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Summa Theologiae

Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologiae

Part Two: On Happiness and Law, in Questions 1–5 and 90–97 of the First Part of the Second Part

---

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



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

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Prologus

PROLOGUE

Since man is made in God's image, as he is intelligent, free in judgment, and the master of his own acts, Thomas turns, after treating God the exemplar and what proceeds from his power according to his will, to man, God's image, as the principle of his own works, having free choice and power over them.

Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei
because as Damascene says man made to the-image of-God
dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale
is-said according as through image is-signified the-intellectual
et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam
and in-choice free and through itself having-power after
praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de
said-before it-is about the-exemplar namely about God and about
his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius
those-things which proceeded from the-divine power according-to his
voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de
will it-remains that we-consider about his image that-is about
homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium,
man according as also he is of-his works the-principle
quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
as-if free choice having and of-his works power

De ultimo fine hominis

I · ON THE LAST END OF MAN

Thomas first considers the last end of human life, and then the things by which man may reach it or stray from it. Since the end is beatitude, he will treat the last end in general and then beatitude. He asks eight questions about the last end in general.

Ubi primo considerandum occurrit de ultimo fine
where first to-be-considered it-presents-itself about the-last end
humanae vitae; et deinde de his per quae homo ad
of-human life and then about those-things through which man to
hunc finem pervenire potest, vel ab eo deviare: ex fine
this end to-arrive can or from it to-deviate from the-end
enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur
for it-is-necessary to-take the-notions of-those-things which are-ordered
ad finem. Et quia ultimus finis humanae vitae ponitur esse
to the-end and because the-last end of-human life is-held to-be
beatitudo, oportet primo considerare de ultimo fine in
beatitude it-is-necessary first to-consider about the-last end in
communi; deinde de beatitudine.
common then about beatitude

Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
about the-first are-asked eight

Primo: utrum hominis sit agere propter finem.
first whether of-man it-be to-act for-the-sake-of an-end

Secundo: utrum hoc sit proprium rationalis naturae.
second whether this be proper of-the-rational nature

Tertio: utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem a fine.
third whether the-acts of-man receive species from the-end

Quarto: utrum sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae.
fourth whether there-be some last end of-human life

Quinto: utrum unius hominis possint esse plures ultimi
fifth whether of-one man can to-be several last
fines.
ends

Sexto: utrum homo ordinet omnia in ultimum finem.
sixth whether man may-order all-things to the-last end

Septimo: utrum idem sit finis ultimus omnium hominum.
seventh whether the-same be the-end last of-all men

Octavo: utrum in illo ultimo fine omnes aliae creaturae
eighth whether in that last end all other creatures
conveniant.
agree

Utrum homini conveniat agere propter finem

1 · WHETHER IT BELONGS TO MAN TO ACT FOR AN END

The objections: the end is last, a cause comes first, and some acts are done without deliberation. Thomas answers that only acts proceeding from a deliberate will, of which man is master, are properly human. The will's object is the end and the good, so every human act is for an end. Acts done without deliberation, like stroking one's beard, are acts of a man but not human acts.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homini non
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-man not
conveniat agere propter finem. Causa enim naturaliter prior
it-belongs to-act for-the-sake-of an-end the-cause for naturally prior
est. Sed finis habet rationem ultimi, ut ipsum nomen sonat.
is but the-end has the-notion of-the-last as the-very name sounds
Ergo finis non habet rationem causae. Sed propter illud
therefore the-end not has the-notion of-cause but for-the-sake-of that
agit homo, quod est causa actionis: cum haec praepositio
acts man which is the-cause of-the-action since this preposition

propter designet habitudinem causae. Ergo homini non
for-the-sake-of designates the-relation of-cause therefore to-man not
convenit agere propter finem.
it-belongs to-act for-the-sake-of an-end

2. Praeterea, illud quod est ultimus finis, non est
2 further that which is the-last end not is
propter finem. Sed in quibusdam actiones sunt ultimus
for-the-sake-of an-end but in some actions are the-last
finis; ut patet per Philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo non
end as is-plain through the-Philosopher in I Ethics therefore not
omnia homo agit propter finem.
all-things man does for-the-sake-of an-end

3. Praeterea, tunc videtur homo agere propter finem,
3 further then it-seems man to-act for-the-sake-of an-end
quando deliberat. Sed multa homo agit absque deliberatione,
when he-deliberates but many-things man does without deliberation
de quibus etiam quandoque nihil cogitat; sicut cum aliquis
about which also sometimes nothing he-thinks as when someone
movet pedem vel manum aliis intentus, vel fricat
moves foot or hand on-other-things intent or rubs
barbam. Non ergo homo omnia agit propter finem.
beard not therefore man all-things does for-the-sake-of an-end

Sed contra, omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere, derivantur
but against all-things which are in some genus are-derived
a principio illius generis. Sed finis est principium in
from the-principle of-that genus but the-end is the-principle in
operabilibus ab homine; ut patet per Philosophum in II
things-doable by man as is-plain through the-Philosopher in II
Physic. Ergo homini convenit omnia agere propter finem.
Physics therefore to-man it-belongs all-things to-do for-the-sake-of an-end

Respondeo dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine
I-answer it-must-be-said that of-the-actions which by man
aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt
are-done those alone properly are-called human which are
propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab
proper of-man inasmuch-as he-is man differs moreover man from
aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum
other irrational creatures in this that he-is of-his acts
dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae,
the-master whence those alone actions are-called properly human
quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum
of-which man is the-master is moreover man master of-his
actuum per rationem et voluntatem: unde et liberum
acts through reason and will whence also free
arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae
choice to-be is-said a-faculty of-will and of-reason those
ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate
therefore actions properly human are-said which from will
deliberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones homini
deliberated proceed if any moreover other actions to-man
conveniant, possunt dici quidem hominis actiones; sed non
belong they-can to-be-called indeed of-man actions but not
proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo.
properly human since not they-are of-man inasmuch-as he-is man
– Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt
manifest it-is moreover that all actions which proceed
ab aliqua potentia, causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui
from some power are-caused by it according-to the-notion of-its
obiecti. Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum. Unde
object the-object moreover of-the-will is the-end and the-good whence
oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint.
it-is-necessary that all actions human for-the-sake-of an-end be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis, etsi sit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-end although it-be
postremus in executione, est tamen primus in intentione
last in execution it-is yet first in the-intention
agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae.
of-the-agent and in-this way it-has the-notion of-cause

Ad secundum dicendum quod, si qua actio humana sit
to the-second it-must-be-said that if some action human be
ultimus finis, oportet eam esse voluntariam: alias non
the-last end it-is-necessary it to-be voluntary otherwise not
esset humana, ut dictum est. Actio autem aliqua dupliciter
it-would-be human as said it-is an-action moreover some in-two-ways
dicitur voluntaria: uno modo, quia imperatur a voluntate,
is-said voluntary in-one way because it-is-commanded by the-will
sicut ambulare vel loqui; alio modo, quia elicitur a
as to-walk or to-speak in-another way because it-is-elicited by
voluntate, sicut ipsum velle. Impossibile autem est quod ipse
the-will as the-very to-will impossible moreover it-is that the-very
actus a voluntate elicitus sit ultimus finis. Nam obiectum
act by the-will elicited be the-last end for the-object
voluntatis est finis, sicut obiectum visus est color: unde sicut
of-the-will is the-end as the-object of-sight is color whence as
impossibile est quod primum visibile sit ipsum videre, quia
impossible it-is that the-first visible be the-very to-see because
omne videre est alicuius obiecti visibilis; ita impossibile est
every to-see is of-some object visible so impossible it-is
quod primum appetibile, quod est finis, sit ipsum velle. Unde
that the-first desirable which is the-end be the-very to-will whence
relinquitur quod, si qua actio humana sit ultimus finis, quod
it-remains that if some action human be the-last end that
ipsa sit imperata a voluntate. Et ita ibi aliqua actio hominis,
it be commanded by the-will and so there some action of-man

ad minus ipsum velle, est propter finem. Quidquid ergo
at least the-very to-will is for-the-sake-of an-end whatever therefore
homo faciat, verum est dicere quod homo agit propter
man may-do true it-is to-say that man acts for-the-sake-of
finem, etiam agendo actionem quae est ultimus finis.
an-end even by-doing an-action which is the-last end

Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi actiones non sunt
to the-third it-must-be-said that of-this-kind actions not are
proprie humanae: quia non procedunt ex deliberatione
properly human because not they-proceed from the-deliberation
rationis, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum.
of-reason which is the-proper principle of-human acts
Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem
and therefore they-have indeed an-end imagined not moreover
per rationem praestitutum.
through reason pre-established

Utrum agere propter finem sit proprium rationalis naturae

2 · WHETHER ACTING FOR AN END IS PROPER TO RATIONAL NATURE

It seems acting for an end is proper to rational nature, since what lacks knowledge cannot know an end, ordering to an end is reason's work, and the will is in reason; but the Philosopher shows that nature too acts for an end. Thomas answers that every agent acts for an end, but rational nature moves itself to it through free choice, while things without reason are moved to it by another, as the arrow by the archer. So to tend to an end as moving itself is proper to rational nature.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod agere propter
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to-act for-the-sake-of
finem sit proprium rationalis naturae. Homo enim, cuius est
an-end be proper of-the-rational nature man for of-whom it-is

agere propter finem, nunquam agit propter finem ignotum.
to-act for-the-sake-of an-end never acts for-the-sake-of an-end unknown
Sed multa sunt quae non cognoscunt finem: vel quia
but many-things are which not know the-end either because
omnino carent cognitione, sicut creaturae insensibiles; vel quia
altogether they-lack knowledge as creatures insensible or because
non apprehendunt rationem finis, sicut bruta animalia. Videtur
not they-apprehend the-notion of-end as brute animals it-seems
ergo proprium esse rationalis naturae agere propter finem.
therefore proper to-be of-the-rational nature to-act for-the-sake-of an-end

2. Praeterea, agere propter finem est ordinare suam
2 further to-act for-the-sake-of an-end is to-order its-own
actionem ad finem. Sed hoc est rationis opus. Ergo non
action to an-end but this is of-reason the-work therefore not
convenit his quae ratione carent.
it-belongs to-those-things which reason lack

3. Praeterea, bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed
3 further the-good and the-end is the-object of-the-will but
voluntas in ratione est, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo
the-will in reason is as is-said in III on the-Soul therefore
agere propter finem non est nisi rationalis naturae.
to-act for-the-sake-of an-end not is except of-the-rational nature

Sed contra est quod Philosophus probat in II Physic.,
but against is that the-Philosopher proves in II Physics
quod non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter
that not only intellect but also nature acts for-the-sake-of
finem.
an-end

Respondeo dicendum quod omnia agentia necesse est agere
I-answer it-must-be-said that all agents necessary it-is to-act
propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum,
for-the-sake-of an-end of-causes for to one-another ordered

si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima
if the-first be-withdrawn necessary it-is the-others to-be-withdrawn the-first
autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cuius ratio
moreover among all causes is the-cause final of-which the-reason
est, quia materia non consequitur formam, nisi secundum
is because matter not attains form except according
quod movetur ab agente: nihil enim reducit se de potentia
as it-is-moved by an-agent nothing for brings itself from potency
in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione
into act the-agent moreover not moves except from the-intention
finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem
of-the-end if for the-agent not were determined to some
effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud: ad hoc ergo
effect not more it-would-do this than that for this therefore
quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod
that a-determined effect it-may-produce necessary it-is that
determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.
it-be-determined to something certain which has the-notion of-end
Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per
this moreover determination as in rational nature is-made through
rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit
rational appetite which is-called will so in others it-is-made
per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.
through inclination natural which is-called appetite natural

Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel
yet to-be-considered it-is that something by-its action or
motu tendit ad finem dupliciter: uno modo, sicut seipsum ad
motion tends to an-end in-two-ways in-one way as itself to
finem movens, ut homo; alio modo, sicut ab alio motum
an-end moving as man in-another way as by another moved
ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad determinatum finem ex hoc
to an-end as the-arrow tends to a-determined end from this

quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam actionem dirigit in finem.
that it-is-moved by the-archer who his action directs to an-end
Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem: quia
those therefore which reason have themselves move to an-end because
habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium,
they-have dominion of-their acts through free choice
quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae ratione
which is a-faculty of-will and of-reason those but which reason
carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi
lack tend to an-end through natural inclination as-if
ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis: cum non cognoscant
by another moved not moreover by themselves since not they-know
rationem finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed
the-notion of-end and therefore nothing to an-end to-order they-can but
solum in finem ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis
only to an-end by another are-ordered for the-whole irrational
natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens
nature is-compared to God as an-instrument to the-agent
principale, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo proprium est naturae
principal as above held it-is and therefore proper it-is of-nature
rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se agens vel ducens ad
rational that it-tend to an-end as-if itself acting or leading to
finem: naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio acta vel ducta,
the-end of-nature but irrational as-if by another acted or led
sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia, sive in finem
whether to an-end apprehended as brute animals or to an-end
non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione carent.
not apprehended as those-things which altogether knowledge lack

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo, quando per
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that man when through
seipsum agit propter finem, cognoscit finem: sed quando
himself he-acts for-the-sake-of an-end knows the-end but when

ab alio agitur vel ducitur, puta cum agit ad imperium
by another he-is-acted or is-led for-example when he-acts at the-command
alterius, vel cum movetur altero impellente, non est necessarium
of-another or when he-is-moved another impelling not it-is necessary
quod cognoscat finem. Et ita est in creaturis irrationalibus.
that he-know the-end and so it-is in creatures irrational

Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinare in finem est
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-order to an-end is
eius quod seipsum agit in finem. Eius vero quod ab alio
of-that which itself acts to an-end of-that but which by another
in finem agitur, est ordinari in finem. Quod potest esse
to an-end is-acted it-is to-be-ordered to an-end which can to-be
irrationalis naturae, sed ab aliquo rationem habente.
of-irrational nature but by something reason having

Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectum voluntatis est finis et
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-object of-the-will is the-end and
bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his
the-good in universal whence not can to-be will in those-things
quae carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere
which lack reason and intellect since not they-can to-apprehend
universale: sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus,
the-universal but there-is in them appetite natural or sensitive
determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare. Manifestum autem
determined to some good particular manifest moreover
est quod particulares causae moventur a causa universali:
it-is that particular causes are-moved by a-cause universal
sicut rector civitatis, qui intendit bonum commune, movet
as the-ruler of-a-city who intends the-good common moves
suo imperio omnia particularia officia civitatis. Et ideo
by-his command all particular offices of-the-city and therefore
necesse est quod omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur
necessary it-is that all which lack reason be-moved

in fines particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se
to ends particular by some will rational which itself
extendit in bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina.
extends to the-good universal namely by the-will divine

Utrum actus hominis recipiant speciem ex fine

3 · WHETHER HUMAN ACTS TAKE THEIR SPECIES FROM THE END

Since the end is extrinsic and one act may serve diverse ends, it seems not. Thomas answers that each thing takes its species from act, not potency; in motions action takes its species from the act that is its principle and passion from the act that is its term; and the end, the will's object, is both principle and term of human acts, so human acts, as moral, are specified by the end. One act in nature may be several in morals, and the same end may be sought by diverse acts.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humani non
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that acts human not
recipiant speciem a fine. Finis enim est causa extrinseca. Sed
receive species from the-end the-end for is a-cause extrinsic but
unumquodque habet speciem ab aliquo principio intrinseco.
each-thing has species from some principle intrinsic
Ergo actus humani non recipiunt speciem a fine.
therefore acts human not receive species from the-end

2. Praeterea, illud quod dat speciem, oportet esse prius.
2 further that which gives species it-is-necessary to-be prior
Sed finis est posterior in esse. Ergo actus humanus non
but the-end is posterior in the-to-be therefore the-act human not
habet speciem a fine.
has species from the-end

3. Praeterea, idem non potest esse nisi in una specie.
3 further the-same not can to-be except in one species
Sed eundem numero actum contingit ordinari ad diversos
but the-same in-number act it-happens to-be-ordered to diverse
fines. Ergo finis non dat speciem actibus humanis.
ends therefore the-end not gives species to-acts human

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de
but against is that says Augustine in the-book on
Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum: Secundum quod finis
the-Morals of-the-Church and of-the-Manichees according as the-end
est culpabilis vel laudabilis, secundum hoc sunt opera nostra
is culpable or laudable according-to this are works our
culpabilia vel laudabilia.
culpable or laudable

Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque sortitur speciem
I-answer it-must-be-said that each-thing obtains species
secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam: unde ea
according-to act and not according-to potency whence those-things
quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis
which are composed from matter and form are-constituted in their
speciebus per proprias formas. Et hoc etiam considerandum
species through proper forms and this also to-be-considered
est in motibus propriis. Cum enim motus quodammodo
it-is in motions proper since for motion in-a-way
distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum ab
is-distinguished through action and passion each of-these from
actu speciem sortitur: actio quidem ab actu qui est principium
act species obtains action indeed from the-act which is the-principle
agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde
of-acting passion but from the-act which is the-term of-the-motion whence
calefactio actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore
heating the-action nothing other is than motion a-certain from heat

procedens, calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus
proceeding heating but the-passion nothing other is than motion
ad calorem: definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei.
toward heat the-definition moreover manifests the-notion of-the-species
Et utroque modo actus humani, sive considerentur
and in-either way acts human whether they-be-considered
per modum actionum, sive per modum passionum,
through the-mode of-actions or through the-mode of-passions
a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt
from the-end species obtain in-either for way can
considerari actus humani: eo quod homo movet
to-be-considered acts human for-the-reason that man moves
seipsum, et movetur a seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod
himself and is-moved by himself said it-is moreover above that
actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate
acts are-called human inasmuch-as they-proceed from will
deliberata. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et
deliberated the-object moreover of-the-will is the-good and the-end and
ideo manifestum est quod principium humanorum actuum,
therefore manifest it-is that the-principle of-human acts
inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et similiter est terminus
inasmuch-as they-are human is the-end and similarly it-is the-term
eorundem: nam id ad quod terminatur actus humanus, est
of-the-same for that to which is-terminated the-act human is
id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in agentibus
that which the-will intends as the-end as in agents
naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae generantis.
natural the-form of-the-generated is conformed to-the-form of-the-generator
Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, mores proprie
and because as Ambrose says on Luke morals properly

dicuntur humani, actus morales proprie speciem sortiuntur
are-called human acts moral properly species obtain
ex fine: nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani.
from the-end for the-same are acts moral and acts human

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis non est omnino
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-end not is altogether
aliquid extrinsecum ab actu: quia comparatur ad actum
something extrinsic from the-act because it-is-compared to the-act
ut principium vel terminus; et hoc ipsum est de ratione
as principle or term and this itself is of the-notion
actus, ut scilicet sit ab aliquo, quantum ad actionem, et
of-act that namely it-be from something as-far to action and
ut sit ad aliquid, quantum ad passionem.
that it-be toward something as-far to passion

Ad secundum dicendum quod finis secundum quod est
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-end according as it-is
prior in intentione, ut dictum est, secundum hoc pertinet
prior in intention as said it-is according-to this pertains
ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo dat speciem actui humano
to the-will and in-this way it-gives species to-the-act human
sive morali.
or moral

Ad tertium dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-same act in-number according
quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad
as once it-goes-out from the-agent not is-ordered except to
unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem: sed potest
one end proximate from which it-has species but it-can
ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis
to-be-ordered to several ends remote of-which one is the-end
alterius. – Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum
of-another possible yet it-is that one act according-to

speciem naturae, ordinetur ad diversos fines voluntatis: sicut
species of-nature be-ordered to diverse ends of-will as
hoc ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod est idem
this itself which is to-kill a-man which is the-same
secundum speciem naturae, potest ordinari sicut in finem
according-to species of-nature can to-be-ordered as to an-end
ad conservationem iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex
to the-preservation of-justice and to satisfying anger and from
hoc erunt diversi actus secundum speciem moris: quia uno
this they-will-be diverse acts according-to species of-morals because in-one
modo erit actus virtutis, alio modo erit actus vitii.
way it-will-be an-act of-virtue in-another way it-will-be an-act of-vice
Non enim motus recipit speciem ab eo quod est terminus
not for motion receives species from that which is the-term
per accidens, sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per se.
through accident but only from that which is the-term through itself
Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso
ends moreover moral are-accidental to-a-thing natural and from the-converse
ratio naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil
the-notion natural of-end is-accidental to-the-moral and therefore nothing
prohibet actus qui sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae,
prohibits acts which are the-same according-to species of-nature
esse diversos secundum speciem moris, et e converso.
to-be diverse according-to species of-morals and from the-converse

Utrum sit aliquis ultimus finis humanae vitae

4 · WHETHER THERE IS A LAST END OF HUMAN LIFE

It seems the good can be multiplied without end, as numbers are, and the will can go on wishing. Thomas answers that an infinite series is impossible in ends as in movers: in the order of intention, without a first end nothing would be desired, and in the order of execution, without a first means nothing would begin. Accidentally ordered things may be infinite, but not those essentially ordered.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-be some
ultimus finis humanae vitae, sed procedatur in finibus
last end of-human life but it-be-proceeded in ends
in infinitum. Bonum enim, secundum suam rationem, est
to infinity the-good for according-to its notion is
diffusivum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div.
diffusive of-itself as is-plain through Dionysius IV chapter on Divine
Nom. Si ergo quod procedit ex bono, ipsum etiam est
Names if therefore what proceeds from the-good itself also is
bonum, oportet quod illud bonum diffundat aliud bonum:
good it-is-necessary that that good diffuse another good
et sic processus boni est in infinitum. Sed bonum habet
and thus the-procession of-the-good is to infinity but the-good has
rationem finis. Ergo in finibus est processus in infinitum.
the-notion of-end therefore in ends is a-procession to infinity

2. Praeterea, ea quae sunt rationis, in infinitum
2 further those-things which are of-reason to infinity
multiplicari possunt: unde et mathematicae quantitates in
to-be-multiplied can whence also mathematical quantities to
infinitum augentur. Species etiam numerorum propter hoc
infinity are-increased the-species also of-numbers on-account-of this

sunt infinitae, quia, dato quolibet numero, ratio alium
are infinite because given any-whatever number reason another
maiorem excogitare potest. Sed desiderium finis sequitur
greater to-think-out can but the-desire of-the-end follows
apprehensionem rationis. Ergo videtur quod etiam in finibus
the-apprehension of-reason therefore it-seems that also in ends
procedatur in infinitum.
it-be-proceeded to infinity

3. Praeterea, bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed
3 further the-good and the-end is the-object of-the-will but
voluntas infinities potest reflecti supra seipsam: possum
the-will infinitely can to-be-reflected upon itself I-can
enim velle aliquid, et velle me velle illud, et sic in infinitum.
for to-will something and to-will me to-will it and thus to infinity
Ergo in finibus humanae voluntatis proceditur in infinitum,
therefore in the-ends of-human will it-is-proceeded to infinity
et non est aliquis ultimus finis humanae voluntatis.
and not there-is some last end of-human will

Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, II Metaphys.,
but against is that the-Philosopher says II Metaphysics
quod qui infinitum faciunt, auferunt naturam boni.
that (those)-who the-infinite make take-away the-nature of-the-good
Sed bonum est quod habet rationem finis. Ergo contra
but the-good is what has the-notion of-end therefore against
rationem finis est quod procedatur in infinitum. Necesse
the-notion of-end it-is that it-be-proceeded to infinity necessary
est ergo ponere unum ultimum finem.
it-is therefore to-posit one last end

Respondeo dicendum quod, per se loquendo, impossibile
I-answer it-must-be-said that through itself speaking impossible
est in finibus procedere in infinitum, ex quacumque parte.
it-is in ends to-proceed to infinity from any-whatever side

In omnibus enim quae per se habent ordinem ad
in all for which through themselves have order to
invicem, oportet quod, remoto primo, removeantur ea quae
one-another it-is-necessary that removed the-first be-removed those which
sunt ad primum. Unde Philosophus probat, in VIII Physic.,
are toward the-first whence the-Philosopher proves in VIII Physics
quod non est possibile in causis moventibus procedere in
that not it-is possible in causes moving to-proceed to
infinitum, quia iam non esset primum movens, quo
infinity because then not there-would-be a-first mover which
subtracto alia movere non possunt, cum non moveant
withdrawn the-others to-move not can since not they-move
nisi per hoc quod moventur a primo movente. In finibus
except through this that they-are-moved by the-first mover in ends
autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet ordo intentionis, et
moreover is-found a-twofold order namely the-order of-intention and
ordo executionis: et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid
the-order of-execution and in each order it-is-necessary to-be something
primum. Id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis, est
first that for which is first in the-order of-intention is
quasi principium movens appetitum: unde, subtracto principio,
as-if the-principle moving the-appetite whence withdrawn the-principle
appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium
the-appetite by nothing would-be-moved that moreover which is the-principle
in executione, est unde incipit operatio: unde, isto principio
in execution is whence begins the-operation whence that principle
subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem
withdrawn no-one would-begin anything to-work the-principle moreover
intentionis est ultimus finis: principium autem executionis
of-intention is the-last end the-principle moreover of-execution
est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sic ergo
is the-first of-those-things which are toward the-end thus therefore

ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere: quia
from neither side possible it-is to infinity to-proceed because
si non esset ultimus finis, nihil appeteretur, nec aliqua
if not there-were a-last end nothing would-be-desired nor any
actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis;
action would-be-terminated nor even would-rest the-intention of-the-agent
si autem non esset primum in his quae sunt ad
if moreover not there-were a-first in those-things which are toward
finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur
the-end no-one would-begin anything to-work nor would-be-terminated
consilium, sed in infinitum procederet.
counsel but to infinity it-would-proceed

Ea vero quae non habent ordinem per se, sed per
those but which not have order through themselves but through
accidens sibi invicem coniunguntur, nihil prohibet
accident to-one-another mutually are-joined nothing prohibits
infinitatem habere: causae enim per accidens indeterminatae
infinity to-have the-causes for through accident indeterminate
sunt. Et hoc etiam modo contingit esse infinitatem per
are and in-this also way it-happens to-be infinity through
accidens in finibus, et in his quae sunt ad finem.
accident in ends and in those-things which are toward the-end

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de ratione boni est quod
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that of the-notion of-good it-is that
aliquid ab ipso effluat, non tamen quod ipsum ab alio
something from it flow-out not yet that it from another
procedat. Et ideo, cum bonum habeat rationem finis, et
proceed and therefore since the-good has the-notion of-end and
primum bonum sit ultimus finis, ratio ista non probat quod
the-first good is the-last end reasoning this not proves that
non sit ultimus finis; sed quod a fine primo supposito
not there-be a-last end but that from the-end first supposed

procedatur in infinitum inferius versus ea quae sunt ad
it-be-proceeded to infinity downward toward those-things which are toward
finem. Et hoc quidem competeret, si consideraretur sola virtus
the-end and this indeed would-hold if were-considered alone the-power
primi boni, quae est infinita. Sed quia primum bonum habet
of-the-first good which is infinite but because the-first good has
diffusionem secundum intellectum, cuius est secundum aliquam
diffusion according-to intellect of-which it-is according-to some
certam formam profluere in causata; aliquis certus modus
certain form to-flow-forth into the-things-caused some certain measure
adhibetur bonorum effluxui a primo bono, a quo omnia
is-applied of-goods to-the-outflow from the-first good from which all
alia bona participant virtutem diffusivam. Et ideo diffusio
other goods participate the-power diffusive and therefore the-diffusion
bonorum non procedit in infinitum, sed, sicut dicitur Sap.
of-goods not proceeds to infinity but as is-said Wisdom
XI, Deus omnia disposuit in numero, pondere et mensura.
XI God all-things disposed in number weight and measure

Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quae sunt per
to the-second it-must-be-said that in those-things which are through
se, ratio incipit a principiis naturaliter notis, et ad
themselves reason begins from principles naturally known and to
aliquem terminum progreditur. Unde Philosophus probat,
some term progresses whence the-Philosopher proves
in I Poster., quod in demonstrationibus non est
in I Posterior-Analytics that in demonstrations not there-is
processus in infinitum, quia in demonstrationibus attenditur
procession to infinity because in demonstrations is-regarded
ordo aliquorum per se ad invicem connexorum,
the-order of-some-things through themselves to one-another connected
et non per accidens. In his autem quae per accidens
and not through accident in those moreover which through accident

connectuntur, nihil prohibet rationem in infinitum procedere.
are-connected nothing prohibits reason to infinity to-proceed
Accidit autem quantitati aut numero praeexistenti, inquantum
it-happens moreover to-quantity or number pre-existing inasmuch-as
huiusmodi, quod ei addatur quantitas aut unitas. Unde in
of-this-kind that to-it be-added quantity or unity whence in
huiusmodi nihil prohibet rationem procedere in infinitum.
of-this-kind-things nothing prohibits reason to-proceed to infinity

Ad tertium dicendum quod illa multiplicatio actuum
to the-third it-must-be-said that that multiplication of-acts
voluntatis reflexae supra seipsam, per accidens se habet
of-will reflected upon itself through accident itself has
ad ordinem finium. Quod patet ex hoc, quod circa unum
to the-order of-ends which is-plain from this that about one
et eundem finem indifferenter semel vel pluries supra
and the-same end indifferently once or several-times upon
seipsam voluntas reflectitur.
itself the-will is-reflected

Utrum unius hominis possint esse plures ultimi fines

5 · WHETHER ONE MAN CAN HAVE SEVERAL LAST ENDS

It seems one man could have several last ends, since some placed it in four things at once (pleasure, rest, the first things of nature, and virtue), and goods not opposed do not exclude each other. Thomas answers that a man desires his last end as his perfect good, which so fills his appetite that nothing is left to desire beyond it. Nature tends to one thing, and all desirable things are of one genus with one first principle, so as mankind has one last end, each man fixes his will on one.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that possible it-be
voluntatem unius hominis in plura ferri simul, sicut in
the-will of-one man into several to-be-borne at-once as into
ultimos fines. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei,
last ends says for Augustine XIX on the-City of-God
quod quidam ultimum hominis finem posuerunt in quatuor,
that some the-last of-man end placed in four
scilicet in voluptate, in quiete, in primis naturae, et in
namely in pleasure in rest in the-first-things of-nature and in
virtute. Haec autem manifeste sunt plura. Ergo unus homo
virtue these moreover manifestly are several therefore one man
potest constituere ultimum finem suae voluntatis in multis.
can to-establish the-last end of-his will in many-things

2. Praeterea, ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, se
2 further those-things which not are-opposed to one-another each-other
invicem non excludunt. Sed multa inveniuntur in rebus quae
mutually not exclude but many-things are-found in things which
sibi invicem non opponuntur. Ergo si unum ponatur
to-one-another mutually not are-opposed therefore if one be-posited
ultimus finis voluntatis, non propter hoc alia excluduntur.
the-last end of-the-will not on-account-of this the-others are-excluded

3. Praeterea, voluntas per hoc quod constituit ultimum
3 further the-will through this that it-establishes the-last
finem in aliquo, suam liberam potentiam non amittit. Sed
end in something its free power not loses but
antequam constitueret ultimum finem suum in illo, puta
before it-established the-last end its in that for-example
in voluptate, poterat constituere finem suum ultimum in
in pleasure it-could to-establish end its last in
alio, puta in divitiis. Ergo etiam postquam constituit
another for-example in riches therefore also after has-established
aliquis ultimum finem suae voluntatis in voluptate, potest
someone the-last end of-his will in pleasure he-can
simul constituere ultimum finem in divitiis. Ergo possibile
at-once to-establish the-last end in riches therefore possible
est voluntatem unius hominis simul ferri in diversa,
it-is the-will of-one man at-once to-be-borne into diverse-things
sicut in ultimos fines.
as into last ends

Sed contra, illud in quo quiescit aliquis sicut in ultimo
but against that in which rests someone as in the-last
fine, hominis affectui dominatur: quia ex eo totius vitae
end of-man the-affection rules because from it of-the-whole life
suae regulas accipit. Unde de gulosis dicitur Philip. III:
his the-rules he-takes whence about gluttons it-is-said Philippians III
Quorum deus venter est: quia scilicet constituunt ultimum
whose god the-belly is because namely they-establish the-last
finem in deliciis ventris. Sed sicut dicitur Matt. VI, nemo
end in the-delights of-the-belly but as is-said Matthew VI no-one
potest duobus dominis servire, ad invicem scilicet non
can two masters to-serve to one-another namely not

ordinatis. Ergo impossibile est esse plures ultimos fines
ordered therefore impossible it-is to-be several last ends
unius hominis ad invicem non ordinatos.
of-one man to one-another not ordered

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod voluntas
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is that the-will
unius hominis simul se habeat ad diversa, sicut ad ultimos
of-one man at-once itself has to diverse-things as to last
fines. Cuius ratio potest triplex assignari. Prima est quia,
ends of-which the-reason can threefold to-be-assigned the-first is because
cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit
since each-thing desires its perfection that desires
aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit ut bonum perfectum
someone as the-last end which he-desires as the-good perfect
et completivum sui ipsius. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de
and completive of-him himself whence Augustine says XIX on
Civ. Dei: Finem boni nunc dicimus, non quod consumatur
the-City of-God the-end of-good now we-call not that it-be-consumed
ut non sit, sed quod perficiatur ut plenum sit.
that not it-may-be but that it-be-perfected that full it-may-be
Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita impleat totum hominis
it-is-necessary therefore that the-last end so fill the-whole of-man
appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur.
appetite that nothing outside it to-be-desired be-left
Quod esse non potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius
which to-be not can if something extraneous to its
perfectionem requiratur. Unde non potest esse quod in duo sic
perfection be-required whence not can to-be that into two thus
tendat appetitus, ac si utrumque sit bonum perfectum ipsius.
tend the-appetite as if each be the-good perfect of-it

Secunda ratio est quia, sicut in processu rationis principium
the-second reason is because as in the-process of-reason the-principle
est id quod naturaliter cognoscitur, ita in processu rationalis
is that which naturally is-known so in the-process of-rational
appetitus, qui est voluntas, oportet esse principium id quod
appetite which is the-will it-is-necessary to-be the-principle that which
naturaliter desideratur. Hoc autem oportet esse unum: quia
naturally is-desired this moreover it-is-necessary to-be one because
natura non tendit nisi ad unum. Principium autem in processu
nature not tends except to one the-principle moreover in the-process
rationalis appetitus est ultimus finis. Unde oportet id in
of-rational appetite is the-last end whence it-is-necessary that into
quod tendit voluntas sub ratione ultimi finis, esse unum.
which tends the-will under the-notion of-last end to-be one

Tertia ratio est quia, cum actiones voluntariae ex fine
the-third reason is because since actions voluntary from the-end
speciem sortiantur, sicut supra habitum est, oportet quod
species obtain as above held it-is it-is-necessary that
a fine ultimo, qui est communis, sortiantur rationem
from the-end last which is common they-obtain the-notion
generis: sicut et naturalia ponuntur in genere secundum
of-genus as also natural-things are-placed in a-genus according-to
formalem rationem communem. Cum igitur omnia appetibilia
a-formal notion common since therefore all desirable-things
voluntatis, inquantum huiusmodi, sint unius generis, oportet
of-the-will inasmuch-as of-this-kind be of-one genus it-is-necessary
ultimum finem esse unum. Et praecipue quia in quolibet
the-last end to-be one and especially because in any-whatever
genere est unum primum principium: ultimus autem finis
genus is one first principle the-last moreover end
habet rationem primi principii, ut dictum est.
has the-notion of-first principle as said it-is

Sicut autem se habet ultimus finis hominis simpliciter
as moreover itself has the-last end of-man simply
ad totum humanum genus, ita se habet ultimus finis
to the-whole human race so itself has the-last end
huius hominis ad hunc hominem. Unde oportet quod,
of-this man to this man whence it-is-necessary that
sicut omnium hominum est naturaliter unus finis ultimus,
as of-all men is naturally one end last
ita huius hominis voluntas in uno ultimo fine statuatur.
so of-this man the-will in one last end be-established

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa plura
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that all those several-things
accipiebantur in ratione unius boni perfecti ex his constituti,
were-taken in the-notion of-one good perfect from these constituted
ab his qui in eis ultimum finem ponebant.
by those who in them the-last end placed

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi plura accipi
to the-second it-must-be-said that even-if several-things to-be-taken
possint quae ad invicem oppositionem non habeant, tamen
can which to one-another opposition not have yet
bono perfecto opponitur quod sit aliquid de perfectione
to-the-good perfect it-is-opposed that there-be something of the-perfection
rei extra ipsum.
of-the-thing outside it

Ad tertium dicendum quod potestas voluntatis non habet ut
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-power of-the-will not has that
faciat opposita esse simul. Quod contingeret, si tenderet in
it-may-make opposites to-be at-once which would-happen if it-tended into
plura disparata sicut in ultimos fines, ut ex dictis patet.
several disparate-things as into last ends as from things-said is-plain

Utrum homo omnia quae vult, velit propter ultimum finem

6 · WHETHER MAN WILLS ALL HE WILLS FOR THE LAST END

Play and speculative science seem willed for their own sake, not for the last end, and no one always thinks of that end. Thomas answers that whatever man desires he desires as good, either as perfect good or as tending to it; and as second movers move only as moved by the first, so lesser goods move the appetite only in order to the last end. Nor must one always think of the last end: the power of the first intention remains in every desire, as a traveler need not think of his goal at every step.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not all-things
quaecumque homo vult, propter ultimum finem velit. Ea
whatever man wills for-the-sake-of the-last end he-wills those
enim quae ad finem ultimum ordinantur, seriosa dicuntur,
for which to the-end last are-ordered serious are-called
quasi utilia. Sed iocosa a seriis distinguuntur. Ergo
as-if useful but jesting-things from serious-things are-distinguished therefore
ea quae homo iocose agit, non ordinat in ultimum finem.
those-things which man jestingly does not he-orders to the-last end

2. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, in principio Metaphys., quod
2 further the-Philosopher says in the-beginning of-the-Metaphysics that
scientiae speculativae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Nec tamen
the-sciences speculative for-the-sake-of themselves are-sought nor yet
potest dici quod quaelibet earum sit ultimus finis. Ergo non
it-can to-be-said that any of-them be the-last end therefore not
omnia quae homo appetit, appetit propter ultimum finem.
all-things which man desires he-desires for-the-sake-of the-last end

3. Praeterea, quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem,
3 further whoever orders something to an-end some
cogitat de illo fine. Sed non semper homo cogitat de
thinks about that end but not always man thinks about

ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit aut facit. Non ergo
the-last end in every thing which he-desires or does not therefore
omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum finem.
all-things man desires or does for-the-sake-of the-last end

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIX de Civ.
but against is that says Augustine XIX on the-City
Dei: Illud est finis boni nostri, propter quod amantur
of-God that is the-end of-good our for-the-sake-of which are-loved
cetera, illud autem propter seipsum.
the-other-things that moreover for-the-sake-of itself

Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est quod omnia quae
I-answer it-must-be-said that necessary it-is that all-things which
homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem. Et hoc
man desires he-desire for-the-sake-of the-last end and this
apparet duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia quidquid
appears by-a-twofold reason first indeed because whatever
homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod quidem
man desires he-desires under the-notion of-good which indeed
si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus
if not is-desired as the-good perfect which is the-last
finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum
end necessary it-is that it-be-desired as tending to the-good
perfectum: quia semper inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad
perfect because always the-beginning of-something is-ordered to
consummationem ipsius; sicut patet tam in his quae
the-consummation of-it as is-plain as-much in those-things which
fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et
are-made by nature as in those-things which are-made by art and
ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem
therefore every beginning of-perfection is-ordered to the-perfection
consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem.
consummated which is through the-last end

Secundo, quia ultimus finis hoc modo se habet in
second because the-last end in-this way itself has in
movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis motionibus
moving the-appetite as itself has in other motions
primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae secundae
the-first mover manifest it-is moreover that causes second
moventes non movent nisi secundum quod moventur a primo
moving not move except according as they-are-moved by the-first
movente. Unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum
mover whence second desirables not move the-appetite
nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis.
except in order to the-first desirable which is the-last end

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actiones ludicrae
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that actions playful
non ordinantur ad aliquem finem extrinsecum; sed
not are-ordered to some end extrinsic but
tamen ordinantur ad bonum ipsius ludentis, prout
yet they-are-ordered to the-good of-the-very player according-as
sunt delectantes vel requiem praestantes. Bonum autem
they-are delighting or rest furnishing the-good moreover
consummatum hominis est ultimus finis eius.
consummated of-man is the-last end his

Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, de scientia
and similarly it-must-be-said to the-second about science
speculativa; quae appetitur ut bonum quoddam speculantis,
speculative which is-desired as a-good certain of-the-speculator
quod comprehenditur sub bono completo et perfecto, quod
which is-comprehended under the-good complete and perfect which
est ultimus finis.
is the-last end

Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet ut semper
to the-third it-must-be-said that not it-is-necessary that always
aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit
someone think about the-last end whenever something he-desires
vel operatur: sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu
or works but the-power of-the-first intention which is with-respect-to
ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam
of-the-last end remains in any appetite of-whatever thing even
si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet
if about the-last end in-act not it-be-thought as not it-is-necessary
quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine.
that he-who goes along the-way at every step think about the-end

Utrum sit unus ultimus finis omnium hominum

7 · WHETHER ALL MEN HAVE ONE LAST END

It seems not, since sinners turn from the unchangeable good, men follow diverse ways of life, and individuals differ. Thomas answers that the last end may be considered in its notion or in that in which the notion is found. In its notion all agree, desiring their own perfection; in what it is found they differ, some seeking riches and some pleasure, as tastes differ over sweetness. The most complete good is the one desired by a man whose affection is well disposed.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not of-all
hominum sit unus finis ultimus. Maxime enim videtur
men there-be one end last most for it-seems
hominis ultimus finis esse incommutabile bonum. Sed
of-man the-last end to-be the-unchangeable good but

quidam avertuntur ab incommutabili bono, peccando. Non
some are-turned-away from the-unchangeable good by-sinning not
ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.
therefore of-all men is one last end

2. Praeterea, secundum ultimum finem tota vita hominis
2 further according-to the-last end the-whole life of-man
regulatur. Si igitur esset unus ultimus finis omnium
is-regulated if therefore there-were one last end of-all
hominum, sequeretur quod in hominibus non essent
men it-would-follow that in men not there-would-be
diversa studia vivendi. Quod patet esse falsum.
diverse pursuits of-living which is-plain to-be false

3. Praeterea, finis est actionis terminus. Actiones autem
3 further the-end is of-action the-term actions moreover
sunt singularium. Homines autem, etsi conveniant in natura
are of-singulars men moreover although they-agree in the-nature
speciei, tamen differunt secundum ea quae ad individua
of-the-species yet differ according-to those-things which to individuals
pertinent. Non ergo omnium hominum est unus ultimus finis.
pertain not therefore of-all men is one last end

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin.,
but against is that Augustine says XIII on the-Trinity
quod omnes homines conveniunt in appetendo ultimum
that all men agree in desiring the-last
finem, qui est beatitudo.
end which is beatitude

Respondeo dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui
I-answer it-must-be-said that about the-last end we-can to-speak
dupliciter: uno modo, secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio
in-two-ways in-one way according-to the-notion of-last end in-another
modo, secundum id in quo finis ultimi ratio invenitur.
way according-to that in which of-the-end last the-notion is-found

Quantum igitur ad rationem ultimi finis, omnes conveniunt in
as-far therefore to the-notion of-last end all agree in
appetitu finis ultimi: quia omnes appetunt suam perfectionem
the-desire of-the-end last because all desire their perfection
adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est. Sed
to-be-fulfilled which is the-notion of-last end as said it-is but
quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines
as-far to that in which this notion is-found not all men
conveniunt in ultimo fine: nam quidam appetunt divitias
agree in the-last end for some desire riches
tanquam consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem,
as the-consummated good some moreover pleasure
quidam vero quodcumque aliud. Sicut et omni gustui delectabile
some but whatever else as also to-every taste delightful
est dulce: sed quibusdam maxime delectabilis est dulcedo vini,
is the-sweet but to-some most delightful is the-sweetness of-wine
quibusdam dulcedo mellis, aut alicuius talium. Illud tamen
to-some the-sweetness of-honey or of-some of-such-things that yet
dulce oportet esse simpliciter melius delectabile, in quo
sweet it-is-necessary to-be simply better delightful in which
maxime delectatur qui habet optimum gustum. Et similiter
most is-delighted he-who has the-best taste and similarly
illud bonum oportet esse completissimum, quod tanquam
that good it-is-necessary to-be most-complete which as
ultimum finem appetit habens affectum bene dispositum.
the-last end desires one-having affection well disposed

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi qui peccant,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that those who sin
avertuntur ab eo in quo vere invenitur ratio ultimi
are-turned-away from that in which truly is-found the-notion of-the-last

finis: non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis intentione, quam
end not moreover from the-very of-the-last end intention which
quaerunt falso in aliis rebus.
they-seek falsely in other things

Ad secundum dicendum quod diversa studia vivendi
to the-second it-must-be-said that diverse pursuits of-living
contingunt in hominibus propter diversas res in quibus
happen in men on-account-of diverse things in which
quaeritur ratio summi boni.
is-sought the-notion of-the-highest good

Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi actiones sint singularium,
to the-third it-must-be-said that although actions be of-singulars
tamen primum principium agendi in eis est natura, quae
yet the-first principle of-acting in them is nature which
tendit ad unum, ut dictum est.
tends to one as said it-is

Utrum in illo ultimo fine aliae creaturae conveniant

8 · WHETHER OTHER CREATURES SHARE IN THAT LAST END

It seems they do, since God is the principle and end of all things and is also man's last end. Thomas answers that the end is twofold: the thing itself and its attainment, or use. In the first sense man and all creatures share one end, God; in the second, irrational creatures do not share man's end, since they reach God only by some likeness to him, while man reaches him by knowledge and love.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in ultimo fine
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that in the-last end
hominis etiam omnia alia conveniant. Finis enim respondet
of-man also all others agree the-end for corresponds
principio. Sed illud quod est principium hominum, scilicet
to-the-principle but that which is the-principle of-men namely

Deus, est etiam principium omnium aliorum. Ergo in
God is also the-principle of-all others therefore in
ultimo fine hominis omnia alia communicant.
the-last end of-man all others share

2. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod
2 further Dionysius says in the-book on Divine Names that
Deus convertit omnia ad seipsum, tanquam ad ultimum
God turns all-things to himself as to the-last
finem. Sed ipse est etiam ultimus finis hominis: quia solo
end but he is also the-last end of-man because alone
ipso fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo in fine
him to-be-enjoyed it-is as Augustine says therefore in the-end
ultimo hominis etiam alia conveniunt.
last of-man also others agree

3. Praeterea, finis ultimus hominis est obiectum voluntatis.
3 further the-end last of-man is the-object of-the-will
Sed obiectum voluntatis est bonum universale, quod est
but the-object of-the-will is the-good universal which is
finis omnium. Ergo necesse est quod in ultimo fine
the-end of-all therefore necessary it-is that in the-last end
hominis omnia conveniant.
of-man all agree

Sed contra est quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo;
but against is that the-last end of-men is beatitude
quam omnes appetunt, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed non cadit
which all desire as Augustine says but not it-falls
in animalia rationis expertia ut beata sint, sicut Augustinus
to animals of-reason devoid that blessed they-be as Augustine
dicit in libro Octoginta trium Quaest. Non ergo in ultimo
says in the-book of-Eighty three Questions not therefore in the-last
fine hominis alia conveniunt.
end of-man others agree

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II
I-answer it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher says in II
Physic. et in V Metaphys., finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet
Physics and in V Metaphysics the-end in-two-ways is-said namely
cuius, et quo: idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur,
of-which and by-which that-is the-very thing in which the-notion of-good is-found
et usus sive adeptio illius rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus
and the-use or obtaining of-that thing as if we-say that of-the-motion
corporis gravis finis est vel locus inferior ut res, vel hoc
of-a-body heavy the-end is either the-place lower as the-thing or this
quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut usus: et finis avari
which is to-be in the-place lower as the-use and the-end of-the-miser
est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae ut usus.
is either money as the-thing or the-possession of-money as the-use

Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
if therefore we-speak about the-last end of-man as-far to
ipsam rem quae est finis, sic in ultimo fine hominis omnia
the-very thing which is the-end thus in the-last end of-man all
alia conveniunt: quia Deus est ultimus finis hominis et
others agree because God is the-last end of-man and
omnium aliarum rerum. – Si autem loquamur de ultimo
of-all other things if moreover we-speak about the-last
fine hominis quantum ad consecutionem finis, sic in hoc
end of-man as-far to the-attainment of-the-end thus in this
fine hominis non communicant creaturae irrationales. Nam
end of-man not share creatures irrational for
homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum
man and other rational creatures attain the-last
finem cognoscendo et amando Deum: quod non competit
end by-knowing and by-loving God which not belongs
aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum
to-other creatures which obtain the-last end inasmuch-as

participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt,
they-participate some likeness of-God according as they-are
vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.
or live or even know

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta: nam beatitudo
and through this is-plain the-answer to the-objections for beatitude
nominat adeptionem ultimi finis.
names the-obtaining of-the-last end

De his in quibus hominis beatitudo consistit

II · ON THE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS

Next Thomas considers beatitude: first what it consists in, then what it is, then how it is attained. He asks eight questions about the things in which it might seem to consist: riches, honors, fame, power, a good of the body, pleasure, a good of the soul, and any created good.

Deinde considerandum est de beatitudine: primo quidem,
then to-be-considered it-is about beatitude first indeed
in quibus sit; secundo, quid sit; tertio, qualiter eam
in what-things it-may-be second what it-may-be third how it
consequi possimus.
to-attain we-may-be-able

Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
about the-first are-asked eight

Primo: utrum beatitudo consistat in divitiis.
first whether beatitude consist in riches

Secundo: utrum in honoribus.
second whether in honors

Tertio: utrum in fama, sive in gloria.
third whether in fame or in glory

Quarto: utrum in potestate.
fourth whether in power

Quinto: utrum in aliquo corporis bono.
fifth whether in some of-the-body good

Sexto: utrum in voluptate.
sixth whether in pleasure

Septimo: utrum in aliquo bono animae.
seventh whether in some good of-the-soul

Octavo: utrum in aliquo bono creato.
eighth whether in some good created

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in divitiis

1 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN RICHES

Riches seem all-powerful, since all things obey money, as Ecclesiastes says. Thomas answers that natural riches, food and clothing, serve to sustain nature and so cannot be the last end, and artificial riches, money, are sought only for natural ones. Fools judge that money buys everything, but the desire of riches grows infinite as they are had, while the highest good, the more it is possessed, is loved the more and the rest despised.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
in divitiis consistat. Cum enim beatitudo sit ultimus finis
in riches consist since for beatitude be the-last end
hominis, in eo consistit quod maxime in hominis affectu
of-man in that it-consists which most in of-man the-affection
dominatur. Huiusmodi autem sunt divitiae: dicitur enim
rules of-this-kind moreover are riches it-is-said for
Eccle. X: Pecuniae obediunt omnia. Ergo in divitiis
Ecclesiastes X to-money obey all-things therefore in riches
beatitudo hominis consistit.
the-beatitude of-man consists

2. Praeterea, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol.,
2 further according-to Boethius in III on Consolation
beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus.
beatitude is a-state of-all goods by-the-aggregation perfect
Sed in pecuniis omnia possideri videntur: quia, ut
but in moneys all-things to-be-possessed seem because as
Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., ad hoc nummus est inventus,
the-Philosopher says in V Ethics for this the-coin is invented

ut sit quasi fideiussor habendi pro eo quodcumque
that it-might-be as-if a-surety of-having for it whatever
homo voluerit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
man will-have-wished therefore in riches beatitude consists

3. Praeterea, desiderium summi boni, cum nunquam
3 further the-desire of-the-highest good since never
deficiat, videtur esse infinitum. Sed hoc maxime in divitiis
it-fails seems to-be infinite but this most in riches
invenitur: quia avarus non implebitur pecunia, ut dicitur
is-found because the-miser not will-be-filled with-money as is-said
Eccle. V. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo consistit.
Ecclesiastes V therefore in riches beatitude consists

Sed contra, bonum hominis in retinendo beatitudinem
but against the-good of-man in retaining beatitude
magis consistit quam in emittendo ipsam. Sed sicut Boetius
more consists than in sending-out it but as Boethius
in II de Consol. dicit, divitiae effundendo, magis quam
in II on Consolation says riches by-pouring-out more than
coacervando, melius nitent: siquidem avaritia semper odiosos,
by-heaping-up better shine indeed avarice always hateful
claros largitas facit. Ergo in divitiis beatitudo non consistit.
famous largess makes therefore in riches beatitude not consists

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is the-beatitude
hominis in divitiis consistere. Sunt enim duplices divitiae,
of-man in riches to-consist there-are for twofold riches
ut Philosophus dicit in I Polit., scilicet naturales, et
as the-Philosopher says in I Politics namely natural and
artificiales. Naturales quidem divitiae sunt, quibus homini
artificial natural indeed riches are those-by-which to-man
subvenitur ad defectus naturales tollendos: sicut cibus, potus,
is-helped for defects natural to-be-removed as food drink

vestimenta, vehicula et habitacula, et alia huiusmodi.
clothing vehicles and dwellings and other-things of-this-kind
Divitiae autem artificiales sunt, quibus secundum se
riches moreover artificial are those-by-which according-to itself
natura non iuvatur, ut denarii; sed ars humana eos adinvenit
nature not is-helped as pennies but art human them invented
propter facilitatem commutationis, ut sint quasi
for-the-sake-of the-ease of-exchange that they-might-be as-if
mensura quaedam rerum venalium.
a-measure certain of-things salable

Manifestum est autem quod in divitiis naturalibus beatitudo
manifest it-is moreover that in riches natural the-beatitude
hominis esse non potest. Quaeruntur enim huiusmodi
of-man to-be not can are-sought for of-this-kind
divitiae propter aliud, scilicet ad sustentandam naturam
riches for-the-sake-of another-thing namely for sustaining the-nature
hominis: et ideo non possunt esse ultimus finis hominis,
of-man and therefore not they-can to-be the-last end of-man
sed magis ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem. Unde
but rather they-are-ordered to man as to an-end whence
in ordine naturae omnia huiusmodi sunt infra hominem,
in the-order of-nature all-things of-this-kind are below man
et propter hominem facta; secundum illud Psalmi VIII:
and for-the-sake-of man made according-to that of-Psalm VIII
Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius.
all-things you-have-subjected under feet his

Divitiae autem artificiales non quaeruntur nisi propter
riches moreover artificial not are-sought except for-the-sake-of
naturales: non enim quaererentur, nisi quia per eas
natural not for they-would-be-sought except because through them
emuntur res ad usum vitae necessariae. Unde multo
are-bought things for the-use of-life necessary whence much

minus habent rationem ultimi finis. Impossibile est igitur
less they-have the-notion of-the-last end impossible it-is therefore
beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis hominis, in divitiis esse.
beatitude which is the-last end of-man in riches to-be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia corporalia
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that all bodily-things
obediunt pecuniae, quantum ad multitudinem stultorum, qui
obey money as-far to the-multitude of-fools who
sola corporalia bona cognoscunt, quae pecunia acquiri
only bodily goods know which by-money to-be-acquired
possunt. Iudicium autem de bonis humanis non debet
can the-judgment moreover about goods human not ought
sumi a stultis, sed a sapientibus: sicut et iudicium
to-be-taken from fools but from the-wise as also the-judgment
de saporibus ab his qui habent gustum bene dispositum.
about flavors from those who have taste well disposed

Ad secundum dicendum quod pecunia possunt haberi
to the-second it-must-be-said that by-money can to-be-had
omnia venalia: non autem spiritualia, quae vendi non
all salable-things not moreover spiritual-things which to-be-sold not
possunt. Unde dicitur Proverb. XVII: Quid prodest stulto
can whence it-is-said Proverbs XVII what profits for-a-fool
divitias habere, cum sapientiam emere non possit.
riches to-have since wisdom to-buy not he-can

Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus naturalium divitiarum
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-appetite of-natural riches
non est infinitus: quia secundum certam mensuram naturae
not is infinite because according-to a-certain measure to-nature
sufficiunt. Sed appetitus divitiarum artificialium est infinitus:
they-suffice but the-appetite of-riches artificial is infinite
quia deservit concupiscentiae inordinatae, quae non modificatur,
because it-serves concupiscence disordered which not is-limited

ut patet per Philosophum in I Polit. Aliter tamen est
as is-plain through the-Philosopher in I Politics otherwise yet is
infinitum desiderium divitiarum, et desiderium summi
infinite the-desire of-riches and the-desire of-the-highest
boni. Nam summum bonum quanto perfectius possidetur,
good for the-highest good by-how-much more-perfectly it-is-possessed
tanto ipsummet magis amatur, et alia contemnuntur:
by-so-much itself more is-loved and other-things are-despised
quia quanto magis habetur, magis cognoscitur. Et ideo
because by-how-much more it-is-had more it-is-known and therefore
dicitur Eccli. XXIV: Qui edunt me, adhuc esurient.
it-is-said Ecclesiasticus XXIV who eat me still will-hunger
Sed in appetitu divitiarum, et quorumcumque temporalium
but in the-appetite of-riches and of-any temporal
bonorum, est e converso: nam quando iam habentur, ipsa
goods it-is from the-converse for when already they-are-had they
contemnuntur, et alia appetuntur; secundum quod significatur
are-despised and others are-desired according as is-signified
Ioan. IV, cum Dominus dicit: Qui bibit ex hac aqua, per
John IV when the-Lord says who drinks of this water by
quam temporalia significantur, sitiet iterum. Et hoc ideo,
which temporal-things are-signified will-thirst again and this therefore
quia eorum insufficientia magis cognoscitur cum habentur.
because their insufficiency more is-known when they-are-had
Et ideo hoc ipsum ostendit eorum imperfectionem, et
and therefore this itself shows their imperfection and
quod in eis summum bonum non consistit.
that in them the-highest good not consists

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in honoribus

2 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN HONORS

Honor seems virtue's reward and is given to God and the excellent. Against this, beatitude is in the blessed, but honor is in the one honoring more than in the one honored. Thomas answers that honor is shown to someone for an excellence he has, and so it is a sign and witness of the excellence in him, not the excellence itself. Man's excellence is chiefly his beatitude, his perfect good; so honor can follow beatitude but cannot be it.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man in
honoribus consistat. Beatitudo enim, sive felicitas, est praemium
honors consist beatitude for or happiness is the-reward
virtutis, ut Philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed honor maxime
of-virtue as the-Philosopher says in I Ethics but honor most
videtur esse id quod est virtutis praemium, ut Philosophus
seems to-be that which is of-virtue the-reward as the-Philosopher
dicit in IV Ethic. Ergo in honore maxime consistit beatitudo.
says in IV Ethics therefore in honor most consists beatitude

2. Praeterea, illud quod convenit Deo et excellentissimis,
2 further that which belongs to-God and to-the-most-excellent
maxime videtur esse beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum.
most seems to-be beatitude which is the-good perfect
Sed huiusmodi est honor, ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic.
but of-this-kind is honor as the-Philosopher says in IV Ethics
Et etiam I Tim. I, dicit Apostolus: Soli Deo honor et
and also I Timothy I says the-Apostle to-alone God honor and
gloria. Ergo in honore consistit beatitudo.
glory therefore in honor consists beatitude

3. Praeterea, illud quod est maxime desideratum ab
3 further that which is most desired by
hominibus, est beatitudo. Sed nihil videtur esse magis
men is beatitude but nothing seems to-be more
desiderabile ab hominibus quam honor: quia homines
desirable by men than honor because men
patiuntur iacturam in omnibus aliis rebus, ne patiantur aliquod
suffer loss in all other things lest they-suffer some
detrimentum sui honoris. Ergo in honore beatitudo consistit.
detriment of-their honor therefore in honor beatitude consists

Sed contra, beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non
but against beatitude is in the-blessed honor moreover not
est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui
is in him who is-honored but rather in the-honorer who
reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut Philosophus dicit in I
reverence shows to-the-honored as the-Philosopher says in I
Ethic. Ergo in honore beatitudo non consistit.
Ethics therefore in honor beatitude not consists

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is beatitude
consistere in honore. Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter
to-consist in honor honor for is-shown to-someone on-account-of
aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium
some his excellence and so it-is a-sign and testimony
quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia
a-certain of-that excellence which is in the-honored the-excellence
autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae
moreover of-man most is-regarded according-to beatitude which
est hominis bonum perfectum; et secundum partes eius, idest
is of-man the-good perfect and according-to its parts that-is
secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur.
according-to those goods by-which something of-beatitude is-participated

Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed
and therefore honor can indeed to-follow beatitude but
principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
principally in it beatitude to-consist not can

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher
ibidem dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter
in-the-same-place says honor not is the-reward of-virtue for-the-sake-of
quod virtuosi operantur: sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus
which the-virtuous work but they-receive honor from men
loco praemii, quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad
in-place of-reward as-if from not having anything greater for
dandum. Verum autem praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo,
giving the-true moreover reward of-virtue is the-very beatitude
propter quam virtuosi operantur. Si autem propter honorem
for-the-sake-of which the-virtuous work if moreover for-the-sake-of honor
operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.
they-worked then not it-would-be virtue but rather ambition

Ad secundum dicendum quod honor debetur Deo et
to the-second it-must-be-said that honor is-owed to-God and
excellentissimis, in signum vel testimonium excellentiae
to-the-most-excellent as a-sign or testimony of-excellence
praeexistentis: non quod ipse honor faciat eos excellentes.
pre-existing not that the-very honor makes them excellent

Ad tertium dicendum quod ex naturali desiderio
to the-third it-must-be-said that from the-natural desire
beatitudinis, quam consequitur honor, ut dictum est,
of-beatitude which follows honor as said it-is
contingit quod homines maxime honorem desiderant. Unde
it-happens that men most honor desire whence

quaerunt homines maxime honorari a sapientibus, quorum
seek men most to-be-honored by the-wise whose
iudicio credunt se esse excellentes vel felices.
by-judgment they-believe themselves to-be excellent or happy

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in fama, sive gloria

3 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN FAME OR GLORY

Glory seems the good of the saints and the reward Paul promises. Thomas answers that glory is bright knowledge with praise, as Ambrose says, and human knowledge does not cause the good it knows, as God's does, but is caused by it. So man's beatitude cannot consist in human fame; it depends, as on its cause, on God's knowledge, and so on the glory that is with God.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
consistat in gloria. In eo enim videtur beatitudo consistere,
consist in glory in that for seems beatitude to-consist
quod redditur Sanctis pro tribulationibus quas in mundo
which is-rendered to-the-Saints for the-tribulations which in the-world
patiuntur. Huiusmodi autem est gloria: dicit enim Apostolus,
they-suffer of-this-kind moreover is glory says for the-Apostle
Rom. VIII: Non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad
Romans VIII not are worthy the-sufferings of-this time to
futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in nobis. Ergo beatitudo
the-future glory which will-be-revealed in us therefore beatitude
consistit in gloria.
consists in glory

2. Praeterea, bonum est diffusivum sui, ut patet per
2 further the-good is diffusive of-itself as is-plain through
Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed per gloriam bonum
Dionysius IV chapter on Divine Names but through glory the-good

hominis maxime diffunditur in notitiam aliorum: quia
of-man most is-diffused into the-knowledge of-others because
gloria, ut Ambrosius dicit, nihil aliud est quam clara cum
glory as Ambrose says nothing other is than bright with
laude notitia. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in gloria.
praise knowledge therefore the-beatitude of-man consists in glory

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est stabilissimum bonorum. Hoc
3 further beatitude is the-most-stable of-goods this
autem videtur esse fama vel gloria: quia per hanc
moreover seems to-be fame or glory because through this
quodammodo homines aeternitatem sortiuntur. Unde Boetius
in-a-way men eternity obtain whence Boethius
dicit, in libro de Consol.: Vos immortalitatem vobis
says in the-book on Consolation you immortality for-yourselves
propagare videmini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis.
to-propagate seem when of-future fame time you-think
Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.
therefore the-beatitude of-man consists in fame or glory

