MEDIEVAL LATIN SERIES · VOLUME 42

The Metalogicon

John of Salisbury

Metalogicon

The Metalogicon

A Defense of the Arts of Language and Logic

---

with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order



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

Volume 42 of the Canes Nobiles Medieval Latin interlinear texts

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Prologus

PROLOGUE

Nothing human escapes detraction, and John, among courtiers who would rather carp at others' work than mend their own, cannot escape their teeth. He defends logic because, when it was mocked as useless, a rival provoked him almost daily; he answered the charges as they arose, dictating in haste amid his lord's business and his friends' demands. He names the book Metalogicon, in four parts, and cites moderns beside ancients; content as an Academic with the probable, he confesses ignorance, false assertion, and swollen profession of truth, and asks for prayers.

In rebus humanis nichil fere sic arbitror elimatum, ut
in affairs human nothing almost so I-judge polished that
aliqua ex parte detractioni non pateat; cum mala de
some from side to-detraction not it-lie-open since bad-things for
merito, bona autem de liuore carpantur. Unde michimet
desert good-things however from envy are-carped-at whence to-myself
persuasi detractorum aculeos equanimius tolerare; presertim
I-have-persuaded of-detractors the-stings more-calmly to-bear especially
cum ex diuina dispositione natura parens nos in ea etate
since from divine disposition nature the-parent us in that age
et regione ediderit, editosque sors in ea conditione
and region has-brought-forth and-brought-forth fate in that condition
conuiuentiumque coetu locauerit, qui malunt aliena
and-of-fellow-livers in-the-company has-placed who prefer others'-things
carpere quam sua respicere, componere, uel emendare.
to-carp-at than their-own to-look-to to-compose or to-amend

Sic nemo in sese temptat descendere, nemo,
so no-one into himself tries to-descend no-one
sed precedentis spectatur mantica dorso.
but of-the-one-going-before is-looked-at the-wallet on-the-back

Potueram quidem scolarium, et eorum qui philosophie
I-had-been-able indeed of-scholars and of-those who of-philosophy
nomina profitentur, utcumque in silentio cauere morsus, sed
the-names profess somehow in silence to-beware the-bites but
omnino non possum concurialium dentes euadere. Omnibus
altogether not I-can of-fellow-courtiers the-teeth to-escape all
obsequi, neminem ledere, solebat prodesse ad gratiam; ut
to-oblige no-one to-harm was-wont to-profit for favor that
iuxta comicum:
according-to the-comic-poet

Sine inuidia laudem inuenias et amicos pares;
without envy praise you-may-find and friends you-may-get

nunc autem uel sic raro proficitur ad commilitonum
now however even so rarely it-is-advanced toward of-fellow-soldiers
inuidiam reprimendam. Nam obsequendi mos nota
envy to-be-checked for of-obliging the-habit with-the-mark
abiectionis inuritur; innocentia impotentie esse uidetur
of-abjectness is-branded innocence of-impotence to-be seems
professio. Taciturnus criminatur indoctus; facundus accedit ad
the-profession the-silent-man is-charged-as unlearned the-eloquent approaches to
garrulos. Vir grauis sedere dicitur in insidiis, minus grauis
the-garrulous a-man grave to-sit is-said in ambush less grave
a leuitate culpatur ineptus. Qui modestiam sequitur sermonis
of levity is-blamed the-inept he-who modesty follows of-speech
et operis, censetur factiosus. Postremo, si rixa non est,
and of-work is-reckoned factious lastly if quarrel not there-is
uix est ut liuor non sit incuria. Si tamen in alea et
scarcely it-is that envy not be negligence if yet in dice and
uenatica ceterisque curialium nugis omnem inter commilitiones
hunting and-the-other of-courtiers trifles all among fellow-soldiers

consumpsissem etatem, scripta mea nequaquam roderent,
I-had-consumed (my)-age writings my by-no-means would-they-gnaw
sicut nec ego illorum scripta redarguo. Michi tamen pro
as nor I their writings refute to-me yet for
minimo est, ut scribens ab illis iudicer, qui magni faciunt
least it-is that writing by them I-be-judged who of-great-worth make
mimorum histrionumque iudicia, et uelut serui abiectissimi
of-mimes and-of-actors the-judgments and like slaves most-abject
expauescunt ne de iis perperam loquatur aut sentiat
dread lest about them wrongly speak or think
Thais aut Thraso, Calliroe aut Batillus. Porro si philosophie
Thais or Thraso Callirhoe or Bathyllus moreover if of-philosophy
professores persequuntur philosophantium amatorem, plane
the-professors persecute of-the-philosophizers the-lover plainly
iniuriosi sunt et meam male remunerant caritatem. Eos enim
injurious they-are and my ill they-repay charity them for
etsi nequeam imitari, certe amare, honorare, et colere
although I-cannot to-imitate certainly to-love to-honor and to-cultivate
propositum est. Scolarium uero debueram meruisse fauorem
purposed it-is of-the-scholars indeed I-ought to-have-earned the-favor
qui aut quod sunt aut quod fuerunt quali possum
who either what they-are or what they-were with-such-as I-can
aduocatione defendo. Quod si utiliter gessero, gratia et
advocacy I-defend but if usefully I-shall-have-done thanks and
merces debetur euentui; sin autem, uoluntati. Hinc est illud:
reward is-owed to-the-outcome but-if not to-the-will hence is that

Egisti nichil, inquis, et a te perdita causa est;
you-have-done nothing you-say and by you lost the-case is
tanto plus debes, Sexte, quod erubui.
so-much more you-owe Sextus because I-blushed

Neque enim a patrocinandi officio excludo potiores, si
nor for from of-advocating the-office do-I-exclude the-more-able if
mee deuotionis protestor affectum. Prestantiores supremam
of-my devotion I-declare the-affection the-more-excellent the-final
manum apponant et ad sententiam ferendam pro logicis
hand let-them-apply and for the-sentence to-be-borne for the-logicians
iudicis inclinent officium. Siquidem cum opera logicorum
of-the-judge let-them-incline the-office since when the-work of-the-logicians
uehementius tanquam inutilis rideretur, et me indignantem
too-vehemently as useless was-ridiculed and me indignant
et renitentem emulus cotidianis fere iurgiis prouocaret,
and resisting a-rival with-daily almost quarrels provoked
tandem litem excepi et ad eas calumnias, quas procurauerat,
at-length the-suit I-took-up and to those calumnies which he-had-procured
sicut emergebant studui respondere. Unde factum est ut illum
as they-arose I-strove to-answer whence done it-is that that
ordinem sequi oportuerit, quo ille urgebat, et plerumque
order to-follow it-behooved by-which he pressed and mostly
silere a potioribus, dum diluerentur obiecta. Ipse enim
to-be-silent about the-weightier while were-washed-away the-objections he for
procurabat super quibus articulis uellet orationem procedere.
procured upon which points he-would the-discourse to-proceed
Placuit itaque sociis ut hoc ipsum tumultuario sermone
it-pleased and-so to-the-companions that this very-thing in-hurried speech
dictarem; cum nec ad sententias subtiliter examinandas nec
I-should-dictate since neither for opinions subtly to-be-examined nor
ad uerba expolienda studium superesset aut otium. Necessariis
for words to-be-polished zeal remained or leisure by-necessary
enim occupationibus uix aliquid amplius deducebatur quam
for occupations scarcely anything more was-drawn-off than
refectionis hora uel somni; cum ex mandato domini mei,
of-refreshment the-hour or of-sleep since from the-command of-lord my

cui deesse non possum, sollicitudo totius Britannie, quod
to-whom to-fail not I-can the-care of-all Britain as
ad causas ecclesiasticas, michi incumbat. Ad hec sollicitudo
to the-causes ecclesiastical to-me falls to these the-care
rei familiaris et curiales nuge studium excludebant;
of-the-affairs household and courtly trifles zeal shut-out
amicorum interpellatio me fere totum absorbuerat. Itaque
of-friends the-interruption me almost wholly had-absorbed and-so
iustum arbitror, ut in his, que temere dicta sunt,
just I-judge that in those-things which rashly said were
michi uenia facilius impendatur; si quid uero exierit
to-me pardon more-easily be-spent if anything indeed will-have-come-out
aptius, ei gratia referatur, sine quo nichil potest humana
more-aptly to-him thanks be-rendered without whom nothing can human
infirmitas. Nam ingenium hebes est et memoria infidelior
weakness for wit dull is and memory more-unfaithful
quam ut antiquorum subtilitates percipere aut que aliquando
than that of-the-ancients the-subtleties to-perceive or what sometime
percepta sunt diutius ualeam retinere. Linguam uero impolitam
perceived were longer I-be-able to-retain the-tongue indeed unpolished
esse stilus ipse conuincit. Et quia logice suscepi
to-be the-style itself proves and because of-logic I-have-undertaken
patrocinium, METALOGICON inscriptus est liber, quem
the-defense METALOGICON inscribed is the-book which
quatuor uoluminibus ad recreationem lectoris distinguere
into-four volumes for the-recreation of-the-reader to-divide

curaui. More scribentium res uarias complexus sum,
I-have-taken-care by-the-custom of-writers things various embraced I-have
quas quisque suo probabit aut reprobabit arbitrio.
which each by-his-own will-approve or will-reject judgment

Sunt bona, sunt quedam mediocria, sunt mala plura
there-are good-things there-are some middling there-are bad more
que legis hic; aliter non fit, Auite, liber.
which you-read here otherwise not is-made Avitus a-book

Sic Marcialis; sic et ego, malens sic nugari quam ad
so Martial so also I preferring so to-trifle than after
formam Ganimedis lepores agitare uel
the-form of-Ganymede hares to-chase or

nocturno putere mero, putere diurno.
with-night-time to-stink wine to-stink with-daytime

Nec dedignatus sum modernorum proferre sententias,
nor disdained have-I of-the-moderns to-bring-forth the-opinions
quos antiquis in plerisque preferre non dubito. Spero
whom to-the-ancients in very-many-things to-prefer not I-doubt I-hope
equidem quod gloriam eorum qui nunc sunt posteritas
indeed that the-glory of-those who now are posterity
celebrabit, eo quod multorum nobilia mirer ingenia,
will-celebrate by-that that of-many the-noble I-admire wits
inuestigandi subtilitatem, diligentiam studii, felicitatem
of-investigating subtlety diligence of-study the-felicity
memorie, fecunditatem mentis et oris facultatem et
of-memory the-fertility of-mind and of-mouth the-facility and
copiam uerbi. De moribus uero nonnulla scienter
the-abundance of-word about morals indeed some-things knowingly

inserui; ratus omnia que leguntur aut scribuntur inutilia
I-have-inserted reckoning all-things which are-read or are-written useless
esse, nisi quatenus afferunt aliquod adminiculum uite. Est
to-be except so-far-as they-bring some prop to-life is
enim quelibet professio philosophandi inutilis et falsa, que se
for every profession of-philosophizing useless and false which it
ipsam in cultu uirtutis et uitae exhibitione non aperit.
itself in the-cultivation of-virtue and of-life the-display not opens
Achademicus in his que sunt dubitabilia sapienti non
an-Academic in those-things which are doubtful to-the-wise-man not
iuro uerum esse quod loquor: sed, seu uerum seu falsum
I-swear true to-be what I-say but whether true or false
sit, sola probabilitate contentus sum. Tu, ut libuerit,
it-be with-sole probability content I-am you as it-will-please
universa examinabis, et singula, quia te iudicem meis
all will-examine and single-things because you as-judge to-my
opusculis consecraui, dum intelligam quod michi opera non
little-works I-have-consecrated while I-understand that for-me the-work not
pereat et impensa. Quod si (quod absit) contigerit,
perishes and the-expense but if which be-it-far it-will-have-happened

inueniam alium, si me hic fastidit Alexis,
I-shall-find another if me here disdains Alexis

philosophanti quemlibet preferens histrionem. Tria quidem
to-the-philosophizer any-whatever preferring actor three indeed
sunt (ut de consilio meo perfectius instruaris,) que
there-are that about counsel my more-perfectly you-may-be-instructed which
non modo michi metum, sed plerisque scriptoribus periculum
not only to-me fear but to-very-many writers danger
salutis aut meriti dispendium afferunt: ignorantia ueri,
of-salvation or of-merit loss bring ignorance of-the-true

fallax aut proterua assertio falsi, et tumida professio
deceitful or shameless assertion of-the-false and swollen profession
ueritatis. Noui enim quis dixerit: Tutius auditur ueritas quam
of-truth I-know for who said more-safely is-heard truth than
dicatur; in audiendo enim custoditur humilitas, sed in dicendo
it-is-spoken in hearing for is-guarded humility but in speaking
sepissime subrepit elatio. Ego autem in omnibus his errorem
very-often creeps-in pride I however in all these the-error
meum agnosco, qui et rerum ignorantia laboro, et falsum
my I-acknowledge who both of-things by-ignorance I-labor and the-false
sepius et magis quam expediat tueor, et plerumque tumide
more-often and more than is-expedient defend and mostly swollenly
et cum elatione, donec me Deus corripiat et corrigat, ipsam
and with pride until me God rebuke and correct the-very
profero ueritatem. Unde lectorem et auditorem quanta
bring-forth truth whence the-reader and the-hearer with-as-great-as
possum supplicatione conuenio ut in orationibus suis memores
I-can supplication I-meet that in prayers their mindful
mei sint apud Altissimum, impetrantes michi precedentium
of-me they-be with the-Most-High obtaining for-me of-preceding
ueniam delictorum, cautelam futurorum, notitiam ueri,
pardon offenses caution of-future-ones knowledge of-the-true
amorem boni, cultum Dei, et ut corde, ore, opere
love of-the-good worship of-God and that with-heart mouth work
exerceantur a nobis que diuine sunt placita uoluntati.
be-practiced by us the-things-which to-the-divine are pleasing will

BOOK ONE

Calumnia que ut Cornificio suo responderetur extorsit

I · THE SLANDER THAT FORCED THIS REPLY

A shameless litigant revives an old calumny, holding that eloquence comes freely from nature and art adds nothing. But nature raised man by reason and marked him by speech, and God made all things need one another. Reason without speech stays barren and wisdom maimed, so whoever parts the marriage of reason and word that founded cities tears Mercury from Philology and assails the liberal studies and human society, as our Cornificius does.

Aduersus insigne donum nature parentis et gratie calumniam
against the-signal gift of-nature the-parent and of-grace a-calumny
ueterem et maiorum nostrorum iudicio condemnatam
old and of-elders our by-the-judgment condemned
excitat improbus litigator et, conquirens undique imperitie
stirs-up the-shameless litigant and seeking-out from-everywhere of-ignorance
sue solatia, sibi proficere sperat ad gloriam, si
his-own consolations to-himself to-profit he-hopes toward glory if
multos similes sui, id est, si eos uiderit imperitos;
many like to-himself that is if them he-will-have-seen ignorant
habet enim hoc proprium arrogantie tumor, ut se
has for this proper of-arrogance the-swelling that itself
commetiatur aliis, bona sua, siqua sunt, efferens, deprimens
it-measure-against others goods its-own if-any there-are extolling depressing
aliena, defectumque proximi suum putet esse profectum.
others' and-the-defect of-a-neighbor its-own it-think to-be profit
Omnibus autem recte sapientibus indubium est quod natura,
to-all however rightly wise-men undoubted it-is that nature
clementissima parens omnium et dispositissima moderatrix,
most-clement the-parent of-all and most-orderly governess

inter cetera que genuit animantia hominem priuilegio rationis
among the-other which she-begot living-things man by-the-privilege of-reason
extulit et usu eloquii insignivit; id agens sedulitate
raised and with-the-use of-speech distinguished that doing with-diligence
officiosa et lege dispositissima, ut homo, qui grauedine
dutiful and by-law most-orderly that man who by-the-heaviness
feculentioris nature et molis corporee tarditate premebatur
of-a-grosser nature and of-mass bodily by-the-slowness was-pressed
et trahebatur ad ima, his quasi subuectus alis
and was-drawn to the-lowest-things by-these as-if borne-up wings
ad alta conscendat et ad obtinendum uere beatitudinis
to the-heights may-climb and for obtaining of-true blessedness
brauium omnia alia felici compendio antecedat. Dum
the-prize all others by-happy shortcut may-outstrip while
itaque naturam fecundat gratia, ratio rebus perspiciendis et
and-so nature fertilizes grace reason for-things to-be-perceived and
examinandis inuigilat, nature sinus excutit, metitur fructus
to-be-examined keeps-watch of-nature the-folds shakes-out measures the-fruits
et efficaciam singulorum; et innatus omnibus amor boni,
and efficacy of-each and the-inborn in-all love of-good
naturali urgente se appetitu, hoc aut solum aut pre ceteris
by-natural urging itself appetite this either alone or before the-others
sequitur, quod percipiende beatitudini maxime uidetur esse
follows which to-be-attained for-blessedness most seems to-be
accommodum. Cum uero beatitudo communionis ignara, que
fitted since indeed blessedness of-fellowship ignorant what
aut qualis extra societatem sit, nec fingi quidem
or of-what-kind outside society it-be not-even to-be-feigned indeed
possit; quisquis ea, que ad ius humane societatis (que
could whoever those-things which to the-right of-human society which
quodammodo filiorum nature unica et singularis fraternitas
in-a-way of-the-sons of-nature a-unique and singular brotherhood

est) conciliandum et fouendum proficiunt, impugnat, uiam
is to-be-won and to-be-cherished profit assails the-way
adipiscende felicitatis omnibus uidetur obstruere et, precluso
of-obtaining happiness for-all seems to-block and closed
pacis aditu, ut in se concurrant ad interitum
of-peace the-entrance that against themselves they-may-run to the-destruction
orbis nature uiscera incitare. Hoc quidem est seminare
of-the-world of-nature the-bowels to-incite this indeed is to-sow
inter fratres discordiam, hoc arma ministrare compositis,
among brothers discord this arms to-supply to-the-settled
hoc denique firmare nouum et magnum chaos inter Deum
this finally to-establish a-new and great chaos between God
et homines; sic enim ad firmioris nexus compagem et
and men so for for of-a-firmer bond the-structure and
caritatis custodiam uniuersitatis partes creatrix Trinitas, Deus
of-charity the-keeping of-the-universe the-parts the-creating Trinity God
unus et uerus, ordinauit ut alterius ope res altera
one and true has-ordered that of-another by-the-help one thing
indigeret et altera defectum suppleret alterius, dum sunt
should-need and the-other the-defect should-supply of-the-other while they-are
singula quasi singulorum membra. Semiplena sunt ergo
single-things as-it-were of-each-other members half-full are therefore
omnia, si ab inuicem dissoluantur, sed aliorum federatione
all-things if from one-another they-be-dissolved but of-the-others by-federation
perfecta; quoniam omnia mutuis constant auxiliis. Quid ad
perfect since all-things by-mutual consist helps what for
beatitudinem optinendam uirtute fidelius aut utilius? quid
blessedness to-be-obtained than-virtue more-faithful or more-useful what
compendiosius? Hec est enim fere singularis et unica uia
more-direct this is for almost the-singular and unique way
quam ad beatitudinem gratia preparauit. Nam qui citra
which to blessedness grace has-prepared for who without

uirtutis meritum beati fiunt, non tam eundo illuc perueniunt
of-virtue merit blessed become not so-much by-going thither arrive
quam trahuntur. Miror itaque (non tamen satis, quia
as they-are-dragged I-wonder and-so not yet enough because
non possum,) quid sibi uult qui eloquentie negat esse
not I-can what to-himself wills he-who eloquence denies to-be
studendum; ipsamque sicut uisum non ceco, auditum non
to-be-studied and-it as sight not to-the-blind hearing not
surdo, asserit gratis a natura prouenire ei qui mutus
to-the-deaf asserts freely from nature to-come to-him who dumb
non est; sed plenius, si nature munus exercitio roboretur, nec
not is but more-fully if of-nature the-gift by-exercise be-strengthened nor
tamen beneficium aliquod ab arte prestari, aut id minus
yet benefit any from art to-be-furnished or it less
quam labor artis exposcat. Sicut enim eloquentia non modo
than the-labor of-art demands as for eloquence not only
temeraria est sed etiam ceca, quam ratio non illustrat; sic et
rash is but also blind which reason not illuminates so also
sapientia, que usu uerbi non proficit, non modo debilis est
wisdom which by-use of-the-word not profits not only weak is
sed quodam modo manca; licet enim quandoque aliquatenus
but in-a-certain way maimed although for sometimes in-some-measure
sibi prodesse possit sapientia elinguis ad solatium conscientie,
to-itself to-profit can wisdom tongueless for the-solace of-conscience
raro tamen et parum confert ad usum societatis humane.
rarely yet and little it-confers to the-use of-society human
Nam ratio, scientie uirtutumque parens altrix et custos, que
for reason of-knowledge and-of-virtues the-parent nurse and guardian which
de uerbo frequentius concipit et per uerbum numerosius
from the-word more-frequently conceives and through the-word more-numerously
et fructuosius parit, aut omnino sterilis permaneret aut
and more-fruitfully gives-birth either altogether sterile would-remain or

quidem infecunda, si non conceptionis eius fructum, in
indeed unfruitful if not of-the-conception its the-fruit into
lucem ederet usus eloquii; et inuicem quod sentit
light brought-forth the-use of-speech and mutually what it-perceives
prudens agitatio mentis hominibus publicaret. Hec autem
the-prudent agitation of-mind to-men should-publish this however
est illa dulcis et fructuosa coniugatio rationis et uerbi, que
is that sweet and fruitful marriage of-reason and of-word which
tot eggregias genuit urbes, tot conciliauit et federauit
so-many outstanding has-begotten cities so-many has-reconciled and has-federated
regna, tot uniuit populos et caritate deuinxit; ut hostis
kingdoms so-many has-united peoples and in-charity has-bound that the-enemy
omnium publicus merito censeatur quisquis hoc, quod ad
of-all public deservedly be-reckoned whoever this which for
utilitatem omnium Deus coniunxit, nititur separare. Mercurio
the-utility of-all God has-joined strives to-separate Mercury
Philologiam inuidet et ab amplexu Philologie Mercurium
Philology he-grudges and from the-embrace of-Philology Mercury
auellit qui eloquentie preceptionem a studiis philosophie
tears he-who of-eloquence the-teaching from the-studies of-philosophy
eliminat et quamuis solam uideatur eloquentiam persequi,
drives-out and although alone he-seem eloquence to-pursue
omnia liberalia studia conuellit, omnem totius philosophie
all liberal studies he-overturns all of-the-whole of-philosophy
impugnat operam, societatis humane fedus distrahit, et
he-assails the-work of-society human the-league he-tears-apart and
nullum caritati aut uicissitudini officiorum relinquit locum.
no to-charity or to-the-exchange of-duties leaves place
Brutescent homines, si concessi dote priuentur eloquii;
will-become-brutes men if of-the-granted dowry they-be-deprived of-speech
ipseque urbes uidebuntur potius pecorum quasi septa,
and-the-very cities will-seem rather of-cattle as-it-were pens

quam cetus hominum, nexu quodam societatis federatus,
than a-gathering of-men by-a-bond certain of-society federated
ut participatione officiorum et amica inuicem uicissitudine
that in-participation of-duties and friendly mutual exchange
eodem iure uiuat. Quis enim contractus rite celebrabitur?
by-the-same right it-may-live what for contract rightly will-be-celebrated
que fidei aut morum disciplina uigebit? quenam erit
what of-faith or of-morals discipline will-thrive what will-be
obsecundatio aut communicatio uoluntatum, subtracto uerbi
compliance or communication of-wills withdrawn of-word
commercio? Non ergo unam, non paucos, sed omnes simul
the-commerce not therefore one not a-few but all at-once
urbes et politicam uitam totam aggreditur Cornificius noster,
cities and political life whole assails Cornificius our
studiorum eloquentie imperitus et improbus impugnator.
of-the-studies of-eloquence unskilled and shameless assailant

Descriptio persone suppresso nomine

II · A PORTRAIT OF THE MAN, HIS NAME WITHHELD

John could expose the man's belly, shameless mouth, grasping hands, and foul life, but reverence for the Christian name restrains him: he spares the person and attacks the error, since sparing an opinion for the man's sake is fairer than savaging the man for it. In truth he despises both alike. Let him snore till noon; John opposes the opinion, which has ruined many, for a crowd of fools eager to seem wise believes it.

Ipsum uero uulgato designarem ex nomine; et tumorem
him indeed by-his-common I-would-designate from name and the-swelling
uentris et mentis, oris impudicitiam, rapacitatem manuum,
of-belly and of-mind of-mouth the-shamelessness the-rapacity of-hands
gestus leuitatem, feditatem morum (quos tota uicinia
of-gesture the-levity the-foulness of-morals which the-whole neighborhood

despuit), obscenitatem libidinis, deformitatem corporis,
spits-at the-obscenity of-lust the-deformity of-body
turpitudinem uite, maculam fame, publicis aspectibus ingerens
the-baseness of-life the-stain of-repute to-public gazes thrusting
denudarem, nisi me Christiani nominis reuerentia cohiberet.
I-would-strip-bare unless me of-the-Christian name the-reverence restrained
Memor enim professionis mee et fraterne, que in Domino
mindful for of-profession my and of-the-brotherly which in the-Lord
est, communionis, indulgendum esse persone credidi, dum
is communion to-be-indulged to-be to-the-person I-believed while
tamen non indulgeatur errori. Defero ergo Deo, parcens
yet not be-indulged the-error I-defer therefore to-God sparing
nature, que ab ipso est, et impugnans uitium, quod contra
the-nature which from him is and assailing the-vice which against
ipsum est, dum naturam corrumpit, quam ille generauit. Utique
him is while the-nature it-corrupts which he begot surely
par est sine derogatione persone sententiam impugnari;
right it-is without disparagement of-the-person the-opinion to-be-assailed
nichilque turpius quam cum sententia displicet aut opinio,
and-nothing baser than when the-opinion displeases or the-view
rodere nomen auctoris; longe quidem probabilius est, ut
to-gnaw the-name of-the-author far indeed more-probable it-is that
opinioni false, quatenus tamen error tolerabilius est, parcatur
the-opinion false so-far-as yet the-error more-tolerable is be-spared
interdum propter hominem, quam ut propter opinionem
sometimes on-account-of the-man than that on-account-of the-opinion
homo carpatur. Singula suis sunt examinanda indiciis, et
the-man be-carped-at single-things by-their-own are to-be-examined evidences and
paria meritis sunt premia conferenda; ita tamen, ut rigorem
equal to-merits are rewards to-be-conferred so yet that the-rigor
mansuetudo clementie uincat. Hec itaque contemplatione
the-mildness of-clemency may-conquer this and-so by-consideration

suppressi uulgati nominis notam, ne non tam erroris
I-have-suppressed of-the-common name the-mark lest not so-much of-the-error
uidear procurasse medelam quam infensam deturpasse
I-seem to-have-procured the-cure as the-hostile to-have-disfigured
personam. Ut autem uerum fatear, nichil est minus uerum;
person that however the-truth I-may-confess nothing is less true
quia, quatenus Christiano licitum est, personam et sententiam
because as-far-as for-a-Christian lawful it-is the-person and the-opinion
eque contemno. Ut libet ergo ille stertat in dies medios,
equally I-despise as he-pleases therefore he may-snore into days middle
cotidianis conuiscerationibus ingurgitetur ad crapulam, et
in-daily feastings he-may-be-gorged to surfeit and
in illis immunditiis uolutatus incumbat, que nec porcum
in those filths rolled he-may-lie which not-even a-pig
deceant Epicuri. Ceterum opinioni reluctor, que multos
would-befit of-Epicurus however the-opinion I-struggle-against which many
perdidit, eo quod populum qui sibi credat habet; et licet
has-ruined by-that that a-people who it may-believe it-has and although
antiquo nouus Cornificius ineptior sit, ei tamen turba
than-the-old the-new Cornificius more-inept be to-him yet the-crowd
insipientium adquiescit. Illorum tamen maxime, qui, cum
of-the-foolish assents of-those yet most who though
inertes sint et ignaui, uideri quam esse appetunt sapientes.
inert they-be and lazy to-seem than to-be desire wise

Quando, qualiter, et a quibus fuerit institutus?

III · WHEN, HOW, AND BY WHOM HE WAS TAUGHT

Cornificius, taught as he teaches, makes his hearers know nothing, shunning argument and promising eloquence and philosophy without art or labor. In his schooldays the letter counted for nothing: the schools asked whether a pig led to market is held by the man or the rope, counted negatives with beans, and scorned poets and historians, while pupils founded sects, left as masters as soon as chicks fledge, and said nothing without 'fitting' and 'reason.' Hence the witless old man mocks those who revere the arts' authors.

Ego quidem omnino non miror, si credulos auditores
I indeed altogether not wonder if credulous hearers
suos, multa mercede conductus et multo tempore aerem
his-own by-much wage hired and for-much time the-air
uerberans, docuit nichil scire; cum et ipse sic edoctus
beating he-has-taught nothing to-know since also he-himself so taught
sit a magistris; siquidem non facundus sed uerbosus et
was by teachers since not eloquent but wordy and
sine fructu sensuum uerborum folia in uentum continue
without fruit of-meanings of-words the-leaves into the-wind continually
profert. Ea tamen est cautela hominis, cum eque omnium
he-brings-forth this yet is the-caution of-the-man since equally of-all
dicta vituperet, ut in astruenda sua aut aliena sententia
the-sayings he-blames that in establishing his-own or in-another's opinion
destruenda nunquam manum conserat, ratione numquam
to-be-destroyed never hand he-joins on-reason never
innitatur, numquam sustineat congredi in campo scripturarum;
he-relies never he-endures to-meet in the-field of-the-scriptures
nescio quid arduum et ignotum omnibus sapientibus
I-know-not what lofty and unknown to-all wise-men
tumenti uentosi pulmonis folle concepit; unde alicui
swelling of-the-windy lung by-the-bellows he-has-conceived whence to-anyone

respondere aut patienter audire quempiam dedignatur. Si enim
to-answer or patiently to-hear anyone he-disdains if for
quidlibet proposueris, ille conuiciabitur aut ridebit. Si, ut
anything you-will-have-proposed he will-rail or will-laugh if that
ille propositum probet, expectas, dilatio necessaria est; ut, cum
he the-proposition prove you-await delay necessary is that when
dies cesserit, tu expectationis fructu fraudaberis, eo
the-day will-have-passed you of-expectation by-the-fruit will-be-cheated by-that
quod margaritas suas porcis alienis (ut ait) non uult esse
that pearls his-own to-pigs foreign as he-says not he-wills to-be
communes. Fabellis tamen et nugis suos pascit interim
common with-little-tales yet and trifles his-own he-feeds meanwhile
auditores quos sine artis beneficio, si uera sunt que
hearers whom without of-art the-benefit if true are-the-things which
promittit, faciet eloquentes et tramite compendioso sine
he-promises he-will-make eloquent and by-path short without
labore philosophos. Nam et ipse accepit a doctoribus
labor philosophers for also he-himself received from the-teachers
quod nunc discipulis tradit, eosque sic instituit, sicut
what now to-pupils he-hands-on and-them so he-instructs as
et ipse institutus est. Discipulos ergo in philosophia
also he-himself instructed was pupils therefore in philosophy
sibi faciet coequales. Quid multa? Nonne sic perfecti
to-himself he-will-make equal what many-words surely-not so perfect
erunt, iuxta illud Euangelii: Discipulus omnis perfectus
will-they-be according-to that of-the-Gospel the-pupil every perfect
est, si sit sicut magister eius? Eo autem tempore ista
is if he-be as master his at-that however time these-things
Cornificius didicit que nunc docenda reseruat, audienda
Cornificius learned which now to-be-taught he-reserves to-be-heard
quidem felicibus et (ut dici solet) auribus Iouis, quando
indeed by-happy and as to-be-said it-is-wont by-the-ears of-Jove when

in liberalibus disciplinis littera nichil erat et ubique spiritus
in the-liberal disciplines the-letter nothing was and everywhere the-spirit
querebatur, qui (ut aiunt) latet in littera. Ylum esse ab
was-sought which as they-say lies-hidden in the-letter Hylas to-be from
Hercule, ualidum scilicet argumentum a forti et robusto
Hercules a-valid namely argument from a-strong and robust
argumentatore, potestates uocalium quinque iura regnorum,
arguer the-powers of-the-vowels five the-laws of-kingdoms
et in hunc modum docere omnia, studium illius etatis
and in this way to-teach all-things the-study of-that age
erat. Insolubilis in illa philosophantium scola tunc temporis
was insoluble in that of-philosophizers school at-that of-time
questio habebatur, an porcus, qui ad uenalicium agitur,
a-question was-held whether the-pig which to market is-driven
ab homine an a funiculo teneatur. Item, an capucium
by the-man or by the-rope be-held likewise whether the-hood
emerit qui cappam integram comparauit. Inconueniens
he-has-bought who the-cape whole purchased unfitting
prorsus erat oratio, in qua hec uerba, 'conueniens' et
altogether was a-discourse in which these words fitting and
'inconueniens', 'argumentum' et 'ratio' non perstrepebant,
unfitting argument and reason not resounded
multiplicatis particulis negatiuis, et traiectis per 'esse'
multiplied particles negative and transposed through to-be
et 'non esse', ita ut calculo opus esset, quotiens fuerat
and not to-be so that of-a-pebble need there-was as-often-as it-had
disputandum; alioquin uis affirmationis et negationis
to-be-disputed otherwise the-force of-affirmation and of-negation
erat incognita. Nam plerumque uim affirmationis habet
was unknown for mostly the-force of-affirmation has
geminata negatio; itemque vis negatoria ab impari numero
doubled negation and-likewise the-force negating from an-odd number

conualescit; siquidem negatio iterata plerumque seipsam
grows-strong since negation repeated mostly itself
perimit, et contradictioni, sicut regulariter proditum est,
destroys and to-contradiction as by-rule handed-down it-is
coequatur. Ut ergo pari loco an impari uersetur deprehendi
is-equated that therefore in-even place or odd it-turn to-be-detected
queat, ad disceptationes collectam fabam et pisam deferre,
it-might for disputations collected bean and pea to-bring
que conueniebatur, consilio prudenti consueuerat. Ita quidem,
which was-agreed by-counsel prudent he-had-been-wont so indeed
si intellectui rerum que uidebantur in questione uersari
if to-the-understanding of-the-things which seemed in the-question to-turn
operam dabat, sufficiebat ad uictoriam uerbosus clamor;
effort one-gave sufficed for victory wordy clamor
et qui undecumque aliquid inferebat, ad propositi
and he-who from-anywhere something brought-in to of-the-proposition
perueniebat metam. Poete historiographi habebantur infames,
arrived the-goal poets historians were-held infamous
et si quis incumbebat laboribus antiquorum, notabatur,
and if anyone applied-himself to-the-labors of-the-ancients he-was-marked
et non modo asello Archadie tardior, sed obtusior
and not only than-the-little-ass of-Arcadia slower but duller
plumbo uel lapide, omnibus erat in risum. Suis enim aut
than-lead or stone to-all he-was for laughter on-his-own for or
magistri sui quisque incumbebat inuentis. Nec hoc tamen
of-master his each applied-himself discoveries nor this yet
diu licitum, cum ipsi auditores in breui coerrantium
long lawful since the-very hearers in short-time by-the-onset
impetu urgerentur, ut et ipsi, spretis his que a
of-fellow-strayers were-urged that also they spurning those-things which from
doctoribus suis audierant, cuderent et conderent nouas sectas.
teachers their they-had-heard should-forge and found new sects

Fiebant ergo summi repente philosophi; nam qui illiteratus
were-made therefore highest suddenly philosophers for he-who illiterate
accesserat, fere non morabatur in scolis ulterius quam eo
had-come almost not stayed in the-schools longer than in-that
curriculo temporis, quo auium pulli plumescunt. Itaque
course of-time in-which of-birds the-chicks become-feathered and-so
recentes magistri e scolis, et pulli uolucrum e nidis,
new masters from the-schools and the-chicks of-birds from the-nests
sicut pari tempore morabantur, sic pariter auolabant.
as in-an-equal time they-stayed so equally they-flew-away
Sed quid docebant noui doctores, et qui plus somniorum
but what taught-they the-new doctors and who more of-dreams
quam uigiliarum in scrutinio philosophie consumpserant, et
than of-wakings in the-scrutiny of-philosophy had-consumed and
facilius instituti quam illi iuxta narrationes fabulosas,
more-easily instructed than those according-to the-tales fabulous
qui somniantes in Parnaso repente uates progrediebantur, aut
who dreaming on Parnassus suddenly bards went-forth or
citius quam hi, qui de Castalio fonte Musarum munus
more-quickly than those who from the-Castalian spring of-the-Muses the-gift
hauriebant poeticum, aut quam illi qui uiso Phebo Musarum,
drew poetic or than those who seen Phoebus of-the-Muses
nedum musicorum, meruerunt ascribi consortio? Numquid
not-to-say of-musicians deserved to-be-enrolled in-the-fellowship surely-not
rude aliquid aut incultum, numquid aliquid uetustum aut
crude something or uncultivated surely-not something old or
obsoletum? Ecce noua fiebant omnia; innouabatur gramatica,
obsolete behold new became all-things was-renewed grammar
immutabatur dialectica, contemnebatur rethorica; et nouas
was-changed dialectic was-despised rhetoric and new
totius quadruuii uias, euacuatis priorum regulis, de
of-the-whole quadrivium ways emptied of-the-predecessors the-rules from

ipsis philosophie aditis proferebant. Solam 'conuenientiam'
the-very of-philosophy sanctuaries they-brought-forth sole fittingness
sive 'rationem' loquebantur, argumentum sonabat in ore
or reason they-spoke argument sounded in the-mouth
omnium, et asinum nominare uel hominem aut aliquid
of-all and an-ass to-name or a-man or anything
operum nature instar criminis erat aut ineptum nimis aut
of-the-works of-nature like-a crime was or inept too or
rude et a philosopho alienum. Impossibile credebatur
crude and from a-philosopher foreign impossible it-was-believed
'conuenienter' et ad 'rationis' normam dicere quicquam,
fittingly and to of-reason the-norm to-say anything
aut facere, nisi 'conuenientis' et 'rationis' mentio expressim
or to-do unless of-fitting and of-reason mention expressly
esset inserta. Sed nec argumentum fieri licitum, nisi
were inserted but not-even argument to-be-made lawful unless
premisso nomine argumenti. Ex arte et de arte agere
premised the-name of-argument from art and about art to-act
idem erat. Docebunt hi forte quod poeta uersifice nichil
the-same was will-teach these perhaps that a-poet versifyingly nothing
dicet, nisi connominet uersum, quod faber lignarius
will-say unless he-name-also verse that a-craftsman wood-working
scannum facere nequeat, nisi scannum aut lignum uoluat
a-bench to-make cannot unless bench or wood he-roll
in ore. Inde ergo hec sartago loquendi, in qua senex
in mouth thence therefore this frying-pan of-speaking in which the-old-man
insulsus exultat, insultans his qui artium uenerantur auctores,
witless exults insulting those who of-the-arts venerate the-authors
eo quod nichil utilitatis in his repperit, cum se eis
by-that that nothing of-utility in them he-found when himself to-them
dare operam simularet.
to-give effort he-feigned

Qualiter euaserint consortes erroris

IV · HOW HIS FELLOWS IN ERROR FARED

Their time lost and hopes deceived, the sect's members went several ways. Some entered cloisters, where most confessed their learning vanity and others kept their pride under the habit. Some came back from Salerno or Montpellier as physicians with new words and two maxims about fees, though no one ignorant of philosophy and of each discipline's tongue can find nature's secrets. Others, like John, served the court for riches; others took to usury, counting wealth wisdom's only fruit.

Ceterum huius secte, post damnum temporis rerumque
however of-this sect after the-loss of-time and-of-things
iacturam et spes deceptas et propositi sui solatio
the-waste and hopes deceived and of-purpose their-own by-the-solace
destitutas, multiplex usus emersit. Alii namque monachorum
destitute manifold use emerged others for of-monks
aut clericorum claustrum ingressi sunt, et plerique suum
or of-clerics the-cloister entered have and most their-own
correxerunt errorem; deprehendentes in se et aliis
corrected error detecting in themselves and to-others
predicantes quia quicquid didicerant uanitas uanitatum est
preaching that whatever they-had-learned vanity of-vanities is
et super omnia uanitas. Plerique, inquam, eo quod quidam,
and above all-things vanity most I-say by-that that some
in sua perdurantes insania, tumidi uetusta peruersitate,
in their-own persisting madness swollen with-old perversity
malebant desipere quam ab humilibus, quibus Deus dat
preferred to-be-foolish than by the-humble to-whom God gives
gratiam, fideliter erudiri; erubescebant enim formam discipuli,
grace faithfully to-be-taught they-were-ashamed for of-the-form of-disciple
qui magisterii presumpserant fastum. Si michi non credis,
who of-mastership had-presumed the-pride if me not you-believe

claustra ingredere; scrutare mores fratrum; et inuenies ibi
the-cloisters enter scrutinize the-morals of-the-brothers and you-will-find there
superbiam Moab, et eam intensam ualde, ut arrogantia
the-pride of-Moab and it intense very so-that arrogance
absorbeat fortitudinem eius. Miratur Benedictus et queritur
swallow-up the-strength its wonders Benedict and complains
quod, se quodammodo auctore, latet lupus in pellibus
that himself in-a-way as-author hides the-wolf in skins
agninis; utique tonsuram et pullam uestem a supercilio
lamb's surely the-tonsure and dark garment from the-haughtiness
distare causatur. Et, ut rectius dixerim, supercilium arguit,
to-differ he-pleads and that more-rightly I-may-say the-haughtiness he-accuses
eo quod tonsure uestibusque non consonet. Ritus
by-that that to-the-tonsure and-the-garments not it-accords the-rite
obseruationum contemnitur; et sub imagine philosophantis
of-observances is-despised and under the-image of-one-philosophizing
spiritus fallacis elationis obrepit. Nota sunt hec et in
the-spirit of-deceitful elation creeps-in known are these-things and in
omni ueste ac professione uulgata. Alii autem, suum in
every garment and profession published others moreover their-own in
philosophia intuentes defectum, Salernum uel ad Montem
philosophy beholding defect to-Salerno or to Mont
Pessulanum profecti, facti sunt clientuli medicorum, et
Pellier set-out made were the-little-clients of-physicians and
repente, quales fuerant philosophi, tales in momento
suddenly such-as they-had-been philosophers such in a-moment
medici eruperunt. Fallacibus enim referti experimentis in
physicians they-burst-forth with-deceitful for stuffed experiments in
breui redeunt, sedulo exercentes quod didicerunt. Hipocratem
brief they-return busily practicing what they-learned Hippocrates
ostentant aut Galienum; uerba proferunt inaudita, ad omnia
they-display or Galen words they-bring-forth unheard-of to all-things

suos loquitur afforismos, et mentes humanas, uelut afflatas
his-own he-speaks aphorisms and minds human as-if blasted
tonitruis, sic percellunt nominibus inauditis. Creduntur omnia
by-thunders so they-strike with-names unheard-of they-are-believed all-things
posse, quia omnia iactitant, omnia pollicentur. Duo tamen
to-be-able because all-things they-boast all-things they-promise two-things yet
deprehendi eos fideliori tenuisse memoria et frequentius
I-have-detected them more-faithful to-have-held in-memory and more-frequently
in eorum operatione uersari. Alterum quidem Hipocratis
in their practice to-be-engaged the-one indeed of-Hippocrates
est (sed ibi uergit ad alium intellectum): Ubi, inquit,
is but there it-inclines to another understanding where he-says
indigentia, non oportet laborare; et reuera hi inopportunum
need not it-behooves to-labor and indeed these inopportune
et inofficiosum opinantes dare operam indigentibus et his
and undutiful deeming to-give effort to-the-needy and to-those
qui nolunt aut nequeunt uel solis uerbis eorum plene gratiam
who will-not or cannot even by-sole words their fully the-favor
referre mercedis. Alterum profecto est, non, quod meminerim,
to-repay of-reward the-other surely is not as-far-as I-may-remember
Hipocratis, sed diligentium adiectio medicorum: Dum dolet,
of-Hippocrates but of-diligent the-addition physicians while it-hurts
accipe. Occasio siquidem exigendi maxime opportuna est, cum
take the-occasion since of-exacting most opportune is when
dolor cruciat egrotantem sibique cooperantur languentis
pain tortures the-sick-man and-for-it co-operate of-the-languishing-one
exulceratio et auaritia medentis. Si conualescit eger,
the-ulceration and the-avarice of-the-healer if recovers the-sick-man
operam danti medico adscribatur; si deficit, eius inualescat
effort to-the-giving physician let-it-be-ascribed if he-fails his let-grow-strong
auctoritas, qui hoc antea familiaribus suis reuelauit. Siquidem
the-authority who this before to-familiars his-own revealed since

impossibile est non euenire quod de industria preuaticinatus
impossible it-is not to-happen what of purpose foretold
est, cum huic sospitatem, isti sinistrum exitum
has since to-this-one recovery to-that-one sinister outcome
pronunciauit egrotantis. Si euasurus est eger, curatur
he-pronounced of-the-sick if about-to-escape is the-sick-man he-is-cured
facile, nisi quatenus incolumitatem eius medicus prepedit
easily unless so-far-as safety his the-physician hinders
imperitus. Sin autem, ut Sollius Sidonius ait, occiditur
unskilled but-if however as Sollius Sidonius says he-is-killed
officiosissime. Quid ni? Numquid enim nature secretos
most-dutifully why not surely-not for of-nature the-secret
latentesque cuniculos deprehendet homo totius philosophie
and-hidden burrows will-detect a-man of-the-whole philosophy
ignarus? et qui nec recte loqui nouit, nec recte intelligere
ignorant and who neither rightly to-speak knows nor rightly to-understand
que scripta sunt aut que dicuntur, cum fere quot
what-things written are or what-things are-said since almost as-many-as
discipline sunt, tot sint lingue, et in ipsis plerumque
disciplines are so-many be tongues and in the-very mostly
auctoribus non sit maior in corporali compositione, diuersitas
authors not be greater in bodily composition the-diversity
facierum quam in usu uarietas linguarum? Homo enim
of-faces than in use the-variety of-tongues man for
homini assimilatur; sed nec gemelli inuicem usquequaque
to-man is-likened but not-even twins mutually in-every-way
se exprimunt. Vox uoci conformatur interdum; sed
themselves express voice to-voice is-conformed sometimes but
nec sororum et, si uis, nec Musarum eadem etiam
not-even of-sisters and if you-will not-even of-the-Muses the-same even
uocis agilitas. Consonant enim uoces, sed dispares; ipsaque
of-voice the-agility harmonize for the-voices but unequal and-the-very

disparilitas suis coequata proportionibus est apta concentui,
inequality to-its-own equalized proportions is apt for-concord
et quodammodo gratior quam si identitatem pareret
and in-a-way more-pleasing than if identity bore
similitudo. Habent itaque lingue ydiomata sua et singuli
likeness have and-so tongues idioms their-own and each
suum loquendi modum, quem qui ignorat, non magis
his-own of-speaking way which he-who is-ignorant-of not more
commode philosophabitur quam si picam, humana conantem
conveniently will-philosophize than if a-magpie human attempting
uerba, uelit homini coequare. Alii profecto, similes
words he-should-wish to-man to-equate others surely like
mei, se nugis curialibus mancipauerunt ut, magnorum
to-me themselves to-trifles courtly have-enslaved that of-great
uirorum patrocinio freti, possent ad diuitias aspirare,
men by-the-patronage relying they-might to riches aspire
quibus se uidebant et iudicio conscientie, quicquid
of-which themselves they-saw and by-the-judgment of-conscience whatever
lingua dissimulet, fatebantur indignos. Taceo uias istorum,
the-tongue may-dissemble confessed unworthy I-pass-over the-ways of-these
quoniam eas Policraticus noster diligenter exequitur, etsi
since them the-Policraticus our diligently pursues although
omnes plene non sufficiat indagare; hoc enim uires excedit
all fully not it-may-suffice to-track this for powers exceeds
humanas. Alii autem Cornificio similes ad uulgi
human others however to-Cornificius like to of-the-common-crowd
professiones easque prophanas relapsi sunt; parum curantes
professions and-them profane fallen-back have little caring
quid philosophia doceat, quid appetendum fugiendumue
what philosophy teaches what to-be-sought or-to-be-fled
denuntiet; dummodo rem faciant, si possunt, recte; si non,
it-announces provided-that wealth they-make if they-can rightly if not

quocumque modo rem. Exercent fenebrem pecuniam, alternis
in-whatever way wealth they-practice usurious money by-alternate
uicibus inequalia rotundantes, et adiectione multiplici quod
turns unequal-sums rounding-off and by-addition manifold what
rotundauerant abequantes. Nichil enim sordidum putant,
they-had-rounded-off un-evening nothing for sordid they-think
nichil stultum, nisi paupertatis angustias; et solas opes
nothing foolish except of-poverty the-straits and sole riches
ducunt esse fructum sapientie. Siquidem celebre est in corde
they-hold to-be the-fruit of-wisdom since celebrated is in the-heart
eorum, quod ait ethicus, etsi hoc eum, quia contemnitur,
their what says the-moralist though this him because he-is-despised
dixisse non nouerint:
to-have-said not they-know

Et genus et formam regina Pecunia donat,
both birth and beauty queen Money gives
et bene nummatum decorat Suadela Venusque.
and the-well moneyed adorns Persuasion and-Venus

Hoc autem quasi quadruuio, sibi utique necessario, euadebant
this however as-if crossroads to-them surely necessary escaped
illi repentini philosophi et cum Cornificio non modo triuii
those sudden philosophers and with Cornificius not only of-trivium
nostri sed totius quadruuii contemptores. Nam, ut dictum
our but of-the-whole quadrivium despisers for as said
est, aut sub pretextu religionis mergebantur in claustris, aut
it-has-been either under pretext of-religion they-were-drowned in cloisters or
sub imagine philosophandi et utilitatis publice confugiebant
under the-image of-philosophizing and of-utility public fled
ad phisicam, aut sub honestatis uelamine, quo splenderent
to physic or under of-honor the-veil by-which they-might-shine

et sublimarentur, se preclaris domibus ingerebant, aut
and be-exalted themselves on-illustrious houses they-thrust or
sub obtentu necessitatis exercendique officii, dum lucrum
under the-pretext of-necessity and-of-exercising office while gain
sitiebant, multiplicis auaritie uoragine absorbebantur. Adeo
they-thirsted of-manifold avarice by-the-whirlpool they-were-swallowed so-far
quidem ut sic proficientium philosophorum (aut, ut uerius
indeed that thus of-advancing philosophers or that more-truly
dixerim, deficientium) collatione quiuis in turba prophane
I-may-say of-failing by-comparison anyone in the-crowd of-the-profane
multitudinis rudis ad flagitia uideretur.
multitude unskilled to vices might-seem

Quantis uiris, et quare, familia illa detrahere audeat

V · WHICH GREAT MEN HIS HOUSEHOLD DARES TO DISPARAGE, AND WHY

Gilbert, then chancellor of Chartres, would promise such students the bakers' trade, and Thierry, William of Conches, and Abelard opposed the error until the arts regained their honor. Cornificius, ashamed to go back to school, carped at all; his household, courting the religious orders for cover, disparages Anselm and Ralph of Laon in secret, the followers of Alberic and Simon openly, and William of Champeaux, Hugh of Saint Victor, and Robert Pullen. John, their pupil and debtor, bears it calmly and turns to the error.

Solebat magister Gilebertus, tunc quidem cancellarius
was-wont master Gilbert then indeed chancellor
Carnotensis et postmodum uenerabilis episcopus Pictauorum,
of-Chartres and afterward venerable bishop of-Poitiers
temporis eius nescio ridens aut dolens insaniam, cum
of-time his I-know-not laughing-at or grieving-at the-madness when
eos uidebat ad studia, que predicta sunt, euolare, eis
them he-saw to the-studies which aforesaid were to-fly-off to-them

artem pistoriam polliceri; quoniam illa est, ut aiebat, in
the-art bakers' to-promise since that is as he-said in
gente sua que sola accipere consueuit omnes aliis operibus
nation his which alone to-receive is-wont all from-other works
aut artificio destitutos; ars enim facillime exercetur et
or from-craft destitute the-art for most-easily is-practiced and
subsidiaria est aliarum, presertim apud eos qui panem
auxiliary is of-the-others especially among those who bread
potius quam artificium querunt. Sed et alii uiri, amatores
rather than craft seek but also other men lovers
litterarum, utpote magister Theodoricus, artium studiosissimus
of-letters such-as master Thierry of-the-arts most-zealous
inuestigator; itidem Willelmus de Conchis, gramaticus post
investigator likewise William of Conches grammarian after
Bernardum Carnotensem opulentissimus; et Peripateticus
Bernard of-Chartres most-opulent and the-Peripatetic
Palatinus, qui logice opinionem preripuit omnibus coetaneis
of-Le-Pallet who of-logic the-opinion snatched-from all contemporaries
suis, adeo ut solus Aristotilis crederetur usus colloquio;
his so-far that alone of-Aristotle he-was-believed to-have-used the-conversation
se omnes opposuerunt errori. Sed nec uniuersi
themselves all opposed to-the-error but not-even all
insanientibus resistere potuerunt; insipientes itaque facti
to-the-madmen to-resist could foolish and-so made
sunt, dum insipientie resistebant; et erronei diutius habiti,
they-were while to-foolishness they-resisted and erring longer held
dum obuiare nitebantur errori. Verumtamen fumus ille cito
while to-oppose they-strove to-the-error but-yet smoke that quickly
euanuit, et predictorum opera magistrorum et diligentia
vanished and of-the-aforesaid by-the-work masters and diligence
redierunt artes, et quasi iure postliminii honorem pristinum
returned the-arts and as-if by-right of-postliminy honor former

nacte sunt et post exilium gratiam et gloriam ampliorem.
obtained have and after exile favor and glory more-ample
Inuidit Cornificius et, turpe reputans ut senex mitteretur
was-envious Cornificius and base reckoning that an-old-man should-be-sent
ad scolas et ut sensu puer appareret senex etate, culpare
to school and that in-sense a-boy he-should-appear an-old-man in-age to-blame
cepit quod se posse consequi desperabat. Sententias
he-began what himself to-be-able to-attain he-despaired-of the-opinions
carpebat omnium, eo quod ei dissimiliter uniuersi
he-carped-at of-all by-that that to-him differently all
sentirent. Sic uulpes a desperatione cerasa culpat et, ut
thought so the-fox from despair the-cherries blames and as
dici solet rusticano prouerbio, quod negatur ducit inutile.
to-be-said it-is-wont by-rustic proverb what is-denied he-holds useless
Inde ergo ire, hinc lacrime, hinc indignatio, quam aduersus
thence therefore wrath hence tears hence indignation which against
discipulos memoratorum sapientium concepit Cornificii domus;
the-disciples of-the-mentioned wise-men conceived of-Cornificius the-house
unde exercet dentem et in soliditate eorum frangit, ut
whence he-exercises the-tooth and on the-solidity their breaks as
dicitur, genuinum. Impudenter etiam, (in latebris tamen,
it-is-said the-molar shamelessly also in hiding-places yet
quia palam non licet) obfuscare nititur splendidissima
because openly not it-is-lawful to-obscure he-strives the-most-splendid
lumina Galliarum, Lauduni gloriam, fratres theologos,
lights of-the-Gauls of-Laon the-glory the-brothers theologians
Ansellum et Radulfum, quorum memoria in iocunditate
Anselm and Ralph whose memory in pleasantness
et benedictione est, quos nemo lacerauit impune, et
and blessing is whom no-one has-mangled with-impunity and
qui solis displicuerunt hereticis aut flagitiorum turpitudine
who to-alone displeased heretics or of-vices by-the-baseness

obvolutis. Nam de Alberico Remensi et Symone Parisiensi
wrapped for about Alberic of-Reims and Simon of-Paris
palam loquuntur et prouerbium nullum dicunt, et sequaces
openly they-speak and proverb none they-say and the-followers
eorum non modo philosophos negant, immo nec clericos
their not only philosophers they-deny nay nor clerics
patiuntur, uix homines sinunt esse, sed boues Abrahe
they-allow scarcely men they-suffer to-be but oxen of-Abraham
uel asinos Balaamitos, dumtaxat nominant, immo derident,
or asses of-Balaam only they-name nay they-deride
aut si quid scomatice magis aut ledorice in eos dici
or if anything scoffingly more or insultingly against them to-be-said
potest. Willelmus de Campellis errasse conuincitur scriptis
can William of Champeaux to-have-erred is-proved by-writings
propriis. Vix parcitur magistro Hugoni de Sancto Victore,
his-own scarcely is-spared master Hugh of Saint Victor
et hoc quidem magis propter habitum religionis, quam
and this indeed more on-account-of the-habit of-religion than
propter reuerentiam scientie aut doctrine. Deo enim in
on-account-of reverence of-knowledge or of-doctrine to-God for in
ipso deferunt, non persone. Rodbertus Pullus, cuius memoria
him they-defer not to-the-person Robert Pullen whose memory
bonis omnibus iocunda est, diceretur filius subiugalis, nisi
to-good all pleasant is would-be-called the-son of-a-beast-of-burden unless
sedi apostolice deferretur, que ipsum de doctore scolastico
to-the-see apostolic it-were-deferred which him from doctor scholastic
cancellarium fecit. Ut autem licentius hec familia aliis
chancellor made that however more-licentiously this household to-others
derogaret, religionem extrinsecam induit paterfamilias
might-disparage religion external has-put-on the-father-of-the-family
(de interna enim cognoscet Dominus et iudicabit) et
about the-internal for will-know the-Lord and will-judge and

Cisterciensium, Cluniacensium, Premonstratensium, aliorumque
of-the-Cistercians of-the-Cluniacs of-the-Premonstratensians and-of-others
quorum fama hilarior est familiaritatem captat, ut ab eorum
whose fame more-cheerful is the-familiarity he-courts that from their
auctoritate possit esse insignis. Ego autem detractionem eius
authority he-may to-be distinguished I however the-detraction of-his
familie equanimiter porto, et me fateor aliquos premissorum
household calmly bear and myself I-confess some of-the-aforesaid
habuisse doctores, et itidem aliorum audisse discipulos,
to-have-had as-teachers and likewise of-others to-have-heard the-disciples
et ab eis modicum id didicisse quod noui; neque enim,
and from them the-little that to-have-learned which I-know nor for
ut Cornificius, meipsum docui. Nec multum curo quid
as Cornificius myself did-I-teach nor much do-I-care what
ineptum in auribus suorum cornicetur. Ingratus enim est
inept in the-ears of-his-own he-may-crow ungrateful for he-is
et peruersi ingenii qui profectus sui diffitetur auctorem.
and of-perverse wit who of-advancement his-own denies the-author
Sed hec hactenus: nunc pretermissis persone ineptiis,
but these-things thus-far now passed-over of-the-person the-follies
ipsius sententie redarguamus errorem.
of-his-very opinion let-us-refute the-error

Quibus rationibus nitatur

VI · THE ARGUMENTS HE LEANS ON

Cornificius argues that eloquence is given or denied by nature, so precepts are either superfluous or useless; that each man can do only what nature allows, as Daedalus never flew; that use, not rules, makes speakers, as nations learn their tongues from nurses; that precepts cost more labor than they repay; and that philosophy seeks things and wisdom, not words, and so banishes the rules of eloquence.

Non est ergo ex eius sententia (si tamen falsa opinio
not it-is therefore from his opinion if however a-false view
sententia dicenda est,) studendum preceptis eloquentie;
opinion to-be-called is to-be-studied the-precepts of-eloquence
quoniam eam cunctis natura ministrat aut negat. Si ultro
since it to-all nature supplies or denies if freely
ministrat aut sponte, opera superfluit et diligentia; si
she-supplies or of-her-own-accord effort is-superfluous and diligence if
uero negat, inefficax est et inanis. Nam plerumque ad
indeed she-denies ineffective it-is and empty for mostly to
maximarum propositionum robur accedit 'Tantum quemque
of-the-greatest propositions the-strength comes so-much each-one
posse, quantum natura permiserit'; adeo quidem ut apud
to-be-able as-much-as nature will-have-permitted so-far indeed that among
serietatem fidelium historicorum constet Dedalum non
the-seriousness of-faithful historians it-be-agreed Daedalus not
uolasse, quoniam ei natura alas negauerat, sed tirannicam
to-have-flown since to-him nature wings had-denied but tyrannical
rabiem subito euasisse nauigio. Preterea ratio preceptorum
rage suddenly to-have-escaped by-ship besides the-system of-precepts
quod pollicetur non efficit; et omnino impossibile est ut quis
what it-promises not effects and altogether impossible it-is that anyone

eloquens sit etiam diligentissimo studio preceptorum. Sufficit
eloquent be even by-most-diligent study of-precepts suffices
enim usus uerbi loquendique inter cohabitantes commercium;
for the-use of-word and-of-speaking among cohabitants the-commerce
et lingue cuiusque habet potissimam facultatem, qui officium
and of-tongue each has the-chiefest facility he-who the-office
eius crebro exercet. Apud Grecos planum est hoc et Latinos;
its often exercises among the-Greeks plain is this and the-Latins
Galli nobis attestantur et Britones. Apud Scitas et Arabes,
the-Gauls to-us bear-witness and the-Britons among Scythians and Arabs
immo ubique locorum, uerum est quia usus magistrum
nay everywhere of-places true it-is that use the-master
reddit; labor improbus uincit omnia, et assiduitas operis in
renders labor relentless conquers all-things and assiduity of-work in
quauis arte prestantissimum facit opificem. Ad hec, etsi
any art most-excellent makes the-workman to these-things even-if
eloquentie precepta proficerent, plus habent laboris quam
of-eloquence the-precepts profited more they-have of-labor than
utilitatis; nec dispendium opere equa unquam compensabitur
of-utility nor the-expense of-effort by-equal ever will-be-compensated
retributione mercedis. Greca plebs et Hebrea sine
repayment of-reward the-Greek populace and the-Hebrew without
preceptorum difficultate lingue sue compendio utitur; et
of-precepts difficulty of-tongue their-own the-shortcut uses and
tam Galli quam Britones et alie itidem gentes commercium
as-much the-Gauls as the-Britons and other likewise nations the-commerce
uerbi ante a nutricum sinu quam a cathedra doctorum
of-word before from of-nurses the-bosom than from the-chair of-teachers
excipiunt. Nutricis linguam plerumque redolet etas uirilis;
receive of-the-nurse the-tongue mostly smells-of age manly
nec potest interdum ab eo quod tenerior etas ebiberat
nor can sometimes from that which the-more-tender age had-drunk

doctorum diligentia erudiri. Quam recte loquuntur, quam
by-the-teachers' diligence to-be-taught how rightly they-speak how
expedite, singule gentes in linguis quas eis decreti diuini
readily single nations in the-tongues which to-them of-decree divine
constitutio assignauit! Numquid artem orationis expectant
the-constitution has-assigned surely-not the-art of-speech do-they-await
aut precepta eloquentie? Postremo quid est eloquentie cum
or precepts of-eloquence lastly what is of-eloquence with
philosophia? Altera enim consistit in uerbo, altera sapientie
philosophy the-one for consists in word the-other of-wisdom
uias affectat inuestigat et circuit et interdum pro studio
the-ways seeks investigates and goes-round and sometimes for zeal
efficaciter apprehendit. Plane eloquentie precepta sapientiam
effectively apprehends plainly of-eloquence the-precepts wisdom
non conferunt; sed nec amorem eius et sepissime quidem
not confer but neither the-love its and very-often indeed
ei obtinende non conferunt. Res enim philosophia (aut finis
for-it to-be-obtained not they-contribute things for philosophy or the-end
eius, que est sapientia) querit, non uerba. Ex his itaque liquet
its which is wisdom seeks not words from these and-so it-is-clear
quia precepta eloquentie ab operis suis philosophia eliminat.
that the-precepts of-eloquence from works its-own philosophy drives-out

De commendatione eloquentie

VII · IN PRAISE OF ELOQUENCE

The household boasts of despising the precepts of speech, confessing it cannot mind tenses, cases, and meaning at once, and calls precepts superfluous because eloquence is present or absent by nature. Nothing is falser: eloquence is the faculty, named from facility, of fittingly expressing what the mind wills. After virtue and wisdom it holds second place among goods, as Horace's nurse wishes for her charge; it adorns every age and wins wealth and favor, so its despiser is a fool.

Cornicatur hec domus insulsa (suis tamen uerbis) et
croaks this the-household witless with-its-own yet words and
quam constat totius eloquii contempsisse precepta. Sicut
which it-is-agreed of-all speech to-have-despised the-precepts as
enim de seipsa testatur, grauium temporum casuumque non
for about itself it-testifies of-grave tenses and-cases not
potest simul curare iuncturam et constructioni sensuum
it-can at-once to-care-for the-joining and to-the-construction of-meanings
operam dare. Esto, loquatur falso, dum uerum sentiat; sed
effort to-give granted let-it-speak falsely provided true it-think but
plane non adquiescet, quia homo ore mendax et spiritu
plainly not it-will-rest because man with-mouth lying and in-spirit
falsum loquitur et falsum sentit. Ait enim: Superflua sunt
false speaks and false thinks it-says for superfluous are
precepta eloquentie, quoniam ea naturaliter adest aut abest.
the-precepts of-eloquence since it naturally is-present or is-absent
Quid, inquam, falsius? Est enim eloquentia facultas dicendi
what I-say more-false is for eloquence the-faculty of-saying
commode quod sibi uult animus expediri. Quod enim in
fittingly what to-itself wills the-mind to-be-expressed what for in
abdito cordis est, hoc quodammodo in lucem profert
the-hidden-place of-the-heart is this in-a-way into light it-brings-forth

et producit in publicum. Siquidem non est eloquens quisquis
and leads-forth into public since not is eloquent whoever
loquitur, aut qui quod uoluerit utcumque loquitur, sed ille
speaks or who what he-wills in-whatever-way speaks but he
dumtaxat qui animi sui arbitrium commode profert. Ipsa
only who of-mind his-own the-judgment fittingly brings-forth the-very
quoque commoditas exigit facultatem (que a facilitate
also fittingness demands a-faculty which from facility
dicitur) ut sequamur mores nostros, quibus gratum est in
is-named that we-may-follow customs our-own to-which pleasing it-is in
ea parte Stoicos imitari, qua ad faciliorem intelligentiam
that part the-Stoics to-imitate in-which for easier understanding
rerum et uerborum originem studiosius perscrutantur. Ergo
of-things and of-words the-origin more-zealously they-scrutinize therefore
cui facilitas adest commode exprimendi uerbo quidem
to-whom facility is-present fittingly of-expressing by-word indeed
quod sentit, eloquens est. Et hoc faciendi facultas rectissime
what he-thinks eloquent he-is and this of-doing the-faculty most-rightly
eloquentia nominatur. Qua quid esse prestantius possit
eloquence is-named than-which what to-be more-excellent could
ad usum, compendiosius ad opes, fidelius ad gratiam,
for use more-direct for wealth more-faithful for favor
commodius ad gloriam, non facile uideo. Nichil enim dotem
more-convenient for glory not easily I-see nothing for dowry
istam nature et gratie antecedit aut rarum. Siquidem cum
this of-nature and of-grace precedes or rare since while
uirtus et sapientia, que forte, sicut Victorino placet, uerbis
virtue and wisdom which perhaps as to-Victorinus it-pleases in-words
potius quam substantia differunt, in appetendis locis
rather than in-substance differ among to-be-sought the-places
primum obtineant, secundum sibi eloquentia uendicat;
the-first may-hold the-second for-itself eloquence claims

tertius autem cedit locus bonis corporeis, eique ad materiam
the-third however falls place to-goods bodily and-to-it for the-matter
gerendorum cohabitantium fauor et rerum copia quarto
of-things-to-be-done of-cohabitants the-favor and of-things abundance in-the-fourth
loco succedunt. Secutus est hunc ordinem ethicus, uotorumque
place succeed followed has this order the-moralist and-of-wishes
seriem in ordine expetendorum eleganter expressit.
the-series in order of-things-to-be-sought elegantly expressed

Quid uoueat dulci nutricula maius alumno,
what could-wish for-her-sweet the-nurse greater charge
quam sapere, et fari possit que sentiat, et cui
than to-be-wise and to-speak he-can what-things he-thinks and to-whom
gratia, fama, ualitudo, contingat habunde,
favor fame health may-befall abundantly
et mundus uictus, non deficiente crumena.
and clean fare not failing the-purse

Si ergo, uerbi et rationis usu aliorum animantium naturam
if therefore of-word and of-reason by-the-use of-other animals the-nature
humana dignitas antecedit, quid conducibilius ad omnia, quid
human dignity precedes what more-conducive for all-things what
ad claritatem conciliandam potentius quam in eo nature
for renown to-be-won more-powerful than in that of-nature
preuenire consortes et generis, in quo solus homo cetera
to-outstrip the-sharers and of-the-kind in which alone man other-things
uincit? Hec autem, cum omnem etatem doceat et exornet,
conquers this however since every age it-teaches and adorns
clariorem efficit iuuentutem; eo quod etas tenerior gratie
more-illustrious it-makes youth by-that that age the-more-tender to-grace
quodammodo lenocinatur ut ingenium uendicet. Qui sunt
in-a-way panders that wit it-may-claim who are

enim qui florent inter conciues? Qui sunt qui opibus
for those-who flourish among fellow-citizens who are those-who in-wealth
pollent? Qui sunt qui preualent uiribus et in omnibus
are-powerful who are those-who prevail in-strength and in all
negotiis obtinent, nisi eloquentes? Nam, ut Cicero est auctor,
affairs succeed except the-eloquent for as Cicero is the-author
nichil est tam incredibile quod non dicendo fiat probabile;
nothing is so incredible that not by-speaking it-become probable
nichil tam horrendum et incultum quod non splendescat
nothing so horrid and uncultivated that not it-shine
oratione et quodammodo mansuescat tamquam si excolatur.
by-speech and in-a-way grow-tame as if it-be-cultivated
Qui ergo tanti boni contemptor est, manifestissime
he-who therefore of-so-great a-good despiser is most-manifestly
desipit. Qui autem diligit, immo se diligere simulat et
is-foolish he-who however loves-it nay himself to-love-it feigns and
non excolit, nimis negligens est et desipientie proximus.
not cultivates-it too negligent is and to-folly nearest

Quod natura usu iuuanda est, et exercitio

VIII · NATURE MUST BE HELPED BY USE AND EXERCISE

If nature taught every tongue, why do the Cornificians not know Hebrew, the language nature first gave? Nature is the generative force set in things by God, but it can be corrupted by vice and repaired by care. Socrates tamed a lustful nature by philosophy and Scaurus overcame a dull wit. As Horace says, talent and art conspire; diligence strengthens a good nature and rescues a poor one.

