum suam totam
communicable this name God not according-to its whole
 significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per quamdam
signification but according-to something of-it by a-certain
 similitudinem: ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid
likeness so-that gods may-be-called who participate something
 divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud: Ego dixi, dii estis.
divine by likeness according-to that I said gods you-are
 Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum
if but there-were some name imposed for signifying
 Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi,
God not from the-side of-nature but from the-side of-the-suppositum
 secundum quod consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen
according as he-is-considered as this something that name
 esset omnibus modis incommunicabile: sicut forte est
would-be in-all ways incommunicable as perhaps is
 nomen Tetragrammaton apud Hebraeos. Et est simile si
the-name Tetragrammaton among the-Hebrews and it-is similar if
 quis imponeret nomen Soli designans hoc individuum.
someone imposed a-name on-the-Sun designating this individual
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura divina non est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-nature divine not is
 communicabilis, nisi secundum similitudinis participationem.
communicable except according-to of-likeness participation
 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen
to the-second it-must-be-said that this name God is a-name
 appellativum, et non proprium, quia significat naturam
appellative and not proper because it-signifies the-nature
 divinam ut in habente; licet ipse Deus, secundum rem,
divine as in the-one-having although the-very God according-to reality

non sit nec universalis nec particularis. Nomina enim non
not be neither universal nor particular names for not
 sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum
follow the-mode of-being which is in things but the-mode
 essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen,
of-being according as in knowledge our it-is and yet
 secundum rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum
according-to the-thing's truth it-is incommunicable according
 quod dictum est de hoc nomine sol.

as said it-is about this name sun
 Ad tertium dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et
to the-third it-must-be-said that these names good wise and
 similia, imposita quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus
similar imposed indeed are from perfections proceeding
 a Deo in creaturas: non tamen sunt imposita ad
from God into creatures not yet are imposed for
 significandum divinam naturam, sed ad significandum ipsas
signifying the-divine nature but for signifying the-very
 perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum rei
perfections absolutely and therefore also according-to the-thing's
 veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus
truth they-are communicable to-many but this name God
 impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur
imposed is from an-operation proper to-God which we-experience
 continue, ad significandum divinam naturam.
continually for signifying the-divine nature

Utrum hoc nomen Deus univoce
dicatur de Deo per participationem,
secundum naturam, et secundum opinionem

10 • WHETHER THE NAME GOD IS SAID UNIVOCALLY IN EVERY USE

The catholic and the pagan seem to contradict each other about an idol, so they must use the name univocally. Thomas answers that the name God is said in these three ways neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, since God by participation and by opinion are defined by reference to the true God. Both catholic and pagan, saying whether an idol is God, mean the true God.

Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus
to the-tenth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this name God
univoce dicatur de Deo per naturam, et per participationem,
univocally is-said of God by nature and by participation
et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim est diversa significatio,
and according-to opinion where for there-is diverse signification
non est contradictio affirmantis et negantis:
not there-is contradiction of-the-one-affirming and of-the-one-denying
aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem. Sed catholicus
equivocation for impedes contradiction but the-catholic
dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit pagano dicenti idolum
saying an-idol not is God contradicts the-pagan saying an-idol
est Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.
is God therefore God in-both-cases taken univocally is-said
2. Praeterea, sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem
2 further as an-idol is God according-to opinion
et non secundum veritatem, ita fruitio carnalium
and not according-to truth so the-enjoyment of-carnal
delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum opinionem, et non
delights is-called happiness according-to opinion and not

secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo univoce
according-to truth but this name blessedness univocally
 dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine
is-said of this blessedness opined and of this blessedness
 vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo
true therefore also this name God univocally is-said of God
 secundum veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.

according-to truth and of God according-to opinion

3. Praeterea, univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed
3 further univocal are-called things-of-which there-is a-notion one but
 catholicus, cum dicit unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine
the-catholic when he-says one to-be God understands by-the-name
 Dei rem omnipotentem, et super omnia venerandam: et
of-God a-thing omnipotent and above all-things to-be-venerated and
 hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum esse Deum.
this same understands the-gentile when he-says an-idol to-be God
 Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.

therefore this name God univocally is-said in-both-cases

Sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius
but against that which is in the-intellect is the-likeness of-that
 quod est in re, ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal,
which is in reality as it-is-said in I On-Interpretation but animal
 dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce
said of the-animal true and of the-animal painted equivocally
 dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de Deo vero et
is-said therefore this name God said of God true and
 de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.

of God according-to opinion equivocally is-said

Praeterea, nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit:
further no-one can to-signify that which not he-knows
 sed gentilis non cognoscit naturam divinam: ergo, cum
but the-gentile not knows the-nature divine therefore when

dicat idolum est Deus, non significat veram deitatem. Hanc

he-says an-idol is God not he-signifies the-true deity this
 autem significat catholicus dicens unum esse Deum. Ergo
but signifies the-catholic saying one to-be God therefore
 hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed aequivoce, de
this name God not is-said univocally but equivocally of
 Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.