Sed contra, beatitudo est verum hominis bonum. Sed
but against beatitude is the-true of-man good but
famam seu gloriam contingit esse falsam: ut enim dicit
fame or glory it-happens to-be false as for says
Boetius, in libro III de Consol., plures magnum saepe
Boethius in the-book III on Consolation many a-great often
nomen falsis vulgi opinionibus abstulerunt. Quo quid
name by-the-false of-the-crowd opinions have-carried-off than-which what
turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, suis
baser to-be-thought-out can for who falsely are-proclaimed at-their
ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant. Non ergo beatitudo
they necessary it-is praises blush not therefore the-beatitude
hominis consistit in fama seu gloria.
of-man consists in fame or glory

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is the-beatitude
hominis in fama seu gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria
of-man in fame or glory human to-consist for glory
nihil aliud est quam clara notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius
nothing other is than bright knowledge with praise as Ambrose
dicit. Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem
says the-thing moreover known otherwise is-compared to knowledge
humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam: humana enim
human and otherwise to knowledge divine human for
cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est
knowledge by the-things known is-caused but divine knowledge is
causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni,
the-cause of-the-things known whence the-perfection of-human good
quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana:
which beatitude is-called not can to-be-caused by knowledge human
sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit
but rather knowledge human about the-beatitude of-someone proceeds
et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel
and in-a-way is-caused by the-very human beatitude either
inchoata vel perfecta. Et ideo in fama vel in gloria non
begun or perfect and therefore in fame or in glory not
potest consistere hominis beatitudo. Sed bonum hominis
can to-consist of-man the-beatitude but the-good of-man
dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex
depends as on a-cause on the-knowledge of-God and therefore on
gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis
the-glory which is with God depends the-beatitude of-man
sicut ex causa sua: secundum illud Psalmi XC: Eripiam
as on cause its according-to that of-Psalm XC I-shall-deliver

eum, et glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum,
him and I-shall-glorify him with-length of-days I-shall-fill him
et ostendam illi salutare meum.
and I-shall-show to-him salvation my

Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia
it-is also another-thing to-be-considered that human knowledge
saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus,
often is-deceived and especially in singulars contingent
cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana
of-which-kind are acts human and therefore frequently human
gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest,
glory deceptive is but because God to-be-deceived not can
eius gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad
his glory always true is on-account-of which it-is-said II to
Cor. X: Ille probatus est, quem Deus commendat.
Corinthians X he approved is whom God commends

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Apostolus non loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-Apostle not speaks
ibi de gloria quae est ab hominibus, sed de gloria quae
there about glory which is from men but about glory which
est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde dicitur Marc. VIII:
is from God before the-Angels his whence it-is-said Mark VIII
Filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria Patris sui, coram
the-Son of-man will-confess him in the-glory of-Father his before
Angelis eius.
Angels his

Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-good of-some man
quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum,
which through fame or glory is in the-knowledge of-many
si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur
if the-knowledge indeed true be it-is-necessary that it-be-derived

a bono existente in ipso homine: et sic praesupponit
from the-good existing in the-very man and thus it-presupposes
beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio
beatitude perfect or begun if moreover the-knowledge
falsa sit, non concordat rei: et sic bonum non
false be not it-agrees with-the-thing and thus the-good not
invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet
is-found in him whose fame celebrated is-held whence it-is-plain
quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum.
that fame in-no way can to-make a-man blessed

Ad tertium dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem:
to the-third it-must-be-said that fame not has stability
immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis
nay by-false rumor from ease is-lost and if stable
aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo
sometimes it-persevere this is through accident but beatitude
habet per se stabilitatem, et semper.
has through itself stability and always

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in potestate

4 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN POWER

Power seems godlike and most desired. Thomas answers that power has the notion of a principle, while beatitude is the last end, and power can serve good or evil, while beatitude is man's proper and perfect good; beatitude would sooner lie in the good use of power, through virtue. Four reasons exclude all the outward goods together: they are found in the good and the wicked, they leave much to be desired, harm can come from them, and they come from outward causes and often from fortune.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude consist
in potestate. Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam
in power all-things for desire to-be-likened to-God as
ultimo fini et primo principio. Sed homines qui in
to-the-last end and first principle but men who in
potestatibus sunt, propter similitudinem potestatis, maxime
powers are on-account-of the-likeness of-power most
videntur esse Deo conformes: unde et in Scriptura dii
seem to-be to-God conformed whence also in Scripture gods
vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, Diis non detrahes.
they-are-called as is-plain Exodus XXII the-gods not you-will-disparage
Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
therefore in power beatitude consists

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed
2 further beatitude is the-good perfect but
perfectissimum est quod homo etiam alios regere possit,
most-perfect it-is that man also others to-rule can
quod convenit his qui in potestatibus sunt constituti.
which belongs to-those who in powers are placed
Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate.
therefore beatitude consists in power

3. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis,
3 further beatitude since it-be most desirable
opponitur ei quod maxime est fugiendum. Sed homines
is-opposed to-that which most is to-be-fled but men
maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur potestas.
most flee servitude to-which is-opposed power
Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit.
therefore in power beatitude consists

Sed contra, beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas
but against beatitude is the-perfect good but power
est maxime imperfecta. Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de
is most imperfect as for says Boethius III on
Consol., potestas humana sollicitudinum morsus expellere,
Consolation power human of-anxieties the-bites to-expel
formidinum aculeos vitare nequit. Et postea: Potentem
of-fears the-stings to-avoid cannot and afterward powerful
censes cui satellites latus ambiunt, qui quos terret,
do-you-reckon-him whose attendants the-side surround who those-whom he-terrifies
ipse plus metuit? Non igitur beatitudo consistit in potestate.
he more fears not therefore beatitude consists in power

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is beatitude
in potestate consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia
in power to-consist on-account-of two-things first indeed because
potestas habet rationem principii, ut patet in V Metaphys.
power has the-notion of-principle as is-plain in V Metaphysics
Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis. – Secundo,
beatitude moreover has the-notion of-last end second
quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum. Beatitudo
because power itself has to good and to evil beatitude
autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde
moreover is the-proper and perfect of-man good whence

magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu
rather could to-consist beatitude some in the-good use
potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.
of-power which is through virtue than in the-very power
Possunt autem quatuor generales rationes induci ad
can moreover four general reasons to-be-brought for
ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum exteriorum bonorum
showing that in none of-the-aforesaid outer goods
beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum beatitudo
beatitude consists of-which the-first is because since beatitude
sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod
be the-highest of-man good not it-is-compatible with-itself some
malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et
evil all moreover the-aforesaid can to-be-found both in the-good and
in malis. – Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis
in the-evil the-second reason is because since of the-notion of-beatitude
sit quod sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic.,
it-be that it-be through itself sufficient as is-plain in I Ethics
necesse est quod, beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini
necessary it-is that beatitude obtained no good to-man
necessarium desit. Adeptis autem singulis praemissorum,
necessary be-lacking obtained moreover each of-the-aforesaid
possunt adhuc multa bona homini necessaria deesse, puta
can still many goods to-man necessary to-be-lacking for-example
sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi. – Tertia, quia, cum
wisdom health of-body and of-this-kind the-third because since
beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non potest
beatitude be the-good perfect from beatitude not can
aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit praemissis:
any evil to-anyone to-come which not belongs to-the-aforesaid
dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum conservantur in
it-is-said for Ecclesiastes V that riches sometimes are-kept to

malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus. – Quarta
the-harm of-master their and the-like is-plain in the-other three the-fourth
ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia
reason is because to beatitude man is-ordered through principles
interiora: cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa
interior since to it naturally he-be-ordered the-aforesaid
autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut
moreover four goods rather are from causes exterior and for
plurimum a fortuna: unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde
the-most-part from fortune whence also goods of-fortune they-are-called whence
patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
it-is-plain that in the-aforesaid in-no way beatitude consists

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divina potestas est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-divine power is
sua bonitas: unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene.
his goodness whence to-use his power not he-can except well
Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad
but this in men not is-found whence not it-suffices for
beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad
the-beatitude of-man that he-be-likened to-God as-far to
potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.
power unless also he-be-likened to-him as-far to goodness

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod
to the-second it-must-be-said that as best it-is that
aliquis utatur bene potestate in regimine multorum, ita
someone use well power in the-rule of-many so
pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita potestas se habet
worst it-is if badly he-use and so power itself has
et ad bonum et ad malum.
both to good and to evil

Ad tertium dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum
to the-third it-must-be-said that servitude is a-hindrance
boni usus potestatis: et ideo naturaliter homines eam
of-the-good use of-power and therefore naturally men it
fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate hominis sit summum bonum.
flee and not as-if in the-power of-man be the-highest good

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo corporis bono

5 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN A GOOD OF THE BODY

Since bodily health is required for man's being, which is better than living and most desired by all, it seems so. Against this, many animals surpass man in the body's goods, as the elephant in length of life, the lion in strength, and the stag in running. Thomas answers that the last end of a thing ordered to another cannot be its own preservation, as the helmsman does not intend the ship's preservation as his last end, and man is ordered to an end, not being the highest good; besides, his body is for his soul as matter for form; so all the body's goods are ordered to the soul's, and beatitude cannot lie in them.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
consistat in bonis corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX: Non
consist in goods of-the-body it-is-said for Ecclesiasticus XXX not
est census supra census salutis corporis. Sed in eo quod est
there-is wealth above the-wealth of-the-health of-the-body but in that which is
optimum, consistit beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute.
best consists beatitude therefore it-consists in of-the-body health

2. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse
2 further Dionysius says V chapter on Divine Names that to-be
est melius quam vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae
is better than to-live and to-live better than other-things which

consequuntur. Sed ad esse et vivere hominis requiritur salus
follow but for the-to-be and to-live of-man is-required the-health
corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit summum bonum hominis,
of-the-body since therefore beatitude be the-highest good of-man
videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat ad beatitudinem.
it-seems that the-health of-the-body most pertains to beatitude

3. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto
3 further by-how-much something is more-common by-so-much
ab altiori principio dependet: quia quanto causa est
on a-higher principle it-depends because by-how-much the-cause is
superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se extendit. Sed
superior by-so-much its power to more-things itself extends but
sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur secundum
as the-causality of-the-cause efficient is-considered according-to
influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum
influence so the-causality of-the-end is-regarded according-to
appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae
appetite therefore as the-first cause efficient is that-which
in omnia influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus
into all-things flows-in so the-last end is that-which by all
desideratur. Sed ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab
is-desired but the-very to-be is that-which most is-desired by
omnibus. Ergo in his quae pertinent ad esse hominis,
all therefore in those-things which pertain to the-to-be of-man
sicut est salus corporis, maxime consistit eius beatitudo.
as is the-health of-the-body most consists his beatitude

Sed contra, secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia
but against according-to beatitude man excels all
alia animalia. Sed secundum bona corporis, a multis
other animals but according-to the-goods of-the-body by many
animalibus superatur: sicut ab elephante in diuturnitate vitae,
animals he-is-surpassed as by the-elephant in length of-life

a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in cursu. Ergo beatitudo
by the-lion in strength by the-stag in running therefore the-beatitude
hominis non consistit in bonis corporis.
of-man not consists in goods of-the-body

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is the-beatitude
hominis in bonis corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo
of-man in goods of-the-body to-consist on-account-of two-things first
quidem, quia impossibile est quod illius rei quae ordinatur
indeed because impossible it-is that of-that thing which is-ordered
ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus finis sit eiusdem conservatio
to another as to an-end the-last end be of-the-same the-preservation
in esse. Unde gubernator non intendit, sicut ultimum finem,
in the-to-be whence the-helmsman not intends as the-last end
conservationem navis sibi commissae; eo quod navis
the-preservation of-the-ship to-himself entrusted for-the-reason that the-ship
ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad navigandum. Sicut
to another is-ordered as to an-end namely to sailing as
autem navis committitur gubernatori ad dirigendum, ita homo
moreover the-ship is-entrusted to-the-helmsman for directing so man
est suae voluntati et rationi commissus; secundum illud quod
is to-his will and reason entrusted according-to that which
dicitur Eccli. XV: Deus ab initio constituit hominem,
is-said Ecclesiasticus XV God from the-beginning established man
et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Manifestum est autem
and left him in the-hand of-counsel his manifest it-is moreover
quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem: non enim homo
that man is-ordered to something as to an-end not for man
est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis
is the-highest good whence impossible it-is that the-last end
rationis et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse.
of-reason and will human be the-preservation of-human the-to-be

Secundo quia, dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis
second because granted that the-end of-reason and will
humanae esset conservatio humani esse, non tamen posset
human were the-preservation of-human the-to-be not yet it-could
dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod corporis bonum. Esse
to-be-said that the-end of-man were some of-the-body good the-to-be
enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore: et quamvis esse
for of-man consists in soul and body and although the-to-be
corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae
of-the-body depend on the-soul the-to-be yet of-the-human soul
non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque
not depends on the-body as above shown it-is and-the-very
corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam,
body is for-the-sake-of the-soul as matter for-the-sake-of form
et instrumenta propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones
and instruments for-the-sake-of the-mover that through them his actions
exerceat. Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona
he-may-exercise whence all goods of-the-body are-ordered to the-goods
animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis
of-the-soul as to an-end whence impossible it-is that in goods
corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis.
of-the-body beatitude consist which is the-last of-man end

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as the-body is-ordered
ad animam sicut ad finem, ita bona exteriora ad ipsum
to the-soul as to an-end so goods outer to the-very
corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum corporis praefertur
body and therefore reasonably the-good of-the-body is-preferred
bonis exterioribus, quae per censum significantur, sicut et
to-goods outer which by wealth are-signified as also
bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis corporis.
the-good of-the-soul is-preferred to-all goods of-the-body

Ad secundum dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum,
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-be simply taken
secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi,
according as it-includes in itself all perfection of-being
praeeminet vitae et omnibus subsequentibus: sic enim ipsum
excels life and all subsequent-things thus for the-very
esse praehabet in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc modo
to-be pre-has in itself all subsequent-things and in-this way
Dionysius loquitur. – Sed si consideretur ipsum esse prout
Dionysius speaks but if be-considered the-very to-be according-as
participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non capiunt totam
it-is-participated in this thing or in that which not grasp the-whole
perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut
perfection of-being but have the-to-be imperfect as
est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod
is the-to-be of-any creature thus manifest it-is that
ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius.
the-very to-be with perfection super-added is more-eminent
Unde et Dionysius ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt
whence also Dionysius in-the-same-place says that living-things are
meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus.
better than-existing-things and understanding-things than-living-things

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia finis respondet
to the-third it-must-be-said that because the-end corresponds
principio, ex illa ratione probatur quod ultimus finis
to-the-principle from that reason is-proved that the-last end
est primum principium essendi, in quo est omnis essendi
is the-first principle of-being in which is all of-being
perfectio: cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum suam
perfection whose likeness desire according-to their
proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum,
proportion some indeed according-to the-to-be only

quaedam secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse
some according-to the-to-be living some according-to the-to-be
vivens et intelligens et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est.
living and understanding and blessed and this of-few is

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in voluptate

6 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN PLEASURE

All desire pleasure for itself, it seems. Thomas answers that pleasure is a proper accident following beatitude, not its essence; and bodily pleasure, following the sense's good, which is a good of the body, cannot be the perfect good, being slight beside the good of the soul. Bodily pleasures are more desired because the senses' operations, as the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man in
voluptate consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non
pleasure consist beatitude for since it-be the-last end not
appetitur propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed
is-desired for-the-sake-of another-thing but other-things for-the-sake-of it but
hoc maxime convenit delectationi: ridiculum est enim ab aliquo
this most belongs to-delight ridiculous it-is for from someone
quaerere propter quid velit delectari, ut dicitur in X Ethic.
to-ask for-the-sake-of what he-wishes to-be-delighted as is-said in X Ethics
Ergo beatitudo maxime in voluptate et delectatione consistit.
therefore beatitude most in pleasure and delight consists

2. Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam
2 further the-cause first more-vehemently impresses than
secunda, ut dicitur in libro de Causis. Influentia autem
the-second as is-said in the-book on Causes the-influence moreover
finis attenditur secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo
of-the-end is-regarded according-to its appetite that therefore

videtur habere rationem finis ultimi, quod maxime movet
seems to-have the-notion of-end last which most moves
appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas: cuius signum est quod
the-appetite this moreover is pleasure of-which a-sign is that
delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et rationem,
delight so-far absorbs of-man the-will and reason
quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod ultimus
that other goods to-despise it-makes therefore it-seems that the-last
finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate consistat.
end of-man which is beatitude most in pleasure consists

3. Praeterea, cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia
3 further since appetite be of-the-good that which all-things
appetunt, videtur esse optimum. Sed delectationem omnia
desire seems to-be best but delight all
appetunt, et sapientes et insipientes, et etiam ratione
desire both wise and unwise and even reason
carentia. Ergo delectatio est optimum. Consistit ergo in
lacking therefore delight is best consists therefore in
voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum bonum.
pleasure beatitude which is the-highest good

Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol.:
but against is that Boethius says in III on Consolation
Tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum
sad the-ends to-be of-pleasures whoever to-remember lusts
suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent,
his will-wish will-understand which if blessed to-make they-could
nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur.
no of-cause there-is why cattle also blessed to-be be-called

Respondeo dicendum quod, quia delectationes corporales
I-answer it-must-be-said that because delights bodily
pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum,
to-more known are they-have-taken to-themselves the-name of-pleasures

ut dicitur VII Ethic.: cum tamen sint aliae delectationes
as is-said VII Ethics although yet there-be other delights
potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit.
better in which yet beatitude principally not consists
Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam
because in each thing one-thing is which pertains to the-essence
eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius: sicut in homine
its another is the-proper accident of-it as in man
aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est
one-thing is that he-is an-animal rational mortal another that he-is
risibile. Est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est
risible it-is therefore to-be-considered that every delight is
quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem,
a-certain proper accident which follows beatitude
vel aliquam beatitudinis partem: ex hoc enim aliquis
or some of-beatitude part from this for someone
delectatur, quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel
is-delighted that he-has a-good some to-himself fitting either
in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum autem
in reality or in hope or at-least in memory the-good moreover
conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis
fitting if indeed it-be perfect is the-very of-man
beatitudo: si autem sit imperfectum, est quaedam beatitudinis
beatitude if moreover it-be imperfect it-is a-certain of-beatitude
participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens.
participation either near or remote or at-least apparent
Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae
whence manifest it-is that not-even the-very delight which
consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis;
follows the-good perfect is the-very essence of-beatitude
sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens.
but something consequent to it as through itself an-accident

Voluptas autem corporalis non potest etiam modo
pleasure moreover bodily not can even in-the-way
praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur bonum quod
aforesaid to-follow the-good perfect for it-follows the-good which
apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens.
apprehends sense which is a-power of-the-soul the-body using
Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur
the-good moreover which pertains to the-body which is-apprehended
secundum sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum.
according-to sense not can to-be the-perfect of-man good
Cum enim anima rationalis excedat proportionem materiae
since for the-soul rational exceeds the-proportion of-matter
corporalis, pars animae quae est ab organo corporeo
bodily the-part of-the-soul which is from organ bodily
absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem respectu ipsius corporis
loosed a-certain has infinity with-respect-to of-the-very body
et partium animae corpori concretarum: sicut immaterialia
and of-the-parts of-the-soul to-the-body bound as immaterial-things
sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, eo
are in-a-way infinite with-respect-to of-material-things for-the-reason
quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et
that form through matter in-a-way is-contracted and
finitur, unde forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo
is-limited whence form from matter loosed is in-a-way
infinita. Et ideo sensus, qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit
infinite and therefore sense which is a-power bodily knows
singulare, quod est determinatum per materiam: intellectus
the-singular which is determined through matter the-intellect
vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta, cognoscit universale,
but which is a-power from matter loosed knows the-universal
quod est abstractum a materia, et continet sub se infinita
which is abstracted from matter and contains under itself infinite

singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens corpori,
singulars whence it-is-plain that the-good fitting to-the-body
quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem
which through the-apprehension of-sense delight bodily
causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum
causes not is the-perfect good of-man but is the-least
quiddam in comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap.
something in comparison to the-good of-the-soul whence Wisdom
VII dicitur quod omne aurum, in comparatione sapientiae,
VII it-is-said that all gold in comparison of-wisdom
arena est exigua. Sic igitur neque voluptas corporalis est
sand is little thus therefore neither pleasure bodily is
ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se accidens beatitudinis.
the-very beatitude nor is-it through itself an-accident of-beatitude

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that of-the-same notion it-is
quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae
that be-desired the-good and that be-desired delight which
nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono: sicut ex
nothing is other than the-quieting of-the-appetite in the-good as from
eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur deorsum, et
the-same power of-nature it-is that the-heavy be-borne downward and
quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum
that there it-rest whence as the-good for-the-sake-of itself
appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter
is-desired so also delight for-the-sake-of itself and not for-the-sake-of
aliud appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si
another is-desired if the-word for-the-sake-of it-say the-cause final if
vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio
but it-say the-cause formal or rather motive thus delight
est appetibilis propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod
is desirable for-the-sake-of another that-is for-the-sake-of the-good which

est delectationis obiectum, et per consequens est principium
is of-delight the-object and by consequence is the-principle
eius, et dat ei formam: ex hoc enim delectatio habet
of-it and gives to-it form from this for delight has
quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato.
that it-be-desired because it-is rest in the-good desired

Ad secundum dicendum quod vehemens appetitus
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-vehement appetite
delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes
of-delight sensible happens from this that the-operations
sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae cognitionis, sunt
of-the-senses because they-are the-principles of-our knowledge are
magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus delectationes
more perceptible whence also by more delights
sensibiles appetuntur.
sensible are-desired

Ad tertium dicendum quod eo modo omnes appetunt
to the-third it-must-be-said that in-that way all desire
delectationem, sicut et appetunt bonum: et tamen
delight as also they-desire the-good and yet
delectationem appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso,
delight they-desire by-reason of-the-good and not from the-converse
ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit
as said it-is whence not it-follows that delight be
maximum et per se bonum: sed quod unaquaeque delectatio
the-greatest and through itself good but that each delight
consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio
follows some good and that some delight
consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.
follows that which is through itself and greatest good

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo bono animae

7 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN SOME GOOD OF THE SOUL

Since beatitude is a good of man, and it lies neither in outward goods nor in the body's, it seems to lie in the soul's. Thomas answers that the end may be the thing desired or its attainment. The soul itself, in potency, cannot be the last end, nor its powers, habits, or acts, which are participated goods. Beatitude is something of the soul as its attainment, but what makes man blessed is outside the soul.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude consist
in aliquo bono animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis
in some good of-the-soul beatitude for is a-certain of-man
bonum. Hoc autem per tria dividitur, quae sunt bona
good this moreover into three is-divided which are goods
exteriora, bona corporis, et bona animae. Sed beatitudo
outer goods of-the-body and goods of-the-soul but beatitude
non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in bonis corporis,
not consists in goods outer nor in goods of-the-body
sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis animae.
as above shown it-is therefore it-consists in goods of-the-soul

2. Praeterea, illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum,
2 further that for-which we-desire some good
magis amamus quam bonum quod ei appetimus: sicut
more we-love than the-good which for-it we-desire as
magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam
more we-love the-friend for-whom we-desire money than
pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi
money but each-one whatever good for-himself
appetit. Ergo seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona.
desires therefore himself he-loves more than all other goods

Sed beatitudo est quod maxime amatur: quod patet ex
but beatitude is what most is-loved which is-plain from
hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia amantur et
this that for-the-sake-of it all other-things are-loved and
desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono ipsius
are-desired therefore beatitude consists in some good of-the-very
hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis animae.
man but not in goods of-the-body therefore in goods of-the-soul

3. Praeterea, perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed
3 further perfection is something of-that which is-perfected but
beatitudo est quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est
beatitude is a-certain perfection of-man therefore beatitude is
aliquid hominis. Sed non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum
something of-man but not it-is something of-the-body as shown
est. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in
it-is therefore beatitude is something of-the-soul and so it-consists in
bonis animae.
goods of-the-soul

Sed contra, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ.,
but against as Augustine says in the-book on Doctrine Christian
id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum
that in which is-established the-blessed life for-the-sake-of itself to-be-loved
est. Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed
is but man not is for-the-sake-of himself to-be-loved but
quidquid est in homine, est diligendum propter Deum.
whatever is in man is to-be-loved for-the-sake-of God
Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo consistit.
therefore in no good of-the-soul beatitude consists

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is
finis dupliciter dicitur: scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci
the-end in-two-ways is-said namely the-very thing which to-obtain

desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei. Si
we-desire and the-use or obtaining or possession of-that thing if
ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam
therefore we-speak about the-last end of-man as-far to the-very
rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est
thing which we-desire as the-last end impossible it-is
quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid eius.
that the-last end of-man be the-very soul or something of-it
Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in potentia
the-very for soul in itself considered is as in potency
existens: fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et
existing it-becomes for from potentially knowing actually knowing and
de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit
from potentially virtuous actually virtuous since moreover potency be
propter actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile
for-the-sake-of act as for-the-sake-of completion impossible
est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens,
it-is that that which is according-to itself in potency existing
habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod
have the-notion of-last end whence impossible it-is that
ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.
the-very soul be the-last end of-it itself

Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia,
similarly also neither something of-it whether it-be power
sive habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus
or habit or act the-good for which is the-last
finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus
end is the-good perfect fulfilling the-appetite the-appetite
autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis.
moreover human which is the-will is of-the-good universal
Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens ipsi animae, est
any good moreover inhering in-the-very soul is

bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde
a-good participated and by consequence particularized whence
impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus finis hominis.
impossible it-is that any of-them be the-last end of-man

Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad
but if we-speak about the-last end of-man as-far to
ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum
the-very obtaining or possession or any use
ipsius rei quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem
of-the-very thing which is-desired as the-end thus to the-last end
pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animae: quia homo per
pertains something of-man on the-side of-the-soul because man through
animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae
the-soul beatitude attains the-thing therefore itself which
appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et
is-desired as the-end is that in which beatitude consists and
quod beatum facit: sed huius rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo.
which blessed makes but of-this thing the-obtaining is-called beatitude
Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed
whence to-be-said it-is that beatitude is something of-the-soul but
id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam.
that in which consists beatitude is something outside the-soul

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod sub
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that according as under
illa divisione comprehenduntur omnia bona quae homini
that division are-comprehended all goods which to-man
sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur non solum
are desirable thus the-good of-the-soul is-called not only
potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod
power or habit or act but also the-object which

est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id
is extrinsic and in-this way nothing prohibits to-say that
in quo beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae.
in which beatitude consists to-be a-certain good of-the-soul

Ad secundum dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet,
to the-second it-must-be-said as-far to the-proposition it-pertains
quod beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum:
that beatitude most is-loved as a-good coveted
amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur
the-friend moreover is-loved as that for-which is-coveted
bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est
the-good and thus also man loves himself whence not is
eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae
the-same notion of-love in-both whether moreover by-the-love of-friendship
aliquid homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi
something man above himself may-love will-be the-place of-considering
cum de caritate agetur.
when about charity it-will-be-treated

Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit
to the-third it-must-be-said that beatitude itself since it-be
perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum inhaerens:
the-perfection of-the-soul is a-certain of-the-soul good inhering
sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod scilicet beatum
but that in which beatitude consists which namely blessed
facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est.
makes is something outside the-soul as said it-is

Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo bono creato

8 · WHETHER MAN'S BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN ANY CREATED GOOD

It seems so, since the divine wisdom joins the lowest of the higher with the highest of the lower. Thomas answers that beatitude is the perfect good that wholly quiets desire, and the will's object is the universal good, as the intellect's is universal truth. No created good, being participated, satisfies it, only God; so beatitude consists in God alone.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
consistat in aliquo bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII
consist in some good created says for Dionysius VII
cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit fines
chapter on Divine Names that divine wisdom joins the-ends
primorum principiis secundorum: ex quo potest accipi
of-the-first to-the-beginnings of-the-second from which can to-be-taken
quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere infimum naturae
that the-highest of-a-lower nature be to-reach the-lowest of-the-nature
superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo. Cum
higher but the-highest of-man good is beatitude since
ergo angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in
therefore the-angel of-nature in-order be above man as in
Primo habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat
the-First held it-is it-seems that the-beatitude of-man consist
in hoc quod aliquo modo attingit ad angelum.
in this that in-some way he-reaches to the-angel

2. Praeterea, ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto:
2 further the-last end of-any thing is in its perfect
unde pars est propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed
whence the-part is for-the-sake-of the-whole as for-the-sake-of an-end but

tota universitas creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus,
the-whole totality of-creatures which is-called the-greater world
comparatur ad hominem, qui in VIII Physic. dicitur minor
is-compared to man who in VIII Physics is-called the-lesser
mundus, sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo
world as the-perfect to the-imperfect therefore the-beatitude
hominis consistit in tota universitate creaturarum.
of-man consists in the-whole totality of-creatures

3. Praeterea, per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius
3 further through this man is-made blessed that his
naturale desiderium quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis
natural desire it-quiets but the-natural desire of-man
non extenditur ad maius bonum quam quod ipse capere
not extends to a-greater good than that-which he to-grasp
potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax boni quod excedit
can since therefore man not be capable of-good which exceeds
limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per aliquod bonum
the-limits of-the-whole creature it-seems that through some good
creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo hominis
created man blessed to-become can and so the-beatitude of-man
in aliquo bono creato consistit.
in some good created consists

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei:
but against is that Augustine says XIX on the-City of-God
Ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est;
as the-life of-the-flesh the-soul is so the-blessed life of-man God is
de quo dicitur, Beatus populus cuius Dominus Deus eius.
about whom it-is-said blessed the-people whose Lord (is)-God their

Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem
I-answer it-must-be-said that impossible it-is the-beatitude
hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim
of-man to-be in some good created beatitude for

est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum:
is the-good perfect which totally quiets the-appetite
alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid
otherwise not it-would-be the-last end if still remained something
appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus
to-be-desired the-object moreover of-the-will which is the-appetite
humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus
human is the-universal good as the-object of-the-intellect
est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest
is the-universal true from which it-is-plain that nothing can
quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod
to-quiet the-will of-man except the-good universal which
non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo: quia
not is-found in any created-thing but only in God because
omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus
every creature has goodness participated whence alone
Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest; secundum quod
God the-will of-man to-fill can according as
dicitur in Psalmo CII: Qui replet in bonis desiderium
is-said in Psalm CII who fills with goods desire
tuum. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit.
your in alone therefore God the-beatitude of-man consists

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superius hominis
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-higher of-man
attingit quidem infimum angelicae naturae per quandam
reaches indeed the-lowest of-angelic nature through a-certain
similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in ultimo fine, sed
likeness not yet there it-stops as in the-last end but
procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni, qui est
proceeds even to the-very universal fount of-good which is

universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam
the-universal object of-the-beatitude of-all the-blessed as
infinitum et perfectum bonum existens.
infinite and perfect good existing

Ad secundum dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit
to the-second it-must-be-said that if a-whole some not be
ultimus finis, sed ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus
the-last end but be-ordered to an-end further the-last
finis partis non est ipsum totum, sed aliquid aliud.
end of-the-part not is the-very whole but something else
Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo
the-totality moreover of-creatures to which is-compared man
ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in
as a-part to the-whole not is the-last end but is-ordered to
Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non
God as to the-last end whence the-good of-the-universe not
est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus.
is the-last end of-man but the-very God

Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-good created not is less
quam bonum cuius homo est capax ut rei intrinsecae et
than the-good of-which man is capable as of-a-thing intrinsic and
inhaerentis: est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est capax ut
inhering it-is yet less than the-good of-which he-is capable as
obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod participatur ab
of-an-object which is infinite the-good moreover which is-participated by
angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et contractum.
the-angel and by the-whole universe is a-good finite and contracted

Quid sit beatitudo

III · WHAT BEATITUDE IS

Next Thomas asks what beatitude is and what it requires. He asks eight questions: whether it is something uncreated; whether it is an operation; whether an operation of the senses or of the intellect alone; whether of the intellect or of the will; whether of the speculative or the practical intellect; whether it lies in the speculative sciences; whether in the knowledge of the angels; and whether in the vision of God's essence.

Deinde considerandum est quid sit beatitudo; et quae
then to-be-considered it-is what may-be beatitude and what-things
requirantur ad ipsam.
may-be-required for it

Circa primum quaeruntur octo.
about the-first are-asked eight

Primo: utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum.
first whether beatitude be something uncreated

Secundo: si est aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio.
second if it-is something created whether it-be an-operation

Tertio: utrum sit operatio sensitivae partis, an intellectivae
third whether it-be an-operation of-the-sensitive part or of-the-intellective
tantum.
only

Quarto: si est operatio intellectivae partis, utrum sit
fourth if it-is an-operation of-the-intellective part whether it-be
operatio intellectus, an voluntatis.
an-operation of-the-intellect or of-the-will

Quinto: si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio
fifth if it-is an-operation of-the-intellect whether it-be an-operation
intellectus speculativi, aut practici.
of-the-intellect speculative or practical

Sexto: si est operatio intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat
sixth if it-is an-operation of-the-intellect speculative whether it-consist
in speculatione scientiarum speculativarum.
in the-speculation of-the-sciences speculative

Septimo: utrum consistat in speculatione substantiarum
seventh whether it-consist in the-speculation of-substances
separatarum, scilicet angelorum.
separated namely of-angels

Octavo: utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per
eighth whether in the-sole speculation of-God by-which through
essentiam videtur.
essence he-is-seen

Utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum

1 · WHETHER BEATITUDE IS SOMETHING UNCREATED

Boethius says God is beatitude itself, and the highest good is God, so it seems uncreated. Thomas answers that the end is twofold, the thing itself and its attainment. In the first sense man's beatitude is something uncreated, God; in the second, as the attaining and enjoying of God, it is something created in man.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude be
aliquid increatum. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol.:
something uncreated says for Boethius in III on Consolation
Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri.
God to-be the-very beatitude necessary it-is to-confess

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse
2 further beatitude is the-highest good but to-be
summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum ergo non sint plura
the-highest good belongs to-God since therefore not there-be several
summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem quod Deus.
highest goods it-seems that beatitude be the-same as God

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter
3 further beatitude is the-last end to which naturally
humana voluntas tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam
the-human will tends but to no other the-will as
in finem tendere debet nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est,
to an-end to-tend ought except to God whom alone to-be-enjoyed it-is
ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo beatitudo est idem quod Deus.
as Augustine says therefore beatitude is the-same as God

Sed contra, nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo
but against nothing made is uncreated but beatitude
hominis est aliquid factum: quia secundum Augustinum, I
of-man is something made because according-to Augustine I
de Doctr. Christ., illis rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos
on Doctrine Christian those things to-be-enjoyed it-is which us blessed
faciunt. Ergo beatitudo non est aliquid increatum.
make therefore beatitude not is something uncreated

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is the-end
dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus
is-said in-two-ways in-one way the-very thing which we-desire
adipisci: sicut avaro est finis pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa
to-obtain as to-the-miser is the-end money in-another way the-very
adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut fruitio eius rei quae
obtaining or possession or use or enjoyment of-that thing which
desideratur: sicut si dicatur quod possessio pecuniae est finis
is-desired as if it-be-said that the-possession of-money is the-end

avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis intemperati.
of-the-miser and to-enjoy a-thing voluptuous is the-end of-the-intemperate
Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum
in-the-first therefore way the-last of-man end is the-good
increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest
uncreated namely God who alone by-his infinite goodness can
voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo,
the-will of-man perfectly to-fill in-the-second moreover way
ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens,
the-last end of-man is something created in him existing
quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi.
which nothing is other than the-obtaining or enjoyment of-the-end last
Ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo
the-last moreover end is-called beatitude if therefore the-beatitude
hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic
of-man be-considered as-far to the-cause or object thus
est aliquid increatum: si autem consideretur quantum ad
it-is something uncreated if moreover it-be-considered as-far to
ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum.
the-very essence of-beatitude thus it-is something created

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that God is beatitude
per essentiam suam: non enim per adeptionem aut
through essence his not for through obtaining or
participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per
participation of-some other-thing blessed he-is but through
essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem
essence his men moreover are blessed as in-the-same-place
dicit Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per
says Boethius through participation as also gods through

participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis
participation are-called the-very moreover participation of-beatitude
secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est.
according-to which man is-called blessed something created is

Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse
to the-second it-must-be-said that beatitude is-said to-be
summum hominis bonum, quia est adeptio vel fruitio
the-highest of-man good because it-is the-obtaining or enjoyment
summi boni.
of-the-highest good

Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus
to the-third it-must-be-said that beatitude is-said the-last
finis, per modum quo adeptio finis dicitur finis.
end through the-manner by-which the-obtaining of-the-end is-said the-end

Utrum beatitudo sit operatio

2 · WHETHER BEATITUDE IS AN OPERATION

Beatitude seems rather a state, and an operation is fleeting, while beatitude is lasting. Thomas answers that beatitude, as something created in man, is his last perfection, and a thing is perfect so far as it is in act; so it must be his last act, an operation, which the Philosopher calls the second act. In this life it is interrupted; in the blessed it is one continual operation.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude not be
operatio. Dicit enim Apostolus, Rom. VI: Habetis fructum
an-operation says for the-Apostle Romans VI you-have fruit
vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam.
your unto sanctification the-end but life eternal

Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum esse viventium. Ergo
but life not is an-operation but the-very to-be of-the-living therefore
ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est operatio.
the-last end which is beatitude not is an-operation

2. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod beatitudo
2 further Boethius says in III on Consolation that beatitude
est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed status
is a-state of-all goods by-the-aggregation perfect but state
non nominat operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
not names operation therefore beatitude not is an-operation

3. Praeterea, beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens:
3 further beatitude signifies something in the-blessed existing
cum sit ultima perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat
since it-is the-last perfection of-man but operation not signifies
ut aliquid existens in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso
as something existing in the-operator but rather as from him
procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
proceeding therefore beatitude not is an-operation

4. Praeterea, beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem
4 further beatitude remains in the-blessed operation moreover
non permanet, sed transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
not remains but passes therefore beatitude not is an-operation

5. Praeterea, unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes
5 further of-one man is one beatitude operations
autem sunt multae. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio.
moreover are many therefore beatitude not is an-operation

6. Praeterea, beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione.
6 further beatitude is-in the-blessed without interruption
Sed operatio humana frequenter interrumpitur: puta
but operation human frequently is-interrupted for-example

somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione, vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo
by-sleep or some other occupation or rest therefore beatitude
non est operatio.
not is an-operation

Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod
but against is that the-Philosopher says in I Ethics that
felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam.
happiness is an-operation according-to virtue perfect

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo
I-answer it-must-be-said that according as the-beatitude
hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, necesse est
of-man is something created in him existing necessary it-is
dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio. Est enim beatitudo
to-say that the-beatitude of-man be an-operation is for beatitude
ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem intantum
the-last of-man perfection each-thing moreover so-far
perfectum est, inquantum est actu: nam potentia sine actu
perfect is inasmuch-as it-is in-act for potency without act
imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu
imperfect is it-is-necessary therefore beatitude in the-last act
hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est
of-man to-consist manifest it-is moreover that operation is
ultimus actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a Philosopho
the-last act of-the-operator whence also act second by the-Philosopher
nominatur, in II de Anima: nam habens formam potest esse
it-is-named in II on the-Soul for having form can to-be
in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans.
in potency operating as one-knowing is in potency considering
Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur
and thence it-is that in other also things thing each is-said

esse propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de Caelo.
to-be for-the-sake-of its operation as is-said in II on the-Heavens
Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse.
necessary it-is therefore the-beatitude of-man an-operation to-be
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter.
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that life is-said in-two-ways
Uno modo, ipsum esse viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita:
in-one way the-very to-be of-the-living and thus beatitude not is life
ostensum est enim quod esse unius hominis, qualecumque
shown it-is for that the-to-be of-one man of-whatever-sort
sit, non est hominis beatitudo; solius enim Dei beatitudo
it-be not is of-man the-beatitude alone for of-God the-beatitude
est suum esse. – Alio modo dicitur vita ipsa operatio
is his to-be in-another way is-called life the-very operation
viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum reducitur:
of-the-living according-to which the-principle of-life into act is-brought
et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel
and thus we-name the-life active or contemplative or
voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus
voluptuous and in-this way life eternal is-called the-last
finis. Quod patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII: Haec
end which is-plain through this that it-is-said John XVII this
est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum unum.
is life eternal that they-may-know you God true one
Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo
to the-second it-must-be-said that Boethius by-defining
beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam communem beatitudinis
beatitude considered the-very common of-beatitude
rationem. Est enim communis ratio beatitudinis quod sit
notion it-is for the-common notion of-beatitude that it-be
bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit cum dixit
the-good common perfect and this he-signified when he-said

quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, per
that it-is a-state of-all goods by-the-aggregation perfect by
quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus est in statu
which nothing other is-signified except that the-blessed-one is in the-state
boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam essentiam
of-the-good perfect but Aristotle expressed the-very essence
beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi
of-beatitude showing through what man be in of-this-kind
statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic.
state because through operation a-certain and therefore in I Ethics
ipse etiam ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum.
he also shows that beatitude is the-good perfect

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys.,
to the-third it-must-be-said that as is-said in IX Metaphysics
duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ab operante in
twofold is action one which proceeds from the-operator into
exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare. Et talis operatio
outer matter as to-burn and to-cut and such operation
non potest esse beatitudo: nam talis operatio non est actio
not can to-be beatitude for such operation not is the-action
et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis, ut ibidem
and perfection of-the-agent but rather of-the-patient as in-the-same-place
dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut sentire,
is-said the-other is action remaining in the-very agent as to-sense
intelligere et velle: et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et
to-understand and to-will and of-this-kind action is the-perfection and
actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo.
act of-the-agent and such operation can to-be beatitude

Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that since beatitude says
quandam ultimam perfectionem, secundum quod diversae res
a-certain last perfection according as diverse things

beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus perfectionis pertingere
of-beatitude capable to diverse degrees of-perfection to-reach
possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod diversimode beatitudo
can according-to this necessary it-is that in-diverse-ways beatitude
dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam: quia
be-said for in God is beatitude through essence because
ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur alio, sed
the-very to-be his is operation his by-which not he-enjoys another but
seipso. In angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio secundum
himself in the-angels moreover blessed is the-last perfection according-to
aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato: et
some operation by-which they-are-joined to-the-good uncreated and
haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus
this operation in them is single and everlasting in men
autem, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio
moreover according-to the-state of-present life is the-last perfection
secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo: sed haec
according-to operation by-which man is-joined to-God but this
operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec
operation neither continuous can to-be and by consequence nor
unica est, quia operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter
single is because operation by-interruption is-multiplied and on-account-of
hoc in statu praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine
this in the-state of-present life perfect beatitude by man
haberi non potest. Unde Philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens
to-be-had not can whence the-Philosopher in I Ethics placing
beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam,
the-beatitude of-man in this life calls it imperfect
post multa concludens: Beatos autem dicimus ut homines.
after many-things concluding blessed moreover we-call-them as men

Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando
but is-promised to-us by God beatitude perfect when
erimus sicut angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.
we-shall-be as angels in heaven as is-said Matthew XXII
Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat
as-far therefore to that beatitude perfect ceases
obiectio: quia una et continua et sempiterna operatione
the-objection because by-one and continuous and everlasting operation
in illo beatitudinis statu mens hominis Deo coniungetur.
in that of-beatitude state the-mind of-man to-God will-be-joined
Sed in praesenti vita, quantum deficimus ab unitate et
but in the-present life by-how-much we-fall-short from the-unity and
continuitate talis operationis, tantum deficimus a beatitudinis
continuity of-such operation by-so-much we-fall-short from of-beatitude
perfectione. Est tamen aliqua participatio beatitudinis: et
the-perfection there-is yet some participation of-beatitude and
tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis continua
by-so-much greater by-how-much the-operation can to-be more continuous
et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa
and one and therefore in the-active life which about many-things
occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita
is-occupied there-is less of the-notion of-beatitude than in the-life
contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum, idest circa veritatis
contemplative which is-engaged about one-thing that-is about of-truth
contemplationem. Et si aliquando homo actu non operetur
the-contemplation and if sometimes man in-act not work
huiusmodi operationem, tamen quia in promptu habet eam
of-this-kind operation yet because in readiness he-has it
semper operari; et quia etiam ipsam cessationem, puta
always to-work and because also the-very cessation for-example

somni vel occupationis alicuius naturalis, ad operationem
of-sleep or of-occupation some natural to the-operation
praedictam ordinat; quasi videtur operatio continua esse.
aforesaid he-orders as-if it-seems the-operation continuous to-be
Et per hoc patet solutio ad quintum, et ad sextum.
and through this is-plain the-solution to the-fifth and to the-sixth

Utrum beatitudo sit operatio sensitivae partis, aut intellectivae tantum

3 · WHETHER BEATITUDE IS AN ACT OF SENSE OR OF INTELLECT

The senses seem to have a part, since our intellect depends on them, some goods are sensible, and beatitude perfects every part of man; but brute animals share the senses' operation with us. Thomas answers that it cannot belong to beatitude essentially, since man is not joined to God through the senses, but belongs to it antecedently, in the imperfect beatitude of this life, and consequently, when after the resurrection the soul's beatitude overflows into the body and its senses.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude consist
etiam in operatione sensus. Nulla enim operatio invenitur
also in the-operation of-sense no for operation is-found
in homine nobilior operatione sensitiva, nisi intellectiva.
in man nobler than-the-operation sensitive except the-intellective
Sed operatio intellectiva dependet in nobis ab operatione
but the-operation intellective depends in us on the-operation
sensitiva: quia non possumus intelligere sine phantasmate,
sensitive because not we-can to-understand without a-phantasm
ut dicitur in III de Anima. Ergo beatitudo consistit etiam
as is-said in III on the-Soul therefore beatitude consists also
in operatione sensitiva.
in operation sensitive

2. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod
2 further Boethius says in III on Consolation that
beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus.
beatitude is a-state of-all goods by-the-aggregation perfect
Sed quaedam bona sunt sensibilia, quae attingimus per
but certain goods are sensible which we-reach through
sensus operationem. Ergo videtur quod operatio sensus
of-sense the-operation therefore it-seems that the-operation of-sense
requiratur ad beatitudinem.
be-required for beatitude

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est bonum perfectum, ut probatur
3 further beatitude is the-good perfect as is-proved
in I Ethic.: quod non esset, nisi homo perficeretur per
in I Ethics which not would-be unless man were-perfected through
ipsam secundum omnes partes suas. Sed per operationes
it according-to all parts his but through operations
sensitivas quaedam partes animae perficiuntur. Ergo operatio
sensitive certain parts of-the-soul are-perfected therefore operation
sensitiva requiritur ad beatitudinem.
sensitive is-required for beatitude

Sed contra, in operatione sensitiva communicant nobiscum
but against in operation sensitive share with-us
bruta animalia. Non autem in beatitudine. Ergo beatitudo
brute animals not moreover in beatitude therefore beatitude
non consistit in operatione sensitiva.
not consists in operation sensitive

Respondeo dicendum quod ad beatitudinem potest aliquid
I-answer it-must-be-said that to beatitude can something
pertinere tripliciter: uno modo, essentialiter; alio modo,
to-pertain in-three-ways in-one way essentially in-another way
antecedenter; tertio modo, consequenter. Essentialiter
antecedently in-the-third way consequently essentially

quidem non potest pertinere operatio sensus ad beatitudinem.
indeed not can to-pertain the-operation of-sense to beatitude
Nam beatitudo hominis consistit essentialiter in coniunctione
for the-beatitude of-man consists essentially in the-union
ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis, ut
of-him to the-good uncreated which is the-last end as
supra ostensum est: cui homo coniungi non potest per
above shown it-is to-which man to-be-joined not can through
sensus operationem. Similiter etiam quia, sicut ostensum est,
of-sense the-operation similarly also because as shown it-is
in corporalibus bonis beatitudo hominis non consistit: quae
in bodily goods the-beatitude of-man not consists which
tamen sola per operationem sensus attingimus.
yet alone through the-operation of-sense we-reach

Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem
can moreover the-operations of-sense to-pertain to beatitude
antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum
antecedently and consequently antecedently indeed according-to
beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in praesenti vita haberi
beatitude imperfect such-as in the-present life to-be-had
potest: nam operatio intellectus praeexigit operationem
can for the-operation of-the-intellect pre-requires the-operation
sensus. – Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta beatitudine
of-sense consequently moreover in that perfect beatitude
quae expectatur in caelo: quia post resurrectionem, ex
which is-awaited in heaven because after the-resurrection from
ipsa beatitudine animae, ut Augustinus dicit in Epistola
the-very beatitude of-the-soul as Augustine says in the-Letter
ad Dioscorum, fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et
to Dioscorus there-will-be a-certain overflow into the-body and
in sensus corporeos, ut in suis operationibus perficiantur;
into the-senses bodily that in their operations they-may-be-perfected

ut infra magis patebit, cum de resurrectione agetur.
as below more will-be-plain when about the-resurrection it-will-be-treated
Non autem tunc operatio qua mens humana Deo
not moreover then the-operation by-which the-mind human to-God
coniungetur, a sensu dependebit.
will-be-joined on sense will-depend

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa probat
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that objection that proves
quod operatio sensus requiritur antecedenter ad beatitudinem
that the-operation of-sense is-required antecedently for beatitude
imperfectam, qualis in hac vita haberi potest.
imperfect such-as in this life to-be-had can

Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo perfecta, qualem
to the-second it-must-be-said that beatitude perfect such-as
angeli habent, habet congregationem omnium bonorum per
the-angels have has the-gathering of-all goods through
coniunctionem ad universalem fontem totius boni; non quod
union to the-universal fount of-all good not that
indigeat singulis particularibus bonis. Sed in hac beatitudine
it-needs single particular goods but in this beatitude
imperfecta, requiritur congregatio bonorum sufficientium ad
imperfect is-required the-gathering of-goods sufficient for
perfectissimam operationem huius vitae.
the-most-perfect operation of-this life

Ad tertium dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine
to the-third it-must-be-said that in perfect beatitude
perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per
is-perfected the-whole man but in the-lower part through
redundantiam a superiori. In beatitudine autem imperfecta
overflow from the-higher in the-beatitude moreover imperfect

praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris partis
of-the-present life from the-converse from the-perfection of-the-lower part
proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.
it-is-proceeded to the-perfection of-the-higher

Utrum, si beatitudo est intellectivae partis, sit operatio intellectus, an voluntatis

4 · WHETHER BEATITUDE IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR THE WILL

Since beatitude seems to lie in peace, the good, the love of God, and a good will, which are of the will, it seems the will's. Thomas answers that its essence lies in an act of the intellect, and the delight that follows belongs to the will. The will desires the end before it is had and delights in it once had, but attaining it is the intellect's act, which makes it present, as money is had by grasping it, not by wanting it.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude consist
in actu voluntatis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei,
in an-act of-the-will says for Augustine XIX on the-City of-God
quod beatitudo hominis in pace consistit: unde in Psalmo
that the-beatitude of-man in peace consists whence in Psalm
CXLVII: Qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Sed pax ad voluntatem
CXLVII who has-set borders your peace but peace to the-will
pertinet. Ergo beatitudo hominis in voluntate consistit.
pertains therefore the-beatitude of-man in the-will consists

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed bonum
2 further beatitude is the-highest good but the-good
est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo in operatione
is the-object of-the-will therefore beatitude in the-operation
voluntatis consistit.
of-the-will consists

3. Praeterea, primo moventi respondet ultimus finis:
3 further to-the-first mover corresponds the-last end
sicut ultimus finis totius exercitus est victoria, quae est
as the-last end of-the-whole army is victory which is
finis ducis, qui omnes movet. Sed primum movens ad
the-end of-the-general who all moves but the-first mover to
operandum est voluntas: quia movet alias vires, ut infra
working is the-will because it-moves the-other powers as below
dicetur. Ergo beatitudo ad voluntatem pertinet.
will-be-said therefore beatitude to the-will pertains

4. Praeterea, si beatitudo est aliqua operatio, oportet quod
4 further if beatitude is some operation it-is-necessary that
sit nobilissima operatio hominis. Sed nobilior operatio est
it-be the-noblest operation of-man but nobler operation is
dilectio Dei, quae est actus voluntatis, quam cognitio, quae est
the-love of-God which is an-act of-the-will than knowledge which is
operatio intellectus: ut patet per Apostolum, I ad Cor.
an-operation of-the-intellect as is-plain through the-Apostle I to Corinthians
XIII. Ergo videtur quod beatitudo consistat in actu voluntatis.
XIII therefore it-seems that beatitude consist in an-act of-the-will

5. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod
5 further Augustine says in XIII on the-Trinity that
beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, et nihil vult
blessed is he-who has all-things which he-wills and nothing wills
male. Et post pauca subdit: Propinquat beato qui
badly and after a-few-things he-adds he-draws-near to-the-blessed who
bene vult quodcumque vult: bona enim beatum faciunt,
well wills whatever he-wills goods for blessed make
quorum bonorum iam habet aliquid, ipsam scilicet bonam
of-which goods already he-has something the-very namely good
voluntatem. Ergo beatitudo in actu voluntatis consistit.
will therefore beatitude in an-act of-the-will consists

Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit, Ioan. XVII: Haec
but against is that the-Lord says John XVII this
est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum unum. Vita
is life eternal that they-may-know you God true one life
autem aeterna est ultimus finis, ut dictum est. Ergo beatitudo
moreover eternal is the-last end as said it-is therefore the-beatitude
hominis in cognitione Dei consistit, quae est actus intellectus.
of-man in the-knowledge of-God consists which is an-act of-the-intellect

Respondeo dicendum quod ad beatitudinem, sicut supra
I-answer it-must-be-said that for beatitude as above
dictum est, duo requiruntur: unum quod est essentia
said it-is two-things are-required one which is the-essence
beatitudinis; aliud quod est quasi per se accidens eius,
of-beatitude another which is as-if through itself an-accident of-it
scilicet delectatio ei adiuncta. Dico ergo quod, quantum ad
namely delight to-it joined I-say therefore that as-far to
id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod
that which is essentially the-very beatitude impossible it-is that
consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est enim ex praemissis
it-consist in an-act of-the-will manifest it-is for from the-aforesaid
quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. Consecutio
that beatitude is the-attainment of-the-end last the-attainment
autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. Voluntas
moreover of-the-end not consists in the-very act of-the-will the-will
enim fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et
for is-borne to the-end both absent when it desires and
praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur. Manifestum
present when in it resting it-delights manifest
est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio
it-is moreover that the-very desire of-the-end not is the-attainment
finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit
of-the-end but is motion toward the-end delight moreover comes

voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens: non autem e
to-the-will from this that the-end is present not moreover from
converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur
the-converse from this something becomes present because the-will delights
in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum
in it it-is-necessary therefore something other to-be than the-act
voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti.
of-the-will through which becomes the-very end present to-the-one-willing
Et hoc manifeste apparet circa fines sensibiles. Si enim
and this manifestly appears about ends sensible if for
consequi pecuniam esset per actum voluntatis, statim a
to-attain money were through an-act of-the-will at-once from
principio cupidus consecutus esset pecuniam, quando
the-beginning the-covetous-man attained would-have money when
vult eam habere. Sed a principio quidem est absens
he-wishes it to-have but from the-beginning indeed it-is absent
ei; consequitur autem ipsam per hoc quod manu
to-him he-attains moreover it through this that with-the-hand
ipsam apprehendit, vel aliquo huiusmodi; et tunc iam
it he-grasps or by-something of-this-kind and then now
delectatur in pecunia habita. Sic igitur et circa intelligibilem
he-delights in money had thus therefore also about the-intelligible
finem contingit. Nam a principio volumus consequi finem
end it-happens for from the-beginning we-wish to-attain the-end
intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod
intelligible we-attain moreover it through this that
fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc
it-becomes present to-us through an-act of-the-intellect and then
voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine iam adepto.
the-will delighted rests in the-end now obtained

Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit:
thus therefore the-essence of-beatitude in an-act of-the-intellect consists
sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens;
but to the-will pertains the-delight beatitude following
secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo
according as Augustine says X Confessions that beatitude
est gaudium de veritate; quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est
is joy about the-truth because namely the-very joy is
consummatio beatitudinis.
the-consummation of-beatitude

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pax pertinet ad
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that peace pertains to
ultimum hominis finem, non quasi essentialiter sit ipsa
the-last of-man end not as-if essentially it-be the-very
beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et consequenter se habet
beatitude but because antecedently and consequently itself it-has
ad ipsam. Antecedenter quidem, inquantum iam sunt
to it antecedently indeed inasmuch-as already are
remota omnia perturbantia, et impedientia ab ultimo fine.
removed all disturbing-things and hindering-things from the-last end
Consequenter vero, inquantum iam homo, adepto ultimo
consequently but inasmuch-as already man obtained the-last
fine, remanet pacatus, suo desiderio quietato.
end remains pacified his desire quieted

Ad secundum dicendum quod primum obiectum voluntatis
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-first object of-the-will
non est actus eius: sicut nec primum obiectum visus
not is act its as neither the-first object of-sight
est visio, sed visibile. Unde ex hoc ipso quod beatitudo
is vision but the-visible whence from this very that beatitude

pertinet ad voluntatem tanquam primum obiectum eius,
pertains to the-will as the-first object its
sequitur quod non pertineat ad ipsam tanquam actus ipsius.
it-follows that not it-pertain to it as act of-it

Ad tertium dicendum quod finem primo apprehendit
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-end first apprehends
intellectus quam voluntas: tamen motus ad finem incipit
the-intellect than the-will yet the-motion to the-end begins
in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo
in the-will and therefore to-the-will is-owed that which last
consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio vel fruitio.
follows the-attainment of-the-end namely delight or enjoyment

Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio praeeminet cognitioni
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that love excels knowledge
in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo:
in moving but knowledge prior is to-the-love in reaching
non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X
not for is-loved except the-known as says Augustine in X
de Trin. Et ideo intelligibilem finem primo attingimus
on the-Trinity and therefore the-intelligible end first we-reach
per actionem intellectus; sicut et finem sensibilem primo
through the-action of-the-intellect as also the-end sensible first
attingimus per actionem sensus.
we-reach through the-action of-sense

Ad quintum dicendum quod ille qui habet omnia
to the-fifth it-must-be-said that he who has all-things
quae vult, ex hoc est beatus, quod habet ea quae
which he-wills from this is blessed that he-has those-things which
vult: quod quidem est per aliud quam per actum
he-wills which indeed is through another-thing than through an-act
voluntatis. Sed nihil male velle requiritur ad beatitudinem
of-the-will but nothing badly to-will is-required for beatitude

sicut quaedam debita dispositio ad ipsam. Voluntas autem
as a-certain due disposition to it the-will moreover
bona ponitur in numero bonorum quae beatum faciunt,
good is-placed in the-number of-goods which blessed make
prout est inclinatio quaedam in ipsa: sicut motus
according-as it-is an-inclination certain to it as motion
reducitur ad genus sui termini, ut alteratio ad qualitatem.
is-reduced to the-genus of-its term as alteration to quality

Utrum beatitudo sit operatio intellectus speculativi, an practici

5 · WHETHER BEATITUDE IS SPECULATIVE OR PRACTICAL

Since man is likened to God as a cause through the practical intellect, is called good by its perfection, and is himself its concern, it seems practical. Thomas answers that it lies chiefly in contemplation: the intellect is man's highest power and its best object, the divine good, belongs to the speculative intellect; contemplation is sought for itself; and by it man shares the life of God and the angels. Imperfect beatitude in this life lies first in contemplation and secondarily in the practical intellect's ordering of actions and passions.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude consist
in operatione intellectus practici. Finis enim ultimus cuiuslibet
in the-operation of-the-intellect practical the-end for last of-any
creaturae consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed homo magis
creature consists in assimilation to God but man more
assimilatur Deo per intellectum practicum, qui est causa
is-likened to-God through the-intellect practical which is the-cause
rerum intellectarum, quam per intellectum speculativum, cuius
of-things understood than through the-intellect speculative whose

scientia accipitur a rebus. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis
knowledge is-taken from things therefore the-beatitude of-man more
consistit in operatione intellectus practici quam speculativi.
consists in the-operation of-the-intellect practical than speculative

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum.
2 further beatitude is the-perfect of-man good
Sed intellectus practicus magis ordinatur ad bonum quam
but the-intellect practical more is-ordered to the-good than
speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum. Unde et secundum
the-speculative which is-ordered to the-true whence also according-to
perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni: non autem
the-perfection of-the-practical intellect we-are-called good not moreover
secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed secundum
according-to the-perfection of-the-speculative intellect but according-to
eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo hominis
it we-are-called knowing or understanding therefore the-beatitude of-man
magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam speculativi.
more consists in the-act of-the-intellect practical than speculative

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis.
3 further beatitude is a-certain good of-the-very man
Sed speculativus intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae
but the-speculative intellect is-occupied more about those-things which
sunt extra hominem: practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa
are outside man the-practical moreover intellect is-occupied about
ea quae sunt ipsius hominis, scilicet circa operationes
those-things which are of-the-very man namely about the-operations
et passiones eius. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit
and passions his therefore the-beatitude of-man more consists
in operatione intellectus practici quam intellectus speculativi.
in the-operation of-the-intellect practical than of-the-intellect speculative

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin.,
but against is that Augustine says in I on the-Trinity
quod contemplatio promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis,
that contemplation is-promised to-us of-actions all the-end
atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum.
and eternal perfection of-joys

Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in
I-answer it-must-be-said that beatitude more consists in
operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici. Quod
the-operation of-the-speculative intellect than of-the-practical which
patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod, si beatitudo
is-plain from three-things first indeed from this that if the-beatitude
hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio
of-man is an-operation it-is-necessary that it-be the-best operation
hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae
of-man the-best moreover operation of-man is that-which
est optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima
is of-the-best power with-respect-to of-the-best object the-best
autem potentia est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est
moreover power is the-intellect whose best object is
bonum divinum, quod quidem non est obiectum practici
the-good divine which indeed not is the-object of-the-practical
intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde in tali operatione, scilicet
intellect but of-the-speculative whence in such operation namely
in contemplatione divinorum, maxime consistit beatitudo. Et
in the-contemplation of-divine-things most consists beatitude and
quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod est optimum in
because each-one seems to-be that which is best in
eo, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis operatio est
him as is-said in IX and X Ethics therefore such operation is
maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis.
most proper to-man and most delightful

Secundo apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime
second appears the-same from this that contemplation most
quaeritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici
is-sought for-the-sake-of itself the-act moreover of-the-intellect practical
non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem.
not is-sought for-the-sake-of itself but for-the-sake-of action
Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde
the-very also actions are-ordered to some end whence
manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest consistere
manifest it-is that the-last end not can to-consist
in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum.
in the-life active which pertains to the-intellect practical

Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa
third the-same appears from this that in the-life contemplative
homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et
man shares with the-higher namely with God and
angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his
the-angels to-whom through beatitude he-is-likened but in those-things
quae pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum
which pertain to the-life active also other animals with
homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfecte.
man somewhat share although imperfectly

Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur
and therefore the-last and perfect beatitude which is-awaited
in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo
in the-future life wholly consists in contemplation beatitude
autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem
moreover imperfect such-as here to-be-had can first indeed
et principaliter consistit in contemplatione: secundario vero
and principally consists in contemplation secondarily but

in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et
in the-operation of-the-practical intellect ordering actions and
passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic.
passions human as is-said in X Ethics

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo praedicta
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-likeness aforesaid
intellectus practici ad Deum, est secundum proportionalitatem;
of-the-intellect practical to God is according-to proportionality
quia scilicet se habet ad suum cognitum, sicut Deus ad
because namely itself has to its known-thing as God to
suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus speculativi ad Deum, est
his but the-likening of-the-intellect speculative to God is
secundum unionem vel informationem; quae est multo maior
according-to union or information which is much greater
assimilatio. – Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu
likening and yet to-be-said it-can that with-respect-to
principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus
of-the-principal known-thing which is his essence not has God
practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum.
practical knowledge but speculative only

Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus practicus
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-intellect practical
ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum: sed intellectus
is-ordered to the-good which is outside itself but the-intellect
speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem
speculative has the-good in itself namely the-contemplation
veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus
of-truth and if that good be perfect from it the-whole
homo perficitur et fit bonus: quod quidem intellectus
man is-perfected and becomes good which indeed the-intellect
practicus non habet, sed ad illud ordinat.
practical not has but to that it-orders

