MEDIEVAL LATIN SERIES · VOLUME 40

Monologion

Anselm of Canterbury

Monologium
De Veritate
De Libertate Arbitrii
De Casu Diaboli

Monologion

With On Truth, On Freedom of Choice,
and On the Fall of the Devil

---

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



CANES NOBILES · MMXXVI

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

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ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

Monologium

Monologion

Praefatio

PREFACE

Some brothers asked Anselm for a meditation on the divine essence resting on no authority of Scripture, in which reason would compel every conclusion in plain style. He long refused, then yielded, and many others copied it. He finds nothing in it at odds with the Catholic Fathers, above all Augustine, whose On the Trinity critics should read first. He calls the Trinity three substances after the Greeks, speaks as one reasoning with himself, and asks copyists to set this preface first.

Quidam fratres sæpe me studioseque precati sunt ut
certain brothers often me and-earnestly asked have that
quædam quæ illis de meditanda Divinitatis essentia, et
certain-things which to-them about to-be-meditated of-Divinity essence and
quibusdam aliis huic meditationi cohærentibus, usitato
certain other-things to-this meditation cohering in-customary
sermone colloquendo protuleram, sub quodam eis
speech by-conversing I-had-brought-forth under a-certain for-them
meditationis exemplo describerem. Cujus scilicet scribendæ
of-meditation example I-should-write-down of-which namely to-be-written
meditationis magis secundum suam voluntatem, quam
meditation more according-to their-own will than
secundum rei facilitatem aut meam possibilitatem, hanc
according-to of-the-matter ease or my possibility this
mihi formam præstituerunt: quatenus auctoritate Scripturæ
to-me form they-prescribed so-that by-the-authority of-Scripture
penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur; sed quidquid per singulas
utterly nothing in it should-be-urged but whatever through the-single
investigationes finis assereret, id ita esse plano stylo et
investigations the-end should-assert that so to-be in-plain style and
vulgaribus argumentis, simplicique disputatione, et rationis
by-common arguments and-by-simple disputation both of-reason

necessitas breviter cogeret, et veritatis claritas patenter
the-necessity briefly should-compel and of-truth the-clearness plainly
ostenderet. Voluerunt etiam ut nec simplicibus peneque
should-show they-wished also that not-even simple and-almost
fatuis, objectionibus mihi occurrentibus obviare contemnerem.
foolish objections to-me occurring to-meet I-should-disdain
Quod quidem diu tentare recusavi, atque mecum reipsa
which indeed long to-attempt I-refused and with-myself the-thing-itself
comparans, multis me rationibus excusare tentavi: quanto
comparing with-many myself reasons to-excuse I-tried by-how-much
enim id quod petebant usu sibi optabant facilius, tanto
for that which they-asked in-use for-themselves they-wished more-easily by-so-much
mihi illud actu injungebant difficilius. Tandem tamen victus,
to-me it in-act they-enjoined more-difficultly at-length yet overcome
tum precum modesta importunitate, tum studii eorum non
both of-prayers by-the-modest importunity and of-the-zeal of-them not
contemnenda honestate; invitus quidem propter rei
to-be-despised by-the-decency unwilling indeed on-account-of of-the-matter
difficultatem, et ingenii mei imbecillitatem, quod precabantur
the-difficulty and of-wit my the-weakness what they-prayed
incœpi; sed libenter propter eorum charitatem, quantum
I-began but willingly on-account-of their charity as-much-as
potui secundum ipsorum diffinitionem effeci. Ad quod cum
I-could according-to their-own definition I-accomplished to which since
ea spe sim adductus, ut quidquid facerem illis solis
with-that hope I-was led that whatever I-should-make to-those alone
a quibus exigebatur, esset notum, et paulo post idipsum
by whom it-was-demanded should-be known and a-little after that-same
ut vilem rem fastidientibus, contemptu esset obruendum:
as a-cheap thing to-those-disdaining by-contempt should-be to-be-overwhelmed
scio enim me in eo non tam precantibus satisfacere
I-know for me in it not so-much those-praying to-satisfy

eisdem potuisse, quam precibus me prosequentibus finem
the-same to-have-been-able as to-the-prayers me pursuing an-end
posuisse. Nescio tamen quo pacto sic præter spem
to-have-put I-know-not yet by-what agreement thus beyond hope
evenit, ut non solum prædicti fratres, sed et plures
it-came-about that not only the-aforesaid brothers but also more
alii Scripturam ipsam, quisque eam sibi transcribendo
others the-writing itself each it for-himself by-transcribing
in longum memoriæ condemnare satagerent: quam ego sæpe
at length to-memory to-commit strove which I often
retractans nihil potui invenire me in ea dixisse, quod
re-handling nothing I-could to-find me in it to-have-said which
non catholicorum Patrum, et maxime beati Augustini,
not of-the-catholic Fathers and most of-blessed Augustine
scriptis cohæreat. Quapropter, si cui videbitur quod in
with-the-writings coheres wherefore if to-anyone it-will-seem that in
eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum
the-same little-work something I-have-brought-forth which either too new
sit, aut a veritate dissentiat, rogo ne statim me aut
is or from truth dissents I-ask that-not at-once me either
præsumptorem novitatum, aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet;
a-presumer of-novelties or of-falsehood an-asserter he-cry-out
sed prius libros præfati doctoris Augustini de Trinitate
but first the-books of-the-aforesaid doctor Augustine on the-Trinity
diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum
diligently let-him-look-through then according-to them little-work
meum dijudicet. Quod enim dixi summam Trinitatem posse
my let-him-judge that for I-said the-highest Trinity to-be-able
dici tres substantias, Græcos secutus sum, qui confitentur
to-be-said three substances the-Greeks followed I-have who confess
tres substantias in una essentia, eadem fide, qua nos tres
three substances in one essence by-the-same faith by-which we three

personas in una substantia. Nam hoc significant in Deo per
persons in one substance for this they-signify in God by
substantiam, quod nos per personam. Quæcunque autem ibi
substance which we by person whatever moreover there
dixi, sub persona secum sola cogitatione disputantis et
I-said under the-person with-himself by-sole thought of-one-disputing and
investigantis ea, quæ prius non animadvertisset, prolata
investigating those-things which before not he-had-noticed brought-forth
sunt: sicut sciebam illos velle quorum petitioni obsequi
were as I-knew them to-will whose to-the-petition to-comply
intendebam. Precor autem et obsecro vehementer, si quis hoc
I-intended I-pray moreover and I-beseech vehemently if anyone this
opusculum voluerit transcribere, ut hanc præfationem
little-work he-will-have-willed to-transcribe that this preface
in capite libelli ante ipsa capitula studeat præponere.
at the-head of-the-booklet before the-very chapters he-be-zealous to-put-before
Multum enim prodesse puto ad intelligenda ea quæ
much for to-profit I-think toward understanding those-things which
legerit ibi, si quis prius, qua intentione, quove
he-will-have-read there if anyone first with-what intention or-in-what
modo disputata sint, cognoverit. Puto etiam quod si quis
manner disputed they-were will-have-known I-think also that if anyone
hanc ipsam præfationem viderit prius, non temere judicabit,
this very preface will-have-seen first not rashly he-will-judge
si quid contra suam opinionem prolatum invenerit.
if anything against his-own opinion brought-forth he-will-have-found

Quod sit quiddam optimum et maximum et summum omnium quæ sunt

I · THAT THERE IS SOMETHING BEST AND GREATEST

Anyone ignorant of the one highest nature can reach much of the faith by reason alone, though its conclusions only seem necessary for now. All men seek what they think good, and the many goods are good through one thing, as just things are just through justice. That through which all goods are good is good through itself, and so alone is supremely good and great, the highest of all that is.

Si quis unam naturam summam omnium quæ sunt, solam
if anyone one nature highest of-all-things which are alone
sibi in æterna beatitudine sua sufficientem omnibusque
to-itself in eternal blessedness its-own sufficient and-to-all
rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod aliquid sunt, aut quod aliquo
things other this very-thing that something they-are or that in-some
modo bene sunt, per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem
way well they-are through omnipotent goodness its-own giving
et facientem, aliaque perplura, quæ de Deo, sive de
and making and-other very-many-things which about God or about
ejus creatura necessario credimus, aut non audiendo, aut non
his creature necessarily we-believe either not by-hearing or not
credendo ignorat, putat quia ea ipsa ex magna parte,
by-believing is-ignorant-of he-thinks that those very-things in great part
si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem sola
if even of-moderate wit he-is he-can himself to-himself at-least by-sole
ratione persuadere. Quod cum multis modis facere possit,
reason to-persuade which since in-many ways to-do he-can
unum ponam, quem illi æstimo esse promptissimum.
one I-shall-set-down which for-him I-reckon to-be readiest
Etenim cum omnes frui solis his appetant, quæ bona
for since all to-enjoy only those-things desire which good

putant; in promptu est, ut aliquando mentis oculum
they-think at hand it-is that at-some-time of-the-mind the-eye
convertat ad investigandum illud, unde sunt bona ea
he-turn to investigating that whence are good those
ipsa, quæ non appetit, nisi quia judicat esse bona,
very-things which not he-desires except because he-judges to-be good
ut deinde ratione ducente et illa prosequente ad ea,
so-that then by-reason leading and it following to those-things
quæ irrationabiliter ignorat, rationabiliter proficiat. In
which irrationally he-is-ignorant-of rationally he-may-advance in
quo tamen si quid dixero, quod major non monstret
which yet if anything I-shall-have-said which a-greater not shows
auctoritas, sic volo accipi: ut quamvis ex rationibus, quæ
authority thus I-will to-be-taken that although from reasons which
mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur, non ob
to-me will-seem as-if necessary it-be-concluded not on-account-of
hoc tamen omnino necessarium, sed tantum sic interim
this yet altogether necessary but only thus meanwhile
videri posse dicatur. Facile est igitur ut aliquis sic secum
to-seem to-be-able it-be-said easy it-is therefore that someone thus with-himself
tacitus dicat: Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint, quorum
silent say since so innumerable goods there-are of-which
tam multam diversitatem et sensibus corporeis experimur,
so great diversity both by-the-senses bodily we-experience
et ratione mentis discernimus, estne credendum esse
and by-the-reason of-the-mind we-discern is-it to-be-believed to-be
unum aliquid, per quod unum sint bona quæcunque bona
one something through which one are good whatever good
sunt; an sunt bona alia per aliud. Certissimum quidem et
are or are good others through another most-certain indeed and
omnibus est volentibus advertere perspicuum quia quæcunque
to-all it-is willing to-attend evident that whatever-things

dicuntur aliquid, ita ut ad invicem magis aut minus aut
are-said something so that to one-another more or less or
æqualiter dicantur per aliquid dicuntur, quod non aliud
equally they-are-said through something they-are-said which not one
et aliud, sed idem intelligitur in diversis, sive in illis
and another but the-same is-understood in diverse-things whether in them
æqualiter sive inæqualiter consideretur. Nam quæcunque justa
equally or unequally it-be-considered for whatever-things just
dicuntur ad invicem, sive pariter sive magis vel minus,
are-said to one-another whether equally or more or less
non possunt intelligi justa nisi per justitiam, quæ
not they-can to-be-understood just except through justice which
non est aliud et aliud in diversis. Ergo cum certum sit
not is one and another in diverse-things therefore since certain it-is
quod omnia bona, si ad invicem conferantur, aut æqualiter,
that all goods if to one-another they-be-compared either equally
aut inæqualiter sint bona, necesse est ut omnia sint per
or unequally are good necessary it-is that all be through
aliquid bona, quod intelligitur idem in diversis bonis, licet
something good which is-understood the-same in diverse goods although
aliquando videantur bona dici alia per aliud. Per aliud
sometimes they-seem goods to-be-said some through another through another
enim videtur dici bonus equus, quia fortis est; et per
for it-seems to-be-said good a-horse because strong he-is and through
aliud bonus equus, quia velox est. Cum enim videatur
another good a-horse because swift he-is since for he-seems
dici bonus per fortitudinem, et bonus per velocitatem,
to-be-said good through strength and good through swiftness
non tamen idem videtur esse velocitas et fortitudo. Verum
not yet the-same it-seems to-be swiftness and strength but
si equus, quia est fortis et velox, idcirco bonus est;
if a-horse because he-is strong and swift therefore good is

quomodo fortis et velox latro malus est? Potius igitur
how strong and swift a-robber bad is rather therefore
quemadmodum fortis et velox latro ideo malus est quia
just-as strong and swift a-robber therefore bad is because
noxius est; ita fortis et velox equus idcirco bonus est,
harmful he-is so strong and swift a-horse therefore good is
quia utilis est. Et quidem nihil solet putari bonum,
because useful he-is and indeed nothing is-wont to-be-thought good
nisi aut propter utilitatem aliquam, ut bona dicitur
except either on-account-of usefulness some as good is-said
salus, et quæ saluti prosunt; aut propter quamlibet
health and what-things to-health are-profitable or on-account-of some-or-other
honestatem, sicut pulchritudo æstimatur bona, et quæ
honorableness as beauty is-reckoned good and what-things
pulchritudinem juvant. Sed quoniam jam perspecta ratio nullo
beauty help but since now perceived reason by-no
potest dissolvi pacto, necesse est omne quoque utile vel
can to-be-dissolved way necessary it-is every also useful or
honestum, si vere bona sunt, per idipsum esse bona per
honorable if truly goods they-are through that-same to-be good through
quod necesse est cuncta esse bona, quidquid illud sit. Quis
which necessary it-is all-things to-be good whatever that be who
autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona
moreover would-doubt that very-thing through which all-things are good
esse magnum bonum? Illud igitur est bonum per seipsum;
to-be a-great good that therefore is good through itself
quoniam omne bonum est per ipsum. Ergo consequitur
since every good is through it therefore it-follows
ut omnia alia bona sint per aliud quam quod ipsa
that all other goods be through another than that-which they-themselves
sunt et ipsum solum per seipsum. At nullum bonum
are and it alone through itself but no good

quod per aliud est, est æquale aut majus eo bono
which through another is is equal or greater than-that good
quod per se est bonum. Illud itaque solum est summe
which through itself is good that and-so alone is supremely
bonum, quod solum est per se bonum. Id enim summum
good which alone is through itself good that for highest
est, quod sic supereminet aliis, ut nec par habeat, nec
is which so overtops others that neither an-equal it-has nor
præstantius. Sed quod est summe bonum, est etiam summe
a-more-excellent but what is supremely good is also supremely
magnum. Est igitur unum aliquid summe magnum, et
great there-is therefore one something supremely great and
summe bonum, id est summum omnium quæ sunt.
supremely good that is highest of-all-things which are

De eadem re

II · THE SAME ARGUMENT

As whatever is good is good through one good, so whatever is great, in worth rather than in size, is great through one thing great through itself. Since nothing can be supremely great except what is supremely good, there must be something greatest and best, the highest of all that is.

Quemadmodum autem inventum est aliquid esse summe
just-as moreover found it-has-been something to-be supremely
bonum, quoniam cuncta bona per unum aliquid sunt bona,
good since all goods through one something are good
quod est bonum per seipsum; sic ex necessitate colligitur
which is good through itself so from necessity it-is-gathered
aliquid esse summe magnum, quoniam quæcunque magna
something to-be supremely great since whatever great

sunt, per unum aliquid magna sunt, quod magnum est per
are through one something great they-are which great is through
seipsum. Dico autem non magnum spatio, ut est corpus aliquod;
itself I-say moreover not great in-space as is body some
sed quod quanto majus, tanto melius est aut dignius, ut
but which by-how-much greater by-so-much better is or worthier as
est sapientia. Et quoniam non potest esse summe magnum,
is wisdom and since not can to-be supremely great
nisi id quod est summe bonum, necesse est aliquid esse
except that which is supremely good necessary it-is something to-be
maximum et optimum, id est summum omnium quæ sunt.
greatest and best that is highest of-all-things which are

Quod sit quædam natura per quam est quidquid est, et quæ per se est, et est summum omnium quæ sunt

III · A NATURE THROUGH WHICH ALL THINGS ARE

Whatever exists, exists through something, either one or many. If many, either they are referred to one thing through which they exist, or each exists through itself, and so through one power of existing through itself, or they exist through one another, which reason rejects. So there is one thing through which all exist, and it alone exists through itself: a nature, substance, or essence, best, greatest, and highest of all.

Denique non solum omnia bona per idem aliquid sunt
finally not only all goods through the-same something are
bona, et omnia magna per idem aliquid sunt magna;
good and all great-things through the-same something are great
sed quidquid est, per unum aliquid videtur esse. Omne
but whatever is through one something seems to-be every-thing
namque quod est, aut est per aliquid, aut per nihil; sed
for-indeed that is either is through something or through nothing but

nihil est per nihil. Non enim vel cogitari potest ut sit
nothing is through nothing not for even to-be-thought it-can that there-be
aliquid non per aliquid. Quidquid igitur est, non nisi per
something not through something whatever therefore is not except through
aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est unum, aut sunt
something is which since so it-is either there-is one or there-are
plura, per quæ sunt cuncta quæ sunt. Sed si sunt plura,
many through which are all-things which are but if there-are many
aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquid, per quod sunt;
either they-themselves are-referred to one something through which they-are
aut eadem plura singula sunt per se; aut ipsa
or the-same many singly are through themselves or they-themselves
per se invicem sunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per
through themselves mutually are but if the-many themselves are through
unum, jam non sunt omnia per plura; sed potius per
one now not are all-things through many but rather through
illud unum, per quod hæc plura sunt. Si vero ipsa plura
that one through which these many are if indeed the-very many
singula sunt per se, utique est una aliqua vis vel
singly are through themselves surely there-is one some force or
natura existendi per se, qua habent ut per se sint.
nature of-existing through itself by-which they-have that through themselves they-be
Non est autem dubium quod per idipsum unum sint, per
not is moreover doubtful that through that-same one they-are through
quod habent ut sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum
which they-have that they-be through themselves more-truly therefore through that
unum cuncta sunt, quam per plura, quæ sine eo uno esse
one all-things are than through many which without that one to-be
non possunt: ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla
not can that indeed many through themselves mutually be no
patitur ratio; quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est ut aliqua res
allows reason since irrational a-thought it-is that some thing

sit per illud cui dat esse: nam nec ipsa relativa
be through that to-which it-gives to-be for not-even the-very relatives
sic sunt per se invicem. Nam cum dominus et servus
so are through themselves mutually for since master and slave
referantur ad invicem, et ipsi homines qui referuntur,
are-referred to one-another both the-very men who are-referred
omnino non sunt per invicem; et ipsæ relationes quibus
at-all not are through one-another and the-very relations by-which
referuntur, non omnino sunt per se invicem, quia
they-are-referred not at-all are through themselves mutually because
eædem sunt per subjecta. Cum itaque veritas omnimodo
the-same are through the-subjects since and-so truth in-every-way
excludat plura esse, per quæ cuncta sunt, necesse est unum
excludes many to-be through which all-things are necessary it-is one
illud esse, per quod sunt cuncta quæ sunt. Quoniam ergo
that to-be through which are all-things which are since therefore
cuncta quæ sunt, sunt per ipsum unum; procul dubio et
all-things which are are through that one without doubt also
ipsum unum est per seipsum. Quæcunque igitur alia sunt,
that one is through itself whatever therefore others are
sunt per aliud et ipsum solum per seipsum. At quidquid
are through another and it alone through itself but whatever
est per aliud, minus est quam illud per quod cuncta
is through another less is than that through which all
sunt alia, et quod solum est per se. Quare illud
are other-things and which alone is through itself wherefore that
quod est per se, maxime omnium est. Est igitur unum
which is through itself most of-all is there-is therefore one
aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est: quod
something which alone most and supremely of-all is what
autem maxime omnium est, et per quod est quidquid
moreover most of-all is and through which is whatever

est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid est,
is good or great and altogether whatever something is
id necesse est esse summe bonum, et summe magnum,
that necessary it-is to-be supremely good and supremely great
et summum omnium quæ sunt. Quare est aliquid quod
and highest of-all-things which are wherefore there-is something which
sive essentia, sive substantia, sive natura dicatur, optimum
whether essence or substance or nature it-be-called best
et maximum est, et summum omnium quæ sunt.
and greatest is and highest of-all-things which are

De eadem re

IV · THE SAME ARGUMENT

Natures differ in rank: a horse is better than wood, and a man than a horse. The ranks cannot run on without end, which would leave natures unlimited in number, so some nature has no superior. If there were several such equal natures, they would be equal through some one thing, either their own essence, and so one, or something greater than they. So one nature is highest, existing through itself, and all else exists through it.

Amplius: Si quis intendat rerum naturas, velit, nolit,
further if anyone attend-to of-things the-natures he-will he-will-not
sentit non eas omnes contineri una dignitatis paritate;
he-perceives not them all to-be-contained in-one of-dignity parity
sed quasdam earum distingui graduum imparitate. Qui
but certain of-them to-be-distinguished of-degrees by-disparity he-who
enim dubitat quod in natura sua ligno melior sit equus,
for doubts that in nature its-own than-wood better be a-horse
et equo præstantior homo, is profecto non est dicendus
and than-a-horse more-excellent man he certainly not is to-be-called

homo. Cum igitur naturarum aliæ aliis negari non
a-man since therefore of-natures some than-others to-be-denied not
possint meliores, nihilominus persuadet ratio aliquam in
can better nonetheless persuades reason some-one among
eis sic supereminere, ut non habeat se superiorem. Si enim
them so to-overtop that not it-has itself a-superior if for
hujusmodi graduum distinctio sic est infinita, ut nullus sit
of-this-kind of-degrees the-distinction so is infinite that none be
ibi gradus superior, quo superior alius non inveniatur; ad
there a-degree higher than-which higher another not be-found to
hoc ratio deducitur, ut ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo
this reason is-led that of-the-very the-multitude of-natures by-no
fine claudatur. Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi
end be-closed this moreover no-one not thinks absurd except
qui nimis est absurdus. Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua
he-who too is absurd there-is therefore from necessity some
natura, quæ sic est alicui vel aliquibus superior, ut nulla
nature which so is to-some-one or to-some superior that none
sit cui ordinetur inferior. Hæc vero natura quæ talis est,
be to-which it-be-ordered inferior this indeed nature which such is
aut sola est, aut plures hujusmodi et æquales sunt: verum
either alone is or many of-this-kind and equal are but
si plures sunt et æquales, cum æquales esse non possint,
if many they-are and equal since equal to-be not they-can
per diversa quædam, sed per idem aliquid, illud unum,
through diverse certain-things but through the-same something that one
per quod æqualiter tam magnæ sunt, aut est idipsum
through which equally so great they-are either is that-very-thing
quod ipsæ sunt, id est, ipsa rerum essentia, aut aliud
which they-themselves are that is the-very of-things essence or other
quam quod ipsæ sunt. Sed si nihil est aliud quam
than what they-themselves are but if nothing is other than

ipsa earum essentia, sicut earum essentiæ non sunt plures,
the-very their essence as their essences not are many
sed una; ita et naturæ non sunt plures, sed una. Idem
but one so also the-natures not are many but one the-same
namque naturam hic intelligo, quod essentiam. Si vero id,
for by-nature here I-understand as by-essence if indeed that
per quod plures ipsæ naturæ tam magnæ sunt, aliud est
through which many the-very natures so great are other is
quam quod ipsæ sunt, pro certo minores sunt, quam
than what they-themselves are for certain less they-are than
id per quod magnæ sunt. Quidquid enim per aliud est
that through which great they-are whatever for through another is
magnum, minus est quam id per quod est magnum. Quare
great less is than that through which it-is great wherefore
non sunt sic magnæ, ut illis nihil aliud sit majus. Quod
not they-are so great that than-them nothing other be greater but
si nec per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possibile est
if neither through this which they-are nor through another possible it-is
tales esse plures naturas, quibus nihil sit præstantius; nullo
such to-be many natures than-which nothing be more-excellent in-no
modo possunt esse naturæ plures hujusmodi. Restat igitur
way can there-be natures many of-this-kind it-remains therefore
unam et solam naturam aliquam esse, quæ sic est aliis
one and sole nature some to-be which so is than-others
superior, ut nulli sit inferior; sed quod tale est, maximum
superior that to-none it-be inferior but what such is greatest
et optimum est omnium quæ sunt. Est igitur quædam
and best is of-all-things which are there-is therefore a-certain
natura, quæ est summum omnium quæ sunt. Hoc autem
nature which is highest of-all-things which are this moreover
esse non potest, nisi ipsa sit per se id quod est; et
to-be not can unless it-itself be through itself that which it-is and

cuncta quæ sunt, sint per ipsam id quod sunt. Nam cum
all-things which are be through it that which they-are for since
paulo ante ratio docuerit id quod per se est, et per
a-little before reason taught that which through itself is and through
quod alia cuncta sunt, esse summum omnium existentium;
which others all are to-be highest of-all existing-things
aut e converso id quod est summum, est per se, et
or from the-converse that which is highest is through itself and
cuncta alia per illud; aut erunt plura summa. Sed plura
all others through it or there-will-be many highest-things but many
summa non esse manifestum est. Quare est quædam
highest-things not to-be manifest it-is wherefore there-is a-certain
natura, vel substantia, vel essentia, quæ est per se bona
nature or substance or essence which is through itself good
et magna, et per se est id quod est, et per quam
and great and through itself is that which it-is and through which
est quidquid vere aut bonum, aut magnum, aut aliquid est,
is whatever truly either good or great or something is
et quæ est summum bonum, summum magnum, summum
and which is the-highest good the-highest great the-highest
ens sive subsistens, id est, summum omnium quæ sunt.
being or subsisting that is highest of-all-things which are

Quod sicut illa est per se, et alia per illam; ita illa sit ex se, et alia ex illa

V · FROM ITSELF, AS THROUGH ITSELF

What exists through something also exists from it, as a work exists both through and from its matter and its maker. So as all things exist through the highest nature and it alone through itself, all things also exist from it, and it alone from itself.

Quoniam itaque placet quod inventum est, juvat indagare
since and-so it-pleases what found has-been it-helps to-search-out
utrum hæc ipsa natura et cuncta quæ aliquid sunt, non sint
whether this very nature and all-things which something are not be
nisi ex ipsa, quemadmodum non sunt nisi per ipsam.
except from it just-as not they-are except through it
Sed liquet posse dici quia quod est ex aliquo, est etiam
but it-is-clear to-be-able to-be-said that what is from something is also
per id ipsum; et quod est per aliquid, est etiam ex eo
through that very-thing and what is through something is also from that
ipso: quemadmodum quod est ex materia et per artificem,
very-thing just-as what is from matter and through a-craftsman
potest etiam dici esse per materiam et ex artifice;
can also to-be-said to-be through the-matter and from the-craftsman
quoniam per utrumque, et ex utroque, id est ab utroque
since through each and from each that is from each
habet ut sit, quamvis aliter sit per materiam et ex
it-has that it-be although otherwise it-be through the-matter and from
materia, quam per artificem et ex artifice. Consequitur
the-matter than through the-craftsman and from the-craftsman it-follows
ergo ut quomodo cuncta quæ sunt, per summam naturam
therefore that as all-things which are through the-highest nature
sunt id quod sunt; et ideo illa est per se ipsam, alia
are that which they-are and therefore it is through it itself others

vero per aliud; ita omnia quæ sunt, sint ex eadem summa
indeed through another so all-things which are be from the-same highest
natura: et idcirco illa sit ex seipsa, alia autem ex illa.
nature and therefore it be from itself others moreover from it

Quod illa non sit ulla juvante causa ducta ad esse; nec tamen sit per nihil aut ex nihilo; et quomodo intelligi possit esse per se, et ex se

VI · IT WAS NOT BROUGHT INTO BEING BY ANY CAUSE

What exists through something exists through a maker, through matter, or through some aid such as an instrument, and what does is later and less than that through which it exists. The highest nature has none of these, yet it does not exist through nothing or from nothing, which would make it nothing. It exists through and from itself as light shines through and from itself: essence, to be, and being stand to one another as light, to shine, and shining.

Quoniam igitur non semper habet eumdem sensum quod
since therefore not always it-has the-same sense what
dicitur esse per aliquid, aut esse ex aliquo, quærendum est
is-said to-be through something or to-be from something to-be-sought it-is
diligentius quomodo per summam naturam, vel ex ipsa sint
more-diligently how through the-highest nature or from it be
omnia quæ sunt: et quoniam id quod est per seipsum, et
all-things which are and since that which is through itself and
id quod est per aliud, non eamdem suscipiunt existendi
that which is through another not the-same take-up of-existing
rationem. Prius separatim videamus de ipsa summa natura
account first separately let-us-see about the-very highest nature
quæ per se est; postea de his, quæ per aliud sunt.
which through itself is afterward about those-things which through another are

Cum igitur constet quia illa est per seipsam quidquid est,
since therefore it-is-agreed that it is through itself whatever it-is
et omnia alia sunt per illam id quod sunt, quomodo
and all other-things are through it that which they-are how
ipsa est per se? Quod enim dicitur esse per aliquid
it-itself is through itself what for is-said to-be through something
videtur esse aut per efficiens, aut per materiam, aut per
seems to-be either through an-efficient or through matter or through
aliquod aliud adjumentum velut per instrumentum. Sed
some other aid as-if through an-instrument but
quidquid aliquo ex his tribus modis est, per aliud est; et
whatever in-some of these three ways is through another is and
posterius, et aliquo modo minus est eo, per quod habet
later and in-some way less is than-that through which it-has
ut sit: at summa natura nullatenus est per aliud; nec
that it-be but the-highest nature in-no-way is through another nor
est posterior, aut minor seipsa, aut aliqua alia re. Quare
is later or less than-itself or than-some other thing wherefore
summa natura nec a se, nec ab alio fieri potuit; nec
the-highest nature neither by itself nor by another to-be-made could nor
ipsa sibi, nec aliquid aliud illi materia, unde fieret,
itself to-itself nor anything other to-it matter whence it-might-be-made
fuit; nec ipsa se aliquo modo, aut aliqua res ipsam, ut
was nor itself itself in-some way or some thing it that
esset quod non erat, adjuvit. Quid igitur? Quod enim
it-might-be what not it-was helped what therefore what for
non est a quo faciente, aut ex qua materia, aut quibus
not there-is by what making or from what matter or by-what
adjumentis ad esse pervenerit, id videtur aut esse nihil; aut,
aids to to-be it-came that seems either to-be nothing or
si aliquid est, per nihil esse, et ex nihilo. Quæ licet
if something it-is through nothing to-be and from nothing which-things although

ex iis, quæ rationis luce de summa jam animadverti
from those-things which by-reason's light about the-highest already I-have-noticed
substantia, putem nullatenus in illam posse cadere; non
substance I-think in-no-way into it to-be-able to-fall not
tamen negligam hujus rei probationem contexere. Quoniam
yet I-shall-neglect of-this matter the-proof to-weave-together since
namque ad magnum et delectabile quidam me subito perduxit
for-indeed to a-great and delightful something me suddenly has-led
hæc mea meditatio, nullam vel simplicem peneque fatuam
this my meditation no even simple and-almost foolish
objectionem mihi disputanti occurrentem, negligendo, volo
objection to-me disputing occurring by-neglecting I-will
præterire: quatenus et ego nihil ambiguum in præcedentibus
to-pass-by so-that both I nothing ambiguous in the-preceding
relinquens, certior valeam ad sequentia procedere; et si
leaving more-certain may-be-able to the-following to-proceed and if
forte cui, quod speculor, persuadere voluero, omni, vel
perhaps to-anyone what I-contemplate to-persuade I-shall-will every even
modico, remoto obstaculo quilibet tardus intellectus ad
slight removed obstacle any-whatever slow understanding to
audita facile possit accedere. Quod igitur illa natura,
the-things-heard easily may to-approach that therefore that nature
sine qua nulla est natura, sit nihil, tam falsum est; quam
without which none is nature be nothing as false is as
absurdum erit si dicatur quidquid est nihil esse: per
absurd it-will-be if it-be-said whatever is nothing to-be through
nihil vero non est, quia nullo modo intelligi potest, ut
nothing indeed not it-is because in-no way to-be-understood it-can that
quod aliquid est sit per nihil. At si quo modo est ex
what something is be through nothing but if in-some way it-is from
nihilo, aut per se, aut per aliud, aut per nihil est
nothing either through itself or through another or through nothing it-is

ex nihilo; sed constat quia nullo modo aliquid est per
from nothing but it-is-agreed that in-no way something is through
nihil. Si igitur est aliquo modo ex nihilo; aut per se,
nothing if therefore it-is in-some way from nothing either through itself
aut per aliud est ex nihilo. Per se autem nihil potest
or through another it-is from nothing through itself moreover nothing can
esse ex nihilo; quia si quid est ex nihilo per aliquid
to-be from nothing because if anything is from nothing through something
necesse est ut id, per quod est, prius sit. Quoniam igitur
necessary it-is that that through which it-is before be since therefore
hæc essentia prior seipsa non est, nullo modo est ex
this essence prior than-itself not is in-no way is-it from
nihilo per se. At si dicitur per aliquam naturam aliam
nothing through itself but if it-is-said through some nature other
exstitisse ex nihilo, non est summa omnium, sed aliqua
to-have-stood-forth from nothing not it-is highest of-all but some
inferior; nec est per se hoc quod est, sed per aliud.
lower nor is-it through itself this which it-is but through another
Item: Si per aliquid est ipsa ex nihilo; id, per quod
likewise if through something is it-itself from nothing that through which
est, magnum bonum fuit, cum causa boni fuit. At nullum
it-is a-great good was since cause of-good it-was but no
bonum potest intelligi ante illud bonum, sine quo nihil
good can to-be-understood before that good without which nothing
est bonum: hoc autem bonum, sine quo nullum est bonum,
is good this moreover good without which none is good
satis liquet hanc esse summam naturam, de qua agitur.
enough it-is-clear this to-be the-highest nature about which it-is-treated
Quare res nulla vel intellectu præcessit, per quam ista
wherefore thing none even by-understanding has-preceded through which this
ex nihilo esset. Denique si hæc ipsa natura est aliquid aut
from nothing might-be finally if this very nature is something either

per nihil, aut ex nihilo, procul dubio aut ipsa non est
through nothing or from nothing without doubt either itself not is
per se et ex se quidquid est; aut dicitur ipsa nihil:
through itself and from itself whatever it-is or it-is-called itself nothing
quod utrumque superfluum est exponere quam falsum sit.
which both superfluous it-is to-set-forth how false it-be
Licet igitur summa substantia non sit per aliquid efficiens,
although therefore the-highest substance not be through something efficient
aut ex aliqua materia, nec aliquibus adjuta sit causis, ut
or from some matter nor by-some helped be causes that
ad esse perduceretur: nullatenus tamen est per nihil, aut
to to-be it-might-be-brought in-no-way yet is-it through nothing or
ex nihilo; quia per seipsam, et ex seipsa est quidquid
from nothing because through itself and from itself it-is whatever
est. Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se
it-is how therefore at-length to-be to-be-understood it-is through itself
et ex se; sic nec ipsa se fecit, nec ipsa sibi materia
and from itself so neither itself itself made nor itself to-itself matter
exstitit, nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod non erat
stood-forth nor itself itself in-any way that what not it-was
esset, adjuvit, nisi forte eo modo intelligendum videtur,
it-might-be helped unless perhaps in-that way to-be-understood it-seems
quo dicitur quia lux lucet, vel lucens est per seipsam, et
in-which it-is-said that light shines or shining is through itself and
ex seipsa. Quemadmodum enim sese habent ad invicem
from itself just-as for themselves have to one-another
lux, et lucere, et lucens; sic sunt ad se invicem
light and to-shine and shining so they-are to themselves mutually
essentia, esse, et ens, hoc est existens, sive subsistens.
essence to-be and being that is existing or subsisting
Ergo summa essentia, et summe esse, et summe ens, id
therefore the-highest essence and supremely to-be and supremely being that

est summe existens, sive summe subsistens non dissimiliter
is supremely existing or supremely subsisting not dissimilarly
sibi convenient, quam lux, et lucere, et lucens.
to-themselves will-agree than light and to-shine and shining

Quomodo alia omnia sint per illam, et ex illa

VII · HOW ALL ELSE EXISTS THROUGH IT AND FROM IT

The world's mass is made of the four elements, but what is their matter? Nothing can exist besides the highest nature and what exists through it. Created things cannot be made from its matter, or the highest good could be changed and corrupted, nor from themselves. So the highest essence alone made the whole ordered, various universe of things from nothing.

Restat nunc de rerum earum universitate, quæ per aliud
it-remains now about of-things of-those the-universe which through another
sunt, discutere quomodo sint per summam substantiam,
are to-discuss how they-be through the-highest substance
utrum quia ipsa fecit universa, aut quia materia fuit
whether because it made all-things or because the-matter it-was
universorum. Non enim opus est quærere utrum ideo
of-all-things not for need is to-seek whether therefore
sint universa per ipsam; quia alio faciente, aut alia
be all-things through it because by-another making or other
materia existente, illa tantum quolibet modo, ut res omnes
matter existing it only in-any way that things all
essent, adjuverit cum repugnet his quæ jam supra
might-be helped since it-conflicts with-those-things which already above
patuerunt, si secundo loco et non principaliter sint per
have-become-plain if in-second place and not principally be through
ipsam, quæcunque sunt. Primum itaque mihi quærendum
it whatever-things are first and-so by-me to-be-sought

esse puto utrum universitas rerum, quæ per aliud sunt, sit
to-be I-think whether the-universe of-things which through another are be
ex aliqua materia. Non autem dubito omnem hanc mundi
from some matter not moreover I-doubt all this of-the-world
molem, cum partibus suis, sicut videmus, formatam constare
mass with parts its-own as we-see formed to-consist
ex terra et aqua, et aere et igne: quæ, scilicet, quatuor
of earth and water and air and fire which namely four
elementa, aliquo modo intelligi possunt sine his formis
elements in-some way to-be-understood can without these forms
quas conspicimus in rebus formatis, ut eorum informis aut
which we-behold in things formed so-that their unformed or
etiam confusa natura videatur esse materia omnium corporum
even confused nature seem to-be the-matter of-all bodies
suis formis discretorum; non inquam, hoc dubito; sed
by-their-own forms distinguished not I-say this I-doubt but
quæro, unde hæc ipsa, quam dixi, mundanæ molis materia
I-ask whence this very which I-have-said of-the-world's mass matter
sit. Nam si hujus materiæ est aliqua materia, illa verius
be for if of-this matter there-is some matter that more-truly
est corporeæ universitatis materia. Si igitur universitas rerum,
is of-the-bodily universe the-matter if therefore the-universe of-things
seu visibilium, seu invisibilium est ex aliqua materia,
whether visible or invisible is from some matter
profecto non solum non potest esse, sed nec dici potest
surely not only not it-can to-be but not-even to-be-said can-it
esse ex alia materia, quam ex summa natura, aut ex se
to-be from other matter than from the-highest nature or from it
ipsa, aut ex aliqua tertia essentia; quæ utique nulla est.
itself or from some third essence which surely none is
Quippe nihil omnino vel cogitari potest esse præter illud
indeed nothing at-all even to-be-thought can to-be besides that

summum omnium, quod est per seipsum; et universitatem
highest of-all which is through itself and the-universe
eorum quæ non per se, sed per idem summum
of-those-things which not through themselves but through the-same highest
sunt: quare quod nullo modo aliquid est, nullius rei
are wherefore what in-no way something is of-no thing
materia est. Ex sua vero natura rerum universitas, quæ
the-matter is from its-own indeed nature of-things the-universe which
per se non est, esse non potest; quoniam si hoc esset,
through itself not is to-be not can since if this were
aliquo modo esset per se et per aliud, quam per
in-some way it-would-be through itself and through another than through
id per quod sunt cuncta, et non esset solum id per
that through which are all-things and not would-be alone that through
quod cuncta sunt: quæ omnia sunt falsa. Item, omne
which all-things are which all are false likewise everything
quod ex materia est, ex alio est, et posterius est eo;
which from matter is from another is and later is than-it
quoniam igitur nihil est aliud a seipso, vel posterius
since therefore nothing is other than itself or later
seipso, consequitur ut nihil sit materialiter ex seipso. At si
than-itself it-follows that nothing be materially from itself but if
ex summæ naturæ materia potest esse aliquid minus ipsa,
from of-the-highest nature the-matter can to-be something less than-it
summum bonum mutari et corrumpi potest: quod nefas
the-highest good to-be-changed and to-be-corrupted can which wrong
est dicere. Quapropter, quoniam omne quod aliud est quam
it-is to-say wherefore since everything which other is than
ipsa, minus est ipsa; impossibile est aliquid aliud hoc modo
it less is than-it impossible it-is something other in-this way
esse ex ipsa. Amplius: Dubium non est quia nullatenus
to-be from it further doubtful not it-is that in-no-way

est bonum, per quod mutatur vel corrumpitur summum
is-it good through which is-changed or is-corrupted the-highest
bonum. Quod si qua minor natura est ex summi boni
good but if some lesser nature is from of-the-highest good
materia, cum nihil sit undecunque nisi per summam
the-matter since nothing be from-anywhere except through the-highest
essentiam, mutatur et corrumpitur summum bonum per
essence is-changed and is-corrupted the-highest good through
ipsam: quare summa essentia, quæ est ipsum summum
it wherefore the-highest essence which is the-very highest
bonum, nullatenus est bonum; quod est inconveniens. Nulla
good in-no-way is good which is unfitting no
igitur minor natura materialiter est ex summa natura. Cum
therefore lesser nature materially is from the-highest nature since
igitur eorum essentiam, quæ per aliud sunt, constet non
therefore of-those the-essence which through another are it-is-agreed not
esse velut ex materia, ex summa essentia, nec ex se, nec
to-be as-if from matter from the-highest essence nor from itself nor
ex alio, manifestum est quia ex nulla materia est. Quare,
from another manifest it-is that from no matter it-is wherefore
quoniam quidquid est per summam essentiam est, nec
since whatever is through the-highest essence is nor
per ipsam aliquid aliud esse potest nisi ea aut faciente
through it something other to-be can unless it either making
aut materia existente, consequitur de necessitate, ut præter
or matter existing it-follows of necessity that besides
eam nihil sit, nisi ea faciente, et quoniam nihil aliud est
it nothing be except it making and since nothing other is
vel fuit, nisi illa, et quæ facta sunt ab illa, nihil
or was except it and the-things-which made were by it nothing
omnino facere potuit per aliud, vel instrumentum, vel
at-all to-make could-it through other either instrument or

adjumentum, quam per seipsam. At omne quod fecit,
aid than through itself but everything which it-made
sine dubio aut fecit ex aliquo, velut ex materia; aut
without doubt either it-made from something as-if from matter or
ex nihilo. Quoniam igitur certissime patet quia essentia
from nothing since therefore most-certainly it-is-plain that the-essence
omnium, quæ præter summam essentiam sunt, ab eadem
of-all-things which besides the-highest essence are by the-same
summa essentia facta est, et quia ex nulla materia est;
highest essence made has-been and that from no matter it-is
procul dubio nihil apertius quam quia illa summa essentia
without doubt nothing more-open than that that highest essence
tantam rerum molem, tam numerosam multitudinem, tam
so-great of-things the-mass so numerous a-multitude so
formose formatam, tam ordinate variatam, tam convenienter
beautifully formed so orderly varied so fittingly
diversam, sola per seipsam produxit ex nihilo.
diverse alone through itself produced from nothing

Quomodo intelligendum sit quod omnia fecit ex nihilo

VIII · HOW IT MADE ALL THINGS FROM NOTHING

Whatever is made seems made from something, which raises the doubt whether nothing is something. "From nothing" has three senses. It can mean a thing was not made at all, as a silent man speaks "of nothing." It can mean that nothing was something a thing was made from, which is always false. Or it can mean a thing was made, but not from anything, as a man is saddened "about nothing." In this sense creation is from nothing.

Sed occurrit quædam dubitatio de nihilo. Nam ex
but there-occurs a-certain doubt about nothing for from
quocunque fit aliquid, id causa est ejus quod ex se
whatever is-made something that cause is of-that which from it
fit, et omnis causa necesse est aliquod ad essentiam
is-made and every cause necessary it-is some to the-essence
effecti præbeat adjumentum. Quod sic omnes tenent
of-the-effect furnish aid which so all hold
experimento, ut etiam nulli rapiatur contendendo, et
by-experience that even from-none it-be-snatched by-contending and
vix ulli subripiatur decipiendo. Si ergo factum est
scarcely from-any it-be-stolen by-deceiving if therefore made has-been
ex nihilo aliquid, ipsum nihil fuit causa ejus, quod ex
from nothing something that-very nothing was the-cause of-that which from
ipso factum est. Sed quomodo id quod nullum habebat
it made was but how that which no had
esse, adjuvit aliquid ut perveniret ad esse? Si autem nullum
to-be helped something that it-might-come to to-be if moreover no
adjumentum de nihilo provenit ad aliquid, cui aut qualiter
aid from nothing comes to something to-whom or how
persuadeatur quia ex nihilo aliquid efficiatur? Præterea,
could-it-be-persuaded that from nothing something is-effected besides

nihil aut significat aliquid, aut non significat aliquid. Sed si
nothing either signifies something or not signifies something but if
nihil est aliquid, quæcunque facta sunt ex nihilo, facta sunt
nothing is something whatever-things made were from nothing made were
ex aliquo. Si vero nihil non est aliquid: quoniam intelligi
from something if indeed nothing not is something since to-be-understood
non potest ut ex eo quod penitus non est, fiat
not it-can that from that which utterly not is there-be-made
aliquid, nihil fit ex nihilo; sicut vox omnium est
something nothing is-made from nothing as the-saying of-all is
quia nihil de nihilo. Unde videtur consequi ut quidquid
that nothing from nothing whence it-seems to-follow that whatever
fit, fiat ex aliquo: aut enim fit de aliquo, aut
is-made be-made from something either for it-is-made from something or
de nihilo. Sive igitur nihil sit aliquid, sive nihil non sit
from nothing whether therefore nothing be something or nothing not be
aliquid; consequi videtur ut quidquid factum est, factum
something to-follow it-seems that whatever made has-been made
sit ex aliquo. Quod si verum esse ponitur, omnibus, quæ
be from something but if true to-be it-is-set-down to-all-the-things which
supra disposita sunt, opponitur. Unde quoniam quod erat
above set-out were it-is-opposed whence since what was
nihil, aliquid erit; id quod maxime aliquid erat, nihil erit.
nothing something will-be that which most something was nothing will-be
Ex eo namque quod quamdam substantiam maxime omnium
from that for that a-certain substance most of-all
existentem inveneram, ad hoc ut omnia alia sic facta essent
existing I-had-found to this that all others so made had-been
ab ea, ut nihil esset unde facta essent, ratiocinando
by it that nothing was whence made they-had-been by-reasoning
perveneram. Quare si illud unde facta sunt, quod putabam
I-had-arrived wherefore if that whence made they-were which I-thought

esse nihil, est aliquid; quidquid inventum æstimabam de
to-be nothing is something whatever found I-reckoned about
summa essentia, est nihil. Quid igitur intelligendum est de
the-highest essence is nothing what therefore to-be-understood is about
nihilo? nam nihil quod videam posse objici, vel pene
nothing for nothing which I-may-see to-be-able to-be-objected even almost
fatuum, jam statui in hac meditatione negligere. Tribus
foolish already I-have-resolved in this meditation to-neglect in-three
itaque, ut puto, modis, quod ad præsentis impedimenti
and-so as I-think ways which for the-present hindrance
sufficit expedimentum, exponi potest, si qua substantia
suffices a-disentangling to-be-set-forth can if some substance
dicitur esse facta ex nihilo. Unus quidem modus est, quo
is-said to-be made from nothing one indeed way is in-which
volumus intelligi penitus non esse factum quod dicitur
we-will to-be-understood utterly not to-be made what is-said
ex nihilo esse: cui simile est, cum quærenti de tacente,
from nothing to-be to-which like is when to-one-asking about one-silent
unde loquatur, respondetur de nihilo, id est, non loquitur.
whence he-may-speak it-is-answered from nothing that is not he-speaks
Secundum quem modum de ipsa summa essentia, et de
according-to which way about the-very highest essence and about
eo, quod penitus nec fuit, nec est, quærenti unde factum
that which utterly neither was nor is to-one-asking whence made
sit, recte responderi potest, de nihilo, id est, nequaquam
it-be rightly to-be-answered it-can from nothing that is by-no-means
factum est: qui sensus de nullo eorum, quæ facta sunt,
made is which sense about none of-those-things which made are
intelligi potest. Alia significatio est, quæ dici quidem
to-be-understood can another signification is which to-be-said indeed
potest, vera tamen esse non potest: ut, si dicatur aliquid
can true yet to-be not can as if it-be-said something

sic esse factum ex nihilo, ut ex ipso nihilo, id est, ex
so to-be made from nothing that from very nothing that is from
eo quod penitus non est, factum sit: quasi ipsum nihil
that which utterly not is made it-be as-if very nothing
sit aliquid existens, ex quo possit aliquid fieri: quod
be something existing from which can something to-be-made which
quoniam semper falsum est; quoties esse ponitur, impossibilis
since always false it-is as-often-as to-be it-is-set-down impossible
inconvenientia consequitur. Tertia interpretatio, qua dicitur
unfittingness follows the-third interpretation by-which it-is-said
aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse
something to-be made from nothing is when we-understand to-be
quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid, unde sit factum. Per
indeed made but not to-be something whence it-be made by
similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus
a-like signification to-be-said it-seems when a-man saddened
sine causa, dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur
without cause is-said saddened about nothing according-to therefore
hunc sensum si intelligatur, quod supra conclusum est,
this sense if it-be-understood what above concluded has-been
quia præter summam essentiam cuncta, quæ sunt ab eadem,
that besides the-highest essence all-things which are by the-same
ex nihilo facta sunt, id est, non ex aliquo: sicut ipsa
from nothing made were that is not from something as the-very
conclusio præcedentia convenienter consequetur, ita ex eadem
conclusion the-preceding fittingly will-follow so from the-same
conclusione nihil inconveniens subsequetur; quamvis non
conclusion nothing unfitting will-follow-on although not
inconvenienter et sine omni repugnantia, ea quæ facta
unfittingly and without all conflict those-things which made
sunt a creatrice substantia dici possint esse ex nihilo
were by the-creating substance to-be-said can to-be from nothing

facta; eo modo quo dici solet dives factus ex
made in-that way in-which to-be-said it-is-wont rich made from
paupere, et recepisse quis sanitatem ex ægritudine: id
poor and to-have-recovered someone health from sickness that
est, qui prius pauper erat, nunc est dives, quod antea
is he-who before poor was now is rich which formerly
non erat; et qui prius habebat ægritudinem, nunc habet
not he-was and he-who before had sickness now has
sanitatem quam antea non habebat. Hoc igitur modo non
health which formerly not he-had in-this therefore way not
inconvenienter intelligi potest, si dicatur creatrix essentia
unfittingly to-be-understood it-can if it-be-said the-creating essence
universa fecisse de nihilo, sive quod universa per illam
all-things to-have-made from nothing or that all-things through it
facta sint de nihilo: id est, quæ prius nihil erant nunc
made be from nothing that is which-things before nothing were now
sunt aliquid. Hac ipsa quippe voce qua dicitur, quia illa
are something by-this very indeed word by-which it-is-said that it
fecit, sive, quia ista facta sunt; intelligitur quia cum illa
made or that these made were it-is-understood that when it
fecit, aliquid fecit; et cum ista facta sunt, non nisi aliquid
made something it-made and when these made were not except something
facta sunt. Sic enim aspicientes aliquem de valde humili
made they-were thus for beholding someone from very lowly
fortuna, multis opibus, honoribusve ab aliquo exaltatum,
fortune by-many riches or-honors by someone exalted
dicimus: Ecce ille fecit istum de nihilo, aut factus est ille
we-say behold he made this-man from nothing or made was he
ab isto de nihilo: id est, ipse qui prius quasi nihilum
by this-man from nothing that is he-himself who before as-if nothing
reputabatur, nunc illo faciente vere aliquid æstimatur.
was-reckoned now him making truly something is-reckoned

Quod ea quæ facta sunt ex nihilo, nonnihil erant antequam fierent, quantum ad rationem facientis

IX · MADE THINGS WERE NOT NOTHING IN THE MAKER'S REASON

Nothing can be made rationally unless a pattern of it precedes in the maker's reason. So before all things were made, what they would be, and how, was already in the reason of the highest nature. Made things were nothing before they were made, as they were not yet what they are, but they were not nothing in the reason of their maker.

Verum videor mihi videre quiddam quod non negligenter
but I-seem to-myself to-see something which not negligently
discernere cogit, secundum quid ea quæ facta sunt,
to-discern compels according-to what those-things which made were
antequam fierent, dici possint fuisse nihil. Nullo
before they-were-made to-be-said may to-have-been nothing in-no
namque pacto fieri potest aliquid rationabiliter ab aliquo,
for way to-be-made can something rationally by someone
nisi in facientis ratione præcedat aliquod rei faciendæ
unless in of-the-maker the-reason precede some of-the-thing to-be-made
quasi exemplum, sive (ut aptius dicitur) forma, vel similitudo,
as-it-were a-pattern or as more-aptly it-is-said form or likeness
aut regula. Patet itaque quoniam priusquam fierent universa,
or rule it-is-plain and-so since before were-made all-things
erat in ratione summæ naturæ, quid aut qualia aut
there-was in the-reason of-the-highest nature what or of-what-kind or
quomodo futura essent: quare cum ea quæ facta sunt,
how about-to-be they-were wherefore since those-things which made were
clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad
clear it-be nothing to-have-been before they-were-made as-much-as to
hoc, quia non erant quod nunc sunt, nec erat ex quo
this that not they-were what now they-are nor was-there from which

fierent; non tamen nihil erant, quantum ad rationem
they-might-be-made not yet nothing they-were as-much-as to the-reason
facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent.
of-the-maker through which and according-to which they-might-be-made

Quod illa ratio sit quædam rerum locutio, sicut faber dicit prius apud se quod facturus est

X · THAT REASON IS THE HIGHEST NATURE'S UTTERANCE

That form of things in the creator's reason is a kind of inner utterance, as a craftsman first says his work within himself. We speak of a thing with perceptible signs, with the same signs thought silently, or by beholding the thing itself in the mind. Words of the third kind are natural, the same among all nations, and most like their things. Such an utterance was with the highest substance before things were, that they might be made through it.

Illa autem forma rerum, quæ in ejus ratione res creandas
that moreover form of-things which in its reason the-things to-be-created
præcedebat, quid aliud est quam rerum quædam in ipsa
preceded what other is-it than of-things a-certain in the-very
ratione locutio; veluti cum faber facturus aliquod suæ
reason utterance as-it-were when a-craftsman about-to-make some of-his
artis opus, prius illud intra se dicit mentis conceptione?
art work first it within himself says by-the-mind's conception
Mentis autem sive rationalis locutionem hic intelligo, non
of-the-mind moreover or of-the-reason utterance here I-understand not
cum voces rerum singnificativæ cogitantur; sed cum res
when words of-things significative are-thought but when the-things
ipsæ, vel futuræ, vel jam existentes acie cogitationis
themselves either to-be or already existing by-the-edge of-thought
in mente conspiciuntur. Frequenti namque usu cognoscitur
in the-mind are-beheld by-frequent for use it-is-known

quia rem unam tripliciter loqui possumus. Aut enim res
that a-thing one in-three-ways to-speak we-can either for things
loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est, quæ sensibus corporeis
we-speak by-signs perceptible that is which by-the-senses bodily
sentiri possunt, sensibiliter utendo; aut eadem signa,
to-be-perceived can perceptibly using or the-same signs
quæ foris sensibilia sunt, intra nos insensibiliter cogitando;
which outside perceptible are within us imperceptibly thinking
aut nec sensibiliter, nec insensibiliter his signis utendo,
or neither perceptibly nor imperceptibly these signs using
sed res ipsas, vel corporum imaginatione, vel rationis
but the-things themselves either of-bodies by-the-imagination or of-reason
intellectu, pro rerum ipsarum diversitate, intus
by-the-understanding according-to of-the-things themselves the-diversity inwardly
in nostra mente dicendo. Aliter namque hominem dico,
in our mind saying otherwise for a-man I-say
cum eum hoc nomine, quod est, homo, significo; aliter
when him by-this name which is man I-signify otherwise
cum idem nomen tacens cogito; aliter cum eum ipsum
when the-same name silent I-think otherwise when him the-very
hominem mens, aut per corporis imaginem, aut per
man the-mind either through of-the-body the-image or through
rationem intuetur; per corporis quidem imaginem, ut cum
reason beholds through of-the-body indeed the-image as when
ejus sensibilem figuram imaginatur: per rationem vero, ut
his perceptible shape it-imagines through reason indeed as
cum universalem ejus essentiam, quæ est, animal rationale
when universal his essence which is animal rational
mortale, cogitat. Hæ vero tres loquendi varietates singulæ
mortal it-thinks these indeed three of-speaking varieties singly
verbis sui generis constant; sed illius, quam tertiam
of-words of-their-own kind consist but of-that which third

et ultimam posui, locutionis verba, cum de rebus non
and last I-have-set of-utterance the-words when about things not
ignoratis sunt, naturalia sunt, et apud omnes gentes sunt
unknown they-are natural are and among all nations are
eadem. Et quoniam omnia alia verba propter hæc sunt
the-same and since all other words on-account-of these were
inventa; ubi ista sunt, nullum aliud verbum est necessarium
found where these are no other word is necessary
ad rem cognoscendam; et ubi ista esse non possunt,
for a-thing to-be-known and where these to-be not can
nullum aliud est utile ad rem ostendendam. Possunt
no other is useful for a-thing to-be-shown they-can
etiam non absurde dici tanto veriora, quanto magis
even not absurdly to-be-said by-so-much truer by-how-much more
rebus, quarum sunt verba, similia sunt, et eas expressius
to-the-things of-which they-are words like they-are and them more-expressly
significant, exceptis namque rebus illis, quibus ipsis utimur
signify excepted for things those which themselves we-use
pro nominibus suis ad easdem significandas, ut sunt
for names their-own for the-same to-be-signified as are
quædam voces, velut A vocalis: exceptis, inquam, his,
certain sounds as-for-instance A the-vowel excepted I-say these
nullum aliud verbum sic videtur rei simile, cujus est
no other word so seems to-the-thing like of-which it-is
verbum, aut sic eam exprimit, quomodo illa similitudo quæ in
the-word or so it expresses as that likeness which in
acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur. Illud igitur
the-edge of-the-mind the-thing itself thinking is-expressed that therefore
jure dicendum est maxime proprium et principale rei
by-right to-be-called is most proper and principal of-the-thing
verbum. Quapropter si nulla de qualibet re locutio tantum
word wherefore if no about any thing utterance so-much

propinquat rei, quantum illa quæ hujusmodi verbis constat;
approaches the-thing as-much-as that which of-this-kind of-words consists
nec aliquid aliud tam simile rei vel futuræ, vel jam
nor something other so like to-the-thing either to-be or already
existenti in ratione alicujus potest esse: non immerito videri
existing in the-reason of-anyone can to-be not undeservedly to-seem
potest apud summam substantiam, talem rerum locutionem
it-can with the-highest substance such of-things utterance
et fuisse, antequam essent, ut per eam fierent;
both to-have-been before they-were that through it they-might-be-made
et esse, cum facta sunt, ut per eam sciantur.
and to-be when made they-were that through it they-may-be-known

Quod tamen multa sit in hac similitudine fabri dissimilitudo

XI · THE CRAFTSMAN UNLIKE THE CREATOR

The likeness has much unlikeness. The highest substance took nothing from elsewhere for its works, while a craftsman can conceive and make nothing that he has not learned from things already existing, and he needs matter. The creator's inner utterance was first and sole cause of its work; the craftsman's is neither first nor sole nor sufficient.

Sed quamvis summam substantiam constet prius in se
but although the-highest substance it-be-agreed first in itself
quasi dixisse cunctam creaturam, quam eam secundum
as-it-were to-have-said all creature than it according-to
eamdem, et per eamdem suam intimam locutionem
the-same and through the-same its-own inmost utterance
conderet; quemadmodum faber prius mente concipit,
it-founded just-as a-craftsman first in-mind conceives
quod postea secundum mentis conceptionem opere perficit.
what afterward according-to of-the-mind the-conception in-work he-completes

Multam tamen in hac similitudine intueor dissimilitudinem.
much yet in this likeness I-behold unlikeness
Illa namque nihil omnino aliunde assumpsit, unde
it for nothing at-all from-elsewhere took whence
vel eorum quæ factura erat, formam in se ipsa
either of-those-things which about-to-make it-was the-form in it itself
compingeret, vel ea ipsa, id quod sunt, perficeret;
it-might-put-together or them themselves that which they-are it-might-complete
faber vero penitus nec mente potest aliquid corporeum
the-craftsman indeed utterly not-even in-mind can something bodily
concipere imaginando, nisi id quod aut totum simul, aut per
to-conceive by-imagining except that which either whole at-once or by
partes, ex aliquibus rebus aliquo modo jam didicit; nec
parts from some things in-some way already he-has-learned nor
opus mente conceptum perficere, si desit aut materia, aut
a-work in-mind conceived to-complete if there-lack either matter or
aliquid, sine quo opus præcogitatum fieri non possit:
something without which the-work thought-beforehand to-be-made not can
quanquam enim homo tale aliquod animal possit cogitando
although for a-man such some animal can by-thinking
vel pingendo, quale nusquam sit, confingere; nequaquam
or by-painting as nowhere be to-feign by-no-means
tamen hoc facere valet, nisi componendo in eo partes, quas
yet this to-do is-he-able except by-composing in it parts which
ex rebus alias cognitis in memoriam attraxit. Quare in
from things otherwise known into memory he-has-drawn wherefore in
hoc differunt ab invicem illæ in creatrice substantia, et
this differ from one-another those in the-creating substance and
in fabro suorum operum faciendorum intimæ locutiones,
in the-craftsman of-their-own works to-be-made inmost utterances
quod illa nec assumpta, nec adjuta aliunde, sed prima,
that that neither taken nor helped from-elsewhere but first

et sola causa sufficere potuit suo artifici ad suum opus
and sole cause to-suffice could for-its-own craftsman for its-own work
perficiendum; ista vero nec prima, nec sola, nec sufficiens
to-be-completed this indeed neither first nor sole nor sufficient
est ad suum incipiendum. Quapropter ea quæ per
is for its-own to-be-begun wherefore those-things which through
illam creata sunt, omnia non sunt quod non sunt per
it created were all not are what not they-are through
illam. Quæ vero per istam fiunt, penitus non essent,
it the-things-which indeed through this are-made utterly not would-be
nisi essent aliquid quod non sunt per ipsam.
unless there-were something which not they-are through it

Quod hæc summæ essentiæ locutio sit summa essentia

XII · THE UTTERANCE IS THE HIGHEST ESSENCE

The highest substance made everything through itself and through its inmost utterance. So that utterance can be nothing other than the highest essence itself. Before treating it further, Anselm resolves to investigate some properties of the highest substance.

Sed cum pariter ratione docente sit certum quia quidquid
but since equally with-reason teaching it-be certain that whatever
summa substantia fecit, non fecit per aliud quam
the-highest substance made not it-made through another than
per semetipsam; et quidquid fecit, per suam intimam
through itself and whatever it-made through its-own inmost
locutionem fecit, sive singula singulis verbis, sive potius
utterance it-made whether single-things by-single words or rather
uno verbo simul omnia dicendo; quid magis necessarium
by-one word at-once all-things saying what more necessary

videri potest, quam hanc summæ essentiæ locutionem non
to-seem can than this of-the-highest essence utterance not
esse aliud quam summam essentiam? Non igitur negligenter
to-be other than the-highest essence not therefore negligently
prætereundam hujus locutionis considerationem puto: sed
to-be-passed-by of-this utterance the-consideration I-think but
priusquam de illa possit tractari, diligenter ejusdem summæ
before about it it-can to-be-treated diligently of-the-same highest
substantiæ proprietates aliquas studiose investigandas existimo.
substance properties some earnestly to-be-investigated I-reckon

Quod sicut omnia per summam essentiam facta sunt, ita vigeant per ipsam

XIII · ALL THINGS THRIVE THROUGH IT

Whatever is not the highest nature was made by it, and by the same reasoning all things that are made continue to be and thrive through it. As nothing was made except through its creating presence, nothing endures except through its preserving presence.

Constat ergo per summam naturam esse factum, quidquid
it-is-agreed therefore through the-highest nature to-be made whatever
non est idem illi. Dubium autem nonnisi irrationali menti
not is the-same as-it doubtful moreover only to-an-irrational mind
esse potest, quod cuncta, quæ facta sunt, eodem ipso sustinente
to-be can that all-things which made were the-same itself sustaining
vigent et perseverant esse quandiu sunt, quo faciente de
thrive and persevere to-be as-long-as they-are by-which making from
nihilo habent esse quod sunt. Simili namque per omnia ratione,
nothing they-have to-be what they-are by-a-like for in all-respects reason
qua collectum est omnia, quæ sunt, esse per unum
by-which gathered it-has-been all-things which are to-be through one

aliquid, unde ipsum solum est per seipsum, et alia per
something whence it alone is through itself and others through
aliud; simili, inquam, ratione potest probari quia quæcunque
another by-a-like I-say reason it-can to-be-proved that whatever-things
vigent per unum aliquid vigeant: unde illud solum viget per
thrive through one something thrive whence that alone thrives through
seipsum, et alia per aliud. Quod quoniam aliter esse non
itself and others through another which since otherwise to-be not
potest, nisi ut ea, quæ sunt facta, per aliud vigeant, et
can except that those-things which are made through another thrive and
id a quo facta sunt, vigeat per seipsum, necesse est ut sicut
that by which made they-were thrive through itself necessary it-is that as
nihil factum est nisi per creatricem præsentem essentiam,
nothing made has-been except through the-creating present essence
ita nihil vigeat, nisi per ejusdem servatricem præsentiam.
so nothing thrives except through of-the-same preserving presence

Quod illa sit in omnibus, et per omnia et omnia sint ex illa, et per illam, et in illa

XIV · IT IS IN ALL THINGS AND THROUGH ALL THINGS

Where the highest essence is not, nothing is. So it is everywhere, through all things, and in all things. Nothing created can pass beyond its immensity, and it would be absurd for it to be unable to exceed the whole of what it made; so it bears, surpasses, encloses, and penetrates all things. It is the one in whom, through whom, and from whom all things are.

Quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate sic est, consequitur
but if so it-is nay because from necessity so it-is it-follows
ut ubi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Ubique igitur est, et
that where it not is nothing be everywhere therefore it-is and

per omnia, et in omnibus. At quoniam absurdum est,
through all-things and in all-things but since absurd it-is
ut, scilicet, quemadmodum nullatenus aliquid creatum potest
that namely just-as in-no-way something created can
exire creantis et foventis immensitatem; sic creans et
to-go-out-of of-the-creating and cherishing the-immensity so the-creating and
fovens nequaquam valeat aliquo modo excedere factorum
cherishing by-no-means be-able in-some way to-exceed of-the-things-made
universitatem; liquet quoniam ipsa est quæ cuncta alia portat
the-universe it-is-clear that it is which all others bears
et superat, claudit et penetrat. Si igitur hæc illis, quæ
and surpasses encloses and penetrates if therefore these-things to-those which
superius sunt inventa, jungantur, eadem est quæ in omnibus
above were found be-joined the-same it-is which in all-things
est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua.
is and through all-things and from which and through which and in which

Quid possit aut non possit de illa dici substantialiter

XV · WHAT CAN BE SAID OF IT SUBSTANTIALLY

Relative terms such as "highest" or "greater" do not name its essence, since it would be no less good were there nothing to compare it with. Of everything else, either the thing is altogether better than not being it, as wise is better than not wise, or not being it is in some respect better, as not being gold is better for a man. The highest nature must be whatever is better than not being it: living, wise, powerful, true, just, blessed, and eternal.

Jam non immerito valde moveor quam studiose possum
now not undeservedly greatly I-am-moved as earnestly as-I-can
inquirere quid omnium, quæ de aliquo dici possunt,
to-inquire what of-all-things which about something to-be-said can

huic tam admirabili naturæ queat convenire substantialiter.
to-this so admirable nature can to-befit substantially
Quanquam enim mirer si possit in nominibus vel verbis, quæ
although for I-wonder if it-can in names or words which
aptamus rebus factis de nihilo, reperiri quod digne dicatur
we-fit to-things made from nothing to-be-found what worthily be-said
de creatrice universorum substantia; tentandum tamen est ad
about the-creating of-all-things substance to-be-attempted yet it-is to
quid hanc indagationem ratio perducet. Itaque de relativis
what this tracking reason will-lead and-so about relatives
quidem nulli dubium quia nullum eorum substantiale est
indeed to-none doubtful that none of-them substantial is
illi, de quo relative dicitur. Quare si quid de summa
to-that about which relatively it-is-said wherefore if anything about the-highest
natura dicitur relative, non est ejus significativum substantiæ.
nature is-said relatively not it-is its significative of-substance
Unde hoc ipsum quod summa omnium sive major omnibus
whence this very-thing that highest of-all or greater than-all-things
quæ ab illa facta sunt, vel aliud aliquid similiter relative
which by it made were or other something similarly relatively
dici potest, manifestum est quoniam non ejus naturalem
to-be-said can manifest it-is that not its natural
designat essentiam. Si enim nulla earum rerum unquam
it-designates essence if for none of-those things ever
esset, quarum relatione summa et major dicitur; ipsa nec
were of-which by-relation highest and greater is-called it-itself neither
summa, nec major intelligeretur: nec tamen idcirco minus
highest nor greater would-be-understood nor yet therefore less
bona esset, aut essentialis suæ magnitudinis in aliquo
good would-it-be or of-essential its magnitude in any-respect
detrimentum pateretur. Quod ex eo manifeste cognoscitur,
loss it-would-suffer which from that manifestly is-known

quoniam ipsa quidquid boni vel magni est, non est per
since it-itself whatever of-good or great it-is not it-is through
aliud quam per seipsam. Si igitur summa natura sic
another than through itself if therefore the-highest nature so
potest intelligi non summa, ut tamen nequaquam sit
can to-be-understood not highest that yet by-no-means it-be
major aut minor, quam cum intelligitur summa omnium:
greater or less than when it-is-understood highest of-all
manifestum est quoniam summum non simpliciter significat
manifest it-is that highest not simply signifies
illam essentiam, quæ omnino major et melior est, quam
that essence which altogether greater and better is than
quidquid non est quod ipsa est. Quod autem ratio docet de
whatever not is what it is what moreover reason teaches about
summo, non dissimiliter invenitur in similiter relativis. Illis
highest not dissimilarly is-found in similarly relatives those
itaque, quæ relative dicuntur, omissis, quia nullum eorum
and-so which relatively are-said omitted because none of-them
simpliciter demonstrat alicujus essentiam, ad alia discutienda
simply shows of-anything the-essence to others to-be-discussed
se convertat intentio. Et quidem si quis singula diligenter
itself let-turn the-attention and indeed if anyone singly diligently
intueatur, quidquid est præter relativa, aut tale est, ut
look-at whatever is besides relatives either such is that
ipsum omnino melius sit, quam non ipsum; aut tale, ut
it altogether better be than not it or such that
non ipsum in aliquo melius sit, quam ipsum. Ipsum autem
not it in some-respect better be than it it moreover
et non ipsum, non aliud hic intelligo, quam verum non
and not it not other here I-understand than true not
verum, corpus non corpus, et his similia. Melius quidem
true body not body and to-these like-things better indeed

est omnino aliquid quam non ipsum: ut, sapiens quam non
is altogether something than not it as wise than not
ipsum sapiens, id est, melius est sapiens quam non sapiens.
it wise that is better is wise than not wise
Quamvis enim justus non sapiens melior videatur, quam
although for a-just-man not wise better seem than
non justus sapiens, non tamen melius simpliciter est, non
a-not just wise-man not yet better simply is not
sapiens quam sapiens: omne enim non sapiens, simpliciter
wise than wise every for not wise simply
inquantum non sapiens, est minus quam sapiens; quia omne
in-so-far-as not wise it-is less than wise because every
non sapiens melius esset, si esset sapiens. Similiter omnino
not wise better would-be if it-were wise similarly altogether
melius est verum quam non ipsum, id est, quam non
better is true than not it that is than not
verum; et justum quam non justum; et vivit quam non
true and just than not just and it-lives than not
vivit. Melius autem est in aliquo non ipsum quam ipsum,
it-lives better moreover is in some-respect not it than it
ut non aurum quam aurum. Nam melius est homini esse
as not gold than gold for better is for-a-man to-be
non aurum quam aurum; quamvis forsitan melius esset
not gold than gold although perhaps better would-be
alicui aurum esse quam non aurum esse, ut plumbo.
for-something gold to-be than not gold to-be as for-lead
Cum enim utrumque, scilicet, homo et plumbum sit non
since for both namely man and lead be not
aurum, tanto melius aliquid est homo quam aurum,
gold by-so-much better something is man than gold
quanto inferioris naturæ esset, si esset aurum: et
by-how-much of-lower nature he-would-be if he-were gold and

plumbum tanto vilius est quanto pretiosius esset, si
lead by-so-much viler is by-how-much more-precious it-would-be if
aurum esset. Patet autem ex eo quod summa natura sic
gold it-were it-is-plain moreover from that that the-highest nature so
intelligi potest non summa, ut nec summum omnino
to-be-understood can not highest that neither highest altogether
melius sit quam non summum; nec non summum alicui
better be than not highest nor not highest for-something
melius quam summum: multa relativa esse, quæ nequaquam
better than highest many relatives to-be which by-no-means
hac contineantur divisione. Utrum autem aliqua contineantur,
in-this are-contained division whether moreover some are-contained
inquirere supersedeo, cum ad propositum sufficiat quod de
to-inquire I-forbear since for the-purpose it-suffices what about
illis notum est, nullum, scilicet, eorum simplicem summæ
them known is none namely of-them the-simple of-the-highest
naturæ substantiam designare. Cum igitur quidquid aliud est,
nature substance to-designate since therefore whatever other is
si singula dispiciantur, aut ipsum sit melius quam non ipsum,
if singly they-be-examined either it be better than not it
aut non ipsum in aliquo sit melius quam ipsum; sicut
or not it in some-respect be better than it as
nefas est putare quod substantia summæ naturæ sit aliquid,
wrong it-is to-think that the-substance of-the-highest nature be something
quo melius sit aliquo modo non ipsum; sic necesse est ut
than-which better be in-some way not it so necessary it-is that
sit quidquid omnino melius est quam non ipsum. Illa enim
it-be whatever altogether better is than not it it for
sola est, qua penitus nihil est melius; et quæ melior
alone is than-which utterly nothing is better and which better
est omnibus, quæ non sunt quod est ipsa. Non est igitur
is than-all-things which not are what it is not it-is therefore

corpus, vel aliquid eorum quæ corporei sensus discernunt.
body or something of-those-things which bodily senses discern
Quippe his omnibus melius est aliquid quod non est
indeed than-these all better is something which not is
quod ipsa sunt. Mens enim rationalis, quæ nullo corporeo
what they are the-mind for rational which by-no bodily
sensu quid, vel qualis, vel quanta sit percipitur; quanto
sense what or of-what-kind or how-great it-be is-perceived by-how-much
minor esset, si esset aliquid eorum quæ corporeis sensibus
less it-would-be if it-were something of-those which to-bodily senses
subjacent, tanto major est, quam quodlibet eorum. Penitus
lie-under by-so-much greater it-is than any-one of-them utterly
enim ipsa summa essentia tacenda est esse aliquid
for the-very highest essence to-be-left-unsaid is to-be something
eorum, quibus est aliquid, quod non est quod ipsa sunt,
of-those to-which is something which not is what they are
superius: et est omnino, sicut ratio docet, dicenda quodlibet
higher and it-is altogether as reason teaches to-be-called any-one
eorum, quibus est omne, quod non est quod ipsa sunt,
of-those to-which is every-thing which not is what they are
inferius. Quare necesse est eam esse viventem, sapientem,
lower wherefore necessary it-is it to-be living wise
potentem et omnipotentem, veram, justam, beatam, æternam,
powerful and omnipotent true just blessed eternal
et quidquid similiter absolute melius quam non ipsum. Quid
and whatever similarly absolutely better than not it what
ergo quæratur amplius quid summa illa sit natura, si
therefore should-be-sought further what highest that be nature if
manifestum est quid omnium sit, aut quid omnium non sit?
manifest it-is what of-all-things it-be or what of-all-things not it-be

Quod idem sit illi esse justam, quod est esse justitiam; et eodem modo de his quæ similiter de illa dici possunt; et quod nihil horum monstret qualis illa, vel quanta sit, sed quid sit

XVI · IT IS JUSTICE ITSELF

The highest nature is not just by sharing in a quality of justice, since it is good through itself and not through another. It does not have justice; it is justice, and so calling it just says what it is, not of what kind it is. So it is the highest essence, life, reason, justice, wisdom, truth, goodness, eternity, power, and unity.