Ceterum hanc aliquando habituris gratis ipsa natura
however this sometime to-those-about-to-have freely the-very nature
largitur; et non habituris eam negat, et perpetuo
bestows and not to-those-about-to-have-it it she-denies and perpetually
subtrahit; ut liquido constet operam ulteriorem aut inanem
withdraws so-that clearly it-be-agreed effort further either empty
esse aut superuacuam. Quare ergo, doctissimi Cornificiani,
to-be or superfluous why therefore most-learned Cornificians
peritiam omnium non habetis linguarum? Quare non saltem
the-skill of-all not have-you tongues why not at-least
Hebream nostis? quam, ut aiunt, natura parens primigenis
Hebrew know-you which as they-say nature the-parent to-the-first-born
tradidit et generi conseruauit humano, donec unitatem
handed-down and for-the-race preserved human until unity
scidit impietas et confusione linguarum prostrata est elatio
split impiety and by-confusion of-tongues laid-low was the-pride
que in celum conscendere non uirtute sed uiribus moliebatur,
which into heaven to-climb not by-virtue but by-strength strove
turre constructa. Quare non hanc, que ceteris naturalior
the-tower built why not this which than-the-others more-natural
est, ut sic dicatur, natura docente loquuntur? Est autem
is that so it-be-said nature teaching do-they-speak is however

natura, ut quibusdam placet, (licet eam sit diffinire difficile,)
nature as to-some it-pleases although it be to-define difficult
uis quedam genitiua, rebus omnibus insita, ex qua facere
a-force certain generative in-things all implanted from which to-act
uel pati possunt. Genitiua autem dicitur, eo quod ipsam
or to-suffer they-can generative however it-is-called by-that that it-itself
res queque contrahat, a causa sue generationis, et ab
thing each contracts from the-cause of-its generation and from
eo quod cuique est principium existendi; res enim quelibet
that which to-each is the-beginning of-existing a-thing for any
a componentibus contrahit, unde ad hoc apta sit uel ad
from the-composing-parts contracts whence for this apt it-be or for
illud; siue componentia partium nomine censeantur, siue
that whether the-composing-parts of-parts by-the-name be-reckoned or
accedant ad originem materie et forme, ut in simplicibus,
they-come to the-origin of-matter and of-form as in simple-things
que coaceruationem partium non admittunt; siue ratio
which aggregation of-parts not admit or the-account
componendi ad solius diuine bonitatis decretum accedat. Nam
of-composing to of-sole divine goodness the-decree come for
et hec ipsa prima natura est, auctore Platone, qui, sicut
also this very first nature is by-the-author Plato who as
Victorinus et alii multi testantur, et certissimam omnium
Victorinus and others many testify both most-certain of-all
rerum naturam esse asseruit diuinam uoluntatem; siquidem
things the-nature to-be asserted divine will since
natura creata ab hoc fonte manat, et quicquid operatur,
nature created from this spring flows and whatever it-works
operis sui Deum habet auctorem; ita quidem, nisi sit
of-work its-own God has as-author so indeed unless it-be
corruptionis opus et culpe, in quo ab auctore suo natura
of-corruption a-work and of-fault in which from author its-own nature

degenerat. Vis itaque originaliter indita cuique, ex qua
degenerates the-force and-so originally implanted in-each from which
opus aut aptitudo procedit, natura quidem est, sed creata.
work or aptitude proceeds nature indeed is but created
Alias quidem diffinitiones, que sparsim in diuersis reperiuntur
other indeed definitions which scatteredly in diverse are-found
auctoribus, eo plerumque trahendas arbitror, ut natura, que
authors to-that mostly to-be-drawn I-judge that nature which
creata est, describatur. Nam et ignis artifex, qui per
created is be-described for even fire the-craftsman which through
inuisibiles uias procedit ad res uisibiles procreandas, creatus
invisible ways proceeds for things visible to-be-procreated created
quidem est; sed pace Aristotilis et Calcidii, eum naturam
indeed is but by-leave of-Aristotle and of-Chalcidius it nature
esse aliqui diffitentur. Item principium motus secundum se
to-be some deny likewise the-principle of-motion of itself
a Deo habuisse initium, nec Aristotilem negaturum credo.
from God to-have-had beginning nor Aristotle about-to-deny I-believe
De Boetio certus sum; quia id, quod facere uel pati
about Boethius certain I-am that that which to-act or to-suffer
potest, non negabit esse creatum. Sed et unamquamque rem
can not he-will-deny to-be created but also each thing
informans specifica differentia, aut ab eo est, per quem
informing specific difference either from him is through whom
facta sunt omnia, aut omnino nichil est. Aliis quoque modis
made were all-things or altogether nothing is in-other also ways
natura describitur; sed quicquid aliud a Platonico ponitur,
nature is-described but whatever other by the-Platonist is-set
aut de rerum numero tollendum est aut diuinis operibus
either from of-things the-number to-be-removed is or to-divine works
ascribendum. Sed utamur ad presens prima diffinitione, que
to-be-ascribed but let-us-use for the-present the-first definition which

ad usum presentis articuli magis uidetur accedere. Esto
to the-use of-the-present point more seems to-come granted
ergo; sit potens et efficax uis illa genitiua, indita rebus
therefore it-be powerful and effective force that generative implanted in-things
originaliter; certe, sicut uitio corrumpi aut impediri, sic
originally certainly as by-vice to-be-corrupted or to-be-hindered so
uariis adminiculis reparari uel adiuuari potest. Nam et
by-various props to-be-repaired or to-be-helped it-can for even
pueri uulgo garriunt eum gerendi aliquid habere aptitudinem
boys commonly chatter him of-doing something to-have aptitude
naturalem, cui aptitudinis negatus est usus; quod enim
natural to-whom of-the-aptitude denied is the-use what for
gressibile est, interdum gradi non potest, et qui bipes est
able-to-walk is sometimes to-walk not can and he-who two-footed is
natura, actu plerumque caret utroque pede uel altero. Cura
by-nature in-act often lacks both foot or one care
itaque non superfluit, sed naturam iuuat, faciliusque reddit
and-so not is-superfluous but nature helps and-more-easily renders
quod tamen utcumque forte fieri posset. Nam et Socrates,
what yet somehow perhaps to-be-done could for also Socrates
ut traditur, natura petulcus erat et muliebrosus (ut uerbo
as is-handed-down by-nature butting was and woman-mad that the-word
utar historie), nature tamen intemperantiam castigatione
I-may-use of-the-story of-nature yet the-intemperance by-the-chastisement
philosophie et uirtutis exercitatione repressit et domuit.
of-philosophy and of-virtue by-the-exercise he-checked and tamed
Obtusioris ingenii tradunt fuisse Scaurum Ruffum, sed
of-duller wit they-relate to-have-been Scaurus Rufus but
sedulitate exercitii in id uirium euasisse ut Ciceronem
by-the-diligence of-exercise to that of-strength to-have-come-out that Cicero
ipsum Allobroga nominaret. Si exemplis utendum fuerit,
himself an-Allobrogian he-named if examples to-be-used it-will-have-been

undique fiet conspicuum quia nec diligentia inanis
from-everywhere it-will-become conspicuous that neither diligence empty
est ubi est natura obtusior, et nec habundat cura, utpote
is where is nature duller and neither is-excessive care as-being
superflua, et si fuerit ad aliquid agendum natura
superfluous even if it-will-have-been for something to-be-done nature
benignior. Licet enim plerumque natura dominetur et sit
more-kindly although for mostly nature rule and be
procliuior in alterutro; tamen, sicut facile corrumpitur a
more-inclined to one-or-the-other yet as easily it-is-corrupted by
negligentia, sic a cultura et a cura sepissime mansuescit.
negligence so by cultivation and by care very-often it-grows-tame

Ingenio fieret laudabile carmen an arte,
by-genius should-be-made praiseworthy a-poem or by-art
quesitum est; ego nec studium sine diuite uena
asked it-has-been I neither study without a-rich vein
nec rude quid possit uideo ingenium; alterius sic
nor crude what may-avail I-see genius of-the-other so
altera possit opem res et coniurat amice.
the-one could the-help thing and conspires friendly

Prodest utique natura, sed eatenus aut numquam aut raro, ut
profits surely nature but so-far either never or rarely that
sine studio culmen optineat: nichil enim est tam ualidum,
without study the-summit it-obtain nothing for is so strong
tam robustum, quod diligentia non eneruet, nichil tam
so robust that diligence not may-weaken nothing so
erectum, quod non deiciat; sicut e contra quamlibet
erect that not it-may-cast-down as on the-contrary any
humilem gradum cura diligens erigit et conseruat. Ergo, si
low degree care diligent raises and preserves therefore if

natura propitia est, contemni non debet sed excoli ut
nature propitious is to-be-despised not it-ought but to-be-cultivated that
facile prosit; si aduersa, eo diligentiorem cultum exigit
easily it-may-profit if adverse the-more diligent cultivation it-demands
ut ope uirtutis felicius et gloriosius inualescat.
that by-the-help of-virtue more-happily and more-gloriously it-may-grow-strong

Quod homines nititur elingues facere qui logicam impugnat

IX · WHOEVER ATTACKS LOGIC WOULD MAKE MEN DUMB

No one has become most eloquent in even one tongue by nature without study, and the more eloquent the better, since here the comparative does not drift toward the contrary, as some grammarians held of 'fluent.' Language is largely convention and cannot be known by nature. The sect accuses not eloquence, which all praise, but the arts that promise it, and above all logic, a deceitful profession, it says, that has closed the way to philosophy and to every business.

Quis autem ope nature hunc assecutus est titulum,
who however by-the-help of-nature this attained has title
ut sine studio in omnibus, immo uel in una linguarum,
that without study in all nay even in one of-tongues
eloquentissimus haberetur? Utique si eloquentem esse
most-eloquent he-should-be-held surely if eloquent to-be
bonum est, et eloquentissimum melius erit. Neque enim
good is also most-eloquent better it-will-be not for
hic in contrarium boni quod proponitur comparationis
here into the-contrary of-the-good which is-proposed of-comparison
gradus excrescunt; quemadmodum in eo qui disertus dicitur,
the-degrees grow as in him who fluent is-called
aut disertior, cum positiuus sapientie sensum habeat et
or more-fluent since the-positive of-wisdom the-sense has and

eloquentie, quantum excrescit comparatio, tantum decrescit
of-eloquence as-much-as grows the-comparison so-much decreases
sapientia et eloquii fluuius inualescit. Sic enim nonnullis
wisdom and of-speech the-river grows-strong so for to-some
gramaticis placuit. Sed licet alique artium contingentium
grammarians it-pleased but although some of-the-arts touching
et docentium uirtutem eloquii naturam attingant, illa tamen,
and teaching the-virtue of-speech nature touch that yet
que ad placitum fere est, naturaliter sciri non potest,
which by convention almost is naturally to-be-known not can
quia nec naturalis est; non est enim eadem apud omnes.
because neither natural is-it not it-is for the-same among all
Quocirca id quod est homini precipue debitum, imprudenter
wherefore that which is to-man especially due imprudently
sine hominis beneficio a natura exigitur; at hec domus
without of-man the-benefit from nature is-demanded but this household
non eloquentiam criminatur, que omnibus necessaria est et
not eloquence accuses which to-all necessary is and
commendatur ab omnibus, sed artes eam pollicentium arguit
is-commended by all but the-arts it of-those-promising it-charges
esse inutiles. Eo itaque opinionis uergit intentio, ut non
to-be useless thither and-so of-the-opinion inclines the-intention that not
omnes mutos faciat, quod nec fieri potest nec expedit,
all dumb it-may-make which neither to-be-done can nor is-expedient
sed ut de medio logicam tollat. Est enim fallax, ut
but that from the-midst logic it-may-remove is for deceitful as
aiunt, professio uerbosorum, et que multorum consumpsit
they-say the-profession of-the-wordy and which of-many has-consumed
ingenia, et non modo philosophie studiis preclusit uiam
the-wits and not only of-philosophy to-the-studies has-closed the-way
sed gerendis omnibus rationem et exitum interclusit.
but for-things-to-be-done all the-method and issue has-shut-off

Quid significet nomen logice, et quod omnes artes colende, nisi reprobate sint

X · THE NAME OF LOGIC, AND WHICH ARTS TO CULTIVATE

The sect now storms logic first, as the art most familiar to its heresy. Logic, in its widest sense, is the method of speaking or discoursing, logos meaning both speech and reason; in a narrower sense, of discoursing alone. Either way it is useful, since what teaches concisely saves labor. All arts of action, born of nature as their parent, deserve cultivation; only the arts of evil, such as sorcery, are to be banished.

Ecce propositi planior est intentio et logicam aggreditur
behold of-the-purpose plainer is the-intention and logic it-sets-about
expugnare, que omnes philosophie semitas pari furore
to-storm which all of-philosophy the-paths with-equal fury
persequitur. Verumtamen ab aliqua fuerat incohandum. Illam
pursues but-yet from some it-had to-be-begun that
itaque preferri placuit que ceteris notior, et huic
and-so to-be-put-first it-pleased which than-the-others better-known and to-this
heresi familiarior uidebatur. Congrediamur ergo, et quid
heresy more-familiar seemed let-us-engage therefore and what
censeatur nomine logice proferatur in medium. Est itaque
be-reckoned by-the-name of-logic be-brought-forth into the-midst is and-so
logica, (ut nominis significatio latissime pateat) loquendi uel
logic that of-the-name the-signification most-widely may-extend of-speaking or
disserendi ratio. Contrahitur enim interdum, et dumtaxat
of-discoursing the-method is-contracted for sometimes and only
circa disserendi rationes, uis nominis coartatur. Siue
about of-discoursing the-methods the-force of-the-name is-restricted whether
itaque ratiocinandi uias doceat, siue omnium sermonum
and-so of-reasoning the-ways it-teach or of-all of-speeches
regulam prebeat, profecto desipiunt qui eam dicunt esse
the-rule it-furnish surely are-foolish who it say to-be

inutilem; cum utrumque ratione clarissima doceatur esse
useless since each by-reason most-clear is-taught to-be
pernecessarium. Duplicitatem uero huius significationis nomen
very-necessary the-doubleness indeed of-this signification the-name
a Greca quidem origine contrahit, quoniam ibi logos nunc
from Greek indeed origin contracts since there logos now
sermonem, nunc rationem significat. Sed ut quam latissime
speech now reason signifies but that as most-widely
protendatur significatio, ei ad presens sermonum omnium
be-extended the-signification to-it for the-present of-speeches all
magisterium tribuatur; ut nusquam convincatur esse inutilis,
the-mastery be-attributed that nowhere it-be-proved to-be useless
cum etiam secundum generaliorem modum tota perutilis
since even according-to the-more-general way wholly very-useful
esse et necessaria apparuerit. Si enim, ut sepe dictum
to-be and necessary it-will-have-appeared if for as often said
est, necessarius (quod nemo negat) est usus uerbi,
it-has-been necessary which no-one denies is the-use of-the-word
quanto compendiosius docetur, tanto est doctrina utilior
by-how-much more-concisely it-is-taught by-so-much is the-teaching more-useful
et certe fidelior. Stultum enim est in eo diutius cum
and certainly more-faithful foolish for it-is in that longer with
labore et difficultate uersari, quod aliter expediri facile
labor and difficulty to-be-occupied which otherwise to-be-expedited easily
et cito potest. Solet hoc negligentibus euenire et qui
and quickly can is-wont this to-the-negligent to-happen and to-those-who
iacturam temporis nullius putant esse momenti. Omnium
the-loss of-time of-no they-think to-be moment of-all
itaque gerendorum artes amplectende sunt et colende, eo
and-so things-to-be-done the-arts to-be-embraced are and to-be-cultivated the
quidem studiosius, quo ab optima parente natura originem
indeed more-zealously as from the-best parent nature origin

ducunt et nobilitatem generis facili et felici gerendorum
they-draw and the-nobility of-their-race by-easy and happy of-things-to-be-done
protestantur effectu. Gerendorum iccirco dixerim artes
they-declare effect of-things-to-be-done therefore I-would-say the-arts
colendas ad discretionem artium, que uersantur in maleficiis,
to-be-cultivated for the-distinguishing of-the-arts which are-occupied in evil-deeds
ut sunt sortilegorum et cetere reprobate matheseos. Que,
as are of-sorcerers and the-other reprobate of-mathesis which
quoniam ab officiis aliene sunt, a toto hominum cetu
since from duties foreign they-are from the-whole of-men gathering
recte philosophantium decreto eliminari debent. Sed de
rightly of-the-philosophizing by-decree to-be-driven-out ought but about
his latius dictum est in Policratico.
these more-widely said it-has-been in the-Policraticus

Quid ars, et de speciebus ingeniorum: et quod artibus excolenda sunt

XI · WHAT ART IS, AND THE KINDS OF WIT

Art is a method that shortens nature's long road to what is possible. Nature gives wit, memory, and reason; use and exercise strengthen them into art. Bernard of Chartres distinguished three wits: the flighty, which keeps nothing; the low, which cannot rise; and the middling, best for philosophy. Reason makes art a finite knowledge of infinite things, and despising the arts wrongs nature, their mother. Study tempered with rest sharpens wit rather than blunting it.

Est autem ars ratio que compendio sui naturaliter
is however art a-system which by-a-shortcut its-own naturally
possibilium expedit facultatem. Neque enim impossibilium
of-possible-things expedites the-faculty not for of-impossible-things
ratio prestat aut pollicetur effectum; sed eorum que
the-system furnishes or promises the-effect but of-those which

fieri possunt, quasi quodam dispendioso nature circuitu
to-be-done can as-if a-certain wasteful of-nature circuit
compendiosum iter prebet, et parit (ut ita dixerim)
a-short route it-furnishes and begets as so I-might-say
difficilium facultatem. Unde et Greci eam methodon
of-difficult-things the-faculty whence also the-Greeks it methodon
dicunt, quasi compendiariam rationem, que nature uitet
call as-if a-short-cut method which of-nature avoids
dispendium, et amfractuosum eius circuitum dirigat, ut
the-waste and winding its circuit straightens that
quod fieri expedit, rectius et facilius fiat. Natura
what to-be-done is-expedient more-rightly and more-easily be-done nature
enim, quamuis uiuida, nisi erudiatur, ad artis facilitatem non
for although lively unless it-be-trained to of-art the-facility not
peruenit, artium tamen omnium parens est, eisque, quo
attains of-the-arts yet all the-parent is and-to-them whereby
proficiant et perficiantur, dat nutriculam rationem. Excitat
they-may-advance and be-perfected gives as-nurse reason it-rouses
enim primo ingenium ad res aliquas percipiendas; et
for first wit to things some to-be-perceived and
cum eas perceperit, deponit quasi in custodia et thesauro
when them it-has-perceived lays-up as-if in the-custody and treasury
memorie; ratio que percepta et commendanda uel
of-memory reason what-things perceived and to-be-entrusted or
commendata sunt, studio diligenti examinat, et ex natura
entrusted are with-study diligent examines and from the-nature
singulorum de singulis (nisi forte labatur in aliquo) uerum
of-each about each unless perhaps it-slip in something true
profert incorruptumque iudicium. Hec tria quidem, quasi
brings-forth and-uncorrupted judgment these three indeed as-if
omnium artium fundamenta et instrumenta, natura premittit.
of-all arts the-foundations and instruments nature sends-ahead

Est autem ingenium (ut Isidoro placet) uis quedam animo
is however wit as to-Isidore it-pleases a-force certain in-the-mind
naturaliter insita, per se ualens. Hoc autem exprimere uidetur
naturally implanted of itself prevailing this however to-express seems
ista descriptio quod natura animo uim quandam indidit,
that description that nature in-the-mind a-force certain has-put
que aut primitiuus motus anime est aut motum excitat
which either the-primitive motion of-the-soul is or the-motion rouses
primitiuum, quem anima exercet in rerum inuestigatione.
primitive which the-soul exercises in of-things the-investigation
Unde et per se dicitur ualens eo quod nullius precedentis
whence also of itself it-is-said prevailing by-that that of-none preceding
opem expectat, et omnes preuenit, et iuuat subsequentes;
the-help it-awaits and all it-goes-before and helps the-following
precedit enim inuestigatio comprehensionem, examinationem,
precedes for investigation comprehension examination
et custodiam omnium sciendorum. Itaque proficiscitur a
and custody of-all things-to-be-known and-so it-sets-out from
natura; studio iuuatur, et exercitio; ut quod difficile fuerat
nature by-study is-helped and by-exercise that what difficult had-been
in prima agitatione, ab assiduitate usus reddatur facilius; et
in the-first exertion by the-assiduity of-use be-rendered easier and
cum regulas hoc faciendi deprehenderit, fiat, nisi desuetudinis
when the-rules this of-doing it-will-have-grasped become unless of-disuse
et negligentie torpor obsistat, facillimum. Et hec quidem
and of-negligence the-torpor resist most-easy and this indeed
est omnium origo artium, ut cum natura preiacens usum
is of-all the-origin of-arts that since nature lying-beneath use
et exercitium studii peperit, usus et exercitatio artem; ars
and exercise of-study begot use and exercise art art
autem eam, de qua nunc agitur, facultatem. Valet itaque
however that about which now it-is-treated faculty prevails and-so

per se ingenium, exercitatio, ex usu ab utroque memoria;
of itself wit exercise from use from both memory
et ab his etiam ipsa ratio conualescit artesque producit,
and from these also the-very reason grows-strong and-the-arts produces
et hoc quidem pro capacitate ingeniorum. Horum tria
and this indeed according-to the-capacity of-wits of-these three
sunt genera, sicut Carnotensis senex Bernardus frequenti
are kinds as of-Chartres the-old-man Bernard in-a-frequent
colloquio suis auditoribus tradere consueuit. Aliud enim
conversation to-his-own bearers to-hand-down was-accustomed one for
aduolans, aliud infimum, aliud mediocre est. Aduolans quidem
flying-up another lowest another middling is the-flying-up indeed
eadem facilitate, qua percipit, recedit a perceptis, nec
with-the-same facility with-which it-perceives withdraws from things-perceived nor
in aliqua sede inuenit requiem. Infimum autem sublimari non
in any seat finds rest the-lowest however to-be-raised not
potest, ideoque profectum nescit; at mediocre, et quia habet
can and-therefore advance knows-not but the-middling both because it-has
in quo sedeat, et quia sublimari potest, nec de profectu
in which to-sit and because to-be-raised it-can neither of advance
desperat, et philosophantis exercitio accommodissimum
despairs and of-one-philosophizing for-the-exercise most-suited
est. Et in hac quidem specie naturam, opinor, artium
is and in this indeed kind nature I-think of-the-arts
fundamenta iecisse; usus enim huius studio invalescit. Est
the-foundations to-have-laid use for of-this by-study grows-strong is
autem (ut Ciceroni placet) studium assidua et uehemens
however as to-Cicero it-pleases study assiduous and vehement
animi applicatio ad aliquid agendum magna cum uoluntate;
of-the-mind application to something to-be-done great with will
memoria uero quasi mentis archa, firmaque et fidelis
memory indeed as-if of-the-mind the-chest and-firm and faithful

custodia perceptorum, ratio eorum que sensibus aut animo
custody of-things-perceived reason of-those which to-the-senses or to-the-mind
occurrunt, examinatrix animi uis est et fidelis arbitra
occur the-examiner of-the-mind the-force is and faithful arbiter
potiorum, que, rerum similitudines dissimilitudinesque
of-the-better-things which of-things likenesses and-unlikenesses
perpendens, tandem artem statuit quasi quandam infinitorum
weighing at-length art establishes as-if a-certain of-infinite-things
finitam esse scientiam. Cum enim in a desinant nomina
finite to-be knowledge since for in a end nouns
infinita, ea omnia feminino definiunt articulo, his
infinite them all with-the-feminine they-define article those
exclusis, que certa sue proprietatis assignatione distinxit.
excluded which by-sure of-its property assignment it-distinguished
Species infinite sunt; sed hec in eis finitum tradidit, ut
species infinite are but this in them finite it-handed-down that
cuicumque species, adest et genus. Numeri infiniti; omnem
to-whomever the-species is-present also the-genus numbers infinite every
tamen parem uel imparem esse diffiniuit: et ut duo
yet even or odd to-be it-defined and that two-things
dicitur, liquido comprobetur exemplo; disceptationem primam
it-is-said by-clear be-proved example the-dispute first
casus intulit; usum disceptandi exercitatio auxit. Disceptandi
chance brought-in the-use of-disputing exercise increased of-disputing
formam, que ars eius operis est, ratio deprehendit; ars
the-form which the-art of-that work is reason grasped art
culta contulit facultatem; et, quia artium natura mater
cultivated conferred the-faculty and because of-the-arts nature the-mother
est, merito in iniuriam parentis redundat contemptus
is deservedly into the-injury of-the-parent redounds contempt
earum. Sedulo igitur ingenium tam studii quam remissionis
of-them diligently therefore wit as-much of-study as of-relaxation

moderatione excolendum est, ut ab altero conualescat,
by-the-moderation to-be-cultivated is that by the-one it-may-grow-strong
ab altero confortetur. Unde eggregie sapiens quidam
by the-other be-strengthened whence outstandingly wise a-certain-man
(cui dicti habeo gratiam) ait: Ingenium a natura
to-whom for-the-saying I-have thanks says wit from nature
proficiscitur, usu iuuatur, immoderato labore retonditur, et
sets-out by-use is-helped by-immoderate labor is-blunted and
temperato acuitur exercitio. Si enim compositum fuerit,
by-tempered is-sharpened exercise if for well-composed it-will-have-been
et legitime exerceatur, non modo ad artium capacitatem
and lawfully be-exercised not only for of-the-arts capacity
sufficiet, sed ad res quodammodo naturaliter inaccessibiles,
it-will-suffice but to things in-a-way naturally inaccessible
rectam et expeditam inueniet uiam; et ad discendum aut
a-right and expeditious it-will-find way and for learning or
docendum quicquid oportet aut expedit, fidelissimum erit.
teaching whatever is-fitting or is-expedient most-faithful it-will-be

Unde artes dicantur liberales

XII · WHY THE ARTS ARE CALLED LIBERAL

Among the arts the liberal ones come first, comprised in the trivium and quadrivium; the ancients who mastered them needed no teacher to open any book. They are called arts because they constrain by rules, or from virtue or reason; and liberal because the ancients had their children, their liberi, taught them, or because they free a man from cares so that he may give himself to wisdom.

Sed cum artium multa sint genera, ingenio philosophantis
but since of-arts many be kinds to-the-wit of-the-philosophizing
animi prime omnium liberales occurrunt. He quidem omnes,
mind first of-all the-liberal occur these indeed all
aut Triuii aut Quadruuii ratione clauduntur; et
either of-the-Trivium or of-the-Quadrivium by-the-system are-enclosed and
tantam dicuntur obtinuisse efficaciam apud maiores, qui
so-great are-said to-have-obtained efficacy among the-ancestors who
eis diligenter institerant, ut omnem aperirent lectionem,
to-them diligently had-applied-themselves that every they-opened reading
ad omnia intellectum erigerent, et omnium questionum,
to all-things the-understanding they-raised and of-all questions
que probari possunt, difficultatem sufficerent enodare. Neque
which to-be-proved can the-difficulty they-sufficed to-untie not
enim doctore egebant in aperiendis libris aut questionibus
for a-teacher did-they-need in opening books or questions
dissoluendis hi, quibus aut ratio Triuii omnium uim
in-dissolving those to-whom either the-system of-the-Trivium of-all the-force
sermonum, aut Quadruuii lex totius nature secreta
speeches or of-the-Quadrivium the-law of-the-whole of-nature the-secrets
exponebat. Unde sicut artes dicte sunt, eo quod artant
expounded whence as arts called they-are by-that that they-constrain

regulis et preceptis, uel a uirtute, que Grece ares dicitur,
by-rules and precepts or from virtue which in-Greek ares is-called
et animos roborat ad percipiendas uias sapientie, aut
and the-minds strengthens for perceiving the-ways of-wisdom or
a ratione, cui alimenta et incrementa prestant, que
from reason to-which nourishments and increases they-furnish which
a Grecis arso nominatur; sic et liberales dicte sunt,
by the-Greeks arso is-named so also liberal called they-are
uel ex eo quod antiqui liberos suos his procurabant
either from that that the-ancients children their-own in-these took-care
institui; uel ab hoc quod querunt hominis libertatem,
to-be-instructed or from this that they-seek of-man the-freedom
ut curis liber sapientie uacet, et sepissime
so-that from-cares free to-wisdom he-may-be-at-leisure and very-often
liberant a curis his, quarum participium sapientia non
they-free from cares those of-which a-share wisdom not
admittit. Necessarias quoque sepe excludunt, ut agitationi
admits necessary-ones also often they-shut-out that to-the-exertion
mentis ad philosophiam sit expeditior uia.
of-the-mind toward philosophy be more-expeditious the-way

Unde dicatur Gramatica

XIII · WHY GRAMMAR IS SO NAMED

First of the arts is logic in its widest sense, beginning from grammar, the part concerned with the first instruction in speech: the science of speaking and writing rightly, the origin of the liberal disciplines, and the cradle of philosophy. Named from gramma, letter or line, it teaches letters and comes first in learning as the line in magnitude. Training the tongue through ear and eye, it is as needful to a philosopher as sight and hearing.

Harum autem omnium prima est logica; ab ea tamen sui
of-these however all first is logic from that yet its-own
parte, que in prima sermonum institutione uersatur; ut
part which in the-first of-speeches instruction is-occupied so-that
nomen logices, sicut iam dictum est, quam latissime
the-name of-logic as already said it-has-been as most-widely
pateat, et non modo ad disserendi scientiam contrahatur.
may-extend and not only to of-discoursing the-science be-contracted
Est enim Gramatica scientia recte loquendi scribendique et
is for Grammar the-science rightly of-speaking and-of-writing and
origo omnium liberalium disciplinarum. Eadem quoque est
the-origin of-all liberal disciplines the-same also is
totius philosophie cunabulum, et (ut ita dixerim) totius
of-the-whole of-philosophy the-cradle and as so I-might-say of-the-whole
litteratorii studii altrix prima; que omnium nascentium de
literary of-study the-nurse first who of-all being-born from
sinu nature teneritudinem excipit, nutrit infantiam, cuiusque
the-bosom of-nature the-tenderness receives nourishes the-infancy of-each
gradus incrementa in philosophia prouehit, et sedulitate
degree the-increases in philosophy carries-forward and with-diligence
materna omnem philosophantis producit et custodit etatem;
maternal every of-the-philosophizer leads-forth and guards age

unde a primis tam scribendi quam loquendi principiis
whence from the-first as-much of-writing as of-speaking principles
gramatica appellatur. Grama enim littera uel linea est, et
grammar is-called gramma for a-letter or line is and
inde litteralis, eo quod litteras doceat; quo nomine tam
thence literal by-that that letters it-teaches by-which name both
simplicium uocum figure quam elementa, id est uoces
of-simple sounds the-shapes and the-elements that is the-sounds
figurarum, intelliguntur; aut etiam linearis est, eo quod
of-the-shapes are-understood or also linear it-is by-that that
sicut in magnitudinis incremento dimensio linee prima
as in of-magnitude the-increase the-dimension of-the-line first
occurrit, et quasi quedam materia est superficiei aut corporis,
occurs and as-if a-certain matter is of-surface or of-body
sic aspirantibus ad profectum sapientie disciplina hec prima
so to-those-aspiring to advance of-wisdom discipline this first
succurrit, que linguam erudit; et tam per aures quam per
comes-to-aid which the-tongue trains and as-much through the-ears as through
oculos, ut sic procedat oratio, sapientiam introducit; uerba
the-eyes that so may-proceed the-speech wisdom brings-in words
enim per aurem intromissa pulsant et excitant intellectum,
for through the-ear sent-in strike and rouse the-understanding
qui (ut ait Augustinus) quedam anime manus est, rerum
which as says Augustine a-certain of-the-soul hand is of-things
capax et perceptibilis obiectorum. Littere autem, id est
capable and perceptive of-objects letters however that is
figure, primo uocum indices sunt, deinde rerum, quas anime
shapes first of-sounds indicators are then of-things which to-the-soul
per oculorum fenestras opponunt et frequenter absentium
through of-the-eyes the-windows they-present and frequently of-the-absent
dicta sine uoce loquuntur. Tradit ergo prima elementa
the-sayings without voice they-speak it-hands-on therefore the-first elements

sermonis ars ista, oculorum et aurium iudicium instruit,
of-speech art this of-the-eyes and of-the-ears the-judgment it-instructs
ut non facilius queat aliquis preter eam philosophari, quam
so-that not more-easily could anyone without it philosophize than
inter philosophos eminere qui semper cecus fuit et surdus.
among philosophers be-eminent who always blind has-been and deaf

Quod ipsa, etsi naturalis non sit, naturam imitatur

XIV · GRAMMAR, THOUGH NOT NATURAL, IMITATES NATURE

Grammar is largely convention, yet it imitates nature: it sets the vowels at five among all peoples, though Tenred counted seven, and nature formed the kinds of consonants. Names were first imposed on things nature formed, and adjectives depict their properties. Substantives, names of substantial differences, and words of quantity take no comparison, since neither substance nor quantity admits more and less; verbs signify motion with time, adverbs its differences, and verbs lacking a tense show nature's trace.

Ceterum cum hec ad placitum sit, non a natura uidetur
however since this by convention is not from nature it-seems
esse profecta; siquidem naturalia eadem sunt apud omnes,
to-have proceeded since natural-things the-same are among all
hec autem apud omnes non eadem est. Artium uero matrem
this however among all not the-same is of-the-arts indeed the-mother
superius collectum est esse naturam; sed licet hec
above gathered it-has-been to-be nature but although this
aliquatenus, immo ex maxima parte ab hominum institutione
to-some-extent nay from the-greatest part from of-men the-institution
processerit, naturam tamen imitatur, et pro parte ab ipsa
has-proceeded nature yet it-imitates and in part from her-very
originem ducit, eique in omnibus, quantum potest, studet
origin draws and-to-her in all-things as-much-as it-can strives

esse conformis; unde et ad eius nutum uocalium numerum
to-be conformed whence also at her nod of-vowels the-number
apud omnes gentes, quantum ad elementa spectat, quinario
among all nations as-far-as to elements it-looks in-five
inclusit; nam apud plerosque figurarum numerus multiplicior
it-has-enclosed for among most of-shapes the-number more-manifold
est. Tenredus tamen noster, gramaticus scientia quam
is Tenred however our grammarian in-knowledge than
opinione potentior, etiam in sonis elementariis ampliorem
in-opinion more-powerful even in sounds elementary a-larger
numerum conuincebat. Si enim attendantur uocum (ut ait)
number proved if for be-attended-to of-sounds as he-says
differentie, septem sunt. In ipsis quoque consonantibus
the-differences seven are in the-very also consonants
diuersas species semiuocalium et mutarum, item simplicium
diverse species of-semivowels and of-mutes likewise of-simple
dupliciumque, natura formauit; quarum differentiam patenter
and-double nature formed of-which the-difference plainly
aduertit, si quis attendat ora, mirabili lege nature modulantia
he-notices if anyone attends-to mouths by-wondrous law of-nature modulating
uoces et potestatem eorum subtili examinatione perpendat.
sounds and the-power of-them by-subtle examination weighs
Ipsa quoque nominum impositio aliarumque dictionum,
the-very also of-nouns imposition and-of-other words
etsi arbitrio humano processerit, nature quodammodo
although by-will human it-has-proceeded to-nature in-a-way
obnoxia est, quam pro modulo suo probabiliter imitatur.
subject is which according-to the-measure its-own probably it-imitates
Homo enim ad exequendum diuine dispensationis effectum
man for for carrying-out of-divine dispensation the-effect
et ad instituendum inter homines uerbi commercium rebus
and for establishing among men of-word the-commerce on-things

his primo uocabula indidit, que preiacebant, nature manu
these first names put which lay-before by-nature's hand
formate, et quas illa uel ex quattuor elementis uel ex
formed and which she either from four elements or from
materia et forma compegerat et distinxerat, ut rationalis
matter and form had-joined and had-distinguished so-that of-the-rational
creature possent sensibus obici, earumque diuersitas,
creature they-could to-the-senses to-be-presented and-their diversity
sicut proprietatibus, sic et uocabulis insigniri. Inde ergo
as by-properties so also by-names to-be-marked thence therefore
(sicut Boetius auctor est) contigit, ut hoc uocetur homo,
as Boethius author is it-happened that this is-called man
illud lignum, aliud uero lapis; et sic substantiis omnibus
that wood another indeed stone and so on-substances all
sua quasi impressa sunt nomina. Sed quoniam ipsarum
their-own as-if impressed are the-names but since of-them
multe sunt differentie; alie quidem a quantitate, alie a
many are the-differences some indeed from quantity others from
qualitate, alie a uariis accidentium formis, item alie ab
quality others from various of-accidents forms likewise others from
his que familiariora sunt et adesse conducunt; iccirco
these which more-familiar are and to-be-present conduce therefore
quibus hoc designaretur nomina sunt inuenta que possent
by-which this might-be-designated nouns were invented which could
adici substantiuis et eorum uim et naturam quodammodo
to-be-added to-substantives and their force and nature in-a-way
depingerent, sicut premisse substantiarum differentie suis
might-depict as the-aforesaid of-substances differences by-their-own
proprietatibus exprimuntur. Sicut enim accidentia substantiam
properties are-expressed as for accidents the-substance
uestiunt et informant; sic quadam proportione rationis
clothe and inform so by-a-certain proportion of-reason

ab adiectiuis substantiua informantur. Et ut familiarius
by adjectives substantives are-informed and that more-familiarly
rationis institutio nature cohereat, sicut substantia cuiusque
of-reason the-institution to-nature may-cohere as the-substance of-each
rei intensionis et remissionis ignara est, sic substantiua
thing of-intension and of-remission ignorant is so substantives
ad comparationis gradus non ueniunt, ut nec nomina
to of-comparison the-degrees not come as neither the-names
differentiarum substantialium, licet adiectiua sint, eo
of-differences substantial although adjectives they-be by-that
quod substantie quandam indicent qualitatem. Item nec illa
that of-substance a-certain they-indicate quality likewise neither those
comparantur, que adiciuntur substantiis a quantitate, eo
are-compared which are-added to-substances from quantity by-that
quod ipsa quantitas non suscipit magis et minus. Et in
that the-very quantity not admits more and less and in
summa, sicut solum accidens comparabile est, nec id tamen
sum as alone accident comparable is nor that yet
omne, sic sola adiectiua accidentium, nec ea tamen omnia,
all so alone adjectives of-accidents nor them yet all
comparantur. Nec in solis nominibus conspicua est hec nature
are-compared nor in only nouns conspicuous is this of-nature
imitatio, sed in aliis omnibus orationis partibus, si diligentius
imitation but in other all of-speech parts if more-diligently
attendatur. Pro eo quod substantia, que sensui aut rationi
it-be-attended-to for that that substance which to-sense or to-reason
obicitur, sine motu, quo agendo uel patiendo aliquid
is-presented without motion by-which by-acting or by-suffering something
temporaliter mouetur, esse non potest, ideo ad designandos
temporally is-moved to-be not can therefore for designating
motus temporales agentis aut patientis excogitata sunt uerba.
motions temporal of-the-agent or of-the-patient devised were verbs

Unde quia motus non est sine tempore, nec uerbum esse
whence because motion not is without time neither a-verb to-be
potuit sine temporis consignificatione; et sicut motus is non
could without of-time consignification and as motion this not
semper uniformis est, sed, ut sic dicam, multicolor, alio
always uniform is but as so I-may-say many-colored with-one
aliter uel alias agente uel patiente, ad exprimendas
otherwise or at-other-times acting or suffering for expressing
differentias eius ad modum adiectiuorum nominum aduerbia
the-differences its after the-manner of-adjective nouns adverbs
processerunt. Quid etiam quod uerba quedam aliquibus
proceeded what also that verbs certain some
temporibus carent, sicut meditatiua et incoatiua, preterito
tenses lack as meditatives and inchoatives the-preterite
eo quod gerendorum deliberatio non statim completur, nec
by-that that of-things-to-be-done deliberation not at-once is-completed nor
initia rerum ad sui perfectionem accedunt, hoc nonne
the-beginnings of-things to their perfection come this surely-not
est expressum nature apud humanam rationem uestigium?
is an-expressed of-nature among human reason trace

Quod adiectiua secunde impositionis substantiuis prime non apte copulantur, ut equus patronomicus

XV · SECOND-IMPOSITION ADJECTIVES ON FIRST-IMPOSITION NOUNS

Names given to names, such as patronymic or categorical, cannot fitly modify names of things: a patronymic horse agrees in gender, number, and case, yet to join such meanings is not only to lie but to trifle. Grammar judges the fit of words, dialectic the true and probable, and civil knowledge the just, useful, and honorable. A Greek interpreter in Apulia taught John that grammar accepts even the impossible braying man but condemns the categorical man as absurd.

Procedat ratio ad secunde impositionis originem, ubi, etsi
let-proceed the-account to of-the-second imposition the-origin where although
non tam liquido, dominantis tamen nature claret auctoritas.
not so clearly of-dominating yet of-nature shines the-authority
Rebus itaque, ut dictum est, cum nomina primitus
on-things and-so as said it-has-been when names first
essent imposita, reuersus ad se animus imponentis ipsis
had-been imposed turned-back to itself the-mind of-the-imposer on-the-very
nominibus uocabula indidit, per que sermonum doctrina
names terms put through which of-speech the-teaching
procederet; dum eorum adminiculo alter in mentem alterius
might-proceed while by-their aid one into the-mind of-another
suum trahiceret intellectum. Ergo quod casualiter flectitur
his-own might-transfer understanding therefore what by-case is-inflected
et temporis expers est, dictum est nomen substantiuum
and of-time devoid is called it-has-been noun substantive
quidem, si substantiam significat aut substantiue; adiectiuum,
indeed if substance it-signifies or substantively adjective
si formaliter, ut sic dici liceat, id quod inest
if formally that so to-be-said it-be-permitted that which is-in
substantie uel aliquid ad imaginem eius. Quod autem motum
the-substance or something after the-image its what however motion

significat temporalem (ita tamen ut temporaliter) uerbum
signifies temporal so yet that temporally verb
est appellatum; actiuum quidem, si eum ut in agente;
has-been called active indeed if it as in the-agent
passiuum, si ut in patiente significat. Ad similitudinem
passive if as in the-patient it-signifies after the-likeness
itaque dictionum prime impositionis earum que secundario
and-so of-words of-the-first imposition of-those which secondarily
processerunt facta est institutio; ut quemadmodum in
proceeded made has-been the-institution that just-as in
illis, tam substantiuis quam adiectiuis, dicuntur quedam
those as-much substantive as adjective are-said some
propria singulorum, alia plurium sunt sua ratione
proper of-single-things others of-several are by-their-own account
communia; ita quedam singulariter dicta, quedam accepta
common so some singularly said some taken
communiter inueniantur in istis. Quod enim nomen dicitur
commonly be-found in these what for noun is-said
aut enuntiatio, ad substantiuorum accedit rationem; quod
or enunciation to of-substantives comes the-account what
appellatiuum aut cathegorica premissis adnectuntur, adiectiue
appellative or categorical to-the-aforesaid are-joined of-adjectival
uirtutis explet officium, que substantiuorum determinat
force fulfills the-office which of-substantives determines
qualitatem. Verumtamen sicut in operibus nature subtilior
the-quality but-yet as in the-works of-nature subtler
est speculatio eorum que insunt, utpote simplicium, quam
is the-speculation of-those which are-in as-being simple than
eorum que compositio sensui ingerit aut intellectui; sic
of-those which composition to-sense presents or to-the-intellect so
in adiectiuis secunde impositionis, si non adiciantur his
in adjectives of-the-second imposition if not they-be-added to-those

quibus naturaliter addicta sunt, quid significent difficilius
to-which naturally assigned they-are what they-signify more-difficult
est intelligere; solidior est enim natura substantie quam
it-is to-understand more-solid is for the-nature of-substance than
uerborum; et accidentia eius quam eorum que sensui
of-words and the-accidents its than of-those which to-sense
aut intellectui familiarius occurrunt. Adeo quidem, ut qui
or to-intellect more-familiarly occur so-far indeed that who
secunde impositionis adiectiua prime institutionis substantiuis
of-the-second imposition adjectives of-the-first institution to-substantives
applicant, aut nichil omnino dicant aut nugiloqui sint. Si
apply either nothing at-all say or triflers be if
enim equus dicatur patronomicus, aut ypotetici sotulares,
for a-horse be-called patronymic or hypothetical shoes
iunctura incompetens est, prepediente quidem rationem
the-joining incongruous is hindering indeed the-account
intelligendi principali significatione uerborum, non aliqua
of-understanding by-the-principal signification of-the-words not by-some
discoherentia accidentium. Nam quod ad genus, numerum,
incoherence of-accidents for as-far-as to gender number
et casum attinet, substantiuo satis coheret adiectiuum; sed
and case pertains to-the-substantive enough coheres the-adjective but
principalia significata coniungere, non modo mentiri sed
the-principal significations to-join not only to-lie but
etiam nugari est. Reus acirologie Virgilius criminatur, dicens
also to-trifle is guilty of-acyrology Virgil is-charged saying
gramineo in campo, eo quod graminoso in campo dici
grassen in field by-that that grassy in field to-be-said
oportuit; et plane magis reus esset et proculdubio longe
it-behooved and plainly more guilty he-would-be and without-doubt far
nugatior, si dixisset in campo cathegorico uel patronomico.
more-trifling if he-had-said in field categorical or patronymic

Dissoluit autem instantiam eorum qui ex solis nituntur
he-dissolves however the-objection of-those who from only strive
accidentibus, in similitudine coherentibus sibi, probare
accidents in likeness cohering to-themselves to-prove
quod non omnis consonans uocali subiuncta sillabam facit.
that not every consonant to-a-vowel subjoined a-syllable makes
Siquidem I et V consonantes subiuncte non magis proficiunt
since I and V consonants subjoined not more avail
ad sillabam quam adiectiua secunde impositionis primis
for a-syllable than adjectives of-the-second imposition to-the-first
substantiuis apposita ad rectam et equimodam locutionem.
substantives set for right and even-measured speech
Constat equidem duo esse peccata loquentium; alterum
it-is-agreed indeed two to-be sins of-speakers the-one
mentientis; alterum transgredientis positam locutionem;
of-one-lying the-other of-one-transgressing the-established speech
quod ad minus isti committunt. Prime et secunde
which at least these commit of-the-first and second
persone pronomina uerbis inepte coniunguntur, nisi causa
person the-pronouns with-verbs ineptly are-joined unless for-the-sake
discretionis aut significantie, licet sibi satis congruant
of-distinction or of-significance although with-each-other enough agree
accidentia dictionum. Nugatorie autem dictionis rationem non
the-accidents of-the-words of-trifling however diction the-account not
hic ita coarto, ut idem frequenter dicere intelligatur; ut
here so I-restrict that the-same-thing frequently to-say it-be-understood as
si substantiuo adiectiuum, quod in eo intelligitur, quis forte
if to-a-substantive an-adjective which in it is-understood one perhaps
adiciat, quale est homo rationalis ambulat; sed ad omnem
may-add such-as is a-man rational walks but to every
dicendi formam extenditur, ubi dictionum iunctura inutilis
of-saying form it-is-extended where of-words the-joining useless

et quodammodo sue legis implende inefficax est. Sed
and in-a-way of-its-own law to-be-fulfilled ineffective is but
nec inutilis est iunctura, licet falsi nota sit, et quod
nor useless is the-joining although of-falsehood the-mark it-be and which
nunc explicat, nunc inuoluit. Lex enim gramatices mentiri
now unfolds now involves the-law for of-grammar to-lie
non prohibet, etsi ea socientur, ex quibus nullus lingue
not forbids even-if those be-associated from which no of-the-tongue
peritiam habenti prouenit intellectus. Ex eo autem liquidius
the-skill to-one-having comes understanding from this however more-clearly
est, quia primis secundariorum competens non fit adiectio;
it-is that to-the-first of-the-secondary fitting not becomes the-addition
quod si adiectiua equipollenter in alia resoluantur (ut
that if adjectives equivalently into other-things be-resolved as
si forte reddatur pro nominibus diffinitio), appositionem
if perhaps be-rendered for the-names the-definition the-apposition
equipollentis termini nequaquam horrebit animus et
of-the-equivalent term in-no-way will-shudder-at the-mind and
ipsius adiectiui secunde impositionis formidabit auditum.
of-the-very adjective of-the-second imposition will-dread the-hearing
Verbi gratia, propositio predicatiua est, hoc equipollenter
of-word for-the-sake a-proposition predicative is this equivalently
uidetur asserere, quod simpliciter, id est sine conditione
seems to-assert that simply that is without condition
aliqua, enuntiat, aut quod terminum habeat predicatum.
some it-enunciates or that a-term it-has predicated
Dicatur ergo, tunica est cathegorica, herebit intellectus
let-it-be-said therefore a-tunic is categorical will-stick the-understanding
ob adiectionis incompetentiam, et forte citius de
on-account-of of-the-addition the-incongruity and perhaps sooner about
inepta dictionum iunctura causabitur quam mendacii reum
the-inept of-words joining will-complain than of-lying guilty

arguat proponentem. Sin autem dicat, tunica, simpliciter, id
accuse the-proposer but-if however he-say a-tunic simply that
est sine conditione aliquid enuntiat, aut terminum habet
is without condition something enunciates or a-term has
predicatum, statim falsum arguet auditor, nec tamen cito
predicated at-once false will-charge the-hearer nor yet quickly
prosiliet ad causandas iuncture ineptias. Utique cum dicitur
will-leap to complaining-of of-the-joining the-ineptitudes surely when is-said
propositio cathegorica, intelligitur habens predicatum terminum
proposition categorical is-understood having predicate term
et subiectum; cum uero, sillogismus cathegoricus, significatur
and subject when indeed syllogism categorical is-meant
quoniam ex cathegoricis constat. Equus cathegoricus quid
since of categoricals it-consists horse categorical what
significet, ignotum habeo; sed interim credo quod nichil
it-signify unknown I-hold but meanwhile I-believe that nothing
significat. Quod enim non inuenitur usquam, esse puto
it-signifies what for not is-found anywhere to-be I-think
nusquam. Similis quoque abusio, si quis dicat Equus desinit
nowhere similar also the-misuse if anyone say horse ends
in S et similia. Item: Cato sedens inter Ianiculum et
in S and similar-things likewise Cato sitting between the-Janiculum and
Kalendas Martias uestes populi Romani quaternario aut
the-Kalends of-March the-garments of-the-people Roman by-four or
senione resarcit aut sermo non est aut quouis sermone
by-six patches either speech not it-is or than-any speech
nugatorio corruptior. Huiusmodi sermo quidem stychyologus
trifling more-corrupt of-this-kind speech indeed stichologus
dicitur, id est, sermo inuersus; eo quod aduersus loquendi
is-called that is speech inverted by-that that against of-speaking
leges coeunt uerba. Nam sticos uersus; unde distichium
the-laws come-together the-words for stichos verse whence distich

duorum uersuum carmen. Cum super hoc articulo multos
of-two verses a-poem since on this point many
conferentes et uaria sentientes audierim, non pigebit referre,
conferring and diverse opinions-holding I-have-heard not it-will-irk to-relate
nec forte audire displicebit quod a Greco interprete et qui
nor perhaps to-hear will-it-displease what from a-Greek interpreter and who
Latinam linguam commode nouerat, dum in Apulia morarer,
the-Latin tongue fittingly knew while in Apulia I-tarried
accepi; nam et ipsi uolo referre gratiam, etsi non utilitatis
I-received for also to-him I-wish to-render thanks even-if not of-utility
(que tamen in his aliqua est), saltem bone uoluntatis, qua
which yet in these some is at-least of-good will with-which
auditoribus prodesse cupiebat. Primus ergo huius sententie
his-hearers to-benefit he-desired the-first therefore of-this judgment
aut opinionis articulus est, quem premisi; quod adiectiuorum
or opinion point is which I-set-before that of-adjectives
secunde impositionis et substantiuorum prime coniunctio
of-the-second imposition and of-substantives of-the-first the-conjunction
etiam secundum gramatices rationes inconsequens est. Habet
even according-to of-grammar the-rules inconsequent is it-has
autem nescio quid latentis aphonie, id est inconsonantie;
however I-know-not what of-hidden aphony that is of-dissonance
uel (ut Quintiliani uerbo utar) cacozugie, id est male
or that of-Quintilian the-word I-may-use of-cacozygy that is of-bad
coniunctionis. Hec appositio, quam etsi nequeamus tam facile
conjunction this apposition which even-if we-cannot so easily
perspicuis rationibus condemnare, per se tamen displicet
by-clear reasons condemn of itself yet displeases
gramatico auditori. Talia quidem multa sunt, que statim
the-grammatical hearer such indeed many are which at-once
offendunt, licet eorum improbatio longius absit. Quod forte
offend although their disproof farther be-away which perhaps

in his euenit, quorum uirtus aut uitium perspicuum est.
in these happens whose virtue or vice clear is
Ut multum parcat, hic gramatica acirologiam deprehendit
that much may-spare here grammar acyrology it-detects
et arguit. Illa enim non modo accidentium dissidentiam
and charges that for not only of-accidents the-disagreement
in dictionum iunctura causatur; sed secundarie inuentionis
in of-words the-joining complains-of but of-secondary invention
adiectionem in subiectis prime ducit absurdam. Et quidem
the-addition on subjects of-the-first it-holds absurd and indeed
ea ratione absurda est, quod ad iuncturam huiusmodi
by-that reason absurd it-is that to a-joining of-this-kind
animus obsurdescit. Sed quis auditus recte examinat ea
the-mind grows-deaf but what hearing rightly examines those-things
ad que surdus est? Nonne uox cassa est que in aurem
to which deaf it-is surely-not a-voice empty is which into an-ear
surdam effunditur? Quia ergo intellectus, sicut anime
deaf is-poured because therefore the-understanding as of-the-soul
manus, ita quodammodo auris est; nichil omnino ad uocem
the-hand so in-a-way the-ear is nothing at-all at the-voice
concepit, cuius rei intelligentiam absurditas preclusit. Attamen
conceived of-which thing the-understanding absurdity has-shut-off but-yet
interdum absurdum ducitur, cuius est pro tempore insolens
sometimes absurd is-held of-which is for the-time unusual
et infrequens usus, nec tamen usquequaque absurdum est;
and infrequent use nor yet wholly absurd is-it
sicut mulier informis male quidem formata, non tamen
as a-woman shapeless badly indeed formed not yet
omnino carens forma; et sicut in litteris quedam mute, non
altogether lacking form and as in letters some mutes not
quod omnino nichil, sed quod aliarum respectu minimum
that altogether nothing but that of-others in-respect very-little

sonent. Hec autem adiectio penitus quidem absurda est, non
they-sound this however addition thoroughly indeed absurd is not
solum falso aut male sonans in aure audientis. Falsa enim
only falsely or badly sounding in the-ear of-the-hearer false-things for
non omnia absurda sunt, etsi ea ueri examinator reprobet
not all absurd are even-if them of-the-true the-examiner reject
et repellat. Absurda quoque dicuntur singula pro
and repel absurd also are-called single-things according-to
iudicio facultatum que dictorum factorumue qualitatem
the-judgment of-the-faculties which of-sayings or-of-deeds the-quality
examinant. Gramatica enim absurdam habet incompetentem
examine grammar for as-absurd holds an-incongruous
iuncturam dictionum; sed ad examinandi ueri iudicium
joining of-words but to of-examining the-true the-judgment
non aspirat. Cesar in libro de Analogia gramaticus quidem
not it-aspires Caesar in the-book on Analogy a-grammarian indeed
est et euitandum esse denuntiat quicquid auditori perito
is and to-be-avoided it-to-be he-announces whatever to-the-hearer skilled
potest esse absurdum; ut naute, inquit, scopulum fugiunt, sic
can to-be absurd as sailors he-says the-reef flee so
fugiendum est infrequens atque insolens uerbum. Dialectica
to-be-fled is an-infrequent and unusual word dialectic
autem id dumtaxat acceptat, quod uerum est aut uerisimile,
however that only accepts which true is or probable
et quicquid ab his longius dissidet ducit absurdum. Neque
and whatever from these farther disagrees it-holds absurd not
enim utilis aut honesti finem attendit; ciuilis autem
for of-the-useful or the-honorable the-end does-it-attend-to civil however
scientia ista metitur, uersaturque in fine iusti, utilis
science these-things measures and-is-occupied in the-end of-the-just of-the-useful
aut honesti; et que a iure bono et equo longius
or of-the-honorable and what from right good and fair farther

absunt, uera aut falsa sint, eque abhorret; palam erit hoc
are-away true or false they-be equally it-shrinks-from plain will-be this
et in ceteris disciplinis. Sed nunc Greci interpretis nostri
also in the-other disciplines but now of-the-Greek interpreter our
procedat explanatio. Homo est rationalis: rebus existentibus
let-proceed the-explanation man is rational with-things existing
ut nunc sunt, hec quodammodo necessaria est. Homo est
as now they-are this in-a-way necessary is man is
risibilis: hec probabilis est. Homo est albus: hec quidem
capable-of-laughter this probable is man is white this indeed
possibilis, dubia tamen, eo quod eque uera potest esse
possible doubtful yet by-that that equally true it-can to-be
et falsa. Homo est rudibilis: hec quidem impossibilis
and false man is capable-of-braying this indeed impossible
est, ut omnino uera esse non possit. Nullam istarum
is so-that at-all true to-be not it-can none of-these
gramaticus abhorret, quia ubique inuenit legem suam.
the-grammarian shrinks-from because everywhere he-finds law his-own
Nichil istorum corrigit, nichil immutat; gratanter accipit
nothing of-these he-corrects nothing he-changes gladly he-accepts
omnia. Quartam corripit et redarguit logicus, eo quod
all the-fourth rebukes and refutes the-logician by-that that
sibi ueri falsique commissa est examinatio. Et ob
to-him of-the-true and-false entrusted is the-examination and on-account-of
hoc quidem, ei prebere aurem ducit absurdum. Modo
this indeed to-it to-offer ear he-holds absurd now
premissis quintam adice. Homo cathegoricus est: hanc utique
to-the-aforesaid a-fifth add man categorical is this surely
absurditatis damnat gramaticus, qui non modo dubiam, non
of-absurdity condemns the-grammarian who not only the-doubtful not
modo falsam, sed etiam impossibilem admittebat. Quare,
only the-false but even the-impossible admitted why

inquit? nisi quia non sequitur leges suas; perpetuo enim
he-says unless because not it-follows laws his-own perpetually for
dicebat inhibitum hec adiectiua illis copulari subiectis.
he-said forbidden these adjectives to-those to-be-coupled subjects

Quod adiectiua prime impositionis substantiuis prime iunguntur

XVI · FIRST-IMPOSITION ADJECTIVES ON NAMES OF NAMES

The reverse works: names of things are lent to words, so speech is hard or soft, sweet or bitter, faithful or fraudulent, and convertible, finite, or universal return from words to things. But words made to mark the qualities of words cannot pass to things, so a patronymic horse earns the grammarian's rebuke. Usage is the norm of speech, as custom interprets law, and this traffic helps a trained wit but confounds the undiscerning.

Non autem uice uersa adiectiua prime impositionis, secunde
not however in-turn turned adjectives of-the-first imposition of-the-second
institutionis nominibus adici impossibile aut inconsequens
institution to-names to-be-added impossible or inconsequent
est. Natura enim copiosa est et ubertatis sue gratiam
is nature for copious is and of-abundance its-own the-favor
humane indigentie facit. Inde ergo est quod proprietas rerum
to-human need makes thence therefore it-is that the-property of-things
redundat in uoces, dum ratio affectat sermones rebus de
overflows into words while reason aims-at words to-the-things about
quibus loquitur esse cognatos. Dicitur ergo durus sermo aut
which it-speaks to-be akin is-called therefore hard speech or
mollis; uerbum asperum aut leue; nomen dulce aut amarum;
soft a-word harsh or smooth a-name sweet or bitter
cum hec tamen proprie corporum sint, non sermonum.
although these yet properly of-bodies be not of-words

Inueniuntur et plurima in hunc modum, quorum nichil
are-found also very-many in this way of-which nothing
absonum est aut falsi arguitur apud iudicem bone fidei uel
dissonant is or of-falsehood is-accused before a-judge of-good faith or
auditorem; licet enim fides rationalis creature dumtaxat uirtus
a-hearer although for faith of-the-rational creature only a-virtue
sit, sermo tamen fidelis dicitur, itemque fraudulentus, etsi
be speech yet faithful is-called and-likewise fraudulent even-if
non in ipso sed in homine esse fraudulentiam conuincatur.
not in itself but in the-man to-be the-fraudulence it-be-proved
Solent enim naturalia, ut sic dixerim, transferri nomina
are-wont for natural as so I-might-say to-be-transferred names
ad explendam indigentiam rationalium, cum e contra,
to fill the-need of-rational-things whereas on the-contrary
transsumptio rationalium ad naturalia in tam frequenti usu
the-transumption of-rational-things to natural-things in so frequent use
nequaquam uersetur. Fit autem translatio, nunc quidem
in-no-way is-occupied is-made however transference now indeed
necessitatis causa, nunc ornatus; sed, ut celebre est apud
of-necessity for-the-sake now of-ornament but as celebrated it-is among
eruditos, que ornatus causa non fit, ab equiuocatione
the-learned what of-ornament for-the-sake not is-made from equivocation
non est aliena. Quorum ergo necessaria est translatio,
not is foreign of-which therefore necessary is the-transference
multis commode applicantur, et pro modo eorum que
to-many fittingly are-applied and according-to the-manner of-those which
dicuntur accidentaliter predicari sensum plerumque mutant
are-said accidentally to-be-predicated the-sense mostly they-change
ad singula; nemo tamen coniunctionis incompetentiam
for single-things no-one yet of-the-conjunction the-incongruity
reprehendit. Et licet improprius, id est translationis, sensus
blames and although improper that is of-transference sense

suo dictionis, id est quem a prima institutione habuerit,
its-own of-diction that is that-which from the-first institution it-had
sic obtinente usu, sepe preualeat, si forte ad domesticum
so prevailing use often prevail if perhaps to the-domestic
redeant sensum, utique aut nulla absurditas est, aut non
they-return sense surely either no absurdity is or not
tanta quantam arguimus, cum adiectiua uerborum eo
so-great as-much-as we-allege when adjectives of-words thither
trahuntur, ut rerum significent qualitatem. Ecce conuertibile
are-drawn that of-things they-signify the-quality behold convertible
in his ex usu optinet, que se predicatione mutua
in these from use prevails which themselves by-predication mutual
circumscribunt; ut in specie et diffinitione aut proprio. Item
circumscribe as in species and definition or property likewise
finitum et infinitum ad designandas eorum qualitates nomini
finite and infinite for designating their qualities to-the-noun
adiciuntur et uerbo; sed, quoniam hec a rebus sumpta
are-added and to-the-verb but since these from things taken
sunt, nequaquam absonum est, si uelut a peregrinatione
are in-no-way dissonant it-is if as-if from travel
domum redeant, ut res aliqua conuertibilis aut finita
home they-return so-that a-thing some convertible or finite
dicatur aut infinita. Similiter uniuersale et particulare, licet
be-called or infinite likewise universal and particular although
in uerbis eorum uigeat appellatio, quam a rebus mutuata
in words their flourish the-naming which from things borrowed
sunt (secunde enim impositionis non sunt), possunt sine
they-are of-the-second for imposition not they-are they-can without
absurditate rerum nominibus adiectiuis coniungi. Et quidem
absurdity of-things to-the-names as-adjectives to-be-joined and indeed
que a rebus sumpta sunt, ad res redire possunt; sed
what from things taken are to things to-return can but

que inuenta sunt ut uerborum indicent qualitatem,
what invented were that of-words they-may-indicate the-quality
non ea commoditate uel usu deuocantur ut rerum
not with-that fitness or use are-called-off that of-things
indicent qualitatem. Videntur enim aliquid habere simile
they-indicate the-quality they-seem for something to-have similar
cum his generibus uerborum que Grece syncategoremata
with these kinds of-words which in-Greek syncategoremata
appellantur, eo quod, sicut illorum ab adiunctis aut est
are-called by-that that as of-those from the-adjoined either is
aut perpenditur significatio, sic ista, originis sue sociata
or is-weighed the-signification so these of-origin their-own joined
sermonibus, suum commode excitant intellectum; alio
to-the-words their-own fittingly rouse understanding elsewhere
uero traducta, uelut naturali uigore destituta, euanescunt
indeed carried as-if of-natural vigor destitute they-vanish
uel absona sunt. Si enim dicatur equus patronomicus, ilico
or dissonant are if for be-said horse patronymic at-once
gramaticus auditor uel dicenti conuiciabitur, ut uerbi
the-grammatical hearer either the-speaker will-revile that of-the-word
uitium purget aut ut multum loquenti deferat, serui
the-vice he-may-purge or that much to-the-speaker he-may-defer of-the-slave
comici utetur prouerbio: Bona uerba queso. Hec itaque
comic will-use the-proverb good words I-pray this and-so
supplicatio, nonne uitii quedam exprobatio est? Qui enim
supplication surely-not of-vice a-certain reproach is he-who for
pro istis bona querit, hec bona esse proculdubio non
in-place-of those good seeks these good to-be without-doubt not
consentit. Alioquin elegantius diceret: Meliora uerba queso.
consents otherwise more-elegantly he-would-say better words I-pray
Profecto, si modum aut tempus quis querat in nomine, casum
surely if mood or tense anyone seek in a-noun case

et comparationem in uerbo, eum quasi nugacem gramaticus
and comparison in a-verb him as-a trifler the-grammarian
castigabit; unde non opinor quod patientiam accommodet
will-chastise whence not I-think that patience he-may-afford
discipulo equum patronomicum appellanti. Adeo autem nature
to-the-pupil the-horse patronymic calling so-far however of-nature
sue limitibus secunde impositionis adiectiua coartata sunt,
their-own to-the-limits of-the-second imposition adjectives restricted are
ut non modo non queant ad rerum uocabula euagari, sed
that not only not they-can to of-things the-names to-wander but
nec a quibus indita sunt longe recedere. Siquidem
not-even from those-which assigned they-are far withdraw since
propositio recte dicitur ypothetica, nomen patronomicum. Si
a-proposition rightly is-called hypothetical a-noun patronymic if
uicissim uertas, ut dicatur ypotheticum nomen, propositio
in-turn you-turn so-that be-said a-hypothetical noun a-proposition
patronomica, aut nichil utique dices, gramatico iudice,
patronymic either nothing surely you-will-say by-the-grammarian judge
aut inepte loqueris. Preterea penes usum est summa
or ineptly you-speak besides in-the-power-of use is the-sum
examinandi sermonis auctoritas, neque eo non restituente
of-examining speech the-authority nor it not restoring
conualescet quod ipse condemnat. Hinc est illud:
will-grow-strong what itself condemns hence is that-saying

Multa renascentur que iam cecidere, cadentque
many will-be-reborn which already have-fallen and-will-fall
que nunc sunt in honore uocabula, si uolet usus,
which now are in honor words if will-wish use
quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.
in-whose power the-judgment is and the-right and the-norm of-speaking

Sicut enim in iure dicitur quod consuetudo optima legum
as for in law it-is-said that custom the-best of-laws
interpres est; sic et usus recte loquentium est
the-interpreter is so also the-use of-those-rightly speaking is
potentissimus interpres regularum. Unde consequens arbitror
the-most-powerful interpreter of-rules whence consequent I-judge
quia id quod nusquam scriptum legitur, nec alicubi a
that that which nowhere written is-read nor anywhere by
recte loquentibus auditur, sed nec aliquid generis eius, aut
rightly by-those-speaking is-heard but nor anything of-kind its either
pridem damnatum esse aut certe nondum a gramaticis
long-ago condemned to-have-been or certainly not-yet by grammarians
approbatum. Sed nec prime inuentionis nomina uniuersa
approved but neither of-the-first invention the-names all
credo ad omnia commode posse transferri, etsi ad usum
do-I-believe to all-things fittingly to-be-able to-be-transferred even-if for the-use
transumptionis sicut generaliora, ita commodiora sint. Sed quia
of-transumption as more-general so more-convenient they-be but because
frequens est aliquid extra regulam inueniri, erit fortasse aliter
frequent it-is something outside the-rule to-be-found it-will-be perhaps otherwise
quam dictum sit alicubi inueniri; sed quod propositum
than said it-has-been somewhere to-be-found but what proposed
est, usus obtinet. Nam et ea uicissitudo, que rerum est ad
is use holds for also that interchange which of-things is to
sermones sermonumque ad res, que sibi inuicem quasi
words and-of-words to things which to-themselves in-turn as-if
collatione mutua suas proprietates attribuunt, translatiuis
by-collation mutual their-own properties attribute in-transferred
sermonibus quam his quos institutio secundaria promulgauit,
words than in-those which institution secondary published
frequentius explicatur. Regule enim uniuersitati fortasse casus
more-frequently is-unfolded of-the-rule for to-the-universality perhaps chance

derogat; sed nos usum loquimur. Hec itaque translationis uis,
derogates but we use speak-of this and-so of-transference the-force
dum sermonibus quod rerum est et rebus quod sermonum
while to-words what of-things is and to-things what of-words
est ascribit, quandam loquendi parit indifferentiam; que sicut
is it-ascribes a-certain of-speaking begets indifference which as
compendio sui compositis ingeniis prodest, sic indiscreta
by-shortcut its-own to-composed wits profits so the-undiscerning
confundit et prosternit, eisque totius ueritatis precludit
it-confounds and lays-low and-to-them of-all truth shuts-off
intelligentiam. Necesse enim est ei, qui ad notitiam
the-understanding necessary for it-is for-him who to the-knowledge
ueritatis aspirat, ut composito perpendat ingenio quid uelit
of-truth aspires that with-composed he-weigh wit what wishes
dicere etiam qui balbutit; nam et is sepissime uerum dicit.
to-say even he-who stammers for also he very-often true says

Quod et in poetica naturam imitatur

XVII · GRAMMAR IMITATES NATURE IN POETICS TOO

The precepts of poetics follow nature, which first shapes the mind to each fortune and then utters its motions through the tongue; the poet who would make others weep must first grieve. Many deny that poetics belongs to grammar, but John refers it to grammar as its mother and nurse: either grammar holds poetics, or poetics leaves the liberal arts.

In aliis quoque naturam gramatica imitatur; precepta enim
in other-things also nature grammar imitates the-precepts for
poetice, naturam morum patenter exprimunt, exiguntque ut
of-poetics the-nature of-characters plainly express and-require that
artis opifex sequatur naturam.
of-the-art the-craftsman follow nature

Format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
forms for nature first us within to every
fortunarum habitum; iuuat, aut impellit ad iram,
of-fortunes condition she-delights or drives to wrath
aut in humum merore graui deducit et angit;
or to the-ground with-grief heavy brings-down and torments
post effert animi motus interprete lingua.
afterward she-utters of-the-mind the-motions as-interpreter the-tongue

Eo quidem hec, ut a nature uestigiis poeta non
to-that indeed these-things that from of-nature the-footsteps the-poet not
recedat, sed habitu et gestu, item uerbo, ei toto nisu
withdraw but in-bearing and gesture likewise in-word to-her with-whole effort
studeat coherere:
he-strive to-cohere

Si uis me flere, dolendum est
if you-wish me to-weep to-be-grieved it-is
primum ipsi tibi,
first yourself by-you

si gaudere, pregaudendum; alioquin
if to-rejoice to-be-rejoiced-first otherwise

male si mandata loqueris,
badly if the-charges you-speak
aut dormitabo, aut ridebo.
either I-shall-doze or I-shall-laugh

Ad hec, non modo pedum aut temporum ibi ratio
besides these-things not only of-feet or of-times there account
habenda est, sed etatum, locorum, temporum, aliorumque,
to-be-had is but of-ages of-places of-times and-of-other-things
que sigillatim referre ad rem presentem non attinet;
which singly to-relate to the-thing present not pertains
cum omnia a nature officina proueniant. Adeo quidem
since all-things from of-nature the-workshop come so-far indeed
assidet poetica rebus naturalibus, ut eam plerique negauerint
sits-beside poetics things natural that it most have-denied
gramatice speciem esse, asserentes eam esse artem per se, nec
of-grammar a-species to-be asserting it to-be an-art of itself nor

magis ad gramaticam quam ad rethoricam pertinere, affinem
more to grammar than to rhetoric to-pertain akin
tamen utrique, eo quod cum his habeat precepta communia.
yet to-both by-that that with these it-has precepts common
Rixentur super hoc qui uoluerint (non enim hanc protendo
let-them-quarrel over this who will not for this I-prolong
litem) sed omnium pace opinor ut sit hec ad gramaticam
dispute but of-all with-peace I-think that it-be this to grammar
referenda, sicut ad matrem et altricem studii sui. Licet
to-be-referred as to the-mother and nurse of-study its-own although
autem neutra illarum omnino naturalis sit, et ex maxima
however neither of-them altogether natural be and from the-greatest
parte substantie sue hominem, qui eam inuenit, utraque
part of-substance its-own the-man who it invented each
laudet auctorem, natura tamen aliquid iuris sibi uendicat
praises as-author nature yet something of-right for-herself claims
in utraque. Profecto aut poeticam gramatica obtinebit, aut
in each surely either poetics grammar will-hold or
poetica a numero liberalium disciplinarum eliminabitur.
poetics from the-number of-liberal disciplines will-be-driven-out

Quid sequi doceat et quid uitare gramatica

XVIII · WHAT GRAMMAR TEACHES US TO FOLLOW AND TO AVOID

Grammar is the science of writing and speaking rightly, avoiding barbarism in a word and solecism in construction. Art is a public road and vice a way off it; figures hold the middle, metaplasm in one word and schemata in their joining, faults with reason allowed to great authors. Augustine says the poets renamed their solecisms and barbarisms schemata and metaplasms. Whoever cannot tell proper, figurative, and faulty speech apart rarely understands writings faithfully.

Traditum quidem est gramaticam esse recte scribendi
handed-down indeed it-has-been grammar to-be of-rightly writing
recteque loquendi scientiam. Recte quidem dicitur, ut uitium
and-of-rightly speaking the-science rightly indeed it-is-said that vice
excludat, ut scilicet in scribendo sequatur orthographiam,
it-may-shut-out that namely in writing it-may-follow orthography
in loquendo artis et usus auctoritatem. In eo autem
in speaking of-art and of-use the-authority in this however
orthographia, id est recta scriptura, consistit, ut queque
orthography that is right writing consists that each
littera suo ponatur loco, nec alterius usurpet officium
letter in-its-own be-put place nor of-another usurp the-office
aut deserat. Loqui autem est articulata et literata uoce
or desert to-speak however is with-articulate and lettered voice
suum interpretari intellectum. Nam quod dicitur:
one's-own to-interpret understanding for what is-said

nutu signisque loquuntur,
by-nod and-signs they-speak

a sermonis proprietate recedit. Recte quidem loqui est
from of-speech the-propriety departs rightly indeed to-speak is
soloecismi et barbarismi uitium in sermone declinare. Est
of-solecism and of-barbarism the-vice in speech to-avoid is
autem barbarismus corruptio dictionis non barbare, id est
however barbarism corruption of-a-word not barbarous that is
que Greca sit aut Latina. Si enim barbara dictione in
which Greek be or Latin if for a-barbarous word in
nostro utamur eloquio, non barbarismus, sed barbarolexis est.
our we-use speech not barbarism but barbarolexis it-is
Soloecismus autem est corruptio non quidem dictionis, sed
solecism however is corruption not indeed of-a-word but
constructionis, cum aduersus legem construendi incompetenter
of-construction when against the-law of-construing incongruously
uerba iungantur. Fit autem dupliciter; aut per partes
words are-joined it-is-done however doubly either through the-parts
ipsius orationis, aut per accidentia partium. Per partes
of-the-very speech or through the-accidents of-the-parts through the-parts
quidem, ut si alteram quis ponat, pro altera, puta
indeed as if one anyone put for the-other say
prepositionem pro aduerbio, uel e contra; aut si in eadem
a-preposition for an-adverb or on the-contrary or if in the-same
parte genus unum uerborum quis pro altero ponat, puta
part kind one of-words anyone for another put say
secunde inuentionis pro eo quod prime esse oportuit. Per
of-the-second invention for that which of-the-first to-be it-behooved through
accidentia uero, ut per qualitates, genera, casus, numeros,
the-accidents indeed as through qualities genders cases numbers
et figuras. Similiter et in metro metaplasmus reperitur, qui
and figures likewise also in meter metaplasm is-found which
fit in uno uerbo licentius urgente metri lege, sicut
is-made in one word more-licentiously pressing of-meter the-law as

et barbarismus unius dictionis est in soluto eloquio. Dicitur
also barbarism of-one word is in loose speech is-called
autem metaplasmus quasi transformatio uel deformatio, eo
however metaplasm as-if transformation or deformation by-that
quod quasi a iure suo dictionem transformat aut deformat.
that as-if from right its-own the-word it-transforms or deforms
Sunt item scemata, que figure interpretantur in uerbis aut in
are likewise schemata which figures are-interpreted in words or in
sententiis, fiuntque per uarias dictionum formas ad eloquii
sentences and-are-made through various of-words forms for of-speech
uenustatem. Ergo barbarismus et metaplasmus in uerbis
the-grace therefore barbarism and metaplasm in words
singulis deprehenduntur; soloecismus et scemata non in
single are-detected solecism and schemata not in
singulis, sed in plurium coniunctione fiunt. Cum autem tria
single but in of-several the-conjunction are-made since however three
sint, ars, uitium, et figura, notitiam singulorum necesse est
be art vice and figure the-knowledge of-each necessary it-is
habere gramaticum. Alioquin nec arte muniri, nec uitia
to-have the-grammarian otherwise neither by-art to-be-fortified nor vices
declinare, nec uenustates auctorum facile poterit imitari.
to-avoid nor the-graces of-authors easily will-he-be-able to-imitate
Quod si eorum ignarus recte scribit aut loquitur, peritie eius
that if of-them ignorant rightly he-writes or speaks to-the-skill his
adscribendum non est, eo quod casus agit uirtutis opus.
to-be-ascribed not it-is by-that that chance does of-virtue the-work
Ars itaque est quasi strata publica, qua ire, ambulare, et
art and-so is as-if a-road public on-which to-go to-walk and
agere, sine calumnia et concussione omnibus ius est. Vitium
to-drive without false-charge and extortion for-all right it-is vice
est omnibus deuium, ut qui in eo iter actumue exercet,
is for-all off-the-road so-that he-who in it journey or-driving exercises

aut precipitium subeat, aut calumniam et concussionem
either a-precipice undergo or false-charge and extortion
interpellantium patiatur. Figura uero medium tenet locum; et
of-those-accosting suffer figure indeed the-middle holds place and
dum aliquatenus recedit ab utroque, non cadit in alterutrius
while to-some-extent it-withdraws from both not it-falls into of-either
rationem. Omnes itaque sequuntur artem, quia precipitur;
the-account all and-so follow art because it-is-prescribed
declinant uitium, quia prohibetur; sed nonnulli figuris
avoid vice because it-is-forbidden but some figures
utuntur, quia permittitur. Nam inter uitia, barbarismum
use because it-is-permitted for between the-vices barbarism
scilicet et soloecismum, et artem, que uirtus eloquii est et
namely and solecism and art which the-virtue of-speech is and
norma, figure et scemata sunt; metaplasmus scilicet, si ratione
norm figures and schemata are metaplasm namely if by-reason
peccetur in uerbo, scema, si ex causa probabili delictum sit
one-sin in a-word schema if from cause probable the-fault be
in contextu uerborum. Est enim, teste Isidoro, figura uitium
in the-texture of-words is for by-witness Isidore figure vice
cum ratione, ideoque solis auctoribus auctorumque similibus,
with reason and-therefore to-alone authors and-of-authors to-the-like
uiris scilicet eruditissimis, qui dicendorum tacendorumque
men namely most-learned who of-things-to-be-said and-of-things-to-be-kept-silent
nouerunt rationes, hec licentia indulgetur. Magnis, ut ait
know the-reasons this license is-granted great as says
Cicero, et diuinis bonis hanc licentiam assecuti sunt et
Cicero and divine by-goods this license attained have and
assecuntur. Non est leuis auctoritas personarum; omnia dicta
attain not is light the-authority of-persons all sayings
uel facta laudem afferunt uel crimen auferunt, quam frustra
or deeds praise bring or charge remove which in-vain

affectat, nisi qui se in magnis bonis imitabilem prebet.
one-aims-at unless he-who himself in great goods imitable shows
Profecto hoc aliarum virtutum auctoritas meruit ut hec uitia
surely this of-other virtues the-authority has-merited that these vices
maiorum dulcia sint et grata posteris. Unde in secundo
of-the-ancestors sweet be and pleasing to-posterity whence in the-second
de Ordine Augustinus: Soloecismos et barbarismos quos
on Order Augustine solecisms and barbarisms which
uocant poete et quos adamauerunt, scemata et metaplasmos
they-call the-poets and which they-have-loved schemata and metaplasms
mutatis maluerunt appellare nominibus quam manifesta
with-changed preferred to-call names than manifest
uitia declinare. Detrahe tamen ista carminibus, suauissima
vices to-avoid take-away yet these from-poems most-sweet
condimenta desiderabo. Transfer in liberam forensemque
seasonings I-shall-miss-them transfer into free and-forensic
dictionem, quis non eam fugere, atque in theatra se condere
diction who not it to-flee and into theaters itself to-hide
iubebit? Congere multa in unum locum, totum acre putidum
will-bid heap many into one place the-whole sour putrid
rancidum fastidibo. Ergo moderator rerum ordo ea nec
rancid I-shall-loathe therefore the-moderator of-things order them neither
ubilibet nec nusquam esse patietur; quibus interpositis alias
anywhere nor nowhere to-be will-allow by-which interposed otherwise
iacens et uilis erigitur et illustratur oratio. Hec ille; ut
lying and cheap is-raised and illuminated speech these-things he so-that
a precepta constet auctoritate quam necessaria sit notitia
from the-aforesaid be-agreed authority how necessary be the-knowledge
eorum que doctioribus concessa, omnem fere latitudinem
of-those which to-the-more-learned granted all almost the-breadth
occupant scripturarum, ut qui proprie et figurate dicta
occupy of-the-scriptures so-that he-who properly and figuratively said-things

itemque uitiosa non discernit, raro fidelem, numquam uero
and-likewise faulty-things not discerns rarely a-faithful never indeed
facilem eorum, que scripta sunt, intelligentiam assequatur.
an-easy of-those which written are understanding attain

Quod figurarum perutilis est cognitio

XIX · KNOWLEDGE OF FIGURES IS MOST USEFUL

Grammar also treats tropes, such as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, privileged like the schemata. Three things most hinder understanding: figures, sophisms, and the diversity of reasons in the speaker's mind, which Hilary says must be weighed, or the Evangelists will seem to contradict one another, as Solomon seems to in consecutive verses. John wonders that his contemporaries neglect figures, which nearly every grammarian treats, and urges weighing each saying by its circumstance, person, hearers, place, and time.