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet,
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that would-proceed
si ipsemet homo esset ultimus finis suus: tunc enim
if the-very man were the-last end his then for
consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum eius esset
the-consideration and ordering of-the-acts and passions his would-be
eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est aliquod
his beatitude but because the-last of-man end is some
bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem
good extrinsic namely God to whom through the-operation
intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo
of-the-intellect speculative we-reach therefore more the-beatitude
hominis in operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam
of-man in the-operation of-the-intellect speculative consists than
in operatione intellectus practici.
in the-operation of-the-intellect practical

Utrum beatitudo consistat in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum

6 · WHETHER BEATITUDE LIES IN THE SPECULATIVE SCIENCES

The Philosopher seems to place happiness in the speculative virtues, science, wisdom, and understanding, and these sciences are desired for themselves. Thomas answers that they begin from principles taken from the senses and reach no further than the knowledge of sensible things leads, so not to the separate substances above the human intellect, while man's last perfection must come through knowing something above that intellect. Perfect beatitude cannot lie there, though their consideration is a participation of it.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
consistat in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum.
consist in the-consideration of-speculative sciences
Philosophus enim dicit, in libro Ethic., quod felicitas
the-Philosopher for says in the-book of-Ethics that happiness
est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem. Et distinguens
is an-operation according-to perfect virtue and distinguishing
virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi tres, scientiam, sapientiam
the-virtues not he-posits speculative-ones except three science wisdom
et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad considerationem
and understanding which all pertain to the-consideration
scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis beatitudo
of-sciences speculative therefore the-last of-man beatitude
in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum consistit.
in the-consideration of-sciences speculative consists

2. Praeterea, illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo,
2 further that seems to-be the-last of-man beatitude
quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum.
which naturally is-desired by all for-the-sake-of itself

Sed huiusmodi est consideratio speculativarum scientiarum:
but of-this-kind is the-consideration of-speculative sciences
quia, ut dicitur in I Metaphys., omnes homines natura
because as is-said in I Metaphysics all men by-nature
scire desiderant; et post pauca subditur quod speculativae
to-know desire and after a-few-things it-is-added that speculative
scientiae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione
sciences for-the-sake-of themselves are-sought therefore in the-consideration
scientiarum speculativarum consistit beatitudo.
of-sciences speculative consists beatitude

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio.
3 further beatitude is the-last of-man perfection
Unumquodque autem perficitur secundum quod reducitur
each-thing moreover is-perfected according as it-is-brought
de potentia in actum. Intellectus autem humanus reducitur
from potency into act the-intellect moreover human is-brought
in actum per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum.
into act through the-consideration of-sciences speculative
Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi consideratione ultima
therefore it-seems that in of-this-kind consideration the-last
hominis beatitudo consistat.
of-man beatitude consist

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. IX: Non glorietur
but against is that it-is-said Jeremiah IX not let-glory
sapiens in sapientia sua; et loquitur de sapientia
the-wise-man in wisdom his and he-speaks about the-wisdom
speculativarum scientiarum. Non ergo consistit in harum
of-speculative sciences not therefore consists in of-these
consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo.
the-consideration the-last of-man beatitude

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is twofold
est hominis beatitudo: una perfecta, et alia imperfecta.
is of-man beatitude one perfect and another imperfect
Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae
it-is-necessary moreover to-understand perfect beatitude which
attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem: beatitudinem autem
reaches to the-true of-beatitude notion beatitude moreover
imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed participat quandam
imperfect which not reaches but participates a-certain
particularem beatitudinis similitudinem. Sicut perfecta
particular of-beatitude likeness as perfect
prudentia invenitur in homine, apud quem est ratio rerum
prudence is-found in man with whom is the-reason of-things
agibilium: imperfecta autem prudentia est in quibusdam
doable imperfect moreover prudence is in certain
animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares
animals brute in which are certain particular
instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae.
instincts to certain works like to-the-works of-prudence

Perfecta igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum
perfect therefore beatitude in the-consideration of-sciences
speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius
speculative essentially to-consist not can for whose
evidentiam, considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae
evidence to-be-considered it-is that the-consideration of-speculative
scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius
science not itself extends beyond the-power of-the-principles of-that
scientiae: quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia
science because in the-principles of-a-science virtually the-whole science
continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum
is-contained the-first moreover principles of-sciences speculative

sunt per sensum accepta; ut patet per Philosophum in
are through sense received as is-plain through the-Philosopher at
principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster. Unde
the-beginning of-the-Metaphysics and at the-end of-the-Posterior-Analytics whence
tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest
the-whole consideration of-sciences speculative not can
ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In
beyond to-be-extended than of-sensible-things knowledge to-lead can in
cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima
knowledge moreover of-sensible-things not can to-consist the-last
hominis beatitudo, quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim
of-man beatitude which is the-last his perfection not for
aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod
something is-perfected by something lower except according as
in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris. Manifestum est
in the-lower is some participation of-the-higher manifest it-is
autem quod forma lapidis, vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est
moreover that the-form of-a-stone or of-any thing sensible is
inferior homine. Unde per formam lapidis non perficitur
lower than-man whence through the-form of-a-stone not is-perfected
intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in
the-intellect inasmuch-as it-is such form but inasmuch-as in
ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est supra
it is-participated some likeness of-something which is above
intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel aliquid
the-intellect human namely light intelligible or something
huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad
of-this-kind all moreover which is through another is-reduced to
id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio
that which is through itself whence it-is-necessary that the-last perfection
hominis sit per cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra
of-man be through the-knowledge of-some thing which be above

intellectum humanum. Ostensum est autem quod per
the-intellect human shown it-is moreover that through
sensibilia non potest deveniri in cognitionem substantiarum
sensible-things not can to-be-arrived into the-knowledge of-substances
separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum humanum. Unde
separated which are above the-intellect human whence
relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit esse
it-remains that the-last of-man beatitude not can to-be
in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. – Sed sicut in
in the-consideration of-speculative sciences but as in
formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum
forms sensible is-participated some likeness of-higher
substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est
substances so the-consideration of-sciences speculative is
quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis.
a-certain participation of-true and perfect beatitude

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-Philosopher speaks
in libro Ethicorum de felicitate imperfecta, qualiter in hac
in the-book of-Ethics about happiness imperfect such-as in this
vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum est.
life to-be-had can as above said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non
to the-second it-must-be-said that naturally is-desired not
solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo
only perfect beatitude but also of-whatever-sort likeness
vel participatio ipsius.
or participation of-it

Ad tertium dicendum quod per considerationem
to the-third it-must-be-said that through the-consideration
scientiarum speculativarum reducitur intellectus noster aliquo
of-sciences speculative is-brought intellect our in-some
modo in actum, non autem in ultimum et completum.
way into act not moreover into the-last and complete

Utrum beatitudo consistat in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet angelorum

7 · WHETHER BEATITUDE LIES IN KNOWING THE ANGELS

Since the angels are higher than man and illumine him, knowing them seems his beatitude. Thomas answers that the intellect is finally perfected only by what is true by its essence, not by participation; the angels have their being, and so their truth, by participation, and God alone is truth by essence, so only his contemplation makes man perfectly blessed. The contemplation of angels can give an imperfect beatitude, higher than the speculative sciences give.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man
consistat in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest
consist in the-knowledge of-substances separated that-is
angelorum. Dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam Homilia:
of-angels says for Gregory in a-certain Homily
Nihil prodest interesse festis hominum, si non contingat
nothing it-profits to-be-present-at the-feasts of-men if not it-happen
interesse festis angelorum; per quod finalem beatitudinem
to-be-present-at the-feasts of-angels by which final beatitude
designat. Sed festis angelorum interesse possumus per
he-designates but at-the-feasts of-angels to-be-present we-can through

eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in contemplatione
their contemplation therefore it-seems that in the-contemplation
angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat.
of-angels the-last of-man beatitude consist

2. Praeterea, ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut
2 further the-last perfection of-each thing is that
coniungatur suo principio: unde et circulus dicitur esse
it-be-joined to-its principle whence also the-circle is-said to-be
figura perfecta, quia habet idem principium et finem. Sed
a-figure perfect because it-has the-same beginning and end but
principium cognitionis humanae est ab ipsis angelis, per
the-principle of-knowledge human is from the-very angels through
quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap.
whom men are-illumined as says Dionysius IV chapter
Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus est in
of-the-Celestial Hierarchy therefore the-perfection of-human intellect is in
contemplatione angelorum.
the-contemplation of-angels

3. Praeterea, unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando
3 further each nature perfect is when
coniungitur superiori naturae: sicut ultima perfectio corporis
it-is-joined to-a-higher nature as the-last perfection of-the-body
est ut coniungatur naturae spirituali. Sed supra intellectum
is that it-be-joined to-nature spiritual but above the-intellect
humanum, ordine naturae, sunt angeli. Ergo ultima
human in-the-order of-nature are the-angels therefore the-last
perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur per
perfection of-the-intellect human is that it-be-joined through
contemplationem ipsis angelis.
contemplation to-the-very angels

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. IX: In hoc glorietur
but against is that it-is-said Jeremiah IX in this let-him-glory
qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me. Ergo ultima hominis
who glories to-know and to-know me therefore the-last of-man
gloria, vel beatitudo, non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei.
glory or beatitude not consists except in the-knowledge of-God

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta
I-answer it-must-be-said that as said it-is the-perfect
hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio
of-man beatitude not consists in that which is the-perfection
intellectus secundum alicuius participationem, sed in eo
of-the-intellect according-to of-something the-participation but in that
quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum est autem quod
which is through essence such manifest it-is moreover that
unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius potentiae,
each-thing so-far is the-perfection of-some power
inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius
inasmuch-as to it pertains the-notion of-the-proper object of-that
potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum.
power the-proper moreover object of-the-intellect is the-true
Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non
whatever therefore has truth participated contemplated not
facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem
makes the-intellect perfect with-the-last perfection since moreover
eadem sit dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur
the-same be the-disposition of-things in the-to-be as in truth as is-said
in II Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem,
in II Metaphysics whatever-things are beings through participation
sunt vera per participationem. Angeli autem habent esse
are true through participation the-angels moreover have the-to-be
participatum: quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia,
participated because alone of-God his to-be is his essence

ut in Primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus
as in the-First shown it-is whence it-remains that alone God
sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius contemplatio faciat
be truth through essence and that his contemplation make
perfecte beatum. – Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam
perfectly blessed some moreover beatitude imperfect
nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione angelorum; et etiam
nothing prohibits to-be-regarded in the-contemplation of-angels and even
altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum.
higher than in the-consideration of-sciences speculative

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod festis angelorum
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that at-the-feasts of-angels
intererimus non solum contemplantes angelos, sed, simul
we-shall-be-present not only contemplating the-angels but together
cum ipsis, Deum.
with them God

Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt
to the-second it-must-be-said that according-to those who posit
animas humanas esse ab angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur
souls human to-be by angels created enough fitting it-seems
quod beatitudo hominis sit in contemplatione angelorum, quasi
that the-beatitude of-man be in the-contemplation of-angels as-if
in coniunctione ad suum principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut
in union to its principle but this is erroneous as
in Primo dictum est. Unde ultima perfectio intellectus humani
in the-First said it-is whence the-last perfection of-the-intellect human
est per coniunctionem ad Deum, qui est primum principium
is through union to God who is the-first principle
et creationis animae et illuminationis eius. Angelus autem
both of-the-creation of-the-soul and of-the-illumination its the-angel moreover
illuminat tanquam minister, ut in Primo habitum est.
illumines as minister as in the-First held it-is

Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem
whence by-his ministry he-helps man that to beatitude
perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum.
he-may-come not moreover he-is of-human beatitude the-object

Ad tertium dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam
to the-third it-must-be-said that to-be-reached a-higher nature
ab inferiori contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum
by a-lower happens in-two-ways in-one way according-to the-degree
potentiae participantis: et sic ultima perfectio hominis erit
of-the-power participating and thus the-last perfection of-man will-be
in hoc quod homo attinget ad contemplandum sicut angeli
in this that man will-reach to contemplating as the-angels
contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum attingitur a
contemplate in-another way as an-object is-reached by
potentia: et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet potentiae est
a-power and in-this way the-last perfection of-any power is
ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti.
that it-reach to that in which fully is-found the-notion of-its object

Utrum beatitudo hominis sit in visione divinae essentiae

8 · WHETHER BEATITUDE LIES IN SEEING GOD'S ESSENCE

Dionysius says the mind is joined to God as to one altogether unknown, and seeing God's essence seems proper to the divine intellect. Thomas answers that final beatitude can lie only in the vision of God's essence: man is not perfectly blessed while anything remains for him to desire, and the intellect's object is a thing's essence, so knowing an effect it naturally desires to know what its cause is, and rests only in seeing the first cause in its essence.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-beatitude of-man not
sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius,
be in the-vision of-the-very divine essence says for Dionysius
in I cap. Myst. Theol., quod per id quod est supremum
in I chapter of-the-Mystical Theology that through that which is highest
intellectus, homo Deo coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto.
of-the-intellect man to-God is-joined as altogether to-the-unknown
Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, non est omnino
but that which is-seen through essence not is altogether
ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo,
unknown therefore the-last of-the-intellect perfection or beatitude
non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur.
not consists in this that God through essence is-seen

2. Praeterea, altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec
2 further of-a-higher nature higher is the-perfection but this
est perfectio divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam
is the-perfection of-the-divine intellect proper that his essence
videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc
it-see therefore the-last perfection of-the-intellect human to this
non pertingit, sed infra subsistit.
not reaches but below stops

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioann. III: Cum
but against is that it-is-said I John III when
apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti
he-will-have-appeared like to-him we-shall-be and we-shall-see him as
ipse est.
he is

Respondeo dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo
I-answer it-must-be-said that the-last and perfect beatitude
non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. Ad
not can to-be except in the-vision of-the-divine essence for
cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem,
whose evidence two-things to-be-considered are first indeed
quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat
that man not is perfectly blessed as-long-as remains
sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est,
to-him something to-be-desired and to-be-sought the-second is
quod uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum
that of-each power the-perfection is-regarded according-to
rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid
the-notion of-its object the-object moreover of-the-intellect is that what
est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Unde
is that-is the-essence of-a-thing as is-said in III on the-Soul whence
intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit
so-far proceeds the-perfection of-the-intellect inasmuch-as it-knows
essentiam alicuius rei. Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat
the-essence of-some thing if therefore an-intellect some know
essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci
the-essence of-some effect through which not can to-be-known
essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est; non
the-essence of-the-cause that namely be-known about the-cause what it-is not
dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis
is-said the-intellect to-reach to the-cause simply although

per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit. Et
through the-effect to-know it-can about the-cause whether it-be and
ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit
therefore remains naturally to-man the-desire when he-knows
effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat
the-effect and knows it to-have a-cause that also he-may-know
de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis,
about the-cause what it-is and that desire is of-wonder
et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.
and causes inquiry as is-said at the-beginning of-the-Metaphysics
Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod
for-example if someone knowing the-eclipse of-the-sun considers that
ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit,
from some cause it-proceeds about which because he-knows-not what it-be
admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit,
he-wonders and by-wondering inquires nor this inquiry rests
quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae.
until it-arrive at knowing the-essence of-the-cause

Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius
if therefore the-intellect human knowing the-essence of-some
effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est;
effect created not know about God except whether he-is
nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam,
not-yet the-perfection its reaches simply to the-cause first
sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi
but remains to-it still the-natural desire of-inquiring-into
causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam
the-cause whence not-yet it-is perfectly blessed for perfect
igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad
therefore beatitude is-required that the-intellect reach to
ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam
the-very essence of-the-first cause and thus perfection its

habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo
it-will-have through union to God as to the-object in which
solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est.
alone the-beatitude of-man consists as above said it-is

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Dionysius speaks
de cognitione eorum qui sunt in via, tendentes ad
about the-knowledge of-those who are on the-way tending to
beatitudinem.
beatitude

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis
to the-second it-must-be-said that as above said it-is the-end
potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam
can to-be-taken in-two-ways in-one way as-far to the-thing itself
quae desideratur: et hoc modo idem est finis superioris et
which is-desired and in-this way the-same is the-end of-the-higher and
inferioris naturae, immo omnium rerum, ut supra dictum est.
lower nature nay of-all things as above said it-is
Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem huius rei: et sic
in-another way as-far to the-attainment of-this thing and thus
diversus est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, secundum
diverse is the-end of-the-higher and lower nature according-to
diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur altior est
diverse relation to the-thing such thus therefore higher is
beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis,
the-beatitude of-God his essence by-intellect comprehending
quam hominis vel angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis.
than of-man or of-angel seeing and not comprehending

De his quae ad beatitudinem exiguntur

IV · ON WHAT BEATITUDE REQUIRES

Next Thomas considers what is required for beatitude. He asks eight questions: whether delight is required; which is chief in beatitude, delight or vision; whether comprehension is required; whether rectitude of will; whether the body; whether some perfection of the body; whether outward goods; and whether the society of friends.

Deinde considerandum est de his quae exiguntur ad
then to-be-considered it-is about those-things which are-required for
beatitudinem.
beatitude

Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
and about this are-asked eight

Primo: utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem.
first whether delight be-required for beatitude

Secundo: quid sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum
second what be more-principal in beatitude whether
delectatio vel visio.
delight or vision

Tertio: utrum requiratur comprehensio.
third whether be-required comprehension

Quarto: utrum requiratur rectitudo voluntatis.
fourth whether be-required rectitude of-will

Quinto: utrum ad beatitudinem hominis requiratur corpus.
fifth whether for the-beatitude of-man be-required the-body

Sexto: utrum perfectio corporis.
sixth whether the-perfection of-the-body

Septimo: utrum aliqua exteriora bona.
seventh whether some outer goods

Octavo: utrum requiratur societas amicorum.
eighth whether be-required the-society of-friends

Utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem

1 · WHETHER DELIGHT IS REQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE

Augustine says vision is the whole reward of faith, so delight seems not needed. Thomas answers that one thing is required for another in four ways: as a preparation, as what perfects it, as an outside help, or as a concomitant, as heat to fire; delight is required as a concomitant, since it arises from the appetite's rest in the good attained, and beatitude is the attaining of the highest good.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that delight not
requiratur ad beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I
be-required for beatitude says for Augustine in I
de Trin., quod visio est tota merces fidei. Sed id quod
on the-Trinity that vision is the-whole reward of-faith but that which
est praemium vel merces virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet
is the-prize or reward of-virtue is beatitude as is-plain
per Philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo nihil aliud requiritur
through the-Philosopher in I Ethics therefore nothing other is-required
ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio.
for beatitude except alone vision

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum
2 further beatitude is through itself the-most-sufficient
bonum, ut Philosophus dicit I Ethic. Quod autem eget
good as the-Philosopher says I Ethics what moreover needs
aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. Cum igitur
some other-thing not is through itself sufficient since therefore
essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut ostensum
the-essence of-beatitude in the-vision of-God consists as shown
est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur delectatio.
it-is it-seems that for beatitude not be-required delight

3. Praeterea, operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis
3 further the-operation of-happiness or beatitude
oportet esse non impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
it-is-necessary to-be not hindered as is-said in VII Ethics
Sed delectatio impedit actionem intellectus: corrumpit enim
but delight hinders the-action of-the-intellect it-corrupts for
aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo
the-estimate of-prudence as is-said in VI Ethics therefore
delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem.
delight not is-required for beatitude

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod
but against is that Augustine says X Confessions that
beatitudo est gaudium de veritate.
beatitude is joy about the-truth

Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur
I-answer it-must-be-said that in-four-ways something is-required
ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad
for another in-one way as a-preamble or preparation for
ipsum: sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo,
it as discipline is-required for science in-another way
sicut perficiens aliquid: sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis.
as perfecting something as the-soul is-required for the-life of-the-body
Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans extrinsecum: sicut amici
in-a-third way as a-helper extrinsic as friends
requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid
are-required for something to-be-done in-a-fourth way as something
concomitans: ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem.
concomitant as if we-say that heat is-required for fire
Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio
and in-this way delight is-required for beatitude delight
enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto.
for is-caused from this that the-appetite rests in the-good obtained

Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi
whence since beatitude nothing other be than the-obtaining of-the-highest
boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante.
good not can to-be beatitude without delight concomitant

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that from this very that
merces alicui redditur, voluntas merentis requiescit,
a-reward to-someone is-rendered the-will of-the-one-meriting rests
quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae
which is to-be-delighted whence in the-very notion of-reward rendered
delectatio includitur.
delight is-included

Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei
to the-second it-must-be-said that from the-very vision of-God
causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione
is-caused delight whence he who God sees delight
indigere non potest.
to-need not can

Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio concomitans
to the-third it-must-be-said that delight accompanying
operationem intellectus, non impedit ipsam, sed magis
the-operation of-the-intellect not hinders it but rather
eam confortat, ut dicitur in X Ethic.: ea enim quae
it strengthens as is-said in X Ethics those-things for which
delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius operamur.
delightfully we-do more-attentively and more-perseveringly we-work
Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem: quandoque
delight moreover extraneous hinders the-operation sometimes
quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est,
indeed from of-intention distraction because as said it-is
ad ea in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et
on those-things in which we-delight more intent we-are and

dum uni vehementer intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio
while on-one vehemently we-intend necessary it-is that from another
intentio retrahatur. Quandoque autem etiam ex contrarietate:
intention be-withdrawn sometimes moreover also from contrariety
sicut delectatio sensus contraria rationi, impedit aestimationem
as the-delight of-sense contrary to-reason hinders the-estimate
prudentiae magis quam aestimationem speculativi intellectus.
of-prudence more than the-estimate of-the-speculative intellect

Utrum in beatitudine sit principalius visio quam delectatio

2 · WHETHER IN BEATITUDE VISION IS CHIEF RATHER THAN DELIGHT

Delight seems chief, since it perfects operation, operations are sought for its sake, and charity, to which it answers, is greater than faith. Thomas answers that delight is the will's rest in a good, and the will rests in an operation because the operation is good; so the good itself, the operation of vision, is chief, and delight accompanies it, as beauty accompanies youth.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that delight be
principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim,
more-principal in beatitude than vision delight for
ut dicitur in X Ethic., est perfectio operationis. Sed
as is-said in X Ethics is the-perfection of-operation but
perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior
perfection is better than-the-perfectible therefore delight is better
operatione intellectus, quae est visio.
than-the-operation of-the-intellect which is vision

2. Praeterea, illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est
2 further that for-the-sake-of which something is desirable is
potius. Sed operationes appetuntur propter delectationem
better but operations are-desired for-the-sake-of the-delight

ipsarum: unde et natura operationibus necessariis ad
of-them whence also nature to-operations necessary for
conservationem individui et speciei, delectationem
the-preservation of-the-individual and of-the-species delight
apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab animalibus non
added that of-this-kind operations by animals not
negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in beatitudine quam
be-neglected therefore delight is better in beatitude than
operatio intellectus, quae est visio.
the-operation of-the-intellect which is vision

3. Praeterea, visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive
3 further vision corresponds to-faith delight moreover or
fruitio, caritati. Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit Apostolus I
enjoyment to-charity but charity is greater than-faith as says the-Apostle I
ad Cor. XIII. Ergo delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione.
to Corinthians XIII therefore delight or enjoyment is better than-vision

Sed contra, causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est
but against the-cause is better than-the-effect but vision is
causa delectationis. Ergo visio est potior quam delectatio.
the-cause of-delight therefore vision is better than delight

Respondeo dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet
I-answer it-must-be-said that this question raises
Philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed
the-Philosopher in X Ethics and it unsolved leaves but
si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod
if anyone carefully consider of necessity it-is-necessary that
operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione.
the-operation of-the-intellect which is vision be better than-delight
Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis.
delight for consists in a-certain quieting of-the-will
Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi
that moreover the-will in something be-quieted not is except

propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas
on-account-of the-goodness of-that in which it-is-quieted if therefore the-will
quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis
is-quieted in some operation from the-goodness of-the-operation
procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum
proceeds the-quieting of-the-will nor the-will seeks good
propter quietationem: sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset
for-the-sake-of quieting thus for the-very act of-the-will would-be
finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod
the-end which is against the-premises but therefore it-seeks that
quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde
it-be-quieted in operation because operation is good its whence
manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio
manifest it-is that the-more-principal good is the-very operation
in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso.
in which is-quieted the-will than the-quieting of-the-will in it

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher
ibidem dicit, delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor
in-the-same-place says delight perfects operation as beauty
iuventutem, qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde
youth which is to youth consequent whence
delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem; non
delight is a-certain perfection accompanying vision not
sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in sua specie perfectam.
as perfection making vision to-be in its species perfect

Ad secundum dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non
to the-second it-must-be-said that apprehension sensitive not
attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum
reaches to the-common notion of-good but to some good
particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum
particular which is delightful and therefore according-to the-appetite

sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur
sensitive which is in animals operations are-sought
propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem
for-the-sake-of delight but the-intellect apprehends the-universal
rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio.
notion of-good on whose attainment follows delight
Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem. Et
whence more-principally it-intends good than delight and
inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturae,
thence it-is that the-divine intellect which is the-founder of-nature
delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non est autem
delights added for-the-sake-of operations not is moreover
aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi
something to-be-reckoned simply according-to the-order of-the-sensitive
appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi.
appetite but rather according-to the-order of-the-appetite intellective

Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum
to the-third it-must-be-said that charity not seeks the-good
dilectum propter delectationem: sed hoc est ei consequens,
loved for-the-sake-of delight but this is to-it consequent
ut delectetur in bono adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio
that it-be-delighted in the-good obtained which it-loves and thus delight
non respondet ei ut finis, sed magis visio, per quam
not corresponds to-it as end but rather vision through which
primo finis fit ei praesens.
first the-end becomes to-it present

Utrum ad beatitudinem requiratur comprehensio

3 · WHETHER COMPREHENSION IS REQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE

Augustine says to reach God with the mind is great beatitude, but to comprehend him impossible. Thomas answers that comprehension here is not enclosing God but holding him present, and that three things in beatitude answer to the three by which man is ordered to his end: vision to imperfect knowledge, comprehension, the end's presence, to hope, and delight or enjoyment to love. So comprehension is required.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that for beatitude
non requiratur comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad
not be-required comprehension says for Augustine to
Paulinam de Videndo Deum: Attingere mente Deum magna
Paulina on Seeing God to-reach by-mind God great
est beatitudo, comprehendere autem est impossibile. Ergo
is beatitude to-comprehend moreover is impossible therefore
sine comprehensione est beatitudo.
without comprehension is beatitude

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum
2 further beatitude is the-perfection of-man according-to
intellectivam partem, in qua non sunt aliae potentiae
the-intellective part in which not are other powers
quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in Primo dictum est. Sed
than intellect and will as in the-First said it-is but
intellectus sufficienter perficitur per visionem Dei, voluntas
the-intellect sufficiently is-perfected through the-vision of-God the-will
autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non requiritur
moreover through delight in him therefore not is-required
comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium.
comprehension as some third-thing

3. Praeterea, beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes
3 further beatitude in operation consists operations
autem determinantur secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem
moreover are-determined according-to objects the-objects moreover
generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum: verum correspondet
general are two the-true and the-good the-true corresponds
visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi. Ergo non
to-vision and the-good corresponds to-delight therefore not
requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium.
is-required comprehension as-if some third-thing

Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor.
but against is that the-Apostle says I to Corinthians
IX: Sic currite ut comprehendatis. Sed spiritualis cursus
IX thus run that you-may-comprehend but the-spiritual race
terminatur ad beatitudinem: unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim.
is-ended at beatitude whence he says II to Timothy
ult.: Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem
last a-good fight I-have-fought the-course I-have-finished the-faith
servavi; in reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae. Ergo
I-have-kept for the-rest laid-up is for-me the-crown of-justice therefore
comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.
comprehension is-required for beatitude

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in
I-answer it-must-be-said that since beatitude consist in
consecutione ultimi finis, ea quae requiruntur ad
the-attainment of-the-last end those-things which are-required for
beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex ipso ordine hominis ad
beatitude are to-be-considered from the-very order of-man to
finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem ordinatur homo partim
the-end to the-end moreover intelligible is-ordered man partly
quidem per intellectum, partim autem per voluntatem. Per
indeed through the-intellect partly moreover through the-will through

intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu praeexistit aliqua
the-intellect indeed inasmuch-as in the-intellect pre-exists some
cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, primo
knowledge of-the-end imperfect through the-will moreover first
quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in
indeed through love which is the-first motion of-the-will toward
aliquid: secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad
something second moreover through the-real relation of-the-lover to
amatum, quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim
the-beloved which indeed can to-be threefold sometimes for
amatum est praesens amanti: et tunc iam non quaeritur.
the-beloved is present to-the-lover and then now not it-is-sought
Quandoque autem non est praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum
sometimes moreover not it-is present but impossible it-is it
adipisci: et tunc etiam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem
to-obtain and then also not it-is-sought sometimes moreover
possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est elevatum supra facultatem
possible it-is it to-obtain but it-is raised above the-faculty
adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non possit: et haec est
of-the-obtainer so that at-once to-be-had not it-can and this is
habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola habitudo facit
the-relation of-the-one-hoping to the-hoped-for which alone relation makes
finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent aliqua in
of-the-end the-search and to-these three correspond some-things in
ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet
the-very beatitude for perfect knowledge of-the-end corresponds
imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini
to-the-imperfect the-presence but of-the-very end corresponds to-the-relation
spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur
of-hope but delight in the-end now present follows
dilectionem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad
love as above said it-is and therefore necessary it-is for

beatitudinem ista tria concurrere: scilicet visionem, quae est
beatitude these three to-concur namely vision which is
cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae
the-knowledge perfect of-the-intelligible end comprehension which
importat praesentiam finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem,
implies the-presence of-the-end delight or enjoyment
quae importat quietationem rei amantis in amato.
which implies the-quieting of-the-thing loving in the-beloved

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehensio
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that comprehension
dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio comprehensi in
is-said in-two-ways in-one way the-inclusion of-the-comprehended in
comprehendente: et sic omne quod comprehenditur a
the-comprehender and thus all which is-comprehended by
finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest
the-finite is finite whence in-this way God not can
comprehendi ab aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo
to-be-comprehended by any intellect created in-another way
comprehensio nihil aliud nominat quam tentionem alicuius
comprehension nothing other names than the-holding of-some
rei iam praesentialiter habitae: sicut aliquis consequens
thing now presently had as someone overtaking
aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando tenet eum. Et
someone is-said him to-comprehend when he-holds him and
hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem.
in-this way comprehension is-required for beatitude

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem
to the-second it-must-be-said that as to the-will
pertinet spes et amor, quia eiusdem est amare aliquid et
pertains hope and love because of-the-same it-is to-love something and
tendere in illud non habitum; ita etiam ad voluntatem
to-tend toward it not had so also to the-will

pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia eiusdem est
pertains both comprehension and delight because of-the-same it-is
habere aliquid et quiescere in illo.
to-have something and to-rest in it

Ad tertium dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua
to the-third it-must-be-said that comprehension not is some
operatio praeter visionem: sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem
operation besides vision but is a-certain relation to the-end
iam habitum. Unde etiam ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum
now had whence also the-very vision or the-thing seen according
quod praesentialiter adest, est obiectum comprehensionis.
as presently it-is-present is the-object of-comprehension

Utrum ad beatitudinem requiratur rectitudo voluntatis

4 · WHETHER RECTITUDE OF WILL IS REQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE

Since beatitude is the intellect's operation, the will seems not to matter. Thomas answers that rectitude of will is required antecedently, as the due order to the end, and concomitantly, since he who sees God's essence necessarily loves whatever he loves in order to God, and this is what makes the will right.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that rectitude of-will
non requiratur ad beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter
not be-required for beatitude beatitude for essentially
consistit in operatione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad
consists in the-operation of-the-intellect as said it-is but for
perfectam intellectus operationem non requiritur rectitudo
the-perfect of-the-intellect operation not is-required the-rectitude
voluntatis, per quam homines mundi dicuntur: dicit enim
of-will through which men pure are-called says for

Augustinus, in libro Retract.: Non approbo quod in
Augustine in the-book of-Retractations not I-approve that in
oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire
a-prayer I-said O-God who not except the-pure the-true to-know
voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos
have-willed to-be-answered for it-can many even not pure
multa scire vera. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non
many-things to-know true-things therefore rectitude of-will not
requiritur ad beatitudinem.
is-required for beatitude

2. Praeterea, prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed
2 further the-prior not depends on the-posterior but
operatio intellectus est prior quam operatio voluntatis.
the-operation of-the-intellect is prior than the-operation of-the-will
Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta operatio intellectus, non
therefore beatitude which is the-perfect operation of-the-intellect not
dependet a rectitudine voluntatis.
depends on rectitude of-will

3. Praeterea, quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem,
3 further what is-ordered to something as to an-end
non est necessarium adepto iam fine: sicut navis postquam
not is necessary obtained already the-end as the-ship after
pervenitur ad portum. Sed rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per
it-is-come to the-port but rectitude of-will which is through
virtutem, ordinatur ad beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo,
virtue is-ordered to beatitude as to an-end therefore
adepta beatitudine, non est necessaria rectitudo voluntatis.
obtained beatitude not is necessary rectitude of-will

Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V: Beati mundo corde,
but against is that it-is-said Matthew V blessed the-clean of-heart
quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et Hebr. XII: Pacem sequimini
for they God will-see and Hebrews XII peace follow
cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum.
with all and holiness without which no-one will-see God

Respondeo dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad
I-answer it-must-be-said that rectitude of-will is-required for
beatitudinem et antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter
beatitude both antecedently and concomitantly antecedently
quidem, quia rectitudo voluntatis est per debitum ordinem
indeed because rectitude of-will is through due order
ad finem ultimum. Finis autem comparatur ad id quod
to the-end last the-end moreover is-compared to that which
ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam. Unde sicut
is-ordered to the-end as form to matter whence as
materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo
matter not can to-attain form unless it-be in-due way
disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit
disposed to it so nothing attains the-end unless it-be
debito modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad
in-due way ordered to it and therefore no-one can to
beatitudinem pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis.
beatitude to-arrive unless he-have rectitude of-will

Concomitanter autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo
concomitantly moreover because as said it-is beatitude
ultima consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa
last consists in the-vision of-the-divine essence which is the-very
essentia bonitatis. Et ita voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex
essence of-goodness and so the-will of-one-seeing of-God the-essence of
necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut
necessity loves whatever it-loves under order to God as

voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat
the-will not of-one-seeing of-God the-essence of necessity loves
quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam novit. Et
whatever it-loves under the-common notion of-good which it-knows and
hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde manifestum
this itself is what makes the-will right whence manifest
est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta voluntate.
it-is that beatitude not can to-be without right will

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Augustine speaks
de cognitione veri quod non est ipsa essentia bonitatis.
about knowledge of-the-true which not is the-very essence of-goodness

Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis
to the-second it-must-be-said that every act of-the-will
praeceditur ab aliquo actu intellectus: aliquis tamen actus
is-preceded by some act of-the-intellect some yet act
voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus. Voluntas
of-the-will is prior than some act of-the-intellect the-will
enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et
for tends to the-final act of-the-intellect which is beatitude and
ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem,
therefore right inclination of-the-will is-prerequired for beatitude
sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi.
as the-right motion of-the-arrow for the-striking of-the-mark

Ad tertium dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur
to the-third it-must-be-said that not all which is-ordered
ad finem, cessat adveniente fine: sed id tantum quod se
to an-end ceases arriving the-end but that only which itself
habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut motus. Unde instrumenta
has in the-notion of-imperfection as motion whence the-instruments

motus non sunt necessaria postquam pervenitur ad finem:
of-motion not are necessary after it-is-come to the-end
sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.
but due order to the-end is necessary

Utrum ad beatitudinem hominis requiratur corpus

5 · WHETHER THE BODY IS REQUIRED FOR MAN'S BEATITUDE

Since the soul is perfected in its body, and beatitude is man's whole perfection, it seems so. Thomas answers that the body is required for imperfect beatitude in this life, since the intellect's operation here needs phantasms and so a bodily organ, but not for perfect beatitude, the vision of God, which the souls of the saints have without the body; after the resurrection the body adds to beatitude extensively, not intensively.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that for beatitude
requiratur corpus. Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae
be-required the-body the-perfection for of-virtue and grace
praesupponit perfectionem naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio
presupposes the-perfection of-nature but beatitude is the-perfection
virtutis et gratiae. Anima autem sine corpore non habet
of-virtue and grace the-soul moreover without the-body not has
perfectionem naturae: cum sit pars naturaliter humanae
the-perfection of-nature since it-is a-part naturally of-human
naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo toto
nature every moreover part is imperfect from its whole
separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
separated therefore the-soul without the-body not can to-be blessed

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta,
2 further beatitude is an-operation certain perfect
ut supra dictum est. Sed operatio perfecta sequitur esse
as above said it-is but operation perfect follows the-to-be
perfectum: quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est ens
perfect because nothing works except according as it-is a-being
in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse perfectum
in act since therefore the-soul not have the-to-be perfect
quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars
when it-is from the-body separated as neither any part
quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine
when separated it-is from the-whole it-seems that the-soul without
corpore non possit esse beata.
the-body not can to-be blessed

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima
3 further beatitude is the-perfection of-man but the-soul
sine corpore non est homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest
without the-body not is a-man therefore beatitude not can
esse in anima sine corpore.
to-be in the-soul without the-body

4. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in VII Ethic.,
4 further according-to the-Philosopher in VII Ethics
felicitatis operatio, in qua consistit beatitudo, est non
of-happiness the-operation in which consists beatitude is not
impedita. Sed operatio animae separatae est impedita:
hindered but the-operation of-the-soul separated is hindered
quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litt., inest
because as says Augustine XII on Genesis to the-letter is-in
ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo
it a-natural certain appetite the-body of-administering by-which
appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat
appetite it-is-held-back in-a-way lest with-whole intention it-go

in illud summum caelum, idest in visionem essentiae
into that highest heaven that-is into the-vision of-the-essence
divinae. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata.
divine therefore the-soul without the-body not can to-be blessed

5. Praeterea, beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat
5 further beatitude is a-sufficient good and quiets
desiderium. Sed hoc non convenit animae separatae: quia
desire but this not belongs to-the-soul separated because
adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo
still it-desires of-the-body the-union as Augustine says therefore
anima separata a corpore non est beata.
the-soul separated from the-body not is blessed

6. Praeterea, homo in beatitudine est angelis aequalis. Sed
6 further man in beatitude is to-the-angels equal but
anima sine corpore non aequatur angelis, ut Augustinus
the-soul without the-body not is-equaled to-the-angels as Augustine
dicit. Ergo non est beata.
says therefore not it-is blessed

Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV: Beati mortui
but against is that it-is-said Apocalypse XIV blessed the-dead
qui in Domino moriuntur.
who in the-Lord die

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo: una
I-answer it-must-be-said that twofold is beatitude one
imperfecta, quae habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae
imperfect which is-had in this life and the-other perfect which
in Dei visione consistit. Manifestum est autem quod ad
in of-God the-vision consists manifest it-is moreover that for
beatitudinem huius vitae, de necessitate requiritur corpus. Est
the-beatitude of-this life of necessity is-required the-body is
enim beatitudo huius vitae operatio intellectus, vel speculativi
for the-beatitude of-this life an-operation of-the-intellect either speculative

vel practici. Operatio autem intellectus in hac vita non
or practical the-operation moreover of-the-intellect in this life not
potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non est nisi in organo
can to-be without a-phantasm which not is except in an-organ
corporeo, ut in Primo habitum est. Et sic beatitudo quae
bodily as in the-First held it-is and thus the-beatitude which
in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex corpore.
in this life to-be-had can depends in-a-way on the-body

Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione
but about beatitude perfect which in of-God the-vision
consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire
consists some have-held that not it-can to-the-soul to-come
sine corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae Sanctorum a
without the-body existing saying that the-souls of-the-Saints from
corporibus separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt
bodies separated to that beatitude not arrive
usque ad diem Iudicii, quando corpora resument. – Quod
until to the-day of-Judgment when the-bodies they-will-resume which
quidem apparet esse falsum et auctoritate, et ratione.
indeed appears to-be false both by-authority and by-reason
Auctoritate quidem, quia Apostolus dicit, II. ad Cor. V:
by-authority indeed because the-Apostle says II to Corinthians V
Quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; et
as-long-as we-are in the-body we-are-pilgrims from the-Lord and
quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens: Per fidem
what be the-reason of-pilgrimage he-shows adding through faith
enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ex quo apparet
for we-walk and not through sight from which it-appears
quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per
that as-long-as anyone walks through faith and not through
speciem, carens visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo
sight lacking the-vision of-the-divine essence not-yet is to-God

praesens. Animae autem Sanctorum a corporibus separatae,
present the-souls moreover of-the-Saints from bodies separated
sunt Deo praesentes: unde subditur: Audemus autem, et
are to-God present whence it-is-added we-dare moreover and
bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari a corpore, et
good will we-have to-be-pilgrims from the-body and
praesentes esse ad Dominum. Unde manifestum est quod
present to-be with the-Lord whence manifest it-is that
animae Sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per
the-souls of-the-Saints separated from bodies walk through
speciem, Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo.
sight of-God the-essence seeing in which is true beatitude

Hoc etiam per rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam
this also through reason appears for the-intellect for its
operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata,
operation not needs the-body except on-account-of phantasms
in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur, ut in Primo
in which truth intelligible it-beholds as in the-First
dictum est. Manifestum est autem quod divina essentia
said it-is manifest it-is moreover that the-divine essence
per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in Primo ostensum
through phantasms to-be-seen not can as in the-First shown
est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis
it-is whence since in the-vision of-the-divine essence the-perfect of-man
beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta hominis
beatitude consist not depends beatitude perfect of-man
a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata.
on the-body whence without the-body can the-soul to-be blessed

Sed sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter
but to-be-known that to the-perfection of-some thing in-two-ways
aliquid pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei:
something pertains in-one way to constituting the-essence of-the-thing

sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo
as the-soul is-required for the-perfection of-man in-another way
requiritur ad perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse
is-required for the-perfection of-a-thing what pertains to the-well the-to-be
eius: sicut pulchritudo corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet
of-it as beauty of-body and swiftness of-wit pertains
ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo
to the-perfection of-man although therefore the-body in-the-first way
ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae non pertineat, pertinet
to the-perfection of-beatitude human not pertain it-pertains
tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura
yet in-the-second way since for operation depend on the-nature
rei, quanto anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto
of-the-thing by-how-much the-soul more-perfect will-be in its nature by-so-much
perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas
more-perfectly it-will-have its proper operation in which happiness
consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad litt., cum
consists whence Augustine in XII on Genesis to the-letter when
quaesivisset, Utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus
he-had-asked whether to-the-spirits of-the-dead without bodies
possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi: respondet quod non
can highest that beatitude to-be-furnished answers that not
sic possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti
thus they-can to-see the-unchangeable substance as the-holy
angeli vident; sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia
angels see whether by-another more-hidden cause or therefore because
est in eis naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi.
there-is in them a-natural certain appetite the-body of-administering

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that beatitude is the-perfection
animae ex parte intellectus, secundum quem anima transcendit
of-the-soul on the-side of-the-intellect according-to which the-soul transcends

corporis organa: non autem secundum quod est forma
of-the-body the-organs not moreover according as it-is the-form
naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio manet
natural of-the-body and therefore that of-nature perfection remains
secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat
according-to which to-it beatitude is-owed although not remain
illa naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma.
that of-nature perfection according-to which it-is of-the-body the-form

Ad secundum dicendum quod anima aliter se habet
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-soul otherwise itself has
ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam esse totius non est
to the-to-be than other parts for the-to-be of-the-whole not is
alicuius suarum partium: unde vel pars omnino desinit esse,
of-any of-its parts whence either the-part altogether ceases to-be
destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo animali; vel, si
destroyed the-whole as the-parts of-an-animal destroyed the-animal or if
remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars lineae habet
they-remain they-have another the-to-be in act as the-part of-a-line has
aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet
another the-to-be than the-whole line but to-the-soul human remains
esse compositi post corporis destructionem: et hoc ideo,
the-to-be of-the-composite after of-the-body the-destruction and this therefore
quia idem est esse formae et materiae, et hoc est esse
because the-same is the-to-be of-form and of-matter and this is the-to-be
compositi. Anima autem subsistit in suo esse, ut in Primo
of-the-composite the-soul moreover subsists in its the-to-be as in the-First
ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod post separationem a
shown it-is whence it-remains that after separation from
corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et perfectam operationem
the-body perfect the-to-be it-have whence also perfect operation
habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei.
to-have it-can although not it-have the-perfect nature of-the-species

Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis
to the-third it-must-be-said that beatitude is of-man
secundum intellectum: et ideo, remanente intellectu, potest
according-to the-intellect and therefore remaining the-intellect can
inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes Aethiopis possunt esse albi,
to-be-in him beatitude as the-teeth of-an-Ethiopian can to-be white
etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos Aethiops dicitur albus.
even after the-pulling-out according-to which the-Ethiopian is-called white

Ad quartum dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that in-two-ways something is-hindered
ab alio. Uno modo, per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus
by another in-one way through the-mode of-contrariety as cold
impedit actionem caloris: et tale impedimentum operationis
hinders the-action of-heat and such hindrance of-operation
repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam
is-repugnant to-happiness in-another way through the-mode of-a-certain
defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad
defect because namely the-thing hindered not has whatever for
omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur: et tale impedimentum
every-kind-of its perfection is-required and such hindrance
operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectioni
of-operation not is-repugnant to-happiness but to-every-kind-of perfection
ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam retardare,
of-it and thus separation from the-body is-said the-soul to-hold-back
ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae.
lest with-whole intention it-tend into the-vision of-the-divine essence
Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio
desires for the-soul thus to-enjoy God that also the-very enjoyment
derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile.
be-derived to the-body through overflow as is possible
Et ideo quandiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus
and therefore as-long-as it enjoys God without the-body the-appetite

eius sic quiescit in eo quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad
its thus rests in that which it-has that yet still to
participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere.
the-participation of-it it-would-wish its body to-reach

Ad quintum dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae
to the-fifth it-must-be-said that the-desire of-the-soul separated
totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibilis: quia scilicet habet id
totally rests on the-side of-the-desirable because namely it-has that
quod suo appetitui sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex
which to-its appetite suffices but not totally it-rests on
parte appetentis: quia illud bonum non possidet secundum
the-side of-the-desirer because that good not it-possesses according-to
omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore
every mode in-which to-possess it-would-wish and therefore the-body
resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive.
resumed beatitude grows not intensively but extensively

Ad sextum dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur,
to the-sixth it-must-be-said that that which in-the-same-place is-said
quod spiritus defunctorum non sic vident Deum sicut
that the-spirits of-the-dead not thus see God as
angeli, non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem
the-angels not is to-be-understood according-to inequality
quantitatis: quia etiam modo aliquae animae Beatorum sunt
of-quantity because even now some souls of-the-Blessed are
assumptae ad superiores ordines angelorum, clarius videntes
taken-up to the-higher orders of-angels more-clearly seeing
Deum quam inferiores angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum
God than the-lower angels but it-is-understood according-to
inaequalitatem proportionis: quia angeli, etiam infimi, habent
inequality of-proportion because the-angels even the-lowest have

omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non
all perfection of-beatitude which they-are about-to-have not
autem animae separatae Sanctorum.
moreover the-souls separated of-the-Saints

Utrum ad beatitudinem requiratur aliqua perfectio corporis

6 · WHETHER BEATITUDE REQUIRES SOME PERFECTION OF THE BODY

Since the vision does not depend on the body, it seems not. Thomas answers that perfect beatitude requires a perfect disposition of the body both antecedently, since a body hard to govern turns the mind from that vision, and consequently, since from the soul's beatitude, as Augustine says, the vigor of incorruption overflows into the body. The body adds nothing to the vision of God, but a spiritual body, wholly subject to the spirit, no longer hinders it.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that perfection of-body
non requiratur ad beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio
not be-required for the-beatitude of-man perfect the-perfection
enim corporis est quoddam corporale bonum. Sed supra
for of-the-body is a-certain bodily good but above
ostensum est quod beatitudo non consistit in corporalibus
shown it-is that beatitude not consists in bodily
bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non requiritur aliqua
goods therefore for the-beatitude of-man not is-required some
perfecta dispositio corporis.
perfect disposition of-the-body

2. Praeterea, beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae
2 further the-beatitude of-man consists in the-vision of-the-divine
essentiae, ut ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil
essence as shown it-is but for this operation nothing

exhibet corpus, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis
furnishes the-body as said it-is therefore no disposition of-the-body
requiritur ad beatitudinem.
is-required for beatitude

3. Praeterea, quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a
3 further by-how-much the-intellect is more abstracted from
corpore, tanto perfectius intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit
the-body by-so-much more-perfectly it-understands but beatitude consists
in perfectissima operatione intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus
in the-most-perfect operation of-the-intellect therefore it-is-necessary in-all
modis animam esse abstractam a corpore. Nullo ergo
ways the-soul to-be abstracted from the-body in-no therefore
modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad beatitudinem.
way is-required some disposition of-the-body for beatitude

Sed contra, praemium virtutis est beatitudo: unde dicitur
but against the-reward of-virtue is beatitude whence it-is-said
Ioan. XIII: Beati eritis, si feceritis ea. Sed
John XIII blessed you-will-be if you-will-have-done these-things but
Sanctis repromittitur pro praemio non solum visio Dei
to-the-Saints is-promised as reward not only the-vision of-God
et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona dispositio: dicitur
and delight but also of-the-body good disposition it-is-said
enim Isaiae ult.: Videbitis, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et
for Isaiah last you-will-see and will-rejoice heart your and
ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt. Ergo bona dispositio
bones your as-if grass will-sprout therefore good disposition
corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem.
of-the-body is-required for beatitude

Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine
I-answer it-must-be-said that if we-speak about the-beatitude
hominis qualis in hac vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod
of-man such-as in this life can to-be-had manifest it-is that

ad eam ex necessitate requiritur bona dispositio corporis.
for it of necessity is-required good disposition of-the-body
Consistit enim haec beatitudo, secundum Philosophum, in
consists for this beatitude according-to the-Philosopher in
operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum est autem quod
the-operation of-virtue perfect manifest it-is moreover that
per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione virtutis
through ill-health of-the-body in every operation of-virtue
homo impediri potest.
man to-be-hindered can

Sed si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, sic quidam
but if we-speak about beatitude perfect thus some
posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem aliqua
have-held that not is-required for beatitude some
corporis dispositio: immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino
of-the-body disposition nay it-is-required for it that altogether
anima sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII
the-soul be from the-body separated whence Augustine XXII
de Civ. Dei, introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod
on the-City of-God introduces the-words of-Porphyry saying that
ad hoc quod beata sit anima, omne corpus fugiendum
for this that blessed may-be the-soul every body to-be-fled
est. – Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum enim naturale sit
is but this is unfitting since for natural it-be
animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio
for-the-soul to-the-body to-be-united not can to-be that the-perfection
animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat.
of-the-soul natural its perfection exclude

Et ideo dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus
and therefore to-be-said it-is that for beatitude in-all
modis perfectam, requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et
ways perfect is-required perfect disposition of-the-body both

antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut
antecedently and consequently antecedently indeed because as
Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad litt., si tale sit corpus,
Augustine says XII on Genesis to the-letter if such be the-body
cuius sit difficilis et gravis administratio, sicut caro
whose may-be difficult and heavy the-administration as the-flesh
quae corrumpitur et aggravat animam, avertitur mens ab
which is-corrupted and weighs-down the-soul is-turned-away the-mind from
illa visione summi caeli. Unde concludit quod, cum hoc
that vision of-the-highest heaven whence he-concludes that when this
corpus iam non erit animale, sed spirituale, tunc angelis
body now not will-be animal but spiritual then to-the-angels
adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod sarcinae fuit.
it-will-be-equaled and will-be to-it for glory what a-burden was
– Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae fiet
consequently but because from the-beatitude of-the-soul there-will-be
redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur.
an-overflow to the-body that also it by-its perfection may-possess
Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum: Tam potenti
whence Augustine says in the-Letter to Dioscorus so powerful
natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine
a-nature God made the-soul that from its fullest beatitude
redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor.
may-overflow into the-lower nature of-incorruption the-vigor

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in corporali bono non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that in bodily good not
consistit beatitudo sicut in obiecto beatitudinis: sed corporale
consists beatitude as in the-object of-beatitude but bodily
bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel
good can to-make for some of-beatitude comeliness or
perfectionem.
perfection

Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat
to the-second it-must-be-said that although the-body nothing contribute
ad illam operationem intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur,
to that operation of-the-intellect by-which of-God the-essence is-seen
tamen posset ab hac impedire. Et ideo requiritur perfectio
yet it-could from this to-hinder and therefore is-required perfection
corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis.
of-the-body that not it-hinder the-elevation of-the-mind

Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem
to the-third it-must-be-said that for the-perfect operation
intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili
of-the-intellect is-required indeed abstraction from this corruptible
corpore, quod aggravat animam: non autem a corpore
body which weighs-down the-soul not moreover from the-body
spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui subiectum, de quo
spiritual which will-be totally to-the-spirit subject about which
in Tertia Parte huius operis dicetur.
in the-Third Part of-this work it-will-be-said

Utrum ad beatitudinem requirantur aliqua exteriora bona

7 · WHETHER OUTWARD GOODS ARE REQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE

Promises of a kingdom and a table in Scripture seem to require them. Thomas answers that outward goods are needed for imperfect beatitude in this life, as instruments for the body and the works of virtue, but not for perfect beatitude in the vision of God; Scripture's promises of food and kingdoms speak of spiritual goods in bodily figures.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that for beatitude
requirantur etiam exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium
be-required also outer goods what for as reward
Sanctis promittitur, ad beatitudinem pertinet. Sed Sanctis
to-the-Saints is-promised to beatitude pertains but to-the-Saints
repromittuntur exteriora bona, sicut cibus et potus, divitiae
are-promised outer goods as food and drink riches
et regnum: dicitur enim Luc. XXII: Ut edatis et
and kingdom it-is-said for Luke XXII that you-may-eat and
bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo; et Matth. VI:
drink at table my in kingdom my and Matthew VI
Thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo; et Matth. XXV:
lay-up for-yourselves treasures in heaven and Matthew XXV
Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete regnum. Ergo ad
come O-blessed of-Father my possess the-kingdom therefore for
beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona.
beatitude are-required outer goods

2. Praeterea, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol.,
2 further according-to Boethius in III on Consolation
beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus.
beatitude is a-state of-all goods by-the-aggregation perfect

Sed exteriora sunt aliqua hominis bona, licet minima, ut
but outer-things are some of-man goods although least as
Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam requiruntur ad beatitudinem.
Augustine says therefore they also are-required for beatitude

3. Praeterea, Dominus, Matth. V, dicit: Merces vestra
3 further the-Lord Matthew V says reward your
multa est in caelis. Sed esse in caelis significat esse in
great is in the-heavens but to-be in the-heavens signifies to-be in
loco. Ergo saltem locus exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem.
a-place therefore at-least place outer is-required for beatitude

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII: Quid
but against is that it-is-said in Psalm LXXII what
enim mihi est in caelo? Et a te quid volui super
for to-me is in heaven and from you what have-I-wished upon
terram? Quasi dicat: «Nihil aliud volo nisi hoc quod
earth as-if he-should-say nothing other I-wish except this which
sequitur, Mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est.» Ergo nihil
follows for-me to-cling to-God good it-is therefore nothing
aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur.
other outer for beatitude is-required

Respondeo dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam,
I-answer it-must-be-said that for beatitude imperfect
qualis in hac vita potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona,
such-as in this life can to-be-had are-required outer goods
non quasi de essentia beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi
not as-if of the-essence of-beatitude existing but as-if
instrumentaliter deservientia beatitudini, quae consistit in
instrumentally serving beatitude which consists in
operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Indiget enim
the-operation of-virtue as is-said in I Ethics needs for
homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem
man in this life the-necessaries of-the-body as-much for the-operation

virtutis contemplativae, quam etiam ad operationem virtutis
of-virtue contemplative as also for the-operation of-virtue
activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus
active for which also many other-things are-required by-which
exerceat opera activae virtutis.
he-may-exercise the-works of-active virtue

Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam, quae in visione Dei
but for beatitude perfect which in the-vision of-God
consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona requiruntur. Cuius ratio
consists in-no way of-this-kind goods are-required of-which the-reason
est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora vel requiruntur
is because all of-this-kind goods outer either are-required
ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel requiruntur ad
for the-sustenance of-the-animal body or are-required for
aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus exercemus, quae
some operations which through the-animal body we-exercise which
humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta beatitudo quae
to-human life belong that moreover perfect beatitude which
in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine corpore; vel
in the-vision of-God consists either will-be in the-soul without the-body or
erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed spirituali.
will-be in the-soul to-the-body united not now animal but spiritual
Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur
and therefore in-no way of-this-kind outer goods are-required
ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem.
for that beatitude since they-are-ordered to life animal
– Et quia in hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius
and because in this life more approaches to the-likeness of-that
perfectae beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa,
perfect beatitude happiness contemplative than active

utpote etiam Deo similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo
inasmuch-as also to-God more-like as from things-said is-plain therefore
minus indiget huiusmodi bonis corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic.
less it-needs of-this-kind goods of-the-body as is-said in X Ethics

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes illae corporales
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that all those bodily
promissiones quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, sunt
promises which in sacred Scripture are-contained are
metaphorice intelligendae, secundum quod in Scripturis
metaphorically to-be-understood according as in the-Scriptures
solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, ut ex his
are-wont spiritual-things through bodily-things to-be-designated that from those-things
quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita consurgamus,
which we-know to desiring unknown-things we-may-rise
sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam Homilia. Sicut per cibum
as Gregory says in a-certain Homily as through food
et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias,
and drink is-understood the-delight of-beatitude through riches
sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum,
the-sufficiency by-which to-man will-suffice God through the-kingdom
exaltatio hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.
the-exaltation of-man even to union with God

Ad secundum dicendum quod bona ista deservientia
to the-second it-must-be-said that goods those serving
animali vitae, non competunt vitae spirituali, in qua beatitudo
animal life not belong to-life spiritual in which beatitude
perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit in illa beatitudine
perfect consists and yet there-will-be in that beatitude
omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni invenitur
of-all goods the-gathering because whatever of-good is-found
in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.
in these the-whole will-be-had in the-highest fount of-goods

Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in
to the-third it-must-be-said that according-to Augustine in
libro de Serm. Dom. in Monte, merces Sanctorum non
the-book on the-Sermon of-the-Lord on the-Mount the-reward of-the-Saints not
dicitur esse in corporeis caelis: sed per caelos intelligitur
is-said to-be in bodily heavens but through heavens is-understood
altitudo spiritualium bonorum. – Nihilominus tamen locus
the-height of-spiritual goods nonetheless yet place
corporeus, scilicet caelum empyreum, aderit Beatis, non
bodily namely heaven empyrean will-be-present to-the-Blessed not
propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam
on-account-of necessity of-beatitude but according-to a-certain
congruentiam et decorem.
fittingness and comeliness

Utrum ad beatitudinem requiratur societas amicorum

8 · WHETHER THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS IS REQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE

Since Scripture often calls beatitude glory, and glory is a man's good made known to many, it seems so. Thomas answers that in this life the happy man needs friends, to do good to them, to delight in seeing them do good, and to be helped by them; but in the life to come the society of friends is not required, since man has the whole fullness of his perfection in God, though it adds to beatitude's well-being.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that friends be necessary
ad beatitudinem. Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis
for beatitude the-future for beatitude in the-Scriptures
frequenter nomine gloriae designatur. Sed gloria consistit in
frequently by-the-name of-glory is-designated but glory consists in

hoc quod bonum hominis ad notitiam multorum deducitur.
this that the-good of-man to the-knowledge of-many is-brought
Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur societas amicorum.
therefore for beatitude is-required the-society of-friends

2. Praeterea, Boetius dicit quod nullius boni sine
2 further Boethius says that of-no good without
consortio iucunda est possessio. Sed ad beatitudinem
companionship pleasant is the-possession but for beatitude
requiritur delectatio. Ergo etiam requiritur societas amicorum.
is-required delight therefore also is-required the-society of-friends

3. Praeterea, caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas
3 further charity in beatitude is-perfected but charity
se extendit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur
itself extends to the-love of-God and of-neighbor therefore it-seems
quod ad beatitudinem requiratur societas amicorum.
that for beatitude be-required the-society of-friends

Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VII: Venerunt mihi
but against is that it-is-said Wisdom VII came to-me
omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum divina sapientia,
all goods equally with her namely with divine wisdom
quae consistit in contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem
which consists in the-contemplation of-God and thus for beatitude
nihil aliud requiritur.
nothing other is-required

Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate
I-answer it-must-be-said that if we-speak about the-happiness
praesentis vitae, sicut Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic.,
of-present life as the-Philosopher says in IX Ethics
felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem,
the-happy-man needs friends not indeed on-account-of usefulness
cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem,
since he-is to-himself sufficient nor on-account-of delight

quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione
because he-has in himself delight perfect in the-operation
virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis
of-virtue but on-account-of good operation that namely to-them
benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur,
he-may-do-good and that them beholding to-do-good he-may-be-delighted
et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget
and that also by them in doing-good he-may-be-helped needs
enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in
for man for well working the-help of-friends as-much in
operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae.
the-works of-life active as in the-works of-life contemplative

Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in
but if we-speak about perfect beatitude which will-be in
patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate
the-fatherland not is-required the-society of-friends of necessity
ad beatitudinem: quia homo habet totam plenitudinem
for beatitude because man has the-whole fullness
suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis
of-his perfection in God but to the-well the-to-be of-beatitude
facit societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super
makes the-society of-friends whence Augustine says VIII on
Gen. ad litt., quod creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata
Genesis to the-letter that the-creature spiritual for this that blessed
sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate,
it-may-be not except inwardly is-helped by-the-eternity truth
caritate Creatoris. Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est,
charity of-the-Creator outwardly but if to-be-helped to-be-said it-is
fortasse hoc solo adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de
perhaps by-this alone it-is-helped that one-another they-see and in
sua societate gaudent in Deo.
their society rejoice in God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gloria quae est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-glory which is
essentialis beatitudini, est quam habet homo non apud
essential to-beatitude is that-which has man not with
hominem, sed apud Deum.
man but with God

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur,
to the-second it-must-be-said that word that is-understood
quando in eo bono quod habetur, non est plena
when in that good which is-had not there-is full
sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non potest: quia
sufficiency which in the-case to-be-said not can because
omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.
of-every good the-sufficiency has man in God

Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-perfection of-charity is
essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non
essential to-beatitude as-far to the-love of-God not
autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una
moreover as-far to the-love of-neighbor whence if there-were one
sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum
alone soul enjoying God blessed it-would-be not having a-neighbor
quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio
whom it-might-love but supposing a-neighbor follows love
eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter
of-him from perfect love of-God whence as-if concomitantly
se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.
itself has friendship to beatitude perfect

De adeptione beatitudinis

V · ON THE ATTAINMENT OF BEATITUDE

Next, Thomas asks how beatitude is attained, in eight questions: whether man can attain it; whether one can be more blessed than another; whether anyone is blessed in this life; whether beatitude once had can be lost; whether man attains it by his natural powers; whether through the action of a higher creature; whether good works are required; and whether every man desires it.