Sed fortasse cum dicitur justa, vel magna, vel aliquid
but perhaps when it-is-called just or great or something
similium, non ostenditur quid sit, sed potius qualis, vel
of-like-things not it-is-shown what it-be but rather of-what-kind or
quanta sit. Per qualitatem quippe, vel quantitatem, quodlibet
how-great it-be through quality indeed or quantity any-one
horum dici videtur. Omne namque quod justum est, per
of-these to-be-said it-seems every for what just is through
justitiam justum est; et alia hujusmodi similiter. Quare ipsa
justice just is and others of-this-kind similarly wherefore the-very
summa natura non est justa, nisi per justitiam. Videtur
highest nature not is just except through justice it-seems
igitur participatione qualitatis, justitiæ scilicet, justa dici
therefore by-participation of-the-quality of-justice namely just to-be-called
summe bona substantia: quod si ita est, per aliud est
the-supremely good substance which if so it-is through another it-is
justa, non per se. At hoc contrarium est veritati perfectæ;
just not through itself but this contrary is to-truth perfect
quia bona, vel magna, vel subsistens, quod est omnino, per
because good or great or subsisting what it-is altogether through

se est, non per aliud. Si igitur non est justa, nisi per
itself it-is not through another if therefore not it-is just except through
justitiam, nec justa esse potest nisi per se: quid magis
justice nor just to-be can-it except through itself what more
conspicuum, quid magis necessarium, quam quod eadem natura,
conspicuous what more necessary than that the-same nature
est ipsa justitia: et cum dicitur esse justa per justitiam,
is the-very justice and when it-is-said to-be just through justice
idem est quod per se; et cum justa per se dicitur
the-same it-is as through itself and when just through itself it-is-said
esse, non aliud intelligitur quam per justitiam. Quapropter,
to-be not other is-understood than through justice wherefore
si quæratur quid sit ipsa summa natura de qua agitur;
if it-be-asked what be the-very highest nature about which it-is-treated
quid verius respondetur quam justitia? Videndum igitur
what more-truly is-answered than justice to-be-seen therefore
quomodo intelligendum sit quando illa natura, quæ est ipsa
how to-be-understood it-be when that nature which is the-very
justitia, dicitur justa. Quoniam enim homo non potest esse
justice is-called just since for a-man not can to-be
justitia, justitiam autem habere potest; non intelligitur justus
justice justice however to-have he-can not is-understood just
homo existens justitia, sed habens justitiam. Quoniam igitur
a-man existing justice but having justice since therefore
de summa natura non proprie dicitur quia habet justitiam,
about the-highest nature not properly it-is-said that it-has justice
sed existit justitia: cum dicitur justa, proprie intelligitur
but it-exists justice when it-is-called just properly is-understood
existens justitia, non autem habens justitiam. Quare si, cum
existing justice not however having justice wherefore if when
dicitur existens justitia, non dicitur qualis est sed quid
it-is-called existing justice not it-is-said of-what-kind it-is but what

est; consequitur ut, cum dicitur justa, non dicatur qualis
it-is it-follows that when it-is-called just not it-be-said of-what-kind
sit, sed quid sit. Deinde, quoniam de illa suprema essentia
it-be but what it-be then since about that supreme essence
idem est dicere quia est justa, et quia est existens justitia:
the-same it-is to-say that it-is just and that it-is existing justice
et cum dicitur, est existens justitia, non est aliud quam est
and when it-is-said it-is existing justice not it-is other than it-is
justitia: nihil differt in illa, sive dicatur, est justitia, sive
justice nothing it-differs in it whether it-be-said it-is justice or
est justa. Quapropter cum quæritur de illa quid est, non
it-is just wherefore when it-is-asked about it what it-is not
minus congrue respondetur justa, quam justitia: quod vero
less fittingly is-answered just than justice what indeed
in exemplo justitiæ ratum esse conspicitur, hoc de omnibus,
in the-example of-justice settled to-be is-seen this about all-things
quæ similiter de ipsa summa natura dicuntur, intellectus
which similarly about the-very highest nature are-said the-understanding
sentire per rationem constringitur. Quidquid igitur eorum
to-perceive through reason is-constrained whatever therefore of-them
de illa dicatur, non qualis, vel quanta; sed magis quid
about it be-said not of-what-kind or how-great but rather what
sit monstratur. Sed palam est quia quodlibet bonum summa
it-be is-shown but plain it-is that whatever good the-highest
natura sit, summe illud est. Illa igitur est summa essentia,
nature be supremely that it-is it therefore is highest essence
summa vita, summa ratio, summa salus, summa justitia,
highest life highest reason highest health highest justice
summa sapientia, summa veritas, summa bonitas, summa
highest wisdom highest truth highest goodness highest
magnitudo, summa pulchritudo, summa immortalitas, summa
greatness highest beauty highest immortality highest

incorruptibilitas, summa immutabilitas, summa beatitudo,
incorruptibility highest immutability highest blessedness
summa æternitas, summa potestas, summa unitas; quod non
highest eternity highest power highest unity which not
est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens: et alia similiter.
is other than supremely being supremely living and others similarly

Quod ita sit simplex, ut omnia, quæ de ejus essentia dici possunt, unum idemque sint in illa; et nihil de ea dici possit substantialiter, nisi in eo quod quid est

XVII · IT IS SO SIMPLE THAT ALL THESE ARE ONE

If the highest nature were made of so many goods, it would be composite, depending on its parts, which reason rejects. So all these goods are one, and each signifies what all signify. A man is body, rational, and man in different respects; the highest essence is whatever it is in one way, by one consideration. So whatever is said of its essence says what it is, never of what kind or how great.

Quid ergo, si illa summa natura tot bona est, eritne
what therefore if that highest nature so-many goods is will-it-be
composita tam pluribus bonis; an potius non sunt plura
composite of-so many goods or rather not are-they many
bona, sed unum bonum tam pluribus nominibus significatum?
goods but one good by-so many names signified
Omne enim compositum, ut subsistat, indiget his ex quibus
every for composite that it-may-subsist needs those from which
componitur; et illis debet quidem quod est, quia quidquid
it-is-composed and to-them it-owes indeed what it-is because whatever
est, per illa est; et illa quod sunt, per illud non sunt:
it-is through them it-is and they what they-are through it not are

et idcirco penitus summum non est. Si igitur natura illa
and therefore utterly highest not it-is if therefore nature that
composita est ex pluribus bonis, hæc omnia, quæ omni
composite is from many goods these all which in-every
composito insunt, in illam incidere necesse est: quod nefas
composite are-in into it to-fall necessary it-is which wrong
falsitatis aperta ratione destruit et obruit tota, quæ supra
of-falsehood by-open reason destroys and overwhelms the-whole which above
patuit, necessitas veritatis. Cum igitur illa natura nullo
became-plain necessity of-truth since therefore that nature in-no
modo composita sit et tamen omnimodo tot illa bona
way composite be and yet in-every-way so-many those goods
sit, necesse est ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint.
be necessary it-is that those all not many but one be
Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum, quod omnia, sive
the-same therefore is any one of-them as all whether
simul, sive singula; ut cum dicitur justitia, vel essentia,
at-once or singly as when is-said justice or essence
idem significat, quod alia, vel omnia simul, vel singula.
the-same it-signifies as the-others or all at-once or singly
Quemadmodum itaque unum est, quidquid essentialiter
just-as and-so one is whatever essentially
de summa substantia dicitur; ita ipsa uno modo una
about the-highest substance is-said so it-itself in-one way by-one
consideratione est, quidquid est essentialiter. Cum enim
consideration is whatever it-is essentially when for
aliquis homo dicitur et corpus, et rationalis, et homo;
some man is-called both body and rational and man
non uno modo vel consideratione hæc tria dicitur.
not in-one way or consideration these three-things he-is-called
Secundum aliud est enim corpus, et secundum aliud
according-to one-thing he-is for body and according-to another

rationalis, et singulum horum non est totum id quod est
rational and each of-these not is the-whole that which is
homo. Illa vero summa essentia nullo modo sic est aliquid,
man that indeed highest essence in-no way so is something
ut illud idem secundum alium modum, aut secundum
that that same according-to another way or according-to
aliam considerationem non sit; quia quidquid aliquo modo
another consideration not it-be because whatever in-some way
essentialiter est, hoc est totum quod ipsa est. Nihil igitur
essentially it-is this is the-whole which it is nothing therefore
quod de ejus essentia vere dicitur, in eo quod qualis,
which about its essence truly is-said in that which of-what-kind
vel quanta; sed in eo quod quid sit, accipitur. Quidquid
or how-great but in that which what it-be is-taken whatever
enim est, vel quale, vel quantum, est etiam aliud in
for is either of-what-kind or how-great is also something-else in
eo quod quid est, unde non simplex, sed compositum est.
that which what it-is whence not simple but composite it-is

Quod sit sine principio, et sine fine

XVIII · WITHOUT BEGINNING AND WITHOUT END

It cannot have begun through itself, through another, or through nothing, so it has no beginning. It cannot end, willing or unwilling, without being less than supremely good and powerful. And truth can neither begin nor end, for it would be true before truth began that there was no truth, and the highest nature is the highest truth.

Ex quo igitur hæc tam simplex natura creatrix et vigor
from when therefore this so simple nature creating and vigor
omnium fuit, vel usquequo futura est? An potius nec
of-all-things was or until-when about-to-be it-is or rather neither

ex quo, nec usquequo est; sed sine principio et sine
from when nor until-when it-is but without beginning and without
fine est? Si enim principium habet, aut ex se vel per
end it-is if for a-beginning it-has either from itself or through
se hoc habet; aut ex alio vel per aliud; aut ex nihilo
itself this it-has or from another or through another or from nothing
vel per nihil. Sed constat per veritatem jam perspectam
or through nothing but it-is-agreed through the-truth already perceived
quia nullo modo ex alio, vel ex nihilo, vel per aliud,
that in-no way from another or from nothing or through another
vel per nihil est. Nullo igitur modo per aliud, vel ex
or through nothing it-is in-no therefore way through another or from
alio, aut per nihil, vel ex nihilo initium sortita est.
another or through nothing or from nothing a-beginning obtained has-it
Ex seipsa vero, vel per se initium habere non potest,
from itself indeed or through itself a-beginning to-have not it-can
quanquam ex seipsa, et per seipsam sit. Sic enim est
although from itself and through itself it-be so for it-is
ex se et per se, ut nullo modo sit alia essentia,
from itself and through itself that in-no way be-there one essence
quæ est per se et ex se, et alia per quam et
which is through itself and from itself and another through which and
ex qua est. Quidquid autem ex aliquo vel per aliquid
from which it-is whatever moreover from something or through something
incipit esse, non est omnino idem illi ex quo, vel per
begins to-be not is altogether the-same as-that from which or through
quod incipit esse. Summa igitur natura non incœpit per
which it-begins to-be the-highest therefore nature not began through
se, vel ex se. Quoniam igitur nec per se, nec ex
itself or from itself since therefore neither through itself nor from
se, nec per aliud, nec ex alio, nec per nihil, nec ex
itself nor through another nor from another nor through nothing nor from

nihilo habet principium, nullo modo habet principium. Sed
nothing it-has a-beginning in-no way has-it a-beginning but
neque finem habebit. Si enim finem habitura est, non est
neither an-end will-it-have if for an-end about-to-have it-is not it-is
summe immortalis et summe incorruptibilis; sed constat
supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible but it-is-agreed
quia est summe immortalis et incorruptibilis: non habebit
that it-is supremely immortal and incorruptible not it-will-have
igitur finem. Amplius: Si finem habitura est, aut volens,
therefore an-end further if an-end about-to-have it-is either willing
aut nolens deficiet. Sed pro certo non est simplex bonum,
or unwilling it-will-fail but for certain not is simple good
cujus voluntate perit summum bonum: at ipsa est verum
whose by-will perishes the-highest good but it is true
et simplex bonum; quare sua sponte non deficiet ipsa,
and simple good wherefore of-its-own accord not will-fail it
quam certum est esse summum bonum. Si vero nolens
which certain it-is to-be the-highest good if indeed unwilling
peritura est, non est summe potens, nec omnipotens; sed
about-to-perish it-is not it-is supremely powerful nor omnipotent but
rationis necessitas asseruit eam summe potentem esse et
of-reason the-necessity has-asserted it supremely powerful to-be and
omnipotentem. Non ergo nolens deficiet. Quare si nec
omnipotent not therefore unwilling it-will-fail wherefore if neither
volens, neque nolens summa natura finem habebit, nullo
willing nor unwilling the-highest nature an-end will-have in-no
modo finem habebit. Amplius: Si illa summa natura finem
way an-end will-it-have further if that highest nature an-end
habet, vel principium, non est vera æternitas: quod esse supra
has or a-beginning not it-is true eternity which to-be above
inexpugnabiliter inventum est. Deinde cogitet, qui potest,
unassailably found has-been then let-him-think who can

quando incœpit, aut quando non fuit hoc verum; scilicet,
when it-began or when not was this true namely
quia futurum erat aliquid: aut quando desinet, et non erit
that about-to-be was something or when it-will-cease and not will-be
hoc verum; scilicet, quia præteritum erit aliquid. Quod si
this true namely that past will-be something but if
neutrum horum cogitari potest, et utrumque hoc verum
neither of-these to-be-thought can and both this true
sine veritate esse non potest; impossibile est vel cogitare
without truth to-be not can impossible it-is even to-think
quod veritas principium vel finem habeat. Denique si veritas
that truth a-beginning or an-end have finally if truth
habuit principium, vel habebit finem; antequam ipsa inciperet,
had a-beginning or will-have an-end before it-itself began
verum erat tunc quia non erat veritas; et postquam
true it-was then that not there-was truth and after
finita erit quia non erit. Atqui verum non potest
ended it-will-be that not there-will-be-(truth) but true not can
esse sine veritate: erat igitur veritas, antequam esset
to-be without truth there-was therefore truth before there-was
veritas; et erit veritas, postquam finita erit veritas;
truth and there-will-be truth after ended will-be truth
quod inconvenientissimum est. Sive igitur dicatur veritas
which most-unfitting is whether therefore it-be-said truth
habere, sive intelligatur non habere principium vel finem,
to-have or it-be-understood not to-have a-beginning or end
nullo claudi potest veritas principio vel fine: quare idem
by-no to-be-closed can truth beginning or end wherefore the-same
sequitur de summa natura, quia ipsa summa veritas est.
follows about the-highest nature because it-itself highest truth is

Quomodo nihil fuit ante, aut erit post illam

XIX · NOTHING WAS BEFORE IT OR WILL BE AFTER IT

"Nothing was before it" seems to set a time when there was nothing and it was not. The phrase has two senses: that there was a time when nothing existed, which is false, or that there was not anything before it, which is true, like "nothing taught me to fly." Rightly understood, nothing preceded the highest essence and nothing will follow it.

Sed ecce iterum insurgit nihil, et quæcunque hactenus ratio
but behold again rises-up nothing and whatever-things hitherto reason
veritate et necessitate concorditer attestantibus, disseruit,
with-truth and necessity concordantly bearing-witness has-discussed
asserit esse nihil. Si enim ea, quæ supra digesta sunt,
it-asserts to-be nothing if for those-things which above set-out were
necessariæ veritatis munimine firmata sunt, non fuit aliquid
of-necessary truth by-the-bulwark established were not was something
ante summam essentiam, nec erit aliquid post eam: quare
before the-highest essence nor will-be something after it wherefore
nihil fuit ante eam, et nihil erit post eam. Nam aut
nothing was before it and nothing will-be after it for either
aliquid, aut nihil necesse est præcessisse, vel subsecuturum
something or nothing necessary it-is to-have-preceded or about-to-follow
esse. Qui autem dicit quia nihil fuit ante ipsam, et nihil
to-be he-who moreover says that nothing was before it and nothing
erit post ipsam, id pronuntiare videtur. Quia fuit ante
will-be after it that to-pronounce he-seems that there-was before
ipsam, quando nihil erat; et erit post ipsam, quando
it when nothing was and there-will-be after it when
nihil erit. Quando ergo nihil erat, illa non erat; et quando
nothing will-be when therefore nothing was it not was and when
nihil erit, illa non erit. Quomodo ergo non incœpit
nothing will-be it not will-be how therefore not did-it-begin

ex nihilo, aut quomodo non deveniet ad nihilum: si illa
from nothing or how not will-it-come to nothing if it
nondum erat, cum jam erat nihil; et eadem jam non erit,
not-yet was when already was nothing and the-same already not will-be
cum adhuc erit nihil? Quid ergo molita est tanta moles
when still will-be nothing what therefore wrought has so-great a-mass
argumentorum, si tam facile demolitur nihilum molimina
of-arguments if so easily demolishes nothing the-structures
eorum? Si namque constituitur ut summum esse nihilo et
of-them if for it-is-established that highest to-be to-nothing both
præcedenti succedat, et subsequenti decedat, quidquid supra
preceding succeed and following depart whatever above
statuit verum, necesse destituitur per inane nihilum. An
it-established true necessarily is-forsaken through empty nothing or
potius repugnandum est nihilo, ne tot structuræ necessariæ
rather to-be-resisted is nothing lest so-many structures of-necessary
rationis a nihilo expugnentur; et summum bonum, quod
reason by nothing be-stormed and the-highest good which
lucerna veritatis quæsitum et inventum est, amittatur pro
by-the-lamp of-truth sought and found was be-lost for
nihilo. Potius igitur asseratur, si fieri potest, quia nihil
nothing rather therefore let-it-be-asserted if to-be-done it-can that nothing
non fuit ante summam essentiam, nec erit post illam;
not was before the-highest essence nor will-be after it
quam, cum locus datur ante vel post illam nihilo, per
than when place is-given before or after it to-nothing through
nihilum reducatur ad nihilum illud esse, quod per seipsum
nothing be-brought-back to nothing that to-be which through itself
conduxit id quod erat nihil, esse. Duplicem namque una
has-brought that which was nothing to-be a-double for one
pronuntiatio gerit sententiam, cum dicitur quia nihil fuit
pronouncement bears meaning when it-is-said that nothing was

ante summam essentiam, Unus enim est ejus sensus, quia,
before the-highest essence one for is its sense that
priusquam summa essentia esset, fuit, cum erat
before the-highest essence was there-was-a-time when there-was
nihil. Alter vero ejus est intellectus, quia ante summam
nothing the-other indeed its is understanding that before the-highest
essentiam non fuit aliquid, veluti si dicam, nihil docuit
essence not was something as if I-should-say nothing taught
me volare: aut hoc sic exponam, quia ipsum nihil, quod
me to-fly either this so I-should-expound that the-very nothing which
significat non aliquid, docuit me volare; et erit falsum:
signifies not something taught me to-fly and it-will-be false
aut quia non me docuit aliquid volare, quod est verum.
or that not me taught something to-fly which is true
Prior itaque sensus est, quem sequitur supra tractata
the-former and-so sense is which follows the-above treated
inconvenientia, et omnimoda ratione pro falso repellitur.
unfittingness and by-every-way reason as false is-repelled
Alter vero est, qui superioribus perfecta cohæret convenientia
the-other indeed is which with-the-above perfect coheres in-agreement
et tota illorum contexione verus esse compellitur. Quare
and by-the-whole their weaving true to-be is-compelled wherefore
cum dicitur quia nihil fuit ante illam, secundum posteriorem
when it-is-said that nothing was before it according-to the-latter
intellectum accipiendum est; nec sic est exponendum, ut
understanding to-be-taken it-is nor so is-it to-be-expounded that
intelligatur aliquando fuisse, quando illa non erat, et
it-be-understood once to-have-been when it not was and
nihil erat; sed ita ut intelligatur quia ante illam non fuit
nothing was but so that it-be-understood that before it not was
aliquid. Eadem ratio est duplicis intellectus si nihil dicatur
something the-same reason is of-the-double understanding if nothing be-said

post illam esse futurum. Si ergo hæc interpretatio, quæ
after it to-be about-to-be if therefore this interpretation which
facta est de nihilo, diligenter discernitur, verissime nec
made has-been about nothing diligently is-discerned most-truly neither
aliquid nec nihil summam essentiam aut præcessisse aut
something nor nothing the-highest essence either to-have-preceded or
subsecuturum esse, et nihil fuisse ante vel post illam esse
about-to-follow to-be and nothing to-have-been before or after it to-be
secuturum concluditur, et tamen nulla jam constitutorum
about-to-follow is-concluded and yet no now of-the-things-established
soliditas nihili inanitate concutitur.
solidity of-nothing by-the-emptiness is-shaken

Quod illa sit in omni loco et tempore

XX · IT IS IN EVERY PLACE AND TIME

It cannot be nowhere and never, for without it no good and nothing at all would be anywhere or ever. It cannot be somewhere and sometime only, for then elsewhere and at other times there would be nothing, though place and time are themselves something. Nor does it reach other places by its power alone, since its power is itself. So it is everywhere and always.

Quanquam autem supra conclusum sit, quia creatrix hæc
although moreover above concluded it-be that creating this
natura ubique, et in omnibus, et per omnia sit: et
nature everywhere and in all-things and through all-things be and
ex eo, quia nec incœpit, nec desinet esse consequatur
from that because neither it-began nor it-will-cease to-be it-follow
quia semper fuit, et est, et erit, sentio tamen quiddam
that always it-was and is and will-be I-perceive yet something
contradictionis submurmurare; quod me cogit diligentius, ubi
of-contradiction to-murmur which me compels more-diligently where

et quando illa sit, indagare. Itaque summa essentia, aut
and when it be to-search-out and-so the-highest essence either
ubique et semper est, aut tantum alicubi et aliquando,
everywhere and always is or only somewhere and sometime
aut nusquam et nunquam: quod dico, aut in omni loco et
or nowhere and never which I-say either in every place and
tempore; aut determinate in aliquo, vel in nullo. Sed quid
time or determinately in some or in none but what
videtur repugnantius, quam ut quod verissime et summe est,
seems more-conflicting than that what most-truly and supremely is
id nusquam et nunquam sit. Falsum est igitur nusquam vel
that nowhere and never be false it-is therefore nowhere or
nunquam illam esse. Deinde, quoniam nullum bonum, nec
never it to-be then since no good nor
penitus aliquid est sine ea: si ipsa nusquam vel nunquam
utterly something is without it if it nowhere or never
est, nusquam vel nunquam aliquod bonum est, et nusquam
is nowhere or never some good is and nowhere
vel nunquam omnino aliquid est. Quod quam falsum sit,
or never at-all something is which how false it-be
nec dicere opus est: falsum igitur est et illud, quod illa
not-even to-say need is false therefore is also that that it
nusquam aut nunquam sit. Aut est ergo determinate alicubi
nowhere or never be either it-is therefore determinately somewhere
et aliquando; aut ubique et semper. At si determinate est
and sometime or everywhere and always but if determinately it-is
in aliquo loco vel tempore; ibi et tunc tantum, ubi et
in some place or time there and then only where and
quando ipsa est, potest aliquid esse. Ubi vero et quando
when it is can something to-be where indeed and when
ipsa non est, ibi et tunc penitus nulla est essentia, quia
it not is there and then utterly none is essence because

sine ea nihil est: unde consequetur ut sit aliquis locus
without it nothing is whence it-will-follow that there-be some place
et aliquod tempus, ubi et quando omnino nihil est. Quod
and some time where and when at-all nothing is which
quoniam est falsum; ipse namque locus et tempus ipsum
since is false the-very for place and time itself
aliquid est; non potest esse summa natura alicubi, vel
something is not can to-be the-highest nature somewhere or
aliquando determinate. Quod si dicitur quod determinate ipsa
sometime determinately but if it-is-said that determinately it
per se alicubi et aliquando est; sed per potentiam suam
through itself somewhere and sometime is but through power its-own
est ubicunque, vel quandocunque aliquid est; non est verum:
it-is wherever or whenever something is not it-is true
quoniam enim potentiam ejus nihil aliud quam ipsam esse
since for power its nothing other than it to-be
manifestum est; nullo modo potentia ejus sine ipsa est. Cum
manifest it-is in-no way the-power its without it is since
ergo non sit alicubi vel aliquando determinate, necesse est
therefore not it-be somewhere or sometime determinately necessary it-is
ut sit ubique et semper, id est in omni loco et tempore.
that it-be everywhere and always that is in every place and time

Quod in nullo sit loco aut tempore

XXI · IT IS IN NO PLACE OR TIME

If it is everywhere, it is there either whole or in part, and it has no parts. Being whole at once in each place would make as many highest natures as places; being whole in each place at different times would leave the other places meanwhile without any being. Being whole in each time in turn would divide its eternity into past, present, and future, which its simplicity forbids. So it seems to be in no place or time, yet it must be everywhere and always.

Quod si ita est, aut tota est in omni loco vel tempore, aut
but if so it-is either whole it-is in every place or time or
tantum quælibet pars ejus, ut altera pars sit extra omnem
only any part of-it so-that the-other part be outside every
locum et tempus. Si vero partim est, et partim non in
place and time if indeed partly it-is and partly not in
omni loco vel tempore, partes habet: quod falsum est. Non
every place or time parts it-has which false is not
igitur partim est ubique et semper. Tota autem quomodo
therefore partly it-is everywhere and always whole moreover how
est ubique et semper? Aut enim sic est intelligendum,
is-it everywhere and always either for so it-is to-be-understood
ut tota simul sit in omnibus locis vel temporibus, et
that whole at-once it-be in all places or times and
per partes in singulis; aut sic; ut tota sit etiam in
through parts in single-ones or so that whole it-be also in
singulis. Verum si per partes est in singulis, non effugit
single-ones but if through parts it-is in single-ones not it-escapes
partium compositionem et divisionem: quod valde alienum
of-parts composition and division which very foreign
a summa natura inventum est. Quapropter non est ita
from the-highest nature found has-been wherefore not it-is so

tota in omnibus locis et temporibus, ut per partes sit
whole in all places and times that through parts it-be
in singulis. Restat altera pars discutienda, scilicet, qualiter
in single-ones there-remains the-other part to-be-discussed namely how
summa natura sit tota in omnibus, et singulis locis et
the-highest nature be whole in all and single places and
temporibus. Hoc nimirum esse non potest, nisi aut simul,
times this doubtless to-be not can unless either at-once
aut diversis temporibus. Sed quoniam ratio loci, aut
or at-diverse times but since the-account of-place or
ratio temporis, quas hactenus simul progressas eisdem
the-account of-time which hitherto at-once advanced by-the-same
vestigiis una potuit indagare prosecutio, hic ab invicem
footsteps one could to-track pursuit here from one-another
digredientes disputationem videntur diversis quasi fugere
departing the-disputation seem by-diverse as-it-were to-flee
anfractibus, singillatim suis investigentur discussionibus.
windings singly by-their-own let-them-be-investigated discussions
Primum ergo videatur si summa natura tota possit esse in
first therefore let-it-be-seen if the-highest nature whole can to-be in
singulis locis, aut simul aut per diversa tempora. Deinde
single places either at-once or through diverse times then
idipsum in temporibus inquiratur. Si igitur tota est simul
that-very-thing in times let-it-be-inquired if therefore whole it-is at-once
in singulis locis, per singula loca sunt singulæ totæ. Sicut
in single places through single places are single wholes as
enim locus a loco distinguitur ut singula loca sint,
for place from place is-distinguished so-that single places they-be
ita id quod totum est in uno loco, ab eo quod eodem
so that which whole is in one place from that which at-the-same
tempore totum est in alio loco distinguitur, ut singula
time whole is in another place is-distinguished so-that single

tota sint. Nam quod totum est in aliquo loco, nihil ejus
wholes they-be for what whole is in some place nothing of-it
est quod non sit in ipso loco. At de quo nihil est quod
is which not be in that place but of which nothing is which
non sit in aliquo loco, nihil est de eo quod sit eodem
not be in some place nothing is of it which be at-the-same
tempore extra eumdem locum. Quod igitur totum est in
time outside the-same place what therefore whole is in
aliquo loco, nihil est ejus quod eodem tempore sit extra
some place nothing is of-it which at-the-same time be outside
ipsum locum. Sed de quo nihil est extra quemlibet locum,
that place but of which nothing is outside any place
nihil ejus est eodem tempore in alio loco. Quare quod
nothing of-it is at-the-same time in another place wherefore what
totum est in quolibet loco, nihil ejus est simul in alio
whole is in any place nothing of-it is at-once in another
loco. Quod igitur totum est in aliquo loco, quomodo totum
place what therefore whole is in some place how whole
quoque simul est in alio loco, si nihil de eo potest esse
also at-once is-it in another place if nothing of it can to-be
in alio loco? Quoniam igitur unum totum non potest esse
in another place since therefore one whole not can to-be
simul in diversis locis totum, consequitur ut per singula
at-once in diverse places whole it-follows that through single
loca, singula sint tota, si in singulis locis simul aliquid est
places single be wholes if in single places at-once something is
totum. Quapropter si summa natura tota est uno tempore
whole wherefore if the-highest nature whole is at-one time
in singulis omnibus locis, quot singula loca esse possunt,
in single all places as-many-as single places to-be can
tot singulæ sunt naturæ summæ, quod irrationabile est
so-many single are natures highest which irrational it-is

opinari. Non est igitur tota uno tempore in singulis locis. At
to-suppose not it-is therefore whole at-one time in single places but
vero si diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis, quando
indeed if at-diverse times whole it-is in single places when
est in uno loco, nullum bonum et nulla essentia est interim
it-is in one place no good and no essence is meanwhile
in aliis locis, quia sine ea prorsus aliquid non existit. Quod
in other places because without it altogether something not exists which
absurdum esse vel ipsa loca probant, quæ nonnihil, sed
absurd to-be even the-very places prove which not-nothing but
aliquid sunt. Non est itaque summa natura tota in singulis
something are not it-is and-so the-highest nature whole in single
locis, diversis temporibus. Quod si nec eodem tempore,
places at-diverse times but if neither at-the-same time
nec diversis temporibus tota est in singulis locis, liquet quia
nor at-diverse times whole it-is in single places it-is-clear that
nullo modo est tota in singulis omnibus locis. Nunc igitur
in-no way is-it whole in single all places now therefore
est indagandum si eadem summa natura sit tota in singulis
it-is to-be-tracked if the-same highest nature be whole in single
temporibus, aut simul, aut distincte per singula tempora.
times either at-once or distinctly through single times
Sed quomodo est aliquid totum simul in singulis temporibus,
but how is something whole at-once in single times
si ipsa tempora simul non sunt? Si vero separatim et
if the-very times at-once not are if indeed separately and
distincte tota est in singulis temporibus, quemadmodum
distinctly whole it-is in single times just-as
aliquis homo totus est heri, et hodie, et cras; proprie
some man whole is yesterday and today and tomorrow properly
dicitur quia fuit, et est, et erit. Ergo ejus ætas, quæ nihil
it-is-said that it-was and is and will-be therefore its age which nothing

aliud est quam ejus æternitas, non est tota simul; sed est
other is than its eternity not is whole at-once but it-is
partibus extensa per temporum partes. At ejus æternitas
by-parts extended through of-times the-parts but its eternity
nihil aliud est, quam ipsa. Summa igitur essentia erit divisa
nothing other is than it the-highest therefore essence will-be divided
per partes, secundum temporum distinctiones. Si enim ejus
through parts according-to of-times the-distinctions if for its
ætas per temporum cursus producitur, habet cum ipsis
age through of-times the-course is-drawn-out it-has with the-very
temporibus præsens, præteritum et futurum. Quid autem
times present past and future what moreover
aliud est eius ætas, vel existendi diuturnitas, quam ejus
other is its age or of-existing the-duration than its
æternitas? Ergo cum ejus æternitas nihil aliud sit quam
eternity therefore since its eternity nothing other be than
ejus essentia, sicut supra digesta ratio indubitabiliter probat:
its essence as above set-out reason indubitably proves
si ejus æternitas habet præteritum, præsens et futurum,
if its eternity has past present and future
consequenter quoque ejus essentia habet præteritum, præsens,
consequently also its essence has past present
et futurum. At quod præteritum est, non est præsens vel
and future but what past is not is present or
futurum; et quod præsens est, non est præteritum, nec
future and what present is not is past nor
futurum; et quod futurum est, non est præteritum, vel
future and what future is not is past or
præsens. Quomodo ergo stabit quod supra rationabili et
present how therefore will-stand what above by-rational and
perspicua necessitate claruit, scilicet, quia illa summa natura
clear necessity became-clear namely that that highest nature

nullo modo composita, sed summe simplex et summe
in-no way composite but supremely simple and supremely
incommutabilis, si aliud et aliud est in diversis temporibus,
unchangeable if one and another it-is in diverse times
et per tempora distributas habet partes; aut potius, si
and through times distributed it-has parts or rather if
illa vera sunt; imo quia liquido vera sunt, quomodo hæc
those true are nay because clearly true they-are how these
possibilia sunt? Nullo igitur modo creatrix essentia, aut ætas,
possible are in-no therefore way the-creating essence or the-age
aut æternitas ejus recipit præteritum vel futurum. Præsens
or the-eternity of-it receives past or future the-present
enim quomodo non habet, si vere est? sed fuit, significat
for how not has-it if truly it-is but it-was signifies
præteritum; et erit, futurum. Nunquam igitur illa fuit, vel
past and it-will-be future never therefore it was or
erit; quare non est distincte, sicut nec simul tota in diversis
will-be wherefore not it-is distinctly as nor at-once whole in diverse
singulis temporibus. Si igitur, sicut discussum est, nec
single times if therefore as discussed it-has-been neither
sic est tota in omnibus locis vel temporibus, ut semel sit
so is-it whole in all places or times that once it-be
tota in omnibus, et per partes in singulis; nec sic, ut tota
whole in all and through parts in single-ones nor so that whole
sit in singulis, manifestum est quia non est ullo modo in
it-be in single-ones manifest it-is that not it-is in-any way in
omni loco vel tempore tota. Et quoniam similiter pervisum
every place or time whole and since similarly seen-through
est quia nec sic est in omni loco vel tempore, ut pars
it-has-been that neither so is-it in every place or time that a-part
sit in omni, et pars sit extra omnem locum vel tempus,
be in every and a-part be outside every place or time

impossibile est ut sit ubique et semper. Nullatenus enim
impossible it-is that it-be everywhere and always in-no-way for
potest intelligi esse ubique et semper, nisi aut tota,
can to-be-understood to-be everywhere and always unless either whole
aut pars. Quod si nequaquam est ubique et semper, aut
or part but if by-no-means it-is everywhere and always either
erit determinate in aliquo loco vel tempore, aut in nullo;
it-will-be determinately in some place or time or in none
determinate autem eam in aliquo non posse esse, jam
determinately however it in some not to-be-able to-be already
discussum est. In nullo igitur vel tempore, id est, nusquam
discussed has-been in none therefore or time that is nowhere
et nunquam est. Non enim potest esse, nisi aut in omni,
and never it-is not for it-can to-be unless either in every
aut in aliquo. Sed rursus cum constet inexpugnabiliter non
or in some but again since it-be-agreed unassailably not
solum quia est per se, et sine principio, et sine fine;
only that it-is through itself and without beginning and without end
sed quia aliquid sine ea nec usquam nec nunquam est,
but that something without it neither anywhere nor ever is
necesse illam esse ubique et semper.
necessary it to-be everywhere and always

Quomodo sit in omni, et in nullo loco et tempore

XXII · IN EVERY PLACE AND TIME, AND IN NONE

Only what place and time contain, bounding its size or measuring its duration, is bound by their law. The highest substance, which no place or time contains, is bound by none and is present whole at once to every place and time. It would better be said to be with them than in them: in all because it sustains all and is absent from none, and in none because none contains it.

Quomodo ergo convenient hæc tam necessaria secundum
how therefore will-agree these so necessary according-to
prolationem, et tam necessaria secundum probationem?
the-statement and so necessary according-to the-proof
Fortasse quodam modo est summa natura in loco vel
perhaps in-a-certain way is the-highest nature in place or
tempore, quo non prohibetur sic esse simul tota in singulis
time by-which not it-is-prevented so to-be at-once whole in single
locis vel temporibus, ut tamen non sint plures totæ, sed
places or times that yet not there-be many wholes but
una sola tota; nec ejus ætas, quæ non est nisi vera æternitas,
one sole whole nor its age which not is except true eternity
non sit distributa in præteritum, præsens et futurum. Non
not be distributed into past present and future not
enim videntur hac lege loci ac temporis cogi, nisi
for they-seem by-this law of-place and of-time to-be-compelled except
ea quæ sic sunt in loco vel tempore, ut loci spatium
those-things which so are in place or time that of-place the-space
vel temporis diuturnitatem non excedant. Quare, sicut de
or of-time the-duration not they-exceed wherefore as about
his quæ hujusmodi sunt, unum idemque totum simul
those-things which of-this-kind are one and-the-same whole at-once

non posse esse totum in diversis locis vel temporibus
not to-be-able to-be whole in diverse places or times
omni veritate asseritur; ita in his quæ hujusmodi non
with-all truth it-is-asserted so in those-things which of-this-kind not
sunt, idipsum nulla necessitate concluditur. Jure namque
are that-very-thing by-no necessity is-concluded by-right for
dici videtur, quod tantum ejus rei sit aliquis locus, cujus
to-be-said it-seems that only of-that thing be some place whose
quantitatem locus circumscribendo continet, et continendo
quantity place by-circumscribing contains and by-containing
circumscribit, et quod ejus rei solum sit aliquod tempus,
circumscribes and that of-that thing alone be some time
cujus diuturnitatem tempus metiendo aliquo modo terminat,
whose duration time by-measuring in-some way bounds
et terminando metitur. Quapropter cujus amplitudini, aut
and by-bounding measures wherefore whose to-amplitude or
diuturnitati, nulla meta vel a loco vel a tempore opponitur;
duration no limit either by place or by time is-opposed
ulli nullum esse locum vel tempus vere proponitur. Quoniam
to-any no to-be place or time truly it-is-proposed since
namque nec locus illi facit, quod locus; nec tempus, quod
for neither place to-it does what place nor time what
tempus: non irrationabiliter dicitur quia nullus locus est ejus
time not irrationally it-is-said that no place is its
locus, et nullum tempus est ejus tempus. Quod vero nullum
place and no time is its time what indeed no
locum aut tempus habere conspicitur, id profecto nullatenus
place or time to-have is-seen that surely in-no-way
loci aut temporis legem subire convincitur. Nulla igitur
of-place or of-time the-law to-undergo is-proved no therefore
lex loci aut temporis naturam ullam aliquo modo cogit,
law of-place or of-time nature any in-some way compels

quam nullus locus aut tempus aliqua continentia claudit.
which no place or time by-some containing encloses
Quænam autem rationalis consideratio omnimoda ratione non
what moreover rational consideration by-every-way reason not
concludat, ut creatricem summamque omnium substantiam,
would-conclude that the-creating and-highest of-all substance
quam necesse est alienam esse et liberam a natura et
which necessary it-is foreign to-be and free from the-nature and
jure omnium, quæ ipsa fecit de nihilo, nulla loci cohibitio
law of-all-things which it made from nothing no of-place restraint
vel temporis includat, cum potius ejus potentia, quæ non
or of-time enclose since rather its power which not
est aliud quam ejus essentia, cuncta a se facta sub se
is other than its essence all-things by itself made under itself
continendo concludat. Quomodo quoque non est impudentis
by-containing encloses how also not is-it of-shameless
imprudentiæ dicere quod summæ veritatis aut locus
imprudence to-say that of-the-highest truth either place
circumscribat quantitatem, aut tempus metiatur diuturnitatem:
circumscribes the-quantity or time measures the-duration
quæ nullam penitus localis vel temporalis distensionis
which no utterly local or temporal of-extension
magnitudinem suscipit vel parvitatem? Quoniam itaque loci
greatness admits or smallness since and-so of-place
hæc est vel temporis conditio, ut tantummodo quidquid
this is or of-time the-condition that only whatever
eorum metis clauditur, nec partium fugiat rationem, vel
by-their limits is-enclosed neither of-parts escape the-account either
qualem suscipit locus ejus secundum quantitatem, vel qualem
such-as takes-up place its according-to quantity or such-as
patitur tempus ejus secundum diuturnitatem; nec ullo modo
suffers time its according-to duration nor in-any way

possit totum a diversis locis vel temporibus simul contineri:
can whole by diverse places or times at-once to-be-contained
quidquid vero loci vel temporis continentia nequaquam
whatever indeed of-place or of-time by-the-containing by-no-means
coercetur, nulla locorum vel temporum lege ad partium
is-restrained by-no of-places or of-times law to of-parts
multiplicitatem cogatur; aut præsens esse totum simul
multiplicity be-compelled or present to-be whole at-once
pluribus locis aut temporibus prohibeatur; quoniam, inquam,
in-many places or times be-prevented since I-say
hæc est conditio loci aut temporis, procul dubio summa
this is the-condition of-place or of-time without doubt the-highest
substantia, quæ nulla loci vel temporis continentia cingitur,
substance which by-no of-place or of-time containing is-girded
nulla eorum lege constringitur. Quare quoniam summam
by-no their law is-constrained wherefore since the-highest
essentiam totam et inevitabilis necessitas exigit nulli loco vel
essence whole both unavoidable necessity demands to-no place or
tempori deesse, et nulla ratio loci aut temporis prohibet
time to-be-lacking and no account of-place or of-time prevents
omni loco vel tempori simul totam adesse, necesse est
to-every place or time at-once whole to-be-present necessary it-is
eam simul totam omnibus et singulis locis et temporibus
it at-once whole to-all and single places and times
præsentem esse. Non enim, quia huic loco vel tempori
present to-be not for because to-this place or time
præsens est, idcirco prohibetur illi vel illi loco, aut tempori
present it-is therefore it-is-prevented to-that or that place or time
simul et similiter præsens esse; nec quoniam fuit, aut est,
at-once and similarly present to-be nor since it-was or is
aut erit, ideo æternitatis ejus aliquid evanuit a præsenti
or will-be therefore of-eternity its something has-vanished from the-present

tempore cum præterito, quod jam non est; aut transit cum
time with the-past which already not is or passes with
præsenti, quod vix est; aut venturum est cum futuro, quod
the-present which scarcely is or to-come is with the-future which
nondum est. Nullatenus namque cogitur vel prohibetur
not-yet is in-no-way for is-it-compelled or prevented
lege locorum vel temporum, alicubi aut aliquando esse
by-the-law of-places or of-times somewhere or sometime to-be
vel non esse, quod nullo modo intra locum vel tempus
or not to-be what in-no way within place or time
claudit suum esse. Nam, si ipsa summa essentia dicitur
encloses its-own to-be for if the-very highest essence is-said
esse in loco aut tempore, quamvis de illa et de localibus
to-be in place or time although about it and about local
sive temporalibus naturis una sit prolatio, propter loquendi
or temporal natures one be the-statement on-account-of of-speaking
consuetudinem, diversus tamen est intellectus, propter
the-custom diverse yet is the-understanding on-account-of
rerum dissimilitudinem. In illis namque duo quædam eadem
of-things the-unlikeness in those for two certain-things the-same
prolatio significat, id est, quia præsentia sunt locis et
statement signifies that is that present they-are to-places and
temporibus, in quibus esse dicuntur; et quia continentur
times in which to-be they-are-said and that they-are-contained
ab ipsis. In summa vero essentia unum tantum præcipitur,
by them in the-highest indeed essence one-thing only is-taken
id est, quia præsens est; non etiam quia continentur. Unde,
that is that present it-is not also that they-are-contained whence
si usus loquendi admitteret, convenientius dici videretur
if the-use of-speaking allowed more-fittingly to-be-said it-would-seem
esse cum loco vel tempore, quam in loco vel tempore.
to-be with place or time than in place or time

Verius enim significatur contineri aliquid, cum dicitur esse
more-truly for is-signified to-be-contained something when it-is-said to-be
in alio, quam cum dicitur esse cum alio. In nullo itaque
in another than when it-is-said to-be with another in no and-so
loco vel tempore proprie dicitur esse, quia omnino a nullo
place or time properly is-it-said to-be because altogether by no
alio continetur: et tamen in omni loco vel tempore suo
other it-is-contained and yet in every place or time in-its-own
quodam modo dici potest esse; quoniam quidquid aliud
certain way to-be-said it-can to-be since whatever other
est, ne in nihilum cadat, ab ea præsente sustinetur:
is that-not into nothing it-fall by it present is-sustained
in omni loco et tempore est, quia nulli abest; et
in every place and time it-is because from-none it-is-absent and
in nullo est, quia nullum locum aut tempus habet, nec
in none it-is because no place or time it-has nor
in se recepit distinctiones locorum aut temporum; nec
into itself has-it-received the-distinctions of-places or of-times neither
hic vel illic, vel alicubi, vel tunc, vel nunc, vel aliquando;
here or there or somewhere or then or now or sometime
nec secundum labile præsens tempus quo utimur, est aut
nor according-to the-slippery present time which we-use it-is or
secundum præteritum, vel futurum, fuit, vel erit, quoniam
according-to the-past or future it-was or will-be since
hæc circumscriptorum et mutabilium propria sunt; quod illa
these of-circumscribed and mutable-things proper are which it
non est. Et tamen hæc de ea quodammodo dici
not is and yet these-things about it in-a-way to-be-said
possunt; quoniam sic est præsens omnibus circumscriptis
can since so it-is present to-all circumscribed
et mutabilibus, ac si illa circumscribatur eisdem locis,
and mutable-things as if it were-circumscribed by-the-same places

et mutetur temporibus. Patet itaque, quantum satis est
and were-changed by-times it-is-plain and-so as-much-as enough is
ad dissolvendam, quæ insonabat, contrarietatem; qualiter
for dissolving which sounded-against the-contrariety how
summa omnium essentia ubique et semper, et nusquam et
the-highest of-all essence everywhere and always and nowhere and
nunquam, id est, in omni et in nullo loco, aut tempore
never that is in every and in no place or time
sit, juxta diversorum intellectuum concordem veritatem.
it-be according-to of-diverse understandings the-concordant truth

Quomodo melius intelligi possit esse ubique, quam in omni loco

XXIII · BETTER SAID TO BE EVERYWHERE THAN IN EVERY PLACE

Local words are often used of things no place contains, as when the understanding is said to be in the soul where rationality is. So the highest nature is better said to be everywhere, meaning in all things that exist, than in every place, since it is not contained by them but contains all things by penetrating them, and it is one and the same, perfectly whole at once, in each.

Verum cum constet eamdem summam naturam non magis
but since it-is-agreed the-same highest nature not more
esse in omnibus locis, quam in omnibus quæ sunt, non velut
to-be in all places than in all-things which are not as-if
quæ contineatur, quæ penetrando cuncta contineat: cur
which be-contained (but)-which by-penetrating all-things contains why
non dicatur esse ubique, hoc sensu, ut potius intelligatur
not should-it-be-said to-be everywhere in-this sense that rather it-be-understood
esse in omnibus quæ sunt, quam tantum in omnibus
to-be in all-things which are than only in all

locis, cum hunc intellectum et rei veritas exhibeat, et
places since this understanding both of-the-thing the-truth shows and
ipsa localis verbi proprietas nequaquam prohibeat. Solemus
the-very of-the-local word property by-no-means prohibits we-are-wont
namque localia verba sæpe irreprehensibiliter attribuere rebus,
for local words often irreprehensibly to-attribute to-things
quæ nec loca sunt, nec circumscriptione locali continentur,
which neither places are nor by-circumscription local are-contained
velut si dicam ibi esse intellectum in anima, ubi est
as if I-should-say there to-be the-understanding in the-soul where is
rationalitas. Nam cum ibi, et ubi, adverbia localia sint; non
rationality for although there and where adverbs local be not
tamen locali circumscriptione aut anima continet aliquid,
yet by-local circumscription either the-soul contains something
aut intellectus aut rationalitas continetur. Quare summa
or the-understanding or rationality is-contained wherefore the-highest
natura secundum rei veritatem, aptius dicitur ubique
nature according-to of-the-thing the-truth more-aptly is-said everywhere
esse secundum hanc significationem, ut intelligatur esse in
to-be according-to this signification that it-be-understood to-be in
omnibus quæ sunt, quam si intelligatur tantum in omnibus
all-things which are than if it-be-understood only in all
locis. Et quoniam, sicut supra expositæ rationes docent, aliter
places and since as above set-out reasons teach otherwise
esse non potest; necesse est eam sic esse in omnibus quæ
to-be not it-can necessary it-is it so to-be in all-things which
sunt, ut una eademque perfecte tota simul sit in singulis.
are that one and-the-same perfectly whole at-once it-be in single-ones

Quomodo melius intelligi possit, «esse semper,» quam, «in omni tempore.»

XXIV · BETTER SAID TO BE ALWAYS THAN IN EVERY TIME

Its age, or eternity, is nothing other than itself, unchangeable and without parts. So "always," said of it, signifies eternity, which is never unlike itself, rather than the variety of times. To say that it always is means that it is or lives eternally, possessing interminable life at once and perfectly whole. Such eternity belongs to it alone, the one substance not made, since whatever was made from nothing has a beginning.

Eamdem quoque summam substantiam constat sine principio
the-same also highest substance it-is-agreed without beginning
et sine fine esse; nec habere præteritum, aut futurum,
and without end to-be nor to-have past or future
nec temporale, hoc est, labile præsens, quo nos utimur,
nor temporal that is slippery present which we use
quoniam ætas sive æternitas ejus quæ nihil aliud est quam
since the-age or eternity its which nothing other is than
ipsa, immutabilis et sine partibus est. Nonne ergo semper
itself unchangeable and without parts is surely-not therefore always
quod videtur designare totum tempus, multo verius (si
which seems to-designate whole time much more-truly if
de illa dicitur) intelligitur significare æternitatem, quæ sibi
about it it-is-said is-understood to-signify eternity which to-itself
ipsi nunquam est dissimilis, quam temporum varietatem,
itself never is unlike than of-times the-variety
quæ sibi ipsi semper est in aliquo non similis. Quare si
which to-itself itself always is in some-respect not like wherefore if
dicitur semper esse, quoniam idem est illi esse et vivere;
it-is-said always to-be since the-same is for-it to-be and to-live
nihil melius intelligitur, quam æterne esse vel vivere, id est,
nothing better is-understood than eternally to-be or to-live that is

interminabilem vitam simul perfecte totam obtinere. Videtur
interminable life at-once perfectly whole to-possess it-seems
enim ejus æternitas esse interminabilis vita simul perfecte tota
for its eternity to-be interminable life at-once perfectly whole
existens. Cum enim supra jam satis liqueat quod eadem
existing since for above already enough it-be-clear that the-same
substantia non sit aliud quam vita sua, et æternitas sua; nec
substance not be other than life its and eternity its nor
sit aliquo modo terminabilis, nec nisi simul et perfecte tota,
be in-any way terminable nor except at-once and perfectly whole
quid aliud est vera æternitas, quæ soli illi convenit, quam
what other is true eternity which alone to-it befits than
interminabilis vita simul et perfecte tota existens? Nam vel
interminable life at-once and perfectly whole existing for even
hoc solo, veram æternitatem soli inesse illi substantiæ,
by-this alone true eternity to-it-alone to-be-in that substance
quæ sola non facta, sed factrix esse inventa est, aperte
which alone not made but maker to-be found has-been openly
percipitur; quoniam vera æternitas principii finisque meta
is-perceived since true eternity of-beginning and-of-end the-limit
carere intelligitur: quod nulli rerum creatarum convenire,
to-lack is-understood which to-none of-things created to-befit
eo ipso quod de nihilo factæ sunt, convincitur.
by-that very-fact that from nothing made they-were is-proved

Quod nullis mutabilis sit accidentibus

XXV · IT CANNOT BE CHANGED BY ACCIDENTS

Some accidents, such as colors, cannot come or go without changing their subject; others, such as certain relations, change it not at all: Anselm can gain and lose being greater, less, equal, or like a man not yet born, as that man grows, without change in himself. The highest nature admits no changing accident, though it may be spoken of by the others, which are improperly called accidents. Nothing can be said of it by which it could be thought mutable.

Sed hæc essentia, quam patuit omnimode sibi esse
but this essence which has-become-plain in-every-way to-itself to-be
eamdem substantialiter, nonne est aliquando a se diversa
the-same substantially surely-not is-it sometimes from itself diverse
vel accidentaliter. Verum quomodo est summe incommutabilis,
even accidentally but how is-it supremely unchangeable
si per accidentia potest, non dicam esse, sed vel intelligi
if through accidents it-can not I-shall-say to-be but even to-be-understood
variabilis? Et econtra quomodo non est particeps accidentis; cum
variable and conversely how not is-it a-partaker of-accident since
et hoc ipsum, quod major est omnibus aliis naturis, et quod
both this very-thing that greater it-is than-all other natures and that
illis dissimilis est, illi videatur accidere? Sed quid repugnant
to-them unlike it-is to-it seems to-befall but why conflict
quorumdam, quæ accidentia dicuntur, susceptibilitas, et naturalis
of-certain-things which accidents are-called the-receptibility and natural
incommutabilitas; si ex eorum assumptione nulla substantiam
unchangeableness if from their assumption no the-substance
consequatur variabilitas? Omnium quippe quæ accedentia
follow variability of-all indeed things-which accidents
dicuntur, alia non nisi cum aliqua participantis variatione
are-called some not except with some of-the-partaker variation

adesse et abesse posse intelliguntur, ut omnes colores,
to-be-present and to-be-absent to-be-able are-understood as all colors
alia omnino nullam vel accidendo vel recedendo mutationem
others altogether no either by-befalling or by-receding change
circa id de quo dicuntur, efficere noscuntur, ut quædam
about that of which they-are-said to-effect are-known as certain
relationes. Constat namque quia homini post annum præsentem
relations it-is-agreed for that to-a-man after year the-present
nascituro, nec major, nec minor, nec æqualis sim, nec similis.
about-to-be-born neither greater nor less nor equal am-I nor like
Omnes autem relationes has, utique cum natus fuerit,
all moreover relations these surely when born he-will-have-been
sine omni mei mutatione, ad illum habere potero et
without all my change toward him to-have I-shall-be-able and
amittere, secundum quod crescet, vel per qualitates diversas
to-lose according-to as he-will-grow or through qualities diverse
mutabitur. Palam itaque fit quia eorum quæ accidentia
will-be-changed plain and-so it-becomes that of-those-things which accidents
dicuntur, quædam aliquatenus attrahant commutabilitatem,
are-called some in-some-way draw changeableness
quædam vero nullatenus subtrahant incommutabilitatem. Sicut
some indeed in-no-way take-away unchangeableness as
igitur summa natura accidentibus mutationem efficientibus
therefore the-highest nature to-accidents change effecting
nunquam in sua simplicitate locum tribuit; sic secundum
never in its-own simplicity place gives so according-to
ea, quæ nullatenus summæ incommutabilitati repugnant,
those-things which in-no-way to-the-highest unchangeableness are-opposed
aliquando dici aliquod non respuit, et tamen aliquid ejus
sometimes to-be-said something not it-rejects and yet something of-its
essentiæ, unde ipsa variabilis intelligi possit, non accidit.
essence whence it-itself variable to-be-understood can not befalls

Unde hoc quoque concludi potest, quia nullius accidentis
whence this also to-be-concluded can that of-no accident
susceptibilis est: quippe quemadmodum illa accidentia, quæ
receptive it-is indeed just-as those accidents which
mutationem aliquam accedendo vel recedendo faciunt, ipso
change some by-befalling or by-receding make by-their-very
suo effectu vere accidere rei, quam mutant, perpenduntur;
own effect truly to-befall the-thing which they-change are-weighed
sic illa, quæ a simili effectu deficiunt, improprie dici
so those which from a-like effect fall-short improperly to-be-called
accidentia deprehenduntur. Sicut igitur semper sibi est
accidents are-detected as therefore always to-itself it-is
omnimodo eadem substantialiter, ita nunquam est a se
in-every-way the-same substantially so never is-it from itself
diversa ullo modo, vel accidentaliter. Sed quoquo modo sese
diverse in-any way even accidentally but in-whatever way itself
habeat ratio de proprietate nominis accidentium, illud
may-have the-reason about the-property of-the-name of-accidents that
sine dubio verum est, quia de summe incommutabili
without doubt true is that about the-supremely unchangeable
natura nihil potest dici, unde mutabilis possit intelligi.
nature nothing can to-be-said whence mutable it-can to-be-understood

Quomodo illa dicenda sit esse substantia; et quod sit extra omnem substantiam, et singulariter sit quidquid est

XXVI · HOW IT IS A SUBSTANCE, BEYOND ALL SUBSTANCE

Every substance admits a mixture of differences or a change of accidents, and the highest essence admits neither. So it is a substance only if substance is taken for essence, and it is beyond every substance as it is above it. Since it alone has from itself whatever it is, it is whatever it is singularly, and any name it shares with other things must be understood in a very different sense.

Sed si ratum est quod de hujus naturæ simplicitate perspectum
but if settled it-is what about of-this nature the-simplicity perceived
est, quomodo substantia est? Nam cum omnis substantia
has-been how a-substance is-it for since every substance
admistionis differentiarum, vel mutationis accidentium sit
of-admixture of-differences or of-change of-accidents be
susceptibilis, hujus immutabilis sinceritas omnimodæ admistioni,
receptive of-this unchangeable the-purity to-every admixture
sive mutationi est inaccessibilis; quomodo ergo obtinebitur
or change is inaccessible how therefore will-it-be-held
eam esse quamlibet substantiam, nisi dicatur substantia pro
it to-be any substance unless it-be-said substance for
essentia, et sic sit extra, sicut est supra omnem substantiam?
essence and so it-be outside as it-is above every substance
Nam quantum illud esse, quod per se est quidquid, et de
for as-much-as that being which through itself is whatever and from
nihilo facit omne aliud esse, diversum est ab eo esse, quod
nothing makes every other being diverse is from that being which
per aliud fit de nihilo quidquid est; tantum omnino distat
through another is-made from nothing whatever it-is so-much altogether differs

summa substantia ab his quæ non sunt idem quod ipsa.
the-highest substance from those-things which not are the-same as it
Cumque ipsa sola omnium naturarum habeat a se, sine
and-since it alone of-all natures has from itself without
alterius naturæ auxilio, esse quidquid est; quomodo non est
of-another nature help to-be whatever it-is how not is-it
singulariter, absque suæ creaturæ consortio, quidquid ipsa est?
singularly without of-its creature fellowship whatever it is
Unde si quando illi est cum aliis nominis alicujus communio,
whence if ever to-it there-is with others of-name some community
valde procul dubio intelligenda est diversa significatio.
very without doubt to-be-understood is a-diverse signification

Quod non contineatur in communi tractatu substantiarum; et tamen sit substantia, et individuus spiritus

XXVII · IT IS A SUBSTANCE AND AN INDIVIDUAL SPIRIT

It falls under no common account of substance, being neither universal, shared by many, nor individual, sharing an essence with others. Yet since it exists supremely, it may be called substance. Spirit is worthier than body, so it is spirit, not body; and since it has no parts and there cannot be several such spirits, it is an altogether individual spirit.

Constat igitur quia illa substantia nullo communi tractatu
it-is-agreed therefore that that substance in-no common treatment
substantiarum includitur, a cujus essentiali communione
of-substances is-included from whose essential community
omnis natura excluditur. Nempe, cum omnis substantia
every nature is-excluded indeed since every substance
tractetur aut esse universalis, quæ pluribus substantiis
is-treated either to-be universal which to-many substances

essentialiter communis est, ut, hominem esse, commune
essentially common is as man to-be common
est singulis hominibus; aut esse individua, quæ universalem
is to-single men or to-be individual which a-universal
essentiam communem habet cum aliis, quemadmodum singuli
essence common has with others just-as single
homines commune habent cum singulis, ut homines sint;
men in-common have with single-ones that men they-be
quomodo aliquis summam naturam in aliarum substantiarum
how someone the-highest nature in of-other substances
tractatu contineri intelligit, quæ nec in plures substantias
the-treatment to-be-contained understands which neither into many substances
se dividit, nec cum aliqua alia per essentialem communionem
itself divides nor with some other through essential community
se colligit? Quoniam tamen ipsa non solum certissime existit,
itself gathers since yet it not only most-certainly exists
sed etiam summe omnium existit, et cujuslibet rei essentia
but even supremely of-all exists and of-any thing the-essence
dici solet substantia; profecto, si quid digne dici potest,
to-be-called is-wont substance surely if anything worthily to-be-said can
non prohibetur dici substantia. Et quoniam non noscitur
not it-is-prohibited to-be-called substance and since not is-known
dignior essentia quam spiritus aut corpus; et ex his dignior
a-worthier essence than spirit or body and of these worthier
est spiritus quam corpus: utique eadem asserenda est esse
is spirit than body surely the-same to-be-asserted is to-be
spiritus, non corpus. Quoniam autem nec ullæ partes sunt
spirit not body since moreover neither any parts are
ejusdem spiritus, nec plures esse possunt ejusmodi spiritus,
of-the-same spirit nor many to-be can of-this-kind spirits
necesse est ut sit omnino individuus spiritus. Quoniam
necessary it-is that it-be altogether individual spirit since

enim, sicut supra constat, nec partibus est compositus,
for as above it-is-agreed neither of-parts is-it composed
nec ullis differentiis vel accidentibus intelligi potest esse
nor by-any differences or accidents to-be-understood can-it to-be
mutabilis, impossibile est ut qualibet sectione sit divisibilis.
mutable impossible it-is that by-any section it-be divisible

Quod idem spiritus simpliciter sit: et creata illi comparata non sint

XXVIII · IT ALONE IS, AND CREATED THINGS SCARCELY ARE

This spirit exists simply, perfectly, and absolutely, never was or will be what it is not, and is whatever it is at once and without end. Created things change, were what they no longer are and will be what they are not yet, and came from not being. Compared with it they scarcely are, and in a way do not exist, though they are something made through it.

Videtur ergo consequi ex præcedentibus, quod iste spiritus,
it-seems therefore to-follow from the-preceding that this spirit
qui sic suo quodam mirabiliter singulari et singulariter
which so in-its-own certain wonderfully singular and singularly
mirabili modo est, quadam ratione solus sit; alia vero
wonderful way is in-a-certain reason alone be others indeed
quæcunque videntur esse huic collata, non sint. Si enim
whatever seem to-be to-this compared not be if for
diligenter intendatur, ille solus videbitur simpliciter et perfecte
diligently it-be-attended he alone will-seem simply and perfectly
et absolute esse; alia vero omnia fere non esse, et vix esse,
and absolutely to-be others indeed all almost not to-be and scarcely to-be
quoniam namque idem spiritus, propter incommutabilem
since for the-same spirit on-account-of unchangeable

æternitatem suam, nullo modo secundum aliquem motum
eternity his in-no way according-to some motion
dici potest quia fuit, aut erit; sed simpliciter, est: nec
to-be-said can that he-was or will-be but simply he-is nor
mutabiliter est aliquid, quod aliquando aut non fuit, aut
mutably is-he something which sometime either not he-was or
non erit; neque non est quod aliquando fuit, aut erit;
not will-be nor not he-is what sometime he-was or will-be
sed quidquid est, semel et simul, et interminabiliter est.
but whatever he-is once and at-once and interminably he-is
Quoniam, inquam, hujusmodi est esse ejus; jure ipse
since I-say of-this-kind is the-being his by-right he
simpliciter et absolute et perfecte dicitur esse. Quoniam
simply and absolutely and perfectly is-said to-be since
vero omnia alia secundum aliquid mutabiliter aliquando aut
indeed all others according-to something mutably sometime either
fuerunt, aut erunt quod non sunt; aut sunt quod aliquando
were or will-be what not they-are or are what sometime
non fuerunt, vel non erunt: et quoniam hoc quia fuerunt,
not they-were or not will-be and since this that they-were
jam non est; illud autem, scilicet quia erunt, nondum est;
already not is that moreover namely that they-will-be not-yet is
et hoc quia in labili brevissimoque et vix existente præsenti
and this that in slippery and-most-brief and scarcely existing present
sunt, vix est. Quoniam ergo tam mutabiliter sunt, non
they-are scarcely is since therefore so mutably they-are not
immerito negantur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse;
undeservedly they-are-denied simply and perfectly and absolutely to-be
et asseruntur fere non esse, vix esse. Deinde, cum omnia,
and are-asserted almost not to-be scarcely to-be then since all
quæcunque aliud sunt quam ipse, de non esse venerint ad
whatever other are than he from not to-be have-come to

esse, non per se, sed per aliud; et cum de esse
to-be not through themselves but through another and since from to-be
redeant ad non esse, quantum ad se, nisi sustineantur
they-return to not to-be as-much-as to themselves unless they-be-sustained
per aliud, quomodo illis simpliciter convenit, aut perfecte
through another how to-them simply befits-it or perfectly
sive absolute esse, et non magis fere vix non esse?
or absolutely to-be and not rather almost scarcely not to-be
Cumque esse solius ejusdem ineffabilis Spiritus intelligi
and-since the-being of-the-sole same ineffable Spirit to-be-understood
nullo modo possit, aut ex non esse incœptum, aut aliquem
in-no way can either from not to-be begun or some
pati posse, ex eo quod est in non esse, defectum;
to-suffer to-be-able from that which it-is into not to-be failing
et quidquid ipse est, non sit per aliud quam per
and whatever he is not be through another than through
se, id est, per hoc quod ipse est, nonne hujus esse
himself that is through this which he is not-surely of-this the-being
merito solum intelligitur simplex perfectumque et absolutum?
deservedly alone is-understood simple and-perfect and absolute
Quod vero sic simpliciter et omnimoda ratione solum est
what indeed so simply and by-every-way reason alone is
perfectum, simplex et absolutum, id nimium quodammodo
perfect simple and absolute that very in-a-way
jure dici potest solum esse: et econtra, quidquid per
by-right to-be-said can alone to-be and conversely whatever through
superiorem rationem, nec simpliciter, nec perfecte, nec
the-above reason neither simply nor perfectly nor
absolute esse; sed vix esse, aut fere non esse cognoscitur;
absolutely to-be but scarcely to-be or almost not to-be is-recognized
id utique aliquo modo recte, non esse dicitur. Secundum
that surely in-some way rightly not to-be is-said according-to

hanc igitur rationem ille solus creator Spiritus est, et omnia
this therefore reason he alone creator Spirit is and all
creata, non sunt; nec tamen omnino non sunt, quia per
created-things not are nor yet altogether not they-are because through
illum qui solus absolute est, de nihilo aliquid facta sunt.
him who alone absolutely is from nothing something made they-were

Quod ejus locutio idipsum sit quod ipse, et ipsi sit consubstantialis, cum non sint duo, sed unus Spiritus

XXIX · ITS UTTERANCE IS ITSELF

Anselm turns to the utterance through which all things were made. It cannot be a creature, for every creature was made through it, and nothing can be made through itself. Its utterance is its understanding, by which it understands all things, and as its understanding and wisdom are what it is, so is its utterance: consubstantial with it, one spirit, not two.

Jam vero his quæ de proprietatibus hujus summæ
now indeed these-things which about the-properties of-this highest
naturæ ad præsens mihi ducem rationem sequenti occurrerunt
nature for the-present to-me as-guide reason following have-occurred
perspectis, opportunum existimo ut de ejus locutione, per
perceived timely I-reckon that about its utterance through
quam facta sunt omnia, si quid possim, considerem. Etenim
which made were all-things if anything I-can I-consider for
cum omnia quæ de illa supra potuit animadvertere, rationis
since all-things which about it above he-could to-notice of-reason
robur inflexibile teneant, illud me maxime cogit de illa
the-strength unbending hold that me most compels about it
diligentius discutere, quia id ipsum, quod ipse summus
more-diligently to-discuss because that very-thing which the-very highest

spiritus est, probatur esse. Si enim ille nihil fecit, nisi
spirit is it-is-proved to-be if for he nothing made except
per seipsum, et quidquid ab eo factum est per illam
through himself and whatever by him made has-been through it
est factum, quomodo illa est aliud quam quod est idem
has-been made how it is other than what is the-same
ipse? Amplius: asserunt utique inexplicabiliter ea quæ
himself further assert surely inexplicably those-things which
jam inventa sunt, quia nihil omnino potuit unquam aut
already found have-been that nothing at-all could ever or
potest subsistere præter creantem spiritum et ejus creaturam.
can to-subsist besides the-creating spirit and his creature
Hanc vero spiritus ejusdem locutionem impossibile est inter
this indeed of-the-spirit the-same utterance impossible it-is among
creata contineri: quoniam quidquid creatum subsistit, per
created-things to-be-contained since whatever created subsists through
illam factum est; illa vero per se fieri non potuit.
it made has-been it indeed through itself to-be-made not could
Nihil quippe per seipsum fieri potest, quia quidquid
nothing indeed through itself to-be-made can because whatever
fit, posterius est eo per quod fit; et nihil est
is-made later is than-that through which it-is-made and nothing is
posterius seipso. Relinquitur itaque ut hæc summi spiritus
later than-itself it-remains and-so that this of-the-highest spirit
locutio, cum creatura esse non possit, non sit aliud quam
utterance since a-creature to-be not it-can not be other than
summus spiritus. Denique, hæc ipsa locutio nihil aliud potest
the-highest spirit finally this very utterance nothing other can
intelligi quam ejusdem spiritus intelligentia, qua cuncta
to-be-understood than of-the-same spirit the-understanding by-which all-things
intelligit. Quid enim est aliud illi rem loqui aliquam, hoc
it-understands what for is other for-him a-thing to-speak any in-this

loquendi modo, quam intelligere? Nam non, ut homo, non
of-speaking way than to-understand for not as man not
semper dicit quod intelligit. Si igitur summe simplex natura
always he-says what he-understands if therefore the-supremely simple nature
non est aliud quam quod est sua intelligentia, quemadmodum
not is other than what is its understanding just-as
est idem quod est sua sapientia, necesse est ut similiter
it-is the-same as is its wisdom necessary it-is that similarly
non sit aliud quam quod est sua locutio. Sed quoniam jam
not it-be other than what is its utterance but since already
manifestum est summum spiritum unum tantum esse, et
manifest it-is the-highest spirit one only to-be and
omnimode individuum, necesse est ut sic illi hæc sua locutio
in-every-way individual necessary it-is that so to-it this its utterance
sit consubstantialis, ut non sint duo, sed unus spiritus.
be consubstantial that not they-be two but one spirit

Quod eadem locutio non constet ex pluribus verbis, sed sit unum Verbum

XXX · IT IS NOT MANY WORDS BUT ONE WORD

Anselm settles the question he left open. Since the utterance is consubstantial with the supremely simple nature, it is as simple as that nature: not many words but one Word, through which all things were made.

Cur igitur dubitem quod supra dubium dimiseram, scilicet,
why therefore should-I-doubt what above doubtful I-had-left namely
utrum hæc locutio in pluribus verbis an in uno verbo
whether this utterance in many words or in one word
consistat? Nam si sic est summæ naturæ consubstantialis,
consist for if so it-is to-the-highest nature consubstantial

ut non sint duo, sed unus spiritus, utique sicut illa
that not they-be two but one spirit surely as it
summe simplex est, ita et ista. Non igitur constat pluribus
supremely simple is so also this not therefore it-consists of-many
verbis; sed est unum Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia.
words but it-is one Word through which made were all-things

Quod ipsum Verbum non sit similitudo factorum,
sed veritas essentiæ, facta vero sint
aliqua veritatis imitatio. Et quæ naturæ
magis sint et præstantiores quam aliæ

XXXI · THE WORD IS THE TRUTH OF EXISTING

Our words are likenesses of things, but if the Word were a likeness of changing things it could not be consubstantial with the unchangeable. Rather, as a living man is the truth and a painted one his likeness, in the Word is the true and simple essence of existing, and created things are imitations of it. The more like it a nature is, the more it is and the more excellent: living above lifeless, sentient above insentient, and rational above irrational.

Sed ecce videtur mihi suboriri nec facilis nec ullatenus sub
but behold it-seems to-me to-arise neither easy nor in-any-way under
ambiguitate relinquenda quæstio. Etenim omnia hujusmodi
ambiguity to-be-left a-question for all of-this-kind
verba, quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus,
words by-which things any in-mind we-say that is we-think
similitudines et imagines sunt rerum quarum verba sunt;
likenesses and images are of-the-things of-which words they-are
et omnis similitudo, vel imago, tanto magis vel minus
and every likeness or image by-so-much more or less
est vera, quanto magis vel minus imitatur rem cujus
is true by-how-much more or less it-imitates the-thing of-which

est similitudo. Quid igitur tenendum est de Verbo, quo
it-is the-likeness what therefore to-be-held is about the-Word by-which
dicuntur et per quod facta sunt omnia? Erit, an non
are-said and through which made were all-things will-it-be or not
erit similitudo eorum quæ per ipsum facta sunt?
will-it-be the-likeness of-those-things which through it made were
Si enim ipsum est vera mutabilium similitudo, non est
if for it is the-true of-mutable-things likeness not it-is
consubstantiale summæ incommutabilitati: quod falsum est.
consubstantial to-the-highest unchangeableness which false is
Si autem non omnino vera, sed qualiscunque similitudo
if moreover not altogether true but of-whatever-kind likeness
mutabilium est, non est Verbum summæ veritatis omnino
of-mutable-things it-is not is the-Word of-the-highest truth altogether
verum: quod absurdum est. At si nullam mutabilium
true which absurd is but if no of-mutable-things
habet similitudinem, quomodo ad illius exemplum facta
it-has likeness how to its example made
sunt? Verum forsitan nihil hujus remanebit ambiguitatis, si
were-they but perhaps nothing of-this will-remain of-ambiguity if
quemadmodum in vivo homine veritas hominis esse dicitur,
just-as in a-living man the-truth of-the-man to-be is-said
in picto vero similitudo sive imago illius veritatis,
in the-painted-one indeed the-likeness or image of-that truth
sic existendi veritas intelligitur in Verbo, cujus essentia sic
so of-existing the-truth is-understood in the-Word whose essence so
summe est, ut quodammodo illa sola sit, in his vero quæ
supremely is that in-a-way it alone be in those indeed which
in ejus comparatione quodammodo non sunt, et tamen per
in its comparison in-a-way not are and yet through
illud et secundum illud facta sunt aliquid, aliqua imitatio
it and according-to it made were something some imitation

illius summæ essentiæ perpendatur. Sic quippe Verbum
of-that highest essence be-weighed so indeed the-Word
summæ veritatis, quod et ipsum est summa veritas, nullum
of-the-highest truth which also itself is the-highest truth no
augmentum vel detrimentum sentiet, secundum hoc quod
increase or loss will-feel according-to this that
magis vel minus creaturis sit simile; sed potius necesse erit
more or less to-creatures it-be like but rather necessary it-will-be
omne quod creatum est tanto magis esse et tanto esse
everything which created is by-so-much more to-be and by-so-much to-be
præstantius, quanto similius est illi quod summe est, et
more-excellently by-how-much more-like it-is to-that which supremely is and
summe magnum est. Hinc etenim fortasse, imo non fortasse,
supremely great is hence for perhaps nay not perhaps
sed pro certo, hinc omnis intellectus judicat naturas quolibet
but for certain hence every understanding judges natures in-any
modo viventes præstare non viventibus, sentientes non
way living to-excel the-non living the-perceiving the-non
sentientibus, rationales irrationalibus. Quoniam enim summa
perceiving the-rational the-irrational since for the-highest
natura suo quodam modo singulari non solum est, sed et
nature in-its-own certain way singular not only is but also
vivit, et sentit, et rationalis est, liquet quoniam omnium
lives and perceives and rational is it-is-clear that of-all-things
quæ sunt, id quod aliquo modo vivit magis est illi simile,
which are that which in-some way lives more is to-it like
quam id quod nullatenus vivit; et quod modo quolibet vel
than that which in-no-way lives and what in-way any even
corporeo sensu cognoscit aliquid, magis quam quod nihil
by-bodily sense knows something more than what nothing
omnino sentit; et quod rationale est, magis quam quod
at-all perceives and what rational is more than what

rationis capax non est. Quoniam vero simili ratione quædam
of-reason capable not is since indeed by-a-like reason certain
naturæ magis minusve sunt quam aliæ, perspicuum est.
natures more or-less are than others clear it-is
Quemadmodum enim natura illud præstantius est, quod per
just-as for in-nature that more-excellent is which through
naturalem essentiam propinquius est præstantissimo, ita utique
natural essence nearer is to-the-most-excellent so surely
illa natura magis est, cujus essentia similior est summæ
that nature more is whose essence more-like is to-the-highest
essentiæ. Quod sic quoque animadverti facile posse existimo.
essence which thus also to-be-noticed easily to-be-able I-reckon
Nempe si cuilibet substantiæ, quæ et vivit, et sensibilis, et
indeed if from-any substance which both lives and perceptive and
rationalis est, cogitatione auferatur quod rationalis est, deinde
rational is in-thought be-taken-away that rational it-is then
quod sensibilis, et postea quod vitalis, postremo ipsum
that perceptive and afterward that vital lastly the-very
nudum esse, quod remanet; quis non intelligat quod illa
bare to-be which remains who not would-understand that that
substantia quæ sic paulatim destruitur, ad minus et minus
substance which so little-by-little is-destroyed to less and less
esse, et ad ultimum ad non esse gradatim perducitur?
to-be and at the-last to not to-be by-degrees is-led
Quæ autem singulatim assumpta quamlibet essentiam ad
the-things-which moreover singly taken-up any essence to
minus et minus esse deducunt, eadem ordinatim assumpta,
less and less to-be lead-down the-same in-order taken-up
illam ad magis et magis esse perducunt. Patet igitur quia
it to more and more to-be lead it-is-plain therefore that
magis est vivens substantia quam non vivens, et sensibilis
more is a-living substance than a-non living and a-perceptive

quam non sensibilis, et rationalis quam non rationalis. Non
than a-non perceptive and a-rational than a-non rational not
est itaque dubium quod omnis essentia eo ipso magis
it-is and-so doubtful that every essence by-that very-thing more
est, præstantiorque est, quo similior est illi essentiæ
is and-more-excellent is by-which more-like it-is to-that essence
quæ summe est et summe præstat. Satis itaque manifestum
which supremely is and supremely excels enough and-so manifest
est in Verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse
it-is in the-Word through which made were all-things not to-be
eorum similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam; in
their likeness but true and-simple essence in
factis vero non esse simplicem absolutamque essentiam,
the-things-made indeed not to-be simple and-absolute essence
sed veræ illius essentiæ vix aliquam imitationem. Unde
but true of-that essence scarcely some imitation whence
necesse est non idem Verbum, secundum rerum creatarum
necessary it-is not the-same Word according-to of-things created
similitudinem, magis vel minus esse verum, sed omnem
the-likeness more or less to-be true but every
creatam naturam eo altiori gradu essentiæ dignitatisque
created nature by-that higher degree of-essence and-of-dignity
consistere, quo magis illi propinquare videtur.
to-stand by-which more to-it to-draw-near it-seems

Quod summus Spiritus seipsum dicat coæterno Verbo

XXXII · THE HIGHEST SPIRIT UTTERS ITSELF

If nothing had ever been created, there would seem to be no Word, since every word is of some thing. But then the highest wisdom would understand nothing, not even itself, which is absurd. The rational mind can remember and understand itself and the highest wisdom after whose likeness it is made; so the highest spirit eternally remembers and understands itself. Understanding itself eternally, it utters itself eternally, and its Word is coeternal with it.