Disponit et tropos, id est, modos locutionum, ut cum
it-arranges also tropes that is modes of-speech as when
a propria significatione ex causa probabili sermo ad
from proper signification from cause probable speech to
non propriam trahitur significationem; qualis est metaphora,
a-not proper is-drawn signification such-as is metaphor
metonomia, et sinedoche, et similes, quas enumerare longum
metonymy and synecdoche and similar-ones which to-enumerate long
est. Sed et hi ad modum scematum priuilegiati sunt,
is but also these after the-manner of-schemata privileged are
et solis eruditissimis patet usus eorum; unde et lex
and to-alone the-most-learned lies-open the-use of-them whence also the-law
eorum artior est, qua non permittuntur longius euagari.
of-them stricter is by-which not they-are-permitted farther to-wander
Regulariter enim proditum est, quia figuras extendere
as-a-rule for handed-down it-has-been that figures to-extend

non licet. Si quis etiam in translationibus et figuris
not it-is-lawful if anyone also in the-metaphors and figures
auctorum studiosior imitator est, caueat ne sit dura
of-authors a-more-zealous imitator is let-him-beware lest be with-harsh
translatione figura inculta. Virtus enim sermonis optima
metaphor the-figure uncouth the-virtue for of-speech best
est perspicuitas, et facilitas intelligendi; et scematum causa
is clarity and ease of-understanding and of-schemata the-cause
est necessitas aut ornatus. Nam sermo institutus est ut
is necessity or ornament for speech established has-been that
explicet intellectum; et figure admisse, ut quod in eis
it-may-unfold the-understanding and figures admitted that what in them
ab arte dissidet, aliqua commoditate compensent. Horum
from art disagrees by-some advantage they-may-compensate of-these
autem maxime necessaria est cognitio, quia in omnibus que
however most necessary is the-knowledge because in all-things which
prepediunt intellectum tria solent pre ceteris accusari; hec
hinder understanding three are-wont before the-others to-be-accused these
autem sunt scemata, adiunctis tropis oratorum sophismata,
however are schemata added tropes of-orators sophisms
que fallaciarum nube obducunt animos auditorum; et
which of-fallacies with-a-cloud veil the-minds of-hearers and
rationum diuersitas, que preiacet in animo dicentis
of-reasons the-diversity which lies-beforehand in the-mind of-the-speaker
et rectam intelligentie cognita parat uiam. Siquidem, ut
and the-right of-understanding when-known prepares way since as
Hilarius ait, intelligentia sumenda est ex causis dicendi;
Hilary says understanding to-be-taken is from the-causes of-speaking
alioquin etiam in scripturis canonicis rixabuntur patres,
otherwise even in scriptures canonical will-quarrel the-fathers
sibique erunt etiam Euangeliste contrarii, si iudex
and-with-themselves will-be even the-Evangelists at-odds if a-judge

insulsus ad solam dictorum superficiem et non ad dicentium
witless to the-sole of-sayings surface and not to of-the-speakers
mentes aspiciat. Hoc itaque peruersi ingenii est et suum
the-minds look this and-so of-perverse wit is and its-own
aspernantis profectum. Nonne Salomon, non modo in eodem
spurning advance surely Solomon not only in the-same
libro et in eadem pagina, sed etiam continuis uersibus, dicit:
book and in the-same page but also in-consecutive verses says
Ne respondeas stulto secundum stulticiam suam, ne efficiaris
not answer a-fool according-to folly his lest you-be-made
ei similis; et responde stulto secundum stulticiam suam,
to-him like and answer a-fool according-to folly his
ne sibi sapiens uideatur? Itaque regule sciende sunt, ut ad
lest to-himself wise he-seem and-so the-rules to-be-known are that by
illas constet quid in sermone rectum sit, quid enorme; quia
them it-be-agreed what in speech right be what abnormal because
nisi ad regulam praua non corriges, nulloque studio
unless by the-rule crooked-things not you-will-correct and-by-no zeal
ignotum precipitium declinabis. At in regulis uix aliquid
an-unknown precipice you-will-avoid but in rules scarcely anything
utilius aut compendiosius dixerim ea parte artium que,
more-useful or more-concise would-I-say than-that part of-the-arts which
dum figuras notat auctorum, uirtutes et uitia sermonum
while figures it-marks of-authors the-virtues and the-vices of-speech
luculenter ostendit? Unde miror quare tantopere a coetaneis
brilliantly shows whence I-wonder why so-much by contemporaries
nostris negligitur, cum utilissima sit et compendiosissima
our it-is-neglected since most-useful it-is and most-concise
et fere ab omnibus scriptoribus huius artis diligentissime
and almost by all writers of-this art most-diligently
pertractata. Donatus, Seruius, Priscianus, Isidorus, Cassiodorus,
treated Donatus Servius Priscian Isidore Cassiodorus

Beda noster et alii quamplures eam singuli tractant, ut nisi
Bede our and others very-many it each treat so-that unless
ex negligentia ignota esse non possit. Quintilianus quoque
from negligence unknown to-be not it-can Quintilian also
hanc tradit, et tantis effert preconiis, ut sine hac nec
this hands-on and with-such extols praises that without this neither
nomen professionis dicat constare gramatico, et frustra
the-name of-the-profession he-says to-stand for-the-grammarian and in-vain
ad artis peritiam aspirare. Verborum autem significatio
to of-the-art the-skill to-aspire of-words however the-signification
diligentius excutienda est, et quid sermo quilibet in se, quid
more-diligently to-be-shaken-out is and what a-speech any in itself what
ab adiunctis in contextu possit, sollertius perscrutandum,
from the-adjoined in context can more-skillfully to-be-scrutinized
ut sophismatum umbras, que uerum obnubilant, discutere
so-that of-sophisms the-shadows which the-true cloud to-dispel
possit. Dicendi autem ratio pensanda est ex circumstantia
one-may of-saying however the-reason to-be-weighed is from the-circumstance
dictorum, ex qualitate persone, ex qualitate auditorum,
of-the-sayings from the-quality of-the-person from the-quality of-the-hearers
ex loco et tempore, aliisque uario modo apud
from place and time and-other-things in-various way by
diligentem exploratorem considerandis. Si quis autem his
a-diligent explorer to-be-considered if anyone however to-these
diligenter institerit, que aduersus tria intellectus
diligently will-have-applied-himself which against three of-understanding
repagula proposita sunt, profectum suum in scriptis et dictis
the-barriers set are advance his-own in writings and sayings
intelligendis et ipse mirabitur et aliis uenerabilis apparebit.
to-be-understood both himself will-wonder-at and to-others venerable will-appear

In quibus gramaticum oporteat occupari

XX · WHAT A GRAMMARIAN MUST ATTEND TO

Grammar also studies feet, accents, and the punctuation that marks colon, comma, and period, and the old notes that marked doubt and certainty in writings, an art of shorthand now lost, though musicians still mark many sounds with few characters. Seneca promised an art of memory, and Cicero attempted one. The rules of analogy, etymology, glosses, differences, vices, figures, and meters would profit greatly; Isidore is a ready and praiseworthy guide.

Versatur et circa alia gramatice studium, et non modo
is-occupied also about other-things of-grammar the-study and not only
litterarum, sillabarum, dictionumque naturam considerat, sed
of-letters of-syllables and-of-words the-nature it-considers but
pedes in metris, accentus in sillabis, attendit, sed et figuras
feet in meters accents in syllables it-attends-to but also the-figures
accentuum; ut scias cui sillabe grauis, acutus, aut
of-accents so-that you-may-know on-which syllable grave acute or
circumflexus accentus innitatur. Sensus quoque distinguit
circumflex accent rests the-meanings also it-distinguishes
posituris, id est figuris indicantibus ubi colon, ubi coma, ubi
by-positions that is by-figures indicating where colon where comma where
periodus, id est ubi subdistinctio aut media distinctio aut
period that is where subdistinction or middle distinction or
distinctio facienda sit. Quod quidem significantius interpretari
distinction to-be-made be which indeed more-significantly to-interpret
possumus, ut sit colon membrum, coma articulus, periodus
we-can so-that be colon a-member comma a-joint period
circuitus, qui sermonis sententiam claudit. Sed quidam, ut
a-circuit which of-speech the-sentence closes but some that
patentius sit, dicunt (an recte uiderint ipsi,) colon
more-plainly it-may-be say whether rightly they-have-seen themselves colon

esse, ubi uulgariter punctum dicimus aut quendam spiritus
to-be where commonly point we-say or a-certain of-breath
tractum: coma, ubi quasi diuisione media partimur uersum;
drawing comma where as-if by-division middle we-part the-verse
peryodum, que sermonis sensum cum integritate concludit.
period which of-speech the-sense with completeness concludes
Sunt et note, que scripturarum distinguunt modos; ut
there-are also marks which of-writings distinguish the-modes so-that
deprehendatur quid in eis lucidum, quid obscurum, quid
be-grasped what in them clear what obscure what
certum, quid dubium, et in hunc modum plurima. Pars
certain what doubtful and in this way very-many-things part
hec tamen artis iam ex maxima parte in desuetudinem
this yet of-the-art already from the-greatest part into disuse
abiit; adeo quidem ut studiosissimi litterarum merito
has-gone so-far indeed that the-most-zealous of-letters deservedly
querantur et fere lugeant rem utilissimam et tam ad
complain and almost mourn a-thing most-useful and as-much for
res retinendas quam intelligendas efficacissimam maiorum
things to-be-retained as to-be-understood most-effective of-ancestors
nostrorum inuidia aut negligentia, artem dico deperisse
our by-the-envy or negligence the-art I-mean to-have-perished
notariam. Nec miretur quis tantam uim fuisse in notulis,
notarial nor let-wonder anyone such force to-have-been in little-marks
cum et musici cantores paucis caracteribus multas acutarum
since also musical singers with-few characters many of-acute
et grauium differentias indicent uocum. Et ob hoc
and grave differences indicate of-sounds and on-account-of this
quidem caracteres illos musice claues dicunt. Si tamen tante
indeed characters those of-music keys they-call if however of-such
scientie clauis fuit in notulis, mirum est nostros, licet
knowledge the-key was in little-marks wonderful it-is our although

plura scierint, non agnouisse maiores, aut tante scientie
more-things they-knew not to-have-recognized ancestors or of-such knowledge
perditas esse claues. Seneca se artem comparande memorie
lost to-be the-keys Seneca himself the-art of-acquiring memory
traditurum facillime pollicetur; ut utinam innotuisset
about-to-hand-down most-easily promises as would-that it-had-become-known
michi, sed quod eam tradiderit, omnino non recolo. Tullius
to-me but that it he-handed-down at-all not I-recall Tully
in Rethoricis operam dedisse uisus est; sed similibus
in the-Rhetorics effort to-have-given seemed has but to-those-like
mei non multum prodest. Extant autem que discere
me not much it-profits there-are however things-which to-learn
uix sufficimus, sed minus curamus. Proficerent tamen
scarcely we-suffice but less we-care would-profit yet
plurimum regule analogiarum, ethimologiarum, glosematum,
very-much the-rules of-analogies of-etymologies of-glosses
differentiarum; et que barbarismi, soloecismi, aliorumque
of-differences and those-which of-barbarism of-solecism and-of-others
uitandorum uitia monstrant; metaplasmi, scematumque et
to-be-avoided the-vices show of-metaplasm and-of-schemata and
troporum licentiosas et ornatas edocent rationes, prosas
of-tropes the-licentious and ornate teach reasons prose
aperiunt, metrorum leges edicunt, et exponunt causas,
they-open of-meters the-laws they-proclaim and expound the-causes
et qua ratione uti oporteat in historiis aut narrationibus
and by-what reason to-use it-behooves in histories or narrations
fabulosis. Si quis istorum diffinitiones figurasque desiderat,
fabulous if anyone of-these the-definitions and-figures desires
superiorum gramaticorum libros euoluat; quos si uniuersos
of-the-earlier grammarians the-books let-him-unroll which if all
ad manum habere non potest, exploret quid scitu
at hand to-have not he-can let-him-explore what to-be-known

dignum carpat a singulis. Quia, etsi non omnes ad
worthy let-him-pluck from each because even-if not all for
omnia, quisque utilis inuenitur, ad multa Isidorus tamen et
all-things each useful is-found for many Isidore yet both
satis communis est et diligenti breuitate laudabilis, et si totus
enough common is and for-diligent brevity praiseworthy and if whole
haberi non potest, ad instructionem legendorum plurimum
to-be-had not he-can for the-instruction of-things-to-be-read very-much
confert ipsius memoriter uel hanc tenuisse particulam.
it-contributes his by-heart even this to-have-held particle

Quantis uiris placuerit, et quod sine ea non magis
quis philosophari potest quam si sit surdus aut mutus

XXI · NO ONE PHILOSOPHIZES WITHOUT GRAMMAR

Grammar fits the mind for everything that words can teach. Some boast of chattering without it; yet Cicero demanded it of his son, Caesar wrote on analogy, and Quintilian holds that its study ends only with life. Martianus gives Grammar a scalpel, a rod, and an ointment box, since she purges faults, punishes, and soothes pain. She is the key of all writings, and to reject her is to make the blind and deaf fitter for philosophy.

Patet ex his non circa unum gramaticam occupari, sed
it-is-plain from these not about one-thing grammar to-be-occupied but
ad omnia que uerbo doceri possunt, ut eorum capax
for all-things which by-word to-be-taught can that of-them capable
sit, animum preformare; unde quantum ei omnes alie
it-may-be the-mind to-preform whence how-much to-it all other
discipline obnoxie sint, quisque consideret. Ad laudem suam
disciplines indebted be let-each consider to praise their-own
referendum putant quidam nostrorum quod sine gramatica
to-be-referred they-think some of-ours that without grammar

garriunt eamque credunt inutilem et palam culpant, gloriantes
they-chatter and-it they-believe useless and openly blame glorying
se ei operam non dedisse. At Marcus Tullius non
themselves to-it effort not to-have-given but Marcus Tullius not
oderat filium, a quo in epistolis, sicut apparet, gramaticam
hated his-son from whom in letters as appears grammar
instantissime exigebat. Gaius Cesar de Analogia libros edidit,
most-urgently he-demanded Gaius Caesar on Analogy books published
sciens sine ea neque ad philosophiam (in qua peritissimus
knowing without it neither to philosophy in which most-skilled
erat) nec ad eloquentiam (in qua potentissimus) posse
he-was nor to eloquence in which most-powerful to-be-able
quempiam peruenire. Quintilianus eam commendat adeo ut
anyone to-arrive Quintilian it commends so-far that
dicat quia usus gramatices et amor lectionis non scolarum
he-says that the-use of-grammar and the-love of-reading not of-schools
temporibus, sed uite spatio terminetur. Nam et intelligere
by-the-times but of-life by-the-span be-ended for both to-understand
docet et dicere; accentus regit, et ipsius uocis, qua
it-teaches and to-speak accents it-rules and of-the-very voice which
utimur prout personis et rebus conuenit, usquequaque
we-use according-as to-persons and things it-befits in-every-way
instrumenta componit. Nam et pronuntiationis lex alia metro,
the-instruments it-composes for also of-pronunciation law one for-meter
alia prose prescribitur. Siquidem alia melica, alia metrica,
another for-prose is-prescribed since one melic another metric
alia significatiua est. Sed ad musicam melica pertinet.
another significative is but to music the-melic pertains
Unde et Cesar pretextatus egregio scomate lusit in
whence also Caesar as-a-boy with-an-excellent jest played against
quendam: Si legis, cantas; si cantas, male cantas. Eo
someone if you-read you-sing if you-sing badly you-sing to-this

spectat quod Marcianus in Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologie
looks that Martianus in the-Marriage of-Mercury and of-Philology
Gramaticam inducit cum scalpro et ferula et unguentaria
Grammar brings-in with a-scalpel and a-rod and an-ointment
pixide medicorum. Scalpro siquidem oris uitia purgat
box of-physicians with-the-scalpel since of-the-mouth the-vices she-purges
et infantium linguas, qui ad artem philosophie, ea prelactante
and of-infants the-tongues who to the-art of-philosophy she nursing-first
cibante et ducente, ituri sunt, radit, dum erudit; et ne
feeding and leading about-to-go are she-scrapes while she-trains and lest
barbarismo, aut soloecismo balbutiant, in sermone preformat;
in-barbarism or in-solecism they-stammer in speech she-preforms
peccantes autem castigat ferula; et unguento honestatis
the-erring however she-chastises with-the-rod and with-the-ointment of-honor
et utilitatis, que ex ea prouenit, patientium mitigat penam.
and of-utility which from her comes of-the-sufferers she-soothes the-pain
Manum quoque ad recte scribendum reddit idoneam;
the-hand also for rightly writing she-renders fit
acuit et uisum, ut ei partes littere densiores aut uelum
she-sharpens also the-sight that to-it the-parts of-a-letter denser or a-veil
multipliciter elaboratum obstare non possit. Aures aperit,
manifoldly elaborated to-stand-in-the-way not can the-ears she-opens
et tam grauibus quam acutis, immo et cunctis uocibus
and as-much to-grave as to-acute nay also to-all sounds
reddit accommodas. Si ergo tantum utilitatis prestat, et
she-renders adapted if therefore so-much of-utility she-furnishes and
clauis est omnium scripturarum et totius sermonis mater
the-key is of-all writings and of-all speech mother
et arbitra, quis eam a philosophie liminibus arcebit, nisi
and arbiter who her from of-philosophy the-thresholds will-keep-off except
qui intelligentiam eorum que dicuntur aut scripta sunt
he-who the-understanding of-those which are-said or written are

ad philosophandum credit esse superfluam. Utique qui
for philosophizing believes to-be superfluous surely those-who
eam abiciunt aut contemnunt, cecos et surdos philosophicis
her cast-off or despise the-blind and deaf for-philosophical
studiis faciunt aptiores, quam eos quibus nature gratia
studies make more-apt than those to-whom of-nature the-favor
integri sensus uigorem contulit et conseruat.
of-whole sense the-vigor has-conferred and preserves

Quod auctoritate Senece suum tueatur errorem

XXII · HE DEFENDS HIS ERROR BY SENECA'S AUTHORITY

Cornificius cites Seneca, who held that the liberal arts do not make a man good; Seneca is rich in moral teaching, though Quintilian blamed his sweet faults. John agrees that charity alone makes a good man, but Seneca does not banish the arts from philosophy; poetry profits virtue, as Horace reread Homer. The ancients held that whoever fully knows the arts can understand every book without a teacher.

Magno tamen se Cornificius tuetur iudice, et erroris
by-a-great yet himself Cornificius defends judge and of-error
sui ⟨Senecam⟩ laudat auctorem. Qui quidem duabus de
his-own ⟨Seneca⟩ he-praises as-author who indeed two for
causis merito a pluribus commendatur. Multus enim est
reasons deservedly by many is-commended much for he-is
in laude uirtutis morumque doctrina; et comatico genere
in praise of-virtue and-of-morals teaching and in-the-comatic kind
dicendi utens quod breuiter et succincte sententias colligit,
of-speaking using which briefly and succinctly sentences gathers
ornatu uerborum splendet; ut eis displicere non
with-the-ornament of-words he-shines so-that to-those to-displease not
possit, qui aut uirtutem amant aut eloquentiam. Nam, ut
he-can who either virtue love or eloquence for that

pace Quintiliani loquar (qui sic hominis ingenium laudat
by-the-leave of-Quintilian I-may-speak who so of-the-man the-wit praises
ut iudicium culpet, dicitque eum dulcibus uitiis habundasse,
that the-judgment he-blames and-says him in-sweet vices to-have-abounded
et magis placuisse pueris quam eruditis, et summas rerum
and more to-have-pleased boys than the-learned and the-sums of-things
minutissimis sententiis frangere, unde libri eius ab uno
with-most-minute sentences to-break whence the-books his by one
imperatorum appellati sunt arena sine calce), nullus inter
of-the-emperors called were sand without lime no among
gentiles ethicus inuenitur aut rarus, cuius uerbis aut sententiis
gentiles moralist is-found or rare whose words or sentences
in omni negotio commodius uti possis. Ad omnia enim
in every business more-fittingly to-use you-could to all-things for
suum aliquid confert. Sentit hic quod discipline liberales
his-own something he-contributes he-thinks here that disciplines liberal
uirum bonum non faciunt. Ego ei consentio; et de
a-man good not make I with-him agree and about
aliis hoc ipsum arbitror. Scientia enim inflat, sed caritas sola
others this very-thing I-judge knowledge for puffs-up but charity alone
uirum facit bonum. Deprimit artes, sed tamen a philosophia
a-man makes good he-depresses the-arts but yet from philosophy
non reicit; neque enim soli philosophi boni uiri sunt.
not he-casts-them-out nor for alone philosophers good men are
Gramaticus, inquit, circa curam sermonis uersatur; et ut
the-grammarian he-says about the-care of-speech is-occupied and that
longius euagetur, circa historias; ut longissime procedat,
farther he-may-wander about histories that farthest he-may-proceed
circa carmina. Hoc autem parum non est, sed plurimum
about poems this however little not is but very-much

prodest ad informationem uirtutis, que facit uirum bonum.
it-profits for the-forming of-virtue which makes a-man good
Gloriatur Horatius se uirtutis causa relegisse Homerum,
boasts Horace himself of-virtue for-the-sake-of to-have-reread Homer

qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
who what be beautiful what base what useful what not
pulchrius et melius Crisippo et Cantore dicit.
more-finely and better than-Chrysippus and Crantor says

Poetas philosophorum cunas esse celebre est. Disciplinas
the-poets of-philosophers the-cradle to-be celebrated it-is the-disciplines
liberales tante utilitatis esse tradit antiquitas, ut quicumque
liberal of-such utility to-be hands-on antiquity that whoever
eas plene norint, libros omnes et quecunque scripta
them fully know books all and whatever written
sunt, possint intelligere etiam sine doctore. Ut enim ait
are can to-understand even without a-teacher as for says
Quintilianus, non nocent he discipline per illas euntibus,
Quintilian not harm these disciplines through them going
sed circa illas herentibus.
but about them sticking

Que precipua sunt ad exercitium philosophie et uirtutis; et quod gramatica eorum est fundamentum

XXIII · THE CHIEF AIDS OF PHILOSOPHY AND VIRTUE

Reading, teaching, meditation, and the practice of good works are the chief exercises of philosophy and virtue. Reading and teaching use writings, meditation reaches the unknown, and practice prepares understanding. Knowledge precedes virtue, which does not beat the air. Grammar, root of the three that beget knowledge, sows in nature's furrows, but grace alone makes a man good and gives the faculty of speaking and writing rightly; despised, it justly withdraws.

Precipua autem sunt ad totius philosophie et uirtutis
foremost however are for of-the-whole philosophy and of-virtue
exercitium, lectio, doctrina, meditatio, et assiduitas operis.
the-exercise reading teaching meditation and assiduity of-work
Lectio uero scriptorum preiacentem habet materiam;
reading indeed of-writings lying-before has matter
doctrina et scriptis plerumque incumbit, et interdum
teaching both on-writings mostly leans and sometimes
ad non scripta progreditur, que tamen in archanis
to not written-things proceeds which yet in the-secret-places
memorie recondita sunt aut in presentis rei intelligentia
of-memory stored are or in of-a-present thing the-understanding
eminent. At meditatio etiam ad ignota protenditur et
stand-out but meditation even to unknown-things extends and
usque ad incomprehensibilia sepe seipsam erigit et tam
even to incomprehensible-things often itself raises and as-much
manifesta rerum quam abdita rimatur. Quartum, operis
the-manifest of-things as the-hidden it-searches the-fourth of-work
scilicet assiduitas, etsi a preexistente cognitione formetur,
namely assiduity although by preexisting knowledge it-be-formed
scientiamque desideret, uias tamen parat intelligentie; eo
and-knowledge desire ways yet it-prepares for-understanding by-that

quod intellectus bonus est omnibus facientibus eum. Et
that understanding good is to-all doing it and
precones ueritatis, ut scriptum est, adnuntiauerunt opera Dei
the-heralds of-truth as written it-is announced the-works of-God
et facta eius intellexerunt. Ceterum operationem cultumque
and the-deeds his they-understood however the-operation and-cultivation
uirtutis scientia naturaliter precedit, neque enim uirtus currit
of-virtue knowledge naturally precedes nor for virtue runs
in incertum; aut in pugna, quam exercet cum uitiis, aerem
into uncertainty or in the-fight which it-wages with vices the-air
uerberat, sed uidet quo tendit, et in quo dirigit arcum.
beats but it-sees whither it-tends and at what it-aims the-bow
Nec passim coruos sequitur testaque lutoque. At lectio,
nor at-random crows does-it-follow with-potsherd and-with-mud but reading
doctrina, et meditatio scientiam pariunt. Unde constat
teaching and meditation knowledge beget whence it-is-agreed
quod gramatica, que istorum fundamentum est et radix,
that grammar which of-these the-foundation is and root
quodammodo sementem iacit quasi in sulcis nature, gratia
in-a-way seed casts as-if into the-furrows of-nature grace
tamen preeunte, que, si ei cooperatrix quoque affuerit,
yet going-before which if to-it as-fellow-worker also it-will-be-present
in solide uirtutis robur coalescit, et crescit multipliciter, ut
into solid of-virtue strength coalesces and grows manifoldly so-that
boni operis fructum faciat, unde boni uiri et nominantur et
of-good work fruit it-make whence good men both are-named and
sunt. Sola tamen gratia, que et uelle bonum et perficere
are alone yet grace which both to-will good and to-accomplish
operatur, uirum bonum facit, et pre ceteris omnibus recte
works a-man good makes and before others all of-rightly
scribendi et recte loquendi, quibus datum est, facultatem
writing and of-rightly speaking to-whom given it-is the-faculty

impertitur, artesque ministrat uarias et, cum se indigentibus
imparts and-arts furnishes various and when itself to-the-needy
benigne offert, contempni non debet. Si enim contempnitur,
kindly it-offers to-be-despised not it-ought if for it-is-despised
iuste recedit, nec contemptori relinquitur conquestionis locus.
justly it-withdraws nor to-the-despiser is-left of-complaint room

De usu legendi et prelegendi; et consuetudine Bernardi Carnotensis et sequacium ejus

XXIV · PRELECTION AND THE CUSTOM OF BERNARD OF CHARTRES

Prelection, the reading master and pupil share, shows parts of speech, feet, figures, and what authors borrowed from the disciplines. Bernard of Chartres taught so, with daily recitation, an evening declension ending in prayer, imitation without theft, and daily prose and verse. John's masters William of Conches and Richard the Bishop followed him until, when professors promised all philosophy in two or three years, the unskilled crowd overcame them; grammar is now neglected, and its despiser is not even lettered.

Qui ergo ad philosophiam aspirat, apprehendat lectionem,
he-who therefore to philosophy aspires let-him-grasp reading
doctrinam, et meditationem, cum exercitio boni operis,
teaching and meditation with the-exercise of-good work
nequando irascatur Dominus, et quod uidebatur habere,
lest-ever be-angry the-Lord and what he-seemed to-have
auferatur ab eo. Sed quia legendi uerbum equiuocum
be-taken-away from him but since of-reading the-word equivocal
est, tam ad docentis et discentis exercitium quam ad
is as-much to of-the-teacher and of-the-learner the-exercise as to
occupationem per se scrutantis scripturas; alterum, id
the-occupation by himself of-one-scrutinizing the-writings the-one that

est quod inter doctorem et discipulum communicatur, (ut
is which between teacher and pupil is-shared that
uerbo utamur Quintiliani) dicatur prelectio, alterum quod
the-word we-may-use of-Quintilian let-be-called prelection the-other which
ad scrutinium meditantis accedit, lectio simpliciter appelletur.
to the-scrutiny of-the-meditator comes reading simply let-be-called
Ergo, ab auctoritate eiusdem Quintiliani, in prelegendo
therefore on the-authority of-the-same Quintilian in prelecting
gramaticus et illa quidem minora prestare debebit, ut
the-grammarian also those indeed lesser-things to-furnish will-be-bound that
partes orationis reddi sibi soluto uersu desideret,
the-parts of-speech to-be-rendered to-him with-loosened verse he-require
et pedum proprietates que debent in carminibus note esse.
and of-the-feet the-properties which ought in poems known to-be
Deprehendat que barbara, que impropria aut alias contra
let-him-detect what-things barbarous what improper or otherwise against
legem loquendi composita. Non tamen ut poetas improbet,
the-law of-speaking composed not yet so-that the-poets he-reprove
quibus ob metri necessitatem adeo ignoscitur, ut uitia
to-whom on-account-of of-meter the-necessity so-far it-is-pardoned that vices
uirtutum nomine censeantur; laudem enim uirtutis plerumque
of-virtues by-the-name be-reckoned the-praise for of-virtue often
occupat necessitatis improbitas, cui sine dispendio negari
occupies of-necessity the-shamelessness to-which without loss to-be-denied
non potest assensus. Metaplasmum, scematismumque, et
not can assent metaplasm and-schematism and
oratorios tropos, multiplicitatem dictionum, cum affuerint,
oratorical tropes the-multiplicity of-words when they-will-be-present
et diuersas sic uel sic dicendi rationes ostendat et crebris
and the-diverse so or so of-speaking ways let-him-show and with-frequent
commonitionibus agat in memoriam auditorum.
admonitions let-him-drive-them into the-memory of-the-hearers

Auctores excutiat, et sine intuentium risu eos plumis
the-authors let-him-shake-out and without of-the-onlookers laughter them of-feathers
spoliet, quas (ad modum cornicule) ex uariis disciplinis,
let-him-despoil which after the-manner of-the-little-crow from various disciplines
ut color aptior sit, suis operibus indiderunt. Quantum
that the-color more-apt be to-their-own works they-put by-as-much-as
pluribus disciplinis et habundantius quisque imbutus
in-more disciplines and more-abundantly each steeped
fuerit, tanto elegantiam auctorum plenius intuebitur
will-have-been by-so-much the-elegance of-the-authors more-fully he-will-behold
planiusque docebit. Illi enim per diacrisim, quam nos
and-more-plainly he-will-teach they for through diacrisis which we
illustrationem siue picturationem possumus appellare, cum
illustration or picturing can call when
rudem materiam historie aut argumenti aut fabule aliamue
the-rough matter of-history or of-argument or of-fable or-other
quamlibet suscepissent, eam tanta disciplinarum copia et
any they-had-taken-up it with-such of-disciplines abundance and
tanta compositionis et condimenti gratia excolebant, ut
with-such of-composition and of-seasoning grace they-cultivated that
opus consummatum omnium artium quodammodo uideretur
the-work finished of-all arts in-a-way might-seem
imago. Siquidem Gramatica Poeticaque se totas infundunt,
the-image since Grammar and-Poetics themselves wholly pour
et eius quod exponitur totam superficiem occupant. Huic,
and of-that which is-expounded the-whole surface occupy to-this
ut dici solet, campo Logica, probandi colores afferens,
as to-be-said it-is-wont field Logic of-proving the-colors bringing
suas immittit rationes in fulgore auri; et Rethorica in
its-own sends reasons in the-gleam of-gold and Rhetoric in
locis persuasionum et nitore eloquii candorem argenteum
the-places of-persuasions and in-the-sheen of-speech the-whiteness silvery

emulatur. Mathematica quadruuii sui rotis uehitur,
emulates Mathematics of-the-quadrivium its-own on-the-wheels is-carried
aliarumque uestigiis insistens, colores et uenustates suas
and-of-the-others in-the-footsteps treading its-colors and graces its-own
multiplici uarietate contexit. Phisica, exploratis nature
with-manifold variety interweaves Physics having-explored of-nature
consiliis, de promptuario suo affert multiplicem colorum
the-counsels from storehouse its-own brings manifold of-colors
uenustatem. Illa autem que ceteris philosophie partibus
grace that however which than-the-other of-philosophy parts
preminet, Ethicam dico, sine qua nec philosophi subsistit
stands-out Ethics I-mean without which neither of-philosopher subsists
nomen, collati decoris gratia omnes alias antecedit. Excute
the-name of-conferred beauty in-grace all others precedes shake-out
Virgilium aut Lucanum, et ibi cuiuscunque philosophie
Virgil or Lucan and there of-whatever philosophy
professor sis, eiusdem inuenies condituram. Ergo pro
professor you-be of-the-same you-will-find the-seasoning therefore according-to
capacitate discentis aut docentis industria et diligentia,
the-capacity of-the-learner or of-the-teacher the-industry and diligence
constat fructus prelectionis auctorum. Sequebatur hunc morem
stands the-fruit of-the-prelection of-authors followed this custom
Bernardus Carnotensis, exundantissimus modernis temporibus
Bernard of-Chartres the-most-overflowing in-modern times
fons litterarum in Gallia, et in auctorum lectione quid
fount of-letters in Gaul and in of-authors the-reading what
simplex esset et ad imaginem regule positum ostendebat;
simple was and after the-image of-the-rule placed he-showed
figuras gramatice, colores rethoricos, cauillationes sophismatum,
the-figures of-grammar the-colors rhetorical the-quibbles of-sophisms
et qua parte sui proposite lectionis articulus respiciebat
and in-what part of-itself of-the-set reading the-point looked

ad alias disciplinas, proponebat in medio; ita tamen ut
to other disciplines he-set-forth in the-midst so yet that
non in singulis uniuersa doceret, sed pro capacitate
not in each-thing all-things he-taught but according-to the-capacity
audientium dispensaret eis in tempore doctrine mensuram.
of-the-hearers he-dispensed to-them in time of-teaching the-measure
Et, quia splendor orationis aut a proprietate est, id est,
and since the-splendor of-speech either from propriety is that is
cum adiectiuum aut uerbum substantiuo eleganter adiungitur,
when an-adjective or verb to-a-substantive elegantly is-joined
aut a translatione, id est, ubi sermo ex causa probabili
or from metaphor that is where speech from cause probable
ad alienam traducitur significationem, hec sumpta occasione
to another's is-carried-over signification these taken occasion
inculcabat mentibus auditorum. Et quoniam memoria exercitio
he-inculcated on-the-minds of-the-hearers and since memory by-exercise
firmatur, ingeniumque acuitur ad imitandum ea que
is-strengthened and-wit is-sharpened for imitating those-things which
audiebant, alios admonitionibus, alios flagellis et penis
they-heard some with-admonitions others with-floggings and penalties
urgebat. Cogebantur exsoluere singuli die sequenti
he-urged they-were-compelled to-render each on-the-day following
aliquid eorum que precedenti audierant; alii plus, alii
something of-those which on-the-preceding they-had-heard some more others
minus; erat enim apud eos precedentis discipulus sequens
less was for with them of-the-preceding the-pupil the-following
dies. Vespertinum exercitium, quod declinatio dicebatur,
day the-evening exercise which declension was-called
tanta copiositate gramatice refertum erat, ut siquis in
with-such abundance of-grammar packed was that if-anyone in
eo per annum integrum uersaretur, rationem loquendi et
it through year whole were-occupied the-method of-speaking and

scribendi, si non esset hebetior, haberet ad manum, et
of-writing if not he-were duller he-would-have at hand and
significationem sermonum, qui in communi usu uersantur,
the-signification of-words which in common use are-current
ignorare non posset. Sed quia nec scolam nec diem
to-be-ignorant-of not he-could but since neither a-school nor a-day
aliquem decet esse religionis expertem, ea proponebatur
any befits to-be of-religion devoid that was-set-forth
materia que fidem edificaret et mores, et unde qui
matter which faith would-edify and morals and whence those-who
conuenerant, quasi collatione quadam, animarentur ad bonum.
had-assembled as-if by-collation a-certain might-be-animated to good
Nouissimus autem huius declinationis, immo philosophice
the-last however of-this declension nay of-philosophical
collationis, articulus pietatis uestigia preferebat; et animas
collation the-point of-piety the-traces bore-before and the-souls
defunctorum commendabat deuota oblatione psalmi qui
of-the-dead commended with-devout offering of-the-psalm which
in penitentialibus sextus est et in oratione Dominica
among the-penitential the-sixth is and in the-prayer Lord's
Redemptori suo. Quibus autem indicebantur preexercitamina
to-the-Redeemer his to-whom however were-assigned the-preliminary-exercises
puerorum in prosis, aut poematibus imitandis poetas aut
of-boys in prose or poems to-be-imitated poets or
oratores proponebat, et eorum iubebat uestigia imitari,
orators he-set-forth and their he-bade footsteps to-imitate
ostendens iuncturas dictionum et elegantes sermonum
showing the-joinings of-words and elegant of-speech
clausulas. Si quis autem ad splendorem sui operis
closings if anyone however for the-splendor of-his-own work
alienum pannum assuerat, deprehensum redarguebat furtum;
another's patch had-sewn-on detected he-rebuked the-theft

sed penam sepissime non infligebat. Sic uero redargutum,
but the-penalty very-often not he-inflicted so indeed rebuked-one
si hoc tamen meruerat inepta positio ad exprimendam
if this however he-had-deserved the-inept placing to express
auctorum imaginem, modesta indulgentia conscendere iubebat,
of-the-authors the-image with-modest indulgence to-climb he-bade
faciebatque, ut qui maiores imitabatur, fieret posteris
and-he-made that who the-ancients imitated should-become for-posterity
imitandus. Id quoque inter prima rudimenta docebat et
to-be-imitated this also among the-first rudiments he-taught and
infigebat animis, que in economia uirtus; que in decore
fixed in-minds what in arrangement virtue what in the-decorum
rerum, que in uerbis laudanda sint; ubi tenuitas et quasi
of-things what in words praiseworthy be where thinness and as-if
macies sermonis, ubi copia probabilis, ubi excedens, ubi
leanness of-speech where abundance acceptable where exceeding where
omnium modus. Historias, poemata percurrenda monebat
of-all-things the-measure histories poems to-be-run-through he-warned
diligenter quidem et qui uelut nullis calcaribus urgebantur
diligently indeed and those-who as-if by-no spurs were-urged
ad fugam; et ex singulis aliquid reconditum in memoria,
to flight and from each something laid-up in memory
diurnum debitum diligenti instantia exigebat. Superflua
as-daily debt with-diligent insistence he-exacted superfluous-things
tamen fugienda dicebat; et ea sufficere que a claris
yet to-be-fled he-said and those to-suffice which by famous
auctoribus scripta sunt: siquidem persequi quid quis unquam
authors written are since to-pursue what anyone ever
uel contemptissimorum hominum dixerit, aut nimie miserie,
even of-the-most-despised men has-said either of-excessive misery
aut inanis iactantie est, et detinet atque obruit ingenia,
or of-empty boasting is and detains and overwhelms wits

melius aliis uacatura; quod autem melius tollit,
better on-other-things about-to-be-at-leisure what however the-better takes-away
eo usque non prodest, quod nec boni censetur nomine;
to-that point not profits that not-even of-good it-is-reckoned by-the-name
omnes enim cedas excutere et euoluere scripturas, etiam
all for sheets to-shake-out and to-unroll writings even
lectione indignas, non magis ad rem pertinet quam anilibus
of-reading unworthy not more to the-thing pertains than to-old-wives'
fabulis operam dare. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro de
tales effort to-give as for says Augustine in the-book on
Ordine: Quis ferat imperitum uideri hominem qui uolasse
Order who would-bear unskilled to-seem the-man who to-have-flown
Dedalum non audierit; mendacem illum qui dixerit, stultum
Daedalus not has-heard a-liar him who has-said a-fool
qui crediderit, impudentem qui interrogauerit, non uideri?
who has-believed shameless who has-asked not to-seem
Aut in quo nostros familiares grauiter miserari soleo, qui si
or in which our friends grievously to-pity I-am-wont who if
non responderint quid uocata sit mater Euriali, accusantur
not they-have-answered what called was the-mother of-Euryalus are-accused
inscitie; cum ipsi eos, a quibus interrogantur, uanos
of-ignorance though they-themselves those by whom they-are-asked vain
ineptos et curiosos non audeant appellare. Hec quidem
inept and curious not dare to-call these-things indeed
ille eleganter et uere. Unde inter uirtutes gramatici
he elegantly and truly whence among the-virtues of-the-grammarian
merito reputatum est ab antiquis, aliqua ignorare. Et
deservedly reckoned has-been by the-ancients some-things to-be-ignorant-of and
quia in toto preexercitamine erudiendorum nichil utilius
since in the-whole preliminary-exercise of-those-to-be-taught nothing more-useful
est quam ei quod fieri ex arte oportet assuescere,
is than to-that which to-be-done by art it-behooves to-grow-accustomed

prosas et poemata cotidie scriptitabant, et se mutuis
prose and poems daily they-wrote and themselves with-mutual
exercebant collationibus, quo quidem exercitio nichil
exercised collations than-which indeed exercise nothing
utilius ad eloquentiam, nichil expeditius ad scientiam, et
more-useful for eloquence nothing more-expeditious for knowledge and
plurimum confert ad uitam, si tamen hanc sedulitatem regit
very-much it-contributes to life if however this diligence rules
caritas, si in profectu litteratorio seruetur humilitas. Non est
charity if in progress literary be-preserved humility not it-is
enim eiusdem hominis litteris et carnalibus uitiis inseruire.
for of-the-same man to-letters and to-carnal vices to-be-a-slave
Ad huius magistri formam preceptores mei in gramatica,
after of-this master the-model the-teachers my in grammar
Willelmus de Conchis et Ricardus, cognomento Episcopus,
William of Conches and Richard surnamed the-Bishop
officio nunc archidiaconus Constantiensis, uita et conuersatione
by-office now archdeacon of-Coutances in-life and conduct
uir bonus, suos discipulos aliquandiu informauerunt. Sed
a-man good their pupils for-some-time formed but
postmodum, ex quo opinio ueritati preiudicium fecit, et
afterward from when opinion to-truth prejudice did and
homines uideri quam esse philosophi maluerunt, professoresque
men to-seem than to-be philosophers preferred and-the-professors
artium se totam philosophiam breuius quam triennio
of-the-arts themselves the-whole philosophy in-less than three-years
aut biennio transfusuros auditoribus pollicebantur, impetu
or two-years about-to-pour-over to-their-hearers promised by-the-onslaught
multitudinis imperite uicti, cesserunt. Exinde autem minus
of-the-multitude unskilled conquered they-yielded thenceforth however less
temporis et diligentie in gramatice studio impensum est.
of-time and of-diligence in of-grammar the-study spent has-been

Ex quo contigit ut qui omnes artes tam liberales quam
from which it-happened that those-who all arts both liberal and
mecanicas profitentur, nec primam nouerint, sine qua
mechanical profess not-even the-first know without which
frustra quis progredietur ad reliquas. Licet autem et alie
in-vain anyone will-proceed to the-rest although however also other
discipline ad litteraturam proficiant, hec tamen priuilegio
disciplines to literature profit this yet by-privilege
singulari facere dicitur litteratum. Siquidem Romulus eam
singular to-make is-said lettered since Romulus it
litteraturam, Varro uero litterationem appellat; et professor
literature Varro indeed litteratio calls and the-professor
eius siue assertor dicitur litteratus. Antiquitus tamen uocabatur
its or champion is-called lettered anciently however he-was-called
litterator iuxta illud Catulli: Munus dat tibi Silla
litterator according-to that-saying of-Catullus a-gift gives to-you Sulla
litterator. Unde probabile est quod contemptor gramatice non
the-litterator whence probable it-is that the-despiser of-grammar not
modo litterator non est, sed nec litteratus dici debet.
only a-litterator not is but not-even lettered to-be-called ought

Breuis clausula de laude gramatice

XXV · A BRIEF CLOSE IN PRAISE OF GRAMMAR

To the boys turned masters who hold grammar commended only from ignorance of other arts, John offers Quintilian: let no one scorn its elements, for those who enter its sanctuary find a subtlety that can sharpen boys and exercise the highest learning. It is the foundation of the orator; it is necessary to boys, pleasant to the old, a sweet companion of retirement, and more substance than show.

Sed quia isti hesterni pueri, magistri hodierni, heri uapulantes
but since these yesterday's boys masters today's yesterday being-beaten
in ferula, hodie stolati docentes in cathedra, ex ignorantia
under the-rod today stoled teaching in the-chair from ignorance
aliarum arguunt gramaticam commendari, quid de laude eius
of-the-others charge grammar to-be-commended what about praise its
inueniatur in libro de Institutione Oratoris, audiant patienter
may-be-found in the-book on the-Institution of-the-Orator let-them-hear patiently
et, si placet, innocentibus gramaticis parcant. Ait ergo: Ne
and if it-pleases to-innocent grammarians let-them-spare he-says therefore lest
quis tamquam parua fastidiat gramatices elementa; non quia
anyone as small-things disdain of-grammar the-elements not because
magne sit opere discernere a uocalibus consonantes, easque
of-great it-be labor to-distinguish from vowels consonants and-them
ipsas in semiuocalium numerum mutarumque partiri, sed
themselves into of-semivowels the-number and-of-mutes to-divide but
quia interiora uelut sacri huius adeuntibus apparebit
because the-inner-parts as-if of-sanctuary of-this to-those-approaching will-appear
rerum multa subtilitas, que non modo acuere ingenia puerilia
of-things much subtlety which not only to-sharpen wits boyish
sed exercere altissimam quoque eruditionem ac scientiam
but to-exercise the-highest also learning and knowledge

possit. Quo minus ferendi sunt qui hanc artem ut tenuem
can by-which the-less to-be-borne are those-who this art as thin
atque ieiunam cauillantur. Que, nisi oratoris futuri fundamenta
and meager mock which unless of-the-orator future the-foundations
fideliter iecerit, quicquid superstruxeris corruet. Hec
faithfully it-will-have-laid whatever you-will-have-built-upon will-collapse this
est igitur liberalium artium prima, necessaria pueris, iocunda
is therefore of-the-liberal arts the-first necessary for-boys pleasant
senibus, dulcis secretorum comes; et que sola in omni
for-old-men sweet of-retirement the-companion and which alone in every
studiorum genere plus habeat operis quam ostentationis.
of-studies kind more has of-work than of-display

BOOK TWO

Liber Secundus

BOOK TWO · PREFACE

The first book showed that grammar is useful and that without it neither eloquence nor any other part of philosophy is open; it rests on human will, as laws do. Now logic must be acquitted, which Cornificius gropes at like a blind man. Whether grammar is part of logic does not matter. Since everyone boasts of being a logician, the task of commending logic is easy, and John sets out to measure its worth.

Superioris libri serie satis arbitror expeditum gramaticam
of-the-former book by-the-course enough I-judge settled grammar
non esse inutilem; et quod sine illa non modo eloquentia
not to-be useless and that without it not only eloquence
perfecta non constat, sed nec ad alias philosophie
perfect not stands but not-even to other of-philosophy
professiones eo tendentibus aliqua patet uia; pro ea
professions to-those-thither tending any lies-open way for it
quoque mitius interpretandum est, eo quod non modo
also more-mildly to-be-interpreted it-is by-that that not only
nature obnoxia subiacet, sed uoluntati hominum adquiescit.
to-nature subject it-lies-under but to-the-will of-men it-assents
Nam et leges ciuium ab humana constitutione plerumque
for also the-laws of-citizens from human enactment mostly
uigorem sumunt; et quod publice utilitati creditur expedire,
vigor take and what to-public utility is-believed to-be-expedient
naturali iusticie coequatur. Nondum tamen absoluta est logica,
to-natural justice is-made-equal not-yet however acquitted is logic
quam, etsi mutilus sit et amplius mutilandus, Cornificius,
which although maimed he-be and further to-be-maimed Cornificius
parietem solidum cecati more palpans, impudenter
a-wall solid of-a-blinded-man in-the-manner groping shamelessly

attemptat et impudentius criminatur. Utique ueritatis amatori
attempts and more-shamelessly accuses surely to-the-lover of-truth
non placent iurgia, et ultro, nedum sponte, se subtrahit
not please quarrels and willingly not-to-say freely himself withdraws
contentioni quisquis amplectitur caritatem. Sit aut non sit
from-contention whoever embraces charity let-be or not let-be
gramatica pars logices, non contendo; constat enim quod
grammar a-part of-logic not I-contend it-is-agreed for that
in sermonibus uertitur eosque ministrat, etsi non omnes
about speeches it-turns and-them furnishes even-if not all
sermonum examinet rationes. Tu uero cui de re
of-speeches it-examine the-reasons you indeed to-whom about the-thing
constat, de nomine iudicabis, eamque cunctis applicabis
it-is-agreed about the-name will-judge and-it to-all will-apply
sermonibus; aut circa rationum dumtaxat instantiam coartabis.
speeches or about of-reasons only the-instance will-restrict
Non formido iudicium qui et de equitate cause et
not I-dread the-judgment who both about the-fairness of-the-cause and
iudicis peritia et sinceritate confido. Despiciamus ergo an
the-judge's skill and sincerity am-confident let-us-examine therefore whether
rationalis utilis sit, et uires eius reluctante emulo metiamur.
the-rational useful be and the-strength its resisting the-rival let-us-measure
In quo quidem tanto minus laboris meo incumbit officio,
in which indeed by-so-much less of-labor on-my lies office
quanto fauorem suum etiam citra persuasionem facilius
by-as-much-as favor his even short-of persuasion more-readily
impendit auditor. Omnes enim se esse logicos gloriantur,
bestows the-hearer all for themselves to-be logicians boast
non modo qui scientiam aliquibus subarrauerunt blanditiis,
not only who knowledge with-some have-pledged blandishments
sed et illi qui eam nondum salutauerunt a limine.
but also those who it not-yet have-greeted from the-threshold

Quod logica, eo quod uerum querit, ad totam proficit philosophiam

I · LOGIC, SEEKING TRUTH, SERVES ALL PHILOSOPHY

Logic, narrowly, is the method of discoursing that makes all prudence firm. Since wisdom's fruit lies in loving the good and practicing virtue, the mind must search out truth, the matter of prudence, which Cicero calls the first virtue; justice embraces it, fortitude guards it, temperance moderates the rest. Prudence is the root of the virtues, the poets call happy whoever knows the causes of things or beholds the fount of good, and truth frees its lover from the yoke of vices.

Ut itaque nominis significatio contrahatur, logica est ratio
that and-so of-the-name the-signification be-contracted logic is the-method
disserendi, per quam totius prudentie agitatio solidatur.
of-discoursing through which of-all prudence the-exertion is-made-solid
Cum enim omnium expetibilium prima sit sapientia, ipsiusque
since for of-all things-to-be-sought first be wisdom and-its-very
fructus in amore boni et uirtutum cultu consistat,
fruit in the-love of-good and of-virtues the-cultivation consists
mentem necesse est in illius inuestigatione uersari et res
the-mind necessary it-is in its investigation to-be-occupied and things
plena inquisitione discutere, ut ei de singulis esse possit
with-full inquiry to-discuss that to-it about single-things to-be can
purum incorruptumque iudicium. Constat ergo exercitatio eius
a-pure and-uncorrupted judgment consists therefore the-exercise its
in scrutinio ueritatis, que, sicut Cicero in libro de Officiis
in the-scrutiny of-truth which as Cicero in the-book on Duties
auctor est, materia est uirtutis primitiue, quam prudentiam
author is the-matter is of-virtue the-first which prudence
uocant; reliquis enim tribus utilitates necessitatesque
they-call to-the-remaining for three utilities and-necessities
subiecte sunt. Prudentia uero tota consistit in perspicientia
subject are prudence indeed wholly consists in the-discernment

ueri et quadam sollertia illud examinandi; porro iustitia
of-the-true and a-certain skill it of-examining further justice
illud amplectitur, fortitudo tuetur, temperantia uirtutum
it embraces fortitude guards temperance of-the-virtues
precedentium exercitia moderatur. Unde libet prudentiam
preceding the-exercises moderates whence it-is-pleasing prudence
uirtutum omnium esse radicem; que si precidatur, cetere,
of-virtues all to-be the-root which if it-be-cut-off the-others
uelut rami nature beneficio destituti, marcida quadam
as-if branches of-nature's benefit destitute with-withered a-certain
ariditate euanescunt. Quis enim amplectetur aut colet quod
dryness vanish who for will-embrace or cultivate what
ignorat? At ueritas materia est prudentie et uirtutum fons;
he-knows-not but truth the-matter is of-prudence and of-the-virtues the-spring
quam qui plene nouerit, sapiens est, qui amauerit,
which he-who fully will-have-known wise is he-who will-have-loved
bonus, et beatus qui tenuerit eam. Unde nostrorum
good and blessed he-who will-have-held it whence of-our
doctissimus poetarum, uite beate monstrans originem, ait:
most-learned of-poets of-life blessed showing the-origin says

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
happy who could of-things to-know the-causes
atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
and fears all and inexorable fate
subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis auari.
has-set-under feet and-the-roar of-Acheron greedy

Et alius fide et notitia ueritatis prestantior:
and another in-faith and knowledge of-truth more-excellent

Felix qui potuit boni
happy who could of-the-good
Fontem uisere lucidum;
the-fount to-behold clear
Felix qui potuit grauis
happy who could of-heavy
Terre soluere uincula;
earth to-loose the-bonds

ac si aliis uerbis dicant, sed eodem sensu: Felix cui
as if in-other words they-say but with-the-same sense happy to-whom
rerum collata est intelligentia; quia quo familiarius
of-things given is understanding because by-how-much more-familiarly
fluida et ad momentum transeuntia innotescunt, eo
the-fluid and for a-moment passing become-known by-so-much
amplius apud mentem sui compotem peritura uilescunt;
more with a-mind of-itself in-control the-perishing grow-cheap
nec iugo premitur uitiorum quem de seruitute ueritas
nor by-the-yoke is-pressed of-vices he-whom from slavery truth
in libertatem uendicat et educit. Impossibile enim est ut
into freedom claims and leads-out impossible for it-is that
diligat et colat uanitatem, quisquis ex toto corde querit
love and cultivate vanity whoever from whole heart seeks
et amplectitur ueritatem.
and embraces truth

De secta Peripatheticorum, et ortu logices, et eius auctore

II · THE PERIPATETICS, THE RISE OF LOGIC, AND ITS AUTHOR

The Peripatetics placed the highest good in knowing truth and so studied nature and morals; but unskilled reasoning bred errors, such as Epicurus' atoms and the Stoics' matter coeternal with God. Logic arose to tell true from false. Parmenides labored to find it, but successors took his glory; Plato added it, not yet an art, to physics and ethics, and Aristotle grasped and handed down its rules, a master Quintilian could scarcely praise enough.

Peripatheticorum hinc orta est secta, que in cognitione
of-the-Peripatetics hence arisen has the-sect which in the-knowledge
ueri summum bonum uite humane esse constituit.
of-the-true the-highest good of-life human to-be established
Omnium ergo rerum naturas scrutati sunt, ut scirent
of-all therefore of-things the-natures scrutinized they-have that they-might-know
quid in omnibus rebus fugiendum tanquam malum, quid
what in all things to-be-fled as evil what
contemnendum tanquam non bonum, quid petendum ut
to-be-despised as not good what to-be-sought as
simpliciter bonum, quid preferendum ut maius bonum, quid
simply good what to-be-preferred as greater good what
ex casu boni nomen sortiatur aut mali. Nate sunt ergo
from chance of-good the-name obtain or of-evil born were therefore
due partes philosophie, naturalis et moralis, que aliis
two parts of-philosophy natural and moral which by-other
nominibus ethica et phisica appellantur. Sed quia per
names ethics and physics are-called but because through
imperitiam disserendi multa inconuenientia colligebant, sicuti
unskill of-discoursing many incongruities they-gathered as
Epicurus, qui ex athomis et inani mundum sine auctore
Epicurus who from atoms and void the-world without author

Deo constituit, et Stoici, qui materiam Deo fingebant
God established and the-Stoics who matter with-God feigned
coeternam, et omnia peccata equalia; necesse fuit inuestigari
coeternal and all sins equal necessary it-was to-be-investigated
et promulgari scientiam que discretionem faceret uocum
and to-be-promulgated a-science which a-distinction would-make of-words
et intellectuum et fallaciarum nubeculas dissiparet. Et
and of-understandings and of-fallacies the-little-clouds would-dispel and
hic quidem, sicut Boetius in commento secundo super
here indeed as Boethius in the-commentary second on
Porphirium asserit, est ortus logice discipline. Oportuit
Porphyry asserts is the-rise of-the-logical discipline it-behooved
enim esse scientiam que uerum a falso discerneret et
for to-be a-science which the-true from the-false might-distinguish and
doceret que ratiocinatio ueram teneat semitam disputandi,
might-teach which reasoning the-true holds path of-disputing
que uerisimilem, et que fida sit, et que debeat esse
which the-probable and which trustworthy be and which ought to-be
suspecta; alioquin ueritas per ratiocinantis operam non
suspect otherwise truth through of-the-reasoner the-work not
poterat inueniri. Et licet Parmenides Egiptius in rupe uitam
could to-be-found and although Parmenides the-Egyptian on a-rock life
egerit, ut rationes logice inueniret, tot et tantos studii
spent that the-reasons of-logic he-might-find so-many and so-great of-study
habuit successores ut ei inuentionis sue totam fere
he-had successors that from-him of-invention his-own the-whole almost
preripuerint gloriam. Tradunt ergo Apuleius, Augustinus,
they-snatched glory they-relate therefore Apuleius Augustine
et Isidorus quod Plato philosophiam perfecisse laudatur,
and Isidore that Plato philosophy to-have-perfected is-praised
phisice, quam Pithagoras, et ethice, quam Socrates plene
to-physics which Pythagoras and to-ethics which Socrates fully

docuerat, adiciens logicam, per quam discussis rerum
had-taught adding logic through which having-discussed of-things
morumque causis uim panderet rationum; non tamen
and-of-morals the-causes the-force he-might-lay-open of-reasons not yet
hanc in artis redegit peritiam; preerat tamen usus
this into of-art he-reduced the-skill there-was-before however use
et exercitatio, que, sicut in aliis, ita et hic precepta
and exercise which as in other-things so also here precepts
antecessit. Deinde Aristotiles artis regulas deprehendit et
went-before then Aristotle of-the-art the-rules grasped and
tradidit. Hic est Peripatheticorum princeps, quem ars ista
handed-down this is of-the-Peripatetics the-chief whom art this
precipuum laudat auctorem, et qui alias disciplinas communes
as-chief praises author and who other disciplines common
habet cum auctoribus suis, sed hanc suo iure uendicans
has with authors their but this by-his-own right claiming
a possessione illius exclusit ceteros. Et licet alibi de
from the-possession of-it shut-out the-others and although elsewhere about
eo plenius scripserim, nequaquam hic silendum credidi,
him more-fully I-have-written by-no-means here to-be-kept-silent I-believed
quod de eo dicat Quintilianus: Quid Aristotilem memorem,
what about him says Quintilian why Aristotle should-I-mention
quem scientia rerum dubito an scriptorum copia an
whom for-knowledge of-things I-doubt whether of-writings for-abundance or
loquendi usu an suauitate eloquii an inuentionum acumine
of-speaking for-use or for-sweetness of-speech or of-inventions for-sharpness
an uarietate operum clariorem putem?
or for-variety of-works more-illustrious I-should-think

Quod logica philosophantibus prelegenda est, et de differentia demonstrative itemque probabilis logice, et sophistice

III · Logic is to be read first, and how its kinds differ

The Peripatetics reduced use to art: logic is later in time but first in order, since it interprets words and thoughts. In the fable, Phronesis' daughter Philology weds Mercury. Plato divided logic into dialectic and rhetoric; others subject to it demonstrative logic, resting on necessity, probable logic, holding dialectic and rhetoric, and sophistic, feigned wisdom. Dialectic, neither lofty, political, nor deceitful, examines truth with ready probability.

Videntes itaque Peripathetici, quod opus in usum, usus
seeing and-so the-Peripatetics that work into use use
transire potest in artem, quod uagum fuerat et licentiosum,
to-pass can into art what wandering had-been and licentious
certis regulis subiecerunt, excludentes mendacia, supplentes
to-sure rules they-subjected shutting-out lies supplying
imperfecta, resecantes superflua, et in omnibus precepta
imperfect-things cutting-off superfluous-things and in all-things precepts
congrua prescribentes. Profecta igitur hinc est et sic
fitting prescribing proceeded therefore hence has and thus
perfecta scientia disserendi; que disputandi modos et rationes
perfected the-science of-discoursing which of-disputing the-modes and the-reasons
probationum aperit, procedentibus uiam parat, qua quid in
of-proofs opens for-those-proceeding a-way prepares by-which what in
dictis uerum, quid falsum, quid necessarium, quid impossibile
sayings true what false what necessary what impossible
sit, innotescit; aliis philosophicis disciplinis posterior
be becomes-known than-other philosophical disciplines later
tempore, sed ordine prima. Inchoantibus enim philosophiam
in-time but in-order first for-those-beginning for philosophy

prelegenda est, eo quod uocum et intellectuum interpres
to-be-read-first it-is by-that that of-words and of-understandings the-interpreter
est, sine quibus nullus philosophie articulus recte procedit
it-is without which no of-philosophy point rightly proceeds
in lucem. Qui uero sine logica philosophiam doceri putat,
into light he-who indeed without logic philosophy to-be-taught thinks
idem a sapientie cultu omnium rerum exterminet
the-same from of-wisdom the-cultivation of-all things let-him-banish
rationes, quoniam eis logica presidet. Ut diuertamus
the-reasons since over-them logic presides that we-may-turn-aside
ad fabulas, Fronesim sororem Alicie, nec sterilem reputauit
to fables Phronesis the-sister of-Alethia neither barren did-reckon
antiquitas, sed eggregiam eius sobolem castis Mercurii
antiquity but excellent her offspring to-the-chaste of-Mercury
iunxit amplexibus; est enim soror ueritatis prudentia, et
joined embraces is for the-sister of-truth prudence and
amorem rationis et scientie per eloquentiam fecundat et
the-love of-reason and of-knowledge through eloquence makes-fruitful and
illustrat. Siquidem hoc est Philologiam Mercurio copulari; pro
illuminates since this is Philology to-Mercury to-be-coupled for
eo namque logica dicta est, quod rationalis, id est rationum
that for logic called it-is that rational that is of-reasons
ministratoria et examinatrix est. Diuisit eam Plato in
the-furnisher and examiner it-is divided it Plato into
dialecticam et rethoricam; sed qui efficaciam eius altius
dialectic and rhetoric but those-who the-efficacy its more-deeply
metiuntur, ei plura attribuunt. Siquidem ei demonstratiua,
measure to-it more-things attribute since to-it the-demonstrative
probabilis, et sophistica subiciuntur, sed demonstratiua a
the-probable and the-sophistical are-subjected but the-demonstrative from
disciplinalibus uiget principiis et ad eorum consecutiua
disciplinary flourishes principles and to their consequents

progreditur, necessitate gaudet, et quid cui uideatur, dum
proceeds in-necessity it-rejoices and what to-whom seem while
tamen ita esse oporteat, non multum attendit. Decet hoc
however so to-be it-behoove not much it-attends-to it-befits this
philosophicam recte docentium maiestatem, que suo citra
philosophical rightly of-those-teaching majesty which by-its-own short-of
auditorum assensum roboratur arbitrio. Probabilis autem
of-the-hearers assent is-strengthened judgment the-probable however
uersatur in his que uidentur omnibus aut pluribus aut
is-occupied in those which seem to-all or to-most or
sapientibus; et his uel omnibus uel pluribus uel maxime
to-the-wise and to-these either all or most or most
notis et probabilibus aut consecutiuis eorum. Hec quidem
known and probable or to-the-consequents of-them this indeed
dialecticam et rethoricam continet; quoniam dialecticus et
dialectic and rhetoric contains since the-dialectician and
orator persuadere nitentes, alter aduersario, alter iudici,
the-orator to-persuade striving the-one the-adversary the-other the-judge
non multum referre arbitrantur, uera an falsa sint argumenta
not much to-matter think true or false be the-arguments
eorum, dummodo ueri similitudinem teneant. At sophistica,
their provided-that of-truth the-likeness they-hold but sophistic
que apparens et non existens sapientia est, probabilitatis aut
which apparent and not existing wisdom is of-probability or
necessitatis affectat imaginem; parum curans quid sit hoc aut
of-necessity affects the-image little caring what be this or
illud, dum phantasticis imaginibus et uelut umbris fallacibus
that while with-fantastic images and as-if with-shadows deceptive
inuoluat eum cum quo sermo conseritur. Profecto, quam pre
it-may-wrap him with whom speech is-joined surely which before
ceteris omnes ambiunt, sed pauci meo iudicio assequuntur,
the-others all court but few in-my judgment attain

dialectica est, que nec ad docentium aspirat grauitatem,
dialectic it-is which neither to of-teachers aspires the-gravity
nec undis ciuilibus mergitur, nec seducit fallaciis, sed
nor in-the-waves civil is-plunged nor seduces by-fallacies but
prompta et mediocri probabilitate uerum examinat.
with-ready and middling probability the-true examines

Quid dialectica, et unde dicatur

IV · WHAT DIALECTIC IS, AND WHY SO CALLED

For Augustine dialectic is the science of disputing well, by art and not by chance; the demonstrator and the sophist each fall short of the dialectician's aim, though each proves well within his own office. To dispute is to prove or disprove what is doubtful or contradicted. The name comes from discourse about sayings, Greek lecton, or from lexis, speech; either way it examines the force and truth of what is said, for sense is speech's life.

Est autem dialectica, ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi
is however dialectic as to-Augustine it-pleases of-well disputing
scientia; quod quidem ita accipiendum est, ut uis habeatur
the-science which indeed so to-be-taken is that the-force be-held
in uerbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur quos casus iuuat
in words lest namely dialecticians be-believed those-whom chance helps
artis beneficio destitutos. Item non bene disputat qui id
of-art of-benefit destitute likewise not well disputes he-who that
quod intendit uere et probabiliter, nequaquam probat. Pace
which he-intends truly and probably by-no-means proves by-the-leave
dixerim demonstratoris et sophiste, quorum neuter bene
I-would-say of-the-demonstrator and of-the-sophist of-whom neither well
procedit ad propositum dialectici, si alter probabilitatem
proceeds to the-purpose of-the-dialectician if the-one probability

non habet, alter deserit ueritatem; uterque tamen, si suum
not has the-other deserts truth each yet if his-own
metiatur officium, bene probat, dum non omittit quicquam
he-measure office well proves while not he-omits anything
ex contingentibus sue facultatis. Est autem disputare,
of the-things-belonging his-own faculty is however to-dispute
aliquid eorum, que dubia sunt aut in contradictione posita
something of-those which doubtful are or in contradiction placed
aut que sic vel sic proponuntur ratione supposita probare vel
or which so or so are-proposed by-reason set-under to-prove or
improbare; quod quidem quisquis ex arte probabiliter facit, ad
to-disprove which indeed whoever from art probably does to
dialectici pertingit metam. Hoc autem ei nomen Aristotiles
of-the-dialectician reaches the-goal this however to-it name Aristotle
auctor suus imposuit, eo quod in ipsa et per ipsam de
author its has-imposed by-that that in it and through it about
dictis disputatur: ut enim gramatica de dictionibus et in
sayings it-is-disputed as for grammar about words and in
dictionibus, teste Remigio, sic ista de dictis et in dictis
words by-witness Remigius so this about sayings and in sayings
est. Illa uerba sensuum principaliter: sed hec examinat sensus
is that the-words of-the-senses principally but this examines the-senses
uerborum; nam lecton Greco eloquio (sicut ait Isidorus,)
of-words for lecton in-Greek speech as says Isidore
dictum appellatur. Siue autem dicatur a Greco lexis, quod
a-saying is-called whether however it-be-called from Greek lexis which
locutio interpretatur, sicut Quintiliano in Preexercitaminibus
speech is-interpreted as to-Quintilian in the-Preliminary-Exercises
placet, siue a lecton, quod dictum nuncupatur, non multum
it-pleases or from lecton which a-saying is-named not much
refert; cum examinare locutionis uim et eius quod dicitur
it-matters since to-examine of-speech the-force and of-that which is-said

ueritatem et sensum, idem aut fere idem sit; uis enim
the-truth and sense the-same or almost the-same be the-force for
uerbi sensus est; quo si destituatur, sermo cassus et
of-a-word the-sense is of-which if it-be-destitute speech empty and
inutilis est et (ut sic dixerim) mortuus; ut quodammodo,
useless is and as so I-might-say dead so-that in-a-way
sicut corpus ad uitam uegetatur ab anima, sic ad uitam
as the-body for life is-quickened by the-soul so to life
quandam uerbi sensus proficiat. Qui enim sine sensu
a-certain of-the-word the-sense may-profit he-who for without sense
sermonem profert, utique non loquitur sed aerem uerberat.
speech brings-forth surely not speaks but the-air beats

De partibus dialectice, et fine logicorum

V · THE PARTS OF DIALECTIC AND THE END OF LOGICIANS

Logic is divided into invention and judgment and works through division, definition, and inference, serving physics and ethics as an instrument. Reason here is whatever is adduced to establish an opinion, so sophistic too is rational, a feigned wisdom that mimics demonstration and dialectic. The philosopher seeks truth, the dialectician opinion, and the sophist mere seeming; sophistic is worth knowing, since it harms the ignorant, and whoever scorns probable reasoning does not love truth.