Deinde considerandum est de ipsa adeptione beatitudinis.
then to-be-considered it-is about the-very obtaining of-beatitude

Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
and about this are-asked eight

Primo: utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem.
first whether man can to-attain beatitude

Secundo: utrum unus homo possit esse alio beatior.
second whether one man can to-be than-another more-blessed

Tertio: utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita beatus.
third whether anyone can to-be in this life blessed

Quarto: utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti.
fourth whether beatitude had can to-be-lost

Quinto: utrum homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem.
fifth whether man through his natural-powers can to-acquire beatitude

Sexto: utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius superioris creaturae.
sixth whether man attain beatitude through the-action of-some higher creature

Septimo: utrum requirantur opera hominis aliqua ad hoc
seventh whether be-required works of-man some for this
quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo.
that man beatitude may-attain from God
Octavo: utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem.
eighth whether every man desire beatitude

Utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem

1 · WHETHER MAN CAN ATTAIN BEATITUDE

The objections: as rational nature is above the sensible, so intellectual nature is above the rational, and as brutes cannot reach the rational end, man cannot reach the intellectual nature's end, beatitude; man's knowing truth in material things, through phantasms, is connatural to him; and angelic nature stands between God and man, and man cannot transcend it. Thomas answers that man is capable of the perfect good, since his intellect can grasp the universal and perfect good and his will desire it, and since he is capable of seeing God's essence, as the First showed; so he can attain beatitude, though not at once, as the angels did, but through time.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that man beatitude
adipisci non possit. Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra
to-obtain not can as for nature rational is above
sensibilem, ita natura intellectualis est supra rationalem; ut
the-sensible so nature intellectual is above the-rational as
patet per Dionysium in libro de Div. Nom., in multis
is-plain through Dionysius in the-book on Divine Names in many
locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent naturam sensibilem
places but brute animals which have nature sensible
tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem rationalis naturae.
only not can to-arrive at the-end of-rational nature

Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae, potest pervenire
therefore neither man who is of-rational nature can to-arrive
ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est beatitudo.
at the-end of-intellectual nature which is beatitude

2. Praeterea, beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui
2 further beatitude true consists in the-vision of-God who
est veritas pura. Sed homini est connaturale ut veritatem
is truth pure but to-man it-is connatural that truth
intueatur in rebus materialibus: unde species intelligibiles
he-behold in things material whence species intelligible
in phantasmatibus intelligit, ut dicitur in III de Anima.
in phantasms he-understands as is-said in III on the-Soul
Ergo non potest ad beatitudinem pervenire.
therefore not he-can to beatitude to-arrive

3. Praeterea, beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi
3 further beatitude consists in the-obtaining of-the-highest
boni. Sed aliquis non potest pervenire ad summum, nisi
good but someone not can to-arrive at the-highest unless
transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum et naturam
he-transcend the-middle-things since therefore between God and nature
humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo transcendere
human middle be the-nature angelic which man to-transcend
non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem adipisci.
not can it-seems that not he-can beatitude to-obtain

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII: Beatus
but against is that it-is-said in Psalm XCIII blessed
homo quem tu erudieris, Domine.
the-man whom you will-have-taught O-Lord

Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem
I-answer it-must-be-said that beatitude names the-obtaining
perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest
of-perfect good whoever therefore is capable of-perfect good can

ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit
to beatitude to-arrive that moreover man of-perfect good be
capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere
capable from this appears that both his intellect to-apprehend
potest universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas
can universal and perfect good and his will
appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci.
to-desire it and therefore man can beatitude to-obtain
– Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis
it-appears also the-same from this that man is capable of-the-vision
divinae essentiae, sicut in Primo habitum est; in qua quidem
of-the-divine essence as in the-First held it-is in which indeed
visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.
vision the-perfect of-man beatitude to-consist we-have-said

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter excedit natura
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that otherwise exceeds nature
rationalis sensitivam, et aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura
rational the-sensitive and otherwise the-intellectual the-rational nature
enim rationalis excedit sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis
for rational exceeds the-sensitive as-far to of-knowledge
obiectum: quia sensus nullo modo potest cognoscere
the-object because sense in-no way can to-know
universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed intellectualis
the-universal of-which reason is cognitive but intellectual
natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum cognoscendi
nature exceeds the-rational as-far to the-mode of-knowing
eandem intelligibilem veritatem: nam intellectualis natura
the-same intelligible truth for intellectual nature
statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per
at-once apprehends truth at which rational nature through
inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in
the-inquiry of-reason arrives as is-plain from those-things which in

Primo dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit,
the-First said are and therefore to that which the-intellect apprehends
ratio per quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura
reason through a-certain motion arrives whence rational nature
consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis
to-attain can beatitude which is the-perfection of-intellectual
naturae: tamen alio modo quam angeli. Nam angeli
nature yet in-another way than the-angels for the-angels
consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis:
attained have it at-once after the-beginning of-their creation
homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed
men moreover through time to it arrive but
natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest.
nature sensitive to this end in-no way to-reach can

Ad secundum dicendum quod homini, secundum statum
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-man according-to the-state
praesentis vitae, est connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem
of-present life is connatural the-mode of-knowing truth
intelligibilem per phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum,
intelligible through phantasms but after of-this life the-state
habet alium modum connaturalem, ut in Primo dictum est.
he-has another mode connatural as in the-First said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere
to the-third it-must-be-said that man not can to-transcend
angelos gradu naturae, ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis
the-angels in-the-degree of-nature that namely naturally he-be to-them
superior. Potest tamen eos transcendere per operationem
superior he-can yet them to-transcend through the-operation
intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid super angelos esse, quod
of-the-intellect while he-understands something above the-angels to-be which

homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte consequetur, perfecte
men beatifies which when perfectly he-will-attain perfectly
beatus erit.
blessed he-will-be

Utrum unus homo possit esse beatior altero

2 · WHETHER ONE MAN CAN BE MORE BLESSED THAN ANOTHER

The denarius of the laborers in the vineyard, the same for all, seems to say not. Thomas answers that beatitude may mean the good itself, God, which cannot be greater or less, or its attainment and enjoyment, in which one can be more blessed than another, as one is better disposed to enjoy God. The single denarius signifies the one object; the many mansions, its diverse enjoying.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that one man
alio non possit esse beatior. Beatitudo enim est
than-another not can to-be more-blessed beatitude for is
praemium virtutis, ut Philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed pro
the-reward of-virtue as the-Philosopher says in I Ethics but for
operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces redditur: dicitur
the-works of-the-virtues to-all equal reward is-rendered it-is-said
enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in vinea,
for Matthew XX that all who worked have in the-vineyard
acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius,
received each-a penny because as says Gregory
aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt. Ergo
equal of-eternal life retribution obtained they-have therefore
unus non erit alio beatior.
one not will-be than-another more-blessed

2. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo
2 further beatitude is the-highest good but than-the-highest
non potest esse aliquid maius. Ergo beatitudine unius
not can to-be anything greater therefore than-the-beatitude of-one
hominis non potest esse alia maior beatitudo.
man not can to-be another greater beatitude

3. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens
3 further beatitude since it-be the-perfect and sufficient
bonum, desiderium hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur
good the-desire of-man quiets but not is-quieted
desiderium, si aliquod bonum deest quod suppleri possit. Si
desire if some good is-lacking which to-be-supplied can if
autem nihil deest quod suppleri possit, non poterit esse
moreover nothing is-lacking which to-be-supplied can not will-be-able to-be
aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo non est beatus:
anything other greater good therefore either man not is blessed
vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo esse.
or if he-is blessed not can another greater beatitude to-be

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV: In domo Patris
but against is that it-is-said John XIV in the-house of-Father
mei mansiones multae sunt; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit,
my mansions many are by which as Augustine says
diversae meritorum dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna.
diverse of-merits dignities are-understood in life eternal
Dignitas autem vitae aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est
the-dignity moreover of-life eternal which for merit is-given is
ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et
the-very beatitude therefore there-are diverse degrees of-beatitude and
non omnium est aequalis beatitudo.
not of-all is equal beatitude

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is in
ratione beatitudinis duo includuntur: scilicet ipse finis
the-notion of-beatitude two-things are-included namely the-very end
ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et adeptio vel fruitio
last which is the-highest good and the-obtaining or enjoyment
ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est
of-that good as-far therefore to the-very good which is
beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo
of-beatitude the-object and cause not can to-be one beatitude
alia maior: quia non est nisi unum summum bonum,
than-another greater because not there-is except one highest good
scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. – Sed
namely God whose by-enjoyment men are blessed but
quantum ad adeptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem,
as-far to the-obtaining of-this-kind good or enjoyment
potest aliquis alio esse beatior: quia quanto magis
can someone than-another to-be more-blessed because by-how-much more
hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit autem
this good he-enjoys by-so-much more-blessed he-is it-happens moreover
aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod
someone more-perfectly to-enjoy God than another from this that
est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et
he-is better disposed or ordered to his enjoyment and
secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse.
according-to this can someone than-another more-blessed to-be

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas denarii
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-unity of-the-penny
significat unitatem beatitudinis ex parte obiecti. Sed
signifies the-unity of-beatitude on the-side of-the-object but

diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem beatitudinis
the-diversity of-mansions signifies the-diversity of-beatitude
secundum diversum gradum fruitionis.
according-to the-diverse degree of-enjoyment

Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse
to the-second it-must-be-said that beatitude is-said to-be
summum bonum, inquantum est summi boni perfecta
the-highest good inasmuch-as it-is of-the-highest good the-perfect
possessio sive fruitio.
possession or enjoyment

Ad tertium dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod
to the-third it-must-be-said that to-no blessed-one is-lacking any
bonum desiderandum: cum habeat ipsum bonum infinitum,
good to-be-desired since he-has the-very good infinite
quod est bonum omnis boni, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur
which is the-good of-every good as Augustine says but is-called
aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa eiusdem boni participatione.
someone than-another more-blessed from diverse of-the-same good participation
Additio autem aliorum bonorum non auget beatitudinem:
the-addition moreover of-other goods not increases beatitude
unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess.: Qui te et alia novit,
whence Augustine says in V Confessions who you and other-things knows
non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus.
not on-account-of them more-blessed but on-account-of you alone blessed

Utrum aliquis in hac vita possit esse beatus

3 · WHETHER ANYONE CAN BE BLESSED IN THIS LIFE

The undefiled in the way are called blessed, and some participation in the highest good is had here. Thomas answers that some participation of beatitude can be had in this life, but not perfect and true beatitude: this life cannot exclude every evil, of ignorance, disordered affection, and the body's penalties, nor fill desire with permanent goods; and the vision of God's essence is not given here. Men are called blessed here in hope or by some participation.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude can in this
vita haberi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII: Beati immaculati
life to-be-had it-is-said for in Psalm CXVIII blessed the-undefiled
in via, qui ambulant in lege Domini. Hoc autem in hac
in the-way who walk in the-law of-the-Lord this moreover in this
vita contingit. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.
life happens therefore someone in this life can to-be blessed

2. Praeterea, imperfecta participatio summi boni non
2 further imperfect participation of-the-highest good not
adimit rationem beatitudinis: alioquin unus non esset
takes-away the-notion of-beatitude otherwise one not would-be
alio beatior. Sed in hac vita homines possunt participare
than-another more-blessed but in this life men can to-participate
summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando Deum, licet
the-highest good by-knowing and by-loving God although
imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse beatus.
imperfectly therefore man in this life can to-be blessed

3. Praeterea, quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter
3 further what by many is-said not can totally
falsum esse: videtur enim esse naturale quod in pluribus
false to-be it-seems for to-be natural what in many

est; natura autem non totaliter deficit. Sed plures ponunt
is nature moreover not totally fails but many place
beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per illud Psalmi CXLIII:
beatitude in this life as is-plain through that of-Psalm CXLIII
Beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt, scilicet praesentis
blessed they-called the-people to-whom these-things are namely of-present
vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus.
life the-goods therefore someone in this life can to-be blessed

Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XIV: Homo natus de
but against is that it-is-said Job XIV man born of
muliere, brevi vivens tempore, repletur multis miseriis.
a-woman for-a-brief living time is-filled with-many miseries
Sed beatitudo excludit miseriam. Ergo homo in hac vita
but beatitude excludes misery therefore man in this life
non potest esse beatus.
not can to-be blessed

Respondeo dicendum quod aliqualis beatitudinis participatio
I-answer it-must-be-said that some of-beatitude participation
in hac vita haberi potest: perfecta autem et vera beatitudo
in this life to-be-had can perfect moreover and true beatitude
non potest haberi in hac vita. Et hoc quidem considerari
not can to-be-had in this life and this indeed to-be-considered
potest dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ipsa communi
can in-two-ways first indeed from the-very common
beatitudinis ratione. Nam beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et
of-beatitude notion for beatitude since it-be the-perfect and
sufficiens bonum, omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium
sufficient good every evil excludes and every desire
implet. In hac autem vita non potest omne malum
fills in this moreover life not can every evil
excludi. Multis enim malis praesens vita subiacet, quae
to-be-excluded to-many for evils the-present life is-subject which

vitari non possunt: et ignorantiae ex parte intellectus,
to-be-avoided not can both to-ignorance on the-side of-the-intellect
et inordinatae affectioni ex parte appetitus, et multiplicibus
and to-disordered affection on the-side of-the-appetite and to-manifold
poenalitatibus ex parte corporis; ut Augustinus diligenter
penalties on the-side of-the-body as Augustine diligently
prosequitur XIX de Civ. Dei. Similiter etiam desiderium
pursues XIX on the-City of-God similarly also the-desire
boni in hac vita satiari non potest. Naturaliter enim homo
of-good in this life to-be-sated not can naturally for man
desiderat permanentiam eius boni quod habet. Bona autem
desires the-permanence of-that good which he-has the-goods moreover
praesentis vitae transitoria sunt: cum et ipsa vita transeat,
of-present life transitory are since also the-very life passes
quam naturaliter desideramus, et eam perpetuo permanere
which naturally we-desire and it perpetually to-remain
vellemus, quia naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde
we-would-wish because naturally man flees death whence
impossibile est quod in hac vita vera beatitudo habeatur.
impossible it-is that in this life true beatitude be-had

Secundo, si consideretur id in quo specialiter beatitudo
second if be-considered that in which specially beatitude
consistit, scilicet visio divinae essentiae, quae non potest
consists namely the-vision of-the-divine essence which not can
homini provenire in hac vita, ut in Primo ostensum est.
to-man to-come in this life as in the-First shown it-is
Ex quibus manifeste apparet quod non potest aliquis in
from which-things manifestly it-appears that not can someone in
hac vita veram et perfectam beatitudinem adipisci.
this life true and perfect beatitude to-obtain

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beati dicuntur aliqui
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that blessed are-called some
in hac vita, vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendae
in this life either on-account-of the-hope of-beatitude to-be-obtained
in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII, Spe salvi facti
in the-future life according-to that Romans VIII by-hope saved made
sumus: vel propter aliquam participationem beatitudinis,
we-are or on-account-of some participation of-beatitude
secundum aliqualem summi boni fruitionem.
according-to some of-the-highest good enjoyment

Ad secundum dicendum quod participatio beatitudinis
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-participation of-beatitude
potest esse imperfecta dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte
can to-be imperfect in-two-ways in-one way on the-side
ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod quidem secundum sui
of-the-very object of-beatitude which indeed according-to its
essentiam non videtur. Et talis imperfectio tollit rationem
essence not is-seen and such imperfection takes-away the-notion
verae beatitudinis. Alio modo potest esse imperfecta ex
of-true beatitude in-another way it-can to-be imperfect on
parte ipsius participantis, qui quidem ad ipsum obiectum
the-side of-the-very participant who indeed to the-very object
beatitudinis secundum seipsum attingit, scilicet Deum, sed
of-beatitude according-to itself reaches namely God but
imperfecte, per respectum ad modum quo Deus seipso
imperfectly through respect to the-mode in-which God himself
fruitur. Et talis imperfectio non tollit veram rationem
enjoys and such imperfection not takes-away the-true notion
beatitudinis: quia, cum beatitudo sit operatio quaedam, ut
of-beatitude because since beatitude be an-operation certain as

supra dictum est, vera ratio beatitudinis consideratur ex
above said it-is the-true notion of-beatitude is-considered from
obiecto, quod dat speciem actui, non autem ex subiecto.
the-object which gives species to-the-act not moreover from the-subject

Ad tertium dicendum quod homines reputant in hac vita esse
to the-third it-must-be-said that men think in this life to-be
aliquam beatitudinem, propter aliquam similitudinem verae
some beatitude on-account-of some likeness of-true
beatitudinis. Et sic non ex toto in sua aestimatione deficiunt.
beatitude and thus not from the-whole in their estimate they-fail

Utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti

4 · WHETHER BEATITUDE ONCE HAD CAN BE LOST

Man is changeable and the will free, and what begins seems to end. Thomas answers that imperfect beatitude can be lost, through forgetfulness, distracting occupations, or the will's fall into vice. Against Origen's Platonist error, perfect beatitude cannot: it must quiet desire and exclude the fear of losing it; no one who sees God's essence can will not to see it; God will not withdraw it, since only fault deserves the withdrawal and the vision excludes fault; and no other agent can, since the mind joined to God is raised above all things.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that beatitude can
amitti. Beatitudo enim est perfectio quaedam. Sed omnis
to-be-lost beatitude for is a-perfection certain but every
perfectio inest perfectibili secundum modum ipsius. Cum
perfection is-in the-perfectible according-to the-mode of-it since
igitur homo secundum suam naturam sit mutabilis, videtur
therefore man according-to his nature be changeable it-seems

quod beatitudo mutabiliter ab homine participetur. Et ita
that beatitude changeably by man be-participated and so
videtur quod homo beatitudinem possit amittere.
it-seems that man beatitude can to-lose

2. Praeterea, beatitudo consistit in actione intellectus, qui
2 further beatitude consists in the-action of-the-intellect which
subiacet voluntati. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo
is-subject to-the-will but the-will itself has to opposites therefore
videtur quod possit desistere ab operatione qua homo
it-seems that it-can to-desist from the-operation by-which man
beatificatur: et ita homo desinet esse beatus.
is-beatified and so man will-cease to-be blessed

3. Praeterea, principio respondet finis. Sed beatitudo
3 further to-the-beginning corresponds the-end but the-beatitude
hominis habet principium: quia homo non semper fuit
of-man has a-beginning because man not always was
beatus. Ergo videtur quod habeat finem.
blessed therefore it-seems that it-have an-end

Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XXV de iustis,
but against is that it-is-said Matthew XXV about the-just
quod ibunt in vitam aeternam; quae, ut dictum est, est
that they-will-go into life eternal which as said it-is is
beatitudo Sanctorum. Quod autem est aeternum, non deficit.
the-beatitude of-the-Saints what moreover is eternal not fails
Ergo beatitudo non potest amitti.
therefore beatitude not can to-be-lost

Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine
I-answer it-must-be-said that if we-speak about beatitude
imperfecta, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, sic potest amitti.
imperfect such-as in this life can to-be-had thus it-can to-be-lost
Et hoc patet in felicitate contemplativa, quae amittitur vel
and this is-plain in happiness contemplative which is-lost either

per oblivionem, puta cum corrumpitur scientia ex aliqua
through forgetfulness for-example when is-corrupted knowledge from some
aegritudine; vel etiam per aliquas occupationes, quibus
sickness or also through some occupations by-which
totaliter abstrahitur aliquis a contemplatione. Patet etiam
totally is-drawn-away someone from contemplation it-is-plain also
idem in felicitate activa: voluntas enim hominis transmutari
the-same in happiness active the-will for of-man to-be-changed
potest, ut in vitium degeneret a virtute, in cuius actu
can so-that into vice it-degenerate from virtue in whose act
principaliter consistit felicitas. Si autem virtus remaneat integra,
principally consists happiness if moreover virtue remain whole
exteriores transmutationes possunt quidem beatitudinem talem
outer changes can indeed beatitude such
perturbare, inquantum impediunt multas operationes virtutum:
to-disturb inasmuch-as they-binder many operations of-the-virtues
non tamen possunt eam totaliter auferre, quia adhuc remanet
not yet they-can it totally to-take-away because still remains
operatio virtutis, dum ipsas adversitates homo laudabiliter
the-operation of-virtue while the-very adversities man laudably
sustinet. – Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, quod
bears and because the-beatitude of-this life to-be-lost can which
videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo Philosophus
seems to-be against the-notion of-beatitude therefore the-Philosopher
dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter,
says in I Ethics some to-be in this life blessed not simply
sed sicut homines, quorum natura mutationi subiecta est.
but as men whose nature to-change subject is

Si vero loquamur de beatitudine perfecta quae expectatur
if but we-speak about beatitude perfect which is-awaited
post hanc vitam, sciendum est quod Origenes posuit,
after this life to-be-known it-is that Origen held

quorundam Platonicorum errorem sequens, quod post ultimam
of-certain Platonists the-error following that after the-last
beatitudinem homo potest fieri miser.
beatitude man can to-become wretched

Sed hoc manifeste apparet esse falsum dupliciter. Primo
but this manifestly appears to-be false in-two-ways first
quidem, ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis. Cum enim
indeed from the-very common notion of-beatitude since for
ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet
the-very beatitude be the-perfect good and sufficient it-is-necessary
quod desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat.
that the-desire of-man it-quiet and every evil exclude
Naturaliter autem homo desiderat retinere bonum quod
naturally moreover man desires to-retain the-good which
habet, et quod eius retinendi securitatem obtineat: alioquin
he-has and that of-its retaining the-security he-obtain otherwise
necesse est quod timore amittendi, vel dolore de certitudine
necessary it-is that by-fear of-losing or by-grief from the-certainty
amissionis, affligatur. Requiritur igitur ad veram beatitudinem
of-loss he-be-afflicted it-is-required therefore for true beatitude
quod homo certam habeat opinionem bonum quod habet,
that man a-sure have opinion the-good which he-has
nunquam se amissurum. Quae quidem opinio si vera
never himself about-to-lose which indeed opinion if true
sit, consequens est quod beatitudinem nunquam amittet. Si
it-be consequent it-is that beatitude never he-will-lose if
autem falsa sit, hoc ipsum est quoddam malum, falsam
moreover false it-be this itself is a-certain evil a-false
opinionem habere: nam falsum est malum intellectus, sicut
opinion to-have for the-false is the-evil of-the-intellect as

verum est bonum ipsius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non igitur
the-true is the-good of-it as is-said in VI Ethics not therefore
iam vere erit beatus, si aliquod malum ei inest.
then truly he-will-be blessed if some evil to-him is-present

Secundo idem apparet, si consideretur ratio beatitudinis
second the-same appears if be-considered the-notion of-beatitude
in speciali. Ostensum est enim supra quod perfecta beatitudo
in special shown it-is for above that perfect beatitude
hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Est autem
of-man in the-vision of-the-divine essence consists it-is moreover
impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam essentiam, velit eam
impossible that someone seeing the-divine essence wish it
non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis carere vult,
not to-see because every good had which anyone to-lack wishes
aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid sufficientius loco
either is insufficient and is-sought something more-sufficient in-place
eius: aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, propter
of-it or has some inconvenience attached on-account-of
quod in fastidium venit. Visio aut divinae essentiae
which into disgust it-comes the-vision moreover of-the-divine essence
replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius
fills the-soul with-all goods since it-joins-it to-the-fount of-all
bonitatis: unde dicitur in Psalmo XVI: Satiabor cum
goodness whence it-is-said in Psalm XVI I-shall-be-satisfied when
apparuerit gloria tua; et Sap. VII dicitur: Venerunt mihi
will-have-appeared glory your and Wisdom VII it-is-said came to-me
omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum contemplatione
all goods equally with her namely with the-contemplation
sapientiae. Similiter etiam non habet aliquod incommodum
of-wisdom similarly also not it-has some inconvenience
adiunctum: quia de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur, Sap.
attached because about the-contemplation of-wisdom it-is-said Wisdom

VIII: Non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium
VIII not has bitterness the-conversation of-her nor weariness
convictus eius. Sic ergo patet quod propria voluntate
the-living-with her thus therefore it-is-plain that by-own will
beatus non potest beatitudinem deserere. – Similiter
the-blessed-one not can beatitude to-desert similarly
etiam non potest eam perdere, Deo subtrahente. Quia, cum
also not he-can it to-lose God withdrawing because since
subtractio beatitudinis sit quaedam poena, non potest talis
the-withdrawal of-beatitude be a-certain punishment not can such
subtractio a Deo, iusto iudice, provenire, nisi pro aliqua
withdrawal from God the-just judge to-come except for some
culpa: in quam cadere non potest qui Dei essentiam videt,
fault into which to-fall not can he-who of-God the-essence sees
cum ad hanc visionem ex necessitate sequatur rectitudo
since upon this vision of necessity follow rectitude
voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. – Similiter etiam nec
of-will as above shown it-is similarly also nor
aliquod aliud agens potest eam subtrahere. Quia mens Deo
any other agent can it to-withdraw because the-mind to-God
coniuncta super omnia alia elevatur; et sic ab huiusmodi
joined above all other-things is-raised and thus from of-this-kind
coniunctione nullum aliud agens potest ipsam excludere.
union no other agent can it to-exclude
Unde inconveniens videtur quod per quasdam alternationes
whence unfitting it-seems that through certain alternations
temporum transeat homo de beatitudine ad miseriam, et e
of-times may-pass man from beatitude to misery and from
converso: quia huiusmodi temporales alternationes esse non
the-converse because of-this-kind temporal alternations to-be not
possunt, nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et motui.
can except about those-things which are-subject to-time and motion

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that beatitude is perfection
consummata, quae omnem defectum excludit a beato. Et
consummated which every defect excludes from the-blessed and
ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam habenti, faciente
therefore without changeability it-comes it to-the-one-having making
hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in participationem
this the-power divine which man raises into the-participation
aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.
of-eternity transcending every change

Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas ad opposita se
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-will to opposites itself
habet in his quae ad finem ordinantur: sed ad ultimum
has in those-things which to the-end are-ordered but to the-last
finem naturali necessitate ordinatur. Quod patet ex hoc,
end by-natural necessity it-is-ordered which is-plain from this
quod homo non potest non velle esse beatus.
that man not can not to-will to-be blessed

Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo habet principium ex
to the-third it-must-be-said that beatitude has a-beginning from
conditione participantis: sed caret fine, propter conditionem
the-condition of-the-participant but lacks an-end on-account-of the-condition
boni cuius participatio facit beatum. Unde ab alio
of-the-good whose participation makes blessed whence from one-thing
est initium beatitudinis; et ab alio est quod caret fine.
is the-beginning of-beatitude and from another is that-it lacks an-end

Utrum homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem

5 · WHETHER MAN CAN ATTAIN BEATITUDE BY HIS NATURAL POWERS

Nature does not fail in necessary things, and irrational creatures reach their ends by nature. Thomas answers that imperfect beatitude can be acquired by natural powers, as virtue can; but perfect beatitude, the vision of God's essence, exceeds every created nature, whose knowledge is according to its substance. Nature gave man free choice, by which he can turn to God, who makes him blessed: what we can do through friends, we can in a way do ourselves.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo per sua
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that man through his
naturalia possit beatitudinem consequi. Natura enim non
natural-powers can beatitude to-attain nature for not
deficit in necessariis. Sed nihil est homini tam necessarium
fails in necessary-things but nothing is to-man so necessary
quam id per quod finem ultimum consequitur. Ergo hoc
as that through which the-end last he-attains therefore this
naturae humanae non deest. Potest igitur homo per sua
to-nature human not is-lacking can therefore man through his
naturalia beatitudinem consequi.
natural-powers beatitude to-attain

2. Praeterea, homo, cum sit nobilior irrationalibus creaturis,
2 further man since he-be nobler than-irrational creatures
videtur esse sufficientior. Sed irrationales creaturae per sua
seems to-be more-sufficient but irrational creatures through their
naturalia possunt consequi suos fines. Ergo multo magis
natural-powers can to-attain their ends therefore much more
homo per sua naturalia potest beatitudinem consequi.
man through his natural-powers can beatitude to-attain

3. Praeterea, beatitudo est operatio perfecta, secundum
3 further beatitude is an-operation perfect according-to
Philosophum. Eiusdem autem est incipere rem, et perficere
the-Philosopher of-the-same moreover it-is to-begin a-thing and to-perfect
ipsam. Cum igitur operatio imperfecta, quae est quasi
it since therefore operation imperfect which is as-if
principium in operationibus humanis, subdatur naturali
the-beginning in operations human be-subject to-the-natural
hominis potestati, qua suorum actuum est dominus;
of-man power by-which of-his acts he-is master
videtur quod per naturalem potentiam possit pertingere
it-seems that through natural power he-can to-reach
ad operationem perfectam, quae est beatitudo.
to operation perfect which is beatitude

Sed contra, homo est principium naturaliter actuum
but against man is the-principle naturally of-acts
suorum per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed ultima
his through intellect and will but the-last
beatitudo Sanctis praeparata, excedit intellectum hominis et
beatitude for-the-Saints prepared exceeds the-intellect of-man and
voluntatem: dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Cor. II: Oculus
the-will says for the-Apostle I to Corinthians II eye
non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis
not has-seen and ear not has-heard and into the-heart of-man
non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Ergo
not it-has-ascended what has-prepared God for-those-loving him therefore
homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi.
man through his natural-powers not can beatitude to-attain

Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo imperfecta quae in
I-answer it-must-be-said that beatitude imperfect which in
hac vita haberi potest, potest ab homine acquiri per sua
this life to-be-had can can by man to-be-acquired through his

naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in cuius operatione
natural-powers in-that way in-which also virtue in whose operation
consistit: de quo infra dicetur. Sed beatitudo hominis
it-consists about which below it-will-be-said but the-beatitude of-man
perfecta, sicut supra dictum est, consistit in visione divinae
perfect as above said it-is consists in the-vision of-the-divine
essentiae. Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra
essence to-see moreover God through essence is above
naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae, ut
the-nature not only of-man but also of-every creature as
in Primo ostensum est. Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet
in the-First shown it-is the-natural for knowledge of-any
creaturae est secundum modum substantiae eius: sicut de
creature is according-to the-mode of-substance its as about
Intelligentia dicitur in libro de Causis, quod cognoscit
an-Intelligence it-is-said in the-book on Causes that it-knows
ea quae sunt supra se, et ea quae sunt infra se,
those-things which are above itself and those-things which are below itself
secundum modum substantiae suae. Omnis autem cognitio
according-to the-mode of-substance its all moreover knowledge
quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit a
which is according-to the-mode of-substance created falls-short from
visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem
the-vision of-the-divine essence which to infinity exceeds all
substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura,
substance created whence neither man nor any creature
potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.
can to-attain beatitude last through its natural-powers

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut natura non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as nature not
deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit sibi
fails man in necessary-things although not it-gave to-him

arma et tegumenta, sicut aliis animalibus, quia dedit ei
arms and coverings as to-other animals because it-gave to-him
rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi conquirere;
reason and hands by-which he-could these-things for-himself to-acquire
ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret
so not-even it-fails man in necessary-things although not it-gave
sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi;
to-him some principle by-which he-could beatitude to-attain
hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium,
this for was impossible but it-gave to-him free choice
quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum.
by-which he-could to-be-turned to God who him would-make blessed
Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter
what for through friends we-can through ourselves in-some-way
possumus, ut dicitur in III Ethic.
we-can as is-said in III Ethics

Ad secundum dicendum quod nobilioris conditionis est
to the-second it-must-be-said that of-nobler condition is
natura quae potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat
the-nature which can to-attain the-perfect good although it-need
exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quae non
outer help for this attaining than the-nature which not
potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam
can to-attain the-perfect good but attains a-certain
bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem eius non
good imperfect although for the-attainment of-it not
indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut Philosophus dicit in II de Caelo.
it-need outer help as the-Philosopher says in II on the-Heavens
Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi
as better is disposed to health he-who can to-attain
perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae;
perfect health although this be through the-help of-medicine

quam qui solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam
than he-who only can to-attain a-certain imperfect
sanitatem, sine medicinae auxilio. Et ideo creatura
health without of-medicine help and therefore the-creature
rationalis, quae potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum,
rational which can to-attain the-perfect of-beatitude good
indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura
needing for this divine help is more-perfect than the-creature
irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam
irrational which of-this-kind good not is capable but a-certain
imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae naturae.
imperfect good attains by-the-power of-its nature

Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando imperfectum et
to the-third it-must-be-said that when the-imperfect and
perfectum sunt eiusdem speciei, ab eadem virtute causari
the-perfect are of-the-same species by the-same power to-be-caused
possunt. Non autem hoc est necesse, si sunt alterius
they-can not moreover this is necessary if they-are of-another
speciei: non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem
species not for whatever can to-cause the-disposition
materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta
of-matter can the-last perfection to-confer the-imperfect
autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis potestati,
moreover operation which is-subject to-the-natural of-man power
non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quae
not is of-the-same species with operation that perfect which
est hominis beatitudo: cum operationis species dependeat
is of-man the-beatitude since of-operation the-species depend
ex obiecto. Unde ratio non sequitur.
on the-object whence the-reasoning not follows

Utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius superioris creaturae

6 · WHETHER A HIGHER CREATURE GIVES MAN BEATITUDE

Since the lower parts of the universe are ordered through the higher, and the angels illumine men, it seems so. Thomas answers that what exceeds created nature is done by God alone, as raising the dead, and perfect beatitude exceeds it; so man is made blessed by God alone acting. Angels help by disposing men to it, as the shipbuilder serves the steersman, but no creature can communicate its own beatitude, and all are illumined by God immediately for the vision.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit fieri
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that man can to-become
beatus per actionem alicuius superioris creaturae, scilicet
blessed through the-action of-some higher creature namely
angeli. Cum enim duplex ordo inveniatur in rebus, unus
an-angel since for twofold order be-found in things one
partium universi ad invicem, alius totius universi ad
of-the-parts of-the-universe to one-another the-other of-the-whole universe to
bonum quod est extra universum; primus ordo ordinatur ad
the-good which is outside the-universe the-first order is-ordered to
secundum sicut ad finem, ut dicitur XII Metaphys.; sicut
the-second as to an-end as is-said XII Metaphysics as
ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem
the-order of-the-parts of-an-army to one-another is for-the-sake-of the-order
totius exercitus ad ducem. Sed ordo partium universi
of-the-whole army to the-general but the-order of-the-parts of-the-universe
ad invicem attenditur secundum quod superiores creaturae
to one-another is-regarded according as higher creatures
agunt in inferiores, ut in Primo dictum est: beatitudo
act on lower as in the-First said it-is beatitude
autem consistit in ordine hominis ad bonum quod est extra
moreover consists in the-order of-man to the-good which is outside

universum, quod est Deus. Ergo per actionem superioris
the-universe which is God therefore through the-action of-a-higher
creaturae, scilicet angeli, in hominem, homo beatus efficitur.
creature namely an-angel upon man man blessed is-made

2. Praeterea, quod est in potentia tale, potest reduci
2 further what is in potency such can to-be-brought
in actum per id quod est actu tale: sicut quod est
into act through that which is in-act such as what is
potentia calidum, fit actu calidum per id quod est
in-potency hot becomes in-act hot through that which is
actu calidum. Sed homo est in potentia beatus. Ergo potest
in-act hot but man is in potency blessed therefore be-can
fieri actu beatus per angelum, qui est actu beatus.
to-become in-act blessed through an-angel who is in-act blessed

3. Praeterea, beatitudo consistit in operatione intellectus, ut
3 further beatitude consists in an-operation of-the-intellect as
supra dictum est. Sed angelus potest illuminare intellectum
above said it-is but an-angel can to-illumine the-intellect
hominis, ut in Primo habitum est. Ergo angelus potest
of-man as in the-First held it-is therefore an-angel can
facere hominem beatum.
to-make man blessed

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII: Gratiam
but against is that it-is-said in Psalm LXXXIII grace
et gloriam dabit Dominus.
and glory will-give the-Lord

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis creatura naturae
I-answer it-must-be-said that since every creature of-nature
legibus sit subiecta, utpote habens limitatam virtutem et
to-the-laws be subject inasmuch-as having limited power and
actionem; illud quod excedit naturam creatam, non potest
action that which exceeds nature created not can

fieri virtute alicuius creaturae. Et ideo si quid fieri
to-be-done by-the-power of-some creature and therefore if anything to-be-done
oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a
it-be-necessary which be above nature this is-done immediately by
Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et cetera
God as the-raising of-the-dead the-illumination of-the-blind and the-rest
huiusmodi. Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam
of-this-kind shown it-is moreover that beatitude is a-certain
bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod
good exceeding nature created whence impossible it-is that
per actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur: sed homo beatus
through the-action of-some creature it-be-conferred but man blessed
fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta.
becomes alone God acting if we-speak about beatitude perfect
– Si vero loquamur de beatitudine imperfecta, sic eadem
if but we-speak about beatitude imperfect thus the-same
ratio est de ipsa et de virtute, in cuius actu consistit.
reason is about it and about virtue in whose act it-consists

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plerumque contingit in
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that mostly it-happens in
potentiis activis ordinatis, quod perducere ad ultimum finem
powers active ordered that to-lead to the-last end
pertinet ad supremam potentiam, inferiores vero potentiae
pertains to the-highest power the-lower but powers
coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi finis disponendo:
help toward the-attainment of-that last end by-disposing
sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest navifactivae,
as to the-art of-steering which presides-over shipbuilding
pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit. Sic igitur
pertains the-use of-the-ship for-the-sake-of which the-ship itself is-made thus therefore
et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab angelis ad
also in the-order of-the-universe man indeed is-helped by the-angels to

consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia,
attaining the-last end according-to some preceding-things
quibus disponitur ad eius consecutionem: sed ipsum ultimum
by-which he-is-disposed to its attainment but the-very last
finem consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.
end he-attains through the-very first agent who is God

Ad secundum dicendum quod, quando aliqua forma actu
to the-second it-must-be-said that when some form in-act
existit in aliquo secundum esse perfectum et naturale,
exists in something according-to the-to-be perfect and natural
potest esse principium actionis in alterum; sicut calidum
it-can to-be the-principle of-action upon another as the-hot
per calorem calefacit. Sed si forma existit in aliquo
through heat heats but if the-form exists in something
imperfecte, et non secundum esse naturale, non potest esse
imperfectly and not according-to the-to-be natural not it-can to-be
principium communicationis sui ad alterum: sicut intentio
the-principle of-communication of-itself to another as the-intention
coloris quae est in pupilla, non potest facere album; neque
of-color which is in the-pupil not can to-make white nor
etiam omnia quae sunt illuminata aut calefacta, possunt alia
even all-things which are illumined or heated can others
calefacere et illuminare; sic enim illuminatio et calefactio
to-heat and to-illumine thus for illumination and heating
essent usque ad infinitum. Lumen autem gloriae, per
would-be even to infinity the-light moreover of-glory through
quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte secundum
which God is-seen in God indeed is perfectly according-to
esse naturale: in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et
the-to-be natural in any moreover creature it-is imperfectly and

secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla
according-to the-to-be likeness-wise or participated whence no
creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.
creature blessed can to-communicate its beatitude to-another

Ad tertium dicendum quod angelus beatus illuminat
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-angel blessed illumines
intellectum hominis, vel etiam inferioris angeli, quantum ad
the-intellect of-man or even of-a-lower angel as-far to
aliquas rationes divinorum operum: non autem quantum ad
some reasons of-divine works not moreover as-far to
visionem divinae essentiae, ut in Primo dictum est. Ad
the-vision of-the-divine essence as in the-First said it-is for
eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a Deo.
it for to-be-seen all immediately are-illumined by God

Utrum requirantur aliqua opera bona ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo

7 · WHETHER MAN NEEDS GOOD WORKS TO ATTAIN BEATITUDE FROM GOD

God needs no disposition of matter, and Paul calls blessed the man on whom God confers justice without works. Thomas answers that rectitude of will is required, and the order of divine wisdom demands that man reach beatitude through many movements of meritorious works, as the angel did by one; God alone has it by nature. Christ's soul was blessed from his conception, and his merit avails for baptized children; Paul speaks of the beatitude of hope given by justifying grace.

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non requirantur
to the-seventh thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not be-required
aliqua opera hominis ad hoc ut beatitudinem consequatur
some works of-man for this that beatitude be-may-attain
a Deo. Deus enim, cum sit agens infinitae virtutis, non
from God God for since he-be an-agent of-infinite power not

praeexigit in agendo materiam, aut dispositionem materiae,
pre-requires in acting matter or disposition of-matter
sed statim potest totum producere. Sed opera hominis, cum
but at-once can the-whole to-produce but the-works of-man since
non requirantur ad beatitudinem eius sicut causa efficiens,
not they-are-required for beatitude his as cause efficient
ut dictum est, non possunt requiri ad eam nisi sicut
as said it-is not can to-be-required for it except as
dispositiones. Ergo Deus, qui dispositiones non praeexigit in
dispositions therefore God who dispositions not pre-requires in
agendo, beatitudinem sine praecedentibus operibus confert.
acting beatitude without preceding works confers

2. Praeterea, sicut Deus est auctor beatitudinis immediate,
2 further as God is the-author of-beatitude immediately
ita et naturam immediate instituit. Sed in prima institutione
so also nature immediately he-established but in the-first establishment
naturae, produxit creaturas nulla dispositione praecedente vel
of-nature he-produced creatures no disposition preceding or
actione creaturae; sed statim fecit unumquodque perfectum
action of-the-creature but at-once he-made each-thing perfect
in sua specie. Ergo videtur quod beatitudinem conferat
in its species therefore it-seems that beatitude he-confers
homini sine aliquibus operationibus praecedentibus.
on-man without any operations preceding

3. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem
3 further the-Apostle says Romans IV the-beatitude
hominis esse cui Deus confert iustitiam sine operibus.
of-man to-be on-whom God confers justice without works
Non ergo requiruntur aliqua opera hominis ad beatitudinem
not therefore are-required some works of-man for beatitude
consequendam.
to-be-attained

Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIII: Si haec scitis,
but against is that it-is-said John XIII if these-things you-know
beati eritis si feceritis ea. Ergo per actionem ad
blessed you-will-be if you-will-have-done them therefore through action to
beatitudinem pervenitur.
beatitude one-arrives

Respondeo dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis, ut supra
I-answer it-must-be-said that the-rectitude of-the-will as above
dictum est, requiritur ab beatitudinem, cum nihil aliud
said it-is is-required for beatitude since nothing other
sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis ad ultimum finem; quae
it-is than the-due order of-the-will to the-last end which
ita exigitur ad consecutionem ultimi finis, sicut debita
so is-demanded for the-attainment of-the-last end as the-due
dispositio materiae ad consecutionem formae. Sed ex hoc non
disposition of-matter for the-attainment of-form but from this not
ostenditur quod aliqua operatio hominis debeat praecedere eius
is-shown that some operation of-man ought to-precede his
beatitudinem: posset enim Deus simul facere voluntatem recte
beatitude could for God at-once to-make the-will rightly
tendentem in finem, et finem consequentem; sicut quandoque
tending to the-end and the-end attaining as sometimes
simul materiam disponit, et inducit formam. Sed ordo
at-once matter he-disposes and induces form but the-order
divinae sapientiae exigit ne hoc fiat: ut enim dicitur in II de
of-divine wisdom demands lest this be-done as for is-said in II on
Caelo, eorum quae nata sunt habere bonum perfectum,
the-Heavens of-those-things which born are to-have the-good perfect
aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, aliquid uno motu, aliquid
one has it without motion one by-one motion one
pluribus. Habere autem perfectum bonum sine motu, convenit
by-several to-have moreover the-perfect good without motion belongs

ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere autem beatitudinem
to-that which naturally has it to-have moreover beatitude
naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei proprium est quod
naturally is of-alone God whence of-alone God proper it-is that
ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam operationem
to beatitude not he-be-moved through some operation
praecedentem. Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam
preceding since moreover beatitude exceed all nature
creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem
created no pure creature fittingly beatitude
consequitur absque motu operationis, per quam tendit
attains without the-motion of-operation through which it-tends
in ipsam. Sed angelus, qui est superior ordine naturae
toward it but the-angel who is higher in-the-order of-nature
quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex ordine divinae sapientiae,
than man attained has it from the-order of-divine wisdom
uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in Primo expositum
by-one motion of-operation meritorious as in the-First set-forth
est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis motibus
it-is men moreover attain it by-many motions
operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum
of-operations which merits are-called whence also according-to
Philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.
the-Philosopher beatitude is the-reward of-virtuous operations

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio hominis
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-operation of-man
non praeexigitur ad consecutionem beatitudinis, propter
not is-pre-required for the-attainment of-beatitude on-account-of
insufficientiam divinae virtutis beatificantis: sed ut servetur
the-insufficiency of-the-divine power beatifying but that be-kept
ordo in rebus.
order in things

Ad secundum dicendum quod primas creaturas statim Deus
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-first creatures at-once God
perfectas produxit, absque aliqua dispositione vel operatione
perfect produced without any disposition or operation
creaturae praecedente, quia sic instituit prima individua
of-the-creature preceding because thus he-established the-first individuals
specierum, ut per ea natura propagaretur ad posteros.
of-the-species that through them nature might-be-propagated to posterity
Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est Deus et homo,
and similarly because through Christ who is God and man
beatitudo erat ad alios derivanda, secundum illud Apostoli ad
beatitude was to others to-be-derived according-to that of-the-Apostle to
Hebr. II, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat; statim a
the-Hebrews II who many sons into glory had-brought at-once from
principio suae conceptionis, absque aliqua operatione meritoria
the-beginning of-his conception without any operation meritorious
praecedente, anima eius fuit beata. Sed hoc est singulare
preceding soul his was blessed but this is singular
in ipso: nam pueris baptizatis subvenit meritum Christi ad
in him for to-children baptized comes-to-aid the-merit of-Christ for
beatitudinem consequendam, licet desint eis merita propria,
beatitude to-be-attained although be-lacking to-them merits own
eo quod per baptismum sunt Christi membra effecti.
for-the-reason that through baptism they-are of-Christ members made

Ad tertium dicendum quod Apostolus loquitur de
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-Apostle speaks about
beatitudine spei, quae habetur per gratiam iustificantem,
the-beatitude of-hope which is-had through grace justifying
quae quidem non datur propter opera praecedentia. Non
which indeed not is-given on-account-of works preceding not

enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo: sed magis
for it-has the-notion of-the-term of-motion as beatitude but rather
est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.
it-is the-principle of-motion by-which to beatitude one-tends

Utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem

8 · WHETHER EVERY MAN DESIRES BEATITUDE

Many do not know what beatitude is, and some think the vision of God impossible. Thomas answers that beatitude may be taken in its common notion, the perfect good that satisfies the will, which every man necessarily wills; or in its special notion, as to that in which it consists, and so not all know it or will it. Augustine's blessed man, who has all he wills and wills nothing ill, is so if what he wills is understood by natural appetite.

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes
to the-eighth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not all
appetant beatitudinem. Nullus enim potest appetere quod
desire beatitude no-one for can to-desire what
ignorat: cum bonum apprehensum sit obiectum appetitus,
he-knows-not since the-good apprehended be the-object of-appetite
ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sed multi nesciunt quid sit
as is-said in III on the-Soul but many know-not what be
beatitudo: quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trin.,
beatitude which as Augustine says in XIII on the-Trinity
patet ex hoc, quod quidam posuerunt beatitudinem in
is-plain from this that some have-placed beatitude in
voluptate corporis, quidam in virtute animi, quidam in
the-pleasure of-the-body some in the-virtue of-the-mind some in
aliis rebus. Non ergo omnes beatitudinem appetunt.
other things not therefore all beatitude desire

2. Praeterea, essentia beatitudinis est visio essentiae divinae,
2 further the-essence of-beatitude is the-vision of-the-essence divine
ut dictum est. Sed aliqui opinantur hoc esse impossibile, quod
as said it-is but some opine this to-be impossible that
Deus per essentiam ab homine videatur: unde hoc non
God through essence by man be-seen whence this not
appetunt. Ergo non omnes homines appetunt beatitudinem.
they-desire therefore not all men desire beatitude

3. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod
3 further Augustine says in XIII on the-Trinity that
beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult, et nihil male vult.
blessed is he-who has all-things which he-wills and nothing badly wills
Sed non omnes hoc volunt: quidam enim male aliqua
but not all this will some for badly some-things
volunt, et tamen volunt illa se velle. Non ergo
will and yet they-will those-things themselves to-will not therefore
omnes volunt beatitudinem.
all will beatitude

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin.:
but against is that Augustine says XIII on the-Trinity
Si mimus dixisset, «Omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse
if a-mime had-said all blessed to-be you-wish wretched to-be
non vultis», dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non
not you-wish he-would-have-said something which no-one in his not
cognosceret voluntate. Quilibet ergo vult esse beatus.
would-recognize will each-one therefore wills to-be blessed

Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo dupliciter potest
I-answer it-must-be-said that beatitude in-two-ways can
considerari. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem
to-be-considered in-one way according-to the-common notion
beatitudinis. Et sic necesse est quod omnis homo beatitudinem
of-beatitude and thus necessary it-is that every man beatitude

velit. Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum
will the-notion moreover of-beatitude common is that it-be the-good
perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit obiectum
perfect as said it-is since moreover the-good be the-object
voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter eius
of-the-will the-perfect good is of-someone that-which totally his
voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud
will satisfies whence to-desire beatitude nothing other
est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur. Quod quilibet vult.
is than to-desire that the-will be-sated which each-one wills

Alio modo possumus loqui de beatitudine secundum
in-another way we-can to-speak about beatitude according-to
specialem rationem, quantum ad id in quo beatitudo
the-special notion as-far to that in which beatitude
consistit. Et sic non omnes cognoscunt beatitudinem: quia
consists and thus not all know beatitude because
nesciunt cui rei communis ratio beatitudinis conveniat. Et
they-know-not to-what thing the-common notion of-beatitude belongs and
per consequens, quantum ad hoc, non omnes eam volunt.
through consequence as-far to this not all it will

Unde patet responsio ad primum.
whence is-plain the-answer to the-first

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum voluntas sequatur
to the-second it-must-be-said that since the-will follow
apprehensionem intellectus seu rationis, sicut contingit quod
the-apprehension of-the-intellect or of-reason as it-happens that
aliquid est idem secundum rem, quod tamen est diversum
something is the-same according-to the-thing which yet is diverse
secundum rationis considerationem; ita contingit quod aliquid
according-to of-reason the-consideration so it-happens that something
est idem secundum rem, et tamen uno modo appetitur,
is the-same according-to the-thing and yet in-one way is-desired

alio modo non appetitur. Beatitudo ergo potest considerari
in-another way not is-desired beatitude therefore can to-be-considered
sub ratione finalis boni et perfecti, quae est communis ratio
under the-notion of-final good and perfect which is the-common notion
beatitudinis: et sic naturaliter et ex necessitate voluntas
of-beatitude and thus naturally and of necessity the-will
in illud tendit, ut dictum est. Potest etiam considerari
toward it tends as said it-is it-can also to-be-considered
secundum alias speciales considerationes, vel ex parte ipsius
according-to other special considerations either on the-side of-the-very
operationis, vel ex parte potentiae operativae, vel ex parte
operation or on the-side of-the-power operative or on the-side
obiecti: et sic non ex necessitate voluntas tendit in ipsam.
of-the-object and thus not of necessity the-will tends toward it

Ad tertium dicendum quod ista definitio beatitudinis
to the-third it-must-be-said that this definition of-beatitude
quam quidam posuerunt, Beatus est qui habet omnia quae
which some have-posited blessed is he-who has all-things which
vult, vel, cui omnia optata succedunt, quodam modo
he-wills or to-whom all-things wished succeed in-a-certain way
intellecta, est bona et sufficiens; alio vero modo, est
understood is good and sufficient in-another but way it-is
imperfecta. Si enim intelligatur simpliciter de omnibus
imperfect if for it-be-understood simply about all-things
quae vult homo naturali appetitu, sic verum est quod
which wills man by-natural appetite thus true it-is that
qui habet omnia quae vult, est beatus: nihil enim satiat
he-who has all-things which he-wills is blessed nothing for sates
naturalem hominis appetitum, nisi bonum perfectum, quod
the-natural of-man appetite except good perfect which
est beatitudo. Si vero intelligatur de his quae homo
is beatitude if but it-be-understood about those-things which man

vult secundum apprehensionem rationis, sic habere quaedam
wills according-to the-apprehension of-reason thus to-have certain-things
quae homo vult, non pertinet ad beatitudinem, sed magis ad
which man wills not pertains to beatitude but rather to
miseriam, inquantum huiusmodi habita impediunt hominem
misery inasmuch-as of-this-kind-things had hinder man
ne habeat quaecumque naturaliter vult: sicut etiam ratio
lest he-have whatever naturally he-wills as also reason
accipit ut vera interdum quae impediunt a cognitione
takes as true sometimes things-which hinder from the-knowledge
veritatis. Et secundum hanc considerationem, Augustinus
of-truth and according-to this consideration Augustine
addidit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, quod nihil mali velit.
added for the-perfection of-beatitude that nothing of-evil he-will
Quamvis primum posset sufficere, si recte intelligeretur,
although the-first could to-suffice if rightly it-were-understood
scilicet quod beatus est qui habet omnia quae vult.
namely that blessed is he-who has all-things which he-wills

De essentia legis

XC · ON THE ESSENCE OF LAW

Next come the outward principles of human acts: the devil, who inclines to evil and whose temptation the First Part treated, and God, who moves to good, instructing us by law and helping us by grace. Thomas treats law first, in common and then in its parts; of law in common, its essence, its kinds, and its effects. On its essence he asks four questions: whether law belongs to reason, its end, its cause, and its promulgation.

Consequenter considerandum est de principiis exterioribus
consequently to-be-considered it-is about the-principles exterior
actuum. Principium autem exterius ad malum inclinans est
of-acts the-principle moreover exterior to evil inclining is
diabolus, de cuius tentatione in Primo dictum est. Principium
the-devil about whose temptation in the-First said it-is the-principle
autem exterius movens ad bonum est Deus, qui et nos instruit
moreover exterior moving to good is God who both us instructs
per legem, et iuvat per gratiam. Unde primo, de lege;
through law and helps through grace whence first about law
secundo, de gratia dicendum est. Circa legem autem, primo
second about grace to-be-said it-is about law moreover first
oportet considerare de ipsa lege in communi; secundo,
it-is-necessary to-consider about the-very law in common second
de partibus eius. Circa legem autem in communi tria
about the-parts of-it about law moreover in common three-things
occurrunt consideranda: primo quidem, de essentia ipsius;
present-themselves to-be-considered first indeed about the-essence of-it
secundo, de differentia legum; tertio, de effectibus legis.
second about the-difference of-laws third about the-effects of-law

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
about the-first are-asked four

Primo: utrum lex sit aliquid rationis.
first whether law be something of-reason
Secundo: de fine legis.
second about the-end of-law
Tertio: de causa eius.
third about the-cause of-it
Quarto: de promulgatione ipsius.
fourth about the-promulgation of-it

Utrum lex sit aliquid rationis

1 · WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING OF REASON

Paul speaks of another law in his members, and law is neither a power, a habit, nor an act of reason; and what pleases the prince has the force of law, which seems the will's. Thomas answers that law is a rule and measure of acts, named from binding, and reason is the first principle of human acts; so law is something of reason. It is in reason as in the one ruling, and by participation in whatever is ruled, as the inclination of the members; the universal propositions of practical reason have the notion of law, and the prince's will has its force only as ruled by reason.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non sit aliquid
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law not be something
rationis. Dicit enim Apostolus, ad Rom. VII: Video aliam
of-reason says for the-Apostle to the-Romans VII I-see another
legem in membris meis, etc. Sed nihil quod est rationis,
law in members my etc but nothing which is of-reason
est in membris: quia ratio non utitur organo corporali.
is in the-members because reason not uses organ bodily
Ergo lex non est aliquid rationis.
therefore law not is something of-reason

2. Praeterea, in ratione non est nisi potentia, habitus et
2 further in reason not is except power habit and
actus. Sed lex non est ipsa potentia rationis. Similiter etiam
act but law not is the-very power of-reason similarly also
non est aliquis habitus rationis: quia habitus rationis sunt
not it-is some habit of-reason because the-habits of-reason are
virtutes intellectuales, de quibus supra dictum est. Nec etiam
the-virtues intellectual about which above said it-is nor also
est actus rationis: quia cessante rationis actu, lex cessaret,
is-it an-act of-reason because ceasing of-reason the-act law would-cease
puta in dormientibus. Ergo lex non est aliquid rationis.
for-example in sleepers therefore law not is something of-reason

3. Praeterea, lex movet eos qui subiiciuntur legi, ad
3 further law moves those who are-subject to-the-law to
recte agendum. Sed movere ad agendum proprie pertinet ad
rightly acting but to-move to acting properly pertains to
voluntatem, ut patet ex praemissis. Ergo lex non pertinet
the-will as is-plain from the-premises therefore law not pertains
ad rationem, sed magis ad voluntatem: secundum quod etiam
to reason but rather to the-will according as also
Iurisperitus dicit: Quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem.
the-Jurist says what has-pleased the-prince of-law has the-force

Sed contra est quod ad legem pertinet praecipere et
but against is that to law pertains to-command and
prohibere. Sed imperare est rationis, ut supra habitum est.
to-forbid but to-command is of-reason as above held it-is
Ergo lex est aliquid rationis.
therefore law is something of-reason

Respondeo dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et
I-answer it-must-be-said that law a-certain rule is and
mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad
measure of-acts according-to which is-induced someone to

agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur: dicitur enim lex a
acting or from acting is-held-back it-is-called for law from
ligando, quia obligat ad agendum. Regula autem et mensura
binding because it-binds to acting the-rule moreover and measure
humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium
of-human acts is reason which is the-first principle
actuum humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet: rationis enim est
of-acts human as from the-aforesaid is-plain of-reason for it-is
ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis,
to-order to the-end which is the-first principle in things-to-be-done
secundum Philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod
according-to the-Philosopher in each moreover genus that which
est principium, est mensura et regula illius generis: sicut
is the-principle is the-measure and rule of-that genus as
unitas in genere numeri, et motus primus in genere motuum.
unity in the-genus of-number and the-motion first in the-genus of-motions
Unde relinquitur quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem.
whence it-remains that law be something pertaining to reason

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum lex sit regula
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that since law be a-rule
quaedam et mensura, dicitur dupliciter esse in aliquo. Uno
certain and measure it-is-said in-two-ways to-be in something in-one
modo, sicut in mensurante et regulante. Et quia hoc est
way as in the-measuring and ruling and because this is
proprium rationis, ideo per hunc modum lex est in
proper of-reason therefore through this mode law is in
ratione sola. – Alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato.
reason alone in-another way as in the-ruled and measured
Et sic lex est in omnibus quae inclinantur in aliquid ex
and thus law is in all-things which are-inclined to something from
aliqua lege: ita quod quaelibet inclinatio proveniens ex
some law so that any inclination arising from

aliqua lege, potest dici lex, non essentialiter, sed quasi
some law can to-be-called law not essentially but as-if
participative. Et hoc modo inclinatio ipsa membrorum ad
participatively and in-this way the-inclination itself of-the-members to
concupiscendum lex membrorum vocatur.
lusting the-law of-the-members is-called

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in actibus exterioribus
to the-second it-must-be-said that as in acts exterior
est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem
it-is to-consider the-operation and the-thing-done for-example building
et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare
and the-thing-built so in the-works of-reason it-is to-consider
ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et
the-very act of-reason which is to-understand and to-reason and
aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem
something through of-this-kind act constituted which indeed
in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secundo,
in speculative reason first indeed is definition second
enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio. Et quia
enunciation third but syllogism or argumentation and because
ratio etiam practica utitur quodam syllogismo in operabilibus,
reason also practical uses a-certain syllogism in things-doable
ut supra habitum est, secundum quod Philosophus docet in
as above held it-is according as the-Philosopher teaches in
VII Ethic.; ideo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod
VII Ethics therefore it-is to-find something in reason practical which
ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in
so itself may-have to operations as itself has a-proposition in
ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones
reason speculative to conclusions and of-this-kind propositions
universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent
universal of-reason practical ordered to actions have

rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter
the-notion of-law which indeed propositions sometimes actually
considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.
are-considered sometimes but habitually by reason are-held

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio habet vim movendi a
to the-third it-must-be-said that reason has the-force of-moving from
voluntate, ut supra dictum est: ex hoc enim quod aliquis
the-will as above said it-is from this for that someone
vult finem, ratio imperat de his quae sunt ad finem.
wills the-end reason commands about those-things which are toward the-end
Sed voluntas de his quae imperantur, ad hoc quod legis
but the-will about those-things which are-commanded for this that of-law
rationem habeat, oportet quod sit aliqua ratione regulata. Et
the-notion it-may-have it-is-necessary that it-be by-some reason ruled and
hoc modo intelligitur quod voluntas principis habet vigorem
in-this way is-understood that the-will of-the-prince has the-force
legis: alioquin voluntas principis magis esset iniquitas quam lex.
of-law otherwise the-will of-the-prince rather would-be iniquity than law

Utrum lex ordinetur semper ad bonum commune

2 · WHETHER LAW IS ALWAYS ORDERED TO THE COMMON GOOD

Precepts concern particular goods, and acts are about particulars. Thomas answers that law belongs to the first principle of practical reason, the last end, which is happiness; and since every part is ordered to the whole and man to the perfect community, law properly regards the order to the common happiness. A precept about a particular work has the notion of law only as ordered to the common good.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex non ordinetur
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law not be-ordered
semper ad bonum commune sicut ad finem. Ad legem enim
always to the-good common as to an-end to law for
pertinet praecipere et prohibere. Sed praecepta ordinantur
pertains to-command and to-forbid but precepts are-ordered
ad quaedam singularia bona. Non ergo semper finis legis
to certain singular goods not therefore always the-end of-law
est bonum commune.
is the-good common

2. Praeterea, lex dirigit hominem ad agendum. Sed actus
2 further law directs man to acting but acts
humani sunt in particularibus. Ergo et lex ad aliquod
human are in particulars therefore also law to some
particulare bonum ordinatur.
particular good is-ordered

3. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol.: Si ratione
3 further Isidore says in the-book of-Etymologies if by-reason
lex constat, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit. Sed
law stands law will-be all which by-reason will-have-stood but
ratione consistit non solum quod ordinatur ad bonum
by-reason stands not only what is-ordered to the-good

commune, sed etiam quod ordinatur ad bonum privatum.
common but also what is-ordered to the-good private
Ergo lex non ordinatur solum ad bonum commune, sed
therefore law not is-ordered only to the-good common but
etiam ad bonum privatum unius.
also to the-good private of-one

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol., quod
but against is that Isidore says in V Etymologies that
lex est nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate
law is for-no private advantage but for the-common utility
civium conscripta.
of-the-citizens written

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex pertinet
I-answer it-must-be-said that as said it-is law pertains
ad id quod est principium humanorum actuum, ex eo quod
to that which is the-principle of-human acts from this that
est regula et mensura. Sicut autem ratio est principium
it-is the-rule and measure as moreover reason is the-principle
humanorum actuum, ita etiam in ipsa ratione est aliquid
of-human acts so also in the-very reason is something
quod est principium respectu omnium aliorum. Unde ad
which is the-principle with-respect-to of-all others whence to
hoc oportet quod principaliter et maxime pertineat lex.
this it-is-necessary that principally and most pertain law
– Primum autem principium in operativis, quorum est ratio
the-first moreover principle in things-operative of-which is reason
practica, est finis ultimus. Est autem ultimus finis humanae
practical is the-end last is moreover the-last end of-human
vitae felicitas vel beatitudo, ut supra habitum est. Unde
life happiness or beatitude as above held it-is whence
oportet quod lex maxime respiciat ordinem qui est in
it-is-necessary that law most regard the-order which is to

beatitudinem. – Rursus, cum omnis pars ordinetur ad totum
beatitude again since every part be-ordered to the-whole
sicut imperfectum ad perfectum; unus autem homo est pars
as the-imperfect to the-perfect one moreover man is a-part
communitatis perfectae: necesse est quod lex proprie respiciat
of-community perfect necessary it-is that law properly regard
ordinem ad felicitatem communem. Unde et Philosophus,
the-order to happiness common whence also the-Philosopher
in praemissa definitione legalium, mentionem facit et de
in the-aforesaid definition of-legal-things mention makes both of
felicitate et communione politica. Dicit enim, in V Ethic.,
happiness and of-communion political he-says for in V Ethics
quod legalia iusta dicimus factiva et conservativa felicitatis
that legal-things just we-call productive and conservative of-happiness
et particularum ipsius, politica communicatione: perfecta
and of-the-particulars of-it in-political communication perfect
enim communitas civitas est, ut dicitur in I Polit.
for community the-city is as is-said in I Politics