God true and of God according-to opinion

Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis

I-answer it-must-be-said that this name God in the-aforesaid
 tribus significationibus, non accipitur neque univoce neque

three significations not is-taken neither univocally nor

aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc patet. Quia

equivocally but analogically which from this is-plain because

univocorum est omnino eadem ratio: aequivocorum est

of-univocals is altogether the-same notion of-equivocals is

omnino ratio diversa: in analogicis vero, oportet quod

altogether the-notion diverse in analogicals but it-is-necessary that

nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur

the-name according-to one signification taken be-placed

in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes

in the-definition of-the-same name according-to other significations

accepti. Sicut ens de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione

taken as being of substance said is-placed in the-definition

entis secundum quod de accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum

of-being according as of accident it-is-said and healthy said

de animali, ponitur in definitione sani secundum quod

of the-animal is-placed in the-definition of-healthy according as

dicatur de urina et de medicina; huius enim sani quod

it-is-said of urine and of medicine of-this for healthy which

est in animali, urina est significativa, et medicina factiva.

is in the-animal urine is significative and medicine productive

Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, secundum
thus it-happens in the-case for this name God according
 quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur
as for God true it-is-taken in the-notion of-God is-taken
 secundum quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel
according as is-said God according-to opinion or
 participationem. Cum enim aliquem nominamus Deum
participation when for someone we-name God
 secundum participationem, intelligimus nomine Dei aliquid
according-to participation we-understand by-the-name of-God something
 habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum idolum
having likeness of-the-true God similarly when an-idol
 nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari
we-name God by-this name God we-understand to-be-signified
 aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic
something about which men opine that it-is God and thus
 manifestum est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis,
manifest it-is that one and another is the-signification of-the-name
 sed una illarum significationum clauditur in significationibus
but one of-those significations is-enclosed in the-significations
 aliis. Unde manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.
other whence manifest it-is that analogically it-is-said
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that of-names the-multiplicity not
 attenditur secundum nominis praedicationem, sed secundum
is-attended according-to of-the-name predication but according-to
 significationem: hoc enim nomen homo, de quocumque
signification this for name man of whatever
 praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. Sed tunc
it-be-predicated whether truly or falsely is-said in-one way but then
 multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo intenderemus
manifoldly it-would-be-said if by this name man we-intended

significare diversa: puta, si unus intenderet significare per
to-signify diverse-things for-example if one intended to-signify by
hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius intenderet
this name man that which truly is man and another intended
significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. Unde
to-signify by-the-same name a-stone or something other whence
patet quod catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit
is-plain that the-catholic saying an-idol not to-be God contradicts
pagano hoc asserenti: quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus
the-pagan this asserting because each uses this name God
ad significandum verum Deum. Cum enim paganus dicit
for signifying the-true God when for the-pagan says
idolum esse Deum, non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod
an-idol to-be God not he-uses this name according as
significat Deum opinabilem: sic enim verum diceret, cum
it-signifies God opinable thus for true he-would-say since
etiam catholici interdum in tali significatione hoc nomine
also catholics sometimes in such signification this name
utantur, ut cum dicitur, omnes dii gentium daemonia.
use as when it-is-said all the-gods of-the-gentiles demons
Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam
and similarly it-must-be-said to the-second and third for
illae rationes procedunt secundum diversitatem praedicationis
those reasons proceed according-to diversity of-predication
nominis, et non secundum diversam significationem.
of-the-name and not according-to diverse signification
Ad quartum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that animal said of the-animal true
et de picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; sed Philosophus
and of the-painted not is-said purely equivocally but the-Philosopher
largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in
in-a-broad way takes equivocal according as they-include in

se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando
themselves analogicals because also being which analogically is-said sometimes
 dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.