Sed cum ita sit, quomodo illud quod simplex est veritas
but since so it-is how that which simple is truth
potest esse Verbum eorum quorum non est similitudo? cum
can to-be the-Word of-those-things of-which not it-is the-likeness since
omne verbum quo aliqua res sic mente dicitur, similitudo
every word by-which some thing so in-mind is-said the-likeness
sit rei ejusdem; et, si non est verbum eorum quæ
be of-the-thing the-same and if not it-is the-word of-those-things which
facta sunt per ipsum, quomodo constabit quia sit Verbum?
made were through it how will-it-be-agreed that it-be the-Word
Nempe omne verbum alicujus rei verbum est. Denique si
indeed every word of-some thing word is finally if
nunquam creatura esset, nullum ejus esset verbum. Quid
never creature were none its would-be word what
igitur? An concludendum est quia si nullo modo esset
therefore or to-be-concluded is-it that if in-no way there-were
creatura, nequaquam esset Verbum illud, quod est summa
creature by-no-means would-there-be Word that which is the-highest
et nullius indigens essentia; aut fortasse ipsa summa
and of-nothing needing essence or perhaps the-very highest
essentia, quæ Verbum est, essentia quidem esset æterna, sed
essence which Word is essence indeed would-be eternal but

Verbum non esset, si nihil unquam per illam fieret?
Word not it-would-be if nothing ever through it were-made
Ejus enim quod non fuit, nec est, nec futurum est, nullum
of-that for which not was nor is nor about-to-be is no
verbum esse potest. Verum secundum hanc rationem, si
word to-be can but according-to this reason if
nunquam ulla præter summum spiritum esset essentia, nullum
never any besides the-highest spirit were essence none
omnino esset verbum in illo. Si nullum in illo verbum
at-all would-be word in him if none in him word
esset, nihil apud se diceret, si nihil apud se diceret,
were nothing with himself he-would-say if nothing with himself he-said
cum idem sit illi, sic dicere aliquid quod est intelligere,
since the-same be for-him so to-say something which is to-understand
non aliquid intelligeret; si nihil intelligeret, ergo summa
not anything he-would-understand if nothing he-understood therefore the-highest
sapientia, quæ non est aliud quam idem spiritus, nihil
wisdom which not is other than the-same spirit nothing
intelligeret: quod absurdissimum est. Quid igitur? Si enim
would-understand which most-absurd is what therefore if for
nihil intelligeret, quomodo esset summa sapientia? Aut si
nothing he-understood how would-be-be the-highest wisdom or if
nullo modo esset aliquid præter illam, quid illa intelligeret?
in-no way there-were something besides it what it would-understand
Sed nunquid seipsam non intelligeret? At quomodo vel
but surely-not itself not would-it-understand but how even
cogitari potest quod summa sapientia se aliquando non
to-be-thought can-it that the-highest wisdom itself sometime not
intelligat; cum mens rationalis possit non solum suimet,
understand since the-mind rational can not only of-itself
sed et illius summæ sapientiæ reminisci; et illam, et se
but also of-that highest wisdom to-remember and it and itself

intelligere? Si enim mens humana nullam ejus aut sui
to-understand if for the-mind human no of-it or of-itself
habere memoriam aut intelligentiam posset, nequaquam se
to-have memory or understanding could by-no-means itself
ab irrationalibus creaturis, et illam ab omni creatura,
from the-irrational creatures and it from every creature
secum sola tacite disputando, sicut nunc mens mea facit,
with-itself alone silently by-disputing as now mind my does
discerneret. Ergo summus ille spiritus, sicut est æternus; ita
it-would-distinguish therefore the-highest that spirit as he-is eternal so
æterne sui memor est, et intelligit se ad similitudinem
eternally of-himself mindful he-is and understands himself after the-likeness
mentis rationalis; imo non ad ullius similitudinem, sed ille
of-the-mind rational nay not after of-any the-likeness but he
principaliter, et mens rationalis ad ejus similitudinem. At
principally and the-mind rational after his likeness but
si æterne se intelligit, æterne se dicit. Si æterne se
if eternally himself he-understands eternally himself he-says if eternally himself
dicit, æterne est Verbum ejus apud ipsum. Sive igitur ille
he-says eternally is the-Word his with him whether therefore he
cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus,
be-thought no other existing essence or others existing
necesse est Verbum illius coæternum illi esse cum ipso.
necessary it-is the-Word of-him coeternal to-him to-be with him

Quod consubstantiali uno Verbo dicat se, et quod facit

XXXIII · BY ONE WORD IT UTTERS ITSELF AND CREATION

The Word by which it utters itself is identical with what it is, as is the Word by which it utters creation. As the mind thinking of itself forms an image of itself in thought, the highest wisdom understanding itself begets its consubstantial likeness, its Word. The Word by which it utters creation is not creation's likeness but its principal essence, so it utters nothing by a word of the creature, and by one and the same Word utters itself and whatever it made.

Sed ecce quærenti mihi de Verbo quo Creator dicit
but behold seeking to-me about the-Word by-which the-Creator says
omnia quæ facit, obtulit se Verbum quo seipsum dicit
all-things which he-makes has-offered itself the-Word by-which himself says
qui omnia facit. An ergo alio verbo dicit seipsum,
he-who all-things makes whether therefore by-another word does-he-say himself
et alio ea quæ facit; aut potius eodem ipso Verbo
and by-another those-things which he-makes or rather by-the-same very Word
quo dicit seipsum, dicit quæcunque facit? Nam hoc
by-which he-says himself does-he-say whatever he-makes for this
quoque Verbum, quo seipsum dicit, necesse est idipsum
also Word by-which himself he-says necessary it-is that-very-thing
esse quod ipse est, sicut constat de Verbo illo quo
to-be which he is as it-is-agreed about the-Word that by-which
dicit ea quæ facta sunt a se. Cum enim, etiamsi nihil
he-says those-things which made were by him since for even-if nothing
unquam aliud esset nisi summus ille spiritus, ratio tamen
ever other were except the-highest that spirit reason yet
cogat Verbum illud quo se dicit ex necessitate esse,
compels the-Word that by-which himself he-says from necessity to-be
quid verius quam hoc Verbum ejus non esse aliud quam
what truer than this Word his not to-be other than

quod ipse est? Ergo si et seipsum, et ea quæ facit,
what he is therefore if both himself and those-things which he-makes
consubstantiali sibi Verbo dicit, manifestum est quia
by-a-consubstantial to-himself Word he-says manifest it-is that
Verbi quo se dicit, et Verbi quo creaturam dicit,
of-the-Word by-which himself he-says and of-the-Word by-which creature he-says
una substantia est. Quomodo ergo, si una substantia est,
one substance there-is how therefore if one substance there-is
duo verba sunt? Sed forsitan non cogit identitas substantiæ
two words are-there but perhaps not compels identity of-substance
Verbi unitatem admittere. Nam idem ipse qui his
of-the-Word unity to-admit for the-same he who by-these
verbis loquitur, eamdem cum illis habet substantiam, et
words speaks the-same with them has substance and
tamen Verbum non est. Sed utique verbum, quo se dicit
yet Word not he-is but surely the-word by-which himself says
summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest Verbum ejus
the-highest wisdom most-fittingly to-be-called can Word his
secundum superiorem rationem, quia ejus perfectam tenet
according-to the-above reason because his perfect it-holds
similitudinem. Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens
likeness for by-no reason to-be-denied can-it when the-mind
rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit imaginem ipsius nasci
rational itself by-thinking understands an-image of-itself to-be-born
in sua cogitatione: imo ipsam cogitationem sui esse
in its-own thought nay the-very thought of-itself to-be
suam imaginem, ad ejus similitudinem, tanquam ex ejus
its-own image after its likeness as-if from its
impressione formatam. Quamcunque enim rem mens, seu
impression formed whatever for thing the-mind whether
per corporis imaginationem seu per rationem cupit veraciter
through of-the-body imagination or through reason desires truly

cogitare, ejus utique similitudinem, quantum valet, in ipsa
to-think of-it surely the-likeness as-far-as it-is-able in the-very
sua cogitatione conatur exprimere. Quod quanto verius
its-own thought it-strives to-express which by-how-much more-truly
facit, tanto rem ipsam verius cogitat; et hoc quidem,
it-does by-so-much the-thing itself more-truly it-thinks and this indeed
cum cogitat aliquid aliud quod ipsa non est, et maxime cum
when it-thinks something other which it not is and most when
aliquod cogitat corpus. clarius perspicitur. Cum enim cogito
some it-thinks body more-clearly is-seen when for I-think
notum mihi hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis
known to-me a-man absent is-formed the-edge of-thought
meæ in talem imaginem ejus qualem illam per visum
my into such image his as it through the-sight
oculorum in memoriam attraxi; quæ imago in cogitatione,
of-the-eyes into memory I-drew which image in thought
verbum est ejusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico. Habet
the-word is of-the-same man whom by-thinking I-say has
igitur mens rationalis, cum se cogitando intelligit, secum
therefore the-mind rational when itself by-thinking it-understands with-itself
imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui ad
image its-own from itself born that is the-thought of-itself after
suam similitudinem, quasi sua impressione formatam,
its-own likeness as-it-were by-its-own impression formed
quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine, non nisi ratione sola,
although it itself from its-own image not except by-reason alone
separare possit, quæ imago ejus verbum ejus est. Hoc itaque
to-separate can which image its word its is in-this and-so
modo, quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo
way who would-deny the-highest wisdom when itself by-saying
intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam,
it-understands to-beget consubstantial to-itself likeness its-own

id est Verbum suum? Quod Verbum, licet de re tam
that is Word its-own which Word although about a-thing so
singulariter eminenti proprie aliquid satis convenienter dici
singularly eminent properly something enough fittingly to-be-said
non possit, non tamen inconvenienter, sicut similitudo, ita
not can not yet unfittingly as likeness so
et imago, et figura et character, ejus dici potest.
also image and figure and character its to-be-called it-can
Verbum autem quo creaturam dicit, nequaquam similiter
the-Word moreover by-which creature he-says by-no-means similarly
est verbum creaturæ, quia non est ejus similitudo, sed
is the-word of-the-creature because not it-is its likeness but
principalis essentia. Consequitur igitur ut ipsam creaturam
principal essence it-follows therefore that the-very creature
non dicat verbo creaturæ. Cujus ergo verbo eam dicit,
not he-says by-the-word of-the-creature whose therefore by-word it he-says
si non dicit eam verbo ejus? Nam quod dicit, verbo dicit;
if not he-says it by-word its for what he-says by-word he-says
et verbum alicujus est verbum, id est similitudo. Sed
and a-word of-something is a-word that is likeness but
si nihil aliud dicit quam se aut creaturam nihil dicere
if nothing other he-says than himself or creature nothing to-say
potest, nisi aut suo, aut ejus verbo. Si ergo nihil
he-can except either by-his-own or by-its word if therefore nothing
dicit verbo creaturæ, quidquid dicit, Verbo suo dicit. Uno
he-says by-word of-the-creature whatever he-says by-Word his-own he-says by-one
igitur eodemque Verbo dicit seipsum, et quæcunque fecit.
therefore and-the-same Word he-says himself and whatever he-made

Quomodo suo Verbo videri possit dicere creaturam

XXXIV · HOW IT UTTERS CREATION BY ITS OWN WORD

Creator and creation are utterly different, yet both are uttered by one Word, since the highest spirit is the highest wisdom and reason in which all things are, as a work is always in the art that makes it. In themselves created things are changeable essence; in the creator they are the first essence and the first truth of existing.

Sed quomodo tam differentes res, scilicet creans et creata
but how so different things namely the-creating and created
essentia, dici possunt uno Verbo, præsertim cum Verbum
essence to-be-said can by-one Word especially since the-Word
ipsum sit dicenti coæternum; creatura autem non sit illi
itself be to-the-sayer coeternal creature however not be to-him
coæterna? Forsitan quia ipse est summa sapientia et summa
coeternal perhaps because he is the-highest wisdom and the-highest
ratio, in qua sunt omnia quæ facta sunt; quemadmodum
reason in which are all-things which made were just-as
opus, quod fit secundum aliquam artem, non solum quando
a-work which is-made according-to some art not only when
fit, verum et antequam fiat, et postquam dissolvitur,
it-is-made but also before it-be-made and after it-is-dissolved
semper est in ipsa arte non aliud quam quod est ars
always is in the-very art not other than what is the-art
ipsa. Idcirco cum ipse summus Spiritus dicit seipsum, dicit
itself therefore when the-very highest Spirit says himself he-says
omnia quæ facta sunt. Nam et antequam fierent, et cum
all-things which made were for both before they-were-made and when
jam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur, seu aliquo modo
already made they-are and when they-are-corrupted or in-some way
varientur, semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis,
are-varied always in him they-are not what they-are in themselves

sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia
but what is the-same he for in themselves they-are essence
mutabilis, secundum immutabilem rationem creata; in ipso
mutable according-to unchangeable reason created in him
vero sunt ipsa prima essentia, et prima existendi veritas
indeed they-are the-very first essence and the-first of-existing truth
cui, prout magis utcunque illa similia sunt, ita verius
to-which according-as more in-any-way they like are so more-truly
et præstantius existunt. Hoc itaque modo non irrationabiliter
and more-excellently they-exist in-this and-so way not irrationally
asseri potest quia, cum seipsum dicit summus ille Spiritus,
to-be-asserted it-can that when himself says the-highest that Spirit
dicit etiam quidquid factum est uno eodemque Verbo.
he-says also whatever made has-been by-one and-the-same Word

Quod quidquid factum est, in ejus Verbo et scientia, sit vita et veritas

XXXV · IN ITS WORD ALL THINGS ARE LIFE AND TRUTH

The Word is consubstantial with the highest spirit and perfectly like it, so whatever is in the spirit is in its Word in the same way. Whatever was made, living or not, is life and truth in the Word. And since for the highest spirit to know is to understand and to utter, all things are life and truth in its knowledge too.

Verum cum constet quia Verbum ejus consubstantiale est
but since it-is-agreed that the-Word his consubstantial is
illi et perfecte simile, necessario consequitur ut omnia
to-him and perfectly like necessarily it-follows that all-things
quæ sunt in illo, eadem et eodem modo sint in Verbo
which are in him the-same and in-the-same way be in the-Word
ejus. Quidquid igitur factum est, sive vivat, sive non
his whatever therefore made has-been whether it-live or not

vivat, aut quomodocunque sit in se, in illo est ipsa
live or howsoever it-be in itself in him it-is the-very
vita et veritas. Quoniam autem idem est summo Spiritui
life and truth since moreover the-same it-is for-the-highest Spirit
scire quod intelligere, sive dicere, necesse est ut eodem
to-know as to-understand or to-say necessary it-is that in-the-same
modo sciat omnia quæ scit quod ea dicit aut intelligit.
way he-know all-things which he-knows as them he-says or understands
Quemadmodum igitur omnia sunt in Verbo ejus vita et
just-as therefore all-things are in the-Word his life and
veritas, ita sunt in scientia ejus.
truth so they-are in the-knowledge his

Quam incomprehensibili modo dicat, vel sciat res a se factas

XXXVI · HOW IT KNOWS THINGS PASSES HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

Created things are truly in themselves through their essence, but in our knowledge only through likenesses. They are truer still in the creator's understanding than in themselves, as the creating essence is truer than the created. So how the highest spirit utters and knows what it made cannot be grasped, if our knowledge falls as far short of things as a likeness falls short of an essence.

Qua ex re manifestissime comprehendi potest quomodo
which from thing most-manifestly to-be-comprehended can how
dicat idem Spiritus, vel quomodo sciat ea quæ facta
says the-same Spirit or how he-knows those-things which made
sunt, ab humana scientia comprehendi non posse. Nam nulli
were by human knowledge to-be-comprehended not to-be-able for to-none
dubium creatas substantias multo aliter esse in seipsis, quam
doubtful created substances much otherwise to-be in themselves than
in nostra scientia. In seipsis namque sunt per ipsam suam
in our knowledge in themselves for they-are through the-very their-own

essentiam; in nostra vero scientia non sunt earum essentiæ sed
essence in our indeed knowledge not are their essences but
earum similitudines. Restat igitur ut tanto verius sint in
their likenesses it-remains therefore that by-so-much more-truly they-be in
seipsis, quam in nostra scientia; quanto verius sunt alicubi
themselves than in our knowledge by-how-much more-truly they-are anywhere
per suam essentiam, quam per suam similitudinem. Cum
through their-own essence than through their-own likeness since
ergo et hoc constet, quia omnis creata substantia tanto
therefore also this be-agreed that every created substance by-so-much
verius est in Verbo, id est in intelligentia Creatoris, quam
more-truly is in the-Word that is in the-understanding of-the-Creator than
in seipsa; quanto verius existit creatrix quam creata
in itself by-how-much more-truly exists the-creating than the-created
essentia: quomodo comprehendat humana mens, cujusmodi sit
essence how could-comprehend the-human mind of-what-kind be
illud dicere et illa scientia, quæ sic longe superior et verior
that saying and that knowledge which so far higher and truer
est creatis substantiis; si nostra scientia tam longe superatur
is than-created substances if our knowledge so far is-surpassed
ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia.
by them as-much-as their likeness differs from their essence

Quod quidquid ipse est ad creaturam, hoc sit et Verbum ejus; nec tamen ambo simul pluraliter

XXXVII · WHAT THE SPIRIT IS TO CREATION, SO IS THE WORD

The Word, consubstantial with the highest spirit, is the highest essence, and that essence alone made all things from nothing through itself. So whatever the spirit makes, its Word makes too, and whatever the spirit is toward creation, its Word is. Yet they are not two creators or two beginnings, but one creator and one beginning.

Verum cum manifeste rationes superiores doceant summum
but since manifestly reasons the-above teach the-highest
Spiritum per Verbum suum fecisse omnia, nunquid non
Spirit through Word his-own to-have-made all-things surely-not not
et ipsum Verbum fecit eadem omnia? Quoniam enim illi
also the-very Word made the-same all-things since for to-him
est consubstantiale, cujus est Verbum, necesse est ut sit
it-is consubstantial whose it-is the-Word necessary it-is that it-be
summa essentia. Summa autem essentia non est nisi una,
the-highest essence the-highest however essence not is except one
quæ sola creatrix et solum principium est omnium quæ facta
which alone creator and alone beginning is of-all-things which made
sunt. Ipsa namque sola fecit, non per aliud quam per
were it for alone made not through another than through
se, omnia ex nihilo. Quare quæcunque summus Spiritus
itself all-things from nothing wherefore whatever-things the-highest Spirit
facit, eadem et Verbum ejus facit, et similiter. Quidquid
makes the-same also the-Word his makes and similarly whatever
igitur summus spiritus est ad creaturam; hoc et Verbum
therefore the-highest spirit is toward creature this also the-Word
ejus est. et similiter. Nec tamen ambo simul pluraliter, quia
his is and similarly nor yet both together plurally because

non sunt plures creatrices summæ essentiæ. Sicut igitur ille
not there-are many creating highest essences as therefore he
creator est rerum et principium; sic et Verbum ejus: nec
creator is of-things and beginning so also the-Word his nor
tamen sunt duo, sed unus creator, et unum principium.
yet are-they two but one creator and one beginning

Quod dici non possit quid duo sint, quamvis necesse sit esse duos

XXXVIII · TWO, THOUGH WHAT TWO CANNOT BE SAID

What each is in essence and toward creation belongs wholly to each and to both, yet is not doubled: not two truths or two creators. But the one whose Word it is cannot be his own Word, nor the Word the one it belongs to, and the Word is from him while he is not from it. So they are certainly two, yet what two they are cannot be named, since Word and image are relations proper to one alone.

Studiose itaque attendendum est quiddam, quod, valde
earnestly and-so to-be-attended is something which very
insolitum aliis rebus, in summo Spiritu et Verbo ejus
unaccustomed to-other things in the-highest Spirit and the-Word his
videtur evenire. Nam certum est sic unicuique singulatim,
seems to-befall for certain it-is so to-each singly
et utrisque simul inesse quidquid sunt in essentia, et
and to-both together to-be-in whatever they-are in essence and
quidquid sunt ad creaturam, ut et singulatim perfectum
whatever they-are toward creature that both singly perfect
sit ambobus, et tamen pluralitatem non admittat in duobus.
it-be to-both and yet plurality not it-admit in the-two
Licet enim singulatim et ille perfecte sit summa veritas et
although for singly both he perfectly be the-highest truth and

Creator, et verbum ejus sit summa veritas et creator; non
Creator and the-word his be the-highest truth and creator not
tamen ambo simul sunt duæ veritates, aut duo creatores. Sed
yet both together are two truths or two creators but
cum hæc ita sint, miro tamen modo apertissimum
although these-things so be in-a-wonderful yet way most-open
est quia nec ille, cujus est Verbum, potest esse Verbum
it-is that neither he whose is the-Word can to-be Word
suum; nec Verbum potest esse iste cujus est Verbum, ut
his-own nor the-Word can to-be he whose it-is the-Word so-that
in eo quod significat vel quid sint substantialiter, vel quid
in that which signifies either what they-be substantially or what
sint ad creaturam semper individuam teneant unitatem. In
they-be toward creature always individual they-hold unity in
eo vero, quod ille non est ex isto: hoc autem est ex illo;
that indeed that he not is from this this however is from him
ineffabilem admittant pluralitatem: ineffabilem certe; quamvis
an-ineffable they-admit plurality ineffable certainly although
enim necessitas cogat ut sint duo, nullo tamen modo
for necessity compels that they-be two in-no yet way
exprimi potest quid duo sint. Nam etsi forte duo pares
to-be-expressed can-it what two they-be for although perhaps two equals
aut aliquid aliud similiter adinvicem possint dici, in
or something other similarly toward-one-another can to-be-called in
his ipsis tamen relativis si quæratur quid sit illud de quo
these very yet relatives if it-be-asked what be that about which
dicuntur, non potest dici pluraliter, quemadmodum dicuntur
they-are-said not it-can to-be-said plurally as are-said
duæ pares lineæ, aut duo homines similes. Quippe nec sunt
two equal lines or two men like indeed neither are-they
duo pares spiritus, nec duo pares creatores, nec duo aliquid,
two equal spirits nor two equal creators nor two anything

quod significet eorum aut essentiam aut habitudinem ad
which signify their either essence or relation toward
creaturam; sed nec duo aliquid, quod designet propriam
creature but neither two anything which designate the-proper
habitudinem alterius ad alterum, quia nec duo verba, nec
relation of-one to the-other because neither two words nor
duæ imagines. Verbum namque hoc ipsum quod Verbum
two images the-Word for this very-thing that Word
est, aut imago, ad alterum est; quia non nisi alicujus
it-is or image toward another is because not except of-something
Verbum est aut imago; et sic propria sunt hæc alterius, ut
Word it-is or image and so proper are these of-the-one that
nequaquam alteri coaptentur. Nam ille, cujus est Verbum
by-no-means to-the-other they-be-fitted for he whose is the-Word
aut imago nec imago, nec Verbum est. Constat igitur quia
or image neither image nor Word is it-is-agreed therefore that
exprimi non potest quid duo sint, summus Spiritus et
to-be-expressed not it-can what two they-be the-highest Spirit and
Verbum ejus, quamvis quibusdam singulorum proprietatibus
the-Word his although by-certain of-each properties
cogantur esse duo. Etenim proprium unius est esse ex
they-are-compelled to-be two for proper of-one is to-be from
altero, et proprium est alterius alterum esse ex illo.
the-other and proper is of-the-other the-other to-be from him

Quod idem Verbum sit a summo Spiritu, nascendo

XXXIX · THE WORD IS FROM THE SPIRIT BY BEING BORN

The Word is from the highest spirit not as made things are, but as creator from creator, highest from highest, and from him alone. Since it holds his perfect likeness, as offspring holds a parent's, and is not made by him, it is most fittingly said to be born. Hair is said to be born of the head and apples of the tree without resembling them; the Word, which resembles its source perfectly, is born much more truly.

Quod ipsum nullo utique verbo videtur familiarius posse
which itself by-no surely word seems more-familiarly to-be-able
proferri, quam si dicatur proprium esse unius nasci ex
to-be-brought-forth than if it-be-said proper to-be of-one to-be-born from
altero; et proprium alterius, nasci alterum ex ipso. Certum
the-other and proper of-the-other to-be-born the-other from him certain
namque jam constat quia Verbum summi Spiritus non sic
for now it-stands that the-Word of-the-highest Spirit not so
est ex eo, quemadmodum ea quæ ab illo facta sunt; sed
is from him as those-things which by him made were but
quemadmodum Creator de Creatore, summum de summo. Et
as Creator from Creator highest from highest and
ut plena brevitate omnimoda absolvatur similitudo, penitus
that with-full brevity in-every-way be-completed the-likeness utterly
idem ipsum est de eodem ipso, et ita ut nullatenus sit nisi
the-same itself is from the-same itself and so that in-no-way it-be except
ex eo. Cum igitur pateat Verbum summi Spiritus sic esse
from him since therefore it-be-plain the-Word of-the-highest Spirit so to-be
ex ipso solo, ut perfectam ejus quasi proles parentis teneat
from him alone that perfect his as-it-were offspring of-a-parent it-holds
similitudinem: nec sic esse ex ipso ut fiat ab eo, profecto
likeness nor so to-be from him that it-be-made by him surely

nullo modo convenientius cogitari potest ex illo esse quam
in-no way more-fittingly to-be-thought can-it from him to-be than
nascendo. Nempe si innumerabiles res indubitanter dicuntur
by-being-born indeed if innumerable things undoubtingly are-said
nasci ex his ex quibus habent ut sint; cum nullam eorum,
to-be-born from those from which they-have that they-be though no of-those
de quibus nasci dicuntur, teneant similitudinem sicut proles
from which to-be-born they-are-said they-hold likeness as offspring
parentis. Dicimus enim capillos nasci de capite et poma
of-a-parent we-say for the-hairs to-be-born from the-head and the-apples
ex arbore, licet nec illi capitis, nec ista arboris similia
from the-tree although neither those to-the-head nor these to-the-tree like
sint. Si, inquam, multa hujusmodi non absurde dicuntur
be if I-say many-things of-this-kind not absurdly are-said
nasci, tanto congruentius dici potest Verbum summi
to-be-born by-so-much more-fittingly to-be-said it-can the-Word of-the-highest
Spiritus ex illo existere, nascendo; quanto perfectius, quasi
Spirit from him to-exist by-being-born by-how-much more-perfectly as-it-were
proles parentis, trahit ejus similitudinem ex illo existendo.
offspring of-a-parent draws his likeness from him by-existing

Quod verissime ille parens, illud vero proles

XL · MOST TRULY PARENT AND OFFSPRING

Among other things that stand as parent and offspring, no parent suffices by itself alone to beget, needing nothing else, and no offspring shows its parent's likeness without some unlikeness mixed in. The Word is wholly from the essence of the highest spirit alone and singularly like it. So the relation of parent and offspring fits nothing as well as the highest spirit and its Word: he most truly parent, it most truly offspring.

Quod si convenientissime dicitur nasci, et tam simile est illi
but if most-fittingly it-is-said to-be-born and so like it-is to-him
de quo nascitur, cur æstimetur simile, quasi proles parenti;
from whom it-is-born why should-it-be-reckoned like as offspring to-parent
non potius asseratur quia tanto verior est ille parens, et istud
not rather be-asserted that by-so-much truer is he parent and it
proles, quanto magis et ille ad hujus nativitatis perfectionem
offspring by-how-much more both he for of-this birth the-perfection
solus sufficit, et quod nascitur ejus similitudinem exprimit?
alone suffices and what is-born his likeness expresses
Namque in rebus aliis, quas parentis prolisque certum est
for in things other which of-parent and-of-offspring certain it-is
habitudinem habere, nulla sic gignit ut omnino nullius indigens
the-relation to-have none so begets that altogether of-nothing needing
sola per se ad gignendam prolem sufficiat; nulla sic gignitur,
alone through itself for begetting offspring it-suffice none so is-begotten
ut nulla admista dissimilitudine omnimodam similitudinem
that no admixed unlikeness in-every-way likeness
parentis exhibeat. Si ergo Verbum summi Spiritus sic est
of-the-parent it-show if therefore the-Word of-the-highest Spirit so is
omnino ex ipsius sola essentia, et sic singulariter est illi
altogether from his sole essence and so singularly is to-him

simile ut nulla proles sic sit omnino ex sola parentis essentia,
like that no offspring so be altogether from the-sole parent's essence
aut sic similis parenti, profecto nullis rebus tam convenienter
or so like to-the-parent surely to-no things so fittingly
videtur aptari habitudo parentis et prolis, quam summo
seems to-be-fitted the-relation of-parent and of-offspring as to-the-highest
Spiritui et Verbo ejus. Quapropter illius est proprium
Spirit and the-Word his wherefore of-him it-is proper
verissimum esse parentem, istius vero verissimam esse prolem.
most-true to-be parent of-it indeed most-true to-be offspring

Quod ille verissime gignat, illud verissime gignatur

XLI · MOST TRULY BEGETTING AND BEGOTTEN

That they are most truly parent and offspring can stand only if the one most truly begets and the other is most truly begotten. As that is clear, this must be most certain: it belongs to the highest spirit most truly to beget, and to its Word most truly to be begotten.

At hoc constare non poterit, nisi pariter ille verissime gignat;
but this to-stand not it-will-be-able unless equally he most-truly beget
et istud verissime gignatur. Sicut igitur illud est perspicuum,
and it most-truly be-begotten as therefore that is clear
ita hoc esse certissimum necesse est. Quare summi Spiritus
so this to-be most-certain necessary it-is wherefore of-the-highest Spirit
est verissime gignere, et Verbi ejus verissime gigni.
it-is most-truly to-beget and of-the-Word his most-truly to-be-begotten

Quod alterius verissime sit esse genitorem et Patrem, alterius genitum et Filium

XLII · MOST TRULY FATHER AND SON

Should they be called Father and Son or mother and daughter, having no sex? Each is Spirit, but also truth and wisdom, and the male is not always the better sex, as some birds show. Rather, the first cause of offspring is always in the father, and no cause joins or precedes the highest spirit, so it is Father. A son is more like his father than a daughter is, and nothing is more like the Father than his offspring, so it is Son.

Vellem jam quidem, et forte possem, illum esse verissime
I-would-wish now indeed and perhaps I-could him to-be most-truly
Patrem; hoc vero verissime esse Filium concludere. Sed nec
Father this indeed most-truly to-be Son to-conclude but neither
hoc negligendum existimo, an Patris et Filii, et an
this to-be-neglected I-reckon whether of-Father and of-Son and whether
matris et filiæ magis illis apta sit appellatio, cum in
of-mother and of-daughter more to-them fitting be the-appellation since in
eis nulla sit sexus discretio. Nam si idcirco convenienter est
them no be of-sex distinction for if therefore fittingly is
ille Pater, et proles ejus Filius, quia uterque est Spiritus:
he Father and offspring his Son because each is Spirit
cur non pari ratione alteri convenit esse matrem, alteri
why not by-equal reason to-one befits-it to-be mother to-the-other
filiam, quia uterque est veritas et sapientia? An quia in
daughter because each is truth and wisdom or because in
his naturis, quæ sexus habent differentiam, melioris sexus
these natures which of-sex have difference of-the-better sex
est patrem esse vel filium; minoris vero, matrem vel filiam?
it-is father to-be or son of-the-lesser indeed mother or daughter
Et hoc quidem naturaliter in pluribus; in quibusdam vero
and this indeed naturally in most-things in certain indeed

econtrario, ut in quibusdam avium generibus, In quibus
conversely as in certain of-birds kinds in which
femineus sexus semper major et validior est; masculinus
the-female sex always greater and stronger is the-male
vero minor et infirmior. Aut certe idcirco magis convenit
indeed lesser and weaker or certainly therefore more it-befits
summo Spiritui dici Patrem quam matrem, quia
to-the-highest Spirit to-be-called Father than mother because
prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre.
the-first and principal cause of-offspring always is in the-father
Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna
for if the-maternal cause in-any way always the-paternal
præcedit, nimis est incongruum ut illi parenti adaptetur
precedes too it-is incongruous that to-that parent be-fitted
nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa
the-name of-mother to-whom for begetting offspring no other cause
aut sociatur, aut præcedit. Verissimum est igitur summum
either is-associated or precedes most-true it-is therefore the-highest
Spiritum Patrem esse prolis suæ. Quod si filius semper
Spirit Father to-be of-offspring his but if a-son always
similior est patri quam filia; nihil autem similius est
more-like is to-the-father than a-daughter nothing moreover more-like is
alteri quam summo Patri proles sua; verissimum est hanc
to-another than to-the-highest Father offspring his most-true it-is this
prolem non esse filiam, sed Filium. Sicut igitur proprium est
offspring not to-be daughter but Son as therefore proper it-is
illius verissime gignere, istius vero gigni, sic proprium est
of-him most-truly to-beget of-it indeed to-be-begotten so proper it-is
illius esse verissimum gignitorem, istius vero verissimum esse
of-him to-be most-true begetter of-it indeed most-true to-be

genitum. Et sicut alter est verissimus parens, alter verissima
begotten and as the-one is most-true parent the-other most-true
proles; sic alter est verissimus Pater, alter verissimus Filius.
offspring so the-one is most-true Father the-other most-true Son

Retractatio communionis amborum, et proprietatum singulorum

XLIII · THE UNITY AND THE PROPERTIES REVISITED

Anselm delights to turn over the secret again. Begetter and begotten cannot be the same, so Father and Son are two; yet what each is, is so wholly the same that it remains hidden what two they are. Each is perfectly the highest spirit, yet they are not two spirits but one, opposed in relations, so that neither is ever called the other, and one in nature, so that each always holds the other's essence.

Inventis tot et tantis singulorum proprietatibus, quibus
found so-many and so-great of-each properties by-which
mira quædam tam ineffabilis quam inevitabilis in summa
a-wonderful certain as ineffable as inevitable in the-highest
unitate probatur esse pluralitas, valde mihi videtur delectabile
unity is-proved to-be plurality very to-me it-seems delightful
retractare sæpius tam impenetrabile secretum. Ecce enim
to-handle-again more-often so impenetrable a-secret behold for
cum sic impossibile sit eumdem esse qui gignit, et eum
since so impossible it-be the-same to-be who begets and him
qui gignitur; atque eumdem esse parentem et prolem: ut
who is-begotten and the-same to-be parent and offspring that
necesse sit alium esse genitorem, alium genitum; et alium
necessary it-be another to-be begetter another begotten and another
esse Patrem, alium Filium: sic tamen necesse est idem esse
to-be Father another Son so yet necessary it-is the-same to-be

illum qui gignit, et illum qui gignitur, nec non parentem et
him who begets and him who is-begotten nor not parent and
prolem, ut impossibile sit aliud esse genitorem, quam quod
offspring that impossible it-be other to-be the-begetter than what
est genitus; aliud esse Patrem, quam quod est Filius. Et cum
is the-begotten other to-be the-Father than what is the-Son and though
ita sit alius ille, et alius ille, ut omnino pateat quod
so it-be another he and another he so-that altogether it-be-plain that
duo sint; sic tamen unum et idem ipsum est, id quod est
two they-be so yet one and the-same itself is that which is
ille et ille, ut penitus lateat qui duo sint. Nam sic est
he and he that utterly it-lie-hidden what two they-be for so is
alius Pater, alius Filius, ut, cum ambos dixerim, videam
another the-Father another the-Son that when both I-have-said I-see
me duos dixisse; et sic est idipsum quod est, et Pater
me two to-have-said and so is that-very-thing which is both Father
et Filius, ut non intelligam quid duos dixerim. Quamvis
and Son that not I-understand what two I-have-said although
namque singulus Pater sit perfecte summus Spiritus, et
for singly the-Father be perfectly the-highest Spirit and
singulus Filius sit perfecte summus Spiritus; sic tamen unum
singly the-Son be perfectly the-highest Spirit so yet one
idemque est Spiritus Pater et Spiritus Filius, ut Pater et
and-the-same is the-Spirit Father and the-Spirit Son that the-Father and
Filius non sint duo Spiritus, sed unus Spiritus: ut sicut
the-Son not be two Spirits but one Spirit so-that as
singula propria singulorum non recipiunt pluralitatem, quia
the-single properties of-each not receive plurality because
non sunt duorum; ita id quod commune est amborum,
not they-are of-two so that which common is of-both
individuam teneat unitatem, quamvis totum sit singulorum.
individual hold unity although whole it-be of-each

Nam sicut non sunt duo patres, aut duo filii; sed unus
for as not there-are two fathers or two sons but one
Pater, et unus Filius, quoniam singula sunt singulorum
Father and one Son since the-single-properties are of-each
propria; ita non sunt duo, sed unus Spiritus; quamvis
proper so not there-are two but one Spirit although
et singuli Patris, et singuli Filii, sit perfectum esse
both of-the-single Father and of-the-single Son it-be perfect to-be
Spiritum. Sic sunt oppositi relationibus, ut alter nunquam
Spirit so they-are opposed by-relations that the-one never
suscipiat proprium alterius; sic sunt concordes natura ut
takes-up the-proper of-the-other so they-are concordant in-nature that
alter semper teneat essentiam alterius. Sic enim diversi
the-one always holds the-essence of-the-other so for diverse
sunt, per hoc quod alter est Pater, et alter Filius, ut
they-are through this that the-one is Father and the-other Son that
nunquam dicatur aut Pater Filius, aut Filius Pater; et sic
never be-called either the-Father Son or the-Son Father and so
idem sunt per substantiam, ut semper sit in Patre
the-same they-are through substance that always there-be in the-Father
essentia Filii, et in Filio essentia Patris. Est enim non
the-essence of-the-Son and in the-Son the-essence of-the-Father there-is for not
diversa, sed eadem; non plures, sed una utriusque essentia.
diverse but the-same not many but one of-both essence

Quomodo alter alterius sit essentia

XLIV · HOW EACH IS THE OTHER'S ESSENCE

Calling the Father the Son's essence, or the Son the Father's, does not mean that either exists only through the other, as a man is wise only through wisdom. Each is perfectly the highest essence through himself. By begetting, the Father gives the Son essence, wisdom, and life in himself, so the Son has his being from the Father yet subsists through himself. The phrase means each is what the other is, and so has his essence.

Unde etiam si alter alterius dicatur essentia, non erratur
whence even if the-one of-the-other be-called the-essence not there-is-straying
a veritate; sed summa unitas simplicitasque commendatur
from truth but the-highest unity and-simplicity is-commended
communis naturæ. Non enim quemadmodum intelligitur
of-the-common nature not for as is-understood
sapientia hominis, per quam homo sapiens est, qui per
the-wisdom of-a-man through which a-man wise is who through
se non potest esse sapiens; ita intelligi potest, si
himself not can to-be wise so to-be-understood it-can if
dicatur Pater essentia Filii, et Filius essentia Patris,
it-be-said the-Father the-essence of-the-Son and the-Son the-essence of-the-Father
ut eo modo sit Filius existens per patrem, et Pater
that in-that way be the-Son existing through the-father and the-Father
per Filium, quasi non possit alter existens esse nisi per
through the-Son as-if not can the-one existing to-be except through
alterum; sicut homo non potest esse sapiens, nisi per
the-other as a-man not can to-be wise except through
sapientiam. Sicut namque summa sapientia semper sapit per
wisdom as for the-highest wisdom always is-wise through
se; ita summa essentia semper est per se. Est autem
itself so the-highest essence always is through itself is moreover

perfecte summa essentia Pater, et perfecte summa essentia
perfectly highest essence the-Father and perfectly highest essence
Filius; pariter ergo perfectus Pater per se est, et
the-Son equally therefore perfect the-Father through himself is and
pariter perfectus Filius per se est, sicut uterque sapit
equally perfect the-Son through himself is as each is-wise
per se. Non enim idcirco minus perfecta est essentia vel
through himself not for therefore less perfect is essence or
sapientia Filius, quia est essentia nata de Patris essentia,
wisdom the-Son because he-is essence born from the-Father's essence
et sapientia de sapientia; sed tunc minus perfecta essentia
and wisdom from wisdom but then less perfect essence
vel sapientia esset, si non esset per se aut non saperet
or wisdom he-would-be if not he-were through himself or not were-wise
per se. Nequaquam enim repugnat ut Filius et per
through himself by-no-means for is-it-repugnant that the-Son both through
se subsistat, et de Patre habeat esse. Sicut enim Pater
himself subsist and from the-Father have to-be as for the-Father
habet essentiam, et sapientiam, et vitam in semetipso; ut
has essence and wisdom and life in himself so-that
non per alienam, sed per suam essentiam sit, per suam
not through another's but through his-own essence he-be through his-own
sapientiam sapiat, per suam vitam vivat; ita gignendo,
wisdom he-be-wise through his-own life he-live so by-begetting
dat Filio essentiam habere, et sapientiam et vitam in
he-gives to-the-Son essence to-have and wisdom and life in
semetipso; ut non per extraneam, sed suam essentiam,
himself that not through a-foreign but his-own essence
sapientiam et vitam subsistat, sapiat et vivat; alioquin non
wisdom and life he-subsist be-wise and live otherwise not
erit idem esse Patris et Filii, nec erit par Patri
will-be the-same to-be of-the-Father and of-the-Son nor will-be equal to-the-Father

Filius: quod quam falsum sit liquidissime superius pervisum
the-Son which how false it-be most-clearly above seen-through
est. Quare non repugnat Filium et subsistere per se,
has-been wherefore not it-is-repugnant the-Son both to-subsist through himself
et esse de Patre; quia hoc ipsum, id est, per se
and to-be from the-Father because this very-thing that is through himself
ipsum posse subsistere, necesse est illum de Patre habere.
himself to-be-able to-subsist necessary it-is him from the-Father to-have
Nam si quis sapiens suam me sapientiam, cujus prius expers
for if some wise-man his-own me wisdom of-which before devoid
essem, doceret, utique hoc ipsa sapientia ejus facere non
I-was should-teach surely this the-very wisdom his to-do not
incongrue diceretur, sed quamvis mea sapientia ab illius
incongruously it-would-be-said but although my wisdom from his
sapientia haberet esse et sapere; tamen cum jam esset,
wisdom should-have to-be and to-be-wise yet when already it-was
nonnisi sua essentia esset, nec saperet nisi seipsa.
only its-own essence it-would-be nor would-it-be-wise except by-itself
Multo igitur magis æterni Patris coæternus Filius, qui sic
much therefore more of-the-eternal Father the-coeternal Son who so
habet a Patre esse, ut non sint duæ essentiæ, per se
has from the-Father to-be that not there-be two essences through himself
subsistit, sapit et vivit. Non igitur sic intelligi potest
subsists is-wise and lives not therefore so to-be-understood it-can
quod Pater Filii, aut Filius Patris sit essentia; quasi
that the-Father of-the-Son or the-Son of-the-Father be the-essence as-if
alter non possit subsistere per se sed per alterum;
the-one not can to-subsist through himself but through the-other
sed ad significandum quam habent communionem summe
but for signifying what they-have community of-the-supremely
simplicis, summeque unius essentiæ, sic congrue dici et
simple and-supremely one essence so fittingly to-be-said and

intelligi potest quia sic est alter idipsum quod alter, ut
to-be-understood it-can that so is the-one that-very-thing which the-other that
alter habeat essentiam alterius. Hac itaque ratione, quoniam
the-one have the-essence of-the-other by-this and-so reason since
utique non aliud est habere essentiam, quam essentiam esse:
surely not other it-is to-have essence than essence to-be
sicut habet alter alterius essentiam, ita est alter alterius
as has the-one of-the-other the-essence so is the-one of-the-other
essentia, id est, idem esse est alteri, quod alteri.
the-essence that is the-same to-be is to-the-one as to-the-other

Quod aptius dici possit Filius essentia Patris, quam Pater essentia Filii: et quod similiter sit Filius Patris virtus, et sapientia, et similia

XLV · THE SON IS BETTER CALLED THE FATHER'S ESSENCE

The Father has his essence from no one but himself, while the Son has his from the Father, the very same essence. So it is more apt to call the Son the Father's essence than the Father the Son's: the phrase says briefly that the Son has the same essence as the Father and has it from him. In the same way the Son is the Father's power, wisdom, truth, and justice.

Quod licet secundum perspectam rationem verum sit, valde
which although according-to the-perceived reason true it-be very
tamen magis congruit Filium dici essentiam Patris,
yet more it-befits the-Son to-be-called the-essence of-the-Father
quam Patrem essentiam Filii, quoniam namque Pater
than the-Father the-essence of-the-Son since for the-Father
a nullo habet essentiam nisi a seipso, non satis apte
from no-one has essence except from himself not enough aptly
dicitur habere essentiam alicujus nisi suam; quia vero Filius
he-is-said to-have the-essence of-anyone except his-own because indeed the-Son

essentiam suam habet a Patre, et eamdem quam habet
essence his-own has from the-Father and the-same which has
Pater, aptissime dici potest habere essentiam Patris.
the-Father most-aptly to-be-said he-can to-have the-essence of-the-Father
Quare quoniam neuter aliter habet essentiam, quam existendo
wherefore since neither otherwise has essence than by-existing
essentia; sicut aptius intelligitur habere Filius Patris
essence as more-aptly is-understood to-have the-Son of-the-Father
essentiam quam Pater Filii, ita convenientius dici
the-essence than the-Father of-the-Son so more-fittingly to-be-called
potest Filius Patris essentia quam Pater Filii. Nam hæc
can the-Son of-the-Father the-essence than the-Father of-the-Son for this
una si fiat prolatio, satis acuta brevitate commendat
one if it-be-made statement enough with-sharp brevity commends
Filium non solum eamdem essentiam habere cum Patre,
the-Son not only the-same essence to-have with the-Father
sed hanc ipsam habere de Patre: ut hoc sit, Filius est
but this very to-have from the-Father so-that this be the-Son is
essentia Patris, quod est, Filius est non differens essentia
the-essence of-the-Father which is the-Son is not differing essence
de Patris essentia, imo de Patre essentia. Similiter
from the-Father's essence nay from the-Father essence similarly
ergo est Filius Patris virtus, et sapientia, seu veritas
therefore is the-Son of-the-Father the-power and wisdom or truth
et justitia; et quidquid summi Spiritus convenit essentiæ.
and justice and whatever of-the-highest Spirit befits the-essence

Quomodo quædam ex his quæ sic proferuntur, aliter quoque possint intelligi

XLVI · ANOTHER SENSE OF THESE PHRASES

Some of these phrases bear another meaning too. The Son is the true Word, the perfect understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of the whole paternal substance, which understands and knows the Father's essence. And he can be called the Father's truth, not only because the Son's truth is the Father's, but because in him is the whole truth of the Father's substance, no imperfect imitation.

Videntur tamen quædam, ex his quæ sic proferri et
they-seem yet certain-things of these which so to-be-brought-forth and
intelligi possunt, aliam quoque non incongruam sub hac ipsa
to-be-understood can another also not incongruous under this very
pronuntiatione intelligentiam suscipere. Liquet enim Filium esse
pronouncement understanding to-take-up it-is-clear for the-Son to-be
verum Verbum, id est perfectam intelligentiam, sive perfectam
the-true Word that is perfect understanding or perfect
totius paternæ substantiæ cognitionem, et scientiam, et
of-the-whole paternal substance knowledge and science and
sapientiam, id est, quæ ipsam Patris intelligit essentiam, et
wisdom that is which the-very of-the-Father understands essence and
cognoscit, et scit, et sapit. Si igitur hoc sensu dicatur Filius
knows and knows and is-wise-in if therefore in-this sense be-called the-Son
Patris intelligentia, et sapientia, et scientia, et cognitio,
of-the-Father the-understanding and wisdom and science and knowledge
sive notitia; quoniam intelligit, sapit, scit et novit
or acquaintance since he-understands is-wise-in knows and is-acquainted-with
Patrem, nequaquam a veritate disceditur. Veritas quoque
the-Father by-no-means from truth there-is-departure the-truth also
Patris aptissime dici potest Filius, non solum eo sensu,
of-the-Father most-aptly to-be-called can the-Son not only in-that sense

quia est eadem Filii veritas quæ est et Patris, sicut jam
that it-is the-same of-the-Son truth which is also of-the-Father as already
perspectum est; sed etiam hoc sensu ut in eo intelligatur
perceived it-has-been but also in-this sense that in him be-understood
non imperfecta quædam imitatio, sed integra veritas paternæ
not an-imperfect certain imitation but the-whole truth of-the-paternal
substantiæ, quia non est aliud quam quod est Pater.
substance because not he-is other than what is the-Father

Quod Filius sit intelligentia intelligentiæ et Veritas veritatis

XLVII · UNDERSTANDING OF UNDERSTANDING, TRUTH OF TRUTH

If the Father's substance itself is understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and truth, then as the Son is the understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and truth of the paternal substance, he is the understanding of understanding, the knowledge of knowledge, the wisdom of wisdom, and the truth of truth.

At si ipsa substantia Patris est intelligentia, et scientia,
but if the-very substance of-the-Father is understanding and science
et sapientia, et veritas, consequenter colligitur quia sicut
and wisdom and truth consequently it-is-gathered that as
Filius est intelligentia, et scientia, et sapientia, et veritas
the-Son is the-understanding and science and wisdom and truth
paternæ substantiæ; ita est intelligentia intelligentiæ,
of-the-paternal substance so he-is the-understanding of-understanding
scientia scientiæ, sapientia sapientiæ, et veritas veritatis.
the-science of-science the-wisdom of-wisdom and the-truth of-truth

Quod et quomodo Filius sit intelligentia vel sapientia memoriæ, et memoria Patris et memoriæ

XLVIII · THE FATHER AS MEMORY, THE SON AS UNDERSTANDING

The highest wisdom remembers itself, and in us the word is born from memory when the mind thinks of itself, so the Father is fittingly understood as memory and the Son as the Word born of it. The highest spirit is its own memory, so the Son is that memory's understanding and, remembering what he understands, memory of memory, as the Father is memory born of none.

De memoria vero quid sentiendum est? an æstimandus
about memory indeed what to-be-thought is-it whether to-be-reckoned
est Filius intelligentia memoriæ, sive memoria Patris, aut
is the-Son the-understanding of-memory or the-memory of-the-Father or
memoria memoriæ? Equidem cum summa sapientia sui
the-memory of-memory truly since the-highest wisdom of-itself
memor esse negari non possit, nihil competentius quam in
mindful to-be to-be-denied not can nothing more-suitable than in
memoria Pater, sicut in Verbo Filius intelligitur; quoniam
memory the-Father as in the-Word the-Son is-understood since
de memoria nasci Verbum videtur, quod clarius in nostra
from memory to-be-born the-Word seems which more-clearly in our
mente percipitur. Quoniam namque mens humana non
mind is-perceived since for the-mind human not
semper se cogitat, sicut sui semper meminit, liquet, cum se
always itself thinks as itself always it-remembers it-is-clear when itself
cogitat, quia verbum ejus nascitur de memoria. Unde apparet
it-thinks that the-word its is-born from memory whence it-appears
quia si semper se cogitaret, semper verbum ejus de memoria
that if always itself it-thought always the-word its from memory
nasceretur. Rem etenim cogitare, cujus memoriam habemus,
would-be-born a-thing for to-think of-which memory we-have

hoc est mente eam dicere; verbum vero rei, est ipsa
this is in-mind it to-say the-word indeed of-the-thing is the-very
cogitatio ad ejus similitudinem ex memoria formata. Hinc
thought to its likeness from memory formed hence
itaque liquido animadverti potest de summa sapientia, quæ
and-so clearly to-be-noticed it-can about the-highest wisdom which
sic semper se dicit, sicut semper sui memor est, quia de
so always itself says as always of-itself mindful it-is that from
æterna memoria ejus coæternum Verbum nascitur. Sicut igitur
eternal memory its the-coeternal Word is-born as therefore
Verbum congrue intelligitur proles; ita memoria, parentis
the-Word fittingly is-understood offspring so memory of-parent
nomen aptissime suscipit. Si ergo proles, quæ omnino de
the-name most-aptly takes-up if therefore the-offspring which altogether from
solo summo Spiritu nata est, proles est memoriæ ejus; nihil
the-sole highest Spirit born is offspring is of-memory his nothing
consequentius, quam quia memoria sua est idem ipse.
more-consequent than that memory his-own is the-same he
Quippe non in eo quod sui memor est, sic est in sua
indeed not in that which of-himself mindful he-is so he-is in his-own
memoria, velut alia res in alia; quemadmodum ea
memory as another thing in another just-as those-things
quæ sic sunt in humanæ mentis memoria, ut non sint
which so are in of-the-human mind the-memory that not they-be
ipsa nostra memoria; sed sic est memor sui, ut ipse
the-very our memory but so he-is mindful of-himself that he
memoria sua sit. Consequitur itaque ut quomodo Filius
memory his-own be it-follows and-so that as the-Son
est intelligentia sive sapientia Patris, ita sit et paternæ
is the-understanding or wisdom of-the-Father so he-be also of-the-paternal
memoriæ. At quidquid Filius sapit, aut intelligit; ejus
memory but whatever the-Son is-wise-in or understands of-it

similiter et meminit. Est igitur Filius memoria Patris, et
similarly also he-remembers he-is therefore the-Son the-memory of-the-Father and
memoria memoriæ, id est, memoria memor Patris, qui est
the-memory of-memory that is memory mindful of-the-Father who is
memoria, sicut est sapientia Patris, et sapientia sapientiæ,
memory as he-is the-wisdom of-the-Father and the-wisdom of-wisdom
id est, sapientia sapiens Patrem sapientiam: et Filius
that is wisdom wise-in the-Father wisdom and the-Son
quidem memoria nata de memoria, sicut sapientia nata de
indeed memory born from memory as wisdom born from
sapientia; Pater vero de nullo nata memoria vel sapientia.
wisdom the-Father indeed from none born memory or wisdom

Quod summus Spiritus se amet

XLIX · THE HIGHEST SPIRIT LOVES ITSELF

Anselm finds nothing more delightful to contemplate in Father and Son than their mutual love. Memory and understanding of anything are idle unless the thing is loved or rejected as reason demands. A rational mind can love itself and the highest spirit because it can remember and understand them, so it would be absurd to deny that the highest spirit loves itself, as it remembers and understands itself.

Sed ecce dum hujus Patris Filiique proprietates
but behold while of-this Father and-Son the-properties
communionemque delectabiliter intueor, nihil delectabilius in
and-community delightedly I-behold nothing more-delightful in
illis contemplandum invenio quam mutui amoris affectum.
them to-be-contemplated I-find than of-mutual love the-affection
Quam enim absurde negetur summus Spiritus se
how for absurdly it-would-be-denied the-highest Spirit himself
amare, sicut sui memor est, et se intelligit! cum et
to-love as of-himself mindful he-is and himself understands since even

mens rationalis et se et illum amare posse convincatur
the-mind rational both itself and him to-love to-be-able is-proved
ex eo, quia sui et illius memor esse, et se et illum
from that that of-itself and of-him mindful to-be and itself and him
intelligere potest: otiosa namque, et penitus inutilis est
to-understand it-can idle for and utterly useless is
memoria et intelligentia cujuslibet rei; nisi, prout ratio exigit,
the-memory and understanding of-any thing unless as reason demands
res ipsa ametur aut reprobetur. Amat ergo seipsum
the-thing itself be-loved or be-rejected loves therefore himself
summus Spiritus; sicut sui meminit, et se intelligit.
the-highest Spirit as himself he-remembers and himself understands

Quod idem amor pariter procedat a Patre et Filio

L · THE LOVE PROCEEDS EQUALLY FROM FATHER AND SON

The highest spirit does not remember and understand itself because it loves itself; it loves itself because it remembers and understands itself, since nothing is loved without being remembered or understood, while much is remembered and understood that is not loved. If the Father is understood as memory and the Son as understanding, the love of the highest spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son equally.

Palam certe est rationem habenti, eum non idcirco sui
plain certainly it-is reason to-one-having him not therefore of-himself
memorem esse aut se intelligere, quia se amat, sed ideo
mindful to-be or himself to-understand because himself he-loves but therefore
se amare, quia sui meminit, et se intelligit; nec eum
himself to-love because himself he-remembers and himself understands nor him
se posse amare, si sui non sit memor, aut se non
himself to-be-able to-love if of-himself not he-be mindful or himself not

intelligat. Nulla enim res amatur, sine ejus memoria aut
he-understand no for thing is-loved without its memory or
intelligentia; et multa tenentur memoria et intelliguntur
understanding and many-things are-held in-memory and are-understood
quæ non amantur. Patet igitur amorem summi Spiritus
which not are-loved it-is-plain therefore the-love of-the-highest Spirit
ex eo procedere, quia sui memor est, et se intelligit.
from that to-proceed that of-himself mindful he-is and himself understands
Quod si in memoria summi Spiritus intelligitur Pater, in
but if in the-memory of-the-highest Spirit is-understood the-Father in
intelligentia Filius manifestum est quia a Patre pariter
the-understanding the-Son manifest it-is that from the-Father equally
et a Filio, summi Spiritus amor procedit.
and from the-Son of-the-highest Spirit the-love proceeds

Quod uterque pari amore diligat se, et alterum

LI · EACH LOVES HIMSELF AND THE OTHER EQUALLY

If the highest spirit loves itself, the Father loves himself, the Son loves himself, and each loves the other, since each singly is the highest spirit and both together are one spirit. As each remembers and understands himself and the other equally, and what loves and is loved is the same in both, each loves himself and the other with equal love.

Sed si se amat summus Spiritus, procul dubio se amat
but if himself loves the-highest Spirit without doubt himself loves
Pater, amat se Filius, et alter alterum; quia singulus
the-Father loves himself the-Son and the-one the-other because singly
Pater est summus Spiritus, et singulus Filius, summus
the-Father is the-highest Spirit and singly the-Son the-highest
Spiritus; et ambo simul, unus spiritus. Et quia uterque
Spirit and both together one spirit and because each

pariter sui et alterius meminit, et se et alterum
equally himself and the-other remembers and himself and the-other
intelligit: et quoniam omnino idipsum est quod amat,
understands and since altogether that-very-thing it-is which loves
vel amatur in Patre, et quod in Filio necesse est ut
or is-loved in the-Father and which in the-Son necessary it-is that
pari amore uterque diligat se et alterum.
by-equal love each love himself and the-other

Quod tantus sit iste amor, quantus est ipse summus Spiritus

LII · THE LOVE IS AS GREAT AS THE HIGHEST SPIRIT

How great is this love, common to Father and Son! The highest spirit loves itself as much as it remembers and understands itself, and it remembers and understands itself to the full measure of its essence. So its love is as great as the highest spirit itself.

Quantus ergo est amor iste summi Spiritus, sic communis
how-great therefore is love this of-the-highest Spirit so common
Patri et Filio! Sed si se tantum diligit, quantum sui
to-the-Father and the-Son but if himself so-much he-loves as-much-as himself
meminit et se intelligit: tantum autem sui memor est
he-remembers and himself understands so-much moreover of-himself mindful he-is
et intelligit se, quanta est ejus essentia, quod aliter esse
and understands himself as-great-as is his essence which otherwise to-be
non potest: profecto tantus est amor ejus, quantus ipse est.
not can surely so-great is love his as-great-as he is

Quod idem amor sit idipsum quod est summus Spiritus; et tamen ipse sit cum Patre et Filio unus spiritus

LIII · THE LOVE IS THE HIGHEST SPIRIT

Nothing can equal the highest spirit but the highest spirit, so this love is the highest spirit. Even with no creature at all, Father and Son would love themselves and each other. So the love is what the Father and Son are, the highest essence, and since there cannot be several highest essences, Father, Son, and their love are one highest essence: the highest wisdom, the highest truth, and the highest good.

Verum quid potest esse par summo Spiritui, nisi summus
but what can to-be equal to-the-highest Spirit except the-highest
Spiritus? Iste itaque amor est summus Spiritus. Denique si
Spirit this and-so love is the-highest Spirit finally if
nulla unquam creatura, id est si nihil unquam aliud esset
no ever creature that is if nothing ever other were
quam summus Spiritus, Pater et Filius nihilominus seipsos et
than the-highest Spirit Father and Son nonetheless themselves and
invicem Pater et Filius diligerent. Consequitur itaque hunc
one-another the-Father and the-Son would-love it-follows and-so this
amorem non esse aliud quam quod est Pater et Filius, quod
love not to-be other than what is the-Father and the-Son which
est summa essentia. At quoniam summæ essentiæ plures esse
is the-highest essence but since highest essences many to-be
non possunt, quid magis necessarium quam Patrem et Filium,
not can what more necessary than the-Father and the-Son
et utriusque amorem unam esse summam essentiam? Est igitur
and of-both the-love one to-be highest essence is therefore
idem amor summa sapientia, summa veritas, summum bonum,
the-same love highest wisdom highest truth highest good
et quidquid de summi Spiritus substantia dici potest.
and whatever about of-the-highest Spirit the-substance to-be-said can

Quod totus procedat a Patre, totus a Filio; et tamen non sit nisi unus amor

LIV · ONE LOVE, WHOLLY FROM EACH

Are there two loves, one from each, or one proceeding partly from each? The love proceeds not from what makes Father and Son two, their relations, but from what makes them one, their essence. So as each is the highest spirit and both are one spirit, the whole love flows from the Father and the whole from the Son, and from both together not two wholes but one.

Intuendum est diligenter utrum sint duo amores, unus a
to-be-observed it-is diligently whether there-be two loves one from
Patre procedens, alter a Filio: an unus, non totus ab
the-Father proceeding the-other from the-Son or one not whole from
uno procedens, sed partim a Patre, partim a Filio: an
one proceeding but partly from the-Father partly from the-Son or
nec plures, nec unus partim procedens a singulis, sed unus
neither many nor one partly proceeding from each but one
totus a singulis, et idem totus a duobus simul. Sed
whole from each and the-same whole from the-two at-once but
hujusmodi dubitationis certitudo hinc indubitanter cognoscitur,
of-this-kind of-doubt the-certainty hence undoubtedly is-known
quia non ex eo procedit, in quo plures sunt Pater et Filius,
that not from that it-proceeds in which many are the-Father and the-Son
sed ex eo in quo unum sunt. Nam non ex relationibus
but from that in which one they-are for not from relations
suis, quæ plures sunt, alia est enim relatio Patris, alia
their-own which many are other is for the-relation of-the-Father other
Filii; sed ex ipsa sua essentia, quæ pluralitatem non
of-the-Son but from the-very their-own essence which plurality not
admittit, emittunt Pater et Filius tantum pariter bonum.
admits send-forth the-Father and the-Son so-great equally a-good

Sicut ergo singulus Pater est summus Spiritus et singulus
as therefore singly the-Father is the-highest Spirit and singly
Filius est summus Spiritus et simul Pater et Filius non
the-Son is the-highest Spirit and together the-Father and the-Son not
duo, sed unus spiritus; ita a singulo Patre manat totus
two but one spirit so from the-single Father flows the-whole
amor summi Spiritus et a singulo Filio totus; et simul
love of-the-highest Spirit and from the-single Son whole and together
a Patre et Filio non duo toti, sed unus idemque totus.
from the-Father and the-Son not two wholes but one and-the-same whole

Quod non sit eorum Filius amor

LV · THE LOVE IS NOT THEIR SON

The love has its being from Father and Son and is wholly what they are, but it is not their son. The Word shows itself offspring at once by bearing its parent's image; the love shows no such plain likeness. If it were offspring, one would be its father and the other its mother, or both its father or both its mother. But it proceeds from each in the same way, and no nature shows two things standing equally as father or mother to one.

Quid ergo? cum hic amor pariter habeat esse a Patre et
what therefore since this love equally have to-be from the-Father and
Filio, et sic similis sit ambobus ut nullatenus dissimilis sit
the-Son and so like be to-both that in-no-way unlike it-be
illis, sed omnino idem sit quod illi: nunquid Filius eorum,
to-them but altogether the-same it-be as they surely-not the-Son their
aut proles, æstimandus est? Sed sicut Verbum, mox ut
or offspring to-be-reckoned is-it but as the-Word soon as
consideratur, se prolem esse ejus, a quo est, evidentissime
it-is-considered itself offspring to-be of-him from whom it-is most-evidently

probat, promptam præferendo, parentis imaginem; sic amor
proves ready displaying of-the-parent the-image so love
aperte se prolem negat; quia dum a Patre et Filio
openly itself offspring denies because while from the-Father and the-Son
procedere intelligitur, non statim tam perspicuam exhibet se
to-proceed it-is-understood not at-once so clear it-shows itself
contemplanti ejus, ex quo est, similitudinem, quamvis ipsum
to-one-contemplating of-him from whom it-is the-likeness although it
considerata ratio doceat omnino idipsum esse, quod est Pater
considered reason teach altogether that-very-thing to-be which is the-Father
et Filius. Denique si proles eorum est, aut alter eorum erit
and the-Son finally if offspring of-them it-is either the-one of-them will-be
pater ejus, alter mater; aut uterque pater, sive mater est: quæ
father its the-other mother or each father or mother is which
omnia veritati repugnare videntur. Quoniam namque nullatenus
all to-truth to-be-repugnant seem since for in-no-way
aliter a Patre procedit, quam a Filio; nulla veritas patitur
otherwise from the-Father does-it-proceed than from the-Son no truth allows
ut dissimili vocabulo ad illum Pater et Filius referantur:
that by-unlike word to it the-Father and the-Son be-referred
non est igitur alter pater ejus, alter mater. Ut autem duo
not is therefore the-one father its the-other mother that moreover two
aliqua sint, quæ singula perfectam, et nulla consideratione
any-things there-be which singly perfect and in-no consideration
differentem habeant pariter ad aliquid unum, patris aut matris
differing have equally toward something one of-father or of-mother
habitudinem, nulla natura aliquo monstrari concedit exemplo.
relation no nature by-any to-be-shown grants example
Ergo non est uterque, scilicet Pater et Filius, pater aut
therefore not is each namely the-Father and the-Son father or

mater amoris a se manantis. Nequaquam itaque videtur
mother of-the-love from themselves flowing by-no-means and-so does-it-seem
veritati convenire, ut idem amor eorum filius sit aut proles.
to-truth to-agree that the-same love their son be or offspring

Quod solus Pater sit genitor, et ingenitus; solus Filius genitus, solus amor nec genitus, nec ingenitus

LVI · THE FATHER BEGETS, THE SON IS BEGOTTEN, THE LOVE NEITHER

In common speech the love cannot be called wholly unbegotten, since we say heat is begotten of fire, yet it cannot properly be called begotten, as the Word is. So he whose Word it is alone is begetter and unbegotten, being Father and from no other; the Word alone is begotten, being Son and offspring; and only the love of both is neither begotten nor unbegotten, since it is neither son nor offspring, yet it is from another.

Sed videtur tamen amor idem, nec omnino, secundum
but it-seems yet love the-same neither altogether according-to
communis locutionis usum, dici posse ingenitus; nec
of-common speech the-use to-be-called to-be-able unbegotten nor
ita proprie, sicut Verbum, genitus. Solemus enim sæpe dicere
so properly as the-Word begotten we-are-wont for often to-say
aliquid gigni ex ea re de qua existit: ut cum dicimus
something to-be-begotten from that thing from which it-exists as when we-say
splendorem aut calorem gigni ab igne, seu aliquod
splendor or heat to-be-begotten from fire or some
effectum ex causa sua. Secundum hanc igitur rationem,
effect from its cause according-to this therefore reason
amor a summo Spiritu exiens, non omnino asseri
love from the-highest Spirit going-forth not altogether to-be-asserted
potest ingenitus; ita vero proprie, sicut Verbum, dici
can unbegotten so indeed properly as the-Word to-be-called

genitus non potest; quia Verbum verissimam esse prolem, et
begotten not it-can because the-Word most-true to-be offspring and
verissimum filium; amorem vero nullatenus filium aut prolem
most-true son love indeed in-no-way son or offspring
esse, manifestum est. Potest itaque, imo debet dici solus
to-be manifest it-is can and-so nay ought to-be-called alone
ille, cujus Verbum est, genitor et ingenitus; quia solus est
he whose the-Word is begetter and unbegotten because alone he-is
Pater et parens, et nullo modo ab alio est: solum autem
Father and parent and in-no way from another is alone moreover
Verbum genitum, qui solum filius et proles est. Solus vero
the-Word begotten who alone son and offspring is alone indeed
amor utriusque, nec genitus, nec ingenitus, quia nec
the-love of-both neither begotten nor unbegotten because neither
filius est, nec proles est, nec omnino non est ab alio.
son is-it nor offspring is-it nor altogether not it-is from another

Quod amor idem sic sit increatus et creator,
sicut Pater et Filius: et tamen ipse cum illis
non tres, sed unus increatus, et unus creator.
Et quod idem possit dici Spiritus Patris et Filii

LVII · THE LOVE IS UNCREATED AND CREATOR

The love is singly the highest essence, as Father and Son are, and the three together are one highest essence, which made all things. So the love too is uncreated and creator, and the three are one uncreated and one creator. Father and Son neither make nor beget their love but, if it can be put so, breathe it. So it may fittingly be called their Spirit, a name common to both that shows it is what they are.

Quoniam autem idem amor singulus est summa essentia,
since moreover the-same love singly is the-highest essence
sicut Pater et Filius, et tamen simul Pater, et Filius, et
as the-Father and the-Son and yet together the-Father and the-Son and
utriusque amor non plures, sed una summa essentia, quæ sola
of-both the-love not many but one highest essence which alone
a nullo facta, non per aliud quam per se omnia fecit.
by none made not through another than through itself all-things made
Necesse est ut quemadmodum singulus Pater, et singulus
necessary it-is that just-as the-single Father and the-single
Filius est increatus et creator; ita et amor singulus sit
Son is uncreated and creator so also love singly be
increatus et creator, et tamen omnes tres simul, non plures,
uncreated and creator and yet all three together not many
sed unus increatus et unus creator. Patrem itaque nullus
but one uncreated and one creator the-Father and-so none
facit, sive creat, aut gignit; Filium vero Pater solus gignit,
makes or creates or begets the-Son indeed the-Father alone begets
sed non facit: Pater autem pariter et Filius non faciunt,
but not makes the-Father moreover equally and the-Son not make

neque gignunt; sed quodammodo, si sic dici potest, spirant
nor beget but in-a-way if so to-be-said it-can breathe
suum amorem: quamvis enim non nostro modo spiret
their-own love although for not in-our way breathes
summe incommutabilis essentia, tamen ipsum suum amorem
the-supremely unchangeable essence yet the-very its-own love
a se ineffabiliter procedentem, non discedendo ab illa, sed
from itself ineffably proceeding not by-departing from it but
existendo ex illa, forsitan non alio modo videtur posse
by-existing from it perhaps not in-another way it-seems to-be-able
dici aptius ex se emittere quam spirando. Quod si
to-be-said more-aptly from itself to-send-forth than by-breathing but if
dici potest, sicut Verbum summæ essentiæ Filius est ejus;
to-be-said it-can as the-Word of-the-highest essence the-Son is its
ita ejusdem amor satis convenienter appellari potest Spiritus
so of-the-same the-love enough fittingly to-be-called can the-Spirit
ejus: ut cum essentialiter ipse sit spiritus, sicut Pater
its so-that though essentially he-himself be spirit as the-Father
et Filius, illi non putentur alicujus spiritus; quia nec
and the-Son they not be-thought of-anyone spirit because neither
Pater ab ullo alio est, nec Filius a Patre quasi spirante
the-Father from any other is nor the-Son from the-Father as-if breathing
nascitur; iste autem æstimetur Spiritus utriusque; quia ab
is-born he moreover be-reckoned the-Spirit of-both because from
utroque, suo quodam inenarrabili modo, spirante mirabiliter
each its-own in-certain unspeakable way breathing wonderfully
procedit. Qui etiam ex eo quia est communio Patris
he-proceeds who also from that that he-is the-communion of-the-Father
et Filii, non absque ratione quasi proprium assumere
and of-the-Son not without reason as-if proper to-take-up
posse videtur aliquod nomen, quod Patri Filioque
to-be-able seems some name which to-the-Father and-to-the-Son

commune sit; si proprii nominis exigit indigentia. Quod
common be if of-a-proper name demands the-need which
quidem si fiat, scilicet, ut ipse amor nomine Spiritus,
indeed if it-be-done namely that the-very love by-the-name of-Spirit
quod substantiam pariter Patris et Filii significat, quasi
which the-substance equally of-the-Father and of-the-Son signifies as-if
proprio designetur: ad hoc quoque non inutiliter valebit,
by-a-proper be-designated for this also not uselessly it-will-avail
ut per hoc idipsum esse, quod est Pater et Filius,
that through this that-very-thing to-be which is the-Father and the-Son
quamvis ab illis esse suum habeat, intimetur.
although from them to-be its-own he-have be-intimated

Quod sicut Filius est essentia vel sapientia Patris, eo sensu, quia habet eamdem essentiam vel sapientiam quam Pater; sic idem Spiritus sit Patris et Filii essentia et sapientia, et similia

LVIII · THE SPIRIT AS THEIR ESSENCE AND WISDOM

As the Son is the Father's substance, wisdom, and power, because he has the same essence, wisdom, and power, so the Spirit of both may be understood as the essence, wisdom, or power of the Father and the Son, since he has wholly the same as they have.

Potest quoque quemadmodum Filius est substantia, et sapientia,
can also just-as the-Son is the-substance and wisdom
et virtus Patris, eo sensu quia habet eamdem essentiam,
and power of-the-Father in-that sense that he-has the-same essence
et sapientiam, et virtutem, quam Pater; ita utriusque
and wisdom and power as the-Father so of-both

Spiritus intelligi essentia, vel sapientia, vel virtus Patris
the-Spirit to-be-understood the-essence or wisdom or power of-the-Father
et Filii, quia habet omnino eamdem quam habent illi.
and of-the-Son because he-has altogether the-same which have they

Quod Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus, pariter sint in se invicem

LIX · EACH IS IN THE OTHERS EQUALLY

Father, Son, and Spirit are in one another with such equality that none exceeds another or is without him. The whole Father is in the Son and the common Spirit, the Son in the Father and the Spirit, and the Spirit in both, as the memory of the highest essence is wholly in its understanding and love, and each of these in the others.

Jucundum est intueri in Patre, et Filio et utriusque Spiritu,
pleasant it-is to-behold in the-Father and the-Son and of-both the-Spirit
quomodo sint in se invicem tanta æqualitate ut nullus
how they-be in themselves mutually with-so-great equality that none
alium excedat. Præter hoc enim, quia unusquisque eorum sic
the-other exceeds besides this for that each of-them so
est perfecte summa essentia, ut tamen omnes tres simul non
is perfectly highest essence that yet all three together not
sint nisi essentia una summa, quæ nec sine se vel extra
be except essence one highest which neither without itself or outside
se, nec major vel minor seipsa esse potest: per singulos
itself nor greater or less than-itself to-be can through the-single-ones
tamen idipsum non minus valet probari. Est etenim totus
yet that-very-thing not less avails to-be-proved is for whole
Pater in Filio et communi Spiritu; et Filius in Patre,
the-Father in the-Son and the-common Spirit and the-Son in the-Father
et eodem Spiritu; et idem Spiritus in Patre et Filio;
and the-same Spirit and the-same Spirit in the-Father and the-Son

quia memoria summæ essentiæ tota est in ejus intelligentia
because the-memory of-the-highest essence whole is in its understanding
et in amore, et intelligentia in memoria et in amore, et
and in love and understanding in memory and in love and
amor in memoria et in intelligentia. Totam quippe suam
love in memory and in understanding whole indeed his-own
memoriam summus intelligit Spiritus, et amat; et totius
memory the-highest understands Spirit and loves and of-the-whole
intelligentiæ meminit, et totam amat; et totius amoris
understanding remembers and whole loves and of-the-whole love
meminit, et totum intelligit. Intelligitur autem in memoria
remembers and whole understands is-understood moreover in memory
Pater; in intelligentia Filius; in amore, utriusque Spiritus.
the-Father in understanding the-Son in love of-both the-Spirit
Tanta igitur Pater et Filius, et utriusque Spiritus,
with-so-great therefore the-Father and the-Son and of-both the-Spirit
æqualitate sese complectuntur, et sunt in se invicem
equality one-another embrace and are in themselves mutually
ut eorum nullus alium excedere aut sine eo esse probetur.
that of-them none the-other to-exceed or without it to-be is-proved

Quod nullus eorum alio indigeat ad memorandum, vel intelligendum, vel amandum; quia singulus quisque est memoria, et intelligentia, et amor, et quidquid necesse est inesse summæ essentiæ

LX · NONE NEEDS ANOTHER TO REMEMBER, UNDERSTAND, OR LOVE

The Father is understood as memory, the Son as understanding, and the Spirit as love, yet none needs another, as if the Father could only remember by himself and needed the Son to understand. Each is the highest essence and wisdom, perfect enough to remember, understand, and love by itself. Each singly is essentially memory, understanding, love, and whatever the highest essence must be.

Sed in his nullatenus negligenter memoriæ commendandum,
but in these-things in-no-way negligently to-memory to-be-committed
quod intuenti mihi occurrit, existimo. Sic enim necesse est ut
what observing to-me has-occurred I-reckon so for necessary it-is that
Pater intelligatur memoria, Filius intelligentia, Spiritus amor;
the-Father be-understood memory the-Son understanding the-Spirit love
ut nec Pater indigeat Filio, aut communi Spiritu, nec
that neither the-Father need the-Son or the-common Spirit nor
Filius Patre vel eodem Spiritu, sive idem Spiritus Patre
the-Son the-Father or the-same Spirit or the-same Spirit the-Father
aut Filio; quasi Pater per se meminisse solum possit,
or the-Son as-if the-Father through himself to-remember only can
intelligere autem nonnisi per Filium, et amare nonnisi per
to-understand however only through the-Son and to-love only through
suum Filiique Spiritum; et Filius per se intelligere
his-own and-the-Son's Spirit and the-Son through himself to-understand
tantum queat, per Patrem autem memor sit, et per
only could through the-Father however mindful be-be and through
Spiritum suum amet; et idem Spiritus per se non aliud
the-Spirit his-own love and the-same Spirit through himself not other

quam amare valeat, sed Pater illi sit memor, et Filius
than to-love be-able but the-Father for-him be mindful and the-Son
illi intelligat. Nam cum in his tribus, unusquisque singulus
for-him understand for since in these three each singly
sit summa essentia et summa sapientia sic perfecta, ut ipsa
be highest essence and highest wisdom so perfect that itself
per se memor sit et intelligat, et amet, necesse est ut
through itself mindful it-be and understand and love necessary it-is that
nullus horum trium alio indigeat, aut ad memorandum,
none of-these three another need either for remembering
aut ad intelligendum, aut ad amandum. Singulus enim
or for understanding or for loving singly for
quisque essentialiter est et memoria, et intelligentia, et
each essentially is both memory and understanding and
amor, et quidquid summæ essentiæ necesse est inesse.
love and whatever in-the-highest essence necessary it-is to-be-in

Quod tamen non sint tres, sed unus, seu Pater, seu Filius, seu utriusque Spiritus

LXI · NOT THREE FATHERS, SONS, OR SPIRITS

If the Father is also understanding and love, why is he not Son and Spirit, and so on? Because the Father is not begotten understanding or proceeding love but only begetter and source; the Son is not begetting memory or proceeding love but only begotten, and the one from whom the Spirit proceeds; the Spirit is neither begetting nor begotten but only proceeds. So there is one Father, one Son, and one Spirit in the highest essence.