In quolibet autem genere id quod maxime dicitur, est
in any moreover genus that which most is-called is
principium aliorum, et alia dicuntur secundum ordinem
the-principle of-the-others and the-others are-called according-to order
ad ipsum: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa
to it as fire which is most hot is the-cause
caliditatis in corporibus mixtis, quae intantum dicuntur calida,
of-heat in bodies mixed which so-far are-called hot
inquantum participant de igne. Unde oportet quod, cum
inasmuch-as they-participate of fire whence it-is-necessary that since
lex maxime dicatur secundum ordinem ad bonum commune,
law most be-called according-to order to the-good common
quodcumque aliud praeceptum de particulari opere non
whatever other precept about particular work not

habeat rationem legis nisi secundum ordinem ad bonum
have the-notion of-law except according-to order to the-good
commune. Et ideo omnis lex ad bonum commune ordinatur.
common and therefore every law to the-good common is-ordered

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum importat
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that a-precept implies
applicationem legis ad ea quae ex lege regulantur.
the-application of-law to those-things which by law are-ruled
Ordo autem ad bonum commune, qui pertinet ad legem,
the-order moreover to the-good common which pertains to law
est applicabilis ad singulares fines. Et secundum hoc, etiam
is applicable to singular ends and according-to this also
de particularibus quibusdam praecepta dantur.
about particular certain-things precepts are-given

Ad secundum dicendum quod operationes quidem sunt
to the-second it-must-be-said that operations indeed are
in particularibus: sed illa particularia referri possunt ad
in particulars but those particulars to-be-referred can to
bonum commune, non quidem communitate generis vel
the-good common not indeed by-the-community of-genus or
speciei, sed communitate causae finalis, secundum quod
of-species but by-the-community of-cause final according as
bonum commune dicitur finis communis.
the-good common is-called the-end common

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut nihil constat firmiter
to the-third it-must-be-said that as nothing stands firmly
secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad
according-to reason speculative except through resolution to
prima principia indemonstrabilia, ita firmiter nihil constat
the-first principles indemonstrable so firmly nothing stands
per rationem practicam nisi per ordinationem ad ultimum
through reason practical except through ordering to the-last

finem, qui est bonum commune. Quod autem hoc modo
end which is the-good common what moreover in-this way
ratione constat, legis rationem habet.
by-reason stands of-law the-notion has

Utrum ratio cuiuslibet sit factiva legis

3 · WHETHER ANYONE'S REASON CAN MAKE LAW

The gentiles are a law to themselves, and anyone can lead another to virtue, and a father rules his house. Thomas answers that to order something to the common good belongs to the whole multitude or to the public person who has its care, so making law belongs to them alone. A private person can only admonish, lacking coercive force, and a household's precepts are not properly laws.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod cuiuslibet ratio sit
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that of-anyone the-reason be
factiva legis. Dicit enim Apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod cum
productive of-law says for the-Apostle to the-Romans II that when
gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis
the-gentiles who law not have naturally those-things which of-the-law
sunt faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt lex. Hoc autem communiter
are do they to-themselves are a-law this moreover commonly
de omnibus dicit. Ergo quilibet potest facere sibi legem.
about all he-says therefore anyone can to-make for-himself a-law

2. Praeterea, sicut Philosophus dicit, in libro II Ethic.,
2 further as the-Philosopher says in the-book II Ethics
intentio legislatoris est ut inducat hominem ad virtutem.
the-intention of-the-legislator is that he-induce man to virtue
Sed quilibet homo potest alium inducere ad virtutem. Ergo
but any man can another to-induce to virtue therefore
cuiuslibet hominis ratio est factiva legis.
of-any man the-reason is productive of-law

3. Praeterea, sicut princeps civitatis est civitatis gubernator,
3 further as the-prince of-the-city is of-the-city the-governor
ita quilibet paterfamilias est gubernator domus. Sed princeps
so any father-of-a-family is the-governor of-the-house but the-prince
civitatis potest legem in civitate facere. Ergo quilibet
of-the-city can law in the-city to-make therefore any
paterfamilias potest in sua domo facere legem.
father-of-a-family can in his house to-make law

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., et
but against is that Isidore says in the-book of-Etymologies and
habetur in Decretis, dist. 2: Lex est constitutio populi,
it-is-had in the-Decrees distinction 2 law is the-constitution of-the-people
secundum quam maiores natu simul cum plebibus aliquid
according-to which the-greater by-birth together with the-commons something
sanxerunt. Non est ergo cuiuslibet facere legem.
have-sanctioned not it-is therefore of-anyone to-make law

Respondeo dicendum quod lex proprie, primo et
I-answer it-must-be-said that law properly first and
principaliter respicit ordinem ad bonum commune. Ordinare
principally regards the-order to the-good common to-order
autem aliquid in bonum commune est vel totius
moreover something to the-good common is either of-the-whole
multitudinis, vel alicuius gerentis vicem totius multitudinis.
multitude or of-someone bearing the-place of-the-whole multitude
Et ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem,
and therefore to-frame law either pertains to the-whole multitude
vel pertinet ad personam publicam quae totius multitudinis
or pertains to the-person public who of-the-whole multitude
curam habet. Quia et in omnibus aliis ordinare in
the-care has because also in all other-things to-order to
finem est eius cuius est proprius ille finis.
the-end is of-him of-whom is proper that end

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as above said
est, lex est in aliquo non solum sicut in regulante,
it-is law is in something not only as in the-ruling
sed etiam participative sicut in regulato. Et hoc modo
but also participatively as in the-ruled and in-this way
unusquisque sibi est lex, inquantum participat ordinem
each-one to-himself is a-law inasmuch-as he-participates the-order
alicuius regulantis. Unde et ibidem subditur: Qui
of-some ruler whence also in-the-same-place is-added who
ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis.
show the-work of-the-law written in hearts their

Ad secundum dicendum quod persona privata non potest
to the-second it-must-be-said that a-person private not can
inducere efficaciter ad virtutem. Potest enim solum monere, sed
to-induce efficaciously to virtue he-can for only to-admonish but
si sua monitio non recipiatur, non habet vim coactivam; quam
if his admonition not be-received not it-has force coercive which
debet habere lex, ad hoc quod efficaciter inducat ad virtutem, ut
ought to-have law for this that efficaciously it-induce to virtue as
Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Hanc autem virtutem coactivam
the-Philosopher says in X Ethics this moreover power coercive
habet multitudo vel persona publica, ad quam pertinet poenas
has the-multitude or the-person public to whom pertains penalties
infligere, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo solius eius est leges facere.
to-inflict as below it-will-be-said and therefore of-alone him it-is laws to-make

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut homo est pars domus, ita
to the-third it-must-be-said that as man is a-part of-the-house so
domus est pars civitatis: civitas autem est communitas perfecta,
the-house is a-part of-the-city the-city moreover is a-community perfect
ut dicitur in I Politic. Et ideo sicut bonum unius hominis
as is-said in I Politics and therefore as the-good of-one man

non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad commune bonum; ita
not is the-last end but is-ordered to the-common good so
etiam et bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum unius
also even the-good of-one house is-ordered to the-good of-one
civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta. Unde ille qui gubernat
city which is a-community perfect whence he who governs
aliquam familiam, potest quidem facere aliqua praecepta vel
some family can indeed to-make some precepts or
statuta; non tamen quae proprie habeant rationem legis.
statutes not yet which properly have the-notion of-law

Utrum promulgatio sit de ratione legis

4 · WHETHER PROMULGATION BELONGS TO THE NOTION OF LAW

The natural law needs no promulgation, and law binds those absent and the future. Thomas answers that a rule is imposed by being applied to those it rules, which is done by bringing it to their knowledge; so promulgation is necessary. From the four articles he gathers law's definition: an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod promulgatio non
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that promulgation not
sit de ratione legis. Lex enim naturalis maxime habet
be of the-notion of-law law for natural most has
rationem legis. Sed lex naturalis non indiget promulgatione.
the-notion of-law but law natural not needs promulgation
Ergo non est de ratione legis quod promulgetur.
therefore not it-is of the-notion of-law that it-be-promulgated

2. Praeterea, ad legem pertinet proprie obligare ad aliquid
2 further to law pertains properly to-bind to something
faciendum vel non faciendum. Sed non solum obligantur
to-be-done or not to-be-done but not only are-bound

ad implendam legem illi coram quibus promulgatur lex,
to fulfilling the-law those before whom is-promulgated the-law
sed etiam alii. Ergo promulgatio non est de ratione legis.
but also others therefore promulgation not is of the-notion of-law

3. Praeterea, obligatio legis extenditur etiam in futurum:
3 further the-obligation of-law extends also into the-future
quia leges futuris negotiis necessitatem imponunt, ut
because laws on-future affairs necessity impose as
iura dicunt. Sed promulgatio fit ad praesentes. Ergo
the-rights say but promulgation is-made to those-present therefore
promulgatio non est de necessitate legis.
promulgation not is of the-necessity of-law

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Decretis, 4 dist., quod
but against is that it-is-said in the-Decrees 4 distinction that
leges instituuntur cum promulgantur.
laws are-instituted when they-are-promulgated

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex imponitur
I-answer it-must-be-said that as said it-is law is-imposed
aliis per modum regulae et mensurae. Regula autem et
on-others through the-mode of-rule and of-measure the-rule moreover and
mensura imponitur per hoc quod applicatur his quae
measure is-imposed through this that it-is-applied to-those-things which
regulantur et mensurantur. Unde ad hoc quod lex virtutem
are-ruled and measured whence for this that law the-power
obligandi obtineat, quod est proprium legis, oportet quod
of-binding obtain which is proper of-law it-is-necessary that
applicetur hominibus qui secundum eam regulari debent.
it-be-applied to-men who according-to it to-be-ruled ought
Talis autem applicatio fit per hoc quod in notitiam
such moreover application is-made through this that into the-knowledge

eorum deducitur ex ipsa promulgatione. Unde promulgatio
of-them it-is-brought from the-very promulgation whence promulgation
necessaria est ad hoc quod lex habeat suam virtutem.
necessary is for this that law have its power

Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definitio legis,
and thus from the-four aforesaid can to-be-gathered the-definition of-law
quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum
which nothing is other than a-certain of-reason ordinance to the-good
commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.
common by him who the-care of-the-community has promulgated

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod promulgatio legis
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-promulgation of-the-law
naturae est ex hoc ipso quod Deus eam mentibus hominum
of-nature is from this very that God it in-the-minds of-men
inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam.
has-inserted naturally to-be-known

Ad secundum dicendum quod illi coram quibus lex
to the-second it-must-be-said that those before whom the-law
non promulgatur, obligantur ad legem servandam, inquantum
not is-promulgated are-bound to the-law to-be-kept inasmuch-as
in eorum notitiam devenit per alios, vel devenire potest,
into their knowledge it-comes through others or to-come it-can
promulgatione facta.
promulgation made

Ad tertium dicendum quod promulgatio praesens in
to the-third it-must-be-said that promulgation present into
futurum extenditur per firmitatem scripturae, quae
the-future is-extended through the-firmness of-writing which
quodammodo semper eam promulgat. Unde Isidorus dicit, in
in-a-way always it promulgates whence Isidore says in
II Etymol., quod lex a legendo vocata est, quia scripta est.
II Etymologies that law from reading named it-is because written it-is

De legum diversitate

XCI · ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF LAW

Next Thomas asks six questions on the diversity of laws: whether there is an eternal law, a natural law, a human law, and a divine law; whether the divine law is one or several; and whether there is a law of sin.

Deinde considerandum est de diversitate legum.
next to-be-considered it-is about the-diversity of-laws

Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.
and about this are-asked six

Primo: utrum sit aliqua lex aeterna.
first whether there-be some law eternal

Secundo: utrum sit aliqua lex naturalis.
second whether there-be some law natural

Tertio: utrum sit aliqua lex humana.
third whether there-be some law human

Quarto: utrum sit aliqua lex divina.
fourth whether there-be some law divine

Quinto: utrum sit una tantum, vel plures.
fifth whether it-be one only or several

Sexto: utrum sit aliqua lex peccati.
sixth whether there-be some law of-sin

Utrum sit aliqua lex aeterna

1 · WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW

No one existed from eternity on whom a law could be imposed or to whom it could be promulgated. Thomas answers that law is a dictate of practical reason in a ruler, and the whole community of the universe is governed by God's reason, which conceives nothing in time; so the very reason of the government of things in God has the nature of an eternal law. Things not yet existing exist in God's foreknowledge.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-be some
lex aeterna. Omnis enim lex aliquibus imponitur. Sed non
law eternal every for law on-some is-imposed but not
fuit ab aeterno aliquis cui lex posset imponi: solus
was from eternity anyone on-whom law could to-be-imposed alone
enim Deus fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nulla lex est aeterna.
for God was from eternity therefore no law is eternal

2. Praeterea, promulgatio est de ratione legis. Sed promulgatio
2 further promulgation is of the-notion of-law but promulgation
non potuit esse ab aeterno: quia non erat ab aeterno
not could to-be from eternity because not there-was from eternity
cui promulgaretur. Ergo nulla lex potest esse aeterna.
one-to-whom it-might-be-promulgated therefore no law can to-be eternal

3. Praeterea, lex importat ordinem ad finem. Sed nihil
3 further law implies order to an-end but nothing
est aeternum quod ordinetur ad finem: solus enim ultimus
is eternal which is-ordered to an-end alone for the-last
finis est aeternus. Ergo nulla lex est aeterna.
end is eternal therefore no law is eternal

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb.:
but against is that Augustine says in I on Free Choice
Lex quae summa ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam
the-law which highest reason is-named not can to-anyone
intelligenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri.
understanding not unchangeable and-eternal to-seem

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nihil est
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is nothing is
aliud lex quam quoddam dictamen practicae rationis in principe
other law than a-certain dictate of-practical reason in the-prince
qui gubernat aliquam communitatem perfectam. Manifestum
who governs some community perfect manifest
est autem, supposito quod mundus divina providentia regatur,
it-is moreover supposing that the-world by-divine providence be-ruled
ut in Primo habitum est, quod tota communitas universi
as in the-First held it-is that the-whole community of-the-universe
gubernatur ratione divina. Et ideo ipsa ratio gubernationis
is-governed by-reason divine and therefore the-very notion of-the-government
rerum in Deo sicut in principe universitatis existens, legis
of-things in God as in the-prince of-the-universe existing of-law
habet rationem. Et quia divina ratio nihil concipit ex
has the-notion and because the-divine reason nothing conceives from
tempore, sed habet aeternum conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. VIII;
time but has an-eternal concept as is-said Proverbs VIII
inde est quod huiusmodi legem oportet dicere aeternam.
thence it-is that of-this-kind law it-is-necessary to-call eternal

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae in
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that those-things which in
seipsis non sunt, apud Deum existunt, inquantum sunt
themselves not are with God exist inasmuch-as they-are
ab ipso praecognita et praeordinata; secundum illud Rom.
by him foreknown and preordained according-to that Romans

IV: Qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea
IV who calls those-things which not are as those-things
quae sunt. Sic igitur aeternus divinae legis conceptus habet
which are thus therefore the-eternal of-divine law concept has
rationem legis aeternae, secundum quod a Deo ordinatur
the-notion of-law eternal according as by God it-is-ordered
ad gubernationem rerum ab ipso praecognitarum.
to the-government of-things by him foreknown

Ad secundum dicendum quod promulgatio fit et
to the-second it-must-be-said that promulgation is-made both
verbo et scripto; et utroque modo lex aeterna habet
by-word and by-writing and in-each way the-law eternal has
promulgationem ex parte Dei promulgantis: quia et
promulgation on the-side of-God promulgating because both
Verbum divinum est aeternum, et scriptura libri vitae est
the-Word divine is eternal and the-writing of-the-book of-life is
aeterna. Sed ex parte creaturae audientis aut inspicientis,
eternal but on the-side of-the-creature hearing or inspecting
non potest esse promulgatio aeterna.
not can to-be promulgation eternal

Ad tertium dicendum quod lex importat ordinem ad finem
to the-third it-must-be-said that law implies order to an-end
active, inquantum scilicet per eam ordinantur aliqua in
actively inasmuch-as namely through it are-ordered some-things to
finem: non autem passive, idest quod ipsa lex ordinetur ad
an-end not moreover passively that-is that the-very law be-ordered to
finem, nisi per accidens in gubernante cuius finis est extra
an-end except by accident in a-governor whose end is outside
ipsum, ad quem etiam necesse est ut lex eius ordinetur. Sed
himself to which also necessary it-is that the-law his be-ordered but

finis divinae gubernationis est ipse Deus, nec eius lex est
the-end of-divine government is the-very God nor his law is
aliud ab ipso. Unde lex aeterna non ordinatur in alium finem.
other from himself whence the-law eternal not is-ordered to another end

Utrum sit in nobis aliqua lex naturalis

2 · WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW

Man seems governed enough by the eternal law, and by reason and will rather than nature. Thomas answers that all things share in the eternal law by having inclinations from it to their acts and ends; the rational creature shares in it more excellently, providing for itself and others, and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is the natural law, the light of God's face sealed upon us, by which we discern good from evil.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit in nobis
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-be in us
aliqua lex naturalis. Sufficienter enim homo gubernatur per
some law natural sufficiently for man is-governed through
legem aeternam: dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb.,
the-law eternal says for Augustine in I on Free Choice
quod lex aeterna est qua iustum est ut omnia sint
that the-law eternal is-that by-which just it-is that all-things be
ordinatissima. Sed natura non abundat in superfluis, sicut nec
most-ordered but nature not abounds in superfluous-things as nor
deficit in necessariis. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini naturalis.
it-fails in necessary-things therefore not there-is some law for-man natural

2. Praeterea, per legem ordinatur homo in suis actibus
2 further through law is-ordered man in his acts
ad finem, ut supra habitum est. Sed ordinatio humanorum
to the-end as above held it-is but the-ordering of-human

actuum ad finem non est per naturam, sicut accidit in
acts to the-end not is through nature as happens in
creaturis irrationabilibus, quae solo appetitu naturali agunt
creatures irrational which by-sole appetite natural act
propter finem: sed agit homo propter finem per rationem
for-the-sake-of an-end but acts man for-the-sake-of an-end through reason
et voluntatem. Ergo non est aliqua lex homini naturalis.
and will therefore not there-is some law for-man natural

3. Praeterea, quanto aliquis est liberior, tanto minus
3 further by-as-much-as someone is freer by-so-much less
est sub lege. Sed homo est liberior omnibus animalibus,
he-is under law but man is freer than-all animals
propter liberum arbitrium, quod prae aliis animalibus habet.
on-account-of free choice which before other animals he-has
Cum igitur alia animalia non subdantur legi naturali, nec
since therefore other animals not be-subject to-law natural neither
homo alicui legi naturali subditur.
man to-any law natural is-subject

Sed contra est quod, Rom. II, super illud, Cum gentes,
but against is that Romans II upon that when the-gentiles
quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis
who law not have naturally those-things which of-the-law
sunt faciunt, dicit Glossa: Etsi non habent legem scriptam,
are do says the-Gloss although not they-have law written
habent tamen legem naturalem, qua quilibet intelligit et
they-have yet law natural by-which each-one understands and
sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid malum.
to-himself conscious is what be good and what evil

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law
cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in
since it-be a-rule and measure in-two-ways can to-be in

aliquo: uno modo, sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio
something in-one way as in the-ruling and measuring in-another
modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia inquantum
way as in the-ruled and measured because inasmuch-as
participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel
it-participates something of the-rule or measure thus it-is-ruled or
mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae
measured whence since all-things which to-divine providence
subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut
are-subject by the-law eternal be-ruled and measured as
ex dictis patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant
from the-things-said is-plain manifest it-is that all-things participate
aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione
in-some-way the-law eternal inasmuch-as namely from the-impression
eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter
of-it they-have inclinations to proper acts and ends among
cetera autem, rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo
the-rest moreover the-rational creature in-a-more-excellent certain way
divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit
to-divine providence is-subject inasmuch-as also itself becomes
providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde
of-providence a-partaker for-it itself and for-others providing whence
et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet
also in it is-participated the-reason eternal through which it-has
naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis
a-natural inclination to due act and end and such
participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis
participation of-the-law eternal in the-rational creature law natural
dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, Sacrificate sacrificium
is-called whence when the-Psalmist had-said sacrifice the-sacrifice
iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae
of-justice as-if to-certain-ones asking which are of-justice

opera, subiungit: Multi dicunt, Quis ostendit nobis bona?
the-works he-adds many say who shows to-us good-things
cui quaestioni respondens, dicit: Signatum est super nos
to-which question answering he-says sealed is upon us
lumen vultus tui, Domine: quasi lumen rationis naturalis,
the-light of-face your O-Lord as-if the-light of-reason natural
quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet
by-which we-discern what be good and evil which pertains
ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini
to natural law nothing other be than the-impression of-the-divine
luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud
light in us whence it-is-plain that law natural nothing other
est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.
is than the-participation of-the-law eternal in the-rational creature

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reasoning that would-proceed
si lex naturalis esset aliquid diversum a lege aeterna. Non
if law natural were something diverse from the-law eternal not
autem est nisi quaedam participatio eius, ut dictum est.
moreover it-is except a-certain participation of-it as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis operatio rationis et
to the-second it-must-be-said that every operation of-reason and
voluntatis derivatur in nobis ab eo quod est secundum
will is-derived in us from that which is according-to
naturam, ut supra habitum est: nam omnis ratiocinatio
nature as above held it-is for all reasoning
derivatur a principiis naturaliter notis, et omnis appetitus
is-derived from principles naturally known and every appetite
eorum quae sunt ad finem, derivatur a naturali appetitu
of-those-things which are toward the-end is-derived from the-natural appetite

ultimi finis. Et sic etiam oportet quod prima directio
of-the-last end and thus also it-is-necessary that the-first direction
actuum nostrorum ad finem, fiat per legem naturalem.
of-acts our to the-end be-made through law natural

Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam animalia irrationalia
to the-third it-must-be-said that also animals irrational
participant rationem aeternam suo modo, sicut et
participate the-reason eternal in-their way as also
rationalis creatura. Sed quia rationalis creatura participat
the-rational creature but because the-rational creature participates
eam intellectualiter et rationaliter, ideo participatio legis
it intellectually and rationally therefore the-participation of-the-law
aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: nam lex
eternal in the-creature rational properly law is-called for law
est aliquid rationis, ut supra dictum est. In creatura autem
is something of-reason as above said it-is in the-creature moreover
irrationali non participatur rationaliter: unde non potest
irrational not it-is-participated rationally whence not it-can
dici lex nisi per similitudinem.
to-be-called law except by likeness

Utrum sit aliqua lex humana

3 · WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW

The natural law seems enough, and human reason is no measure of things. Thomas answers that as speculative reason draws from indemonstrable principles the conclusions of the sciences, so practical reason must proceed from the natural law's precepts to more particular dispositions, and these, devised by human reason, are human laws. Tully says that right began from nature, and fear and religion sanctioned what custom approved.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-be some
lex humana. Lex enim naturalis est participatio legis
law human the-law for natural is a-participation of-the-law
aeternae, ut dictum est. Sed per legem aeternam omnia
eternal as said it-is but through the-law eternal all-things
sunt ordinatissima, ut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb.
are most-ordered as Augustine says in I on Free Choice
Ergo lex naturalis sufficit ad omnia humana ordinanda.
therefore the-law natural suffices for all human-things to-be-ordered
Non est ergo necessarium quod sit aliqua lex humana.
not it-is therefore necessary that there-be some law human

2. Praeterea, lex habet rationem mensurae, ut dictum
2 further law has the-notion of-measure as said
est. Sed ratio humana non est mensura rerum, sed potius
it-is but reason human not is the-measure of-things but rather
e converso, ut in X Metaphys. dicitur. Ergo ex ratione
from the-converse as in X Metaphysics is-said therefore from reason
humana nulla lex procedere potest.
human no law to-proceed can

3. Praeterea, mensura debet esse certissima, ut dicitur
3 further a-measure ought to-be most-certain as is-said
in X Metaphys. Sed dictamen humanae rationis de rebus
in X Metaphysics but the-dictate of-human reason about things
gerendis est incertum; secundum illud Sap. IX: Cogitationes
to-be-done is uncertain according-to that Wisdom IX the-thoughts
mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Ergo
of-mortals (are)-fearful and uncertain providences our therefore
ex ratione humana nulla lex procedere potest.
from reason human no law to-proceed can

Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., ponit
but against is that Augustine in I on Free Choice posits
duas leges, unam aeternam et aliam temporalem, quam
two laws one eternal and another temporal which
dicit esse humanam.
he-says to-be human

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex est
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law is
quoddam dictamen practicae rationis. Similis autem processus
a-certain dictate of-practical reason similar moreover a-process
esse invenitur rationis practicae et speculativae: utraque enim
to-be is-found of-reason practical and speculative each for
ex quibusdam principiis ad quasdam conclusiones procedit, ut
from certain principles to certain conclusions proceeds as
superius habitum est. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod,
above held it-is according-to this therefore to-be-said it-is that
sicut in ratione speculativa ex principiis indemonstrabilibus
as in reason speculative from principles indemonstrable
naturaliter cognitis producuntur conclusiones diversarum
naturally known are-produced the-conclusions of-diverse
scientiarum, quarum cognitio non est nobis naturaliter indita,
sciences whose knowledge not is in-us naturally implanted

sed per industriam rationis inventa; ita etiam ex praeceptis
but through the-industry of-reason found so also from the-precepts
legis naturalis, quasi ex quibusdam principiis communibus
of-the-law natural as-if from certain principles common
et indemonstrabilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana procedat
and indemonstrable necessary it-is that reason human proceed
ad aliqua magis particulariter disponenda. Et istae particulares
to some-things more particularly to-be-disposed and these particular
dispositiones adinventae secundum rationem humanam, dicuntur
dispositions devised according-to reason human are-called
leges humanae, servatis aliis conditionibus quae pertinent
laws human being-observed the-other conditions which pertain
ad rationem legis, ut supra dictum est. Unde et Tullius
to the-notion of-law as above said it-is whence also Tully
dicit, in sua Rhetor., quod initium iuris est a natura
says in his Rhetoric that the-beginning of-right is from nature
profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitate
proceeded then certain-things into custom from the-utility
rationis venerunt; postea res et a natura profectas et
of-reason have-come afterward things both from nature proceeded and
a consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.
by custom approved of-the-laws fear and religion sanctioned

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio humana non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reason human not
potest participare ad plenum dictamen rationis divinae,
can to-participate to the-full the-dictate of-reason divine
sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo sicut ex parte
but in-its way and imperfectly and therefore as on the-side
rationis speculativae, per naturalem participationem divinae
of-reason speculative through natural participation of-divine
sapientiae, inest nobis cognitio quorundam communium
wisdom is-in us the-knowledge of-certain common

principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognitio,
principles not moreover of-every truth the-proper knowledge
sicut in divina sapientia continetur; ita etiam ex parte
as in the-divine wisdom is-contained so also on the-side
rationis practicae naturaliter homo participat legem aeternam
of-reason practical naturally man participates the-law eternal
secundum quaedam communia principia, non autem secundum
according-to certain common principles not moreover according-to
particulares directiones singulorum, quae tamen in aeterna
the-particular directions of-single-things which yet in the-eternal
lege continentur. Et ideo necesse est ulterius quod ratio
law are-contained and therefore necessary it-is further that reason
humana procedat ad particulares quasdam legum sanctiones.
human proceed to particular certain of-laws sanctions

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio humana secundum se
to the-second it-must-be-said that reason human according-to itself
non est regula rerum: sed principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt
not is the-rule of-things but the-principles in-it naturally implanted are
quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae
certain rules general and measures of-all those-things which
sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et
are by man to-be-done of-which reason natural is the-rule and
mensura, licet non sit mensura eorum quae sunt a natura.
measure although not it-be the-measure of-those-things which are from nature

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio practica est circa
to the-third it-must-be-said that reason practical is about
operabilia, quae sunt singularia et contingentia: non autem
things-doable which are singular and contingent not moreover
circa necessaria, sicut ratio speculativa. Et ideo leges
about necessary-things as reason speculative and therefore laws
humanae non possunt illam infallibilitatem habere quam
human not can that infallibility to-have which

habent conclusiones demonstrativae scientiarum. Nec oportet
have the-conclusions demonstrative of-the-sciences nor it-is-necessary
quod omnis mensura sit omni modo infallibilis et certa,
that every measure be in-every way infallible and certain
sed secundum quod est possibile in genere suo.
but according-to what is possible in genus its

Utrum fuerit necessarium esse aliquam legem divinam

4 · WHETHER A DIVINE LAW WAS NEEDED

The natural law participates the eternal, and God left man in the hand of his own counsel. Thomas answers that a divine law was needed for four reasons: man is ordered to an end exceeding his nature; human judgment is uncertain and diverse; human law cannot judge inner acts; and human law cannot forbid every evil without hindering much good. Psalm XVIII touches all four.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not it-was
necessarium esse aliquam legem divinam. Quia, ut dictum
necessary there-to-be some law divine because as said
est, lex naturalis est quaedam participatio legis aeternae
it-is the-law natural is a-certain participation of-the-law eternal
in nobis. Sed lex aeterna est lex divina, ut dictum
in us but the-law eternal is the-law divine as said
est. Ergo non oportet quod praeter legem naturalem, et
it-is therefore not it-is-necessary that besides the-law natural and
leges humanas ab ea derivatas, sit aliqua alia lex divina.
the-laws human from it derived there-be some other law divine

2. Praeterea, Eccli. XV dicitur quod Deus dimisit
2 further Ecclesiasticus XV it-is-said that God left
hominem in manu consilii sui. Consilium autem est actus
man in the-hand of-counsel his counsel moreover is an-act

rationis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo homo dimissus est
of-reason as above held it-is therefore man left it-is
gubernationi suae rationis. Sed dictamen rationis humanae
to-the-government of-his reason but the-dictate of-reason human
est lex humana, ut dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod
is law human as said it-is therefore not it-is-necessary that
homo alia lege divina gubernetur.
man by-another law divine be-governed

3. Praeterea, natura humana est sufficientior irrationalibus
3 further nature human is more-sufficient than-irrational
creaturis. Sed irrationales creaturae non habent aliquam
creatures but irrational creatures not have any
legem divinam praeter inclinationem naturalem eis inditam.
law divine besides the-inclination natural in-them implanted
Ergo multo minus creatura rationalis debet habere aliquam
therefore much less the-creature rational ought to-have some
legem divinam praeter naturalem legem.
law divine besides the-natural law

Sed contra est quod David expetit legem a Deo
but against is that David asks a-law by God
sibi poni, dicens: Legem pone mihi, Domine, in via
for-himself to-be-set saying a-law set for-me O-Lord in the-way
iustificationum tuarum.
of-justifications your

Respondeo dicendum quod praeter legem naturalem et legem
I-answer it-must-be-said that besides the-law natural and the-law
humanam, necessarium fuit ad directionem humanae vitae
human necessary it-was for the-direction of-human life
habere legem divinam. Et hoc propter quatuor rationes. Primo
to-have law divine and this on-account-of four reasons first
quidem, quia per legem dirigitur homo ad actus proprios
indeed because through law is-directed man to acts proper

in ordine ad ultimum finem. Et si quidem homo ordinaretur
in order to the-last end and if indeed man were-ordered
tantum ad finem qui non excederet proportionem naturalis
only to an-end which not exceeded the-proportion of-the-natural
facultatis hominis, non oporteret quod homo haberet
faculty of-man not it-would-be-necessary that man have
aliquid directivum ex parte rationis, supra legem naturalem
something directive on the-side of-reason above the-law natural
et legem humanitus positam, quae ab ea derivatur. Sed quia
and the-law humanly posited which from it is-derived but because
homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae excedit
man is-ordered to the-end of-beatitude eternal which exceeds
proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum
the-proportion of-the-natural faculty human as above held
est; ideo necessarium fuit ut supra legem naturalem et
it-is therefore necessary it-was that above the-law natural and
humanam, dirigeretur etiam ad suum finem lege divinitus data.
human be-directed also to his end by-law divinely given

Secundo, quia propter incertitudinem humani iudicii,
second because on-account-of the-uncertainty of-human judgment
praecipue de rebus contingentibus et particularibus, contingit
especially about things contingent and particular it-happens
de actibus humanis diversorum esse diversa iudicia, ex
about acts human of-diverse-men to-be diverse judgments from
quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges procedunt. Ut
which also diverse and contrary laws proceed that
ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid
therefore man without all doubt to-know may-be-able what
ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut
by-him be to-be-done and what to-be-avoided necessary it-was that

in actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam,
in acts proper he-be-directed through law divinely given
de qua constat quod non potest errare.
about which it-is-established that not it-can to-err

Tertio, quia de his potest homo legem ferre, de
third because about those-things can man law to-bring about
quibus potest iudicare. Iudicium autem hominis esse non
which he-can to-judge the-judgment moreover of-man to-be not
potest de interioribus motibus, qui latent, sed solum de
can about interior motions which lie-hidden but only about
exterioribus actibus, qui apparent. Et tamen ad perfectionem
exterior acts which appear and yet for the-perfection
virtutis requiritur quod in utrisque actibus homo rectus
of-virtue is-required that in both acts man upright
existat. Et ideo lex humana non potuit cohibere et
exist and therefore law human not could to-restrain and
ordinare sufficienter interiores actus, sed necessarium fuit
to-order sufficiently interior acts but necessary it-was
quod ad hoc superveniret lex divina.
that for this should-come-upon law divine

Quarto quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb.,
fourth because as Augustine says in I on Free Choice
lex humana non potest omnia quae male fiunt, punire vel
law human not can all-things which badly are-done to-punish or
prohibere: quia dum auferre vellet omnia mala, sequeretur
to-forbid because while to-take-away it-wished all evils it-would-follow
quod etiam multa bona tollerentur, et impediretur utilitas
that also many goods would-be-taken-away and would-be-hindered the-utility
boni communis, quod est necessarium ad conversationem
of-the-good common which is necessary for intercourse
humanam. Ut ergo nullum malum improhibitum et
human that therefore no evil unforbidden and

impunitum remaneat, necessarium fuit supervenire legem
unpunished remain necessary it-was to-come-upon law
divinam, per quam omnia peccata prohibentur.
divine through which all sins are-forbidden

Et istae quatuor causae tanguntur in Psalmo XVIII,
and these four causes are-touched in Psalm XVIII
ubi dicitur: Lex Domini immaculata, idest nullam peccati
where it-is-said the-law of-the-Lord unspotted that-is no of-sin
turpitudinem permittens; convertens animas, quia non solum
foulness permitting converting souls because not only
exteriores actus, sed etiam interiores dirigit; testimonium
exterior acts but also interior it-directs the-testimony
Domini fidele, propter certitudinem veritatis et rectitudinis;
of-the-Lord faithful on-account-of the-certainty of-truth and of-rectitude
sapientiam praestans parvulis, inquantum ordinat hominem
wisdom giving to-little-ones inasmuch-as it-orders man
ad supernaturalem finem et divinum.
to supernatural end and divine

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per naturalem
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that through natural
legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem
law is-participated the-law eternal according-to the-proportion
capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo
of-the-capacity of-human nature but it-is-necessary that in-a-higher way
dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo
be-directed man to the-last end supernatural and therefore
superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna
is-added law divinely given through which the-law eternal
participatur altiori modo.
is-participated in-a-higher way

Ad secundum dicendum quod consilium est inquisitio
to the-second it-must-be-said that counsel is an-inquiry
quaedam: unde oportet quod procedat ex aliquibus
certain whence it-is-necessary that it-proceed from some
principiis. Nec sufficit quod procedat ex principiis
principles nor does-it-suffice that it-proceed from principles
naturaliter inditis, quae sunt praecepta legis naturae,
naturally implanted which are the-precepts of-the-law of-nature
propter praedicta: sed oportet quod superaddantur
on-account-of the-aforesaid but it-is-necessary that be-added
quaedam alia principia, scilicet praecepta legis divinae.
certain other principles namely the-precepts of-the-law divine

Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non
to the-third it-must-be-said that creatures irrational not
ordinantur ad altiorem finem quam sit finis qui est
are-ordered to a-higher end than is the-end which is
proportionatus naturali virtuti ipsarum. Et ideo non est
proportioned to-the-natural power of-them and therefore not it-is
similis ratio.
a-like reasoning

Utrum lex divina sit una tantum

5 · WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE DIVINE LAW

One king, one kingdom, one law; and God wills all men to be saved. Thomas answers that the divine law is two, old and new, as the imperfect and the perfect in one species, boy and man. The old law ordered to an earthly good, the new to a heavenly; the new rules the inner acts of the mind; and the old induced by fear, the new by love poured into our hearts.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex divina sit
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law divine be
una tantum. Unius enim regis in uno regno est una lex.
one only of-one for king in one kingdom is one law
Sed totum humanum genus comparatur ad Deum sicut
but the-whole human race is-compared to God as
ad unum regem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVI: Rex omnis
to one king according-to that of-Psalm XLVI king of-all
terrae Deus. Ergo est una tantum lex divina.
the-earth God therefore there-is one only law divine

2. Praeterea, omnis lex ordinatur ad finem quem legislator
2 further every law is-ordered to the-end which the-legislator
intendit in eis quibus legem fert. Sed unum et idem est
intends in those to-whom law he-brings but one and the-same it-is
quod Deus intendit in omnibus hominibus; secundum illud
which God intends in all men according-to that
I ad Tim. II: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad
I to Timothy II he-wills all men saved to-be-made and to
agnitionem veritatis venire. Ergo una tantum est lex divina.
the-knowledge of-truth to-come therefore one only is the-law divine

3. Praeterea, lex divina propinquior esse videtur legi
3 further the-law divine nearer to-be seems to-the-law
aeternae, quae est una, quam lex naturalis, quanto altior
eternal which is one than the-law natural by-as-much-as higher
est revelatio gratiae quam cognitio naturae. Sed lex naturalis
is the-revelation of-grace than the-knowledge of-nature but the-law natural
est una omnium hominum. Ergo multo magis lex divina.
is one of-all men therefore much more the-law divine

Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII:
but against is that the-Apostle says to the-Hebrews VII
Translato sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat.
transferred the-priesthood necessary it-is that of-the-law a-transfer be-made
Sed sacerdotium est duplex, ut ibidem dicitur: scilicet
but the-priesthood is twofold as in-the-same-place is-said namely
sacerdotium Leviticum, et sacerdotium Christi. Ergo etiam
the-priesthood Levitical and the-priesthood of-Christ therefore also
duplex est lex divina: scilicet lex vetus, et lex nova.
twofold is the-law divine namely the-law old and the-law new

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in Primo dictum est,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as in the-First said it-is
distinctio est causa numeri. Dupliciter autem inveniuntur
distinction is the-cause of-number in-two-ways moreover are-found
aliqua distingui. Uno modo, sicut ea quae sunt
some-things to-be-distinguished in-one way as those-things which are
omnino specie diversa: ut equus et bos. Alio modo,
wholly in-species diverse as a-horse and an-ox in-another way
sicut perfectum et imperfectum in eadem specie: sicut puer
as the-perfect and the-imperfect in the-same species as a-boy
et vir. Et hoc modo lex divina distinguitur in legem
and a-man and in-this way the-law divine is-distinguished into the-law
veterem et legem novam. Unde Apostolus, ad Gal. III,
old and the-law new whence the-Apostle to the-Galatians III

comparat statum veteris legis statui puerili existenti sub
compares the-state of-the-old law to-the-state childish existing under
paedagogo: statum autem novae legis comparat statui
a-pedagogue the-state moreover of-the-new law he-compares to-the-state
viri perfecti, qui iam non est sub paedagogo.
of-a-man perfect who now not is under a-pedagogue

Attenditur autem perfectio et imperfectio utriusque legis
is-regarded moreover the-perfection and imperfection of-each law
secundum tria quae ad legem pertinent, ut supra dictum
according-to three-things which to law pertain as above said
est. Primo enim ad legem pertinet ut ordinetur ad bonum
it-is first for to law it-pertains that it-be-ordered to the-good
commune sicut ad finem, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem
common as to an-end as above said it-is which indeed
potest esse duplex. Scilicet bonum sensibile et terrenum: et
can to-be twofold namely good sensible and earthly and
ad tale bonum ordinabat directe lex vetus; unde statim,
to such good ordered directly the-law old whence at-once
Exodi III, in principio legis, invitatur populus ad regnum
Exodus III in the-beginning of-the-law is-invited the-people to the-kingdom
terrenum Chananaeorum. Et iterum bonum intelligibile
earthly of-the-Canaanites and again good intelligible
et caeleste: et ad hoc ordinat lex nova. Unde statim
and heavenly and to this orders the-law new whence at-once
Christus ad regnum caelorum in suae praedicationis principio
Christ to the-kingdom of-heaven in his of-preaching beginning
invitavit, dicens: Poenitentiam agite: appropinquavit enim
invited saying penance do has-drawn-near for
regnum caelorum, Matth. IV. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in
the-kingdom of-heaven Matthew IV and therefore Augustine says in
IV contra Faustum, quod temporalium rerum promissiones
IV against Faustus that of-temporal things the-promises

Testamento veteri continentur, et ideo vetus appellatur: sed
in-the-Testament old are-contained and therefore old it-is-called but
aeternae vitae promissio ad novum pertinet Testamentum.
of-eternal life the-promise to the-new pertains Testament

Secundo ad legem pertinet dirigere humanos actus secundum
second to law it-pertains to-direct human acts according-to
ordinem iustitiae. In quo etiam superabundat lex nova legi
the-order of-justice in which also superabounds the-law new over-the-law
veteri, interiores actus animi ordinando; secundum illud
old the-interior acts of-the-mind by-ordering according-to that
Matth. V: Nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum
Matthew V unless will-have-abounded justice your more than of-the-Scribes
et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum. Et ideo
and of-the-Pharisees not you-will-enter into the-kingdom of-heaven and therefore
dicitur quod lex vetus cohibet manum, lex nova animum.
it-is-said that the-law old restrains the-hand the-law new the-mind

Tertio ad legem pertinet inducere homines ad observantias
third to law it-pertains to-induce men to the-observances
mandatorum. Et hoc quidem lex vetus faciebat timore
of-the-commandments and this indeed the-law old did by-fear
poenarum: lex autem nova facit hoc per amorem, qui in
of-penalties the-law but new does this through love which into
cordibus nostris infunditur per gratiam Christi, quae in lege
hearts our is-poured through the-grace of-Christ which in the-law
nova confertur, sed in lege veteri figurabatur. Et ideo dicit
new is-conferred but in the-law old was-figured and therefore says
Augustinus, Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum, quod
Augustine against Adimantus of-Manichaeus the-Disciple that
brevis differentia est Legis et Evangelii, timor et amor.
brief the-difference is of-the-Law and of-the-Gospel fear and love

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut paterfamilias
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as a-father-of-a-family
in domo alia mandata proponit pueris et adultis, ita
in the-house other commands sets-forth to-children and to-adults so
etiam unus rex Deus, in uno suo regno, aliam legem
also the-one king God in one his kingdom another law
dedit hominibus adhuc imperfectis existentibus; et aliam
gave to-men still imperfect existing and another
perfectiorem iam manuductis per priorem legem ad
more-perfect now to-those-led-by-the-hand through the-prior law to
maiorem capacitatem divinorum.
greater capacity of-divine-things

Ad secundum dicendum quod salus hominum non
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-salvation of-men not
poterat esse nisi per Christum; secundum illud Act. IV:
could to-be except through Christ according-to that Acts IV
Non est aliud nomen datum hominibus, in quo oporteat
not there-is another name given to-men in which it-be-necessary
nos salvos fieri. Et ideo lex perfecte ad salutem omnes
us saved to-be-made and therefore a-law perfectly to salvation all
inducens, dari non potuit nisi post Christi adventum.
inducing to-be-given not could except after of-Christ the-coming
Antea vero dari oportuit populo ex quo Christus erat
before but to-be-given it-was-necessary to-the-people from which Christ was
nasciturus, legem praeparatoriam ad Christi susceptionem,
about-to-be-born a-law preparatory for of-Christ the-reception
in qua quaedam rudimenta salutaris iustitiae continerentur.
in which certain rudiments of-saving justice might-be-contained

Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis dirigit
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-law natural directs
hominem secundum quaedam praecepta communia, in quibus
man according-to certain precepts common in which

conveniunt tam perfecti quam imperfecti: et ideo est
agree as-well the-perfect as the-imperfect and therefore it-is
una omnium. Sed lex divina dirigit hominem etiam in
one of-all but the-law divine directs man also in
quibusdam particularibus, ad quae non similiter se
certain particulars to which not similarly themselves
habent perfecti et imperfecti. Et ideo oportuit legem
have the-perfect and the-imperfect and therefore it-was-necessary the-law
divinam esse duplicem, sicut iam dictum est.
divine to-be twofold as already said it-is

Utrum sit aliqua lex fomitis

6 · WHETHER THERE IS A LAW OF THE FOMES

The fomes departs from reason, makes no one a transgressor for not following it, and inclines to private good. Thomas answers that, as the inclinations of diverse creatures are each a law under God, man's law was to act by reason; withdrawing from God, man fell to being moved by sensuality like the beasts. In other animals that inclination is a law simply; in man it has the notion of law only as a penalty, following from divine justice when man is deprived of original justice.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliqua lex
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not there-be some law
fomitis. Dicit enim Isidorus, in V Etymol., quod lex ratione
of-the-fomes says for Isidore in V Etymologies that law in-reason
consistit. Fomes autem non consistit ratione, sed magis a
consists the-fomes moreover not consists in-reason but rather from
ratione deviat. Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis.
reason deviates therefore the-fomes not has the-notion of-law

2. Praeterea, omnis lex obligatoria est, ita quod qui
2 further every law obligatory is so that those-who
ipsam non servant, transgressores dicuntur. Sed fomes non
it not keep transgressors are-called but the-fomes not
constituit aliquem transgressorem ex hoc quod ipsum non
constitutes anyone a-transgressor from this that it not
sequitur, sed magis transgressor redditur si quis ipsum
he-follows but rather a-transgressor is-rendered if anyone it
sequatur. Ergo fomes non habet rationem legis.
follow therefore the-fomes not has the-notion of-law

3. Praeterea, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra
3 further law is-ordered to the-good common as above
habitum est. Sed fomes non inclinat ad bonum commune,
held it-is but the-fomes not inclines to the-good common
sed magis ad bonum privatum. Ergo fomes non habet
but rather to the-good private therefore the-fomes not has
rationem legis.
the-notion of-law

Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Rom. VII: Video
but against is that the-Apostle says Romans VII I-see
aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis
another law in members my fighting-against the-law of-mind
meae.
my

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law
essentialiter invenitur in regulante et mensurante, participative
essentially is-found in the-ruling and measuring participatively
autem in eo quod mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod
but in that which is-measured and ruled so that
omnis inclinatio vel ordinatio quae invenitur in his quae
every inclination or ordering which is-found in those-things which

subiecta sunt legi, participative dicitur lex, ut ex supradictis
subject are to-law participatively is-called law as from the-above-said
patet. Potest autem in his quae subduntur legi, aliqua
is-plain can moreover in those-things which are-subject to-law some
inclinatio inveniri dupliciter a legislatore. Uno modo,
inclination to-be-found in-two-ways from the-legislator in-one way
inquantum directe inclinat suos subditos ad aliquid; et
inasmuch-as directly he-inclines his subjects to something and
diversos interdum ad diversos actus; secundum quem modum
diverse-ones sometimes to diverse acts according-to which mode
potest dici quod alia est lex militum, et alia est
it-can to-be-said that other is the-law of-soldiers and other is
lex mercatorum. Alio modo, indirecte, inquantum scilicet
the-law of-merchants in-another way indirectly inasmuch-as namely
per hoc quod legislator destituit aliquem sibi subditum
through this that the-legislator deprives someone to-him subject
aliqua dignitate, sequitur quod transeat in alium ordinem,
of-some dignity it-follows that he-pass into another order
et quasi in aliam legem: puta si miles ex militia
and as-if into another law for-example if a-soldier from soldiery
destituatur, transibit in legem rusticorum vel mercatorum.
be-deprived he-will-pass into the-law of-rustics or of-merchants

Sic igitur sub Deo legislatore diversae creaturae diversas
thus therefore under God legislator diverse creatures diverse
habent naturales inclinationes, ita ut quod uni est
have natural inclinations so that what for-one is
quodammodo lex, alteri sit contra legem: ut si dicam
in-a-way a-law for-another be against law as if I-say
quod furibundum esse est quodammodo lex canis, est
that furious to-be is in-a-way the-law of-the-dog it-is
autem contra legem ovis vel alterius mansueti animalis.
moreover against the-law of-the-sheep or of-another gentle animal

Est ergo hominis lex, quam sortitur ex ordinatione divina
there-is therefore of-man a-law which he-obtains from the-ordinance divine
secundum propriam conditionem, ut secundum rationem
according-to his-own condition that according-to reason
operetur. Quae quidem lex fuit tam valida in primo statu, ut
he-operate which indeed law was so strong in the-first state that
nihil vel praeter rationem vel contra rationem posset subrepere
nothing either beside reason or against reason could to-creep-upon
homini. Sed dum homo a Deo recessit, incurrit in hoc
man but when man from God withdrew he-incurred into this
quod feratur secundum impetum sensualitatis: et unicuique
that he-be-borne according-to the-impulse of-sensuality and to-each-one
etiam particulariter hoc contingit, quanto magis a ratione
also particularly this happens by-how-much more from reason
recesserit: ut sic quodammodo bestiis assimiletur, quae
he-will-have-withdrawn so-that thus in-a-way to-beasts he-be-likened which
sensualitatis impetu feruntur; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII:
of-sensuality by-impulse are-borne according-to that of-Psalm XLVIII
Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est
man when in honor he-was not understood compared he-is
iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis.
to-beasts senseless and like made he-is to-them

Sic igitur ipsa sensualitatis inclinatio, quae fomes dicitur,
thus therefore the-very of-sensuality inclination which the-fomes is-called
in aliis quidem animalibus simpliciter habet rationem legis,
in other indeed animals simply has the-notion of-law
illo tamen modo quo in talibus lex dici potest,
in-that yet way in-which in such-things law to-be-called can
secundum directam inclinationem. In hominibus autem
according-to direct inclination in men moreover
secundum hoc non habet rationem legis, sed magis est
according-to this not it-has the-notion of-law but rather it-is

deviatio a lege rationis. Sed inquantum per divinam
a-deviation from the-law of-reason but inasmuch-as through divine
iustitiam homo destituitur originali iustitia et vigore
justice man is-deprived of-original justice and of-the-vigor
rationis, ipse impetus sensualitatis qui eum ducit, habet
of-reason the-very impulse of-sensuality which him leads has
rationem legis, inquantum est poenalis et ex lege divina
the-notion of-law inasmuch-as it-is penal and from the-law divine
consequens, hominem destituente propria dignitate.
following man depriving of-proper dignity

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds
de fomite secundum se considerato, prout inclinat ad
about the-fomes according-to itself considered according-as it-inclines to
malum. Sic enim non habet rationem legis, ut dictum
evil thus for not it-has the-notion of-law as said
est, sed secundum quod sequitur ex divinae legis iustitia:
it-is but according as it-follows from of-divine law justice
tanquam si diceretur lex esse quod aliquis nobilis, propter
as-though if it-were-said law to-be that someone noble on-account-of
suam culpam, ad servilia opera induci permitteretur.
his fault to servile works to-be-led be-permitted

Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo
to the-second it-must-be-said that objection that proceeds about that
quod est lex quasi regula et mensura: sic enim deviantes a
which is law as-if rule and measure thus for those-deviating from
lege transgressores constituuntur. Sic autem fomes non est
the-law transgressors are-constituted thus moreover the-fomes not is
lex, sed per quandam participationem, ut supra dictum est.
law but through a-certain participation as above said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds about
fomite quantum ad inclinationem propriam, non autem
the-fomes as-far to inclination proper not moreover
quantum ad suam originem. Et tamen si consideretur
as-far to its origin and yet if be-considered
inclinatio sensualitatis prout est in aliis animalibus, sic
the-inclination of-sensuality according-as it-is in other animals thus
ordinatur ad bonum commune, idest ad conservationem
it-is-ordered to the-good common that-is to the-conservation
naturae in specie vel in individuo. Et hoc est etiam in
of-nature in species or in individual and this is also in
homine, prout sensualitas subditur rationi. Sed fomes
man according-as sensuality is-subject to-reason but the-fomes
dicitur secundum quod exit rationis ordinem.
is-called according as it-goes-out-of of-reason the-order

De effectibus legis

XCII · ON THE EFFECTS OF LAW

Next Thomas considers the effects of law, in two questions: whether law makes men good, and whether its acts are rightly said to be to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish.

Deinde considerandum est de effectibus legis.
next to-be-considered it-is about the-effects of-law

Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
and about this are-asked two

Primo: utrum effectus legis sit homines facere bonos.
first whether the-effect of-law be men to-make good

Secundo: utrum effectus legis sint imperare, vetare,
second whether the-effects of-law be to-command to-forbid

permittere et punire, sicut Legisperitus dicit.
to-permit and to-punish as the-Jurist says

Utrum effectus legis sit facere homines bonos

1 · WHETHER THE EFFECT OF LAW IS TO MAKE MEN GOOD

Virtue is from God alone, obedience presupposes goodness, and some laws are tyrannical. Thomas answers that law is a dictate of reason in the ruler, and the virtue of any subject is to be well subject to his ruler, so law's proper effect is to lead its subjects to their virtue. If it aims at the true common good it makes them good simply; if at the ruler's own advantage, good only relatively, as one speaks of a good thief.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis non sit facere
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that of-law not it-be to-make
homines bonos. Homines enim sunt boni per virtutem:
men good men for are good through virtue
virtus enim est quae bonum facit habentem, ut dicitur
virtue for is-that which good makes the-one-having-it as is-said
in II Ethic. Sed virtus est homini a solo Deo: ipse enim
in II Ethics but virtue is to-man from alone God he for
eam facit in nobis sine nobis, ut supra dictum est in
it makes in us without us as above said it-is in
definitione virtutis. Ergo legis non est facere homines bonos.
the-definition of-virtue therefore of-law not it-is to-make men good

2. Praeterea, lex non prodest homini nisi legi obediat.
2 further law not profits man unless the-law he-obey
Sed hoc ipsum quod homo obedit legi, est ex bonitate.
but this very that man obeys the-law is from goodness
Ergo bonitas praeexigitur in homine ad legem. Non igitur
therefore goodness is-pre-required in man for law not therefore
lex facit homines bonos.
law makes men good

3. Praeterea, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut supra
3 further law is-ordered to the-good common as above
dictum est. Sed quidam bene se habent in his quae
said it-is but some well themselves have in those-things which
ad commune pertinent, qui tamen in propriis non bene se
to the-common pertain who yet in their-own not well themselves
habent. Non ergo ad legem pertinet quod faciat homines bonos.
have not therefore to law it-pertains that it-make men good

4. Praeterea, quaedam leges sunt tyrannicae, ut Philosophus
4 further certain laws are tyrannical as the-Philosopher
dicit, in sua Politica. Sed tyrannus non intendit ad bonitatem
says in his Politics but a-tyrant not aims at the-goodness
subditorum, sed solum ad propriam utilitatem. Non ergo
of-subjects but only at his-own utility not therefore
legis est facere homines bonos.
of-law it-is to-make men good

Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod
but against is that the-Philosopher says in II Ethics that
voluntas cuiuslibet legislatoris haec est, ut faciat cives
the-will of-every legislator this is that he-make the-citizens
bonos.
good

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law
nihil aliud est quam dictamen rationis in praesidente, quo
nothing other is than a-dictate of-reason in the-one-presiding by-which
subditi gubernantur. Cuiuslibet autem subditi virtus est ut
the-subjects are-governed of-any moreover subject the-virtue is that
bene subdatur ei a quo gubernatur: sicut videmus quod
well he-be-subject to-him by whom he-is-governed as we-see that
virtus irascibilis et concupiscibilis in hoc consistit quod sint
the-virtue irascible and concupiscible in this consists that they-be

bene obedientes rationi. Et per hunc modum virtus cuiuslibet
well obedient to-reason and in this mode the-virtue of-any
subiecti est ut bene subiiciatur principanti, ut Philosophus
subject is that well he-be-subjected to-the-one-ruling as the-Philosopher
dicit, in I Polit. Ad hoc autem ordinatur unaquaeque lex,
says in I Politics to this moreover is-ordered each law
ut obediatur ei a subditis. Unde manifestum est quod hoc
that it-be-obeyed to-it by the-subjects whence manifest it-is that this
sit proprium legis, inducere subiectos ad propriam ipsorum
be proper of-law to-induce the-subjects to the-proper of-them
virtutem. Cum igitur virtus sit quae bonum facit habentem,
virtue since therefore virtue be-that which good makes the-one-having-it
sequitur quod proprius effectus legis sit bonos facere eos
it-follows that the-proper effect of-law be good to-make those
quibus datur, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Si enim
to-whom it-is-given either simply or in-some respect if for
intentio ferentis legem tendat in verum bonum, quod
the-intention of-the-one-bringing the-law tend to true good which
est bonum commune secundum iustitiam divinam regulatum,
is the-good common according-to justice divine regulated
sequitur quod per legem homines fiant boni simpliciter. Si
it-follows that through the-law men become good simply if
vero intentio legislatoris feratur ad id quod non est bonum
but the-intention of-the-legislator be-borne to that which not is good
simpliciter, sed utile vel delectabile sibi, vel repugnans
simply but useful or pleasing to-himself or repugnant
iustitiae divinae; tunc lex non facit homines bonos simpliciter,
to-justice divine then law not makes men good simply
sed secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad tale regimen. Sic
but in-some respect namely in order to such regime thus

autem bonum invenitur etiam in per se malis: sicut
moreover good is-found also in through themselves evil-things as
aliquis dicitur bonus latro, quia operatur accommode ad finem.
someone is-called a-good thief because he-works fittingly to the-end

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est virtus, ut ex
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that twofold is virtue as from
supradictis patet: scilicet acquisita, et infusa. Ad utramque
the-above-said is-plain namely acquired and infused toward each
autem aliquid operatur operum assuetudo, sed diversimode:
moreover something works of-works the-habituation but diversely
nam virtutem quidem acquisitam causat; ad virtutem autem
for virtue indeed acquired it-causes to virtue but
infusam disponit, et eam iam habitam conservat et
infused it-disposes and it already had preserves and
promovet. Et quia lex ad hoc datur ut dirigat actus
promotes and because law for this is-given that it-direct acts
humanos, inquantum actus humani operantur ad virtutem,
human inasmuch-as acts human work to virtue
intantum lex facit homines bonos. Unde et Philosophus
so-far law makes men good whence also the-Philosopher
dicit, II Polit., quod legislatores assuefacientes faciunt bonos.
says II Politics that legislators by-habituating make good

Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper aliquis obedit
to the-second it-must-be-said that not always someone obeys
legi ex bonitate perfecta virtutis: sed quandoque quidem ex
the-law from goodness perfect of-virtue but sometimes indeed from
timore poenae; quandoque autem ex solo dictamine rationis,
fear of-punishment sometimes moreover from alone the-dictate of-reason
quod est quoddam principium virtutis, ut supra habitum est.
which is a-certain principle of-virtue as above held it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod bonitas cuiuslibet partis
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-goodness of-any part
consideratur in proportione ad suum totum: unde et
is-considered in proportion to its whole whence also
Augustinus dicit, in III Confess., quod turpis omnis pars est
Augustine says in III Confessions that base every part is
quae suo toti non congruit. Cum igitur quilibet homo sit
which with-its whole not agrees since therefore any man be
pars civitatis, impossibile est quod aliquis homo sit bonus,
a-part of-the-city impossible it-is that any man be good
nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi: nec totum
unless he-be well proportioned to-the-good common nor the-whole
potest bene consistere nisi ex partibus sibi proportionatis.
can well to-stand unless from parts to-it proportioned
Unde impossibile est quod bonum commune civitatis bene
whence impossible it-is that the-good common of-the-city well
se habeat, nisi cives sint virtuosi, ad minus illi quibus
itself have unless the-citizens be virtuous at least those to-whom
convenit principari. Sufficit autem, quantum ad bonum
it-belongs to-rule it-suffices moreover as-far to the-good
communitatis, quod alii intantum sint virtuosi quod
of-the-community that the-others so-far be virtuous that
principum mandatis obediant. Et ideo Philosophus dicit, in
of-the-princes the-commands they-obey and therefore the-Philosopher says in
III Polit., quod eadem est virtus principis et boni viri; non
III Politics that the-same is the-virtue of-a-prince and of-a-good man not
autem eadem est virtus cuiuscumque civis et boni viri.
moreover the-same is the-virtue of-any-whatever citizen and of-a-good man

Ad quartum dicendum quod lex tyrannica, cum non sit
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that law tyrannical since not it-be
secundum rationem, non est simpliciter lex, sed magis est
according-to reason not is simply law but rather is

quaedam perversitas legis. Et tamen inquantum habet aliquid
a-certain perversity of-law and yet inasmuch-as it-has something
de ratione legis, intendit ad hoc quod cives sint boni.
of the-notion of-law it-aims at this that the-citizens be good
Non enim habet de ratione legis nisi secundum hoc quod
not for it-has of the-notion of-law except according-to this that
est dictamen alicuius praesidentis in subditis, et ad hoc
it-is a-dictate of-someone presiding over subjects and to this
tendit ut subditi legi sint bene obedientes; quod est eos
it-tends that the-subjects to-the-law be well obedient which is them
esse bonos, non simpliciter, sed in ordine ad tale regimen.
to-be good not simply but in order to such regime

Utrum legis actus convenienter assignentur

2 · WHETHER THE ACTS OF LAW ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED

To command and to prescribe are the same, counsel is better than precept, and law should reward as well as punish. Thomas answers that law induces by way of precept, and human acts are good in kind, evil in kind, or indifferent; so law commands the first, forbids the second, and permits the third, and it induces obedience by fear of punishment. Counsel belongs to private persons too, as does reward; punishment, to the law's minister alone.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod legis actus non sint
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that of-law the-acts not be
convenienter assignati in hoc quod dicitur quod legis actus
fittingly assigned in this that it-is-said that of-law the-act
est imperare, vetare, permittere et punire. Lex enim omnis
is to-command to-forbid to-permit and to-punish law for every

praeceptum commune est, ut Legisconsultus dicit. Sed idem
precept common is as the-Jurist says but the-same
est imperare quod praecipere. Ergo alia tria superfluunt.
is to-command as to-prescribe therefore the-other three are-superfluous

2. Praeterea, effectus legis est ut inducat subditos ad
2 further the-effect of-law is that it-induce subjects to
bonum, sicut supra dictum est. Sed consilium est de
good as above said it-is but counsel is about
meliori bono quam praeceptum. Ergo magis pertinet ad
better good than precept therefore more it-pertains to
legem consulere quam praecipere.
law to-counsel than to-prescribe

3. Praeterea, sicut homo aliquis incitatur ad bonum per
3 further as man some is-incited to good through
poenas, ita etiam et per praemia. Ergo sicut punire
punishments so also and through rewards therefore as to-punish
ponitur effectus legis, ita etiam et praemiare.
is-posited an-effect of-law so also and to-reward

4. Praeterea, intentio legislatoris est ut homines faciat
4 further the-intention of-the-legislator is that men he-make
bonos, sicut supra dictum est. Sed ille qui solo metu
good as above said it-is but he who by-alone fear
poenarum obedit legi, non est bonus: nam timore servili,
of-punishments obeys the-law not is good for by-fear servile
qui est timor poenarum, etsi bonum aliquis faciat, non
which is the-fear of-punishments although good someone do not
tamen bene aliquid fit, ut Augustinus dicit. Non ergo
yet well anything is-done as Augustine says not therefore
videtur esse proprium legis quod puniat.
it-seems to-be proper of-law that it-punish

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in V Etymol.: Omnis
but against is that Isidore says in V Etymologies every
lex aut permittit aliquid, ut: Vir fortis praemium petat. Aut
law either permits something as a-man brave a-reward may-seek or
vetat, ut: Sacrarum virginum nuptias nulli liceat petere.
forbids as of-sacred virgins the-marriage to-no-one be-it-lawful to-seek
Aut punit, ut: Qui caedem fecerit, capite plectatur.
or punishes as who murder will-have-done by-the-head let-him-be-punished

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut enuntiatio est rationis
I-answer it-must-be-said that as an-enunciation is of-reason
dictamen per modum enuntiandi, ita etiam lex per modum
a-dictate through the-mode of-enunciating so also law through the-mode
praecipiendi. Rationis autem proprium est ut ex aliquo ad
of-prescribing of-reason moreover proper it-is that from something to
aliquid inducat. Unde sicut in demonstrativis scientiis ratio
something it-induce whence as in demonstrative sciences reason
inducit ut assentiatur conclusioni per quaedam principia, ita
induces that one-assent to-the-conclusion through certain principles so
etiam inducit ut assentiatur legis praecepto per aliquid.
also it-induces that one-assent of-the-law to-the-precept through something

Praecepta autem legis sunt de actibus humanis, in quibus
the-precepts moreover of-law are about acts human in which
lex dirigit, ut supra dictum est. Sunt autem tres differentiae
law directs as above said it-is there-are moreover three differences
humanorum actuum. Nam sicut supra dictum est, quidam
of-human acts for as above said it-is some
actus sunt boni ex genere, qui sunt actus virtutum: et
acts are good by genus which are the-acts of-virtues and
respectu horum, ponitur legis actus praecipere vel imperare;
with-respect-to of-these is-posited of-law the-act to-prescribe or to-command
praecipit enim lex omnes actus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic.
prescribes for law all the-acts of-virtues as is-said in V Ethics

Quidam vero sunt actus mali ex genere, sicut actus vitiosi: et
some but are acts evil by genus as acts vicious and
respectu horum, lex habet prohibere. Quidam vero ex genere
with-respect-to of-these law has to-forbid some but by genus
suo sunt actus indifferentes: et respectu horum, lex habet
their are acts indifferent and with-respect-to of-these law has
permittere. Et possunt etiam indifferentes dici omnes illi
to-permit and can also indifferent to-be-called all those
actus qui sunt vel parum boni vel parum mali. – Id autem
acts which are either little good or little evil that moreover
per quod inducit lex ad hoc quod sibi obediatur, est timor
through which induces law to this that to-it it-be-obeyed is the-fear
poenae: et quantum ad hoc, ponitur legis effectus punire.
of-punishment and as-far to this is-posited of-law the-effect to-punish

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut cessare a
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as to-cease from
malo habet quandam rationem boni, ita etiam prohibitio
evil has a-certain notion of-good so also prohibition
habet quandam rationem praecepti. Et secundum hoc, large
has a-certain notion of-precept and according-to this broadly
accipiendo praeceptum, universaliter lex praeceptum dicitur.
by-taking precept universally law a-precept is-called

Ad secundum dicendum quod consulere non est proprius
to the-second it-must-be-said that to-counsel not is the-proper
actus legis, sed potest pertinere etiam ad personam privatam,
act of-law but it-can to-pertain also to a-person private
cuius non est condere legem. Unde etiam Apostolus, I ad
of-whom not it-is to-frame law whence also the-Apostle I to
Cor. VII, cum consilium quoddam daret, dixit: Ego dico,
Corinthians VII when counsel a-certain he-gave said I say
non Dominus. Et ideo non ponitur inter effectus legis.
not the-Lord and therefore not it-is-posited among the-effects of-law

Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam praemiare potest
to the-third it-must-be-said that even to-reward can
ad quemlibet pertinere: sed punire non pertinet nisi ad
to anyone to-pertain but to-punish not pertains except to
ministrum legis, cuius auctoritate poena infertur. Et
the-minister of-the-law by-whose authority punishment is-inflicted and
ideo praemiare non ponitur actus legis, sed solum punire.
therefore to-reward not is-posited an-act of-law but only to-punish

Ad quartum dicendum quod per hoc quod aliquis
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that through this that someone
incipit assuefieri ad vitandum mala et ad implendum
begins to-be-accustomed to avoiding evils and to fulfilling
bona propter metum poenae, perducitur quandoque ad
goods on-account-of fear of-punishment he-is-led sometimes to
hoc quod delectabiliter et ex propria voluntate hoc faciat.
this that delightfully and from his-own will this he-do
Et secundum hoc, lex etiam puniendo perducit ad hoc
and according-to this law also by-punishing leads to this
quod homines sint boni.
that men be good

De lege aeterna

XCIII · ON THE ETERNAL LAW

Thomas now takes each law in turn: the eternal, the natural, the human, the old, and the new, which is the law of the Gospel; of the law of the fomes enough was said in the treatise on original sin. On the eternal law he asks six questions: what it is; whether all know it; whether every law derives from it; whether necessary things are subject to it; whether natural contingent things are; and whether all human things are.