is-said equivocally to-be-predicated of diverse predicaments

Ad quintum dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout

to the-fifth it-must-be-said that the-very nature of-God according-as

in se est, neque catholicus neque paganus cognoscit:

in itself it-is neither the-catholic nor the-pagan knows

sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam rationem

but each knows it according-to some notion

causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotiois, ut supra dictum

of-causality or of-excellence or of-removal as above said

est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere

it-is and according-to this in the-same signification to-take

potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est

can the-gentile this name God when he-says an-idol is

Deus, in qua accipit ipsum catholicus dicens idolum non est

God in which takes it the-catholic saying an-idol not is

Deus. Si vero aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem

God if but someone there-were who according-to no notion

Deum cognosceret, nec ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut

God knew neither him he-would-name unless perhaps as

proferimus nomina quorum significationem ignoramus.

we-utter names whose signification we-are-ignorant-of

Utrum hoc nomen Qui est sit maxime nomen Dei proprium

11 • WHETHER HE WHO IS IS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD

The name God is incommunicable while He Who Is is not, and good seems the more principal name. Thomas answers that He Who Is is most proper, for three reasons: it signifies being itself, which is God's essence; it is the most universal and undetermined, the infinite sea of substance, as Damascene says; and it signifies the present, God's being knowing neither past nor future, as Augustine says.

Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen

to the-eleventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that this name

Qui est non sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim

He-who is not is most proper name of-God this for

nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, ut dictum est. Sed

name God is a-name incommunicable as said it-is but

hoc nomen Qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. Ergo

this name He-who is not is a-name incommunicable therefore

hoc nomen Qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.

this name He-who is not is most proper name of-God

2. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod

2 further Dionysius says III chapter on Divine Names that

boni nominatio est manifestativa omnium Dei processionum.

of-good the-naming is manifestative of-all God's processions

Sed hoc maxime Deo convenit, quod sit universale rerum

but this most to-God belongs that he-be the-universal of-things

principium. Ergo hoc nomen bonum est maxime proprium

principle therefore this name good is most proper

Dei, et non hoc nomen Qui est.

of-God and not this name He-who is

3. Praeterea, omne nomen divinum videtur importare

3 further every name divine seems to-import

relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus non cognoscatur a nobis

relation to creatures since God not is-known by us

nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen Qui est nullam

except through creatures but this name He-who is no

importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen Qui

imports relation to creatures therefore this name He-who

est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.

is not is most proper name of-God

Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti,

but against is that it-is-said Exodus III that to-Moses asking

si dixerint mihi: Quod est nomen eius? quid dicam eis?

if they-will-say to-me what is name of-him what shall-I-say to-them

et respondit ei Dominus: Sic dices eis: Qui est

and answered him the-Lord thus you-will-say to-them He-who is

misit me ad vos. Ergo hoc nomen Qui est est maxime

sent me to you therefore this name He-who is is most

proprium nomen Dei.

proper name of-God

Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen Qui est triplici

I-answer it-must-be-said that this name He-who is for-a-threefold

ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei. Primo quidem,

reason is most proper name of-God first indeed

propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam

on-account-of its signification not for it-signifies form

aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius

any but the-very to-be whence since the-to-be of-God is the-very his

essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est,

essence and this to-no other belongs as above shown it-is

manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie
manifest it-is that among other names this most properly
 nominat Deum: unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma.
names God each-thing for is-denominated from its form
 Secundo, propter eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia
second on-account-of its universality all for other
 nomina vel sunt minus communia; vel, si convertantur
names either are less common or if they-be-converted
 cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra ipsum secundum
with it yet they-add some-things over it according-to
 rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant
notion whence in-a-way they-inform and determine
 ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei
it the-intellect moreover our not can the-very of-God
 essentiam cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se
essence to-know in the-state of-the-way according as in itself
 est: sed quemcumque modum determinet circa id quod de
it-is but whatever mode it-determine about that which of
 Deo intelligit, deficit a modo quo Deus in se est. Et
God it-understands falls-short of the-mode in-which God in himself is and
 ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus determinata, et
therefore by-how-much some names are less determinate and
 magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie dicuntur
more common and absolute by-so-much more properly are-said
 de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod principalius
of God by us whence also Damascene says that more-principal
 omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est Qui est:
than-all which of God are-said names is He-who is
 totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut
the-whole for in himself comprehending he-has the-very to-be as
 quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum.
a-certain sea of-substance infinite and undetermined

Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus
by-any for other name is-determined some mode
 substantiae rei: sed hoc nomen Qui est nullum modum
of-substance of-the-thing but this name He-who is no mode
 essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminate ad omnes;
of-being determines but itself has indeterminately to all
 et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum.
and therefore it-names the-very sea of-substance infinite
 Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. Significat enim esse
third but from its consignification it-signifies for to-be
 in praesenti: et hoc maxime proprie de Deo dicitur, cuius
in present and this most properly of God is-said whose
 esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit Augustinus
to-be not knows past or future as says Augustine
 in V de Trin.
in V on the-Trinity

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen Qui est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that this name He-who is
 est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus,
is more proper name of-God than this name God
 quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et
as-far to that from which it-is-imposed namely from to-be and
 quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut
as-far to the-mode of-signifying and of-consignifying as
 dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen
said it-is but as-far to that for which is-imposed the-name
 ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus,
for signifying is more proper this name God
 quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam. Et
which is-imposed for signifying the-nature divine and
 adhuc magis proprium nomen est Tetragrammaton, quod
still more proper name is the-Tetragrammaton which

est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam

is imposed for signifying the-very of-God substance

incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.

incommunicable and as thus it-be-lawful to-speak singular

Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est

to the-second it-must-be-said that this name good is

principale nomen Dei inquantum est causa, non tamen

the-principal name of-God inasmuch-as he-is cause not yet

simpliciter: nam esse absolute praeintelligitur causae.

simply for to-be absolutely is-pre-understood to-the-cause

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod

to the-third it-must-be-said that not is necessary that

omnia nomina divina importent habitudinem ad creaturas;

all names divine import relation to creatures

sed sufficit quod imponantur ab aliquibus perfectionibus

but it-suffices that they-be-imposed from some perfections

procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter quas prima est

proceeding from God into creatures among which the-first is

ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen Qui est.

the-very to-be from which is-taken this name He-who is

Utrum propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo

12 • WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED ABOUT GOD

Dionysius calls affirmations about God unfit, a simple form cannot be a subject, and an intellect that understands otherwise than the thing is false. Thomas answers that in a true affirmation predicate and subject signify one thing under different notions; our intellect represents God's unity by composition, understanding simple things in a composite way, not as composite.

Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones

to the-twelfth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that propositions

affirmativae non possunt formari de Deo. Dicit enim

affirmative not can to-be-formed about God says for

Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod negationes de Deo

Dionysius II chapter Celestial Hierarchy that negations about God

sunt verae, affirmationes autem incompactae.

are true affirmations but unfitting

2. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod forma

2 further Boethius says in the-book on the-Trinity that form

simplex subiectum esse non potest. Sed Deus maxime est

simple subject to-be not can but God most is

forma simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse

form simple as above shown it-is therefore not can to-be

subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo propositio affirmativa

subject but every that about which a-proposition affirmative

formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de Deo propositio

is-formed is-taken as subject therefore about God a-proposition

affirmativa formari non potest.

affirmative to-be-formed not can

3. Praeterea, omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit,
3 further every intellect understanding a-thing otherwise than it-is
 est falsus. Sed Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut
is false but God has to-be without all composition as
 supra probatum est. Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus
above proved it-is since therefore every intellect affirmative
 intelligat aliquid cum compositione, videtur quod propositio
understands something with composition it-seems that a-proposition
 affirmativa vere de Deo formari non possit.

affirmative truly about God to-be-formed not can
 Sed contra est quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones
but against is that to-faith not underlies the-false but propositions
 quaedam affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est
some affirmative are-subject to-faith such-as that God is
 trinus et unus, et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones
three and one and that he-is omnipotent therefore propositions
 affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo.