Quamdam hic video quæstionem occurrere. Nam si Pater ita
a-certain here I-see question to-occur for if the-Father so
est intelligentia et amor, sicut est memoria, et Filius sic est
is understanding and love as he-is memory and the-Son so is
memoria et amor, quomodo est intelligentia; et utriusque
memory and love as he-is understanding and of-both
Spiritus non minus est memoria et intelligentia, quam amor:
the-Spirit not less is memory and understanding than love
quomodo non est Pater, Filius, et alicujus Spiritus; et quare
how not is the-Father Son and of-someone Spirit and why
non est Filius, Pater et alicujus Spiritus, et cur non est
not is the-Son Father and of-someone Spirit and why not is
idem Spiritus, alicujus Pater, et alicujus Filius? sic quippe
the-same Spirit of-someone Father and of-someone Son so indeed
intelligebatur quod memoria esset Pater, Filius intelligentia,
it-was-understood that memory was the-Father the-Son understanding
utriusque Spiritus amor. Verum hæc quæstio non difficile
of-both the-Spirit love but this question not with-difficulty
solvitur, si ea quæ jam ratione inventa sunt considerentur.
is-solved if those-things which already by-reason found were be-considered
Idcirco enim non est Pater Filius, aut alicujus Spiritus,
therefore for not is the-Father Son or of-someone Spirit

licet sit intelligentia et amor; quia non est intelligentia
although he-be understanding and love because not he-is understanding
genita, aut amor ab aliquo procedens; sed quidquid est,
begotten or love from someone proceeding but whatever he-is
gignens est tantum, et a quo procedit alius. Filius quoque
begetting he-is only and from whom proceeds another the-Son also
ideo non est Pater, aut alicujus Spiritus; quamvis seipso
therefore not is Father or of-someone Spirit although by-himself
et memor sit, et amet; quia non est memoria gignens, aut
both mindful he-be and he-love because not he-is memory begetting or
amor ab alio, ad similitudinem sui Spiritus, procedens;
love from another to the-likeness of-himself Spirit proceeding
sed quidquid existit, tantum gignitur, et est a quo Spiritus
but whatever he-exists only is-begotten and he-is from whom the-Spirit
procedit. Spiritum quoque non cogit esse Patrem aut Filium,
proceeds the-Spirit also not compels to-be Father or Son
hoc, quia contentus est memoria aut intelligentia sua, cum
this that content he-is with-memory or understanding his-own since
non sit memoria gignens, aut intelligentia genita, sed solum,
not he-be memory begetting or understanding begotten but only
quidquid est, procedat. Quid igitur prohibet concludi quia
whatever he-is proceed what therefore prevents to-be-concluded that
unus tantum est in summa essentia Pater, unus Filius, unus
one only is in the-highest essence Father one Son one
Spiritus; et non tres Patres, aut Filii, aut Spiritus?
Spirit and not three Fathers or Sons or Spirits

Quomodo ex his tribus plures filii nasci videantur

LXII · HOW MANY SONS MIGHT SEEM TO BE BORN

Each of the three says himself and the other two. Among men there are as many words of a thing as thinkers, and a man's word of an outside thing is born from its likeness in memory, not from the absent thing. But the three are always present to one another, so the one who is said seems to beget his own word, and the highest essence would beget as many sons and spirits as words.

Sed ne forte repugnet huic assertioni quod intueor: nam
but lest perhaps be-repugnant to-this assertion what I-behold for
dubium esse non debet quia Pater, et Filius, et eorum
doubtful to-be not ought that the-Father and the-Son and their
Spiritus, unusquisque seipsum et alios ambos dicit; sicut
Spirit each himself and the-other two says as
se, et alios intelligit. Quod si ita est, quomodo non sunt
himself and the-others he-understands but if so it-is how not are-there
in summa essentia tot verba quot sunt dicentes, et quot
in the-highest essence as-many words as are speakers and as-many-as
sunt qui dicuntur? Si enim plures homines unum aliquid
are who are-spoken if for many men one something
cogitatione dicant, tot ejus videntur esse verba quot sunt
in-thought say so-many its seem to-be words as-many-as are
cogitantes; quia in singulorum cogitationibus verbum ejus
thinkers because in each-one's thoughts the-word of-it
est. Item, si unus homo cogitat aliqua plura, tot verba
is likewise if one man thinks some many-things so-many words
sunt in mente cogitantis quot sunt res cogitatæ. Sed
are in the-mind of-the-thinker as-many-as are things thought but
in hominis cogitatione, cum cogitat aliquid quod extra ejus
in a-man's thought when he-thinks something which outside his

mentem est, non nascitur verbum cogitatæ rei ex ipsa re;
mind is not is-born the-word of-the-thought thing from the-very thing
quia ipsa absens est a cogitationis intuitu, sed ex rei
because it absent is from of-thought the-gaze but from of-the-thing
aliqua similitudine vel imagine, quæ est in cogitantis memoria,
some likeness or image which is in of-the-thinker the-memory
aut forte quæ tunc, cum cogitat, per corporeum sensum ex
or perhaps which then when he-thinks through bodily sense from
re præsenti in mentem attrahitur. In summa vero essentia
the-thing present into the-mind is-drawn in the-highest indeed essence
sic sibi semper sunt præsentes Pater, et Filius, et eorum
so to-themselves always are present the-Father and the-Son and their
Spiritus: est enim, sicut jam perspectum est, unusquisque
Spirit is for as already perceived it-has-been each
non minus in aliis quam in seipso; ut cum invicem se
not less in the-others than in himself that when mutually themselves
dicunt, sic videatur idem ipse, qui dicitur, gignere verbum
they-say so seem the-same he who is-spoken to-beget word
suum, quemadmodum cum a seipso dicitur. Quomodo ergo
his-own as when by himself he-is-spoken how therefore
nihil gignit Filius, aut ejus Patrisque Spiritus; si unusquisque
nothing begets the-Son or his and-the-Father's Spirit if each
eorum verbum gignit suum, cum a seipso dicitur vel ab
of-them word begets his-own when by himself he-is-spoken or by
alio? Quot autem verba probari possunt de summa nasci
another as-many moreover words to-be-proved can from the-highest to-be-born
substantia, tot eam necesse est, secundum superiorem
substance so-many it necessary it-is according-to the-above
considerationem, filios gignere, et tot emittere spiritus.
consideration sons to-beget and so-many to-send-forth spirits

Quomodo non sit ibi nisi unus unius; hoc est, unum Verbum, et ex solo Patre

LXIII · ONLY ONE WORD, AND OF ONE ALONE

Each knows and understands, yet the three are one knower; so each speaks, yet they are one speaker, and what is spoken, their essence, is one. So there is only one Word. Yet it is the Word of one alone: it is the image and Son of the one it is born from, not of itself or of the Spirit proceeding from it. So there is one Father, one Son, and one proceeding Spirit.

Hac itaque ratione videntur in illa esse non solum multi
by-this and-so reason there-seem in it to-be not only many
patres, et filii, et procedentes, sed et aliæ necessitudines;
fathers and sons and proceeding-ones but also other relationships
aut certe Pater, et Filius, et eorum Spiritus, de quibus
or certainly the-Father and the-Son and their Spirit about whom
jam certissimum est quia vere existunt, non sunt tres
already most-certain it-is that truly they-exist not are three
dicentes, quamvis singulus quisque sit dicens; nec sunt
speakers although each singly be speaking nor are
plura, quæ dicuntur, cum unusquisque seipsum, et alios
many-things which are-spoken when each himself and the-other
duos dicit. Sicut enim summæ sapientiæ inest scire et
two says as for in-the-highest wisdom is-in to-know and
intelligere; ita utique æternæ incommutabilisque scientiæ et
to-understand so surely to-eternal and-unchangeable knowledge and
intelligentiæ naturale est, id semper præsens intueri, quod
understanding natural is that always present to-behold which
scit et intelligit. Nihil autem aliud est summo spiritui
it-knows and understands nothing moreover other is for-the-highest spirit
hujusmodi dicere, quam quasi cogitando intueri: sicut nostræ
of-this-kind to-say than as-it-were by-thinking to-behold as of-our

mentis locutio nihil aliud est quam cogitantis inspectio.
mind the-utterance nothing other is than of-the-thinker the-inspection
Certissimum autem jam consideratæ rationes reddiderunt,
most-certain moreover already the-considered reasons have-rendered
quidquid summæ naturæ inest essentialiter, id perfecte
whatever in-the-highest nature is-in essentially that perfectly
convenire Patri, et Filio, et eorum Spiritui, singulatim; et
to-befit the-Father and the-Son and their Spirit singly and
tamen idipsum, si simul dicatur de tribus, non admittere
yet that-very-thing if together it-be-said about the-three not to-admit
pluralitatem. Cum ergo constet quia sicut pertinet ad ejus
plurality since therefore it-be-agreed that as belongs to its
essentiam scientia et intelligentia, sic ejus scire et intelligere
essence knowledge and understanding so its to-know and to-understand
non est aliud quam dicere, id est semper præsens intueri
not is other than to-say that is always present to-behold
quod scit et intelligit: necesse est ut quemadmodum
what it-knows and understands necessary it-is that just-as
singulus Pater, singulus Filius, et singulus eorum Spiritus
singly the-Father singly the-Son and singly their Spirit
est sciens et intelligens, et tamen hi tres simul non sunt
is knowing and understanding and yet these three together not are
plures scientes aut intelligentes, sed unus sciens, et unus
many knowers or understanders but one knower and one
intelligens; ita singulus quisque sit dicens; nec tamen sint
understander so each singly be speaking nor yet be-they
tres dicentes simul, sed unus dicens. Hinc illud quoque
three speakers together but one speaker hence that also
liquide cognosci potest quia, cum hi tres dicuntur, vel
clearly to-be-known can that when these three are-spoken either
a seipsis, vel ab invicem, non sunt plura quæ dicuntur.
by themselves or by one-another not there-are many-things which are-spoken

Quid namque ibi dicitur, nisi eorum essentia? Si ergo illa
what for there is-spoken except their essence if therefore that
una sola est, unum solum est, quod dicitur: ergo si unum
one alone is one alone is which is-spoken therefore if one
solum est in illis, quod dicit, et unum, quod dicitur; una
alone is in them which speaks and one which is-spoken one
quippe sapientia est, quæ in illis dicit, et una substantia
indeed wisdom is which in them speaks and one substance
quæ dicitur: consequitur non ibi esse plura verba, sed
which is-spoken it-follows not there to-be many words but
unum. Licet igitur unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem
one although therefore each himself and all one-another
se dicant, impossibile tamen est in summa essentia esse
themselves say impossible yet it-is in the-highest essence to-be
verbum aliud præter illud, de quo jam constat quod sic
a-word other besides that about which already it-is-agreed that so
nascitur ex eo cujus est Verbum, ut et vera ejus dici
it-is-born from him whose it-is the-Word that both true his to-be-called
possit imago, et vere Filius ejus sit. In quo mirum
it-can image and truly Son his it-be in which a-wonderful
quiddam et inexplicabile video. Ecce enim cum manifestum
something and inexplicable I-see behold for since manifest
sit unumquemque, scilicet Patrem, et Filium, et Patris
it-be each namely the-Father and the-Son and of-the-Father
Filiique Spiritum, pariter se et ambos alios dicere, et
and-Son the-Spirit equally himself and both others to-say and
unum solum ibi esse Verbum; nullatenus tamen ipsum
one alone there to-be Word in-no-way yet the-very
Verbum videtur posse dici Verbum omnium trium, sed
Word seems to-be-able to-be-called the-Word of-all three but
tantum unius eorum. Constat enim ipsum esse imaginem et
only of-one of-them it-is-agreed for it to-be the-image and

Filium ejus cujus est Verbum: et patet quia nec imago,
Son of-him whose it-is the-Word and it-is-plain that neither image
nec Filius suimet, aut a se procedentis Spiritus congrue
nor Son of-itself or from itself proceeding of-the-Spirit fittingly
dici potest. Nam nec ex seipso, nec ex procedente
to-be-called it-can for neither from itself nor from the-one-proceeding
a se, nascitur: nec seipsum, aut procedentem a se,
from itself it-is-born nor itself or the-one-proceeding from itself
existendo imitatur. Seipsum quippe non imitatur, nec a se
by-existing it-imitates itself indeed not it-imitates nor from itself
trahit existendi similitudinem; quia imitatio et similitudo
draws of-existing likeness because imitation and likeness
non est in uno solo, sed in pluribus; illum vero non
not is in one alone but in many him indeed not
imitatur nec ad ejus similitudinem existit, quia iste non
it-imitates nor after his likeness exists because this-one not
habet ab illo esse, sed ille ab isto. Restat igitur hoc
has from that-one to-be but that-one from this-one it-remains therefore this
solum Verbum illius solius esse, de quo nascendo habet
alone Word of-him alone to-be from whom by-being-born it-has
esse, et ad cujus omnimodam similitudinem existit. Unus
to-be and to whose every-way likeness it-exists one
ergo Pater, non plures patres; unus Filius, non plures filii,
therefore Father not many fathers one Son not many sons
unus procedens Spiritus, non plures procedentes spiritus, sunt
one proceeding Spirit not many proceeding spirits are
in summa essentia. Qui cum ita tres sint, ut nunquam
in the-highest essence who though so three they-be that never
Pater sit Filius, aut procedens Spiritus; nec Filius aliquando
the-Father be the-Son or the-proceeding Spirit nor the-Son ever
sit Pater, aut Spiritus procedens; nec unquam Spiritus
be the-Father or the-Spirit proceeding nor ever the-Spirit

Patris et Filii sit Pater, aut Filius, et singulus
of-the-Father and of-the-Son be the-Father or the-Son and each
quisque sic sit perfectus, ut nullo indigeat: id tamen
singly so be perfect that of-nothing be-need that yet
quod sunt, sic est unum; ut sicut de singulis pluraliter
which they-are so is one that as about the-single-ones plurally
dici non potest, ita nec tribus simul. Et cum pariter
to-be-said not it-can so neither of-the-three together and though equally
unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem se dicant; non
each himself and all one-another themselves say not
tamen sunt ibi plura verba, sed unum: et ipsum non
yet there-are there many words but one and it not
singulorum, aut omnium simul, sed unius tantum.
of-each or of-all together but of-one only

Quod hoc licet inexplicabile sit, tamen credendum sit

LXIV · INEXPLICABLE YET TO BE BELIEVED

The secret passes human understanding, and Anselm leaves off explaining it. It is enough that reasoning shows a thing most certainly to be, even if the mind cannot see how, and faith is no less certain of what necessary proofs assert because they cannot be explained. If how the highest wisdom knows what it made is incomprehensible, who could explain how it knows or says itself, or tell the generation of the Son?

Videtur mihi hujus tam sublimis rei secretum transcendere
it-seems to-me of-this so sublime thing the-secret to-transcend
omnem intellectus aciem humani: et idcirco conatum
every of-understanding edge human and therefore the-attempt
explicandi qualiter hoc sit, continendum puto. Sufficere namque
of-explaining how this be to-be-restrained I-think to-suffice for
debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si
to-be-bound I-reckon a-thing incomprehensible for-one-investigating if

ad hoc ratiocinando pervenerit ut eam certissime esse
to this by-reasoning he-will-have-come that it most-certainly to-be
cognoscat; etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu, quomodo ita
he-know even-if to-penetrate he-cannot by-understanding how so
sit: nec idcirco minus his adhibendam fidei certitudinem,
it-be nor therefore less to-these to-be-applied of-faith the-certainty
quæ probationibus necessariis, nulla alia repugnante ratione
which by-proofs necessary no other opposing reason
asseruntur; si suæ naturalis altitudinis incomprehensibilitate
are-asserted if of-their-own natural of-loftiness by-the-incomprehensibility
explicari non patiantur. Quid autem tam incomprehensibile,
to-be-explained not they-allow what moreover so incomprehensible
tam ineffabile, quam id quod supra omnia est? Quapropter
so ineffable as that which above all-things is wherefore
si ea, quæ de summa essentia hactenus disputata
if those-things which about the-highest essence hitherto disputed
sunt, necessariis rationibus sunt asserta, quamvis sic
were by-necessary reasons were asserted although so
intellectu penetrari non possint, ut et verbis valeant
by-understanding to-be-penetrated not they-can that also in-words they-be-able
explicari; nullatenus tamen certitudinis eorum nutat soliditas.
to-be-explained in-no-way yet of-the-certainty of-them totters the-solidity
Nam, si superior consideratio rationabiliter comprehendit
for if the-above consideration rationally comprehended
incomprehensibile esse, quomodo eadem summa sapientia
incomprehensible to-be how the-same highest wisdom
sciat ea quæ fecit, de quibus tam multa nos scire
knows those-things which it-made about which so many-things we to-know
necesse est: quis explicet quomodo sciat aut dicat seipsam,
necessary it-is who would-explain how it-knows or says itself
de qua aut nihil, aut vix aliquid ab homine sciri
about which either nothing or scarcely anything by man to-be-known

possibile est? Ergo si non eo quod seipsam dicit, generat
possible is therefore if not by-that that itself it-says generates
Pater, et generatur Filius: Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?
the-Father and is-generated the-Son the-generation his who will-tell

Quomodo de ineffabili re verum disputatum sit

LXV · HOW THE INEFFABLE WAS TRULY REASONED OF

If the highest essence is ineffable, how can the reasoning be true, when our words keep a common sense foreign to it? But we often speak of a thing through another, as in riddles, or see a face in a mirror. So the reasoning can be true while the essence stays ineffable, signified through another, not by its own property: even the names wisdom and essence only hint at it.

Sed rursum, si ita se ratio ineffabilitatis illius habet, imo
but again if so itself the-account of-ineffability its has nay
quia sic est: quomodo stabit quidquid de illa secundum
because so it-is how will-stand whatever about it according-to
Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus procedentis habitudinem
of-the-Father and of-the-Son and of-the-Spirit proceeding the-relation
disputatum est? Nam si vera illud ratione explicitum est,
disputed has-been for if by-true that reason explained has-been
qualiter est illa ineffabilis? Aut si ineffabilis est, quomodo
how is it ineffable or if ineffable it-is how
est ita, sicut disputatum est? An quodantenus de illa
is-it so as disputed it-has-been or in-a-certain-measure about it
potuit explicari: et ideo nihil prohibet esse verum quod
it-could to-be-explained and therefore nothing prevents to-be true what
disputatum est. Sed quia penitus non potuit comprehendi,
disputed has-been but because utterly not it-could to-be-comprehended
idcirco est ineffabilis. Sed ad illud quid responderi poterit,
therefore is ineffable but to that what to-be-answered will-be-able

quod jam supra in hac ipsa disputatione constitit; quia sic
which already above in this very disputation was-established that so
est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam naturam, ut
is the-highest essence above and outside every other nature that
si quando de illa dicitur aliquid verbis, quæ communia sunt
if ever about it is-said something in-words which common are
aliis naturis, sensus nullatenus sit communis? Quem enim
to-other natures the-sense in-no-way be common what for
sensum in omnibus his verbis, quæ cogitavi, intellexi
sense in all these words which I-have-thought have-I-understood
nisi communem et usitatum? Si ergo usitatus sensus
except the-common and customary if therefore the-customary sense
verborum alienus est ab illa; quidquid ratiocinatus sum, non
of-the-words foreign is from it whatever reasoned I-have not
pertinet ad illam. Quomodo igitur verum est inventum esse
belongs to it how therefore true is-it found to-be
aliquid de summa essentia; si quod est inventum, longe
something about the-highest essence if what has-been found far
diversum est ab illa? Quid ergo? An quodammodo inventum
diverse is from it what therefore or in-a-way found
est aliquid de incomprehensibili re; et quodammodo
has-been something about the-incomprehensible thing and in-a-way
nihil perspectum est de ea? Sæpe namque multa
nothing perceived has-been about it often for many-things
dicimus, quæ proprie sicut sunt non exprimimus; sed per
we-say which properly as they-are not we-express but through
aliud significamus id quod proprie aut nolumus, aut non
another we-signify that which properly either we-will-not or not
possumus depromere, ut cum per ænigmata loquimur. Et
we-can to-bring-forth as when through riddles we-speak and
sæpe videmus aliquid, non proprie quemadmodum res ipsa
often we-see something not properly as the-thing itself

est; sed per aliquam similitudinem aut imaginem, ut cum
is but through some likeness or image as when
vultum alicujus consideramus in speculo. Sic quippe unam
the-face of-someone we-consider in a-mirror so indeed one
eamdemque rem dicimus et non dicimus; videmus et non
and-the-same thing we-say and not we-say we-see and not
videmus: dicimus et videmus per aliud; non dicimus et
we-see we-say and we-see through another not we-say and
non videmus per suam proprietatem. Hac itaque ratione
not we-see through its-own property by-this and-so reason
nihil prohibet et verum esse quod disputatum est hactenus
nothing prevents both true to-be what disputed has-been hitherto
de summa natura; et ipsam tamen nihilominus ineffabilem
about the-highest nature and it yet nonetheless ineffable
persistere: si nequaquam illa putetur per essentiæ suæ
to-persist if by-no-means it be-thought through of-essence its-own
proprietatem expressa, sed utcunque per aliud designata.
the-property expressed but somehow through another designated
Nam, quæcunque nomina de illa natura dici posse
for whatever names about that nature to-be-said to-be-able
videntur, non tam mihi eam ostendunt per proprietatem
seem not so to-me it show through property
quam per aliquam innuunt similitudinem. Etenim cum
as through some they-hint likeness for when
earumdem vocum significationes cogito, familiarius concipio
of-the-same words the-significations I-think more-familiarly I-conceive
mente quod in rebus factis conspicio, quam id quod omnem
in-mind what in things made I-behold than that which every
humanum intellectum transcendere intelligo: nam valde minus
human understanding to-transcend I-understand for very less
aliquid, imo longe aliud in mente mea sua significatione
something nay far other in mind my by-their signification

constituunt, quam sit illud ad quod intelligendum per hanc
they-set than be that to which to-be-understood through this
tenuem significationem mens ipsa mea conatur proficere.
slender signification the-mind itself my strives to-advance
Nam, nec nomen sapientiæ mihi sufficit ostendere illud,
for neither the-name of-wisdom to-me suffices to-show that
per quod omnia facta sunt de nihilo, et servantur a
through which all-things made were from nothing and are-kept from
nihilo; nec nomen essentiæ mihi valet exprimere illud, quod
nothing nor the-name of-essence to-me avails to-express that which
per singularem altitudinem longe est supra omnia, et
through singular loftiness far is above all-things and
per naturalem proprietatem valde est extra omnia. Sic
through natural property very is outside all-things so
ergo illa natura et ineffabilis est; quia per verba, sicuti
therefore that nature both ineffable is because through words as
est nullatenus valet intimari: et falsum non est, si quid
it-is in-no-way it-is-able to-be-intimated and false not it-is if anything
de illa, ratione docente, per aliud velut in ænigmate
about it reason teaching through another as-if in a-riddle
potest æstimari.
can to-be-reckoned

Quod per rationalem mentem maxime accedatur ad cognoscendum summam essentiam

LXVI · THE RATIONAL MIND COMES NEAREST TO KNOWING IT

Since this nature is perceived only through another, the nearer a creature is to it in likeness, the more it helps the mind toward knowledge of it. Of all creatures the rational mind alone can rise to seek it, and it is most like it. So the more the mind studies itself, the more it ascends to knowledge of the highest essence, and the more it neglects itself, the more it falls from that contemplation.

Cum igitur pateat quia nihil de hac natura possit percipi
since therefore it-be-plain that nothing about this nature can to-be-perceived
per suam proprietatem, sed per aliud, certum est quia
through its-own property but through another certain it-is that
per illud magis ad ejus cognitionem acceditur, quod illi
through that more to its knowledge is-approached which to-it
magis per similitudinem propinquat. Quidquid enim inter
more through likeness draws-near whatever for among
creata constat illi esse similius, id necesse est esse natura
created-things it-is-agreed to-it to-be more-like that necessary it-is to-be in-nature
præstantius. Quapropter id et per majorem similitudinem
more-excellent wherefore that both through greater likeness
plus juvat mentem indagantem summæ veritati propinquare;
more helps the-mind investigating to-the-highest truth to-draw-near
et per excellentiorem creatam essentiam plus docet quid
and through more-excellent created essence more teaches what
de creante mens ipsa debeat æstimare. Procul dubio
about the-creating the-mind itself ought to-reckon without doubt
itaque tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto
and-so by-so-much more-loftily the-creating essence is-known by-how-much
per propinquiorem sibi creaturam indagatur. Nam quod
through a-nearer to-itself creature it-is-investigated for that

omnis essentia, inquantum est, intantum sit similis summæ
every essence in-so-far-as it-is so-far be like to-the-highest
essentiæ, ratio jam supra considerata dubitare non permittit.
essence reason already above considered to-doubt not permits
Patet itaque quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes
it-is-plain and-so that as alone is the-mind rational among all
creaturas, quæ ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat; ita
creatures which to its investigation to-rise be-able so
nihilominus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad
nonetheless the-same alone is through which most itself to
ejusdem inventionem proficere queat. Nam, jam cognitum
the-same discovery to-advance can for already known
est quia hæc illi maxime per naturalis essentiæ propinquat
it-is that this to-it most through of-natural essence draws-near
similitudinem. Quid igitur apertius, quam quia mens rationalis
likeness what therefore more-open than that the-mind rational
quanto studiosius ad se discendum intendit; tanto
by-how-much more-earnestly to itself to-be-learned it-attends by-so-much
efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit: et quanto seipsam
more-effectually to its knowledge it-ascends and by-how-much itself
intueri negligit, tanto ab ejus speculatione descendit?
to-behold it-neglects by-so-much from its contemplation it-descends

Quod mens ipsa speculum ejus, et imago ejus sit

LXVII · THE MIND IS ITS MIRROR AND IMAGE

The mind may be called a mirror in which to see the image of what it cannot see face to face. Since it alone can remember, understand, and love itself, it bears a true image of the essence that is memory, understanding, and love in the ineffable Trinity, and a truer one because it can remember, understand, and love that essence. No creature has anything so like the highest wisdom.

Aptissime igitur ipsa sibimet esse velut speculum dici
most-aptly therefore it to-itself to-be as-it-were a-mirror to-be-called
potest, in quo speculetur, ut ita dicam, imaginem ejus quam
can in which it-may-behold as so I-may-say the-image its which
facie ad faciem videre nequit. Nam, si mens ipsa sola ex
face to face to-see it-cannot for if the-mind itself alone of
omnibus quæ facta sunt, sui memor et intelligens et amans
all-things which made were of-itself mindful and understanding and loving
esse potest, non video cur negetur esse in illa vera imago illius
to-be can not I-see why it-be-denied to-be in it a-true image of-that
essentiæ, quæ per sui memoriam, et intelligentiam, et
essence which through of-itself memory and understanding and
amorem in Trinitate ineffabili consistit. Aut certe inde verius
love in the-Trinity ineffable consists or certainly thence more-truly
esse illius se probat imaginem; quia illius potest esse memor,
to-be his itself it-proves image because of-him it-can to-be mindful
illam intelligere et amare. In quo enim major est et illi
him to-understand and to-love in which for greater it-is and to-him
similior, in eo verior illius esse imago cognoscitur. Omnino
more-like in that truer his to-be image it-is-known altogether
autem cogitari non potest rationali creaturæ naturaliter esse
moreover to-be-thought not it-can to-the-rational creature naturally to-be

datum aliquid tam præcipuum, tamque simile summæ sapientiæ
given anything so excellent and-so like to-the-highest wisdom
quam hoc, quia potest reminisci, et intelligere, et amare id
as this that it-can to-remember and to-understand and to-love that
quod optimum et maximum est omnium. Nihil igitur aliud est
which best and greatest is of-all nothing therefore other is
inditum alicui creaturæ quod sic præferat imaginem Creatoris.
implanted in-any creature which so displays the-image of-the-Creator

Quod rationalis creatura ad amandum illam facta sit

LXVIII · THE RATIONAL CREATURE WAS MADE TO LOVE IT

The rational creature should strive for nothing more than to express willingly the image impressed on it by nature. To be rational is to be able to discern just from unjust and good from better, and that power is useless unless it loves and rejects accordingly. So the rational creature was made to love the highest essence above all goods, and to spend all its power and will in remembering, understanding, and loving it.

Consequi itaque videtur quod rationalis creatura nihil tantum
to-follow and-so it-seems that the-rational creature nothing so-much
debet studere, quam hanc imaginem sibi per naturalem
ought to-be-zealous-for as this image on-itself through natural
potentiam impressam, per voluntarium effectum exprimere.
power impressed through voluntary effect to-express
Etenim præter hoc, quod creanti se debet hoc ipsum quod
for besides this that to-the-creator itself it-owes this very-thing which
est: hinc quoque, quia nihil tam præcipuum posse, quam
it-is hence also because nothing so excellent to-be-able than
reminisci et intelligere et amare summum bonum, cognoscitur,
to-remember and to-understand and to-love the-highest good it-is-known

nimirum nihil tam præcipue debere velle convincitur. Quis
doubtless nothing so excellently to-be-bound to-will it-is-proved who
enim neget quæcunque meliora sunt in potestate, ea magis
for would-deny whatever-things better are in power those more
esse debere in voluntate? Denique rationali naturæ non est
to-be to-be-bound in will finally for-the-rational nature not is
aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere justum a non
other to-be rational than to-be-able to-discern just from not
justo, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum
just true from not true good from not good more good
a minus bono: hoc autem posse omnino inutile est illi et
from less good this moreover to-be-able altogether useless is to-it and
supervacuum, nisi quod discernit amet vel reprobet secundum
superfluous unless what it-discerns it-love or reject according-to
veræ discretionis judicium. Hinc itaque satis patenter videtur
of-true discernment the-judgment hence and-so enough plainly it-seems
omne rationale ad hoc existere, ut sicut ratione discretionis
every rational-thing for this to-exist that as by-the-reason of-discernment
aliquid magis, vel minus bonum sive non bonum judicat; ita
something more or less good or not good it-judges so
magis aut minus id amet, aut respuat. Nihil igitur apertius
more or less it it-love or reject nothing therefore more-open
quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam
than the-rational creature for this to-be made that the-highest
essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum
essence it-love above all goods as it is the-highest
bonum: imo ut nihil amet nisi illam, aut propter illam;
good nay that nothing it-love except it or on-account-of it
quia illa est bona per se, et nihil aliud est bonum nisi
because it is good through itself and nothing other is good except
per illam. Amare autem eam nequit, nisi ejus reminisci, et
through it to-love moreover it it-cannot unless it to-remember and

eam studuerit intelligere. Clarum est ergo rationalem
it it-will-have-been-zealous to-understand clear it-is therefore the-rational
creaturam, totum suum posse et velle ad memorandum,
creature whole its-own to-be-able and to-will for remembering
et intelligendum, et amandum summum bonum impendere
and understanding and loving the-highest good to-spend
debere, ad quod ipsum esse suum se cognoscit habere.
to-be-bound to which its-very to-be its-own itself it-knows to-have

Quod anima semper illam amans, aliquando vere beate vivat

LXIX · THE SOUL THAT LOVES IT WILL LIVE BLESSED

The human soul was made to love the highest essence without end, so it must be made to live forever if it keeps to that end. The creator will not take life from a soul while it loves him. Nor would long life be great if lived in fear or suffering, so a soul that always loves the highest good will at last live blessedly, secure from death and every trouble.

Dubium autem non est animam humanam esse rationalem
doubtful moreover not it-is the-soul human to-be a-rational
creaturam: ergo necesse est eam esse factam ad hoc ut
creature therefore necessary it-is it to-be made for this that
amet summam essentiam. Necesse est igitur eam esse factam
it-love the-highest essence necessary it-is therefore it to-be made
aut ad hoc, ut sine fine amet; aut ad hoc, ut aliquando
either for this that without end it-love or for this that sometime
vel sponte, vel violenter hunc amorem amittat. Sed nefas
either of-its-own-accord or violently this love it-lose but wrong
est æstimare summam sapientiam ad hoc eam fecisse, ut
it-is to-reckon the-highest wisdom for this it to-have-made that
aliquando tantum bonum, aut contemnat, aut volens tenere
sometime so-great a-good either it-despise or willing to-hold

aliqua violentia perdat. Restat igitur eam esse ad hoc factam,
by-some violence it-lose it-remains therefore it to-be for this made
ut sine fine amet summam essentiam. At hoc facere non
that without end it-love the-highest essence but this to-do not
potest nisi semper vivat. Sic igitur est facta ut semper vivat,
it-can unless always it-live so therefore is made that always it-live
si semper velit facere ad quod facta est. Deinde inconveniens
if always it-will to-do for which made it-is then unfitting
nimis est summe bono, summeque sapienti, et omnipotenti
too it-is for-the-supremely good and-supremely wise and omnipotent
Creatori, ut quod fecit esse ad se amandum, id faciat
Creator that what he-made to-be for himself to-be-loved that he-make
non esse, quandiu vere amaverit; et quod sponte dedit
not to-be as-long-as truly it-will-have-loved and what freely he-gave
non amanti, ut semper amaret, id auferat vel auferri
not to-it-loving that always it-might-love that be-take-away or to-be-taken-away
permittat amanti, ut ex necessitate non amet; præsertim
permit from-it-loving that from necessity not it-love especially
cum dubitari nullatenus debeat quod ipse omnem naturam
since to-be-doubted in-no-way it-ought that he every nature
se vere amantem amet. Quare manifestum est humanæ
him truly loving loves wherefore manifest it-is from-the-human
animæ nunquam auferri suam vitam, si semper studeat
soul never to-be-taken-away its-own life if always it-strive
amare summam vitam. Qualiter ergo vivet? Quid enim
to-love the-highest life how therefore will-it-live what for
magnum est longa vita, nisi sit a molestiarum incursione
great is a-long life unless it-be from of-troubles the-incursion
vere secura? Quisquis enim dum vivit, aut timendo, aut
truly secure whoever for while he-lives either by-fearing or
patiendo molestiis subjacet, aut falsa securitate fallitur, quid
by-suffering to-troubles lies-under or by-false security is-deceived what

nisi misere vivit? Si quis autem ab his liber vivit,
except wretchedly does-he-live if anyone moreover from these free lives
beate vivit. Sed absurdissimum est ut aliqua natura semper
blessedly he-lives but most-absurd it-is that some nature always
amando illum, qui est summe bonus et omnipotens, semper
by-loving him who is supremely good and omnipotent always
misere vivat. Liquet igitur humanam animam hujusmodi
wretchedly live it-is-clear therefore the-human soul of-this-kind
esse, ut si servet id ad quod est, aliquando vere secura
to-be that if it-keep that for which it-is sometime truly secure
ab ipsa morte et omni alia molestia beate vivat.
from the-very death and every other trouble blessedly it-live

Quod illa se amanti seipsam retribuat ut æterne beata sit

LXX · IT GIVES ITSELF TO THE SOUL THAT LOVES IT

The most just and powerful creator will not leave a persevering lover unrepaid, or he would not distinguish the lover from the despiser. And nothing less than himself would repay love of the highest good: anything else would neither compensate love nor satisfy desire. So the soul that strives rightly will at last enjoy him, seeing face to face what it sees now in a mirror, and will be blessed forever.

Denique nullatenus verum videri potest, ut justissimus et
finally in-no-way true to-seem can-it that the-most-just and
potentissimus nihil retribuat amanti se perseveranter; cui
most-powerful nothing repay to-one-loving him perseveringly to-whom
non amanti tribuit essentiam, ut amans esse posset. Si
not loving he-gave essence that loving to-be it-might-be-able if
enim nihil retribuit amanti, non discernit justissimus inter
for nothing he-repays to-one-loving not discerns the-most-just between
amantem, et contemnentem id quod summe amari debet,
one-loving and one-despising that which supremely to-be-loved ought

nec amat amantem se, aut non prodest ab illo amari: quæ
nor loves one-loving him or not it-profits by him to-be-loved which
omnia ab illo dissonant: retribuit igitur omni se amare
all-things from him are-discordant he-repays therefore to-every-one him to-love
perseveranti. Quid autem retribuit? Si nihilo dedit rationalem
persevering what moreover does-he-repay if to-nothing he-gave rational
essentiam ut amans esset, quid dabit amanti, si amare
essence that loving it-might-be what will-he-give to-one-loving if to-love
non cesset? Si tam grande est quod amori famulatur, quam
not it-cease if so great is what to-love is-servant how
grande est quod amori recompensatur? Et si tale est amoris
great is what to-love is-recompensed and if such is of-love
fulcimentum, quale est amoris emolumentum? Nam, si
the-prop of-what-sort is of-love the-profit for if
rationalis creatura, quæ sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore,
the-rational creature which to-itself useless is without this love
si eminet in omnibus creaturis: utique nihil potest esse
if it-stands-out among all creatures surely nothing can to-be
præmium hujus amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus
the-reward of-this love except what overtops among all
naturis. Etenim ipsum idem bonum, quod sic se amari
natures for the-very same good which so itself to-be-loved
exigit, non minus se ab amante desiderari cogit. Nam quis sic
demands not less itself by the-lover to-be-desired compels for who so
amet justitiam, veritatem, beatitudinem, incorruptibilitatem
would-love justice truth blessedness incorruptibility
ut his frui non appetat? Quid ergo summa bonitas
that them to-enjoy not he-seek what therefore the-highest goodness
retribuet amanti et desideranti se nisi seipsam? Nam
will-repay to-one-loving and desiring itself except itself for
quidquid aliud tribuat, non retribuit; quia nec compensatur
whatever other it-may-give not it-repays because neither is-it-compensated

amori, nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem.
to-love nor does-it-console the-lover nor does-it-sate the-desirer
Aut si se vult amari et desiderari, ut aliud retribuat,
or if itself it-wills to-be-loved and to-be-desired that another-thing it-may-repay
non se vult amari et desiderari propter se, sed propter
not itself it-wills to-be-loved and to-be-desired for itself but for
aliud; et sic non vult se amari, sed aliud: quod cogitare
another and so not it-wills itself to-be-loved but another which to-think
nefas est. Nihil ergo verius quam quod omnis anima
wrong is nothing therefore truer than that every soul
rationalis, si, quemadmodum debet, studeat amando desiderare
rational if as it-ought it-strive by-loving to-desire
summam beatitudinem, aliquando illam ad fruendum percipiat,
the-highest blessedness sometime it for enjoying it-perceive
ut quod nunc videt quasi per speculum et in ænigmate
that what now it-sees as-it-were through a-mirror and in a-riddle
tunc videat facie ad faciem. Utrum autem ea sine fine
then it-see face to face whether moreover it without end
fruatur, dubitare stultissimum est; quoniam illa fruens nec
it-enjoy to-doubt most-foolish is since it enjoying neither
timore torqueri poterit, nec fallaci securitate decipi,
by-fear to-be-tormented will-it-be-able nor by-deceitful security to-be-deceived
nec ejus indigentiam jam experta; illam poterit non
nor of-it the-need now having-experienced it it-will-be-able not
amare; nec illa deseret amantem se, nec aliquid erit
to-love nor it will-desert one-loving itself nor anything will-be
potentius, quod eas separet invitas. Quare quæcunque anima
more-powerful which them may-separate unwilling wherefore whatever soul
summa beatitudine semel frui cœperit, æterne beata erit.
the-highest blessedness once to-enjoy will-have-begun eternally blessed will-be

Quod illam contemnens, æterne misera sit

LXXI · THE SOUL THAT DESPISES IT WILL BE WRETCHED FOREVER

A soul that despises the highest good cannot be punished simply by ceasing to exist, or it would be after its fault as it was before any fault, and justice would not distinguish the greatest guilt from none. So the soul made to love the highest essence, if it despises that love, suffers eternal misery, as the lover rejoices in eternal reward.

Hinc utique consequenter colligitur, quod illa, quæ summi
hence surely consequently it-is-gathered that that which of-the-highest
boni amorem contemnit, æternam miseriam incurret. Nam
good the-love despises eternal misery will-incur for
si dicitur quod pro tali contemptu sic justius puniatur, ut
if it-is-said that for such contempt so more-justly it-be-punished that
ipsum esse, vel vitam perdat; quia se non utitur ad id ad
very to-be or life it-lose because itself not it-uses for that for
quod est facta; nullatenus hoc admittit ratio, ut, post tantam
which it-is made in-no-way this admits reason that after so-great
culpam, pro pœna recipiat esse quod erat ante omnem
guilt for penalty it-receive to-be what it-was before all
culpam. Quippe antequam esset, nec culpam habere, nec
guilt indeed before it-was neither guilt to-have nor
pœnam sentire poterat. Si ergo anima contemnens id ad
penalty to-feel could-it if therefore the-soul despising that for
quod facta est, sic moritur, ut nihil sentiat, aut ut omnino
which made it-is so dies that nothing it-feel or that altogether
nihil sit; similiter se habebit, et in maxima culpa, et sine
nothing it-be similarly itself it-will-have both in the-greatest guilt and without
omni culpa; nec discernet summe sapiens justitia inter
all guilt nor will-distinguish the-supremely wise justice between
id quod nullum bonum potest, et nullum malum vult; et
that which no good can and no evil wills and

id quod maximum bonum potest, et maximum malum vult.
that which the-greatest good can and the-greatest evil wills
At hoc satis patet quam inconveniens sit. Nihil igitur videri
but this enough is-plain how unfitting it-be nothing therefore to-seem
potest consequentius, et nihil credi debet certius,
can more-consequent and nothing to-be-believed ought more-certainly
quam hominis animam sic esse factam, ut si contemnat
than of-man the-soul so to-be made that if it-despise
amare summam essentiam, æternam patiatur miseriam: ut
to-love the-highest essence eternal it-suffer misery that
sicut amans æterno gaudebit præmio, ita contemnens æterna
as loving by-eternal it-will-rejoice reward so despising by-eternal
pœna doleat: et sicut illa sentiet immutabilem sufficientiam,
penalty it-grieve and as that will-feel unchangeable sufficiency
ita ista sentiat inconsolabilem indigentiam.
so this it-feel inconsolable need

Quod omnis anima humana sit immortalis. Et quod aut semper misera, aut aliquando vere beata sit

LXXII · EVERY HUMAN SOUL IS IMMORTAL

If the soul were mortal, the loving soul could not be eternally blessed, nor the despising soul eternally wretched, so it must be immortal. Infants' souls, which seem neither to love nor to despise, share the same nature, so every one is immortal. And since everything living is either never or at some time truly secure from all trouble, every human soul is either always wretched or at some time truly blessed.

Sed nec amantem animam necesse est æterne beatam esse;
but neither the-loving soul necessary it-is eternally blessed to-be
nec contemnentem, miseram, si sit mortalis. Sive igitur amet,
nor the-despising wretched if it-be mortal whether therefore it-love

sive contemnat id ad quod amandum creata est, necesse est
or despise that for which to-be-loved created it-is necessary it-is
eam immortalem esse. Si autem aliquæ sunt animæ rationales,
it immortal to-be if moreover some are souls rational
quæ nec amantes, nec contemnentes judicandæ sint, sicut
which neither loving nor despising to-be-judged be as
esse videntur animæ infantum, quid de his sentiendum
to-be seem the-souls of-infants what about these to-be-thought
est? Sunt mortales, an immortales? Sed procul dubio omnes
is-it are-they mortal or immortal but without doubt all
humanæ animæ ejusdem naturæ sunt. Quare, quoniam constat
human souls of-the-same nature are wherefore since it-is-agreed
quasdam esse immortales, necesse est omnem humanam
some to-be immortal necessary it-is every human
animam esse immortalem. Verum, cum omne quod vivit
soul to-be immortal but since everything which lives
aut nunquam, aut aliquando sit vere securum ab omni
either never or sometime be truly secure from every
molestia; nihilominus est necesse omnem humanam animam
trouble nonetheless it-is necessary every human soul
aut semper miseram esse, aut aliquando vere beatam.
either always wretched to-be or sometime truly blessed

Quod nulla anima injuste privetur summo bono, et quod omnino ad ipsum sit nitendum

LXXIII · NO SOUL IS UNJUSTLY DEPRIVED OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

Anselm thinks it most difficult or impossible for a mortal to grasp which souls love the highest good enough to enjoy it, which despise it enough to lack it forever, and how those that seem to do neither are assigned to eternal blessedness or misery. But it must be held most certainly that the just and good creator deprives no soul unjustly of the good it was made for, and every man must strive toward it with all his heart.

Quæ vero animæ incunctanter judicandæ sint, sic amantes
which indeed souls unhesitatingly to-be-judged be so loving
id, ad quod amandum factæ sunt, ut illo quandoque
that for which to-be-loved made they-are that it at-some-time
frui; quæ autem sic contemnentes, ut illo semper indigere
to-enjoy which moreover so despising that it always to-lack
mereantur, aut qualiter, quove merito illæ, quæ nec
they-deserve or how or-by-what merit those which neither
amantes nec contemnentes dici posse videntur, ad
loving nor despising to-be-called to-be-able seem to
beatitudinem æternam miseriamve distribuantur, aliquem
blessedness eternal or-misery are-distributed any-one
mortalium disputando posse comprehendere, procul dubio vel
of-mortals by-disputing to-be-able to-comprehend without doubt either
difficillimum vel impossibile existimo. Quod tamen a summe
most-difficult or impossible I-reckon that yet by the-supremely
justo summeque bono Creatore rerum nulla eo bono, ad
just and-supremely good Creator of-things none of-that good for
quod facta est, injuste privetur, certissime est tenendum; et
which made it-is unjustly be-deprived most-certainly is to-be-held and

ad idem ipsum bonum est omni homini toto corde,
toward that very good it-is for-every man with-whole heart
tota anima, tota mente amando et desiderando nitendum.
whole soul whole mind by-loving and by-desiring to-be-striven

Quod summa essentia sit speranda

LXXIV · THE HIGHEST ESSENCE IS TO BE HOPED FOR

The human soul cannot exercise itself in this striving if it despairs of reaching its goal. So the hope of attaining is as necessary to it as the effort of striving is useful.

Sed in hac intentione humana anima nullatenus se poterit
but in this intention the-human soul in-no-way itself will-be-able
exercere, si desperet quo intendit se posse pervenire.
to-exercise if it-despair whither it-intends itself to-be-able to-arrive
Quapropter quantum illi est utile studium adnitendi, tantum
wherefore as-much-as to-it is useful the-zeal of-striving so-much
necessaria est spes pertingendi.
necessary is the-hope of-attaining

Quod credendum sit in illam, hoc est, credendo tendendum in illam

LXXV · TO BELIEVE INTO IT

One cannot love or hope for what one does not believe, so the soul must believe the highest essence and what it cannot be loved without, and tend into it by believing. This is said more briefly as believing into it: whoever says so shows that he tends toward it through his faith and believes what belongs to that aim. "Into" fits better than "toward," since one who arrives by tending will remain within it.

Amare autem, aut sperare non potest quod non credit.
to-love moreover or to-hope not it-can what not it-believes
Expedit itaque eidem humanæ animæ summam essentiam,
it-is-expedient and-so for-the-same human soul the-highest essence
et ea sine quibus illa amari non potest, credere,
and those-things without which it to-be-loved not can to-believe
ut illam credendo, tendat in illam. Quod idem apte
that it by-believing it-may-tend into it which same-thing aptly
breviusque significari posse puto, si pro eo quod est
and-more-briefly to-be-signified to-be-able I-think if for that which is
credendo tendere in summam essentiam, dicatur credere
by-believing to-tend into the-highest essence it-be-said to-believe
in summam essentiam. Nam, si quis dicat se credere
into the-highest essence for if anyone say himself to-believe
in illam, satis videtur ostendere, et per fidem quam
into it enough he-seems to-show both through the-faith which
profitetur, ad summam se tendere essentiam, et illa
he-professes to the-highest himself to-tend essence and those-things
se credere, quæ ad hanc pertinent intentionem: nam, non
himself to-believe which to this belong intention for not
videtur credere in illam, sive qui credit quod ad tendendum
he-seems to-believe into it either who believes what for tending

in illam non pertinet, sive qui per hoc quod credit, non
into it not belongs or who through this that he-believes not
ad illam tendit. Et fortasse indifferenter dici potest, credere
to it tends and perhaps indifferently to-be-said it-can to-believe
in illam, et ad illam: sicut pro eodem accipi potest
into it and toward it as for the-same to-be-taken can
credendo tendere in illam et ad illam, nisi quia quisquis
by-believing to-tend into it and toward it except that whoever
tendendo ad illam pervenerit, non extra illam remanebit,
by-tending toward it will-have-arrived not outside it will-remain
sed intra illam permanebit. Quod expressius et familiarius
but within it will-abide which more-expressly and more-familiarly
significatur, si dicitur tendendum esse in illam, quam si
is-signified if it-is-said to-be-tended to-be into it than if
dicitur ad illam. Hac itaque ratione puto congruentius
it-is-said toward it by-this and-so reason I-think more-fittingly
posse dici credendum esse in illam quam ad illam.
to-be-able to-be-said to-be-believed to-be into it than toward it

Quod in Patrem, et Filium, et eorum Spiritum pariter et in singulos, et simul in tres credendum sit

LXXVI · BELIEF INTO FATHER, SON, AND SPIRIT

We must believe equally into the Father, the Son, and their Spirit, into each singly and into the three together, since each is the highest essence and the three are one highest essence, the sole end every man ought to aim at through love alone in every thought and act. As no one can tend into it without believing it, believing it profits no one who does not tend into it.

Credendum igitur est pariter in Patrem, et Filium, et eorum
to-be-believed therefore is equally into the-Father and the-Son and their
Spiritum, et in singulos, et simul in tres; quia et singulus
Spirit and into each-singly and together into the-three because both singly
Pater, et singulus Filius, et singulus eorum Spiritus est
the-Father and singly the-Son and singly their Spirit is
summa essentia: et simul Pater, et Filius, cum suo Spiritu
the-highest essence and together the-Father and the-Son with their-own Spirit
sunt una eademque summa essentia, in quam solam omnis
are one and-the-same highest essence into which alone every
homo debet credere; quia est solus finis, quem in omni cogitatu
man ought to-believe because it-is the-sole end which in every thought
actuque solo per amorem debet intendere. Unde manifestum
and-deed alone through love he-ought to-intend whence manifest
est quia sicut in illam tendere, nisi credat illam, nullus
it-is that as into it to-tend unless he-believe it no-one
potest; ita illam credere, nisi tendat in illam, nulli prodest.
can so it to-believe unless he-tend into it to-no-one profits

Quæ sit viva, quæ mortua fides

LXXVII · LIVING FAITH AND DEAD FAITH

However certain, faith without love is useless and as if dead. Faith that love accompanies is never idle when it has the chance to act, for what loves the highest justice can neither despise anything just nor admit anything unjust. As a man is called blind who lacks the sight he ought to have, faith without love is dead because it lacks what it always ought to have. So living faith believes into what it ought to believe, dead faith only believes it.

Quapropter quantacunque certitudine credatur tanta res,
wherefore with-however-great certainty it-be-believed so-great a-thing
inutilis erit fides, et quasi mortuum aliquid, nisi dilectione
useless will-be faith and as-it-were dead something unless by-love
valeat et vivat. Etenim nullatenus fidem illam, quam
it-be-strong and it-live for in-no-way faith that which
competens comitatur dilectio, si se opportunitas offerat
a-suitable accompanies love if itself the-opportunity offer
operandi, otiosam esse, sed magis se quadam operum exercere
of-working idle to-be but rather itself by-a-certain of-works to-exercise
frequentia, quod sine dilectione facere non posset, vel hoc
frequency which without love to-do not it-could even by-this
solo probari potest; quia quod summam justitiam diligit,
alone to-be-proved it-can because what the-highest justice loves
nihil justum contemnere, nihil valet injustum admittere.
nothing just to-despise nothing is-it-able unjust to-admit
Ergo, quoniam quod aliquid operatur, inesse sibi vitam, sine
therefore since what something works to-be-in itself life without
qua operari non valeret, ostendit: non absurde dicitur et
which to-work not it-could shows not absurdly it-is-said both
operosa fides vivere, quia habet vitam dilectionis sine qua
the-working faith to-live because it-has the-life of-love without which

non operaretur; et otiosa fides non vivere, qui caret vita
not it-would-work and idle faith not to-live which lacks the-life
dilectionis, cum qua non otiaretur. Quare, si cæcus dicitur,
of-love with which not it-would-be-idle wherefore if blind is-called
non tantum qui perdidit visum; sed qui cum debet habere,
not only he-who has-lost sight but who when he-ought to-have
non habet: cur non similiter potest dici fides sine
not has why not similarly can to-be-called faith without
dilectione, mortua; non quia vitam suam, id est, dilectionem
love dead not because life its-own that is love
perdiderit; sed quia non habet quam semper habere debet?
it-has-lost but because not it-has what always to-have it-ought
Quemadmodum igitur illa fides, quæ per dilectionem
just-as therefore that faith which through love
operatur, viva esse cognoscitur; ita illa, quæ per contemptum
works living to-be is-known so that which through contempt
otiatur, mortua esse convincitur. Satis itaque convenienter
is-idle dead to-be is-proved enough and-so fittingly
dici potest viva fides credere in id, in quod credi debet;
to-be-said can living faith to-believe into that into which to-be-believed it-ought
mortua vero fides credere tantum id, quod credi debet.
dead indeed faith to-believe only that which to-be-believed it-ought

Quod tres summa essentia quodammodo dici possit

LXXVIII · HOW THE HIGHEST ESSENCE MAY BE CALLED THREE

Every man should believe into an ineffable threefold unity: one because of one essence, three because of three I know not what, for no one name says what Father, Son, and Spirit are three of. They are not to be thought three persons, since several persons subsist so apart that they are as many substances, as in men. Yet for want of a fitting name one may say one essence and three persons or substances, names more apt than others for plurality, since both are said of individuals.

Ecce patet omni homini expedire ut credat in quamdam
behold it-is-plain for-every man to-be-expedient that he-believe into a-certain
ineffabilem trinam unitatem, et unam Trinitatem: unam
ineffable threefold unity and one Trinity one
quidem et unitatem, propter unam essentiam; trinam
indeed and unity on-account-of the-one essence threefold
vero et trinitatem, propter tres, nescio quid. Licet
indeed and trinity on-account-of three I-know-not what although
enim possim dicere Trinitatem, propter Patrem, et Filium,
for I-can to-say Trinity on-account-of the-Father and the-Son
et utriusque Spiritum, qui sunt tres; non tamen possum
and of-both the-Spirit who are three not yet I-can
proferre uno nomine, propter quid tres; velut si dicerem
to-bring-forth by-one name on-account-of what three as if I-should-say
propter tres personas; sicut dicerem unitatem, propter
on-account-of three persons as I-should-say unity on-account-of
unam substantiam. Non enim putandæ sunt tres personæ;
one substance not for to-be-thought are three persons
quia omnes plures personæ sic subsistunt separatim ab
because all many persons so subsist separately from
invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias, quot sunt
one-another that so-many necessary it-be to-be substances as-many-as are

personæ: quod in pluribus hominibus, qui quot personæ,
persons which in many men who as-many-as persons
tot individuæ sunt substantiæ, cognoscitur. Quare in
so-many individual are substances is-known wherefore in
summa essentia, sicut non sunt plures substantiæ; ita nec
the-highest essence as not are many substances so neither
plures personæ. Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui
many persons if anyone and-so thence should-wish to-someone to-speak
quid tres, dicet esse Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque
what three he-will-say to-be the-Father and the-Son and of-both
Spiritum, nisi forte indigentia nominis proprie convenientis
the-Spirit unless perhaps by-need of-a-name properly befitting
coactus elegerit, aliquod ex illis nominibus, quæ pluraliter
compelled he-will-have-chosen some of those names which plurally
in summa essentia dici non possunt ad significandum id
in the-highest essence to-be-said not can for signifying that
quod congruo nomine dici non potest: ut si dicat illam
which by-a-fitting name to-be-said not can as if he-say that
admirabilem Trinitatem esse unam essentiam, vel naturam; et
admirable Trinity to-be one essence or nature and
tres personas, sive substantias. Nam hæc duo nomina aptius
three persons or substances for these two names more-aptly
eliguntur ad significandam pluralitatem in summa essentia,
are-chosen for signifying plurality in the-highest essence
quia persona non dicitur, nisi de individua rationali natura;
because person not is-said except about an-individual rational nature
et substantia principaliter dicitur de individuis, quæ maxime
and substance principally is-said about individuals which most
in pluralitate subsistunt. Individua namque maxime substant,
in plurality subsist individuals for most stand-under
id est, subjacent accidentibus: et ideo magis proprie nomen
that is lie-under accidents and therefore more properly the-name

substantiæ suscipiunt. Unde jam supra manifestum est
of-substance take-up whence already above manifest it-is
summam essentiam, quæ nullis subjacet accidentibus, proprie
the-highest essence which to-no lies-under accidents properly
non posse dici substantiam; nisi substantia ponatur pro
not to-be-able to-be-called substance unless substance be-put for
essentia. Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiliter
essence it-can therefore by-this of-necessity reason irreprehensibly
illa summa et una Trinitas, sive trina unitas, dici una
that highest and one Trinity or threefold unity to-be-called one
essentia, et tres personæ, sive tres substantiæ.
essence and three persons or three substances

Quod ipsa sit Deus, qui solus omnibus dominatur et omnia regit

LXXIX · IT IS GOD, WHO ALONE RULES ALL THINGS

This highest essence is properly called God, for whoever says that God exists means a substance above every nature, to be worshiped for its dignity and implored in need. It is the supremely good and powerful Spirit who rules and governs all things, from whom, through whom, and in whom all things are. It alone is to be loved and worshiped, and it alone is God, ineffably three and one.

Videtur ergo, imo incunctanter asseritur quia nec nihil est
it-seems therefore nay unhesitatingly it-is-asserted that not-even nothing is
id quod dicitur Deus; et huic soli summæ essentiæ proprie
that which is-called God and to-this alone highest essence properly
nomen Dei assignatur. Quippe omnis qui Deum esse dicit,
the-name of-God is-assigned indeed everyone who God to-be says
sive unum sive plures, non intelligit nisi aliquam substantiam,
whether one or many not understands except some substance

quam censet supra omnem naturam, quæ Deus non est,
which he-judges above every nature which God not is
ab hominibus et venerandam, propter ejus eminentem
by men both to-be-venerated on-account-of its eminent
dignitatem, et exorandam sibi propter quamlibet
dignity and to-be-entreated for-himself on-account-of any
imminentem necessitatem. Quid autem tam pro sua dignitate
impending necessity what moreover so for its dignity
venerandum et pro qualibet re deprecandum, quam summe
to-be-venerated and for any thing to-be-prayed-to as the-supremely
bonus et summe potens Spiritus, qui dominatur omnibus et
good and supremely powerful Spirit who rules over-all-things and
regit omnia? Sicut enim constat quia omnia per summe
governs all-things as for it-is-agreed that all-things through the-supremely
bonam, summeque sapientem omnipotentiam ejus facta sunt et
good and-supremely wise omnipotence his made were and
vigent, ita nimis inconveniens est, si æstimetur quod rebus
thrive so too unfitting it-is if it-be-reckoned that over-the-things
a se factis ipse non dominetur; sive quod factæ ab illo,
by himself made he not rule or that made by him
ab alio minus potente, minusve bono, vel sapiente; aut nulla
by another less powerful or-less good or wise or by-no
penitus ratione, sed sola casuum inordinata volubilitate
utterly reason but by-the-sole of-chances disordered fickleness
regnantur: cum ille solus sit, per quem cuilibet, et sine
they-are-governed since he alone be through whom to-anyone and without
quo nulli bene est, et ex quo, et per quem, et in quo
whom to-none well it-is and from whom and through whom and in whom
sunt omnia. Cum igitur solus sit ipse, non solum bonus
are all-things since therefore alone be he not only good
Creator, sed et potentissimus Dominus et sapientissimus rector
Creator but also most-powerful Lord and most-wise ruler

omnium: liquidissimum est hunc solum esse, quem omnis
of-all most-clear it-is him alone to-be whom every
alia natura, secundum totum suum posse, debet diligendo
other nature according-to whole its-own to-be-able ought by-loving
venerari, et venerando diligere; de quo solo prospera
to-venerate and by-venerating to-love from whom alone prosperous-things
sunt speranda, ad quem solum ab adversis fugiendum, cui
are to-be-hoped to whom alone from adversities it-is-to-be-fled to-whom
soli pro quavis re supplicandum. Vere igitur hic est non
alone for any thing it-is-to-be-prayed truly therefore this is not
solum Deus, sed solus Deus, ineffabiliter trinus et unus.
only God but the-only God ineffably threefold and one

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

De Veritate

On Truth

Prologus

PROLOGUE TO THE THREE DIALOGUES

Anselm names three treatises in question and answer between a student and a teacher, touching the study of Scripture: On Truth, on what truth and justice are; On Freedom of Choice, on what it is and whether man always has it; and one asking in what the devil sinned, titled On the Fall of the Devil. On the Grammarian, written for beginners in dialectic, is left out. He asks that the three be copied in this order.

Tres tractatus pertinentes ad studium sacræ Scripturæ
three treatises pertaining to the-study of-sacred Scripture
quondam feci diversis temporibus, consimiles in hoc quia
once I-made at-diverse times alike in this that
facti sunt per interrogationem et responsionem; et persona
made they-were through question and answer and the-person
interrogantis nomine notatur discipuli, respondentis vero
of-the-questioner by-the-name is-marked of-the-disciple of-the-answerer indeed
nomine magistri. Quartum enim, quem simili modo edidi,
by-the-name of-the-master a-fourth for which in-like manner I-put-forth
non inutilem, ut puto, introducendis ad dialecticam, cujus
not useless as I-think for-those-to-be-introduced to dialectic whose
initium est: De grammatico, quoniam ad diversum ab his
beginning is On the-grammarian since to a-diverse from these
tribus studium pertinet, istis nolo connumerare. Unus
three study it-pertains with-these I-will-not to-number one
horum trium est De veritate: quid, scilicet, sit veritas, et In
of-these three is On truth what namely be truth and in
quibus rebus soleat dici; et quid sit justitia. Alius vero De
what things it-is-wont to-be-said and what be justice another indeed On
libertate arbitrii, quid sit, et utrum eam semper habeat homo;
the-freedom of-choice what it-be and whether it always has man

et quot sint ejus diversitates in habendo, vel non habendo
and how-many be its diversities in having or not having
rectitudinem voluntatis, ad quam servandam est data creaturæ
the-rectitude of-will for which to-be-kept it-is given to-the-creature
rationali; in quo naturalem tantum fortitudinem voluntatis ad
rational in which the-natural only strength of-will for
servandam acceptam rectitudinem; non quomodo necessarium
keeping the-received rectitude not how necessary
ad hoc ipsum illi sit, ut gratia subsequatur, ostendi.
for this very-thing to-it it-be that grace follow I-have-shown
Tertius autem est De quæstione qua quæritur quid peccavit
the-third moreover is On the-question by-which is-asked in-what sinned
diabolus, quia non stetit in veritate: cum Deus non dederit
the-devil because not he-stood in the-truth since God not gave
ei perseverantiam quam nisi eo dante habere non potuit:
to-him perseverance which unless he giving to-have not he-could
quoniam si Deus dedisset, ille habuisset, sicut boni angeli
since if God had-given he would-have-had as the-good angels
habuerunt illam, quia illis dedit Deus. Quem tractatum,
had it because to-them gave-it God which treatise
quamvis ibi de confirmatione bonorum angelorum dixerim,
although there about the-confirmation of-the-good angels I-have-spoken
de casu diaboli titulavi: quoniam illud contingens fuit, quod
on the-fall of-the-devil I-have-titled since that incidental was what
dixi de bonis angelis; quod autem scripsi de malis, ex
I-said about the-good angels what however I-wrote about the-bad from
proposito fuit quæstionis. Qui videlicet tractatus, quamvis nulla
purpose was of-the-question which namely treatises although by-no
continuatione dictaminis cohæreant, materia tamen eorum,
continuity of-composition they-cohere the-matter yet of-them
et similitudo disputationis exigit, ut simul eo, quo illos
and the-likeness of-disputation demands that together in-that in-which them

commemoravi, ordine conscribantur. Licet itaque a quibusdam
I-have-mentioned order they-be-written-down although and-so by certain
festinantibus alio ordine sint conscripti, antequam
hasty-ones in-another order they-were written-down before
perfecti essent, sic tamen eos, ut hic posui, volo ordinari.
finished they-were so yet them as here I-have-placed I-will to-be-ordered

Quod veritas non habeat principium, vel finem

I · THAT TRUTH HAS NO BEGINNING OR END

Since truth is said to be in many things besides God, the student asks whether God is the truth wherever truth is spoken of. He recalls the Monologion's proof that truth has no beginning or end, for otherwise it would have been true that there was no truth, and asks for a definition. The teacher does not remember finding one, but offers to seek it through the things truth is said to be in, and the student promises at least to help by listening.

DISC. Quoniam Deum, veritatem esse credimus, et veritatem in
since God truth to-be we-believe and truth in
multis aliis esse dicimus, vellem scire an ubicunque
many other-things to-be we-say I-would-wish to-know whether wherever
veritas dicitur, Deum eam esse fateri debeamus. Nam tu
truth is-spoken-of God it to-be to-confess we-ought for you
quoque in Monologio tuo per veritatem orationis probas
also in Monologion your through the-truth of-a-statement prove
summam veritatem non habere principium vel finem, dicens:
the-highest truth not to-have beginning or end saying
«Cogitet qui potest, quando incœpit, aut quando non fuit
let-him-think who can when it-began or when not was
hoc verum, scilicet, quia futurum erat aliquid: aut quando
this true namely that future was something or when

desinet, et non erit hoc verum, scilicet, quia præteritum
it-will-cease and not will-be this true namely that past
erit aliquid. Quod si neutrum istorum cogitari potest,
will-be something but if neither of-these to-be-thought can
et utrumque hoc verum sine veritate esse non potest,
and both this true without truth to-be not can
impossibile est vel cogitare quod veritas principium, aut finem
impossible it-is even to-think that truth beginning or end
habeat. Denique si veritas habuit principium, aut habebit
have finally if truth had beginning or will-have
finem, antequam ipsa inciperet, verum erat tunc quia non
end before it-itself began true it-was then that not
erat veritas; et postquam finita erit, verum erit quia
there-was truth and after ended it-will-be true it-will-be that
non erit veritas. Atqui verum non potest esse sine veritate:
not will-be truth but true not can to-be without truth
erat igitur veritas, antequam esset veritas; et erit veritas,
there-was therefore truth before there-was truth and will-be truth
postquam finita erit veritas: quod inconvenientissimum est.
after ended will-be truth which most-unfitting is
Sive igitur dicatur veritas habere, sive intelligatur non
whether therefore it-be-said truth to-have or it-be-understood not
habere principium vel finem, nullo claudi potest veritas
to-have beginning or end by-no to-be-closed can truth
principio vel fine.» Hæc tu in Monologio tuo. Quapropter
by-beginning or end these-things you in Monologion your wherefore
veritatis diffinitionem a te audire exspecto.
of-truth the-definition from you to-hear I-await

MAG. Non memini me invenisse diffinitionem veritatis: sed si
not I-remember me to-have-found a-definition of-truth but if
vis, quæramus per rerum diversitates, in quibus veritatem
you-will let-us-seek through of-things the-diversities in which truth
dicimus esse, quid sit veritas.
we-say to-be what be truth
DISC. Si aliud non potero, vel audiendo juvabo.
if other not I-shall-be-able at-least by-listening I-shall-help

De veritate significationis, et de duabus veritatibus enuntiationis

II · THE TRUTH OF SIGNIFICATION AND OF STATEMENT

A statement is true when what it states is so. Its truth is not the thing stated, which is only its cause, nor the statement or its signification, but its signifying what it ought: its rectitude. Even a false statement signifies what it received the power to signify, so a statement has two rectitudes, one natural and unchanging, the other by use, which common speech calls its truth. The same holds for every sign.

MAG. Quæramus ergo primum quid sit veritas in enuntiatione:
let-us-seek therefore first what be truth in a-statement
quoniam hanc sæpius dicimus veram, vel falsam.
since this more-often we-call true or false
DISC. Quære tu; et quidquid inveneris, ego observabo.
seek you and whatever you-will-have-found I shall-watch
MAG. Quando est enuntiatio vera?
when is a-statement true

DISC. Quando est quod enuntiat, sive affirmando, sive negando:
when is what it-states whether by-affirming or by-denying
dico enim esse quod enuntiat, etiam quando negat esse
I-say for to-be what it-states even when it-denies to-be
quod non est; quia sic enuntiat, quemadmodum res est.
what not is because so it-states as the-thing is
MAG. An ergo tibi videtur quod res enuntiata sit veritas
does therefore to-you it-seem that the-thing stated be the-truth
enuntiationis?
of-the-statement
DISC. Non.
no
MAG. Quare?
why
DISC. Quia nihil est verum, nisi participando veritatem:
because nothing is true except by-participating-in truth
et ideo veri veritas in ipso vero est; res
and therefore of-the-true-thing the-truth in the-very true-thing is the-thing
vero enuntiata non est in enuntiatione vera, unde non ejus
however stated not is in the-statement true whence not its
veritas, sed causa veritatis ejus dicenda est. Quapropter non
truth but the-cause of-truth its to-be-called is wherefore not
nisi in ipsa oratione quærenda mihi videtur ejus veritas.
except in the-very statement to-be-sought to-me seems its truth
MAG. Vide ergo an ipsa oratio, aut ejus significatio, aut
see therefore whether the-very statement or its signification or
aliquid eorum, quæ sunt in diffinitione enuntiationis, sit
something of-those-things which are in the-definition of-statement be
quod quæris?
what you-seek
DISC. Non puto.
not I-think

MAG. Quare.
why

DISC. Quia si hoc esset, semper esset vera; quoniam eadem
because if this were always it-would-be true since the-same
manent omnia, quæ sunt in enuntiationis diffinitione; et
remain all-things which are in of-statement the-definition both
cum est, quod enuntiat, et cum non est: eadem est enim
when is what it-states and when not it-is the-same is for
oratio, et eadem significatio, et cætera similiter.
the-statement and the-same the-signification and the-rest similarly

MAG. Quid igitur tibi videtur ibi veritas?
what therefore to-you seems there truth

DISC. Nihil aliud scio, nisi quia cum significat esse, quod
nothing other I-know except that when it-signifies to-be what
est, tunc est in ea veritas, et est vera.
is then is in it truth and it-is true

MAG. Ad quid facta est affirmatio?
for what made has-been affirmation

DISC. Ad significandum esse, quod est.
for signifying to-be what is

MAG. Hoc ergo debet?
this therefore it-ought

DISC. Certum est.
certain it-is

MAG. Cum ergo significat esse, quod est, significat quod
when therefore it-signifies to-be what is it-signifies what
debet.
it-ought

DISC. Palam est.
plain it-is

MAG. At cum significat quod debet, recte significat.
but when it-signifies what it-ought rightly it-signifies

DISC. Ita est.

so it-is

MAG. Cum autem significat recte, recta est significatio?

when moreover it-signifies rightly right is the-signification

DISC. Non est dubium.

not it-is doubtful

MAG. Cum ergo significat esse quod est, recta est significatio?

when therefore it-signifies to-be what is right is the-signification

DISC. Ita sequitur.

so it-follows

MAG. Item cum significat esse quod est, vera est significatio?

likewise when it-signifies to-be what is true is the-signification

DISC. Vere et recta et vera est, cum significat esse quod est.

truly both right and true it-is when it-signifies to-be what is

MAG. Idem igitur est illi, et rectam, et veram esse, id est, significare esse quod est?

the-same therefore it-is for-it both right and true to-be that is to-signify to-be what is

DISC. Vere idem.

truly the-same

MAG. Ergo non est illi aliud veritas, quam rectitudo.

therefore not is for-it other truth than rectitude

DISC. Aperte nunc video veritatem hanc esse rectitudinem.

openly now I-see truth this to-be rectitude

MAG. Similiter est, cum enuntiatio significat non esse quod non est.

similarly it-is when a-statement signifies not to-be what not is

DISC. Video quod dicis: sed doce me quid respondere possim, si quis dicat quod etiam cum oratio significat esse quod non

I-see what you-say but teach me what to-answer I-can if anyone say that even when the-statement signifies to-be what not

est, significat quod debet: pariter namque accepit significare
is it-signifies what it-ought equally for it-received to-signify
esse et quod est, et quod non est. Nam si non accepisset
to-be both what is and what not is for if not it-had-received
significare esse, etiam quod non est, non id significaret. Quare
to-signify to-be even what not is not that it-would-signify wherefore
etiam cum significat esse quod non est, significat quod debet.
even when it-signifies to-be what not is it-signifies what it-ought
At si quod debet significando, recta et vera est sicut ostendisti;
but if what it-ought by-signifying right and true it-is as you-have-shown
vera est oratio, etiam cum enuntiat esse quod non est.
true is the-statement even when it-states to-be what not is
MAG. Vera quidem non solet dici, cum significat esse quod
true indeed not it-is-wont to-be-called when it-signifies to-be what
non est; veritatem tamen et rectitudinem habet, quia facit
not is truth yet and rectitude it-has because it-does
quod debet. Sed cum significat esse quod est, dupliciter facit
what it-ought but when it-signifies to-be what is doubly it-does
quod debet: quoniam significat et quod accepit significare,
what it-ought since it-signifies both what it-received to-signify
et quod facta est. Sed secundum hanc rectitudinem
and for-what made it-has-been but according-to this rectitude
et veritatem, qua significat esse, quod est usu recta et
and truth by-which it-signifies to-be what is by-usage right and
vera dicitur enuntiatio, non secundum illam, qua significat
true is-called the-statement not according-to that by-which it-signifies
esse, etiam quod non est. Plus enim debet propter quod
to-be even what not is more for it-owes on-account-of what
accepit significationem, quam propter quod non accepit.
it-received signification than on-account-of what not it-received
Non enim accepit significare rem esse, cum non est, vel
not for it-received to-signify a-thing to-be when not it-is or

non esse, cum est; nisi quia non potuit illi dari tunc
not to-be when it-is except because not could to-it to-be-given then
solummodo significare esse, quando est, vel non esse, quando
only to-signify to-be when it-is or not to-be when
non est. Alia igitur est rectitudo et veritas enuntiationis,
not it-is one therefore is the-rectitude and truth of-the-statement
quia significat ad quod significandum facta est: alia
because it-signifies for what to-be-signified made it-has-been another
vero quia significat quod accepit significare. Quippe ista
indeed because it-signifies what it-received to-signify indeed this
immutabilis est ipsi orationi; illa vero, mutabilis: hanc
unchangeable is to-the-very statement that indeed changeable this
namque semper habet; illam vero non semper: istam enim
for always it-has that indeed not always this for
naturaliter habet; illam vero, accidentaliter et secundum
naturally it-has that indeed accidentally and according-to
usum. Nam cum dico: Dies est, ad significandum esse quod
usage for when I-say day it-is for signifying to-be what
est, recte utor hujus orationis significatione: quia ad hoc
is rightly I-use of-this statement the-signification because for this
facta est, et ideo tunc recte dicitur significare. Cum
made it-has-been and therefore then rightly it-is-said to-signify when
vero eadem oratione significo esse quod non est, non ea
indeed by-the-same statement I-signify to-be what not is not it
recte utor: quia non ad hoc facta est; et idcirco tunc
rightly I-use because not for this made it-has-been and therefore then
non recta ejus significatio dicitur: quamvis in quibusdam
not right its signification is-called although in certain
enuntiationibus inseparabiles sint istæ duæ rectitudines, seu
statements inseparable be these two rectitudes or
veritates: ut, cum dicimus: Homo animal est, aut, Homo
truths as when we-say man an-animal is or man

lapis non est. Semper enim hæc affirmatio significat esse
a-stone not is always for this affirmation signifies to-be
quod est; et hæc negatio, non esse quod non est: nec illa
what is and this negation not to-be what not is nor that
possumus uti ad significandum esse quod non est; semper
can-we to-use for signifying to-be what not is always
enim homo animal est; nec ista ad significandum non esse,
for man an-animal is nor this for signifying not to-be
quod est, quia homo nunquam lapis est. De illa igitur
what is because man never a-stone is about that therefore
veritate, quam habet oratio, secundum quod aliquis ea
truth which has the-statement according-to that someone it
recte utitur, incœpimus quærere: quoniam secundum hanc,
rightly uses we-began to-seek since according-to this
veram eam esse judicat usus communis locutionis. De illa
true it to-be judges the-usage of-common speech about that
autem veritate quam non habere non potest, postea dicemus.
however truth which not to-have not it-can afterward we-shall-speak

DISC. Redi igitur ad id quod incœpisti: quoniam sufficienter
return therefore to that which you-began since sufficiently
mihi inter duas veritates orationis discrevisti; si tamen
to-me between the-two truths of-the-statement you-have-distinguished if yet
aliquam eam veritatem ostenderis habere, cum mentitur,
some it truth you-will-have-shown to-have when it-lies
sicut tu dicis.
as you say

MAG. De veritate significationis, de qua incœpimus, interim
about the-truth of-signification about which we-began meanwhile
ista sufficiant. Eadem enim ratio veritatis, quam in
these-things let-suffice the-same for account of-truth which in
propositione vocis perspeximus, consideranda est in omnibus
the-proposition of-voice we-have-perceived to-be-considered is in all

signis, quæ fiunt ad significandum aliquid esse, vel non
signs which are-made for signifying something to-be or not
esse, ut sunt scripturæ, vel digitorum loquela.
to-be as are writings or of-the-fingers speech
DISC. Ergo transi ad alia.
therefore pass to other-things

De veritate opinionis

III · THE TRUTH OF THOUGHT

A thought is called true when what we think is so, and false when it is not. We were given the power to think so that we would think that what is, is, and that what is not, is not. So the truth of thought, like that of a statement, is nothing but its rectitude.