Verum ut a specie redeamus ad genus, quoniam
but that from the-species we-may-return to the-genus since
quedam adhuc uidentur dicenda communiter; logicam
some-things still seem to-be-said in-common logic
diuiserunt auctores in scientiam inueniendi et scientiam
have-divided the-authors into the-science of-finding and the-science
iudicandi; eandemque totam in diuisionibus, diffinitionibus,
of-judging and-the-same whole in divisions definitions

collectionibusque uersari docuerunt; siquidem inueniendi
and-collections to-be-occupied they-taught since of-finding
et iudicandi magistra est et diuidendi, diffiniendique, et
and of-judging the-mistress it-is and of-dividing and-of-defining and
argumentandi peritum habet, immo facit opificem. Inter
of-arguing a-skilled-one has nay makes craftsman among
ceteras itaque philosophie partes priuilegio duplici insignita
the-other and-so of-philosophy parts with-privilege double marked
est; quia et principalis membri decoratur honore, et
it-is because both of-a-principal member it-is-adorned with-the-honor and
in toto philosophie corpore efficacis instrumenti exercet
in the-whole of-philosophy body of-an-effective instrument it-exercises
officium. Phisicus enim et ethicus in suis assertionibus non
the-office the-physicist for and the-moralist in their assertions not
procedunt, nisi probationibus a logico mutuatis. Nemo
proceed except with-proofs from the-logician borrowed no-one
eorum recte diffinit aut diuidit, nisi eis artis sue logicus
of-them rightly defines or divides unless to-them of-art his the-logician
gratiam faciat; alioquin successus eorum non scientia sed casus
the-favor do otherwise success their not knowledge but chance
promouet. Rationalis enim est; ut constet ex nomine
advances rational for it-is so-that it-be-agreed from the-name
quis ei sit in philosophia processus, qui rationis expers
what to-him be in philosophy advance who of-reason devoid
est; licet enim quis perspicacem habeat rationem, anime
is although for anyone a-perspicacious have reason of-the-soul
uirtutem dico, in philosophie tamen negotiis ad multa subsistit
the-power I-mean in of-philosophy yet affairs at many stops
offendicula, si non habeat rationem propositi faciendi;
stumbling-blocks if not he-have the-method of-the-purpose to-be-accomplished
que quidem est methodus, id est ratio compendiaria,
which indeed is method that is a-system compendious

propositi pariens et expediens facultatem. Versantur autem
of-the-purpose begetting and expediting the-faculty are-occupied however
in his et que dicte sunt pertinentes ad logicam discipline.
in these also which said have-been pertaining to logic the-disciplines
Nam demonstratiua, probabilis, et sophistica, omnes quidem
for the-demonstrative the-probable and the-sophistical all indeed
consistunt in inuentione et iudicio, et itidem diuidentes,
consist in invention and judgment and likewise dividing
diffinientes, et colligentes, domesticis rationibus utuntur;
defining and gathering domestic reasons they-use
etsi materia aut fine aut modo agendi dissimiles sint. Cum
although in-matter or end or mode of-acting unlike they-be since
uero ratio multipliciter dicatur, latissime patet hic officium
indeed reason in-many-ways is-said most-widely extends here the-office
nominis; neque enim coartatur ad id dumtaxat quod ratio
of-the-name nor for is-it-restricted to that only which reason
est, sed id protenditur etiam quod uidetur. Nam, ut
is but that it-is-extended also which seems for that
alias taceam nominis significationes, dicunt hoc nomen
others I-may-pass-over of-the-name the-significations call this name
gramatici absolutum quod ad intelligentiam sui non
the-grammarians absolute which for the-understanding of-itself not
indiget adiectione, ut Deus; nisi forte causa significantie,
needs addition as God unless perhaps for-the-sake of-significance
ut cum dicitur Deus omnipotens ad differentiam ydolorum,
as when it-is-said God almighty for the-distinction of-idols
que nichil, aut demoniorum, que minimum possunt, sic ratio
which nothing or of-demons which very-little can so reason
necessaria aut uera ad differentiam eius, que casu potest vel
necessary or true for the-distinction of-that which by-chance can or
mendacio uitiari. Est autem hic, ut opinor, ratio, quicquid
by-lie to-be-vitiated is however here as I-think reason whatever

adducitur vel adduci potest ad statuendam opinionem
is-adduced or to-be-adduced can for establishing opinion
uel sententiam roborandam; opinio enim plerumque labitur,
or judgment strengthening opinion for mostly slips
at sententia semper assidet ueritati. Ita quidem, si recte
but judgment always sits-beside truth so indeed if rightly
sermonibus utimur; usurpatur tamen alterum pro altero. Ergo
words we-use there-is-used however the-one for the-other therefore
et sophistica sic rationalis est; et, quamuis fallat, sibi inter
also sophistic so rational is and although it-deceive for-itself among
partes philosophie locum uendicat. Suas enim rationes inducit,
the-parts of-philosophy a-place it-claims its-own for reasons it-brings-in
et nunc se demonstratiuam simulat, nunc dialecticam
and now itself demonstrative it-feigns now dialectic
mentitur; nec seipsam profitetur alicubi, sed ubique habitum
it-pretends nor itself professes anywhere but everywhere a-garb
induit alienum. Apparens namque sapientia est, et inducit
puts-on another's apparent for wisdom it-is and it-leads
ad statuendam opinionem plerumque non quod uerum aut
for establishing opinion mostly not what true or
uerisimile, sed quod alterutrum uideatur. Interdum autem
probable but what the-one-or-the-other seem sometimes however
utitur et iis; cauillatrix enim est, et sepe a ueris et
it-uses also these quibbling for it-is and often from true and
manifestis per minutas interrogationes aliasue doli sui
manifest-things through minute questions or-other of-deceit its
insidias ad dubia et falsa progreditur. Transfigurat enim
ambushes to doubtful and false-things proceeds it-transforms for
se in ministram lucis, et Neptuni more quem in deuia
itself into a-minister of-light and of-Neptune in-the-manner whom into byways
abducit, aut periculis exponit aut risui. Philosophus autem,
it-leads-off either to-dangers it-exposes or to-laughter the-philosopher however

demonstratiua utens, negotiatur ad ueritatem; dialecticus
the-demonstrative using trades toward truth the-dialectician
ad opinionem, siquidem probabilitate contentus est. Sophiste
toward opinion since with-probability content he-is to-the-sophist
autem sufficit, si uel uideatur esse probabile. Unde non facile
however it-suffices if even it-seem to-be probable whence not easily
dixerim eam esse inutilem scitu, que non mediocriter
I-would-say it to-be useless to-be-known which not moderately
exercet ingenia, et ignaris rerum efficacius nocet, si
exercises wits and to-the-ignorant of-things more-effectively harms if
sit ignota. Dolus enim scienti non infertur; sibique
it-be unknown deceit for on-one-knowing not is-inflicted and-to-himself
imputet, qui casum declinare noluit quem preuidit.
let-him-impute who the-fall to-avoid was-unwilling which he-foresaw
Qui autem demonstratiuam et probabilem non amplectitur,
he-who however the-demonstrative and the-probable not embraces
utique non diligit ueritatem; sed nec probabilium querit
surely not loves truth but not-even of-probable-things seeks
habere notitiam. Plane nec uirtutem quis sine ueritate
to-have knowledge plainly neither virtue does-anyone without truth
assequitur; et qui probabilia contemnit, non probatur.
attain and he-who probable-things despises not is-approved

Quod omnes logicam appetunt, sed non omnes assequuntur

VI · ALL DESIRE LOGIC, BUT NOT ALL ATTAIN IT

Logic promises much, and so crowds run to it from everywhere. John, calling himself dull of wit, sought its light from these heralds and was taught to define by genus and differences, to divide, and to infer. When he asked them to show these rules at work on books, they called him a blockhead and demanded payment; he repays them with the arts of war, medicine, and law, and charity above all, since truth is sought only by humility.

Ex premissis itaque magnum aliquid uidetur logica polliceri,
from the-aforesaid and-so great something seems logic to-promise
que inuentionis et iudicii copiam prestat diuidendi diffiniendi,
which of-invention and of-judgment abundance furnishes of-dividing of-defining
et conuincendi ministrat facultatem; et sic philosophie pars
and of-convincing furnishes the-faculty and so of-philosophy a-part
insignis est, ut per omnia membra eius quadam spiritus uice
notable is that through all members its in-a-certain of-spirit way
discurrat; iners enim est omnis philosophia que ad logicam non
it-runs-about inert for is all philosophy which to logic not
disponitur. Merito ergo ad eam tantus undique est cursus
is-disposed deservedly therefore to it so-great from-everywhere is the-running
populorum ut sola plures teneat occupatos quam omnes alie
of-peoples that alone more it-holds occupied than all other
officine illius que actus humanos disponit et uerba, certe et
workshops of-that which the-acts human disposes and the-words certainly and
cogitatus, si recte processerint; philosophiam loquor, sine
the-thoughts if rightly they-will-have-proceeded philosophy I-mean without

qua quicquid est insulsum et insipidum est et plane erroneum
which whatever is witless and tasteless is and plainly erroneous
et bonis moribus displicens. Clamant omnes ad inuicem:
and to-good morals displeasing they-shout all to one-another

Occupet extremum scabies;
may-seize the-last the-itch

et qui non accedit ad logicam, continuis et perhennibus
and he-who not approaches to logic in-continual and perennial
uersetur in sordibus. Ergo:
let-him-be-occupied in filth therefore

et michi turpe relinqui est,
and for-me shameful to-be-left-behind it-is

probrosum et periculosum. Vellem uidere lumen quod
disgraceful and dangerous I-would-wish to-see the-light which
solis istis preconibus reuelatum est; accedo, et humili
to-alone these heralds revealed has-been I-approach and with-humble
supplicatione deposco ut me doceant et, si fieri potest,
supplication I-demand that me they-teach and if to-be-done it-can
similem sui faciant. Promittunt grandia: sed interim
like to-themselves they-make they-promise great-things but meanwhile
Pithagoreorum silentium mihi indicunt, quod ad archana
of-the-Pythagoreans the-silence on-me they-impose as-to to the-secrets
Minerue, que sibi credita esse iactitant. Permittunt
of-Minerva which to-themselves entrusted to-be they-boast they-permit
tamen, immo et precipiunt, ut congarriam eis; hoc
however nay also they-order that I-chatter-along with-them this
siquidem talibus est disputare. Tandem, cum ex longa
since for-such-men is to-dispute at-length when from long

familiaritate benignius audior, diligentius insto, uehementius
familiarity more-kindly I-am-heard more-diligently I-press more-vehemently
pulso, affectuosius peto, michi ostium artis aperiri. A
I-knock more-affectionately I-ask for-me the-door of-the-art to-be-opened from
diffinitione ergo incipimus. Docet me paucis quicquid
definition therefore we-begin he-teaches me in-few-words whatever
uoluero diffinire; iubet enim ut eius, de quo agitur, genus
I-shall-wish to-define he-bids for that of-that about which it-is-treated the-genus
premittam, eique aggregem differentias substantiales, donec
I-put-first and-to-it I-join the-differences substantial until
ad conuertentiam propositi coequentur. Suprema enim,
to convertibility with-the-thing-proposed they-be-equaled the-highest for
quia genere, et infima, quia differentiis carent, diffiniri
because genus and the-lowest because differences they-lack to-be-defined
non possunt. Eis tamen descriptio applicatur que fit
not can to-them however description is-applied which is-made
ex proprietatibus, quarum alibi non reperitur collectio.
from properties of-which elsewhere not is-found the-collection
Substantialis enim diffinitio sine genere propositi et
substantial for definition without genus of-the-thing-proposed and
aliqua substantialium differentiarum esse non potest. Ecce
some of-the-substantial differences to-be not can behold
sic artem diffiniendi edoctus sum; iubetque me quodlibet
so the-art of-defining taught I-am and-he-bids me anything
propositorum commode diffinire, vel saltem describere.
of-the-things-proposed fittingly to-define or at-least to-describe
Progredimur ad diuidendi scientiam, et genus in species
we-proceed to of-dividing the-science and the-genus into species
aut per differentias aut per affirmationem et negationem,
either through differences or through affirmation and negation
sufficienter diuidere moneor. Totum integrum in eas partes
sufficiently to-divide I-am-advised the-whole integral into those parts

resoluendum est, ex quibus integraliter constat; uniuersale
to-be-resolved is from which integrally it-consists the-universal
in subiecta et in potentias uirtuale. Si uocis est diuisio
into subjects and into powers the-virtual if of-a-word is division
facienda, aut significationes illius enumerentur aut modi.
to-be-made either the-significations its be-enumerated or the-modes
Accidens in subiecta diuidere doceor, ammonitus que illius
an-accident into subjects to-divide I-am-taught advised what of-it
susceptibilia sint aperire, subiectum quoque in accidentia, cum
susceptible be to-open the-subject also into accidents when
eorum, que ei accidunt, diuersitatem contingit assignare;
of-those which to-it happen diversity it-happens to-assign
sed et accidentis in coaccidentia, cum pro subiectorum
but also of-an-accident into co-accidents when according-to of-subjects
uarietate excedentia esse docentur et excessa. Compendiose
the-variety exceeding to-be they-are-taught and exceeded concisely
itaque institutus sum duas partes exercitii huius. Restat tertia
and-so instructed I-am in-two parts of-exercise this remains the-third
quidem magis necessaria, si haberetur, et longe uerbosior
indeed more necessary if it-were-had and far more-wordy
ut doceretur, ars scilicet colligendi que ad aduersarium
that be-taught the-art namely of-gathering which for an-adversary
conuincendum proficit, uel in philosophia ad ueritatem
to-be-convinced avails or in philosophy for truth
demonstrandam, quicquid sentiant auditores. Eius itaque
to-be-demonstrated whatever may-think the-hearers of-it and-so
proponuntur pauca precepta, et que ego compendii gratia
are-set-forth few precepts and which I of-brevity for-the-sake
paucioribus disseram. Est itaque diligenter obseruandum, ut ad
in-fewer shall-discuss is and-so diligently to-be-observed that for
faciendam fidem eius, de quo agitur aliquid premittamus,
making faith of-that about which it-is-treated something we-put-first

ex quo illud probabiliter inferri possit aut necessario,
from which it probably to-be-inferred can or necessarily
quale est genus ad positionem speciei; aut, uno contrariorum
such-as is the-genus to the-positing of-the-species or one of-the-contraries
posito, reliquum tolli. Procedo itaque, quoniam homo
posited the-other to-be-removed I-proceed and-so since a-man
obtusioris ingenii sum et cui fides est ex auditu; et qui
of-duller wit I-am and one-to-whom faith is from hearing and who
uix et raro intelligere possum audita uel scripta. Quoniam
scarcely and rarely to-understand can things-heard or written since
ergo regule innotescunt, sollicito doctiores et qui nichil
therefore the-rules become-known I-solicit the-more-learned and who nothing
nescire dignantur, ut, deductis exemplis librorum, me
to-be-ignorant-of deign that with-drawn-out examples of-books me
illarum doceant usum. Non enim magnum est, qui artem
of-them they-teach the-use not for great it-is one-who the-art
diffiniendi habet, si in diffinitionibus pridem scriptis aliena
of-defining has if in definitions long-ago written another's
inuenta recenseat. Siquidem si logica diffinitiua est, eo quod
findings he-review since if logic definitive is by-that that
aliquas habeat diffinitiones, et multe discipline, quia pluribus
some it-has definitions and many disciplines because in-more
habundant diffinitionibus, magis diffinitiue erunt. Indignantur
they-abound definitions more definitive will-be are-indignant
ergo puri philosophi et qui omnia preter logicam
therefore the-pure philosophers and who all-things except logic
dedignantur, eque gramatice ut phisice expertes et ethice, et
disdain equally of-grammar as of-physics devoid and of-ethics and
me improbum obtusum et caudicem aut lapidem criminantur.
me wicked dull and a-blockhead or a-stone accuse
Sufficere enim debuerat ad artis triplicem facultatem quod
to-suffice for it-ought for of-the-art the-threefold faculty what

predictum est. Urgent etiam ad solutionem promisse
aforesaid has-been they-urge also to the-payment of-the-promised
mercedis. Quod si excipio, iuxta illud ethicum:
reward but if I-object according-to that-saying moral

Mercedem appellas? quid enim scio?
the-reward you-claim what for do-I-know

continuo replicant iuxta eumdem:
at-once they-retort according-to the-same

Culpa docentis
the-fault of-the-teacher
scilicet arguitur, cum in leua parte mamille
of-course is-charged when in the-left part of-the-breast
nil salit Archadio iuueni.
nothing leaps in-the-Arcadian youth

Sic, sic, inquiunt,
so so they-say

nosse uolunt omnes, mercedem soluere nemo.
to-know wish all the-reward to-pay no-one

Quia itaque uereor ingratitudinis notam, doctrinam pro
since and-so I-fear of-ingratitude the-mark teaching for
doctrina, necessariam pro necessaria eis rependo. Regularum
teaching necessary for necessary to-them I-repay of-rules
trado compendium, indicens eis ut earum sibi
I-hand-down a-compendium enjoining on-them that of-them for-themselves
comparent usum: et, quia tres artes accepi, easque utiles, tres
they-procure the-use and since three arts I-received and-them useful three

itidem doceo, sed utiliores. Sit ergo prima militaris, secunda
likewise I-teach but more-useful let-be therefore the-first military the-second
medicinalis, tertia iuris ciuilis et decretorum et totius
medical the-third of-law civil and of-decrees and of-the-whole
ethice perfectionem absoluat. Quotiens ergo cum hoste
of-ethics the-perfection may-complete as-often-as therefore with the-enemy
congrediendum est, caute prouideas ne te hostis ledat in
to-be-engaged is cautiously provide lest you the-enemy hurt in
aliquo; et tu in primo conflictu totus insurgas in eum,
something and you in the-first conflict wholly rise against him
et illesus uulneri uulnus infligas, donec ille aut te fateatur
and unhurt on-wound wound inflict until he either you confess
esse uictorem, aut exanimis tibi iudicio publico uictoriam
to-be victor or lifeless to-you by-judgment public the-victory
cedat. In phisica uero ante omnia causam egritudinis preuide;
yield in physic indeed before all-things the-cause of-the-sickness foresee
eamque cura et amoue; et exinde tamdiu reparatiuis
and-it cure and remove and thereafter so-long with-restoratives
et conseruatiuis egrum erige et foue, donec plenissime
and preservatives the-sick-man raise and cherish until most-fully
conualescat. Porro in ciuilibus usquequaque iustitiam sequere,
he-recover further in civil-matters everywhere justice follow
te amabilem omnibus facito et, iuxta comicum,
yourself lovable to-all make and according-to the-comic-poet

sine inuidia laudem inuenias et amicos pares.
without envy praise you-may-find and friends may-get

Quid multa? In omnibus indue caritatem. Nam et
why many-words in all-things put-on charity for also
michi in promptu est usus horum, sicut eis exercitium
for-me in readiness is the-use of-these as for-them the-exercise

premissorum. Eo ergo miserabiliores sunt, quo miseriam
of-the-aforesaid by-that therefore more-wretched they-are by-which misery
suam non agnoscunt; dum seipsos fallunt, id agentes
their-own not they-recognize while themselves they-deceive this doing
in studio ueritatis, ut nichil sciant; neque enim fideli,
in the-study of-truth that nothing they-know nor for by-the-faithful
nisi humilitatis uia, queritur ueritas. Sic Pilatus, ueritatis
except by-humility's way is-sought truth thus Pilate of-truth
audita mentione, quid esset interrogauit; sed infidelitas
having-heard mention what it-was asked but the-unbelief
querentis egit ut docentem ante tumidus declinaret
of-the-asker brought-about that the-teacher before the-swollen avoided
auditor quam sacre responsionis instrueretur oraculo.
hearer than of-the-sacred answer he-was-instructed by-the-oracle

Quod nugiloquos ventilatores dedoceri oportet, ut sciant

VII · TRIFLING WINNOWERS MUST UNLEARN IN ORDER TO KNOW

John does not inveigh against logic, a pleasant and fruitful science, but against those who grow old in it at the crossroads, doubting everything, compiling every opinion, and heaping up oppositions their own authors scarcely know. Aristotle himself, whom alone they acknowledge, says it is foolish to answer every contrary view. Like Timotheus, who charged double to retrain the badly taught, a teacher must first wash out vicious learning before sound learning can take hold.

Non tamen, ut in logicam inuehar, hec propono
not however that against logic I-may-inveigh these-things I-propose
(scientia enim iocunda est et fructuosa) sed ut illis
the-science for pleasant is and fruitful but that to-those
eam liqueat non adesse, qui clamant in compitis et in
it may-be-clear not to-be-present who shout at crossroads and at

triuiis docent, et in ea, quam solam profitentur, non
street-corners teach and in it which alone they-profess not
decennium aut uicennium, sed totam consumpserunt etatem.
ten-years or twenty-years but the-whole have-consumed age
Nam et cum senectus ingruit, corpus eneruat, sensuum
for even when old-age comes-on the-body it-unnerves of-the-senses
retundit acumina, et precedentes comprimit uoluptates, sola
blunts the-edges and the-preceding checks pleasures alone
hec in ore uoluitur, uersatur in manibus, et aliis
this in the-mouth rolls is-turned in the-hands and from-other
omnibus studiis preripit locum. Fiunt itaque in puerilibus
all studies snatches the-place they-become and-so in boyish-things
Achademici senes, omnem dictorum aut scriptorum excutiunt
Academic old-men every of-sayings or of-writings they-shake-out
sillabam, immo et litteram; dubitantes ad omnia, querentes
syllable nay even letter doubting about all-things seeking
semper, sed numquam ad scientiam peruenientes; et tandem
always but never to knowledge arriving and at-length
conuertuntur ad uaniloquium, nescientes quid loquantur aut
they-are-turned to vain-talk not-knowing what they-say or
de quibus asserant, errores condunt nouos, et antiquorum
about what-things they-assert errors they-compose new and of-the-ancients
aut nesciunt aut dedignantur sententias imitari. Compilant
either they-know-not or disdain the-judgments to-imitate they-compile
omnium opiniones, et ea que etiam a uilissimis dicta
of-all the-opinions and those-things which even by the-vilest said
uel scripta sunt, ab inopia iudicii scribunt et referunt;
or written are from want of-judgment they-write and report
proponunt enim omnia, quia nesciunt preferre meliora.
they-set-forth for all-things because they-know-not to-prefer the-better
Tanta est opinionum oppositionumque congeries, ut uix
so-great is of-opinions and-of-oppositions the-heap that scarcely

suo nota esse possit auctori. Accidit hoc Didimo, quo
to-its-own known to-be it-can author it-happened this to-Didymus than-whom
nemo plura scripsit, ut cum historie cuidam tanquam
no-one more-things wrote that when a-history certain as
uane repugnaret, ipsius proferretur liber qui eam continebat,
vain he-opposed his-own was-brought-forth book which it contained
Sed nunc multos inuenies Didimos, quorum pleni, immo
but now many you-will-find Didymuses whose full nay
referti sunt commentarii huiusmodi logicorum impedimentis.
stuffed are commentaries with-such of-logicians impediments
Recte autem dicuntur oppositiones, quia melioribus
rightly however they-are-called oppositions because to-better
studiis opponuntur; obstant enim profectui. Sed nec
studies they-are-opposed they-stand-in-the-way for to-progress but not-even
Aristotiles, quem solum nugidici uentilatores ista dignantur
Aristotle whom alone the-trifle-speaking winnowers these deign
agnoscere, fideliter auditur, dicens quidem eleganter et uere
to-acknowledge faithfully is-heard saying indeed elegantly and truly
quia quolibet contraria opinionibus proferente sollicitum esse
that with-anyone contrary-things to-opinions bringing-forth anxious to-be
stultum est. Refert Quintilianus Timotheum quendam, clarum
foolish it-is relates Quintilian Timotheus a-certain famous
in arte tibiarum, solitum exigere duplas mercedes ab his
in the-art of-pipes was-wont to-exact double fees from those
quos alius instituisset, quam si traderentur rudes omnino.
whom another had-trained than if they-were-handed-over untaught altogether
Duplex enim labor est, alter in eluenda uitiosa doctrina,
double for the-labor is the-one in washing-out the-faulty teaching
quam perceperant; alter ut uera et recta fideliter
which they-had-received the-other that with-true and right-things faithfully
imbuantur. Ad hec, qui iam artificis nomen uendicat,
they-be-imbued to these he-who already of-a-craftsman the-name claims

non potest leuiter humiliari, ut ad minora descendat; sine
not can lightly to-be-humbled so-that to lesser-things he-descend without
quibus tamen proficere nequit. Timotheus utique sapiebat, quia
which yet to-advance he-cannot Timotheus surely was-wise because

quo semel est imbuta recens, seruabit odorem
with-what once is imbued new it-will-keep the-odor
testa diu
the-jar long

Et quisque, sui iuris effectus,
and each of-his-own right made

curret ad illam,
will-run to that
quam primum rupto predam gustauerat ouo.
which first from-the-broken prey it-had-tasted egg

Quod eos Aristotiles compescuerat, si audiretur

VIII · ARISTOTLE WOULD HAVE CHECKED THEM, IF HEARD

Constant wrangling, if modest, gives abundance of words, fluency, memory, and subtlety, but without measure subtlety turns hateful, as Seneca says, and precocious wits fade. Sidonius and Cicero reprove useless words, and the poet's useful and sweet carries the point. The tongue must be bridled, and useless things are not worth remembering. Aristotle forbade disputing questions that need punishment or sense, or whose proof is too near or too far, but they dispute everything.

Usus tamen aliquis interdum est in malo isto; scilicet quod
use however some sometimes is in evil this namely that
qui talibus assuescunt, si tamen modestia instituantur,
those-who to-such grow-accustomed if however with-modesty they-be-trained
uerborum copiam preparant, uolubilitatem lingue, capacitatem
of-words abundance prepare fluency of-tongue capacity
memorie; ad hoc enim proficit frequens hec et de omnibus
of-memory to this for avails frequent this and about all-things
concertatio; quartum quoque adicit, subtilitatem ingenii;
contention a-fourth also it-adds subtlety of-wit
continuo siquidem proficit exercitio. Si autem moderatio desit,
by-continual since it-advances by-exercise if however moderation be-lacking
omnia hec in contrarium cedunt; subtrahitur namque
all these-things into the-contrary turn is-withdrawn for
subtilitati utilitas. Nichil autem, ut in primo Declamationum
from-subtlety utility nothing however as in the-first of-the-Declamations
ait Seneca, odibilius subtilitate, ubi nichil aliud est quam
says Seneca more-hateful than-subtlety where nothing else is than
subtilitas; et ad Lucilium: Nichil est acutius arista; sed hec
subtlety and to Lucilius nothing is sharper than-an-awn but this
ad quid utilis? Tale utique est illud ingenium, quod, sola
for what useful such surely is that wit which with-sole

subtilitate lasciuiens, nulla residet grauitate. Hoc est quod in
subtlety wantoning in-no rests gravity this is what in
libro de Institutione Oratoris precoquum dicitur, et non
the-book on the-Institution of-the-Orator precocious is-called and not
temere peruenit ad frugem. Laudatur in pueris, sed in senibus
readily arrives at fruit it-is-praised in boys but in old-men
contemnitur et culpatur; pueri enim ex hoc facile parua
is-despised and blamed boys for from this easily small-things
faciunt, et audacia prouecti, quicquid possunt, statim
make and by-boldness carried-forward whatever they-can at-once
ostendunt; possunt id demum quod in proximo est. Verba
they-show they-can that only which at hand is words
concinnant et continuant, hec uultu interrito, nulla
they-fit-together and join these with-countenance undaunted by-no
tardati uerecundia, proferunt. Non multum prestant, sed cito;
slowed shame they-bring-forth not much they-furnish but quickly
non subest uera uis, nec penitus immissis radicibus nititur.
not is-beneath true force nor deeply sent-down roots does-it-rest-on
Ut que solo summo sparsa sunt semina, celerius
as which on-the-ground surface scattered are the-seeds more-quickly
se effundunt et, imitate spicas herbule, inanibus aristis
themselves pour-forth and imitating ears the-little-grasses with-empty awns
ante messem flauescunt; sic et ingenia, que subtilitatem aut
before the-harvest turn-yellow so also wits which subtlety or
copiam affectant, deducta grauitate. Placent hec annis
abundance affect drawn-off with-gravity please these-things with-the-years
comparata, deinde stat profectus, admiratio decrescit. Sic
compared then stands-still advance admiration decreases so
et in Nisio Flauo, qui referente Seneca apud Arellium
also in Nisius Flavus who relating Seneca with Arellius
declamabat, aliquid extra eloquentiam commendabat, in puero
declaimed something beyond eloquence commended in the-boy

scilicet eloquentia; nam lenocinium erat ingenii etas. Sed
namely eloquence for the-enticement was of-wit his-age but
nec uerborum copia perpetuo laudem habet; ut enim ait
neither of-words abundance perpetually praise has as for says
Sidonius: Non est maior gloria dixisse quod noueris quam
Sidonius not is greater glory to-have-said what you-know than
siluisse quod nescias. Sed et Cicero uerba redarguit
to-have-kept-silent what you-know-not but also Cicero words rebukes
que sine utilitate aut uoluptate tam dicentis quam
which without utility or pleasure as-much of-the-speaker as
audientis inutiliter proferuntur. Optinet enim illud poeticum:
of-the-hearer uselessly are-brought-forth holds for that poetic-saying

Aut prodesse uolunt, aut delectare poete,
either to-profit wish or to-delight poets
aut simul et iocunda et idonea dicere uite.
or at-once both pleasant and fitting to-say for-life
Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci.
every carried point who mixed the-useful with-the-sweet

Et multiloquium peccata comitantur. Lingue autem
and much-speaking sins accompany of-the-tongue however
uolubilitas tunc demum prodest, si ad sapientiam disponatur;
the-fluency then only profits if to wisdom it-be-disposed
in udo enim est et cito labitur. Licet autem sit membrum
in moist for it-is and quickly slips although however it-be a-member
modicum rotam humane natiuitatis succendit, conturbat
small the-wheel of-human birth it-sets-on-fire troubles
uitam, et totum hominem, nisi moderationis uinculo
life and the-whole man unless by-the-bond of-moderation
refrenetur, agit in preceps. Quid autem prodest illa
it-be-reined it-drives into headlong what however profits those-things

in archiuis memorie recondisse, quorum nullus est usus?
in the-archives of-memory to-have-stored of-which no is use
Sicut enim de lana caprina contendere inofficiosum est,
as for about wool goat's to-contend unprofitable is
sic ea que inutiliter proferuntur, commendare memorie
so those-things which uselessly are-brought-forth to-commend to-memory
ineptum et indiscretum est. Quis unquam inutilia folia
inept and undiscerning is who ever useless leaves
et aristas thesaurizans congessit, ut opibus habundet?
and awns treasuring heaped-up that in-wealth he-may-abound
Debuerat Aristotiles hanc compescuisse intemperiem eorum
ought Aristotle this to-have-checked intemperance of-those
qui indiscretam loquacitatem dialectice exercitium putant.
who undiscerning loquacity of-dialectic the-exercise think
Et sane compescuerat, si audiretur. Non oportet, inquit,
and surely he-had-checked-it if he-were-heard not it-behooves he-says
problema nec omnem positionem considerare, sed quam
a-problem nor every position to-consider but which
dubitabit aliquis rationis egentium et ⟨non⟩ pene uel
will-doubt someone of-reason of-those-needing and ⟨not⟩ of-punishment or
sensus. Nam qui dubitant utrum oporteat deos uereri et
of-sense for those-who doubt whether it-behooves the-gods to-revere and
parentes honorare uel non, pene indigent; qui uero
parents to-honor or not of-punishment are-in-need those-who indeed
utrum nix alba est uel non, sensus. Neque uero quorum
whether snow white is or not of-sense nor indeed those-of-which
propinqua est demonstratio, neque quorum ualde longe; nam
near is the-demonstration nor those-of-which very far for
hec quidem non habent dubitationem, illa autem magis quam
these indeed not have doubt those however more than
secundum exercitatiuam. Hec ille. Sed illi, eo inconsulto,
according-to the-exercising these-things he but they him unconsulted

immo et prohibente, semper, ubique, et de omnibus eque
nay even forbidding always everywhere and about all-things equally
disputant; forte quia notitiam omnium eque habent.
dispute perhaps because knowledge of-all-things equally they-have

Quod inefficax est dialectica, si aliarum destituatur subsidio

IX · DIALECTIC IS INEFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE OTHER DISCIPLINES

Eloquence profits in the measure of wisdom, so dialectic profits each man by his knowledge, like Hercules' sword, useless in a pygmy's hand, a thunderbolt in Achilles'. Alone it is maimed; with the other disciplines it can destroy all falsehood. It is no great thing if it only circles on itself in school matters that mature study casts out. Talking about an art is easy and practicing it hard, so whoever lacks the disciplines lacks dialectic's abundance.

Eloquentiam sine sapientia non prodesse, celebre est et
eloquence without wisdom not to-profit celebrated it-is and
uerum; unde ipsam, ut prosit, a sapientia contrahere
true whence it-itself that it-may-profit from wisdom to-draw
manifestum est. Ergo et pro modulo sapientie quam
manifest it-is therefore also according-to the-measure of-wisdom which
quisque adeptus est eloquentia prodest; nocet enim hec,
each attained has eloquence profits it-harms for this
si dissocietur ab illa. Ex quo liquet dialecticam, que
if it-be-dissociated from that from which it-is-clear dialectic which
inter ministras eloquentie expeditissima est et promptissima,
among the-handmaids of-eloquence most-expeditious is and most-ready
unicuique prodesse ad mensuram scientie sue. Ei
to-each to-profit according-to the-measure of-knowledge his to-him
enim prodest plurimum qui habet notitiam plurimorum et
for it-profits most who has knowledge of-very-many-things and

ei qui pauca nouit minimum prodest. Nam, sicut gladius
to-him who few-things knows least it-profits for as the-sword
Herculis in manu Pigmei aut pumilionis inefficax est, et
of-Hercules in the-hand of-a-Pygmy or of-a-dwarf ineffective is and
idem in manu Achillis aut Hectoris ad modum fulminis
the-same in the-hand of-Achilles or of-Hector after the-manner of-a-thunderbolt
uniuersa prosternit; sic dialectica, si aliarum disciplinarum
all-things lays-low so dialectic if of-other disciplines
uigore destituatur, quodammodo manca est et inutilis fere.
of-the-vigor it-be-destitute in-a-way maimed is and useless almost
Si aliarum robore uigeat, potens est omnem destruere
if of-others with-the-strength it-flourish powerful it-is all to-destroy
falsitatem; et, ut minimum ei ascribam, sufficit de omnibus
falsehood and that the-least to-it I-may-ascribe it-suffices about all-things
probabiliter disputare. Neque enim magnum est si more
probably to-dispute nor for great is-it if after-the-manner
nostrorum iugiter in se rotetur, se circumeat, sua rimetur
of-ours continually in itself it-be-rolled itself it-go-round its-own it-search
archana, et in illis dumtaxat uersetur que nec domi, nec
secrets and in those only be-occupied which neither at-home nor
militie, nec in foro, nec in claustro, nec in curia, nec in
in-war nor in the-forum nor in the-cloister nor in the-court nor in
ecclesia, immo nusquam nisi in scola prosunt; ibi enim
the-church nay nowhere except in the-school profit there for
teneriori etati plura indulgentur ad modum et modicum,
to-the-tenderer age more-things are-indulged in measure and moderately
que mox magis serius philosophie tractatus eliminat. Siquidem
which soon more serious of-philosophy the-treatment drives-out since
hic, cum ad maturam scientie uel uite uenitur etatem, non
here when to the-mature of-knowledge or of-life one-comes age not
modo uerba puerilia et licentioris indulgentie, sed totos
only words boyish and of-more-licentious indulgence but whole

plerumque reicit libros. Hoc est enim quod cum poetici
mostly it-casts-out books this is for what when of-poetic
nube figmenti in Mercurii et Philologie docemur nuptiis
in-the-cloud of-fiction in of-Mercury and of-Philology we-are-taught the-marriage
deorum omnium auspicio contractis et utiliter hominibus
of-the-gods of-all by-the-auspice contracted and usefully by-men
amplectendis. Ibi namque Philologia, postquam celi templa
to-be-embraced there for Philology after of-heaven the-temples
conscenderat et purioris status nactus est libertatem, librorum
she-had-climbed and of-a-purer state obtained has the-freedom of-books
copiam, quibus fecunda erat, euomuisse describitur. Est
the-abundance with-which pregnant she-was to-have-vomited is-described is
autem cuique opifici facillimum de arte sua loqui; sed
however for-each craftsman most-easy about art his-own to-speak but
ex arte quod artis est facere difficillimum est. Quis est
from art what of-art is to-do most-difficult is who is
enim medicus qui non de elementis et humoribus et
for a-physician who not about elements and humors and
complexionibus et morbis et ceteris pertinentibus ad
complexions and diseases and the-other-things pertaining to
phisicam sepe loquatur et multum? Sed qui ad hoc
physic often speaks and much but he-who for this
conualescit, magis poterat egrotare. Quis ethicus morum
recovers more could to-be-sick what moralist in-the-rules
regulis, dum in lingua uersantur, non habundat? Sed
of-morals while in the-tongue they-are-occupied not abounds but
plane longe difficilius est ut exprimantur in uita. Mecanici
plainly far more-difficult it-is that they-be-expressed in life mechanical
opifices facile singuli loquuntur de artibus suis, sed nemo
craftsmen easily each speak about arts their-own but no-one
eorum tam leui opera architectum exercet aut pugilem.
of-them with-so light labor the-architect exercises or the-boxer

Idem est et in reliquis. Sic de diffinitione aut argumentis
the-same is also in the-rest so about definition or arguments
aut genere et similibus loqui facillimum est; sed eadem ad
or genus and similar-things to-speak most-easy is but the-same for
artis explendum officium in singulis facultatibus inuenire
of-the-art fulfilling the-office in single faculties to-find
longe difficilius. Ergo qui disciplinarum inopia premitur,
far more-difficult therefore he-who of-disciplines by-want is-pressed
copiam, quam dialectica pollicetur et prestat, non habebit.
the-abundance which dialectic promises and furnishes not will-have

Quorum auctoritate precedentia et sequentia constent

X · BY WHOSE AUTHORITY THE PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING STAND

John recounts his studies in France from the year after Henry I died: logic under Abelard on the Mount of Saint Genevieve, then two years with Alberic and Robert of Melun; three years with the grammarian of Conches; the quadrivium and rhetoric with Richard the Bishop, Thierry, and Peter Helias; Adam's friendship; then, after teaching, Gilbert, Robert Pullen, and Simon of Poissy. After twelve years his old companions on the mount had not advanced, which shows that dialectic alone lies bloodless and barren.

Cum primum adolescens admodum studiorum causa
when first a-youth very of-studies for-the-sake
migrassem in Gallias, anno altero postquam illustris
I-had-migrated into Gaul in-the-year second after the-illustrious
rex Anglorum Henricus, Leo iustitie, rebus excessit
king of-the-English Henry the-Lion of-justice from-affairs departed
humanis, contuli me ad Peripateticum Palatinum qui, tunc
human I-betook myself to the-Peripatetic of-Le-Pallet who then
in monte sancte Genouefe clarus doctor et admirabilis
on the-mount of-Saint Genevieve famous doctor and admirable

omnibus presidebat. Ibi ad pedes eius prima artis huius
over-all presided there at the-feet his the-first of-art this
rudimenta accepi et pro modulo ingenioli mei quicquid
rudiments I-received and according-to the-measure of-little-wit my whatever
excidebat ab ore eius tota mentis auiditate excipiebam.
fell from the-mouth his with-whole of-mind avidity I-took-up
Deinde post discessum eius, qui michi preproperus uisus est,
then after the-departure his which to-me too-hasty seemed has
adhesi magistro Alberico, qui inter ceteros opinatissimus
I-attached-myself to-master Alberic who among the-others as-most-esteemed
dialecticus enitebat et erat reuera nominalis secte acerrimus
dialectician shone and was in-truth of-the-nominal sect the-sharpest
impugnator. Sic ferme toto biennio conuersatus in monte,
assailant so almost for-whole two-years having-spent-time on the-mount
artis huius preceptoribus usus sum Alberico et magistro
of-art this as-teachers used I-have Alberic and master
Rodberto Meludensi (ut cognomine designetur quod meruit
Robert of-Melun that by-surname he-be-designated which he-earned
in scolarum regimine, natione siquidem Angligena est);
in of-schools the-rule by-nation since English he-is
quorum alter, ad omnia scrupulosus, locum questionis
of-whom the-one to all-things scrupulous a-place of-question
inueniebat ubique, ut quamuis polita planities offendiculo
found everywhere so-that although polished a-plain of-a-stumbling-block
non careret et, ut aiunt, ei cirpus non esset enodis. Nam
not would-lack and as they-say to-him a-bulrush not would-be knotless for
et ibi monstrabat quid oporteat enodari. Alter autem,
even there he-showed what it-behooved to-be-unknotted the-other however
in responsione promptissimus, subterfugii causa propositum
in answering most-ready of-subterfuge for-the-sake the-proposed
numquam declinauit articulum, quin alteram contradictionis
never declined point but-that the-one of-contradiction

partem eligeret aut determinata multiplicitate sermonis
part he-would-choose or determined the-multiplicity of-speech
doceret unam non esse responsionem. Ille ergo in
would-teach one not to-be the-answer the-former therefore in
questionibus subtilis et multus; iste in responsis perspicax,
questions subtle and copious the-latter in answers perspicacious
breuis et commodus. Que duo si pariter eis alicui
brief and apt which two-things if equally to-them to-anyone
omnium contigissent, parem utique disputatorem nostra etate
of-all had-befallen an-equal surely disputant in-our age
non esset inuenire. Ambo enim acuti erant ingenii
not it-would-be-possible to-find both for of-sharp were wit
et studii peruicacis; et, ut reor, magni preclarique uiri in
and of-study persevering and as I-think great and-illustrious men in
phisicis studiis enituissent, si de magno litterarum niterentur
physical studies would-have-shone if on the-great of-letters they-rested
fundamento, si tantum institissent uestigiis maiorum
foundation if as-much they-had-pressed-on in-the-footsteps of-the-ancients
quantum suis applaudebant inuentis. Hec pro tempore
as-much-as at-their-own they-applauded inventions these-things for the-time
quo illis adhesi. Nam postea unus eorum, profectus
in-which to-them I-adhered for afterward one of-them having-gone
Bononiam, dedidicit quod docuerat; siquidem et reuersus
to-Bologna unlearned what he-had-taught since also having-returned
dedocuit. An melius, iudicent qui eum ante et postea
he-untaught whether better let-them-judge who him before and afterward
audierunt. Porro alter in diuinis proficiens litteris etiam
heard further the-other in divine advancing letters also
eminentioris philosophie et celebrioris nominis assecutus
of-a-more-eminent philosophy and of-a-more-celebrated name attained
est gloriam. Apud hos, toto exercitatus biennio, sic locis
has the-glory with these for-whole exercised two-years so to-places

assignandis assueui et regulis et aliis rudimentorum
to-be-assigned I-grew-accustomed and to-rules and to-other of-rudiments
elementis, quibus pueriles animi imbuuntur, et in quibus
elements with-which boyish minds are-imbued and in which
prefati doctores potentissimi erant et expeditissimi, ut
the-aforesaid doctors most-powerful were and most-expeditious that
hec omnia michi uiderer nosse tanquam ungues digitosque
these all-things to-myself I-seemed to-know as nails and-fingers
meos. Hoc enim plane didiceram, ut iuuenili leuitate
my-own this for plainly I-had-learned that with-youthful levity
pluris facerem scientiam meam quam esset. Videbar michi
of-more I-made knowledge my than it-was I-seemed to-myself
sciolus, eo quod in iis que audieram promptus eram.
a-smatterer by-that that in those which I-had-heard ready I-was
Deinde, reuersus in me et metiens uires meas, bona
then having-returned into myself and measuring strength my by-the-good
preceptorum meorum gratia, consulto me ad gramaticum
of-teachers my favor deliberately myself to the-grammarian
de Conchis transtuli, ipsumque triennio docentem audiui.
of Conches I-transferred and-him for-three-years teaching I-heard
Interim legi plura, nec me umquam penitebit temporis
meanwhile I-read more-things nor me ever will-it-repent of-time
eius. Postmodum uero Ricardum cognomento Episcopum,
that afterward indeed Richard surnamed the-Bishop
hominem fere nullius discipline expertem, et qui plus
a-man almost of-no discipline devoid and who more
pectoris habet quam oris, plus scientie quam facundie,
of-breast has than of-mouth more of-knowledge than of-eloquence
plus ueritatis quam uanitatis, uirtutis quam ostentationis,
more of-truth than of-vanity of-virtue than of-display
secutus sum; et que ab aliis audieram ab eo cuncta
followed I-have and what from others I-had-heard from him all

relegi, et inaudita quedam ad quadruuium pertinentia, in
I-reread and unheard-of certain-things to the-quadrivium pertaining in
quo aliquatenus Teutonicum preaudieram Hardewinum. Relegi
which to-some-extent the-German I-had-heard-before Hardwin I-reread
quoque rethoricam, quam prius cum quibusdam aliis a
also rhetoric which before with certain other-things from
magistro Theodorico tenuiter auditis paululum intelligebam.
master Thierry thinly heard a-little I-understood
Sed eam postea a Petro Helia plenius accepi. Et quia
but it afterward from Peter Helias more-fully I-received and since
nobilium liberos qui michi, amicorum et cognatorum auxiliis
of-nobles the-children who to-me of-friends and of-kinsmen of-the-help
destituto, paupertati mee solatiante Deo, alimenta prestabant,
destitute to-poverty my solacing God nourishment furnished
instruendos susceperam, ex necessitate officii et instantia
to-be-instructed I-had-undertaken from necessity of-office and by-the-insistence
iuuenum urgebar quod audieram ad memoriam crebrius
of-the-youths I-was-urged what I-had-heard to memory more-frequently
reuocare. Unde ad magistrum Adam, acutissimi uirum ingenii
to-recall whence to master Adam of-very-sharp a-man wit
et, quicquid alii sentiant, multarum litterarum, qui Aristotili
and whatever others may-think of-many letters who on-Aristotle
pre ceteris incumbebat, familiaritatem contraxi ulteriorem;
before others bent a-familiarity I-contracted further
ut, licet eum doctorem non habuerim, michi sua
so-that although him as-teacher not I-had to-me his-own-things
benigne communicaret, et se, quod aut nulli faciebat
kindly he-communicated and himself which either to-none he-did
aut paucis alienis, michi patentius exponebat. Putabatur
or to-few strangers to-me more-openly he-expounded he-was-thought
enim inuidia laborare. Interim Willelmum Suessionensem,
for by-envy to-labor meanwhile William of-Soissons

qui ad expugnandam, ut aiunt sui, logice uetustatem
who for storming as they-say his-own logic the-oldness
et consequentias inopinabiles construendas et antiquorum
and consequences unexpected to-be-built and of-the-ancients
sententias diruendas machinam postmodum fecit, prima
the-judgments to-be-demolished a-machine afterward made the-first
logices docui elementa et tandem iam dicto preceptori
of-logic I-taught elements and at-length to-the-already said teacher
apposui. Ibi forte didicit idem esse ex contradictione, cum
I-set-him there perhaps he-learned the-same to-be from contradiction although
Aristotiles obloquatur, quia idem cum sit et non sit, non
Aristotle speaks-against-it that the-same when it-is and not it-is not
necesse est idem esse, et item, cum aliquid sit, non necesse
necessary it-is the-same to-be and likewise when something is not necessary
est idem esse et non esse. Nichil enim ex contradictione
it-is the-same to-be and not to-be nothing for from contradiction
euenit et contradictionem impossible est ex aliquo euenire.
results and contradiction impossible it-is from something to-result
Unde nec amici machina impellente urgeri potui ut
whence not-even with-a-friend's machine impelling to-be-urged could-I that
credam ex uno impossibili omnia impossibilia prouenire.
I-should-believe from one impossible all impossible-things to-come-forth
Extraxerunt me hinc rei familiaris angustia, sociorum
drew me hence of-affairs household the-straitness of-companions
petitio, et consilium amicorum, ut officium docentis
the-request and the-counsel of-friends that the-office of-teacher
aggrederer. Parui. Reuersus itaque in fine triennii
I-should-undertake I-obeyed having-returned and-so at the-end of-three-years
repperi magistrum Gilebertum, ipsumque audiui in logicis et
I-found master Gilbert and-him I-heard in logical and
diuinis; sed nimis cito subtractus est. Successit Rodbertus
divine-matters but too quickly withdrawn he-was succeeded Robert

Pullus, quem uita pariter et scientia commendabant. Deinde
Pullen whom life equally and knowledge commended then
me excepit Simon Pexiacensis, fidus lector, sed obtusior
me received Simon of-Poissy a-trusty lecturer but a-duller
disputator. Sed hos duos in solis theologicis habui preceptores.
disputant but these two in only theological-matters I-had as-teachers
Sic fere duodennium michi elapsum est diuersis studiis
so almost twelve-years for-me elapsed has in-diverse studies
occupato. Iocundum itaque uisum est ueteres quos reliqueram
occupied pleasant and-so seemed it-has the-old whom I-had-left
et quos adhuc dialectica detinebat in monte reuisere socios,
and whom still dialectic detained on the-mount to-revisit companions
conferre cum eis super ambiguitatibus pristinis, ut nostrum
to-confer with them about ambiguities former that our
inuicem ex collatione mutua commetiremur profectum.
in-turn from collation mutual we-might-measure advance
Inuenti sunt qui fuerant et ubi; neque enim ad palmam
were-found they-were what they-had-been and where nor for to the-palm
uisi sunt processisse. Ad questiones pristinas dirimendas
seemed they to-have-proceeded for questions former to-be-settled
neque propositiunculam unam adiecerant. Quibus urgebant
not-even little-proposition one had-they-added by-which they-urged
stimulis, eisdem et ipsi urgebantur, profecerant in uno
goads the-same also themselves were-urged they-had-advanced in one
dumtaxat, dedicerant modum, modestiam nesciebant; adeo
only they-had-unlearned measure modesty they-knew-not so-far
quidem ut de reparatione eorum posset desperari. Expertus
indeed that about the-recovery their one-could despair experienced
itaque sum, quod liquido colligi potest, quia, sicut
and-so I-have what clearly to-be-gathered can that as
dialectica alias expedit disciplinas, sic, si sola fuerit,
dialectic other expedites disciplines so if alone it-will-have-been

iacet exanguis et sterilis, nec ad fructum philosophie
it-lies bloodless and barren nor to the-fruit of-philosophy
fecundat animam, si aliunde non concipit.
does-it-make-fruitful the-soul if from-elsewhere not it-conceives

Quid sola dialectica possit

XI · WHAT DIALECTIC ALONE CAN DO

Dialectic alone, with grammar's help, settles questions about itself, such as whether affirming is enunciating; each may judge what that does for life. The pure dialectician seldom asks whether pleasure is good or virtue preferable, where life's use lies. Though logic serves itself, it was found for other things: like the animal spirits, born of the humors yet moving the body, it draws its origin from the other arts and moves them.

Est tamen quod solitaria pollicetur et prestat, solius
there-is however what alone it-promises and furnishes of-sole
gramatice subnixa presidio; propositas enim de se
grammar supported by-the-protection proposed for about itself
expedit questiones, sed ad alia non consurgit; quale est:
it-settles questions but to other-things not it-rises such-as is
An affirmare sit enuntiare, et: An simul extare possit
whether to-affirm be to-enunciate and whether at-once to-stand can
contradictio. Hoc autem quid ad usum uite conferat, si non
a-contradiction this however what to the-use of-life contributes if not
est adminiculans alii, quisque diiudicet. Ceterum: An
it-is aiding to-other let-each judge however whether
uoluptas bona sit; An preeligenda uirtus: An in summo
pleasure good be whether to-be-preferred virtue whether in the-highest
bone habitudines; An sit in indigentia laborandum,
good the-habits whether one-ought in want to-labor

purus et simplex dialecticus raro examinat; at in his uiuendi
the-pure and simple dialectician rarely examines but in these of-living
uel ad beatitudinem uel ad incolumitatem uersatur utilitas;
either for blessedness or for safety is-occupied the-utility
licet enim logica seipsam expediat, propter alia tamen
although for logic itself may-expedite for other-things yet
magis inuenta est. Fere ergo ut spiritus animalium ea
more invented it-was almost therefore as the-spirit of-animals them
disponit et uegetat, et humores regit et fouet ad uitam
disposes and quickens and the-humors rules and fosters for life
animalem, ab ipsis tamen humoribus nascitur, et subtilitate
animal from the-very yet humors it-is-born and by-subtlety
sua et uigore magnam molem agitat et ad se disponit,
its-own and vigor a-great mass sets-in-motion and to itself disposes
quantum non noxia tardant corpora; sic logica ab aliis
as-far-as not harmful slow bodies so logic from others
ducit originem easque disponit et mouet, quantum inertie
draws origin and-them disposes and moves as-far-as of-inertia
et ignorantie nocumento non retardatur. Quod planum est
and of-ignorance by-the-harm not it-is-slowed which plain is
his qui et artem disserendi nouerunt et alias disciplinas.
to-those who both the-art of-discoursing know and other disciplines

In quibus constet exercitium eius, et quo utatur instrumento

XII · WHAT DIALECTIC EXERCISES AND WHICH INSTRUMENT IT USES

Dialectic's matter is the question: it leaves the hypothesis, entangled in circumstances of who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when, to the orator, and claims the thesis, freed of them. Its instrument is speech, continuous in the orator, who moves a judge and addresses many, mostly by induction, and interrupted in the dialectician, who convinces one adversary mostly by syllogism. Reason, which speech clothes, is also an instrument and makes speech one; the art supplies it and teaches its use.

Versatur exercitium dialectice in omnibus disciplinis, siquidem
is-occupied the-exercise of-dialectic in all disciplines since
questionem habet materiam; sed eam quae ypotesis dicitur, id
question it-has as-matter but that which hypothesis is-called that
est que circumstantiis implicatur, relinquit oratori. Sunt autem
is which by-circumstances is-entangled it-leaves to-the-orator are however
circumstantie, quas Boetius in quarto Topicorum enumerat,
circumstances which Boethius in the-fourth of-the-Topics enumerates
quis, quid, ubi, quibus adminiculis, cur, quomodo, quando.
who what where by-what aids why how when
Thesim uero uendicat sibi, id est questionem a predictarum
the-thesis indeed it-claims for-itself that is the-question from of-the-aforesaid
circumstantiarum nexibus absolutam. Communiorem enim
circumstances the-bonds loosed a-more-common for
speculationem aggreditur, nec iure suo descendit ad singula;
speculation it-undertakes nor by-right its-own it-descends to single-things
quod si quando euenit, hospitis more bonis fruitur
but if ever it-happens of-a-guest in-the-manner goods it-enjoys
alienis. Porro instrumentum quo alterutra utitur, proposito
another's further the-instrument which each uses purpose
suo deseruiens, oratio est. Illa enim que iudicem mouet
its-own serving speech is that for which the-judge moves

alium a confligentibus continua utitur oratione et inductione
another from the-contenders continuous uses speech and induction
frequentius, eo quod ad plures est et plerumque populum
more-frequently by-that that to many it-is and mostly the-people
captat; hec autem intercisa oratione et crebrius utitur
it-captures this however interrupted speech and more-often uses
sillogismis, quia de aduersarii pendet iudicio, et ad unum
syllogisms because on of-the-adversary it-hangs judgment and to one
est, cui si fidem fecerit, finem propositi apprehendit.
is to-whom if faith it-will-have-made the-end of-its-purpose it-grasps
Neque enim sermonem habet ad populum, aut arbitrium
nor for speech does-it-have to the-people or the-decision
legis expectat. Ipsa quoque ratio, quam oratio uestit et,
of-the-law await the-very also reason which speech clothes and
adminiculo sermonis ad animam per aurem ingrediens,
with-the-aid of-speech into the-soul through the-ear entering
ipsam mouet, itidem instrumentum est; immo hec est que
it moves likewise an-instrument is nay this it-is which
facit ut sit oratio instrumentum. Virtus enim orationis est
makes that be speech an-instrument the-virtue for of-speech is
mens atque sententia; sine qua nec uigere nec mouere
mind and meaning without which neither to-flourish nor to-move
potest oratio. Cum itaque questio sit materia, ratio uel
can speech since and-so the-question be the-matter reason or
oratio instrumentum, artis opera singulariter in eo uersatur,
speech the-instrument of-the-art the-work singularly in this is-occupied
ut instrumenti copiam faciat et doceat usum eius; materiam
that of-the-instrument abundance it-make and teach the-use its the-matter
enim prestant communiter et alie discipline; siquidem
for furnish in-common also other disciplines since
undique emergunt questiones, sed non undique absoluuntur.
from-everywhere emerge questions but not everywhere they-are-resolved

Quante utilitatis sit scientia probabilium, et quod simpliciter necessaria non facile innotescunt

XIII · PROBABLES, AND HOW RARE SIMPLE NECESSITY IS

Ethics, physics, and logic each furnish questions, and logic lends them all its methods, useful for exercise, for meeting opponents, and for the philosophical disciplines. Demonstration seeks the necessary, but only God knows the number of possibles; the Virgin's childbirth showed that what seemed necessary for ages was not. Demonstration falters in nature but prevails in mathematics; dialectic rests on probables known to all, most, or the eminent.

Tres itaque facultates, naturalis, moralis, et rationalis,
three and-so faculties natural moral and rational
materiam prestant; quia singule suas exponunt questiones.
the-matter furnish because each their-own set-forth questions
Querit enim Ethica parentibus magis an legibus oporteat
asks for Ethics to-parents rather or to-laws it-behooves
obedire, si forte dissentiant. Phisica, ⟨an⟩ mundus eternus sit
to-obey if perhaps they-disagree Physics ⟨whether⟩ the-world eternal be
aut perpetuus aut initium habuerit et sit finem habiturus in
or perpetual or a-beginning have-had and be an-end about-to-have in
tempore, aut sit nichil horum. Logica, an contrariorum sit
time or be none of-these Logic whether of-contraries be
eadem disciplina, quoniam eorum est idem sensus. Querunt
the-same discipline since of-them is the-same sense ask
ergo singule, et, licet suis muniantur principiis,
therefore each and although with-their-own they-be-fortified principles
eis tamen logica metodos suas, compendii scilicet rationes,
to-them yet logic methods its-own of-shortcut namely the-systems
communiter subministrat, unde non modo ad exercitationem,
in-common supplies whence not only for exercise
sed ad obuiationes et ad secundum philosophiam disciplinas
but for encounters and for according-to philosophy disciplines

utilissima est. Nam et de proposito metodum habens facile
most-useful it-is for also about the-proposed a-method having easily
argumentatur, et qui, multorum opiniones sciens, non ab
one-argues and who of-many the-opinions knowing not from
extraneis sed a propriis loquitur documentis, commode
outside but from his-own speaks proofs fittingly
obuiat, immutans quicquid non bene dictum uidetur; et qui
meets-them changing whatever not well said seems and who
circumstantes attendit rationes, in singulis uerum facilius
the-surrounding attends-to reasons in single-things the-true more-easily
discernit a falso, et habilior redditur ad intelligendum
distinguishes from the-false and more-apt is-rendered for understanding
et docendum, quod philosophantis propositum expetit et
and teaching what of-the-philosopher the-purpose seeks and
officium exigit. Cum autem dialectica inquisitiua sit, ad
the-office demands since however dialectic inquisitive be to
omnium metodorum principia uiam habet; siquidem ars
of-all methods the-principles a-way it-has since art
quelibet suas habet metodos, quas nos figuraliter aduiationes
any its-own has methods which we figuratively approaches
uel aditus possumus interpretari, et inquisitioni succedit
or entrances can interpret and on-inquiry follows
inuentio, nec apprehendit scientie fructum, cui querendi
finding nor does-he-grasp of-knowledge the-fruit to-whom of-seeking
displicet studium. Sed demonstratiua necessarias metodos
displeases the-study but demonstrative necessary methods
querit, et que illam rerum inherentiam docent, quam
seeks and those-which that of-things inherence teach which
impossible est dissolui; hoc enim dumtaxat necessarium
impossible it-is to-be-dissolved this for only necessary
est, quod aliter esse impossibile est. Ceterum quia uires
is which otherwise to-be impossible is however since the-powers

nature aut nullus pene scrutatur aut rarus, et numerum
of-nature either no-one almost scrutinizes or rarely-one and the-number
possibilium solus Deus nouit, de necessariis plerumque
of-possible-things alone God knows about necessary-things mostly
non modo incertum, sed et temerarium iudicium est. Quis
not only uncertain but also rash judgment is who
enim nouit penitus quid esse possit aut non possit? 'Si
for knows thoroughly what to-be can or not can if
peperit, cum aliquo concubuit aut corrupta est', necessarium
she-has-borne with someone she-has-lain or corrupted she-is necessary
esse duxerunt secula multa; sed tandem in fine temporum
to-be held the-ages many but at-last in the-end of-times
non necessarium esse docuit integerrime Virginis partus.
not necessary to-be taught of-the-most-pure Virgin the-childbirth
Quod enim simpliciter necesse est, nullo modo aliter esse
what for simply necessary is in-no way otherwise to-be
potest; mutari uero potest quod a determinatione necesse
can to-be-changed indeed can what by determination necessary
est. Victorinus in Rethoricis in explanatione necessarii hoc
is Victorinus in the-Rhetoric in the-explanation of-the-necessary this
ipsum docet, et quod ad partum corruptio, non quidem
very-thing teaches and that on childbirth corruption not indeed
necessario sed probabiliter, consequatur; Augustinus quoque
necessarily but probably follows Augustine also
rationes, que necessarie sunt, esse asserit sempiternas et nullo
the-reasons which necessary are to-be asserts everlasting and in-no
modo euacuari posse. Probabilium uero rationes mutari
way to-be-emptied to-be-able of-probable-things indeed the-reasons to-be-changed
posse palam est, nisi necessarie fuerint. Unde constat
to-be-able plain it-is unless necessary they-be whence it-is-agreed
quam arduum sit demonstratoris propositum, qui semper
how arduous be of-the-demonstrator the-purpose who always

necessitatem sequitur, et a ueritatis, quam profitetur,
necessity follows and from of-the-truth which he-professes
principiis non recedit. Si enim ueritatem deprehendere, que
the-principles not withdraws if for truth to-grasp which
(ut aiunt Academici nostri) tanquam in profundo putei
as say the-Academics our as-if in the-depth of-a-well
latet, magnum est; quante uiuacitatis est, non modo
lies great it-is of-how-great liveliness is-it not only
ueritatem, sed ipsius necessitatis penetrare archana, siquidem
truth but of-the-very necessity to-penetrate the-secrets since
existentium quam possibilium facilior est assignatio? Vacillet
of-existing-things than of-possible-things easier is the-assignment let-waver
itaque in naturalibus plerumque (corporalibus et mutabilibus
and-so in natural-things mostly bodily and changeable
dico) ratio demonstrandi; sed in mathematicis efficacissime
I-mean the-method of-demonstrating but in mathematical-things most-effectively
conualescit. Quicquid enim in numeris, proportionibus, figuris,
it-grows-strong whatever for in numbers proportions figures
similibusque ab ea colligitur, indubitanter uerum est et
and-similar-things by it is-gathered undoubtedly true is and
aliter esse non potest. Itaque ad demonstrandi scientiam non
otherwise to-be not can and-so to of-demonstrating the-science not
aspiret, cui probabilia nota non fuerint. Demonstratiue
let-him-aspire to-whom probable-things known not will-have-been of-demonstrative
ergo principia necessaria sunt; dialectice probabilia. Unde
therefore the-principles necessary are of-dialectic probable whence
et dialecticus ab illis abstinebit, que nulli uidentur, ne
also the-dialectician from those will-abstain which to-none seem lest
habeatur insanus; et a manifestis, ne palpare uideatur in
he-be-held insane and from manifest-things lest to-grope he-seem in

tenebris; et iis dumtaxat insistet, que aut omnibus aut
darkness and on-those only will-insist which either to-all or
pluribus aut precipuis in unoquoque generum nota erunt.
to-most or to-the-foremost in each of-the-kinds known will-be

Item de eodem

XIV · THE SAME CONTINUED

Dialectic's principles are probable, as demonstration's are necessary, and the probable suffices for it, as Cicero professes for the Academy. The probable is what appears so always or mostly; strong opinion passes into faith and nears knowledge, as when we trust the sun's return after it sets. Knowledge from sense of what cannot be otherwise survives sense, and what holds in all or most of a kind is set down universally unless an objection stands.

Principia itaque dialectice probabilia sunt; sicut demonstratiue
the-principles and-so of-dialectic probable are as of-demonstrative
necessaria. Quod si quid probabile et necessarium est, ad
necessary but if anything probable and necessary is to
utraque poterit pertinere; sed aliunde ad alteram. Sola
both will-be-able to-pertain but from-elsewhere to the-other alone
enim probabilitas dialectico sufficit. Unde Cicero in secundo
for probability for-the-dialectician suffices whence Cicero in the-second
Tusculanarum: Nos qui sequimur probabilia, nec ultra quam
of-the-Tusculans we who follow probable-things nor beyond than
quod uerisimile occurrit, progredi possumus et refellere sine
what likely occurs to-proceed can and to-refute without
iracundia et refelli sine pertinacia parati sumus. Idem
anger and to-be-refuted without stubbornness ready are the-same
quoque alibi: Hanc nobis dat Academia nostra licentiam, ut
also elsewhere this to-us gives Academy our license that

quicquid probabile occurrit, nostro iure liceat defendere.
whatever probable occurs by-our right it-be-permitted to-defend
Est autem probabile quod habenti iudicium etiam a
is however probable what to-one-having judgment even from
superficie innotescit; sic quidem in omnibus et semper, aut
the-surface becomes-known so indeed in all-things and always or
in paucissimis et admodum raro aliter existens. Quod enim
in very-few and very rarely otherwise existing what for
semper sic aut frequentissime, aut probabile est aut uidetur
always so or most-frequently either probable is or seems
probabile, etsi aliter esse possit; tanto autem probabilius,
probable even-if otherwise to-be it-can by-so-much however more-probable
quanto habenti iudicium facilius et certius innotescit.
by-as-much-as to-one-having judgment more-easily and more-certainly it-becomes-known
Sunt enim quedam tanta probabilitatis luce conspicua,
are for some-things with-such of-probability light conspicuous
ut etiam necessaria reputentur; quedam autem, eo quod
that even necessary they-be-reckoned some however by-that that
opinioni minus familiaria sint, uix ascribuntur probabilibus.
to-opinion less familiar they-be scarcely are-ascribed to-probable-things
Siquidem si opinio tenuis, iudicio uacillat incerto; si
since if opinion slight with-judgment wavers uncertain if
uehemens, transit in fidem et ad iudicium certum aspirat.
vehement it-passes into faith and to judgment certain aspires
Si autem adhuc eius uehementia inualescat, ut aut non
if however still its vehemence grow-strong so-that either not
protendi aut parum possit, licet infra scientiam sit, tamen
to-be-extended or little it-can although below knowledge it-be yet
scientie quod ad certitudinem iudicii coequatur. Quod
to-knowledge which as-to certainty of-judgment it-is-equaled which
quidem palam est, auctore Aristotile, in his que sensu
indeed plain is by-the-authority-of Aristotle in those which by-sense

solo cognoscuntur et aliter esse possunt. Ignotum enim
alone are-known and otherwise to-be can unknown for
erit, cum occiderit sol, si adhuc feratur super terram
it-will-be when will-have-set the-sun if still it-be-borne over the-earth
an in nostrum sit emisperium reuersurus; eo quod tunc
whether into our it-be hemisphere about-to-return by-that that then
cesset sensus, per quem lationis eius habebatur scientia;
ceases the-sense through which of-movement its was-had knowledge
fides tamen lationis et reditus tanta est ut aliquatenus
the-faith however of-movement and of-return so-great is that to-some-extent
videatur equis cum scientia passibus ambulare. Si uero
it-seems with-equal with knowledge steps to-walk if indeed
sensus scientiam parit eius quod aliter esse non potest, ut
sense knowledge begets of-that which otherwise to-be not can as
si quis lineam uisu docente longam sciat aut superficiem
if anyone a-line by-sight teaching long know or a-surface
coloratam, cessante uisu non euanescit quidem scientia,
colored ceasing sight not vanishes indeed knowledge
eo quod rem ita esse necesse est. Ergo quod diuisim
by-that that the-thing so to-be necessary it-is therefore what severally
in omnibus uel in pluribus alicuius generis inuenitur et
in all or in most of-some kind is-found also
uniuersaliter in omnibus statuendum est aut ferenda instantia
universally in all to-be-established is or to-be-brought an-objection
in quo non sic. Est autem instantia alicuius talis obuia
in which not so is however an-objection of-something such an-opposed
positio, collecte uniuersitati preiudicans. Scientia itaque
position to-the-gathered universality prejudicing the-knowledge and-so
probabilium copiosa expeditissimam ad omnia uiam parat.
of-probable-things abundant a-most-expeditious to all-things way prepares

Que propositio sit dialectica, et quid problema

XV · WHAT A DIALECTICAL PROPOSITION AND A PROBLEM ARE

A dialectical proposition holds mostly and admits no objection; whoever holds such propositions can dispute probably on any ethical, physical, or logical problem. Aristotle defines the dialectical problem as a speculation bearing on choice and avoidance or on truth and knowledge, on which opinions divide; John extends choice and avoidance to physics, hardly to logic. Quarrels over goat's wool are not problems, since dialectic's matter is the thesis, and no liberal art is more useful.

Est autem dialectica propositio contra quam sic in pluribus
is however a-dialectical proposition against which thus in most-cases
se habentem non est instantia; id est, argumentum ad
itself having not is an-objection that is an-argument against
positionem. Qui uero tales propositiones pre mente habet,
the-position he-who indeed such propositions before the-mind has
et si que sunt positionum instantie, in omni genere
and if any are of-positions objections in every kind
controuersandi ad alteram quidem copiosus erit, et etiam, si
of-controversy for the-other indeed well-supplied will-be and even if
philosophice secum exerceatur, non modice felix. Potens
philosophically with-himself he-be-exercised not moderately fortunate able
enim est de omni problemate, ethico scilicet, phisico, et
for he-is about every problem ethical namely physical and
logico, probabiliter disputare. Est autem problema dialecticum
logical probably to-dispute is however a-problem dialectical
speculatio contendens uel ad electionem et fugam uel ad
a-speculation contending either toward choice and avoidance or toward
ueritatem et scientiam aut ipsum aut ut adminiculans ad
truth and knowledge either itself or as aiding toward
aliquid aliud huiusmodi; de quo aut neutro modo opinantur
something else of-this-kind about which either in-neither way they-opine

aut contrarie plurimi sapientibus aut sapientes plurimis aut
or contrarily the-many to-the-wise or the-wise to-the-many or
utrique iidem eisdem. Auctorem diffinitionis indicat stilus, et
each the-same to-the-same the-author of-the-definition indicates the-style and
Aristotilem faciunt uerba manifestum, sed et sensus uerborum.
Aristotle make the-words manifest but also the-sense of-the-words
Neque enim problema dialecticum censuit quicquid inter
not for a-problem dialectical did-he-reckon whatever between
affirmationem negationemque deducitur, nec artis sue opificem
affirmation and-negation is-drawn nor of-art his the-craftsman
in illius uentilatione credidit exercendum, quod nec per
in its winnowing did-he-believe to-be-exercised which neither through
se nec per aliud predictarum disciplinarum alicui prodest.
itself nor through other of-the-aforesaid disciplines to-any profits
Nam quod ait: Contendens ad electionem uel fugam, etsi
for what he-says contending toward choice or avoidance although
sint qui ad ethicas dumtaxat questiones referendum putent,
there-be who to ethical only questions to-be-referred think
ego et ad phisicas arbitror pertinere, sed ad logicas aut nichil
I also to physical I-judge to-pertain but to logical either nothing
aut minimum. Siquidem ibi uirtus et uitium et similia
or very-little since there virtue and vice and similar-things
electioni uel fuge materiam prestant; hic autem sanitas,
for-choice or for-avoidance matter furnish here however health
egritudo, cause, signa, et circumstantie singulorum. Porro
sickness causes signs and the-circumstances of-each further
ad scientiam et ueritatem trium disciplinarum questiones
toward knowledge and truth of-the-three disciplines the-questions
eque contendunt. Utrum uoluptas eligenda sit uel non,
equally contend whether pleasure to-be-chosen be or not
ethica speculatio propter se utilis. Utrum mundus eternus
an-ethical speculation for itself useful whether the-world eternal

uel non, speculatio quidem philosophica est; ad scientiam
or not a-speculation indeed philosophical is toward knowledge
et ueritatem, et forte ad aliud prodest; ut scilicet, cum
and truth and perhaps for something-else profits that namely when
creatus innotuerit, tanti operis ueneremur auctorem,
created it-will-have-become-known of-so-great a-work we-may-revere the-author
cum transitorius, uilescat moribus piis, eo quod uanitati
when transitory it-grow-cheap to-morals pious by-that that to-vanity
subiectus est totus. An contradictoriarum sit semper altera
subject it-is wholly whether of-contradictories be always the-one
uera uel non, logica speculatur, et ad aliud confert
true or not logic speculates and to something-else contributes
ueritatis huius habere scientiam. Qui igitur de lana
of-truth this to-have knowledge those-who therefore about wool
caprina contendunt iugiter, dialectica quidem problemata non
goat's contend continually dialectical indeed problems not
exercent, et tam ab artificis materia quam ab officio
exercise and as-much from of-the-craftsman the-matter as from the-office
remoti sunt; siquidem materia eius thesis uel positio est. Est
removed are since the-matter its a-thesis or position is is
autem positio opinio extranea alicuius notorum secundum
however a-position an-opinion strange of-someone of-the-known according-to
philosophiam, ut quoniam omnia mouentur, quod Eraclitus,
philosophy as that all-things are-moved which Heraclitus
aut unum est ens, quod Melissus. Nullus enim, qui mentem
or one is being which Melissus no-one for who a-mind
habeat, deducet in questionem quod nulli uideatur, nec
have will-lead into question what to-no-one seems nor
quod omnibus manifestum est, aut his quorum iudicium
what to-all manifest is or to-those whose judgment
optinet. Nam hec non habent dubitationem; illa autem nemo
prevails for these not have doubt those however no-one

ponet. Quocirca nullam liberalium disciplinarum utiliorem
will-posit wherefore none of-the-liberal disciplines more-useful
esse crediderim quam istam a qua in omnes philosophie
to-be I-would-believe than this from which into all of-philosophy
partes facilis et felix processus est; ad nullam enim
parts easy and happy progress is toward no for
scientiam inuenitur infirmus, cui probabilia innotescunt.
knowledge is-found weak he-to-whom probable-things become-known

Quod omnes alii professores huius Aristotili cedunt

XVI · ALL OTHER TEACHERS OF THIS ART YIELD TO ARISTOTLE

It is madness to disparage the discipline that instructs all others and that the keenest philosophers wrote on: Aristotle, Apuleius, Cicero, Porphyry, Boethius, and Augustine, whom posterity will never rank below Cornificius. All revere Aristotle, called the Philosopher by preeminence, who brought probable reasoning into an art. Porphyry's Isagoge was rightly read first as an introduction, but those who spend their lives on its five little words leave no time for what it introduces.

Unde quidem manifeste uidetur insanie, illi detrahere
whence indeed manifestly it-seems of-madness that to-disparage
discipline, que omnes alias instruit, et sine cuius beneficio
discipline which all others instructs and without whose benefit
nullus recte inuestigationibus philosophicis procedit. Scripserunt
no-one rightly in-investigations philosophical proceeds wrote
de ea quamplures, et hi quidem, sicut acutissimi, ita et
about it very-many and these indeed as most-acute so also
diligentissimi philosophorum, quos omnes reprehendi palam
most-diligent of-philosophers whom all to-be-blamed plain
est ab his qui artem hanc criminantur. Studii namque
it-is by those who art this accuse of-a-study for

detractio auctoris indubitata criminatio est. Unum scio,
the-disparagement of-the-author undoubted accusation is one-thing I-know
quod Cornificium posteritas illis nequaquam preferet; nam
that Cornificius posterity to-them by-no-means will-prefer for
Aristotiles, Apuleius, Cicero, Porphirius, Boetius, Augustinus,
Aristotle Apuleius Cicero Porphyry Boethius Augustine
ut Eudemum, Alexandrum, Theophrastum, et alios expositores
that Eudemus Alexander Theophrastus and other expositors
taceam (quorum tamen celebris gloria est), omnes artis
I-may-pass-over whose however famous glory is all of-art
huius uelut triumphatricis inter alias grandi preconio erexere
this as-if triumphant among others with-great proclamation have-raised
uexillum. Sed cum singuli suis meritis splendeant, omnes
the-standard but though each by-their-own merits shine all
se Aristotilis adorare uestigia gloriantur; adeo quidem, ut
themselves of-Aristotle to-adore the-footsteps boast so-far indeed that
commune omnium philosophorum nomen preminentia quadam
the-common of-all philosophers name by-preeminence a-certain
sibi proprium fecerit. Nam et antonomasice, id est
for-himself proper he-has-made for also antonomastically that is
excellenter, Philosophus appellatur. Hic ergo probabilium
excellently the-Philosopher he-is-called this-man therefore of-probable-things
rationes redegit in artem et, quasi ab elementis incipiens,
the-reasons reduced into art and as-if from the-elements beginning
usque ad propositi perfectionem euexit. Hoc autem planum est
even to of-the-purpose the-perfection carried this however plain is
his qui scrutantur et discutiunt opera eius. Voces enim primo
to-those who scrutinize and discuss works his words for first
significatiuas, id est sermones incomplexos, de gramatici
significative that is speeches uncombined from of-the-grammarian
manu accipiens, differentias et uires eorum diligenter
the-hand receiving the-differences and powers their diligently

exposuit, ut ad complexionem enuntiationum et inueniendi
he-expounded that to the-combination of-enunciations and of-finding
iudicandique scientiam facilius accedant. Sed quia ad hunc
and-of-judging the-science more-easily they-may-approach but because for this
elementarem librum magis elementarem quodammodo scripsit
elementary book a-more elementary in-a-way wrote
Porphirius, eum ante Aristotilem esse credidit antiquitas
Porphyry it before Aristotle to-be believed antiquity
prelegendum, Recte quidem, si recte doceatur; id est ut
to-be-read-first rightly indeed if rightly it-be-taught that is so-that
tenebras non inducat erudiendis nec consumat etatem.
darkness not it-bring-in on-those-to-be-taught nor consume age
Indignum enim est, si in quinque uoculis addiscendis quis
unworthy for it-is if in five little-words to-be-learned anyone
uitam terat, ut ei desit spatium procedendi ad illa
life wear-out so-that to-him be-lacking room of-proceeding to those
quorum gratia debuerant hec predoceri. Unde quoniam ad
whose for-sake ought these to-be-taught-first whence since to
alia introductorius est, nomine Ysagogarum inscribitur.
other-things introductory it-is by-the-name of-Isagoge it-is-inscribed
Itaque inscriptioni derogant qui sic uersantur in hoc,
and-so on-the-inscription detract those-who so are-occupied in this
ut locum principalibus non relinquant, quibus ignotis non
that room to-the-principal-works not they-leave which unknown not
est quod introducentis opere gratia debeatur.
there-is what of-the-introducer to-the-work thanks be-owed

Quam perniciose doceatur, et que fuerint de generibus et speciebus opiniones modernorum

XVII · BAD TEACHING, AND THE OPINIONS ON UNIVERSALS

Masters pour every opinion on beginners, who are owed a simple, brief account, and explain universals against the author's mind. Some place universals in words, as Roscelin did; others in speeches, as Abelard; others in notions. Of those who place them in things, Walter of Mortagne divides states; another posits ideas, imitating Bernard of Chartres; Gilbert, native forms; Joscelin, things gathered into one; another, maneries, a word John cannot trace; another, states of things.