Deinde considerandum est de singulis legibus. Et primo,
next to-be-considered it-is about the-single laws and first
de lege aeterna; secundo, de lege naturali; tertio, de
about the-law eternal second about the-law natural third about
lege humana; quarto, de lege veteri; quinto, de lege
the-law human fourth about the-law old fifth about the-law
nova, quae est lex Evangelii. De sexta autem lege,
new which is the-law of-the-Gospel about the-sixth moreover law
quae est lex fomitis, sufficiat quod dictum est cum de
which is the-law of-the-fomes let-suffice what said it-is when about
peccato originali ageretur.
sin original it-was-treated

Circa primum quaeruntur sex.
about the-first are-asked six

Primo: quid sit lex aeterna.
first what be the-law eternal

Secundo: utrum sit omnibus nota.
second whether it-be to-all known

Tertio: utrum omnis lex ab ea derivetur.
third whether every law from it be-derived

Quarto: utrum necessaria subiiciantur legi aeternae.
fourth whether necessary-things be-subject to-the-law eternal

Quinto: utrum contingentia naturalia subiiciantur legi
fifth whether contingent-things natural be-subject to-the-law
aeternae.
eternal

Sexto: utrum omnes res humanae ei subiiciantur.
sixth whether all things human to-it be-subject

Utrum lex aeterna sit summa ratio in Deo existens

1 · WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS THE HIGHEST REASON IN GOD

The reasons of things in God are many, the Word is said personally, and truth differs from reason. Thomas answers that as the reason of works of art pre-exists in the artificer, so the reason of the order of things pre-exists in their governor; God's wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, has the nature of law, so the eternal law is the reason of divine wisdom directing every act and motion. It is appropriated to the Son, but not said personally.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non sit
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law eternal not be
ratio summa in Deo existens. Lex enim aeterna est una
the-reason highest in God existing the-law for eternal is one
tantum. Sed rationes rerum in mente divina sunt plures: dicit
only but the-reasons of-things in the-mind divine are several says
enim Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod
for Augustine in the-book of-Eighty three Questions that
Deus singula fecit propriis rationibus. Ergo lex aeterna
God single-things made by-proper reasons therefore the-law eternal
non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina existens.
not seems to-be the-same as reason in the-mind divine existing

2. Praeterea, de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut
2 further of the-notion of-law it-is that by-word it-be-promulgated as
supra dictum est. Sed Verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter,
above said it-is but Word in divine-things is-said personally
ut in Primo habitum est: ratio autem dicitur essentialiter.
as in the-First held it-is reason moreover is-said essentially
Non igitur idem est lex aeterna quod ratio divina.
not therefore the-same is the-law eternal as reason divine

3. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Vera Relig.:
3 further Augustine says in the-book on True Religion
Apparet supra mentem nostram legem esse, quae veritas
it-appears above mind our a-law to-be which truth
dicitur. Lex autem supra mentem nostram existens est
is-called the-law moreover above mind our existing is
lex aeterna. Ergo veritas est lex aeterna. Sed non est
the-law eternal therefore truth is the-law eternal but not is
eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex aeterna non
the-same the-notion of-truth and of-reason therefore the-law eternal not
est idem quod ratio summa.
is the-same as reason highest

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib.
but against is that Augustine says in I on Free
Arb., quod lex aeterna est summa ratio, cui semper
Choice that the-law eternal is the-highest reason which always
obtemperandum est.
to-be-obeyed it-is

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in quolibet artifice
I-answer it-must-be-said that as in any artificer
praeexistit ratio eorum quae constituuntur per artem,
pre-exists the-reason of-those-things which are-constituted through art
ita etiam in quolibet gubernante oportet quod praeexistat
so also in any governor it-is-necessary that pre-exist

ratio ordinis eorum quae agenda sunt per eos qui
the-reason of-the-order of-those-things which to-be-done are by those who
gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum
to-government are-subject and as the-reason of-things to-be-made
per artem vocatur ars vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita
through art is-called art or exemplar of-things made-by-art so
etiam ratio gubernantis actus subditorum, rationem legis
also the-reason of-the-governor of-the-acts of-subjects the-notion of-law
obtinet, servatis aliis quae supra esse diximus de
obtains being-observed the-other-things which above to-be we-said about
legis ratione. Deus autem per suam sapientiam conditor
of-law the-notion God moreover through his wisdom founder
est universarum rerum, ad quas comparatur sicut artifex ad
is of-all things to which he-is-compared as an-artificer to
artificiata, ut in Primo habitum est. Est etiam gubernator
things-made-by-art as in the-First held it-is he-is also the-governor
omnium actuum et motionum quae inveniuntur in singulis
of-all acts and motions which are-found in single
creaturis, ut etiam in Primo habitum est. Unde sicut ratio
creatures as also in the-First held it-is whence as the-reason
divinae sapientiae inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata,
of-divine wisdom inasmuch-as through it all-things are created
rationem habet artis vel exemplaris vel ideae; ita ratio
the-notion has of-art or exemplar or idea so the-reason
divinae sapientiae moventis omnia ad debitum finem, obtinet
of-divine wisdom moving all-things to due end obtains
rationem legis. Et secundum hoc, lex aeterna nihil aliud
the-notion of-law and according-to this the-law eternal nothing other
est quam ratio divinae sapientiae, secundum quod est
is than the-reason of-divine wisdom according as it-is
directiva omnium actuum et motionum.
directive of-all acts and motions

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that Augustine speaks
ibi de rationibus idealibus, quae respiciunt proprias naturas
there about the-reasons ideal which regard the-proper natures
singularum rerum: et ideo in eis invenitur quaedam
of-single things and therefore in them is-found a-certain
distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos respectus ad res,
distinction and plurality according-to diverse relations to things
ut in Primo habitum est. Sed lex dicitur directiva actuum
as in the-First held it-is but law is-called directive of-acts
in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. Ea
in order to the-good common as above said it-is those-things
autem quae sunt in seipsis diversa, considerantur ut unum,
moreover which are in themselves diverse are-considered as one
secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune. Et ideo
according as they-are-ordered to some common-thing and therefore
lex aeterna est una, quae est ratio huius ordinis.
the-law eternal is one which is the-reason of-this order

Ad secundum dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque
to the-second it-must-be-said that about word any
duo possunt considerari: scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea
two-things can to-be-considered namely the-very word and those-things
quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim vocale est quiddam
which by-the-word are-expressed the-word for vocal is something
ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo exprimuntur
from the-mouth of-man uttered but by-this word are-expressed
quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est de
what-things by-words human are-signified and the-same reason is about
verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam
the-word of-man mental which nothing is other than something
mente conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea
by-the-mind conceived by-which man expresses mentally those-things

de quibus cogitat. Sic igitur in divinis ipsum Verbum, quod
about which he-thinks thus therefore in divine-things the-very Word which
est conceptio paterni intellectus, personaliter dicitur: sed
is the-conception of-the-paternal intellect personally is-said but
omnia quaecumque sunt in scientia Patris, sive essentialia
all-things whatever are in the-knowledge of-the-Father whether essential
sive personalia, sive etiam Dei opera, exprimuntur hoc Verbo,
or personal or even of-God the-works are-expressed by-this Word
ut patet per Augustinum, in XV de Trin. Et inter cetera
as is-plain through Augustine in XV on the-Trinity and among the-rest
quae hoc Verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex aeterna Verbo
which by-this Word are-expressed also the-very law eternal by-the-Word
ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod lex
itself is-expressed nor yet on-account-of this it-follows that the-law
aeterna personaliter in divinis dicatur. Appropriatur tamen
eternal personally in divine-things be-said it-is-appropriated yet
Filio, propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.
to-the-Son on-account-of the-fittingness which has reason to word

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio intellectus divini aliter
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-reason of-the-intellect divine otherwise
se habet ad res quam ratio intellectus humani. Intellectus
itself has to things than the-reason of-the-intellect human the-intellect
enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus
for human is measured by things so-that namely the-concept
hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus
of-man not be true on-account-of itself but it-is-called true
ex hoc quod consonat rebus: ex hoc enim quod res
from this that it-accords with-things from this for that a-thing
est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa est. Intellectus vero
is or not is an-opinion true or false is the-intellect but
divinus est mensura rerum: quia unaquaeque res intantum
divine is the-measure of-things because each thing so-far

habet de veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum,
has of truth inasmuch-as it-imitates the-intellect divine
ut in Primo dictum est. Et ideo intellectus divinus est
as in the-First said it-is and therefore the-intellect divine is
verus secundum se. Unde ratio eius est ipsa veritas.
true according-to itself whence the-reason of-it is the-very truth

Utrum lex aeterna sit omnibus nota

2 · WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS KNOWN TO ALL

No one knows the things of God but his Spirit, and men cannot judge the eternal law. Thomas answers that a thing is known in itself or in its effect, as the sun in its rays; only the blessed know the eternal law in itself, but every rational creature knows it in some radiation, at least in the common principles of the natural law. No one comprehends it, and no one judges it as a superior judges an inferior.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex aeterna non
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law eternal not
sit omnibus nota. Quia ut dicit Apostolus, I ad Cor.,
be to-all known because as says the-Apostle I to Corinthians
quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi Spiritus Dei. Sed
the-things-which are of-God no-one has-known except the-Spirit of-God but
lex aeterna est quaedam ratio in mente divina existens.
the-law eternal is a-certain reason in the-mind divine existing
Ergo omnibus est ignota nisi soli Deo.
therefore to-all it-is unknown except to-alone God

2. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib.
2 further as Augustine says in the-book on Free
Arb., lex aeterna est qua iustum est ut omnia sint
Choice the-law eternal is-that by-which just it-is that all-things be

ordinatissima. Sed non omnes cognoscunt qualiter omnia sint
most-ordered but not all know how all-things be
ordinatissima. Non ergo omnes cognoscunt legem aeternam.
most-ordered not therefore all know the-law eternal

3. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Vera Relig., quod
3 further Augustine says in the-book on True Religion that
lex aeterna est de qua homines iudicare non possunt.
the-law eternal is-that about which men to-judge not can
Sed sicut in I Ethic. dicitur, unusquisque bene iudicat
but as in I Ethics is-said each-one well judges
quae cognoscit. Ergo lex aeterna non est nobis nota.
the-things-which he-knows therefore the-law eternal not is to-us known

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib.
but against is that Augustine says in the-book on Free
Arb., quod aeternae legis notio nobis impressa est.
Choice that of-the-eternal law the-notion on-us impressed is

Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid cognosci potest:
I-answer it-must-be-said that in-two-ways something to-be-known can
uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in suo effectu, in quo
in-one way in itself in-another way in its effect in which
aliqua similitudo eius invenitur; sicut aliquis non videns solem
some likeness of-it is-found as someone not seeing the-sun
in sua substantia, cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur
in its substance knows it in its irradiation thus therefore
dicendum est quod legem aeternam nullus potest cognoscere
to-be-said it-is that the-law eternal no-one can to-know
secundum quod in seipsa est, nisi solum beati, qui Deum per
according as in itself it-is except only the-blessed who God through
essentiam vident. Sed omnis creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit
essence see but every creature rational it knows
secundum aliquam eius irradiationem, vel maiorem vel
according-to some its irradiation either greater or

minorem. Omnis enim cognitio veritatis est quaedam irradiatio
lesser all for knowledge of-truth is a-certain irradiation
et participatio legis aeternae, quae est veritas incommutabilis,
and participation of-the-law eternal which is truth unchangeable
ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Vera Relig. Veritatem autem
as Augustine says in the-book on True Religion truth moreover
omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus quantum ad principia
all in-some-way know at least as-far to the-principles
communia legis naturalis. In aliis vero quidam plus et
common of-the-law natural in the-others but some more and
quidam minus participant de cognitione veritatis; et secundum
some less participate of the-knowledge of-truth and according-to
hoc etiam plus vel minus cognoscunt legem aeternam.
this also more or less they-know the-law eternal

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that those-things which are
Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a nobis non possunt: sed
of-God in themselves indeed to-be-known by us not can but
tamen in effectibus suis nobis manifestantur, secundum illud
yet in effects their to-us they-are-manifested according-to that
Rom. I: Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt,
Romans I the-invisible-things of-God through those-things which made are
intellecta, conspiciuntur.
understood are-clearly-seen

Ad secundum dicendum quod legem aeternam etsi
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-law eternal although
unusquisque cognoscat pro sua capacitate, secundum
each-one know according-to his capacity according-to
modum praedictum, nullus tamen eam comprehendere potest:
the-mode aforesaid no-one yet it to-comprehend can
non enim totaliter manifestari potest per suos effectus.
not for totally to-be-manifested it-can through its effects

Et ideo non oportet quod quicumque cognoscit legem
and therefore not it-is-necessary that whoever knows the-law
aeternam secundum modum praedictum, cognoscat totum
eternal according-to the-mode aforesaid know the-whole
ordinem rerum, quo omnia sunt ordinatissima.
order of-things by-which all-things are most-ordered

Ad tertium dicendum quod iudicare de aliquo potest
to the-third it-must-be-said that to-judge about something can
intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut vis cognitiva
to-be-understood in-two-ways in-one way as the-power cognitive
diiudicat de proprio obiecto; secundum illud Iob XII:
discerns about its-proper object according-to that Job XII
Nonne auris verba diiudicat, et fauces comedentis saporem?
does-not the-ear words discern and the-palate of-one-eating the-flavor
Et secundum istum modum iudicii, Philosophus dicit quod
and according-to this the-mode of-judgment the-Philosopher says that
unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit, iudicando
each-one well judges the-things-which he-knows by-judging
scilicet an sit verum quod proponitur. Alio modo,
namely whether it-be true what is-proposed in-another way
secundum quod superior iudicat de inferiori quodam
according as a-superior judges about an-inferior by-a-certain
practico iudicio, an scilicet ita debeat esse vel non ita.
practical judgment whether namely so it-ought to-be or not so
Et sic nullus potest iudicare de lege aeterna.
and thus no-one can to-judge about the-law eternal

Utrum omnis lex a lege aeterna derivetur

3 · WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW

The fomes, unjust laws, and laws that permit what providence punishes seem not to derive from it. Thomas answers that in ordered movers the second moves by the power of the first, as the king's reason passes to his officers and the architect's to the workmen; so every law, so far as it shares right reason, derives from the eternal law. An unjust law is violence rather than law, and human law permits what it cannot direct.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex a lege
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not every law from the-law
aeterna derivetur. Est enim quaedam lex fomitis, ut supra
eternal be-derived there-is for a-certain law of-the-fomes as above
dictum est. Ipsa autem non derivatur a lege divina, quae est
said it-is it moreover not is-derived from the-law divine which is
lex aeterna: ad ipsam enim pertinet prudentia carnis, de qua
the-law eternal to it for pertains the-prudence of-the-flesh about which
Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII, quod legi Dei non potest
the-Apostle says to the-Romans VIII that to-the-law of-God not can
esse subiecta. Ergo non omnis lex procedit a lege aeterna.
to-be subject therefore not every law proceeds from the-law eternal

2. Praeterea, a lege aeterna nihil iniquum procedere potest:
2 further from the-law eternal nothing unjust to-proceed can
quia sicut dictum est, lex aeterna est secundum quam
because as said it-is the-law eternal is-that according-to which
iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Sed quaedam leges
just it-is that all-things be most-ordered but certain laws
sunt iniquae; secundum illud Isaiae X: Vae qui condunt
are unjust according-to that of-Isaiah X woe to-those-who frame
leges iniquas. Ergo non omnis lex procedit a lege aeterna.
laws unjust therefore not every law proceeds from the-law eternal

3. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arbit.,
3 further Augustine says in I on Free Choice
quod lex quae populo regendo scribitur, recte multa
that the-law which for-the-people to-be-ruled is-written rightly many-things
permittit quae per divinam providentiam vindicantur. Sed
permits which through divine providence are-punished but
ratio divinae providentiae est lex aeterna, ut dictum est.
the-reason of-divine providence is the-law eternal as said it-is
Ergo nec etiam omnis lex recta procedit a lege aeterna.
therefore not even every law right proceeds from the-law eternal

Sed contra est quod, Prov. VIII, divina sapientia dicit: Per
but against is that Proverbs VIII divine wisdom says through
me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt.
me kings reign and of-laws the-framers just-things decree
Ratio autem divinae sapientiae est lex aeterna, ut supra
the-reason moreover of-divine wisdom is the-law eternal as above
dictum est. Ergo omnes leges a lege aeterna procedunt.
said it-is therefore all laws from the-law eternal proceed

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law
importat rationem quandam directivam actuum ad finem.
implies a-reason certain directive of-acts to the-end
In omnibus autem moventibus ordinatis oportet quod
in all moreover movers ordered it-is-necessary that
virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute moventis
the-power of-the-second mover be-derived from the-power of-the-mover
primi: quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum
first because the-mover second not moves except inasmuch-as
movetur a primo. Unde et in omnibus gubernantibus idem
it-is-moved by the-first whence also in all governors the-same
videmus, quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante
we-see that the-reason of-government from the-first governor

ad secundos derivatur: sicut ratio eorum quae sunt
to the-second-ones is-derived as the-reason of-those-things which are
agenda in civitate, derivatur a rege per praeceptum in
to-be-done in the-city is-derived from the-king through precept to
inferiores administratores. Et in artificialibus etiam ratio
the-lower administrators and in things-of-art also the-reason
artificialium actuum derivatur ab architectore ad inferiores
of-artificial acts is-derived from the-architect to the-lower
artifices, qui manu operantur. Cum ergo lex aeterna sit
artificers who by-hand work since therefore the-law eternal be
ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernante, necesse est
the-reason of-government in the-supreme governor necessary it-is
quod omnes rationes gubernationis quae sunt in inferioribus
that all the-reasons of-government which are in lower
gubernantibus, a lege aeterna deriventur. Huiusmodi autem
governors from the-law eternal be-derived of-this-kind moreover
rationes inferiorum gubernantium sunt quaecumque aliae
reasons of-lower governors are whatever other
leges praeter legem aeternam. Unde omnes leges, inquantum
laws besides the-law eternal whence all laws inasmuch-as
participant de ratione recta, intantum derivantur a lege
they-participate of reason right so-far are-derived from the-law
aeterna. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib.
eternal and on-account-of this Augustine says in I on Free
Arb., quod in temporali lege nihil est iustum ac legitimum,
Choice that in the-temporal law nothing is just and lawful
quod non ex lege aeterna homines sibi derivaverunt.
which not from the-law eternal men for-themselves have-derived

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fomes habet rationem
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-fomes has the-notion
legis in homine, inquantum est poena consequens divinam
of-law in man inasmuch-as it-is a-penalty following divine

iustitiam: et secundum hoc manifestum est quod derivatur
justice and according-to this manifest it-is that it-is-derived
a lege aeterna. Inquantum vero inclinat ad peccatum, sic
from the-law eternal inasmuch-as but it-inclines to sin thus
contrariatur legi Dei, et non habet rationem legis, ut
it-is-contrary to-the-law of-God and not has the-notion of-law as
ex supradictis patet.
from the-above-said is-plain

Ad secundum dicendum quod lex humana intantum habet
to the-second it-must-be-said that law human so-far has
rationem legis, inquantum est secundum rationem rectam: et
the-notion of-law inasmuch-as it-is according-to reason right and
secundum hoc manifestum est quod a lege aeterna derivatur.
according-to this manifest it-is that from the-law eternal it-is-derived
Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic dicitur lex iniqua: et
inasmuch-as but from reason it-recedes thus it-is-called law unjust and
sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis violentiae cuiusdam.
thus not it-has the-notion of-law but rather of-violence a-certain
– Et tamen in ipsa lege iniqua inquantum servatur aliquid de
and yet in the-very law unjust inasmuch-as is-preserved something of
similitudine legis propter ordinem potestatis eius qui legem
the-likeness of-law on-account-of the-order of-power of-him who law
fert, secundum hoc etiam derivatur a lege aeterna: omnis
brings according-to this also it-is-derived from the-law eternal all
enim potestas a Domino Deo est, ut dicitur Rom. XIII.
for power from the-Lord God is as is-said Romans XIII

Ad tertium dicendum quod lex humana dicitur aliqua
to the-third it-must-be-said that law human is-said some-things
permittere, non quasi ea approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere
to-permit not as-if them approving but as-if them to-direct
non potens. Multa autem diriguntur lege divina quae
not able many-things moreover are-directed by-law divine which

dirigi non possunt lege humana: plura enim subduntur
to-be-directed not can by-law human more for are-subject
causae superiori quam inferiori. Unde hoc ipsum quod lex
to-a-cause higher than to-a-lower whence this very that law
humana non se intromittat de his quae dirigere non
human not itself intrude about those-things which to-direct not
potest, ex ordine legis aeternae provenit. Secus autem
it-can from the-order of-the-law eternal proceeds otherwise moreover
esset si approbaret ea quae lex aeterna reprobat.
it-would-be if it-approved those-things which the-law eternal reproves
Unde ex hoc non habetur quod lex humana non derivetur
whence from this not is-had that law human not be-derived
a lege aeterna, sed quod non perfecte eam assequi possit.
from the-law eternal but that not perfectly it to-attain it-can

Utrum necessaria et aeterna subiiciantur legi aeternae

4 · WHETHER NECESSARY THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW

God's will is reasonable, and the Son is subject to the Father. Thomas answers that whatever is subject to God's government is subject to the eternal law, as what men can do is subject to human government but not what belongs to man's nature. All created things, contingent or necessary, are subject to it; what belongs to God's nature or essence is the eternal law itself. The Son is not made but begotten, and is subject in his human nature.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod necessaria et
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that necessary-things and
aeterna subiiciantur legi aeternae. Omne enim quod
eternal-things be-subject to-the-law eternal all for which
rationabile est, rationi subditur. Sed voluntas divina est
reasonable is to-reason is-subject but the-will divine is

rationabilis: cum sit iusta. Ergo rationi subditur. Sed lex
reasonable since it-be just therefore to-reason it-is-subject but the-law
aeterna est ratio divina. Ergo voluntas Dei subditur legi
eternal is the-reason divine therefore the-will of-God is-subject to-the-law
aeternae. Voluntas autem Dei est aliquod aeternum. Ergo
eternal the-will moreover of-God is something eternal therefore
etiam aeterna et necessaria legi aeternae subduntur.
also eternal-things and necessary-things to-the-law eternal are-subject

2. Praeterea, quidquid subiicitur regi, subiicitur legi
2 further whatever is-subject to-the-king is-subject to-the-law
regis. Filius autem, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, subiectus
of-the-king the-Son moreover as is-said I to Corinthians XV subject
erit Deo et Patri, cum tradiderit ei regnum.
will-be to-God and the-Father when he-will-have-delivered to-him the-kingdom
Ergo Filius, qui est aeternus, subiicitur legi aeternae.
therefore the-Son who is eternal is-subject to-the-law eternal

3. Praeterea, lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae.
3 further the-law eternal is the-reason of-divine providence
Sed multa necessaria subduntur divinae providentiae: sicut
but many necessary-things are-subject to-divine providence as
permanentia substantiarum incorporalium et corporum
the-permanence of-substances incorporeal and of-bodies
caelestium. Ergo legi aeternae subduntur etiam necessaria.
heavenly therefore to-the-law eternal are-subject also necessary-things

Sed contra, ea quae sunt necessaria, impossibile est
but against those-things which are necessary impossible it-is
aliter se habere: unde cohibitione non indigent. Sed
otherwise themselves to-have whence restraint not they-need but
imponitur hominibus lex ut cohibeantur a malis, ut ex
is-imposed on-men law that they-be-restrained from evils as from

supradictis patet. Ergo ea quae sunt necessaria, legi
the-above-said is-plain therefore those-things which are necessary to-law
non subduntur.
not are-subject

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is the-law
aeterna est ratio divinae gubernationis. Quaecumque ergo
eternal is the-reason of-divine government whatever-things therefore
divinae gubernationi subduntur, subiiciuntur etiam legi
to-divine government are-subject are-subjected also to-the-law
aeternae: quae vero gubernationi aeternae non subduntur,
eternal those-which but to-government eternal not are-subject
neque legi aeternae subduntur. Horum autem distinctio
neither to-the-law eternal are-subject of-these moreover the-distinction
attendi potest ex his quae circa nos sunt. Humanae
to-be-regarded can from those-things which about us are to-human
enim gubernationi subduntur ea quae per homines
for government are-subject those-things which through men
fieri possunt: quae vero ad naturam hominis pertinent,
to-be-done can those-which but to the-nature of-man pertain
non subduntur gubernationi humanae, scilicet quod homo
not are-subject to-government human namely that man
habeat animam, vel manus aut pedes. Sic igitur legi
have a-soul or hands or feet thus therefore to-the-law
aeternae subduntur omnia quae sunt in rebus a Deo creatis,
eternal are-subject all-things which are in things by God created
sive sint contingentia sive sint necessaria: ea vero
whether they-be contingent or they-be necessary those-things but
quae pertinent ad naturam vel essentiam divinam, legi
which pertain to the-nature or essence divine to-the-law
aeternae non subduntur, sed sunt realiter ipsa lex aeterna.
eternal not are-subject but are really the-very law eternal

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod de voluntate Dei
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that about the-will of-God
dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsam
in-two-ways we-can to-speak in-one way as-far to the-very
voluntatem: et sic, cum voluntas Dei sit ipsa eius essentia,
will and thus since the-will of-God be the-very his essence
non subditur gubernationi divinae neque legi aeternae,
not it-is-subject to-government divine nor to-the-law eternal
sed est idem quod lex aeterna. Alio modo possumus
but it-is the-same as the-law eternal in-another way we-can
loqui de voluntate divina quantum ad ipsa quae
to-speak about the-will divine as-far to those-things-themselves which
Deus vult circa creaturas: quae quidem subiecta sunt legi
God wills about creatures which indeed subject are to-the-law
aeternae, inquantum horum ratio est in divina sapientia.
eternal inasmuch-as of-these the-reason is in the-divine wisdom
Et ratione horum, voluntas Dei dicitur rationabilis. Alioquin,
and by-reason of-these the-will of-God is-called reasonable otherwise
ratione sui ipsius, magis est dicenda ipsa ratio.
by-reason of-it itself rather it-is to-be-called the-very reason

Ad secundum dicendum quod Filius Dei non est a
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-Son of-God not is by
Deo factus, sed naturaliter ab ipso genitus. Et ideo non
God made but naturally from him begotten and therefore not
subditur divinae providentiae aut legi aeternae: sed magis
he-is-subject to-divine providence or to-the-law eternal but rather
ipse est lex aeterna per quandam appropriationem, ut
he is the-law eternal through a-certain appropriation as
patet per Augustinum, in libro de Vera Relig. Dicitur
is-plain through Augustine in the-book on True Religion he-is-said

autem esse subiectus Patri ratione humanae naturae,
moreover to-be subject to-the-Father by-reason of-human nature
secundum quam etiam Pater dicitur esse maior eo.
according-to which also the-Father is-said to-be greater than-him

Tertium concedimus: quia procedit de necessariis creatis.
the-third we-grant because it-proceeds about necessary-things created

Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in V
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher says in V
Metaphys., quaedam necessaria habent causam suae necessitatis:
Metaphysics certain necessary-things have a-cause of-their necessity
et sic hoc ipsum quod impossibile est ea aliter esse, habent
and thus this very that impossible it-is them otherwise to-be they-have
ab alio. Et hoc ipsum est cohibitio quaedam efficacissima:
from another and this very is a-restraint certain most-efficacious
nam quaecumque cohibentur, intantum cohiberi dicuntur,
for whatever-things are-restrained so-far to-be-restrained are-said
inquantum non possunt aliter facere quam de eis disponatur.
inasmuch-as not they-can otherwise to-do than about them it-be-disposed

Utrum naturalia contingentia subsint legi aeternae

5 · WHETHER CONTINGENT THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW

Promulgation is only to rational creatures, and natural things fail. Thomas answers that man cannot impose law on irrational things, which do not act themselves, but God impresses on the whole of nature the principles of its acts, as man impresses a rule on the mind of his subject; so all the movements of nature are subject to the eternal law. Its defects fall outside particular causes but not the first cause's providence.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod naturalia
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that natural
contingentia non subsint legi aeternae. Promulgatio enim
contingent-things not be-subject to-the-law eternal promulgation for
est de ratione legis, ut supra dictum est. Sed promulgatio
is of the-notion of-law as above said it-is but promulgation
non potest fieri nisi ad creaturas rationales, quibus
not can to-be-made except to creatures rational to-whom
potest aliquid denuntiari. Ergo solae creaturae rationales
can something to-be-announced therefore alone creatures rational
subsunt legi aeternae. Non ergo naturalia contingentia.
are-subject to-the-law eternal not therefore natural contingent-things

2. Praeterea, ea quae obediunt rationi, participant
2 further those-things which obey reason participate
aliqualiter ratione, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Lex autem aeterna
in-some-way in-reason as is-said in I Ethics the-law moreover eternal
est ratio summa, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur naturalia
is the-reason highest as above said it-is since therefore natural
contingentia non participent aliqualiter ratione, sed penitus
contingent-things not participate in-some-way in-reason but wholly
sint irrationabilia, videtur quod non subsint legi aeterna.
be irrational it-seems that not they-be-subject to-the-law eternal

3. Praeterea, lex aeterna est efficacissima. Sed in
3 further the-law eternal is most-efficacious but in
naturalibus contingentibus accidit defectus. Non ergo
natural contingent-things happens defect not therefore
subsunt legi aeternae.
they-are-subject to-the-law eternal

Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. VIII: Quando circumdabat
but against is that it-is-said Proverbs VIII when he-set-round
mari terminum suum, et legem ponebat aquis ne
for-the-sea boundary its and a-law set for-the-waters lest
transirent fines suos.
they-should-pass the-bounds their

Respondeo dicendum quod aliter dicendum est de lege
I-answer it-must-be-said that otherwise to-be-said it-is about the-law
hominis, et aliter de lege aeterna, quae est lex Dei. Lex
of-man and otherwise about the-law eternal which is the-law of-God the-law
enim hominis non se extendit nisi ad creaturas rationales quae
for of-man not itself extends except to creatures rational which
homini subiiciuntur. Cuius ratio est quia lex est directiva
to-man are-subject of-which the-reason is because law is directive
actuum qui conveniunt subiectis gubernationi alicuius: unde
of-acts which belong to-those-subject to-the-government of-someone whence
nullus, proprie loquendo, suis actibus legem imponit.
no-one properly speaking on-his-own acts law imposes
Quaecumque autem aguntur circa usum rerum irrationalium
whatever-things moreover are-done about the-use of-things irrational
homini subditarum, aguntur per actum ipsius hominis
to-man subject are-done through the-act of-the-very man
moventis huiusmodi res: nam huiusmodi irrationales creaturae
moving of-this-kind things for of-this-kind irrational creatures
non agunt seipsas, sed ab aliis aguntur, ut supra habitum
not act themselves but by others are-acted-upon as above held

est. Et ideo rebus irrationalibus homo legem imponere
it-is and therefore on-things irrational man law to-impose
non potest, quantumcumque ei subiiciantur. Rebus autem
not can however-much to-him they-be-subject on-things moreover
rationalibus sibi subiectis potest imponere legem, inquantum
rational to-him subject he-can to-impose law inasmuch-as
suo praecepto, vel denuntiatione quacumque, imprimit
by-his precept or announcement whatever he-impresses
menti earum quandam regulam quae est principium agendi.
on-the-mind of-them a-certain rule which is the-principle of-acting

Sicut autem homo imprimit, denuntiando, quoddam interius
as moreover man impresses by-announcing a-certain interior
principium actuum homini sibi subiecto, ita etiam Deus
principle of-acts on-man to-himself subject so also God
imprimit toti naturae principia propriorum actuum. Et
impresses on-the-whole nature the-principles of-proper acts and
ideo per hunc modum dicitur Deus praecipere toti naturae;
therefore in this mode is-said God to-command the-whole nature
secundum illud Psalmi CXLVIII: Praeceptum posuit, et non
according-to that of-Psalm CXLVIII a-precept he-set and not
praeteribit. Et per hanc etiam rationem omnes motus et
it-will-pass-away and by this also reason all the-motions and
actiones totius naturae legi aeternae subduntur. Unde
actions of-the-whole nature to-the-law eternal are-subject whence
alio modo creaturae irrationales subduntur legi aeternae,
in-another way creatures irrational are-subject to-the-law eternal
inquantum moventur a divina providentia, non autem per
inasmuch-as they-are-moved by divine providence not moreover through
intellectum divini praecepti, sicut creaturae rationales.
understanding of-the-divine precept as creatures rational

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo se
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that in-this way itself
habet impressio activi principii intrinseci, quantum ad
has the-impression of-an-active principle intrinsic as-far to
res naturales, sicut se habet promulgatio legis quantum
things natural as itself has the-promulgation of-law as-far
ad homines: quia per legis promulgationem imprimitur
to men because through of-law the-promulgation is-impressed
hominibus quoddam directivum principium humanorum
on-men a-certain directive principle of-human
actuum, ut dictum est.
acts as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non
to the-second it-must-be-said that creatures irrational not
participant ratione humana, nec ei obediunt: participant
participate in-reason human nor it they-obey they-participate
tamen, per modum obedientiae, ratione divina. Ad plura
yet through the-mode of-obedience in-reason divine to more-things
enim se extendit virtus rationis divinae quam virtus
for itself extends the-power of-reason divine than the-power
rationis humanae. Et sicut membra corporis humani
of-reason human and as the-members of-the-body human
moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant
are-moved at the-command of-reason not yet they-participate
ratione, quia non habent aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam
in-reason because not they-have any apprehension ordered
ad rationem; ita etiam creaturae irrationales moventur a
to reason so also creatures irrational are-moved by
Deo, nec tamen propter hoc sunt rationales.
God nor yet on-account-of this are-they rational

Ad tertium dicendum quod defectus qui accidunt in
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-defects which happen in
rebus naturalibus, quamvis sint praeter ordinem causarum
things natural although they-be beside the-order of-causes
particularium, non tamen sunt praeter ordinem causarum
particular not yet they-are beside the-order of-causes
universalium; et praecipue causae primae, quae Deus est, cuius
universal and especially of-the-cause first which God is whose
providentiam nihil subterfugere potest, ut in Primo dictum est.
providence nothing to-escape can as in the-First said it-is
Et quia lex aeterna est ratio divinae providentiae, ut dictum
and because the-law eternal is the-reason of-divine providence as said
est, ideo defectus rerum naturalium legi aeternae subduntur.
it-is therefore the-defects of-things natural to-the-law eternal are-subject

Utrum omnes res humanae subiiciantur legi aeternae

6 · WHETHER ALL HUMAN THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW

The spiritual are not under the law, the prudence of the flesh is not subject to it, and the blessed and the damned no longer merit. Thomas answers that a thing is subject to the eternal law by knowledge and by an inner principle of motion; man is subject in both ways, though imperfectly in the wicked, in whom what fails on the side of action is supplied on the side of passion, as they suffer what the law decrees. The blessed and damned are kept in their state by it.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes res
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not all things
humanae subiiciantur legi aeternae. Dicit enim Apostolus,
human be-subject to-the-law eternal says for the-Apostle
ad Gal. V: Si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege.
to the-Galatians V if by-the-spirit you-are-led not you-are under the-law

Sed viri iusti, qui sunt filii Dei per adoptionem, Spiritu
but men just who are sons of-God through adoption by-the-Spirit
Dei aguntur; secundum illud Rom. VIII: Qui Spiritu
of-God are-led according-to that Romans VIII who by-the-Spirit
Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Ergo non omnes homines
of-God are-led these sons of-God are therefore not all men
sunt sub lege aeterna.
are under the-law eternal

2. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VIII: Prudentia
2 further the-Apostle says to the-Romans VIII the-prudence
carnis inimica est Deo: legi enim Dei subiecta non
of-the-flesh hostile is to-God to-the-law for of-God subject not
est. Sed multi homines sunt in quibus prudentia carnis
it-is but many men there-are in whom the-prudence of-the-flesh
dominatur. Ergo legi aeternae, quae est lex Dei, non
rules therefore to-the-law eternal which is the-law of-God not
subiiciuntur omnes homines.
are-subjected all men

3. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb., quod
3 further Augustine says in I on Free Choice that
lex aeterna est qua mali miseriam, boni vitam beatam
the-law eternal is-that by-which the-evil misery the-good life blessed
merentur. Sed homines iam beati, vel iam damnati, non
merit but men already blessed or already damned not
sunt in statu merendi. Ergo non subsunt legi aeternae.
are in the-state of-meriting therefore not they-are-subject to-the-law eternal

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ.
but against is that Augustine says XIX on the-City
Dei: Nullo modo aliquid legibus summi Creatoris
of-God in-no way anything from-the-laws of-the-highest Creator

Ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax universitatis
and-Orderer is-withdrawn by whom the-peace of-the-universe
administratur.
is-administered

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est modus quo aliquid
I-answer it-must-be-said that twofold is the-mode by-which something
subditur legi aeternae, ut ex supradictis patet: uno
is-subject to-the-law eternal as from the-above-said is-plain in-one
modo, inquantum participatur lex aeterna per modum
way inasmuch-as is-participated the-law eternal through the-mode
cognitionis; alio modo, per modum actionis et passionis,
of-knowledge in-another way through the-mode of-action and of-passion
inquantum participatur per modum interioris principii
inasmuch-as it-is-participated through the-mode of-an-interior principle
motivi. Et hoc secundo modo subduntur legi aeternae
motive and in-this second way are-subject to-the-law eternal
irrationales creaturae, ut dictum est. Sed quia rationalis
irrational creatures as said it-is but because rational
natura, cum eo quod est commune omnibus creaturis,
nature with that which is common to-all creatures
habet aliquid sibi proprium inquantum est rationalis, ideo
has something to-itself proper inasmuch-as it-is rational therefore
secundum utrumque modum legi aeternae subditur: quia
according-to each mode to-the-law eternal it-is-subject because
et notionem legis aeternae aliquo modo habet, ut supra
both the-notion of-the-law eternal in-some way it-has as above
dictum est; et iterum unicuique rationali creaturae inest
said it-is and again in-each rational creature is-in
naturalis inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi
a-natural inclination to that which is consonant with-the-law

aeternae; sumus enim innati ad habendum virtutes, ut dicitur
eternal we-are for born-apt to having virtues as is-said
in II Ethic.
in II Ethics

Uterque tamen modus imperfectus quidem est, et
each yet mode imperfect indeed is and
quodammodo corruptus, in malis; in quibus et inclinatio
in-a-way corrupted in the-evil in whom both the-inclination
naturalis ad virtutem depravatur per habitum vitiosum; et
natural to virtue is-depraved through habit vicious and
iterum ipsa naturalis cognitio boni in eis obtenebratur per
again the-very natural knowledge of-good in them is-darkened through
passiones et habitus peccatorum. In bonis autem uterque
the-passions and habits of-sins in the-good moreover each
modus invenitur perfectior: quia et supra cognitionem
mode is-found more-perfect because both above the-knowledge
naturalem boni, superadditur eis cognitio fidei et
natural of-good is-superadded to-them the-knowledge of-faith and
sapientiae; et supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum,
of-wisdom and above the-natural inclination to good
superadditur eis interius motivum gratiae et virtutis.
is-superadded to-them the-interior motive of-grace and of-virtue

Sic igitur boni perfecte subsunt legi aeternae, tanquam
thus therefore the-good perfectly are-subject to-the-law eternal as-though
semper secundum eam agentes. Mali autem subsunt quidem
always according-to it acting the-evil moreover are-subject indeed
legi aeternae, imperfecte quidem quantum ad actiones
to-the-law eternal imperfectly indeed as-far to the-actions
ipsorum, prout imperfecte cognoscunt et imperfecte
of-them according-as imperfectly they-know and imperfectly
inclinantur ad bonum: sed quantum deficit ex parte actionis,
are-inclined to good but as-much-as fails on the-side of-action

suppletur ex parte passionis, prout scilicet intantum
is-supplied on the-side of-passion according-as namely so-far
patiuntur quod lex aeterna dictat de eis, inquantum
they-suffer what the-law eternal dictates about them inasmuch-as
deficiunt facere quod legi aeternae convenit. Unde
they-fail to-do what with-the-law eternal accords whence
Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb.: Iustos sub aeterna lege
Augustine says in I on Free Choice the-just under the-eternal law
agere existimo. Et in libro de Catechizandis Rudibus, dicit
to-act I-reckon and in the-book on Catechizing the-Uninstructed he-says
quod Deus ex iusta miseria animarum se deserentium,
that God from the-just misery of-souls themselves deserting
convenientissimis legibus inferiores partes creaturae suae
by-most-fitting laws the-lower parts of-creation his
novit ornare.
knows-how to-adorn

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum Apostoli
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that that word of-the-Apostle
potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut esse sub lege
can to-be-understood in-two-ways in-one way that to-be under the-law
intelligatur ille qui nolens obligationi legis subditur, quasi
be-understood he who unwilling to-the-obligation of-the-law is-subject as-if
cuidam ponderi. Unde Glossa ibidem dicit quod sub
to-a-certain weight whence the-Gloss in-the-same-place says that under
lege est qui timore supplicii quod lex minatur, non
the-law is he-who by-fear of-the-punishment which the-law threatens not
amore iustitiae, a malo opere abstinet. Et hoc modo
by-love of-justice from evil work abstains and in-this way
spirituales viri non sunt sub lege: quia per caritatem,
spiritual men not are under the-law because through charity
quam Spiritus Sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie
which the-Spirit Holy into-the-hearts of-them pours voluntarily

id quod legis est, implent. – Alio modo potest etiam
that which of-the-law is they-fulfill in-another way it-can also
intelligi inquantum hominis opera qui Spiritu Sancto
to-be-understood inasmuch-as of-the-man the-works who by-the-Spirit Holy
agitur, magis dicuntur esse opera Spiritus Sancti quam
is-led rather are-said to-be the-works of-the-Spirit Holy than
ipsius hominis. Unde cum Spiritus Sanctus non sit sub
of-the-very man whence since the-Spirit Holy not be under
lege, sicut nec Filius, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod
law as neither the-Son as above said it-is it-follows that
huiusmodi opera, inquantum sunt Spiritus Sancti, non sint
of-this-kind works inasmuch-as they-are of-the-Spirit Holy not be
sub lege. Et huic attestatur quod Apostolus dicit, II ad
under law and to-this attests what the-Apostle says II to
Cor. III: Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas.
Corinthians III where the-Spirit of-the-Lord there liberty

Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia carnis non
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-prudence of-the-flesh not
potest subiici legi Dei ex parte actionis: quia
can to-be-subjected to-the-law of-God on the-side of-action because
inclinat ad actiones contrarias legi Dei. Subiicitur tamen
it-inclines to actions contrary to-the-law of-God it-is-subjected yet
legi Dei ex parte passionis: quia meretur pati poenam
to-the-law of-God on the-side of-passion because it-merits to-suffer punishment
secundum legem divinae iustitiae. – Nihilominus tamen in
according-to the-law of-divine justice nevertheless yet in
nullo homine ita prudentia carnis dominatur, quod totum
no man so the-prudence of-the-flesh rules that the-whole
bonum naturae corrumpatur. Et ideo remanet in homine
good of-nature be-corrupted and therefore remains in man
inclinatio ad agendum ea quae sunt legis aeternae.
the-inclination to doing those-things which are of-the-law eternal

Habitum est enim supra quod peccatum non tollit totum
held it-is for above that sin not takes-away the-whole
bonum naturae.
good of-nature

Ad tertium dicendum quod idem est per quod aliquid
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-same is through which something
conservatur in fine, et per quod movetur ad finem: sicut
is-preserved in the-end and through which it-is-moved to the-end as
corpus grave gravitate quiescit in loco inferiori, per quam
a-body heavy by-heaviness rests in place lower through which
etiam ad locum ipsum movetur. Et sic dicendum est quod,
also to the-place itself it-is-moved and thus to-be-said it-is that
sicut secundum legem aeternam aliqui merentur beatitudinem
as according-to the-law eternal some merit beatitude
vel miseriam, ita per eandem legem in beatitudine vel
or misery so through the-same law in beatitude or
miseria conservantur. Et secundum hoc, et beati et
misery they-are-preserved and according-to this both the-blessed and
damnati subsunt legi aeternae.
the-damned are-subject to-the-law eternal

De lege naturali

XCIV · ON THE NATURAL LAW

On the natural law Thomas asks six questions: what it is; what its precepts are; whether all acts of virtue belong to it; whether it is one among all men; whether it can be changed; and whether it can be blotted out of the mind of man.

Deinde considerandum est de lege naturali.
next to-be-considered it-is about the-law natural

Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.
and about this are-asked six

Primo: quid sit lex naturalis.
first what be the-law natural

Secundo: quae sint praecepta legis naturalis.
second what be the-precepts of-the-law natural

Tertio: utrum omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturali.
third whether all the-acts of-virtues be of the-law natural

Quarto: utrum lex naturalis sit una apud omnes.
fourth whether the-law natural be one among all

Quinto: utrum sit mutabilis.
fifth whether it-be changeable

Sexto: utrum possit a mente hominis deleri.
sixth whether it-can from the-mind of-man to-be-blotted-out

Utrum lex naturalis sit habitus

1 · WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT

It is neither a power nor a passion, synderesis is called our intellect's law, and it remains when we do not think of it. Thomas answers that properly the natural law is not a habit but something constituted by reason, as a proposition is a work of reason; but it may be called a habit as what is held by habit, since its precepts are sometimes considered in act and sometimes held habitually. What is held by habit can sometimes not be used, as a sleeper cannot use his science and a child, for his age, the natural law.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis sit
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law natural be
habitus. Quia ut Philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., tria sunt
a-habit because as the-Philosopher says in II Ethics three-things there-are
in anima: potentia, habitus et passio. Sed naturalis lex non
in the-soul power habit and passion but the-natural law not
est aliqua potentiarum animae, nec aliqua passionum: ut patet
is any of-the-powers of-the-soul nor any of-the-passions as is-plain
enumerando per singula. Ergo lex naturalis est habitus.
by-enumerating through single-ones therefore the-law natural is a-habit

2. Praeterea, Basilius dicit quod conscientia, sive synderesis,
2 further Basil says that conscience or synderesis
est lex intellectus nostri: quod non potest intelligi
is the-law of-intellect our which not can to-be-understood
nisi de lege naturali. Sed synderesis est habitus quidam,
except about the-law natural but synderesis is a-habit certain
ut in Primo habitum est. Ergo lex naturalis est habitus.
as in the-First held it-is therefore the-law natural is a-habit

3. Praeterea, lex naturalis semper in homine manet,
3 further the-law natural always in man remains
ut infra patebit. Sed non semper ratio hominis, ad
as below will-be-plain but not always the-reason of-man to

quam lex pertinet, cogitat de lege naturali. Ergo lex
which the-law pertains thinks about the-law natural therefore the-law
naturalis non est actus, sed habitus.
natural not is an-act but a-habit

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Bono
but against is that Augustine says in the-book on the-Good
Coniugali, quod habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum
of-Marriage that a-habit is-that by-which something is-done when
opus est. Sed naturalis lex non est huiusmodi: est enim
need is but the-natural law not is of-this-kind it-is for
in parvulis et damnatis, qui per eam agere non possunt.
in little-ones and the-damned who through it to-act not can
Ergo lex naturalis non est habitus.
therefore the-law natural not is a-habit

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse
I-answer it-must-be-said that something can to-be-said to-be
habitus dupliciter. Uno modo, proprie et essentialiter: et sic
a-habit in-two-ways in-one way properly and essentially and thus
lex naturalis non est habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod
the-law natural not is a-habit said it-is for above that
lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum: sicut
the-law natural is something through reason constituted as
etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis. Non est autem
also a-proposition is a-certain work of-reason not is moreover
idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit: aliquis
the-same that-which one does and that-by-which one does someone
enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam.
for through the-habit of-grammar makes a-speech congruous
Cum igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse
since therefore a-habit be that-by-which one does not can to-be
quod lex aliqua sit habitus proprie et essentialiter.
that law any be a-habit properly and essentially

Alio modo potest dici habitus id quod habitu
in-another way can to-be-called habit that which by-habit
tenetur: sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur. Et
is-held as is-called faith that which by-faith is-held and
hoc modo, quia praecepta legis naturalis quandoque
in-this way because the-precepts of-the-law natural sometimes
considerantur in actu a ratione, quandoque autem sunt
are-considered in act by reason sometimes moreover they-are
in ea habitualiter tantum, secundum hunc modum potest
in it habitually only according-to this mode it-can
dici quod lex naturalis sit habitus. Sicut etiam principia
to-be-said that the-law natural be a-habit as also principles
indemonstrabilia in speculativis non sunt ipse habitus
indemonstrable in speculative-things not are the-very habit
principiorum, sed sunt principia quorum est habitus.
of-principles but are the-principles of-which is the-habit

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus intendit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-Philosopher intends
ibi investigare genus virtutis: et cum manifestum sit quod
there to-investigate the-genus of-virtue and since manifest it-be that
virtus sit quoddam principium actus, illa tantum ponit quae
virtue be a-certain principle of-act those only be-posits which
sunt principia humanorum actuum, scilicet potentias, habitus
are principles of-human acts namely powers habits
et passiones. Praeter haec autem tria sunt quaedam alia
and passions besides these moreover three there-are certain other-things
in anima: sicut quidam actus, ut velle est in volente; et
in the-soul as certain acts as to-will is in the-willer and
etiam cognita sunt in cognoscente; et proprietates naturales
also things-known are in the-knower and the-properties natural
animae insunt ei, ut immortalitas et alia huiusmodi.
of-the-soul are-in it as immortality and other-things of-this-kind

Ad secundum dicendum quod synderesis dicitur lex
to the-second it-must-be-said that synderesis is-called the-law
intellectus nostri, inquantum est habitus continens praecepta
of-intellect our inasmuch-as it-is a-habit containing the-precepts
legis naturalis, quae sunt prima principia operum
of-the-law natural which are the-first principles of-works
humanorum.
human

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that concludes that
lex naturalis habitualiter tenetur. Et hoc concedimus.
the-law natural habitually is-held and this we-grant

Ad id vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod
to that but which to the-contrary is-objected it-must-be-said that
eo quod habitualiter inest, quandoque aliquis uti non potest
that which habitually is-in sometimes someone to-use not can
propter aliquod impedimentum: sicut homo non potest uti
on-account-of some impediment as man not can to-use
habitu scientiae propter somnum. Et similiter puer non
the-habit of-science on-account-of sleep and similarly a-boy not
potest uti habitu intellectus principiorum, vel etiam lege
can to-use the-habit of-the-understanding of-principles or even the-law
naturali, quae ei habitualiter inest, propter defectum aetatis.
natural which in-him habitually is-in on-account-of defect of-age

Utrum lex naturalis contineat plura praecepta, vel unum tantum

2 · WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW HOLDS SEVERAL PRECEPTS OR ONE

Law is one precept, nature is one, and reason is one. Thomas answers that as being is the first thing the intellect grasps, so good is the first in practical reason, and its first precept is that good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided. On it the others rest, in the order of man's natural inclinations: to preserve his being, which he shares with all substances; to what nature taught all animals, as the union of male and female; and, proper to reason, to know the truth about God and to live in society.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturalis
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law natural
non contineat plura praecepta, sed unum tantum. Lex enim
not contain several precepts but one only law for
continetur in genere praecepti, ut supra habitum est. Si
is-contained in the-genus of-precept as above held it-is if
igitur essent multa praecepta legis naturalis, sequeretur
therefore there-were many precepts of-the-law natural it-would-follow
quod etiam essent multae leges naturales.
that also there-would-be many laws natural

2. Praeterea, lex naturalis consequitur hominis naturam.
2 further the-law natural follows of-man the-nature
Sed humana natura est una secundum totum, licet sit
but human nature is one according-to the-whole although it-be
multiplex secundum partes. Aut ergo est unum praeceptum
manifold according-to the-parts either therefore there-is one precept
tantum legis naturae, propter unitatem totius: aut
only of-the-law of-nature on-account-of the-unity of-the-whole or
sunt multa, secundum multitudinem partium humanae
there-are many according-to the-multitude of-the-parts of-human

naturae. Et sic oportebit quod etiam ea quae sunt de
nature and thus it-will-behoove that also those-things which are of
inclinatione concupiscibilis, pertineant ad legem naturalem.
the-inclination of-the-concupiscible pertain to the-law natural

3. Praeterea, lex est aliquid ad rationem pertinens, ut
3 further law is something to reason pertaining as
supra dictum est. Sed ratio in homine est una tantum.
above said it-is but reason in man is one only
Ergo solum unum praeceptum est legis naturalis.
therefore only one precept there-is of-the-law natural

Sed contra est quia sic se habent praecepta legis
but against is that thus themselves have the-precepts of-the-law
naturalis in homine quantum ad operabilia, sicut se
natural in man as-far to things-doable as themselves
habent prima principia in demonstrativis. Sed prima principia
have the-first principles in demonstrative-matters but the-first principles
indemonstrabilia sunt plura. Ergo etiam praecepta legis
indemonstrable are several therefore also the-precepts of-the-law
naturae sunt plura.
of-nature are several

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is
praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent ad
the-precepts of-the-law of-nature in-this way themselves have to
rationem practicam, sicut principia prima demonstrationum
reason practical as the-principles first of-demonstrations
se habent ad rationem speculativam: utraque enim sunt
themselves have to reason speculative both for are
quaedam principia per se nota. Dicitur autem aliquid
certain principles through themselves known is-said moreover something
per se notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se; alio
through itself known in-two-ways in-one way according-to itself in-another

modo, quoad nos. Secundum se quidem quaelibet propositio
way as-regards us according-to itself indeed any proposition
dicitur per se nota, cuius praedicatum est de ratione
is-said through itself known whose predicate is of the-notion
subiecti: contingit tamen quod ignoranti definitionem
of-the-subject it-happens yet that to-one-ignorant-of the-definition
subiecti, talis propositio non erit per se nota. Sicut ista
of-the-subject such proposition not will-be through itself known as this
propositio, Homo est rationale, est per se nota secundum
proposition man is rational is through itself known according-to
sui naturam, quia qui dicit hominem, dicit rationale:
its nature because he-who says man says rational
et tamen ignoranti quid sit homo, haec propositio
and yet to-one-ignorant-of what be man this proposition
non est per se nota. Et inde est quod, sicut dicit
not is through itself known and thence it-is that as says
Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quaedam sunt dignitates
Boethius in the-book on the-Hebdomads certain-things are axioms
vel propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus:
or propositions through themselves known commonly to-all
et huiusmodi sunt illae propositiones quarum termini sunt
and of-this-kind are those propositions whose terms are
omnibus noti, ut, Omne totum est maius sua parte, et,
to-all known as every whole is greater than-its part and
Quae uni et eidem sunt aequalia, sibi invicem sunt
things-which to-one and the-same are equal to-each-other mutually are
aequalia. Quaedam vero propositiones sunt per se notae
equal some but propositions are through themselves known
solis sapientibus, qui terminos propositionum intelligunt quid
to-alone the-wise who the-terms of-the-propositions understand what
significent: sicut intelligenti quod angelus non est corpus,
they-signify as to-one-understanding that an-angel not is a-body

per se notum est quod non est circumscriptive in loco,
through itself known it-is that not it-is circumscriptively in place
quod non est manifestum rudibus, qui hoc non capiunt.
which not is manifest to-the-unlearned who this not grasp
In his autem quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt,
in those moreover which into the-apprehension of-all fall
quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in
a-certain order is-found for that which first falls into
apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus
apprehension is being whose understanding is-included in all-things
quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium
whatever anyone apprehends and therefore the-first principle
indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et
indemonstrable is that not it-is-possible at-once to-affirm and
negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis:
to-deny which is-founded upon the-notion of-being and not of-being
et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in
and upon this principle all others are-founded as is-said in
IV Metaphys. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in
IV Metaphysics as moreover being is the-first-thing which falls into
apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit
apprehension simply so good is the-first-thing which falls
in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus:
into the-apprehension of-practical reason which is-ordered to work
omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem
every for agent acts for-the-sake-of an-end which has the-notion
boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est
of-good and therefore the-first principle in reason practical is-that
quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, Bonum est
which is-founded upon the-notion of-good which is good is
quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum
what all-things desire this is therefore the-first precept

legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et
of-law that good is to-be-done and to-be-pursued and
malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia
evil to-be-avoided and upon this are-founded all other
praecepta legis naturae: ut scilicet omnia illa facienda
precepts of-the-law of-nature so-that namely all those-things to-be-done
vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae
or to-be-avoided pertain to the-precepts of-the-law of-nature which
ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana.
reason practical naturally apprehends to-be goods human

Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem
because but good has the-notion of-end evil moreover
rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad
the-notion of-the-contrary thence it-is that all those-things to
quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter
which man has natural inclination reason naturally
apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere
apprehends as goods and through consequence as by-work
prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.
to-be-pursued and the-contraries of-them as evils and to-be-avoided
Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo
according-to therefore the-order of-inclinations natural is the-order
praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo inclinatio
of-the-precepts of-the-law of-nature there-is-in for first an-inclination
homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat
in-man to good according-to the-nature in which he-shares
cum omnibus substantiis: prout scilicet quaelibet substantia
with all substances according-as namely any substance
appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et
desires the-preservation of-its the-to-be according-to its nature and
secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem
according-to this inclination pertain to the-law natural

ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium
those-things through which the-life of-man is-preserved and the-contrary
impeditur. – Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua
is-hindered second there-is-in man an-inclination to some-things
magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum
more special according-to the-nature in which he-shares with
ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea esse
the-other animals and according-to this are-said those-things to-be
de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est
of the-law natural which nature all animals has-taught as is
coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et
the-union of-male and female and the-education of-children and
similia. – Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum
similar-things in-the-third way there-is-in man an-inclination to good
secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria: sicut
according-to the-nature of-reason which is to-him proper as
homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem
man has a-natural inclination to this that the-truth
cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et
he-know about God and to this that in society he-live and
secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae
according-to this to the-law natural pertain those-things which
ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant: utpote quod homo
to such inclination look as that man
ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet
ignorance avoid that others not he-offend with whom he-must
conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant.
to-associate and the-rest of-this-kind which to this look

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia ista praecepta
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that all these precepts
legis naturae, inquantum referuntur ad unum primum
of-the-law of-nature inasmuch-as they-are-referred to one first
praeceptum, habent rationem unius legis naturalis.
precept have the-notion of-one law natural

Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes inclinationes
to the-second it-must-be-said that all the-inclinations
quarumcumque partium humanae naturae, puta
of-any-whatever parts of-human nature for-example
concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod regulantur
of-the-concupiscible and the-irascible according as they-are-ruled
ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad
by-reason pertain to the-law natural and are-reduced to
unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est. Et secundum
one first precept as said it-is and according-to
hoc, sunt multa praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae
this there-are many precepts of-the-law of-nature in themselves which
tamen communicant in una radice.
yet share in one root

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio, etsi in se una sit,
to the-third it-must-be-said that reason although in itself one it-be
tamen est ordinativa omnium quae ad homines spectant.
yet is ordinative of-all-things which to men look
Et secundum hoc, sub lege rationis continentur omnia
and according-to this under the-law of-reason are-contained all
ea quae ratione regulari possunt.
those-things which by-reason to-be-ruled can

Utrum omnes actus virtutum sint de lege naturae

3 · WHETHER ALL ACTS OF VIRTUE BELONG TO THE LAW OF NATURE

Some virtues serve private good, and not all sins are called against nature. Thomas answers that acts of virtue, as virtuous, all belong to the natural law, since reason naturally dictates to each that he act virtuously; but acts considered in their own species do not all belong to it, since many virtuous acts are devised by reason's inquiry as useful for living well. Some sins are called against nature as against the nature man shares with animals.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not all the-acts
virtutum sint de lege naturae. Quia, ut supra dictum est,
of-virtues be of the-law of-nature because as above said it-is
de ratione legis est ut ordinetur ad bonum commune.
of the-notion of-law it-is that it-be-ordered to the-good common
Sed quidam virtutum actus ordinantur ad bonum privatum
but certain of-virtues acts are-ordered to the-good private
alicuius: ut patet praecipue in actibus temperantiae. Non
of-someone as is-plain especially in the-acts of-temperance not
ergo omnes actus virtutum legi subduntur naturali.
therefore all the-acts of-virtues to-the-law are-subject natural