MAG. Cogitationem quoque dicimus veram, cum est quod aut
thought also we-call true when is what either
ratione aut aliquo modo putamus esse, et falsam, cum non
by-reason or in-some way we-think to-be and false when not
est.
it-is
DISC. Ita usus habet.
so usage it-has
MAG. Quid ergo tibi videtur veritas in cogitatione?
what therefore to-you seems truth in thought
DISC. Secundum rationem, quam de propositione vidimus, nihil
according-to the-account which about the-proposition we-saw nothing
rectius dicitur veritas cogitationis, quam rectitudo ejus. Ad
more-rightly is-called the-truth of-thought than rectitude its for
hoc namque nobis datum est posse cogitare esse, vel non esse
this for to-us given it-is to-be-able to-think to-be or not to-be

aliquid: ut cogitemus esse, quod est, et non esse, quod non est.
something that we-may-think to-be what is and not to-be what not is
Quapropter qui putat esse, quod est, putat quod debet, atque
wherefore he-who thinks to-be what is thinks what he-ought and
ideo recta est cogitatio. Si ergo vera et recta est cogitatio,
therefore right is the-thought if therefore true and right is thought
non ob aliud, quam quia putamus esse quod est; aut non
not for another than because we-think to-be what is or not
esse, quod non est: non est aliud ejus veritas, quam rectitudo.
to-be what not is not is other its truth than rectitude

De veritate voluntatis

IV · THE TRUTH OF THE WILL

The Truth himself says the devil did not stand in the truth, which can only mean truth in the will. Had the devil always willed what he ought, he would never have sinned. So truth in the will is rectitude too: to will what one ought, for which the will was given.

MAG. Recte consideras. Sed et in voluntate dicit ipsa Veritas
rightly you-consider but also in the-will says the-very Truth
veritatem esse, cum dicit diabolum non stetisse in veritate.
truth to-be when he-says the-devil not to-have-stood in the-truth
Non enim erat in veritate, neque deseruit veritatem, nisi
not for he-was in the-truth nor did-he-desert the-truth except
in voluntate.
in the-will

DISC. Ita credo. Si enim semper voluisset, quod debuit;
so I-believe if for always he-had-willed what he-ought
nunquam peccasset, qui non, nisi peccando, veritatem
never would-he-have-sinned who not except by-sinning truth
deseruit.
deserted

MAG. Dic ergo quid ibi intelligas veritatem?
say therefore what there you-understand truth

DISC. Non nisi rectitudinem. Nam si quandiu voluit quod
not except rectitude for if as-long-as he-willed what
debuit, ad quod scilicet voluntatem acceperat, in rectitudine
he-ought for which namely will he-had-received in rectitude
et veritate fuit: et cum voluit quod non debuit, rectitudinem
and truth he-was and when he-willed what not he-ought rectitude
et veritatem deseruit: non aliud potest ibi intelligi
and truth he-deserted not other can there to-be-understood
veritas, quam rectitudo; quoniam sive veritas, sive rectitudo,
truth than rectitude since whether truth or rectitude
non aliud in ejus voluntate fuit, quam velle quod debuit.
not other in his will was than to-will what he-ought

De actionis naturalis et non naturalis veritate

V · THE TRUTH OF ACTION, NATURAL AND NOT NATURAL

The Lord sets doing evil against doing the truth, so doing truth is doing well, which is doing what one ought, and the truth of action is rectitude. Fire does it by necessity when it heats; a man does it not by necessity when he does good. "Doing" covers every verb, right willing included. So the truth of action is natural or not natural, and a statement's inseparable truth falls under the natural: "It is day" does truth even when false.

MAG. Bene intelligis. Verum in actione quoque nihilominus
well you-understand but in action also nonetheless
veritas credenda est, sicut Dominus dixit: Quia qui male
truth to-be-believed is as the-Lord said that he-who evil
agit, odit lucem; et: Qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem.
does hates the-light and he-who does the-truth comes to the-light

DISC. Video quod dicis.
I-see what you-say

MAG. Considera igitur quid ibi sit veritas, si potes.
consider therefore what there be truth if you-can

DISC. Nisi fallor, eadem ratione qua supra veritatem in
unless I-am-deceived by-the-same reason by-which above truth in
aliis cognovimus, in actione quoque contemplanda est.
other-things we-came-to-know in action also to-be-contemplated it-is

MAG. Ita est. Nam si male agere, et veritatem facere opposita
so it-is for if evil to-do and truth to-do opposed
sunt, sicut ostendit Dominus cum dicit: Qui male agit odit
are as shows the-Lord when he-says he-who evil does hates
lucem; et: Qui facit veritatem, venit ad lucem; idem est,
the-light and he-who does the-truth comes to the-light the-same is
veritatem facere, quod est, bene facere. Bene namque facere,
truth to-do as is well to-do well for to-do

ad male facere contrarium est. Quapropter si veritatem
to evil to-do contrary is wherefore if truth
facere, et bene facere idem sunt in oppositione, non sunt
to-do and well to-do the-same are in opposition not they-are
diversa in significatione: sed sententia est omnium quia
diverse in signification but the-opinion is of-all that
qui facit quod debet, bene facit, et rectitudinem facit.
he-who does what he-ought well does and rectitude does
Unde sequitur quod rectitudinem facere, est facere veritatem.
whence it-follows that rectitude to-do is to-do truth
Constat namque facere veritatem, esse bene facere; et bene
it-is-agreed for to-do truth to-be well to-do and well
facere, esse rectitudinem facere. Quare nihil apertius quam
to-do to-be rectitude to-do wherefore nothing more-open than
veritatem actionis, esse rectitudinem.
the-truth of-action to-be rectitude

DISC. In nullo video titubare considerationem tuam.
in nothing I-see to-totter consideration your

MAG. Inspice an omnis actio, quæ facit quod debet,
look whether every action which does what it-ought
veritatem facere convenienter dicatur. Est quippe actio
truth to-do fittingly be-said there-is indeed action
rationalis, ut dare eleemosynam; et est irrationalis actio,
rational as to-give alms and there-is irrational action
ut actio ignis, qui calefacit. Vide ergo an convenienter
as the-action of-fire which heats see therefore whether fittingly
dicamus ignem facere veritatem?
we-may-say fire to-do truth

DISC. Si ignis ab eo, a quo habet esse, accepit calefacere,
if fire from him from whom it-has to-be received to-heat
cum calefacit, facit quod debet. Igitur non video quæ
when it-heats it-does what it-ought therefore not I-see what

inconvenientia sit ignem facere veritatem et rectitudinem,
unfittingness there-be fire to-do truth and rectitude
cum facit quod debet.
when it-does what it-ought

MAG. Mihi quoque aliter non videtur. Unde animadverti potest
to-me also otherwise not it-seems whence to-be-noticed it-can
rectitudinem seu veritatem actionis, aliam esse necessariam,
the-rectitude or truth of-action one to-be necessary
aliam non necessariam. Ex necessitate namque ignis facit
another not necessary from necessity for fire does
veritatem et rectitudinem, cum calefacit; et non ex necessitate
truth and rectitude when it-heats and not from necessity
facit homo rectitudinem et veritatem, cum bene facit: facere
does man rectitude and truth when well he-does to-do
autem non solum pro eo quod proprie dicitur facere, sed pro
moreover not only for that which properly is-called to-do but for
omni verbo Dominus voluit intelligere, cum dixit quoniam
every verb the-Lord willed to-understand when he-said that
qui facit veritatem venit ad lucem. Non enim separat
he-who does the-truth comes to the-light not for he-separates
illum ab hac veritate sive luce; qui patitur persecutionem
him from this truth or light who suffers persecution
propter justitiam; aut qui est, quando, et ubi debet esse;
for justice or who is when and where he-ought to-be
aut qui stat, vel sedet, quando debet, et similia. Nullus
or who stands or sits when he-ought and like-things none
namque dicit tales non bene facere. Et cum dicit Apostolus
for says such not well to-do and when says the-Apostle
quia recipiet unusquisque prout gessit, intelligendum ibi
that will-receive each according-as he-has-done to-be-understood there
est quidquid solemus dicere bene facere, vel male facere.
is whatever we-are-wont to-say well to-do or evil to-do

DISC. Usus quoque communis locutionis hoc habet, ut et
the-usage also of-common speech this has that both
pati, et multa alia dicat facere, quæ non sunt facere.
to-suffer and many other-things it-call to-do which not are to-do
Quare rectam quoque voluntatem, de cujus veritate, ante
wherefore right also will about whose truth before
veritatem actionis, supra contemplati sumus, inter rectas
the-truth of-action above contemplated we-have among right
actiones, nisi fallor, computare possumus.
actions unless I-am-deceived to-count we-can

MAG. Non falleris. Nam qui vult quod debet, recte et bene
not you-are-deceived for he-who wills what he-ought rightly and well
facere dicitur, nec ab his qui veritatem faciunt excluditur. Sed
to-do is-said nor from those who truth do is-he-excluded but
quoniam de veritate investigando, illam loquimur, et Dominus
since about truth investigating it we-speak and the-Lord
de illa veritate quæ in voluntate est, specialiter videtur dicere,
about that truth which in will is specially seems to-speak
cum dicit de diabolo quia in veritate non stetit: ideo
when he-says about the-devil that in the-truth not he-stood therefore
separatim quid in voluntate veritas esset, considerare volui.
separately what in will truth were to-consider I-willed

DISC. Placet mihi ita factum esse.
it-pleases me so done to-be

MAG. Cum ergo constet actionis veritatem aliam naturalem
since therefore it-be-agreed of-action the-truth one natural
esse, aliam non naturalem, sub naturali ponenda est illa
to-be another not natural under the-natural to-be-placed is that
veritas orationis, quam supra vidimus ab illa non posse
truth of-statement which above we-saw from it not to-be-able
separari. Sicut enim ignis, cum calefacit, veritatem facit, quia
to-be-separated as for fire when it-heats truth does because

ab eo accepit a quo habet esse: ita et hæc oratio, scilicet,
from him it-received from whom it-has to-be so also this statement namely
dies est, veritatem facit, cum significat diem esse, sive dies
day it-is truth does when it-signifies day to-be whether day
sit, sive dies non sit, quoniam hoc naturaliter accepit facere.
it-be or day not it-be since this naturally it-received to-do
DISC. Nunc primum video in falsa oratione veritatem.
now first I-see in a-false statement truth

De sensuum veritate, et quod falsitas, quæ putatur esse in sensu, sit in opinione

VI · THE TRUTH OF THE SENSES

The student asks about the senses, which seem to deceive. The teacher says the falsity lies in the inner sense's judgment, not in the outer senses: a child fears a carved dragon, glass lends its color to what is seen through it, a stick in water seems broken. The senses report what they can, as they were made to, and so do truth, which belongs under the truth of action.

MAG. Putasne nos præter summam veritatem, omnes sedes
do-you-think us besides the-highest truth all the-seats
invenisse veritatis?
to-have-found of-truth
DISC. Reminiscor nunc cujusdam veritatis, quam in his, de
I-remember now a-certain truth which in these about
quibus tractasti, non invenio.
which you-have-treated not I-find
MAG. Quæ est illa?
what is that

DISC. Est quidem in sensibus corporis veritas, sed non
there-is indeed in the-senses of-the-body truth but not
semper: nam fallunt nos aliquando. Nam cum video
always for they-deceive us sometimes for when I-see
aliquando per medium vitrum aliquid, fallit me visus:
sometimes through an-intervening glass something deceives me sight
quia aliquando renuntiat mihi corpus, quod video ultra
because sometimes it-reports to-me the-body which I-see beyond
vitrum, ejusdem esse coloris cujus est et vitrum, cum
the-glass of-the-same to-be color of-which is also the-glass when
alterius sit coloris: aliquando vero facit me putare vitrum
of-another it-be color sometimes indeed it-makes me to-think the-glass
habere colorem rei, quam ultra video, cum non habeat.
to-have the-color of-the-thing which beyond I-see when not it-has
Multa sunt alia, in quibus visus, et alii sensus fallunt.
many are other-things in which sight and the-other senses deceive
MAG. Non mihi videtur hæc veritas, vel falsitas in sensibus
not to-me it-seems this truth or falsehood in the-senses
esse, sed in opinione. Ipse namque sensus interior se fallit,
to-be but in opinion the-very for sense interior itself deceives
non illi mentitur exterior. Quod aliquando facile cognoscitur,
not to-it lies the-exterior which sometimes easily is-known
aliquando difficile. Cum enim puer timet sculptum draconem
sometimes with-difficulty when for a-boy fears a-carved dragon
aperto ore, facile cognoscitur quia hoc non facit visus,
with-open mouth easily it-is-known that this not does the-sight
qui nihil aliud puero renuntiat, quam senibus, sed puerilis
which nothing other to-the-boy reports than to-old-men but the-boyish
sensus interior, qui nondum bene scit discernere inter rem
sense interior which not-yet well knows to-discern between a-thing
et rei similitudinem. Tale est cum videntes hominem
and of-a-thing the-likeness such it-is when seeing a-man

alicui similem, putamus illum esse cui similis; aut cum
to-someone like we-think him to-be to-whom (he-is)-like or when
audiens quis non hominis vocem, putat esse vocem hominis.
hearing someone not of-a-man the-voice thinks to-be the-voice of-a-man
Nam et hoc facit sensus interior. Quod autem dicis de
for also this does the-sense interior what moreover you-say about
vitro, ideo est, quia cum visus transit per corpus aliquod
the-glass therefore it-is because when the-sight passes through body some
aerei coloris, non aliter impeditur assumere similitudinem
of-airy color not otherwise it-is-hindered to-take-up the-likeness
coloris, quem ultra videt, quam cum transit per aera: nisi
of-the-color which beyond it-sees than when it-passes through air except
inquantum illud corpus, quod transit, spissius, aut obscurius
in-so-far-as that body which it-passes thicker or darker
est aere: ut, cum transit per vitrum sui coloris, id est
is than-air as when it-passes through glass of-its-own color that is
cui nullus alius admistus est color; aut per purissimam
to-which no other admixed is color or through most-pure
aquam, aut per crystallum, aut per aliquid similem habens
water or through crystal or through something like having
colorem. Cum vero transit idem visus per alium colorem,
color when indeed passes the-same sight through another color
ut per vitrum non sui coloris, sed cui alius color est
as through glass not of-its-own color but to-which another color is
additus, ipsum colorem qui prius occurrit accipit. Quapropter,
added that-very color which first meets-it it-receives wherefore
quoniam post unum acceptum colorem, secundum quod illo
since after one received color according-to that by-it
affectus est, alium quicunque occurrat, aut nullatenus, aut
affected it-is another whatever meet-it either in-no-way or
minus integre suscipit: ideo illum quem prius cepit, aut
less wholly it-takes-up therefore that which first it-took either

solum, aut cum eo qui post occurrit, renuntiat. Si enim
alone or with that which afterward meets-it it-reports if for
visus, quantum capax est coloris, tantum afficitur priore
the-sight as-much-as capable it-is of-color so-much is-affected by-the-prior
colore, non potest alium sentire simul colorem: si autem
color not it-can another to-perceive at-once color if however
minus quam colorem sentire possit, priori afficitur, potest
less than color to-perceive it-can by-the-prior it-is-affected it-can
alium sentire: ut, si transit per aliquod corpus velut per
another to-perceive as if it-passes through some body as through
vitrum, quod ita perfecte sit rubicundum, ut omnino ipse
glass which so perfectly be ruddy that altogether the-very
visus afficiatur ejus rubore, nequit diverso simul affici
sight be-affected by-its redness it-cannot by-a-diverse at-once to-be-affected
colore: si autem non tam perfectum invenit ruborem qui
color if however not so perfect it-finds the-redness which
prior occurrit, quantum coloris capax est, quasi nondum
first meets-it as-much-as of-color capable it-is as-if not-yet
plenus, adhuc alium valet assumere colorem, inquantum ejus
full still another it-is-able to-take-up color in-so-far-as its
capacitas priori colore non est satiata. Qui ergo hoc
capacity by-the-prior color not is sated he-who therefore this
nescit, putat visum renuntiare quia omnia quæ post prius
knows-not thinks the-sight to-report that all-things which after the-first
assumptum colorem sentit, aut omnino, aut aliquatenus
taken-up color it-perceives either altogether or in-some-measure
ejusdem sint coloris. Unde contingit ut sensus interior
of-the-same be color whence it-happens that the-sense interior
culpam suam imputet sensui exteriori. Similiter cum fustis
the-fault its-own imputes to-the-sense exterior similarly when a-stick
integer, cujus pars est intra aquam, et pars extra, putatur
whole of-which part is within water and part outside is-thought

fractus: aut cum putamus quod visus noster vultus nostros
broken or when we-think that sight our faces our
inveniat in speculo, et cum multa alia nobis aliter
finds in a-mirror and when many other-things to-us otherwise
videntur visus et alii sensus nuntiare quam sint, non
seem the-sight and other senses to-report than they-are not
culpa sensuum est, qui renuntiant quod possunt, quoniam
the-fault of-the-senses it-is which report what they-can since
ita posse acceperunt; sed judicio animæ imputandum
so to-be-able they-received but to-the-judgment of-the-soul to-be-imputed
est, quod non bene discernit quid possint illi, aut quid
it-is that not well it-discerns what can they or what
debeant. Quod ostendere quoniam laboriosum magis est quam
they-ought which to-show since laborious more it-is than
fructuosum ad hoc quod intendimus, in hoc modo tempus
fruitful for this which we-intend in this manner time
insumendum non arbitror. Hoc tantum sufficiat dicere: quia
to-be-spent not I-judge this only let-suffice to-say that
sensus quidquid renuntiare videantur, sive ex sui natura
the-senses whatever to-report they-seem whether from their nature
hoc faciant, sive ex aliqua alia causa, faciunt quod debent;
this they-do or from some other cause they-do what they-ought
et ideo rectitudinem et veritatem faciunt: et continetur
and therefore rectitude and truth they-do and is-contained
hæc veritas sub illa veritate, quæ est in actione.
this truth under that truth which is in action

DISC. Satisfecisti mihi tua responsione, et nolo te
you-have-satisfied me with-your answer and I-will-not you
amplius morari in hac de sensibus quæstione.
longer to-delay in this about the-senses question

De veritate essentiæ rerum

VII · THE TRUTH IN THE BEING OF THINGS

Whatever exists has what it is from the highest truth and is truly insofar as it is what it is there, so truth is in the being of all things, and no falsity, since what is falsely is not. Nothing ought to be other than it is there, so everything is what it ought to be and is rightly, and the truth of things is their rectitude too.

MAG. Jam considera an præter summam veritatem, in aliqua
now consider whether besides the-highest truth in any
re veritas sit intelligenda, exceptis his quæ supra
thing truth be to-be-understood excepting those-things which above
conspecta sunt.
seen have-been

DISC. Quid illud esse potest?
what that to-be can

MAG. An putas aliquid esse aliquando, aut alicubi, quod non
or do-you-think anything to-be sometime or somewhere which not
sit in summa veritate, et quod inde non acceperit quod est,
be in the-highest truth and which thence not received what it-is
inquantum est: aut quod possit aliud esse, quam quod ibi est?
in-so-far-as it-is or which can other to-be than what there is

DISC. Non est putandum.
not it-is to-be-thought

MAG. Quidquid igitur est vere est, inquantum hoc est quod
whatever therefore is truly is in-so-far-as this it-is which
ibi est.
there is

DISC. Absolute concludere potes quia omne quod est vere
absolutely to-conclude you-can that everything which is truly
est, quoniam non est aliud quam quod ibi est.
is since not it-is other than what there is

MAG. Est igitur veritas in omnium quæ sunt essentia, quia
there-is therefore truth in of-all-things which are the-essence because
hoc sunt quod in summa veritate sunt.
this they-are which in the-highest truth they-are
DISC. Video ita ibi esse veritatem, ut nulla ibi possit esse
I-see so there to-be truth that no there can to-be
falsitas, quoniam quod falso est non est.
falsehood since what falsely is not is
MAG. Bene dicis. Sed dic an aliquid aliud debeat esse,
well you-say but say whether anything other ought to-be
quam quod est in summa veritate?
than what is in the-highest truth
DISC. Non.
no
MAG. Si ergo omnia hoc sunt quod ibi sunt sine dubio
if therefore all-things this are which there they-are without doubt
hoc sunt quod debent.
this they-are which they-ought
DISC. Vere hoc sunt quod debent.
truly this they-are which they-ought
MAG. Quidquid vero est quod debet esse, recte est.
whatever indeed is what it-ought to-be rightly is
DISC. Aliter esse non potest.
otherwise to-be not it-can
MAG. Igitur omne quod est recte est.
therefore everything which is rightly is
DISC. Nihil consequentius.
nothing more-consequent

MAG. Si ergo veritas et rectitudo idcirco sunt in rerum
if therefore truth and rectitude therefore are in of-things
essentia, quia hoc sunt quod sunt in summa veritate,
the-essence because this they-are which they-are in the-highest truth
certum est veritatem rerum esse rectitudinem.
certain it-is the-truth of-things to-be rectitude

De diversis intellectibus, debere, et non debere; posse, et non posse

VIII · THE SENSES OF OUGHT AND OUGHT NOT

The student asks how whatever is ought to be, when many evil deeds ought not to be. The same thing, the teacher answers, ought and ought not to be: what God wisely permits ought to be, but not as regards the wicked will that conceives it, so the innocent Christ ought not to have died, yet ought to, since he willed it wisely. A blow can be right on one side only, pierced flesh ought by nature to feel pain, and "ought," like "can," is sometimes said improperly.

DISC. Nihil planius, quantum ad consequentiam argumentationis.
nothing plainer as-far-as to the-consequence of-the-argument
Sed secundum rei veritatem, quomodo possumus dicere
but according-to of-the-thing the-truth how can-we to-say
quia quidquid est debet esse, cum sint multa opera mala
that whatever is ought to-be since there-be many works evil
quæ certum est esse non debere?
which certain it-is to-be not to-be-bound
MAG. Quid mirum, si eadem res debet esse et non esse?
what wonder if the-same thing ought to-be and not to-be
DISC. Quomodo potest hoc esse?
how can this to-be

MAG. Scio te non dubitare quia nihil omnino est, nisi Deo
I-know you not to-doubt that nothing at-all is except God
aut faciente, aut permittente.
either making or permitting

DISC. Nihil mihi certius.
nothing to-me more-certain

MAG. An audebis dicere quia Deus aliquid faciat aut permittat
or will-you-dare to-say that God anything makes or permits
non sapienter, aut non bene?
not wisely or not well

DISC. Imo assero quia nihil nisi bene et sapienter.
nay I-assert that nothing except well and wisely

MAG. An judicabis non debere esse quod tanta bonitas et
or will-you-judge not to-be-bound to-be what so-great goodness and
tanta sapientia facit, aut permittit?
so-great wisdom makes or permits

DISC. Quis intelligens audeat hoc cogitare?
who understanding would-dare this to-think

MAG. Debet igitur esse pariter, et quod faciente, et quod
ought therefore to-be equally both what making and what
permittente Deo fit.
permitting God is-done

DISC. Patet quod dicis.
it-is-plain what you-say

MAG. Dic etiam: an putas esse debere malæ voluntatis
say also whether you-think to-be to-be-bound of-an-evil will
affectum?
the-effect

DISC. Idem est ac si dicas an debeat esse opus
the-same it-is as if you-should-say whether there-ought to-be a-work
malum: quod nullus sensatus concedet.
evil which no sensible-man will-grant

MAG. Permittit tamen Deus aliquos male facere, quod male
permits however God some evil to-do what evil
volunt.
they-will
DISC. Utinam non tam sæpe permitteret.
would-that not so often he-permitted
MAG. Idem igitur debet esse, et non esse: debet enim esse,
the-same therefore ought to-be and not to-be it-ought for to-be
quia bene et sapienter ab eo, quo non permittente fieri
because well and wisely by him who not permitting to-be-done
non posset, permittitur; et non debet esse, quantum ad
not it-could it-is-permitted and not ought to-be as-far-as to
illum, cujus iniqua voluntate concipitur. Hoc igitur modo
him whose by-wicked will it-is-conceived in-this therefore way
Dominus Jesus, quia solus innocens erat, non debuit mortem
the-Lord Jesus because alone innocent he-was not ought death
pati, nec ullus eam illi debuit inferre; et tamen eam
to-suffer nor anyone it on-him ought to-inflict and yet it
debuit pati, quia ipse sapienter, et benigne, et utiliter
he-ought to-suffer because he wisely and kindly and usefully
voluit eam sufferre. Multis enim modis eadem res suscipit
willed it to-bear in-many for ways the-same thing takes-up
diversis considerationibus contraria: quod in actione sæpe
by-diverse considerations contraries which in action often
contingit, ut in percussione. Percussio namque et agentis
happens as in striking striking for both of-the-agent
est et patientis: unde et actio dici, et passio potest,
is and of-the-patient whence both action to-be-called and passion it-can
quamvis, secundum ipsum nomen, actio vel percussio, et
although according-to the-very name action or striking and
quæ similiter dicta a passivis in activa significatione
the-things-which similarly named from passives in active signification

dicuntur magis videantur esse patientis quam agentis. Quippe
are-said more seem to-be of-the-patient than of-the-agent indeed
secundum id quod agit, magis proprie videntur dici
according-to that which acts more properly seem to-be-called
agentia vel percutientia; et secundum id quod patitur, actio
agency or striking-force and according-to that which suffers action
vel percussio. Nam agentia et percutientia, ab agente et
or striking for agency and striking-force from the-agent and
percutiente dicuntur (sicut providentia a providente, et
the-striker are-named as providence from the-provider and
continentia a continente) quæ scilicet agens et percutiens,
continence from the-continent-one which namely agent and striker
providens et continens, activa sunt; actio vero et percussio,
provider and continent active are action indeed and striking
ab acto et percusso, quæ passiva sunt, derivantur. Sed
from the-acted-on and the-struck which passive are are-derived but
quoniam (ut in uno dicam quod in cæteris intelligas)
since that in one I-may-say what in the-rest you-may-understand
sicut percutiens non est sine percussione, nec percussus
as the-striker not is without striking nor the-struck
absque percutiente, ita percutientia et percussio sine invicem
without the-striker so striking-force and striking without one-another
esse nequeunt; imo una et eadem res est diversis nominibus
to-be cannot nay one and the-same thing it-is by-diverse names
secundum diversas partes significata: idcirco percussio, et
according-to diverse parts signified therefore striking both
percutientis, et percussi esse dicitur. Quapropter secundum
of-the-striker and of-the-struck to-be is-said wherefore according-to
quod agens vel patiens eidem subjacent judicio, vel
that the-agent or the-patient to-the-same lie-under judgment or
contrariis, ipsa quoque actio ex utraque parte similiter
to-contraries the-very also action from each side similarly

judicabitur, aut contrarie. Cum ergo et qui percutit
will-be-judged or contrarily when therefore both he-who strikes
recte percutit, et qui percutitur recte percutitur: ut, cum
rightly strikes and he-who is-struck rightly is-struck as when
peccans, ab eo ad quem pertinet corrigitur, ex utraque
one-sinning by him to whom it-belongs is-corrected from each
parte recta est, quia ex utraque parte debet esse percussio.
side right it-is because from each side ought to-be the-striking
E contrario, quando ab iniquo justus percutitur, quia
from the-contrary when by a-wicked-man a-just-man is-struck because
nec iste percuti, nec ille percutere debet, ex utraque
neither this-one to-be-struck nor that-one to-strike ought from each
parte non recta est, quia ex neutra parte debet esse,
side not right it-is because from neither side ought to-be
percussio. Cum vero peccans ab eo ad quem non pertinet
the-striking when indeed one-sinning by him to whom not it-belongs
percutitur, quoniam et iste debet percuti, et ille non
is-struck since both this-one ought to-be-struck and that-one not
debet percutere, debet et non debet esse percussio: et
ought to-strike it-ought and not ought to-be the-striking and
ideo recta, et non recta negari non potest. Quod si ad
therefore right and not right to-be-denied not it-can but if to
supernæ sapientiæ bonitatisque consideres judicium, sive
of-the-supernal wisdom and-goodness you-consider the-judgment whether
ex altera tantum, sive ex utraque parte, agentis scilicet
from the-other only or from each side of-agent namely
et patientis, non debeat esse percussio: quis audebit negare
and of-patient not ought to-be the-striking who will-dare to-deny
debere esse, quod tanta bonitate et sapientia permittitur?
to-be-bound to-be what by-so-great goodness and wisdom is-permitted

DISC. Neget qui audet, ego vero non audeo.
let-him-deny who dares I indeed not dare

MAG. Quid etiam, si secundum naturam rerum consideres,
what also if according-to the-nature of-things you-consider
ut cum clavi ferrei impressi sunt in corpus Domini: an
as when the-nails iron impressed were into the-body of-the-Lord or
dices fragilem carnem non debuisse penetrari, aut
will-you-say the-frail flesh not to-have-been-bound to-be-pierced or
acuto ferro penetratam non debuisse dolere?
by-sharp iron pierced not to-have-been-bound to-feel-pain
DISC. Contra naturam dicerem.
against nature I-should-say
MAG. Potest igitur contingere ut debeat esse secundum naturam
it-can therefore to-happen that there-ought to-be according-to nature
actio, vel passio, quæ secundum agentem vel patientem esse
an-action or passion which according-to the-agent or the-patient to-be
non debet, quoniam nec ille agere, nec iste debet pati.
not ought since neither that-one to-act nor this-one ought to-suffer
DISC. Nihil horum negare possum.
none of-these to-deny can-I
MAG. Vides igitur sæpissime posse contingere ut eadem actio
you-see therefore very-often to-be-able to-happen that the-same action
debeat esse et non debeat esse, diversis considerationibus.
ought to-be and not ought to-be by-diverse considerations
DISC. Ita aperte hoc ostendis, ut non possim non videre.
so openly this you-show that not I-can not to-see
MAG. Verum inter hæc te scire volo quia debere et
but among these-things you to-know I-will that to-be-bound and
non debere, aliquando dicitur improprie; ut, cum dico
not to-be-bound sometimes is-said improperly as when I-say
quia debeo amari a te. Si enim vere debeo, debitor sum
that I-ought to-be-loved by you if for truly I-ought a-debtor I-am
reddere quod debeo; et in culpa sum, si non amor a te.
to-render what I-owe and in fault I-am if not I-am-loved by you

DISC. Ita sequitur.
so it-follows

MAG. Sed cum debeo amari a te, non est a me exigendum,
but when I-ought to-be-loved by you not it-is from me to-be-demanded
sed a te.
but from you

DISC. Fateri me ita esse oportet.
to-confess me so to-be it-behooves

MAG. Cum ergo dico quia debeo amari a te, non ita dicitur,
when therefore I-say that I-ought to-be-loved by you not so it-is-said
quasi ego aliquid debeam, sed quia tu debes amare me. Similiter
as-if I something ought but because you ought to-love me similarly
cum dico quia non debeo amari a te, non aliud intelligitur,
when I-say that not I-ought to-be-loved by you not other is-understood
quam quia tu non debes amare me. Qui modus loquendi est
than that you not ought to-love me which manner of-speaking is
etiam in potentia et in impotentia, ut cum dicitur: Hector
also in potency and in impotence as when it-is-said Hector
potuit vinci ab Achille, et Achilles non potuit vinci
could to-be-overcome by Achilles and Achilles not could to-be-overcome
ab Hectore. Non enim fuit potentia in illo qui potuit
by Hector not for was power in him who could
vinci, sed in illo qui vincere potuit: nec impotentia in illo
to-be-overcome but in him who to-overcome could nor impotence in him
qui vinci non potuit, sed in illo qui vincere non potuit.
who to-be-overcome not could but in him who to-overcome not could

DISC. Placet mihi quod dicis: quippe utile puto hoc cognoscere.
it-pleases me what you-say indeed useful I-think this to-know

Quod omnis actio significet aut verum aut falsum

IX · EVERY ACTION SIGNIFIES TRUE OR FALSE

Truth of signification reaches beyond signs. Whatever anyone does says that he ought to do it: a man who calls some herbs wholesome but eats others tells you more by his act than by his words. So every action, will, and thought, and even the existence of things, signifies truly or falsely what ought to be.

MAG. Recte putas: sed redeamus ad veritatem significationis,
rightly you-think but let-us-return to the-truth of-signification
a qua ideo incepi, ut te a notioribus ad ignotiora
from which therefore I-began that you from the-better-known to the-less-known
perducerem. Omnes enim de veritate significationis loquuntur:
I-might-lead all for about the-truth of-signification speak
veritatem vero, quæ est in rerum essentia, pauci considerant.
the-truth however which is in of-things the-essence few consider

DISC. Profuit mihi quia hoc ordine me duxisti.
it-has-profited me that in-this order me you-have-led

MAG. Videamus ergo quam lata sit veritas significationis.
let-us-see therefore how wide be the-truth of-signification
Namque non solum in his quæ signa solemus dicere,
for not only in those-things which signs we-are-wont to-call
sed et in aliis omnibus quæ diximus est significatio vera
but also in other all which we-have-mentioned is signification true
vel falsa. Quoniam namque non est ab aliquo faciendum, nisi
or false since for not it-is by anyone to-be-done except
quod quis debet facere; eo ipso quod aliquis aliquid facit,
what one ought to-do by-that very-fact that someone something does
dicit et significat hoc se debere facere: quod si debet
he-says and signifies this himself to-be-bound to-do which if he-ought
facere quod facit, verum dicit, si autem non debet, mentitur.
to-do what he-does truth he-says if however not he-ought he-lies

DISC. Quamvis videar mihi intelligere, tamen quia inauditum
although I-seem to-myself to-understand yet because unheard
hactenus fuit, apertius ostende quod dicis.
hitherto it-was more-openly show what you-say
MAG. Si esses in loco ubi scires esse salubres herbas
if you-were in a-place where you-knew to-be wholesome herbs
et mortiferas, sed nescires eas discernere et esset ibi
and deadly but you-knew-not them to-discern and there-were there
aliquis, de quo non dubitares quin illas discernere sciret,
someone about whom not you-doubted but-that them to-discern he-knew
tibique interroganti quæ salubres essent et quæ mortiferæ,
and-to-you asking which wholesome were and which deadly
alias verbo salubres diceret esse, et alias comederet; cui
some by-word wholesome he-said to-be and others he-ate whom
magis crederes, verbo an actioni ejus?
more would-you-believe his-word or action his
DISC. Non tantum crederem verbo quantum operi.
not so-much I-would-believe the-word as-much-as the-work
MAG. Plus ergo tibi diceret quæ salubres essent opere
more therefore to-you he-would-say which wholesome were by-work
quam verbo.
than by-word
DISC. Ita est.
so it-is
MAG. Sic itaque, si nescires non esse mentiendum, et
so and-so if you-knew-not not to-be to-be-lied and
mentiretur aliquis coram te, etiamsi diceret tibi ipse se
lied someone before you even-if he-said to-you himself himself
non debere mentiri, plus ipse tibi diceret opere se mentiri
not to-be-bound to-lie more he to-you would-say by-work himself to-lie
debere, quam verbo non debere. Similiter dum cogitat
to-be-bound than by-word not to-be-bound similarly while thinks

aliquis, aut vult aliquid, si nescires an deberet id velle, sive
someone or wills something if you-knew-not whether he-ought it to-will or
cogitare, si voluntatem ejus et cogitationem videres, significaret
to-think if the-will his and thought you-saw it-would-signify
tibi ipso opere quia hoc deberet cogitare et velle. Quod
to-you by-the-very work that this he-ought to-think and to-will which
si ita deberet, verum diceret; sin autem, mentiretur. In
if so he-ought truth he-would-say but-if however he-would-lie in
rerum quoque existentia est similiter vera vel falsa significatio;
of-things also the-existence is similarly true or false signification
quoniam eo ipso quia est, dicit se debere esse.
since by-that very-fact that it-is it-says itself to-be-bound to-be

DISC. Video nunc aperte quod hactenus non animadverti.
I-see now openly what hitherto not I-noticed

De summa veritate

X · THE HIGHEST TRUTH

The highest truth is rectitude, but not because it owes anything: all things owe it, and it is what it is only because it is. It causes every other truth: the truth in things' existence is its effect and causes the truths of thought and statement, which cause none. So the Monologion proved through statements that it has no beginning or end, since a statement's truth could not always be unless its cause always were.

MAG. Progrediamur ad ea quæ restant.
let-us-advance to those-things which remain

DISC. Præcede, et sequar.
go-before and I-shall-follow

MAG. Summam autem veritatem non negabis esse rectitudinem?
the-highest moreover truth not will-you-deny to-be rectitude

DISC. Imo nihil aliud illam possum fateri.
nay nothing other it can-I to-confess

MAG. Considera quia cum omnes supradictæ rectitudines ideo
consider that while all the-above-said rectitudes therefore
sint rectitudines, quia illa in quibus sunt, aut sunt aut
be rectitudes because those-things in which they-are either are or
faciunt quod debent; summa veritas non ideo est rectitudo,
do what they-ought the-highest truth not therefore is rectitude
quia debet aliquid. Omnia enim illi debent: ipsa vero nulli
because it-owes something all-things for to-it owe it indeed to-none
quidquam debet, nec ulla ratione est quod est, nisi quia est.
anything owes nor by-any reason is-it what it-is except because it-is

DISC. Intelligo.
I-understand

MAG. Vides etiam quomodo ista rectitudo causa sit omnium
you-see also how this rectitude the-cause be of-all
aliarum veritatum et rectitudinum, et nihil sit causa illius?
other truths and rectitudes and nothing be the-cause of-it

DISC. Video et animadverto in aliis quasdam esse tantum
I-see and I-notice among the-others certain to-be only
effecta; quasdam vero esse causas, et effecta: ut, cum
effects certain indeed to-be causes and effects as since
veritas, quæ est in rerum existentia, sit effectum summæ
the-truth which is in of-things the-existence be an-effect of-the-highest
veritatis, ipsa quoque causa est veritatis quæ cogitationis
truth it also a-cause is of-the-truth which of-thought
est, et ejus quæ est in propositione: et istæ duæ veritates
is and of-that which is in the-proposition and these two truths
nullius sunt causa veritatis.
of-no are cause truth

MAG. Bene consideras: unde jam intelligere potes quomodo
well you-consider whence now to-understand you-can how
summam veritatem in meo Monologio probavi non habere
the-highest truth in my Monologion I-proved not to-have

principium vel finem, per veritatem orationis. Cum enim
beginning or end through the-truth of-a-statement when for
dixi, quando non fuit verum quia futurum erat aliquid,
I-said when not it-was true that future was something
non ita dixi ac si absque principio ista oratio fuisset, quæ
not so I-said as if without beginning this statement had-been which
assereret futurum aliquid esse, aut ista veritas esset Deus: sed
asserted future something to-be or this truth were God but
quoniam non potest intelligi quando, si oratio ista esset,
since not it-can to-be-understood when if statement this were
veritas illi deesset, ut per hoc quia non intelligitur
truth to-it would-be-lacking so-that through this that not it-is-understood
quando ista veritas esse non potuerit, si esset oratio
when this truth to-be not could if there-were a-statement
in qua esse posset, intelligatur illa veritas sine principio
in which to-be it-could it-be-understood that truth without beginning
fuisse, quæ prima causa est hujus veritatis. Quippe veritas
to-have-been which first cause is of-this truth indeed the-truth
orationis non semper posset esse, si ejus causa non semper
of-a-statement not always could to-be if its cause not always
esset. Etenim non est vera oratio, quæ dicit futurum esse
were for not is true a-statement which says future to-be
aliquid, nisi reipsa sit aliquid futurum; neque aliquid est
something unless in-reality there-be something future nor something is
futurum, si non sit in summa veritate. Similiter de illa
future if not it-be in the-highest truth similarly about that
intelligendum est oratione, quæ dicit quia præteritum est
to-be-understood is statement which says that past is
aliquid. Nam si nullo intellectu veritas orationi huic, si facta
something for if by-no understanding truth to-statement this if made
fuerit, deesse poterit, necesse est ut ejus veritatis,
it-will-have-been to-be-lacking will-be-able necessary it-is that of-that truth

quæ summa causa est istius, nullus finis intelligi possit.
which the-highest cause is of-this no end to-be-understood can
Idcirco namque vere dicitur præteritum esse aliquid, quia ita
therefore for truly it-is-said past to-be something because so
est in re: et ideo est aliquid præteritum, quia sic est
it-is in reality and therefore is something past because so it-is
in veritate summa. Quapropter si nunquam potuit non esse
in the-truth highest wherefore if never could not to-be
verum, futurum esse aliquid, et nunquam poterit non esse
true future to-be something and never will-it-be-able not to-be
verum, præteritum aliquid esse, impossibile est principium
true past something to-be impossible it-is a-beginning
summæ veritatis fuisse, aut finem futurum esse.
of-the-highest truth to-have-been or an-end future to-be
DISC. Nihil tuæ rationi objici posse video.
nothing to-your reason to-be-objected to-be-able I-see

De veritatis diffinitione

XI · THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH

The only other rectitude is bodily straightness, as of a rod, which reason grasps too but sight perceives in its subject, while the rectitudes they have considered are perceived by the mind alone. So truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone: "rectitude" sets it apart from everything else, "by the mind alone" from visible straightness.

MAG. Redeamus ad indagationem veritatis quam incœpimus.
let-us-return to the-tracking of-truth which we-began
DISC. Totum hoc pertinet ad indagandam veritatem; verumtamen
all this belongs to tracking truth but-yet
redi ad quod vis.
return to what you-will

MAG. Dic ergo mihi an tibi videatur esse aliqua rectitudo
say therefore to-me whether to-you it-seem to-be some rectitude
alia, præter has quas contemplati sumus.
other besides these which contemplated we-have
DISC. Non alia præter has, nisi illa quæ est in rebus corporeis,
not other besides these except that which is in things bodily
quæ multum est aliena ab istis, ut rectitudo virgæ.
which much is foreign from these as the-rectitude of-a-rod
MAG. In quo tibi illa videtur differre ab istis.
in what to-you that seems to-differ from these
DISC. Quia illa visu corporeo cognosci potest; istas rationis
because that by-sight bodily to-be-known can these of-reason
capit contemplatio.
takes the-contemplation
MAG. Nonne rectitudo illa corporum ratione intelligitur,
surely-not rectitude that of-bodies by-reason is-understood
præter subjectum, et cognoscitur? Aut si alicujus corporis
apart-from the-subject and is-known or if of-some body
absentis linea dubitetur an recta sit, et monstrari potest
absent the-line be-doubted whether straight it-be and to-be-shown it-can
quia in nullam partem flectitur, nonne ratione colligitur
that into no part it-is-bent surely-not by-reason is-it-gathered
quia rectam eam necesse est esse?
that straight it necessary it-is to-be
DISC. Etiam. Sed eadem quæ sic ratione intelligitur, visu
yes but the-same which so by-reason is-understood by-sight
sentitur, in subjecto; illæ vero nonnisi sola mente percipi
is-perceived in the-subject those indeed only by-sole mind to-be-perceived
possunt.
can

MAG. Possumus igitur, nisi fallor, diffinire quia veritas est
we-can therefore unless I-am-deceived to-define that truth is
rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis.
rectitude by-sole mind perceptible
DISC. Nullo modo hoc dicentem falli video. Nempe
in-no way this one-saying to-be-deceived I-see indeed
nec plus, nec minus continet ista diffinitio veritatis quam
neither more nor less contains this definition of-truth than
expediat, quoniam nomen rectitudinis dividit eam ab omni
is-expedient since the-name of-rectitude divides it from every
re, quæ rectitudo non vocatur. Quod vero sola mente
thing which rectitude not is-called that indeed by-sole mind
percipi dicitur, separat eam a rectitudine visibili.
to-be-perceived it-is-said separates it from rectitude visible

De justitiæ diffinitione

XII · THE DEFINITION OF JUSTICE

Justice is rectitude, but a stone or a horse doing what it ought is not just, nor is one who wills what he ought in ignorance, under compulsion, or for vainglory. Justice is in the will, which must will what it ought because it ought, for the sake of rectitude itself. So justice is rectitude of will kept for its own sake. We receive, have, will, and keep it at once, and the definition fits even the highest justice.

DISC. Sed quoniam docuisti me omnem veritatem esse
but since you-have-taught me all truth to-be
rectitudinem, et rectitudo idem videtur mihi esse quod
rectitude and rectitude the-same seems to-me to-be as
justitia, justitiam quoque doce me, quid esse intelligam.
justice justice also teach me what to-be I-should-understand
Videtur namque quia omne quod rectum est esse, justum
it-seems for that everything which right is to-be just

etiam est esse: et conversim, quia quod justum est esse, rectum
also is to-be and conversely that what just is to-be right
est esse. Justum enim et rectum videtur, ignem calidum esse;
is to-be just for and right it-seems fire hot to-be
et unumquemque hominem, diligentem se diligere. Nam si
and every man loving himself to-love for if
quidquid debet esse, recte et juste est; nec aliud recte et juste
whatever ought to-be rightly and justly is nor other rightly and justly
est, nisi quod debet esse: sicut puto, non potest aliud esse
is except what ought to-be as I-think not can other to-be
justitia quam rectitudo. In summa namque et simplici natura,
justice than rectitude in the-highest for and simple nature
quamvis non ideo sit recta et justa, quia debeat aliquid,
although not therefore it-be right and just because it-owes something
dubium tamen non est, idem esse rectitudinem et justitiam.
doubtful yet not it-is the-same to-be rectitude and justice
MAG. Habes igitur diffinitionem justitiæ, si justitia non est
you-have therefore the-definition of-justice if justice not is
aliud quam rectitudo. Et quoniam de rectitudine sola mente
other than rectitude and since about rectitude by-sole mind
perceptibili loquimur, invicem sese diffiniunt veritas, et
perceptible we-speak mutually themselves define truth and
rectitudo, et justitia: ut qui unam earum noverit, et alias
rectitude and justice so-that he-who one of-them knows and the-others
nescierit, per notam ad ignotarum scientiam pertingere
knows-not through the-known to of-the-unknown the-knowledge to-reach
possit; imo qui noverit unam, alias nescire non possit.
can nay he-who knows one the-others to-know-not not can

DISC. Quid ergo? An dicemus lapidem justum, cum a
what therefore or shall-we-call a-stone just when from
superioribus inferiora petit; quia hoc facit, quod debet,
higher-places lower-ones it-seeks because this it-does which it-ought
quemadmodum dicimus hominem justum, qui quod debet facit?
as we-call a-man just who what he-ought does

MAG. Non solemus hujusmodi justitia justum dicere.
not we-are-wont of-this-kind by-justice just to-call

DISC. Cur ergo magis homo quam lapis justus est, si
why therefore more a-man than a-stone just is if
uterque juste facit?
each justly does

MAG. Tu ipse an non putas facere hominis, a facere
you yourself whether not do-you-think the-doing of-a-man from the-doing
lapidis aliquo modo differre?
of-a-stone in-some way to-differ

DISC. Scio quia homo sponte, lapis naturaliter et non sponte
I-know that a-man freely a-stone naturally and not freely
facit.
does

MAG. Idcirco lapis non dicitur justus, quia non est justus
therefore a-stone not is-called just because not is just
qui facit quod debet, si non vult quod facit.
he-who does what he-ought if not he-wills what he-does

DISC. Dicemus ergo justum esse equum, cum vult pascere,
shall-we-say therefore just to-be a-horse when he-wills to-graze
quia volens facit quod debet?
because willing he-does what he-ought

MAG. Non dixi justum esse eum, qui facit volens quod debet;
not I-said just to-be him who does willing what he-ought
sed dixi non esse justum, qui non facit volens quod
but I-said not to-be just him-who not does willing what
debet.
he-ought

DISC. Dic ergo quis sit justus?
say therefore who be just

MAG. Quæris, ut video, diffinitionem justitiæ, cui laus
you-seek as I-see the-definition of-justice to-which praise
debetur; sicut contrario ejus, scilicet injustitiæ debetur
is-due as to-the-contrary its namely to-injustice is-due
vituperatio.
blame

DISC. Illam quæro.
that I-seek

MAG. Constat quia illa justitia non est in ulla natura,
it-is-agreed that that justice not is in any nature
quæ rectitudinem non agnoscit. Quidquid enim non vult
which rectitude not recognizes whatever for not wills
rectitudinem, etiamsi eam tenet, non meretur laudem, quia tenet
rectitude even-if it it-holds not deserves praise because it-holds
rectitudinem; velle autem illam non valet, qui nescit eam.
rectitude to-will however it not is-able he-who knows-not it

DISC. verum est.
true it-is

MAG. Rectitudo igitur, quæ tenenti se laudem acquirit, non
rectitude therefore which for-one-holding it praise acquires not
est nisi in rationali natura, quæ sola rectitudinem, de qua
is except in rational nature which alone rectitude about which
loquimur, percipit.
we-speak perceives

DISC. Ita sequitur.

so it-follows

MAG. ergo quoniam omnis justitia est rectitudo, nullatenus

therefore since all justice is rectitude in-no-way

est justitia, quæ servantem se facit laudabilem, nisi in

is-there justice which one-keeping it makes praiseworthy except in

rationalibus.

rational-beings

DISC. Non potest aliter esse.

not it-can otherwise to-be

MAG. Ubi igitur tibi videtur ista justitia in homine, quia

where therefore to-you seems this justice in man because

rationalis est?

rational he-is

DISC. Non est nisi aut in voluntate, aut in scientia, aut in

not it-is except either in will or in knowledge or in

opere.

work

MAG. Quid, si quis recte intelligit, aut recte operatur, non

what if anyone rightly understands or rightly works not

autem recte velit; laudabit eum quisquam de justitia?

however rightly wills will-praise him anyone for justice

DISC. Non.

no

MAG. Ergo non est ista justitia scientiæ rectitudo, aut

therefore not is this justice of-knowledge the-rectitude or

rectitudo actionis; sed rectitudo voluntatis.

the-rectitude of-action but the-rectitude of-will

DISC. Aut hoc erit, aut nihil.

either this it-will-be or nothing

MAG. Videtur tibi sufficienter esse diffinita justitia quam
does-it-seem to-you sufficiently to-be defined the-justice which
quærimus?
we-seek
DISC. Tu vide.
you see
MAG. Quicunque vult quod debet, putas eum recte velle
whoever wills what he-ought do-you-think him rightly to-will
et habere rectitudinem voluntatis?
and to-have rectitude of-will
DISC. Si quis nesciens vult quod debet: ut cum vult ostium
if anyone not-knowing wills what he-ought as when he-wills the-door
claudere contra illum qui, ipso nesciente, vult in domo
to-shut against him who he not-knowing wills in the-house
alium occidere; sive iste habeat, sive non habeat aliquam
another to-kill whether this-one have or not have some
voluntatis rectitudinem, non habet illam quam quærimus.
of-will rectitude not he-has that which we-seek
MAG. Quid dicis de illo qui scit se debere velle quod
what do-you-say about him who knows himself to-be-bound to-will what
vult?
he-wills
DISC. Potest contingere ut intelligens velit quod debet,
it-can to-happen that understanding he-will what he-ought
et nolit se debere. Nam cum latro cogitur ablatam
and will-not himself to-be-bound for when a-robber is-compelled the-taken
reddere pecuniam, palam est quia non vult se debere;
to-return money plain it-is that not he-wills himself to-be-bound
quoniam ideo cogitur velle reddere, quia debet: sed
since therefore he-is-compelled to-will to-return because he-ought but
hic nullatenus laudandus est hac rectitudine.
this-one in-no-way to-be-praised is for-this rectitude

MAG. Qui cibat esurientem pauperem propter inanem gloriam,
he-who feeds a-hungry poor-man for empty glory
vult se debere velle quod vult: idcirco namque laudatur,
wills himself to-be-bound to-will what he-wills therefore for he-is-praised
quia vult facere quod debet: quid itaque de isto judicas?
because he-wills to-do what he-ought what and-so about this-one do-you-judge
DISC. Non est hujus rectitudo laudanda; et ideo non
not is of-this-one the-rectitude to-be-praised and therefore not
sufficit ad justitiam quam quærimus. Sed ostende jam quæ
it-suffices for the-justice which we-seek but show now what
sufficiat.
suffices

MAG. Omnis voluntas sicut vult aliquid, ita vult propter
every will as it-wills something so it-wills on-account-of
aliquid. Nam quemadmodum considerandum est quid velit,
something for just-as to-be-considered it-is what it-will
ita videndum est cur velit. Quippe non magis recta debet
so to-be-seen it-is why it-will indeed not more right it-ought
esse volendo quod debet, quam volendo propter quod
to-be by-willing what it-ought than by-willing on-account-of what
debet. Quapropter omnis voluntas habet quid, et cur:
it-ought wherefore every will has a-what and a-why
omnino namque nihil volumus nisi sit cur velimus.
altogether for nothing we-will unless there-be why we-should-will
DISC. Omnes hoc in nobis cognoscimus.
all this in ourselves we-recognize

MAG. Cur autem tibi videtur unicuique volendum quod vult,
why moreover to-you does-it-seem by-each to-be-willed what he-wills
ut laudabilem habeat voluntatem? Quid enim volendum sit,
that praiseworthy he-may-have will what for to-be-willed be
palam est; quia qui non vult quod debet, justus non est.
plain it-is because he-who not wills what he-ought just not is

DISC. Nec minus apertum mihi videtur quia sicut volendum
nor less open to-me it-seems that as to-be-willed
est unicuique quod debet; ita volendum est ideo, quia
it-is by-each what he-ought so to-be-willed it-is therefore because
debet, ut justa sit ejus voluntas.
he-ought that just be his will

MAG. Bene intelligis hæc duo necessaria esse voluntati ad
well you-understand these two necessary to-be to-the-will for
justitiam: velle scilicet quod debet; ac ideo, quia debet.
justice to-will namely what it-ought and therefore because it-ought
Sed dic an sufficiant.
but say whether they-suffice

DISC. Cur non?
why not

MAG. Cum aliquis vult quod debet, quia cogitur; et ideo
when someone wills what he-ought because he-is-compelled and therefore
cogitur, quia hoc velle debet: nonne hic quodammodo
he-is-compelled because this to-will he-ought surely-not this-one in-a-way
vult quod debet quoniam debet?
wills what he-ought because he-ought

DISC. Non possum negare; sed alio modo vult iste,
not I-can to-deny but in-another way wills this-one
alio modo vult justus.
in-another way wills the-just-man

MAG. Distingue istos modos.
distinguish these ways

DISC. Justus namque, cum vult quod debet, servat
the-just-man for when he-wills what he-ought keeps
voluntatis rectitudinem non propter aliud, inquantum justus
of-will the-rectitude not for another in-so-far-as just
est, quam propter ipsam rectitudinem. Qui autem nonnisi
he-is than for the-very rectitude he-who however only

coactus, aut extranea mercede conductus, vult quod debet (si
compelled or by-foreign wage hired wills what he-ought if
servare dicendus est rectitudinem) non eam servat propter
to-keep to-be-said he-is rectitude not it he-keeps for
ipsam, sed propter aliud.
itself but for another

MAG. Voluntas ergo illa justa dicenda est, quæ sui
the-will therefore that just to-be-called is which its-own
rectitudinem servat propter ipsam rectitudinem.
rectitude keeps for the-very rectitude

DISC. Aut ista, aut nulla voluntas justa est.
either this or no will just is

MAG. Justitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.
justice therefore is rectitude of-will for itself kept

DISC. hæc est justitiæ diffinitio, quam quærebam.
this is of-justice the-definition which I-was-seeking

MAG. Vide tamen ne forte aliquid in ea debeat corrigi.
see however lest perhaps something in it ought to-be-corrected

DISC. Ego nihil in ea corrigendum.
I nothing in it to-be-corrected

MAG. Nec ego. Nulla namque justitia est, quæ non est
nor I no for justice is which not is
rectitudo; nec alia, quam rectitudo voluntatis, justitia dicitur
rectitude nor another than rectitude of-will justice is-called
per se. Dicitur enim rectitudo actionis, justitia; sed
through itself is-called for the-rectitude of-action justice but
nonnisi cum justa voluntate fit actio. Rectitudo autem
only when with-a-just will is-done the-action the-rectitude however
voluntatis, etiamsi impossibile sit fieri quod recte volumus,
of-will even-if impossible it-be to-be-done what rightly we-will
tamen nequaquam amittit nomen justitiæ. Quia autem servata
yet by-no-means loses the-name of-justice that moreover kept

dicitur: Forte dicet aliquis, si rectitudo voluntatis nonnisi
it-is-said perhaps will-say someone if rectitude of-will only
cum servatur, dicenda est justitia; non mox ut habetur,
when it-is-kept to-be-called is justice not as-soon as it-is-had
est justitia: nec accipimus justitiam, cum illam accipimus;
it-is justice nor do-we-receive justice when it we-receive
sed nos, servando, facimus eam justitiam esse. Nam prius
but we by-keeping make it justice to-be for first
accipimus illam et habemus, quam servemus: non enim ideo
we-receive it and we-have-it than we-keep-it not for therefore
illam accipimus, nec idcirco illam primitus habemus, quia
it we-receive nor therefore it at-first do-we-have because
servamus; sed illam incipimus ideo servare, quia accipimus
we-keep-it but it we-begin therefore to-keep because we-receive
et habemus. Sed ad hoc respondere nos possumus quia simul
and have but to this to-answer we can that at-once
accipimus illam et velle et habere: non enim illam habemus,
we-receive it both to-will and to-have not for it we-have
nisi volendo; et, si eam volumus, hoc ipso eam habemus.
except by-willing and if it we-will by-this very-fact it we-have
Sicut autem illam simul habemus, et volumus; ita illa simul
as moreover it at-once we-have and we-will so it at-once
volumus et servamus: quoniam sicut eam non servamus, nisi
we-will and we-keep since as it not we-keep except
cum illam volumus; sic non est quando eam velimus,
when it we-will so not there-is-a-time when it we-will
et non servemus: sed quandiu eam volumus, servamus; et
and not we-keep but as-long-as it we-will we-keep and
donec servamus, volumus. Quoniam ergo eodem tempore
as-long-as we-keep we-will since therefore at-the-same time
contingit nobis illam et velle et habere: nec diverso tempore
it-befalls us it both to-will and to-have nor at-diverse time

in nobis sunt et velle, et servare eam; ex necessitate simul
in us are both to-will and to-keep it from necessity at-once
accipimus et habere illam, et servare: et sicut quandiu
we-receive both to-have it and to-keep and as as-long-as
servamus, habemus illam; ita quandiu habemus, servamus: nec
we-keep we-have it so as-long-as we-have we-keep nor
ulla ex his generatur inconvenientia. Quippe sicut ejusdem
any from these is-generated unfittingness indeed as of-the-same
rectitudinis acceptio natura prius est quam habere, aut
rectitude the-receiving by-nature prior is than to-have or
velle illam: quoniam habere illam, aut velle, non est causa
to-will it since to-have it or to-will not is the-cause
acceptionis, sed acceptio facit velle illam et habere: et tamen
of-the-receiving but the-receiving makes to-will it and to-have and yet
simul sunt tempore acceptio, et habere et velle: simul
at-once are in-time the-receiving and the-having and the-willing at-once
enim incipimus illam et accipere, et habere, et velle; et
for we-begin it both to-receive and to-have and to-will and
tamen simul sunt tempore, acceptio, et habere, et velle: et
yet at-once are in-time the-receiving and the-having and the-willing and
mox ut est accepta, est habita et volumus eam; ita habere,
as-soon as it-is received it-is had and we-will it so to-have
seu velle illam, quamvis natura prius sint, quam servare illam;
or to-will it although by-nature prior they-be than to-keep it
simul tamen sunt tempore. Quare a quo simul accipimus
at-once yet they-are in-time wherefore from whom at-once we-receive
et habere, et velle, et servare voluntatis rectitudinem, ab
both to-have and to-will and to-keep of-will the-rectitude from
illo accipimus justitiam: et mox ut habemus et volumus
him we-receive justice and as-soon as we-have and we-will
eamdem rectitudinem voluntatis, justitia dicenda est. Quod
the-same rectitude of-will justice to-be-called it-is what

vero addidimus, propter se, ita necessarium est ut nullo
indeed we-added for itself so necessary is that in-no
modo eadem rectitudo, nisi propter se servata, justitia sit.
way the-same rectitude unless for itself kept justice be

DISC. Nihil possum cogitare contra.
nothing can-I to-think against

MAG. Videtur tibi quod ista diffinitio possit aptari summæ
does-it-seem to-you that this definition can to-be-fitted to-the-highest
justitiæ, secundum quod de re loqui possumus, de
justice according-to that-which about a-thing to-speak we-can about
qua nihil, aut vix proprie aliquid potest dici?
which nothing or scarcely properly anything can to-be-said

DISC. Licet nonnisi tibi aliud voluntas, aliud rectitudo: tamen
although only for-you one-thing the-will another rectitude yet
sicut dicimus potestatem divinitatis, aut divinam potestatem, sive
as we-say the-power of-divinity or divine power or
potentem divinitatem (cum in divinitate non sit aliud potestas
powerful divinity though in divinity not be other power
quam divinitas); ita non inconvenienter dicimus ibi rectitudinem
than divinity so not unfittingly we-say there rectitude
voluntatis, aut voluntariam rectitudinem, seu rectam voluntatem.
of-will or voluntary rectitude or right will
Si vero illam rectitudinem dicimus propter se servari, de
if indeed that rectitude we-say for itself to-be-kept about
nulla alia rectitudine tam convenienter dici posse videtur.
no other rectitude so fittingly to-be-said to-be-able it-seems
Sicut enim non aliud illam, sed ipsa se servat, nec per
as for not another it but itself itself keeps nor through
aliud sed per se, ita non propter aliud quam propter se.
another but through itself so not for another than for itself

MAG. Indubitanter itaque possumus dicere quia justitia est
undoubtingly and-so we-can to-say that justice is
rectitudo voluntatis: quæ rectitudo propter se servatur. Et
rectitude of-will which rectitude for itself is-kept and
quoniam verbi, quod hic dico (servatur) non habemus
since of-the-verb which here I-say is-kept not we-have
participium passivum præsentis temporis, pro præsenti,
a-participle passive of-the-present tense for the-present
possumus uti passivo præterito participio ejusdem verbi.
we-can to-use the-passive past participle of-the-same verb
DISC. Hunc usum habemus notissimum, ut præteritis participiis
this usage we-have most-known that past participles
passivis utamur pro præsentibus, quæ latinitas non habet;
passive we-use for present-ones which latinity not has
sicut non habet præterita participia a verbis activis et
as not it-has past participles from verbs active and
neutris; et pro præteritis, quæ non habet, utitur præsentibus:
neuter and for the-past-ones which not it-has it-uses present-ones
ut si dicatur de aliquo: Hic quod studens et legens
as if it-be-said about someone this-man what studying and reading
didicit, nonnisi coactus docet, id est quod dum studuit
he-learned only compelled teaches that is what while he-studied
et legit, didicit, nonnisi cum cogitur docet.
and read he-learned only when he-is-compelled he-teaches
MAG. Bene ergo diximus justitiam esse rectitudinem voluntatis
well therefore we-have-said justice to-be rectitude of-will
servatam propter se, id est quæ servatur propter se. Et
kept for itself that is which is-kept for itself and
hinc est, quod justi dicuntur aliquando recti corde, id
hence it-is that the-just are-called sometimes right in-heart that
est recti voluntate; aliquando recti, sine adjectione cordis;
is right in-will sometimes right without addition of-heart

quoniam nullus alius intelligitur rectus, nisi qui rectam
since no other is-understood right except who right
habet voluntatem: ut est illud: Gloriamini omnes recti corde.
has will as is that glory all right in-heart
Et illud: Videbunt recti, et lætabuntur.
and that will-see the-right and will-rejoice
DISC. Satisfecisti etiam pueris de diffinitione justitiæ:
you-have-satisfied even boys about the-definition of-justice
transeamus ad alia.
let-us-pass to other-things

Quod una sit veritas in omnibus veris

XIII · ONE TRUTH IN ALL TRUE THINGS

If there were as many truths as true things, each would come and go with its thing. But the rectitude by which a signification is right remains when the signification ceases, unlike color, which cannot outlast its body, and the same holds of the will and the rest. So there is one rectitude of all things, and one truth, called the truth of this or that only improperly, as one time is called the time of many things.

MAG. Redeamus ad rectitudinem seu veritatem: quibus duobus
let-us-return to rectitude or truth by-which two
nominibus (quoniam de rectitudine mente sola perceptibili
names since about rectitude by-mind alone perceptible
loquimur) una res significatur, quæ genus est justitiæ: et
we-speak one thing is-signified which the-genus is of-justice and
quæramus an sit una sola veritas in omnibus istis, in
let-us-seek whether there-be one sole truth in all these in
quibus veritatem dicimus esse: an ita sint veritates plures,
which truth we-say to-be or so there-be truths many
sicut plura sunt, in quibus constat esse veritatem.
as many are-the-things in which it-is-agreed to-be truth

DISC. Hoc multum nosse desidero.
this much to-know I-desire

MAG. Constat quia in quacunque re sit veritas, non est
it-is-agreed that in whatever thing there-be truth not it-is
aliud quam rectitudo.
other than rectitude

DISC. Non hinc dubito.
not hence I-doubt

MAG. Si ergo plures sunt veritates, secundum plures res,
if therefore many are truths according-to many things
plures quoque sunt rectitudines.
many also are rectitudes

DISC. Hoc quoque non minus certum est.
this also not less certain is

MAG. Si secundum diversitates rerum, necesse est esse diversas
if according-to the-diversities of-things necessary it-is to-be diverse
rectitudines, utique, secundum res ipsas, habent esse
rectitudes surely according-to the-things themselves have to-be
suum eædem rectitudines: et sicut res ipsæ, in quibus
their-own the-same rectitudes and as the-things themselves in which
sunt, variantur, sic quoque rectitudines varias esse necesse est.
they-are are-varied so also rectitudes various to-be necessary it-is

DISC. In una re in qua rectitudinem esse dicimus, ostende
in one thing in which rectitude to-be we-say show
quod in cæteris intelligam.
what in the-rest I-may-understand

MAG. Dico quia si rectitudo significationis ideo est alia,
I-say that if the-rectitude of-signification therefore is other
quam voluntatis rectitudo, quia ista in voluntate, illa
than of-will the-rectitude because this in will that

in significatione est, habet suum esse rectitudo propter
in signification is has its-own to-be rectitude on-account-of
significationem, et secundum eam mutatur.
signification and according-to it is-changed

DISC. Ita est. Cum enim significatur esse quod est, aut non
so it-is when for it-is-signified to-be what is or not
esse quod non est, recta significatio est, et constat esse
to-be what not is right signification it-is and it-is-agreed to-be
rectitudinem, sine qua significatio recta nequit esse. Si
rectitude without which signification right cannot to-be if
vero significetur esse quod non est, aut non esse quod
indeed it-be-signified to-be what not is or not to-be what
est, aut si nihil omnino significetur, nulla erit rectitudo
is or if nothing at-all be-signified no will-be rectitude
significationis, quæ nonnisi in significatione est. Quapropter
of-signification which only in signification is wherefore
per significationem habet esse, et per eam mutatur ejus
through signification has to-be and through it is-changed its
rectitudo: quemadmodum color per corpus habet esse, et
rectitude just-as color through body has to-be and
non esse. Existente namque corpore, colorem ejus necesse est
not to-be existing for the-body color its necessary it-is
esse; et pereunte corpore, colorem ejus manere impossibile est.
to-be and perishing the-body color its to-remain impossible it-is

MAG. Non similiter se habent color ad corpus et rectitudo
not similarly themselves have color to body and rectitude
ad significationem.
to signification

DISC. Ostende dissimilitudinem.
show the-unlikeness

MAG. Si nullus aliquo significare velit signo quod significandum
if no-one by-any to-signify will sign what to-be-signified
est, erit ulla per signa significatio?
is will-there-be any through signs signification

DISC. Nulla.
none

MAG. An ideo non erit rectum ut significetur quod
or therefore not will-it-be right that it-be-signified what
significari debet?
to-be-signified ought

DISC. Non idcirco minus erit rectum, aut minus hoc
not therefore less it-will-be right or less this
exiget rectitudo.
will-demand rectitude

MAG. Ergo non existente significatione, non perit rectitudo,
therefore not existing signification not perishes the-rectitude
qua rectum est, et qua exigitur, ut quod significandum
by-which right it-is and by-which it-is-demanded that what to-be-signified
est, significetur.
is be-signified

DISC. Si interiisset, non esset rectum hoc, nec ipsa hoc
if it-had-perished not would-be right this nor it this
exigeret.
would-demand

MAG. Putasne, cum significatur quod significari debet,
do-you-think when is-signified what to-be-signified ought
significationem tunc rectam esse propter hanc et secundum
the-signification then right to-be on-account-of this and according-to
hanc ipsam rectitudinem?
this very rectitude

DISC. Imo non possum aliter cogitare. Si enim alia rectitudine
nay not I-can otherwise to-think if for by-another rectitude
recta est significatio; pereunte ista, nihil prohibet rectam esse
right is the-signification perishing this nothing prevents right to-be
significationem. Sed nulla est recta significatio, quæ significat
the-signification but none is right signification which signifies
quod non est rectum significari, aut quod non exigit rectitudo.
what not is right to-be-signified or what not demands rectitude
MAG. Nulla igitur significatio est recta alia rectitudine, quam
no therefore signification is right by-other rectitude than
illa quæ permanet pereunte significatione.
that which remains perishing the-signification
DISC. Palam est.
plain it-is
MAG. An itaque non vides quia non ideo est rectitudo in
or and-so not do-you-see that not therefore is rectitude in
significatione, quia tunc incipit esse, cum significatur esse
signification because then it-begins to-be when it-is-signified to-be
quod est, vel non esse quod non est; sed quia significatio
what is or not to-be what not is but because signification
tunc fit secundum rectitudinem, quæ semper est: nec
then is-made according-to the-rectitude which always is nor
ob hoc abest a significatione, quia perit, cum
on-account-of this is-it-absent from signification because it-perishes when
non sic ut debet, aut cum nulla sit significatio; sed quoniam
not so as it-ought or when none be signification but because
tunc significatio deficit a non deficiente rectitudine?
then signification falls-short from not failing the-rectitude
DISC. Sic video, ut non possim non videre.
so I-see that not I-can not to-see

MAG. Rectitudo ergo, qua significatio recta dicitur, non
rectitude therefore by-which signification right is-called not
habet esse, aut aliquem motum, per significationem:
has to-be or any motion through signification
quomodocunque moveatur ipsa significatio.
howsoever be-moved the-very signification
DISC. Mihi nihil jam clarius.
to-me nothing now clearer
MAG. Potesne probare colorem similiter se habere ad corpus,
can-you to-prove color similarly itself to-have to body
quomodo rectitudo se habet ad significationem?
as rectitude itself has to signification
DISC. Paratior nunc sum probare quia valde dissimiliter.
readier now I-am to-prove that very dissimilarly
MAG. Puto quia jam tibi notum est quid de voluntate et
I-think that already to-you known it-is what about will and
ejus rectitudine, et de aliis quæ rectitudinem habere
its rectitude and about the-other-things which rectitude to-have
debent, sentiendum sit.
ought to-be-thought be
DISC. Omnino video hac ipsa ratione probari, quoquo modo
altogether I-see by-this very reason to-be-proved in-whatever way
ipsa sint, rectitudinem immutabilem permanere.
they-themselves be rectitude unchangeable to-remain
MAG. Quid itaque consequi existimas de ipsis rectitudinibus.
what and-so to-follow do-you-reckon about the-very rectitudes
Sunt aliæ ab invicem; aut est una et eadem omnium
are-they other from one-another or is-it one and the-same of-all
rectitudo.
rectitude

DISC. Supra concessi quia si ideo sunt plures rectitudines,
above I-granted that if therefore there-are many rectitudes
quoniam plures sunt res in quibus considerantur, necesse
since many are the-things in which they-are-considered necessary
est eas existere et variari secundum res ipsas: quod
it-is them to-exist and to-be-varied according-to the-things themselves which
nequaquam fieri demonstratum est. Quapropter non
by-no-means to-be-done demonstrated has-been wherefore not
ideo sunt plures rectitudines, quia plures sunt res,
therefore there-are many rectitudes because many are the-things
in quibus sunt.
in which they-are

MAG. An habes aliquam aliam rationem, cur tibi plures esse
or have-you some other reason why to-you many to-be
videantur? præter ipsam rerum pluralitatem?
they-seem besides the-very of-things plurality

DISC. Sicut istam nullam esse cognosco; ita nullam aliam
as this none to-be I-know so none other
inveniri posse considero.
to-be-found to-be-able I-consider

MAG. Una igitur et eadem est omnium rectitudo.
one therefore and the-same is of-all rectitude

DISC. Sic me fateri necesse est.
so me to-confess necessary it-is

MAG. Amplius: Si rectitudo non est in rebus illis, quæ debent
further if rectitude not is in things those which owe
rectitudinem, nisi cum sunt secundum quod debent, et
rectitude except when they-are according-to what they-ought and
hoc solum est illis rectas esse, manifestum est earum
this alone is for-them right to-be manifest it-is of-them
omnium unam solam esse rectitudinem.
all one sole to-be rectitude

DISC. Non potest negari.
not it-can to-be-denied
MAG. Una igitur in omnibus illis est veritas.
one therefore in all them is truth
DISC. Et hoc negari impossibile est: sed tamen ostende
and this to-be-denied impossible it-is but yet show
mihi cur dicimus hujus vel illius rei veritatem, velut ad
me why we-say of-this or of-that thing the-truth as-if for
distinguendas veritatum differentias, si nullam ab ipsis
distinguishing of-truths the-differences if none from the-very
rebus assumunt diversitatem? Multi namque vix concedent
things they-take-up diversity many for scarcely will-grant
nullam esse differentiam inter veritatem voluntatis, et eam
no to-be difference between the-truth of-will and that
quæ dicitur actionis, aut alicujus aliorum.
which is-called of-action or of-any of-the-others
MAG. Improprie hujus, vel illius rei esse dicitur; quoniam illa
improperly of-this or of-that thing to-be it-is-said since it
non in ipsis rebus, aut ex ipsis, aut per ipsas, in quibus
not in the-very things or from them or through them in which
esse dicitur, habet suum esse: sed cum res ipsæ secundum
to-be it-is-said has its-own to-be but when the-things themselves according-to
illam sunt, quæ semper præsto est his quæ sunt sicut debent,
it are which always at-hand is to-those which are as they-ought
tunc dicitur hujus vel illius rei veritas: ut veritas vocis, actionis,
then is-said of-this or of-that thing the-truth as the-truth of-voice of-action
voluntatis; quemadmodum dicitur tempus hujus, vel illius rei,
of-will as is-said the-time of-this or of-that thing
cum unum et idem sit tempus omnium, quæ sunt in eodem
though one and the-same be the-time of-all-things which are in the-same
tempore simul. Et si non esset hæc vel illa res, non minus
time at-once and if not were this or that thing not less

esset idem tempus: non enim dicitur ideo tempus hujus vel
would-be the-same time not for is-said therefore the-time of-this or
illius rei, quia tempus est in ipsis rebus; sed quia ipsæ
of-that thing because time is in the-very things but because they-themselves
sunt in tempore. Et sicut tempus per se consideratum non
are in time and as time through itself considered not
dicitur tempus alicujus, sed cum res, quæ in illo sunt,
is-called the-time of-something but when the-things which in it are
consideramus, dicimus tempus hujus vel illius rei; ita summa
we-consider we-say the-time of-this or of-that thing so the-highest
veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est: sed cum aliquid
truth through itself subsisting of-no thing is but when something
secundum illam est, tunc ejus dicitur veritas, vel rectitudo.
according-to it is then its is-said the-truth or rectitude

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

De Libertate Arbitrii

On Freedom of Choice

Quod potestas peccandi non pertineat ad libertatem arbitrii

I · THE POWER TO SIN IS NO PART OF FREEDOM

Since freedom of choice seems to oppose grace, predestination, and foreknowledge, the student asks what it is and whether we always have it. The teacher denies that it is the power to sin and not to sin, since God and the good angels cannot sin and are free. A will that cannot turn from rectitude is freer than one that can, so the power to sin, which lessens freedom when added, is neither freedom nor part of it.