Nostri vero ad ostentationem scientie sue sic suos
ours indeed for the-display of-knowledge their-own so their-own
instituunt auditores ut non intelligantur ab eis; et
train hearers that not they-be-understood by them and
apices singulos secretis Minerue grauidos opinantur.
the-letters every with-the-secrets of-Minerva pregnant they-think
Quicquid unquam ab aliquo dictum aut factum est,
whatever ever by anyone said or done has-been
excutiunt et teneris ingerunt auribus; ut, uitio quod a
they-shake-out and on-tender pour ears so-that by-the-vice which by
Cicerone arguitur, sepe minus intellecti sint ob rerum
Cicero is-charged often less understood they-be on-account-of of-things
multitudinem quam ob difficultatem. Utile quidem est
the-multitude than on-account-of difficulty useful indeed it-is
et obuiantibus, sicut ait Aristotiles, confert opiniones
and to-those-meeting-objections as says Aristotle it-confers the-opinions
multorum; ut ex earum conflictu ad inuicem quicquid
of-many that from their conflict with each-other whatever
non bene dictum uidetur, refelli ualeat aut mutari;
not well said seems to-be-refuted can or to-be-changed
sed nunc non erat his locus, cum oratio simplex, res
but now not was for-these a-place since speech simple matter

breuis et facilis quantum potest debeatur introducendis.
brief and easy as-much-as it-can is-owed to-those-to-be-introduced
Adeo quidem ut et multa in rebus difficilibus facilius
so-far indeed that also many-things in matters difficult more-easily
quam earum natura exigat, licentius proponantur; eo
than their nature demands more-licentiously be-set-forth by-that
quod in puerilibus annis addiscuntur multa que serior
that in boyish years are-learned many-things which later
philosophie tractatus eliminat. Naturam tamen uniuersalium
of-philosophy the-treatment drives-out the-nature however of-universals
hic omnes expediunt, et altissimum negotium et maioris
here all explain and a-most-high business and of-greater
inquisitionis contra mentem auctoris explicare nituntur. Alius
inquiry against the-mind of-the-author to-unfold strive one
ergo consistit in uocibus; licet hec opinio cum Rocelino
therefore takes-his-stand on words although this opinion with Roscelin
suo fere omnino iam euanuerit. Alius sermones intuetur
its almost wholly already has-vanished another speeches looks-to
et ad illos detorquet quicquid alicubi de uniuersalibus
and to them twists whatever anywhere about universals
meminit scriptum; in hac autem opinione deprehensus est
he-remembers written in this however opinion caught was
Peripateticus Palatinus Abaelardus noster, qui multos reliquit
the-Peripatetic of-Le-Pallet Abelard our who many left
et adhuc quidem aliquos habet professionis huius sectatores
and still indeed some has of-profession this followers
et testes. Amici mei sunt; licet ita plerumque captiuatam
and witnesses friends my they-are although so mostly captive
detorqueant litteram ut uel durior animus miseratione illius
they-twist the-letter that even a-harder mind with-pity for-it
mouetur. Rem de re predicari monstrum ducunt; licet
is-moved a-thing of a-thing to-be-predicated a-monster they-hold although

Aristotiles monstruositatis huius auctor sit, et rem de
Aristotle of-monstrosity this the-author be and a-thing of
re sepissime asserat predicari; quod palam est, nisi
a-thing very-often asserts to-be-predicated which plain is unless
dissimulent, familiaribus eius. Alius uersatur in intellectibus,
they-dissemble to-the-familiars his another is-occupied in understandings
et eos dumtaxat genera dicit esse et species. Sumunt enim
and them only genera says to-be and species they-take for
occasionem a Cicerone et Boetio, qui Aristotilem laudant
the-occasion from Cicero and Boethius who Aristotle praise
auctorem, quod hec credi et dici debeant notiones.
as-author that these to-be-believed and to-be-called ought notions
Est autem, ut aiunt, notio ex ante percepta forma
is however as they-say a-notion from previously perceived a-form
cuiusque rei cognitio enodatione indigens. Et alibi: Notio
of-each thing a-cognition of-unknotting in-need and elsewhere a-notion
est quidam intellectus et simplex animi conceptio. Eo
is a-certain understanding and simple of-the-mind conception thither
ergo deflectitur quicquid scriptum est, ut intellectus aut
therefore is-bent whatever written is that understanding or
notio uniuersalium uniuersitatem claudat. Eorum uero qui
notion of-universals the-universality enclose of-those indeed who
rebus inherent, multe sunt et diuerse opiniones. Siquidem
on-things fasten many are and diverse opinions since
hic, ideo quod omne quod est, unum numero est,
this-one therefore because every-thing which is one in-number is
rem uniuersalem aut unam numero esse aut omnino
a-thing universal either one in-number to-be or altogether
non esse concludit. Sed quia impossibile substantialia non
not to-be concludes but since impossible substantials not
esse, existentibus his quorum sunt substantialia, denuo
to-be when-existing these of-which they-are substantials anew

colligunt uniuersalia singularibus quod ad essentiam unienda.
they-gather universals with-singulars as-to to essence to-be-united
Partiuntur itaque status, duce Gautero de Mauritania,
they-divide and-so states with-the-leadership of-Walter of Mortagne
et Platonem, in eo quod Plato est, dicunt indiuiduum;
and Plato in that that Plato he-is they-call an-individual
in eo quod homo, speciem; in eo quod animal, genus,
in that that man a-species in that that animal a-genus
sed subalternum; in eo quod substantia, generalissimum.
but subaltern in that that substance most-general
Habuit hec opinio aliquos assertores; sed pridem hanc
had this opinion some asserters but long-ago this
nullus profitetur. Ille ideas ponit, Platonem emulatus
no-one professes that-one ideas posits Plato emulating
et imitans Bernardum Carnotensem; et nichil preter
and imitating Bernard of-Chartres and nothing besides
eas genus dicit esse uel speciem. Est autem idea, sicut
them genus says to-be or species is however an-idea as
Seneca diffinit, eorum que natura fiunt exemplar eternum.
Seneca defines of-those which by-nature are-made the-exemplar eternal
Et quoniam uniuersalia corruptioni non subiacent, nec
and since universals to-corruption not lie-subject nor
motibus alterantur, quibus mouentur singularia et quasi ad
by-motions are-altered by-which are-moved singulars and as-if at
momentum aliis succedentibus alia defluunt, proprie et uere
moment others succeeding others flow-away properly and truly
dicuntur esse uniuersalia. Siquidem res singule uerbi
are-said to-be universals since things single of-the-word
substantiui nuncupatione creduntur indigne, cum nequaquam
substantive by-the-naming are-believed unworthy since by-no-means
stent et fugiant nec expectent appellationem; adeo namque
they-stand and they-flee nor await the-appellation so-far for

uariantur qualitatibus, temporibus, locis, et multimodis
they-are-varied by-qualities times places and manifold
proprietatibus, ut totum esse eorum non status stabilis
properties that the-whole being their not a-state stable
sed mutabilis quidem transitus uideatur. Esse autem, inquit
but a-changeable indeed passage seems to-be however says
Boetius, ea dicimus que neque intentione crescunt neque
Boethius those-things we-say which neither by-intension grow nor
retractione minuuntur, sed semper sue nature subnixa
by-retraction are-diminished but always of-their-own nature supported
subsidiis sese custodiunt. Hec autem sunt quantitates,
by-the-aids themselves guard these however are quantities
qualitates, relationes, loca, tempora, habitudines, et quicquid
qualities relations places times habits and whatever
quodammodo adunatum corporibus inuenitur. Que quidem
in-a-way united with-bodies is-found which indeed
corporibus adiuncta mutari uidentur, sed in natura sui
with-bodies joined to-be-changed seem but in the-nature of-themselves
immutabilia permanent. Sic et rerum species transeuntibus
unchangeable remain so also of-things the-species with-passing
indiuiduis permanent eedem, quemadmodum preter fluentibus
individuals remain the-same just-as past flowing
undis motus amnis manet in flumine; nam et idem
waves the-motion of-the-river remains in the-stream for also the-same
dicitur. Unde illud apud Senecam, alienum tamen: Bis
it-is-called whence that-saying with Seneca another's however twice
in idem flumen descendimus et non descendimus. He
into the-same river we-go-down and not we-go-down these
autem idee, id est exemplares forme, rerum primeue
however ideas that is the-exemplary forms of-things the-primeval
omnium rationes sunt, que nec diminutionem suscipiunt
of-all-things reasons are which neither diminution undergo

nec augmentum, stabiles et perpetue; ut, etsi mundus
nor increase stable and perpetual so-that even-if the-world
totus corporalis pereat, nequeant interire. Rerum omnium
whole bodily perish they-cannot perish of-things all
numerus consistit in his; et, sicut in libro de Libero
the-number consists in these and as in the-book on Free
Arbitrio uidetur astruere Augustinus, quia he semper sunt,
Choice seems to-assert Augustine that these always are
etiamsi temporalia perire contingat, rerum numerus nec
even-if temporal-things to-perish happen of-things the-number neither
minuitur nec augetur. Magnum profecto est et notum
is-diminished nor is-increased great surely it-is and known
philosophis contemplantibus altiora quod isti pollicentur;
to-philosophers contemplating higher-things what these promise
sed, sicut Boetius et alii multi testantur auctores, a
but as Boethius and other many testify authors from
sententia Aristotilis penitus alienum est. Nam et ipse huic
the-judgment of-Aristotle thoroughly foreign it-is for also he-himself this
sententie, sicut euidens est in libris eius, sepius aduersatur.
judgment as evident is in books his very-often opposes
Egerunt operosius Bernardus Carnotensis et auditores eius
labored more-laboriously Bernard of-Chartres and the-hearers his
ut componerent inter Aristotilem et Platonem, sed eos tarde
that they-might-compose between Aristotle and Plato but them late
uenisse arbitror et laborasse in uanum ut reconciliarent
to-have-come I-judge and to-have-labored in vain that they-might-reconcile
mortuos qui, quamdiu in uita licuit, dissenserunt. Porro
the-dead who as-long-as in life it-was-permitted disagreed further
alius, ut Aristotilem exprimat, cum Gilleberto episcopo
another that Aristotle he-may-express with Gilbert the-bishop
Pictauensi uniuersalitatem formis natiuis attribuit et in
of-Poitiers universality to-forms native attributes and in

earum conformitate laborat. Est autem forma natiua originalis
their conformity labors is however a-form native of-the-original
exemplum et que non in mente Dei consistit, sed rebus
the-example and which not in the-mind of-God consists but in-things
creatis inheret. Hec Greco eloquio dicitur idos, habens se ad
created inheres this in-Greek speech is-called eidos having itself to
ideam ut exemplum ad exemplar; sensibilis quidem in re
the-idea as the-example to the-exemplar sensible indeed in the-thing
sensibili, sed mente concipitur insensibilis; singularis quoque
sensible but by-the-mind is-conceived insensible singular also
in singulis, sed in omnibus uniuersalis. Est et alius qui
in singulars but in all universal there-is also another who
cum Gausleno Suessionensi episcopo uniuersalitatem rebus in
with Joscelin of-Soissons the-bishop universality to-things into
unum collectis attribuit et eamdem singulis demit. Exinde,
one gathered attributes and the-same from-singulars takes-away thereafter
cum ad interpretandas auctoritates uentum est, laborat pre
when to interpreting the-authorities come one-has he-labors for
dolore; quia in locis pluribus rictum littere indignantis
grief because in places many the-gape of-the-letter indignant
ferre non sustinet. Est aliquis qui confugit ad subsidium
to-bear not he-endures there-is someone who flees to the-aid
noue lingue, quia Latine peritiam non satis habet; nunc
of-a-new tongue because of-Latin the-skill not enough he-has now
enim cum genus audit uel species, res quidem dicit
for when genus he-hears or species things indeed he-says
intelligendas uniuersales, nunc rerum maneries interpretatur.
to-be-understood universal now of-things maneries he-interprets
Hoc autem nomen in quo auctorum inuenerit uel hanc
this however name in which of-the-authors he-may-have-found or this
distinctionem, incertum habeo, nisi forte in glosematibus, aut
distinction uncertain I-hold unless perhaps in glosses or

modernorum linguis doctorum. Sed et ibi quid significet
of-modern tongues of-doctors but even there what it-signifies
non uideo, nisi rerum collectionem cum Gausleno, aut rem
not I-see unless of-things the-collection with Joscelin or a-thing
uniuersalem, quod tamen fugit maneriem dici; nam ad
universal which yet shuns maneries to-be-called for to
utrumque potest ab interpretatione nomen referri: eo
both can from interpretation the-name to-be-referred by-that
quod maneries rerum numerus aut status dici potest,
that maneries of-things the-number or the-state to-be-called can
in quo talis permanet res. Nec deest qui rerum status
in which such remains a-thing nor is-lacking one-who of-things the-states
attendat, et eos genera dicit esse et species.
attends-to and them genera says to-be and species

Quod posteriores semper priorum opiniones immutant

XVIII · EACH TEACHER CHANGES HIS MASTERS' OPINIONS

Rehearsing every master's opinion would be long, since there are as many opinions as men and each master forges his own error to make a name, offering himself to be corrected by pupils and posterity. John knows that writing exposes him to the judgment of the whole world. Many dispute about names rather than things, which Aristotle warns dialecticians against, and each accuses the other's words while admitting his meaning.

Longum erit et a proposito penitus alienum, si
long it-will-be and from the-purpose thoroughly foreign if
singulorum opiniones posuero uel errores; cum, ut uerbo
of-each the-opinions I-shall-set-down or errors since that the-word
comici utar, fere quot homines, tot sententie.
of-the-comic-poet I-may-use almost as-many-as men so-many opinions

Nam de magistris aut nullus aut rarus est qui doctoris sui
for of the-masters either none or rare is-he who of-teacher his
uelit inherere uestigiis. Ut sibi faciat nomen, quisque
wishes to-cling to-the-footsteps that for-himself he-may-make a-name each
proprium cudit errorem; sicque fit, ut, dum se doctorem
his-own forges error and-so it-happens that while himself the-teacher
corrigere promittit, seipsum corrigendum aut reprehendendum
to-correct he-promises himself to-be-corrected or to-be-blamed
tam discipulis quam posteris prebeat. Ego ipse michi legem
as-much to-pupils as to-posterity he-offer I myself for-me law
hanc non ambigo imminere, ut, dum ab aliis dissentio
this not I-doubt to-impend that while from others I-dissent
et dissensum scripto profiteor, me obicio reprehensionibus
and dissent in-writing I-profess myself I-expose to-the-censures
plurimorum. Qui enim loquitur, iudicatur ab uno uel a
of-very-many he-who for speaks is-judged by one or by
paucis; sed qui scribit, omnium sententias excipit et totius
few but he-who writes of-all the-judgments receives and of-the-whole
orbis et omnis etatis se exponit iudicio. Ut autem cum
world and of-every age himself exposes to-the-judgment that however with
doctoribus mitius agam, sepius ad nomen quam ad
the-doctors more-mildly I-may-deal more-often about the-name than about
rem uidentur plurimi disputare. Nichil tamen est quod artis
the-thing seem very-many to-dispute nothing however is which of-art
huius minus deceat professorem, quoniam modus hic uiro
this less befits the-professor since mode this for-a-man
graui inconuenientissimus est. Ut enim ait Aristotiles, omnino
grave most-unbecoming is as for says Aristotle altogether
uerendum dialecticis huiusmodi ad nomen disputare, nisi quis
to-be-feared for-dialecticians in-this-way about the-name to-dispute unless anyone
aliter non possit de proposito disputare. Sane in articulis, ubi
otherwise not can about the-proposed to-dispute surely in the-points where

plurimum dissidere uidentur, alter alterius interpretationem
most to-disagree they-seem the-one of-the-other the-interpretation
admittit, etsi eam contendat esse ineptam. Itaque uicissim
admits even-if it he-contends to-be inept and-so in-turn
ducunt in crimine sermonem, non sensum alienum.
they-draw into accusation the-speech not the-sense of-another

In quo non sit parcendum doctoribus huiusmodi

XIX · WHERE SUCH TEACHERS ARE NOT TO BE SPARED

John spares their opinions but not three faults: they lay unbearable burdens on tender shoulders; they abandon the order of teaching so that nothing keeps its proper place, reading the art's end into its title and making Porphyry teach the Topics, Analytics, and Refutations; and they go against the author's mind, teaching Plato's doctrine, or an error equally far from both, to make Aristotle plainer.

Sit ergo quod sententiis parcam, in quibus nec
let-it-be therefore that the-opinions I-spare in which not-even
ipsi, si interpretationes inuicem supponere liceat,
they if interpretations in-turn to-substitute it-were-permitted
dissident; pauca tamen sunt in quibus eis non arbitror
disagree few however are in which them not I-judge
ignoscendum. Primum quod onera importabilia teneris
to-be-pardoned first that burdens unbearable on-the-tender
auditorum humeris imponunt. Deinde quod, docendi ordine
of-the-hearers shoulders they-impose then that of-teaching the-order
pretermisso, diligentissime cauent ne
passed-over most-diligently they-beware lest

singula queque locum teneant sortita decenter;
each-thing single its-place hold allotted fittingly

finem enim artis, ut sic dixerim, legunt in titulo, et non
the-end for of-the-art as so I-might-say they-read in the-title and not
modo Topicorum, sed Analeticorum et Elenchorum uim
only of-the-Topics but of-the-Analytics and of-the-Refutations the-force
Porphirius predocet. Postremo quod, quasi ab aduerso
Porphyry teaches-beforehand lastly that as-if from the-wrong-way
pectentes, ueniunt contra mentem auctoris et, ut Aristotiles
combing they-come against the-mind of-the-author and that Aristotle
planior sit, Platonis sententiam docent aut erroneam
plainer may-be of-Plato the-judgment they-teach or an-erroneous
opinionem, que equo errore deuiat a sententia Aristotilis
opinion which with-equal error deviates from the-judgment of-Aristotle
et Platonis; siquidem omnes Aristotilem profitentur.
and of-Plato since all Aristotle profess

Sententia Aristotilis de generibus et speciebus circumuallata rationibus multis et multarum testimonio scripturarum

XX · ARISTOTLE'S JUDGMENT ON GENERA AND SPECIES, DEFENDED

Aristotle holds that genera and species do not exist but are only understood. Abstracting understanding conceives man without this man or that, forming universals, images in the mind that vanish like dreams when sought apart from singulars. Relative words such as 'what is signified' must be read kindly. Whatever exists is from God and singular; universals are figments of reason for teaching, and the authors' words should be befriended. John follows Aristotle, not Plato, as better suited to these disciplines, and faults those who review every opinion.

Porro hic genera et species non esse sed intelligi
further this-one genera and species not to-be but to-be-understood
tantum asseruit. Quid ergo ad rem attinet querere quid
only asserted what therefore to the-thing pertains to-ask what
genus sit, si illud omnino non esse constiterit? In
genus be if it altogether not to-be will-have-been-established in
eo enim quod non est inepte queritur quid, quantum, aut
that for which not is ineptly is-asked what how-great or
quale est; si enim substantiam tuleris cuique,
of-what-kind it-is if for substance you-will-have-taken-away from-each
nichil ei relinquitur aliorum. Ergo si Aristotiles uerus
nothing to-it is-left of-the-others therefore if Aristotle true
est, qui eis esse tollit, inanis est opera precedentis
is who from-them being removes empty is the-work of-the-preceding
inuestigationis in inquisitione substantie, quantitatis, aut
investigation in the-inquiry of-substance of-quantity or
qualitatis, aut cause; cum illius quod non est substantia aut
of-quality or of-cause since of-that which not is substance or
quantitas aut qualitas nequeat assignari aut causa propter
quantity or quality cannot to-be-assigned or cause on-account-of

quam quod non est hoc aut illud sit aut tantum aut tale.
which what not is this or that be or so-great or such
Quare aut ab Aristotile recedendum est, concedendo ut
wherefore either from Aristotle to-be-withdrawn is by-granting that
uniuersalia sint, aut refragandum opinionibus que eadem
universals be or one-must-resist the-opinions which them
uocibus, sermonibus, sensibilibus rebus, ideis, formis natiuis,
to-words to-speeches to-sensible things to-ideas to-forms native
collectionibus aggregant; cum singula horum esse non
to-collections add since each of-these to-be not
dubitentur. Qui autem ea esse statuit, Aristotili aduersatur.
are-doubted he-who however them to-be establishes Aristotle opposes
Nec uerendum ut cassus sit intellectus, qui ea perceperit
nor is-it-to-be-feared that empty be the-understanding which them has-perceived
seorsum a singularibus, cum tamen a singularibus
apart from singulars though yet from singulars
seorsum esse non possint. Intellectus enim quandoque rem
apart to-be not they-can the-understanding for sometimes a-thing
simpliciter intuetur, uelut si hominem per se intueatur aut
simply beholds as if a-man by himself it-behold or
lapidem, et ob hoc simplex est; quandoque gradatim
a-stone and on-account-of this simple it-is sometimes by-degrees
suis incedit passibus, ut si hominem albere uel equum
with-its-own it-advances steps as if a-man to-be-white or a-horse
currere contempletur. Et hic quidem dicitur esse compositus.
to-run it-contemplate and this indeed is-said to-be composite
Porro simplex rem interdum inspicit ut est, ut si Platonem
further the-simple a-thing sometimes inspects as it-is as if Plato
attendat, interdum alio modo; nunc enim componendo
it-attend-to sometimes in-another way now for by-composing
que non sunt composita, nunc abstrahendo que non possunt
what not are composite now by-abstracting what not can

esse disiuncta. Qui enim hircoceruum cogitat aut centaurum,
to-be disjoined he-who for a-goat-stag thinks or a-centaur
ignotam nature hominis ad bestiam aut bestie ad bestiam
unknown to-nature of-man with beast or of-beast with beast
compositionem opinatur. At qui lineam aut superficiem
a-composition opines but he-who a-line or surface
attendit sine corpore, formam utique contemplationis oculo
attends-to without body form surely of-contemplation with-the-eye
a materia disiungit, cum tamen sine materia forma
from matter disjoins though yet without matter form
esse non possit. Non tamen formam sine materia esse
to-be not can not however form without matter to-be
abstrahens hic concipit intellectus; compositus enim
abstracting this-one conceives the-understanding composite for
esset; sed simpliciter alterum sine altero, cum tamen
it-would-be but simply the-one without the-other though yet
sine altero esse non possit, intuetur. Nec hoc quidem
without the-other to-be not it-can it-beholds nor this indeed
simplicitati eius preiudicat, sed eo simplicior est quo
to-simplicity its prejudices but by-that more-simple it-is by-which
simpliciora sine aliorum admixtione perspicit singulatim.
simpler-things without of-others admixture it-perceives singly
Hoc autem nature rerum non aduersatur, que ad sui
this however to-the-nature of-things not is-opposed which for its-own
inuestigationem hanc potestatem contulit intellectui, ut
investigation this power has-conferred on-the-understanding that
possit coniuncta disiungere et disiuncta coniungere. Ceterum
it-can joined-things disjoin and disjoined-things join however
componens, qui disiuncta coniungit, inanis est; abstrahens
the-composing which disjoined-things joins empty is the-abstracting
uero fidelis, et quasi quedam officina omnium artium. Et
indeed faithful and as-if a-certain workshop of-all arts and

quidem rebus existendi unus est modus, quem scilicet
indeed for-things of-existing one is the-mode which namely
natura contulit, sed easdem intelligendi aut significandi
nature conferred but them of-understanding or of-signifying
non unus est modus. Licet enim esse nequeat homo qui
not one is the-mode although for to-be cannot a-man who
non sit iste uel alius homo, intelligi tamen potest et
not be this or another man to-be-understood however he-can and
significari; ita quod nec intelligatur, nec significetur iste
to-be-signified so that neither he-be-understood nor be-signified this
uel alius. Ergo ad significationem incomplexorum per
or another therefore for the-signification of-uncombined-things through
abstrahentem intellectum genera concipiantur et species; que
the-abstracting understanding genera are-conceived and species which
tamen, si quis in rerum natura diligentius a sensibilibus
however if anyone in of-things the-nature more-diligently from sensible-things
remota querat, nichil aget et frustra laborabit; nichil
removed seek nothing he-will-accomplish and in-vain will-labor nothing
enim tale natura peperit. Ratio autem ea deprehendit,
for such nature has-borne reason however them grasps
substantialem similitudinem rerum differentium pertractans
the-substantial likeness of-things differing handling
apud se, diffinitque, sicut Boetius ait, generale conceptum
with itself and-defines as Boethius says the-general concept
suum, quod de hominum conformitate perpendit, sic:
its-own which about of-men the-conformity it-weighs thus
Animal rationale mortale; quod utique nisi in singularibus
animal rational mortal which surely except in singulars
esse non potest. Sunt itaque genera et species non quidem
to-be not can are and-so genera and species not indeed
res a singularibus actu et naturaliter aliene, sed quedam
things from singulars in-act and naturally foreign but certain

naturalium et actualium phantasie renitentes in intellectum,
of-natural and of-actual-things images shining-back into the-understanding
de similitudine actualium, tamquam in speculo, natiue
from the-likeness of-actual-things as in a-mirror of-native
puritatis ipsius anime, quas Greci ennoyas siue yconoyfanas
purity of-the-very soul which the-Greeks ennoiai or iconophanai
appellant, hoc est rerum imagines in mente apparentes.
call that is of-things images in the-mind appearing
Anima enim, quasi reuerberata acie contemplationis sue,
the-soul for as-if reflected with-the-edge of-contemplation its-own
in seipsa reperit quod diffinit; nam et eius exemplar in
in itself finds what it-defines for also its exemplar in
ipsa est, exemplum uero in actualibus. Sicut enim cum
it is the-example indeed in actual-things as for when
in gramatica dicitur: Nomina que sic desinunt, feminina
in grammar is-said nouns which so end feminine
uel neutra sunt; generalis quedam prescribitur ratio, que
or neuter are a-general certain is-prescribed rule which
quasi multorum declinabilium exemplar est, exempla uero
as-if of-many declinable-words the-exemplar is the-examples indeed
in omnibus illius terminationis dictionibus manifesta sunt;
in all of-that ending words manifest are
sic quedam exemplaria concipiuntur in mente, quorum
so certain exemplars are-conceived in the-mind whose
exempla natura formauit, et sensibus obiecit. Illa itaque
examples nature formed and to-the-senses presented those and-so
exemplaria cogitabilia quidem sunt et sunt quasi phantasie
exemplars thinkable indeed are and are as-if images
et umbre existentium, secundum Aristotilem; quas si quis
and shadows of-existing-things according-to Aristotle which if anyone
apprehendere nititur per existentiam quam habent a
to-grasp strives through the-existence which they-have from

singularibus separatam, uelut somnia elabuntur. Monstra
singulars separate like dreams they-slip-away monsters
enim sunt et soli intellectui patent. Quod autem
for they-are and alone to-the-understanding lie-open that however
uniuersalia dicuntur esse substantialia singularibus, ad causam
universals are-said to-be substantial to-singulars to the-cause
cognitionis referendum est singulariumque naturam; hoc
of-cognition to-be-referred is and-of-singulars the-nature this
enim in singulis patet, siquidem inferiora sine superioribus
for in singulars is-plain since inferior-things without superior-things
nec esse nec intelligi possunt. Homo namque non
neither to-be nor to-be-understood can man for not
est, nisi sit animal. Sed nec intelligitur homo, quin
is unless be-be animal but neither is-understood man but-that
cointelligatur animal; quoniam homo est animal tale. Sic in
be-co-understood animal since man is animal such so in
Platone homo, quoniam Plato et est et intelligitur; talis
Plato man since Plato both is and is-understood such
autem iste homo. Ad hoc autem ut sit homo exigitur
however this man for this however that be-be man is-required
esse animal, nec conuertitur ut animal esse non possit
to-be animal nor is-it-converted so-that animal to-be not can
aut intelligi, si non sit aut non intelligatur homo; nam
or to-be-understood if not be or not be-understood man for
in ratione hominis est animal, sed non in animalis ratione
in the-account of-man is animal but not in of-animal the-account
est homo. Quia ergo tale exigit tale, et non exigitur
is man since therefore such requires such and not is-required
a tali, tam ad essentiam quam ad notitiam, ideo hoc
by such as-much for essence as for knowledge therefore this
illi substantiale dicitur esse. Idem est in indiuiduis, que
to-that substantial is-said to-be the-same is in individuals which

exigunt species et genera, sed nequaquam exiguntur ab eis.
require species and genera but by-no-means are-required by them
Hoc enim nec substantiam habebit nec in notitiam ueniet,
this for neither substance will-have nor into knowledge will-come
nisi sit species aut genus, id est, nisi quid sit aut
unless it-be species or genus that is unless something it-be or
innotescat tale uel tale. Uniuersalia tamen et res dicuntur
become-known such or such universals however also things are-said
esse, et plerumque simpliciter esse; sed non ob hoc
to-be and mostly simply to-be but not on-account-of this
aut moles corporum aut subtilitas spirituum aut singularium
either the-mass of-bodies or the-subtlety of-spirits or of-singulars
discreta essentia in eis attendenda est. Nam et ea que
the-distinct essence in them to-be-attended-to is for also those which
iacent sub affirmatione et negatione res dicuntur, et
lie under affirmation and negation things are-called and
uera sepissime dicuntur esse, nec tamen substantiis vel
true very-often are-said to-be nor yet to-substances or
accidentibus aggregantur aut nomen suscipiunt Creatoris aut
accidents are-they-added or the-name do-they-receive of-Creator or
Creature. Siquidem, ut ait Ulgerius venerabilis Andegauorum
of-Creature since as says Ulger the-venerable of-Angers
episcopus in uenalicio disciplinarum gratiosum ad inuicem
bishop in the-market of-disciplines gracious to each-other
debet esse uerbi commercium; nam in philosophantium
ought to-be of-word the-commerce for in of-philosophers
foro exuberat bonitas, et uerba distrahuntur ad gratiam.
the-market abounds kindness and words are-sold for favor
Itaque detur ut sint uniuersalia, aut etiam ut res
and-so let-it-be-granted that be universals or even that things
sint, si hoc pertinacibus placet; non tamen ob hoc
be if this to-the-stubborn pleases not yet on-account-of this

uerum erit rerum numerum augeri uel minui pro
true it-will-be of-things the-number to-be-increased or diminished for
eo quod ista non sunt in numero rerum. Si quis autem
that that these not are in the-number of-things if anyone however
uniuersalia seorsim recenseat, numero quidem inueniet esse
universals separately reviews in-number indeed he-will-find to-be
subiecta, sed cui singularium numerus non aggregatur.
subject but to-which of-singulars the-number not is-added
Sicut enim collegiis aut corporibus non connumerantur capita
as for to-colleges or to-bodies not are-numbered-with heads
aut capitibus corpora, sic nec uniuersalia singularibus nec
or to-heads bodies so neither universals to-singulars nor
singularia numeri accessione uniuersalibus accrescunt; numerus
singulars of-number by-accession to-universals grow number
enim dumtaxat illa complectitur que eiusdem rationis sunt
for only those embraces which of-the-same account are
et que in singulis rerum generibus natura discreuit. Nichil
and which in single of-things kinds nature distinguished nothing
autem uniuersale est, nisi quod in singularibus inuenitur.
however universal is except what in singulars is-found
Seorsum tamen a multis quesitum est, sed tandem
apart however by many sought it-has-been but at-length
nichil inuenerunt omnes in manibus suis; quoniam seorsum
nothing found all in their-hands their-own since apart
a singularibus nichil est, nisi forte qualia sunt uera
from singulars nothing is unless perhaps such-as are the-true-things
aut similia complexorum significata sermonum. Nec moueat
or similar of-combined the-significates speeches nor let-it-move
quod singularia et corporea exempla sunt uniuersalium et
that singular and bodily the-examples are of-universals and
incorporalium; cum omnis ratio gerendi (ut ait Augustinus)
incorporeal-things since every method of-doing as says Augustine

incorporea sit et insensibilis, illud tamen quod geritur,
incorporeal be and insensible that however which is-done
et actus quo geritur, plerumque sensibilis sit. Ergo
and the-act by-which it-is-done mostly sensible be therefore
quod mens communiter intelligit et ad singularia multa
what the-mind in-common understands and to singulars many
eque pertinet, quod uox communiter significat et eque
equally pertains what a-word in-common signifies and equally
de multis uerum est, indubitanter uniuersale est. Sed
of many true is undoubtedly universal is but
et hoc ipsum, scilicet quod intelligitur, quod significatur,
also this very-thing namely what is-understood what is-signified
benignius interpretandum est, ut nequaquam ad disputandi
more-kindly to-be-interpreted is so-that by-no-means to of-disputing
decurratur angustias et artis gramatice subtilitatem, que ex
one-run-down the-narrows and of-the-art grammatical the-subtlety which from
sui natura, nisi uenia licentie impetrata, demonstratiuas
its-own nature unless the-pardon of-license obtained demonstrative
dictiones infinitas esse non patitur; sed nec relatiuas uagas
words infinite to-be not allows but neither relative-ones vague
esse permittit, quin earum significatio aut determinatione
to-be permits but-that their signification either by-the-determination
persone aut actus aut actionis alterius coartetur; siquidem
of-person or of-act or of-action of-another be-restricted since
relatiua dictio est que significat rem, ut de qua precessit
a-relative word is which signifies a-thing as about which went-before
sermo uel cogitatio. Itaque cum dicitur: Sapiens est et felix
speech or thought and-so when is-said wise is and happy
qui bona nouit et ea fideliter exercet, relatiue dictiones,
he-who good-things knows and them faithfully practices the-relative words
scilicet qui et ea etiamsi personam non exprimant, actus
namely who and them even-if a-person not they-express of-the-act

cognoscendi determinatione a sua quodammodo infinitate
of-knowing by-the-determination from their in-a-way infinity
artantur. Necesse tamen est aliquem unum dictionibus
are-restricted necessary yet it-is some one to-the-words
subesse qui et bona nouerit et exerceat et ex eo
to-be-subject who both good-things knows and practices and from that
sit felix. Nam ut nichil certum et finitum sit in quod
be happy for that nothing certain and finite be into which
cadat relatio, non contingit sine uitio aut figura. Unde si
may-fall the-relation not happens without vice or figure whence if
equus promittatur in genere, et dicat stipulator: Equus qui
a-horse be-promised in genus and say the-stipulator the-horse which
michi promissus est, sanus aut eger est; cum omnis equus
to-me promised is sound or sick is since every horse
sit aut sanus aut eger, arguitur nugari, eo quod non
is either sound or sick he-is-charged to-trifle by-that that not
est equus qui sit ei promissus. Non dico: Non est,
there-is a-horse which be to-him promised not I-say not there-is
eo quod non existat, nam et illud quod non existit, ut
by-that that not it-exist for even that which not exists as
partus Arethuse, in certissimam deducitur obligationem, sed
the-foal of-Arethusa into most-certain is-drawn obligation but
quia species, id est res discreta, obligationem generis
because the-species that is a-thing distinct the-obligation of-the-genus
non attingit. Cum enim dico: Quod promittitur, Quod
not touches when for I-say what is-promised what
significatur, Quod intelligitur, et similia, discretum aliquid
is-signified what is-understood and similar-things something distinct
promissioni aut significationi subiectum est, si tamen propria
to-the-promise or to-the-signification subject is if however proper
est ipsa relatio; fiunt tamen relationes in genere, que
is the-very relation are-made however relations in genus which

saluo intellectu ueri nequeunt reuocari ad speciem; ut
saving the-understanding of-the-true cannot to-be-recalled to species as
cum dicitur: Mulier que saluauit damnauit; Lignum quod
when is-said the-woman who saved damned the-wood which
mortis et uite causam dedit; et: Quas Boreas aufert,
of-death and of-life the-cause gave and those-which Boreas takes-away
reuehit mitis Zephirus frondes. Sic et in his que predixi,
brings-back gentle Zephyr leaves so also in these which I-said-before
relativas dictiones accipiendas arbitror, ut non decurrant
relative words to-be-taken I-judge so-that not they-run-down
ad speciem, id est ad diffinitum aliquod quod discernant,
to species that is to defined something which they-may-distinguish
sed subsistant in genere. Puta: Quod significatur hoc
but they-subsist in genus suppose what is-signified by-this
nomine homo, species est, quoniam et homo significatur,
name man a-species is since both man is-signified
et homo animalium species est. Quod significatur hoc
and man of-animals a-species is what is-signified by-this
nomine animal, est genus; nam et animal significatur, et
name animal is a-genus for both animal is-signified and
animal genus rerum est; est enim significatum uocis
animal a-genus of-things is it-is for the-significate of-the-word
in quod descendit aut quod animus rationabiliter concipit
into which it-descends or which the-mind reasonably conceives
ex uoce audita. Itaque qui audit hanc uocem 'Homo',
from the-word heard and-so he-who hears this word man
nec omnes percurrit homines, quoniam hoc infinitum et
neither all runs-through men since this infinite and
uires excedit, nec tenetur in uno, quoniam hoc imperfectum
powers exceeds nor is-held in one since this imperfect
et ad doctrinam parum. Sic et qui diffinit animal esse
and for teaching too-little so also he-who defines animal to-be

substantiam animatam atque sensibilem, non unum aliquod,
substance animate and sensible not one something
ne imperfectum, nec omne diffinit, ne laboret in infinitum.
lest imperfect nor all defines lest he-labor into infinity
Singulum enim horum non simpliciter quid significat aut
each for of-these not simply what it-signifies or
diffinit, sed potius quale quid, non enim simpliciter
defines but rather of-what-kind what not for simply
hoc, sed potius quid tale. Simile est quod Galienus in
this but rather what such similar is what Galen in
Tegni medicinam dicit scientiam sanorum, egrorum, et
the-Tegni medicine calls the-science of-the-healthy of-the-sick and
neutrorum. Non inquit, omnium, quoniam hoc infinitum;
of-the-neutral not he-says of-all since this infinite
non quorumdam, quoniam hoc ad artem imperfectum, sed
not of-certain-ones since this for art imperfect but
potius quorum qualium. Item Aristotiles: Genera, inquit,
rather of-which of-what-kind likewise Aristotle the-genera he-says
et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant; non
and species about substance the-quality determine not
enim simpliciter quid, sed quodam modo quale quid
for simply what but in-a-certain way of-what-kind what
determinant. Item in Elenchis: Homo et omne commune
they-determine likewise in the-Refutations man and every common-thing
non hoc aliquid, sed quale quid, ⟨uel⟩ ad aliquid uel
not this something but of-what-kind what ⟨or⟩ to something or
aliquo modo uel huiusmodi quid significat. Et post pauca:
in-some way or of-this-kind what it-signifies and after a-few-words
Manifestum quoniam non dandum hoc aliquid esse quod
manifest that not to-be-granted this something to-be what
communiter predicatur de omnibus, sed aut quale aut ad
in-common is-predicated of all but either of-what-kind or to

aliquid aut quantum aut talium quid significare. Profecto
something or how-great or of-such-things something to-signify surely
quod non est hoc aliquid, significatione expressa non potest
what not is this something by-signification expressed not can
explanari quid sit. Existentium enim a natura certus est
to-be-explained what it-be of-existing-things for by nature certain is
finis, et singula suis ab inuicem proprietatibus discreta
the-end and single-things by-their-own from each-other properties distinct
sunt, sed eorumdem est plerumque minus finita cognitio
are but of-the-same is mostly less finite the-cognition
et quodammodo conceptio uaga. Nec istis preiudicat quod
and in-a-way the-conception vague nor to-these prejudices what
fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse
almost in of-all the-mouth celebrated is one-thing namely to-be
quod appellatiua significant et aliud esse quod nominant.
what appellatives signify and another to-be what they-name
Nominantur singularia, sed uniuersalia significantur. Plane si
are-named singulars but universals are-signified plainly if
relationem simplicem, que fit in genere, quis attendat,
the-relation simple which is-made in genus anyone attend-to
precedentibus nichil obest; si uero discretionem querit,
to-the-preceding nothing is-in-the-way if indeed distinction he-seeks
forte non palam est quod discernat. Regulariter proditum
perhaps not plain it-is what it-distinguish as-a-rule handed-down
est quia demonstratio primam, relatio secundam facit
it-has-been that demonstration the-first relation the-second makes
cognitionem. Porro cognitio rem, quatenus nouit, sibi
cognition further cognition a-thing as-far-as it-knows for-itself
quadam mentis capacitate diffiniens circumscribit ut
by-a-certain of-the-mind capacity defining circumscribes so-that
nec prima nec secunda possit procedere cognitio, si res
neither the-first nor the-second can to-proceed cognition if the-thing

usquequaque occurrat animo infinita. Omnis enim scientia
everywhere meet the-mind infinite all for knowledge
siue notitia creature finita est; solius autem Dei,
or acquaintance of-the-creature finite is of-alone however God
quoniam infinitus est, scientia infinita; suo tamen fine,
since infinite he-is the-knowledge infinite by-its-own yet end
scilicet infinito, quamlibet infinita certissime diffinit, et
namely infinite any infinite-things most-certainly defines and
immensitatis sue scientia et sapientia, cuius numerus
of-immensity its-own by-the-knowledge and wisdom of-which number
aut finis non est, circumscribit. Sed nos modulum humanum
or end not is circumscribes but we the-measure human
prosequimur, qui non primam, non secundam, non tertiam,
follow which not the-first not the-second not the-third
sed nec aliquam rei infinite, nisi quod ignota quatenus
but nor any of-a-thing infinite unless that unknown as-far-as
infinita est, sibi scientie gloriam uendicat. Omnis itaque
infinite it-is for-itself of-knowledge the-glory claims every and-so
dictio, que demonstratiue aut relatiue significat, aut non
word which demonstratively or relatively signifies either not
satis proprie ponitur aut certo et sua ratione definito
enough properly is-placed or on-a-certain and by-its-own account defined
innititur subiecto; alioquin suo priuabuntur officio; cum
rests subject otherwise their-own they-will-be-deprived office since
ratio cognitionis certitudinis finem querat aut teneat.
the-principle of-cognition of-certainty the-end seek or hold
Frequens tamen est usurpatio et illicitorum ex causa
frequent however is usurpation and of-unlawful-things from cause
commoditatis plerumque multus est usus. Admittitur itaque
of-convenience often much is the-use there-is-admitted and-so
non modo ad cauillationem eorum quibus de quauis materia
not only for the-quibbling of-those for-whom about any matter

satis est oggarrire; sed etiam ad statuendam in auditoribus
enough it-is to-chatter but also for establishing in hearers
bone fidei ueri intelligentiam, quia 'omnis homo diligit
of-good faith of-the-true understanding that every man loves
se'. Quod si ex relatiue dictionis proprietate discutias,
himself but if from of-the-relative word the-property you-discuss
incongrue dictum forte causabaris et falsum; siquidem nec
incongruously said perhaps you-would-plead and false since neither
omnis omnem diligit, nec aliquis est qui diligatur ab omni,
every-one every-one loves nor anyone is who be-loved by every-one
ut, siue collectiue siue distributiue accipiatur quod dictum
so-that whether collectively or distributively be-taken what said
est 'omnis', pronomen relatiuum 'se', quod subiungitur,
is every pronoun relative himself which is-subjoined
nec uniuersitati singulorum nec alicui omnium ueraciter
neither to-the-universality of-singulars nor to-any of-all truly
aptetur. Est itaque licentiosa relatio et, quasi legis sue
fits is and-so a-licentious relation and as-if of-law its-own
uenia impetrata, fidem uniuersalis de singularium ueritate
pardon obtained the-faith of-the-universal from of-singulars the-truth
conuincit. Quoniam enim in singulis uerum est quia quisque
it-proves since for in singulars true it-is that each
diligat se, et distributiua ratione quadam de uniuersis
love himself and by-distributive reason a-certain about all
in commune affirmatur quod omnis homo diligit se,
in common is-affirmed that every man loves himself
benignius quidem accepta relatione quam ut ex angustia
more-kindly indeed taken the-relation than that from the-narrowness
gramatice uel uniuersitatem colligat uel aliquod singulorum
of-grammar either the-universality it-gather or some of-singulars
ab uniuersitate singulatim excerpat. Unde, ex sententia
from the-universality singly pick-out whence from the-opinion

eorum qui angustiis et subtilitatibus semper insistunt nec
of-those who to-narrows and subtleties always insist nor
bone fidei rationem in colloquiis aut lectionibus curant,
of-good faith the-account in conversations or readings care
hec potius enuntiationis forma est quam regularis forme
this rather of-enunciation a-form is than of-regular form
enuntiatio. Idem quoque asserunt, quotiens pronominis fit
an-enunciation the-same also they-assert whenever of-a-pronoun is-made
ad nomen appellatiuum relatio, eo quod pronomen, quod
to a-noun appellative relation by-that that the-pronoun which
semper demonstratiuum aut relatiuum est, proprii nominis
always demonstrative or relative is of-a-proper noun
expleat uicem; si tamen prime inuentionis cause recte
fill the-place if however of-the-first invention to-the-cause rightly
respondeat; nam interdum ex indulgentia latius euagatur.
it-answer for sometimes from indulgence more-widely it-wanders
Itaque cum dicitur: Si aliquid est homo, illud est animal; non
and-so when is-said if something is a-man that is an-animal not
tam ipotetice dictionis consequentia est quam in ipotetice
so-much of-hypothetical speech the-consequence is as in hypothetically
dicendis consequentie forma. Illud enim quod dicitur, nec
things-to-be-said of-consequence the-form that for which is-said neither
refertur ad hominem ex angustia disputandi, nec alio
is-referred to man from the-narrowness of-disputing nor elsewhere
patet certum quid quo referatur. Unde et importunitates
lies-open certain something to-which it-be-referred whence also importunities
multe ab his qui rerum ignaros aut benignioris ingenii
many from those who of-things the-ignorant or of-kindlier wit
homines uexant, cum ipsi inquieti obiurgatores et peruicaci
men harass when they restless rebukers and on-stubborn
instantie insistentes aut ex ignorantia aut ex proteruitate
insistence insisting either from ignorance or from wantonness

laborent, aut auiditate comproficiendi. Ergo sicut cognitio
labor or from-greed of-advancing-together therefore as cognition
certitudinem querit, sic demonstratiua et relatiua, que aut
certainty seeks so demonstrative and relative-words which either
primam aut alteram faciunt cognitionem, certo et definito
the-first or the-second make cognition on-a-certain and defined
innituntur subiecto, et illud, si proprie fuerint posita,
rest subject and that if properly they-will-have-been placed
animo singulariter ostendunt. Sed esto ut statum aliquem
to-the-mind singularly show but granted that state some
generalem appellatiua significent (non enim contentionibus
general appellatives signify not for in-contentions
delector, qui me in his, que sunt dubitabilia sapienti,
I-am-delighted who myself in these which are doubtful to-the-wise
Academicum esse pridem professus sum,) status ille quid sit,
an-Academic to-be long-ago professed have that state what it-be
in quo singula uniuntur, et nichil singulorum est, etsi
in which single-things are-united and nothing of-single-things is although
aliquo modo somniare possim; tamen quomodo sententie
in-some way to-dream I-could yet how to-the-judgment
Aristotilis coaptetur, qui uniuersalia non esse contendit, non
of-Aristotle it-be-fitted who universals not to-be contends not
perspicuum habeo. Sed et nomina que premisi, 'incorporeum'
clear I-have but also the-names which I-set-before incorporeal
et 'insensibile', uniuersalibus conuenire, priuatiua in eis
and insensible to-universals to-fit privative in them
dumtaxat sunt, nec proprietates aliquas, quibus natura
only are nor properties any by-which the-nature
uniuersalium discernatur, illis attribuunt; siquidem nichil
of-universals be-distinguished to-them they-attribute since nothing
incorporeum aut insensibile uniuersale est. Nam quicquid
incorporeal or insensible universal is for whatever

incorporeum est, aut spiritus est aut proprietas corporis aut
incorporeal is either spirit is or a-property of-body or
spiritus; quod si in rem uniuersalem non cadit, utique non
of-spirit which if on a-thing universal not falls surely not
recte incorporei suscipit nomen. Quid est autem incorporeum
rightly of-incorporeal it-receives the-name what is however incorporeal
quod non sit substantia creata a Deo uel ipsi concretum?
which not be substance created by God or to-it joined
Ita, si uniuersalia incorporea sunt aut sunt substantie,
so if universals incorporeal are either they-are substances
corpora scilicet aut spiritus aut concreta his, et ex causa
bodies namely or spirits or joined to-these and from the-cause
sue existentie et quodam substantie contactu sunt obnoxia
of-their existence and by-a-certain of-substance contact are subject
Creatori. Valeant autem, immo dispereant uniuersalia, si
to-the-Creator farewell however nay let-them-perish universals if
ei obnoxia non sunt. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt,
to-him subject not they-are all-things through him made were
utique tam subiecta formarum quam forme subiectorum,
surely as-much the-subjects of-forms as the-forms of-subjects
ut sint quod a suis qualitatibus uel a suis
that they-may-be what from their-own qualities or from their-own
dicuntur effectibus. Ut substantia ab eo substantia sit, sit
they-are-called effects as substance from him substance be be
quanta, sit qualis, sit ad aliquid, sit alicubi, sit aliquando,
so-great be of-such-kind be to something be somewhere be sometime
et aliquid habeat aut faciat aut patiatur, illo auctore
and something have or do or suffer be being-author
per quem est omnis substantia, omnis proprietas substantie
through whom is every substance every property of-substance
et omnis pars, omnis quoque compago partium. Forme
and every part every also joining of-parts forms

quoque, tam substantiales quam accidentales, habent ab
also as-much substantial as accidental have from
ipso ut sint et ut suos subiectis operentur effectus.
him that they-be and that their-own in-subjects they-work effects
Quod itaque ei obnoxium non est, omnino nichil est.
what and-so to-him subject not is altogether nothing is
Licet enim Stoici Deo ponant materiam coeternam et
although for the-Stoics with-God set matter coeternal and
forme dicant nullum extitisse principium, tria ponentes
of-form say no to-have-existed beginning three positing
principia, materiam, formam, et Deum, non creatorem
principles matter form and God not creator
quidem, sed predictorum conciliatorem; et alii quidam,
indeed but of-the-aforesaid the-reconciler and others certain
professione et affectu philosophi, sed nequaquam ad plenum
by-profession and affection philosophers but by-no-means to the-full
ueri notitiam assequentes, plura mentiantur principia;
of-the-true knowledge attaining more lyingly-assert principles
rerum omnium unum principium est, a quo est quicquid
of-things all one principle there-is from which is whatever
uero nomine censetur aliquid. Ut enim ait Augustinus,
by-a-true name is-reckoned something as for says Augustine
formatam creauit Deus materiam; siquidem, etsi alicubi
formed created God matter since even-if somewhere
dicatur informis, nunquam omnino extitit sine formis.
it-be-called formless never altogether it-existed without forms
Inuestigationi ergo ratio, non actui seruit, quoniam ylen,
to-investigation therefore reason not to-act serves since hyle
que informis nec est, nec esse, sed nec plane intelligi
which formless neither is nor to-be but nor plainly to-be-understood
potest, deductis quodammodo formarum exuuiis, usque ad
can drawn-off in-a-way of-forms the-spoils even to

quandam nuditatem sui propriumque defectum intellectus
a-certain nakedness of-itself and-its-own defect the-understanding
prosequitur. Vires enim rationis quodammodo circa rerum
pursues the-powers for of-reason in-a-way about of-things
principia euanescunt. Inde est quod Boetius in libro contra
the-principles vanish thence it-is that Boethius in the-book against
Nestorium et Euticen naturam diffiniens ait illam esse earum
Nestorius and Eutyches nature defining says it to-be of-those
rerum que, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi
things which since they-are in-whatever way by-understanding to-be-grasped
possunt. Exponens autem uim diffinitionis 'quoquo modo',
can expounding however the-force of-the-definition in-whatever way
hoc uerbum propter Deum et materiam dicit appositum,
this word on-account-of God and matter he-says added
quia in eorum scrutinio humanus deficit intellectus. Porro
because in their scrutiny human fails understanding further
materiam Deus fecit ex nichilo; ipsique materie concreta
matter God made from nothing and-to-the-very matter joined
est forma, eo quod simul eque de nichilo creata; ita
is form by-that that at-once equally from nothing created so
tamen ut, sicut discretionis forme, ita priuilegium existendi
yet that as of-distinction to-form so the-privilege of-existing
materie relinquatur. Quodam enim modo per materiam
to-matter be-left in-a-certain for way through matter
existit forma, sicut discernitur materia ipsa per formam.
exists form as is-distinguished matter itself through form
Nam nec forma res per se existens est, nec materia
for neither form a-thing through itself existing is nor matter
sine forme beneficio discreta est. Chaos erit, aut potius
without of-form the-benefit distinct is chaos it-will-be or rather
mundus sensibilis nichil erit, nisi rerum effigies formis
the-world sensible nothing will-be unless of-things the-likenesses with-forms

adhibitis natura componat. Eo spectat illud Boetii in
applied nature compose to-that looks that-saying of-Boethius in
primo de Trinitate; Omne esse ex forma est, quod et
the-first on the-Trinity all being from form is which also
subiectis declarat exemplis. Statua enim, inquit, non ab ere
by-subjoined he-declares examples a-statue for he-says not from bronze
quod materia eius est, statua dicitur; sed ab Hectorea uel
which the-matter its is a-statue is-called but from the-Hectorean or
Achillea forma, que eri impresse sunt. Item es non
Achillean form which on-the-bronze impressed are likewise bronze not
a terra, que eius materia est, es dicitur, sed a formis
from earth which its matter is bronze is-called but from the-forms
quas a natura accepit. Terra quoque ipsa, non a potou
which from nature it-received earth also itself not from qualityless
yle, que materia eius est, dicitur terra, sed a siccitate et
matter which the-matter its is is-called earth but from dryness and
grauitate, que forme sunt. Cuilibet ergo esse quod est, aut
heaviness which forms are to-anything therefore to-be what it-is or
quale aut quantum est, a forma est. Sed sicut materia
of-what-kind or how-great it-is from form is but as matter
habet ut possit hoc esse aut tantum aut tale; sic et forme
has that it-can this to-be or so-great or such so also forms
habent a conditore ut possint uel hoc uel aliquid facere,
have from the-founder that they-can either this or something to-make
puta animal aut lignum, aut tantum aut tale. Ceterum etsi
suppose animal or wood or so-great or such however although
mathesis, que doctrinaliter in abstractionibus uersatur et
mathesis which doctrinally in abstractions is-occupied and
subtilitate sua naturaliter coniuncta disiungit, hec uicissim
by-subtlety its-own naturally joined-things disjoins these in-turn
separatimque discutiat, ut natura compositorum fidelius
and-separately discuss so-that the-nature of-composite-things more-faithfully

et expressius teneatur; tamen alterum sine altero esse
and more-expressly be-held yet the-one without the-other to-be
non potest, ut uel materia sit informis uel forma sine
not can so-that either matter be formless or form without
subiecto sit inanis. Alterius sic altera poscit opem res et
subject be empty of-the-other so the-one demands the-help thing and
coniurat amice. Unde ab initio creata memorantur celum
conspires friendly whence from the-beginning created are-recorded heaven
et terra, deinde ornatus tam eorum quam illorum que
and earth then the-adornment as-much of-these as of-those which
interiecta sunt media inter ignem et aquam, que quasi
interposed are middle between fire and water which as-if
prima mundani corporis fundamenta iecit Deus; et in ipsa
the-first of-the-worldly body foundations laid God and in the-very
expressione rerum habita est mentio specierum. Non illarum
expression of-things had is mention of-species not of-those
dico, quas logici fingunt non obnoxias creatori; sed
I-mean which the-logicians feign not subject to-the-creator but
formarum in quibus res prodierunt primo in essentiam
of-forms in which things came-forth first into essence
suam, et in humanum deinde intellectum. Nam hoc ipsum
their-own and into human then understanding for this very-thing
quod aliquid celum aut terra dicitur, forme effectus est.
that something heaven or earth is-called of-form the-effect is
Item: Produxit, inquit, terra herbam uirentem, et lignum
likewise brought-forth he-says the-earth grass green and wood
tale uel tale; ut materie formas doceret esse concretas
such or such that to-matter forms he-might-teach to-be joined
et Deum, sicut herbe, ita et uiroris auctorem. Nam
and God as of-grass so also of-greenness the-author for
sine eo factum est nichil; sed profecto quicquid ab uno
without him made was nothing but surely whatever from one

principio est, unum numero est ipsumque bonum, immo
principle is one in-number is and-itself good nay
et ualde bonum, quoniam ab optimo est. Voluit enim
even very good since from the-best it-is willed for
Deus cuncta similia sui effici, prout natura cuiusque
God all-things like himself to-be-made according-as the-nature of-each
ex diuine dispositionis decreto capax bonitatis esse poterat;
from of-divine disposition the-decree capable of-goodness to-be could
et sic facta sunt, approbante Deo opifice rerum, cuncta
and so made were approving God the-craftsman of-things all-things
que fecerat ualde bona. Ergo si genera et species a
which he-had-made very good therefore if genera and species from
Deo non sunt, omnino nichil sunt. Quod si unumquodque
God not are altogether nothing they-are but if each
eorum ab ipso est, unum plane et idem bonum est. Si
of-them from him is one plainly and the-same good it-is if
autem quid unum numero est, protinus et singulare est.
however anything one in-number is at-once also singular it-is
Nam quod quidam unum aliquid dicunt, non quod unum
for what some one something call not because one
in se, sed quod multa uniat expressa plurium conformitate,
in itself but because many it-unites expressed of-several the-conformity
articulo presenti non derogant; illud enim nec statim
to-the-point present not derogate that for neither at-once
nec satis unum est, aut utique singulare est. Quantumlibet
nor enough one is or surely singular it-is however-much
conformia sint opera Dei, omnia singularia sunt uicissimque
conformed be the-works of-God all singular are and-mutually
discreta, illo sic disponente, qui omnia creauit in numero
distinct he so disposing who all-things created in number
ad distinctionem, et pondere ad generis dignitatem, et
for distinction and weight for of-the-genus the-dignity and

mensura ad modum quantitatis certe, infinitam sibi
measure for the-manner of-quantity certain infinite for-himself
reseruans in omnibus auctoritatem. Cetera enim omnia
reserving in all-things authority the-others for all
finita sunt. Omnis namque substantia accidentium pluralitate
finite are every for substance of-accidents by-plurality
numero subest. Accidens autem omne et forma quelibet
to-number is-subject accident however every and form any
itidem numero subiacet, sed non accidentium aut formarum
likewise to-number lies-subject but not of-accidents or of-forms
participatione, sed singularitate subiecti. Habet itidem pondus
by-participation but by-the-singularity of-the-subject it-has likewise weight
suum uel pro ueneratione forme, si substantia est, uel pro
its-own either for the-veneration of-form if substance it-is or for
dignitate effectus, si sit forma. Hinc est quod hominem
the-dignity of-the-effect if it-be form hence it-is that man
in substantiis ex forme reuerentia brutis preferimus,
among substances from of-form reverence to-brutes we-prefer
quoniam rationalis est; et rationalitatem preponimus colori
since rational he-is and rationality we-put-before to-color
eo quod facit rationale. Mensura uero in eo consistit,
by-that that it-makes rational measure indeed in this consists
quod res omnis certa quantitatis lege finitur; ut nec
that thing every by-a-certain of-quantity law is-bounded so-that neither
accidens siue forma rem subiectam, nec res subiecta
accident or form the-thing subject nor the-thing subject
accidentis aut forme modum excedat. Nam et color in
of-accident or of-form the-measure exceed for also color in
toto diffunditur corpore, eiusque termino limitatur; et
the-whole is-diffused body and-by-its boundary is-limited and
corpus ad coloris disponitur quantitatem, nec excedit nec
the-body to of-color is-disposed the-quantity nor exceeds nor

infra subsistit. Sic et quodlibet accidens in toto sui
below subsists so also any accident in the-whole of-its
subiecto est totaliter, si totius; partialiter, si pro parte;
subject is wholly if of-the-whole partially if for a-part
et quodlibet subiectum accidentis sui limitibus coequatur.
and any subject of-the-accident its-own to-the-limits is-made-equal
Hoc idem de generibus et speciebus protestari non uereor
this same about genera and species to-testify not I-fear
quin mundo reclamante dicam quoniam a Deo sunt aut
but-that the-world protesting I-may-say that from God they-are or
omnino nichil sunt. Clamat mecum et Dionisius Ariopagita
altogether nothing they-are cries with-me also Dionysius the-Areopagite
et numerum quo discernuntur, pondus quo statuuntur,
and the-number by-which are-distinguished the-weight by-which are-established
mensuram qua diffiniuntur omnia, Dei dicit imaginem:
the-measure by-which are-defined all-things of-God he-calls the-image
siquidem Deus sine numero numerus est, pondus sine
since God without number number is weight without
pondere, sine quantitate mensura, in quo solo creata sunt
weight without quantity measure in whom alone created were
omnia que facta sunt, in numero, pondere et mensura.
all-things which made were in number weight and measure
Unde Augustinus: Inuisibiles differentias inuisibilium solus ille
whence Augustine the-invisible differences of-invisible-things alone he
ponderare potuit, qui omnia in numero, mensura et pondere
to-weigh could who all-things in number measure and weight
disposuit, id est in seipso, qui est mensura, omni rei
disposed that is in himself who is the-measure to-every thing
modum prefigens; et numerus, omni rei speciem prebens;
the-mode prefixing and the-number to-every thing the-species furnishing
et pondus, omnem rem ad stabilitatem trahens, id est
and the-weight every thing to stability drawing that is

terminans et formans et ordinans omnia. In operibus sex
bounding and forming and ordering all-things in the-works of-the-six
dierum in genere suo bona singula creata memorantur,
days in kind their-own good single-things created are-recorded
nec tamen creationis uniuersalium mentio aliqua facta est;
nor yet of-the-creation of-universals mention any made was
nec oportuit quidem, si essentialiter singularibus unita
nor did-it-behoove indeed if essentially with-singulars united
sunt, aut si Platonicum dogma optineat. Alioquin unde
they-are or if the-Platonic doctrine prevail otherwise whence
esse habeant aut quando ceperint, nusquam memini me
being they-have or when they-began nowhere do-I-remember myself
legisse. Ergo dumtaxat intelliguntur, secundum Aristotilem,
to-have-read therefore only are-understood according-to Aristotle
uniuersalia; sed in actu rerum nichil est quod sit uniuersale.
universals but in the-act of-things nothing is which be universal
A modo enim intelligendi figuralia hec, licenter quidem
from the-mode for of-understanding figurative these licentiously indeed
et doctrinaliter, nomina indita sunt. Nam omne quod homo
and doctrinally names put are for all which man
est, iste uel ille est, id est res singularis; sed quia
is this or that is that is a-thing singular but because
intelligi potest homo, ita quod nec iste intelligatur nec
to-be-understood can man so that neither this be-understood nor
ille nec aliquid singularitate essentie unum; et secundum
that nor anything by-singularity of-essence one and according-to
intellectum illum deliberari potest de re subiecta,
understanding that to-be-deliberated can about the-thing subject
id est actualiter exemplificari, ob intellectus
that is actually to-be-exemplified on-account-of of-the-understanding
communitatem; res que sic intelligi potest, etsi
the-commonness the-thing which so to-be-understood can even-if

a nullo intelligatur, dicitur esse communis; res enim
by no-one it-be-understood is-said to-be common things for
conformes sibi sunt, ipsamque conformitatem deducta
conformed to-themselves are and-the-very conformity with-drawn-off
rerum cogitatione perpendit intellectus. Siquidem homo
of-things the-thought weighs the-understanding since man
homini conformis est, in eo quod uterque est homo, etsi
to-man conformed is in that that each is man even-if
personalibus proprietatibus differant. Habet autem commune
by-personal properties they-differ he-has however in-common
cum equo (a quo tota specie, id est uniuersa nature
with the-horse from which by-whole species that is by-the-whole of-nature
sue forma, et, ut sic dixerim, tota facie dissidet) quod
his form and as so I-might-say by-whole face he-differs that
uiuunt et sentiunt, scilicet quod animalia sunt. Illud itaque
they-live and sense namely that animals they-are that and-so
in quo conueniunt homines, nature forma similes et solo
in which agree men of-nature in-the-form similar and alone
numero (quod hic scilicet unus, et ille alter) differentes,
in-number because this namely one and that another differing
speciei censetur nomine. Quod autem diuersarum formarum
of-species is-reckoned by-the-name what however of-diverse forms
quasi communis imago est, generis suscepit nomen. Ergo
as-if common image is of-genus has-received the-name therefore
ex sententia Aristotilis genera et species non omnino quid
from the-judgment of-Aristotle genera and species not altogether what
sunt sed quale quid quodammodo concipiuntur; et quasi
they-are but of-what-kind what in-a-way are-conceived and as-if
quedam sunt figmenta rationis seipsam in rerum inquisitione
certain are fictions of-reason itself in of-things the-inquiry
et doctrina subtilius exercentis. Et hoc quidem fideliter,
and teaching more-subtly exercising and this indeed faithfully

quia, quotiens opus est, agitationis sue manifestum in rebus
because as-often-as need is of-exertion its-own a-manifest in things
producit exemplum. Sic et ius ciuile sua figmenta nouit,
it-brings-forth example so also law civil its-own fictions knows
et disciplina quelibet ea, per que ipsius procedat usus,
and discipline any those-things through which its proceed use
excogitare non erubescit, sed propriis quodammodo figmentis
to-devise not blushes but in-its-own in-a-way fictions
gaudet. Gaudeant, inquit Aristotiles, species, monstra enim
rejoices let-rejoice says Aristotle the-species monsters for
sunt (uel, secundum nouam translationem: cicadationes
they-are or according-to the-new translation chirpings
enim sunt); aut, si sunt, nichil ad rationem. Quod etsi
for they-are or if they-are nothing to the-reason which although
de Platonicis ideis possit intelligi, habita tamen ratione
of the-Platonic ideas it-can to-be-understood had however the-account
equiuocationis, qua ens uel esse distinguitur pro
of-equivocation by-which being or to-be is-distinguished according-to
diuersitate subiectorum, species et genera utrumque non
the-diversity of-subjects species and genera each not
sine ratione esse dicuntur. Persuadet enim ratio ut ea
without reason to-be are-said persuades for reason that they
dicantur esse, quorum exempla conspiciuntur in singularibus,
be-said to-be whose examples are-seen in singulars
que nullus ambigit esse. Non autem sic dicuntur genera
which no-one doubts to-be not however so are-called genera
et species exemplaria singularium ut, iuxta Platonici
and species exemplars of-singulars that according-to of-the-Platonic
dogmatis sensum, forme sint exemplares, que in mente
doctrine the-sense forms they-be exemplary which in the-mind
diuina intelligibiliter constiterint, antequam prodirent in
divine intelligibly stood before they-came-forth into

corpora; sed quoniam, si quis eius quod communiter
bodies but since if anyone of-that which in-common
concipitur, audito hoc nomine, 'homo', aut quod diffinitur,
is-conceived heard this name man or what is-defined
cum dicitur 'homo esse animal rationale mortale' querat
when is-said man to-be animal rational mortal seek
exemplum, statim ei Plato aliusue hominum singulorum
an-example at-once to-him Plato or-another of-men single
ostenditur, ut communiter significantis aut diffinientis
is-shown so-that of-the-commonly signifying or defining
ratio solidetur. Possunt et monstra dici, quoniam
the-account be-made-solid they-can also monsters to-be-called since
inuicem res singulas monstrant, et monstrantur ab eis;
in-turn things single they-show and are-shown by them
fit enim nunc per priora, nunc per posteriora rerum
is-made for now through the-prior now through the-posterior of-things
manifestatio. Que autem communiora sunt, et priora quidem
the-manifestation which however more-common are and prior indeed
simpliciter, nam et in aliis intelliguntur; que uero
simply for also in others they-are-understood those-which indeed
singularia, posteriora. Sed plerumque que naturaliter priora
singular posterior but often what-things naturally prior
sunt et notiora simpliciter, ignotiora sunt nobis. Nam
are and better-known simply less-known are to-us for
que solida, magis familiariora sunt sensibus; que uero
those-which solid more more-familiar are to-the-senses those-which indeed
subtiliora, longius absunt. Ut enim ait Aristotiles, punctum
subtler farther are-away as for says Aristotle the-point
quoniam prius est linea, et simpliciter euidentius, sic
since prior it-is than-the-line and simply more-evident so
et linea superficie, superficies soliditate, unitas numero,
also the-line than-the-surface the-surface than-solidity unity than-number

quoniam eius principium est; littera quoque quam sillaba,
since its beginning it-is the-letter also than the-syllable
et sic in aliis. Nobis autem e contrario quandoque
and so in other-things to-us however on the-contrary sometimes
accidit; nam hec quidem, id est posteriora, magis quolibet;
it-happens for these indeed that is the-posterior more by-any
illa autem priora magis subtili et habundanti intellectu
those however the-prior more by-a-subtle and abundant understanding
comprehendere est. Unde licet per priora melius fiat
to-comprehend is whence although through the-prior better be-made
assignatio posteriorum, et disciplinabilius sit hoc ubique
the-assignment of-the-posterior and more-instructive it-be this everywhere
temptare; urgente tamen necessitate, ob impotentiam
to-attempt pressing however necessity on-account-of the-weakness
sensuum priorum sepe fit per posteriora explanatio; ut
of-the-senses of-the-prior often is-made through the-posterior the-explanation as
cum dicitur punctum linee, linea superficiei, superficies
when it-is-said the-point of-the-line the-line of-the-surface the-surface
soliditatis terminus esse. Item unitas principium numeri,
of-solidity the-boundary to-be likewise unity the-beginning of-number
momentum temporis, orationis elementum. Sunt itaque
the-moment of-time of-speech the-element are and-so
genera et species exemplaria singulorum; sed hoc quidem
genera and species exemplars of-singulars but this indeed
magis ad rationem doctrine (si Aristotiles uerus est)
more toward the-account of-teaching if Aristotle true is
quam ad causam essentie; procedit et hec monstruosa
than toward the-cause of-essence proceeds and this monstrous
(ut licentius loquar,) figmentorum speculatio usque ad
that more-licentiously I-may-speak of-fictions speculation even to
uentilationem singularium. Et cum quelibet substantiarum
the-winnowing of-singulars and since any of-substances

ex proprietatibus constet, quarum collectio eadem non
from properties consists of-which the-collection the-same not
repperitur in alio, abstrahentis intellectus opera per se
is-found in another of-the-abstracting understanding by-the-work by itself
rem quamlibet contemplatur. Cum enim Plato esse non
thing any it-contemplates since for Plato to-be not
possit informis et expers loci aut temporis, eum ratio quasi
can formless and devoid of-place or time him reason as-if
nudum, deducto respectu quantitatis et qualitatis aliorumque
naked drawn-off the-regard of-quantity and of-quality and-of-other
accidentium, simpliciter intuetur et indiuiduum nominat. Sed
accidents simply beholds and individual names but
et hoc utique doctrinalis instantie et subtilioris agitationis
also this surely of-doctrinal insistence and of-subtler exertion
figmentum est. Nichil enim tale in rebus occurrit; tale
a-fiction is nothing for such in things occurs such
quid tamen fideliter intelligitur. Hinc forte est illud in
something however faithfully is-understood hence perhaps is that-saying in
Analeticis: Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est; Aristomenes
the-Analytics Aristomenes intelligible always is Aristomenes
autem non semper, quoniam corruptibilis est. Et hoc
however not always since corruptible he-is and this
quidem est singulariter indiuiduum, quod solum quidam
indeed is singularly individual which alone some
aiunt posse de aliquo predicari. Plato enim Aristidis filius
say to-be-able of something to-be-predicated Plato for of-Aristides the-son
nec quantitate ut athomus, nec soliditate ut adamas, sed
neither by-quantity as an-atom nor by-solidity as adamant but
nec predicatione, ut dicunt, indiuiduum est. Ego quidem
nor by-predication as they-say individual is I indeed
opinionem hanc uehementer nec impugno, nec propugno;
opinion this vehemently neither attack nor defend

nec enim multum referre arbitror, ob hoc quod illam
nor for much to-matter do-I-judge on-account-of this that that
amplector indifferentiam in uicissitudine sermonum, sine
I-embrace indifference in the-interchange of-words without
qua non credo quempiam ad mentem auctorum fideliter
which not I-believe anyone to the-mind of-the-authors faithfully
peruenire. Quid obest si, quemadmodum genus de specie
to-arrive what is-in-the-way if just-as the-genus of the-species
uerum est, ita et Plato iste sensibilis de filio Aristidis
true is so also Plato this sensible of the-son of-Aristides
uerus sit, si ei solus Plato est filius? Sicut enim homo
true be if to-him only Plato is a-son as for man
animal, ita et ille est Plato. Hoc enim ex opinione
animal so also he is Plato this for from the-opinion
quorundam sensisse uisus est Aristotiles in Analeticis dicens:
of-some to-have-held seemed has Aristotle in the-Analytics saying
Omnium que sunt, hec quidem sunt talia, ut de nullo alio
of-all-things which are these indeed are such that of no other
predicentur uere uniuersaliter, ut Cleon et Callias, et quod
they-are-predicated truly universally as Cleon and Callias and what
singulare et sensibile, de his autem alia; nam et homo et
singular and sensible of these however others for both man and
animal uterque eorum est. Illa uero ipsa quidem de aliis
animal each of-them is those indeed themselves indeed of others
predicantur, de his autem alia priora non predicantur. Alia
are-predicated of these however others prior not are-predicated others
autem et ipsa de aliis, et de his alia; ut homo de Callia,
however both themselves of others and of these others as man of Callias
et de homine animal. Quoniam ergo quedam eorum que
and of man animal that therefore some of-those which
sunt, de nullo nata sunt dici palam; nam sensibilium pene
are of nothing born are to-be-said plain for of-sensible-things almost

unumquodque est huiusmodi ut de nullo predicetur, nisi
each is of-this-kind that of nothing it-be-predicated except
secundum accidens; dicimus enim quandoque album illud
according-to accident we-say for sometimes white-thing that
Socratem esse, et ueniens Calliam. Sane inepta uidetur hec
Socrates to-be and the-one-coming Callias surely inept seems this
distributio, nisi sensibile contingat predicari, non tamen de
distribution unless the-sensible happen to-be-predicated not however of
alio, nisi secundum accidens. Si enim nec de se nec de
another except according-to accident if for neither of itself nor of
alio ut secundum accidens predicatur, nec dicti ueritas
another as according-to accident it-is-predicated neither of-the-saying the-truth
nec ratio constat exempli. Quod si nec subici res
nor the-account stands of-the-example but if not-even to-be-subjected a-thing
sensibilis potest, Aristotilem nullus esse mentitum ambigit
sensible can Aristotle no-one to-have lied doubts
aut nugatum. Itaque hic, sicut et alibi, executus est quod
or to-have-trifled and-so here as also elsewhere followed he-has what
decet liberalium artium preceptorem, agens, ut dici solet,
befits of-the-liberal arts a-teacher acting as to-be-said it-is-wont
Minerua pinguiori, ut intelligeretur; nec in generibus et
with-Minerva fatter that he-might-be-understood nor in genera and
speciebus hanc statuit difficultatem quam ipsi doctores
species this did-he-set difficulty which themselves the-doctors
nequeunt intelligere, nedum sufficiant aliis explanare. Ex
cannot understand let-alone suffice to-others to-explain from
hac Minerue pinguedine dictum est illud in Topicis:
this of-Minerva fatness said was that-saying in the-Topics
Differentie omnes aut species aut indiuidua erunt; siquidem
differences all either species or individuals will-be since
sunt animalia; nam unumquodque animalium aut species est
they-are animals for each of-animals either species is

aut indiuiduum. Similiter et illud Boetii: Omnis species
or individual likewise also that-saying of-Boethius every species
est suum genus. Nam omnis homo animal, omnis albedo
is its genus for every man animal every whiteness
color. Quid ergo prohibet iuxta hanc licentie rationem
color what therefore forbids according-to this of-license the-account
ea que sunt sensibilia uel predicari uel subici? Nec
those which are sensible either to-be-predicated or to-be-subjected nor
opinor auctores hanc uim imposuisse sermoni, ut alligatus
do-I-think the-authors this force to-have-imposed on-speech that bound
sit ad unam in iuncturis omnibus significationem, sed
it-be to one in joinings all signification but
doctrinaliter sic esse locutos, ut ubique seruiant intellectui
doctrinally so to-have spoken that everywhere they-serve the-understanding
qui commodissimus est et quem ibi haberi pre ceteris
which most-convenient is and which there to-be-had before others
ratio exigit. Hoc ipsum ergo quod dicitur predicari,
reason demands this very-thing therefore which is-said to-be-predicated
ab adiunctis plures significandi contrahit modos. Poterit
from the-adjoined several of-signifying contracts modes it-will-be-able
tamen forte ubique aliquam quodammodo conuenientiam
however perhaps everywhere some in-a-way agreement
uel inherentiam designare. Nam cum sermo de sermone
or inherence to-designate for when speech of speech
iungibilitatem quandam terminorum uere affirmationis innuit,
a-joinability certain of-the-terms of-true affirmation hints
cum de re sermo dicitur predicari, ostenditur quod
when of a-thing speech is-said to-be-predicated it-is-shown that
ei talis nuncupatio aptatur. Rem uero de re predicari
to-it such a-naming is-fitted a-thing indeed of a-thing to-be-predicated
interdum notat, quoniam hoc est hoc, puta Plato homo;
sometimes notes that this is this suppose Plato man

interdum quoniam hoc participat hoc, utpote subiectum
sometimes that this participates this as subject
accidente. Nec erubesco confiteri quod res de re
accident nor do-I-blush to-confess that a-thing of a-thing
predicetur in propositione, etsi res in propositione non
be-predicated in a-proposition although a-thing in a-proposition not
sit; cum hoc in mente michi uersetur quod res significetur
be since this in mind to-me turns that a-thing be-signified
predicato termino uere affirmationis, cuius subiecto aliqua
by-the-predicated term of-a-true affirmation whose in-subject some
de re agitur aut res aliqua significatur. Itaque non
about thing is-treated or thing some is-signified and-so not
aduersandum littere arbitror, sed amicandum, eique mos
to-oppose the-letter I-judge but to-befriend and-to-it compliance
gerendus est in admittenda licentioris uerbi indifferentia;
to-be-shown is in admitting of-a-more-licentious word indifference
nec ad omnem translationem aut usurpationem discole, ut
nor at every metaphor or usurpation peevish as
creditur, dictionis lectorem uel auditorem decet dentem
is-believed of-speech for-a-reader or hearer befits-it the-tooth
caninum exercere. Quod male fers, assuesce, feres. Et
canine to-exercise what badly you-bear grow-used you-will-bear and
plane ingratus est et tam impudentis quam imprudentis
plainly ungrateful is and as of-shameless as of-imprudent
ingenii qui ad omnia se docentis uerba mouetur et
wit he-who at all him of-the-one-teaching the-words is-moved and
ei in aliquo obtemperare detrectat. Sequamur ergo figuras
to-him in anything to-comply refuses let-us-follow therefore the-figures
auctorum, et singula dicta pensemus ex causis dicendi; inde
of-the-authors and single sayings let-us-weigh from the-causes of-speaking thence
enim fidelis sumenda est intelligentia. Sed et rei nomen
for faithful to-be-taken is understanding but also of-thing the-name

latius pateat, ut possit uniuersalibus conuenire, que sic
more-widely may-extend that it-can to-universals to-fit which so
auctore Aristotile intelliguntur abstracta a singularibus,
on-the-authority-of Aristotle are-understood abstracted from singulars
ut tamen esse non habeant, deductis singularibus; hoc enim,
that however to-be not they-have drawn-off singulars this for
sicut ait, illi asserunt qui genus unum numero esse dicunt.
as he-says those assert who genus one in-number to-be say
Id autem faciunt qui formas solas ponunt, ideas scilicet, quas
this however they-do who forms alone posit ideas namely which
cum auctore suo Platone, quotiens datur occasio, uehementer
with author their Plato as-often-as is-given occasion vehemently
impugnat. Unde licet Plato cetum philosophorum grandem
he-attacks whence although Plato a-gathering of-philosophers great
et tam Augustinum quam alios plures nostrorum in
and as-much Augustine as other many of-ours in
statuendis ideis habeat assertores, ipsius tamen dogma in
establishing ideas has as-asserters his yet doctrine in
scrutinio uniuersalium nequaquam sequimur; eo quod
the-scrutiny of-universals by-no-means we-follow by-that that
hic Peripateticorum principem Aristotilem dogmatis huius
here of-the-Peripatetics the-prince Aristotle of-doctrine this
principem profitemur. Magnum quidem est et, quod Boetius
the-prince we-profess great indeed it-is and which Boethius
in secundo commento super Porphirium nimis arduum
in the-second commentary on Porphyry too arduous
fatetur tantorum uirorum diiudicare sententias; sed ei qui
confesses of-so-great men to-decide the-judgments but for-him who
Peripateticorum libros aggreditur, magis Aristotilis sententia
of-the-Peripatetics the-books approaches rather of-Aristotle the-judgment
sequenda est; forte non quia uerior, sed plane quia his
to-be-followed is perhaps not because truer but plainly because to-these

disciplinis magis accommoda est. Ab hac autem longissime
disciplines more suited it-is from this however farthest
uidentur abcedere tam illi qui genera et species uoces
seem to-depart as-much those who genera and species words
esse constituunt aut sermones, quam alii qui premissis de
to-be establish or speeches as others who by-the-aforesaid about
rerum inuestigatione opinionibus distrahuntur. Et quidem
of-things the-investigation opinions are-distracted and indeed
omnes ab Aristotile puerilius aut stolidius euagantur quam
all from Aristotle more-childishly or more-stupidly wander than
Platonici, cuius sententiam agnoscere dedignantur. Hec
the-Platonists whose judgment to-acknowledge they-disdain these-things
opinor debere sufficere, quod nec fideliter cum Porphirio nec
I-think ought to-suffice that neither faithfully with Porphyry nor
utiliter cum introducendis uersantur qui omnium de
usefully with those-to-be-introduced are-occupied those-who of-all about
generibus et speciebus recensent opiniones, omnibus obuiant,
genera and species review the-opinions to-all object
ut tandem sue inuentionis erigant titulum; cum hoc
that at-length of-their-own invention they-may-raise the-title since this
a proposito auctoris omnino dissideat et retundat ingenia
from the-purpose of-the-author altogether disagrees and blunts the-wits
auditorum et aliis articulis eque necessariis scitu locum
of-the-hearers and to-other points equally necessary to-be-known room
inquisitionis esse non sinat.
of-inquiry to-be not allows

Liber Tertius

BOOK THREE · PREFACE

Nearly twenty years after leaving the schools of logic, John has had scarcely an hour for philosophy amid business at Rome, in England, and in France, so the reader must excuse a dull style. A veteran owed his discharge, he is dragged back into the arena by an adversary. He borrows freely from the moderns, since truth is not lessened by a new author, thanks those who taught him, and turns to which books to read and how.