2. Praeterea, omnia peccata aliquibus virtuosis actibus
2 further all sins to-some virtuous acts
opponuntur. Si igitur omnes actus virtutum sint de lege
are-opposed if therefore all the-acts of-virtues be of the-law
naturae, videtur ex consequenti quod omnia peccata sint contra
of-nature it-seems from the-consequent that all sins be against
naturam. Quod tamen specialiter de quibusdam peccatis dicitur.
nature which yet specially about certain sins is-said

3. Praeterea, in his quae sunt secundum naturam, omnes
3 further in those-things which are according-to nature all
conveniunt. Sed in actibus virtutum non omnes conveniunt:
agree but in the-acts of-virtues not all agree
aliquid enim est virtuosum uni, quod est alteri vitiosum.
something for is virtuous to-one which is to-another vicious
Ergo non omnes actus virtutum sunt de lege naturae.
therefore not all the-acts of-virtues are of the-law of-nature

Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod
but against is that Damascene says in III book that
virtutes sunt naturales. Ergo et actus virtuosi subiacent
the-virtues are natural therefore also the-acts virtuous are-subject
legi naturae.
to-the-law of-nature

Respondeo dicendum quod de actibus virtuosis dupliciter
I-answer it-must-be-said that about acts virtuous in-two-ways
loqui possumus: uno modo, inquantum sunt virtuosi;
to-speak we-can in-one way inasmuch-as they-are virtuous
alio modo, inquantum sunt tales actus in propriis
in-another way inasmuch-as they-are such acts in their-proper
speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de actibus virtutum
species considered if therefore we-speak about the-acts of-virtues
inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic omnes actus virtuosi pertinent
inasmuch-as they-are virtuous thus all acts virtuous pertain
ad legem naturae. Dictum est enim quod ad legem naturae
to the-law of-nature said it-is for that to the-law of-nature
pertinet omne illud ad quod homo inclinatur secundum
pertains all that to which man is-inclined according-to
suam naturam. Inclinatur autem unumquodque naturaliter ad
his nature is-inclined moreover each-thing naturally to
operationem sibi convenientem secundum suam formam: sicut
the-operation to-itself fitting according-to its form as

ignis ad calefaciendum. Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria
fire to heating whence since the-soul rational be the-proper
forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad hoc
form of-man a-natural inclination is-in every man to this
quod agat secundum rationem. Et hoc est agere secundum
that he-act according-to reason and this is to-act according-to
virtutem. Unde secundum hoc, omnes actus virtutum sunt de
virtue whence according-to this all the-acts of-virtues are of
lege naturali: dictat enim hoc naturaliter unicuique propria
the-law natural dictates for this naturally to-each-one his-own
ratio, ut virtuose agat. – Sed si loquamur de actibus virtuosis
reason that virtuously he-act but if we-speak about acts virtuous
secundum seipsos, prout scilicet in propriis speciebus
according-to themselves according-as namely in their-proper species
considerantur, sic non omnes actus virtuosi sunt de lege
they-are-considered thus not all acts virtuous are of the-law
naturae. Multa enim secundum virtutem fiunt, ad quae
of-nature many-things for according-to virtue are-done to which
natura non primo inclinat; sed per rationis inquisitionem
nature not first inclines but through of-reason inquiry
ea homines adinvenerunt, quasi utilia ad bene vivendum.
them men have-devised as-if useful for well living

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia est circa
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that temperance is about
concupiscentias naturales cibi et potus et venereorum,
the-concupiscences natural of-food and of-drink and of-venereal-things
quae quidem ordinantur ad bonum commune naturae, sicut
which indeed are-ordered to the-good common of-nature as
et alia legalia ordinantur ad bonum commune morale.
also other legal-things are-ordered to the-good common moral

Ad secundum dicendum quod natura hominis potest
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-nature of-man can
dici vel illa quae est propria homini: et secundum hoc,
to-be-called either that which is proper to-man and according-to this
omnia peccata, inquantum sunt contra rationem, sunt etiam
all sins inasmuch-as they-are against reason are also
contra naturam, ut patet per Damascenum, in II libro.
against nature as is-plain through Damascene in II book
Vel illa quae est communis homini et aliis animalibus: et
or that which is common to-man and to-other animals and
secundum hoc, quaedam specialia peccata dicuntur esse contra
according-to this certain special sins are-said to-be against
naturam; sicut contra commixtionem maris et feminae, quae
nature as against the-intercourse of-male and female which
est naturalis omnibus animalibus, est concubitus masculorum,
is natural to-all animals is the-lying-together of-males
quod specialiter dicitur vitium contra naturam.
which specially is-called the-vice against nature

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de actibus
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds about acts
secundum seipsos consideratis. Sic enim, propter diversas
according-to themselves considered thus for on-account-of the-diverse
hominum conditiones, contingit quod aliqui actus sunt aliquibus
of-men conditions it-happens that some acts are for-some
virtuosi, tanquam eis proportionati et convenientes, qui
virtuous as-though to-them proportioned and fitting which
tamen sunt aliis vitiosi, tanquam eis non proportionati.
yet are for-others vicious as-though to-them not proportioned

Utrum lex naturae sit una apud omnes

4 · WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE IS ONE FOR ALL MEN

Not all obey the Gospel, nothing is just everywhere, and men are inclined to diverse things. Thomas answers that in the common principles the natural law is the same for all, in rectitude and in knowledge; in its proper conclusions it is the same for most, but can fail in a few, as that deposits must be returned fails when they are claimed to fight one's country, and in knowledge too, through passion or bad custom, as the Germans once did not hold robbery wicked.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law of-nature
non sit una apud omnes. Dicitur enim in Decretis, dist.
not be one among all it-is-said for in the-Decrees distinction
I, quod ius naturale est quod in Lege et in Evangelio
I that right natural is what in the-Law and in the-Gospel
continetur. Sed hoc non est commune omnibus: quia, ut
is-contained but this not is common to-all because as
dicitur Rom. X, non omnes obediunt Evangelio. Ergo lex
is-said Romans X not all obey the-Gospel therefore the-law
naturalis non est una apud omnes.
natural not is one among all

2. Praeterea, ea quae sunt secundum legem, iusta
2 further those-things which are according-to law just
esse dicuntur, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Sed in eodem libro
to-be are-said as is-said in V Ethics but in the-same book
dicitur quod nihil est ita iustum apud omnes, quin apud
it-is-said that nothing is so just among all but-that among
aliquos diversificetur. Ergo lex etiam naturalis non est
some it-be-varied therefore the-law also natural not is
apud omnes eadem.
among all the-same

3. Praeterea, ad legem naturae pertinet id ad quod homo
3 further to the-law of-nature pertains that to which man
secundum naturam suam inclinatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed
according-to nature his is-inclined as above said it-is but
diversi homines naturaliter ad diversa inclinantur: alii quidem
diverse men naturally to diverse-things are-inclined some indeed
ad concupiscentiam voluptatum, alii ad desideria honorum,
to the-concupiscence of-pleasures others to the-desires of-honors
alii ad alia. Ergo non est una lex naturalis apud omnes.
others to other-things therefore not there-is one law natural among all

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol.:
but against is that Isidore says in the-book of-Etymologies
Ius naturale est commune omnium nationum.
right natural is common of-all nations

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is to
legem naturae pertinent ea ad quae homo naturaliter
the-law of-nature pertain those-things to which man naturally
inclinatur; inter quae homini proprium est ut inclinetur ad
is-inclined among which to-man proper it-is that he-be-inclined to
agendum secundum rationem. Ad rationem autem pertinet ex
acting according-to reason to reason moreover it-pertains from
communibus ad propria procedere, ut patet ex I Physic.
common-things to proper-things to-proceed as is-plain from I Physics
Aliter tamen circa hoc se habet ratio speculativa, et aliter
otherwise yet about this itself has reason speculative and otherwise
ratio practica. Quia enim ratio speculativa praecipue negotiatur
reason practical because for reason speculative chiefly is-busied
circa necessaria, quae impossibile est aliter se habere,
about necessary-things which impossible it-is otherwise themselves to-have
absque aliquo defectu invenitur veritas in conclusionibus
without any defect is-found truth in conclusions

propriis, sicut et in principiis communibus. Sed ratio practica
proper as also in principles common but reason practical
negotiatur circa contingentia, in quibus sunt operationes
is-busied about contingent-things in which are operations
humanae: et ideo, etsi in communibus sit aliqua
human and therefore although in common-things there-be some
necessitas, quanto magis ad propria descenditur, tanto
necessity by-as-much-as more to proper-things one-descends by-so-much
magis invenitur defectus. Sic igitur in speculativis est eadem
more is-found defect thus therefore in speculative-things is the-same
veritas apud omnes tam in principiis quam in conclusionibus:
truth among all as-well in principles as in conclusions
licet veritas non apud omnes cognoscatur in conclusionibus,
although the-truth not among all be-known in conclusions
sed solum in principiis, quae dicuntur communes conceptiones.
but only in principles which are-called common conceptions
In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel rectitudo
in operative-things moreover not there-is the-same truth or rectitude
practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum
practical among all as-far to proper-things but only
quantum ad communia: et apud illos apud quos est eadem
as-far to common-things and among those among whom is the-same
rectitudo in propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota.
rectitude in proper-things not it-is equally to-all known

Sic igitur patet quod, quantum ad communia principia
thus therefore it-is-plain that as-far to the-common principles
rationis sive speculativae sive practicae, est eadem veritas seu
of-reason whether speculative or practical there-is the-same truth or
rectitudo apud omnes, et aequaliter nota. Quantum vero ad
rectitude among all and equally known as-far but to
proprias conclusiones rationis speculativae, est eadem veritas
the-proper conclusions of-reason speculative there-is the-same truth

apud omnes, non tamen aequaliter omnibus nota: apud omnes
among all not yet equally to-all known among all
enim verum est quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales
for true it-is that a-triangle has three angles equal
duobus rectis, quamvis hoc non sit omnibus notum. Sed
to-two right-ones although this not be to-all known but
quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est
as-far to the-proper conclusions of-reason practical neither is-there
eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos
the-same truth or rectitude among all nor even among whom
est eadem, est aequaliter nota. Apud omnes enim hoc rectum
it-is the-same it-is equally known among all for this right
est et verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem
is and true that according-to reason it-be-acted from this moreover
principio sequitur quasi conclusio propria, quod deposita sint
principle follows as-if a-conclusion proper that deposits be
reddenda. Et hoc quidem ut in pluribus verum est: sed potest in
to-be-returned and this indeed as in the-more true it-is but it-can in
aliquo casu contingere quod sit damnosum, et per consequens
some case to-happen that it-be harmful and through consequence
irrationabile, si deposita reddantur; puta si aliquis petat
unreasonable if deposits be-returned for-example if someone ask-for(-them)
ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc tanto magis invenitur
for attacking the-fatherland and this by-so-much more is-found
deficere, quanto magis ad particularia descenditur, puta
to-fail by-as-much-as more to particulars one-descends for-example
si dicatur quod deposita sunt reddenda cum tali cautione,
if it-be-said that deposits are to-be-returned with such caution
vel tali modo: quanto enim plures conditiones particulares
or in-such way by-as-much-as for more conditions particular

apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut
are-added by-so-much in-more ways it-will-be-able to-fail so-that
non sit rectum vel in reddendo vel in non reddendo.
not it-be right either in returning or in not returning

Sic igitur dicendum est quod lex naturae, quantum
thus therefore to-be-said it-is that the-law of-nature as-far
ad prima principia communia, est eadem apud omnes
to the-first principles common is the-same among all
et secundum rectitudinem, et secundum notitiam. Sed
both according-to rectitude and according-to knowledge but
quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi conclusiones
as-far to certain proper-things which are as-if conclusions
principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in
of-principles common it-is the-same among all as in
pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam: sed
the-more both according-to rectitude and according-to knowledge but
ut in paucioribus potest deficere et quantum ad rectitudinem,
as in the-fewer it-can to-fail both as-far to rectitude
propter aliqua particularia impedimenta (sicut etiam naturae
on-account-of some particular impediments as also natures
generabiles et corruptibiles deficiunt ut in paucioribus,
generable and corruptible fail as in the-fewer
propter impedimenta), et etiam quantum ad notitiam; et
on-account-of impediments and also as-far to knowledge and
hoc propter hoc quod aliqui habent depravatam rationem
this on-account-of this that some have depraved reason
ex passione, seu ex mala consuetudine, seu ex mala
from passion or from evil custom or from evil
habitudine naturae; sicut apud Germanos olim latrocinium non
disposition of-nature as among the-Germans once robbery not

reputabatur iniquum, cum tamen sit expresse contra legem
was-reckoned unjust although yet it-be expressly against the-law
naturae, ut refert Iulius Caesar, in libro de Bello Gallico.
of-nature as relates Julius Caesar in the-book on the-War Gallic

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that word that not
est sic intelligendum quasi omnia quae in Lege et in
is thus to-be-understood as-if all-things which in the-Law and in
Evangelio continentur, sint de lege naturae, cum multa
the-Gospel are-contained be of the-law of-nature since many-things
tradantur ibi supra naturam: sed quia ea quae sunt
are-handed-down there above nature but because those-things which are
de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur. Unde cum dixisset
of the-law of-nature fully there are-handed-down whence when had-said
Gratianus quod ius naturale est quod in Lege et in
Gratian that right natural is what in the-Law and in
Evangelio continetur, statim, exemplificando, subiunxit: quo
the-Gospel is-contained at-once by-exemplifying he-added by-which
quisque iubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri.
each-one is-bidden to-another to-do what to-himself he-wills to-be-done

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Philosophi est
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-word of-the-Philosopher is
intelligendum de his quae sunt naturaliter iusta non
to-be-understood about those-things which are naturally just not
sicut principia communia, sed sicut quaedam conclusiones
as principles common but as certain conclusions
ex his derivatae; quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem habent,
from them derived which as in the-more rectitude have
et ut in paucioribus deficiunt.
and as in the-fewer fail

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut ratio in homine
to the-third it-must-be-said that as reason in man
dominatur et imperat aliis potentiis, ita oportet quod
rules and commands the-other powers so it-is-necessary that
omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias potentias pertinentes
all the-inclinations natural to other powers pertaining
ordinentur secundum rationem. Unde hoc est apud omnes
be-ordered according-to reason whence this is among all
communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes
commonly right that according-to reason be-directed all
hominum inclinationes.
of-men the-inclinations

Utrum lex naturae mutari possit

5 · WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE CHANGED

The written law corrects it, God commanded Abraham to kill his son, and property and slavery came by human law. Thomas answers that it can be changed by addition, but not by subtraction in its first principles; its secondary precepts can fail in a few particular cases. All men die by God's sentence for original sin, so death at his command is no injustice; what God commands takes nothing against its owner's will.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law of-nature
mutari possit. Quia super illud Eccli. XVII, Addidit
to-be-changed can because upon that Ecclesiasticus XVII be-added
eis disciplinam et legem vitae, dicit Glossa: Legem
to-them discipline and the-law of-life says the-Gloss the-law
litterae, quantum ad correctionem legis naturalis, scribi
of-the-letter as-far to the-correction of-the-law natural to-be-written

voluit. Sed illud quod corrigitur, mutatur. Ergo lex
he-willed but that which is-corrected is-changed therefore the-law
naturalis potest mutari.
natural can to-be-changed

2. Praeterea, contra legem naturalem est occisio innocentis, et
2 further against the-law natural is the-killing of-the-innocent and
etiam adulterium et furtum. Sed ista inveniuntur esse mutata a
also adultery and theft but these are-found to-be changed by
Deo: puta cum Deus praecepit Abrahae quod occideret filium
God for-example when God commanded Abraham that he-should-kill (his)-son
innocentem, ut habetur Gen. XXII; et cum praecepit Iudaeis
innocent as is-had Genesis XXII and when he-commanded the-Jews
ut mutuata Aegyptiorum vasa subriperent, ut habetur Exod.
that the-borrowed of-the-Egyptians vessels they-should-steal as is-had Exodus
XII; et cum praecepit Osee ut uxorem fornicariam acciperet,
XII and when he-commanded Hosea that a-wife fornicating he-should-take
ut habetur Osee I. Ergo lex naturalis potest mutari.
as is-had Hosea I therefore the-law natural can to-be-changed

3. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod
3 further Isidore says in the-book of-Etymologies that
communis omnium possessio, et una libertas, est de iure
the-common of-all possession and one liberty is of right
naturali. Sed haec videmus esse commutata per leges
natural but these-things we-see to-be changed through laws
humanas. Ergo videtur quod lex naturalis sit mutabilis.
human therefore it-seems that the-law natural be changeable

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Decretis, dist. 5:
but against is that it-is-said in the-Decrees distinction 5
Naturale ius ab exordio rationalis creaturae. Nec variatur
natural right from the-beginning of-the-rational creature nor is-it-varied
tempore, sed immutabile permanet.
by-time but unchangeable remains

Respondeo dicendum quod lex naturalis potest intelligi
I-answer it-must-be-said that the-law natural can to-be-understood
mutari dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod aliquid ei
to-be-changed in-two-ways in-one way through this that something to-it
addatur. Et sic nihil prohibet legem naturalem mutari:
be-added and thus nothing prohibits the-law natural to-be-changed
multa enim supra legem naturalem superaddita sunt, ad
many-things for above the-law natural superadded are for
humanam vitam utilia, tam per legem divinam, quam
human life useful as-well through the-law divine as
etiam per leges humanas.
also through laws human

Alio modo intelligitur mutatio legis naturalis per
in-another way is-understood change of-the-law natural through
modum subtractionis, ut scilicet aliquid desinat esse de lege
the-mode of-subtraction so-that namely something cease to-be of the-law
naturali, quod prius fuit secundum legem naturalem. Et sic
natural which before was according-to the-law natural and thus
quantum ad prima principia legis naturae, lex naturae est
as-far to the-first principles of-the-law of-nature the-law of-nature is
omnino immutabilis. Quantum autem ad secunda praecepta,
wholly unchangeable as-far moreover to the-second precepts
quae diximus esse quasi quasdam proprias conclusiones
which we-said to-be as-if certain proper conclusions
propinquas primis principiis, sic lex naturalis non immutatur
near to-the-first principles thus the-law natural not is-changed
quin ut in pluribus rectum sit semper quod lex naturalis
but-that as in the-more right be always what the-law natural
habet. Potest tamen immutari in aliquo particulari, et in
has it-can yet to-be-changed in some particular and in

paucioribus, propter aliquas speciales causas impedientes
the-fewer on-account-of some special causes impeding
observantiam talium praeceptorum, ut supra dictum est.
the-observance of-such precepts as above said it-is

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex scripta dicitur esse
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-law written is-said to-be
data ad correctionem legis naturae, vel quia per legem
given for the-correction of-the-law of-nature either because through the-law
scriptam suppletum est quod legi naturae deerat: vel quia
written supplied it-is what to-the-law of-nature was-lacking or because
lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, quantum ad aliqua,
the-law of-nature in of-some the-hearts as-far to some-things
corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae
corrupted was so-far that they-thought to-be good the-things-which
naturaliter sunt mala; et talis corruptio correctione indigebat.
naturally are evil and such corruption correction needed

Ad secundum dicendum quod naturali morte moriuntur
to the-second it-must-be-said that by-natural death die
omnes communiter, tam nocentes quam innocentes. Quae
all commonly as-well the-guilty as the-innocent which
quidem naturalis mors divina potestate inducitur propter
indeed natural death by-divine power is-brought-on on-account-of
peccatum originale; secundum illud I Reg. II: Dominus
sin original according-to that I Kings II the-Lord
mortificat et vivificat. Et ideo absque aliqua iniustitia,
kills and makes-alive and therefore without any injustice
secundum mandatum Dei, potest infligi mors cuicumque
according-to the-command of-God can to-be-inflicted death on-any-whatever
homini, vel nocenti vel innocenti. – Similiter etiam
man whether guilty or innocent similarly also
adulterium est concubitus cum uxore aliena: quae quidem
adultery is lying-together with the-wife of-another who indeed

est ei deputata secundum legem divinitus traditam. Unde
is to-him assigned according-to the-law divinely handed-down whence
ad quamcumque mulierem aliquis accedat ex mandato divino,
to whatever woman someone approach from command divine
non est adulterium nec fornicatio. – Et eadem ratio est de
not it-is adultery nor fornication and the-same reason is about
furto, quod est acceptio rei alienae. Quidquid enim accipit
theft which is the-taking of-a-thing of-another whatever for takes
aliquis ex mandato Dei, qui est Dominus universorum,
someone from the-command of-God who is the-Lord of-all
non accipit absque voluntate domini, quod est furari. – Nec
not he-takes without the-will of-the-owner which is to-steal nor
solum in rebus humanis quidquid a Deo mandatur, hoc
only in things human whatever by God is-commanded by-this
ipso est debitum: sed etiam in rebus naturalibus quidquid a
very it-is due but also in things natural whatever by
Deo fit, est quodammodo naturale, ut in Primo dictum est.
God is-done is in-a-way natural as in the-First said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse de iure
to the-third it-must-be-said that something is-said to-be of right
naturali dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ad hoc natura inclinat:
natural in-two-ways in-one way because to this nature inclines
sicut non esse iniuriam alteri faciendam. Alio modo,
as not to-be injury to-another to-be-done in-another way
quia natura non induxit contrarium: sicut possemus dicere
because nature not introduced the-contrary as we-could to-say
quod hominem esse nudum est de iure naturali, quia
that man to-be naked is of right natural because
natura non dedit ei vestitum, sed ars adinvenit. Et
nature not gave to-him clothing but art devised(-it) and
hoc modo communis omnium possessio, et omnium una
in-this way the-common of-all possession and of-all one

libertas, dicitur esse de iure naturali: quia scilicet distinctio
liberty is-said to-be of right natural because namely the-distinction
possessionum et servitus non sunt inductae a natura, sed
of-possessions and servitude not are introduced by nature but
per hominum rationem, ad utilitatem humanae vitae. Et sic
through of-men the-reason for the-utility of-human life and thus
in hoc lex naturae non est mutata nisi per additionem.
in this the-law of-nature not is changed except through addition

Utrum lex naturae possit a corde hominis aboleri

6 · WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CAN BE BLOTTED OUT OF MAN'S HEART

Guilt blots out the law of justice, and many human laws stand against nature. Thomas answers that in its common principles it cannot be blotted out in general, though reason can be hindered from applying it to a particular act by passion; in its secondary precepts it can be blotted out by evil persuasions, as errors arise in speculative conclusions, or by depraved customs and corrupt habits.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex naturae possit
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-law of-nature can
a corde hominis aboleri. Quia Rom. II, super illud,
from the-heart of-man to-be-abolished because Romans II upon that
Cum gentes, quae legem non habent, etc., dicit Glossa quod
when the-gentiles who law not have etc says the-Gloss that
in interiori homine per gratiam innovato, lex iustitiae
in the-interior man through grace renewed the-law of-justice
inscribitur, quam deleverat culpa. Sed lex iustitiae est
is-inscribed which had-blotted-out guilt but the-law of-justice is
lex naturae. Ergo lex naturae potest deleri.
the-law of-nature therefore the-law of-nature can to-be-blotted-out

2. Praeterea, lex gratiae est efficacior quam lex
2 further the-law of-grace is more-efficacious than the-law
naturae. Sed lex gratiae deletur per culpam. Ergo
of-nature but the-law of-grace is-blotted-out through guilt therefore
multo magis lex naturae potest deleri.
much more the-law of-nature can to-be-blotted-out

3. Praeterea, illud quod lege statuitur, inducitur quasi iustum.
3 further that which by-law is-established is-introduced as-if just
Sed multa sunt ab hominibus statuta contra legem naturae.
but many-things are by men established against the-law of-nature
Ergo lex naturae potest a cordibus hominum aboleri.
therefore the-law of-nature can from the-hearts of-men to-be-abolished

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in II Confess.: Lex
but against is that Augustine says in II Confessions law
tua scripta est in cordibus hominum, quam nec ulla quidem
your written is in the-hearts of-men which not-even any indeed
delet iniquitas. Sed lex scripta in cordibus hominum est
blots-out iniquity but the-law written in the-hearts of-men is
lex naturalis. Ergo lex naturalis deleri non potest.
the-law natural therefore the-law natural to-be-blotted-out not can

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is
ad legem naturalem pertinent primo quidem quaedam
to the-law natural pertain first indeed certain
praecepta communissima, quae sunt omnibus nota: quaedam
precepts most-common which are to-all known certain
autem secundaria praecepta magis propria, quae sunt quasi
moreover secondary precepts more proper which are as-if
conclusiones propinquae principiis. Quantum ergo ad illa
conclusions near to-the-principles as-far therefore to those
principia communia, lex naturalis nullo modo potest a
principles common the-law natural in-no way can from

cordibus hominum deleri in universali. Deletur tamen
the-hearts of-men to-be-blotted-out in the-universal it-is-blotted-out yet
in particulari operabili, secundum quod ratio impeditur applicare
in the-particular doable according as reason is-hindered to-apply
commune principium ad particulare operabile, propter
the-common principle to the-particular doable on-account-of
concupiscentiam vel aliquam aliam passionem, ut supra dictum
concupiscence or some other passion as above said
est. – Quantum vero ad alia praecepta secundaria, potest
it-is as-far but to the-other precepts secondary can
lex naturalis deleri de cordibus hominum, vel propter
the-law natural to-be-blotted-out from the-hearts of-men either on-account-of
malas persuasiones, eo modo quo etiam in speculativis
evil persuasions in-that way in-which also in speculative-things
errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias; vel etiam
errors happen about conclusions necessary or also
propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos; sicut
on-account-of depraved customs and habits corrupted as
apud quosdam non reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam
among certain-men not were-reckoned robberies sins or even
vitia contra naturam, ut etiam Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I.
vices against nature as also the-Apostle says to the-Romans I

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod culpa delet legem naturae
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that guilt blots-out the-law of-nature
in particulari, non autem in universali, nisi forte quantum ad
in the-particular not moreover in the-universal unless perhaps as-far to
secunda praecepta legis naturae, eo modo quo dictum est.
the-second precepts of-the-law of-nature in-that way in-which said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia etsi sit efficacior
to the-second it-must-be-said that grace although it-be more-efficacious
quam natura, tamen natura essentialior est homini, et ideo
than nature yet nature more-essential is to-man and therefore
magis permanens.
more permanent

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds about
secundis praeceptis legis naturae, contra quae aliqui
the-second precepts of-the-law of-nature against which some
legislatores statuta aliqua fecerunt, quae sunt iniqua.
legislators statutes some have-made which are unjust

De lege humana

XCV · ON HUMAN LAW

On human law Thomas treats the law itself, its power, and its change. On the first he asks four questions: its usefulness, its origin, its quality, and its division.

Deinde considerandum est de lege humana. Et primo
next to-be-considered it-is about the-law human and first
quidem, de ipsa lege secundum se; secundo, de potestate
indeed about the-very law according-to itself second about the-power
eius; tertio, de eius mutabilitate.
of-it third about its changeability

Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
about the-first are-asked four

Primo: de utilitate ipsius.
first about the-utility of-it

Secundo: de origine eius.
second about the-origin of-it

Tertio: de qualitate ipsius.
third about the-quality of-it

Quarto: de divisione eiusdem.
fourth about the-division of-the-same

Utrum fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab hominibus

1 · WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR LAWS TO BE MADE BY MEN

Admonition works better than coercion, a living judge is better than a written law, and the wise can judge each case. Thomas answers that man has an aptitude for virtue but must reach its perfection by discipline, and while the well-disposed young need only a father's admonition, the insolent must be restrained by force and fear, so that they cease to do evil and may come to do willingly what they did from fear. Man separated from law is the worst of animals.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit utile
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not it-was useful
aliquas leges poni ab hominibus. Intentio enim cuiuslibet
some laws to-be-set by men the-intention for of-any
legis est ut per eam homines fiant boni, sicut supra
law is that through it men become good as above
dictum est. Sed homines magis inducuntur ad bonum
said it-is but men more are-induced to good
voluntarii per monitiones, quam coacti per leges. Ergo
willing through admonitions than compelled through laws therefore
non fuit necessarium leges ponere.
not it-was necessary laws to-set

2. Praeterea, sicut dicit Philosophus, in V Ethic., ad iudicem
2 further as says the-Philosopher in V Ethics to the-judge
confugiunt homines sicut ad iustum animatum. Sed iustitia
flee men as to the-just animate but justice
animata est melior quam inanimata, quae legibus continetur.
animate is better than inanimate which in-laws is-contained
Ergo melius fuisset ut executio iustitiae committeretur
therefore better it-would-have-been that the-execution of-justice be-committed
arbitrio iudicum, quam quod super hoc lex aliqua ederetur.
to-the-judgment of-judges than that about this a-law any be-published

3. Praeterea, lex omnis directiva est actuum humanorum,
3 further law every directive is of-acts human
ut ex supradictis patet. Sed cum humani actus consistant
as from the-above-said is-plain but since human acts consist
in singularibus, quae sunt infinita, non possunt ea quae
in singulars which are infinite not can those-things which
ad directionem humanorum actuum pertinent, sufficienter
to the-direction of-human acts pertain sufficiently
considerari, nisi ab aliquo sapiente, qui inspiciat singula.
to-be-considered except by some wise-man who inspect single-things
Ergo melius fuisset arbitrio sapientum dirigi
therefore better it-would-have-been by-the-judgment of-the-wise to-be-directed
actus humanos, quam aliqua lege posita. Ergo non fuit
acts human than by-some law set therefore not it-was
necessarium leges humanas ponere.
necessary laws human to-set

Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol.:
but against is that Isidore says in the-book of-Etymologies
Factae sunt leges ut earum metu humana coerceretur
made are laws that their by-fear human be-restrained
audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos innocentia, et in ipsis
boldness and-safe be among the-wicked innocence and in the-very
improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur nocendi facultas.
wicked by-dreaded punishment be-bridled of-harming the-faculty
Sed haec sunt maxime necessaria humano generi. Ergo
but these-things are most necessary to-the-human race therefore
necessarium fuit ponere leges humanas.
necessary it-was to-set laws human

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet,
I-answer it-must-be-said that as from the-above-said is-plain
homini naturaliter inest quaedam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed
in-man naturally is-in a-certain aptitude to virtue but

ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse est quod homini adveniat per
the-very of-virtue perfection necessary it-is that to-man come through
aliquam disciplinam. Sicut etiam videmus quod per aliquam
some discipline as also we-see that through some
industriam subvenitur homini in suis necessitatibus, puta
industry is-helped to-man in his necessities for-example
in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quaedam habet a natura,
in food and clothing of-which beginnings certain he-has from nature
scilicet rationem et manus, non autem ipsum complementum,
namely reason and hands not moreover the-very completion
sicut cetera animalia, quibus natura dedit sufficienter
as the-other animals to-which nature gave sufficiently
tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de
covering and food to this moreover discipline not with
facili invenitur homo sibi sufficiens. Quia perfectio virtutis
ease is-found man to-himself sufficient because the-perfection of-virtue
praecipue consistit in retrahendo hominem ab indebitis
chiefly consists in withdrawing man from undue
delectationibus, ad quas praecipue homines sunt proni, et
pleasures to which chiefly men are prone and
maxime iuvenes, circa quos efficacior est disciplina. Et ideo
most the-young about whom more-efficacious is discipline and therefore
oportet quod huiusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem
it-is-necessary that of-this-kind discipline through which to virtue
perveniatur, homines ab alio sortiantur. Et quidem quantum
one-may-arrive men from another obtain and indeed as-far
ad illos iuvenes qui sunt proni ad actus virtutum, ex
to those young-men who are prone to the-acts of-virtues from
bona dispositione naturae, vel consuetudine, vel magis divino
good disposition of-nature or custom or rather by-divine
munere, sufficit disciplina paterna, quae est per monitiones.
gift suffices discipline paternal which is through admonitions

Sed quia inveniuntur quidam protervi et ad vitia proni, qui
but because are-found some insolent and to vices prone who
verbis de facili moveri non possunt; necessarium fuit ut
by-words with ease to-be-moved not can necessary it-was that
per vim et metum cohiberentur a malo, ut saltem sic
through force and fear they-be-restrained from evil so-that at-least thus
male facere desistentes, et aliis quietam vitam redderent,
evil to-do desisting both to-others a-quiet life they-might-render
et ipsi tandem per huiusmodi assuetudinem ad hoc
and they-themselves at-last through of-this-kind habituation to this
perducerentur quod voluntarie facerent quae prius metu
might-be-brought that voluntarily they-might-do what before by-fear
implebant, et sic fierent virtuosi. Huiusmodi autem
they-fulfilled and thus they-might-become virtuous of-this-kind moreover
disciplina cogens metu poenae, est disciplina legum. Unde
discipline compelling by-fear of-punishment is the-discipline of-laws whence
necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, ut leges
necessary it-was for the-peace of-men and virtue that laws
ponerentur: quia sicut Philosophus dicit, in I Polit., sicut
be-set because as the-Philosopher says in I Politics as
homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimum animalium;
man if he-be perfect in-virtue is the-best of-animals
sic, si sit separatus a lege et iustitia, est pessimum
thus if he-be separated from law and justice he-is the-worst
omnium; quia homo habet arma rationis ad explendas
of-all because man has the-arms of-reason for fulfilling
concupiscentias et saevitias, quae non habent alia animalia.
concupiscences and cruelties which not have other animals

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homines bene dispositi
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that men well disposed
melius inducuntur ad virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam
better are-induced to virtue by-admonitions voluntary than

coactione: sed quidam male dispositi non ducuntur ad
by-coercion but some badly disposed not are-led to
virtutem nisi cogantur.
virtue unless they-be-compelled

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit,
to the-second it-must-be-said that as the-Philosopher says
I Rhetor., melius est omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere
I Rhetoric better it-is all-things to-be-ordered by-law than to-leave(-them)
iudicum arbitrio. Et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem,
of-judges to-the-judgment and this on-account-of three-things first indeed
quia facilius est invenire paucos sapientes, qui sufficiant ad
because easier it-is to-find few wise-men who suffice for
rectas leges ponendas, quam multos, qui requirerentur ad
right laws to-be-set than many who would-be-required for
recte iudicandum de singulis. – Secundo, quia illi qui leges
rightly judging about single-cases second because those who laws
ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege ferendum
set from much time consider what by-law to-be-brought
sit: sed iudicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus
be but judgments about singular deeds are-made from cases
subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest
suddenly arisen easier moreover from many-things considered can
homo videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno
man to-see what right be than only from some one
facto. – Tertio, quia legislatores iudicant in universali, et
deed third because legislators judge in universal and
de futuris: sed homines iudiciis praesidentes iudicant
about future-things but men over-judgments presiding judge
de praesentibus, ad quae afficiuntur amore vel odio, aut
about present-things to which they-are-affected by-love or hatred or
aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum depravatur iudicium.
some cupidity and thus their is-depraved judgment

Quia ergo iustitia animata iudicis non invenitur in multis;
because therefore the-justice animate of-the-judge not is-found in many
et quia flexibilis est; ideo necessarium fuit, in quibuscumque
and because flexible it-is therefore necessary it-was in whatever-things
est possibile, legem determinare quid iudicandum sit, et
it-is possible law to-determine what to-be-judged be and
paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.
very-few-things to-the-judgment of-men to-commit

Ad tertium dicendum quod quaedam singularia, quae non
to the-third it-must-be-said that certain singulars which not
possunt lege comprehendi, necesse est committere iudicibus,
can by-law to-be-comprehended necessary it-is to-commit to-judges
ut ibidem Philosophus dicit: puta de eo quod est
as in-the-same-place the-Philosopher says for-example about that which is
factum esse vel non esse, et de aliis huiusmodi.
done to-be or not to-be and about others of-this-kind

Utrum omnis lex humanitus posita a lege naturali derivetur

2 · WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW

What is legally just is at first indifferent whichever way it is done, positive right is set against natural, and not every law can be given a reason. Thomas answers that a law has the force of law so far as it is just, and the first rule of reason is the natural law; so every human law is derived from it, either as a conclusion from principles, as not to kill, or as a determination of something general, as the kind of punishment. What departs from the natural law is a corruption of law.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis lex
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not every law
humanitus posita a lege naturali derivetur. Dicit enim
humanly set from the-law natural be-derived says for

Philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustum legale est quod ex
the-Philosopher in V Ethics that the-just legal is what from
principio quidem nihil differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat.
the-beginning indeed nothing differs whether thus or otherwise it-be-done
Sed in his quae oriuntur ex lege naturali, differt
but in those-things which arise from the-law natural it-differs
utrum sic vel aliter fiat. Ergo ea quae sunt legibus
whether thus or otherwise it-be-done therefore those-things which are by-laws
humanis statuta, non omnia derivantur a lege naturae.
human established not all are-derived from the-law of-nature

2. Praeterea, ius positivum dividitur contra ius naturale:
2 further right positive is-divided against right natural
ut patet per Isidorum, in libro Etymol, et per
as is-plain through Isidore in the-book of-Etymologies and through
Philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed ea quae derivantur a
the-Philosopher in V Ethics but those-things which are-derived from
principiis communibus legis naturae sicut conclusiones,
the-principles common of-the-law of-nature as conclusions
pertinent ad legem naturae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ea
pertain to the-law of-nature as above said it-is therefore those-things
quae sunt de lege humana, non derivantur a lege naturae.
which are of the-law human not are-derived from the-law of-nature

3. Praeterea, lex naturae est eadem apud omnes: dicit
3 further the-law of-nature is the-same among all says
enim Philosophus, in V Ethic., quod naturale iustum est quod
for the-Philosopher in V Ethics that the-natural just is what
ubique habet eandem potentiam. Si igitur leges humanae a
everywhere has the-same power if therefore laws human from
naturali lege derivarentur, sequeretur quod etiam ipsae
the-natural law were-derived it-would-follow that also they-themselves
essent eaedem apud omnes. Quod patet esse falsum.
would-be the-same among all which is-plain to-be false

4. Praeterea, eorum quae a lege naturali derivantur,
4 further of-those-things which from the-law natural are-derived
potest aliqua ratio assignari. Sed non omnium quae a maioribus
can some reason to-be-assigned but not of-all-things which by the-ancestors
lege statuta sunt, ratio reddi potest, ut Iurisperitus dicit.
by-law established are a-reason to-be-rendered can as the-Jurist says
Ergo non omnes leges humanae derivantur a lege naturali.
therefore not all laws human are-derived from the-law natural

Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetor.: Res
but against is that Tully says in his Rhetoric things
a natura profectas, et a consuetudine probatas, legum
from nature proceeded and by custom approved of-the-laws
metus et religio sanxit.
fear and religion sanctioned

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I
I-answer it-must-be-said that as Augustine says in I
de Lib. Arb., non videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit.
on Free Choice not it-seems to-be a-law which just not will-have-been
Unde inquantum habet de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute
whence inasmuch-as it-has of justice so-far it-has of the-force
legis. In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex
of-law in things moreover human is-said to-be something just from
eo quod est rectum secundum regulam rationis. Rationis autem
this that it-is right according-to the-rule of-reason of-reason moreover
prima regula est lex naturae, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde
the-first rule is the-law of-nature as from the-above-said is-plain whence
omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis,
every law humanly set so-far has of the-notion of-law
inquantum a lege naturae derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a
inasmuch-as from the-law of-nature it-is-derived if but in something from
lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex, sed legis corruptio.
the-law natural it-disagree already not it-will-be law but of-law a-corruption

Sed sciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest
but to-be-known it-is that from the-law natural in-two-ways can
aliquid derivari: uno modo, sicut conclusiones ex principiis;
something to-be-derived in-one way as conclusions from principles
alio modo, sicut determinationes quaedam aliquorum
in-another way as determinations certain of-some
communium. Primus quidem modus est similis ei quo in
common-things the-first indeed way is like to-that by-which in
scientiis ex principiis conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur.
the-sciences from principles conclusions demonstrative are-produced
Secundo vero modo simile est quod in artibus formae communes
in-the-second but way like is what in the-arts forms common
determinantur ad aliquid speciale: sicut artifex formam
are-determined to something special as the-artificer the-form
communem domus necesse est quod determinet ad hanc vel
common of-a-house necessary it-is that he-determine to this or
illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo quaedam a principiis
that of-a-house shape are-derived therefore some-things from the-principles
communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum: sicut
common of-the-law of-nature through the-mode of-conclusions as
hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam
this which is not to-be to-be-killed as a-conclusion certain
derivari potest ab eo quod est nulli esse malum faciendum.
to-be-derived can from that which is to-no-one to-be evil to-be-done
Quaedam vero per modum determinationis: sicut lex naturae
some-things but through the-mode of-determination as the-law of-nature
habet quod ille qui peccat, puniatur; sed quod tali poena
has that he who sins be-punished but that by-such punishment
puniatur, hoc est quaedam determinatio legis naturae.
he-be-punished this is a-certain determination of-the-law of-nature

Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege humana posita. Sed
both therefore are-found in the-law human set but
ea quae sunt primi modi, continentur lege humana
those-things which are of-the-first mode are-contained by-the-law human
non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam
not as-though they-be only by-law set but they-have also
aliquid vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quae sunt
something of-force from the-law natural but those-things which are
secundi modi, ex sola lege humana vigorem habent.
of-the-second mode from alone the-law human force have

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-Philosopher speaks
de illis quae sunt lege posita per determinationem
about those-things which are by-law set through determination
vel specificationem quandam praeceptorum legis naturae.
or specification certain of-the-precepts of-the-law of-nature

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit
to the-second it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds
de his quae derivantur a lege naturae tanquam
about those-things which are-derived from the-law of-nature as-though
conclusiones.
conclusions

Ad tertium dicendum quod principia communia legis
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-principles common of-the-law
naturae non possunt eodem modo applicari omnibus,
of-nature not can in-the-same way to-be-applied to-all
propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum. Et exinde
on-account-of the-great variety of-things human and thence
provenit diversitas legis positivae apud diversos.
comes the-diversity of-law positive among diverse-peoples

Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum illud Iurisperiti
to the-fourth it-must-be-said that word that of-the-Jurist
intelligendum est in his quae sunt introducta a
to-be-understood is in those-things which are introduced by
maioribus circa particulares determinationes legis naturalis;
the-ancestors about particular determinations of-the-law natural
ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum et
to which indeed determinations itself has of-the-experienced and
prudentum iudicium sicut ad quaedam principia; inquantum
of-the-prudent the-judgment as to certain principles inasmuch-as
scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter
namely at-once they-see what more-fitting be particularly
determinari. Unde Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod
to-be-determined whence the-Philosopher says in VI Ethics that
in talibus oportet attendere expertorum et seniorum vel
in such-things it-is-necessary to-attend-to of-the-experienced and of-the-elders or
prudentum indemonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus,
of-the-prudent indemonstrable utterances and opinions
non minus quam demonstrationibus.
not less than demonstrations

Utrum Isidorus convenienter qualitatem legis positivae describat

3 · WHETHER ISIDORE DESCRIBES POSITIVE LAW FITTINGLY

Isidore's list of qualities seems redundant. Thomas answers that a thing's form must be proportioned to its end and its rule, and human law is ruled by the divine and natural law and ordered to human utility; so Isidore's three conditions, to agree with religion, to suit discipline, and to further salvation, answer to these, and all his other conditions reduce to them.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that Isidore unfittingly
qualitatem legis positivae describat, dicens: Erit lex honesta,
the-quality of-law positive describes saying will-be law honorable
iusta, possibilis secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem
just possible according-to nature according-to the-custom
patriae, loco temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis;
of-the-fatherland to-place and-time fitting necessary useful
manifesta quoque, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem
clear also lest anything through obscurity into deception
contineat; nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate
it-contain for-no private advantage but for the-common utility
civium scripta. Supra enim in tribus conditionibus
of-the-citizens written above for in three conditions
qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens: Lex erit omne quod
the-quality of-law he-had-explained saying law will-be all which
ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni congruat, quod
by-reason will-have-stood provided that-which with-religion agrees which
disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. Ergo superflue
with-discipline is-fitting which to-salvation profits therefore superfluously
postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat.
afterward the-conditions of-law he-multiplies

2. Praeterea, iustitia pars est honestatis; ut Tullius dicit,
2 further justice a-part is of-honorableness as Tully says
in I de Offic. Ergo postquam dixerat honesta, superflue
in I on Duties therefore after he-had-said honorable superfluously
additur iusta.
is-added just

3. Praeterea, lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, contra
3 further law written according-to Isidore against
consuetudinem dividitur. Non ergo debuit in definitione
custom is-divided not therefore ought in the-definition
legis poni quod esset secundum consuetudinem patriae.
of-law to-be-put that it-be according-to the-custom of-the-fatherland

4. Praeterea, Necessarium dupliciter dicitur. Scilicet id
4 further necessary in-two-ways is-said namely that
quod est necessarium simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter
which is necessary simply which impossible it-is otherwise
se habere: et huiusmodi necessarium non subiacet humano
itself to-have and of-this-kind necessary not is-subject to-human
iudicio: unde talis necessitas ad legem humanam non
judgment whence such necessity to law human not
pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter finem:
pertains there-is also something necessary on-account-of an-end
et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue
and such necessity the-same is as utility therefore superfluously
utrumque ponitur, necessaria et utilis.
each is-put necessary and useful

Sed contra est auctoritas ipsius Isidori.
but against is the-authority of-the-very Isidore

Respondeo dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei quae est
I-answer it-must-be-said that of-each thing which is
propter finem, necesse est quod forma determinetur
for-the-sake-of an-end necessary it-is that the-form be-determined

secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma serrae talis
according-to proportion to the-end as the-form of-a-saw such
est qualis convenit sectioni; ut patet in II Physic. Quaelibet
is as befits cutting as is-plain in II Physics any
etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam
also thing ruled and measured it-is-necessary that it-have a-form
proportionalem suae regulae et mensurae. Lex autem humana
proportioned to-its rule and measure law moreover human
utrumque habet: quia et est aliquid ordinatum ad finem; et
each has because both it-is something ordered to an-end and
est quaedam regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata quadam
it-is a-certain rule or measure ruled or measured by-a-certain
superiori mensura; quae quidem est duplex, scilicet lex divina
higher measure which indeed is twofold namely the-law divine
et lex naturae, ut ex supradictis patet. Finis autem humanae
and the-law of-nature as from the-above-said is-plain the-end moreover of-human
legis est utilitas hominum; sicut etiam Iurisperitus dicit. Et
law is the-utility of-men as also the-Jurist says and
ideo Isidorus in conditione legis, primo quidem tria
therefore Isidore in the-condition of-law first indeed three-things
posuit: scilicet quod religioni congruat, inquantum scilicet
posited namely that with-religion it-agree inasmuch-as namely
est proportionata legi divinae; quod disciplinae conveniat,
it-is proportioned to-the-law divine that with-discipline it-be-fitting
inquantum est proportionata legi naturae; quod saluti
inasmuch-as it-is proportioned to-the-law of-nature that to-salvation
proficiat, inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanae.
it-profit inasmuch-as it-is proportioned to-utility human

Et ad haec tria omnes aliae conditiones quas postea ponit,
and to these three all other conditions which afterward he-posits
reducuntur. Nam quod dicitur honesta, refertur ad hoc quod
are-reduced for that it-is-said honorable is-referred to this that

religioni congruat. – Quod autem subditur, iusta, possibilis
with-religion it-agree what moreover is-added just possible
secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae,
according-to nature according-to the-custom of-the-fatherland
loco temporique conveniens, additur ad hoc quod conveniat
to-place and-time fitting is-added to this that it-befit
disciplinae. Attenditur enim humana disciplina primum
discipline is-regarded for human discipline first
quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui importatur in hoc
indeed as-far to the-order of-reason which is-implied in this
quod dicitur iusta. Secundo, quantum ad facultatem agentium.
that it-is-said just second as-far to the-faculty of-the-agents
Debet enim esse disciplina conveniens unicuique secundum
it-ought for to-be discipline fitting for-each-one according-to
suam possibilitatem, observata etiam possibilitate naturae (non
his possibility observed also the-possibility of-nature not
enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris, quae imponuntur
for the-same-things are to-be-imposed on-children which are-imposed
viris perfectis); et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non
on-men perfect and according-to human custom not
enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non
for can man alone in society live to-others the-custom not
gerens. Tertio, quantum ad debitas circumstantias, dicit, loco
bearing third as-far to due circumstances he-says to-place
temporique conveniens. – Quod vero subditur, necessaria,
and-time fitting what but is-added necessary
utilis, etc., refertur ad hoc quod expediat saluti: ut
useful etc is-referred to this that it-be-expedient for-salvation so-that
necessitas referatur ad remotionem malorum; utilitas, ad
necessity be-referred to the-removal of-evils utility to
consecutionem bonorum; manifestatio vero, ad cavendum
the-attainment of-goods clearness but to guarding-against

nocumentum quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. – Et quia,
harm which from the-very law might to-come and because
sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune,
as above said it-is law is-ordered to the-good common
hoc ipsum in ultima parte determinationis ostenditur.
this very in the-last part of-the-determination is-shown
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
and through this is-plain the-answer to the-objections

Utrum Isidorus convenienter ponat divisionem humanarum legum

4 · WHETHER ISIDORE FITTINGLY DIVIDES HUMAN LAWS

The right of nations seems natural, and divisions by name are accidental. Thomas answers that human law is divided by what is in its notion: as derived from the natural law, into the right of nations and civil right; as ordered to the common good, by the offices of priests, rulers, and soldiers; by the regimes that make it, kingship, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and the mixed; and by the matters it governs, named after its authors.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Isidorus
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that unfittingly Isidore
divisionem legum humanarum ponat, sive iuris humani. Sub
the-division of-laws human posits or of-right human under
hoc enim iure comprehendit ius gentium, quod ideo sic
this for right he-comprehends the-right of-nations which therefore thus
nominatur, ut ipse dicit, quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur.
is-named as he-himself says because it all almost nations use
Sed sicut ipse dicit, ius naturale est quod est commune
but as he-himself says right natural is what is common

omnium nationum. Ergo ius gentium non continetur
of-all nations therefore the-right of-nations not is-contained
sub iure positivo humano, sed magis sub iure naturali.
under right positive human but rather under right natural

2. Praeterea, ea quae habent eandem vim, non
2 further those-things which have the-same force not
videntur formaliter differre, sed solum materialiter. Sed
seem formally to-differ but only materially but
leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, et alia huiusmodi quae
laws plebiscites decrees-of-the-senate and other-things of-this-kind which
ponit, omnia habent eandem vim. Ergo videtur quod non
he-posits all have the-same force therefore it-seems that not
differant nisi materialiter. Sed talis distinctio in arte non est
they-differ except materially but such distinction in art not is
curanda: cum possit esse in infinitum. Ergo inconvenienter
to-be-cared-for since it-can to-be to infinity therefore unfittingly
huiusmodi divisio humanarum legum introducitur.
of-this-kind division of-human laws is-introduced

3. Praeterea, sicut in civitate sunt principes et sacerdotes et
3 further as in the-city there-are princes and priests and
milites, ita etiam sunt et alia hominum officia. Ergo videtur
soldiers so also there-are also other of-men offices therefore it-seems
quod, sicut ponitur quoddam ius militare, et ius publicum,
that as is-posited a-certain right military and right public
quod consistit in sacerdotibus et magistratibus; ita etiam
which consists in priests and magistrates so also
debeant poni alia iura, ad alia officia civitatis pertinentia.
ought to-be-posited other rights to other offices of-the-city pertaining

4. Praeterea, ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt
4 further those-things which are by accident are
praetermittenda. Sed accidit legi ut ab hoc vel illo
to-be-passed-over but it-happens to-law that by this or that

homine feratur. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur divisio
man it-be-brought therefore unfittingly is-posited the-division
legum humanarum ex nominibus legislatorum, ut scilicet
of-laws human from the-names of-legislators so-that namely
quaedam dicatur Cornelia, quaedam Falcidia, etc.
one be-called Cornelian another Falcidian etc

In contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat.
to the-contrary the-authority of-Isidore let-suffice

Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque potest per se
I-answer it-must-be-said that each-thing can through itself
dividi secundum id quod in eius ratione continetur. Sicut
to-be-divided according-to that which in its notion is-contained as
in ratione animalis continetur anima, quae est rationalis vel
in the-notion of-animal is-contained the-soul which is rational or
irrationalis: et ideo animal proprie et per se dividitur
irrational and therefore animal properly and through itself is-divided
secundum rationale et irrationale; non autem secundum
according-to rational and irrational not moreover according-to
album et nigrum, quae sunt omnino praeter rationem eius.
white and black which are wholly beside the-notion of-it
Sunt autem multa de ratione legis humanae, secundum
there-are moreover many-things of the-notion of-law human according-to
quorum quodlibet lex humana proprie et per se dividi
of-which any law human properly and through itself to-be-divided
potest. Est enim primo de ratione legis humanae quod
can it-is for first of the-notion of-law human that
sit derivata a lege naturae, ut ex dictis patet. Et
it-be derived from the-law of-nature as from the-things-said is-plain and
secundum hoc dividitur ius positivum in ius gentium et
according-to this is-divided right positive into the-right of-nations and
ius civile, secundum duos modos quibus aliquid derivatur a
right civil according-to the-two modes by-which something is-derived from

lege naturae, ut supra dictum est. Nam ad ius gentium
the-law of-nature as above said it-is for to the-right of-nations
pertinent ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae sicut
pertain those-things which are-derived from the-law of-nature as
conclusiones ex principiis: ut iustae emptiones, venditiones,
conclusions from principles as just buyings sellings
et alia huiusmodi, sine quibus homines ad invicem
and other-things of-this-kind without which men with each-other
convivere non possent; quod est de lege naturae, quia
to-live-together not could which is of the-law of-nature because
homo est naturaliter animal sociale, ut probatur in I Polit.
man is naturally an-animal social as is-proved in I Politics
Quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum
the-things-which but are-derived from the-law of-nature through the-mode
particularis determinationis, pertinent ad ius civile, secundum
of-particular determination pertain to right civil according
quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommodum determinat.
as each city something for-itself suitable determines

Secundo est de ratione legis humanae quod ordinetur ad
second it-is of the-notion of-law human that it-be-ordered to
bonum commune civitatis. Et secundum hoc lex humana
the-good common of-the-city and according-to this law human
dividi potest secundum diversitatem eorum qui specialiter
to-be-divided can according-to the-diversity of-those who specially
dant operam ad bonum commune: sicut sacerdotes, pro
give work to the-good common as priests for
populo Deum orantes; principes, populum gubernantes; et
the-people God praying princes the-people governing and
milites, pro salute populi pugnantes. Et ideo istis
soldiers for the-safety of-the-people fighting and therefore to-these
hominibus specialia quaedam iura aptantur.
men special certain rights are-fitted

Tertio est de ratione legis humanae ut instituatur a
third it-is of the-notion of-law human that it-be-instituted by
gubernante communitatem civitatis, sicut supra dictum est.
the-one-governing the-community of-the-city as above said it-is
Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanae secundum
and according-to this are-distinguished laws human according-to
diversa regimina civitatum. Quorum unum, secundum
the-diverse regimes of-cities of-which one according-to
Philosophum, in III Polit., est regnum, quando scilicet
the-Philosopher in III Politics is kingship when namely
civitas gubernatur ab uno: et secundum hoc accipiuntur
the-city is-governed by one and according-to this are-taken
constitutiones principum. Aliud vero regimen est aristocratia,
the-constitutions of-princes another but regime is aristocracy
idest principatus optimorum, vel optimatum: et secundum
that-is the-rule of-the-best or of-the-nobles and according-to
hoc sumuntur responsa prudentum, et etiam senatusconsulta.
this are-taken the-answers of-the-prudent and also decrees-of-the-senate
Aliud regimen est oligarchia, idest principatus paucorum
another regime is oligarchy that-is the-rule of-few
divitum et potentum: et secundum hoc sumitur ius
rich and powerful and according-to this is-taken the-right
praetorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem
praetorian which also honorary is-called another moreover
regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia: et secundum
regime is of-the-people which is-named democracy and according-to
hoc sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod
this are-taken plebiscites another moreover is tyrannical which
est omnino corruptum: unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex.
is wholly corrupt whence from this not is-taken any law
Est etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est
there-is also some regime from these mixed which is

optimum: et secundum hoc sumitur lex «quam maiores
the-best and according-to this is-taken the-law which the-greater
natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt», ut Isidorus dicit.
by-birth together with the-commons sanctioned as Isidore says

Quarto vero de ratione legis humanae est quod sit directiva
fourth but of the-notion of-law human it-is that it-be directive
humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, secundum diversa
of-human acts and according-to this according-to the-diverse-things
de quibus leges feruntur, distinguuntur leges, quae interdum
about which laws are-brought are-distinguished laws which sometimes
ab auctoribus nominantur: sicut distinguitur Lex Iulia de
from (their)-authors are-named as is-distinguished the-Law Julian on
Adulteriis, Lex Cornelia de Sicariis, et sic de aliis, non
Adulteries the-Law Cornelian on Assassins and thus about others not
propter auctores, sed propter res de quibus sunt.
on-account-of the-authors but on-account-of the-things about which they-are

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ius gentium est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-right of-nations is
quidem aliquo modo naturale homini, secundum quod
indeed in-some way natural to-man according as
est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege naturali
he-is rational inasmuch-as it-is-derived from the-law natural
per modum conclusionis quae non est multum remota
through the-mode of-a-conclusion which not is much removed
a principiis. Unde de facili in huiusmodi homines
from the-principles whence with ease in of-this-kind-things men
consenserunt. Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime
have-agreed it-is-distinguished yet from the-law natural most
ab eo quod est omnibus animalibus commune.
from that which is to-all animals common

Ad alia patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt.
to the-others is-plain the-answer from those-things which said are

De potestate legis humanae

XCVI · ON THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW

On the power of human law Thomas asks six questions: whether it should be framed in general terms; whether it should restrain every vice; whether it commands the acts of every virtue; whether it binds in conscience; whether all men are subject to it; and whether those under it may act beside its words.