DISC. Quoniam liberum arbitrium videtur repugnare gratiæ,
since free choice seems to-be-repugnant to-grace
et prædestinationi, et præscientiæ Dei, ipsa libertas
and to-predestination and to-the-foreknowledge of-God the-very freedom
arbitrii quid sit nosse desidero, et utrum illam semper
of-choice what it-be to-know I-desire and whether it always
habeamus. Si enim libertas arbitrii est posse peccare et
we-have if for the-freedom of-choice is to-be-able to-sin and
non peccare, sicut a quibusdam solet dici, et hoc
not to-sin as by certain-men it-is-wont to-be-said and this
semper habemus quomodo aliquando gratia indigemus? Si
always we-have how sometimes grace do-we-need if
autem hoc non semper habemus, cur nobis imputatur
however this not always we-have why to-us is-imputed
peccatum, quando sine libero arbitrio peccamus?
sin when without free choice we-sin

MAG. Libertatem arbitrii non puto esse potentiam peccandi
the-freedom of-choice not I-think to-be the-power of-sinning
et non peccandi. Quippe si hæc ejus esset definitio, nec
and of-not sinning indeed if this its were definition neither

Deus, nec angeli, qui peccare nequeunt, liberum haberent
God nor the-angels who to-sin cannot free would-have
arbitrium: quod nefas est dicere.
choice which wrong it-is to-say

DISC. Quid, si dicitur aliud esse liberum arbitrium Dei et
what if it-is-said one-thing to-be the-free choice of-God and
angelorum bonorum, aliud nostrum?
of-the-angels good another ours

MAG. Quamvis differat liberum arbitrium hominum a libero
although differ the-free choice of-men from the-free
arbitrio Dei et angelorum bonorum diffinitio tamen hujus
choice of-God and of-the-angels good the-definition yet of-this
libertatis in utrisque, secundum hoc nomen, eadem debet esse:
freedom in both according-to this name the-same ought to-be
licet enim animal differat ab animali sive substantialiter,
although for animal differ from animal whether substantially
sive accidentaliter, diffinitio tamen, secundum nomen animalis,
or accidentally the-definition yet according-to the-name of-animal
omnibus animalibus est eadem. Quapropter talem oportet dare
for-all animals is the-same wherefore such it-behooves to-give
diffinitionem libertatis arbitrii, quæ nec plus nec minus
a-definition of-the-freedom of-choice which neither more nor less
illa contineat. Quoniam ergo liberum arbitrium divinum
than-it contain since therefore free choice divine
et bonorum angelorum peccare non potest, non pertinet
and of-the-good angels to-sin not can not belongs
ad diffinitionem libertatis arbitrii posse peccare. Denique
to the-definition of-the-freedom of-choice to-be-able to-sin finally
nec libertas, nec pars libertatis est potestas peccandi. Quod
neither freedom nor part of-freedom is the-power of-sinning which
ut plane intelligas, intende ad ea quæ dicam.
that plainly you-may-understand attend to those-things which I-shall-say

DISC. Ad hoc sum hic.
for this I-am here

MAG. Quæ tibi voluntas liberior videtur: illa, quæ sic vult
which to-you will freer seems that which so wills
et potest non peccare, ut nullatenus flecti valeat a
and is-able not to-sin that in-no-way to-be-bent it-be-able from
non peccandi rectitudine, an illa quæ aliquo modo flecti
not of-sinning the-rectitude or that which in-some way to-be-bent
potest ad peccandum?
can to sinning

DISC. Cur non sit liberior illa, quæ ad utrumque se habet,
why not be freer that which to both itself has
non video.
not I-see

MAG. An non vides quoniam qui sic habet quod decet,
or not do-you-see that he-who so has what befits
et quod expedit, ut hoc amittere non queat; liberior est
and what is-expedient that this to-lose not he-can freer is
quam ille, qui sic habet hoc ipsum, ut possit perdere, et
than he who so has this very-thing that he-can to-lose-it and
ad hoc quod dedecet, et non expedit, valeat adduci?
to that which befits-not and not is-expedient he-be-able to-be-led

DISC. Nulli dubium hoc esse puto.
to-none doubtful this to-be I-think

MAG. Hoc quoque non minus indubitabile dices quia
this also not less indubitable you-will-say that
peccare semper dedecens et noxium est?
to-sin always unbefitting and harmful is

DISC. Nullus sanæ mentis aliter sentit.
no-one of-sound mind otherwise thinks

MAG. Liberior igitur est voluntas quæ a rectitudine non
freer therefore is the-will which from the-rectitude of-not
peccandi declinare nequit, quam quæ illam potest deserere.
sinning to-turn-aside cannot than which it can to-desert

DISC. Nihil mihi rationabilius asseri posse videtur.
nothing to-me more-reasonably to-be-asserted to-be-able seems

MAG. An putas, quod additum minuit, et separatum auget
or do-you-think what added diminishes and separated increases
libertatem, id aut libertatem esse, aut partem libertatis?
freedom that either freedom to-be or a-part of-freedom

DISC. Non hoc putare possum.
not this to-think I-can

MAG. Potestas ergo peccandi, quæ addita voluntati minuit
the-power therefore of-sinning which added to-the-will diminishes
ejus libertatem, et, si dematur, auget, nec libertas est,
its freedom and if it-be-taken-away increases neither freedom is
nec pars libertatis.
nor part of-freedom

DISC. Nihil consequentius.
nothing more-consequent

Quod tamen angelus et homo peccaverunt per hanc potestatem, et per liberum arbitrium: et quamvis potuerint servire peccato, non tamen eis potuit dominari peccatum

II · ANGEL AND MAN SINNED FREELY, NOT THROUGH FREEDOM

The student objects that angel and man sinned through a power alien to freedom, so that they seem to have sinned of necessity, and that whoever can sin can be a slave of sin and ruled by it. The teacher answers that they sinned freely and by their own choice, which nothing could compel, but through their power to sin; and while they used the power not to serve, sin could not rule them.

MAG. Non ergo pertinet ad libertatem arbitrii, quod sic est
not therefore belongs to the-freedom of-choice what so is
extraneum a libertate.
foreign from freedom

DISC. Rationibus tuis nullatenus contradicere queo. Sed non
with-reasons your in-no-way to-contradict I-can but not
parum me movet quia et angelica et nostra natura in
a-little me moves that both the-angelic and our nature in
principio habuit potestatem peccandi, quam si non habuisset,
the-beginning had the-power of-sinning which if not it-had-had
non peccasset: quare si per hanc potestatem, quæ sic
not it-would-have-sinned wherefore if through this power which so
aliena est a libero arbitrio, peccavit utraque prædicta natura,
alien is from free choice sinned each aforesaid nature
quomodo dicemus eam peccasse per liberum arbitrium? At si
how shall-we-say it to-have-sinned through free choice but if
per liberum arbitrium non peccavit, ex necessitate peccasse
through free choice not it-sinned from necessity to-have-sinned
videtur. Nempe aut sponte, aut ex necessitate: nam si sponte
it-seems surely either freely or from necessity for if freely

peccavit, quomodo non per liberum arbitrium? Quare, si
it-sinned how not through free choice wherefore if
non per liberum arbitrium, utique ex necessitate peccasse
not through free choice surely from necessity to-have-sinned
videtur. Est et aliud, quod in hac peccandi potestate me
it-seems there-is also another-thing which in this of-sinning power me
movet. Qui enim peccare potest, servus potest esse peccati;
moves he-who for to-sin can a-slave can to-be of-sin
quoniam qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Qui autem
since he-who does sin a-slave is of-sin he-who moreover
potest servus esse peccati, huic potest dominari peccatum:
can a-slave to-be of-sin over-him can to-rule sin
quomodo ergo libera facta fuit illa natura; aut cujusmodi
how therefore free made was that nature or of-what-kind
liberum arbitrium illud erat, cui peccatum dominari poterat?
free choice that was over-which sin to-rule could

MAG. Et per potestatem peccandi, et sponte et per
both through the-power of-sinning and freely and through
liberum arbitrium, et non ex necessitate, nostra et angelica
free choice and not from necessity our and the-angelic
natura primitus peccavit, et servire potuit peccato; et
nature at-first sinned and to-serve could sin and
tamen non illi peccatum dominari poterat, unde illa non
yet not over-it sin to-rule could whence it not
libera, aut ejus arbitrium non liberum dici possit.
free or its choice not free to-be-called can

DISC. Opus habeo ut, quod dicis, aperias; quia clausum mihi
need I-have that what you-say you-open because closed to-me
est.
it-is

MAG. Per liberum arbitrium peccavit apostata angelus, sive
through free choice sinned the-apostate angel or
primus homo, quia per suum arbitrium peccavit, quod
the-first man because through his-own choice he-sinned which
sic liberum erat, ut nulla alia re cogi posset ad
so free was that by-no other thing to-be-compelled it-could to
peccandum; et ideo juste reprehenditur, quia, cum hanc
sinning and therefore justly he-is-blamed because when this
haberet arbitrii sui libertatem, non aliqua re cogente, non
he-had of-choice his the-freedom not by-some thing compelling not
aliqua necessitate, sed sponte peccavit. Peccavit autem per
by-some necessity but freely he-sinned he-sinned however through
arbitrium suum, quod erat liberum; sed non per hoc unde
choice his-own which was free but not through that whence
liberum erat, id est per potestatem, quia poterat non
free it-was that is through the-power because he-could not
peccare, et peccato non servire; sed per potestatem quam
to-sin and to-sin not to-serve but through the-power which
habebat peccandi, qua nec ad non peccandi libertatem
he-had of-sinning by-which neither to of-not sinning freedom
juvabatur, nec ad peccandi servitutem cogebatur. Quod autem
he-was-helped nor to of-sinning slavery was-he-compelled what however
consequi tibi videtur quia si potuit servus esse peccati,
to-follow to-you seems that if he-could a-slave to-be of-sin
potuit ei dominari peccatum; et ideo nec illum, nec
could over-him to-rule sin and therefore neither him nor
ejus arbitrium liberum fuisse: non ita est. Etenim qui
his choice free to-have-been not so it-is for he-who
suæ potestatis est ut non serviat, nec alienæ potestatis
of-his-own power is that not he-serve nor of-another's power
est ut serviat, quamvis potestate sua servire possit; quandiu
is that he-serve although by-power his-own to-serve he-can as-long-as

non illa quæ est serviendi, sed illa quæ est non serviendi,
not that which is of-serving but that which is of-not serving
utitur potestate, nulla res potest illi dominari, ut serviat.
he-uses power no thing can over-him to-rule that he-serve
Nam etsi dives liber possit se facere servum pauperis:
for although a-rich-man free can himself to-make the-slave of-a-poor-man
quandiu hoc non facit, nec ille nomen amittit libertatis, nec
as-long-as this not he-does neither he the-name loses of-freedom nor
pauper illi dicitur dominari; aut si dicitur, improprie
the-poor-man over-him is-said to-rule or if it-is-said improperly
dicitur, quia hoc non in ejus, sed in alterius est potestate.
it-is-said because this not in his but in the-other's is power
Quamobrem nihil prohibet angelum et hominem ante
wherefore nothing prevents angel and man before
peccatum liberos fuisse, aut liberum arbitrium habuisse.
sin free to-have-been or free choice to-have-had

Quod postquam se fecerunt servos peccati, liberum habuerunt arbitrium: et quid sit liberum arbitrium

III · FREEDOM IS THE POWER TO KEEP RECTITUDE

After sin they could not destroy their natural freedom of choice, though they made themselves unable to use it without another grace. It was given not to take rectitude without a giver, nor to desert it or recover it by themselves, but to keep the rectitude received for its own sake: freedom of choice is the power to keep rectitude of will for its own sake. Rectitude lost, the power remains, as one with sight keeps the power of seeing a mountain while the mountain is absent.

DISC. Satisfecisti mihi, quia nihil certe hoc prohibet ante
you-have-satisfied me because nothing certainly this prevents before
peccatum; sed postquam se fecerunt servos peccati,
sin but after themselves they-made slaves of-sin
quomodo liberum arbitrium servare potuerunt?
how free choice to-keep could-they

MAG. Licet peccato se subdidissent, libertatem tamen
although to-sin themselves they-had-subjected the-freedom yet
arbitrii naturalem in se interimere nequiverunt; sed
of-choice natural in themselves to-destroy they-could-not but
facere potuerunt ut jam non sine alia gratia, quam erat
to-bring-about they-could that now not without other grace than was
illa quam prius habuerant, illa libertate uti non valeant.
that which before they-had-had that freedom to-use not they-be-able

DISC. Credo: sed intelligere desidero.
I-believe but to-understand I-desire

MAG. Consideremus primum cujusmodi arbitrii libertatem
let-us-consider first of-what-kind of-choice freedom
habebant ante peccatum quando certum est eos liberum
they-had before sin when certain it-is them free
arbitrium habuisse.
choice to-have-had

DISC. Hoc exspecto.
this I-await

MAG. Ad quid tibi videntur illam habuisse libertatem arbitrii?
for what to-you do-they-seem it to-have-had the-freedom of-choice

An ad assequendum quod vellent; an ad volendum
whether for attaining what they-might-will or for willing

quod deberent, et quod illis velle expediret?
what they-ought and what to-them to-will was-expedient

DISC. Ad volendum quod deberent, et quod expediret velle.
for willing what they-ought and what was-expedient to-will

MAG. Ergo ad rectitudinem voluntatis habuerunt libertatem
therefore for the-rectitude of-will they-had the-freedom

arbitrii: quandiu namque voluerunt quod debuerunt
of-choice as-long-as for they-willed what they-ought

rectitudinem habuerunt voluntatis.
rectitude they-had of-will

DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Dubium est adhuc, cum dicitur quia libertatem habuerunt
doubtful it-is still when it-is-said that freedom they-had

ad rectitudinem voluntatis, si non addatur aliquid. Quæro
for the-rectitude of-will if not be-added something I-ask

igitur quomodo habebant illam libertatem ad rectitudinem
therefore how they-had that freedom for the-rectitude

voluntatis: an ad capiendum eam sine datore, cum illam
of-will whether for taking it without a-giver since it

nondum haberent; an ad accipiendum nondum habitam,
not-yet they-had or for receiving not-yet had

si daretur ut haberent; an ad deserendum quam
if it-were-given that they-might-have-it or for deserting what

acceperant, et per se resumendum desertam; an ad
they-had-received and through themselves resuming it-deserted or for
semper servandum acceptam?
always keeping it-received

DISC. Ad capiendum rectitudinem sine datore non puto illos
for taking rectitude without a-giver not I-think them
habuisse libertatem; quoniam nihil habere potuerunt quod
to-have-had freedom since nothing to-have could-they which
non acceperunt. Ad accipiendum vero a datore, quam
not they-received for receiving indeed from a-giver what
nondum habebant, ut eam haberent, non est dicendum
not-yet they-had that it they-might-have not it-is to-be-said
eos habuisse libertatem; quia non est credendum eos factos
them to-have-had freedom because not it-is to-be-believed them made
sine recta voluntate, quamvis non negandum sit eos
without right will although not to-be-denied it-be them
habuisse libertatem recipiendi eamdem rectitudinem, si
to-have-had the-freedom of-receiving-again the-same rectitude if
eam desererent, et ab ipso primo datore illis redderetur:
it they-should-desert and by the-very first giver to-them it-were-returned
quod in hominibus sæpe videmus, qui de injustitia ad
which in men often we-see who from injustice to
justitiam superna gratia reducuntur.
justice by-supernal grace are-brought-back

MAG. Verum est quod dicis eos posse recipere perditam
true it-is what you-say them to-be-able to-receive-again the-lost
rectitudinem, si reddatur: sed nos illam libertatem, quam
rectitude if it-be-returned but we that freedom which
habuerunt antequam peccarent, quærimus, cum sine dubio
they-had before they-sinned seek since without doubt

liberum habebant arbitrium non illam, qua nullus indigeret,
free they-had choice not that which none would-need
si nunquam veritatem deseruisset?
if never truth he-had-deserted

DISC. Prosequar itaque, et respondebo ad ea quæ restant
I-shall-proceed and-so and shall-answer to those-things which remain
de his quæ interrogasti. Ad deserendum autem eamdem
of these which you-asked for deserting moreover the-same
rectitudinem, eos libertatem habuisse non est verum; quia
rectitude them freedom to-have-had not it-is true because
deserere voluntatis rectitudinem est peccare, et potestatem
to-desert of-will the-rectitude is to-sin and the-power
peccandi, nec libertatem, nec partem esse libertatis supra
of-sinning neither freedom nor part to-be of-freedom above
monstrasti. Ad resumendum vero per se desertam
you-have-shown for resuming indeed through themselves deserted
rectitudinem libertatem non acceperunt: cum ad hoc rectitudo
rectitude freedom not they-received since for this rectitude
illa data sit, ut nunquam desereretur. Ipsa namque potestas
that given was that never it-should-be-deserted the-very for power
resumendi desertam, generaret negligentiam servandi habitam.
of-resuming it-deserted would-beget negligence of-keeping had
Quapropter restat libertatem arbitrii datam esse rationali
wherefore it-remains the-freedom of-choice given to-be to-the-rational
naturæ ad servandam acceptam rectitudinem voluntatis.
nature for keeping the-received rectitude of-will

MAG. Bene ad interrogata respondisti. Sed adhuc opus est
well to the-things-asked you-have-answered but still need is
ut consideremus propter quid illam rectitudinem servare
that we-consider on-account-of what that rectitude to-keep

debeat rationalis natura: An propter ipsam rectitudinem
ought the-rational nature whether for the-very rectitude
an propter aliud?
or for another

DISC. Si non illa libertas data esset illi naturæ, ut
if not that freedom given were to-that nature that
voluntatis rectitudinem propter ipsam servaret rectitudinem,
of-will the-rectitude for the-very it-might-keep rectitude
non valeret ad justitiam; quoniam constat justitiam esse
not it-would-avail for justice since it-is-agreed justice to-be
rectitudinem voluntatis propter se servatam: sed ad justitiam
the-rectitude of-will for itself kept but for justice
prodesse arbitrii libertatem credimus. Quare indubitanter
to-profit of-choice the-freedom we-believe wherefore undoubtingly
asserendum est rationalem naturam non eam accepisse, nisi ad
to-be-asserted it-is the-rational nature not it to-have-received except for
servandam rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.
keeping the-rectitude of-will for the-very rectitude

MAG. Ergo quoniam omnis libertas est potestas; illa libertas
therefore since every freedom is power that freedom
arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter
of-choice is the-power of-keeping the-rectitude of-will for
ipsam rectitudinem.
the-very rectitude

DISC. Non potest aliud esse.
not it-can other to-be

MAG. Jam itaque clarum est liberum arbitrium non esse
now and-so clear it-is free choice not to-be
aliud, quam arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis
other than choice able to-keep the-rectitude of-will
propter ipsam rectitudinem.
for the-very rectitude

DISC. Clarum utique est. Sed quandiu ipsam rectitudinem
clear surely it-is but as-long-as the-very rectitude
habuit, servare potuit quod habuit. Postquam autem illam
it-had to-keep it-could what it-had after however it
deseruit, quomodo potest servare quod non habet? Absente
it-deserted how can-it to-keep what not it-has absent
ergo rectitudine, quæ servari possit, non est liberum
therefore the-rectitude which to-be-kept can not there-is free
arbitrium, quod eam servare valeat: non enim servare valet
choice which it to-keep be-able not for to-keep it-is-able
quod non habet.
what not it-has

MAG. Etiamsi absit rectitudo voluntatis, non tamen rationalis
even-if be-absent the-rectitude of-will not yet the-rational
natura minus habet quod suum est. Nullam namque potestatem
nature less has what its-own is no for power
habemus, ut puto, quæ sola sufficiat, sibi ad actum: et
we-have as I-think which alone suffices to-itself for act and
tamen, cum ea desunt sine quibus ad actum minime
yet when those-things are-lacking without which to act by-no-means
perducuntur nostræ potestates, non minus eas, quantum in
are-led our powers not less them as-far-as in
nobis est, habere dicimur. Sicut nullum instrumentum solum
us it-is to-have we-are-said as no instrument alone
sibi sufficit ad operandum; tamen, cum desunt illa
to-itself suffices for working yet when are-lacking those-things
sine quibus instrumento uti nequimus, instrumentum nos
without which the-instrument to-use we-cannot the-instrument us
cujuslibet operis habere sine falsitate fatemur. Quod ut in
of-any work to-have without falsehood we-confess which that in

multis animadvertas, in uno tibi monstrabo. Nullus visum
many you-may-notice in one to-you I-shall-show no-one sight
habens dicitur nullatenus posse videre montem.
having is-said in-no-way to-be-able to-see a-mountain
DISC. Qui montem videre non potest, profecto nullum habet
he-who a-mountain to-see not can surely no has
visum.
sight
MAG. Habet ergo potestatem et instrumentum videndi
he-has therefore the-power and the-instrument of-seeing
montem, qui visum habet: et tamen si mons abest, et
a-mountain who sight has and yet if the-mountain is-absent and
dicis ei, Vide montem, respondet tibi: Non possum, quia
you-say to-him see the-mountain he-answers to-you not I-can because
abest; si adesset, possem videre. Item: Si non adesset,
it-is-absent if it-were-present I-could to-see likewise if not it-were-present
et lux abesset; responderet se montem videre monenti,
and light were-absent he-would-answer himself the-mountain to-see to-one-advising
quia non posset absente luce; sed si lux adesset, tunc posset.
because not he-could absent the-light but if light were-present then he-could
Rursum: si visum habenti mons et lux præsens est, et
again if sight to-one-having the-mountain and light present is and
aliquid visui obstet, ut si quis illi oculos claudat, dicet
something to-sight be-in-the-way as if someone his eyes should-close he-will-say
se posse videre montem: sed si nihil visui ejus obsisteret,
himself to-be-able to-see the-mountain but if nothing to-sight his stood-in-the-way
tunc sine dubio montem videndi potestatem haberet.
then without doubt the-mountain of-seeing the-power he-would-have
DISC. Totum hoc omnibus notum est.
all this to-all known is

MAG. Vides ergo quia potestas videndi aliquod corpus, alia
you-see therefore that the-power of-seeing some body one
est in videnteː alia in re videndaː alia in medio, id
is in the-seer another in the-thing to-be-seen another in the-middle that
est neque in videnteː neque in videndo: et ea quæ est
is neither in the-seer nor in the-thing-seen and that which is
in medio, alia est in adjuvante; alia in non impediente,
in the-middle one is in the-helping another in the-not hindering
id est cum nihil quod impedire possit impedit.
that is when nothing which to-hinder can hinders

DISC. Video plane.
I-see plainly

MAG. Quatuor igitur istæ potestates sunt, quarum si una
four therefore these powers are of-which if one
quælibet desit, aliæ tres nec singulæ, nec omnes
any be-lacking the-other three neither singly nor all
simul aliquid possunt efficere: nec tamen, absentibus aliis,
together anything can to-effect nor yet absent the-others
negamus aut eum qui visum habet habere visum, aut
do-we-deny either him who sight has to-have sight or
instrumentum sive potestatem videndi; aut rem visibilem
the-instrument or power of-seeing or the-thing visible
posse videri; aut lucem posse visum juvare.
to-be-able to-be-seen or light to-be-able sight to-help

Quomodo potestatem habeant servandi rectitudinem, quam non habent

IV · THE POWER REMAINS WITHOUT THE RECTITUDE

The fourth power, that of nothing hindering, is power only improperly. As we have the power of seeing in darkness, reason and will give us the power to keep rectitude even when it is absent. The student grants that this power is always present to the rational nature, and was free in the first man and the angels, since rectitude could not be taken from them against their will.

MAG. Quarta autem potestas improprie dicitur: quod enim
the-fourth moreover power improperly is-so-called what for
solet impedire visum, non ob aliud dicitur dare potestatem
is-wont to-binder sight not for another is-said to-give the-power
videndi, cum non impedit, nisi quia non aufert. Potestas
of-seeing when not it-binders except because not it-takes-away the-power
autem videndi lucem, nonnisi in tribus rebus est; quia
moreover of-seeing light only in three things is because
tunc est idem, et quod videtur, et quod adjuvat. Nonne
then it-is the-same both what is-seen and what helps surely-not
hoc omnibus est notum!
this to-all is known

DISC. Nulli utique est ignotum.
to-none surely it-is unknown

MAG. Si ergo, absente re quæ videri possit, in tenebris
if therefore absent the-thing which to-be-seen can in darkness
positi, et clausos sive ligatos oculos habentes, quantum
placed and shut or bound eyes having as-far-as
ad nos pertinet, videndi quamlibet rem visibilem potestatem
to us it-belongs of-seeing any thing visible the-power
habemus; quid prohibet nos habere potestatem servandi
we-have what prevents us to-have the-power of-keeping

rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem, etiam
the-rectitude of-will for the-very rectitude even
absente ipsa rectitudine, quandiu et ratio in nobis est, qua
absent the-very rectitude as-long-as both reason in us is by-which
eam valemus cognoscere; et voluntas, qua illam tenere
it we-are-able to-know and will by-which it to-hold
possumus? Ex his enim constat præfata libertas arbitrii.
we-can of these for consists the-aforesaid freedom of-choice
DISC. Satisfecisti intellectui meo, potestatem hanc servandi
you-have-satisfied understanding my power this of-keeping
rectitudinem voluntatis rationali naturæ semper inesse,
the-rectitude of-will in-the-rational nature always to-be-in
atque hanc potestatem in primi hominis et angelorum
and this power in of-the-first man and of-the-angels
arbitrio liberam fuisse, quibus invitis rectitudo voluntatis
the-choice free to-have-been from-whom unwilling the-rectitude of-will
non poterat auferri.
not could to-be-taken-away

Quod nulla tentatio cogat invitum peccare

V · NO TEMPTATION COMPELS THE WILL

A man who lies to save his life seems to desert rectitude unwillingly, but no one wills unwillingly. He wills the truth for its own sake and the lie for his life, so he lies both willingly and unwillingly, and he is called unwilling because he cannot avoid the lie without the hardship of death. So the will is free: no temptation turns it from rectitude unless it consents, and when it is conquered it is conquered by its own power.

DISC. Sed nunc quomodo est humanæ voluntatis arbitrium
but now how is of-the-human will the-choice
hac potestate liberum; cum sæpe rectam habens homo
by-this power free since often right having man
voluntatem, ipsam rectitudinem invitus, cogente tentatione,
will the-very rectitude unwilling compelling temptation
deserat?
he-deserts

MAG. Nemo illam deserit, nisi volendo. Si ergo invitus
no-one it deserts except by-willing if therefore unwilling
dicitur nolens, nemo deserit illam invitus: ligari enim
is-said not-willing no-one deserts it unwilling to-be-bound for
homo potest invitus, quia nolens potest ligari; torqueri
a-man can unwilling because not-willing he-can to-be-bound to-be-tortured
potest invitus, quia nolens potest torqueri; occidi potest
he-can unwilling because not-willing he-can to-be-tortured to-be-killed he-can
invitus, quia nolens potest occidi; velle autem non potest
unwilling because not-willing he-can to-be-killed to-will however not he-can
invitus, quia velle non potest, nolens velle; nam omnis
unwilling because to-will not he-can not-willing to-will for every-one
volens ipsum suum velle vult.
willing his-very own willing wills

DISC. Quomodo ergo dicitur invitus mentiri, qui mentitur
how therefore is-he-said unwilling to-lie who lies
ne occidatur: cum hoc nonnisi volens facit? Nam, sicut
that-not he-be-killed since this only willing he-does for as
invitus mentitur, sic invitus vult mentiri; et qui invitus
unwilling he-lies so unwilling he-wills to-lie and he-who unwilling
vult mentiri, nolens vult mentiri.
wills to-lie not-willing wills to-lie

MAG. Ideo forsitan invitus mentiri dicitur; quia, cum sic vult
therefore perhaps unwilling to-lie he-is-said because since so he-wills
veritatem ut non mentiatur nisi propter vitam, et vult
truth that not he-would-lie except for life both he-wills
mendacium, quia propter vitam; et non vult mendacium
the-lie because for life and not he-wills the-lie
propter ipsum mendacium, quoniam vult veritatem: et ideo
for the-very lie since he-wills truth and therefore
volens, et nolens mentitur. Alia namque est voluntas,
willing and not-willing he-lies another for is the-will
qua volumus aliquid propter se, ut cum volumus salutem
by-which we-will something for itself as when we-will health
propter se; et alia, cum aliquid volumus propter aliud,
for itself and another when something we-will for another
ut cum volumus absinthium bibere propter salutem. Unde
as when we-will wormwood to-drink for health whence
potest forsitan dici secundum has diversas voluntates, quia
it-can perhaps to-be-said according-to these diverse wills that
invitus, et non invitus mentitur. Quapropter cum dicitur
unwilling and not unwilling he-lies wherefore when he-is-said
invitus mentiri, quia non id vult inquantum vult veritatem,
unwilling to-lie because not it he-wills in-so-far-as he-wills truth
non repugnat illi sententiæ qua dico neminem invitum
not it-is-repugnant to-that opinion by-which I-say no-one unwilling

deserere rectitudinem voluntatis; quia mentiendo vult eam
to-desert the-rectitude of-will because by-lying he-wills it
deserere propter vitam: secundum quam voluntatem non
to-desert for life according-to which will not
invitus eam deserit, sed volens; de qua voluntate nunc
unwilling it he-deserts but willing about which will now
loquimur. De illa namque loquimur, qua vult mentiri
we-speak about that for we-speak by-which he-wills to-lie
propter vitam; non de illa, qua non vult mendacium
for life not about that by-which not he-wills the-lie
propter se. Aut idcirco certe mentitur invitus, quia invitus
for itself or therefore certainly he-lies unwilling because unwilling
aut occiditur, aut mentitur, id est invitus est in hac angustia,
either he-is-killed or he-lies that is unwilling he-is in this strait
ut ex necessitate unum horum quodlibet fiat: quamvis enim
that from necessity one of-these whichever be-done although for
necesse sit illum aut occidi aut mentiri, non tamen necesse
necessary it-be him either to-be-killed or to-lie not yet necessary
est illum occidi, quia potest non occidi, si mentitur;
it-is him to-be-killed because he-can not to-be-killed if he-lies
nec necesse est illum mentiri, quia potest non mentiri, si
nor necessary is-it him to-lie because he-can not to-lie if
occiditur. Neutrum enim est determinate in necessitate; quia
he-is-killed neither for is determinately in necessity because
utrumlibet est in potestate. Ita quoque, licet invitus aut
either-one is in power so also although unwilling either
mentiatur, aut occidatur, non tamen ideo consequitur ut
he-lie or be-killed not yet therefore it-follows that
invitus mentiatur, aut ut invitus occidatur. Est et alia
unwilling he-lie or that unwilling he-be-killed there-is also another
ratio, quam frequens habet usus, cur invitus et nolens et
reason which frequent has usage why unwilling and not-willing and

ex necessitate dicitur aliquis facere, quod tamen volens facit.
from necessity is-said someone to-do what yet willing he-does
Nam quod nonnisi difficile facere valemus, et ideo non
for what only with-difficulty to-do we-are-able and therefore not
facimus, dicimus hoc nos facere non posse, et ex necessitate
we-do we-say this us to-do not to-be-able and from necessity
nos, sive invitos, deserere: et quod sine difficultate dimittere
us or unwilling to-leave-off and what without difficulty to-leave-off
nequimus, et idcirco facimus, hoc nos invitos, et nolentes,
we-cannot and therefore we-do this us unwilling and not-willing
et ex necessitate facere asserimus. Hoc igitur modo, qui
and from necessity to-do we-assert in-this therefore way he-who
mentitur ne moriatur, mentiri invitus et nolens dicitur,
lies that-not he-die to-lie unwilling and not-willing is-said
et ex necessitate, quia mendacium vitare non valet sine
and from necessity because the-lie to-avoid not he-is-able without
mortis difficultate. Sicut igitur qui mentitur propter vitam,
of-death difficulty as therefore he-who lies for life
improprie dicitur invitus mentiri, quoniam mentitur volens;
improperly is-said unwilling to-lie since he-lies willing
ita non proprie dicitur invitus velle mentiri, quoniam hoc
so not properly he-is-said unwilling to-will to-lie since this
nonnisi volens vult. Nam sicut, cum mentitur, vult ipsum
only willing he-wills for as when he-lies he-wills the-very
mentiri; sic, cum vult mentiri, vult ipsum velle.
lying so when he-wills to-lie he-wills the-very willing

DISC. Non possum negare quod dicis.
not I-can to-deny what you-say

MAG. Quomodo ergo non est libera voluntas, quam aliena
how therefore not is free the-will which another's
potestas sine suo assensu subjicere non potest?
power without its-own assent to-subject not can

DISC. Nonne simili ratione possumus dicere voluntatem equi
surely-not by-like reason can-we to-say the-will of-a-horse
esse liberam, quia non appetitui carnis servit, nisi volens?
to-be free because not to-the-appetite of-the-flesh it-serves except willing
MAG. Non est hic similiter; in equo namque non ipsa voluntas
not it-is here similar in a-horse for not the-very will
se subjicit, sed naturaliter subjecta semper necessitate appetitui
itself subjects but naturally subjected always from-necessity to-the-appetite
carnis servit. In homine vero, quandiu ipsa voluntas recta
of-the-flesh serves in man indeed as-long-as the-very will right
est, nec servit, nec subjecta est cui non debet, nec ab ipsa
is neither it-serves nor subjected is-it to-what not it-ought nor from the-very
rectitudine ulla vi aliena avertitur, nisi ipsa, cui non
rectitude by-any force foreign is-it-turned-away unless it-itself to-what not
debet, volens consentiat: quem consensum non naturaliter, nec
it-ought willing consent which consent not naturally nor
ex necessitate sicut equus, sed ex se aperte videtur habere.
from necessity as the-horse but from itself openly it-seems to-have
DISC. Satisfecisti huic objectioni meæ de voluntate equi.
you-have-satisfied this objection my about the-will of-the-horse
Redi ubi eramus.
return where we-were
MAG. An negabis omnem rem liberam esse ab ea re a
or will-you-deny every thing free to-be from that thing by
qua cogi nisi volens, vel prohiberi non potest?
which to-be-compelled except willing or to-be-prevented not it-can
DISC. Non video quomodo negem.
not I-see how I-could-deny
MAG. Dic etiam quomodo superat recta voluntas, et quomodo
say also how overcomes right will and how
superatur?
it-is-overcome

DISC. Velle ipsam rectitudinem perseveranter, est illi vincere;
to-will the-very rectitude perseveringly is for-it to-conquer
velle autem quod non debet, est illi vinci.
to-will however what not it-ought is for-it to-be-conquered
MAG. Puto quia tentatio rectam voluntatem nonnisi volentem,
I-think that temptation right will only willing
aut ab ipsa rectitudine prohibere, aut ad id, quod non
either from the-very rectitude to-hold-back or to that which not
debet, cogere potest: ut illam nolit, et istud velit.
it-ought to-compel can that it it-will-not and this it-will
DISC. Nec hoc ulla ratione falsum esse video.
nor this by-any reason false to-be do-I-see
MAG. Quis ergo potest voluntatem dicere non esse liberam
who therefore can the-will to-say not to-be free
ad servandam rectitudinem, et liberam a tentatione
for keeping rectitude and free from temptation
et peccato: si nulla tentatio potest illam, nisi volentem,
and sin if no temptation can it except willing
avertere a rectitudine ad peccatum, id est ad volendum
to-turn-away from rectitude to sin that is to willing
quod non debet? Cum ergo vincitur, non aliena
what not it-ought when therefore it-is-conquered not by-another's
vincitur potestate, sed sua.
it-is-conquered power but by-its-own
DISC. Hoc monstrant ea quæ dicta sunt.
this show those-things which said were
MAG. Nonne vides ex his consequi quia nulla tentatio potest
surely-not do-you-see from these to-follow that no temptation can
vincere rectam voluntatem? Nam, si potest, habet potestatem
to-conquer right will for if it-can it-has the-power
vincendi, et sua potestate vincit; sed hoc esse non potest,
of-conquering and by-its-own power it-conquers but this to-be not can

quoniam voluntas nonnisi sua vincitur potestate. Quare
since the-will only by-its-own is-conquered power wherefore
nullatenus potest tentatio vincere rectam voluntatem; et cum
in-no-way can temptation to-conquer right will and when
dicitur, improprie dicitur. Non enim aliud intelligitur, quam
it-is-said improperly it-is-said not for other is-understood than
quia voluntas potest se subjicere tentationi; sicut e converso,
that the-will can itself to-subject to-temptation as from the-converse
cum imbecillis dicitur posse vinci a forti, non sua
when the-weak is-said to-be-able to-be-conquered by the-strong not by-his-own
potestate posse dicitur, sed aliena; quoniam non significatur
power to-be-able he-is-said but by-another's since not is-signified
aliud, nisi quia fortis habet potestatem vincendi imbecillem.
other except that the-strong has the-power of-conquering the-weak

Quomodo sit nostra voluntas potens contra tentationes, licet videatur impotens

VI · THE WILL'S WEAKNESS IS DIFFICULTY, NOT IMPOSSIBILITY

The student feels a weakness in the will when temptation overcomes it, but grants that temptation makes refusal hard, never impossible. The teacher confirms it: a man who lies to escape death could will not to lie to escape eternal death. Our inability to hold rectitude is a difficulty, not an impossibility, and does not take away the will's power to persevere.

DISC. Quamvis sic omnia impugnantia voluntati nostræ subjicias,
although so all assailants to-the-will our you-subject
atque nullam tentationem illi dominari permittas, ut in
and no temptation over-it to-rule you-permit so-that in
nullo possim obviare assertionibus tuis; non tamen possum
nothing I-can to-oppose assertions your not yet I-can

dissimulare quamdam impotentiam esse in eadem voluntate,
to-dissemble a-certain impotence to-be in the-same will
quam fere omnes experimur, cum violentia tentationis
which almost all we-experience when by-the-violence of-temptation
superamur. Quapropter nisi illam potentiam quam probas,
we-are-overcome wherefore unless that power which you-prove
et istam impotentiam quam sentimus, facias convenire: non
and this impotence which we-feel you-make to-agree not
potest animus meus ad quietem hujus quæstionis pervenire.
can mind my to rest of-this question to-come

MAG. Istam impotentiam voluntatis, quam dicis, in quo
this impotence of-the-will which you-speak-of in what
putas esse?
do-you-think to-be

DISC. In eo quia non potest perseveranter rectitudini adhærere.
in that that not it-can perseveringly to-rectitude to-cleave

MAG. Si per impotentiam non adhæret, aliena vi
if through impotence not it-cleaves by-another's force
avertitur a rectitudine.
it-is-turned-away from rectitude

DISC. Concedo.
I-grant

MAG. Quæ est hæc vis?
what is this force

DISC. Vis tentationis.
the-force of-temptation

MAG. Hæc vis non eam avertit a rectitudine, si ipsa non
this force not it turns-away from rectitude if it-itself not
vult quod suggerit tentatio.
wills what suggests temptation

DISC. Ita est. Sed ipsa tentatio sua vi cogit eam velle
so it-is but the-very temptation by-its-own force compels it to-will
quod suggerit.
what it-suggests
MAG. Quomodo cogit eam velle? An ita ut possit
how does-it-compel it to-will whether so that it-can
quidem nolle, sed non sine gravi molestia; an ita ut
indeed to-not-will but not without grave trouble or so that
nullatenus possit nolle?
in-no-way it-can to-not-will
DISC. Quamvis fateri me oporteat nos aliquando sic premi
although to-confess me it-behooves us sometimes so to-be-pressed
tentationibus, ut sine difficultate non valeamus nolle quod
by-temptations that without difficulty not we-are-able to-not-will what
suggerunt; non tamen possum dicere quod sic nos unquam
they-suggest not yet I-can to-say that so us ever
opprimant, ut quod monent nullatenus nolle possimus.
they-overwhelm that what they-urge in-no-way to-not-will we-can
MAG. Nescio quomodo possit dici. Si enim vult homo mentiri,
I-know-not how it-can to-be-said if for wills man to-lie
ut non sustineat mortem et servet vitam ad tempus; quis
that not he-may-sustain death and may-keep life for a-time who
dicet impossibile velle eum non mentiri, ut vitet æternam
will-say impossible to-will him not to-lie that he-may-avoid eternal
mortem, et sine fine vivat? Quapropter jam dubitare non
death and without end may-live wherefore now to-doubt not
debes hanc impotentiam servandi rectitudinem, quam dicis
you-ought this impotence of-keeping rectitude which you-speak-of
in nostra voluntate cum tentationibus consentimus, non esse
in our will when to-temptations we-consent not to-be
ex impossibilitate, sed ex difficultate. Frequenti namque
from impossibility but from difficulty with-frequent for

usu dicimus nos non posse aliquid; non quia nobis est
usage we-say us not to-be-able something not because to-us it-is
impossibile, sed quia illud sine difficultate non possumus.
impossible but because it without difficulty not we-can
Hæc autem difficultas non perimit libertatem voluntatis:
this however difficulty not destroys the-freedom of-the-will
impugnare namque potest invitam voluntatem, expugnare nequit
to-assail for it-can unwilling the-will to-storm it-cannot
invitam. Hoc itaque modo, puto te posse videre quomodo
unwilling in-this and-so way I-think you to-be-able to-see how
conveniant potentia voluntatis, quam ratio veritatis asserit; et
agree the-power of-the-will which the-reason of-truth asserts and
impotentia, quam humanitas nostra sentit. Sicut enim difficultas
the-impotence which humanity our feels as for difficulty
nequaquam voluntatis interimit libertatem; ita illa impotentia,
by-no-means of-the-will destroys the-freedom so that impotence
quam non ob aliud in voluntate dicimus esse, nisi quia non
which not for another in the-will we-say to-be except because not
potest tenere suam rectitudinem sine difficultate, non aufert
it-can to-hold its-own rectitude without difficulty not takes-away
eidem voluntati perseverandi in rectitudine potestatem.
from-the-same will of-persevering in rectitude the-power

Quomodo voluntas fortior sit quam tentatio; etiam cum ab illa vincitur

VII · THE WILL IS STRONGER THAN TEMPTATION

How can the will be stronger than the temptation that overcomes it? The teacher distinguishes the will as instrument, always present even in sleep, from its use, which varies with each act of willing, as sight is both the eye's power and the act of seeing. The instrument has its full strength always, but uses it more or less strongly, and abandons what it wills less for what it wills more.

DISC. Sicut nequaquam valeo quod probas negare; ita
as by-no-means am-I-able what you-prove to-deny so
nullatenus queo voluntatem fortiorem esse tentatione, cum ab
in-no-way can-I the-will stronger to-be than-temptation when by
ea superatur, affirmare. Nam si voluntas servandi rectitudinem
it it-is-overcome to-affirm for if the-will of-keeping rectitude
fortior esset quam tentationis impetus; fortius illa volendo
stronger were than of-temptation the-onset more-strongly it by-willing
quod tenet, resisteret quam illa insisteret. Non enim aliunde
what it-holds would-resist than that would-press not for from-elsewhere
scio me magis vel minus fortem habere voluntatem, nisi quia
I-know me more or less strong to-have will except because
magis vel minus fortiter volo. Quapropter cum minus fortiter
more or less strongly I-will wherefore when less strongly
volo quod debeo, quam tentatio mihi suggerit quod non debeo;
I-will what I-ought than temptation to-me suggests what not I-ought
quomodo tentatio fortior non sit voluntate mea, non video.
how temptation stronger not is than-will my not I-see

MAG. Ut video, æquivocatio voluntatis te fallit.
as I-see the-equivocation of-will you deceives

DISC. Ipsam vellem æquivocationem cognoscere.
the-very I-should-wish equivocation to-know

MAG. Sicut visus æquivoce dicitur; ita et voluntas. Vocamus
as sight equivocally is-said so also will we-call
enim visum, ipsum instrumentum videndi, id est radium
for sight the-very instrument of-seeing that is the-ray
procedentem per oculos, quo sentimus lucem et quæ
proceeding through the-eyes by-which we-perceive light and the-things-which
sunt in luce: et dicimus visum, opus instrumenti ipsius,
are in light and we-call sight the-work of-the-instrument itself
quando illo utimur, id est visionem. Eodem modo dicitur
when it we-use that is vision in-the-same way is-called
voluntas, ipsum instrumentum volendi, quod est in anima,
will the-very instrument of-willing which is in the-soul
et quod convertimus ad volendum hoc vel illud; sicut visum
and which we-turn to willing this or that as sight
ad videndum diversa convertimus: et dicitur voluntas, usus
to seeing diverse-things we-turn and is-called will the-use
ejus voluntatis, quæ est instrumentum volendi, sicut dicitur
of-that will which is the-instrument of-willing as is-called
visus, usus ejus visus, qui est instrumentum videndi. Sicut
sight the-use of-that sight which is the-instrument of-seeing as
igitur visum, qui est instrumentum videndi, habemus etiam
therefore sight which is the-instrument of-seeing we-have even
cum non videmus; visus autem, qui est opus ejus, non est
when not we-see sight however which is the-work its not is
nisi cum videmus: ita voluntas, instrumentum scilicet volendi,
except when we-see so the-will the-instrument namely of-willing
semper est in anima, etiam cum non vult aliquid, velut cum
always is in the-soul even when not it-wills anything as when
dormit; voluntatem vero, quam dico usum sive opus ejusdem
it-sleeps the-will indeed which I-call the-use or work of-the-same
instrumenti, non habemus nisi quando volumus aliquid. Illa
instrument not we-have except when we-will something that

igitur voluntas, quam voco instrumentum volendi, una et
therefore will which I-call the-instrument of-willing one and
eadem semper est, quidquid velimus. Illa vero, quæ opus
the-same always is whatever we-will that indeed which the-work
ejus est, tam multiplex est, quam multa et quam sæpe
its is so manifold is as many-things and as often
volumus; quemadmodum visus, quem etiam in tenebris vel
we-will just-as sight which even in darkness or
clausis oculis habemus, semper idem est, quidquid videamus.
with-shut eyes we-have always the-same is whatever we-see
Visus autem, id est opus ejus, qui et visio nominatur, tam
sight however that is the-work its which also vision is-named so
numerosus est quam numerosa, et quam numerose videmus.
numerous is as numerous-things and as numerously we-see

DISC. Plane video, et amo hanc voluntatis discretionem: et
plainly I-see and I-love this of-will distinction and
jam mihi videor videre, quam ex ejus ignorantia patiebar,
now to-me I-seem to-see what from its ignorance I-was-suffering
deceptionem; sed tamen tu prosequere quod incœpisti.
deception but yet you pursue what you-began

MAG. Cum ergo videas duas voluntates esse, instrumentum
since therefore you-see two wills to-be the-instrument
scilicet volendi, et opus ejus, in qua harum duarum
namely of-willing and the-work its in which of-these two
intelligis fortitudinem constare volendi?
do-you-understand the-strength to-consist of-willing

DISC. In illa quæ est instrumentum volendi.
in that which is the-instrument of-willing

MAG. Si ergo scias virum ita fortem, ut eo tenente
if therefore you-should-know a-man so strong that he holding
taurum indomitum, taurus non possit se movere: et
a-bull untamed the-bull not can itself to-move and

videas eumdem virum ita tenentem arietem, ut ipse
you-should-see the-same man so holding a-ram that the-very
aries sese de manibus ejus excutiat, putabis ne illum
ram itself from hands his shook-loose will-you-think (whether) him
minus fortem in tenendo arietem quam in tenendo taurum?
less strong in holding the-ram than in holding the-bull

DISC. Illum quidem non dissimiliter fortem in utroque illo
him indeed not unlike strong in each that
opere judicabo, sed eum sua fortitudine non æqualiter
work I-shall-judge but him his-own strength not equally
uti fatebor: fortius enim operatur in tauro, quam in
to-use I-shall-confess more-strongly for he-works on the-bull than on
ariete. Sed ille fortis est, quia fortitudinem habet; actio
the-ram but he strong is because strength he-has the-action
vero ejus fortis dicitur quia fortiter fit.
indeed his strong is-called because strongly it-is-done

MAG. Sic intellige voluntatem, quam voco instrumentum volendi,
so understand the-will which I-call the-instrument of-willing
inseparabilem et nulla alia vi superabilem fortitudinem habere:
inseparable and by-no other force conquerable strength to-have
qua aliquando magis, aliquando minus utitur in volendo. Unde
which sometimes more sometimes less it-uses in willing whence
quod fortius vult nullatenus deserit, oblato eo quod minus
what more-strongly it-wills in-no-way it-deserts offered that which less
fortiter vult: et cum offertur quod vult fortius, statim
strongly it-wills and when is-offered what it-wills more-strongly at-once
dimittit quod non pariter vult: et tunc voluntas, quam dicere
it-lets-go what not equally it-wills and then the-will which to-call
possumus actionem instrumenti hujus; quoniam agit opus
we-can the-action of-instrument this since it-performs work

suum, cum aliquid vult; tunc, inquam, voluntas actio magis
its-own when something it-wills then I-say the-will the-action more
vel minus fortis dicitur, quoniam magis vel minus fortiter fit.
or less strong is-called since more or less strongly it-is-done

DISC. Aperta jam mihi esse, quæ explicas, necesse est ut
open now to-me to-be what you-explain necessary it-is that
fatear.
I-confess

MAG. Vides igitur quia, cum homo habitam rectitudinem
you-see therefore that when man the-possessed rectitude
voluntatis aliqua ingruente deserit tentatione, nulla vi aliena
of-will some assailing deserts temptation by-no force foreign
abstrahitur; sed ipsa convertit se ad id quod fortius vult.
is-he-dragged-away but it-itself turns itself to that which more-strongly it-wills

Quod nec Deus potest auferre voluntatis rectitudinem

VIII · NOT EVEN GOD CAN TAKE RECTITUDE FROM THE WILL

Justice is willing what God wills one to will. If God took that rectitude from someone's will, he would not will him to will what he wills him to will, which is impossible. God is said to take it only when he does not prevent its loss, and the devil or temptation only when they promise something the will wants more than rectitude, or threaten to take it away.

DISC. Nunquid vel Deus potest illi auferre rectitudinem?
surely-not even God can from-it to-take-away rectitude

MAG. Vide quomodo non possit. Totam quidem substantiam,
see how not he-can the-whole indeed substance
quam de nihilo fecit, potest redigere in nihilum; a
which from nothing he-made he-can to-reduce to nothing from
voluntate vero habente rectitudinem, non valet illam separare.
the-will indeed having rectitude not he-is-able it to-separate

DISC. Hujus tuæ mihi inauditæ assertionis multum a te
of-this your to-me unheard-of assertion much from you
rationem exspecto.
the-reason I-await

MAG. Nos loquimur de illa voluntatis rectitudine, qua justa
we speak about that of-will rectitude by-which just
dicitur voluntas, id est quæ propter se servatur. Nulla autem
is-called the-will that is which for itself is-kept none moreover
est justa voluntas, nisi quæ vult quod Deus vult eam velle.
is just will except which wills what God wills it to-will

DISC. Quæ hoc non vult, plane injusta est.
which this not wills plainly unjust is

MAG. Servare itaque rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam
to-keep and-so the-rectitude of-will for the-very
rectitudinem, est unicuique eam servanti velle quod Deus
rectitude is for-each it keeping to-will what God
vult illum velle.
wills him to-will

DISC. Sic oportet fateri.
so it-behooves to-confess

MAG. Si Deus separat hanc rectitudinem ab alicujus voluntate,
if God separates this rectitude from someone's will
aut volens facit hoc, aut nolens.
either willing he-does this or not-willing

DISC. Nolens non potest.
not-willing not he-can

MAG. Si itaque aufert alicujus voluntati præfatam
if and-so he-takes-away from-someone's will the-aforesaid
rectitudinem vult quod facit.
rectitude he-wills what he-does

DISC. Absque dubio vult.
without doubt he-wills

MAG. Utique ab cujus voluntate vult separare eamdem
surely from whose will he-wills to-separate the-same
rectitudinem, non vult eum rectitudinem servare voluntatis
rectitude not he-wills him rectitude to-keep of-will
propter ipsam rectitudinem.
for the-very rectitude

DISC. Sic sequitur.
so it-follows

MAG. Sed jam positum est servare hoc modo rectitudinem
but already set-down it-is to-keep in-this way the-rectitude
voluntatis esse omni servanti velle quod Deus vult illum
of-will to-be for-everyone keeping to-will what God wills him
velle.
to-will

DISC. Si positum non esset, ita tamen esset.
if set-down not it-were so yet it-would-be

MAG. Ergo si Deus præfatam rectitudinem tollit ab aliquo,
therefore if God the-aforesaid rectitude takes-away from someone
non vult eum velle quod vult eum velle.
not he-wills him to-will what he-wills him to-will

DISC. Nihil consequentius, et nihil impossibilius.
nothing more-consequent and nothing more-impossible

MAG. Igitur nihil magis impossibile, quam Deum rectitudinem
therefore nothing more impossible than God the-rectitude
voluntatis auferre. Quod tamen facere dicitur, quando non
of-will to-take-away which yet to-do he-is-said when not
facit ut eadem rectitudo non deseratur. Porro diabolus,
he-brings-about that the-same rectitude not be-deserted moreover the-devil
vel tentatio, ideo dicitur hoc facere, sive voluntatem ipsam
or temptation therefore is-said this to-do or the-will itself
vincere, et a rectitudine, quam tenet abstrahere; quoniam
to-conquer and from the-rectitude which it-holds to-drag-away since

nisi promitteret ei aliquid aut minaretur auferre, quod
unless it-promised to-it something or threatened to-take-away what
magis quam ipsam rectitudinem vult; nullatenus ipsa se
more than the-very rectitude it-wills in-no-way it itself
ab illa, quam aliquatenus vult, averteret.
from that which in-some-measure it-wills would-turn-away
DISC. Sic planum videtur mihi quod dicis, ut nihil contra
so plain seems to-me what you-say that nothing against
posse dici existimem.
to-be-able to-be-said I-reckon

Quod nihil sit liberius recta voluntate

IX · NOTHING IS FREER THAN A RIGHT WILL

No foreign force can take its rectitude from a right will. One who lies to save his life is not compelled to will life more than truth: prevented from keeping both, he freely chooses what he prefers. He is no weaker for truth but wills health more strongly; shown eternal glory and hell, he would at once prove strong enough to keep the truth.

MAG. Cernis itaque nihil liberius recta voluntate, cui
you-perceive and-so nothing freer than-right will from-which
nulla vis aliena potest suam auferre rectitudinem. Nempe
no force foreign can its-own to-take-away rectitude indeed
si dicimus quia, cum aliquis vult mentiri ne perdat vitam
if we-say that when someone wills to-lie lest he-lose life
aut salutem, cogitur deserere timore mortis, aut tormentis
or health he-is-compelled to-desert by-fear of-death or by-torments
veritatem: non est verum. Non enim cogitur magis velle
truth not it-is true not for he-is-compelled more to-will
vitam quam veritatem; sed quoniam vi aliena prohibetur
life than truth but since by-force foreign it-is-prevented

utramque servare simul, ipsa eligit quod mavult, sponte
both to-keep at-once it-itself chooses what it-prefers freely
utique, et non invita; quamvis in necessitate utramlibet
surely and not unwilling although in the-necessity either-one
deserendi posita sit non sponte, sed invita. Non enim minus
of-deserting placed it-is not freely but unwilling not for less
fortis est ad volendum veritatem, quam ad volendum salutem;
strong it-is for willing truth than for willing health
sed fortius vult salutem. Nam, si præsentem videret
but more-strongly it-wills health for if present it-saw
gloriam æternam, quam statim post servatam veritatem
the-glory eternal which at-once after kept truth
assequeretur, et inferni tormenta, quibus post mendacium
it-would-attain and of-hell the-torments to-which after the-lie
sine mora traderetur; procul dubio mox virium
without delay it-would-be-handed-over without doubt soon of-strength
sufficientiam ad servandam veritatem habere cerneretur.
sufficiency for keeping truth to-have it-would-be-seen

DISC. Aperte hoc videtur, cum majores vires exhiberet ad
openly this is-seen when greater strength it-would-show for
volendum salutem æternam propter se, et veritatem propter
willing health eternal for itself and truth for
præmium, quam ad salutem temporalem servandam.
the-reward than for health temporal to-be-kept

Quomodo peccans sit servus peccati; et quod majus miraculum fit, cum Deus reddit rectitudinem illam deserenti, quam cum mortuo reddit vitam

X · THE SINNER IS SIN'S SLAVE

The rational nature always has free choice, since it always has the power to keep rectitude, though sometimes with difficulty. But once the will deserts rectitude it cannot recover it by itself, and serves sin. It is a greater miracle for God to restore rectitude to the will that deserted it than life to the dead, since the will lost it by its own fault.

MAG. Semper itaque habet rationalis natura liberum arbitrium;
always and-so has the-rational nature free choice
quia semper habet potestatem servandi rectitudinem
because always it-has the-power of-keeping the-rectitude
voluntatis, propter ipsam rectitudinem, quamvis aliquando cum
of-will for the-very rectitude although sometimes with
difficultate. Sed, cum libera voluntas deserit rectitudinem,
difficulty but when free will deserts rectitude
per difficultatem servandi; utique post servit peccato, per
through the-difficulty of-keeping surely afterward it-serves sin through
impossibilitatem per se recuperandi. Si ergo fit spiritus
the-impossibility through itself of-recovering if therefore it-becomes a-spirit
vadens, et non rediens, quoniam qui facit peccatum, servus
going and not returning since he-who does sin a-slave
est peccati. Quippe, sicut nulla voluntas, antequam haberet
is of-sin indeed as no will before it-had
rectitudinem, potuit eam, Deo non dante, capere; ita cum
rectitude could it God not giving to-take so when
deserit acceptam, non potest eam nisi Deo reddente recipere.
it-deserts the-received not it-can it except God returning to-receive-again

Et majus miraculum existimo, cum Deus voluntati desertam
and greater a-miracle I-reckon when God to-the-will the-deserted
reddit rectitudinem, quam cum mortuo reddit vitam amissam.
returns rectitude than when to-the-dead he-returns life lost
Corpus enim necessitate moriendo non peccat, ut vitam
the-body for by-necessity by-dying not sins that life
nunquam recipiat; voluntas vero per se rectitudinem
never it-should-receive-again the-will indeed through itself rectitude
deserendo, meretur ut illa semper indigeat. Et si quis
by-deserting deserves that it always it-should-lack and if anyone
sponte sibi mortem infert, non aufert sibi quod
freely on-himself death inflicts not he-takes-away from-himself what
nunquam erat amissurus; qui vero voluntatis rectitudinem
never he-was about-to-lose he-who indeed of-will the-rectitude
deserit, hoc abjicit quod ex debito semper erat servaturus.
deserts this casts-away which from debt always he-was about-to-keep
DISC. Verum valde video quod dicis de servitute, qua
truly very I-see what you-say about the-slavery by-which
servus sit peccati, qui facit peccatum; et de impossibilitate
a-slave is of-sin he-who does sin and about the-impossibility
recuperandi desertam rectitudinem, nisi ab eo, a quo prius
of-recovering deserted rectitude unless by him by whom first
data erat reddatur; et ut illam semper teneant
given it-had-been it-be-returned and that it always they-may-hold
indesinenter, considerandum est omnibus quibus datur.
unceasingly to-be-considered it-is by-all to-whom it-is-given

Quod ista servitus non auferat libertatem arbitrii

XI · SLAVERY DOES NOT TAKE AWAY FREEDOM

The student fears that slavery contradicts the freedom just defined. Lacking rectitude, the will is slave and free without contradiction: a slave because it cannot return from sin except through another, free because nothing but itself can turn it from rectitude. Neither it nor another can deprive it of that freedom, and it is always naturally free to keep rectitude, even when it has none to keep.

DISC. Sed hac sententia multum repressisti exsultationem
but by-this sentence much you-have-checked exultation
meam, quia jam putabam esse securum hominem semper
my because already I-thought to-be secure man always
habere libertatem arbitrii. Quare ipsam servitutem exponi
to-have the-freedom of-choice wherefore the-very slavery to-be-explained
mihi postulo, ne forte libertati præfatæ repugnare videatur.
to-me I-request lest perhaps to-the-freedom aforesaid to-be-repugnant it-may-seem
Utraque enim, scilicet hæc libertas et servitus, est in
each for namely this freedom and slavery is in
voluntate, secundum quam liber aut servus est homo. Si
the-will according-to which free or slave is man if
ergo servus, quomodo liber? Aut si liber, quomodo servus?
therefore a-slave how free or if free how a-slave
MAG. Si bene discernas; quando non habet præfatam rectitudinem,
if well you-discern when not it-has the-aforesaid rectitude
sine repugnantia et servus est, et liber. Nunquam enim
without repugnance both a-slave it-is and free never for
est ejus potestatis rectitudinem capere, cum non habet; sed
is-it of-its power rectitude to-take when not it-has but
semper est ejus potestatis servare, cum habet. Per hoc, quia
always it-is of-its power to-keep when it-has through this that

redire non potest a peccato, servus est; et per hoc, quia
to-return not it-can from sin a-slave it-is and through this that
abstrahi non potest a rectitudine, liber est. Sed a
to-be-dragged-away not it-can from rectitude free it-is but from
peccato et ejus servitute, nonnisi per alium potest reverti;
sin and its slavery only through another can-it to-return
a rectitudine vero, nonnisi per se potest averti, et a
from rectitude indeed only through itself can-it to-be-turned-away and of
libertate sua nec per se, nec per alium potest privari.
freedom its-own neither through itself nor through another can-it to-be-deprived
Semper enim naturaliter liber est ad servandam rectitudinem,
always for naturally free it-is for keeping rectitude
si eam habet: etiam quando, quam servet, non habet.
if it it-has even when what it-may-keep not it-has
DISC. Sufficit mihi hæc hujus libertatis et servitutis, ut in
suffices to-me this of-this freedom and slavery so-that in
eodem homine possint esse, simul facta concordia.
the-same man they-can to-be at-once made concord

Cur, cum homo non habet rectitudinem, magis dicitur liber; quia, cum habet, non potest ei auferri: quam, cum eam habet, servus; quia, cum non habet, non potest per se eam recuperare

XII · WHY HE IS CALLED FREE EVEN WITHOUT RECTITUDE

Why is man called free rather than slave, when he seems always to have both? The slavery is only the inability not to sin, present only when rectitude is absent, while the power to keep rectitude is always present. So man is always free, but a slave of sin only when he lacks a right will, as one keeps his sight while the sun is absent.

DISC. Sed multum nosse desidero cur quando non habet
but much to-know I-desire why when not it-has
rectitudinem, magis dicitur liber; quia non potest ei
rectitude rather it-is-called free because not it-can from-it
ab alio auferri, cum habet, quam cum rectitudinem
by another to-be-taken-away when it-has than when rectitude
habet, servus; quoniam eam non potest recuperare per se,
it-has a-slave since it not it-can to-recover through itself
cum non habet. Per hoc enim quia redire non potest a
when not it-has through this for that to-return not it-can from
peccato, servus est: per hoc quod abstrahi non potest
sin a-slave it-is through this that to-be-dragged-away not it-can
a rectitudine, liber est. et, sicut nunquam abstrahi
from rectitude free it-is and as never to-be-dragged-away
potest, si habet; ita nunquam potest redire, si non habet.
can-it if it-has so never can-it to-return if not it-has
Quapropter, sicut semper habet illam libertatem; ita semper
wherefore as always it-has that freedom so always
habere videtur illam servitutem.
to-have it-seems that slavery

MAG. Ista servitus non est nisi impotentia non peccandi.
this slavery not is except the-impotence of-not sinning
Sive enim dicamus eam impotentiam esse redeundi ad
whether for we-say it impotence to-be of-returning to
rectitudinem sive impotentiam recuperandi, aut iterum habendi
rectitude or impotence of-recovering or again of-having
rectitudinem: non ob aliud est homo servus peccati, nisi
rectitude not for another is man a-slave of-sin except
quoniam per hoc quia nequit redire ad rectitudinem, aut
since through this that he-cannot to-return to rectitude or
recuperare, aut habere illam, non potest non peccare. Cum
to-recover or to-have it not he-can not to-sin when
autem habet eamdem rectitudinem, non habet impotentiam
however he-has the-same rectitude not he-has the-impotence
non peccandi. Quare quando habet rectitudinem illam, non
of-not sinning wherefore when he-has rectitude that not
est servus peccati. Potestatem autem servandi rectitudinem
he-is a-slave of-sin the-power however of-keeping rectitude
semper habet, et cum rectitudinem habet, et cum non
always he-has both when rectitude he-has and when not
habet; et ideo semper est liber. Quod autem quæris cur
he-has and therefore always he-is free what however you-ask why
quando non habet rectitudinem, magis dicitur liber idcirco
when not he-has rectitude rather he-is-called free therefore
quoniam ab alio non ei potest auferri, quando
since by another not from-him it-can to-be-taken-away when
habet: quam tunc servus, cum habet rectitudinem, ideo quia
he-has than then a-slave when he-has rectitude therefore because
non potest eam recuperare per se, quando non habet:
not he-can it to-recover through himself when not he-has
tale est, ac si quæras cur homo cum sol abest magis
such it-is as if you-should-ask why man when the-sun is-absent rather

dicitur habere potestatem videndi solem, propter hoc quia
is-said to-have the-power of-seeing the-sun on-account-of this that
intueri illum potest, cum adest, quam dicitur cum sol
to-behold it he-can when it-is-present than he-is-said when the-sun
adest, habere impotentiam videndi solem, quoniam quando
is-present to-have the-impotence of-seeing the-sun since when
abest non potest eum facere sibi præsentem. Sicut enim
it-is-absent not he-can it to-make to-himself present as for
etiam quando sol abest, habemus in nobis visum quo
even when the-sun is-absent we-have in us sight by-which
illum videmus, cum adest; sic etiam quando voluntatis
it we-see when it-is-present so also when of-will
rectitudo nobis deest, habemus tamen in nobis aptitudinem
rectitude to-us is-lacking we-have yet in us the-aptitude
intelligendi et volendi, qua eam possumus servare propter
of-understanding and of-willing by-which it we-can to-keep for
se, cum eam habemus. Et, sicut quando nobis nihil deest
itself when it we-have and as when to-us nothing is-lacking
ad videndum solem, nisi præsentia ejus, tunc solummodo non
for seeing the-sun except the-presence its then only not
habemus illam potestatem, quam nobis facit ejus præsentia;
we-have that power which for-us makes its presence
sic tantummodo quando nobis illa rectitudo deest, tunc
so only when to-us that rectitude is-lacking then
habemus illam impotentiam, quam fecit nobis ejus absentia.
we-have that impotence which made for-us its absence
Semper igitur homo habet arbitrii libertatem, sed non semper
always therefore man has of-choice freedom but not always
servus est peccati; sed quando non habet rectam voluntatem.
a-slave he-is of-sin but when not he-has right will

DISC. Si intente cogitassem quæ supra dicta sunt,
if attentively I-had-thought-over the-things-which above said were
quando videndi potestatem in quatuor potestates distribuisti,
when of-seeing the-power into four powers you-distributed
non hic dubitassem: quare fateor culpam hujus dubitationis
not here I-would-have-doubted wherefore I-confess the-fault of-this doubt
meæ.
my

MAG. Parcam tibi nunc, si deinceps ea quæ dicimus sic
I-shall-spare you now if henceforth those-things which we-say so
præsentia, cum opus erit, habueris; ut ea nobis necesse
present when need will-be you-will-have that them for-us necessary
non sit repetere.
not it-may-be to-repeat

DISC. Gratam habeo tuam indulgentiam. Sed ne mireris, si ea
grateful I-hold your indulgence but not wonder if those-things
quæ non consuevi cogitare, non sunt mihi propter unam
which not I-am-accustomed to-think not are to-me because-of one
auditionem semper omnia ad intuendum in corde præsentia.
hearing always all for beholding in the-heart present

Quod potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem, sit perfecta diffinitio libertatis arbitrii

XIII · THE DEFINITION IS COMPLETE

Must one add that the power is free from all force? No: the definition is made of genus and differences. Power is the genus; "of keeping" excludes powers like laughing; "rectitude" excludes keeping gold; "of the will" excludes the straightness of rods; "for its own sake" excludes keeping it for money or by nature, as a dog loves its master. Nothing needs adding or taking away.

MAG. Dic adhuc si quid in diffinitione libertatis arbitrii,
say still if anything in the-definition of-the-freedom of-choice
quam fecimus, dubitas?
which we-made you-doubt
DISC. Unum est, quod adhuc me aliquantulum in ea sollicitat.
one-thing there-is which still me somewhat in it troubles
Nam sæpe habemus potestatem servandi aliquid; quæ tamen
for often we-have the-power of-keeping something which yet
libera non est, ut aliena vi impediri non possit.
free not is so-that by-another's force to-be-hindered not it-can
Quamobrem, cum dicis quia libertas arbitrii est potestas
wherefore when you-say that the-freedom of-choice is the-power
servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem,
of-keeping the-rectitude of-will for the-very rectitude
vide ne forte addendum sit, quod illam potestatem tam
see lest perhaps to-be-added it-is what that power so
liberam designet esse, ut nulla vi superari possit.
free designates to-be that by-no force to-be-overcome it-can

MAG. Si potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis, propter ipsam
if the-power of-keeping the-rectitude of-will for the-very
rectitudinem, aliquando inveniri posset absque illa quam
rectitude sometime to-be-found could without that which
perspeximus libertate, expediret ut quod dicis adderetur:
we-have-perceived freedom it-would-be-expedient that what you-say were-added
sed cum dicta diffinitio sic perfecta sit ex genere et
but since the-said definition so perfect is from genus and
differentiis, ut nec minus aliquid claudat, nec plus quam illa
differences that neither less anything it-encloses nor more than that
quam quærimus libertas, nihil illi addendum, aut demendum
which we-seek freedom nothing to-it to-be-added or to-be-taken-away
intelligi potest. Est enim potestas, libertatis genus. Quod
to-be-understood can is for power of-freedom the-genus what
autem additum est, servandi, separat eam ab omni
however added has-been of-keeping separates it from every
potestate quæ non est servandi, sicut est potestas ridendi aut
power which not is of-keeping as is the-power of-laughing or
ambulandi. Addendo vero, rectitudinem, secrevimus eam a
of-walking by-adding indeed rectitude we-have-set-apart it from
potestate servandi aurum, et quidquid non est rectitudo. Per
the-power of-keeping gold and whatever not is rectitude through
additamentum, voluntatis, segregatur a potestate servandi
the-addition of-will it-is-segregated from the-power of-keeping
rectitudinem aliarum rerum, ut virgæ, aut opinionis. Per
the-rectitude of-other things as of-a-rod or of-an-opinion through
hoc autem quod dictum est, propter rectitudinem ipsam,
this however which said has-been for rectitude itself
dividitur a potestate servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter
it-is-divided from the-power of-keeping the-rectitude of-will for
aliud, ut cum servatur propter pecuniam, aut naturaliter.
another as when it-is-kept for money or naturally

Servat enim naturaliter canis rectitudinem voluntatis, cum
keeps for naturally a-dog the-rectitude of-will when
amat catulos suos, aut dominum suum sibi benefacientem.
it-loves whelps its-own or master its-own to-it doing-good
Quoniam igitur nihil est in hac diffinitione, quod non sit
since therefore nothing is in this definition which not be
necessarium ad concludendam libertatem arbitrii rationalis
necessary for enclosing the-freedom of-choice of-rational
voluntatis, et ad alia excludenda, sufficienter illa includitur,
will and for others excluding sufficiently that is-included
et alia excluduntur: nec abundans utique, nec indigens
and others are-excluded neither redundant surely nor deficient
est hæc nostra diffinitio. Itane tibi videtur?
is this our definition so to-you does-it-seem
DISC. Mihi utique perfecta videtur.
to-me surely perfect it-seems
MAG. Dic ergo, si quid vis amplius de libertate hac,
say therefore if anything you-wish further about freedom this
propter quam imputatur illam habenti, sive faciat bonum,
on-account-of which is-imputed it to-one-having whether be-do good
sive malum. De hac enim sola nunc noster est sermo.
or evil about this for alone now our is discourse

Divisio ejusdem libertatis

XIV · THE DIVISION OF FREEDOM

God's freedom is from himself, made by no one; that of angels and men is made and received. Created freedom has rectitude separably, as all angels before the fall and men before death, or inseparably, as elect angels after the fall and elect men after death; or lacks it recoverably, as men in this life, though many never recover it, or irrecoverably, as the reprobate angels and men after this life.

DISC. Restat nunc ut dividas eamdem libertatem. Quamvis
it-remains now that you-divide the-same freedom although
enim, secundum hanc diffinitionem, communis sit omni
for according-to this definition common it-is to-every
rationali naturæ; multum tamen differt illa quæ Dei est,
rational nature much yet differs that which God's is
ab illis quæ rationalis creaturæ sunt; et illæ ab invicem.
from those which of-the-rational creature are and those from one-another

MAG. Libertas arbitrii alia est a se, quæ nec facta est, nec ab
the-freedom of-choice one is from itself which neither made was nor from
alio accepta, quæ est solius Dei; alia a Deo facta et accepta,
another received which is of-sole God another by God made and received
quæ est angelorum et hominum. Facta autem sive accepta, alia
which is of-angels and of-men made moreover or received one
est habens rectitudinem quam servet; alia carens. Habens,
is having rectitude which it-may-keep another lacking having
alia tenet, separabiliter; alia inseparabiliter. Illa quidem quæ
one holds separably another inseparably that indeed which
separabiliter tenent, fuit angelorum omnium, antequam boni
separably they-held was of-the-angels all before the-good
confirmarentur et mali caderent; et est omnium hominum
were-confirmed and the-bad fell and is of-all men

ante mortem, qui habent rectitudinem eamdem. Quæ vero
before death who have rectitude the-same which indeed
tenet inseparabiliter, est electorum angelorum et hominum. Sed
holds inseparably is of-the-elect angels and men but
angelorum electorum, post ruinam reproborum; et hominum,
of-the-angels elect after the-ruin of-the-reprobate and of-men
post mortem suam. Illa autem quæ caret rectitudine: alia
after death their that however which lacks rectitude one
caret recuperabiliter, alia irrecuperabiliter. Quæ recuperabiliter
lacks recoverably another irrecoverably which recoverably
caret, est tantum in hac vita omnium hominum illa
lacks is only in this life of-all men it
carentium, quamvis illam multi non recuperent. Quæ autem
lacking although it many not recover which however
irrecuperabiliter caret, est reproborum hominum et angelorum,
irrecoverably lacks is of-the-reprobate men and angels
sed angelorum post ruinam, et hominum post hanc vitam.
but of-angels after the-ruin and of-men after this life

DISC. De diffinitione et divisione libertatis hujus, Deo
about the-definition and division of-freedom this God
annuente, sic mihi satisfecisti ut nihil queam invenire
assenting so me you-have-satisfied that nothing I-can to-find
quod necesse habeam de illis interrogare.
which need I-may-have about them to-ask

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

De Casu Diaboli

On the Fall of the Devil

Quod etiam ad angelos dicatur: Quid habes,
quod non accepisti? et a Deo non sit
nisi bonum, et esse: et omne bonum
sit essentia, et omnis essentia bonum

I · NOTHING HAS WHAT IT DID NOT RECEIVE

The student asks whether the Apostle's "What have you that you did not receive?" holds for angels too. No creature has anything from itself. Does God then make things not be? Only improperly, as one who could stop a despoiler is said to strip a man; things cease because he ceases to keep them in being. From the highest good and essence comes only good and being, and Scripture's contrary phrases must be read for their truth.

DISC. Illud Apostoli: Quid habes, quod non accepisti? dicitur
that of-the-Apostle what have-you which not you-have-received is-it-said
hominibus tantum, an et angelis?
to-men only or also to-angels

MAG. Nulla creatura habet aliquid a se. Quod enim seipsum
no creature has anything from itself what for itself
a se non habet, quomodo habet a se aliquid? Denique
from itself not has how has-it from itself anything finally
si non est aliquid, nisi unus qui fecit et quæ facta
if not is anything except the-one who made and the-things-which made
sunt ab uno: clarum est quia nullatenus potest haberi
were by the-one clear it-is that in-no-way can to-be-had
aliquid, nisi qui fecit, aut quod fecit.
anything except who made or what he-made

DISC. Vere clarum est.
truly clear it-is

MAG. Sed neque ipse factor, neque quod factum est, potest
but neither the-very maker nor what made is can
haberi nisi ab ipso factore.
to-be-had except from the-very maker
DISC. Nec hoc minus clarum.
nor this less clear
MAG. Ille igitur solus a se habet quidquid habet; et omnia
he therefore alone from himself has whatever he-has and all
alia nonnisi ab illo habent aliquid: et, sicut a se
other-things only from him have anything and as from themselves
nonnisi nihil habent; ita ab illo nonnisi aliquid habent.
only nothing they-have so from him only something they-have
DISC. Non plane video quod ait, quod a Deo non habent
not plainly I-see what he-says that from God not have
alia nisi aliquid. Nam quis facit alius, ut multa, quæ
other-things except something for who makes other that many-things which
videmus transire de esse ad non esse, non sint quod erant;
we-see to-pass from to-be to not to-be not be what they-were
etiamsi omnino in nihilum non transeant? Aut quis facit
even-if altogether into nothing not they-pass or who makes
non esse, quidquid non est; nisi ille qui facit esse, omne
not to-be whatever not is except he who makes to-be everything
quod est? Item si non est aliquid, nisi ideo quia Deus
which is likewise if not is anything except therefore because God
facit; necesse est ut quod non est idcirco non sit, quia ipse
makes necessary it-is that what not is therefore not be because he
non facit. Sicut ergo illa quæ sunt, ab illo habent esse
not makes as therefore those-things which are from him have to-be
aliquid; ita quæ non sunt, vel quæ de esse transeunt
something so those-which not are or which from to-be pass
ad non esse, videntur ab eodem ipso habere esse nihil.
to not to-be seem from the-same him to-have to-be nothing

MAG. Non solum illi dicitur facere aliquid esse, aut aliquid
not only he is-said to-make something to-be or something
non esse, qui facit ut sit, quod non est; aut ut non
not to-be who makes that there-be what not is or that not
sit, quod est: sed etiam ille, qui potest facere ut non
be what is but also he who can to-make that not
sit aliquid, et non facit, dicitur facere esse; et qui
be something and not makes is-said to-make to-be and he-who
potest facere ut aliquid sit, nec facit, dicitur facere non
can to-make that something be nor makes is-said to-make not
esse. Quippe non ille tantum dicitur facere aliquem nudum
to-be indeed not he only is-said to-make someone naked
esse, aut non esse indutum, qui eum despoliat; sed et
to-be or not to-be clothed who him despoils but also
qui spoliantem, cum prohibere possit, non prohibet: sed
who the-despoiler though to-prevent he-can not prevents but
ille proprie dicitur hoc facere, iste vero improprie. Cum
he properly is-said this to-do this-one indeed improperly when
enim iste dicitur quia fecit esse nudum, aut non esse
for this-one is-said that he-made to-be naked or not to-be
indutum, non aliud intelligitur nisi quia, cum posset, non
clothed not other is-understood except that though he-could not
fecit ut non esset nudus, aut ut maneret indutus.
he-made that not he-were naked or that he-should-remain clothed
Hoc modo Deus dicitur multa facere quæ non facit: ut,
in-this way God is-said many-things to-do which not he-does as
cum dicitur inducere in tentationem; quoniam non defendit
when he-is-said to-lead into temptation since not he-defends
a tentatione, cum possit: et facere non esse, quod non
from temptation though he-can and to-make not to-be what not
est; quoniam, cum possit, non facit esse. At si consideres
is since though he-can not he-makes to-be but if you-consider

ea quæ sunt, cum transeunt ad non esse, ipse facit
those-things which are when they-pass to not to-be he makes
ea non esse. Quoniam namque non solum non est aliqua
them not to-be since for not only not is some
alia essentia, nisi illo faciente; sed nec aliquatenus manere
other essence except him making but not-even in-any-way to-remain
potest, quod facta est, nisi eodem ipso servante. Cum
can what made has-been except the-same him preserving when
ipse desinit servare quod fecit; non ideo id, quod erat,
he ceases to-preserve what he-made not therefore that which was
redit in non esse, quia ipse facit non esse; sed quia
returns into not to-be because he makes not to-be but because
cessat facere esse. Nam et cum quasi iratus destruendo
he-ceases to-make to-be for also when as-if angered by-destroying
aliquid aufert esse; non est ab illo non esse; sed illo
something he-takes-away to-be not is from him not to-be but him
tollente, velut suum, quod præstiterat, quod ab eo factum
taking-away as his-own what he-had-furnished what by him made
servabatur ut esset, redit in non esse, quod non ab illo,
was-preserved that it-might-be returns into not to-be which not from him
sed a se, antequam fieret, habebat. Si enim ab aliquo
but from itself before it-was-made it-had if for from someone
tunicam repetas, quam illi nudo sponte ad tempus
a-tunic you-should-ask-back which to-him naked freely for a-time
præstiteras, non habet a te nuditatem; sed, te quod tuum
you-had-lent not he-has from you nakedness but you what yours
erat tollente, redit in id quod erat antequam indueretur
was taking-away he-returns into that which he-was before he-was-clothed
a te. Nempe sicut a summo bono non est nisi bonum,
by you indeed as from the-highest good not there-is except good
et omne bonum est a summo bono, ita a summa
and every good is from the-highest good so from the-highest

essentia non est nisi essentia, et omnis essentia est a
essence not there-is except essence and every essence is from
summa essentia, unde, quoniam summum bonum est summa
the-highest essence whence since the-highest good is the-highest
essentia, consequens est ut omne bonum sit essentia et
essence consequent it-is that every good be essence and
omnis essentia bonum. Nihil ergo et non esse, sicut non
every essence good nothing therefore and not to-be as not
est essentia, ita non est bonum. Nihil itaque et non esse,
is essence so not is good nothing and-so and not to-be
non est ab illo, a quo non est nisi bonum et essentia.
not is from him from whom not there-is except good and essence
DISC. Aperte nunc video quia sicut bonum et esse, non est
openly now I-see that as good and to-be not is
nisi a Deo; ita non est a Deo, nisi bonum et esse.
except from God so not there-is from God except good and to-be
MAG. Vide ne ullatenus putes, cum in divinis libris legimus, aut
see lest in-any-way you-think when in the-divine books we-read or
cum secundum illos dicimus Deum facere malum, aut facere
when according-to them we-say God to-make evil or to-make
non esse, quia negem propter quod dicitur; aut reprehendam,
not to-be that I-deny on-account-of what is-said or I-blame
quia ita dicitur: sed non tantum debemus inhærere improprietati
because so it-is-said but not so-much we-ought to-cling to-the-impropriety
verborum veritatem tegenti, quantum inhiare proprietate
of-words truth covering as-much-as to-gape-after the-propriety
veritatis sub multimodo genere locutionum latenti.
of-truth under manifold kind of-utterances lying-hidden
DISC. Ista nonnisi non intelligenti aut calumnioso
these-things only to-one-not understanding or to-a-cavilling-one
habes opus dicere.
you-have need to-say

MAG. Redi ad id quod incœpisti, et vide si non solum
return to that which you-began and see if not only
homini, sed et angelo potest dici quia non habet quod
to-man but also to-angel it-can to-be-said that not he-has what
non accepit.
not he-has-received

Cur videatur diabolus ideo non accepisse perseverantiam, quia Deus non dedit

II · WHY THE DEVIL SEEMS NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED PERSEVERANCE

The good angel persevered because he had perseverance, had it because he received it, and received it because God gave it. So the devil seems not to have persevered because God did not give it, and the student asks where his fault lies, though sure he was justly condemned. Not giving seems to cause not receiving, and all he has read or heard pose the question so, unanswered.