Anni fere uiginti elapsi sunt ex quo me ab officinis et
years almost twenty elapsed have from which me from the-workshops and
palestra eorum qui logicam profitentur rei familiaris
wrestling-ground of-those who logic profess of-affairs household
auulsit angustia et consilium amicorum quibus non
tore-away the-straitness and the-counsel of-friends whom not
obtemperare non potui. Exinde, ut ex animi mei sententia
to-obey not I-could thereafter that from of-mind my the-judgment
uerum fatear, nec in transitu uel semel dialecticorum
the-truth I-may-confess neither in passing even once of-dialecticians
attigi scripta, que uel in artibus uel in commentariis
have-I-touched the-writings which either in arts or in commentaries
aut glosematibus scientiam pariunt aut retinent aut reformant.
or glosses knowledge beget or retain or reform
Aliis namque et non modo diuersis sed aduersis fere
by-other for and not only diverse but adverse almost
occupationibus interim distractus sum; ut uix uel ad
occupations meanwhile distracted I-have-been so-that scarcely even for
horam, et hoc quodammodo furtim, philosophari licuerit.
an-hour and this in-a-way stealthily to-philosophize it-was-permitted

Siquidem Alpium iuga transcendi decies, egressus Angliam;
since of-the-Alps the-ridges I-have-crossed ten-times having-left England
Apuliam secundo peragravi; dominorum et amicorum negotia
Apulia twice I-traversed of-lords and of-friends the-business
in Ecclesia Romana sepius gessi; et emergentibus uariis
in the-Church Roman often I-transacted and emerging various
causis non modo Angliam sed et Gallias multotiens circuiui.
causes not only England but also Gaul many-times I-went-round
Ad hec cura rei familiaris, sollicitudinum concursus,
to these the-care of-affairs household of-anxieties the-concourse
gerendorum instantia, litteris dare operam non sinebant.
of-things-to-be-done the-pressure to-letters to-give effort not allowed
Unde me excusatiorem habendum puto in his que obtusius
whence me more-excusable to-be-held I-think in those which more-dully
et incultius a me dicta lector inueniet. Ariditas enim
and more-roughly by me said the-reader will-find the-dryness for
lingue, torpor sensuum partim premissis, partim curialibus
of-tongue the-torpor of-the-senses partly to-the-aforesaid partly to-courtly
nugis ascribenda sunt, partim aduersarii dolo et impudentie,
trifles to-be-ascribed are partly to-the-adversary's guile and shamelessness
qui instantia peruicaci prouocauit incautum et utcumque
who with-insistence stubborn provoked me-unwary and somehow
respondere coegit inuitum. Michi itaque illud ethicum facit;
to-answer compelled unwilling for-me and-so that moral-saying fits

Omnia fert etas, animum quoque; sepe ego longos
all-things bears-off age the-mind also often I long
cantando memini puerum me condere soles.
in-singing I-remember as-a-boy myself to-have-laid-to-rest suns

Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina, uox quoque Merim
now forgotten by-me so-many songs the-voice also Moeris
iam fugit ipsa.
now flees itself

Nonne ergo mecum inique agitur, si illa iuuenilis exigatur
surely-not therefore with-me unjustly it-is-dealt if that youthful be-demanded
agilitas, si alacritas feruentis ingenii, si memorie fides
agility if the-alacrity of-fervent wit if of-memory the-faithfulness
in tanto tumultu rerum et etate circa seria dumtaxat
in so-great a-tumult of-things and with-age about serious-things only
occupata, nisi quatenus aut infirmitas carnis aut negligentia
occupied except as-far-as either the-weakness of-the-flesh or the-negligence
spiritus ex his suborta per fomitem peccati malicia
of-the-spirit from these arisen through the-tinder of-sin the-malice
serietatem minuit aut extinguit? Utique sicut uirtus que annos
the-seriousness lessens or extinguishes surely as virtue which years
preuenit, sic et illa que deficientes non deserit, acceptatur.
anticipates so also that which the-failing not deserts is-accepted
Insignem fecit Ascanium Numanus prostratus a puero, et
notable made Ascanius Numanus laid-low by a-boy and
accessit Entelli titulis emerito seni cedens triumphis
was-added of-Entellus to-the-titles to-the-veteran old-man yielding by-triumphs
inclitus Dares; gloriosissimum enim est, si uirtuti natura
famous Dares most-glorious for it-is if to-virtue nature
cedere uideatur. Ego autem iam emeritus et tam etatis
to-yield seem I however already a-veteran and as-much of-age
quam professionis aut ordinis priuilegio, si iura procederent,
as of-profession or of-order by-the-privilege if rights proceeded
tutus, quodammodo protrahor ad arenam et deserta et
safe in-a-way am-dragged to the-arena and deserted and

desueta cogor instaurare certamina. Conditio dura et dira
disused am-compelled to-renew contests a-condition hard and dire
michi proponitur, ut aut conflictum ineam, quod non expedit,
to-me is-proposed that either the-conflict I-enter which not is-expedient
aut, quod omnino perniciosum est, uictus confessione turpi
or which altogether ruinous is conquered by-confession base
mendacio adquiescam. Turpitudinem itaque malui declinare,
to-a-lie I-assent baseness and-so I-preferred to-avoid
cui aut soli aut pre ceteris philosophantis propositum
to-which either alone or before others of-the-philosopher the-purpose
aduersatur. Et quia propriis non habundo, amicorum omnium
is-opposed and since my-own not I-abound-in of-friends all
iaculis indifferenter utor. Non enim, more coetaneorum
the-darts indifferently I-use not for after-the-manner of-contemporaries
nostrorum, domestica negligo instrumenta, sed ea tanto
our domestic I-neglect instruments but them by-so-much
familiarius apprehendo, quanto ea certius noui esse
more-familiarly I-grasp by-as-much-as them more-certainly I-know to-be
fidelium munera amicorum. Rerum enim ueritas permanet
of-faithful the-gifts friends of-things for the-truth remains
incorrupta, nec unquam, quod in se uerum est, attestatione
uncorrupted nor ever what in itself true is by-the-attestation
noui auctoris euanescit. Quis autem, nisi insulsus aut
of-a-new author vanishes who however unless witless or
ingratus, propositum habebit autenticum, eo quod illud
ungrateful a-proposition will-hold authentic by-that that it
Coriscus, Brisso protulit aut Melissus, eque omnes ignoti,
Coriscus Brisso brought-forth or Melissus equally all unknown
nisi quatenus ab Aristotile exempli gratia nominati sunt?
except as-far-as by Aristotle for-example's sake named they-are
Et illud idem reprobabit eo quod a Gileberto, Abailardo,
and that same will-reject by-that that by Gilbert Abelard

et Adam nostro sit prolatum? Utique non sum ex eis
and Adam our it-be brought-forth surely not I-am of those
qui bona temporis sui oderunt et coetaneos suos
who the-goods of-time their-own hate and contemporaries their-own
inuideant commendare posteritati. Nemo nostrorum, quem
grudge to-commend to-posterity no-one of-ours whom
nouerim, asseruit quoniam non est contradicere, aut
I-may-know has-asserted that not it-is-possible to-contradict or
quod moueri non contingit aut stadium pertransire, aut
that to-be-moved not it-happens or the-stadium to-traverse or
quia terra mouetur, quoniam omnia secundum Eraclitum
that the-earth moves since all-things according-to Heraclitus
moueri contingit; qui, sicut ait Marcianus, ardet, dum totus
to-be-moved it-happens who as says Martianus burns while wholly
in igne est, ex quo omnia primordialiter composita esse
in fire he-is from which all-things primordially composed to-be
contendit. Et he quidem accepte sunt opiniones ueterum,
he-contends and these indeed accepted are the-opinions of-the-ancients
eo ipso quod ueteres; et nostrorum longe probabiliores
by-that very-thing that ancient and of-ours far more-probable
et fideliores, eo quod nostrorum sunt, reprobantur. Dicat
and more-faithful by-that that of-ours they-are are-rejected let-say
unusquisque quod sentit. Ego hoc ab inuidia plerumque
each what he-thinks I this from envy mostly
arbitror prouenire; cum unusquisque in eo sue reputet
judge to-come since each in that his-own reckons
derogatum, in quo aliquid laudi collatum est aliene. Ast
detracted in which something to-praise conferred has-been another's but
ego propriam gloriam non affecto, sed illius a quo est
I my-own glory not affect but his from whom is
quicquid in me uel in aliis bonum est. Et illorum honorem
whatever in me or in others good is and of-those the-honor

desidero, qui michi contulerunt modicum illud, quod scio
I-desire who to-me conferred little that which I-know
uel opinor, quoniam Academicus sum; idemque mei profectus
or think since an-Academic I-am and-the-same of-my advance
non erubesco laudare auctores. Ut enim ait Plinius, boni
not I-blush to-praise the-authors as for says Pliny of-a-good
ingenii laudabilis indoles est per quos profeceris
wit praiseworthy the-disposition is through whom you-have-advanced
confiteri. Illi quoque qui hoc ipsum nunc in me carpunt,
to-confess they also who this very-thing now in me carp-at
quandoque auctore Deo bonorum laudabuntur auctores, quia
sometime as-author God of-good-things will-be-praised as-authors because
eos uirtutis manet gloria et beneficio temporis coeuorum
them of-virtue awaits the-glory and by-the-benefit of-time of-contemporaries
inuidia euanescet. Ergo procedat oratio, et que antiquate
the-envy will-vanish therefore let-proceed the-speech and what-things to-antiquated
occurrent memorie de adolescentie studiis, quoniam iocunda
will-occur memory about of-youth the-studies since the-pleasant
etas ad mentem reducitur, compendiose percurrat, qui
age to mind is-brought-back concisely let-it-run-through who
pre ceteris et qualiter legendi sunt alacri commemoratione
before others and how to-be-read are with-eager remembrance
reuoluens. Que uero pretermissa aut uitiose dicta fuerint,
revolving what-things indeed passed-over or faultily said will-have-been
obliuioni, tempori, et occupationibus imputentur.
to-forgetfulness to-time and to-occupations be-imputed

Quomodo Porphirium legi oporteat et alios libros

I · HOW PORPHYRY AND OTHER BOOKS SHOULD BE READ

Every book should be read as easily as it allows, as Abelard did, inclining to the simpler view of genera and species for beginners. Porphyry should be read for the plain sense: genus first meant parent, species bodily form. Austere masters demand that the little book teach everything; a faithful reader reveres its letter until he learns more, as Aristotle unteaches Porphyry's making body the genus of man. Difficulties should not deter, since authors interpret one another.

Equidem ex animi mei sententia sic omnem librum legi
indeed from of-mind my the-judgment so every book to-be-read
oportet, ut quam facillime potest eorum que scribuntur
it-behooves that as most-easily it-can of-those which are-written
habeatur cognitio. Non enim occasio querenda est ingerende
be-had the-knowledge not for occasion to-be-sought is to-be-heaped-on
difficultatis, sed ubique facilitas generanda. Quem morem
of-difficulty but everywhere ease to-be-generated which custom
secutum recolo Peripateticum Palatinum. Inde est, ut opinor,
followed I-recall the-Peripatetic of-Le-Pallet thence it-is as I-think
quod sed ad puerilem de generibus et speciebus, ut pace
that rather to the-boyish about genera and species that by-the-leave
suorum loquar, inclinauit opinionem; malens instruere et
of-his-own I-may-speak be-inclined opinion preferring to-instruct and
promouere suos in puerilibus quam in grauitate philosophorum
to-advance his-own in boyish-things than in the-gravity of-philosophers
esse obscurior. Faciebat enim studiosissime quod in omnibus
to-be more-obscure he-did for most-zealously what in all-things
precipit fieri Augustinus, id est, rerum intellectui
prescribes to-be-done Augustine that is of-things to-the-understanding
seruiebat. Itaque sic Porphirius legendus est, ut sermonum, de
he-served and-so so Porphyry to-be-read is that of-the-words about

quibus agitur, significatio teneatur, et ex ipsa superficie
which it-is-treated the-signification be-held and from the-very surface
habeatur sensus uerborum; sic enim satis introductorius erit
be-had the-sense of-the-words so for enough introductory it-will-be
et facili breuitate conspicuus. Sufficiat ergo introducendo
and by-easy brevity conspicuous let-it-suffice therefore for-the-one-being-introduced
nosse quia nomen generis multiplex est et a prima
to-know that the-name of-genus manifold is and from the-first
institutione significat generationis principium, id est parentem
institution signifies of-generation the-beginning that is the-parent
a quo uel locum in quo quis genitus est. Unde Polinices,
by whom or the-place in which one begotten has-been whence Polynices
ab Adrasto genus interrogatus, ait utrumque complectens:
by Adrastus about-his-race asked says both embracing

Cadmus origo patrum, tellus Mauortia Tebe.
Cadmus the-origin of-my-fathers my-land Mars's Thebes

Deinde hinc translatum est ad significandum id quod
then hence transferred it-has-been to signifying that which
de differentibus specie in quid predicatur. Item et species
of things-differing in-species in what is-predicated likewise also species
multipliciter dicitur; nam ab institutione formam significat,
in-many-ways is-said for from institution form it-signifies
que in liniamentis membrorum consistit; unde et 'speciosus'
which in the-lineaments of-limbs consists whence also handsome
idem est 'formoso'. Hinc autem sumptum est ad
the-same is as-beautiful hence however taken it-has-been for
significationem eius quod in quid de differentibus numero
the-signification of-that which in what of things-differing in-number
predicatur. Unde constat nomina hec non esse secunde
is-predicated whence it-is-agreed names these not to-be of-the-second

impositionis, sed, cum prime sint, ex translatione deuocari
imposition but though of-the-first they-be by metaphor to-be-called-off
ad aliam significationem; quod, quia non ornatus sed
to another signification which since not of-ornament but
necessitatis causa contingit, equiuocationi comparatur.
of-necessity for-the-sake it-happens to-equivocation is-compared
Tertiam eiusdem apponit Boetius significationem, dicens
a-third of-the-same sets Boethius signification calling
formam substantialem speciei, puta humanitatem, hominis
the-form substantial of-the-species suppose humanity of-man
speciem appellari. Sed hanc subtilem speciem nominat et ex
species to-be-called but this subtle species he-names and on
industria asserit a Porphirio pretermissam, ne nimia grauitate
purpose asserts by Porphyry passed-over lest by-too-great gravity
introducendorum animos retardaret. Quid ergo sibi
of-those-to-be-introduced the-minds he-should-slow what therefore to-themselves
uoluit qui non modo hanc contra consilium auctoris,
did-they-wish who not only this against the-counsel of-the-author
sed quicquid aliud excogitari potest, adiciunt? Hoc credo
but whatever else to-be-devised can add this I-believe
appetunt, ut uideantur multa scire et bene dixisse,
they-seek that they-may-seem many-things to-know and well to-have-spoken
cum id egerint ut minus fuerint intellecti. Idem fiat
when this they-have-done that less they-be understood the-same let-be-done
in differentia, proprio, et accidente. Vocabulorum simpliciter
in difference property and accident of-the-words simply
aperiantur significationes, apprehendatur illa que proposito
let-be-opened the-significations let-be-grasped that which with-the-purpose
congruit per descriptiones certissimas, deinde singulorum
agrees through descriptions most-certain then of-each
sequantur diuisiones. Postremo differentie singulorum ad
let-follow the-divisions lastly the-differences of-each to

singula, sicut occurrunt, in superficie assignentur; et
each as they-occur on the-surface let-be-assigned and
Porphirium perlegisti. Littera enim suauiter excutienda
Porphyry you-have-read-through the-letter for gently to-be-shaken-out
est et non more captiuorum acerbe torquenda, donec
is and not in-the-manner of-captives harshly to-be-tortured until
restituat quod non accepit. Porro austerus nimis et durus
it-restore what not it-received further austere too and hard
magister est, tollens quod positum non est et metens quod
a-master he-is taking-up what laid-down not is and reaping what
non est seminatum, qui Porphirium cogit soluere quod omnes
not is sown who Porphyry compels to-pay what all
philosophi acceperunt; cui satisfactum non est, nisi
philosophers have-received to-whom satisfaction not is-made unless
libellus doceat quicquid alicubi scriptum inuenitur. Plane
the-little-book teach whatever anywhere written is-found plainly
ueritas est amica simplicitati; et qui indebitum exigit quod
truth is a-friend to-simplicity and he-who the-undue demands what
debitum erat accipere sepissime demeretur. Quicquid autem
due was to-receive very-often forfeits whatever however
littere facies indicat, lector fidelis et prudens interim
of-the-letter the-face indicates the-reader faithful and prudent meanwhile
ueneretur ut sacrosanctum, donec ei alia docente aut
let-revere as sacrosanct until to-him another teaching or
Domino reuelante ueritas plenius et familiarius innotescat.
the-Lord revealing truth more-fully and more-familiarly become-known
Quod enim unus fideliter et utiliter docet, alter eque fideliter
what for one faithfully and usefully teaches another equally faithfully
et utiliter dedocet. Siquidem recte docentis officium pro
and usefully unteaches since rightly of-one-teaching the-office according-to
ratione temporis et persone quod cuique nouerit expedire
the-reason of-time and of-person what to-each he-knows to-be-expedient

dispensat. Nam Porphirius corpus asserit esse genus hominis,
dispenses for Porphyry body asserts to-be the-genus of-man
quoniam et animalis. Aristotiles autem hoc dedocet, et
since also of-animal Aristotle however this unteaches and
eorum purgat errorem, qui genus secundum quid opinantur
their purges error who the-genus according-to something think
de specie predicari; non enim secundum quid de specie
of the-species to-be-predicated not for according-to something of the-species
predicatur. Ex quo palam est uisibile aut sensibile non esse
it-is-predicated from which plain it-is visible or sensible not to-be
genus animalis; predicantur enim secundum quid, id est,
the-genus of-animal they-are-predicated for according-to something that is
secundum corpus, non animam; quare, inquit, corpus non
according-to the-body not the-soul wherefore he-says body not
erit genus animalis, eo quod pars est. Nullo enim modo
will-be the-genus of-animal by-that that a-part it-is in-no for way
pars de toto predicatur; ita quidem, si locutio propria; nam
a-part of the-whole is-predicated so indeed if the-speech proper for
in figuratis nichil prohibet. Tradunt utique gramatici
in figurative-things nothing forbids hand-down surely the-grammarians
tropum locutionis esse qui sinedoche appellatur, et nomen
a-trope of-speech to-be which synecdoche is-called and the-name
totius parti et itidem partis nomen toti attribuit;
of-the-whole to-the-part and likewise of-the-part the-name to-the-whole attributes
res enim dignioris aut notioris partis plerumque suscipit
a-thing for of-the-worthier or better-known part often receives
nomen. Unde homo, qui ex anima constat et corpore,
the-name whence man who of soul consists and body
et sicut Cicero, Apuleius et, quod maius est, Ieronimus,
and as Cicero Apuleius and what greater is Jerome
Augustinus et multi alii, tam nostrorum quam Gentilium
Augustine and many others as-much of-ours as of-the-Gentiles

testantur, non magis est corpus quam anima, sed quodammodo
testify not more is body than soul but in-a-way
minus; corporis censetur nomine secundum publicum usum,
less of-body is-reckoned by-the-name according-to public use
quoniam pars illa euidentior est et sensibus notior; eque
since part that more-evident is and to-the-senses better-known equally
tamen uerum est, sed a solis philosophis recipitur, ipsum esse
however true it-is but by alone philosophers is-accepted him to-be
animam. Nec tamen ob hoc esse incorporeum sequitur;
soul nor however on-account-of this to-be incorporeal follows
quoniam, ut aiebat Abaelardus, negatio uehementior est.
since as said Abelard the-negation more-vehement is
Figuratiue quoque locutionis progressum inhibebat; eo quod
of-figurative also speech the-progress he-checked by-that that
figuras non licet extendere, que ipse non recipiuntur,
figures not it-is-permitted to-extend which themselves not are-accepted
nisi cum expedit. Nullum autem genus figuraliter aut
except when it-is-expedient no however genus figuratively or
translatiue de specie predicatur; semper enim et proprie
metaphorically of the-species is-predicated always for and properly
uerum est de omni eo cuius est genus. Si quid
true it-is of every-thing that of-which it-is the-genus if anything
autem non modo in Porphirio, sed in quauis scripturarum
however not only in Porphyry but in any of-the-writings
intellectu difficilius occurrit, non statim deterreat legentem aut
understanding more-difficult occurs not at-once let-it-deter the-reader or
audientem, sed procedat; quia se inuicem interpretantur
the-hearer but let-him-proceed because themselves in-turn interpret
auctores et singule scripture uicissim sunt indices aliarum,
the-authors and single writings in-turn are indicators of-others
unde legentem plurima aut nulla aut paucissima latent.
whence the-reader very-many either none or very-few lie-hidden-from

De Cathegoriarum utilitate et instrumentis

II · THE USEFULNESS AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE CATEGORIES

The Categories, an elementary book on uncombined words, sets equivocals, univocals, and denominatives first, since hidden equivocation misleads. Bernard of Chartres held that whiteness signifies an untouched virgin, 'is white' her entering the bridal chamber, and white her corrupted. John will not quarrel over names or stretch authors' words past their context: a denominative signifies what is such from something, and the word it comes from signifies that from which it is such.

Cathegoriarum liber Aristotilis elementarius est, et
of-the-Categories the-book of-Aristotle elementary is and
accedentis ad logicam quodammodo infantiam excipit.
of-one-approaching to logic in-a-way the-infancy it-receives
Tractat enim de sermonibus incomplexis in eo quod rerum
it-treats for about speeches uncombined in that that of-things
significatiui sunt; quo nichil prius est apud dialecticum.
significative they-are than-which nothing prior is with the-dialectician
Premittit autem de equiuocis, uniuocis, et denominatiuis,
he-puts-first however about equivocals univocals and denominatives
quoniam eorum notitia diffinienti, diuidenti, et colligenti
since of-them the-knowledge for-the-definer for-the-divider and for-the-gatherer
plurimum necessaria est. Siquidem equiuocatio multos inducit
very-much necessary is since equivocation many brings-in
errores, si lateat, et negotiantes impedit, si unus nesciat
errors if it-lie-hidden and the-negotiators hinders if one know-not
quo ferat alius intellectum. Manifestato autem, ut ait
whither may-bear the-other understanding made-manifest however as says
Aristotiles, quot modis dicatur, et ad quid ferens ponat,
Aristotle in-how-many ways it-be-said and to what bearing he-posit
ridiculosus uidebitur interrogans, si non ad hoc sermonem
ridiculous will-seem the-questioner if not to this the-speech

faciat. Utile autem et ad non paralogizari et ad paralogizare.
he-make useful however also for not being-misled and for misleading
Scientes enim quotiens dicitur, non paralogizabimur, sed
knowing for how-many-times it-is-said not we-shall-be-misled but
sciemus si non ad idem sermonem faciat qui interrogat;
we-shall-know if not to the-same the-speech make he-who asks
et ipsi interrogantes poterimus paralogizare, semper
and ourselves asking we-shall-be-able to-mislead always
quidem, si eorum que multipliciter dicuntur, alia fuerint
indeed if of-those which in-many-ways are-said some will-have-been
uera, alia falsa; nisi et is qui respondet nouerit
true others false unless also he who answers will-have-known
quotiens dicitur. Uniuocorum quoque et denominatiuorum
how-many-times it-is-said of-univocals also and of-denominatives
adeo necessaria est cognitio, ut hec tria, scilicet equiuoca,
so-far necessary is the-knowledge that these three namely equivocals
uniuoca, et denominatiua asserat Isidorus cathegoriarum
univocals and denominatives asserts Isidore of-the-categories
instrumenta; siquidem quecumque predicantur, aut equiuoce
the-instruments since whatever-things are-predicated either equivocally
aut uniuoce aut denominatiue suis applicantur subiectis.
or univocally or denominatively to-their-own are-applied subjects
Equiuoce quidem, si non eodem sensu; uniuoce, si eodem;
equivocally indeed if not in-the-same sense univocally if in-the-same
denominatiue, si non prorsus eodem, nec prorsus alio, sed
denominatively if not wholly in-the-same nor wholly in-another but
adiacente sibi uicinitate quadam intellectu uerborum,
with-adjacent to-itself nearness a-certain by-the-understanding of-the-words
sicut manente conformitate uocum. Sic a bonitate bonus,
as remaining the-conformity of-the-sounds so from goodness good
a fortitudine fortis dicitur, ut ex ipsa uerborum forma
from fortitude brave is-said so-that from the-very of-the-words form

perpendatur quodammodo adiacens intellectus. Unde ex
be-weighed in-a-way the-adjacent understanding whence from
opinione plurium idem principaliter significant denominatiua
the-opinion of-several the-same principally signify denominatives
et ea a quibus denominantur, sed consignificatione diuersa.
and those from which they-are-denominated but by-consignification diverse
Aiebat Bernardus Carnotensis quia albedo significat uirginem
said Bernard of-Chartres that whiteness signifies a-virgin
incorruptam, albet eandem introeuntem thalamum aut
uncorrupted whitens the-same entering the-bridal-chamber or
cubantem in thoro, album uero eandem, sed corruptam. Hoc
lying in the-bed white indeed the-same but corrupted this
quidem quoniam albedo ex assertione eius simpliciter et
indeed since whiteness according-to the-assertion his simply and
sine omni participatione subiecti ipsam significat qualitatem,
without all participation of-subject the-very signifies the-quality
uidelicet coloris speciem, disgregatiuam uisus. Albet autem
namely of-color the-species disgregative of-sight whitens however
eandem principaliter, etsi participationem persone admittat.
the-same principally even-if participation of-person it-admit
Si enim illud excutias, quod uerbum hoc pro substantia
if for that you-shake-out which word this for substance
significat, qualitas albedinis occurret, sed in accidentibus
signifies the-quality of-whiteness will-meet-you but in the-accidents
uerbi personam reperies. Album uero eandem significat
of-the-verb the-person you-will-find white indeed the-same signifies
qualitatem, sed infusam commixtamque substantie et iam
quality but poured-in and-mixed with-substance and now
quodammodo magis corruptam; siquidem nomen ipsum
in-a-way more corrupted since the-name itself
pro substantia subiectum albedinis, pro qualitate significat
for substance the-subject of-whiteness for quality signifies

colorem albentis subiecti. Videbatur etiam sibi tam
the-color of-the-whitening subject he-seemed also to-himself as-much
de Aristotile quam de multorum auctoritatibus niti. Ait
on Aristotle as on of-many the-authorities to-rest he-says
enim: Album nichil aliud significat quam qualitatem. Multa
for white nothing else signifies than quality many
quoque proferebat undique conquisita, quibus persuadere
also he-brought-forth from-everywhere sought-out by-which to-persuade
nitebatur res interdum pure, interdum adiacenter predicari,
he-strove things sometimes purely sometimes adjacently to-be-predicated
et ad hoc denominatiuorum scientiam perutilem asserebat.
and for this of-denominatives the-knowledge very-useful he-asserted
Habet hec opinio sicut impugnatores, sic defensores suos.
has this opinion as assailants so defenders its-own
Michi pro minimo est ad nomen in talibus disputare,
to-me for least it-is about the-name in such-things to-dispute
cum intelligentiam dictorum sumendam nouerim ex causis
since the-understanding of-sayings to-be-taken I-know from the-causes
dicendi. Nec sic memoratam Aristotilis aliorumue auctoritates
of-speaking nor so the-mentioned of-Aristotle or-of-others authorities
interpretandas arbitror, ut trahatur istuc quicquid alicubi
to-be-interpreted I-judge that be-drawn thither whatever anywhere
dictum reperitur. Nam apud eundem motus de animali,
said is-found for with the-same motion of animal
uigilatio de bipede astruitur predicari, et sic plura.
waking of biped is-established to-be-predicated and so more-things
Alioquin Analeticorum exempla non recte procederent,
otherwise of-the-Analytics the-examples not rightly would-proceed
et apud eundem, quod si cecitas et cecum esse idem
and with the-same that if blindness and blind to-be the-same
essent, de eodem predicarentur; nunc autem homo cecus
were of the-same they-would-be-predicated now however a-man blind

dicitur, cecitas uero minime. Non est itaque ex leui
is-called blindness indeed by-no-means not it-is and-so from slight
occasione uerbi menti auctorum preiudicandum, que
occasion of-a-word on-the-mind of-the-authors to-be-prejudged which
ex circumstantia sermonis pensanda est. Non enim omnis
from the-circumstance of-speech to-be-weighed is not for every
dictio semper eodem formatur scemate. Plane denominatiua
word always in-the-same is-formed figure plainly denominatives
non eundem his a quibus denominantur intellectum
not the-same as-those from which they-are-denominated understanding
significant, nec in eandem rem descendit animus his auditis;
signify nor into the-same thing descends the-mind these heard
nec eorundem appellatiua sunt; a se enim inuicem
nor of-the-same appellatives are-they from themselves for in-turn
plerumque remouentur et ad ea sequitur contradictio.
mostly they-are-removed and on them follows contradiction
Interdum tamen se patienter admittunt, et de eodem
sometimes however each-other patiently they-admit and of the-same
simul uel de se inuicem predicantur denominatiue
at-once or of themselves in-turn are-predicated denominatively
coniugata. Nam et bonitas bona, una unitas dicitur.
conjugates for also goodness good one unity is-called
Regulare tamen est ut ad ea sequatur contradictio, quod
regular however it-is that on them follow contradiction which
tamen ex causa consignificationis magis quam significationis
however from the-cause of-consignification more than of-signification
asserunt euenire. Et hoc quidem probabiliter; an satis
they-assert to-happen and this indeed probably whether enough
uere diiudicent periti. Nam ad ea que idem significant
truly let-judge the-skilled for on those which the-same signify
ex causa consignificationis dumtaxat sequitur contradictio.
from the-cause of-consignification only follows contradiction

Singularis enim numerus positus eiusdem nominis pluralem
the-singular for number placed of-the-same noun the-plural
tollit, ut si quid homo est, illud homines non est.
removes as if anything man is that men not is
Nichil equidem refert unde proueniat, cum eo tendat
nothing indeed it-matters whence it-come since thither tends
dialectices tota intentio, ut sermonum uim aperiat et ex
of-dialectic the-whole intention that of-speeches the-force it-open and from
eorum predicatione examinandi ueri et statuendi scientiam
their predication of-examining the-true and of-establishing the-science
assequatur. Hoc agit, siue diuidat siue diffiniat siue colligat
it-attain this it-does whether it-divide or define or gather
siue ea que fuerint collecta resoluat. Ergo denominatiua
or those which will-have-been gathered resolve therefore denominatives
significant quodam modo qualia ex aliquibus; illa uero,
signify in-a-certain way such from some-things those indeed
a quibus denominantur, notant a quibus qualia. Nam
from which they-are-denominated mark from which such for
fortitudo significat ex quo quis fortis; fortis autem, qualis
fortitude signifies from which one brave brave however such
quis ex fortitudine; unde et fortitudinis dicitur nomen,
one from fortitude whence also of-fortitude is-called the-name
non ut cuius, sed ut ex quo; indicat enim causam. Hinc
not as whose but as from which it-indicates for the-cause hence
est illud Gregorii: Angelus nomen officii est, non nature;
is that-saying of-Gregory angel the-name of-office is not of-nature
siquidem ex officio est, sed persone, significatque, ut dictum
since from office it-is but of-person and-it-signifies as said
est, quodammodo quale quid illo ministret officio.
it-has-been in-a-way of-what-kind something by-that he-ministers office
Plura sunt in hunc modum, ut consul dignitatis, studiosus
more are in this way as consul of-dignity zealous

uirtutis, Platonicus, Socraticus professionum sunt nomina;
of-virtue Platonic Socratic of-professions are names
predictas itaque res significant. Ex quo liquet quoniam
the-aforesaid and-so things they-signify from which it-is-clear that
significare, sicut et predicare, multipliciter dicitur; sed
to-signify as also to-predicate in-many-ways is-said but
quis modus familiarissimus sit, discernere palam est. Inde
which mode most-familiar be to-discern plain it-is thence
est quod iustus et similia passim apud auctores nunc
it-is that just and similar-things everywhere among the-authors now
dicuntur iustum, nunc iustitiam significare uel predicare.
are-said the-just now justice to-signify or to-predicate
Sed aut omnino non conuertitur, aut rarissime inuenitur;
but either altogether not it-is-converted or very-rarely is-found
si tamen hoc alicubi, quod iustitia iustum significet aut
if however this anywhere that justice the-just signify or
predicet. Boetius autem in libro de Trinitate: Cum, inquit,
predicate Boethius however in the-book on the-Trinity when he-says
dico 'Deus iustus est', qualitatem uideor predicare; sed
I-say God just is quality I-seem to-predicate but
predico substantiam, immo eam que est supra substantiam.
I-predicate substance nay that which is above substance
Quare, inquam, qualitatem uidebitur predicare, si hoc nomen
why I-say quality he-will-seem to-predicate if this name
iustus non predicet qualitatem. Tale est illud Aristotilis:
just not predicate quality such is that-saying of-Aristotle
Qualitatem significant, ut album; quantitatem, ut bicubitum.
quality signify as white quantity as two-cubits
Sic utique quia dantur a qualitate uel quantitate, ita
so surely because they-are-given from quality or quantity so
et qualitatem predicant, quam apposita demonstrant inesse
also quality they-predicate which set-beside they-show to-be-in

subiectis; interdum dicuntur significare qualia, quoniam
the-subjects sometimes they-are-said to-signify such-things since
appositione sua declarant qualia sint subiecta. Sed hec
by-apposition their-own they-declare of-what-kind be the-subjects but these
a se, si sit benignus interpres, non multum distant,
from each-other if there-be a-kindly interpreter not much are-distant
etsi audito albus intelligatur in quo albedo; cum autem
even-if heard white be-understood in which whiteness when however
albedo dicitur, non intelligitur in quo talis color; sed potius
whiteness is-said not is-understood in which such color but rather
color faciens tale. Illud uero quod audita uoce concipit
the-color making such that indeed which heard the-word conceives
intellectus, ipsius familiarissima significatio est.
the-understanding its most-familiar signification is

Que sit predicamentorum conceptio, et quibus contenta sit sobrietas philosophantium

III · THE SCHEME OF THE CATEGORIES, AND PHILOSOPHY'S SOBRIETY

John defends the Categories against those who call it useless. To know a thing fully is to know whether it is, what, how great, of what kind, and the rest; only God knows the why of all. The ten categories were framed for bodies first, hold of what nature shows, and fail before the divine. Usage changes what words mean, and those who read everything into the little book unteach more than they teach, as Adam, the English Peripatetic, mocked.

Quia ergo aut equiuoce aut uniuoce aut denominatiue, ut
since therefore either equivocally or univocally or denominatively that
sequantur indifferentie rationem, singula predicantur, ipsaque
they-may-follow of-indifference the-principle single-things are-predicated and-the-very
predicatio quedam ratiocinandi materia est, predicamentorum
predication a-certain of-reasoning matter is of-the-categories

premissa sunt instrumenta, que negotiantium ex arte
set-before are the-instruments which of-the-negotiators according-to art
operam impediunt aut promouent et procurant. Multiuoca
the-effort hinder or advance and procure multivocals
et diuersiuoca, que Boetius adicit, magis ad gramaticam
and diversivocals which Boethius adds more to grammar
pertinent. Multiuoca autem sunt, cum in eiusdem rei
pertain multivocals however are when into of-the-same thing
intellectum et nominationem plura uerba concurrunt; ut
the-understanding and naming several words concur as
ensis, mucro, gladius. Diuersiuoca, que sensu et uoce
sword blade brand diversivocals those-which in-sense and word
diuersa sunt; ut homo, lapis. Rationem uero indifferentie,
diverse are as man stone the-principle indeed of-indifference
quam semper approbamus, liber iste commendat pre ceteris;
which always we-approve book this commends before others
etsi ubique diligenter inspicienti manifesta sit. Agit enim
although everywhere diligently to-one-looking manifest it-be it-treats for
nunc de significantibus, nunc de significatis, aliorumque
now of signifiers now of signified-things and-of-others
doctrinam facit nominibus aliorum. Sunt qui librum
the-teaching makes with-the-names of-others there-are who book
istum, quoniam elementarius est, inutilem fere dicunt, et
this since elementary it-is useless almost call and
satis esse putant ad persuadendum se in dialectica
enough to-be think for persuading themselves in dialectical
disciplina et apodictica esse perfectos, si contempserint uel
discipline and apodictic to-be perfect if they-will-have-despised or
ignorauerint illa, que in primo commento super
they-will-have-been-ignorant-of those-things which in the-first commentary on
Porphirium antequam artis aliquid attingatur docet Boetius
Porphyry before of-the-art anything be-touched teaches Boethius

prelegenda. Longe michi alia mens est, nec uideo quomodo
to-be-read-first far to-me other mind is nor do-I-see how
sine isto quis magis possit esse logicus quam sine litteris
without this anyone more can to-be a-logician than without letters
litteratus. Hinc enim quid in rebus uniuersale, quid singulare,
lettered hence for what in things universal what singular
quid substantia, quid accidens, quid in sermonibus equiuoce,
what substance what accident what in speeches equivocally
quid uniuoce, quid denominatiue dicatur, conspicuum est.
what univocally what denominatively be-said conspicuous is
Hinc incomplexorum significatio innotescit; hinc rectissime
hence of-uncombined-things the-signification becomes-known hence of-most-right
inuestigationis docetur modus; hinc ad notitie perfectionem
investigation is-taught the-mode hence to of-knowledge the-perfection
prima et dilucida patet uia. Siquidem ad habendam
a-first and lucid lies-open way since for having
perfectam cuiusque rei notitiam Peripatetice discipline,
perfect of-each thing knowledge of-the-Peripatetic discipline
que in inuestigatione ueri laborat, pre ceteris uidentur
which in the-investigation of-the-true labors before others seem
ista sufficere. Primo quidem nosse de aliquo an
these-things to-suffice first indeed to-know about something whether
sit: deinde quid, quale, quantum, ad aliquid, ubi, quando
it-be then what of-what-kind how-great to something where when
sit, quomodo situm, quid habeat, faciat, paciatur. Nouissima
it-be how placed what it-have do suffer the-last
speculatio est in singulis quare sic, et que iam non
speculation is in single-things why so and this already not
modo ad angelicam perfectionem, sed ad diuine maiestatis
only to angelic perfection but to of-divine majesty
prerogatiuam accedit; ei namque soli rerum omnium
the-prerogative approaches to-him for alone of-things all

causa innotuit, cuius uoluntas omnium primeua causa
the-cause has-become-known whose will of-all the-primeval cause
est et qui, quatenus uoluit, singulis cur ita sit uoluit
is and who as-far-as he-willed to-single-things why so it-be willed
reuelare. Omnia namque ad plenum nosse, diuina; in nullo
to-reveal all-things for to the-full to-know divine in nothing
labi, angelica; in plurimis bene sentire, humana perfectio
to-slip angelic in very-many-things well to-think human perfection
est. Cumulus itaque scientie in hoc duodenario solidatur.
is the-heap and-so of-knowledge in this twelve is-made-solid
Inuestigatio philosophica undenarii sobrietate contenta est;
investigation philosophical of-the-eleven with-the-sobriety content is
et, si ultra progreditur, profectum suum gratie ex magna
and if beyond it-proceeds advance its-own to-grace from great
parte ascribit. Nam pulsantibus aperit gratia, et uoluntatem
part it-ascribes for to-those-knocking opens grace and will
suam, que originalis omnium causa est, reuelat Dominus
his-own which original of-all the-cause is reveals the-Lord
his qui ex toto corde querunt eam. Porro logicus
to-those who from whole heart seek it further the-logician
decem institutionis sue elementa cognoscit et, cum in
the-ten of-institution his-own elements knows and when in
his plenius fuerit educatus, in parte contradictionis
these more-fully he-will-have-been reared in the-part of-contradiction
aduersarium pergit ex intentione plenius conuincere. He
the-adversary he-proceeds from intention more-fully to-convince these
ergo que dicuntur naturales, et quodammodo elementares
therefore which are-called natural and in-a-way elementary
sunt, preiacent questiones; scilicet quid, quantum, quale,
are lie-before questions namely what how-great of-what-kind
et cetera. Et exinde, cum in his gimnosophiste fuerint
and the-rest and thereafter when in these the-gymnosophists will-have-been

instituti, contradictionem formant, eamque, ut dici solet,
instructed contradiction they-form and-it as to-be-said it-is-wont
in arto campo distrahentes, ad reprimendam partem
in a-narrow field drawing-apart for repressing the-part
oppositam rationis sue nituntur aculeis; tendit enim
opposed of-reason their-own they-strive with-the-goads strives for
quisque euacuare quod apud alium statutum est. Sed quia
each to-empty what with another established is but since
naturalium prima est inquisitio, in ipsa primo decem
of-natural-things first is the-inquiry in it first ten
predicamenta formata sunt excogitatique sermones, quibus de
categories formed were and-devised speeches by-which about
his que primo occurrant sensui aut intellectui, qualia
those which first may-meet the-sense or the-understanding of-what-kind
sint corpora aut spiritus, quid, quantum, et quale esset,
be bodies or spirits what how-great and of-what-kind it-was
aut secundum ceteras questiones naturaliter procedentes,
or according-to the-other questions naturally proceeding
declaretur unumquodque eorum. Unde et predicamenta dicta
be-declared each of-them whence also categories called
sunt, siue in sermonibus siue in rebus, decem genera
they-are whether in speeches or in things ten kinds
predicabilium, que sic ad singulares indiuiduasque substantias
of-predicables which so to singular and-individual substances
applicentur; que de ipsis indicent quid sint, quantum,
may-be-applied which about them may-indicate what they-be how-great
quale, ad aliquid, ubi, quando, situm, quid habeant,
of-what-kind to something where when placed what they-have
faciant, aut patiantur. Primum itaque predicamentum est
do or suffer the-first and-so category is
in his que de aliqua substantiarum indicant quid sint;
in those which about some of-substances indicate what they-be

secundum, in his que quantum; tertium, ad aliquid; quartum,
the-second in those which how-great the-third to something the-fourth
quale; quintum, ubi; sextum, quando; septimum, situm
of-what-kind the-fifth where the-sixth when the-seventh placed
esse; octauum, habere; nonum, facere; decimum, pati. Et
to-be the-eighth to-have the-ninth to-do the-tenth to-suffer and
hec quidem sic multiplicata sunt, quoniam apud philosophos
these indeed so multiplied were since among philosophers
maxime uigebat speculatio corporalium, cum ante Zenonem
most flourished the-speculation of-bodily-things since before Zeno
aut nullus aut pauci admodum aliquid de anima aut
either none or few very anything about the-soul or
spiritibus incorporeis recte senserint. Hic enim est, sicut
spirits incorporeal rightly have-thought this-one for is as
Ieronimus auctor est, qui immortalitatem tradidit animarum.
Jerome author is who the-immortality handed-down of-souls
Utique situm esse et quedam alia uix congrue poterunt
surely placed to-be and some others scarcely fittingly will-be-able
spiritibus applicari; quoniam hec predicamenta pro parte
to-spirits to-be-applied since these categories in part
corporibus precipue addicta sunt. Prima itaque contemplatio,
to-bodies especially assigned are the-first and-so contemplation
et quodammodo naturaliter philosophantium, uersatur in
and in-a-way naturally of-philosophers is-occupied in
speculatione substantiarum; sequens autem, mathematica est,
the-speculation of-substances the-following however mathematical is
imitaturque naturam; unde mathematicus ab antiquis dictus
and-imitates nature whence the-mathematician by the-ancients called
est simia naturalium philosophorum. Sicut enim nature
was the-ape of-natural philosophers as for of-nature
scrutator inquirit de Cleonte aut Callia quid sit, aut
the-scrutinizer inquires about Cleon or Callias what he-be or

qualis, aut quantus; sic mathematicus, cum substantiam
of-what-kind or how-great so the-mathematician when the-substance
eius abstraxerit, inquirit de ea quid sit, aut qualis, aut
his he-will-have-abstracted inquires about it what it-be or of-what-kind or
quanta, et deinceps naturalium more philosophorum ad
how-great and thereafter of-natural in-the-manner philosophers to
ulteriora progreditur. Sed apud eos qui purioris philosophie
further-things proceeds but among those who of-purer philosophy
uigent acumine pridem receptum est secunde mathesi
flourish in-the-sharpness long-ago accepted it-is for-a-second mathesis
locum non esse, ne philosophicus labor procedat in infinitum
room not to-be lest philosophical labor proceed into infinity
et semper uagetur inquisitio, que semper tendit ad finem.
and always wander the-inquiry which always tends to an-end
Utique iam spoliatus omnino amplius nudari non
surely the-already despoiled altogether further to-be-stripped not
potest; et siue formam a materia abstraxeris, siue
can and whether form from matter you-will-have-abstracted or
materiam subduxeris forme, superfluus erit exinde
matter you-will-have-withdrawn from-form superfluous will-be thereafter
labor aut circumstantiis et proprietatibus, quas non admittit,
the-labor either with-circumstances and properties which not it-admits
uestire formam, aut quas illa non habet, spoliare materiam.
to-clothe form or those-which it not has to-despoil matter
Ergo quicquid ultra temptatur, non constitutio nature sed
therefore whatever beyond is-attempted not the-constitution of-nature but
figmentum animi est subtilitate matematica laborantis.
a-fiction of-the-mind is with-subtlety mathematical laboring
Cum enim queritur quid est albedo, et respondetur color
when for is-asked what is whiteness and is-answered color
talis, quicquid ei ad subsistentie discretionem adicitur,
such whatever to-it for of-subsistence the-distinction is-added

aut effectum redolet, et sic substantie obnoxium est, aut
either of-effect smells and so to-substance subject is or
potestatem sapit, cuius forte operatio nondum est. Quod
of-power tastes whose perhaps operation not-yet is but
si processerit inquisitio, ut queratur quanta aut ubi sit,
if will-have-proceeded the-inquiry so-that be-asked how-great or where it-be
ad corporalium diuerticula fugiendum est. Unde pauciores
to of-bodily-things the-byways to-be-fled it-is whence fewer
illos credo peragrasse philosophos, qui nature arbitro
those I-believe to-have-traversed philosophers who with-nature as-arbiter
mathematicum per omnia coequant; opinantes in aliis
the-mathematical through all-things make-equal thinking in other-things
inueniri hec genera predicamentorum que in corporibus et
to-be-found these kinds of-categories which in bodies and
spiritibus manifesta sunt. Omnia ergo genera speciesque
spirits manifest are all therefore genera and-species
substantiarum et qualitatum aliorumque primo ingerunt
of-substances and of-qualities and-of-the-others into-the-first they-heap
predicamento; quoniam appositione generis speciei prime
category since by-the-apposition of-genus of-species to-the-first
satisfit questioni, id est, declaratur de aliquo quid ipsum
is-satisfied question that is it-is-declared about something what it-itself
sit. Deinde pro genere questionum sequentia disponunt.
be then according-to the-kind of-questions the-following they-arrange
Hoc quidem ab Aristotile uidetur alienum; ait enim:
this indeed from Aristotle seems foreign he-says for
Manifestum quoniam quicquid est, significat quandoque
manifest that whatever is signifies sometimes
quidem substantiam, quandoque autem quale, quandoque
indeed substance sometimes however of-what-kind sometimes
aliquid aliorum predicamentorum. Nam quando, posito
something of-the-other categories for when posited

homine, dixerit ipsum hominem esse uel animal, et
man he-will-have-said it man to-be or animal both
quid est dicit et substantiam significat. Quando uero, posito
what it-is he-says and substance signifies when indeed posited
albo colore, quod positum est dixerit colorem esse,
white color what posited is he-will-have-said color to-be
quid est dicit, et quale significat. Sic posita cubitali
what it-is he-says and of-what-kind signifies so with-posited cubit-long
magnitudine, si dixerit eam esse magnitudinem, quid
magnitude if he-will-have-said it to-be magnitude what
est dicit, et quantum significat. Similiter autem et in aliis;
it-is he-says and how-great signifies likewise however also in others
unumquodque enim talium, siue idem de eodem dicatur
each for of-such-things whether the-same of the-same be-said
siue genus, de hoc quid est significat; quando autem de
or the-genus of this what it-is signifies when however of
alio, non quid est significat, sed quantum aut quale aut
another not what it-is signifies but how-great or of-what-kind or
aliquid aliorum predicamentorum. Equidem non hic uidetur
something of-the-other categories indeed not here seems
auctor exprimere quod in eodem predicamento, etsi
the-author to-express that in the-same category although
eundem modum habeant predicandi, sint omnia genera, aut
the-same mode they-have of-predicating be all genera or
quod nouem genera accidentalium rerum non predicentur de
that nine genera of-accidental things not be-predicated of
substantiis, aut quod eodem modo predicentur de subiectis
substances or that in-the-same way they-be-predicated of the-subjects
et de contentis suis. Isidorus, Alcuinus, et quidam
and of the-contents their-own Isidore Alcuin and certain
alii sapientum omnia alia de primis substantiis asserunt
others of-the-wise all others of the-first substances assert

predicari, et sententiam plenissimam decem predicamentorum
to-be-predicated and a-sentence fullest of-the-ten categories
absolutione perficiunt, ut in hoc eorum patet exemplo:
by-the-completion they-perfect as in this their is-plain example
Augustinus, magnus orator, filius illius, stans in templo,
Augustine a-great orator son of-that-one standing in the-temple
hodie infulatus, disputando fatigatur. Perfecta enim sententia
today wearing-the-fillet by-disputing is-wearied perfect for the-sentence
est et subiecti, id est illius de quo agitur, substantiam,
is and of-the-subject that is of-him about whom it-is-treated the-substance
qualitatem, et quantitatem, cum ceteris, indicat; etsi forte
quality and quantity with the-rest indicates although perhaps
minus proprium dederit quantitatis exemplum. Utique sicut
a-less proper he-has-given of-quantity example surely as
primam substantiam suis informatam accidentibus parens
the-first substance with-its-own informed accidents the-parent
omnium natura creauit; sic et singularia accidentia, quibus
of-all nature created so also the-singular accidents with-which
eadem informatur, substantiis singularibus concreauit. Ea
the-same is-informed with-substances singular she-co-created those
uero que intelliguntur a singularibus abstracta, qualia sunt
indeed which are-understood from singulars abstracted such-as are
secunde substantie, ut dictum est, quedam ex ratione
the-second substances as said it-has-been certain from reason
probabili animi figmenta sunt. Et quidem sicut in
probable of-the-mind fictions are and indeed as among
substantiis he prime dicuntur, que reuera substantie sunt
substances those first are-called which in-truth substances are
et singularitate essentie accidentibus subiacent; ille uero
and by-singularity of-essence to-accidents lie-subject those indeed
secunde, que ex conformitate singularium intellectu non
second which from the-conformity of-singulars by-understanding not

casso concipiuntur; sic et prime ratione proportionis possunt
empty are-conceived so also first by-reason of-proportion can
dici quantitates et qualitates, que primis singulariter
to-be-called quantities and qualities which in-the-first singularly
insunt; et secunde quantitates, et sic in aliis que
are-in and second quantities and so in other-things which
a singularibus quadam ratione similitudinis abstrahuntur.
from singulars by-a-certain reason of-likeness are-abstracted
Constat autem, ut ait Isidorus, appellatas esse categorias,
it-is-agreed however as says Isidore called to-have-been categories
eo quod non possunt nisi ex subiectis agnosci.
by-that that not they-can except from subjects to-be-recognized
Unde et predicamenta recte nominantur; eo quod rebus
whence also categories rightly they-are-named by-that that to-things
presentibus, quas constitutio nature ostendit, dicata, id est,
present which the-constitution of-nature shows dedicated that is
addicta sunt. Dicare siquidem addicere est, iuxta illud
assigned they-are to-dedicate since to-assign is according-to that-saying
Virgilii:
of-Virgil

Conubio iungam stabili propriamque dicabo.
in-wedlock I-shall-join stable and-as-her-own I-shall-assign

Sic autem addicta sunt aliis, ut agnosci nequeant sine
so however assigned they-are to-others that to-be-recognized they-cannot without
illis. Nam, ut premissum est, si phantasie rerum uoluantur
them for as set-before it-has-been if the-images of-things be-turned
in mente, inanis est conceptio, si exemplum eius inueniri non
in the-mind empty is the-conception if an-example of-it to-be-found not
potest in re subiecta. Siquidem uniuersitas singularium
can in the-thing subject since the-totality of-singulars

historia nature est, a qua eximitur quicquid in rebus
the-history of-nature is from which is-exempted whatever in things
actualiter nequaquam inuenitur. Et, quoniam agnoscuntur
actually by-no-means is-found and since they-are-recognized
ex subiectis, talia sunt, ut ait Boetius, predicata, qualia
from subjects such they-are as says Boethius the-predicates as
subiecta permiserint. Unde uirtus predicamentorum, que in
the-subjects will-have-permitted whence the-force of-the-categories which in
operibus nature uiget, circa diuinam excellentiam euanescit.
the-works of-nature flourishes about divine excellence vanishes
Illuc enim tracta uerba mutantur omnino, aut falsa sunt;
thither for drawn words are-changed altogether or false are
multiplicatur et labor cum errore eorum qui uim
is-multiplied also the-labor with the-error of-those who the-force
predicamentorum extendunt ad omnia et, fines naturalium
of-the-categories extend to all-things and the-bounds of-natural-things
excedentes, subuertunt integritatem artis, dum regulas non
exceeding overturn the-integrity of-the-art while the-rules not
patiuntur suis generibus limitari. Omnis enim regula
they-allow by-their-own kinds to-be-limited every for rule
et uniuersitas omnis alicui generi accommodata est, cuius
and universality every to-some kind fitted is whose
ambitum si lasciuiendo excesserit, ilico uitiatur. Profecto
circuit if by-wantoning it-will-have-exceeded at-once it-is-vitiated surely
rerum predicamentalium et sermonum perutilis est notitia
of-things categorical and of-speeches very-useful is the-knowledge
et euidens ab Aristotile disciplina. Uniuersa describit
and evident by Aristotle the-discipline all-things he-describes
et diuidit; docet que ueniant ad comparationem; que
and divides he-teaches which come to comparison which
susceptibilia contrariorum sint; que sint, quorum contraria;
susceptible of-contraries be which be of-which contraries

que totius contrarietatis ignara; exemplum relinquens posteris
which of-all contrariety ignorant an-example leaving to-posterity
quo ad ueri notitiam compendiosissime peruenitur. Et
by-which to of-the-true knowledge most-concisely one-arrives and
quia multiplicitas sermonum plerumque intelligentiam claudit,
since the-multiplicity of-speeches often understanding closes
quotiens dicatur unumquodque docet esse querendum. Eo
how-many-times be-said each he-teaches to-be to-be-sought to-that
enim pertinet, quod in oppositis, et his que prius aut simul
for pertains that in opposites and those which prior or at-once
dicuntur, et in speciebus motus et habendi modis librum
are-said and in the-species of-motion and of-having the-modes the-book
expleuit. Nichil enim utilius ad scientiam aut uictoriam
he-completed nothing for more-useful for knowledge or victory
distinctione eorum que multipliciter proferuntur. Contingit
than-the-distinction of-those which in-many-ways are-brought-forth it-happens
autem tractu temporis, et adquiescente utentium uoluntate,
however by-the-drawing of-time and with-assenting of-users the-will
multiplicitatem sermonum nasci itemque extingui. Nam
the-multiplicity of-speeches to-be-born and-likewise to-be-extinguished for
apud Aristotilem cultellus acutus anguli acuti esse
with Aristotle a-knife sharp of-an-angle sharp to-be
significabat, cum modo potius uideatur indicare facile
signified whereas now rather it-seems to-indicate of-the-easily
secantis acumen; sic enim dicitur gladius bis acutus, quoniam
cutting the-edge so for is-called a-sword twice sharp since
utrimque facile secans; quamuis et hoc perspicacius intuenti
on-both-sides easily cutting although also this more-keenly to-one-looking
ab acumine angulorum appareat euenire; corpus enim
from the-sharpness of-angles may-appear to-come-about a-body for
acutissimum est, ubi in angulo acutissimo coeunt superficies
sharpest is where in an-angle most-acute meet the-surfaces

eius; nam si obtusus superficierum coeuntium fuerit
its for if obtuse of-the-surfaces meeting will-have-been
angulus, et corpus obtusum. Esse in aliquo multiplicius
the-angle also the-body obtuse to-be in something more-manifoldly
dicitur quam Aristotilis tempore diceretur; et que tunc uerba
is-said than in-Aristotle's time it-was-said and which then the-words
aliquam, nunc forte nullam habent significationem; siquidem
some now perhaps none have signification since

multa renascentur que iam cecidere, cadentque
many will-be-reborn which already have-fallen and-will-fall
que nunc sunt in honore uocabula, si uolet usus,
which now are in honor words if will-wish use
quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.
in-whose power the-judgment is and the-right and the-norm of-speaking

Sed plane magis dedocent quam erudiunt qui in hoc libello
but plainly more they-unteach than teach who in this little-book
legunt uniuersa et eum breuitate sua contentum esse
read all-things and it with-brevity its-own content to-be
non sinunt. Quicquid alicubi dici potest, hic congerunt
not allow whatever anywhere to-be-said can here they-heap-up
quibus grauior esse uidetur confessio quam ignorantia ueri.
to-whom heavier to-be seems confession than ignorance of-the-true
Deridebat eos noster ille Anglus Peripateticus Adam, cuius
laughed-at them our that English Peripatetic Adam whose
uestigia sequuntur multi, sed pauci prepediente inuidia
footsteps follow many but few hindering envy
profitentur; dicebatque se aut nullum aut auditores
profess and-he-said himself either none or hearers
paucissimos habiturum, si ea simplicitate sermonum et
very-few about-to-have if with-that simplicity of-speeches and

facilitate sententiarum dialecticam traderet, qua ipsam
ease of-sentences dialectic he-were-to-hand-down with-which it
doceri expediret. Habui enim hominem familiarem assiduitate
to-be-taught were-expedient I-had for the-man familiar by-the-assiduity
colloquii et communicatione librorum et cotidiano fere
of-conversation and the-sharing of-books and daily almost
exercitio super emergentibus articulis conferendi; sed nec
exercise on emerging points of-conferring but not-even
una die discipulus eius fui. Et tamen habeo gratias, quod
one day pupil his was-I and yet I-have thanks that
eo docente plura cognoui, plura ipsius, quoniam aliud
he teaching more-things I-learned more of-his since another-thing
ratione consulta preelegeram, ipso arbitro reprobaui. Itaque
by-reason consulted I-had-preferred he-himself as-judge I-rejected and-so
hic, sicut ubique, facilitati arbitror seruiendum. Neque hec
here as everywhere ease I-judge to-be-served nor these
omnia eo prelibaui proposito, ut ubique dicantur; sed
all-things with-that have-I-sampled purpose that everywhere they-be-said but
ne sileantur ubique que alicubi dici expedit, librum
lest be-kept-silent everywhere things-which somewhere to-be-said is-expedient the-book
commendaui; nec penitet, quoniam reuera commendabilis est.
I-have-commended nor do-I-repent since truly commendable it-is
Ceterum, si plus iusto caritati indulgeatur, que ad prima
however if more than-just to-charity be-indulged which to the-first
artis elementa studiosius rudes et detrectantes inuitat, sic
of-the-art elements more-zealously the-rude and the-reluctant invites so

pueris olim dant crustula blandi
to-boys sometimes give cakes coaxing
doctores, elementa uelint ut discere prima
teachers the-elements they-may-wish that to-learn the-first

et quia ei a plerisque amplius derogatur, eo uehementius
and since from-it by most more is-detracted by-that more-vehemently
commendatur; ut enim ait Aristotiles, omnino insistenti
it-is-commended as for says Aristotle altogether to-one-insisting
omnino est aduersandum.
altogether it-is to-be-opposed

Que sit conceptio et utilitas Periermeniarum, uel rectius Periermenias

IV · THE SCHEME AND USE OF THE PERIERMENIAS

The Periermenias is syllabic, joining elements into true and false statements. Modern Introductions teach it more plainly, yet the authors' words deserve reverence: Abelard said a modern book might equal the ancients but hardly win their authority, and Bernard that we are dwarfs on giants' shoulders. Usage changes words, so contingent now means only what sometimes happens; use rules words, not the truth of things, so the sense must be kept.