Deinde considerandum est de potestate legis humanae.
next to-be-considered it-is about the-power of-law human

Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.
and about this are-asked six

Primo: utrum lex humana debeat poni in communi.
first whether law human ought to-be-set in common

Secundo: utrum lex humana debeat omnia vitia cohibere.
second whether law human ought all vices to-restrain

Tertio: utrum omnium virtutum actus habeat ordinare.
third whether of-all virtues the-acts it-has to-order

Quarto: utrum imponat homini necessitatem quantum ad forum conscientiae.
fourth whether it-imposes on-man necessity as-far to the-court of-conscience

Quinto: utrum omnes homines legi humanae subdantur.
fifth whether all men to-law human be-subject

Sexto: utrum his qui sunt sub lege, liceat agere praeter verba legis.
sixth whether for-those who are under law it-be-lawful to-act beside the-words of-the-law

Utrum lex humana debeat poni in communi magis quam in particulari

1 · WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED IN GENERAL

Laws seem made for singular acts and judgments. Thomas answers that law is ordered to the common good, which consists of many persons, affairs, and times, and the city is meant to last through the succession of its citizens; so laws must look to many things. Privileges, as private laws, regard single persons but reach many affairs, and sentences are called legal only as applying common laws to particular deeds; a rule must direct many things, and in human things a certainty that holds for the most part suffices.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law human not
debeat poni in communi, sed magis in particulari. Dicit enim
ought to-be-set in common but rather in particular says for
Philosophus, in V Ethic., quod legalia sunt quaecumque in
the-Philosopher in V Ethics that legal-things are whatever in
singularibus lege ponunt; et etiam sententialia, quae sunt etiam
singulars by-law they-set and also sentential-things which are also
singularia, quia de singularibus actibus sententiae feruntur.
singular because about singular acts sentences are-brought
Ergo lex non solum ponitur in communi, sed etiam in singulari.
therefore law not only is-set in common but also in singular

2. Praeterea, lex est directiva humanorum actuum, ut supra
2 further law is directive of-human acts as above
dictum est. Sed humani actus in singularibus consistunt.
said it-is but human acts in singulars consist
Ergo leges humanae non debent in universali ferri, sed
therefore laws human not ought in universal to-be-brought but
magis in singulari.
rather in singular

3. Praeterea, lex est regula et mensura humanorum
3 further law is the-rule and measure of-human
actuum, ut supra dictum est. Sed mensura debet esse
acts as above said it-is but a-measure ought to-be
certissima, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Cum ergo in actibus
most-certain as is-said in X Metaphysics since therefore in acts
humanis non possit esse aliquod universale certum, quin
human not can to-be any universal certain but-that
in particularibus deficiat; videtur quod necesse sit leges non
in particulars it-fail it-seems that necessary it-be laws not
in universali, sed in singulari poni.
in universal but in singular to-be-set

Sed contra est quod Iurisperitus dicit, quod iura constitui
but against is that the-Jurist says that rights to-be-constituted
oportet in his quae saepius accidunt: ex his autem
it-is-necessary in those-things which more-often happen from those moreover
quae forte uno casu accidere possunt, iura non constituuntur.
which perhaps in-one case to-happen can rights not are-constituted

Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque quod est
I-answer it-must-be-said that each-thing which is
propter finem, necesse est quod sit fini proportionatum.
for-the-sake-of an-end necessary it-is that it-be to-the-end proportioned
Finis autem legis est bonum commune: quia, ut Isidorus
the-end moreover of-law is the-good common because as Isidore
dicit, in libro Etymol., nullo privato commodo, sed pro
says in the-book of-Etymologies for-no private advantage but for
communi utilitate civium lex debet esse conscripta. Unde
the-common utility of-the-citizens law ought to-be written whence
oportet leges humanas esse proportionatas ad bonum
it-is-necessary laws human to-be proportioned to the-good
commune. Bonum autem commune constat ex multis. Et
common the-good moreover common consists of many-things and

ideo oportet quod lex ad multa respiciat, et secundum
therefore it-is-necessary that law to many-things look both according-to
personas, et secundum negotia, et secundum tempora.
persons and according-to affairs and according-to times
Constituitur enim communitas civitatis ex multis personis;
is-constituted for the-community of-the-city of many persons
et eius bonum per multiplices actiones procuratur; nec ad
and its good through manifold actions is-procured nor for
hoc solum instituitur quod aliquo modico tempore duret, sed
this only is-it-instituted that for-some little time it-last but
quod omni tempore perseveret per civium successionem,
that for-all time it-persevere through of-citizens succession
ut Augustinus dicit, in XXII de Civ. Dei.
as Augustine says in XXII on the-City of-God

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus in V Ethic.
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-Philosopher in V Ethics
ponit tres partes iusti legalis, quod est ius positivum.
posits three parts of-the-just legal which is right positive
Sunt enim quaedam quae simpliciter in communi ponuntur.
there-are for certain-things which simply in common are-set
Et haec sunt leges communes. Et quantum ad huiusmodi,
and these are laws common and as-far to of-this-kind
dicit quod legale est quod ex principio quidem nihil
he-says that legal is that-which from the-beginning indeed nothing
differt sic vel aliter, quando autem ponitur, differt: puta
differs thus or otherwise when but it-is-set it-differs for-example
quod captivi statuto pretio redimantur. – Quaedam vero
that captives at-a-fixed price be-ransomed certain-things but
sunt quae sunt communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia
are which are common as-far to something and singular
quantum ad aliquid. Et huiusmodi dicuntur privilegia, quasi
as-far to something and of-this-kind are-called privileges as-if

leges privatae: quia respiciunt singulares personas, et tamen
laws private because they-regard singular persons and yet
potestas eorum extenditur ad multa negotia. Et quantum
the-power of-them is-extended to many affairs and as-far
ad hoc, subdit: adhuc quaecumque in singularibus lege
to this he-adds further whatever in singulars by-law
ponunt. – Dicuntur etiam quaedam legalia, non quia sint
they-set are-called also certain-things legal not because they-be
leges, sed propter applicationem legum communium ad
laws but on-account-of the-application of-laws common to
aliqua particularia facta; sicut sunt sententiae, quae pro iure
some particular deeds as are sentences which for right
habentur. Et quantum ad hoc, subdit: et sententialia.
are-held and as-far to this he-adds and sentential-things

Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est directivum,
to the-second it-must-be-said that that which is directive
oportet esse plurium directivum: unde in X Metaphys.,
it-is-necessary to-be of-many directive whence in X Metaphysics
Philosophus dicit quod omnia quae sunt unius generis,
the-Philosopher says that all-things which are of-one genus
mensurantur aliquo uno, quod est primum in genere
are-measured by-some one-thing which is first in genus
illo. Si enim essent tot regulae vel mensurae quot
that if for there-were as-many rules or measures as
sunt mensurata vel regulata, cessaret utilitas regulae vel
are things-measured or ruled would-cease the-utility of-rule or
mensurae, quae est ut ex uno multa possint cognosci.
of-measure which is that from one many-things can to-be-known
Et ita nulla esset utilitas legis, si non se extenderet
and so no would-be utility of-law if not itself it-extended
nisi ad unum singularem actum. Ad singulares enim actus
except to one singular act for singular for acts

dirigendos dantur singularia praecepta prudentium: sed lex
to-be-directed are-given singular precepts of-the-prudent but law
est praeceptum commune, ut supra dictum est.
is a-precept common as above said it-is

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est eadem certitudo
to the-third it-must-be-said that not is the-same certitude
quaerenda in omnibus, ut in I Ethic. dicitur. Unde in
to-be-sought in all-things as in I Ethics is-said whence in
rebus contingentibus, sicut sunt naturalia et res humanae,
things contingent as are natural-things and things human
sufficit talis certitudo ut aliquid sit verum ut in pluribus,
suffices such certitude that something be true as in the-more
licet interdum deficiat in paucioribus.
although sometimes it-fail in the-fewer

Utrum ad legem humanam pertineat omnia vitia cohibere

2 · WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO RESTRAIN ALL VICES

Laws were made to restrain boldness, and the legislator would make citizens virtuous. Thomas answers that a measure must suit what it measures, and human law is made for a multitude most of whom are not perfect in virtue; so it forbids only the graver vices from which most can abstain, chiefly those that harm others, as murder and theft. It leads to virtue gradually, lest new wine burst old bottles.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad legem
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that to law
humanam pertineat omnia vitia cohibere. Dicit enim Isidorus,
human it-pertain all vices to-restrain says for Isidore
in libro Etymol., quod leges sunt factae ut earum metu
in the-book of-Etymologies that laws are made that their by-fear
coerceatur audacia. Non autem sufficienter coerceretur,
be-restrained boldness not moreover sufficiently it-would-be-restrained

nisi quaelibet mala cohiberentur per legem. Ergo lex
unless any evils were-restrained through law therefore law
humana debet quaelibet mala cohibere.
human ought any evils to-restrain

2. Praeterea, intentio legislatoris est cives facere
2 further the-intention of-the-legislator is the-citizens to-make
virtuosos. Sed non potest esse aliquis virtuosus, nisi ab
virtuous but not can to-be anyone virtuous unless from
omnibus vitiis compescatur. Ergo ad legem humanam
all vices be-be-checked therefore to law human
pertinet omnia vitia compescere.
it-pertains all vices to-check

3. Praeterea, lex humana a lege naturali derivatur, ut
3 further law human from the-law natural is-derived as
supra dictum est. Sed omnia vitia repugnant legi naturae.
above said it-is but all vices are-repugnant to-the-law of-nature
Ergo lex humana omnia vitia debet cohibere.
therefore law human all vices ought to-restrain

Sed contra est quod dicitur in I de Lib. Arb.: Videtur
but against is that it-is-said in I on Free Choice it-seems
mihi legem istam quae populo regendo scribitur, recte
to-me the-law that which for-the-people to-be-ruled is-written rightly
ista permittere, et divinam providentiam vindicare. Sed
these-things to-permit and divine providence to-punish(-them) but
divina providentia non vindicat nisi vitia. Ergo recte lex
divine providence not punishes except vices therefore rightly law
humana permittit aliqua vitia, non cohibendo ipsa.
human permits some vices not restraining them

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as already said it-is law
ponitur ut quaedam regula vel mensura humanorum actuum.
is-set as a-certain rule or measure of-human acts

Mensura autem debet esse homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur
a-measure moreover ought to-be homogeneous with-the-measured as is-said
in X Metaphys.: diversa enim diversis mensuris mensurantur.
in X Metaphysics diverse-things for by-diverse measures are-measured
Unde oportet quod etiam leges imponantur hominibus
whence it-is-necessary that also laws be-imposed on-men
secundum eorum conditionem: quia, ut Isidorus dicit, lex
according-to their condition because as Isidore says law
debet esse possibilis et secundum naturam, et secundum
ought to-be possible both according-to nature and according-to
consuetudinem patriae. Potestas autem sive facultas operandi
the-custom of-the-fatherland the-power moreover or faculty of-operating
ex interiori habitu seu dispositione procedit: non enim
from interior habit or disposition proceeds not for
idem est possibile ei qui non habet habitum virtutis, et
the-same is possible to-him who not has the-habit of-virtue and
virtuoso; sicut etiam non est idem possibile puero et viro
to-the-virtuous as also not is the-same possible to-a-boy and to-a-man
perfecto. Et propter hoc non ponitur eadem lex pueris
perfect and on-account-of this not is-set the-same law for-children
quae ponitur adultis: multa enim pueris permittuntur
which is-set for-adults many-things for to-children are-permitted
quae in adultis lege puniuntur, vel etiam vituperantur. Et
which in adults by-law are-punished or even are-blamed and
similiter multa sunt permittenda hominibus non perfectis
similarly many-things are to-be-permitted to-men not perfect
virtute, quae non essent toleranda in hominibus virtuosis.
in-virtue which not would-be to-be-tolerated in men virtuous

Lex autem humana ponitur multitudini hominum, in
law moreover human is-set for-the-multitude of-men in
qua maior pars est hominum non perfectorum virtute. Et
which the-greater part is of-men not perfect in-virtue and

ideo lege humana non prohibentur omnia vitia, a quibus
therefore by-law human not are-forbidden all vices from which
virtuosi abstinent; sed solum graviora, a quibus possibile
the-virtuous abstain but only the-graver-ones from which possible
est maiorem partem multitudinis abstinere; et praecipue
it-is the-greater part of-the-multitude to-abstain and especially
quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine quorum
those-which are to the-harm of-others without whose
prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset, sicut
prohibition society human to-be-preserved not could as
prohibentur lege humana homicidia et furta et huiusmodi.
are-forbidden by-law human homicides and thefts and of-this-kind

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod audacia pertinere
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that boldness to-pertain
videtur ad invasionem aliorum. Unde praecipue pertinet ad
seems to the-invasion of-others whence especially it-pertains to
illa peccata quibus iniuria proximis irrogatur; quae lege
those sins by-which injury on-neighbors is-inflicted which by-law
humana prohibentur, ut dictum est.
human are-forbidden as said it-is

Ad secundum dicendum quod lex humana intendit homines
to the-second it-must-be-said that law human intends men
inducere ad virtutem, non subito, sed gradatim. Et ideo non
to-induce to virtue not suddenly but gradually and therefore not
statim multitudini imperfectorum imponit ea quae sunt
at-once on-the-multitude of-the-imperfect it-imposes those-things which are
iam virtuosorum, ut scilicet ab omnibus malis abstineant.
already of-the-virtuous so-that namely from all evils they-abstain
Alioquin imperfecti, huiusmodi praecepta ferre non valentes,
otherwise the-imperfect of-this-kind precepts to-bear not able
in deteriora mala prorumperent: sicut dicitur Prov. XXX:
into worse evils would-break-out as is-said Proverbs XXX

Qui nimis emungit, elicit sanguinem; et Matth. IX dicitur
who too-much blows-his-nose draws-out blood and Matthew IX it-is-said
quod, si vinum novum, idest praecepta perfectae vitae, mittatur
that if wine new that-is the-precepts of-perfect life be-put
in utres veteres, idest in homines imperfectos, utres
into bottles old that-is into men imperfect the-bottles
rumpuntur, et vinum effunditur, idest, praecepta contemnuntur,
are-burst and the-wine is-poured-out that-is the-precepts are-despised
et homines ex contemptu ad peiora mala prorumpunt.
and men from contempt into worse evils break-out

Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis est quaedam
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-law natural is a-certain
participatio legis aeternae in nobis: lex autem humana deficit
participation of-the-law eternal in us law moreover human falls-short
a lege aeterna. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb.:
of the-law eternal says for Augustine in I on Free Choice
Lex ista quae regendis civitatibus fertur, multa concedit
the-law that which for-ruling cities is-brought many-things concedes
atque impunita relinquit, quae per divinam providentiam
and unpunished leaves which through divine providence
vindicantur. Neque enim quia non omnia facit, ideo
are-punished nor for because not all-things it-does therefore
quae facit, improbanda sunt. Unde etiam lex humana
the-things-which it-does to-be-disapproved are whence also law human
non omnia potest prohibere quae prohibet lex naturae.
not all-things can to-forbid which forbids the-law of-nature

Utrum lex humana praecipiat actus omnium virtutum

3 · WHETHER HUMAN LAW COMMANDS THE ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES

It does not forbid all vices, and some virtues serve private good. Thomas answers that every virtue's acts can be ordered to the common good, so there is no virtue of whose acts law cannot command; but it commands only those acts ordered to the common good, directly, or indirectly through good discipline. It cannot command that acts be done as the virtuous man does them, which is the end it aims at.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law human not
praecipiat actus omnium virtutum. Actibus enim virtutum
prescribe the-acts of-all virtues to-the-acts for of-virtues
opponuntur actus vitiosi. Sed lex humana non prohibet
are-opposed acts vicious but law human not forbids
omnia vitia, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam non praecipit actus
all vices as said it-is therefore also not it-prescribes the-acts
omnium virtutum.
of-all virtues

2. Praeterea, actus virtutis a virtute procedit. Sed virtus
2 further the-act of-virtue from virtue proceeds but virtue
est finis legis: et ita quod est ex virtute, sub praecepto
is the-end of-law and so what is from virtue under the-precept
legis cadere non potest. Ergo lex humana non praecipit
of-law to-fall not can therefore law human not prescribes
actus omnium virtutum.
the-acts of-all virtues

3. Praeterea, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, ut dictum
3 further law is-ordered to the-good common as said
est. Sed quidam actus virtutum non ordinantur ad bonum
it-is but certain acts of-virtues not are-ordered to the-good

commune, sed ad bonum privatum. Ergo lex non praecipit
common but to the-good private therefore law not prescribes
actus omnium virtutum.
the-acts of-all virtues

Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod
but against is that the-Philosopher says in V Ethics that
praecipit lex fortis opera facere, et quae temperati, et
prescribes the-law of-the-brave the-works to-do and those of-the-temperate and
quae mansueti; similiter autem secundum alias virtutes et
those of-the-gentle similarly moreover according-to the-other virtues and
malitias, haec quidem iubens, haec autem prohibens.
vices these-things indeed commanding those-things but forbidding

Respondeo dicendum quod species virtutum distinguuntur
I-answer it-must-be-said that the-species of-virtues are-distinguished
secundum obiecta, ut ex supradictis patet. Omnia autem
according-to objects as from the-above-said is-plain all moreover
obiecta virtutum referri possunt vel ad bonum privatum
the-objects of-virtues to-be-referred can either to the-good private
alicuius personae, vel ad bonum commune multitudinis: sicut
of-some person or to the-good common of-the-multitude as
ea quae sunt fortitudinis potest aliquis exequi vel
those-things which are of-fortitude can someone to-carry-out either
propter conservationem civitatis, vel ad conservandum ius
for-the-sake-of the-preservation of-the-city or for preserving the-right
amici sui; et simile est in aliis. Lex autem, ut dictum
of-friend his and similar it-is in the-others law moreover as said
est, ordinatur ad bonum commune. Et ideo nulla virtus est
it-is is-ordered to the-good common and therefore no virtue is
de cuius actibus lex praecipere non possit. Non tamen de
about whose acts law to-prescribe not can not yet about
omnibus actibus omnium virtutum lex humana praecipit: sed
all the-acts of-all virtues law human prescribes but

solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad bonum commune,
only about those which are orderable to the-good common
vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter bonum
either immediately as when some-things directly for-the-sake-of the-good
commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a
common are-done or mediately as when some-things are-ordered by
legislatore pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives
the-legislator pertaining to good discipline through which the-citizens
informantur ut commune bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent.
are-formed that the-common good of-justice and of-peace they-preserve

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex humana non
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that law human not
prohibet omnes actus vitiosos, secundum obligationem
forbids all acts vicious according-to the-obligation
praecepti, sicut nec praecipit omnes actus virtuosos.
of-precept as neither does-it-prescribe all acts virtuous
Prohibet tamen aliquos actus singulorum vitiorum, sicut
it-forbids yet some acts of-single vices as
etiam praecipit quosdam actus singularum virtutum.
also it-prescribes certain acts of-single virtues

Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquis actus dicitur esse
to the-second it-must-be-said that some act is-said to-be
virtutis dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod homo operatur
of-virtue in-two-ways in-one way from this that man works
virtuosa: sicut actus iustitiae est facere recta, et actus
virtuous-things as the-act of-justice is to-do right-things and the-act
fortitudinis facere fortia. Et sic lex praecipit aliquos actus
of-fortitude to-do brave-things and thus law prescribes some acts
virtutum. – Alio modo dicitur actus virtutis, quia aliquis
of-virtues in-another way is-said an-act of-virtue because someone
operatur virtuosa eo modo quo virtuosus operatur. Et
works virtuous-things in-that way in-which the-virtuous-man works and

talis actus semper procedit a virtute: nec cadit sub praecepto
such act always proceeds from virtue nor falls under the-precept
legis, sed est finis ad quem legislator ducere intendit.
of-law but is the-end to which the-legislator to-lead intends

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est aliqua virtus cuius
to the-third it-must-be-said that not there-is any virtue whose
actus non sint ordinabiles ad bonum commune, ut dictum
acts not be orderable to the-good common as said
est, vel mediate vel immediate.
it-is either mediately or immediately

Utrum lex humana imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae

4 · WHETHER HUMAN LAW BINDS A MAN IN THE COURT OF CONSCIENCE

A lower power cannot bind in a higher court, and human laws often oppress. Thomas answers that just laws bind in conscience from the eternal law, laws just in their end, their author, and their form, laying burdens proportionably for the common good. Laws unjust against the human good, by greed, usurpation, or unequal burdens, are violence rather than law and bind only to avoid scandal; laws against the divine good, as to idolatry, must never be obeyed.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana non
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law human not
imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae. Inferior
impose on-man necessity in the-court of-conscience a-lower
enim potestas non potest imponere legem in iudicio
for power not can to-impose law in the-judgment
superioris potestatis. Sed potestas hominis, quae fert legem
of-a-higher power but the-power of-man which brings law
humanam, est infra potestatem divinam. Ergo lex humana
human is below the-power divine therefore law human

non potest imponere legem quantum ad iudicium divinum,
not can to-impose law as-far to the-judgment divine
quod est iudicium conscientiae.
which is the-judgment of-conscience

2. Praeterea, iudicium conscientiae maxime dependet ex
2 further the-judgment of-conscience most depends on
divinis mandatis. Sed quandoque divina mandata evacuantur
divine commands but sometimes divine commands are-made-void
per leges humanas; secundum illud Matth. XV: Irritum
through laws human according-to that Matthew XV void
fecistis mandatum Dei propter traditiones vestras. Ergo
you-have-made the-commandment of-God for traditions your therefore
lex humana non imponit necessitatem homini quantum ad
law human not imposes necessity on-man as-far to
conscientiam.
conscience

3. Praeterea, leges humanae frequenter ingerunt calumniam
3 further laws human frequently bring calumny
et iniuriam hominibus; secundum illud Isaiae X: Vae qui
and injury on-men according-to that of-Isaiah X woe to-those-who
condunt leges iniquas, et scribentes iniustitias scripserunt,
frame laws unjust and writing injustices have-written
ut opprimerent in iudicio pauperes, et vim facerent
that they-might-oppress in judgment the-poor and violence do
causae humilium populi mei. Sed licitum est unicuique
to-the-cause of-the-humble of-people my but lawful it-is for-each-one
oppressionem et violentiam evitare. Ergo leges humanae non
oppression and violence to-avoid therefore laws human not
imponunt necessitatem homini quantum ad conscientiam.
impose necessity on-man as-far to conscience

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Pet. II: Haec est gratia,
but against is that it-is-said I Peter II this is grace
si propter conscientiam sustineat quis tristitias, patiens
if for-the-sake-of conscience endure anyone sorrows suffering
iniuste.
unjustly

Respondeo dicendum quod leges positae humanitus vel
I-answer it-must-be-said that laws set humanly either
sunt iustae, vel iniustae. Si quidem iustae sint, habent
are just or unjust if indeed just they-be they-have
vim obligandi in foro conscientiae a lege aeterna, a
the-force of-binding in the-court of-conscience from the-law eternal from
qua derivantur; secundum illud Prov. VIII: Per me reges
which they-are-derived according-to that Proverbs VIII through me kings
regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt. Dicuntur
reign and of-laws the-framers just-things decree are-called
autem leges iustae et ex fine, quando scilicet ordinantur ad
moreover laws just both from the-end when namely they-are-ordered to
bonum commune; et ex auctore, quando scilicet lex lata
the-good common and from the-author when namely the-law brought
non excedit potestatem ferentis; et ex forma, quando
not exceeds the-power of-the-one-bringing and from the-form when
scilicet secundum aequalitatem proportionis imponuntur
namely according-to equality of-proportion are-imposed
subditis onera in ordine ad bonum commune. Cum enim
on-subjects burdens in order to the-good common since for
unus homo sit pars multitudinis, quilibet homo hoc ipsum
one man be a-part of-the-multitude every man this very
quod est et quod habet, est multitudinis: sicut et quaelibet
which he-is and which he-has is of-the-multitude as also any
pars id quod est, est totius. Unde et natura aliquod
part that which it-is is of-the-whole whence also nature some

detrimentum infert parti, ut salvet totum. Et secundum
loss inflicts on-a-part that it-may-save the-whole and according-to
hoc, leges huiusmodi, onera proportionabiliter inferentes, iustae
this laws of-this-kind burdens proportionably inflicting just
sunt, et obligant in foro conscientiae, et sunt leges legales.
are and bind in the-court of-conscience and are laws legal

Iniustae autem sunt leges dupliciter. Uno modo, per
unjust moreover are laws in-two-ways in-one way through
contrarietatem ad bonum humanum, e contrario praedictis:
contrariety to the-good human from the-contrary to-the-aforesaid
vel ex fine, sicut cum aliquis praesidens leges imponit
either from the-end as when some ruler laws imposes
onerosas subditis non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem,
burdensome on-subjects not pertaining to the-utility common
sed magis ad propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex
but rather to his-own cupidity or glory or also from
auctore, sicut cum aliquis legem fert ultra sibi commissam
the-author as when someone a-law brings beyond to-him committed
potestatem; vel etiam ex forma, puta cum inaequaliter
power or also from the-form for-example when unequally
onera multitudini dispensantur, etiam si ordinentur ad
burdens on-the-multitude are-dispensed even if they-be-ordered to
bonum commune. Et huiusmodi magis sunt violentiae quam
the-good common and of-this-kind rather are violences than
leges: quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb.,
laws because as Augustine says in the-book on Free Choice
lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit. Unde tales
a-law to-be not seems which just not will-have-been whence such
leges non obligant in foro conscientiae: nisi forte propter
laws not bind in the-court of-conscience unless perhaps for
vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam
avoiding scandal or disturbance for-the-sake-of which also

homo iuri suo debet cedere, secundum illud Matth. V:
man to-right his ought to-yield according-to that Matthew V
Qui angariaverit te mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo;
who will-have-forced you a-thousand paces go with him another two
et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam, da ei et pallium.
and who will-have-taken-away from-you the-tunic give to-him also the-cloak

Alio modo leges possunt esse iniustae per contrarietatem
in-another way laws can to-be unjust through contrariety
ad bonum divinum: sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes ad
to the-good divine as the-laws of-tyrants inducing to
idololatriam, vel ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem
idolatry or to whatever other-thing which be against the-law
divinam. Et tales leges nullo modo licet observare: quia sicut
divine and such laws in-no way is-it-lawful to-observe because as
dicitur Act. V, obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus.
is-said Acts V to-obey it-is-necessary God rather than men

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Apostolus dicit,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that as the-Apostle says
ad Rom. XIII, omnis potestas humana a Deo est: et
to the-Romans XIII all power human from God is and
ideo qui potestati resistit, in his quae ad ordinem
therefore he-who the-power resists in those-things which to the-order
potestatis pertinent, Dei ordinationi resistit. Et secundum
of-power pertain of-God the-ordinance resists and according-to
hoc efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam.
this he-is-made guilty as-far to conscience

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de
to the-second it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds about
legibus humanis quae ordinantur contra Dei mandatum. Et
laws human which are-ordered against of-God the-command and

ad hoc ordo potestatis non se extendit. Unde in talibus
to this the-order of-power not itself extends whence in such-things
legi humanae non est parendum.
to-law human not it-is to-be-obeyed

Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de lege
to the-third it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds about law
quae infert gravamen iniustum subditis: ad quod etiam
which inflicts a-burden unjust on-subjects to which also
ordo potestatis divinitus concessus non se extendit. Unde
the-order of-power divinely granted not itself extends whence
nec in talibus homo obligatur ut obediat legi, si sine
neither in such-things man is-bound that he-obey the-law if without
scandalo vel maiori detrimento resistere possit.
scandal or greater loss to-resist he-can

Utrum omnes subiiciantur legi

5 · WHETHER ALL ARE SUBJECT TO THE LAW

The law is not made for the just, the spiritual are led by the Spirit's law, and the prince is freed from laws. Thomas answers that one is subject to law as the ruled to a rule, and so all subject to a power are subject to its law, save in what a higher law governs; and as the coerced to coercion, and so only the wicked are under law. The prince is freed from its coercive force, but should fulfill it willingly, as to its directive force.

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes legi
to the-fifth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not all to-law
subiiciantur. Illi enim soli subiiciuntur legi, quibus lex
be-subject those for alone are-subject to-law for-whom law

ponitur. Sed Apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, quod iusto non
is-set but the-Apostle says I to Timothy I that for-the-just not
est lex posita. Ergo iusti non subiiciuntur legi humanae.
is law set therefore the-just not are-subject to-law human

2. Praeterea, Urbanus Papa dicit, et habetur in Decretis,
2 further Urban Pope says and it-is-had in the-Decrees
XIX, qu. II: Qui lege privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut
XIX question II he-who by-law private is-led no reason demands that
publica constringatur. Lege autem privata Spiritus Sancti
by-public(-law) he-be-bound by-law moreover private of-the-Spirit Holy
ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, qui sunt filii Dei; secundum
are-led all men spiritual who are sons of-God according-to
illud Rom. VIII: Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei
that Romans VIII who by-the-Spirit of-God are-led these sons of-God
sunt. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae subiiciuntur.
are therefore not all men to-law human are-subject

3. Praeterea, Iurisperitus dicit quod princeps legibus
3 further the-Jurist says that the-prince from-the-laws
solutus est. Qui autem est solutus a lege, non subditur
released is he-who moreover is released from the-law not is-subject
legi. Ergo non omnes subiecti sunt legi.
to-the-law therefore not all subject are to-law

Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII: Omnis
but against is that the-Apostle says Romans XIII every
anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Sed non
soul to-powers higher subject let-it-be but not
videtur esse subditus potestati, qui non subiicitur legi
seems to-be subject to-the-power he-who not is-subjected to-the-law
quam fert potestas. Ergo omnes homines debent esse legi
which brings the-power therefore all men ought to-be to-law
humanae subiecti.
human subject

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as from the-above-said is-plain law
de sui ratione duo habet: primo quidem, quod est regula
of its notion two-things has first indeed that it-is the-rule
humanorum actuum; secundo, quod habet vim coactivam.
of-human acts second that it-has force coercive
Dupliciter ergo aliquis homo potest esse legi subiectus. Uno
in-two-ways therefore some man can to-be to-law subject in-one
modo, sicut regulatum regulae. Et hoc modo omnes illi qui
way as the-ruled to-the-rule and in-this way all those who
subduntur potestati, subduntur legi quam fert potestas.
are-subject to-the-power are-subject to-the-law which brings the-power
Quod autem aliquis potestati non subdatur, potest contingere
that moreover someone to-the-power not be-subject can to-happen
dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est simpliciter absolutus ab
in-two-ways in-one way because he-is simply released from
eius subiectione. Unde illi qui sunt de una civitate vel
its subjection whence those who are of one city or
regno, non subduntur legibus principis alterius civitatis vel
kingdom not are-subject to-the-laws of-the-prince of-another city or
regni, sicut nec eius dominio. Alio modo, secundum
kingdom as neither his to-dominion in-another way according
quod regitur superiori lege. Puta si aliquis subiectus
as he-is-ruled by-a-higher law for-example if someone subject
sit proconsuli, regulari debet eius mandato, non tamen
be to-a-proconsul to-be-ruled he-ought his by-command not yet
in his quae dispensantur ei ab imperatore: quantum
in those-things which are-dispensed to-him by the-emperor as-far
enim ad illa, non adstringitur mandato inferioris, cum
for to those-things not he-is-bound by-the-command of-the-lower since
superiori mandato dirigatur. Et secundum hoc contingit
by-a-higher command he-be-directed and according-to this it-happens

quod aliquis simpliciter subiectus legi, secundum aliqua
that someone simply subject to-law according-to some-things
legi non adstringitur, secundum quae regitur superiori lege.
by-law not is-bound according-to which be-is-ruled by-a-higher law
Alio vero modo dicitur aliquis subdi legi sicut
in-another but way is-said someone to-be-subject to-law as
coactum cogenti. Et hoc modo homines virtuosi et iusti
the-coerced to-the-coercer and in-this way men virtuous and just
non subduntur legi, sed soli mali. Quod enim est coactum et
not are-subject to-law but alone the-evil what for is coerced and
violentum, est contrarium voluntati. Voluntas autem bonorum
violent is contrary to-the-will the-will moreover of-the-good
consonat legi, a qua malorum voluntas discordat. Et
accords with-the-law from which of-the-evil the-will disagrees and
ideo secundum hoc boni non sunt sub lege, sed solum mali.
therefore according-to this the-good not are under law but only the-evil
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that reasoning that proceeds
de subiectione quae est per modum coactionis. Sic enim
about the-subjection which is through the-mode of-coercion thus for
iusto non est lex posita: quia ipsi sibi sunt lex,
for-the-just not is law set because they to-themselves are law
dum ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis,
while they-show the-work of-the-law written in hearts their
sicut Apostolus, ad Rom. II, dicit. Unde in eos non
as the-Apostle to the-Romans II says whence upon them not
habet lex vim coactivam, sicut habet in iniustos.
has law force coercive as it-has upon the-unjust
Ad secundum dicendum quod lex Spiritus Sancti
to the-second it-must-be-said that the-law of-the-Spirit Holy
est superior omni lege humanitus posita. Et ideo viri
is higher than-every law humanly set and therefore men

spirituales, secundum hoc quod lege Spiritus Sancti
spiritual according-to this that by-the-law of-the-Spirit Holy
ducuntur, non subduntur legi, quantum ad ea quae
they-are-led not are-subject to-law as-far to those-things which
repugnant ductioni Spiritus Sancti. Sed tamen hoc ipsum
are-repugnant to-the-leading of-the-Spirit Holy but yet this very
est de ductu Spiritus Sancti, quod homines spirituales
is of the-leading of-the-Spirit Holy that men spiritual
legibus humanis subdantur; secundum illud I Pet. II:
to-laws human be-subject according-to that I Peter II
Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae, propter Deum.
subject be to-every human creature for-the-sake-of God

Ad tertium dicendum quod princeps dicitur esse solutus
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-prince is-said to-be released
a lege, quantum ad vim coactivam legis: nullus enim
from the-law as-far to the-force coercive of-law no-one for
proprie cogitur a seipso; lex autem non habet vim coactivam
properly is-coerced by himself law moreover not has force coercive
nisi ex principis potestate. Sic igitur princeps dicitur esse
except from of-the-prince the-power thus therefore the-prince is-said to-be
solutus a lege, quia nullus in ipsum potest iudicium
released from the-law because no-one against him can a-judgment
condemnationis ferre, si contra legem agat. Unde super illud
of-condemnation to-bring if against the-law he-act whence upon that
Psalmi L, Tibi soli peccavi etc., dicit Glossa quod rex
of-Psalm L to-you alone I-have-sinned etc says the-Gloss that the-king
non habet hominem qui sua facta diiudicet. – Sed quantum
not has a-man who his deeds may-judge but as-far
ad vim directivam legis, princeps subditur legi propria
to the-force directive of-law the-prince is-subject to-the-law by-his-own
voluntate; secundum quod dicitur Extra, de Constitutionibus,
will according as it-is-said Extra on Constitutions

cap. Cum omnes: Quod quisque iuris in alterum
chapter when all what each-one of-right toward another
statuit, ipse eodem iure uti debet. Et Sapientis dicit
establishes he-himself by-the-same right to-use ought and of-the-Wise-man says
auctoritas: Patere legem quam ipse tuleris. Improperatur
the-authority submit to-the-law which you-yourself have-brought it-is-reproached
etiam his a Domino qui dicunt et non faciunt; et qui
also those by the-Lord who say and not do and who
aliis onera gravia imponunt, et ipsi nec digito
on-others burdens heavy impose and they-themselves not-even with-a-finger
volunt ea movere; ut habetur Matth. XXIII. Unde quantum
will them to-move as is-had Matthew XXIII whence as-far
ad Dei iudicium, princeps non est solutus a lege,
to of-God the-judgment the-prince not is released from the-law
quantum ad vim directivam eius; sed debet voluntarius,
as-far to the-force directive of-it but he-ought voluntary
non coactus, legem implere. – Est etiam princeps supra
not coerced the-law to-fulfill is also the-prince above
legem, inquantum, si expediens fuerit, potest legem
the-law inasmuch-as if expedient it-will-have-been he-can the-law
mutare, et in ea dispensare, pro loco et tempore.
to-change and in it to-dispense according-to place and time

Utrum ei qui subditur legi, liceat praeter verba legis agere

6 · WHETHER ONE SUBJECT TO THE LAW MAY ACT BESIDE ITS WORDS

Augustine says we may not judge laws once made, and only the lawmaker may interpret. Thomas answers that every law aims at the common welfare, and where keeping its words would harm it, as closing a besieged city's gates against its own pursued citizens, it should not be kept. But to judge this belongs to the rulers, unless the danger is sudden, when necessity carries its own dispensation, for necessity is not subject to law.

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat ei
to the-sixth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that not it-be-lawful for-him
qui subditur legi, praeter verba legis agere. Dicit enim
who is-subject to-law beside the-words of-the-law to-act says for
Augustinus, in libro de Vera Relig.: In temporalibus legibus,
Augustine in the-book on True Religion in temporal laws
quamvis homines iudicent de his cum eas instituunt,
although men judge about them when them they-institute
tamen quando fuerint institutae et firmatae, non
yet when they-will-have-been instituted and confirmed not
licebit de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. Sed si
it-will-be-lawful about them to-judge but according-to them but if
aliquis praetermittat verba legis, dicens se intentionem
someone pass-over the-words of-the-law saying himself the-intention
legislatoris servare, videtur iudicare de lege. Ergo non
of-the-legislator to-keep he-seems to-judge about the-law therefore not
licet ei qui subditur legi, ut praetermittat verba
it-is-lawful for-him who is-subject to-law that he-pass-over the-words
legis, ut intentionem legislatoris servet.
of-the-law that the-intention of-the-legislator he-may-keep

2. Praeterea, ad eum solum pertinet leges interpretari,
2 further to him alone it-pertains laws to-interpret
cuius est condere leges. Sed hominum subditorum legi non
of-whom it-is to-frame laws but of-men subject to-law not
est leges condere. Ergo eorum non est interpretari legislatoris
it-is laws to-frame therefore of-them not it-is to-interpret of-the-legislator
intentionem, sed semper secundum verba legis agere debent.
the-intention but always according-to the-words of-the-law to-act they-ought

3. Praeterea, omnis sapiens intentionem suam verbis
3 further every wise-man intention his by-words
novit explicare. Sed illi qui leges condiderunt, reputari
knows-how to-unfold but those who laws framed to-be-reputed
debent sapientes: dicit enim Sapientia, Prov. VIII: Per
ought wise says for Wisdom Proverbs VIII through
me reges regnant, et legum conditores iusta decernunt.
me kings reign and of-laws the-framers just-things decree
Ergo de intentione legislatoris non est iudicandum nisi
therefore about the-intention of-the-legislator not it-is to-be-judged except
per verba legis.
through the-words of-the-law

Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit, in IV de Trin.:
but against is that Hilary says in IV on the-Trinity
Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi:
the-understanding of-things-said from the-causes is to-be-taken of-saying
quia non sermoni res, sed rei debet esse sermo
because not to-speech the-thing but to-the-thing ought to-be speech
subiectus. Ergo magis est attendendum ad causam quae
subject therefore more it-is to-be-attended to the-cause which
movit legislatorem, quam ad ipsa verba legis.
moved the-legislator than to the-very words of-the-law

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is every
lex ordinatur ad communem hominum salutem, et intantum
law is-ordered to the-common of-men welfare and so-far
obtinet vim et rationem legis; secundum vero quod ab
obtains the-force and notion of-law according but as from
hoc deficit, virtutem obligandi non habet. Unde Iurisperitus
this it-fails the-power of-binding not it-has whence the-Jurist
dicit quod nulla iuris ratio aut aequitatis benignitas patitur
says that no of-right reason or of-equity benignity permits
ut quae salubriter pro utilitate hominum introducuntur,
that the-things-which wholesomely for the-utility of-men are-introduced
ea nos duriori interpretatione, contra ipsorum commodum,
those we by-harsher interpretation against their advantage
perducamus ad severitatem. Contingit autem multoties quod
should-carry to severity it-happens moreover many-times that
aliquid observari communi saluti est utile ut in pluribus, quod
something to-be-observed for-the-common welfare is useful as in the-more which
tamen in aliquibus casibus est maxime nocivum. Quia igitur
yet in some cases is most harmful because therefore
legislator non potest omnes singulares casus intueri, proponit
the-legislator not can all singular cases to-look-at he-proposes
legem secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt, ferens
the-law according-to those-things which in the-more happen bearing
intentionem suam ad communem utilitatem. Unde si emergat
intention his to the-common utility whence if emerge
casus in quo observatio talis legis sit damnosa communi
a-case in which the-observance of-such law be harmful to-the-common
saluti, non est observanda. Sicut si in civitate obsessa statuatur
welfare not it-is to-be-observed as if in a-city besieged be-established
lex quod portae civitatis maneant clausae, hoc est utile
a-law that the-gates of-the-city remain closed this is useful

communi saluti ut in pluribus: si tamen contingat casus quod
to-the-common welfare as in the-more if yet happen a-case that
hostes insequantur aliquos cives, per quos civitas conservatur,
enemies pursue some citizens through whom the-city is-preserved
damnosissimum esset civitati nisi eis portae aperirentur:
most-harmful it-would-be to-the-city unless to-them the-gates were-opened
et ideo in tali casu essent portae aperiendae, contra verba
and therefore in such case would-be the-gates to-be-opened against the-words
legis, ut servaretur utilitas communis, quam legislator intendit.
of-the-law that be-preserved the-utility common which the-legislator intends

Sed tamen hoc est considerandum, quod si observatio
but yet this is to-be-considered that if the-observance
legis secundum verba non habeat subitum periculum,
of-the-law according-to the-words not have sudden danger
cui oporteat statim occurri, non pertinet ad quemlibet
which it-be-necessary at-once to-be-met not it-pertains to anyone
ut interpretetur quid sit utile civitati et quid inutile: sed
that he-interpret what be useful to-the-city and what useless but
hoc solum pertinet ad principes, qui propter huiusmodi
this only pertains to the-princes who on-account-of of-this-kind
casus habent auctoritatem in legibus dispensandi. Si vero
cases have authority in laws of-dispensing if but
sit subitum periculum, non patiens tantam moram ut ad
there-be sudden danger not suffering so-much delay that to
superiorem recurri possit, ipsa necessitas dispensationem
a-superior to-have-recourse can the-very necessity dispensation
habet annexam: quia necessitas non subditur legi.
has annexed because necessity not is-subject to-law

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui in casu
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that he who in a-case
necessitatis agit praeter verba legis, non iudicat de ipsa
of-necessity acts beside the-words of-the-law not judges about the-very

lege: sed iudicat de casu singulari, in quo videt verba
law but he-judges about the-case singular in which he-sees the-words
legis observanda non esse.
of-the-law to-be-observed not to-be

Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui sequitur intentionem
to the-second it-must-be-said that he who follows the-intention
legislatoris, non interpretatur legem simpliciter; sed in
of-the-legislator not interprets the-law simply but in
casu in quo manifestum est per evidentiam nocumenti,
the-case in which manifest it-is through the-evidence of-harm
legislatorem aliud intendisse. Si enim dubium sit, debet
the-legislator something-else to-have-intended if for doubtful it-be he-ought
vel secundum verba legis agere, vel superiores consulere.
either according-to the-words of-the-law to-act or superiors to-consult

Ad tertium dicendum quod nullius hominis sapientia tanta
to the-third it-must-be-said that of-no man the-wisdom so-great
est ut possit omnes singulares casus excogitare: et ideo
is that he-can all singular cases to-think-out and therefore
non potest sufficienter per verba sua exprimere ea
not he-can sufficiently through words his to-express those-things
quae conveniunt ad finem intentum. Et si posset legislator
which suit to the-end intended and if could the-legislator
omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes
all cases to-consider not it-would-be-necessary that all-of-them
exprimeret, propter confusionem vitandam: sed legem ferre
he-express on-account-of confusion to-be-avoided but law to-bring
deberet secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt.
he-ought according-to those-things which in the-more happen

De mutatione legum

XCVII · ON THE CHANGE OF LAWS

Next, Thomas asks four questions on the change of laws: whether human law can be changed; whether it should be changed whenever something better occurs; whether custom abolishes law and obtains its force; and whether rulers may dispense in it.

Deinde considerandum est de mutatione legum.
next to-be-considered it-is about the-change of-laws

Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
and about this are-asked four

Primo: utrum lex humana sit mutabilis.
first whether law human be changeable

Secundo: utrum semper debeat mutari, quando aliquid melius occurrerit.
second whether always it-ought to-be-changed when something better will-have-occurred

Tertio: utrum per consuetudinem aboleatur; et utrum consuetudo obtineat vim legis.
third whether through custom it-be-abolished and whether custom obtain the-force of-law

Quarto: utrum usus legis humanae per dispensationem rectorum immutari debeat.
fourth whether the-use of-law human through the-dispensation of-rulers to-be-changed ought

Utrum lex humana debeat aliquo modo mutari

1 · WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD IN ANY WAY BE CHANGED

The natural law is unchangeable, a measure should be permanent, and what is once right is always right. Thomas answers that human law may rightly change on reason's side, since reason advances by degrees from the imperfect to the perfect, and on the side of men's changing conditions: as Augustine's example has it, a sober people may elect its magistrates, but a corrupt one, selling its votes, rightly loses the power.

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex humana nullo
to the-first thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that law human in-no
modo debeat mutari. Lex enim humana derivatur a lege
way ought to-be-changed law for human is-derived from the-law
naturali, ut supra dictum est. Sed lex naturalis immobilis
natural as above said it-is but the-law natural immovable
perseverat. Ergo et lex humana debet immobilis permanere.
perseveres therefore also law human ought immovable to-remain

2. Praeterea, sicut Philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., mensura
2 further as the-Philosopher says in V Ethics a-measure
maxime debet esse permanens. Sed lex humana est mensura
most ought to-be permanent but law human is the-measure
humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo debet
of-human acts as above said it-is therefore it-ought
immobiliter permanere.
immovably to-remain

3. Praeterea, de ratione legis est quod sit iusta et recta, ut
3 further of the-notion of-law it-is that it-be just and right as
supra dictum est. Sed illud quod semel est rectum, semper est
above said it-is but that which once is right always is
rectum. Ergo illud quod semel est lex, semper debet esse lex.
right therefore that which once is law always ought to-be law

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Lib. Arb.:
but against is that Augustine says in I on Free Choice
Lex temporalis, quamvis iusta sit, commutari tamen per
a-law temporal although just it-be to-be-changed yet through
tempora iuste potest.
times justly can

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as above said it-is law
humana est quoddam dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur
human is a-certain dictate of-reason by-which are-directed
humani actus. Et secundum hoc, duplex causa potest esse
human acts and according-to this twofold cause can to-be
quod lex humana iuste mutetur: una quidem ex parte rationis;
that law human justly be-changed one indeed on the-side of-reason
alia vero ex parte hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur.
the-other but on the-side of-men whose acts by-law are-ruled
Ex parte quidem rationis, quia humanae rationi naturale esse
on the-side indeed of-reason because to-human reason natural to-be
videtur ut gradatim ab imperfecto ad perfectum perveniat.
it-seems that gradually from the-imperfect to the-perfect it-arrive
Unde videmus in scientiis speculativis quod qui primo
whence we-see in sciences speculative that those-who first
philosophati sunt, quaedam imperfecta tradiderunt, quae
philosophized have certain imperfect-things handed-down which
postmodum per posteriores sunt magis perfecta. Ita etiam est
afterward by later-men were more perfected so also it-is
in operabilibus. Nam primi qui intenderunt invenire aliquid
in things-doable for the-first who intended to-find something
utile communitati hominum, non valentes omnia ex seipsis
useful to-the-community of-men not able all-things from themselves
considerare, instituerunt quaedam imperfecta in multis
to-consider instituted certain imperfect-things in many-things

deficientia; quae posteriores mutaverunt, instituentes aliqua
failing which later-men changed instituting some-things
quae in paucioribus deficere possent a communi utilitate.
which in the-fewer to-fail could from the-common utility
Ex parte vero hominum, quorum actus lege regulantur,
on the-side but of-men whose acts by-law are-ruled
lex recte mutari potest propter mutationem conditionum
law rightly to-be-changed can on-account-of the-change of-the-conditions
hominum, quibus secundum diversas eorum conditiones
of-men to-whom according-to the-diverse of-them conditions
diversa expediunt. Sicut Augustinus ponit exemplum, in I
diverse-things are-expedient as Augustine posits an-example in I
de Lib. Arb., quod si populus sit bene moderatus et gravis,
on Free Choice that if a-people be well moderated and grave
communisque utilitatis diligentissimus custos, recte lex fertur
and-of-the-common utility a-most-diligent guardian rightly a-law is-brought
qua tali populo liceat creare sibi magistratus, per quos
by-which to-such people it-be-lawful to-create for-itself magistrates through whom
respublica administretur. Porro si paulatim idem populus
the-commonwealth be-administered but if gradually the-same people
depravatus habeat venale suffragium, et regimen flagitiosis
depraved have a-venal vote and the-government to-the-shameful
sceleratisque committat; recte adimitur tali populo potestas
and-criminal commit rightly is-taken-away from-such people the-power
dandi honores, et ad paucorum bonorum redit arbitrium.
of-giving honors and to of-few good-men it-returns the-judgment
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod naturalis lex est
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-natural law is
participatio quaedam legis aeternae, ut supra dictum est,
a-participation certain of-the-law eternal as above said it-is
et ideo immobilis perseverat: quod habet ex immobilitate
and therefore immovable it-perseveres which it-has from the-immobility

et perfectione divinae rationis instituentis naturam. Sed
and perfection of-the-divine reason establishing nature but
ratio humana mutabilis est et imperfecta. Et ideo eius lex
reason human changeable is and imperfect and therefore its law
mutabilis est. – Et praeterea lex naturalis continet quaedam
changeable is and besides the-law natural contains certain
universalia praecepta, quae semper manent: lex vero posita
universal precepts which always remain the-law but set
ab homine continet praecepta quaedam particularia, secundum
by man contains precepts certain particular according-to
diversos casus qui emergunt.
diverse cases which emerge

Ad secundum dicendum quod mensura debet esse
to the-second it-must-be-said that a-measure ought to-be
permanens quantum est possibile. Sed in rebus mutabilibus
permanent as-far-as it-is possible but in things changeable
non potest esse aliquid omnino immutabiliter permanens.
not can to-be something wholly unchangeably permanent
Et ideo lex humana non potest esse omnino immutabilis.
and therefore law human not can to-be wholly unchangeable

Ad tertium dicendum quod rectum in rebus corporalibus
to the-third it-must-be-said that right in things bodily
dicitur absolute: et ideo semper, quantum est de se, manet
is-said absolutely and therefore always as-far-as it-is of itself it-remains
rectum. Sed rectitudo legis dicitur in ordine ad utilitatem
right but the-rectitude of-law is-said in order to utility
communem, cui non semper proportionatur una eademque
common to-which not always is-proportioned one and-the-same
res, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo talis rectitudo mutatur.
thing as above said it-is and therefore such rectitude is-changed

Utrum lex humana semper sit mutanda, quando occurrit aliquid melius

2 · WHETHER LAW SHOULD ALWAYS CHANGE FOR SOMETHING BETTER

Laws are devised by reason like the arts, which change for the better. Thomas answers that changing a law is in itself a loss to the common welfare, since custom gives laws much of their force; so a law should be changed only if the common good gains as much as it loses, through some very great and evident utility or very great necessity, the old law being unjust or very harmful.

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod semper lex
to the-second thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that always law
humana, quando aliquid melius occurrit, sit mutanda. Leges
human when something better occurs be to-be-changed laws
enim humanae sunt adinventae per rationem humanam,
for human are devised through reason human
sicut etiam aliae artes. Sed in aliis artibus mutatur id quod
as also other arts but in other arts is-changed that which
prius tenebatur, si aliquid melius occurrat. Ergo idem est
before was-held if something better occur therefore the-same is
etiam faciendum in legibus humanis.
also to-be-done in laws human

2. Praeterea, ex his quae praeterita sunt, providere
2 further from those-things which past are to-provide
possumus de futuris. Sed nisi leges humanae mutatae
we-can for future-things but unless laws human changed
fuissent supervenientibus melioribus adinventionibus, multa
had-been supervening better devisings many
inconvenientia sequerentur: eo quod leges antiquae
inconveniences would-follow from-this that laws ancient
inveniuntur multas ruditates continere. Ergo videtur quod
are-found many crudities to-contain therefore it-seems that

leges sint mutandae, quotiescumque aliquid melius occurrit
laws be to-be-changed as-often-as something better occurs
statuendum.
to-be-established

3. Praeterea, leges humanae circa singulares actus hominum
3 further laws human about singular acts of-men
statuuntur. In singularibus autem perfectam cognitionem adipisci
are-established in singulars moreover perfect knowledge to-attain
non possumus nisi per experientiam, quae tempore indiget,
not we-can except through experience which time needs
ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo videtur quod per successionem
as is-said in II Ethics therefore it-seems that through the-succession
temporis possit aliquid melius occurrere statuendum.
of-time can something better to-occur to-be-established

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Decretis, dist. XII:
but against is that it-is-said in the-Decrees distinction XII
Ridiculum est et satis abominabile dedecus, ut traditiones
ridiculous it-is and enough abominable a-disgrace that the-traditions
quas antiquitus a patribus suscepimus, infringi patiamur.
which anciently from the-fathers we-received to-be-broken we-suffer

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex
I-answer it-must-be-said that as said it-is law
humana intantum recte mutatur, inquantum per eius
human so-far rightly is-changed inasmuch-as through its
mutationem communi utilitati providetur. Habet autem ipsa
change for-the-common utility it-is-provided has moreover the-very
legis mutatio, quantum in se est, detrimentum quoddam
of-law change as-far-as in itself it-is a-loss certain
communis salutis. Quia ad observantiam legum plurimum valet
of-the-common welfare because for the-observance of-laws very-much avails
consuetudo: intantum quod ea quae contra communem
custom so-far that those-things which against common

consuetudinem fiunt, etiam si sint leviora de se, graviora
custom are-done even if they-be lighter of themselves graver
videantur. Unde quando mutatur lex, diminuitur vis
seem whence when is-changed law is-diminished the-force
constrictiva legis, inquantum tollitur consuetudo. Et ideo
binding of-law inasmuch-as is-taken-away custom and therefore
nunquam debet mutari lex humana, nisi ex aliqua parte
never ought to-be-changed law human unless on some part
tantum recompensetur communi saluti, quantum ex ista parte
as-much be-made-up to-the-common welfare as on that part
derogatur. Quod quidem contingit vel ex hoc quod aliqua
is-derogated which indeed happens either from this that some
maxima et evidentissima utilitas ex novo statuto provenit:
greatest and most-evident utility from the-new statute comes
vel ex eo quod est maxima necessitas, ex eo quod
or from this that there-is greatest necessity from this that
lex consueta aut manifestam iniquitatem continet, aut eius
the-law customary either manifest iniquity contains or its
observatio est plurimum nociva. Unde dicitur a Iurisperito
observance is very harmful whence it-is-said by the-Jurist
quod in rebus novis constituendis, evidens debet esse utilitas,
that in things new to-be-constituted evident ought to-be the-utility
ut recedatur ab eo iure quod diu aequum visum est.
that one-recede from that right which long equitable seemed has

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae sunt artis,
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that those-things which are of-art
habent efficaciam ex sola ratione: et ideo ubicumque melior
have efficacy from sole reason and therefore wherever better
ratio occurrat, est mutandum quod prius tenebatur. Sed leges
reason occur is to-be-changed what before was-held but laws

habent maximam virtutem ex consuetudine, ut Philosophus
have greatest power from custom as the-Philosopher
dicit, in II Polit. Et ideo non sunt de facili mutandae.
says in II Politics and therefore not they-are with ease to-be-changed

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod
to the-second it-must-be-said that reasoning that concludes that
leges sunt mutandae: non tamen pro quacumque melioratione,
laws are to-be-changed not yet for any-whatever improvement
sed pro magna utilitate vel necessitate, ut dictum est.
but for great utility or necessity as said it-is

Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.
and similarly to-be-said it-is to the-third

Utrum consuetudo possit obtinere vim legis

3 · WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN THE FORCE OF LAW

Custom cannot change the natural or divine law, many evils cannot make one good, and private persons cannot make law. Thomas answers that law proceeds from the lawmaker's reason and will, which deeds manifest as well as words; so acts multiplied into custom can change, interpret, and make law. No custom prevails against the natural or divine law. A free people's custom outweighs the prince's authority; a subject people's custom has force as tolerated by its rulers.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod consuetudo non
to the-third thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that custom not
possit obtinere vim legis, nec legem amovere. Lex enim
can to-obtain the-force of-law nor law to-remove law for
humana derivatur a lege naturae et a lege divina, ut
human is-derived from the-law of-nature and from the-law divine as
ex supradictis patet. Sed consuetudo hominum non potest
from the-above-said is-plain but the-custom of-men not can

immutare legem naturae, nec legem divinam. Ergo etiam
to-change the-law of-nature nor the-law divine therefore also
nec legem humanam immutare potest.
not law human to-change it-can

2. Praeterea, ex multis malis non potest fieri unum
2 further from many evils not can to-be-made one
bonum. Sed ille qui incipit primo contra legem agere, male
good but he who begins first against the-law to-act badly
facit. Ergo, multiplicatis similibus actibus, non efficietur aliquod
does therefore multiplied similar acts not will-be-made some
bonum. Lex autem est quoddam bonum: cum sit regula
good law moreover is a-certain good since it-be the-rule
humanorum actuum. Ergo per consuetudinem non potest
of-human acts therefore through custom not can
removeri lex, ut ipsa consuetudo vim legis obtineat.
to-be-removed law so-that the-very custom the-force of-law obtain

3. Praeterea, ferre legem pertinet ad publicas personas, ad
3 further to-bring law pertains to public persons to
quas pertinet regere communitatem: unde privatae personae
whom it-pertains to-rule the-community whence private persons
legem facere non possunt. Sed consuetudo invalescit per
law to-make not can but custom grows-strong through
actus privatarum personarum. Ergo consuetudo non potest
the-acts of-private persons therefore custom not can
obtinere vim legis, per quam lex removeatur.
to-obtain the-force of-law through which law be-removed

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Casulan.:
but against is that Augustine says in the-Letter to Casulanus
Mos populi Dei et instituta maiorum pro lege sunt
the-custom of-the-people of-God and the-institutions of-the-ancestors for law are

tenenda. Et sicut praevaricatores legum divinarum, ita et
to-be-held and as the-transgressors of-laws divine so also
contemptores consuetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi sunt.
the-despisers of-customs ecclesiastical to-be-restrained are

Respondeo dicendum quod omnis lex proficiscitur a
I-answer it-must-be-said that every law proceeds from
ratione et voluntate legislatoris: lex quidem divina et
the-reason and will of-the-legislator the-law indeed divine and
naturalis a rationabili Dei voluntate; lex autem humana
natural from the-reasonable of-God will the-law moreover human
a voluntate hominis ratione regulata. Sicut autem ratio
from the-will of-man by-reason ruled as moreover the-reason
et voluntas hominis manifestantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita
and will of-man are-manifested by-word in things to-be-done so
etiam manifestantur facto: hoc enim unusquisque eligere videtur
also they-are-manifested by-deed this for each-one to-choose seems
ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem quod
as good which by-work he-fulfills manifest it-is moreover that
verbo humano potest et mutari lex, et etiam exponi,
by-word human can both to-be-changed law and also to-be-expounded
inquantum manifestat interiorem motum et conceptum rationis
inasmuch-as it-manifests the-interior motion and concept of-reason
humanae. Unde etiam et per actus, maxime multiplicatos, qui
human whence also even through acts most multiplied which
consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et
custom make to-be-changed can law and to-be-expounded and
etiam aliquid causari quod legis virtutem obtineat: inquantum
also something to-be-caused which of-law the-force obtain inasmuch-as
scilicet per exteriores actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis
namely through exterior acts multiplied the-interior of-the-will
motus, et rationis conceptus, efficacissime declaratur; cum
motion and of-reason concept most-efficaciously is-declared since

enim aliquid multoties fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis
for something many-times is-done it-seems from deliberate of-reason
iudicio provenire. Et secundum hoc, consuetudo et habet
judgment to-come and according-to this custom both has
vim legis, et legem abolet, et est legum interpretatrix.
the-force of-law and law abolishes and is of-laws the-interpreter

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex naturalis et
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that the-law natural and
divina procedit a voluntate divina, ut dictum est. Unde
divine proceeds from the-will divine as said it-is whence
non potest mutari per consuetudinem procedentem a
not it-can to-be-changed through custom proceeding from
voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam
the-will of-man but only through authority divine
mutari posset. Et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim
to-be-changed it-could and thence it-is that no custom force
obtinere potest contra legem divinam vel legem naturalem:
to-obtain can against the-law divine or the-law natural
dicit enim Isidorus, in Synonym.: Usus auctoritati cedat:
says for Isidore in the-Synonyms usage to-authority let-yield
pravum usum lex et ratio vincat.
depraved usage law and reason let-conquer

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est,
to the-second it-must-be-said that as above said it-is
leges humanae in aliquibus casibus deficiunt: unde possibile
laws human in some cases fail whence possible
est quandoque praeter legem agere, in casu scilicet in quo
it-is sometimes beside the-law to-act in a-case namely in which
deficit lex, et tamen actus non erit malus. Et cum tales
fails the-law and yet the-act not will-be evil and when such
casus multiplicantur, propter aliquam mutationem hominum,
cases are-multiplied on-account-of some change of-men

tunc manifestatur per consuetudinem quod lex ulterius
then is-manifested through custom that the-law further
utilis non est: sicut etiam manifestaretur si lex contraria
useful not is as also it-would-be-manifested if a-law contrary
verbo promulgaretur. Si autem adhuc maneat ratio eadem
by-word were-promulgated if but still remain the-reason the-same
propter quam prima lex utilis erat, non consuetudo legem,
on-account-of which the-first law useful was not custom law
sed lex consuetudinem vincit: nisi forte propter hoc solum
but law custom conquers unless perhaps on-account-of this alone
inutilis lex videatur, quia non est possibilis secundum
useless the-law seem because not it-is possible according-to
consuetudinem patriae, quae erat una de conditionibus
the-custom of-the-fatherland which was one of the-conditions
legis. Difficile enim est consuetudinem multitudinis removere.
of-law difficult for it-is the-custom of-the-multitude to-remove

Ad tertium dicendum quod multitudo in qua consuetudo
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-multitude in which custom
introducitur, duplicis conditionis esse potest. Si enim sit libera
is-introduced of-twofold condition to-be can if for it-be a-free
multitudo, quae possit sibi legem facere, plus est consensus
multitude which can for-itself law to-make more is the-consent
totius multitudinis ad aliquid observandum, quem consuetudo
of-the-whole multitude to something to-be-observed which custom
manifestat, quam auctoritas principis, qui non habet potestatem
manifests than the-authority of-the-prince who not has the-power
condendi legem, nisi inquantum gerit personam multitudinis.
of-framing law except inasmuch-as he-bears the-person of-the-multitude
Unde licet singulae personae non possint condere legem, tamen
whence although single persons not can to-frame law yet
totus populus legem condere potest. – Si vero multitudo non
the-whole people law to-frame can if but the-multitude not

habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem, vel legem a
have free power of-framing for-itself law or a-law by
superiori potestate positam removendi; tamen ipsa consuetudo
a-higher power set of-removing yet the-very custom
in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet vim legis, inquantum
in such multitude prevailing obtains the-force of-law inasmuch-as
per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem imponere:
by those it-is-tolerated to whom it-pertains on-the-multitude law to-impose
ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo induxit.
from this for very they-seem to-approve what custom introduced

Utrum rectores multitudinis possint in legibus humanis dispensare

4 · WHETHER THE RULERS OF THE MULTITUDE CAN DISPENSE IN LAWS

The common good should not yield to private advantage, and dispensing seems respect of persons. Thomas answers that dispensing is measuring out a common precept to individuals, and where a precept useful for most does not suit a person or case, the ruler may grant leave not to keep it; done without reason, he is unfaithful or imprudent. No one can dispense in the divine law save God or one to whom he commits it.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectores multitudinis
to the-fourth thus it-is-proceeded it-seems that the-rulers of-the-multitude
non possint in legibus humanis dispensare. Lex enim statuta est
not can in laws human to-dispense law for established is
pro communi utilitate, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed bonum commune
for the-common utility as Isidore says but the-good common
non debet intermitti pro privato commodo alicuius personae:
not ought to-be-interrupted for the-private advantage of-some person
quia, ut dicit Philosophus, in I Ethic., bonum gentis divinius
because as says the-Philosopher in I Ethics the-good of-the-nation more-divine

est quam bonum unius hominis. Ergo videtur quod non
is than the-good of-one man therefore it-seems that not
debeat dispensari cum aliquo ut contra legem communem agat.
it-ought to-be-dispensed with anyone that against the-law common be-act

2. Praeterea, illis qui super alios constituuntur, praecipitur
2 further to-those who over others are-set it-is-commanded
Deut. I: Ita parvum audietis ut magnum, nec accipietis
Deuteronomy I so the-small you-will-hear as the-great nor you-will-accept
cuiusquam personam: quia Dei iudicium est. Sed concedere
of-anyone the-person because of-God the-judgment it-is but to-grant
alicui quod communiter denegatur omnibus, videtur esse
to-someone what commonly is-denied to-all seems to-be
acceptio personarum. Ergo huiusmodi dispensationes facere
acceptance of-persons therefore of-this-kind dispensations to-make
rectores multitudinis non possunt, cum hoc sit contra
the-rulers of-the-multitude not can since this be against
praeceptum legis divinae.
the-precept of-the-law divine

3. Praeterea, lex humana, si sit recta, oportet quod
3 further law human if it-be right it-is-necessary that
consonet legi naturali et legi divinae: aliter enim non
it-accord with-the-law natural and with-the-law divine otherwise for not
congrueret religioni, nec conveniret disciplinae, quod requiritur
it-would-agree with-religion nor would-it-befit discipline which is-required
ad legem, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed in lege divina et naturali
for law as Isidore says but in the-law divine and natural
nullus homo potest dispensare. Ergo nec etiam in lege humana.
no man can to-dispense therefore nor also in law human

Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus, I ad Cor. IX:
but against is that says the-Apostle I to Corinthians IX
Dispensatio mihi credita est.
a-dispensation to-me entrusted is

Respondeo dicendum quod dispensatio proprie importat
I-answer it-must-be-said that dispensation properly implies
commensurationem alicuius communis ad singula: unde etiam
the-commensuration of-something common to single-things whence also
gubernator familiae dicitur dispensator, inquantum unicuique
the-governor of-a-household is-called a-dispenser inasmuch-as to-each
de familia cum pondere et mensura distribuit et operationes
of the-household with weight and measure he-distributes both operations
et necessaria vitae. Sic igitur et in quacumque multitudine
and the-necessaries of-life thus therefore also in any multitude
ex eo dicitur aliquis dispensare, quod ordinat qualiter
from this is-said someone to-dispense that he-orders how
aliquod commune praeceptum sit a singulis adimplendum.
some common precept be by single-ones to-be-fulfilled
Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquod praeceptum quod
it-happens moreover sometimes that some precept which
est ad commodum multitudinis ut in pluribus, non est
is for the-advantage of-the-multitude as in the-more not is
conveniens huic personae, vel in hoc casu, quia vel per
fitting for-this person or in this case because either through
hoc impediretur aliquid melius, vel etiam induceretur
this would-be-hindered something better or also would-be-brought-in
aliquod malum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Periculosum
some evil as from the-above-said is-plain dangerous
autem esset ut hoc iudicio cuiuslibet committeretur,
moreover it-would-be that this to-the-judgment of-anyone be-committed
nisi forte propter evidens et subitum periculum, ut supra
unless perhaps on-account-of evident and sudden danger as above
dictum est. Et ideo ille qui habet regere multitudinem,
said it-is and therefore he who has to-rule the-multitude
habet potestatem dispensandi in lege humana quae suae
has the-power of-dispensing in law human which on-his

auctoritati innititur, ut scilicet in personis vel casibus
authority rests that namely in persons or cases
in quibus lex deficit, licentiam tribuat ut praeceptum
in which the-law fails license he-grant that the-precept
legis non servetur. – Si autem absque hac ratione, pro
of-the-law not be-kept if but without this reason for
sola voluntate, licentiam tribuat, non erit fidelis in
sole will license he-grant not he-will-be faithful in
dispensatione, aut erit imprudens: infidelis quidem, si non
dispensation or he-will-be imprudent unfaithful indeed if not
habeat intentionem ad bonum commune; imprudens autem,
he-have intention to the-good common imprudent moreover
si rationem dispensandi ignoret. Propter quod Dominus
if the-reason of-dispensing he-know-not on-account-of which the-Lord
dicit, Lucae XII: Quis, putas, est fidelis dispensator et
says Luke XII who think-you is the-faithful dispenser and
prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam?
prudent whom has-set the-lord over household his

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando cum aliquo
to the-first therefore it-must-be-said that when with someone
dispensatur ut legem communem non servet, non debet
it-is-dispensed that the-law common not he-keep not it-ought
fieri in praeiudicium boni communis; sed ea
to-be-done to the-prejudice of-the-good common but with-this
intentione ut ad bonum commune proficiat.
intention that to the-good common it-profit

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum
to the-second it-must-be-said that not it-is acceptance of-persons
si non serventur aequalia in personis inaequalibus. Unde
if not be-kept equal-things in persons unequal whence
quando conditio alicuius personae requirit ut rationabiliter
when the-condition of-some person requires that reasonably

in ea aliquid specialiter observetur, non est personarum
in it something specially be-observed not it-is of-persons
acceptio si sibi aliqua specialis gratia fiat.
acceptance if to-him some special grace be-done
Ad tertium dicendum quod lex naturalis inquantum
to the-third it-must-be-said that the-law natural inasmuch-as
continet praecepta communia, quae nunquam fallunt,
it-contains precepts common which never fail
dispensationem recipere non potest. In aliis vero praeceptis,
dispensation to-receive not can in the-other but precepts
quae sunt quasi conclusiones praeceptorum communium,
which are as-if conclusions of-the-precepts common
quandoque per hominem dispensatur: puta quod mutuum
sometimes by man it-is-dispensed for-example that a-loan
non reddatur proditori patriae, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
not be-returned to-a-betrayer of-the-fatherland or something of-this-kind
– Ad legem autem divinam ita se habet quilibet homo,
to the-law moreover divine so himself has every man
sicut persona privata ad legem publicam cui subiicitur.
as a-person private to the-law public to-which he-is-subject
Unde sicut in lege humana publica non potest dispensare
whence as in the-law human public not can to-dispense
nisi ille a quo lex auctoritatem habet, vel is cui
except he from whom the-law authority has or he to-whom
ipse commiserit; ita in praeceptis iuris divini, quae
he-himself will-have-committed(-it) so in the-precepts of-right divine which
sunt a Deo, nullus potest dispensare nisi Deus, vel si
are from God no-one can to-dispense except God or if
cui ipse specialiter committeret.
to-anyone he-himself specially should-commit(-it)