DISC. Satis patet non minus angelo quam homini convenire.
enough it-is-plain not less to-angel than to-man to-befit
Constat ergo quia ille angelus, qui stetit in veritate,
it-is-agreed therefore that that angel who stood in the-truth
sicut ideo perseveravit, quia perseverantiam habuit; ita
as therefore he-persevered because perseverance he-had so
ideo perseverantiam habuit, quia accepit; et ideo accepit
therefore perseverance he-had because he-received and therefore he-received
quia Deus dedit. Consequens est igitur quia ille, qui in
because God gave consequent it-is therefore that he who in
veritate non stetit, quemadmodum ideo non perseveravit,
the-truth not stood just-as therefore not he-persevered
quia perseverantiam non habuit; sic ideo non habuit
because perseverance not he-had so therefore not he-had

perseverantiam, quia non accepit; et ideo non accepit, quia
perseverance because not he-received and therefore not he-received because
Deus non dedit. Si ergo potes, volo ut ostendas mihi culpam
God not gave if therefore you-can I-wish that you-show me fault
ejus; cum ideo non perseveraverit, quia ille non dedit,
his since therefore not he-persevered because he not gave
quo non dante nihil habere potuit. Certus sum enim,
(with)-whom not giving nothing to-have he-could certain I-am for
etiamsi non videam, non illum nisi juste a summe justo
even-if not I-see not him except justly by the-supremely just
damnatum, nec sine culpa juste illum potuisse damnari.
damned nor without fault justly him to-have-been-able to-be-damned

MAG. Unde putas consequi, si bonus angelus ideo accepit
whence do-you-think to-follow if the-good angel therefore received
perseverantiam quia Deus dedit, malum ideo non accepisse,
perseverance because God gave the-bad therefore not to-have-received
quia Deus non dedit?
because God not gave

DISC. Quia si bono angelo datio est causa acceptionis, puto
because if to-the-good angel giving is the-cause of-receiving I-think
non dationem esse malo angelo causam non acceptionis:
not giving to-be to-the-bad angel the-cause of-not receiving
et si ponitur non datio, video necessariam esse causam
and if is-posited not giving I-see necessary to-be the-cause
ut sequatur non acceptio: et omnes scimus quia cum
that follow not receiving and all we-know that when
non accipimus quod volumus, non ideo non datur, quia
not we-receive what we-will not therefore not it-is-given because
non accipimus; sed ideo non accipimus, quia non datur.
not we-receive but therefore not we-receive because not it-is-given
Denique quoscunque legi aut audivi facere quæstionem
finally whomever I-have-read or heard to-make question

hanc: hac ratione eam, in quantum memini constituunt;
this by-this reason it in so-far-as I-remember they-set-up
quia si bonus angelus ideo accepit, quia Deus dedit,
that if the-good angel therefore received because God gave
malus angelus ideo non accepit, quia Deus non dedit: nec
the-bad angel therefore not received because God not gave nor
memini me adhuc hujus consequentiæ solutionem vidisse.
do-I-remember me yet of-this consequence a-solution to-have-seen

Quod ideo Deus non dedit, quia ille non accepit

III · GOD DID NOT GIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT RECEIVE

Even if giving causes receiving, not giving need not cause not receiving: when a thing offered is not taken, the giver does not give because it was not taken. God gave the devil the will and power to receive perseverance, but he did not will through to the end. Nor did he desert because he first ceased to will to hold: like the miser who gives his coin for bread, he willed something else, so God did not give because he did not receive.

MAG. Nulla est tibi consequentia: potest enim non dare, non
none is for-you consequence can for not to-give not
esse causa non accipiendi, etiamsi dare semper esset causa
to-be the-cause of-not receiving even-if to-give always were the-cause
accipiendi.
of-receiving
DISC. Ergo si ponatur non dare, non necesse est sequi non
therefore if be-posited not to-give not necessary it-is to-follow not
accipere. Quare potest esse accipere, etiamsi non sit dare.
to-receive wherefore it-can to-be to-receive even-if not there-be to-give
MAG. Non est ita.
not it-is so

DISC. Exemplo volo mihi ostendas quod dicis.
by-example I-wish to-me you-show what you-say
MAG. Si ego porrigo tibi aliquid, et tu accipis; non ideo
if I hold-out to-you something and you take-it not therefore
do quia accipis; sed ideo accipis, quia do; et est datio
I-give because you-take but therefore you-take because I-give and is giving
causa acceptionis.
the-cause of-taking
DISC. Ita est.
so it-is
MAG. Quid si id ipsum porrigo alii, et non accipit;
what if that very-thing I-hold-out to-another and not he-takes
illene ideo non accipit, quia non do?
does-he therefore not take because not I-give
DISC. Potius videtur quia tu ideo non das, quia ille non
rather it-seems that you therefore not give because he not
accepit.
took
MAG. Hic igitur non dare, non est causa non accipiendi; et
here therefore not to-give not is the-cause of-not taking and
tamen si pono me non dedisse, causa est consequendi illum
yet if I-posit me not to-have-given cause it-is of-following him
non accepisse. Aliud namque est rem causam esse alterius
not to-have-taken another for is a-thing the-cause to-be of-another
rei: aliud positionem rei esse causam ut sequatur aliud.
thing another the-positing of-a-thing to-be the-cause that follow another
Cum enim incendium non sit causa ignis, sed ignis incendii,
when for burning not be the-cause of-fire but fire of-burning
positio tamen incendii semper causa est ut sequatur esse
the-positing yet of-burning always cause is that follow to-be
ignem. Si enim est incendium, necesse est ignem esse.
fire if for there-is burning necessary it-is fire to-be

DISC. Necesse est me sic esse fateri.
necessary it-is me so to-be to-confess
MAG. Vides ergo, ut puto, si tu ideo accepisti, quia ego
you-see therefore as I-think if you therefore received because I
dedi, non tamen idcirco consequi illum, qui non accepit,
gave not yet therefore to-follow him who not received
ideo non accepisse, quia ego non dedi; et tamen
therefore not to-have-received because I not gave and yet
consequi quia si ego non dedi, ille non accepit.
to-follow that if I not gave he not received
DISC. Video, et placet mihi quia video.
I-see and it-pleases me because I-see
MAG. An amplius dubitas quia sicut angelus, qui stetit,
or further do-you-doubt that as the-angel who stood
ideo accepit perseverantiam, quia Deus dedit, ita non
therefore received perseverance because God gave so not
stanti idcirco Deus non dedit, quia ille non accepit?
to-the-one-standing therefore God not gave because he not received
DISC. Nondum mihi hoc ostendisti; sed illud tantum sufficienter
not-yet to-me this you-have-shown but that only sufficiently
demonstrasti, scilicet non esse consequens ex eo quia
you-have-demonstrated namely not to-be consequent from this that
bonus angelus ideo accepit, quia Deus dedit; malum ideo
the-good angel therefore received because God gave the-bad therefore
non accepisse, quia Deus non dedit. Si enim vis asserere
not to-have-received because God not gave if for you-will to-assert
Deum illi ideo non dedisse, quia non accepit, quæro cur
God to-him therefore not to-have-given because not he-received I-ask why
non accepit? Aut quia non potuit, aut quia non voluit. Nam
not he-received either because not he-could or because not he-willed for
si non habuit potestatem aut voluntatem accipiendi, Deus non
if not he-had the-power or the-will of-receiving God not

dedit. Si enim Deus dedisset, pro certo habuisset. Quare,
gave if for God had-given for certain he-would-have-had wherefore
si non potuit habere potestatem aut voluntatem accipiendi
if not he-could to-have the-power or the-will of-receiving
perseverantiam, nisi dante Deo, quid peccavit, si non accepit
perseverance except giving by-God what did-he-sin if not he-received
quod Deus illi non dedit posse aut velle accipere?
what God to-him not gave to-be-able or to-will to-receive

MAG. Deus dedit illi potestatem et voluntatem accipiendi
God gave to-him the-power and the-will of-receiving
perseverantiam.
perseverance

DISC. Accepit igitur quod Deus dedit, et habuit quod accepit.
he-received therefore what God gave and he-had what he-received

MAG. Vere habuit, et accepit.
truly he-had and received

DISC. Accepit ergo, et habuit perseverantiam.
he-received therefore and had perseverance

MAG. Non accepit, et ideo non habuit.
not he-received and therefore not he-had

DISC. Nonne dixisti Deum illi dedisse, et illum accepisse
surely-not you-said God to-him to-have-given and him to-have-received
potestatem et voluntatem accipiendi perseverantiam?
the-power and the-will of-receiving perseverance

MAG. Dixi; sed non dixi Deum illi dedisse accipere
I-said but not I-said God to-him to-have-given to-receive
perseverantiam, sed tantum velle et posse perseverantiam
perseverance but only to-will and to-be-able perseverance
accipere.
to-receive

DISC. Ergo, si voluit et potuit, accepit perseverantiam.
therefore if he-willed and could he-received perseverance

MAG. Non est necessarium consequens.
not it-is a-necessary consequence

DISC. Non video cur non, nisi mihi ostendas.
not I-see why not unless to-me you-show

MAG. Incœpisti unquam aliquid cum voluntate et potestate
have-you-begun ever something with will and power
perficiendi, quod tamen voluntate ante finem rei mutata
of-completing which yet the-will before the-end of-the-thing changed
non perfecisti?
not you-completed

DISC. Sæpe.
often

MAG. Voluisti igitur et potuisti perseverare, in quo non
you-willed therefore and you-could to-persevere in which not
perseverasti.
you-persevered

DISC. Volui utique; sed non perseveravi in voluntate, et ideo
I-willed surely but not I-persevered in the-will and therefore
non perseveravi in actione.
not I-persevered in the-action

MAG. Quare non perseverasti in voluntate?
why not did-you-persevere in the-will

DISC. Quia non volui.
because not I-willed

MAG. Nonne quandiu voluisti perseverare in actione, voluisti
surely-not as-long-as you-willed to-persevere in the-action you-willed
perseverare in ipsa voluntate?
to-persevere in the-very will

DISC. Non possum negare.
not I-can to-deny

MAG. Cur ergo dicis te non voluisse perseverare in illa?
why therefore do-you-say you not to-have-willed to-persevere in it

DISC. Iterum responderem: Quia perseverare volui; sed non
again I-would-answer because to-persevere I-willed but not
perseveravi in hac voluntate, nisi rem viderem in
I-persevered in this will unless the-thing I-saw into
infinitum procedere, te semper idipsum interrogante, et
infinity to-proceed you always the-same-thing asking and
me eadem respondente.
me the-same-things answering

MAG. Non ergo debes dicere: Ideo non volui perseverare
not therefore ought-you to-say therefore not I-willed to-persevere
in voluntate, quia non volui perseverare in voluntate hujus
in the-will because not I-willed to-persevere in the-will of-this
voluntatis: sed cum quæritur: Quare non perseverasti in
will but when it-is-asked why not did-you-persevere in
actione, in qua voluisti et potuisti perseverare? respondere
the-action in which you-willed and could to-persevere to-answer
potes: quia non perseveravi in voluntate. Quod si quæritur
you-can because not I-persevered in the-will but if it-is-asked
iterum quare non perseverasti in voluntate: alia causa
again why not did-you-persevere in the-will another cause
reddenda est, unde scilicet contigerit defectus illius voluntatis,
to-be-rendered is whence namely happened the-failure of-that will
quam quia non perseverasti velle voluntatem. Non enim
than that not you-persevered to-will the-will not for
respondendo aliud ostendis quam idipsum quod quæritur;
by-answering other you-show than that-very-thing which is-asked
id est non perseverasti in voluntate perseverandi in actione.
that is not you-persevered in the-will of-persevering in the-action

DISC. Video quia non videbam quid dicerem.
I-see that not I-saw what I-was-saying

MAG. Dic ergo uno verbo quid sit perseverare, quantum
say therefore in-one word what be to-persevere as-far-as
res exigit, in faciendo aliquid.
the-thing demands in doing something
DISC. Perficere: nam perseverare in scribendo aliquid, dicimus
to-complete for to-persevere in writing something we-say
perscribere; in ducendo, perducere.
to-write-through in leading to-lead-through
MAG. Dicamus igitur similiter, etiamsi non sit in usu, quod
let-us-say therefore similarly even-if not it-be in use that
perseverare in voluntate, sit pervelle.
to-persevere in will be to-will-through
DISC. Ita fiat.
so let-it-be-done
MAG. Cum ergo non perfecisti quod voluisti, et potuisti,
when therefore not you-completed what you-willed and could
cur non perfecisti?
why not did-you-complete
DISC. Quia non pervolui.
because not I-willed-through
MAG. Ita ergo dic quia diabolus, qui accepit velle, et posse
so therefore say that the-devil who received to-will and to-be-able
accipere perseverantiam, et velle et posse perseverare,
to-receive perseverance and to-will and to-be-able to-persevere
ideo non accepit, nec perseveraverit, quia non pervoluit.
therefore not received nor persevered because not he-willed-through
DISC. Item quæro quare non pervoluit? Cum enim dicis
likewise I-ask why not he-willed-through when for you-say
quia quod voluit, non pervoluit, tale est ac si dicas:
that what he-willed not he-willed-through such it-is as if you-should-say
Quod voluit prius, postea non voluit. Quando ergo non
what he-willed before afterward not he-willed when therefore not

voluit quod prius voluit, quare non voluit, nisi quia non
he-willed what before he-willed why not did-he-will except because not
habuit voluntatem? Non dico voluntatem quam prius habuit,
he-had the-will not I-say the-will which before he-had
cum voluit; sed quam non habuit, cum non voluit. Hanc
when he-willed but which not he-had when not he-willed this
autem voluntatem quare non habuit, nisi quia non accepit?
however will why not did-he-have except because not he-received
Quare autem non accepit, nisi quia Deus non dedit?
why moreover not did-he-receive except because God not gave
MAG. Iterum dico quia non ideo non accepit, quia Deus
again I-say that not therefore not he-received because God
non dedit; sed ideo Deus non dedit quia ille non accepit.
not gave but therefore God not gave because he not received
DISC. Hoc ostende.
this show
MAG. Sponte dimisit voluntatem, quam habebat: et sicut accepit
freely he-let-go the-will which he-had and as he-received
habere quousque habuit; ita potuit accipere semper tenere, quod
to-have as-long-as he-had so he-could to-receive always to-hold what
deseruit: sed quia deseruit, non accepit. Quod ergo ideo non
he-deserted but because he-deserted not he-received what therefore therefore not
accepit tenere, quia deseruit, non ideo non accepit, quia Deus
he-received to-hold because he-deserted not therefore not he-received because God
non dedit; sed ideo Deus non dedit, quia ille non accepit.
not gave but therefore God not gave because he not received
DISC. Quis non videat quia non ideo non voluit tenere,
who not would-see that not therefore not he-willed to-hold
quia deseruit, sed ideo deseruit, quia non voluit tenere?
because he-deserted but therefore he-deserted because not he-willed to-hold
Semper enim tenenti prius est non velle tenere, quam
always for to-one-holding prior is not to-will to-hold than

velle deserere. Ideo enim vult aliquis deserere quod tenet,
to-will to-desert therefore for wills someone to-desert what he-holds
quia non vult tenere. Quæro igitur quare tenere non
because not he-wills to-hold I-ask therefore why to-hold not
voluit quod tenebat, nisi quia Deus non dedit velle?
he-willed what he-held except because God not gave to-will

MAG. Non semper prius est non velle tenere, quam velle
not always prior is not to-will to-hold than to-will
deserere.
to-desert

DISC. Quando non sit ostende mihi.
when not it-be show me

MAG. Quando aliquam rem propter se non vis tenere, sed
when some thing for itself not you-will to-hold but
deserere, ut carbonem ignitum in manu nuda positum: tunc
to-desert as a-coal glowing in hand bare placed then
forsitan prius est non velle tenere, quam velle deserere; et
perhaps prior is not to-will to-hold than to-will to-desert and
ideo vis deserere, quia non vis tenere. Prius enim
therefore you-will to-desert because not you-will to-hold before for
quam teneas, non vis tenere; velle autem deserere non
than you-hold not you-will to-hold to-will however to-desert not
potes nisi cum tenes. Cum autem tenes quod nonnisi propter
you-can except when you-hold when however you-hold what only for
aliud non vis tenere, nec nisi propter aliud deserere
another not you-will to-hold nor except for another to-desert
vis; et magis vis aliud, quod non potes habere, nisi
you-will and more you-will another-thing which not you-can to-have unless
deseras quod tenes: tunc velle deserere prius est, quam non
you-desert what you-hold then to-will to-desert prior is than not
velle tenere. Avarus namque, cum vult tenere nummum, et
to-will to-hold the-miser for when he-wills to-hold a-coin and

mavult panem quem nequit habere, nisi nummum det, prius
prefers bread which he-cannot to-have unless the-coin he-give first
vult dare, id est deserere nummum, quam non velit tenere:
wills to-give that is to-desert the-coin than not he-will to-hold
non enim illum ideo vult, ideo non vult tenere dare
not for it therefore he-wills therefore not he-wills to-hold to-give
quia non vult tenere; sed ideo non vult tenere, quia
because not he-wills to-hold but therefore not he-wills to-hold because
ut panem habeat necesse habet dare. Nam et antequam
that bread he-may-have necessary he-has-it to-give for also before
habeat, vult tenere et habere; et cum habet, nequaquam
he-has he-wills to-hold and to-have and when he-has by-no-means
non vult tenere, quandiu non habet necesse deserere.
not he-wills to-hold as-long-as not he-has-it necessary to-desert

DISC. Verum est.
true it-is

MAG. Non ergo semper est prius non velle tenere, quam
not therefore always is prior not to-will to-hold than
velle deserere; sed aliquando prius est, velle deserere.
to-will to-desert but sometimes prior is to-will to-desert

DISC. Non possum negare.
not I-can to-deny

MAG. Dico ergo quia non ideo non voluit, cum debuit,
I-say therefore that not therefore not he-willed when he-ought
et quod debuit quia voluntas defecit, Deo dare deficiente;
and what he-ought because the-will failed God to-give failing
sed quia ipse volendo quod non debuit, bonam voluntatem
but because he by-willing what not he-ought the-good will
expulit mala superveniente. Quapropter non ideo non habuit
expelled the-bad supervening wherefore not therefore not he-had
bonam voluntatem perseverantem, aut non accepit, quia Deus
good will persevering or not he-received because God

non dedit; sed ideo Deus non dedit, quia ille volendo quod
not gave but therefore God not gave because he by-willing what
non debuit, eam deseruit, et eam deserendo non tenuit.
not he-ought it deserted and it by-deserting not held
DISC. Intelligo quod dicis.
I-understand what you-say

Quomodo ille peccavit, et voluit similis esse Deo

IV · HOW THE DEVIL SINNED AND WILLED TO BE LIKE GOD

The devil would never have sinned had he kept justice, which is kept only by willing what one ought. He could will only justice or advantage, and willing justice he could not sin. So he sinned by willing an advantage he did not have and ought not then to will, extending his will beyond justice. Willing by his own will, subject to none, what God did not will him to will, he willed to be like God, and even greater.

MAG. Dubitas adhuc diabolum non ideo voluisse deserere
do-you-doubt still the-devil not therefore to-have-willed to-desert
quod habebat, quia non voluit tenere; sed ideo non
what he-had because not he-willed to-hold but therefore not
voluisse tenere, quia voluit deserere?
to-have-willed to-hold because he-willed to-desert
DISC. Non dubito sic esse posse; sed nondum fecisti
not I-doubt so to-be to-be-able but not-yet you-have-made
me certum sic esse. Prius ergo ostende quid voluit habere
me certain so to-be first therefore show what he-willed to-have
quod non habebat, ut vellet deserere quod tenebat, sicut
which not he-had that he-should-will to-desert what he-held as
in avaro monstrasti. Deinde, si nihil contradici poterit
in the-miser you-showed then if nothing to-be-contradicted will-be-able
ita esse, me non dubitare fatebor.
so to-be me not to-doubt I-shall-confess

MAG. Peccasse illum non dubitas; quoniam a justo Deo non
to-have-sinned him not you-doubt since by just God not
potuit injuste damnari; sed quæris quomodo peccavit.
he-could unjustly to-be-damned but you-ask how he-sinned

DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Si justitiam perseveranter servasset, non peccasset
if justice perseveringly he-had-kept not he-would-have-sinned
unquam, nec miser esset.
ever nor wretched would-he-be

DISC. Ita credimus.
so we-believe

MAG. Justitiam vero nullus servat, nisi volendo quod debet;
justice indeed none keeps except by-willing what he-ought
neque deserit, nisi volendo quod non debet.
nor deserts except by-willing what not he-ought

DISC. Nulli dubium.
to-none doubtful

MAG. Volendo aliquid igitur, quod velle tunc non debebat,
by-willing something therefore which to-will then not he-ought
deseruit justitiam; et sic peccavit.
he-deserted justice and so he-sinned

DISC. Ita sequitur. Sed quæro quid aliud voluit, quam quod
so it-follows but I-ask what other he-willed than what
habebat.
he-had

MAG. Quidquid habebat, debebat velle.
whatever he-had he-ought to-will

DISC. Debebat vere velle quod a Deo acceperat; nec hoc
he-ought truly to-will what from God he-had-received nor this
volendo peccavit.
by-willing did-he-sin

MAG. Voluit igitur aliquid quod non habebat, nec tunc velle
he-willed therefore something which not he-had nor then to-will
debebat, sicut Eva similis voluit esse diis prius quam Deus
he-ought as Eve like willed to-be to-gods before than God
hoc vellet.
this willed

DISC. Nec hoc ita sequi negare queo.
nor this so to-follow to-deny can-I

MAG. Nihil autem velle poterat nisi justitiam, aut commodum:
nothing moreover to-will could-he except justice or advantage
ex commodis enim constat beatitudo, quam vult omnis
of advantages for consists blessedness which wills every
rationalis natura.
rational nature

DISC. In nobis possumus hoc cognoscere, qui nihil volumus,
in ourselves we-can this to-recognize who nothing we-will
nisi quod justum aut commodum putamus.
except what just or advantageous we-think

MAG. Justitiam vero volendo, peccare non potuit.
justice indeed by-willing to-sin not he-could

DISC. Verum est.
true it-is

MAG. Peccavit ergo volendo aliquod commodum, quod nec
he-sinned therefore by-willing some advantage which neither
habebat, nec tunc velle debuit, quod tamen ad augmentum
he-had nor then to-will he-ought which yet for the-increase
beatitudinis esse illi poterat.
of-blessedness to-be to-him it-could

DISC. Palam est quoniam aliter non potuit.
plain it-is since otherwise not he-could

MAG. Cernis, ut puto, quia plus aliquid quam acceperat,
you-see as I-think that more something than he-had-received
inordinate volendo, voluntatem suam extra justitiam extendit.
disorderedly by-willing will his-own beyond justice he-extended
DISC. Aperte nunc video quia peccavit, et volendo quod non
openly now I-see that he-sinned both by-willing what not
debuit, et non volendo quod debuit: et palam est quia
he-ought and by-not willing what he-ought and plain it-is that
non ideo voluit plusquam debuit, quia noluit tenere
not therefore he-willed more-than he-ought because he-willed-not to-hold
justitiam; sed ideo justitiam non tenuit, quia aliud
justice but therefore justice not he-held because another-thing
voluit, quod volendo illam deseruit, sicut in avaro, de
he-willed which by-willing it he-deserted as in the-miser about
nummo et pane monstrasti.
the-coin and bread you-showed
MAG. At cum hoc voluit, quod Deus illum velle nolebat,
but when this he-willed which God him to-will willed-not
voluit inordinate similis esse Deo.
he-willed disorderedly like to-be to-God
DISC. Si Deus cogitari non potest, nisi ita solus ut nihil
if God to-be-thought not can except so alone that nothing
illi simile cogitari possit, quomodo potuit diabolus velle
to-him like to-be-thought can how could the-devil to-will
quod non potuit cogitare? Non enim ita obtusæ mentis
what not he-could to-think not for so of-dull mind
erat, ut nihil aliud simile Deo cogitari posse nesciret.
he-was that nothing other like to-God to-be-thought to-be-able he-knew-not
MAG. Etiamsi noluit omnino par esse Deo, sed aliquid minus
even-if he-willed-not altogether equal to-be to-God but something less
Deo, contra voluntatem Dei, hoc ipso voluit inordinate
than-God against the-will of-God by-this very-thing he-willed disorderedly

similis esse Deo, quia propria voluntate, quæ nulli subdita
like to-be to-God because by-his-own will which to-none subject
fuit, voluit aliquid. Solius enim Dei esse debet, sic voluntate
was he-willed something of-sole for of-God to-be it-ought so by-will
propria velle aliquid, ut superiorem non sequatur voluntatem.
one's-own to-will something that a-superior not it-follow will

DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Non solum autem voluit esse æqualis Deo, quia
not only moreover he-willed to-be equal to-God because
præsumpsit habere propriam voluntatem; sed etiam major
he-presumed to-have his-own will but also greater
voluit esse, volendo quod Deus illum velle nolebat, quoniam
he-willed to-be by-willing what God him to-will willed-not since
voluntatem suam supra voluntatem Dei posuit.
will his-own above the-will of-God he-set

DISC. Satis liquet.
enough it-is-clear

MAG. Jam igitur tibi manifestum esse puto ex rationibus
now therefore to-you manifest to-be I-think from the-reasons
suprapositis diabolum sponte dimisisse velle quod debebat,
set-above the-devil freely to-have-let-go to-will what he-ought
et juste amisisse quod habebat; quia sponte et injuste
and justly to-have-lost what he-had because freely and unjustly
voluit quod non habebat, et velle non debebat.
he-willed what not he-had and to-will not he-ought

DISC. Nihil puto manifestius.
nothing I-think more-manifest

MAG. Quamvis igitur bonus angelus ideo accepit perseverantiam,
although therefore the-good angel therefore received perseverance
quia Deus dedit, non ideo tamen malus non accepit,
because God gave not therefore yet the-bad not received

quia Deus non dedit: sed Deus ideo non dedit, quia ille
because God not gave but God therefore not gave because he
non accepit; et ideo non accepit, quia accipere noluit.
not received and therefore not he-received because to-receive he-willed-not
DISC. Mihi quidem ita satisfacis ad ea quæ quæro, ut nec
to-me indeed so you-satisfy toward the-things which I-ask that neither
in his quæ proponis, nec in ipsa consequentia conclusionum
in these which you-propose nor in the-very consequence of-conclusions
tuarum ullam videam, sensu meo, titubare veritatem.
your any I-see by-sense my to-totter truth

Quod boni angeli ante casum malorum peccare potuerunt

V · THE GOOD ANGELS COULD HAVE SINNED TOO

If the good angels could not have sinned, they kept justice by necessity, merited no more grace for standing than for keeping a rationality they could not lose, and could not rightly be called just. The fallen would then have been better, had they stood, and either elect men would surpass the good angels or the fallen could not be fully replaced. So the good angels could sin before the fall, as the others did.

MAG. Putasne bonos angelos similiter potuisse peccare,
do-you-think the-good angels similarly to-have-been-able to-sin
antequam mali caderent?
before the-bad fell
DISC. Puto; sed ratione comprehendere vellem.
I-think but by-reason to-comprehend I-should-wish
MAG. Hoc certum habes quia si non potuerunt peccare,
this certain you-hold that if not they-could to-sin
non potestate sed necessitate servaverunt justitiam. Quare
not by-power but by-necessity they-kept justice wherefore
non magis meruerunt gratiam a Deo, quia steterunt,
not more they-merited grace from God because they-stood

aliis cadentibus, quam quia servaverunt rationalitatem,
the-others falling than because they-kept rationality
quam perdere nequiverunt. Sed nec justi recte, si bene
which to-lose they-could-not but not-even just rightly if well
consideres, dicerentur.
you-consider they-would-be-called

DISC. Sic monstrat ratio.
so shows reason

MAG. Illi ergo qui ceciderunt, si non peccassent cum
those therefore who fell if not they-had-sinned when
possent, tanto meliores essent quam isti, quanto et
they-could by-so-much better they-would-be than these by-how-much both
vere essent justi et gratiam a Deo mererentur. Unde
truly they-would-be just and grace from God would-merit whence
sequitur quia aut electi homines majores et meliores erunt
it-follows that either elect men greater and better will-be
angelis bonis, aut reprobi angeli perfecte non restaurabuntur,
than-angels good or reprobate angels perfectly not will-be-restored
quoniam non tales erunt homines, qui pro illis assumentur,
since not such will-be the-men who for them will-be-taken-up
quales illi futuri erant.
as they about-to-be were

DISC. Hæc duo penitus neganda existimo.
these two utterly to-be-denied I-reckon

MAG. Potuerunt igitur boni angeli peccare, ante casum
could therefore the-good angels to-sin before the-fall
malorum nec aliter, quam sicut ostensum est de illis
of-the-bad nor otherwise than as shown has-been about those
qui peccaverunt.
who sinned

DISC. Aliter esse posse non video.
otherwise to-be to-be-able not I-see

Quomodo boni confirmati sunt in suo statu, et mali in casu suo

VI · HOW THE GOOD WERE CONFIRMED AND THE BAD FELL

The angels who preferred the justice they had to the further good they lacked received that good, as justice repaid them, and now see nothing more to will, and so cannot sin. Those who preferred the further good, which God did not yet will to give, never obtained it and lost the good they had. What that good was the teacher does not see; it was something they could grow into, withheld at creation so they might advance by merit.

MAG. Illi itaque angeli, qui magis voluerunt justitiam quam
those and-so angels who rather willed the-justice which
habebant, quam illud plus quod non habebant, bonum quod
they-had than that more which not they-had the-good which
quasi propter justitiam, quantum ad voluntatem pertinuit,
as-if for justice as-far-as to will it-pertained
perdiderunt; justitia retribuente, acceperunt et de illo, quod
they-lost justice repaying received and of that which
habebant, in vera securitate permanserunt. Quapropter adeo
they-had in true security remained wherefore so
sunt provecti, ut sint adepti quidquid potuerunt velle; nec
they-are advanced that they-have obtained whatever they-could to-will nor
jam videant quid plus velle possint: et propter hoc peccare
now do-they-see what more to-will they-can and on-account-of this to-sin
nequeunt. Illi vero angeli qui maluerunt illud plus, quod
they-cannot those indeed angels who preferred that more which
nondum Deus illis dare volebat, quam stare in justitia, in
not-yet God to-them to-give willed than to-stand in the-justice in
qua facti erant, eadem justitia judicante, et illud propter quod
which made they-were the-same justice judging both that for which
illam contempserunt nequaquam obtinuerunt; et quod tenebant
it they-despised by-no-means obtained and what they-held

bonum amiserunt. Sic ergo distincti sunt angeli, ut adhærentes
good lost so therefore distinguished are the-angels that those-cleaving
justitiæ nullum velle bonum possint, quo non gaudeant;
to-justice no to-will good can by-which not they-rejoice
et deserentes illam, nullum velle queant, quo non careant.
and those-deserting it none to-will can which not they-lack
DISC. Nihil pulchrius, aut justius hac distinctione. Sed si
nothing more-beautiful or more-just than-this distinction but if
posses dicere, vellem audire cujusmodi commodum illud
you-could to-say I-should-wish to-hear of-what-kind advantage that
fuit, quod et boni angeli juste volendo sic profecerunt,
was which both the-good angels justly by-willing so advanced
et mali injuste concupiscendo sic defecerunt.
and the-bad unjustly by-coveting so failed
MAG. Quid illud fuerit non video; sed quidquid fuerit,
what that was not I-see but whatever it-was
sufficit scire quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt;
it-suffices to-know that it-was something to which to-grow they-could
quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad aliud
which not they-received when created they-were that to another-thing
suo merito proficerent.
by-their-own merit they-might-advance

Quæstio, an voluntas, et ejus conversio ad quod non debet, sit ipsum malum quod malos facit; et cur non possit rationalis creatura per se de malo converti ad bonum, sicut potest de bono ad malum

VII · IS WILL ITSELF THE EVIL THAT MAKES EVIL?

New questions sprout. If the devil's disordered will was good, he fell through a good; if evil and something, it came from God, who makes all that is. If it came from the devil himself, he had something not received; if it is nothing, he was damned for nothing. The same holds of desire and of the will's turning. And why did God make a nature able to turn to evil but not back to good?

DISC. Et nobis nunc sufficiat hucusque de hoc investigasse.
and for-us now let-it-suffice thus-far about this to-have-investigated
Sed nescio quid sit, ut cum me spero ad finem quæstionis
but I-know-not what it-is that when I hope to the-end of-the-question
jam pertingere, tunc magis videam velut de radicibus
now to-reach then rather I-see as-if from the-roots
succisarum quæstionum alias pullulantes consurgere. Ecce enim
of-cut-down questions others sprouting to-rise-up behold for
cum manifestissime videam perversum angelum nulla ratione
though most-manifestly I-see the-perverse angel by-no reason
devenire potuisse in immoderatam boni indigentiam,
to-come to-have-been-able into an-immoderate of-good need
nisi propter immoderatam concupiscentiam; non parum me
except on-account-of immoderate covetousness not a-little me
movet, unde ipsam inordinatam habuit voluntatem. Si enim
moves whence the-very disordered he-had will if for
bona fuit, propter bonam voluntatem, de tanto bono cecidit
good it-was on-account-of good will from so-great good he-fell
in tantum malum. Item: Si bona fuit, Deus illam illi dedit;
into so-great evil likewise if good it-was God it to-him gave

quia nonnisi nihil habuit a se. Si ergo voluit quod
because only nothing he-had from himself if therefore he-willed what
Deus dedit velle, quid peccavit? Aut si a se habuit hanc
God gave to-will in-what did-he-sin or if from himself he-had this
voluntatem, habuit aliquod bonum, quod non accepit. Quod
will he-had some good which not he-received but
si mala est, et aliquid est; iterum occurrit quia nonnisi a
if evil it-is and something it-is again it-occurs that only from
Deo est, a quo est omne quod aliquid est. Et similiter
God it-is from whom is everything which something is and similarly
quæri potest quid peccavit habendo voluntatem quam Deus
to-be-asked it-can in-what he-sinned by-having the-will which God
dedit; aut quomodo potuit Deus dare malam voluntatem. Si
gave or how could God to-give an-evil will if
vero hæc mala voluntas ab ipso diabolo fuit, et aliquid
indeed this evil will from the-very devil was and something
est, habuit aliquid a se, et non est omnis essentia bona,
it-is he-had something from himself and not is every essence good
nec malum erit nihil, sicut solemus dicere; siquidem mala
nor evil will-be nothing as we-are-wont to-say if-indeed evil
voluntas essentia est; aut si mala voluntas nihil est, propter
will essence is or if evil will nothing is for
nihil et ideo sine causa, tam graviter damnatus est.
nothing and therefore without cause so heavily damned he-was
Quod autem dico de voluntate, hoc ipsum dici potest
what moreover I-say about will this very-thing to-be-said can
de concupiscentia, sive desiderio, quoniam et concupiscentia,
about covetousness or desire since both covetousness
et desiderium voluntas est: et sicut est bona et mala
and desire will is and as there-is good and evil
voluntas, ita est bona et mala concupiscentia, et bonum
will so there-is good and evil covetousness and good

et malum desiderium. Quod si dicitur quia voluntas est
and evil desire but if it-is-said that will is
aliqua essentia, et ideo bonum est aliquid; sed conversa
some essence and therefore good is something but turned
ad hoc, quod debet velle, fit bona voluntas; ad id vero,
to this which it-ought to-will it-becomes good will to that indeed
quod non debet, conversa, dicitur voluntas mala: quidquid
which not it-ought turned it-is-called will evil whatever
dixi de voluntate, video posse dici de ipsa conversione
I-said about will I-see to-be-able to-be-said about the-very turning
voluntatis. Movet enim multum me, unde ipsam perversam
of-will moves for much me whence the-very perverse
habuit diabolus voluntatis conversionem, et cætera quæ
had the-devil of-will turning and the-rest which
de voluntate modo dixi. Est adhuc aliud, quod valde
about will just-now I-said there-is still another-thing which greatly
miror, cum considero hanc voluntatis conversionem: cur,
I-wonder-at when I-consider this of-will turning why
videlicet Deus talem fecerit illam naturam, quam tanta
namely God such made that nature which with-so-great
excellentia sublimaverat; ut eo quod debuit velle, posset
excellence he-had-exalted that from-that which it-ought to-will it-could
convertere voluntatem suam ad id quod non debuit; sed de
to-turn will its-own to that which not it-ought but from
eo quod non debet, non possit ad id quod debet: cum multo
that which not it-ought not it-can to that which it-ought since much
magis videatur, potestatem debuisse talis creatura a
more it-seems power to-have-been-bound such a-creature from
tali factore accipere faciendi bonum, ad quod facta est; quam
such a-maker to-receive of-doing good for which made it-is than
faciendi malum, ad quod vitandam facta est. Quod etiam
of-doing evil for which to-be-avoided made it-is which also

in nostra natura quæri potest, quoniam credimus nullum
in our nature to-be-asked can since we-believe no
hominem posse bonam voluntatem habere, nisi dante Deo;
man to-be-able good will to-have except giving God
malam vero semper habere posse, sola permissione Dei.
evil however always to-have to-be-able by-the-sole permission of-God

Quæstio proposita resolvitur. Quod voluntas, et ejus conversio non sit ipsum malum

VIII · NEITHER WILL NOR ITS TURNING IS THE EVIL

Will and its turning are essences, though not substances. An evil will is no more something than a good will, and if it were the evil that makes men evil, the good will would be the good that makes them good. But evil is nothing, and the good is not nothing. So neither the evil will nor its depraved turning is that evil, nor the good will the good.

MAG. Nec voluntatem, nec voluntatis conversionem puto negari
neither will nor of-will the-turning I-think to-be-denied
posse aliquid esse. Nam etsi non sunt substantiæ, non
to-be-able something to-be for even-if not they-are substances not
tamen probari potest eas non esse essentias, quoniam multæ
yet to-be-proved it-can them not to-be essences since many
sunt essentiæ præter illam, quæ proprie dicitur substantia.
are essences besides that which properly is-called substance
Denique bona voluntas non magis est aliquid, quam mala
finally good will not more is something than evil
voluntas; nec est ista magis malum quam illa bonum. Non
will nor is this more evil than that good not
enim magis est aliquid voluntas, quæ vult dare misericorditer,
for more is something the-will which wills to-give mercifully

quam illa quæ vult rapere violenter; nec magis hæc malum
than that which wills to-seize violently nor more this evil
quam illa bonum est. Ergo si mala voluntas est ipsum
than that good is therefore if evil will is the-very
malum, quod malus aliquis dicitur, erit et bona voluntas
evil by-which evil someone is-called will-be also good will
ipsum bonum, quo fit aliquis bonus: sed mala voluntas
the-very good by-which becomes someone good but evil will
erit nihil, si est ipsum malum quod credimus esse nihil.
will-be nothing if it-is the-very evil which we-believe to-be nothing
Bona igitur voluntas nihil erit, quoniam ipsa non magis est
good therefore will nothing will-be since it not more is
aliquid, quam mala voluntas. Quare ipsum bonum quod bonos
something than evil will wherefore the-very good which the-good
facit non poterimus negare nihil esse, quoniam ipsum est
makes not we-shall-be-able to-deny nothing to-be since it is
bona voluntas quæ nihil erit. Sed falsum esse nullus ambigit,
good will which nothing will-be but false to-be no-one doubts
bonam voluntatem sive bonum ipsum esse nihil. Itaque mala
good will or the-good itself to-be nothing and-so evil
voluntas non est ipsum malum quod malos facit; sicut nec
will not is the-very evil which the-evil makes as neither
bona voluntas est ipsum bonum quod bonos facit. Hoc
good will is the-very good which the-good makes this
ipsum, quod dixi de voluntate, potest etiam considerari in
very-thing which I-said about will can also to-be-considered in
conversione voluntatis. Non enim magis est aliquid conversio
the-turning of-will not for more is something turning
illa quæ convertit voluntatem de rapina ad tribuendum,
that which turns will from robbery to giving

quam est illa quæ convertit eamdem voluntatem de largitate
than is that which turns the-same will from largess
ad avaritiam; et cætera, quæ de voluntate paulo ante dixi.
to avarice and the-rest which about will a-little before I-said
DISC. Mihi quoque hoc ipsum videtur quod asseris.
to-me also this very-thing seems which you-assert
MAG. Neque ergo voluntas mala, neque prava voluntatis
neither therefore will evil nor depraved of-will
conversio, est ipsum malum, quo angelus vel homo fit
turning is the-very evil by-which angel or man becomes
malus, et quod nihil esse dicimus: nunc bona voluntas aut
evil and which nothing to-be we-say now good will or
bona voluntatis conversio est bonum quo boni fiunt.
good of-will turning is the-good by-which good they-become

Quod injustitia sit ipsum malum, et sit nihil

IX · INJUSTICE IS THE EVIL, AND IT IS NOTHING

Justice is the good by which angels and men are just and the will is called good. Injustice is the evil, nothing but the absence of good, the privation of justice. The will, made right at its giving, was just while it stood in that rectitude; when it turned to what it ought not, it lost something great and received in exchange only an absence, which we call injustice.

DISC. Quid ergo dicemus ipsum malum quod malos facit:
what therefore shall-we-call the-very evil which the-evil makes
et quid ipsum bonum quod bonos facit?
and what the-very good which the-good makes
MAG. Justitiam credere debemus esse ipsum bonum quo
justice to-believe we-ought to-be the-very good by-which
sunt boni, id est justi, et angeli, et homines; et quo
are good that is just both angels and men and by-which

ipsa voluntas bona sive justa dicitur, injustitiam vero
the-very will good or just is-called injustice however
ipsum malum esse, quod nihil aliud dicimus esse quam
the-very evil to-be which nothing other we-say to-be than
boni privationem, quod malos et malam voluntatem facit:
of-good the-privation which the-evil and evil will makes
et ideo eamdem injustitiam non aliud esse asserimus quam
and therefore the-same injustice not other to-be we-assert than
privationem justitiæ. Quandiu enim voluntas primum data
the-privation of-justice as-long-as for the-will first given
rationali naturæ, et simul in ipsa datione ab ipso datore
to-the-rational nature and at-once in the-very giving by the-very giver
conversa, imo non conversa, sed facta recta ad hoc quod velle
turned nay not turned but made right for this which to-will
debuit, stetit in ipsa rectitudine, quam dicimus veritatem sive
it-ought stood in the-very rectitude which we-call truth or
justitiam, in qua facta est, justa fuit. Cum vero avertit
justice in which made it-was just it-was when indeed it-turned-away
se ab eo quod debuit, et convertit se ad id quod non
itself from that which it-ought and turned itself to that which not
debuit, non stetit in originali (ut ita dicam) rectitudine,
it-ought not it-stood in the-original so to say rectitude
in qua facta est? Quam cum deseruit, magnum aliquid
in which made it-was which when it-deserted a-great something
perdidit; et nihil pro ea, nisi privationem ejus, quæ nullam
it-lost and nothing for it except the-privation of-it which no
habet essentiam, et quam injustitiam nominamus, suscepit.
has essence and which injustice we-name took-up

Quomodo malum videatur esse aliquid

X · EVIL SEEMS TO BE SOMETHING

The student grants that evil is the privation of good, but notes good is the privation of evil. Arguments may prove evil nothing, yet he accepts that by faith alone: the name "evil" must signify something, or why do we shudder at it? And when justice departs, a passion drives a man like a cruel master to base, laborious works; it is hard to believe this does nothing.

DISC. Quod dicis malum esse privationem boni, concedo;
what you-say evil to-be the-privation of-good I-grant
sed nihilominus video bonum privationem esse mali. Et,
but nonetheless I-see good the-privation to-be of-evil and
sicut percipio in privatione mali aliquid aliud fieri,
as I-perceive in the-privation of-evil something other to-come-about
quod bonum dicimus, ita animadverto in privatione boni
which good we-call so I-notice in the-privation of-good
aliquid aliud fieri, quod malum nominamus. Quapropter
something other to-come-about which evil we-name wherefore
licet quibusdam argumentis malum nihil esse probetur;
although by-certain arguments evil nothing to-be be-proved
quoniam malum nonnisi vitium aut corruptio est, quæ nullo
since evil only vice or corruption is which in-no
modo sunt nisi in aliqua essentia, et quanto magis
way are except in some essence and by-how-much more
ibi sunt, tanto magis illam redigunt in nihilum; et si
there they-are by-so-much more it they-reduce to nothing and if
eadem essentia omnino deveniat ad nihil, vitium quoque et
the-same essence altogether come to nothing vice also and
corruptio inveniuntur nihil: licet, inquam, sic aut alio
corruption are-found nothing although I-say so or in-another

modo probetur nihil esse malum; non potest animus meus
way it-be-proved nothing to-be evil not can mind my
nisi sola fide acquiescere; si non illud mihi auferatur,
except by-sole faith to-rest if not that from-me be-taken-away
quod mihi econtra probat malum nonnisi aliquid esse.
which to-me on-the-contrary proves evil only something to-be
Nam cum auditur nomen mali, frustra horrent corda nostra
for when is-heard the-name of-evil in-vain shudder hearts our
quod in hujus nominis significatione intelligunt, si nihil
at-what in of-this name the-signification they-understand if nothing
significatur hoc nomine. Item: Si vox hæc, scilicet malum
is-signified by-this name likewise if word this namely evil
nomen est; utique significativum est. Si autem significativum
a-name is surely significative it-is if however significative
est, significat; sed, nonnisi aliquid significat. Quomodo ergo
it-is it-signifies but only something it-signifies how therefore
malum est nihil, si quod significat nomen ejus, est aliquid?
is evil nothing if what signifies the-name its is something
Denique, cum manente justitia, tanta videatur tranquillitas,
finally since remaining justice such seems tranquility
tanta quies ut in multis nihil aliud videatur justitia quam
such rest that in many-things nothing other seems justice than
quiescere a malo; sicut est castitas, patientia: recedente
to-rest from evil as is chastity patience receding
autem justitia, tam diversus, tam laboriosus tamque multiplex
however justice so diverse so laborious and-so manifold
occupet animum affectus, qui velut crudelis Dominus miserum
occupies the-mind an-affection which as-if a-cruel Master the-wretched
homunculum cogat tot turpium et laboriosorum operum
little-man compels of-so-many base and laborious works

cura sollicitum esse, et ipsis operibus tam graviter laborare:
by-care anxious to-be and in-the-very works so heavily to-labor
mirum est, si poterit ostendi nihil hæc omnia operari.
wonderful it-is if it-will-be-able to-be-shown nothing these all to-work

Quod malum et nihil non possint per nomen suum probari aliquid esse, sed quasi aliquid

XI · EVIL AND NOTHING ARE SOMETHING ONLY IN SPEECH

"Nothing" is a name, yet no one calls nothing something. It signifies by removing whatever is something, so it signifies something only in negating it. And as blindness is called something in our way of speaking, though it is only the absence of sight where sight should be, evil and nothing are something by the form of speech, not in reality: evil is the absence of good where good ought to be.

MAG. Puto quia non ita es insanus ut dicas nihil esse
I-think that not so you-are mad that you-should-say nothing to-be
aliquid, cum tamen non possis negare nihil esse nomen.
something though yet not you-can to-deny nothing to-be a-name
Quapropter si nihil non potest probare aliquid esse, per
wherefore if nothing not can to-prove something to-be through
nomen nihil, quomodo æstimas te probare malum esse
the-name nothing how do-you-reckon you to-prove evil to-be
aliquid, per nomen mali.
something through the-name of-evil
DISC. Nihil agit exemplum, quod litem lite resolvit.
nothing does an-example which a-dispute by-a-dispute resolves
Nam et hoc ipsum, nihil, nescio quid sit. Quapropter
for even this very nothing I-know-not what it-be wherefore
quoniam in manibus quæstio est de malo, quod dicis esse
since in hand the-question is about evil which you-say to-be

nihil si vis me docere, quid intelligam esse malum,
nothing if you-will me to-teach what I-should-understand to-be evil
doce me prius quid intelligam esse nihil: deinde, ad
teach me first what I-should-understand to-be nothing then to
alia quibus propter nomen mali dixi me moveri
the-other-things by-which on-account-of the-name of-evil I-said me to-be-moved
de eo, ut aliquid esse videatur, respondebis.
about it that something to-be it-seem you-will-answer
MAG. Cum nequaquam differant nihil esse et non aliquid esse,
since by-no-means differ nothing to-be and not something to-be
quomodo dici potest quid sit quod non est aliquid?
how to-be-said can-it what be that-which not is something
DISC. Si non est aliquid, quod hoc nomine significatur, non
if not it-is something which by-this name is-signified not
significat aliquid. Si vero non significat aliquid, non est
it-signifies something if indeed not it-signifies something not it-is
nomen: sed utique nomen est, quanquam igitur nullus dicat
a-name but surely a-name it-is although therefore no-one says
nihil esse aliquid; sed semper nihil esse nihil cogamur
nothing to-be something but always nothing to-be nothing we-are-compelled
fateri, nemo tamen potest nomen nihili significativum esse
to-confess no-one yet can the-name of-nothing significative to-be
diffiteri. Verum, si hoc ipsum nomen non significat nihil, sed
to-deny but if this very name not signifies nothing but
aliquid, id quod significatur, videtur non posse esse nihil,
something that which is-signified seems not to-be-able to-be nothing
sed magis aliquid. Si ergo quod significatur non est nihil, sed
but rather something if therefore what is-signified not is nothing but
aliquid, qualiter verum erit ut nihil significetur per hoc
something how true will-it-be that nothing be-signified through this
nomen, quod est nihil? Quippe si vere nihil dicitur, vere nihil
name which is nothing indeed if truly nothing is-said truly nothing

est; et idcirco non est aliquid. Quare, si quod significatur
is-it and therefore not it-is something wherefore if what is-signified
hoc nomine, non est nihil, sed aliquid (quemadmodum
by-this name not is nothing but something as
consequentia videtur ostendere), falso et incongrue vocatur
the-consequence seems to-show falsely and incongruously it-is-called
hoc nomine. At econtra, si secundum judicium omnium, id
by-this name but conversely if according-to the-judgment of-all that
quod nominatur nihil vere est nihil, nequaquam est aliquid;
which is-named nothing truly is nothing by-no-means is-it something
usquamne videtur aliquid consequentius, quam ut hoc ipsum
anywhere-at-all seems anything more-consequent than that this very
nomen nihil significet, id est non significet aliquid? Quid
name nothing signify that is not signify something what
itaque est quia hoc nomen, videlicet nihil non significat
and-so is-it that this name namely nothing not signifies
nihil, sed aliquid; et non significat aliquid, sed nihil?
nothing but something and not signifies something but nothing

MAG. Forsitan non repugnant, significare nihil et aliquid.
perhaps not are-repugnant to-signify nothing and something

DISC. Si non repugnant: aut ista vox diversa consideratione
if not they-are-repugnant either this word by-diverse consideration
significat nihil et aliquid; aut invenienda res est aliqua,
signifies nothing and something or to-be-found a-thing is some
quæ sit aliquid, et nihil.
which be something and nothing

MAG. Quid si utrumque inveniri potest, et diversa, scilicet
what if both to-be-found can both diverse namely
significationis consideratio in hoc nomine, et eamdem rem
of-signification consideration in this name and the-same thing
esse aliquid, et nihil?
to-be something and nothing

DISC. Utrumque vellem cognoscere.
both I-should-wish to-know

MAG. Constat quoniam hæc vox, scilicet nihil, quantum ad
it-is-agreed that this word namely nothing as-far-as to
significationem, nullatenus differt ab eo quod dico, non
signification in-no-way differs from that which I-say not
aliquid. Nihil quoque hoc apertius, quam quod hæc vox,
something nothing also than-this more-open than that this word
scilicet non aliquid, omnem rem penitus et omne quod est
namely not something every thing utterly and everything which is
aliquid, intellectu removendum; nec omnino ullam rem,
something from-the-understanding to-be-removed nor at-all any thing
aut penitus quod aliquid sit in intellectu retinendum, sua
or utterly what something be in the-understanding to-be-retained by-its
significatione constituit. Sed quoniam remotio alicujus rei
signification establishes but since the-removal of-some thing
significari nullatenus potest nisi cum significatione ejus ipsius,
to-be-signified in-no-way can except with the-signification of-that very-thing
cujus significatur remotio: nullus enim intelligit quid significet
of-which is-signified the-removal no-one for understands what signifies
non homo, nisi intelligendo quid sit homo: necesse est ut
not man except by-understanding what is man necessary it-is that
hæc vox quæ est, non aliquid, destruendo id quod est aliquid,
this word which is not something by-destroying that which is something
significet aliquid. Quoniam vero auferendo omne quod est
signify something since indeed by-taking-away everything which is
aliquid, nullam significat essentiam, quam in audientis intellectu
something no it-signifies essence which in the-hearer's understanding
retinendam constituat: idcirco vox, non aliquid, nullam rem,
to-be-retained it-may-establish therefore the-word not something no thing
aut quod sit aliquid, significat. Igitur hæc vox, non aliquid,
or what be something signifies therefore this word not something

his diversis rationibus aliquatenus significat rem, et aliquid;
by-these diverse reasons in-some-way signifies a-thing and something
et nullatenus significat rem, aut aliquid: significat enim
and in-no-way signifies a-thing or something it-signifies for
removendo, et non significat constituendo. Hac ratione nomen,
by-removing and not it-signifies by-establishing by-this reason the-name
nihil, quod perimit omne quod est aliquid, et destruendo
nothing which destroys everything which is something also by-destroying
non significat nihil, sed aliquid; et constituendo non significat
not signifies nothing but something and by-establishing not signifies
aliquid, sed nihil. Quapropter non est necesse, nihil esse
something but nothing wherefore not it-is necessary nothing to-be
aliquid, ideo quia nomen ejus significat aliquid, quolibet
something therefore because the-name its signifies something in-any
modo; sed potius necesse est nihil esse nihil, quia nomen ejus
way but rather necessary it-is nothing to-be nothing because the-name its
significat hoc modo aliquid. Hoc itaque modo non repugnat
signifies in-this way something in-this and-so way not it-is-repugnant
malum nihil esse et mali nomen esse significativum; si sic
evil nothing to-be and of-evil the-name to-be significative if so
aliquid perimendo significat, ut nullius rei sit constitutivum.
something by-destroying it-signifies that of-no thing it-be constitutive

DISC. Nequeo negare nomen nihili, secundum prædictam a te
I-cannot to-deny the-name of-nothing according-to the-aforesaid by you
rationem, aliquo modo significare aliquid; sed satis notum est
reason in-some way to-signify something but enough known it-is
quia illud aliquid, quod isto modo hoc nomine significatur,
that that something which in-this way by-this name is-signified
non nominatur nihil; nec cum audimus hoc nomen, accipimus
not is-named nothing nor when we-hear this name we-take
illud pro illa re, quam ita significat. Illud igitur quæro, pro
it for that thing which so it-signifies that therefore I-ask for

quo hoc nomen ponitur; et quod intelligimus, cum ipsum
which this name is-put and which we-understand when it
audimus: illud, inquam, quæro, quid sit. Illud enim hoc nomen
we-hear that I-say I-ask what it-be that for this name
proprie significat; et idcirco nomen est, quia ejus significativum
properly signifies and therefore a-name it-is because of-it significative
est, non quia supra dicto modo negando significat aliquid:
it-is not because in-the-above said way by-denying it-signifies something
ejus quippe nomen est, pro cujus significatione inter nomina
of-it indeed the-name it-is for whose signification among names
computatur, et illud vocatur nihil. Illud quæro, quomodo
it-is-counted and that is-called nothing that I-ask how
sit aliquid, si proprie vocatur nihil; aut qualiter sit nihil,
it-be something if properly it-is-called nothing or how it-be nothing
si nomen significativum ejus significat aliquid, aut quomodo
if the-name significative of-it signifies something or how
idem sit aliquid, et nihil? Illud idem quæro de nomine
the-same be something and nothing that same I-ask about the-name
mali; et de eo quod significat, et quod malum nominatur.
of-evil and about that which it-signifies and which evil is-named
MAG. Recte quæris; quia licet, supraposita ratione, malum
rightly you-ask because although by-the-above-set reason evil
et nihil significent aliquid, tamen quod significatur non
and nothing signify something yet what is-signified not
est malum aut nihil: sed est alia ratio qua significant
is evil or nothing but there-is another reason by-which they-signify
aliquid, et quod significatur est aliquid; sed non vere
something and what is-signified is something but not truly
aliquid, sed quasi aliquid. Multa quippe esse dicuntur
something but as-if something many indeed to-be are-said
secundum formam, quæ non sunt secundum rem: ut,
according-to form which not are according-to reality as

timere, secundum formam vocis, dicitur activum, cum sit
to-fear according-to the-form of-the-word is-called active though it-be
passivum, secundum rem. Ita quoque cæcitas dicitur aliquid,
passive according-to reality so also blindness is-called something
secundum formam loquendi, cum non sit aliquid, secundum
according-to the-form of-speaking though not it-be something according-to
rem. Sicut enim de aliquo dicimus quia visum habet, et
reality as for about someone we-say that sight he-has and
visus est in eo; ita dicimus quia habet cæcitatem, et cæcitas
sight is in him so we-say that he-has blindness and blindness
est in eo: cum hæc non sit aliquid, sed potius non aliquid;
is in him though this not be something but rather not something
et hanc habere, non sit habere aliquid, imo carere eo, quod
and this to-have not be to-have something nay to-lack that which
est aliquid. Cæcitas namque non est aliud quam non visus,
is something blindness for not is other than not sight
aut absentia visus ubi visus debet esse; non visus vero vel
or absence of-sight where sight ought to-be not sight indeed or
absentia visus non magis est aliquid, ubi visus debet esse
absence of-sight not more is something where sight ought to-be
quam ubi non debet esse. Quare cæcitas non magis est in
than where not it-ought to-be wherefore blindness not more is in
oculo aliquid quia ibi debet esse visus, quam non visus vel
the-eye something because there ought to-be sight than not sight or
absentia visus in lapide, ubi non debet esse visus. Multa
absence of-sight in a-stone where not ought to-be sight many
quoque alia similiter dicuntur aliquid, secundum formam
also other-things similarly are-called something according-to the-form
loquendi, quæ non sunt aliquid, quoniam sic loquimur de
of-speaking which not are something since so we-speak about
illis, sicut de rebus existentibus. Hoc ergo modo malum
them as about things existing in-this therefore way evil

et nihil significant aliquid; et quod significatur, est aliquid,
and nothing signify something and what is-signified is something
non secundum rem, sed secundum formam loquendi. Nihil
not according-to reality but according-to the-form of-speaking nothing
enim non aliud significat, quam non aliquid, aut absentiam
for not other signifies than not something or the-absence
eorum quæ sunt aliquid; et malum non est aliud, quam
of-those-things which are something and evil not is other than
non bonum, aut absentia boni, ubi debet et expedit esse
not good or the-absence of-good where it-ought and it-is-expedient to-be
bonum. Quod autem non est aliud, quam absentia ejus
good what however not is other than the-absence of-that
quod est aliquid, utique non est aliquid. Malum igitur vere
which is something surely not is something evil therefore truly
est nihil, et nihil non est aliquid, et tamen quodammodo
is nothing and nothing not is something and yet in-a-way
sunt aliquid, quia sic loquimur de his, quasi sint aliquid,
they-are something because so we-speak about these as-if they-be something
cum dicimus: Nihil, vel malum fecit, aut, nihil aut malum
when we-say nothing or evil he-did or nothing or evil
est, quod fecit: sicut dicimus: Aliquid, vel bonum fecit,
is what he-did as we-say something or good he-did
aut, aliquid vel bonum est quod fecit. Hinc est quod cum
or something or good is what he-did hence it-is that when
negamus omnino esse aliquid quod dicit aliquis, ita dicimus:
we-deny altogether to-be something which says someone so we-say
Hoc quod dicis, nihil est. Nam hoc et quod proprie
this which you-say nothing is for this and which properly
non dicuntur nisi de eo quod est aliquid: et cum ita
not are-said except about that which is something and when so

dicuntur, sicut modo dixi, non dicuntur de eo quod sit
they-are-said as just-now I-said not they-are-said about that which be
aliquid, sed quod quasi aliquid dicitur.
something but which as-if something is-said
DISC. De ratione nominis mali, qua me putabam posse
about the-account of-the-name of-evil by-which me I-thought to-be-able
probare malum esse aliquid, satisfecisti.
to-prove evil to-be something you-have-satisfied

Quod angelus a se non potuit habere voluntatem primam; et quod multa dicuntur posse aliena potestate, et non posse aliena impotentia

XII · AN ANGEL CANNOT GIVE ITSELF ITS FIRST WILL

Suppose God makes an angel step by step, fit to have a will but not yet willing. Can it will by itself? What is not yet has no power of its own: the world could be only by God's power, and much is said to be able by another's power. Whatever moves itself to will must first will to move, so the angel cannot have its first will from itself. It cannot be blessed unless it wills blessedness, nor ought it to be unless it wills justice.

DISC. Restat nunc ut me ad alia, quæ mihi malum
it-remains now that me as-to the-other-things which to-me evil
esse aliquid persuadere nituntur, quid respondere valeam
to-be something to-persuade strive what to-answer I-may-be-able
edoceas.
you-teach
MAG. Ut veritatem rei enodare possimus, longius
that the-truth of-the-thing to-unknot we-may-be-able further
aliquantulum exordiri nos oportet; sed et opus est ut tu
somewhat to-begin us it-behooves but also need is that you

ea, quæ dicam, non sis contentus singula tantum intelligere,
those-things which I-shall-say not be content singly only to-understand
sed omnia simul memoria quasi sub uno intuitu colligere.
but all at-once in-memory as-if under one gaze to-gather
DISC. Ego quidem intentus ero quantum potero: veruntamen
I indeed attentive shall-be as-much-as I-shall-be-able but
si in aliquo tardior quam velis exstitero, non te me
if in anything slower than you-would-wish I-shall-have-stood not you me
exspectare pigeat, prout videris tarditatem meam expetere.
to-await let-it-irk according-as you-will-see slowness my to-require
MAG. Ponamus ergo Deum nunc facere angelum, quem
let-us-suppose therefore God now to-make an-angel whom
velit facere beatum; et non simul totum, sed per partes
he-wills to-make blessed and not at-once whole but through parts
et hactenus jam esse factum, ut jam sit aptus ad
and so-far already to-be made that already he-be apt for
habendam voluntatem, sed nondum velit aliquid.
having will but not-yet he-will anything
DISC. Pone quod vis, et expone quod quæro.
suppose what you-will and set-forth what I-ask
MAG. An ergo putas quod iste angelus per se possit
or therefore do-you-think that this angel through himself can
velle aliquid?
to-will anything
DISC. Non bene video quod dicis per se. Quod enim
not well I-see what you-say through himself what for
(sicut supra jam dixisti de omni creatura) nihil habet,
as above already you-said about every creature nothing has
quod non accepit, nihil potest per se.
which not it-received nothing can through itself

MAG. Per se dico, per hoc quod jam habet: ut qui
through himself I-say through that which already he-has as he-who
habet pedes et quæ sufficiunt ad potentiam ambulandi,
has feet and what-things suffice for the-power of-walking
potest ambulare per se; qui autem habet pedes, et
can to-walk through himself he-who however has feet and
non habet incolumitatem pedum non potest ambulare per
not has soundness of-feet not can to-walk through
se. Hoc itaque modo quæro an ille angelus, qui jam
himself in-this and-so way I-ask whether that angel who already
aptus est ad volendum, et nondum quidquam vult, possit
apt is for willing and not-yet anything wills can
per se velle aliquid?
through himself to-will anything

DISC. Puto quia potest, si aliquando vult.
I-think that he-can if sometime he-wills

MAG. Non respondes ad interrogationem meam.
not you-answer to question my

DISC. Quomodo?
how

MAG. Ego quæro de nihil volente, et de potestate quæ
I ask about nothing one-willing and about the-power which
præcedit rem: et tu respondes de volente et de potestate
precedes the-thing and you answer about one-willing and about the-power
quæ fit cum re. Nam omne quod est, eo ipso
which comes-to-be with the-thing for everything which is by-that very-fact
quia est, potest esse; non autem omne quod est, potuit
that it-is can to-be not however everything which is could
esse, antequam esset. Cum ergo quæro utrum ille qui nihil
to-be before it-was when therefore I-ask whether he who nothing
vult, possit velle, quæro potestatem ante voluntatem, qua
wills can to-will I-ask the-power before will by-which

se possit movere ad voluntatem. Tu vero, cum respondes
himself he-can to-move to will you indeed when you-answer
quia si vult potest, dicis potestatem quæ fit cum
that if he-wills he-can you-speak-of the-power which comes-to-be with
ipsa voluntate. Necesse enim est si vult, ut possit velle.
the-very will necessary for it-is if he-wills that he-can to-will

DISC. Scio duas esse potestates: unam, quæ nondum est
I-know two to-be powers one which not-yet is
in re; alteram, quæ jam est in re. Sed et hoc
in the-thing the-other which already is in the-thing but also this
non possum nescire, quia quidquid ita potest esse ut
not I-can to-be-ignorant that whatever so can to-be that
jam sit, si aliquando non fuit, potuit prius esse. Si enim
already it-is if sometime not it-was it-could before to-be if for
non potuisset, nunquam esset. Bene ergo æstimo me
not it-had-been-able never would-it-be well therefore I-reckon me
respondisse, quia qui ideo potest velle, quia jam vult,
to-have-answered that he-who therefore can to-will because already he-wills
necesse est eum prius potuisse, quam vellet.
necessary it-is him before to-have-been-able than he-willed

MAG. Putas quia quod nihil est, omnino nihil habet; et
you-think that what nothing is altogether nothing has and
ideo nullam habet potestatem, et sine potestate omnino
therefore no has power and without power altogether
nihil potest.
nothing it-can

DISC. Hoc non possum negare.
this not I-can to-deny

MAG. Æstimo quia mundus, antequam fieret, nihil erat.
I-reckon that the-world before it-was-made nothing was

DISC. Verum dicis.
true you-say

MAG. Ergo omnino nihil potuit, antequam esset.
therefore altogether nothing it-could before it-was
DISC. Ita sequitur.
so it-follows
MAG. Non ergo potuit esse, antequam esset.
not therefore it-could to-be before it-was
DISC. Et ego dico: Si non potuit esse, impossibile fuit ut
and I say if not it-could to-be impossible it-was that
esset aliquando.
it-should-be ever
MAG. Et possibile, et impossibile erat, antequam esset: et
both possible and impossible it-was before it-was and
quidem in cujus potestate non erat ut esset, erat impossibile;
indeed in whose power not it-was that it-should-be it-was impossible
sed Deo, in cujus potestate erat ut fieret possibile erat;
but to-God in whose power it-was that it-be-made possible it-was
quia ergo Deus prius mundum potuit facere quam fieret,
because therefore God before the-world could to-make than it-was-made
ideo est mundus; non quia ipse mundus prius potuit esse.
therefore is the-world not because the-very world before could to-be
DISC. Rationi non possum contradicere; sed usus loquendi
reason not I-can to-contradict but the-usage of-speaking
non consentit.
not consents
MAG. Non est mirum. Multa namque in communi locutione
not it-is surprising many-things for in common speech
dicuntur improprie; sed cum oportet medullam veritatis
are-said improperly but when it-behooves the-marrow of-truth
inquirere, necesse est improprietatem perturbantem, quantum
to-search-out necessary it-is the-impropriety disturbing as-much-as
res expetit et possibile est, secernere. Ex qua improprietate
the-thing requires and possible is to-set-apart from which impropriety

loquendi fit ut sæpissime dicamus rem posse, non
of-speaking it-comes-about that very-often we-say a-thing to-be-able not
quod illa possit, sed quoniam alia res potest; et rem, quæ
that it can but since another thing can and a-thing which
potest, non posse, quoniam alia res non potest: ut, si
can not to-be-able since another thing not can as if
dico: Liber potest a me scribi, utique liber nihil potest,
I-say the-book can by me to-be-written surely the-book nothing can
sed ego possum scribere librum. Et cum dicimus: Iste non
but I can to-write the-book and when we-say this-one not
potest vinci ab illo, non aliud intelligimus quam ille
can to-be-conquered by that-one not other we-understand than that-one
non potest vincere istum. Hinc est quod dicimus Deum non
not can to-conquer this-one hence it-is that we-say God not
posse aliquid sibi adversum, aut perversum; quoniam sic
to-be-able anything to-himself adverse or perverse since so
est potens in beatitudine et justitia, imo quoniam beatitudo
he-is powerful in blessedness and justice nay since blessedness
et justitia non sunt illo diversa, sed unum bonum, sic est
and justice not are from-him diverse but one good so he-is
omnipotens in simplici bono ut nulla res possit quod noceat
omnipotent in simple good that no thing can what may-harm
summo bono: ideo namque non potest corrumpi vel mentiri.
the-highest good therefore for not he-can to-be-corrupted or to-lie
Ita ergo quidquid non est, antequam sit sua potestate
so therefore whatever not is before it-be by-its-own power
esse non potest; sed, si potest alia res facere ut sit,
to-be not can but if can another thing to-bring-about that it-be
hoc modo aliena potestate potest esse. Quamvis autem
in-this way by-another's power it-can to-be although moreover
pluribus modis dividi possit potentia vel impotentia, hoc
in-more ways to-be-divided can power or impotence this

tantum nunc tibi sufficiat quia multa dicuntur posse non
only now for-you let-suffice that many-things are-said to-be-able not
sua, sed aliena potestate; et multa non posse non
by-their-own but by-another's power and many-things not to-be-able not
sua, sed aliena impotentia. De propria igitur potestate
by-their-own but by-another's impotence about one's-own therefore power
loquor, cum quæro de angelo, quem novum posuimus
I-speak when I-ask about the-angel whom new we-have-supposed
fieri, et hactenus jam esse factum, ut jam aptus sit
to-be-made and thus-far already to-be made that already apt be-be
ad habendam voluntatem, sed nihil adhuc velit; an ipse
for having will but nothing yet he-will whether he
possit per se velle aliquid et de ipsa mihi responde.
can through himself to-will anything and about it to-me answer
DISC. Si jam sic aptus est ad voluntatem ut nihil illi
if already so apt he-is for will that nothing to-him
aliud desit quam velle, non video cur per se non
other be-lacking than to-will not I-see why through himself not
possit: quicunque enim aptus est ad videndum, et clausis
he-can whoever for apt is for seeing and with-closed
oculis in luce positus nihil videt, potest tamen videre per
eyes in light placed nothing sees can yet to-see through
se: quare ergo non volens similiter non velit per se,
himself why therefore not willing similarly not he-will through himself
sicut non videns potest per se videre?
as not seeing can through himself to-see
MAG. Quia ille non videns habet visum et voluntatem, qua
because he not seeing has sight and will by-which
potest movere visum; nunc vero de illo, qui nullam habet
he-can to-move sight now indeed about him who no has

voluntatem, loquimur. Quare, responde mihi, si qua res seipsam
will we-speak wherefore answer me if some thing itself
movet de non velle ad velle, utrum sic ipsa velit movere.
moves from not to-will to to-will whether so it-itself wills to-move
DISC. Si dixero quia moveatur non volens, consequens erit ut
if I-shall-say that it-be-moved not willing consequent it-will-be that
non a se sed ab alio moveatur, nisi forte si quis subito
not by itself but by another it-be-moved unless perhaps if someone suddenly
claudit oculos ad ictum venientem, aut si cogitur quis
shuts his-eyes against a-blow coming or if is-compelled someone
aliquo incommodo, ut velit quod prius non volebat. Nescio
by-some disadvantage that he-will what before not he-willed I-know-not
enim an tunc prius se velit movere ad hanc voluntatem.
for whether then first himself he-wills to-move to this will
MAG. Nullus cogitur vel timore vel sensu alicujus
no-one is-compelled either by-fear or by-the-sense of-some
incommodi, nec attrahitur amore alicujus commodi ad
trouble nor is-drawn by-love of-some advantage to
volendum aliquid, nisi qui prius habet naturalem voluntatem
willing anything except he-who first has natural will
vitandi incommodum aut habendi commodum; quia voluntate
of-avoiding disadvantage or of-having advantage because by-will
se movet ad alias voluntates.
himself he-moves to other wills
DISC. Negare nequeo.
to-deny I-cannot
MAG. Dic ergo quia quidquid se movet ad volendum, prius
say therefore that whatever itself moves to willing first
se vult ita movere.
itself wills so to-move
DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Quod ergo nihil vult, nullo modo potest se movere
what therefore nothing wills in-no way can itself to-move
ad volendum.
to willing

DISC. Non possum contradicere.
not I-can to-contradict

MAG. Restat igitur ut ille angelus, qui jam aptus factus
it-remains therefore that that angel who already apt made
est ad habendam voluntatem, sed tamen nihil vult, non
has-been for having will but yet nothing wills not
possit habere primam voluntatem a se?
can to-have the-first will from himself

DISC. Necesse est fateri me quia nihil potest per se velle,
necessary it-is to-confess me that nothing can through itself to-will
qui nihil vult.
that-which nothing wills

MAG. Beatus autem non potest esse, si non vult beatitudinem.
blessed however not he-can to-be if not he-wills blessedness
Dico autem nunc beatitudinem, non beatitudinem cum
I-mean however now blessedness not blessedness with
justitia; sed quam volunt omnes, etiam injusti. Omnes quippe
justice but which will all even the-unjust all indeed
volunt bene sibi esse. Excepto namque hoc, quod omnis
will well for-themselves to-be excepted for this that every
natura bona dicitur; duo bona et duo his contraria mala
nature good is-called two goods and two to-these contrary evils
usu dicuntur: unum bonum est, quod dicitur justitia, cui
by-usage are-spoken-of one good is which is-called justice to-which
contrarium malum est, injustitia; alterum bonum est, quod
contrary evil is injustice the-other good is which
mihi videtur posse dici commodum; et huic malum
to-me seems to-be-able to-be-called advantage and to-this the-evil

opponitur incommodum. Sed justitiam quidem non omnes
is-opposed disadvantage but justice indeed not all
volunt, neque omnes fugiunt injustitiam; commodum vero non
will nor all flee injustice advantage indeed not
solum omnis rationalis natura, sed et omne quod sentire
only every rational nature but also everything which to-perceive
potest, vult; et vitat incommodum. Nam nullus vult, nisi quod
can wills and avoids disadvantage for no-one wills except what
aliquo modo putat sibi commodum. Hoc igitur modo, bene
in-some way he-thinks to-himself advantageous in-this therefore way well
sibi esse omnes volunt, et male sibi esse nolunt.
for-themselves to-be all will and ill for-themselves to-be will-not
De hac beatitudine nunc dico, quia nullus potest esse beatus
about this blessedness now I-say that no-one can to-be blessed
qui non vult beatitudinem. Nullus namque beatus, potest esse
who not wills blessedness no-one for blessed can to-be
aut habendo quod non vult, aut non habendo quod vult.
either by-having what not he-wills or not by-having what he-wills

DISC. Non est negandum.
not it-is to-be-denied

MAG. Nec beatus esse debet qui non vult justitiam.
nor blessed to-be ought he-who not wills justice

DISC. Nec hoc minus concedendum.
nor this less to-be-granted

Quod accepta sola voluntate beatitudinis, nec aliud posset velle, nec illam non velle; et quidquid vellet, non esset justa vel injusta voluntas

XIII · WITH THE WILL FOR BLESSEDNESS ALONE

Suppose God gives the angel only the will for blessedness. It could will nothing else, nor stop willing it, and would will to be as blessed as it knew possible, even like God. If it could have no higher goods it would will the lowest. Yet that will, good as God's gift, would be neither just, since it wills the unfitting, nor unjust, since it wills by necessity; and it ought not to be blessed without a just will.