Liber Periermeniarum, uel potius Periermenias, ratione
the-book of-the-Periermeniae or rather Periermenias by-reason
proportionis sillabicus est, sicut Predicamentorum elementarius;
of-proportion syllabic is as of-the-Categories elementary
nam elementa rationum, que singulatim tradit in sermonibus
for the-elements of-reasons which singly it-hands-on in speeches
incomplexis, iste colligit, et in modum sillabe comprehensa
uncombined this-one gathers and in the-manner of-a-syllable comprehended
producit ad ueri falsique significationem. Tante quidem
brings-forth to of-the-true and-of-the-false the-signification of-such indeed
subtilitatis est habitus ab antiquis, ut in preconium
subtlety is held by the-ancients that in praise
eius celebratum ferat Isidorus, quia Aristotiles, quando
its celebrated may-report Isidore that Aristotle when

Periermenias scriptitabat, calamum in mente tinguebat.
the-Periermenias he-was-writing the-pen in his-mind dipped
Ceterum (ut pace omnium loquar) quicquid in isto
however that by-the-leave of-all I-may-speak whatever in this
docetur libro, compendiosius et manifestius poterit quilibet
is-taught book more-concisely and more-manifestly will-be-able any
doctorum, (quod et multi faciunt) excepta reuerentia uerborum
of-the-doctors which also many do excepted the-reverence of-the-words
in doctrinalibus parare rudimentis, quas Introductiones
in doctrinal to-prepare rudiments which Introductions
uocant. Vix est enim aliquis qui hec ipsa non doceat,
they-call scarcely is-there for anyone who these very-things not teach
adiectis aliis non minus necessariis. Hoc utique, quia sine
with-added others not less necessary this surely because without
his artis scientia comparari non potest. Percurrunt itaque
these of-the-art the-knowledge to-be-acquired not can they-run-through and-so
quid nomen, quid uerbum, quid oratio, que species eius,
what a-noun what a-verb what a-speech what species its
que uires enuntiationum, quid ex quantitate sortiantur aut
what the-powers of-enunciations what from quantity they-obtain or
qualitate, que determinate uere sunt aut false, que quibus
quality which determinately true are or false which to-which
equipolleant, que consentiant sibi, que dissentiant, que
be-equivalent which agree with-each-other which disagree which
predicata diuisim, coniunctim predicentur aut conuersim, et
predicated separately conjointly are-predicated or conversely and
que non; item que sit natura modalium et que singularium
which not likewise what be the-nature of-modals and what of-singulars
contradictio. In his autem articulis operis huius precipue
the-contradiction in these however points of-the-work this especially
summa consistit, habetque, sicut sententiarum subtilitatem,
the-sum consists and-it-has as of-sentences subtlety

ita non mediocrem difficultatem uerborum. Utrisque uero
so not moderate difficulty of-words to-both indeed
habenda est gratia, quoniam et sensus erudit et uerba
to-be-had is thanks since both the-sense teaches and the-words
exercent. Preterea reuerentia exhibenda est uerbis auctorum,
exercise besides reverence to-be-shown is to-the-words of-the-authors
cum cultu et assiduitate utendi; tum quia quandam
with cultivation and assiduity of-using both because a-certain
a magnis nominibus antiquitatis preferunt maiestatem,
from great names of-antiquity they-bear majesty
tum quia dispendiosius ignorantur, cum ad urgendum
and because more-costly they-are-not-known since for urging
aut resistendum potentissima sint. Siquidem ignaros in
or resisting most-powerful they-be since the-ignorant in
modum turbinis rapiunt, et metu perculsos exagitant
the-manner of-a-whirlwind they-snatch and with-fear struck they-harass
aut prosternunt; inaudita enim philosophorum uerba tonitrua
or lay-low unheard-of for of-philosophers words thunders
sunt. Licet itaque modernorum et ueterum sit sensus
are although and-so of-the-moderns and of-the-ancients be the-sense
idem, uenerabilior est uetustas. Dixisse recolo Peripateticum
the-same more-venerable is antiquity to-have-said I-recall the-Peripatetic
Palatinum quod uerum arbitror, quia facile esset aliquem
of-Le-Pallet what true I-judge that easy it-would-be for-someone
nostri temporis librum de hac arte componere, qui nullo
of-our time a-book about this art to-compose which to-none
antiquorum quod ad conceptionem ueri uel elegantiam
of-the-ancients as to the-conception of-the-true or the-elegance
uerbi, esset inferior; sed ut auctoritatis fauorem sortiretur
of-word would-be inferior but that of-authority the-favor it-should-obtain
aut impossibile aut difficillimum. Hoc ipsum tamen asserebat
either impossible or most-difficult this very-thing however he-asserted

maioribus ascribendum, quorum floruerunt ingenia, et
to-the-ancestors to-be-ascribed whose flourished wits and
inuentione mirabili pollentes: laboris sui fructum posteris
with-invention wondrous being-powerful of-labor their-own the-fruit to-posterity
reliquerunt. Itaque ea, in quibus multi sua tempora
they-left and-so those-things in which many their times
consumpserunt, in inuentione sudantes plurimum, nunc facile
consumed in invention sweating very-much now easily
et breui unus assequitur; fruitur tamen etas nostra beneficio
and briefly one attains enjoys however age our the-benefit
precedentis, et sepe plura nouit, non suo quidem
of-the-preceding and often more-things knows not by-its-own indeed
precedens ingenio, sed innitens uiribus alienis et opulenta
going-before wit but leaning on-strength another's and opulent
patrum. Dicebat Bernardus Carnotensis nos esse quasi nanos
of-the-fathers said Bernard of-Chartres us to-be as-if dwarfs
gigantium humeris insidentes, ut possimus plura eis
of-giants on-the-shoulders sitting that we-may-be-able more-things than-they
et remotiora uidere, non utique proprii uisus acumine
and more-remote to-see not surely of-our-own sight by-sharpness
aut eminentia corporis, sed quia in altum subuehimur et
or by-height of-body but because on high we-are-carried and
extollimur magnitudine gigantea. Ex his facile adquieuerim,
are-raised by-the-magnitude gigantic from these easily I-would-assent
quia artis preparatitia et multos articulos ueritatis
that of-the-art the-preparatory-things and many points of-truth
tradunt artium preceptores, etiam in Introductionibus suis,
hand-down of-the-arts the-teachers even in Introductions their-own
eque bene antiquis et forte commodius. Quis enim
equally well as-the-ancients and perhaps more-conveniently who for
contentus est his que uel Aristotiles in Periermeniis
content is with-those which even Aristotle in the-Periermeniae

docet? Quis aliunde conquisita non adicit? Omnes enim
teaches who from-elsewhere things-sought not adds all for
totius artis summam colligunt, et uerbis facilibus tradunt.
of-the-whole art the-sum gather and in-words easy hand-down
Vestiunt enim sensus auctorum quasi cultu cotidiano,
they-clothe for the-meanings of-the-authors as-if with-dress everyday
qui quodammodo festiuior est, cum antiquitatis grauitate
which in-a-way more-festive is when of-antiquity with-the-gravity
clarius insignitur. Sunt ergo memoriter tenenda uerba
more-clearly it-is-marked are therefore by-heart to-be-held the-words
auctorum, sed ea maxime que plenas sententias explent,
of-the-authors but those most which full sentences fill
et que commode possunt ad multa transferri; nam et
and which conveniently can to many-things to-be-transferred for also
hec integritatem scientie seruant, et preter hoc a seipsis
these the-integrity of-knowledge preserve and besides this from themselves
tam latentis quam patentis energie habent plurimum. Sunt
as-much of-hidden as of-open energy have very-much are
autem pleraque que, si a suis auellas sedibus, aut
however very-many which if from their-own you-tear seats either
nichil aut minimum sapiunt auditori; qualia fere sunt omnia
nothing or very-little savor to-the-hearer such-as almost are all
Analeticorum exempla, ubi littere ponuntur pro terminis;
of-the-Analytics the-examples where letters are-placed for terms
que, sicut ad doctrinam proficiunt, sic tracta alias inutilia
which as for teaching profit so drawn elsewhere useless
sunt. Regule quoque ipse, sicut plurimum uigoris habent
are the-rules also themselves as very-much of-vigor have
a ueritate doctrine, sic in commercio uerbi minimum
from the-truth of-teaching so in the-commerce of-word very-little
possunt. Nam quod dicitur in toto esse alterum alteri
they-can for what is-said in the-whole to-be one in-another

uel in toto non esse, et uniuersaliter aliquid de aliquo
or in the-whole not to-be and universally something of something
predicari uel ab aliquo remoueri, idem est; frequens
to-be-predicated or from something to-be-removed the-same is frequent
tamen usus est alterius uerbi, et alterius fere intercidit,
however the-use is of-the-one word and of-the-other almost dies-out
nisi quatenus ex condicto interdum admittitur. Fuit fortasse
except as-far-as from agreement sometimes it-is-admitted was perhaps
tempore Aristotilis utriusque usus celebrior, sed nunc pre
in-the-time of-Aristotle of-each the-use more-celebrated but now before
altero uiget alterum, quoniam ita uult usus. Sic et in eo
the-other flourishes the-one since so wills use so also in that
quod dicitur contingens, aliquatenus derogatum est ei
which is-called contingent to-some-extent derogated it-has-been from-that
quod apud Aristotilem optinebat. Iam enim nequaquam
which with Aristotle held already for by-no-means
contingens possibili comparatur; hoc tamen in Tractatu
contingent to-possible is-compared this however in the-Treatise
modalium sensisse uisus est. Licet enim possibile est
of-modals to-have-held seemed he-has although for possible is
albere gentem Ethiopum, speciemque cignorum nigrescere,
to-be-white the-race of-Ethiopians and-the-species of-swans to-blacken
neutrum tamen contingens est. Quod si hec quis, quoniam
neither yet contingent is but if these anyone since
possibilia sunt, contingere opinatur, hoc in publico predicet,
possible they-are to-happen thinks this in public let-him-preach
Aristotilis auctoritate deducta, et plane, renitente publice
of-Aristotle with-the-authority adduced and plainly resisting of-public
suasionis usu, aut insanis uidebitur assidere aut certe
persuasion the-use either with-the-insane he-will-seem to-sit or certainly
parum sobrius esse. Sed ut ad alium migremus sensum,
too-little sober to-be but that to another we-may-move sense

quo contingens non coequatur quidem, sed circumscribitur
in-which contingent not is-equated indeed but is-circumscribed
a possibili, quoniam minus est, et hic illi usui derogatum
by possible since less it-is also here from-that use derogated
esse uidebimus. Nam, ut ait in Analeticis: Contingere
to-have-been we-shall-see for as he-says in the-Analytics to-happen
et contingens est quo non existente necessario, posito
and contingent is that-which not existing necessary posited
autem esse, nichil erit propter hoc impossibile. Hec
however to-be nothing will-be on-account-of this impossible this
autem significatio contingenti deducit quidem necessarium,
however signification from-the-contingent draws-off indeed the-necessary
sed alias possibili coequatur. Sed neque ista iam optinet.
but otherwise to-the-possible is-equated but neither this now holds
Siquidem Hobinellum regnare non est necessarium, neque
since Hobinel to-reign not is necessary nor
eo posito quicquam erit propter hoc impossibile; si uero
that posited anything will-be on-account-of this impossible if indeed
contingens esse regnare Hobinellum dicas Wintonie, non
contingent to-be to-reign Hobinel you-say at-Winchester not
tibi quis facile adquiescet. Et ut planius liqueat in
to-you anyone easily will-assent and that more-plainly it-be-clear in
quantum sit ille usus abolitus, in nulla significationum, quas
how-much be that use abolished in none of-the-significations which
ei ascribit, memoratum iam plene optinet uerbum. Ait
to-it he-ascribes the-mentioned already fully holds word he-says
enim: Dicimus quoniam contingere duobus modis dicitur,
for we-say that to-happen in-two ways is-said
uno quidem, quod plerumque fit et deficit necessarium,
in-one indeed what mostly happens and falls-short-of necessary
ut canescere hominem uel augeri uel minui uel
as to-grow-gray for-a-man or to-be-increased or to-be-diminished or

omnino quod natum est esse; hoc enim non continuum
altogether what born is to-be this for not continuous
habet necessarium, eo quod non semper est homo, nam
has necessary by-that that not always is man for
cum homo est, aut ex necessitate aut ut in pluribus est.
when man is either from necessity or as in most-cases it-is
Alio autem infinitum, quod et sic et non sic possibile;
in-another however the-indefinite which both so and not so possible
ut animal ambulare uel ambulante fieri motum terre
as animal to-walk or with-it-walking to-happen a-motion of-the-earth
uel omnino quod a casu fit. Nichil enim sic magis natum
or altogether what by chance happens nothing for so more born
est uel e contrario. Nunc autem ut sequamur usum,
is or on-the contrary now however that we-may-follow use

quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi,
in-whose power the-judgment is and the-right and the-norm of-speaking

illud solum iam dicitur esse contingens quod interdum
that alone now is-said to-be contingent which sometimes
euenit, alioquin neque propter amotam necessitatem neque
happens otherwise neither on-account-of removed necessity nor
propter assistentem possibilitatem, dicetur contingere.
on-account-of assisting possibility it-will-be-said to-happen
Patet itaque quod usus Aristotile potentior est in
it-is-plain and-so that use than-Aristotle more-powerful is in
derogando uerbis uel abroganda uerba; sed ueritatem rerum,
derogating from-words or in-abrogating words but the-truth of-things
quoniam eam homo non statuit, nec uoluntas humana
since it man not established neither will human
conuellit. Itaque, si fieri potest, artium uerba teneantur
tears-up and-so if to-be-done it-can of-the-arts the-words be-held

et sensus. Sin autem minus, dum sensus maneat, excidant
and the-sense if however not while the-sense remain let-fall-away
uerba; quoniam artes scire non est scriptorum uerba
the-words since the-arts to-know not is of-writers the-words
reuoluere, sed nosse uim earum atque sententias.
to-turn-over but to-know the-force of-them and the-meanings

In quibus consistat corpus artis; et de Topicorum utilitate

V · THE BODY OF THE ART, AND THE USE OF THE TOPICS

As readying equipment precedes the art of war, so the preparatory books precede the body of the art: the Topics, the Analytics, and the Refutations. The Topics, long neglected and now revived, serve invention most but also judgment, and aid nearly every discipline. Its first book lays the foundations: what a syllogism is, the four kinds of problem drawn from the categories, induction, and the many senses of words, where Augustine's diction, sayable, and thing belong.

Artis preparatitia precesserunt, ad quam suus opifex et
of-the-art the-preparatory-things have-gone-before to which its craftsman and
quasi legislator rudem omnino tironem irreuerenter et, ut
as-if lawgiver the-raw altogether recruit irreverently and as
dici solet, illotis manibus non censuit admittendum.
to-be-said it-is-wont with-unwashed hands not judged to-be-admitted
Sicut enim in arte militari instrumentorum, quibus res
as for in the-art military of-the-instruments with-which the-thing
militaris instruitur, preparatio precedit artem, sic huius
military is-equipped the-preparation precedes the-art so of-this
sacri adeuntibus cultum quedam elementa premittuntur
sacred to-those-approaching worship certain elements are-sent-ahead
et quasi instrumenta tironum, quorum usu compendiosius
and as-if instruments of-recruits whose by-use more-concisely

ad ipsum corpus artis accedant et commodius
to the-very body of-the-art they-may-approach and more-conveniently
quod profitentur exerceant. Utilissima quidem sunt et,
what they-profess may-exercise most-useful indeed they-are and
si non satis proprie dicantur esse de arte, satis uere
if not enough properly they-be-said to-be of the-art enough truly
dicuntur esse ad artem; parum autem refert si magis
they-are-said to-be for the-art little however it-matters if rather
dicatur an sic. Ipsum itaque quodammodo corpus artis,
it-be-said or so the-very and-so in-a-way body of-the-art
deductis preparatitiis, principaliter consistit in tribus;
drawn-off the-preparatory-things principally consists in three
scilicet Topicorum, Analeticorum, Elencorumque notitia;
namely of-the-Topics of-the-Analytics and-of-the-Refutations the-knowledge
his enim perfecte cognitis, et habitu eorum per usum
these for perfectly known and the-habit of-them through use
et exercitium roboratis, inuentionis et iudicii copia
and exercise strengthened of-invention and of-judgment abundance
suffragabitur in omni facultate tam demonstratori quam
will-support in every faculty as-much the-demonstrator as
dialectico et sophiste. Porro in his maxime necessaria est,
the-dialectician and the-sophist further in these most necessary is
precipue probabilitatem sectantibus, scientia Topicorum,
especially probability for-those-pursuing the-knowledge of-the-Topics
que, etsi inuentionem principaliter instruat, iudiciis
which although invention principally it-equip the-judgments
tamen non mediocriter suffragatur. Et quamuis ex opinione
yet not moderately it-supports and although from the-opinion
multorum dialectico et oratori principaliter faciat, ipsam
of-many for-the-dialectician and the-orator principally it-make it
fere equaliter proficere arbitror his qui uersantur in grauitate
almost equally to-profit I-judge those who are-occupied in the-gravity

demonstratoris aut in fallacia et agone sophistico. Siquidem
of-the-demonstrator or in the-fallacy and contest sophistical since
sibi inuicem uniuersa contribuunt, eoque in proposita
to-each-other in-turn all-things contribute and-by-that in the-proposed
facultate quisque expeditior est, quo in uicina et
faculty each more-expeditious is by-which in the-neighboring and
coherente instructior fuerit. Ergo et tam Analetice
coherent better-equipped he-will-have-been therefore both as-much the-Analytic
quam Sophistica conferunt inuentori, et Topice itidem
as the-Sophistic contribute to-the-finder and the-Topic likewise
conducit iudicanti; facile tamen adquieuerim singulas in suo
conduces to-the-judger easily however I-would-assent each in its-own
proposito dominari et accessorium esse beneficium coherentis.
purpose to-rule and accessory to-be the-benefit of-the-coherent
Cum itaque tam euidens sit utilitas Topicorum, miror quare
since and-so so evident be the-utility of-the-Topics I-wonder why
cum aliis a maioribus tam diu intermissus sit Aristotilis
with others by the-ancestors so long interrupted has-been of-Aristotle
liber, ut omnino aut fere in desuetudinem abierit, quando
the-book that altogether or almost into disuse it-went when
etate nostra, diligentis ingenii pulsante studio, quasi a
in-age our of-diligent wit knocking with-the-study as-if from
morte uel a somno excitatus est, ut reuocaret errantes
death or from sleep roused it-was that it-might-call-back the-erring
et uiam ueritatis querentibus aperiret. Neque enim sermonum
and the-way of-truth to-those-seeking might-open nor for of-words
aut rerum tanta est difficultas ut a studiosis non possit
or of-things so-great is the-difficulty that by the-studious not it-can
intelligi, et utilitas tanta est ut pre ceteris expediat
to-be-understood and the-utility so-great is that before others it-be-expedient
hunc agnosci. Satis enim inter cetera, que translationis
this to-be-recognized enough for among the-others which by-translation's

artissima lege a Grecis tracta sunt, planus est; ita tamen
most-strict law from the-Greeks drawn are plain it-is so however
ut facile sit auctoris sui stilum agnoscere, et ab his
that easy it-be of-the-author its the-style to-recognize and by those
dumtaxat fideliter intelligatur, qui sequuntur indifferentie
only faithfully it-be-understood who follow of-indifference
rationem, sine qua nemo unquam nec apud nos nec apud
the-principle without which no-one ever neither among us nor among
Grecos (sicut Grecus interpres natione Seueritanus dicere
the-Greeks as a-Greek interpreter by-nation of-Santa-Severina to-say
consueuerat), Aristotilem intellexit. Sane ipso librorum
was-accustomed Aristotle has-understood surely by-the-very of-the-books
numero, quasi quodam perfectionis auspicio, utilitatem operis
number as-if by-a-certain of-perfection auspice the-utility of-the-work
commendauit, et omnium que in multis uoluminibus dilatauit
he-commended and of-all-things which in many volumes spread-out
antiquitas quasi sementem dedit. Singula uerba eius tam in
antiquity as-if the-seed he-gave single words his as-much in
regulis quam in exemplis non modo ad dialecticam, sed fere
rules as in examples not only for dialectic but almost
ad omnes proficiunt disciplinas. Octo quidem uoluminibus
for all profit disciplines in-eight indeed volumes
clauditur, fiuntque semper nouissima eius potiora prioribus.
it-is-enclosed and-become always the-latest its better than-the-earlier
Primus autem quasi materiam preiacit omnium reliquorum
the-first however as-if the-matter lays-before of-all the-rest
et totius logice quedam constituit fundamenta; docet
and of-the-whole logic certain lays foundations it-teaches
enim quid sillogismus, quid et ex quibus demonstratio,
for what a-syllogism what and from what-things demonstration
que principia artium et fidei que ab artibus est, quis
what the-principles of-the-arts and of-faith which from the-arts is what

sillogismus dialecticus, quis litigiosus, quid probabile, quod
syllogism dialectical what litigious what probable what
paralogista falsigrafusue non sequitur; item quid propositio,
the-paralogist or-false-drawer not follows likewise what a-proposition
quid problema. Et, quoniam ad problematum discussionem
what a-problem and since to of-problems the-discussion
probationemque positionum progrediendum est, ex quibus
and-the-proof of-positions to-be-proceeded it-is from what-things
sint problemata, id est que propositiones ex arte deducantur
be problems that is which propositions from art are-drawn
in questionem, adicit, habita distinctione predicamentorum,
into question he-adds had the-distinction of-the-categories
ex quorum natura manat ratio questionum. Neque
from whose nature flows the-account of-questions not
enim ad omnia que queri possunt, quoniam nec omnia
for to all-things which to-be-asked can since neither all-things
querere prudentis est, suas formas applicat; sed ad ea que
to-ask of-the-prudent is his forms he-applies but to those which
digna quesitu sunt et cognita aliquid conferunt. Quolibet
worthy to-be-asked are and known something contribute with-anyone
namque proferente contraria opinionibus aut contemptibilia
for bringing-forth contrary-things to-opinions or contemptible-things
quelibet, contemptibiliterque inquirente, sollicitari non
any-things and-contemptibly inquiring to-be-disturbed not
expedit. Quia ergo ratio predicamentorum aut maiora
is-expedient since therefore the-account of-the-categories either greater
aut equalia predicat de subiectis, problematum dialecticorum
or equal-things predicates of the-subjects of-problems dialectical
quadripartitam docet esse naturam. Vult enim (etsi de
fourfold he-teaches to-be the-nature he-wills for although about
hoc possit, ut de ceteris articulis, disputari) ubi de
this it-can as about the-other points to-be-disputed where about

maiori et substantiali queritur, inquisitionem generis esse; si
the-greater and substantial is-asked the-inquiry of-genus to-be if
de pari et substantiali ambigitur, de diffinitione fieri
about the-equal and substantial there-is-doubt about definition to-be-made
questionem. Quod si de maiori et accidentali dubitatur,
the-question but if about the-greater and accidental there-is-doubt
de accidente; si de pari et accidentali, de proprio
about accident if about the-equal and accidental about property
constat inquiri. Verum quia de aliquo querenti quid
it-is-agreed to-be-inquired but since of something to-one-asking what
aut quantum aut quale sit, minus subiecto non dicitur
or how-great or of-what-kind it-be the-lesser than-the-subject not is-said
recte, nec minus predicari, nec de minori questio esse
rightly neither the-lesser to-be-predicated nor about the-lesser a-question to-be
monstratur. Proinde quid genus aut diffinitio, quid accidens
is-shown accordingly what genus or definition what accident
sit aut proprium, docet longe commodius his, qui in
be or property he-teaches far more-conveniently than-those who in
Porphirio aut Categoriis explanandis singuli volumina multa
Porphyry or the-Categories to-be-explained each volumes many
et magna conscribunt. In consilium illorum non ueniat
and great write-up into the-counsel of-them not let-come
anima mea, nec aliquis amicorum meorum preceptoribus his
soul my nor any of-friends my teachers these
utatur. Ad hec, quid inductio, et ubi ea uti expediat,
use to these what induction and where it to-use be-expedient
et quotiens dicatur oppositum dicit, et qualiter oporteat
and how-many-times be-said opposite he-says and how it-behooves
diuidi ea quorum multiplex est significatio. Siquidem ad
to-be-divided those whose manifold is the-signification since for
multa prodest uel illud nosse, quod equiuocatio neque
many-things it-profits even that to-know that equivocation neither

comparationem neque numerum pluralem admittit, ut
comparison nor number plural admits so-that
coniunctim colligat quod diuisim positum est. Nam uox et
conjointly it-gather what separately posited is for the-voice and
angulus aut cultellus nequaquam dicuntur acuta, uel alterum
the-angle or the-knife by-no-means are-called sharp or the-one
acutius altero, quamuis singulum dicatur acutum. Ad hoc
sharper than-the-other although each be-called sharp for this
quoque prodest hec speculatio multipliciter dictorum, ut ex
also profits this speculation in-many-ways of-things-said that from
contrariis uis contrariorum sepissime perpendatur; si enim
contraries the-force of-contraries very-often be-weighed if for
unum eorum aut equiuoce aut uniuoce dicitur ad multa,
one of-them either equivocally or univocally is-said to many-things
simili modo et reliquum ut quidem in omnibus aut in
in-similar way also the-remaining-one as indeed in all or in
pluribus. Nam quoniam acuto in uoce graue contrarium est,
most for since to-sharp in the-voice grave contrary is
in magnitudine autem leui, palam quoniam leue aut graue
in magnitude however light plain that light or grave
equiuoce dicetur ad plura. Volenti autem scire quid
equivocally will-be-said to more-things to-one-wishing however to-know what
agatur, necesse est uim sermonis excutere, qua ignota,
be-treated necessary it-is the-force of-speech to-shake-out which being-unknown
fidus uerborum intellectus constare non potest. Eo spectat
a-faithful of-the-words understanding to-stand not can to-that looks
illud Augustini, tractum quidem ab Aristotile, quoniam
that-saying of-Augustine drawn indeed from Aristotle since
de fonte isto hauserunt omnes, quia in omni enuntiatione
from fount that drew all that in every enunciation
spectanda sunt tria, dictio, dicibile, et res. Est autem
to-be-regarded are three-things the-diction the-sayable and the-thing is however

res de quo aliquid, dicibile quod de aliquo, dictio
the-thing about which something the-sayable what about something the-diction
quo dicitur hoc de illo. Interdum tamen dictionem
by-which is-said this about that sometimes however the-diction
rem esse contingit, cum idem sermo ad agendum de
a-thing to-be happens when the-same speech for treating about
se assumitur, ut in his que preceptores nostri materialiter
itself is-taken-up as in those which teachers our materially
dicebant imposita et dicibilia; quale est: 'Homo est nomen',
called imposed and sayables such-as is man is a-noun
'Currit est uerbum'. Porro res ut in pluribus et dicibilia
runs is a-verb further the-thing as in most-cases and the-sayables
pertinent ad naturam, dictio uero ex hominum pendet
pertain to nature the-diction indeed from of-men hangs
arbitrio. Itaque ad ueri examinationem necesse est rem
the-will and-so for of-the-true the-examination necessary it-is the-thing
non omnino notitie esse subtractam, rei subiecte,
not altogether from-knowledge to-be withdrawn to-the-thing subject
id est de qua agitur, dicibile conuenire, et dictionem,
that is about which it-is-treated the-sayable to-fit and the-diction
ut omnis increpandi tollatur occasio, utrique esse cognatam.
that every of-rebuking be-removed occasion to-both to-be akin

De utilitate et conceptione trium librorum in Topicis

VI · THE USE AND SCHEME OF THE FIRST THREE BOOKS OF THE TOPICS

As the Categories is elementary and the Periermenias syllabic, so the Topics is verbal: its first book shows from what places problems come, the rest how they are proved. The moderns add sound rules, though Abelard was too strict in admitting only necessary consequences. The second book treats accident, and the third, since only accident admits comparison, what to choose and avoid, useful to physics and ethics and wrongly neglected.

Sicut autem elementarius est Predicamentorum, Periermeniarum
as however elementary is of-the-Categories of-the-Periermeniae
uero sillabicus, ita et Topicorum liber quodammodo dictionalis
indeed syllabic so also of-the-Topics the-book in-a-way verbal
est. Licet enim in Periermeniis agatur de simplici
is although for in the-Periermeniae it-be-treated about simple
enuntiatione, que utique ueri falsiue dictio est, nondum
enunciation which surely of-true or-false a-diction is not-yet
tamen ad uim colligendi pertingit, nec illud assequitur,
however to the-force of-gathering does-it-reach nor that does-it-attain
in quo dialectices precipua opera uersatur. Hic uero primus
in which of-dialectic the-chief work is-occupied this indeed first
est in rationibus explicandis, doctrinamque facit localium
is in reasons to-be-unfolded and-the-teaching makes of-local
argumentationum, et sequentium complexionum pandit
argumentations and of-the-following combinations opens
initia. Et sicut, iuxta ethicum, discipulus prioris est
the-beginnings and as according-to the-moralist the-pupil of-the-earlier is
posterior dies, ita primus sequentium librorum instructorius
the-later day so the-first of-the-following books instructive
est. Ex quibus itaque locis sint problemata primus aperit;
is from what and-so places be problems the-first opens

sequentes, unde, et quomodo probentur exponunt, et que
the-following whence and how they-be-proved expound and which
propositio magis aut minus argumentabilis sit, et quare.
proposition more or less arguable be and why
Non tamen huic operi tantum tribuo, ut inanem reputem
not however to-this work so-much I-attribute that empty I-reckon
operam modernorum, qui equidem nascentes et conualescentes
the-work of-the-moderns who indeed being-born and growing-strong
ab Aristotile, inuentis eius multas adiciunt rationes et
from Aristotle to-the-findings his many add reasons and
regulas prioribus eque firmas. Ceterum hoc Aristotili debetur,
rules to-the-earlier equally firm however this to-Aristotle is-owed
quoniam qui a parte totum probari docuit, et a duplici
since who from the-part the-whole to-be-proved taught and from a-double
parte uel triplici aut amplius inferri posse monstrauit.
part or triple or more to-be-inferred to-be-able showed
Eodem modo et in aliis. Ergo non modo Temistio,
in-the-same way also in other-things therefore not only to-Themistius
Ciceroni, Apuleio, et Boetio, adiectorum habemus gratiam,
to-Cicero to-Apuleius and to-Boethius of-the-additions we-have thanks
sed Peripatetico Palatino, et aliis preceptoribus nostris, qui
but to-the-Peripatetic of-Le-Pallet and to-other teachers our who
nobis proficere studuerunt uel in explanatione ueterum uel
for-us to-profit strove either in the-explanation of-the-old or
in inuentione nouorum. Miror tamen quare Peripateticus
in the-finding of-new-things I-wonder however why the-Peripatetic
Palatinus in ipoteticarum iudicio tam artam prescripserit
of-Le-Pallet in of-hypotheticals the-judgment so strict prescribed
legem ut eas solas censuerit admittendas, quarum consequens
law that them alone he-judged to-be-admitted whose consequent
in antecedenti clauditur aut destructo consequenti perimitur
in the-antecedent is-enclosed or with-destroyed consequent is-destroyed

antecedens. Siquidem argumenta recipiebat facile, sed ipoteticas
the-antecedent since arguments he-accepted easily but hypotheticals
respuebat, nisi manifesta necessitate urgente. Forte ideo,
he-rejected unless manifest necessity pressing perhaps for-this-reason
quod omnes, ut ait Boetius, uolunt necessariam tenere
that all as says Boethius wish necessary to-hold
consequentiam. Volunt utique quoniam hoc profitentur, adiecta
consequence they-wish surely since this they-profess with-added
conditione; sed nichilominus quedam ob euidentem
condition but nonetheless some on-account-of evident
probabilitatem, que necessitati plerumque assidet, admittuntur.
probability which beside-necessity often sits are-admitted
Sicut enim argumenta dialecticis sufficiunt probabilia, sic et
as for arguments to-dialecticians suffice probable so also
probabiles consequentie; sed utrisque uis urgens deest,
probable consequences but to-both the-force urgent is-lacking
si necessitas desit; ut si instantiam dederis, docens
if necessity be-lacking as if an-objection you-will-have-given teaching
in quo non sic. Aristotiles autem fere ubique consequentias
in which not so Aristotle however almost everywhere consequences
ponit, siue astruere siue destruere doceat quod positum est.
sets whether to-build or to-destroy he-teach what posited is
Et quia ad unum multa sequuntur, habenda est ratio
and since on one many-things follow to-be-had is the-account
unde plura astruendo uel destruendo proveniant. Ut enim
whence more-things by-building or by-destroying may-come as for
ait Aristotiles: Omnis qui dixit quidlibet, quodammodo
says Aristotle every-one who has-said anything in-a-way
multa dixit, eo quod plura unicuique ex necessitate
many-things has-said by-that that more-things to-each from necessity
consequentia sunt. Ut qui hominem dixit esse, et quoniam
consequent are as he-who a-man has-said to-be also that

animal est dixit, et quoniam animatum, et quoniam bipes,
animal he-is has-said and that animate and that biped
et quoniam mentis et discipline susceptibile. Est autem
and that of-mind and of-discipline susceptible is however
rationabile problema ad quod ratiocinationes fiunt et spisse
a-reasonable problem to which reasonings are-made both thick
et bone. Totus itaque secundus liber in eo uersatur quod est
and good the-whole and-so second book in this is-occupied which is
de accidente. Et cum naturam accidentium eleganter doceat,
about accident and since the-nature of-accidents elegantly it-teach
tam rationum firmitudine quam exemplorum iocunditate,
as-much by-the-firmness of-reasons as by-the-pleasantness of-examples
ad multa commodus est. Et quia solum accidens ad
for many-things convenient it-is and since alone accident to
comparationem uenit, tertius comparabilium uim aperit, et
comparison comes the-third of-comparables the-force opens and
insistens nature accidentium que sit eligendi aut fugiendi
insisting on-the-nature of-accidents what be of-choosing or of-avoiding
ratio, et in ipsis eligendis que preeligenda, et in
the-account and in the-very things-to-be-chosen which to-be-preferred and in
fugiendis que pre ceteris fugienda regulariter monstrat.
things-to-be-avoided which before others to-be-avoided by-rule it-shows
Ex quo liquet quantum hec disciplina phisice et ethice
from which it-is-clear how-much this discipline to-physics and to-ethics
prodest. Cum hec discipline particula in appetendis et
profits since this of-discipline particle in things-to-be-sought and
devitandis et in omnibus denique comparabilibus uigeat,
to-be-avoided and in all lastly comparables flourishes
plane huius lata est commendatio, et male neglectus
plainly its broad is the-commendation and badly neglected

a prioribus, cum utilitate conspicua et uerborum gratia
by the-earlier though by-utility conspicuous and of-words by-grace
iocundus sit, et tam ethice quam phisice plurimum prosit.
pleasant it-be and as-much to-ethics as to-physics very-much it-profit

Breuis ratio quarti, et quinti

VII · THE FOURTH AND FIFTH BOOKS IN BRIEF

The fourth book treats problems of genus, showing at what cost of time our teachers neglected it. Contrary to Porphyry, Aristotle teaches that genus is predicated univocally and not partially, so body is not the genus of animal; it is said of man only by synecdoche, and Plato, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, Cicero, and Augustine held man to be more truly the soul. The fifth book teaches how property is rightly assigned.

Quartus autem exercet problemata que sunt a genere, et
the-fourth however exercises the-problems which are from genus and
sic generis et speciei et ad se et ad alia coherentiam
so of-genus and of-species both to themselves and to others the-coherence
docet; ut liquidum sit omnibus quanto dispendio
it-teaches so-that clear be to-all with-how-great loss
temporis nostri neglectus sit a preceptoribus nostris. In
of-time our neglected it-has-been by teachers our in
hac speculatione non credo diutius immorandum, cum de
this speculation not I-believe longer to-be-lingered since about
rerum generibus multa superius dicta sint et non sit
of-things the-genera many-things above said have-been and not it-is
nostri propositi in hoc opus speciales commentarios facere.
of-our purpose on this work special commentaries to-make
Hoc tamen ab Aristotile (quoniam Porphirius, quem paruuli
this however from Aristotle since Porphyry whom the-little-ones

sequuntur, aliud docuit) adiciendum puto, quoniam, sicut
follow another-thing taught to-be-added I-think that as
genus uniuoce et non denominatiue, sic nec secundum
genus univocally and not denominatively so neither according-to
quid predicatur. Unde constat corpus non esse genus
something is-it-predicated whence it-is-agreed body not to-be the-genus
animalis. Ait enim: Considerandum, si in aliquibus secundum
of-animal he-says for it-must-be-considered if in some according-to
quid participatur genus; ut si animal aliquod sensibile vel
something is-participated the-genus as if animal something sensible or
uisibile dicatur. Nam secundum quid sensibile uel uisibile
visible be-called for according-to something sensible or visible
animal; secundum corpus enim, secundum animam autem,
the-animal according-to the-body for according-to the-soul however
non. Quare non erit genus sensibile uel uisibile animalis.
not wherefore not will-be the-genus sensible or visible of-animal
Latent autem quandoque et totum in partem ponentes:
they-escape-notice however sometimes also the-whole in the-part placing
ut 'animal corpus sensibile'. Nullo enim modo pars de toto
as animal a-body sensible in-no for way a-part of the-whole
predicatur. Quare non erit corpus genus animalis, eo
is-predicated wherefore not will-be body the-genus of-animal by-that
quod pars est. Utique genus omne de specie uerum est et
that a-part it-is surely genus every of the-species true is and
de indiuiduis, sine translatione et figura. Numquam enim
of the-individuals without metaphor and figure never for
improprie predicatur, quoniam nulla familiarior est assignatio
improperly is-it-predicated since no more-familiar is assignment
quam substantie, que in genere et specie rectissime indicatur.
than of-substance which in genus and species most-rightly is-indicated
Corpus autem de homine, figuratiue scilicet, per sinedochem
body however of man figuratively namely through synecdoche

dicitur. Ex quo liquet quod qui ob unius partis
is-said from which it-is-clear that he-who on-account-of of-one part
euidentiam corpus dicitur, idem et anima dici potest
the-evidentness body is-called the-same also soul to-be-called can
ob alterius dignitatem. Sed minutiores philosophi cum
on-account-of of-the-other the-dignity but more-petty philosophers with
Porphirio uulgi sequuntur opinionem, qui fere id solum
Porphyry of-the-crowd follow the-opinion which almost that alone
consueuit approbare quod sensibus patet. Plato autem et tam
has-been-wont to-approve which to-the-senses lies-open Plato however and as-much
Stoicorum quam Peripateticorum dogma hominem rectius
of-the-Stoics as of-the-Peripatetics the-doctrine man more-rightly
animam quam corpus dici declarat. Quam secutus
soul than body to-be-called declares which having-followed
sententiam Marcus Tullius in libro de Republica ait: Tu
opinion Marcus Tullius in the-book on the-Republic says you
non es is, quem exterior figura designat, sed mens cuiusque,
not are he whom the-outer shape designates but the-mind of-each
is est quisque. Doctoribus quoque Ecclesie, Augustino et
that is each-one to-the-doctors also of-the-Church to-Augustine and
ceteris, id ipsum placuit. Siquis hinc dubitat, legat
to-the-others that very-thing pleased if-anyone hence doubts let-him-read
Scripturas, que principatum personalem quodammodo anime
the-Scriptures which the-headship personal in-a-way to-the-soul
tribuunt, et corpus hospitio comparant aut indumento. Item
attribute and the-body to-a-lodging compare or to-a-garment likewise
quintus copiosissime docet quot modis dicatur proprium;
the-fifth most-copiously teaches in-how-many ways is-said property
et in his, quid proprie et multipliciter docet quando recte
and in these what properly and in-many-ways it-teaches when rightly
positum sit et quando sit perperam assignatum. Utilissima
posited it-be and when it-be wrongly assigned most-useful

autem est hec speculatio ad astruendum et destruendum,
however is this speculation for building and destroying
quoniam proprium, quod proprie dicitur, et cuius proprium
since the-property which properly is-said and of-which the-property
est, se inuicem mutua predicatione concludunt.
it-is themselves in-turn by-mutual predication enclose

De titulo diffiniendi qui exercetur in sexto

VIII · THE TITLE OF DEFINING, EXERCISED IN THE SIXTH BOOK

The sixth book teaches the strict art of defining, though Aristotle destroys others' definitions more surely than he builds his own. A definition must equal the thing defined and use the plainest terms, avoiding metaphor and improper speech such as "law is a measure or image"; nor may it use passions, so Plato errs in making mortal a difference of animal. Where definitions fail, descriptions serve, and a settled definition best proves or refutes.

Porro sextus de diffinitione est, et artem diffiniendi
further the-sixth about definition is and the-art of-defining
luculenter tradit, ut qui istum plene nouerit, in
brilliantly hands-on so-that he-who this fully will-have-known in
statuendis aut euacuendis diffinitionibus hesitare non debeat.
establishing or emptying definitions to-hesitate not ought
Porro regulam diffiniendi artissimam docuit, et quam plene
further the-rule of-defining most-strict he-taught and which fully
aut nullus aut rarus assequitur. Itaque Aristotilem pre
either no-one or rarely-one attains and-so Aristotle before
ceteris omnibus tam alie disserendi ratiocinationes quam
others all as-much the-other of-discoursing reasonings as
diffiniendi titulus illustraret, si tam patenter astrueret propria
of-defining the-title would-illuminate if as plainly he-built his-own

quam potenter destruxit aliena. Ceterum, sicut ualidior hic
as powerfully he-destroyed others' however as stronger here
expugnator extitit quam assertor, ita plerique ualidius
as-assailant he-stood-forth than as-asserter so very-many more-strongly
asserunt quam impugnant; neque enim omnes omnia possunt,
assert than attack nor for all all-things can
et quisque, si efficaciam attendat gratie, proprio munere
and each if the-efficacy he-attend-to of-grace by-his-own gift
insignitur. Ut de fidelibus taceam, Naso carmina, Cicero
is-marked that about the-faithful I-may-be-silent Naso poems Cicero
causas feliciter agit, Pithagoras naturam excutit, Socrates
cases happily pleads Pythagoras nature shakes-out Socrates
morum prescribit normam, Plato de omnibus persuadet,
of-morals prescribes the-norm Plato about all-things persuades
Aristotiles argutias procurat. Sumpserunt hinc doctrine sue
Aristotle subtleties procures they-took hence of-teaching their-own
primordia Marius Victorinus et Boetius cum Cicerone, qui
the-beginnings Marius Victorinus and Boethius with Cicero who
singuli libros diffinitionum ediderunt. Illi quidem diffiniendi
each books of-definitions published they indeed of-defining
nomen usque ad quindecim species dilatauerunt, describendi
the-name even to fifteen species widened of-describing
modos diffinitionis uocabulo subponentes; huic uero de
the-modes of-definition to-the-term subordinating to-this-one indeed about
substantiali precipue cura est, que sic constare debet ex
the-substantial especially care is which so to-consist ought from
genere et substantialibus differentiis ut proposito coequetur.
genus and substantial differences that to-the-proposed it-be-equaled
Recte enim assignata est, cum fuerit equalis diffinitio,
rightly for assigned it-is when will-have-been equal the-definition
et planissima utitur interpretatione. Amouenda est ergo
and plainest it-uses interpretation to-be-removed is therefore

non modo equiuocationis impostura, sed omnium que incerta
not only of-equivocation the-imposture but of-all-things which uncertain
sunt fugienda obscuritas; quoniam euidens esse debet que
are to-be-fled the-obscurity since evident to-be ought that-which
redditur ut aliud innotescat. Ergo et translationes
is-rendered that another-thing may-become-known therefore also metaphors
declinande, et quecunque proprie non dicuntur, ut: Lex
to-be-avoided and whatever-things properly not are-said as law
mensura uel imago eorum que naturaliter iusta sunt. Sunt
the-measure or image of-those which naturally just are are
autem, ait Aristotiles, huiusmodi peiora translatione. Nam
however says Aristotle of-this-kind worse than-metaphor for
translatio facit quodammodo notum quod significatum est
metaphor makes in-a-way known what signified is
per similitudinem; omnes enim transferentes secundum
through likeness all for transferring according-to
aliquam similitudinem transferunt. Quod autem huiusmodi
some likeness transfer what however of-this-kind
est, non facit notum; nam neque similitudo inest, secundum
is not makes known for neither likeness is-in according-to
quam mensura uel imago lex est, neque dici solet. Quare
which measure or image law is nor to-be-said is-it-wont wherefore
si proprie mensuram uel imaginem legem esse dicit, mentitur.
if properly measure or image law to-be he-says he-lies
Imago enim est cuius generatio per imitationem est; hoc
an-image for is that-whose generation through imitation is this
autem non inest legi. Si autem non proprie, palam quoniam
however not is-in law if however not properly plain that
obscure dixit et peius quolibet eorum que secundum
obscurely he-has-spoken and worse than-any of-those which according-to
translationem dicuntur. Nota autem sic accipienda sunt,
metaphor are-said known-things however so to-be-taken are

quod bene dispositis intellectu innotescant. Quod
that to-the-well disposed in-understanding they-become-known what
autem nec ex simpliciter notioribus, nec ex his que
however neither from simply better-known-things nor from those which
nobis notiora positum est, non facit ad diffinitionem.
to-us better-known posited is not makes for definition
Equicolam quoque, id est equimembrem, diffinito oportet
equal-limbed also that is equal-membered to-the-defined it-behooves
fieri diffinitionem, ut si queratur quid sit speculatiua
to-be-made the-definition so-that if be-asked what be speculative
scientia, neutrum, nec speculatiua scilicet nec scientia,
science neither neither speculative namely nor science
relinqui debet ambiguum. In ipsis quoque substantialibus
to-be-left ought ambiguous in the-very also substantial
diffinitiuis nichil ponendum est quod uergat ad passionem.
definitives nothing to-be-placed is which inclines to passion
Auctore siquidem Aristotile, omnis passio magis facta
on-the-authority since (of)-Aristotle every passion more made
abicit a substantia. Differentia autem non huiusmodi;
casts-off from substance difference however not of-this-kind
nam magis saluare uidetur id cuius est differentia. Et
for rather to-preserve it-seems that whose it-is difference and
simpliciter impossibile est esse singulum sine propria
simply impossible it-is to-be each without its-own
differentia. Nam cum non est gressibile, non erit homo.
difference for when not it-is able-to-walk not it-will-be man
Simpliciter autem dicendum, secundum que alteratur habens,
simply however it-must-be-said according-to which is-altered the-haver
nichil horum differentia illius. Omnia enim huiusmodi cum
none of-these the-difference of-that all for of-this-kind when
magis fiunt, abiciunt a substantia. Quare si aliquam
more they-are-made cast-off from substance wherefore if any

huiusmodi differentiam assignauit, peccauit. Simpliciter autem
of-this-kind difference he-has-assigned he-has-sinned simply however
non alteramur secundum differentias; unde etiam Plato
not we-are-altered according-to differences whence also Plato
arguitur, mortale in animalium diffinitionibus ponens. Licet
is-charged mortal in of-animals the-definitions placing although
enim non fiat magis aut magis predicetur, eo quod
for not it-become more or more be-predicated by-that that
huiusmodi non suscipiunt magis et minus, differentia tamen
of-this-kind not admit more and less a-difference however
non est; sed forte rectius habitum notat, et passionis
not it-is but perhaps more-rightly a-habit it-marks and of-passion
habilitatem aut magis necessitatem indicat patiendi. Hoc
the-aptitude or rather the-necessity indicates of-suffering this
autem facile suadebitur Christiano, qui, immortalitatem
however easily will-be-persuaded to-the-Christian who immortality
expectans, conditionem uiuendi credit mutandam in melius,
awaiting the-condition of-living believes to-be-changed for the-better
non corrumpi naturam. Glorificabitur enim substantia et
not to-be-corrupted the-nature will-be-glorified for the-substance and
sine corruptione sui eximetur a necessitate patiendi.
without corruption of-itself will-be-exempted from the-necessity of-suffering
Ipsa quoque habilitas passionis perpetiende penitus euanescet,
the-very also aptitude of-passion to-be-suffered wholly will-vanish
quando mortale immortalitatem induet morte absorpta,
when the-mortal immortality will-put-on with-death swallowed-up
et corruptibile nunc incorruptionem possidebit. Nec mirum
and the-corruptible now incorruption will-possess nor wonder
mortalitatem passibilitati ascribi, cum immortalitas ipsa,
mortality to-passibility to-be-ascribed since immortality itself
secundum Aristotilem, passio sit dicenda. Ait enim: Passio
according-to Aristotle a-passion be to-be-called he-says for a-passion

uite et casus immortalitas videtur esse. Quoniam autem
of-life and an-accident immortality seems to-be since however
uerum est quod dicitur, palam fiet, si quis concedat ex
true it-is what is-said plain will-become if anyone grant from
mortali aliquem fieri immortalem. Nullus enim dicet aliam
mortal someone to-become immortal no-one for will-say another
eum uitam sumere, sed casum aliquem uel passionem huic
him life to-take but accident some or passion in-this
eidem adgenerari; quare non est genus uita immortalitatis.
same to-be-generated wherefore not is the-genus life of-immortality
Utique et hinc constat quia mortale et immortale non sunt
surely also hence it-is-agreed that mortal and immortal not are
uiuentium species aut differentie, sed potius modos uiuendi
of-living-things species or differences but rather modes of-living
indicant aut nature conditionem. Equidem nichil mali
they-indicate or of-nature the-condition indeed nothing of-evil
in substantia, nam quod cuiusque optimum in substantia
in substance for what of-each best in substance
maxime. Est autem difficile, nisi multam rerum notitiam
most it-is however difficult except much of-things knowledge
habenti, regulariter eam diffinire, cum substantialia sepe
for-one-having by-rule it to-define since substantials often
incerta sint, uel ob difficultatem rerum et ignorantiam
uncertain be either on-account-of the-difficulty of-things and ignorance
uel propter ambiguitatem sermonum. Sunt etiam pleraque
or on-account-of the-ambiguity of-speeches there-are also very-many
que, urgente natura, propriis diffinitionibus carent: ut
which pressing nature their-own definitions lack as
principia, eo quod sursum pergentibus eorum, quia non
principles by-that that upward to-those-going of-them because not
sunt, genera non occurrunt; et indiuidua, eo quod
there-are genera not they-meet and individuals by-that that

differentiis substantialibus ab inuicem non separantur. Porro
by-differences substantial from each-other not they-are-separated further
hic descriptiones pro diffinitionibus sunt, probabiles quidem
here descriptions for definitions are probable indeed
magis, quo ad diffinitionum formam magis accesserint;
the-more by-which to of-definitions the-form more they-will-have-approached
earum tamen maior est indulgentia. Est autem quidlibet
of-them however greater is the-indulgence is however anything
fecisse facilius, quam bene fecisse; quia uirtus semper
to-have-done easier than well to-have-done because virtue always
in arduo est. Cum uero de diffinitione constabit, ad
in the-arduous is when indeed about definition it-will-be-agreed for
construendum destruendumque propositum efficacissima est;
building and-destroying the-proposed most-effective it-is
qui cum ipso pariter infirmatur aut conualescit.
which with it equally is-weakened or grows-strong

De problemate ejusdem et diuersi, quod agitatur in septimo; et communia quedam Topicorum

IX · THE PROBLEM OF SAME AND DIFFERENT IN THE SEVENTH BOOK

The seventh book treats same and different: things are the same in genus, species, or number, and what is one in number is called the same by name, property, or accident. These seven books make up the Topics, the source of Cicero's and Boethius' Topics. William of Champeaux defined invention, imperfectly, as finding the middle term; nature alone fixes the necessary, as the diamond cut by lead and goat's blood shows, so her course must be watched.

Septimus quoque a diffinitionibus pendet, euoluitque
the-seventh also on definitions hangs and-unrolls
problemata que de eodem sunt et diuerso. In huius
problems which about the-same are and the-different in its
autem discussione plurima attritio est, quoniam contrariarum
however discussion very-great friction is since of-contrary
concursus rationum dubitandi materia est. Ceterum sicut
the-clash reasons of-doubting the-matter is however as
diuersum, sic et idem alicui multipliciter dicitur: nam
different so also the-same to-something in-many-ways is-said for
utrumque genere, specie, et numero. Sed que genere
each in-genus in-species and in-number but those-which in-genus
diuersa sunt, ilico et sequentibus. E contra que
different are at-once also in-the-following on the-contrary those-which
idem numero, statim et ceteris modis uniuntur. Maxime
the-same in-number at-once also in-the-other ways are-united most
indubitanter quod unum est numero, et idem alicui,
undoubtedly what one is in-number and the-same to-something
ab omnibus idem uidetur dici; nam et hoc est esse
by all the-same seems to-be-called for also this is to-be
simpliciter idem. Solet autem et hoc assignari multipliciter;
simply the-same is-wont however also this to-be-assigned in-many-ways

proprie autem et primum, quando nomine uel diffinitione
properly however and first when by-name or by-definition
idem assignatum fuerit, ut 'uestis' tunice, et 'animal
the-same assigned will-have-been as garment to-tunic and animal
gressibile bipes' homini. Secundum autem quando proprio,
walking two-footed to-man second however when by-property
ut 'discipline susceptibilis' homini, et 'quod natura sursum
as of-discipline susceptible to-man and what by-nature upward
fertur' igni. Tertium uero quando ab accidente, ut 'sedens'
is-borne to-fire third indeed when from accident as sitting
uel 'musicum' Socrati; omnia enim hec unum numero uolunt
or musical to-Socrates all for these one in-number wish
significare. Quoniam autem uerum est quod nunc dictum est,
to-signify since however true it-is what now said has-been
ex permutantibus appellationes aliquis addiscet; sepe enim
from those-changing appellations one will-learn often for
precipientes nomine uocare aliquem sedentium, permutamus
ordering by-name to-call someone of-those-sitting we-change
quando forte non intelligit is cui preceptum facimus, uelut
when perhaps not understands he to-whom the-order we-make as-if
ab accidente eo magis intelligente, et iubemus sedentem uel
from accident him more understanding and we-bid the-sitting-one or
disputantem uocare ad nos; palam quoniam eundem opinantes
the-disputing-one to-call to us plain that the-same thinking
et secundum nomen et secundum accidens significare. Ergo
both according-to name and according-to accident to-signify therefore
idem (quemadmodum dictum est) tripliciter diuidatur.
the-same as said it-has-been triply let-be-divided
Itaque non modo diffinitionum, sed generis, proprii, accidentis
and-so not only of-definitions but of-genus of-property of-accident
necessaria est cognitio tam ad astruendum quam ad
necessary is the-knowledge as-much for establishing as for

destruendum ea problemata que de eodem sunt et
destroying those problems which about the-same are and
diuerso, sed nichil ad alterutram operam diffinitione utilius,
the-different but nothing for either work than-definition more-useful
quoniam nichil efficacius, nichil notius est. In his autem
since nothing more-effective nothing better-known is in these however
septem uoluminibus ob ubertatem locorum constare
seven volumes on-account-of the-abundance of-places to-consist
rectissime dicitur summa Topicorum; que, ut ait Isidorus, sic
most-rightly is-said the-sum of-the-Topics which as says Isidore so
dicta sunt, quoniam topos continent, id est locos, qui sunt
called are since topoi they-contain that is places which are
argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum, et origines dictionum.
of-arguments the-seats the-springs of-meanings and the-origins of-words
Pro eo enim disciplina ipsa dicta est Topice, quod
for that for the-discipline itself called has-been Topic that
locorum doctrinam facit. Qui uero librum hunc diligentius
of-places the-teaching it-makes he-who indeed book this more-diligently
perscrutatur, non modo Ciceronis et Boetii Topicos ab
scrutinizes not only of-Cicero and of-Boethius the-Topics from
his septem uoluminibus erutos deprehendet, sed librum
these seven volumes dug-out will-detect but the-book
Diuisionum, qui compendio uerborum et elegantia sensuum
of-Divisions which by-brevity of-words and elegance of-meanings
inter opera Boetii, que ad logicam spectant, singularem
among the-works of-Boethius which to logic look singular
gratiam nactus est. Non omnes tamen locos huic operi
favor obtained has not all however places in-this work
insertos arbitror, quia nec potuerunt, cum et a modernis,
inserted I-judge because neither could-they since also by the-moderns
huius preeunte beneficio, eque necessarios euidentius cotidie
of-this going-before (with)-the-benefit equally necessary-ones more-evidently daily

doceri conspiciam. Versatur in his inuentionis materia,
to-be-taught I-see is-occupied in these of-invention the-matter
quam hilaris memorie Willelmus de Campellis, postmodum
which of-cheerful memory William of Champeaux afterward
Catalanensis episcopus, diffiniuit, etsi non perfecte, esse
of-Châlons bishop defined although not perfectly to-be
scientiam reperiendi medium terminum et inde eliciendi
the-science of-finding the-middle term and thence of-eliciting
argumentum. Cum enim de inherentia dubitatur, necessarium
argument when for about inherence there-is-doubt necessary
est aliquod inquiri medium, cuius interuentu copulentur
it-is some to-be-inquired middle whose by-intervention be-coupled
extrema; qua speculatione an aliqua subtilior uel ad
the-extremes than-which speculation whether any subtler or for
rem efficacior fuerit, non facile dixerim. Medium uero
the-thing more-effective has-been not easily I-would-say the-middle indeed
necessarium est, ubi uis inferentie in terminis uertitur; si
necessary is where the-force of-inference in the-terms turns if
enim inter totas propositiones sit, ut potius sit obnoxia
for between whole propositions it-be so-that rather it-be subject
complexioni partium quam partibus complexis, medii
to-the-combination of-parts than to-the-parts combined of-the-middle
nexus cessat. In his autem que terminis aut terminorum
the-bond ceases in these however which in-terms or of-terms
partibus uim urgendi habent, locus ab ea habitudine
in-parts the-force of-urging have the-place from that relation
est, que est inter id quod demitur conclusioni, et id
is which is between that which is-taken-away from-the-conclusion and that
quod dempto succedit; succedentia enim a precedentibus
which to-the-taken-away succeeds the-succeeding for by the-preceding
conuincuntur. Quod autem utrobique manet immobile, nec
are-proved what however on-both-sides remains unmoved neither

probantis uiolentiam nec probati recipit fidem; et, sicut a
of-the-prover the-violence nor of-the-proved receives the-faith and as from
significatione contrahunt termini ut uniuersales dicantur esse
signification draw the-terms that universal they-be-said to-be
uel singulares, sic ut unus sequatur ex altero uel propulsetur
or singular so that one follow from the-other or be-repelled
ab altero, facit coherentia uel repugnantia significationum;
by the-other makes the-coherence or repugnance of-the-significations
nisi enim res significate sibi cohereant aut
unless for the-things signified with-each-other cohere or
repugnent, non est quare in terminis familiaritas aut
be-repugnant not there-is why in the-terms familiarity or
hostilitas requiratur. Non est autem facile in singulis semper
hostility be-required not it-is however easy in single-things always
explorare rerum quam firmus sit nexus aut quanta dissensio,
to-explore of-things how firm be the-bond or how-great the-dissension
et ob hoc quid simpliciter necesse quidue magis
and on-account-of this what simply necessary or-what more
probabile sit, iudicare interdum difficilius est. Sed quod
probable be to-judge sometimes more-difficult is but what
frequentissime sic, probabile quidem; quod numquam aliter,
most-frequently so probable indeed what never otherwise
magis probabile; quod aliter esse non posse creditur,
more probable what otherwise to-be not to-be-able is-believed
necessarii suscipit nomen. Nam penes naturam est
of-the-necessary receives the-name for in-the-power-of nature is
necessariorum possibiliumque diffinitio, sola siquidem uires
of-necessary-things and-of-possible-things the-definition alone since the-powers
suas agnouit. Adamas diu habitus est insecabilis, quia
her-own she-has-recognized adamant long held was uncuttable because
nec ferri nec calibis uerebatur acumen; tandem uero, cum
neither of-iron nor of-steel did-it-fear the-edge at-length indeed when

plumbo et sanguine hircino sectus esset, patuit factu
with-lead and with-blood goat's cut it-had-been it-was-plain in-doing
facile quod prius impossibile uidebatur. Ergo solitus rerum
easy what before impossible seemed therefore the-accustomed of-things
cursus diligenter aduertendus est, et quodammodo excutiendus
course diligently to-be-noticed is and in-a-way to-be-shaken-out
nature sinus, ut necessariorum probabiliumque natura
of-nature the-bosom that of-necessary-things and-of-probable-things the-nature
clarescat; nichil enim est quod ad locorum notitiam
may-become-clear nothing for there-is which for of-places the-knowledge
magis prosit, nichil quod ueritatis notitiam amplius pariat,
more may-profit nothing which of-truth knowledge more may-beget
nichil quod ad docendum aut ad persuadendum magis proficiat
nothing which for teaching or for persuading more may-avail
et omnium dicendorum prestet laudabilem facultatem.
and of-all things-to-be-said may-furnish the-praiseworthy faculty

De utilitate octaui

X · THE USE OF THE EIGHTH BOOK

The eighth book, worth more than almost all the books of dialectic the schools read, teaches the exercise of the arms: how opponent and respondent dispute, avoid wantonness, conceal the conclusion, use syllogism and induction, distinguish ambiguous questions, and know sophism from demonstration. A logician must be brief, work by art and not by chance like Hescelin the smith, practice, measure his adversary, and not dispute with everyone. John has defended these books as useful, not written commentaries on them.

Familiare est omnium peritorum artificum artis sue
familiar it-is of-all skilled craftsmen of-art their-own
instrumenta preparare antequam experiantur usum, ne conatus
the-instruments to-prepare before they-try the-use lest the-effort
proprie facultatis inanis sit, si domesticis caruerit
of-their-own faculty empty be if domestic it-will-have-lacked
instrumentis. Sic in re militari preuidet dux arma et
instruments so in the-matter military foresees the-general the-arms and
impedimenta militie. Architectus cum instrumentis materiam
baggage of-warfare the-architect with instruments the-material
prequirit, in qua se et illa exerceat. Nauta clauum,
seeks-beforehand in which himself and them he-may-exercise the-sailor helm
rudentes, remos, anchoras, et cetera nauigii armamenta
ropes oars anchors and the-other of-the-ship gear
componit, ut eorum fretus adminiculo propositum artis
arranges so-that of-them relying on-the-aid the-purpose of-the-art
possit rectius expedire. Itaque pari modo rei
he-can more-rightly expedite and-so in-an-equal way of-the-matter
rationalis opifex et campidoctor eorum qui logicam
rational the-craftsman and drill-master of-those who logic
profitentur in precedentibus instrumenta disputandi et
profess in the-preceding the-instruments of-disputing and

quasi arma tironum suorum locauit in arena, dum
as-if arms of-recruits his-own placed in the-arena while
sermonum simplicium significationem euolueret et item
of-speeches simple the-signification he-unrolled and likewise
enuntiationum locorumque naturam aperiret. Consequenter
of-enunciations and-of-places the-nature he-opened consequently
autem instrumentorum exercitium docet et quodammodo
however of-the-instruments the-exercise he-teaches and in-a-way
congrediendi artem tironibus tradit et, quasi membra moueat
of-engaging the-art to-recruits hands-on and as-if the-limbs he-moves
colluctantium, proponendi et respondendi, conuincendi
of-the-wrestlers of-proposing and of-answering of-convincing
et euadendi uias monstrat, et eam propter quam
and of-escaping the-ways he-shows and that for-the-sake-of which
cetera premissa sunt facultatem preceptis informat. Ut
the-rest set-before were faculty with-precepts forms that
autem premisse similitudinis sequamur proportionem,
however of-the-aforesaid likeness we-may-follow the-proportion
quemadmodum Categoriarum elementarius, Periermeniarum
as of-the-Categories elementary of-the-Periermeniae
sillabicus, premissi Topici dictionales libri sunt; sic Topicorum
syllabic the-aforesaid Topics verbal books are so of-the-Topics
octauus constructorius est rationum, quarum elementa uel
the-eighth constructive is of-reasons whose elements or
loca in precedentibus monstrata sunt. Solus itaque uersatur
places in the-preceding shown are alone and-so it-is-occupied
in preceptis, ex quibus ars compaginatur, et plus confert
in precepts from which the-art is-framed and more contributes
ad scientiam disserendi, si memoriter habeatur in corde
to the-knowledge of-discoursing if by-heart it-be-held in the-heart
et iugi exercitio uersetur in opere, quam omnes fere
and in-continual exercise be-turned in work than all almost

libri dialectice, quos moderni patres nostri in scolis legere
the-books of-dialectic which modern fathers our in schools to-read
consueuerant; nam sine eo non disputatur arte, sed casu.
were-accustomed for without it not it-is-disputed by-art but by-chance
Ceterum, ut plurimum prosit, aliorum necessaria est
however that very-much it-may-profit of-others necessary is
cognitio, qui, etsi non habundent preceptis, nisi raro,
the-knowledge which although not they-abound in-precepts except rarely
rerum sermonumque utilissimam doctrinam faciunt. Quia
of-things and-of-speeches most-useful teaching make since
ergo exercitatio dialectice ad alterum est; pares, quos
therefore the-exercise of-dialectic toward another is equals whom
producit et quos rationibus muniuit et locis, sua
it-brings-forth and whom with-reasons it-has-fortified and with-places its-own
docet arma tractare et sermones potius conserere quam
it-teaches arms to-handle and speeches rather to-join than
dexteras, et tanta cautela imbuit, ut totius eloquentie
right-hands and with-such caution it-imbues that of-all eloquence
precepta hinc tracta principaliter, uelut a primitiuo fonte
the-precepts hence drawn principally as-if from the-primitive fount
originis sue, manare perspicuum sit. Indubitanter enim
of-origin their-own to-flow evident be undoubtedly for
uerum est, quod fatentur Cicero et Quintilianus, quia hinc
true it-is what confess Cicero and Quintilian that hence
non modo rethoricorum adiumentum, sed et principium
not only of-rhetorical-things the-aid but also the-beginning
rethores et scriptores artium assumpserunt; postmodum
the-rhetors and writers of-arts took afterward
tamen propriis dilatata est institutis. Versatur ergo
however by-its-own widened it-has-been institutions is-occupied therefore
tota dialectice agitatio, quoniam alter alterius iudex est,
the-whole of-dialectic exertion since the-one of-the-other the-judge is

inter opponentem et respondentem. Horum uero uterque
between the-opponent and the-respondent of-these indeed each
finem suum assequitur, si nichil omittat ex contingentibus; si
end his-own attains if nothing he-omit of the-things-belonging if
proposito sic insistat, ut et se et orationem increpationi
on-the-proposed so he-insist that both himself and the-speech from-rebuke
subducat. Non enim semper eadem est increpationis occasio;
he-withdraw not for always the-same is of-rebuke the-occasion
nam plerumque propositi, plerumque proponentis culpa est.
for often of-the-proposition often of-the-proposer the-fault is
Siquidem, ut ait Aristotiles, non est in altero tantum bene
since as says Aristotle not it-is in one only well
finire commune opus. Nam et qui litigatorie interrogat,
to-finish the-common work for both he-who litigiously asks
praue disputat, et qui in respondendo non concedit quod
badly disputes and he-who in answering not grants what
uidetur, neque suscipit quicquam quod uult interrogans
seems nor takes-up anything which wishes the-asker
inquirere. Manifestum etiam quoniam non similiter
to-inquire manifest also that not in-like-manner
increpandum et per se orationem et interrogantem. Nichil
to-be-rebuked both by itself the-speech and the-asker nothing
enim prohibet orationem quidem prauam esse, interrogantem
for forbids the-speech indeed bad to-be the-asker
uero, ut contingit, optime contra respondentem disputare.
indeed as it-happens best against the-respondent to-dispute
Nam contra discolos non possibile fortasse statim quales
for against the-peevish not possible perhaps at-once such-as
quis uult, sed quales contingit, facere sillogismos. Est
one wishes but such-as it-happens to-make syllogisms is
autem prauus socius qui impedit commune opus. Qualiter
however a-bad partner who hinders the-common work how

uero facienda aut uitanda sit alterutrius increpatio, an
indeed to-be-made or to-be-avoided be of-either the-rebuke whether
utilius an subtilius et strictius doceat, incertum habeo.
more-usefully or more-subtly and more-strictly he-teach uncertain I-hold
Porro bene interrogantis opus est, ut faciat respondentem
further well of-the-asker the-work is that he-make the-respondent
improbabilissima dicere, alia quidem quam que propter
the-most-improbable-things to-say others indeed than those-which on-account-of
positionem sunt necessaria; respondentis autem non propter
the-position are necessary of-the-respondent however not on-account-of
eum uideri accidere impossibile aut quod preter opinionem
him to-seem to-happen the-impossible or what beyond opinion
est, sed propter positionem. Diuersum enim fortasse
is but on-account-of the-position different for perhaps
peccatum est ponere primum quod non oportet, et positum
a-sin it-is to-posit first what not it-behooves and the-posited
non seruare secundum modum. At opponens, etsi interdum
not to-keep according-to mode but the-opponent although sometimes
ad inductionem, ut detur uniuersale, aut in magnitudinem
for induction that be-granted the-universal or for magnitude
orationis, aut ut manifestior sit oratio, negotietur, in omnibus
of-speech or that more-manifest be the-speech he-negotiate in all-things
precipuam uirtutem ducit occultationem conclusionis ut,
the-chief virtue he-holds concealment of-the-conclusion so-that
oratione per conclusionem expleta, queratur propter quid.
with-the-speech through the-conclusion completed be-asked on-account-of what
Unde in Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologie Dialectica in manu
whence in the-Marriage of-Mercury and of-Philology Dialectic in her-hand
serpentem gestat et formulas, ut astutia serpentis, que
a-serpent carries and formulas that by-the-cunning of-the-serpent which
propositum tegit, mordeantur incauti et rudes, aut improbi
the-purpose covers be-bitten the-unwary and the-rude or the-wicked

per rationis formulas erudiantur aut conuincantur. Consistit
through of-reason the-formulas be-taught or be-convinced consists
autem cautela in ordine et modo explendi propositum
however caution in order and mode of-fulfilling the-purpose
siue diuidendum seu diffiniendum seu colligendum sit;
whether to-be-divided or to-be-defined or to-be-gathered it-be
recteque procedit ex preexistenti cognitione locorum et
and-rightly it-proceeds from preexisting knowledge of-places and
argumentationum aliorumque sermonum, quibus diuisiones
of-argumentations and-of-other speeches by-which divisions
et diffinitiones explicantur. Nam loci argumentandi et
and definitions are-unfolded for the-places of-arguing and
diuidendi diffiniendique, plerumque communes sunt; sed uis
of-dividing and-of-defining mostly common are but the-force
artis in argumentationibus amplius uiget. In ipsis quoque
of-art in argumentations more flourishes in the-very also
sillogismis uiolentior est, siue integritate sui perfectus
syllogisms more-violent it-is whether by-the-integrity of-itself perfect
sit siue media propositione subtracta ad modum
it-be or with-the-middle proposition withdrawn after the-manner
enthimematis conclusionem acceleret; ideoque usus magis eius
of-an-enthymeme the-conclusion it-hasten and-therefore the-use more its
facit ad alterum. Inductio uero lenior est, siue maturiori
makes toward another induction indeed gentler is whether with-riper
incessu a pluribus progrediatur ad unum uniuersale aut
pace from several it-proceed to one universal or
particulare, siue acriori impetu ab uno, ad exempli formam
particular or with-sharper onset from one to of-example the-form
inducto, ad unum inferendo prosiliat. Hic autem modus magis
brought-in to one by-inferring it-leap-forth this however mode more
oratoribus congruit; interdum tamen ornatus aut explicationis
to-orators fits sometimes however of-ornament or of-explanation

causa conducit et dialectico; magis enim persuasorius
for-the-sake it-conduces also to-the-dialectician more for persuasive
est quam urgens. Unde, sicut Marcus Tullius in Rethoricis
it-is than urgent whence as Marcus Tullius in the-Rhetoric
testis est, Socrates hoc argumentandi genere sepissime
witness is Socrates this of-arguing kind very-often
utebatur. Ceterum cum exempla ad probandum quid aut
used however when examples for proving something either
plura feruntur aut singula, conuenientia esse debent et ex
several are-brought or single fitting to-be they-ought and from
quibus scimus; qualia Homerus, non qualia Cherillus. Si
which we-know such-as Homer not such-as Choerilus if
autem ab auctoribus transumantur, Homero quidem Grecus,
however from authors they-be-borrowed Homer indeed the-Greek
Latinus autem Virgilio utatur et Lucano; domestica namque
the-Latin however Virgil let-him-use and Lucan domestic for
exempla magis mouent, et ignota dubiorum non
examples more move and unknown-things of-doubtful-things not
faciunt fidem. Ad occultationem uero propositi, immo ut
make faith for concealment indeed of-the-purpose nay that
uterque gignadiorum uoti compos facilius sit, idiotismus
each of-the-gladiators of-his-wish possessed more-easily be idiotism
et ortonoismus perutilis est, ut uterque scilicet sic artem
and orthonoism very-useful is so-that each namely so the-art
dissimulet, quod aut eam non habere credatur aut quod
dissemble that either it not to-have he-be-believed or that
habita nolit uti. Semper enim suspecta est artis
having-it he-be-unwilling to-use always for suspect is of-art
ostentatio; et e contra facilius admittuntur uia simplici
the-display and on the-contrary more-easily are-admitted by-way simple
gradientes. Sed pre omnibus utrique expedit nosse fideliter,
those-stepping but before all-things to-both it-is-expedient to-know faithfully

circa quid confligentium uersetur intentio. Siquidem non
about what of-the-contenders be-occupied the-intention since not
facto manifesto quid est quod positum est, non est facile
made manifest what is that-which posited is not it-is easy
argumentari; nam ex hoc uel ad nomen aut sepe nulla est
to-argue for from this either about the-name or often no is
disputatio. Ratio enim non habet processum, nisi intellectus
disputation reason for not has progress unless the-understanding
altercantium alicui innitatur articulo. Nam ut obuiatio sit,
of-the-disputants on-some rest point for that a-meeting be
necesse est eandem teri uiam. Ergo aut una debet
necessary it-is the-same to-be-trodden way therefore either one ought
esse interrogatio, aut multiplicitas suis est rationibus
to-be the-question or the-multiplicity by-its-own is reasons
distinguenda. Unde Aristotiles: Quoniam autem concessum
to-be-distinguished whence Aristotle since however granted
est respondenti, non intelligenti, dicere quoniam non intelligo,
it-is to-the-respondent not understanding to-say that not I-understand
et, multipliciter dicto, non ex necessitate confiteri
and manifoldly with-(a-thing)-said not from necessity to-confess
uel negare; palam quoniam primum quidem, nisi planum sit
or to-deny plain that first indeed unless plain be
quod dicitur, non pigritandum dicere non intelligere. Nam
what is-said not one-must-be-slow to-say not to-understand for
sepe ex eo quod non plane interrogantibus dant, obuiat
often from that that not plainly to-the-askers they-give there-meets
aliquod difficile. Si autem notum quidem sit, multipliciter
something difficult if however known indeed it-be manifoldly
autem dictum, si in omnibus quidem uerum uel falsum sit
however said if in all indeed true or false be
quod dicitur, dandum simpliciter uel negandum. Si uero
what is-said it-must-be-granted simply or denied if indeed

in aliquo sit falsum, in aliquo autem uerum, significandum
in something it-be false in something however true it-must-be-indicated
est quoniam multipliciter dicitur, et propter hoc aliud
it-is that manifoldly it-is-said and on-account-of this one
quidem falsum, aliud autem uerum; posterius enim diuiso
indeed false another however true later for with-it-divided
incertum si et in principio conspexerit dubium. Si autem
uncertain whether also at the-beginning he-noticed the-doubtful if however
non preuiderit dubium, sed in alterum respiciens posuerit,
not he-foresaw the-doubtful but to the-other looking he-posited
dicendum ad eum qui in alterum ducit, quoniam non ad
it-must-be-said to him who to the-other leads that not to
hoc inspiciens dedi, sed ad alterum eorum; nam, pluribus
this looking I-granted but to the-other of-them for with-several
existentibus que sub eodem nomine uel sub eadem oratione
existing which under the-same name or under the-same speech
sunt, facilius est dubitatio. Si uero planum sit et simplex
are easier is the-doubting if indeed plain it-be and simple
quod interrogatur, aut sic aut non respondendum. Ut enim
what is-asked either yes or no it-must-be-answered as for
est apud Agellium, qui in talibus plus uel minus respondet
it-is with Gellius he-who in such-things more or less answers
quam queratur ab eo, lineam recte disputandi ignorat aut
than be-asked of him the-line rightly of-disputing knows-not or
dissimulat. Siquidem qui aut multiloquio aut distorta
dissembles since he-who either with-much-speaking or with-twisted
responsione collegam impedit, non modo prauus socius sed
answer his-colleague hinders not only a-bad partner but
manifeste proteruus est; presertim si, non habens instantiam,
manifestly wanton is especially if not having an-objection
admissis particularibus contradicit uniuersali; nam sine
admitted particulars he-contradicts the-universal for without

instantia que sit uel uideatur prohibere orationem proteruire
objection which be or seem to-forbid the-speech to-be-wanton
est. Si ergo in multis apparente non dederit
it-is if therefore in many-things appearing not he-will-have-granted
uniuersaliter qui non habet instantiam, manifestum quoniam
universally he-who not has an-objection manifest that
proteruit, nisi forte contra habeat argumentari quoniam non
he-is-wanton unless perhaps against-it he-can argue that not
uerum est quod infertur. Siquidem si consequens falsum est,
true is what is-inferred since if the-consequent false is
palam est quoniam ex antecedentibus ueris non prouenit;
plain it-is that from antecedents true not it-comes
nam ex uero numquam falsum, pro eo quod ueritatis
for from true never false for that that of-truth
integer sinus nec parit nec alit mendacium. Non tamen
the-whole bosom neither begets nor nourishes a-lie not however
sufficit in contrarium argumentari; eo quod plura contraria
it-suffices to the-contrary to-argue by-that that many contraries
opinionibus plerumque facile non soluuntur, hinc inde
to-opinions often easily not are-solved here and-there
colluctantibus argumentis; nam Zeno quoniam non contingit
wrestling arguments for Zeno that not it-happens
moueri neque stadium pertransire, et Empedocles ab
to-be-moved nor the-stadium to-traverse and Empedocles from
aduerso omnia moueri contendit. Sed paucorum opinio,
the-opposite all-things to-be-moved contends but of-few the-opinion
presertim quam firmissima ratio non munit, eque firme
especially which most-firm reason not fortifies equally firmly
et communiori opinioni non derogat. Itaque proteruus
and to-the-more-common opinion not derogates and-so wanton
est qui in talibus nec instantia nec contrariis utitur
is he-who in such-things neither objection nor contrary uses

argumentis; est enim in disputationibus proteruia responsio
arguments is for in disputations wantonness an-answer
preter hos modos sillogismi corruptiua. Ita quidem ex
beyond these modes of-the-syllogism corruptive so indeed on
parte respondentis; nam in interrogante nichilominus est
the-part of-the-respondent for in the-asker nonetheless it-is
si, patefacto quid datum sit, inepta uerborum occasione in
if made-plain what granted be by-inept of-words occasion to
contrarium tendit, fidelem non recipiens intellectum, sed
the-contrary he-tends faithful not receiving understanding but
aucupans sillabas et ad nomen inaniter disputans. Tanto
hunting-for syllables and about the-name emptily disputing by-so-much
quidem improbior est proteruia, quanto acrius quisque
indeed more-wicked is wantonness by-as-much-as more-sharply each
sic urget. Ceterum uterque alterius propositum impedit sine
so urges however each the-other's purpose binders without
proteruie uitio, si officii sui partibus probe renitatur aut
of-wantonness the-vice if of-office his-own in-the-parts honestly he-resist or
urgeat; puta si tardum natura uel usu adhibita celeritate
urge suppose if the-slow by-nature or by-use with-applied speed
quis urgeat; si acrem ingenio uel exercitii assiduitate quis
one urge if the-sharp in-wit or of-exercise by-the-assiduity one
adhibita grauitatis mora retardet; si tegit quis propositum,
with-applied of-gravity delay slow-down if covers one the-purpose
ut arte deludat; si alter detegit occultatum, ut prudenter
that by-art he-may-delude if the-other uncovers the-concealed that prudently
euadat; et quidem in hunc modum plurima. Si uero
he-may-escape and indeed in this way very-many-things if indeed
falsum sequi uideatur ex uero, etsi, ubi fallacia sit, non
the-false to-follow seem from the-true although where the-fallacy be not
sit perspicuum, constat quoniam sophisticus est sillogismus,
be clear it-is-agreed that sophistical is the-syllogism