affirmative can truly to-be-formed about God
 Respondeo dicendum quod propositiones affirmativae possunt
I-answer it-must-be-said that propositions affirmative can
 vere formari de Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est
truly to-be-formed about God for whose evidence to-be-known it-is
 quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera, oportet quod
that in any proposition affirmative true it-is-necessary that
 praedicatum et subiectum significant idem secundum rem
the-predicate and the-subject signify the-same according-to reality
 aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et hoc patet
in-some way and diverse according-to notion and this is-plain
 tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato accidentali,
as-much in propositions which are of a-predicate accidental
 quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. Manifestum
as in those which are of a-predicate substantial manifest

est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et
it-is for that man and white are the-same in-subject and
differunt ratione: alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia
differ in-notion one for is the-notion of-man and another
ratio albi. Et similiter cum dico homo est animal: illud
the-notion of-white and similarly when I-say man is animal that
enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est; in eodem
for the-very which is man truly animal is in the-same
enim supposito est et natura sensibilis, a qua dicitur
for suppositum is both the-nature sensible from which he-is-called
animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur homo. Unde hic
animal and rational from which he-is-called man whence here
etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, sed
also the-predicate and the-subject are the-same in-suppositum but
diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem
diverse in-notion but also in propositions in which the-same
praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum
is-predicated of itself this in-some way is-found inasmuch-as
intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad
the-intellect that which it-places from the-side of-the-subject draws to
partem suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati,
the-side of-the-suppositum what but it-places from the-side of-the-predicate
trahit ad naturam formae in supposito existentis, secundum
it-draws to the-nature of-the-form in the-suppositum existing according
quod dicitur quod praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta
as it-is-said that predicates are-held formally and subjects
materialiter. Huic vero diversitati quae est secundum rationem,
materially to-this but diversity which is according-to notion
respondet pluralitas praedicati et subiecti: identitatem vero
corresponds the-plurality of-predicate and subject the-identity but
rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem.
of-the-thing signifies the-intellect through the-very composition

Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino unus et
God moreover in himself considered is altogether one and
 simplex: sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
simple but yet intellect our according-to diverse
 conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest
conceptions him knows for-the-reason that not it-can
 ipsum ut in seipso est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat
him as in himself he-is to-see but yet although it-understand
 ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod
him under diverse conceptions it-knows yet that
 omnibus suis conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res
to-all its conceptions corresponds one and the-same thing
 simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum
simply this therefore plurality which is according-to
 rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et subiecti:
notion it-represents through the-plurality of-predicate and subject
 unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per compositionem.
the-unity but represents the-intellect through composition
 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius dicit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Dionysius says
 affirmationes de Deo esse incompactas, vel inconvenientes
the-affirmations about God to-be unfitting or inconvenient
 secundum aliam translationem, inquantum nullum nomen Deo
according-to another translation inasmuch-as no name to-God
 competit secundum modum significandi, ut supra dictum est.
belongs according-to the-mode of-signifying as above said it-is
 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest
to the-second it-must-be-said that intellect our not can
 formas simplices subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis
forms simple subsisting according as in themselves
 sunt, apprehendere: sed apprehendit eas secundum modum
they-are to-apprehend but it-apprehends them according-to the-mode

compositorum, in quibus est aliquid quod subiicitur, et
of-composites in which there-is something which is-subjected and
 est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit formam
there-is something which is-in and therefore it-apprehends the-form
 simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.
simple in the-notion of-subject and attributes to-it something
 Ad tertium dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus
to the-third it-must-be-said that this proposition the-intellect
 intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus, est duplex; ex
understanding a-thing otherwise than it-is is false is twofold from
 eo quod hoc adverbium aliter potest determinare hoc verbum
this that this adverb otherwise can to-determine this verb
 intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel ex parte intelligentis. Si
understands from the-side of-the-understood or from the-side of-the-understander if
 ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera est, et est sensus:
from the-side of-the-understood thus the-proposition true is and is the-sense
 quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit, falsus
whatever intellect understands a-thing to-be otherwise than it-is false
 est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito: quia intellectus
is but this not has place in the-case because intellect
 noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit eum esse
our forming a-proposition about God not says him to-be
 compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis,
composite but simple if but from the-side of-the-understander
 sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in
thus the-proposition false is other is for the-mode of-the-intellect in
 intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim
understanding than of-the-thing in being manifest it-is for
 quod intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes
that intellect our things material below itself existing
 intelligit immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse
understands immaterially not that it-understand them to-be

imateriales, sed habet modum imaterialem in intelligendo.

immaterial but it-has a-mode immaterial in understanding

Et similiter, cum intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se,

and similarly when it-understands simple-things which are above itself

intelligit ea secundum modum suum, scilicet composite: non

it-understands them according-to mode its namely compositely not

tamen ita quod intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus

yet so that it-understand them to-be composite and thus intellect

noster non est falsus, formans compositionem de Deo.

our not is false forming composition about God