MAG. Dicamus ergo Deum illi dare primum solam
let-us-say therefore God to-him to-give first the-sole
beatitudinis voluntatem, et videamus an idcirco quia
of-blessedness will and let-us-see whether therefore because
accepit aliquam voluntatem, jam ipse se possit movere
he-received some will now he himself can to-move
ad volendum aliud quam quod accepit velle.
to willing other than what he-received to-will

DISC. Prosequere quod incœpisti: ego enim paratus sum
pursue what you-began I for ready am
intelligere.
to-understand

MAG. Constat quia nondum vult aliud quam beatitudinem;
it-is-agreed that not-yet he-wills other than blessedness
quia non aliud accepit velle.
because not other he-received to-will

DISC. Verum est.
true it-is

MAG. Quæro ergo a te an possit se movere ad aliud
I-ask therefore of you whether he-can himself to-move to other
volendum.
willing
DISC. Nequeo videre quomodo se moveat ad volendum
I-cannot to-see how himself he-may-move to willing
aliud quam beatitudinem, qui aliud non vult. Nam si vult
other than blessedness who other not wills for if he-wills
se movere ad aliud volendum, vult utique aliud.
himself to-move to other willing he-wills surely other
MAG. Sicut ergo, nulla voluntate adhuc data, nihil poterat
as therefore no will yet given nothing could-he
per se velle, ita, sola voluntate beatitudinis accepta,
through himself to-will so the-sole will of-blessedness received
nullam aliam a se potest habere voluntatem.
no other from himself he-can to-have will
DISC. Ita est.
so it-is
MAG. Nonne si putat prodesse aliquid ad adipiscendam
surely-not if he-thinks to-profit something for obtaining
beatitudinem, potest se movere ad volendum illud?
blessedness can-he himself to-move to willing it
DISC. Dubito quid respondeam, nam si non potest, non video
I-doubt what I-should-answer for if not he-can not I-see
quomodo velit beatitudinem qui non potest velle quo
how he-wills blessedness who not can to-will by-which
se adipisci posse beatitudinem putat; si vero potest, non
himself to-obtain to-be-able blessedness he-thinks if indeed he-can not
intelligo quomodo non possit velle aliud.
I-understand how not he-can to-will other

MAG. Qui vult aliquid non propter rem quam videtur
he-who wills something not for the-thing which he-seems
velle, sed propter aliud, quid proprie judicandus est velle?
to-will but for another what properly to-be-judged is-he to-will
an aliud quod dicitur velle, an illud propter quod vult?
whether the-other which he-is-said to-will or that for which he-wills
DISC. Illud utique, propter quod vult, videtur velle.
that surely for which he-wills he-seems to-will
MAG. Qui ergo vult aliquid propter beatitudinem, non aliud
he-who therefore wills something for blessedness not other
vult quam beatitudinem: quare potest et quod putat
wills than blessedness wherefore he-can both what he-thinks
prodesse ad beatitudinem, et solam beatitudinem velle.
to-profit for blessedness and sole blessedness to-will
DISC. Satis est planum.
enough it-is plain
MAG. Quæro adhuc an accepta hac sola voluntate possit
I-ask still whether received this sole will he-can
non velle beatitudinem.
not to-will blessedness
DISC. Non potest utrumque simul et velle, et non velle.
not he-can both at-once both to-will and not to-will
MAG. Verum est. Sed non hoc quæro, sed quæro an possit
true it-is but not this I-ask but I-ask whether he-can
deserere hanc voluntatem, et movere se de velle ad non
to-desert this will and to-move himself from to-will to not
velle beatitudinem?
to-will blessedness
DISC. Siquidem hoc facit nolens, non ipse facit; si vero
if-indeed this he-does not-willing not he does-it if indeed
volens, aliud vult quam beatitudinem; sed non vult aliud;
willing other he-wills than blessedness but not he-wills other

quare manifestum puto quia nullatenus potest per se
wherefore manifest I-think that in-no-way he-can through himself
non velle id quod solum accepit velle.
not to-will that which alone he-received to-will

MAG. Bene intelligis. Sed responde mihi adhuc: Si potest
well you-understand but answer me still if he-can
non velle beatitudinem, quanto majorem eam intelliget
not to-will blessedness by-how-much greater it will-he-understand
qui nihil nisi beatitudinem vult et non potest non velle
who nothing except blessedness wills and not can not to-will
beatitudinem?
blessedness

DISC. Si non tanto magis vellet beatitudinem quanto
if not by-so-much more he-willed blessedness by-how-much
meliorem ac majorem illam putaret, aut omnino non vellet
better and greater it he-thought either altogether not he-would-will
beatitudinem, aut vellet aliquid aliud propter quod meliorem
blessedness or he-would-will something other for which a-better
nollet; sed dicimus quia illam vult, et non aliud.
he-would-not-will but we-say that it he-wills and not other

MAG. Vult ergo esse beatus quanto altius hoc esse posse
he-wills therefore to-be blessed by-how-much higher this to-be to-be-able
cognoscit.
he-knows

DISC. Procul dubio vult.
without doubt he-wills

MAG. Ergo vult similis esse Deo.
therefore he-wills like to-be to-God

DISC. Nihil apertius.
nothing plainer

MAG. Quid tibi videtur? an esset injusta voluntas, si hoc
what to-you seems whether would-be unjust the-will if in-this
modo similis vellet esse Deo?
way like he-willed to-be to-God
DISC. Nec justam volo dicere, quia vellet quod non
neither just I-will to-say because he-would-will what not
conveniret; nec injustam, quia ex necessitate vellet.
befitted nor unjust because from necessity he-would-will
MAG. At eum qui vult beatitudinem solam, commoda tantum
but him who wills blessedness alone advantages only
velle posuimus.
to-will we-have-supposed
DISC. Ita est.
so it-is
MAG. Si ergo ille, qui nihil vellet nisi commoda, non posset
if therefore he who nothing would-will except advantages not could
habere majora et veriora, velletne minora quibuscunque
to-have greater and truer would-be-will lesser which-ever
uti posset?
to-use he-could
DISC. Imo non posset non velle quamlibet infima, si majora
nay not he-could not to-will any lowest if greater
non posset.
not he-could
MAG. Nonne, cum vellet commoda infima et immunda,
surely-not when he-would-will advantages lowest and unclean
quibus irrationabilia animalia delectantur, esset eadem
in-which irrational animals delight would-be the-same
voluntas injusta et vituperabilis?
will unjust and blameworthy

DISC. Quomodo injusta aut reprehendenda voluntas esset;
how unjust or blameworthy will would-it-be
quia vellet, quod non posse non velle accepisset?
because it-would-will what not to-be-able not to-will it-had-received
MAG. Voluntatem tamen ipsam, sive cum vult summa
the-will yet itself whether when it-wills the-highest
commoda, sive cum vult infima, constat esse opus et
advantages or when it-wills the-lowest it-is-agreed to-be the-work and
donum Dei, sicut est vita aut sensibilitas, et non esse
gift of-God as is life or sensibility and not to-be
in ea justitiam sive injustitiam.
in it justice or injustice
DISC. Non est dubium.
not it-is doubtful
MAG. Ergo in quantum essentia est bonum, aliquid est;
therefore in so-far-as essence it-is good something it-is
quantum vero ad justitiam pertinet sive injustitiam, nec
as-far-as indeed to justice it-pertains or injustice neither
bona nec mala est.
good nor evil is-it
DISC. Nihil clarius.
nothing clearer
MAG. Sed non debet esse beatus, si non habet justam
but not he-ought to-be blessed if not he-has just
voluntatem; imo non potest perfecte nec laudabiliter esse
will nay not can perfectly nor praiseworthily to-be
beatus, qui vult quod nec potest, nec debet esse.
blessed he-who wills what neither can nor ought to-be
DISC. Multum patet.
much it-is-plain

Quod similiter sit, si sola accepta est voluntas rectitudinis: et idcirco utramque voluntatem accepit simul ut et justus, et ut beatus esset

XIV · THE WILL FOR JUSTICE MUST BE JOINED TO IT

Given only the will for justice, it would likewise will by necessity and be neither just nor unjust. So God joins both wills, that justice may temper the will for blessedness without removing the power to exceed. Then the angel, able to will what it ought not, deserves by not willing it never to be able to will it, and lacks nothing while it keeps justice, or by deserting justice comes to lack everything.

MAG. Consideremus ergo de justitiæ voluntate. Si daretur
let-us-consider therefore about of-justice the-will if it-were-given
eidem angelo velle solum quod eum velle conveniret, an
to-the-same angel to-will only what him to-will befitted whether
posset aliud velle; aut si posset non velle per se, quod
he-could other to-will or if he-could not to-will through himself what
accepisset velle?
he-had-received to-will

DISC. Omnino quod vidimus in voluntate beatitudinis, necesse
altogether what we-saw in the-will of-blessedness necessary
est in hac quoque voluntate evenire.
it-is in this also will to-come-about

MAG. Ergo nec justam, nec injustam haberet voluntatem.
therefore neither just nor unjust would-he-have will
Sicut enim ibi non esset voluntas injusta, si vellet
as for there not would-be the-will unjust if it-willed
inconvenientia. Quoniam hoc non posset non velle; ita hic
unfitting-things since this not it-could not to-will so here

si vellet convenientia, non idcirco esset justa voluntas;
if it-willed unfitting-things not therefore would-be just the-will
quoniam sic hoc accepisset, ut non posset aliter velle.
since so this it-had-received that not it-could otherwise to-will

DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Quoniam ergo nec solummodo volendo beatitudinem,
since therefore neither only by-willing blessedness
nec solummodo volendo quod convenit, cum ex necessitate
nor only by-willing what befits since from necessity
sic velit, justus vel injustus potest appellari; nec potest nec
so he-wills just or unjust he-can to-be-called nor can-he nor
debet esse beatus nisi velit, et nisi juste velit: necesse est
ought-be to-be blessed unless he-will and unless justly he-will necessary it-is
ut sic faciat Deus utramque voluntatem in illo convenire, ut
that so make God both wills in him to-agree that
et beatus esse velit, et juste velit: quatenus addita justitia
both blessed to-be he-will and justly he-will so-that added justice
sic temperet voluntatem beatitudinis, et resecet voluntatis
so may-temper the-will of-blessedness and may-cut-back of-the-will
excessum, et excedendi non amputet potestatem, ut, cum
the-excess and of-exceeding not may-cut-off the-power so-that while
per hoc quia volet beatus esse, modum possit excedere;
through this that he-will-will blessed to-be the-measure he-can to-exceed
per hoc quia juste volet, non velit excedere: et sic justam
through this that justly he-will-will not he-will to-exceed and so just
habens beatitudinis voluntatem, possit et debeat esse beatus:
having of-blessedness will he-can and ought to-be blessed
qui non volendo quod non debet velle, cum tamen possit,
who not by-willing what not he-ought to-will though yet he-can
mereatur ut quod velle non debet, nunquam velle possit;
may-deserve that what to-will not he-ought never to-will he-can

et semper tenendo justitiam per moderatam voluntatem
and always by-holding justice through moderate will
nullo modo indigeat; aut si deseruerit justitiam per
in-no way he-need or if he-will-have-deserted justice through
immoderatam voluntatem, omni modo indigeat.
immoderate will in-every way he-need

DISC. Nihil convenientius cogitari potest.
nothing more-fitting to-be-thought can-be

MAG. Memento quia, cum superius considerabamus solam
remember that when above we-were-considering the-sole
beatitudinis voluntatem sine hac meta, quam addidimus, ut
of-blessedness will without this limit which we-added that
sub Deo se coerceat, dicebamus in ea non esse justitiam
under God itself it-may-restrain we-were-saying in it not to-be justice
vel injustitiam, quidquid vellet.
or injustice whatever it-willed

DISC. Bene memini.
well I-remember

Quod justitia sit aliquid

XV · JUSTICE IS SOMETHING, INJUSTICE NOTHING

What tempers the will is justice, and it is something, a great good. Once received, justice is always owed, even when deserted, and the debt shows the nature's dignity while the failure to have it makes the person blameworthy. Since injustice is only the absence of justice, and the will after deserting justice keeps only what it had before, when it was not unjust, injustice is nothing.

MAG. An putas aliquid esse quod additum eidem voluntati
or do-you-think something to-be which added to-the-same will
temperat illam, ne plus velit quam velle oportet, et expedit?
tempers it lest more it-will than to-will it-behooves and is-expedient

DISC. Nullus intelligens, nihil hoc esse putabit.
no-one understanding nothing this to-be will-think

MAG. Hoc, satis credo, animadvertis non aliud esse quam
this enough I-believe you-notice not other to-be than
justitiam.
justice

DISC. Nihil aliud cogitari potest.
nothing other to-be-thought can-be

MAG. Certum est igitur justitiam esse aliquid.
certain it-is therefore justice to-be something

DISC. Imo valde aliquid bonum.
nay greatly something good

MAG. Antequam acciperet justitiam hanc, voluntas illa debebat
before it-received justice this will that ought
velle et non velle secundum justitiam?
to-will and not to-will according-to justice

DISC. Non debebat quod ideo non habebat, quia non
not it-owed what therefore not it-had because not
acceperat.
it-had-received

MAG. Postquam autem accepit: non dubitas debere, nisi aliqua
after however it-received not you-doubt it-to-owe unless by-some
violentia amittat?
violence it-lose-it

DISC. Semper eam huic debito alligatam puto, sive teneat
always it to-this debt bound I-think whether it-hold
quod accepit sive sponte deserat.
what it-received or freely desert-it

MAG. Recte judicas. Sed quid, si voluntas eadem justitiam tam
rightly you-judge but what if the-will same justice so
utiliter et tam sapienter additam sibi, nulla indigentia et
usefully and so wisely added to-itself by-no need and
nulla violentia cogente, deserat, utendo sponte sua potestate,
by-no violence compelling desert using freely its-own power
id est plus volendo quam debeat? An remanebit aliquid
that is more by-willing than it-ought or will-there-remain something
aliud cum ipsa voluntate, quam quod prius considerabamus
other with the-very will than what before we-were-considering
ante additamentum justitiæ?
before the-addition of-justice

DISC. Quoniam nihil aliud est additum quam justitia, separata
since nothing other is added than justice separated
justitia nihil aliud certum est remanere quam quod prius
justice nothing other certain it-is to-remain than what before
erat, nisi quia debitricem fecit eam accepta justitia, et
was except that a-debtor made it received justice and
quasi quædam pulchra vestigia sui reliquit derelicta eadem
as-it-were certain beautiful traces of-itself left forsaken the-same

justitia. Eo enim ipso, quo debitrix justitiæ permanet,
justice by-that for very-fact by-which a-debtor of-justice it-remains
monstratur honestate justitiæ fuisse decorata. Sed et hoc
it-is-shown by-the-honor of-justice to-have-been adorned but also this
satis justum est, ut quod semel accepit justitiam, eam semper
enough just is that what once received justice it always
debeat, nisi violenter amiserit. Et certe multum dignior
owe unless violently it-will-have-lost-it and certainly much worthier
natura probatur, quæ vel aliquando habuisse et semper
a-nature is-proved which either sometime to-have-had and always
habere ut habeat tam honestum bonum convincitur, quam
to-have that it-have so honorable a-good is-proved than
quæ hoc ipsum non habere nec debere aliquando cognoscitur.
which this very-thing not to-have nor to-owe ever is-known

MAG. Bene consideras: sed adde huic tuæ sententiæ, quia
well you-consider but add to-this your opinion that
quanto natura, quæ hoc habuit et debet, monstratur
by-how-much the-nature which this had and owes is-shown
laudabilior, tanto persona, quæ non habet quod debet,
more-praiseworthy by-so-much the-person who not has what he-owes
convincitur vituperabilior.
is-proved more-blameworthy

DISC. Vehementer assentio.
vehemently I-assent

MAG. Discernere mihi bene, quid ibi monstret naturam
distinguish for-me well what there shows the-nature
laudabilem, et quid faciat personam vituperabilem.
praiseworthy and what makes the-person blameworthy

DISC. Habuisse vel debere monstrat naturalem dignitatem,
to-have-had or to-owe shows natural dignity
et non habere facit personalem inhonestatem. Debere enim,
and not to-have makes personal dishonor to-owe for

factum est ab eo qui dedit; non habere vero, factum
made has-been by him who gave not to-have indeed made
est ab ipso qui deseruit. Ideo namque debet, qui
has-been by him who deserted therefore for owes he-who
accepit; ideo vero non habet, quia deseruit.
received therefore indeed not he-has because he-deserted

MAG. Non ergo reprehendis in ipsa voluntate, quæ non
not therefore you-blame in the-very will which not
stetit in justitia, debere justitiam; sed non habere justitiam.
stood in justice to-owe justice but not to-have justice

DISC. Omnino nihil aliud ibi reprehendo quam absentiam
altogether nothing other there I-blame than the-absence
justitiæ, sive non habere justitiam. Nam, sicut jam dixi,
of-justice or not to-have justice for as already I-said
debere, decorat; non habere vero, deturpat; et quo
to-owe adorns not to-have indeed disfigures and by-how-much
magis illud decet, eo magis istud dedecet: imo, non ob
more that befits by-so-much more this misbefits nay not for
aliud voluntatem illam deturpat ex propria culpa non habere,
another will that disfigures from its-own fault not to-have
quam quia illam decorat ex bonitate dantis debere habere.
than because it adorns from the-goodness of-the-giver to-owe to-have

MAG. Nonne jam voluntatem ipsam, quæ non habet justitiam,
surely-not now the-will itself which not has justice
quam debet habere, judicas injustam, et in illa esse
which it-ought to-have you-judge unjust and in it to-be
injustitiam?
injustice

DISC. Quis non ita judicet?
who not so would-judge

MAG. Si non esset injusta, nec esset in illa injustitia; puto
if not it-were unjust nor were in it injustice I-think
quia nihil in ea reprehenderes.
that nothing in it you-would-blame
DISC. Nihil omnino.
nothing at-all
MAG. Ergo nihil aliud in ea reprehendis quam injustitiam,
therefore nothing other in it you-blame than injustice
et quia injusta est.
and that unjust it-is
DISC. Non possum aliud quidquam in ea reprehendere.
not I-can other anything in it to-blame
MAG. Si ergo nihil aliud ibi reprehendis quam absentiam
if therefore nothing other there you-blame than the-absence
justitiæ, et illam non habere justitiam, sicut paulo ante
of-justice and it not to-have justice as a-little before
dixisti; et iterum verum est quia nihil aliud reprehendis in
you-said and again true it-is that nothing other you-blame in
ea, quam in illa esse injustitiam, sive illam esse injustam;
it than in it to-be injustice or it to-be unjust
palam est quia non aliud in illa est injustitia aut esse
plain it-is that not other in it is injustice or to-be
injustam, quam absentia justitiæ aut non habere justitiam.
unjust than the-absence of-justice or not to-have justice
DISC. Nullo modo possunt hæc esse diversa.
in-no way can these to-be diverse
MAG. Sicut igitur absentia justitiæ et non habere justitiam,
as therefore the-absence of-justice and not to-have justice
nullam essentiam habet, ita injustitia, et esse injustum,
no essence has so injustice and to-be unjust
nullum habet esse, et idcirco non est aliquid, sed nihil.
no has to-be and therefore not it-is something but nothing

DISC. Non est consequentius aliquid.
not is more-consequent anything

MAG. Memento etiam jam constare quia recedente justitia,
remember also already to-be-agreed that receding justice
excepto debito justitiæ, nihil aliud illi remansit quam quod
excepting the-debt of-justice nothing other to-it remained than what
habebat ante susceptam justitiam.
it-had before taken-up justice

DISC. Constat utique.
it-is-agreed surely

MAG. At injusta non erat, nec injustitiam habebat, antequam
but unjust not it-was nor injustice had-it before
haberet justitiam.
it-had justice

DISC. Non.
no

MAG. Ergo, aut recedente justitia, non est in illa injustitia,
therefore either receding justice not is in it injustice
nec est injusta; aut nihil est injustitia, vel esse injustum.
nor is-it unjust or nothing is injustice or to-be unjust

DISC. Non potest videri aliquid magis necessarium.
not can to-seem anything more necessary

MAG. At injustitiam illam habere, et esse injustam, post
but injustice it to-have and to-be unjust after
desertam justitiam concessisti.
deserted justice you-granted

DISC. Imo non possum non videre.
nay not I-can not to-see

MAG. Nihil igitur est injustitia, vel esse injustum.
nothing therefore is injustice or to-be unjust

DISC. Credentem me fecisti scire quod nesciens credebam.
believing me you-have-made to-know what not-knowing I-believed

Quod injustitia non sit, nisi absentia debitæ justitiæ

XVI · WHY THE ABSENCE OF JUSTICE IS INJUSTICE ONLY AFTER

The absence of justice is called injustice, and blamed, only after justice is given and deserted, since lacking it is unseemly only where it ought to be. A youth is not disgraced by having no beard, but a grown man is, and the more a nature is bound to have justice, the more lacking it defiles.

MAG. Æstimo te jam cognoscere, cum injustitia non sit aliud
I-reckon you now to-recognize since injustice not be other
quam absentia justitiæ, nec injustum esse aliud quam non
than the-absence of-justice nor unjust to-be other than not
habere justitiam, cur non ante datam, sed post derelictam
to-have justice why not before given but after forsaken
justitiam, eadem absentia justitiæ vocetur injustitia, et
justice the-same absence of-justice be-called injustice and
non habere justitiam, sit injustum esse, et sit utrumque
not to-have justice be unjust to-be and be each
reprehensibile: non enim propter aliud, nisi quia non dedecet
blameworthy not for for another except because not misbefits
abesse justitiam, nisi ubi debet esse. Sicut enim virum,
to-be-absent justice except where it-ought to-be as for a-man
qui nondum debet habere barbam, non dedecet non habere,
who not-yet ought to-have a-beard not it-misbefits not to-have
cum vero jam debet habere, indecorum est non habere,
when indeed already he-ought to-have unseemly it-is not to-have
ita naturam, quæ non debet habere justitiam, non deformat
so a-nature which not ought to-have justice not deforms
non habere; illam vero, quæ habere debet, dehonestat non
not to-have that-one indeed which to-have ought dishonors not

habere: et quanto magis debere habere, virilem ostendit
to-have and by-how-much more to-be-bound to-have manly shows
naturam, tanto magis non habere, fœdat virilem figuram.
the-nature by-so-much more not to-have defiles the-manly figure
DISC. Sufficienter video injustitiam non esse, nisi absentiam
sufficiently I-see injustice not to-be except the-absence
justitiæ, ubi debet esse justitia.
of-justice where ought to-be justice

Cur desertor angelus non possit redire ad justitiam

XVII · THE DESERTER CANNOT RETURN TO JUSTICE BY HIMSELF

The angel given only the will for blessedness could will nothing else. Having deserted justice, it can still less return by itself: before, its nature prevented it; now its fault means it ought not to have justice. It can in no way have justice from itself, nor ought it to have anything from itself.

MAG. Cum posuimus solam voluntatem beatitudinis præfato
when we-supposed the-sole will of-blessedness to-the-aforesaid
angelo dari, vidimus eum nihil potuisse velle aliud.
angel to-be-given we-saw him nothing to-have-been-able to-will other
DISC. Aperte vidimus quod dicis.
openly we-saw what you-say
MAG. An modo, derelicta justitia et remanente illa sola
or now forsaken justice and remaining that sole
voluntate, quæ prius fuerat, beatitudinis, potest idem
will which before had-been of-blessedness can the-same
desertor ad voluntatem justitiæ redire per se ad quam
deserter to the-will of-justice to-return through himself to which
non potuit, antequam daretur, venire?
not he-could before it-was-given to-come

DISC. Sed modo multo minus: tunc enim conditione naturæ
but now much less then for by-the-condition of-nature
non poterat habere; nunc vero merito quoque culpæ non
not he-could to-have now indeed by-the-merit also of-fault not
debet habere.
he-ought to-have

MAG. Nullo ergo modo potest habere justitiam a se,
in-no therefore way can-he to-have justice from himself
cum non habet justitiam; quia nec antequam eam accipiat,
when not he-has justice because neither before it he-receives
nec postquam eam deseruit.
nor after it he-deserted

DISC. Non debet aliquid habere a se.
not he-ought anything to-have from himself

Quomodo malus angelus se fecit injustum,
et bonus se justum: et quod malus sic
debet Deo gratias pro bonis, quæ accepit,
et deseruit; sicut bonus, qui servavit accepta

XVIII · HOW THE GOOD GAVE THEMSELVES JUSTICE

In one sense the angels could give themselves justice, by not taking it away when they could, and this too they received from God, who gave them the power to desert that they might give it to themselves. The good angel gave it to himself; the bad took it from himself. Both owe God equal thanks for the blessedness offered, and God makes the bad angel unjust only by not restoring justice.

MAG. Nonne aliquo modo, vel cum haberet, potuit ipse sibi
surely-not in-some way even when he-had could he to-himself
dare justitiam?
to-give justice

DISC. Quomodo potuisset?

how could-he-have

MAG. Pluribus modis dicimur facere: dicimur enim facere

in-several ways we-are-said to-make we-are-said for to-make

aliquid, cum esse facimus rem; et cum facere possumus

something when to-be we-make a-thing and when to-make we-can

ut non sit, et non facimus. Hoc itaque modo potuit ipse

that not it-be and not we-make in-this and-so way could he

sibi dare justitiam, quia potuit sibi auferre eam,

to-himself to-give justice because he-could from-himself to-take-away it

et potuit non auferre: quomodo ille, qui stetit in veritate

and could not to-take-away as he who stood in the-truth

in qua factus est, non fecit, cum potuit, ut eam non

in which made he-was not made when he-could that it not

haberet; et ita eam ipse sibi dedit, et totum hoc a

he-should-have and so it he to-himself gave and all this from

Deo accepit: ab eo enim acceperunt ambo habere, et posse

God he-received from him for received both to-have and to-be-able

tenere, et posse deserere. Hoc ultimum ideo Deus dedit

to-hold and to-be-able to-desert this last therefore God gave

ut possent sibi dare aliquo modo justitiam. Si enim

that they-might-be-able to-themselves to-give in-some way justice if for

nullo modo eam sibi possent auferre, nullo modo

in-no way it from-themselves they-could to-take-away in-no way

possent sibi dare. Qui ergo hoc modo sibi dedit

could-they to-themselves to-give he-who therefore in-this way to-himself gave

eam, hoc ipsum a Deo accipit ut sibi eam daret.

it this very-thing from God receives that to-himself it he-should-give

DISC. Video quia non auferendo potuerunt sibi dare

I-see that not by-taking-away they-could to-themselves to-give

justitiam; sed alter sibi dedit, alter sibi abstulit.

justice but the-one to-himself gave the-other from-himself took-away

MAG. Vides ergo Deo parem eos debere gratiam, quantum
you-see therefore to-God equal them to-owe thanks as-far-as
ad bonitatem ipsius, nec diabolum ideo minus debere
to the-goodness of-him nor the-devil therefore less to-be-bound
Deo reddere, quod Dei est; quia sibi abstulit quod
to-God to-render what of-God is because from-himself he-took-away what
Deus dedit, et noluit accipere quod Deus obtulit.
God gave and he-willed-not to-receive what God offered

DISC. Video.
I-see

MAG. Semper igitur debet Deo gratias agere malus angelus
always therefore ought to-God thanks to-give the-evil angel
pro beatitudine quam sibi abstulit; sicut bonus pro
for the-blessedness which from-himself he-took-away as the-good-one for
ea quam sibi ipse dedit.
that which to-himself he gave

DISC. Verissimum est.
most-true it-is

MAG. Æstimo quia animadvertis Deum nullo modo posse facere
I-reckon that you-notice God in-no way to-be-able to-make
injustum, nisi injustum non faciendo justum, cum possit. Nam
unjust except the-unjust not making just though he-can for
ante acceptam justitiam nullus est justus, vel injustus; et nullus
before received justice none is just or unjust and none
post acceptam justitiam sit injustus, nisi sponte deserta justitia.
after received justice is unjust except freely deserted justice
Sicut ergo bonus angelus fecit se justum, non auferendo
as therefore the-good angel made himself just by-not taking-away
sibi justitiam, cum potuit, ita Deus malum angelum
from-himself justice when he-could so God the-evil angel
facit injustum, non reddendo ei justitiam, cum possit.
makes unjust by-not returning to-him justice though he-can

DISC. Facile cognoscitur.
easily it-is-known

Quod voluntas, in quantum est, bonum sit; et nulla res malum sit

XIX · NO WILL IS EVIL AS A BEING

Before receiving justice, the will for blessedness is good whatever it wills, and after deserting justice it is still good insofar as it is. Were willing likeness to God evil, the Son would not will to be like the Father; were willing low pleasures evil, beasts' wills would be evil. So no will, as God's work, is evil insofar as it is, but only as unjust; no thing is evil, and evil is only forsaken justice absent from a will, or from a thing through that will.

MAG. Redeamus ad considerationem voluntatis; et reminiscamur
let-us-return to the-consideration of-will and let-us-remember
quod consideramus, voluntatem scilicet beatitudinis, quidquid
what we-consider the-will namely of-blessedness whatever
velit, non esse malum, sed esse bonum aliquod, antequam
it-will not to-be evil but to-be good something before
accipiat justitiam. Unde consequitur quia cum deserit acceptam
it-receive justice whence it-follows that when it-deserts received
justitiam (si eadem essentia est, quæ prius erat) bonum est
justice if the-same essence it-is which before it-was good it-is
aliquod, quantum ad hoc quod est; quantum vero ad hoc quia
something as-far-as to this that it-is as-far-as indeed to this that
justitia quæ fuit in illa, non est, dicitur mala et injusta. Nam
the-justice which was in it not is it-is-called evil and unjust for
si velle Deo similem esse, malum esset, Filius Dei non vellet
if to-will to-God like to-be evil were the-Son of-God not would-will
similis esse Patri: aut velle quaslibet infimas voluptates,
like to-be to-the-Father or to-will any lowest pleasures

esset malum; mala diceretur voluntas brutorum animalium.
were evil evil would-be-called the-will of-brute animals
Sed nec voluntas Filii Dei est mala, quia est justa; nec
but neither the-will of-the-Son of-God is evil because it-is just nor
voluntas irrationalis mala dicitur, quia non est injusta. Unde
the-will irrational evil is-called because not it-is unjust whence
sequitur nullam voluntatem esse malum, sed esse bonum in
it-follows no will to-be evil but to-be good in
quantum est, quia opus Dei est; nec nisi in quantum est
so-far-as it-is because the-work of-God it-is nor except in so-far-as it-is
injusta, malam esse: et quoniam nulla res mala dicitur, nisi
unjust evil to-be and since no thing evil is-called except
mala voluntas, aut propter malam voluntatem, ut malus homo,
evil will or because-of evil will as an-evil man
et mala actio: nihil est apertius quam nullam rem esse malum,
and an-evil action nothing is more-open than no thing to-be evil
nec aliud esse malum quam absentiam justitiæ derelictæ in
nor other to-be evil than the-absence of-justice forsaken in
voluntate, aut in aliqua re propter malam voluntatem.
will or in some thing because-of evil will

Quomodo Deus faciat malas et voluntates et actiones: et quomodo accipiantur ab eo

XX · HOW GOD GIVES THE EVIL WILL AND MAKES EVIL DEEDS

The student objects that willing likeness to God is a good, so the devil had it from God. As God leads into temptation by not delivering from it, the teacher answers, he gives the evil will by not preventing it, and the devil both received it and did not. The will and its turning, as things, are good and God's; their injustice, which is nothing, is the devil's. God makes even evil deeds, as he makes beings born of wrong; this, the student grants, excuses God.

DISC. Sic tua disputatio veris, et necessariis apertisque rationibus
so your disputation by-true and necessary and-open reasons
concatenatur ut nulla ratione, quod dicis, dissolvi posse
is-linked that by-no reason what you-say to-be-dissolved to-be-able
videam: nisi quia video aliquid consequi, quod nec dici
I-see except that I-see something to-follow which neither to-be-said
debere credo, nec quomodo non sit si vera sunt quæ
ought I-believe nor how not it-be if true are-the-things which
dicis, non video. Nam si velle esse similem Deo, non nihil, nec
you-say not I-see for if to-will to-be like to-God not nothing nor
malum, sed quoddam bonum est; nonnisi ab eo, a quo est
evil but a-certain good is only from him from whom is
omne quod est, haberi potuit. Si ergo angelus non habuit
everything which is to-be-had it-could if therefore the-angel not had
quod non accepit, quod habuit, ab illo accepit a quo habuit.
what not he-received what he-had from him he-received from whom he-had
Quid autem ab illo accepit, quod ille non dedit? Quare si
what moreover from him did-he-receive which he not gave wherefore if
habuit velle esse similem Deo, ideo habuit, quia Deus dedit.
he-had to-will to-be like to-God therefore he-had because God gave

MAG. Quid mirum, si quemadmodum Deus dicitur inducere
what wonder if just-as God is-said to-lead
in tentationem, quando non liberat ab ea, ita fatemur eum
into temptation when not he-frees from it so we-confess him
dare voluntatem malam, non prohibendo eam cum potest:
to-give will evil not by-preventing it when he-can
præsertim, cum potestas volendi quidlibet nonnisi ab illo sit?
especially since the-power of-willing anything only from him be

DISC. Hoc modo non videtur esse inconveniens.
in-this way not it-seems to-be unfitting

MAG. Si ergo datio non est sine acceptione: quemadmodum
if therefore giving not is without receiving as
non inusitate dicitur dare, et qui sponte concedit, et qui
not unusually is-said to-give both he-who freely grants and he-who
non approbando permittit, ita non incongrue accipere dicitur,
not approving permits so not incongruously to-receive is-said
et qui concessa suscipit, et qui illicita præsumit.
both he-who granted-things takes-up and he-who unlawful-things presumes

DISC. Nec incongruum, nec inusitatum mihi videtur quod
neither incongruous nor unusual to-me seems what
dicis.
you-say

MAG. Quid ergo dicimus contra veritatem, si dicimus cum
what therefore do-we-say against truth if we-say when
diabolus voluit quod non debuit, hoc illum et a Deo
the-devil willed what not he-ought this him both from God
accepisse, quia Deus permisit; et non accepisse, quia
to-have-received because God permitted and not to-have-received because
ille non consensit?
he not consented

DISC. Nihil hic repugnare videtur veritati.
nothing here to-be-repugnant seems to-truth

MAG. Cum igitur diabolus convertit voluntatem ad quod non
when therefore the-devil turned will to what not
debuit, et ipsum velle, et ipsa conversio fuit aliquid; et
he-ought both the-very willing and the-very turning was something and
tamen nonnisi a Deo et de Dei voluntate aliquid habuit,
yet only from God and of God's will something he-had
quoniam nec velle aliquid, nec movere potuit voluntatem,
since neither to-will anything nor to-move could-he will
nisi illo permittente, qui fecit omnes naturas substantiales
except him permitting who made all natures substantial
et accidentales, universales et individuas. In quantum enim
and accidental universal and individual in so-far-as for
voluntas, et conversio, sive motus voluntatis est aliquid,
will and turning or motion of-will is something
bonum est, et Dei est; in quantum vero justitia caret,
good it-is and of-God is in so-far-as indeed justice it-lacks
sine qua esse non debet, non simpliciter malum, sed aliquid
without which to-be not it-ought not simply evil but something
malum est: et quod malum est, non Dei, sed volentis,
evil it-is and what evil is not of-God but of-the-one-willing
sive moventis voluntatem est. Simplex quippe malum, est
or moving the-will is simple indeed evil is
injustitia; quoniam non est aliud quam malum, quod nihil
injustice since not it-is other than evil which nothing
est. Aliquid vero malum est natura, in qua est injustitia, quia
is something indeed evil is the-nature in which is injustice because
est aliquid et aliud quam injustitia, quæ malum et nihil
it-is something and other than injustice which evil and nothing
est. Quare quod aliquid est, a Deo fit, et Dei est; quod
is wherefore what something is by God is-made and of-God is what
vero nihil est, id est malum, ab injusto fit, et ejus est.
indeed nothing is that is evil by the-unjust-one is-made and his is

DISC. Quod quidem Deus naturas rerum omnium faciat,
that indeed God the-natures of-things all makes
fatendum est; quod vero singulas actiones perversarum
to-be-confessed it-is that however the-single actions of-perverse
voluntatum, velut ipsum pravum motum voluntatis,
wills as-for-example the-very depraved motion of-will
quo ipsa mala voluntas se movet, faciat, quis concedat?
by-which the-very evil will itself moves he-makes who would-grant
MAG. Quid mirum, si dicimus Deum facere singulas actiones,
what wonder if we-say God to-make the-single actions
quæ fiunt mala voluntate, cum fateamur eum facere singulas
which are-done by-evil will since we-confess him to-make the-single
substantias, quæ fiunt injusta voluntate et inhonesta actione?
substances which are-made by-unjust will and dishonorable action
DISC. Non habeo quid contradicam: quippe nec negare possum
not I-have what I-may-contradict indeed neither to-deny can-I
vere aliquid esse quamlibet actionem; nec fateri volo non
truly something to-be any action nor to-confess do-I-will not
fieri a Deo, quod vere aliquam habet essentiam. Neque ista
to-be-made by God what truly some has essence nor this
tua ratio ullo modo accusat Deum, aut excusat diabolum? sed
your reason in-any way accuses God or excuses the-devil but
omnino Deum excusat, et diabolum accusat. Sed vellem scire
altogether God excuses and the-devil accuses but I-should-wish to-know
utrum idem desertor angelus ista de se præsciverit.
whether the-same deserter angel these-things about himself foreknew

Quod malus angelus non potuit præscire se casurum esse

XXI · THE BAD ANGEL COULD NOT FOREKNOW HIS FALL

Certain foreknowledge of the fall was impossible, since it need not have happened. The student raises foreknowledge and free choice; the teacher answers briefly that God's foreknowledge is knowledge of the present. Had the angel foreseen his fall, he would have fallen already by willing it, or been wretched in his justice, unfitting in one who, unlike fallen man, had deserved no suffering. Nor could he even suspect he would freely change his will.

MAG. Cum quæris utrum ille angelus, qui non stetit in
when you-ask whether that angel who not stood in
veritate, præsciverit se esse casurum, discernendum est de
the-truth foreknew himself to-be about-to-fall to-be-distinguished it-is about
qua scientia dicas. Nam si de illa scientia quæritur, quæ
what knowledge you-speak for if about that knowledge it-is-asked which
non est nisi cum certa ratione aliquid intelligitur, omnino
not is except when by-certain reason something is-understood altogether
respondeo non posse sciri quod potest non esse. Quod
I-answer not to-be-able to-be-known what can not to-be what
enim non esse potest esse nequaquam certa potest colligi
for not to-be can to-be by-no-means by-certain can to-be-gathered
ratione. Quapropter constat illum nullatenus potuisse
reason wherefore it-is-agreed him in-no-way to-have-been-able
præscire casum suum, quem necesse non erat esse futurum.
to-foreknow fall his-own which necessary not it-was to-be about-to-be
Ponamus enim non fuisse futurum casum illum; an itaque
let-us-suppose for not to-have-been about-to-be fall that or and-so
putas præsciri potuisse, si futurus non erat?
do-you-think to-be-foreknown to-have-been-able if about-to-be not it-was

DISC. Videtur non posse præsciri, quod potest futurum
it-seems not to-be-able to-be-foreknown what can about-to-be
non esse; nec posse non esse futurum, quod præscitur.
not to-be nor to-be-able not to-be about-to-be what is-foreknown
Sed reminiscor nunc illius famosissimæ quæstionis de
but I-remember now that most-famous question about
præscientia divina et libero arbitrio, quamvis enim tanta
the-foreknowledge divine and free choice although for by-so-great
auctoritate asseratur, et tanta teneatur utilitate ut
authority it-be-asserted and by-so-great is-held usefulness that
nullatenus propter ullam humanam rationem dubitandum sit
in-no-way on-account-of any human reason to-be-doubted it-be
divinam præscientiam et liberum arbitrium sibi invicem
divine foreknowledge and free choice to-themselves mutually
consentire, tamen quantum ad rationis considerationem
to-agree yet as-far-as to of-reason the-consideration
quæ videtur, spectat, insociabiliter videntur dissentire: unde
which is-seen it-looks unsociably they-seem to-disagree whence
videmus in hac quæstione nonnullos sic in unam partem
we-see in this question some so into one part
vergentes, ut alteram omnino deserant, unda infidelitatis
inclining that the-other altogether they-desert by-the-wave of-unbelief
submergente, perire; multos vero, velut contrariis ventis hinc
overwhelming to-perish many indeed as-if by-contrary winds hither
inde contra invicem sustentando quassantibus, periclitari.
thither against one-another by-holding-up shaking to-be-endangered
Cum vero divinam constet præscientiam esse omnium, quæ
when indeed divine it-be-agreed foreknowledge to-be of-all-things which
fiunt libero arbitrio, nec aliquid horum sit ex necessitate,
are-done by-free choice nor anything of-these be from necessity
nihilominus videtur posse non esse futurum, quod præscitur.
nonetheless it-seems to-be-able not to-be about-to-be what is-foreknown

MAG. Breviter interim hoc respondeo. Præscientia Dei non
briefly meanwhile this I-answer the-foreknowledge of-God not
proprie dicitur præscientia: cui enim omnia semper sunt
properly is-called foreknowledge to-whom for all-things always are
præsentia, non habet futurorum præscientiam, sed præsentium
present not he-has of-future-things foreknowledge but of-present-things
scientiam. Cum ergo alia sit ratio de præscientia
knowledge since therefore other be the-account about foreknowledge
futuræ, quam de præsentis rei scientia; non est necesse
of-a-future than about of-a-present thing knowledge not it-is necessary
divinam præscientiam, et illam, de qua quærimus, eamdem
divine foreknowledge and that about which we-ask the-same
habere consequentiam.
to-have consequence

DISC. Assentio.
I-assent

MAG. Redeamus ad illam, quæ erat in manibus, quæstionem.
let-us-return to that which was in hand question

DISC. Placet quod dicis. Sed eo pacto, ut cum de illa,
it-pleases what you-say but on-that agreement that when about that
cujus mentionem feci, quæsiero, mihi respondere quod inde
of-which mention I-made I-shall-have-asked to-me to-answer what thence
Deus tibi dignabitur ostendere, non renuas. Valde namque
God to-you will-deign to-show not you-refuse greatly for
necessaria est ejus solutio, si jam ab aliquo facta est,
necessary is its solution if already by someone made it-has-been
aut si fiat: fateor enim nondum alicubi, excepta divina
or if it-be-made I-confess for not-yet anywhere excepting divine
auctoritate, cui indubitanter credo, me legisse rationem,
authority which undoubtingly I-believe me to-have-read a-reason
quæ mihi sufficeret ad ejusdem solutionis intellectum.
which to-me would-suffice for of-the-same solution understanding

MAG. Cum ad illam veniemus, si forte venerimus, erit
when to it we-shall-come if perhaps we-shall-have-come it-will-be
sicut Deus dabit. Nunc autem, quoniam supra posita
as God will-give now however since by-the-above set
ratione patet apostatam angelum non potuisse præscire
reason it-is-plain the-apostate angel not to-have-been-able to-foreknow
ruinam suam, ea præscientia, quam rei necessitas
ruin his-own by-that foreknowledge which of-the-thing necessity
sequitur: accipe adhuc aliam rationem, quæ non solum
follows receive still another reason which not only
præscientia, sed et æstimatione aut qualibet suspicione suum
by-foreknowledge but also by-estimation or by-any suspicion his
eum præsensisse casum excludit.
him to-have-sensed-beforehand fall excludes

DISC. Hoc exspecto.
this I-await

MAG. Si adhuc in bona voluntate stans præsciebat se
if still in good will standing he-foreknew himself
casurum, aut volebat ut ita fieret, aut non volebat.
about-to-fall either he-willed that so it-should-be-done or not he-willed

DISC. Unum horum necesse est verum esse.
one of-these necessary it-is true to-be

MAG. Sed si cum præscientia voluntatem habebat aliquando
but if with foreknowledge will he-had sometime
cadendi; jam ipsa mala voluntate ceciderat.
of-falling already by-the-very evil will he-had-fallen

DISC. Patet quod dicis.
it-is-plain what you-say

MAG. Non itaque volendo cadere, prius scivit se casurum
not and-so by-willing to-fall first did-he-know himself about-to-fall
quam cecidit.
than he-fell

DISC. Non potest aliquid objici conclusioni tuæ.
not can anything to-be-objected to-conclusion your
MAG. At si præsciebat se casurum, et nolebat, tantum
but if he-foreknew himself about-to-fall and willed-not so-much
miser erat dolendo quantum stare volebat.
wretched he-was by-grieving as-much-as to-stand he-willed
DISC. Negari non potest.
to-be-denied not it-can
MAG. At tanto justior erat quanto magis volebat stare,
but by-so-much more-just he-was by-how-much more he-willed to-stand
et quo erat justior, eo debebat esse felicior.
and by-what he-was more-just by-that he-ought to-be happier
DISC. Non potest negari.
not it-can to-be-denied
MAG. Ergo si nolendo præsciebat se casurum, tanto erat
therefore if not-willing he-foreknew himself about-to-fall by-so-much he-was
miserior, quanto debebat esse felicior: quod non convenit.
more-wretched by-how-much he-ought to-be happier which not befits
DISC. Ita quidem consequi negare nequeo; sed hoc sæpe non
so indeed to-follow to-deny I-cannot but this often not
solum sine inconvenientia, sed et laudabiliter et superna gratia
only without unfittingness but also praiseworthily and by-supernal grace
fieri cognoscitur: multoties enim ut pauca de incommodis
to-be-done is-known many-times for that a-few about the-troubles
justorum commemorem, quanto quis justior est, tanto
of-the-just I-may-mention by-how-much anyone more-just is by-so-much
majore doloris compassione de alieno casu afficitur. Sæpe
by-greater of-grief compassion about another's fall he-is-affected often
etiam eum, qui majorem habet in justitia constantiam, videmus
also him who greater has in justice constancy we-see
ab injustis immaniorem pati, persecutionis instantiam.
from the-unjust a-more-savage to-suffer of-persecution pressure

MAG. Non est eadem ratio in hominibus, et in illo angelo.
not it-is the-same account in men and in that angel
Hominum enim natura, propter peccatum primi parentis,
of-men for the-nature because-of the-sin of-the-first parent
jam innumerabilium incommodorum facta est passibilis:
now of-innumerable troubles made has-been passible
ex qua passibilitate multis modis gratia nobis operatur
from which passibility in-many ways grace for-us works
incorruptibilitatem. Ille vero, adhuc nullo peccato præcedente,
incorruptibility he indeed still no sin preceding
alicujus mali non meruerat, passionem.
of-any evil not had-deserved the-suffering
DISC. Satisfecisti objectioni meæ. Patet enim quia hæc ipsa
you-have-satisfied objection my it-is-plain for that this very
ratio sicut separat ab ipso malo angelo sui casus
reason as it-separates from the-very evil angel of-his-own fall
præscientiam, ita nihilominus omnem segregat opinionem.
the-foreknowledge so nonetheless every it-segregates opinion
MAG. Est et aliud quod mihi satis videtur ostendere nullo
there-is also another-thing which to-me enough seems to-show in-no
modo eum suam ante putavisse futuram prævaricationem.
way him his-own beforehand to-have-thought about-to-be transgression
Nempe aut coactam putavisset, aut spontaneam;
indeed either compelled he-would-have-thought-it or spontaneous
sed nec ullatenus erat unde se aliquando cogi
but neither in-any-way was-there whence himself ever to-be-compelled
suspicaretur, nec quandiu voluit in veritate perseverare ullo
he-might-suspect nor as-long-as he-willed in the-truth to-persevere in-any
modo putare potuit se sola voluntate illam deserturum.
way to-think could-he himself by-sole will it about-to-desert
Supra namque jam monstratum est eum, quandiu
above for already shown it-has-been him as-long-as

rectam voluntatem habuit, in hac ipsa voluntate voluisse
right will he-had in this very will to-have-willed
perseverare. Quapropter volendo tenere perseveranter, quod
to-persevere wherefore by-willing to-hold perseveringly what
tenebat; nullo modo video unde potuisset vel suspicari, nulla
he-held in-no way I-see whence he-could-have even to-suspect no
alia accedente causa sola se illud deserturum voluntate.
other supervening cause by-sole himself that about-to-desert will
Non nego illum scivisse quia posset mutare voluntatem,
not I-deny him to-have-known that he-could to-change the-will
quam tenebat; sed dico illum non potuisse putare quia
which he-held but I-say him not to-have-been-able to-think that
aliquando, omni alia cessante causa, sponte mutaret
sometime every other ceasing cause freely he-would-change
voluntatem, quam perseveranter tenere volebat.
the-will which perseveringly to-hold he-willed

DISC. Qui diligenter intelligit quod dicis, patenter videt quia
he-who diligently understands what you-say plainly sees that
nullo modo scire vel putare potuit angelus malus se
in-no way to-know or to-think could angel evil himself
facturum quod male fecit.
about-to-do what evilly he-did

Quod scivit se non debere velle hoc quod volendo peccavit; et debere puniri si peccaret

XXII · HE KNEW HE OUGHT NOT TO WILL WHAT HE WILLED

Had the angel not known that he ought not to will what he unjustly willed, he would have been neither just in keeping justice nor unjust in deserting it. He was rational enough to know what he ought to will. But then, the student asks, he knew he ought to be punished if he deserted, so how could one who inseparably willed blessedness freely will his own wretchedness?

DISC. Sed et hoc volo ut pariter ostendas, si scivit se
but also this I-wish that equally you-show whether he-knew himself
non debere velle quod prævaricando voluit.
not to-be-bound to-will what by-transgressing he-willed

MAG. In hoc dubitare non debes, si supra dicta consideras.
in this to-doubt not you-ought if the-above said-things you-consider
Si enim nescisset se non debere velle quod injuste
if for he-had-not-known himself not to-be-bound to-will what unjustly
voluit, ignorasset se debere voluntatem tenere
he-willed he-would-have-been-ignorant himself to-be-bound the-will to-hold
quam deseruit. Quapropter nec justus esset tenendo,
which he-deserted wherefore neither just would-he-have-been by-holding
nec injustus deserendo justitiam, quam nesciisset: imo
nor unjust by-deserting the-justice which he-had-not-known nay
nec poterat non velle plus quam habebat, si nesciebat se
neither could-he not to-will more than he-had if he-knew-not himself
debere esse contentum eo quod acceperat. Denique,
to-be-bound to-be content with-that which he-had-received finally
quia ita rationalis erat ut nulla re prohiberetur uti
because so rational he-was that by-no thing was-he-prevented to-use
ratione, non ignorabat quid deberet vel non deberet velle.
reason not he-was-ignorant-of what he-ought or not ought to-will

DISC. Rationem tuam non video posse infirmari; sed tamen
reason your not I-see to-be-able to-be-weakened but yet
inde mihi videtur quædam oriri quæstio. Si enim sciebat
thence to-me seems a-certain to-arise question if for he-knew
se non debere deserere quod acceperat, utique sciebat
himself not to-be-bound to-desert what he-had-received surely he-knew
nihilominus se debere puniri, si desereret. Quomodo
nonetheless himself to-be-bound to-be-punished if he-should-desert how
igitur sponte potuit velle unde miser esset, qui acceperat
therefore freely could-he to-will whence wretched he-would-be who had-received
inseparabiliter velle ut beatus esset.
inseparably to-will that blessed he-might-be

Quod non debuit scire quia si peccaret, puniretur

XXIII · HE OUGHT NOT TO HAVE KNOWN HE WOULD BE PUNISHED

He could not be ignorant that he deserved punishment, but ought not to have known it would follow: God's judgments are a great deep, and he could think God would not damn his own creature, with no example yet of avenging justice. Had he known, he could not freely have willed his wretchedness, and so would not have been just in refraining; sinning anyway, he would deserve worse; refraining from fear, he would not be just.

MAG. Sicut certum est quia debere se puniri, si
as certain it-is that to-be-bound himself to-be-punished if
peccaret, ignorare non potuit; ita quia puniretur, si
he-sinned to-be-ignorant-of not he-could so that he-would-be-punished if
peccaret, scire non debuit.
he-sinned to-know not he-ought

DISC. Quomodo hoc ignoravit, si ita rationalis erat, ut
how this was-he-ignorant-of if so rational he-was that
ejus rationalitas non impediretur veritatem cognoscere, sicut
his rationality not was-hindered truth to-know as
sæpe nostra impeditur, gravante corruptibili corpore?
often ours is-hindered weighing-down the-corruptible body
MAG. Quia rationalis erat, potuit intelligere quia juste, si
because rational he-was he-could to-understand that justly if
peccaret, puniretur. Sed, quoniam judicia Dei abyssus
he-sinned he-would-be-punished but since the-judgments of-God a-deep
multa, et investigabiles viæ ejus, nequivit comprehendere
great and unsearchable the-ways his he-could-not to-comprehend
an Deus faceret quod juste facere posset. Sed et si
whether God would-do what justly to-do he-could but also if
quis dicat quia nullatenus credere potuit Deum creaturam
anyone say that in-no-way to-believe could-be God the-creature
suam propter ejus culpam damnaturum, quam tanta sua
his-own because-of its fault about-to-damn which with-so-great his
bonitate fecerat: præsertim, cum nullum exemplum justitiæ
goodness he-had-made especially since no example of-justice
ulciscentis injustitiam præcessisset, et certus esset numerum,
avenging injustice had-preceded and certain he-was the-number
in quo illi facti erant, qui Deo frui deberent, tanta
in which they made had-been who God to-enjoy ought with-so-great
sapientia esse præstitutum: ut, sicut nihil habebat superfluum,
wisdom to-be prescribed that as nothing it-had superfluous
ita si minueretur imperfectus esset; nec tam præclarum
so if it-were-diminished imperfect it-would-be nor so splendid
opus Dei ex aliqua parte permansurum imperfectum; nec
a-work of-God in some part to-remain imperfect nor
ulla ratione scire posset si homo jam factus erat, Deum
by-any reason to-know could-be if man already made was God

humanam naturam pro angelica, aut angelicam pro humana,
human nature for angelic or angelic for human
si caderet, substituturum: sed potius unamquamque in id,
if it-should-fall about-to-substitute but rather each into that
ad quod facta erat, pro se, non pro alia restituturum,
for which made it-had-been for itself not for another about-to-restore
aut si factus nondum homo erat, multo minus putare posset
or if made not-yet man was much less to-think he-could
ad substitutionem alterius naturæ illum esse faciendum. Si,
for the-substitution of-another nature him to-be to-be-made if
inquam, aliquis hoc dicat, quæ inconvenientia inest?
I-say anyone this say what unfittingness is-in-it

DISC. Mihi quidem videtur magis convenientia quam
to-me indeed it-seems more fittingness than
inconvenientia.
unfittingness

MAG. Redeamus ad hoc quod dixeram, illum scilicet, hanc
let-us-return to this which I-had-said him namely this
non debuisse habere scientiam. Si enim scivisset, non
not to-have-been-bound to-have knowledge if for he-had-known not
posset volens et habens beatitudinem sponte velle unde
he-could willing and having blessedness freely to-will whence
miser esset: quare non esset justus, non volendo
wretched he-would-be wherefore not he-would-be just by-not willing
quod non deberet, quoniam non posset velle. Sed et hac
what not he-ought since not he-could to-will but also by-this
ratione considera utrum scire, quod quæris, debuerit: nam
reason consider whether to-know what you-ask he-ought for
si sciisset, aut peccasset, aut non?
if he-had-known either he-would-have-sinned or not

DISC. Unum horum esset.
one of-these it-would-be

MAG. Si prævisa tanta pœna, nulla indigentia et nulla re
if foreseen so-great a-penalty by-no need and by-no thing
cogente peccasset; tanto magis puniendus esset.
compelling he-had-sinned by-so-much more to-be-punished he-would-be

DISC. Ita est.
so it-is

MAG. Non ergo hæc præscientia illi expediebat.
not therefore this foreknowledge to-him was-expedient

DISC. Vere peccaturo non expediebat præscire pœnam.
truly to-one-about-to-sin not it-was-expedient to-foreknow the-penalty

MAG. Quod si non peccasset, aut sola bona voluntate non
but if not he-had-sinned either by-sole good will not
peccasset, aut timore pœnæ.
he-would-have-sinned or by-fear of-penalty

DISC. Nihil aliud dici potest.
nothing other to-be-said can

MAG. Sed quoniam non cavisset peccatum solo amore
but that not he-would-have-shunned sin by-sole love
justitiæ, ipso opere monstravit.
of-justice by-the-very deed he-showed

DISC. Non est dubium.
not it-is doubtful

MAG. Si vero timore cavisset, non esset justus.
if indeed by-fear he-had-shunned not he-would-be just

Quod etiam bonus angelus hoc scire non debuit

XXIV · THE GOOD ANGEL OUGHT NOT TO HAVE KNOWN EITHER

With that knowledge the good angel would have had two motives for not sinning, love of justice, which is honorable and useful, and hatred of punishment, which is neither. His perseverance pleases more as freely chosen. Now both angels know that punishment follows such fault: the bad by experience, to his shame; the good by example, to his glory, so that his inability to sin is the reward of justice.

DISC. Palam est nullo modo eum debuisse scire indictam
plain it-is in-no way him to-have-been-bound to-know the-declared
sibi pœnam suum secuturam peccatum. Sed quoniam et
for-him penalty his-own about-to-follow sin but since both
eum angelum qui stetit, et eum qui non stetit in veritate,
that angel who stood and him who not stood in the-truth
pari scientia præditos in prima conditione credimus, non
with-equal knowledge endowed in the-first condition we-believe not
video cur illi negata sit scientia ista, cui tam tenax
I-see why to-that-one denied has-been knowledge this to-whom so tenacious
erit bona voluntas ut sufficeret ad cavendum peccatum.
will-be good will that it-would-suffice for shunning sin

MAG. Non tamen posset, nec deberet contemnere pœnam,
not yet he-could nor ought-be to-despise the-penalty
quam præsciisset.
which he-had-foreknown

DISC. Sic videtur.
so it-seems

MAG. Sicut ergo solus amor justitiæ; ita solum odium pœnæ
as therefore alone love of-justice so alone hatred of-penalty
sufficeret ad non peccandum.
would-suffice for not sinning

DISC. Nihil planius.
nothing plainer

MAG. Duas igitur habuisset causas non peccandi: unam
two therefore he-would-have-had causes of-not sinning one
honestam et utilem; alteram non honestam et inutilem, id
honorable and useful the-other not honorable and useless that
est amorem justitiæ et odium pœnæ. Nam non est honestum
is love of-justice and hatred of-penalty for not it-is honorable
solo odio pœnæ non peccare; et ad non peccandum inutile
by-sole hatred of-penalty not to-sin and for not sinning useless
est odium pœnæ, ubi solus amor justitiæ sufficit.
is hatred of-penalty where alone love of-justice suffices

DISC. Non est quod possim objicere.
not there-is what I-can to-object

MAG. Quid ergo? Nonne multo nitidius placet ejus perseverantia,
what therefore surely-not much more-brightly pleases his perseverance
cum illa sola perseverandi causa videtur in illo, quæ utilis est
when that sole of-persevering cause appears in him which useful is
et honesta quia spontanea, quam si simul sese illa ostenderet,
and honorable because spontaneous than if together itself that showed
quæ inutilis et inhonesta, quia necessaria intelligitur?
which useless and dishonorable because necessary is-understood

DISC. Sic patet quod dicis, ut quod paulo ante volebam
so it-is-plain what you-say that what a-little before I-willed
eum scivisse, nunc gaudeam eum nescivisse; quia nunc
him to-have-known now I-rejoice him to-have-not-known because now
eamdem eum negare non possumus habere scientiam, quam
the-same him to-deny not we-can to-have knowledge which
ipso angeli peccantis exemplo ignorare non potest.
by-the-very of-the-angel sinning example to-be-ignorant-of not he-can

MAG. Quod nunc uterque scilicet bonus angelus et malus,
that now each namely the-good angel and the-evil
certus est quia talem culpam talis sequitur pœna; sicut
certain is that such fault such follows penalty as
scientia est ambobus diversa, ita est scientiæ causa non
knowledge is to-both diverse so is of-knowledge the-cause not
eadem, et finis dissimilis. Nam quod ille scit ipso
the-same and the-end unlike for what that-one knows by-the-very
sui experimento, hoc iste didicit solo alterius
of-himself experience this this-one has-learned by-the-sole of-the-other
exemplo: sed ille illo modo, quia non perseveravit; iste
example but that-one in-that way because not he-persevered this-one
alio modo, quia perseveravit. Quapropter, sicut illi
in-another way because he-persevered wherefore as to-that-one
quoniam vituperabiliter non perseveravit, scientia sua est ad
since blameworthily not he-persevered knowledge his is for
contumeliam; ita isti quoniam perseveravit, scientia sua
disgrace so to-this-one since he-persevered knowledge his
est ad gloriam. Si ergo isti dicitur hoc solo, quia hanc
is for glory if therefore of-this-one it-is-said by-this alone that this
habet scientiam, jam peccare non posse; satis patet quia,
he-has knowledge now to-sin not to-be-able enough it-is-plain that
sicut gloriosa est scientia quæ ex laudabili perseverantia est
as glorious is the-knowledge which from praiseworthy perseverance is
comparata; sic ad gloriam est impotentia peccandi, quæ ex
acquired so for glory is the-inability to-sin which from
gloriosa scientia est nata. Quemadmodum ergo malus angelus
glorious knowledge is born as therefore the-evil angel
vituperandus est, quia non potest ad justitiam redire; ita
to-be-blamed is because not he-can to justice to-return so
iste laudandus est, quia non potest abire. Sicut enim ille
this-one to-be-praised is because not he-can to-depart as for that-one

jam redire non potest, quia sola mala voluntate abiit;
now to-return not can because by-sole evil will he-departed
sic iste jam abire non potest, quia sola bona voluntate
so this-one now to-depart not can because by-sole good will
permansit. Palam igitur est quia sicut illi non posse
he-remained plain therefore it-is that as for-that-one not to-be-able
recuperare, quod deseruit, est pœna peccati, ita huic
to-recover what he-deserted is the-penalty of-sin so for-this-one
non posse deserere quod tenuit, est præmium justitiæ.
not to-be-able to-desert what he-held is the-reward of-justice

Quod ille etiamsi hoc solo dicitur jam non posse
peccare, quia nunc habet hanc scientiam
ex casu diaboli, tamen illi sit ad gloriam

XXV · THE GOOD DID NOT GAIN BY THE OTHER'S FALL

Does the good angel owe his knowledge to the devil's fall, and so rejoice in it? No: he learned by its example, not because of it. Had neither sinned, God would have given both that knowledge another way; he used the fall to bring good out of evil. Were that knowledge alone what keeps the good angel from sinning, his inability would still reward kept justice; but he cannot sin because perseverance has advanced him so far that he sees nothing more to will.

MAG. Valde pulchra esset hujus scientiæ atque impotentiæ tua
very beautiful would-be of-this knowledge and impotence your
ista contemplatio, si quemadmodum asseris, ideo bono
this contemplation if as you-assert therefore to-the-good
angelo eadem scientia et impotentia, quia perseveravit,
angel the-same knowledge and impotence because he-persevered

contigissent. Non enim eas adeptus esse videtur, quia
had-befallen not for them obtained to-have it-seems because
ipse perseveravit; sed quia desertor non perseveravit.
he-himself persevered but because the-deserter not persevered
Si ita est ut dicis, gaudere potest bonus angelus de
if so it-is as you-say to-rejoice can the-good angel about
casu apostatæ angeli, utpote cui expediebat ut ille
the-fall of-the-apostate angel inasmuch-as to-whom it-was-expedient that he
caderet; quoniam adeptus est hanc scientiam, qua nec
should-fall since obtained he-has this knowledge by-which neither
peccare, nec miser esse amplius possit; non quia ipse
to-sin nor wretched to-be any-longer he-can not because he-himself
bene meruit, sed quia alius male meruit: quæ omnia sunt
well deserved but because another ill deserved which all are
nimia absurditate plena.
with-excessive absurdity full

DISC. Quanto absurdius videtur, sicut tu monstras, stanti
by-how-much more-absurd it-seems as you show to-the-standing
angelo profuisse casum peccantis; tanto magis
angel to-have-profited the-fall of-the-sinning-one by-so-much more
necessarium est ut ostendas istum non ideo adeptum
necessary it-is that you-show this-one not therefore obtained
esse scientiam, de qua agitur, quia ille peccavit.
to-have the-knowledge about which it-is-treated because that-one sinned

MAG. Non debes dicere ideo bonum angelum ad scientiam
not you-ought to-say therefore the-good angel to knowledge
profecisse hanc, quia malus peccavit; sed bonum angelum
to-have-advanced this because the-evil-one sinned but the-good angel
ideo profecisse ad hanc scientiam exemplo cadentis,
therefore to-have-advanced to this knowledge by-the-example of-the-falling-one
quia ille peccavit. Si enim neuter peccasset, utrique
because that-one sinned if for neither had-sinned to-both

daturus erat Deus eamdem scientiam merito perseverantiæ,
about-to-give was God the-same knowledge by-merit of-perseverance
alio modo sine alicujus cadentis exemplo. Nullus enim
in-another way without of-anyone falling example no-one for
dicet Deum non alio modo potuisse angelis suis hanc
will-say God not in-another way to-have-been-able to-angels his this
dare scientiam. Cum ergo ille peccavit, exemplo ejus
to-give knowledge when therefore that-one sinned by-the-example his
istum docuit quod docturus erat; non impotentia, quia
this-one he-taught what about-to-teach he-was not by-impotence because
alio modo non potuit; sed majore potentia, qua de
in-another way not he-could but by-greater power by-which out-of
malo bonum facere potuit, ut nec malum inordinatum
evil good to-make he-could that not-even evil disordered
in regno omnipotentis sapientiæ permaneret.
in the-kingdom of-omnipotent wisdom should-remain

DISC. Placet mihi valde quod dicis.
it-pleases me greatly what you-say

MAG. Patet itaque si bonus angelus hoc solo jam peccare
it-is-plain and-so if the-good angel by-this alone now to-sin
non posset, quia scit peccatum mali angeli pœnam
not could because he-knows the-sin of-the-evil angel penalty
secutam esse; quo tamen hæc impotentia non illi esset
followed to-have by-which yet this impotence not to-him would-be
ad imminutionem laudis; sed ad præmium servatæ justitiæ.
for diminution of-praise but for the-reward of-kept justice
Sed scis quia supra claruit eum idcirco peccare non
but you-know that above it-became-clear him therefore to-sin not
posse, quoniam merito perseverantiæ adeo provectus est,
to-be-able since by-the-merit of-perseverance so-far advanced he-is
ut jam non videat quid plus velle queat.
that now not he-sees what more to-will he-can

DISC. Nihil excidit eorum quæ supra, ratione investigante,
nothing has-fallen-out of-those-things which above with-reason investigating
comperimus, a memoria mea.
we-found from memory my

Quid horremus audito nomine mali: et quid facit opera, quæ dicitur injustitia facere, cum ipsa et malum nihil sit

XXVI · WHAT WE DREAD IN THE NAME OF EVIL

Asked what we dread at the word "evil," the teacher answers that the evil of injustice is always nothing, while the evil of harm is sometimes nothing, as blindness, and sometimes something, as sadness and pain. What we dread is that harm, which follows the absence of good. When injustice is said to cause robbery, it means that if justice were in the will, as a rudder in a ship or a bridle on a horse, there would be no robbery.

DISC. Sed cum omnibus quæstionibus meis satisfeceris, illud
but though all questions my you-have-satisfied that
adhuc exspecto aperiri quid sit quod horremus audito nomine
still I-await to-be-opened what it-is that we-shudder-at heard the-name
mali; et quid faciat opera, quæ injustitia, quæ malum est,
of-evil and what may-do the-works which injustice which evil is
videtur facere, ut, in raptore, in libidinoso cum malum nihil sit.
seems to-do as in the-robber in the-lustful since evil nothing is
MAG. Breviter tibi respondeo. Malum, quod est injustitia, semper
briefly to-you I-answer evil which is injustice always
nihil est; malum vero, quod est incommoditas, aliquando sine
nothing is evil indeed which is disadvantage sometimes without
dubio est nihil, ut cæcitas; aliquando est aliquid, ut tristitia
doubt is nothing as blindness sometimes is something as sadness

et dolor. Et hanc incommoditatem, quæ est aliquid, semper
and pain and this disadvantage which is something always
odio habemus. Cum itaque audimus nomen mali; non
in-hatred we-hold when and-so we-hear the-name of-evil not
malum quod nihil est, timemus; sed malum quod aliquid est,
the-evil which nothing is we-fear but the-evil which something is
quod absentiam boni sequitur. Nam injustitiam et cæcitatem,
which the-absence of-good follows for injustice and blindness
quæ malum et nihil sunt, sequuntur multa incommoda, quæ
which evil and nothing are follow many disadvantages which
malum et aliquid sunt: et hæc sunt quæ horremus audito
evil and something are and these are what we-shudder-at heard
nomine mali. Cum autem dicimus quia injustitia facit rapinam,
the-name of-evil when however we-say that injustice makes robbery
aut cæcitas facit hominem cadere in foveam, nequaquam
or blindness makes a-man to-fall into a-pit by-no-means
intelligendum est quod injustitia aut cæcitas faciant aliquid;
to-be-understood is-it that injustice or blindness make something
sed quod si justitia esset in voluntate, et visus in oculo,
but that if justice were in the-will and sight in the-eye
nec rapina fieret, nec casus in foveam. Tale est, cum
neither robbery would-be-made nor fall into the-pit such it-is when
dicimus: Absentia gubernaculi impellit navem in scopulos, aut
we-say the-absence of-the-rudder drives the-ship onto the-rocks or
absentia freni facit equum discurrere: quod non est aliud
the-absence of-the-bridle makes the-horse to-run-about which not is other
quam si gubernaculum adesset navi et frenum equo,
than if the-rudder were-present to-the-ship and the-bridle to-the-horse
nec venti navem impellerent, nec equus discurreret. Sicut
neither the-winds the-ship would-drive nor the-horse would-run-about as

namque gubernaculo navis, et freno regitur equus; sic
for by-the-rudder the-ship and by-the-bridle is-ruled the-horse so
justitia gubernatur voluntas hominis, et visu pedes.
by-justice is-governed the-will of-man and by-sight the-feet

Unde venit malum in angelum, qui bonus erat

XXVII · WHENCE EVIL CAME INTO THE GOOD ANGEL

The student asks where injustice first came into the angel. Since nothing neither comes nor goes, the teacher has him ask why justice left: it did not leave; the angel deserted it by willing what he ought not. No cause preceded that will but the power to will, and the good angel had that power and did not so will. He willed only because he willed: the will was, so to speak, its own efficient cause and effect.

DISC. Sic mihi de malo, quod est injustitia, satisfecisti, ut jam
so to-me about the-evil which is injustice you-have-satisfied that now
omnis in corde meo, quæ de illo inesse solebat, quæstio sit
every in heart my which about it to-be-in was-wont question be
decisa. De hoc enim malo quæstio nasci videtur, quoniam si
settled about this for evil the-question to-arise seems since if
esset aliqua essentia, esset a Deo, a quo necesse est esse
it-were some essence it-would-be from God from whom necessary it-is to-be
omne, quod aliquid est, et impossibile est, esse peccatum sive
everything which something is and impossible it-is to-be sin or
injustitiam. De malo vero, quod est incommoditas, si aliquando
injustice about the-evil indeed which is disadvantage if sometimes
est aliquid, nihil video rectæ fidei obviare. Sed, ne tædeat
it-is something nothing I-see to-right faith to-be-opposed but lest it-weary
te breviter respondere fatuæ interrogationi meæ, ut sciam
you briefly to-answer foolish question my that I-may-know
qualiter hoc ipsum quærentibus respondeam: quippe non semper
how this very-thing to-those-asking I-may-answer indeed not always

facile est insipienti insipienter quærenti, sapienter respondere.
easy it-is to-the-foolish foolishly asking wisely to-answer
Quæro igitur unde primum venit malum, quod dicitur
I-ask therefore whence first came the-evil which is-called
injustitia, sive peccatum in angelum, qui factus est justus?
injustice or sin into the-angel who made was just
MAG. Dic tu mihi unde venit nihil in aliquid?
say you to-me whence comes nothing into something
DISC. Nihil nec venit, nec recedit.
nothing neither comes nor departs
MAG. Cur ergo quæris unde venit injustitia, quæ nihil est?
why therefore do-you-ask whence comes injustice which nothing is
DISC. Quia quando justitia recedit inde ubi erat, dicimus
because when justice departs thence where it-was we-say
accedere injustitiam.
to-approach injustice
MAG. Dic ergo quod magis proprie et apertius dicitur; et
say therefore what more properly and more-openly is-said and
quære de abscessu justitiæ. Siquidem sæpe apta interrogatio
ask about the-departure of-justice since often an-apt question
expedit responsionem, et inepta reddit impeditiorem.
speeds the-answer and an-inept renders it-more-hindered
DISC. Cur ergo recessit ab angelo justo justitia?
why therefore departed from the-angel just justice
MAG. Si proprie vis loqui, non recessit ab eo; sed ipse
if properly you-will to-speak not it-departed from him but he-himself
deseruit eam, volendo quod non debuit.
deserted it by-willing what not he-ought
DISC. Cur deseruit eam?
why did-he-desert it

MAG. Cum dico quia volendo quod non debuit, eam deseruit,
when I-say that by-willing what not he-ought it he-deserted
aperte ostendo cur et quomodo illam deseruit. Nam ideo
openly I-show why and how it he-deserted for therefore
illam deseruit, quia voluit quod velle non debuit; et hoc
it he-deserted because he-willed what to-will not he-ought and in-this
modo id volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit.
way that by-willing which not he-ought it he-deserted

DISC. Cur voluit quod non debuit?
why did-he-will what not he-ought

MAG. Nulla causa præcessit hanc voluntatem, nisi quia velle
no cause preceded this will except that to-will
potuit.
he-could

DISC. An ideo voluit, quia potuit?
or therefore did-he-will because he-could

MAG. Non; quia similiter potuit bonus angelus velle; nec
no because similarly could the-good angel to-will nor
tamen voluit. Nam nullus vult, quod velle potest, ideo
yet he-willed for no-one wills what to-will he-can therefore
quia potest.
because he-can

DISC. Cur ergo voluit?
why therefore did-he-will

MAG. Nonnisi quia voluit. Nam hæc voluntas nullam aliam
only because he-willed for this will no other
habuit causam, qua impelleretur aliquatenus, aut attraheretur;
had cause by-which it-might-be-driven in-some-way or might-be-drawn
sed ipsa sibi efficiens causa fuit, si dici potest, et effectus.
but itself to-itself the-efficient cause was if to-be-said it-can and the-effect

Quod potestas volendi quod non debuit, bona fuit semper, et ipsum velle, bonum, quantum ad esse

XXVIII · THE POWER TO WILL WAS GOOD, AND SO WAS WILLING

The power to will was something good, God's free gift. The willing itself was good as an essence but evil because done unjustly, and still from God, from whom is all that is something. One has from God not only what God gives freely but what one seizes with his permission, so the angel had from God the very use of the power, which is nothing other than the willing.

DISC. Si potestas ipsa volendi et ipsum velle, fuit aliquid,
if the-power itself of-willing and the-very willing was something
bonum fuit et a Deo.
good it-was and from God

MAG. Utrumque fuit aliquid: et potestas quidem nonnisi
each was something and the-power indeed only
bonum aliquid, et spontaneum donum Dei; velle
a-good something and spontaneous gift of-God the-willing
autem, secundum essentiam, bonum: sed quoniam injuste
however according-to essence good but since unjustly
factum est malum, et tamen a Deo fuit, a quo
done it-was evil and yet from God it-was from whom
est omne quod aliquid est. Nempe non solum hoc
is everything which something is indeed not only this
habet aliquis a Deo, quod Deus sponte dat; sed etiam
has someone from God what God freely gives but also
quod injuste rapit, Deo permittente. Et sicut dicitur
what unjustly he-seizes God permitting and as is-said
Deus facere, quod permittit fieri; ita dicitur dare, quod
God to-make what he-permits to-be-done so he-is-said to-give what
permittit rapi. Quoniam igitur, permittente Deo, angelus
he-permits to-be-seized since therefore permitting God angel

malus per rapinam usus est potestate a Deo sponte
evil through seizure used has the-power by God freely
data, a Deo habuit ipsum uti, quod non est aliud
given from God he-had the-very using which not is other
quam ipsum velle. Non est enim aliud velle quam uti
than the-very willing not is for other to-will than to-use
potestate volendi; sicut idem est loqui, et uti potestate
the-power of-willing as the-same it-is to-speak and to-use the-power
loquendi.
of-speaking