aliaue argumentatio fallax quidem et perfida, cui fidem
or-other argumentation deceitful indeed and treacherous in-which faith
haberi non oportet. Hoc autem litigiis quam demonstrationi
to-be-had not it-behooves this however for-quarrels than for-demonstration
aut exercitationi dialectice magis facit; nam sophisma est
or exercise dialectical more makes for sophism is
sillogismus litigatorius; philosofima uero, demonstratiuus;
a-syllogism litigious philosopheme indeed demonstrative
argumentum autem, sillogismus dialecticus; sed aporisma,
argument however a-syllogism dialectical but aporeme
sillogismus dialecticus contradictionis. Horum omnium
a-syllogism dialectical of-contradiction of-these all
necessaria est cognitio, et in facultatibus singulis perutilis
necessary is the-knowledge and in faculties single very-useful
est exercitatio. Itaque assuescendum est disceptationi, et
is the-exercise and-so to-be-grown-accustomed it-is to-disputation and
prima initia memoriter reuoluenda, distinguenda necessaria
the-first beginnings by-heart to-be-revolved to-be-distinguished the-necessary
et probabilia ab oppositis et a se inuicem; excutiende
and probable from opposites and from each-other in-turn to-be-shaken-out
sunt uocum significationes, ut facile scientiam habenti
are of-words the-significations so-that easily knowledge to-one-having
una oratio in plures transeat aut plures reducantur in
one speech into several may-pass or several be-brought-back into
unam. In uniuersalibus aut astruendis aut depellendis
one in universals either to-be-built or to-be-repelled
diligentia maior, cum in eis profectus aut periculum
diligence greater since in them advance or danger
euidentius constat; pro eo quod non est sine uniuersali
more-evidently stands for that that not it-is-possible without a-universal
sillogizare. Porro, cum in omni sermone precipua sit
to-syllogize further since in every speech the-chief be

uirtus breuitas, tum in eo qui ad alterum est efficacius
virtue brevity then in that which to another is more-effectively
operatur, acceptatur gratius, et clarius enitescit; nam
it-works it-is-accepted more-gratefully and more-clearly it-shines for
in prolixitate omnium maius dispendium. Quod si non
in prolixity of-all-things greater loss but if not
potest accelerari propositum, nouitate rerum, que tamen
can to-be-hastened the-purpose by-the-novelty of-things which however
preter rem non uideantur, purganda est mora; quoniam,
beside the-matter not seem to-be-purged is delay since
ut ait Aristotiles, quisquis unam orationem multo tempore
as says Aristotle whoever one speech for-much time
interrogat, male inquirit: nam si respondente interrogato quod
asks badly inquires for if answering the-one-asked what
interrogatur, palam quoniam multas interrogationes interrogat,
is-asked plain that many questions he-asks
aut frequenter easdem. Quare aut iuuenatur aut non habet
or frequently the-same wherefore either he-is-trifling or not has
sillogismum; nam ex paucis omnis sillogismus; si uero non
a-syllogism for from few every syllogism if indeed not
respondente, quoniam non increpat uel recedit. Contingit
answering that not he-rebukes or withdraws it-happens
autem multiplicare interrogationes, ut reprehensionis detur
however to-multiply questions that of-reprehension be-given
occasio et undecumque iuste increpationis ansas eliciat;
occasion and from-wherever of-just rebuke the-handles he-may-elicit
et hoc plerumque laudabile, interdum uero defectus indicium
and this often praiseworthy sometimes indeed of-defect an-indication
est, eo quod non est propositum certum, aut ei uia
is by-that that not is the-purpose certain or to-it a-way
non patet ad processum, qui easdem replicat orbitas et
not lies-open to progress he-who the-same turns-back ruts and

auras easdem circinat, et mouetur iugiter, nec promouetur.
the-breezes same circles and is-moved continually nor is-moved-forward
Hescelinus faber, sicut magister Willelmus referebat, illorum
Hescelin the-smith as master William reported their
morem sequebatur, qui nichil in disputationibus certum
custom followed who nothing in disputations certain
appetunt, et sic rem fabrilem, sicut hii expediunt
seek and so the-matter smithly as these expedite
dialecticam, exercebat. Prestolabatur enim non ab arte sed
dialectic he-exercised he-awaited for not from art but
fortuna operis finem. Dum enim coctam massam uolueret
from-fortune of-the-work the-end while for the-cooked mass he-turned
in incude eamque formaret ad ictum mallei, si forte
on the-anvil and-it shaped at the-stroke of-the-hammer if perhaps
interrogaretur quid fieret, non certum quid respondebat,
he-were-asked what was-being-made not certain anything he-answered
sed multa disiunctim, puta cultrum aut falcem aut
but many-things disjunctively suppose a-knife or a-sickle or
uomerem aut aliud ad quod materiam casus induceret;
a-plowshare or another-thing to which the-matter chance might-lead
non enim quod uolebat, sed quod poterat, producebatur.
not for what he-wished but what he-could was-produced
Nichil autem minus peritum decet artificem quam sequi
nothing however less a-skilled befits craftsman than to-follow
casum, non arbitrium rationis; proinde rationum undecumque
chance not the-judgment of-reason accordingly of-reasons from-wherever
ad statuendum uel destituendum positionem conquirenda est
for establishing or overthrowing a-position to-be-sought-out is
copia, ut urgendi instandique facultas comparetur. Et,
abundance so-that of-urging and-of-insisting the-faculty be-acquired and
si aduersarius deest, secum quisque experiatur que,
if the-adversary is-lacking with-himself each let-test what-things

quot, et quanta proposite questionis articulum muniant
how-many and how-great of-the-proposed question the-point fortify
aut impugnent; sic enim facile erit quisque idoneus
or attack so for easy it-will-be each fit
ad cogendum et reluctandum et, siue agonizandum
for compelling and resisting and whether in-contesting
seu suadendum seu philosophandum fuerit, urgentias
or persuading or philosophizing it-will-have-been urgings
instantiasque habens aut superabit aut euadet cum gloria
and-objections having either he-will-overcome or will-escape with glory
aut decenter sibi et sine ignominia superabitur. Fuit
or becomingly to-himself and without disgrace will-be-overcome there-was
antiquitus hec in re militari disciplina Romanorum,
anciently this in the-matter military discipline of-the-Romans
ut qui armis fuerant exercendi, ab ineunte etate
that those-who in-arms were to-be-exercised from beginning age
assuescerent militie imaginarie, et ludentes in eo iugiter
should-grow-accustomed to-warfare imaginary and playing in it continually
uersarentur adolescentes, unde postmodum in necessitatibus
be-occupied as-youths whence afterward in the-necessities
rei publice feliciter triumpharent. Telorum quisque
of-the-matter public happily they-might-triumph of-weapons each
nouerat usum, et qualiter equitem, qualiter peditem, nunc
knew the-use and how the-horseman how the-footman now
instare, nunc fugere, nunc cesim, nunc punctim ferire
to-press now to-flee now with-the-edge now with-the-point to-strike
oporteat, domi prediscebatur. Sic suorum instrumentorum
it-behooves at-home was-learned-beforehand so of-his-own instruments
necesse est logicum expeditam habere facultatem, ut
necessary it-is the-logician expeditious to-have faculty so-that
scilicet principia nouerit, probabilibus habundet, sillogizandi
namely the-principles he-know in-probable-things abound of-syllogizing

et inducendi omnes ad manum habeat rationes. Vires
and of-inducing all at hand be-have the-reasons the-strength
quoque aduersarii metiatur; quoniam et ex hoc plerumque
also of-the-adversary let-him-measure since also from this mostly
negotii pendet euentus. Non est enim in altero tantum
of-the-business hangs the-outcome not it-is for in one only
bene finire commune opus; siquidem sicut interrogantis
well to-finish the-common work since as of-the-asker
aut docentis imperitia, sic plerumque tarditas auditoris aut
or of-the-teacher the-unskill so mostly the-slowness of-the-hearer or
rei difficultas eum qui agit ex arte uoti compotem
of-the-matter the-difficulty him who acts from art of-his-wish possessed
esse non sinit. Est autem, ut ait Palladius, magna pars
to-be not allows it-is however as says Palladius a-great part
prudentie eius cum quo agitur estimare personam. In iure
of-prudence of-him with whom one-deals to-estimate the-person in law
quoque cautum est quia nemo debet esse ignarus conditionis
also provided it-is that no-one ought to-be ignorant of-the-condition
eius cum quo contrahit. Ergo et aliter cum erudito,
of-him with whom he-contracts therefore also otherwise with the-learned
aliter agendum est cum eo quem rudem nosti; nam
otherwise to-be-dealt is with him whom unlearned you-know for
eruditus sillogisticis, rudis urgendus est rationibus inductiuis.
the-learned with-syllogistic the-rough to-be-urged is with-reasons inductive
Ceterum ut quis ueniat ad profectum, sicut studium
however that one may-come to advance as study
exercitii, ita et uenam laudabilis necesse est subesse
of-exercise so also a-vein of-praiseworthy necessary it-is to-be-beneath
ingenii. Ingenium uero bonum est quod uero facile
wit wit indeed good is which to-the-true easily
adquiescit et falsum aspernatur. Hoc autem primum a
assents and the-false spurns this however first from

natura oritur per fomitem innate rationis; deinde affectione
nature arises through the-tinder of-inborn reason then by-affection
boni et usu uiuacius conualescit. Usus quidem exercitium
for-good and by-use more-vigorously grows-strong use indeed exercise
roborat, paritque facultatem probandi et examinandi ueri;
strengthens and-begets the-faculty of-proving and of-examining the-true
facilius tamen et expeditius, si artis preceptorumque
more-easily however and more-expeditiously if of-art and-of-precepts
compendio solidetur. Sed licet nunc ad se, nunc
by-the-compendium it-be-made-solid but although now with himself now
ad alterum contingat utiliter exerceri, collatio meditatione
with another it-happen usefully to-be-exercised conference than-meditation
uidetur utilior. Ut enim ferrum ferro acuitur, sic ad
seems more-useful as for iron by-iron is-sharpened so at
uocem alterius contingit animum colloquentis acutius et
the-voice of-another it-happens the-mind of-the-converser more-sharply and
efficacius excitari; sed maxime si cum sapiente aut modesto
more-effectively to-be-roused but most if with a-wise-man or modest
sermo conseritur. Alioquin os stulti quod ebullit
speech is-joined otherwise the-mouth of-the-fool which bubbles-forth
stultitiam, et proteruus qui modestiam nescit, non tam facile
folly and the-wanton who modesty knows-not not so easily
ingenia adolescentium, qui aliis per imitationem appetunt
the-wits of-youths who to-others by imitation seek
conformari, erudiunt quam peruertunt; non informant ad
to-be-conformed train as pervert not form-them for
uitam, nec instruunt ad scientiam, sed infatuant animam
life nor equip-them for knowledge but they-befool the-soul
et toxicant linguam. Itaque licet nichil magis mutua
and poison the-tongue and-so although nothing more than-mutual
collatione prosit, non est tamen cum omni disputandum
conference profit not it-is however with every-one to-be-disputed

neque contra quemlibet exercitandum. Necesse est enim,
nor against anyone to-be-exercised necessary it-is for
ut ait Aristotiles, contra aliquos prauas fieri orationes.
as says Aristotle against some bad to-be-made speeches
Nam contra eum qui omnino temptat uideri perfugere,
for against him who altogether tries to-seem to-escape
iustum quidem omnino temptare sillogismum facere; non
just indeed altogether to-try a-syllogism to-make not
pulchrum autem, eo quod non oportet consistere statim
beautiful however by-that that not it-behooves to-stand-firm at-once
contra quoslibet; necesse est enim laboriosum sermonem
against anyone-whatever necessary it-is for laborious speech
accidere; nam qui exercitati sunt, non possunt abstinere
to-result for those-who exercised are not can abstain
a disputatione certatoria. Sed nec ubique, nec semper,
from disputation contentious but neither everywhere nor always
nec de quolibet disputandum. Sunt enim plura que
nor about anything to-be-disputed there-are for many-things which
disputationem non admittunt; sunt que humanas
disputation not admit there-are those-which human
excedunt rationes et tantum fidei consecrantur. Sunt et
exceed reasons and only to-faith are-consecrated there-are also
que interrogante eque ac respondente uidentur indigna,
those-which to-the-asker equally as to-the-answerer seem unworthy
et eos qui in talibus dimicant, aut desipere aut non
and those who in such-things fight either to-be-foolish or not
sapuisse conuincunt. Hec autem sunt que scita non
to-have-been-wise prove these however are those-which known not
conferunt et ignorata non ledunt. His operam dare, ad
contribute and unknown not harm to-these effort to-give to
philosophiam non tam accessum preparat quam recessum;
philosophy not so-much an-approach prepares as a-retreat

neque enim proficientis, sed deficientis ingenii indicium
nor for of-advancing but of-failing wit an-indication
est. Unde eleganter beatus Ambrosius: Libenter fateor me
is whence elegantly blessed Ambrose gladly I-confess myself
nescire quod nescio, immo quod scire nichil prodest.
not-to-know what I-know-not nay what to-know nothing profits
Porro probabilium inuestigatio, ex quibus fere scientia est
further of-probable-things the-investigation from which almost knowledge is
humana, quodammodo manat a fonte Topicorum, que,
human in-a-way flows from the-fount of-the-Topics which
rerum sermonumque adiunctione deprehensa, parant copiam
of-things and-of-speeches by-the-joining grasped prepare abundance
rationum; ut si quis in eis sufficienter instructus fuerit,
of-reasons so-that if anyone in them sufficiently equipped will-have-been
illud Pitagoricum verum esse cognoscat, quia de omni
that Pythagorean true to-be he-may-know that about every
re potest in utramque partem probabiliter disputari. Ipsam
thing it-can on both sides probably to-be-disputed the-very
uero, sicuti est, deprehendere veritatem, diuine uel angelice
indeed as it-is to-grasp truth of-divine or angelic
perfectionis est; ad quam tanto quisque familiarius accedit,
perfection is to which by-so-much each more-familiarly approaches
quanto uerum querit auidius, amat ardentius, examinat
by-as-much-as the-true he-seeks more-eagerly loves more-ardently examines
fidelius, et in contemplatione eius iocundius delectatur.
more-faithfully and in the-contemplation of-it more-pleasantly delights
Hec summatim excerpta ad instantiam prouocantis
these-things summarily excerpted at the-insistence of-the-provoker
retexui; non quidem quod utilitatem aut conceptionem
I-have-unwoven not indeed that the-utility or conception
precedentium librorum plene descripserim (hoc enim supra
of-the-preceding books fully I-have-described this for above

uires meas est et a proposito alienum) sed ut articulos,
powers my is and from the-purpose foreign but that the-points
qui proponebantur et criminabantur inutiles, officiosos esse
which were-set-forth and were-accused as-useless serviceable to-be
monstrarem. Idem quoque in sequentibus propositum est;
I-might-show the-same also in the-following proposed is
scilicet ut potius emulo occurratur, quam ut in artes, quas
namely that rather the-rival be-met than that on the-arts which
omnes docent aut discunt, commentarii scribantur a nobis.
all teach or learn commentaries be-written by us
Cui ista non placent, doceat potiora.
to-whom these-things not please let-him-teach better-things

Liber Quartus

BOOK FOUR · PREFACE

John is compelled to return to the interrupted subject, though his age, rank, and condition demand other work. Since his rival does not rest and his friend asks his judgment, he will run briefly through what time allows. It would be pleasant, in Seneca's words, to look back to better years, were his mind not weighed down by bitterness from the journey and other cares; yet since his friend wishes to examine his conflict with Cornificius, he descends unwillingly into the arena.

Redire compellor ad materiam intermissam, et que studiis
to-return I-am-compelled to the-matter interrupted and which to-studies
grauioribus fuerat preponenda. Nam et processus etatis,
graver had-been to-be-preferred for both the-advance of-age
gradus ordinis, conditionis forma, ut de imminentibus
the-grade of-order of-condition the-form that about impending
causis et domestice rei oneribus ad presens taceam,
causes and of-the-household matter the-burdens for the-present I-may-be-silent
occupationem aliam exigebant. Sed quoniam temeritas emuli
occupation another demanded but since the-rashness of-the-rival
non quiescit, et tu, cui mos gerendus est, opinionis
not rests and you to-whom compliance to-be-shown is of-opinion
mee sententiam queris, que pro tempore licuit,
my the-judgment seek those-things-which for the-time it-was-permitted
succincta breuitate percurram. Iocundum enim fuerat, ut
with-succinct brevity I-shall-run-through pleasant for it-had-been that
Senece uerbis utar, in antiqua redire tempora et ad annos
of-Seneca the-words I-may-use into old to-return times and to years
respicere meliores, nisi amaritudo, que partim ex meatu,
to-look-back better unless the-bitterness which partly from the-journey

partim ex alia sollicitudine incumbit, animum pregrauaret.
partly from other anxiety lies-upon the-mind were-weighing-down
Quia tamen uisum est tibi meum et Cornificii examinare
since however seemed it-has to-you my and of-Cornificius to-examine
conflictum, inuitus et quodammodo tractus in huius
the-conflict unwilling and in-a-way dragged into of-this
palestre descendo harenam. Sed hec hactenus.
wrestling-ground I-descend the-arena but these-things thus-far

Quod liber Analecticorum est rationum examinatorius

I · THE ANALYTICS IS THE EXAMINER OF REASONS

Since an art's perfection proclaims its author's glory, Aristotle would not leave his work incomplete. Having supplied the instruments of invention and their use, he sat as if at a smelting furnace and forged a tool for examining reasons: the Analytics, which serves judgment chiefly and invention too, since all the disciplines are connected and each borrows its perfection from the others. John gives his opinion of it in a few words.

Campidoctor itaque Peripatetice discipline, que pre ceteris
the-drill-master and-so of-the-Peripatetic discipline which before others
in ueritatis indagatione laboret, infelicem summam operis
in of-truth the-tracking labors an-unhappy sum of-the-work
dedignatus, totum componit; certus quod cuiusque artis
disdaining whole composes certain that of-each art
perfectio gloriam sui preconatur auctoris. Unde cum
the-perfection the-glory of-its proclaims author whence when
inventionis instrumenta procurasset et usum, quasi in
of-invention the-instruments he-had-procured and the-use as-if in
conflatorio sedens, examinatorium quoddam studuit cudere,
the-smelting-house sitting an-examining-tool certain he-strove to-forge

quo diligentissima fieret examinatio rationum. Hic
by-which most-diligent might-be-made the-examination of-reasons this
autem est Analeticorum liber, qui ad iudicium principaliter
however is of-the-Analytics the-book which to judgment principally
spectat, et tamen ad inuentionem aliquatenus proficit. Nam
looks and yet to invention to-some-extent profits for
disciplinarum omnium connexe sunt rationes, et quelibet sui
of-disciplines all connected are the-reasons and any its-own
perfectionem ab aliis mutuatur. Vix est que sine alterius
perfection from others borrows scarcely is-there which without of-another
adminiculo, si tamen omnino aliqua est, que ad summum
aid if however at-all any is which to the-highest
possit ascendere. Ut autem opinionis mee iudicium plene
can ascend that however of-opinion my the-judgment fully
cognoscas, quid de hoc opere sentiam paucis aduerte.
you-may-know what about this work I-think in-a-few-words notice

Quod scientia hec utilis est ad omnia et unde hec sortita sit nomen

II · THIS SCIENCE SERVES ALL THINGS, AND WHENCE ITS NAME

No logician can do without the Analytics, whose name means equal speech; John's interpreter, meeting an unknown word, used to say, "Analyze this." The teaching is necessary, the book less so: its contents are taught more easily elsewhere, though nowhere more truly or forcefully, since like Caesar it wrings assent even from the unwilling. Yet its confused examples and transposed letters make one reach with great labor what could be taught very easily.

Analeticorum quidem perutilis est scientia, et sine
of-the-Analytics indeed very-useful is the-knowledge and without
qua quisquis logicam profitetur, ridiculus est. Ut uero
which whoever logic professes ridiculous is that indeed
ratio nominis exponatur, quam Greci Analeticen dicunt,
the-account of-the-name be-expounded what the-Greeks Analytic call
nos possumus Resolutoriam appellare, familiarius tamen
we can Resolutory to-call more-familiarly however
assignabimus, si dixerimus equam locutionem; nam illi
we-shall-assign if we-shall-have-said equal speech for they
ana 'equale', lexim 'locutionem' dicunt. Frequens autem est,
ana equal lexis speech call frequent however it-is
cum sermo parum est intellectus, et eum in notiorem
when speech too-little is understood and it into a-better-known
resolui desideremus equiualenter; unde et interpres meus,
to-be-resolved we-desire equivalently whence also interpreter my
cum uerbum audiret ignotum, et maxime in compositis,
when a-word he-heard unknown and especially in compounds
dicebat 'Analetiza hoc' quod uolebat equiualenter exponi.
he-said analyze this what he-wished equivalently to-be-expounded
Nam hec resolutio intellectui ad scientiam adminiculatur
for this resolution to-the-understanding for knowledge aids

quam plurimum. Ceterum, licet necessaria sit doctrina,
very much however although necessary be the-teaching
liber non eatenus necessarius est; quicquid enim continet,
the-book not to-that-extent necessary is whatever for it-contains
alibi facilius et fidelius traditur, sed certe uerius
elsewhere more-easily and more-faithfully is-handed-down but certainly more-truly
aut fortius nusquam. Siquidem et ab inuito fidem
or more-strongly nowhere since even from the-unwilling faith
extorquet, quippe uiolentus est et quodam Cesareo impetu
it-extorts as violent it-is and with-a-certain Caesarean onset
nullas, nisi hoste subacto, gaudet habere uias; amici
no unless with-the-enemy subdued rejoices to-have ways of-a-friend
gratiam nullius momenti facit. Quod utique satis congruit
the-favor of-no moment it-makes which surely enough fits
officio iudicantis, cum affectus amici uel hostis sinceritatem
the-office of-the-judger since the-affection of-friend or of-enemy the-sincerity
iudicii pervertere soleat. Porro exemplorum confusione et
of-judgment to-pervert is-wont further of-examples by-confusion and
traiectione litterarum quas tum de industria, tum causa
transposition of-letters which now on purpose now for-the-sake-of
breuitatis, tum ne falsitas alicubi exemplorum argueretur,
brevity now lest falsehood anywhere of-examples be-charged
interseruit, adeo confusus est, ut cum magno labore
he-interspersed so-far confused it-is that with great labor
eo perueniatur, quod facillime tradi potest; et
thither one-arrive which most-easily to-be-handed-down can and
plerumque, dum mendacium uitat, nec uerus nec falsus
often while a-lie it-avoids neither true nor false
est, aut forte mentitur, si tamen proteruia calumniam faciat.
it-is or perhaps it-lies if however wantonness false-charge make

Quod liber non eatenus utilis est ad frasim comparandam

III · THE BOOK IS OF LITTLE USE FOR ACQUIRING PHRASIS

The rules are useful, but the book does little to furnish phrasis, a ready store of words. The philosopher should memorize knowledge and excerpt words that transfer well. Those who imitate Aristotle's tangle to sell their own subtlety, as Adam did in his Art of Discoursing, choose the worst part; Adam's friends call it subtlety, most call it vanity. Yet thanks are owed to authors from whose fount we draw.

Sicut autem regule utiles sunt et necessarie ad scientiam, sic
as however the-rules useful are and necessary for knowledge so
liber fere inutilis est ad frasim instruendam, quam nos uerbi
the-book almost useless is for phrasis to-be-equipped which we of-word
supellectilem possumus appellare. Est enim frasis commoda
the-furniture can to-call is for phrasis a-convenient
uerbi facilitas in quauis lingua. Ergo scientia memoriter est
of-word facility in any tongue therefore knowledge by-heart is
firmanda, et uerba pleraque excerpenda sunt; ea enim debet
to-be-made-firm and words very-many to-be-excerpted are that for ought
esse philosophantis cautela, ut uerborum intellectui semper
to-be of-the-philosopher the-caution that of-words on-the-understanding always
insistat, et preter hoc diligenter excerpat uerba que alio
be-insist and besides this diligently excerpt words which elsewhere
commode transferuntur et quorum potest esse frequentior
conveniently are-transferred and whose can to-be more-frequent
usus. Relique coequantur foliis sine fructu, et ob hoc
the-use the-rest are-equaled to-leaves without fruit and on-account-of this
aut calcantur aut sua relinquuntur in arbore. Unde qui
either they-are-trodden or their-own are-left on the-tree whence those-who
Aristotilem sequuntur in turbatione nominum et uerborum et
Aristotle follow in the-confusion of-nouns and of-verbs and

intricata subtilitate, ut suum uenditent, aliorum obtundunt
intricate subtlety that their-own they-may-sell of-others blunt
ingenia, partem pessimam michi preelegisse uidentur, quo
the-wits the-part worst to-me to-have-chosen seem with-which
quidem uitio Anglicus noster Adam michi pre ceteris uisus
indeed vice English our Adam to-me before others seemed
est laborasse in libro quem Artem Disserendi inscripsit. Et
has to-have-labored in the-book which the-Art of-Discoursing he-inscribed and
utinam bene dixisset bona que dixit; et licet familiares
would-that well he-had-said the-good-things which he-said and although the-familiars
eius et fautores hoc subtilitati asscribant, plurimi tamen
his and supporters this to-subtlety ascribe very-many however
hoc ex desipientia uel inuidentia uani, ut aiunt, hominis
this from folly or envy of-a-vain as they-say man
contigisse interpretati sunt. Adeo enim expressit Aristotilem
to-have-happened interpreted have so-far for he-expressed Aristotle
intricatione uerborum, ut sobrius auditor recte subiungat:
by-intricacy of-words that the-sober hearer rightly may-subjoin

Nonne hoc spumosum et cortice pingui,
surely-not this frothy and with-bark fat
ut ramale uetus pregrandi subere coctum?
as a-branch old with-huge cork dried

Habenda est tamen auctoribus gratia, quia de fonte eorum
to-be-had is however to-the-authors thanks because from the-fount their
haurientes labore ditamur alieno.
drawing by-labor we-are-enriched another's

Que sit libri primi conceptio

IV · THE SCHEME OF THE FIRST BOOK

The first book teaches truly and certainly what a dialectical or demonstrative proposition is, terms, perfect and imperfect syllogisms, conversion, the three figures with their moods, and then mixtures of modal premises. Aristotle nowhere that John has read treats modals sufficiently, but he teaches the method faithfully; expositors of Scripture find the modes very necessary, and usage governs what words mean, as contingent shows. The book closes with the power to syllogize and the reduction of syllogisms to the first figure.

Ceterum quod necesse est sciri, uerissime et certissime
however what necessary is to-be-known most-truly and most-certainly
traditur. Hoc equidem est, quid propositio dialectica aut
is-handed-down this indeed is what a-proposition dialectical or
demonstratiua; uniuersalis, particularis, aut indefinita; quid
demonstrative universal particular or indefinite what
terminus, predicatus uidelicet aut subiectus; quid sillogismus
a-term predicated namely or subject what a-syllogism
perfectus aut imperfectus; quid in toto esse aut non esse,
perfect or imperfect what in the-whole to-be or not to-be
quas propositiones ad usum sillogizandi conuerti contingat
which propositions for the-use of-syllogizing to-be-converted it-happen
et quas non; quidue optineat in his que modernorum usu
and which not or-what hold in those which of-the-moderns by-use
dicuntur esse de naturali materia aut contingenti aut remota.
are-said to-be about natural matter or contingent or remote
Quibus premissis, trium figurarum subnectit rationes, et
which set-before of-the-three figures he-subjoins the-reasons and
tam extremitatum quam medii diffinitione premissa,
as-much of-the-extremes as of-the-middle with-the-definition set-before
quot et qui modi in singulis figuris ex complexione
how-many and which modes in single figures from the-combination

extremitatum proveniant docet; data quidem semente rationis
of-the-extremes come he-teaches given indeed the-seed of-reason
eorum quos, sicut Boetius asserit, Teofrastus et Eudemus
of-those which as Boethius asserts Theophrastus and Eudemus
addiderunt. Deinde habita modalium ratione transit ad
added then had of-modals the-account he-passes to
commixtiones que de necessario sunt aut contingenti cum
the-mixtures which about the-necessary are or the-contingent with
his que sunt de inesse, ut quid ex his in singulis figuris
those which are about the-being-in that what from these in single figures
proueniat ostendatur. Nec tamen dico ipsum Aristotilem
come be-shown nor however do-I-say himself Aristotle
alicubi, quod legerim, nisi forte quod ad propositum,
anywhere that I-have-read unless perhaps what to the-purpose
de modalibus sufficienter egisse; sed procedendi de
about modals sufficiently to-have-treated but of-proceeding about
omnibus fidelissimam scientiam tradidit. Expositores uero
all-things the-most-faithful knowledge he-handed-down the-expositors indeed
diuine pagine rationem modorum pernecessariam esse
of-the-divine page the-account of-modes very-necessary to-be
dicunt; et modum, siue expressus siue tacitus sit, plurimum
say and the-mode whether expressed or silent it-be very-much
attendendum. Nam in hac: 'Quam perfecisti destruxerunt',
to-be-attended-to for in this which you-perfected they-destroyed
modus subticetur et intelligitur perinde ac si modus hic,
the-mode is-kept-silent and is-understood just as if the-mode here
'uoluntate' scilicet, apponeretur; ut ibi: 'Tenerum spe deuorat
by-will namely were-added as there the-tender in-hope he-devours
agnum'. Est enim modus, ut aiunt, quasi quidam medius
lamb is for a-mode as they-say as-if a-certain middle
habitus terminorum. Et profecto licet nullus modos omnes,
relation of-terms and surely although no-one the-modes all

unde modales dicuntur, singulatim enumerare sufficiat,
whence modals they-are-called singly to-enumerate suffice
quod quidem nec ars exigit, tamen magistri scolarum
which indeed neither art requires yet the-masters of-the-schools
inde commodissime disputant, et, ut pace multitudinis
thence most-conveniently dispute and that by-the-leave of-the-multitude
loquar, Aristotile ipso commodius. Opinor utique quod,
I-may-speak than-Aristotle himself more-conveniently I-think surely that
siue ob uerum modum siue ob solam formam
whether on-account-of the-true mode or on-account-of the-sole form
dicantur modales, earum apud plurimos Scripturarum locos
they-be-called modals of-them in very-many of-the-Scriptures places
necessaria est cognitio. Ceterum in his precipuam arbitror esse
necessary is the-knowledge however in these the-chief I-judge to-be
usus auctoritatem, qui sermonum auget et minuit, mutat aut
of-use the-authority which of-speeches increases and diminishes changes or
euacuat significationes. Quod patet in eo quod est contingens,
empties the-significations which is-plain in that which is contingent
cuius latissimus usus, quo possibili equabatur, in communi
whose widest use by-which to-the-possible it-was-equated in the-common
modernorum usu parietes scolarum nusquam egreditur. Ad hec
of-the-moderns use the-walls of-the-schools nowhere goes-out to these
subiungit unde idoneitas sillogizandi proveniat, quoniam parum
he-subjoins whence the-fitness of-syllogizing may-come since little
est generationem nosse sillogismorum, nisi quis et potentiam
it-is the-generation to-know of-syllogisms unless one also the-power
habeat faciendi. Sequitur ratio reducendi sillogismos in
have of-making there-follows the-account of-reducing syllogisms into
prime figure modos; et sic primi libri conceptio clauditur.
of-the-first figure the-modes and so of-the-first book the-conception is-closed

Que sit conceptio secundi

V · THE SCHEME OF THE SECOND BOOK

The second book treats what follows from a syllogism, true conclusions from false premises, circular and converted syllogisms, reduction to the impossible, syllogisms from opposites, begging the question, false cause, induction, example, objection, the probable and the sign, and the enthymeme. It ends on the knowledge of natures, a grand chapter that does not keep its promise: John has seen no one perfected by it.

Secundus autem transit ad rationem inferendi, que in formam
the-second however passes to the-account of-inferring which in the-form
conclusionis patet, adiciens quomodo ex falsis in secunda
of-the-conclusion lies-open adding how from false-things in the-second
et tertia figura uerum sillogizetur; quod eos forte preterit,
and third figure the-true is-syllogized which them perhaps escapes
qui ex falso nichil sequi contendunt. Deinde ad circulares
who from the-false nothing to-follow contend then to circular
progreditur sillogismos, et eos in omnibus figuris exequitur;
it-proceeds syllogisms and them in all figures pursues
tunc ad conuersiones sillogismorum in omni figura. Ut quidem
then to the-conversions of-syllogisms in every figure that indeed
imperfecti redeant ad perfectos, et omnium fides pariter
the-imperfect may-return to the-perfect and of-all the-faith equally
elucescat, ista precedunt. Que directe ratiocinationis
may-shine-forth these-things go-before which of-direct reasoning
forma est. Subiungitur ratio hipoteseos, que necessitate
the-form is there-is-subjoined the-account of-hypothesis which by-the-necessity
impossibilis euentus aut non probabilis propositum astruit.
of-an-impossible outcome or not probable the-proposed builds
Cuius quidem ratio est ut si concludenti non adquiescatur
of-which indeed the-account is that if to-the-concluder not there-be-assent

sumpta contradictoria conclusionis et altera concessarum,
taken the-contradictory of-the-conclusion and one of-the-granted
eisque in prima figura dispositis, colligatur oppositum alicuius
and-these in the-first figure arranged be-gathered the-opposite of-some
concessarum. Quod qualiter in omni figura fiat ostendit;
of-the-granted which how in every figure it-be-done he-shows
omnesque modos per impossibilem euentum ueros esse
and-all modes through an-impossible outcome true to-be
conuincit, Ad hec qualiter et in qua figura sillogizetur ex
proves to these how and in what figure it-be-syllogized from
propositionibus oppositis fideliter aperit. Adicit et regulam
propositions opposed faithfully he-opens he-adds also the-rule
petitionis principii, que speculatio tam demonstratori quam
of-the-begging of-the-principle which speculation as-much to-the-demonstrator as
dialectico satis accommodata est; licet hic probabilitate
to-the-dialectician enough suited is although this-one in-probability
gaudeat, ille ueritatem dumtaxat amplectatur. Preterea si
rejoice that-one truth only embrace besides if
non causa ponatur ut causa, puta, cum quis, non urgente
not cause be-posited as cause suppose when one not pressing
se ratione complexionis, ad impossible ductus esse
him the-reason of-the-combination to the-impossible led to-have-been
causatur, sed eo quod falsum aliquid positum fuerat.
pleads but by-that that false something posited had-been
Sequitur de causa false conclusionis, et catasillogismi,
there-follows about the-cause of-false conclusion and of-the-catasyllogism
et elenchi, et de fallacia secundum opinionem, et de
and of-the-elenchus and about fallacy according-to opinion and about
conuersione medii et extremorum, cuius tamen tota utilitas
the-conversion of-the-middle and of-the-extremes whose however whole utility
longe commodius tradi potest. Subiungitur ratio
far more-conveniently to-be-handed-down can there-is-subjoined the-account

reducende inductionis, quam dicit rethoricum sillogismum,
of-reducing induction which he-calls rhetorical syllogism
itidem et exempli, et de deductione. Deinde quid instantia,
likewise also of-example and about deduction then what objection
quid icos, quam propositionem probabilem dicit, etsi eius
what eikos which proposition probable he-calls although of-it
possit esse instantia, id est, non perpetuo optineat; ut matres
there-can to-be an-objection that is not perpetually it-hold as mothers
amare, nouercas inuidere. Quid item signum et quomodo
to-love stepmothers to-envy what likewise sign and how
entimema constet ex icotibus et signis. Postremo agit de
the-enthymeme consists from eikotes and signs lastly he-treats about
cognitione naturarum. Grande quidem capitulum et quod,
the-knowledge of-natures a-grand indeed chapter and which
licet aliquatenus proposito conferat, fidem tamen promissi
although to-some-extent to-the-purpose it-contribute the-faith however of-the-promise
nequaquam implet. Unum scio, me huius capituli beneficio
by-no-means fulfills one-thing I-know myself of-this chapter's by-the-benefit
neminem in cognitione naturarum uidisse perfectum.
no-one in the-knowledge of-natures to-have-seen perfect

De difficultate Posteriorum Analeticorum, et unde contingat

VI · THE DIFFICULTY OF THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, AND ITS CAUSES

The Posterior Analytics teaches demonstration, the hardest kind of reasoning and now almost out of use, since scarcely anyone but mathematicians demonstrates, and among them almost only geometers, whose art is rare among us except perhaps in Spain and on the border of Africa, where, as in Egypt and Arabia, it serves astronomy. The book is also far more confused than the rest, and so corrupted by scribes that it has almost as many obstacles as chapters; most blame the translator.

Posteriorum uero Analeticorum subtilis quidem scientia est
of-the-Posterior indeed Analytics subtle indeed the-knowledge is
et paucis ingeniis peruia; quod quidem ex causis pluribus
and to-few wits passable which indeed from causes several
euenire perspicuum est. Continet enim artem demonstrandi,
to-come-about evident is it-contains for the-art of-demonstrating
que pre ceteris rationibus disserendi ardua est. Deinde hec
which before the-other methods of-discoursing arduous is then this
utentium raritate iam fere in desuetudinem abiit, eo quod
of-users by-rarity now almost into disuse has-gone by-that that
demonstrationis usus uix apud solos mathematicos est; et
of-demonstration the-use scarcely among alone the-mathematicians is and
in his fere, apud geometras dumtaxat; sed et huius quoque
among these almost among the-geometers only but also of-this too
discipline non est celebris usus apud nos, nisi forte in tractu
discipline not is frequent the-use among us unless perhaps in the-region
Hibero uel confinio Affrice. Etenim gentes iste astronomie
Iberian or the-border of-Africa for nations these for-astronomy's
causa geometriam exercent pre ceteris; similiter Egyptus et
sake geometry practice before others likewise Egypt and
nonnulle gentes Arabie. Ad hec, liber quo demonstratiua
some nations of-Arabia to these the-book in-which the-demonstrative

traditur disciplina, ceteris longe turbatior est, et
is-handed-down discipline than-the-others far more-confused is and
transpositione sermonum, traiectione litterarum, desuetudine
by-transposition of-words by-transposition of-letters by-unfamiliarity
exemplorum, que a diuersis disciplinis mutuata sunt, et
of-examples which from diverse disciplines borrowed are and
postremo, quod non contingit auctorem, adeo scriptorum
lastly what not befits the-author so-far of-scribes
deprauatus est uitio, ut fere quot capita, tot obstacula
depraved it-is by-the-vice that almost as-many-as chapters so-many obstacles
habeat. Et bene quidem ubi non sunt obstacula capitibus
it-has and well indeed where not are obstacles than-chapters
plura. Unde a plerisque in interpretem difficultatis culpa
more whence by most on the-translator of-the-difficulty the-blame
refunditur, asserentibus librum ad nos non recte translatum.
is-poured-back asserting the-book to us not rightly translated

Quare Aristotiles nomen philosophi pre ceteris meruerit?

VII · WHY ARISTOTLE EARNED THE NAME OF PHILOSOPHER

Demonstration had such authority among the Peripatetics that Aristotle took the common name of philosopher as his own because he taught it, as Burgundio of Pisa told John. Demonstration dispels ignorance and often leads the Academics' doubt, which John professes, into light; having made his pupil a judge in the first books, Aristotle here raises him to the teacher's chair.

Fuit autem apud Peripateticos tante auctoritatis scientia
was however among the-Peripatetics of-such authority the-knowledge
demonstrandi ut Aristotiles, qui alios fere omnes et
of-demonstrating that Aristotle who others almost all and
fere in omnibus philosophos superabat, hinc commune
almost in all-things philosophers surpassed hence the-common

nomen sibi quodam proprietatis iure uendicaret, quod
name for-himself by-a-certain of-property right claimed that
demonstratiuam tradiderat disciplinam. Ideo enim, ut
the-demonstrative he-had-handed-down discipline for-this for as
aiunt, in ipso nomen philosophi sedit. Si michi non creditur,
they-say in him the-name of-philosopher sat if me not one-believes
audiatur uel Burgundio Pisanus, a quo istud accepi. Et,
let-be-heard even Burgundio of-Pisa from whom this I-received and
quoniam hec ignorantie tenebras pellit facitque quendam
since this of-ignorance the-darkness drives-away and-makes a-certain
prenoscendi prerogatiua scientem, sectam Academicorum,
of-foreknowing by-the-prerogative knower the-sect of-the-Academics
quam in his que sapienti dubitabilia sunt profitemur,
which in those which to-the-wise doubtful are we-profess
de caligine sua frequenter educit in lucem; et sicut
from darkness its-own frequently it-leads into light and as
in primis examinatorium cudens instruxit iudicem, sic
in the-first-books an-examining-tool forging he-equipped the-judge so
clientem suum Aristotiles in his ad docentis prouehit
client his-own Aristotle in these to of-the-teacher carries-forward
auctoritatem. Eleganti quidem ordine, quia qui recte implet
the-authority in-an-elegant indeed order because he-who rightly fulfills
iudicantis officium, merito ad docentis cathedram sullimatur.
of-the-judger the-office deservedly to of-the-teacher the-chair is-raised

De officio demonstratiue, et ex quibus sit demonstratio, et quomodo; et quod sensus scientie principium est, et quomodo

VIII · THE OFFICE OF DEMONSTRATION, ITS GROUNDS, AND SENSE

Someone may master demonstration in one discipline, but no one in many: it needs the principles of each discipline and an unbroken chain of necessary truths from first and immediate premises. Common conceptions come first. Demonstration also aids invention and claims only necessary places, leaving the rest to dialectic and rhetoric. Its knowledge begins in sense: from sense comes memory, from memories experience, from experience art.

Sed ad hanc disciplinam quis idoneus est? Profecto et si quis
but for this discipline who fit is surely even if one
in aliquo, eam in multis nullus perfecte assequitur. Necesse
in something it in many-things no-one perfectly attains necessary
enim est disciplinarum prenosse principia, et ex his ex
for it-is of-disciplines to-foreknow the-principles and from these from
necessitate uerorum sequelam colligere consertis rationibus et,
necessity of-true-things the-sequence to-gather with-joined reasons and
ut sic dixerim, calcatius urgendo, ne quis, quasi ex defectu
as so I-might-say more-tightly by-urging lest any as-if from defect
necessitatis, uideatur hiatus, qui demonstratiue scientie
of-necessity seem a-gap which to-demonstrative knowledge
preiudicium afferat. Non utique omnis scientia demonstratiua
prejudice may-bring not surely all knowledge demonstrative
est, sed illa dumtaxat que ex ueris et primis est et
is but that only which from true and first is and
immediatis. Nam sicut non omnis sillogismus demonstratio,
immediate-things for as not every syllogism demonstration
sed omnis demonstratio sillogismus est, sic demonstratiuam
but every demonstration syllogism is so demonstrative

scientia inconuertibiliter ambit. Communes itaque conceptiones
knowledge inconvertibly encircles common and-so conceptions
animi precedunt, deinde per se nota; et ex his
of-the-mind go-before then through themselves known and from these
demonstratiua exoritur. Refert autem in his que nota sunt,
the-demonstrative arises it-matters however in those which known are
an natura an ad nos notiora sint; nam proxima sensui
whether by-nature or to us better-known they-be for the-nearest to-sense
notiora nobis, remotiora vero, utpote uniuersalia, simpliciter
better-known to-us the-more-remote indeed as universals simply
et naturaliter notiora. Ex principiis itaque disciplinarum
and naturally better-known from the-principles and-so of-disciplines
per propositiones immediatas, id est que probatione non
through propositions immediate that is which of-proof not
indigent, ad id quo tendit uia est demonstratori. Et
are-in-need to that whither it-tends the-way is for-the-demonstrator and
licet ad iudicium maxime dicatur hec scientia pertinere,
although to judgment most be-said this knowledge to-pertain
inuentioni tamen plurimum confert. Docet enim ex quibus
to-invention however very-much it-contributes it-teaches for from what-things
et qualiter contingat demonstrare, et quando, et quomodo
and how it-happen to-demonstrate and when and how
propriis aut communibus sit utendum; nam scientie sibi
proper or common be to-be-used for sciences to-each-other
inuicem amminicula conferunt. Et quia non omnis locus
in-turn aids bring and since not every place
demonstratori commodus est (utpote ab accidente, eo
for-the-demonstrator convenient is as from accident by-that
quod corruptibilium nec demonstratio nec scientia simpliciter
that of-corruptible-things neither demonstration nor knowledge simply
est,) necessarios sibi uendicat locos, reliquos dialectico
is necessary for-itself it-claims places the-rest to-the-dialectician

cedit et oratori, quibus satisfactum est, si ueri
it-yields and to-the-orator for-whom satisfied it-is if to-the-true
simmillimus fiat sillogismus. Preterea quibus sillogismis
most-like be-made the-syllogism besides which syllogisms
quibusue propositionibus utendum sit aperit, et quam uim
or-which propositions to-be-used be it-opens and what force
in astruendo uel destruendo afferat propositionis quantitas
in building or destroying brings of-the-proposition the-quantity
aut qualitas diligenter inspecta; quis autem sillogismus, cui
or quality diligently inspected which however syllogism for-which
faciat questioni, queve sit figura sillogismo accommodata
makes question or-which be the-figure for-the-syllogism suited
pandit, et sic demonstrandi scientiam statuit, ac si sensu
it-lays-open and so of-demonstrating the-knowledge it-establishes as if by-sense
corporeo teneantur que ratio indubitata sic esse conuincit.
bodily were-held what reason undoubted so to-be proves
Communes enim conceptiones a singulorum inductione
common for conceptions from of-singulars the-induction
fidem sortiuntur. Impossibile enim est uniuersalia speculari
faith obtain impossible for it-is universals to-contemplate
non per inductionem; quoniam, ut ait, que ex
not through induction since as he-says those-which from
abstractione dicuntur, per inductiones nota fiunt. Inducere
abstraction are-said through inductions known become to-induce
autem non habentes sensum impossibile est. Singularium enim
however not having sense impossible it-is of-singulars for
sensus est; nec contingit ipsorum accipere scientiam, neque
sense is nor does-it-happen of-them to-receive knowledge neither
ex uniuersalibus sine inductione, nec per inductionem
from universals without induction nor through induction
sine sensu. Fit ergo ex sensu memoria; ex memoria
without sense there-becomes therefore from sense memory from memory

multorum sepius iterata experimentum; ab experimentis
of-many-things more-often repeated experience from experiences
scientie aut artis ratio manat. Porro ab arte, que usu
of-knowledge or of-art the-account flows further from art which by-use
et exercitatione firmata est, prouenit facultas exequendi ea
and exercise strengthened is comes the-faculty of-executing those
que ex arte gerenda sunt. Sic itaque sensus corporis, qui
which from art to-be-done are so and-so the-sense of-the-body which
prima uis aut primum exercitum anime est, omnium artium
the-first power or the-first exercise of-the-soul is of-all arts
preiacit fundamenta; et preexistentem format cognitionem,
lays-before the-foundations and preexisting forms knowledge
que primis principiis uiam non modo aperit, sed et parit.
which to-the-first principles the-way not only opens but also begets

Quid sensus; et quomodo omnis philosophie species ex ipso conualescat per imaginationem

IX · WHAT SENSE IS, AND HOW PHILOSOPHY GROWS FROM IT

Without sense there is no knowledge, or scarcely any: the physicist, the mathematician, and the logician all begin from what the senses witness. For Chalcidius sense is a passion of the body reaching the soul; for Aristotle it is a power of the soul roused by passions. Its stored images form memory, and turning them over begets imagination. Some make the soul one power used in many ways; more give it many powers, perhaps more than the books record.

Planum autem est hoc diligentius inspicienti per singula.
plain however is this more-diligently to-one-inspecting through single-things
Nam, cum sensus secundum Aristotilem sit naturalis potentia
for since sense according-to Aristotle be a-natural power
iudicatiua rerum, aut omnino non est aut uix est cognitio,
judging of-things either altogether not is or scarcely is knowledge

deficiente sensu; si quis opera nature, que ex elementis
with-failing sense if one the-works of-nature which from elements
uel materia constant et forma, pertractet cum phisico,
or matter consist and form handle with the-physicist
ratiocinandi uiam ab indicio sensuum mutuatur. Si uero
of-reasoning the-way from the-evidence of-the-senses he-borrows if indeed
cum mathematico figuras abstrahat aut numeros partiatur,
with the-mathematician figures he-abstract or numbers divide
discrete multitudinis aut continuorum corporum copiam
of-discrete multitude or of-continuous bodies the-abundance
fidelibus oculis ingerit. Philosophus quoque, qui rationalem
to-faithful eyes he-presents the-philosopher also who the-rational
exercet, qui etiam tam phisici quam mathematici cliens
practices who also as-much of-the-physicist as of-the-mathematician the-client
est, ab his incipit, que sensuum testimonio conualescunt
is from these begins which of-the-senses by-the-testimony grow-strong
et proficiunt ad intelligibilium incorporaliumque notitiam.
and advance to of-intelligible and-incorporeal-things knowledge
Est autem sensus, ut Calcidio placet, passio corporis ex
is however sense as to-Chalcidius it-pleases a-passion of-the-body from
quibusdam extra positis et uarie pulsantibus corpus usque
certain-things outside placed and variously striking the-body even
ad animam commeans. Nisi enim eadem aliquid uiolentie
to the-soul passing unless for the-same some of-violence
habeat, nec ad animam peruenit nec cadit in sensus
have neither to the-soul does-it-arrive nor falls into of-sense
formam. Si uero eadem passio grata est lenitate sui,
the-form if indeed the-same passion pleasing is by-the-smoothness of-itself
uoluptatem gignit, et si inualescit, gaudium nominatur;
pleasure it-begets and if it-grows-strong joy is-named
quod si asperitate sui exulcerat, dolorem gignit. Aristotiles
but if by-the-roughness of-itself it-ulcerates pain it-begets Aristotle

autem sensum potius uim anime asserit quam corporis
however sense rather a-power of-the-soul asserts than of-the-body
passionem. Sed hec eadem uis, ut iudicium suum de rebus
a-passion but this same power that judgment its-own about things
formet, passionibus excitatur. Et, quia res percipit, earundem
it-may-form by-passions is-roused and since things it-perceives of-the-same
apud se deponit imagines quarum retentione et frequenti
with itself it-lays-up the-images of-which by-retention and frequent
reuolutione quasi thesaurum memorie sibi format. Dum uero
revolving as-if a-treasury of-memory for-itself it-forms while indeed
rerum uoluit imagines, nascitur imaginatio; que non modo
of-things it-turns the-images is-born imagination which not only
preceptorum recordatur, sed ad eorum exempla conformanda
of-precepts remembers but to their examples to-be-shaped
sui uiuacitate progreditur. Quesitum tamen est an
of-itself by-liveliness proceeds asked however it-has-been whether
a sensu distet imaginatio naturaliter an solo percipiendi
from sense differ imagination naturally or by-the-sole of-perceiving
modo. Recolo enim fuisse philosophos quibus placuit,
mode I-recall for there-to-have-been philosophers to-whom it-pleased
sicut incorpoream simplicem et indiuiduam esse substantiam
as incorporeal simple and indivisible to-be the-substance
anime, ita et unam esse potentiam quam multipliciter pro
of-the-soul so also one to-be the-power which manifoldly according-to
rerum diuersitate exercet. Eorum ergo opinio est quod eadem
of-things the-diversity it-exercises their therefore opinion is that the-same
potentia nunc sentiat, nunc memoretur, nunc imaginetur; nunc
power now senses now remembers now imagines now
discernat inuestigando, nunc inuestigata assequendo intelligat.
discerns by-investigating now the-investigated by-attaining understands
Sed plures sunt e contrario sentientes animam quidem
but more are on the-contrary holding the-soul indeed

quantitate simplicem, sed qualitatibus compositam et, sicut
in-quantity simple but in-qualities composite and as
multis obnoxiam passionibus, sic multis potentiis utentem. Et
to-many subject passions so many powers using and
facile quidem crediderim plures esse quam eorum sit libris
easily indeed I-would-believe more to-be than of-them be in-the-books
expressum; cum anima, dum a Domino peregrinatur,
expressed since the-soul while from the-Lord it-sojourns-abroad
sue originis nimis ignara, uix uires suas agnoscat.
of-its-own origin too ignorant scarcely powers its-own recognizes

De imaginatione, et quod ex ipsa oriuntur affectiones quibus anima componitur aut turbata deturpatur

X · IMAGINATION, AND THE AFFECTIONS BORN FROM IT

Imagination springs from sense through memory and beholds even what is absent, as the poet recalls how she sat and spun, and Virgil's Andromache finds Astyanax's image in the boy before her. From present qualities it conceives the future: fear and hope arise, and thence desire, which no one can serve together with philosophy; delay breeds grief and anger. Imagination then begets caution, which can slide into fear or rashness.

Imaginatio itaque a radice sensuum per memorie fomitem
imagination and-so from the-root of-the-senses through of-memory the-tinder
oritur, et non modo presentia, sed et absentia, loco
arises and not only present-things but also absent-things in-place

quidem uel tempore, per quandam simplasim, quam nos
indeed or time through a-certain symplasis which we
conformationem possumus dicere, intuetur. Hinc est illud:
conformation can to-call beholds hence is that-saying

Sic sedit, sic culta fuit, sic stamina neuit,
so she-sat so adorned she-was so the-threads she-spun
iniecte collo sic decuere come.
cast on-her-neck so became-her her-locks

Quod autem abstractiua sit, innuit Maro, dum se sui
that however abstractive it-be hints Maro while herself of-her-own
Astianactis imaginem abstraxisse recordatione quadam
Astyanax the-image to-have-abstracted by-recollection a-certain
Andromache fatetur:
Andromache confesses

O michi sola mei super Astianactis imago!
O to-me sole of-my above Astyanax image
Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat,
so eyes so he hands so face bore
et nunc equali tecum pubesceret euo.
and now at-equal with-you would-be-growing-up age

Et quia, ut in Politia ait Plato, facile est assequi naturalia
and since as in the-Republic says Plato easy it-is to-attain natural
archana, ex his que frequenter accidunt, imaginem eorum
secrets from those which frequently happen an-image of-those
que future sunt, concipit ex qualitate eorum que presentialiter
which future are it-conceives from the-quality of-those which presently
sentit uel aliquando sensit. Ergo, si passionem asperam
it-senses or sometime has-sensed therefore if passion harsh

concipit de futuro, timor oritur; spes autem, si utilitate uel
it-conceives about the-future fear arises hope however if by-utility or
amenitate iocundam. Hinc nascitur et cupiditas, perniciosissima
by-pleasantness pleasant hence is-born also cupidity a-most-pernicious
pestis et que philosophandi proposito plurimum aduersatur;
plague and which of-philosophizing to-the-purpose very-much is-opposed
impossibile enim est quemquam cupiditati et philosophie
impossible for it-is anyone to-cupidity and to-philosophy
pariter operam dare. Mixta autem est ex contrariis, cum spes
equally effort to-give mixed however it-is of contraries since the-hope
fruendi uoluptatem pariat, sed dilatio tristitiam et dolorem;
of-enjoying pleasure begets but delay sadness and pain
que, si inualuerint, ut exordinent et turbent animam,
which if they-will-have-grown-strong so-that they-disorder and disturb the-soul
ex ea concussione fit ira. Itaque ad compescendos motus
from that shaking becomes anger and-so for checking motions
illicitos parit imaginatio cautelam, que nociua declinet;
unlawful begets imagination caution which harmful-things may-avoid
ut sunt ex quibus dolor, ira, cupiditas, et sequele
as are from which pain anger cupidity and the-consequences
istorum, puta inuidia, odium, detractio, luxuria, uanitas.
of-these suppose envy hatred detraction luxury vanity
Dum uero nimis cauet, ad formidinem; dum parum,
while indeed too-much it-is-cautious to fear while too-little
ad temeritatem accedit. Et in hunc modum ex sensu
to rashness it-approaches and in this way from sense
proueniunt cetera per imaginationis opem; ut amor,
come the-other-things through of-imagination the-help as love
qui ad tutelam corporis uel ad conseruationem utilium
which for the-protection of-the-body or for the-preservation of-useful-things
uel ad procurandam successionem plurimum operatur.
or for procuring succession very-much works

Quid imaginatio; et de opinione et de fallacia opinionis et sensus; et de ortu fronesis, quam nos prudentiam nominamus

XI · IMAGINATION, OPINION, AND THE ERRORS OF OPINION AND SENSE

Imagination is the first motion of the soul struck from outside. The first judgment is in sense, the second in imagination, and either is called opinion, true or false. Aristotle calls it a passion of the soul. The senses often deceive, as infants take every man for father and a stick looks broken in water; from the effort to hold something firm springs prudence.

Est igitur imaginatio primus motus anime extrinsecus pulsate,
is therefore imagination the-first motion of-the-soul from-outside struck
quo secundum exercetur iudicium aut per recordationem
by-which the-second is-exercised judgment or through recollection
redit primum. Primum enim iudicium uiget in sensu, dum
returns the-first the-first for judgment flourishes in sense while
aliquid album aut nigrum aut calidum aut frigidum esse
something white or black or hot or cold to-be
pronuntiat. Secundum uero imaginationis est; ut cum aliquid
it-pronounces the-second indeed of-imagination is as when something
perceptorum, retenta imagine, tale uel tale asserit, de
of-the-perceived-things with-retained image such or such it-asserts about
futuro iudicans uel remoto. Hoc autem alterutrius iudicium
the-future judging or the-remote this however of-either-one judgment
opinio appellatur; et est quidem certa, si prout se habent
opinion is-called and it-is indeed certain if as themselves they-have
de rebus iudicat; si uero aliter, infidelis. Hanc autem asserit
about things it-judges if indeed otherwise unfaithful this however asserts
Aristotiles anime passionem, eo quod, dum exercetur,
Aristotle of-the-soul a-passion by-that that while it-is-exercised

rerum imagines anime imprimantur; quod si una pro altera
of-things the-images on-the-soul are-impressed but if one for another
imprimatur, pro errore, quo fallitur in iudicio, fallax uel falsa
be-impressed for the-error by-which it-is-deceived in judgment deceitful or false
opinio nominatur. Nam sepissime falluntur sensus, non modo in
opinion it-is-named for very-often are-deceived the-senses not only in
paruulis, ubi ratio putatur otiosa, sed et in prouecta etate; quod
little-ones where reason is-thought idle but also in advanced age which
Aristotiles docens dicit ex eo contingere lactentes omnes uiros
Aristotle teaching says from this to-happen sucklings all men
putare patres, feminas autem matres, quod sensus rudis fallitur,
to-think fathers women however mothers that sense rough is-deceived
nec firmum potest afferre iudicium; baculus uero in aqua fractus
nor firm can to-bring judgment a-stick indeed in water broken
uidetur etiam perspicacissimis. Et quia sensuum fallaciam
seems even to-the-most-perspicacious and since of-the-senses the-fallacy
deprehendit, in eo agitatur ut et fidele aliquid teneat, cui
it-detects in that it-is-agitated that also faithful something it-may-hold on-which
sine errore fiducialiter possit inniti. Ab hac agitatione nascitur
without error confidently it-can to-rest from this agitation is-born
uirtus quam Greci fronesim, Latini prudentiam uocant.
the-virtue which the-Greeks phronesis the-Latins prudence call

Quid prudentia, que materia eius, que partes; et quomodo scientia ex sensu

XII · PRUDENCE, ITS MATTER AND PARTS, AND KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSE

Prudence, Cicero says, is the virtue that searches out truth, its matter. It looks to the future as providence, treasures the past in memory, grows skilled in the present, and spreads to all as circumspection; when it attains truth it becomes knowledge. So knowledge draws its origin from sense: senses make memory, memories experience, experiences rules, rules an art, and art a faculty.

Prudentia autem est, ut ait Cicero, uirtus anime, que in
prudence however is as says Cicero a-virtue of-the-soul which in
inquisitione et perspicientia sollertiaque ueri uersatur.
the-inquiry and discernment and-skill of-the-true is-occupied
Materia enim huius uirtutis, in qua exercetur, ueritas est;
the-matter for of-this virtue in which it-is-exercised truth is
reliquarum uero domestice quedam necessitates. Ne ergo
of-the-rest indeed domestic certain necessities lest therefore
undecumque fallatur, ad futura prospectum intendit et
from-anywhere it-be-deceived to future-things the-view it-directs and
prouidentiam format; uel, preterita ad mentem reuocans,
providence forms or the-past to the-mind recalling
thesaurizat memorie; uel de presentibus callet et astutie
treasures-up for-memory or about present-things is-skilled and of-astuteness
uel calliditatis speciem parit; aut se pariter ad uniuersa
or of-cunning the-species begets or itself equally to all-things
diffundit et ei circumspectio nascitur. Cum autem ueritatem
it-spreads and to-it circumspection is-born when however truth
fuerit assecuta, in speciem scientie transit. Ex his
it-will-have attained into the-species of-knowledge it-passes from these
patet quod, cum de sensu imaginatio, et ex his duobus
it-is-plain that since from sense imagination and from these two

opinio, et ex opinione prudentia nascatur, que in scientiam
opinion and from opinion prudence be-born which into knowledge
conualescit, quod scientia de sensu trahit originem. Nam, ut
grows-strong that knowledge from sense draws origin for as
dictum est, multi sensus aut etiam unus memoriam unam,
said it-has-been many senses or even one memory one
multe memorie experimentum, multa experimenta regulam,
many memories experience many experiences a-rule
multe regule reddiderunt unam artem, ars uero facultatem.
many rules have-rendered one art art indeed faculty

De differentia scientie et sapientie; et quid fides

XIII · KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM, AND WHAT FAITH IS

The ancients referred knowledge to temporal and sensible things, wisdom to spiritual ones. Knowledge so depends on sense that what is withdrawn from sense is not known, yet opinion can still be faithful, and opinion held as certain approaches faith, which Aristotle calls vehement opinion. Faith is needed in human and divine dealings alike and merits when it holds true articles. Master Hugh sets it above opinion and below knowledge.

Inde est quod maiores prudentiam uel scientiam ad
thence it-is that the-ancestors prudence or knowledge to
temporalium et sensibilium notitiam retulerint; ad
of-temporal and of-sensible-things the-knowledge referred to
spiritualium uero, intellectum uel sapientiam. Nam de
of-spiritual-things indeed understanding or wisdom for about
humanis scientia, de diuinis sapientia dici solet. Adeo
human-things knowledge about divine-things wisdom to-be-said is-wont so-much
autem de sensu scientia pendet, ut eorum que sensu sciuntur
however on sense knowledge hangs that of-those which by-sense are-known

non scientia sit, rebus a sensu subductis. Constat enim
not knowledge there-be with-things from sense withdrawn it-is-agreed for
hoc ab Aristotile. Potest tamen esse fidelis opinio; ut cum
this from Aristotle there-can however to-be faithful opinion as when
post noctem sol creditur rediturus. Unde, quia humana
after night the-sun is-believed about-to-return whence since human-things
transitoria sunt, certum opinionis de eisdem nequit esse
transitory are certain of-opinion about the-same cannot to-be
iudicium, nisi raro; si autem, quod non usquequaque certum
judgment except rarely if however what not everywhere certain
est pro certo statuatur, fit accessus ad fidem, quam
is for certain be-established there-comes approach to faith which
Aristotiles diffinit esse uehementem opinionem. Fides autem
Aristotle defines to-be vehement opinion faith however
tam in humanis quam in diuinis rebus maxime necessaria
as-much in human as in divine things most necessary
est; cum nec contractus sine ea celebrari inter homines
is since neither contracts without it to-be-celebrated among men
possent, aut aliqua exerceri commercia; inter Deum quoque
could or any to-be-exercised commerce between God also
et homines meritorum premiorumque nequit esse commercium,
and men of-merits and-of-rewards cannot to-be commerce
fide subtracta. Hec autem tunc habet meritum, cum
with-faith withdrawn this however then has merit when
ueros de religione tenet articulos et est, ut ait Apostolus,
the-true about religion it-holds articles and it-is as says the-Apostle
substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium.
the-substance of-things to-be-hoped-for the-argument not of-appearing-things
Est et media inter opinionem et scientiam, quoniam
it-is also middle between opinion and knowledge since
per uehementiam certum asserit, ad cuius certitudinem
through vehemence the-certain it-asserts to whose certainty

per scientiam non accedit. Unde magister Hugo: Fides
through knowledge not it-approaches whence master Hugh faith
est uoluntaria certitudo absentium, supra opinionem, infra
is a-voluntary certainty of-absent-things above opinion below
scientiam constituta. Sed hic scientie nomen dilatatum
knowledge established but here of-knowledge the-name widened
est, et usque ad diuinorum comprehensionem protenditur.
has-been and even to of-divine-things the-comprehension is-extended

De cognatione fronesis et alicie; et de ortu fronesis, et quid ratio

XIV · PHRONESIS AND ALETHIA, AND WHAT REASON IS

Since truth is prudence's matter, the ancients made Phronesis and Alethia sisters. Human weakness, misled by the senses and opinions and remembering that it has been deceived, seeks firm perception and undoubted judgment, which can be called reason, since reason's examination is ratified and firm. So Phronesis bears Philology, the love of the true. Like philosophy, the name is modest: loving reason is easier than exercising it, which few do.

Et quia ueritas prudentie materia est (nam in ueri
and since truth of-prudence the-matter is for in of-the-true
comprehensione laborat) finxerunt antiqui Fronesin et Aliciam
the-comprehension it-labors feigned the-ancients Phronesis and Alethia
esse germanas, eo quod prudentie cum ueritate est
to-be sisters by-that that of-prudence with truth there-is
quedam diuina cognatio. Inde est quod ab aspectu ueritatis
a-certain divine kinship thence it-is that from the-sight of-truth
prudentia, si perfecta est, nequit arceri; uerum, quia hoc
prudence if perfect it-is cannot to-be-kept-off but since this
hominum non est, latens uerum auide querit infirma conditio.
of-men not is the-hidden truth eagerly seeks the-weak condition

Et quidem propter fallacias sensuum et opinionum, uix in
and indeed on-account-of the-fallacies of-the-senses and of-opinions scarcely in
eius inuestigatione fideliter incedit; uix est in comprehensione
its investigation faithfully it-advances scarcely it-is in comprehension
secura; recolit enim se deceptam esse et posse decipi.
secure it-recalls for itself deceived to-have-been and to-be-able to-be-deceived
Sollicitatur ergo ut firma perceptione gaudeat indubitatoque
it-is-solicited therefore that in-a-firm perception it-may-rejoice and-in-undoubted
iudicio, quod potest ratio appellari; siquidem ratum et
judgment which can reason to-be-called since ratified and
firmum est rationis examen. Philologiam ergo parit
firm is of-reason the-examination Philology therefore bears
Fronesis, dum amor ueri sollicitat prudentiam ad notitiam
Phronesis while the-love of-the-true solicits prudence to the-knowledge
rerum, de quibus ferri uult sincerum firmumque
of-things about which to-be-passed it-wishes sincere and-firm
iudicium. Et est 'philologia', sicut 'philosophia', nomen
judgment and it-is philology as philosophy a-name
temperatum; quia, sicut appetere quam habere sapientiam
tempered because as to-seek than to-have wisdom
facilius est, sic amare quidem quam exercere rationem. Ratio
easier is so to-love indeed than to-exercise reason reason
enim, id est sincera iudicii firmitudo, paucorum est.
for that is the-sincere of-judgment firmness of-few is

Item quid ratio; et quod nomen rationis multiplex est; et quod rationes sempiterne

XV · REASON AGAIN, AND THE ETERNAL REASONS

Struck by the senses and shaken by prudence, the soul gathers its powers to avoid the tricks of the senses and opinions; this power is reason, which judges both bodily and incorporeal things. Its judgment is also called reason, and so are the things it alone judges, which Augustine calls everlasting: the decree of God's wisdom, the truths of the Trinity, and the ratio of two to three.

Anima itaque pulsata sensibus et prudentie sollicitudine
the-soul and-so struck by-the-senses and of-prudence by-the-anxiety
ualidius concussa seipsam exerit, collectisque in unum
more-strongly shaken itself puts-forth and-gathered into one
uiribus, dolos sensuum et opinionum studet intentius
its-powers the-tricks of-the-senses and of-opinions it-strives more-intently
declinare. Sua uero intentione perspicacius uidet, firmius
to-avoid by-its-own indeed intention more-keenly it-sees more-firmly
tenet, et sincerius iudicat. Et hec est uis, que ratio
holds and more-sincerely judges and this is the-power which reason
nominatur; siquidem ratio est potentia spiritualis nature,
is-named since reason is a-power of-spiritual nature
discretiua rerum corporalium et incorporalium, que res
discerning of-things bodily and incorporeal which things
appetit firmo et sincero examinare iudicio. Ipsum quoque
it-seeks with-firm and sincere to-examine judgment the-very also
iudicium eius censetur nomine rationis. Sed et illa censentur
judgment its is-reckoned by-the-name of-reason but also those are-reckoned
rationes, de quibus sola ratio iudicat, et quorum essentia
reasons about which alone reason judges and whose essence
a sensibilium singulariumque natura disiuncta est. Has
from of-sensible and-of-singular-things the-nature disjoined is these

pater Augustinus et multi alii asserunt sempiternas. Hec
father Augustine and many others assert everlasting these
autem sunt in quibus ab initio et sine initio eterne
however are in which from the-beginning and without beginning of-the-eternal
constitutionis decretum et sue dispositionis seriem sanxit
constitution the-decree and of-its-own disposition the-series sanctioned
ratio primitiua, quam si dixero sapientiam Dei, utique
reason primeval which if I-shall-have-called the-wisdom of-God surely
non errabo. Infinita quidem huiusmodi uel in ipsis ueris
not I-shall-err infinite indeed of-this-kind even in the-very true-things
palam est inuenire; nam Deum esse Deum, et Patrem habere
plain it-is to-find for God to-be God and the-Father to-have
Filium, et Spiritum sanctum utrique consubstantialem esse,
a-Son and the-Spirit holy to-both consubstantial to-be
nonnichil utique sunt hec enuntiabilia, sed ab eterno uera, et
something surely are these enunciables but from eternity true and
diuino firma iudicio; et non modo in ueris, sed in aliis, hoc
by-divine firm judgment and not only in true-things but in others this
ipsum liquet; cum ratio duorum ad tria, et item trium ad
very-thing is-clear since the-ratio of-two to three and likewise of-three to
duo, et in hunc modum plurima, auctore Augustino,
two and in this way very-many-things by-the-authority-of Augustine
sempiterna sunt. Quod si cui uideatur absurdum, librum
everlasting are but if to-anyone it-seem absurd the-book
eius de Libero Arbitrio legat, et ita esse constabit.
his on Free Choice let-him-read and so to-be it-will-be-agreed

Distinctio multiplicitatis; et quod bruta non habent rationem, etsi discernere uideantur; et unde homo eam sortitus sit iuxta Hebreos

XVI · BRUTES HAVE NO REASON, THOUGH THEY DISCERN

Cassiodorus calls reason a motion of mind leading from the known to the unknown; Plato calls it the soul's deliberative power. Beasts discern food and danger but do not reason, since, as the Hebrews say, God breathed into man alone a share in divine reason. Sense grasps bodies; reason transcends sense and contemplates all. Seneca's part of the divine Spirit either follows the pagans' World Soul or, read kindly, means a part in power, not quantity.

Cassiodorus uero in libro de Anima tali utitur diffinitione:
Cassiodorus indeed in the-book on the-Soul such uses definition
Rationem dico animi probabilem motum, qui per ea
reason I-call of-the-mind a-probable motion which through those
que conceduntur et nota sunt ad aliquid incognitum ducit,
which are-granted and known are to something unknown leads
perueniens ad ueritatis archanum. Ergo et potentia et
arriving at of-truth the-secret therefore both the-power and
potentie motus ratio appellatur. Hunc autem motum asserit
of-the-power the-motion reason is-called this however motion asserts
Plato in Politia uim esse deliberatiuam anime, que
Plato in the-Republic the-power to-be deliberative of-the-soul which
quid honestum uel utile sit appetendumue aut fugiendum,
what honorable or useful be or-to-be-sought or to-be-fled
pensatis rerum speciebus specierumque causis, iudicio fideli
with-weighed of-things the-species and-of-the-species the-causes by-judgment faithful
examinat. Habent enim et bruta animalia uim quodam
examines have for also brute animals a-power in-a-certain
modo discretiuam, qua discernunt cibos, declinant insidias,
way discerning by-which they-discern foods avoid ambushes

precipitia transiliunt, necessitudinem recognoscunt; non
precipices leap-over kinship recognize not
tamen rationem exercent, sed naturali appetitu uigent et
however reason they-exercise but by-natural appetite they-flourish and
imaginantur pleraque, sed causas rerum discutere nequaquam
imagine very-many-things but the-causes of-things to-discuss by-no-means
possunt. Quod quidem ex eo prouenire dicunt Hebrei,
they-can which indeed from this to-come say the-Hebrews
quod cum, Domino disponente, ab initio creaturarum
that when with-the-Lord disposing from the-beginning of-creatures
cetera coaluerint, et fotu caloris et humoris sortita
the-others grew-together and by-the-fostering of-heat and of-moisture obtained
sint spiritum naturalem, animalem, sensibilem, ex quibus
have spirit natural animal sensible from which
oriuntur appetitus et imaginatio, quam habent bruta, solus
arise appetite and imagination which have brutes alone
homo assecutus est uim efficacius et sincerius disserendi,
man attained has the-power more-effectively and more-sincerely of-discoursing
quod ei uitam inspirans Deus diuine rationis uoluit esse
because into-him life breathing God of-divine reason willed to-be
participem. Hominis uero spiritus, quoniam a Deo datus et
a-partaker of-man indeed the-spirit since by God given and
ad Deum redituruus est, solus diuina meditatur, et in
to God about-to-return is alone divine-things meditates and in
eo fere solo ceteris animalibus prestat. Res enim corporeas
this almost alone than-other animals excels things for bodily
non modo imaginatio sed sensus comprehendit; ad hec et
not only imagination but sense comprehends to these also
rerum corporalium formas, ueram quoque ipsam coherentiam
of-things bodily the-forms true also the-very coherence
discoherentiamque pro parte cognoscit. Sensus enim uidet
and-incoherence in part it-knows sense for sees

hominem, rem utique corporalem; uidet colores et motus,
a-man a-thing surely bodily it-sees colors and motions
formas utique corporalium; uidet etiam hominem mouere
forms surely of-bodily-things it-sees also a-man to-move
manum, quod quidem amplius est quam uidere hominem
a-hand which indeed more is than to-see a-man
mouentem, id est qui mouet manum. Quod si cui
moving that is who moves a-hand but if to-anyone
mirum est, adquiescat uel Augustino. Porro ratio transcendit
strange it-is let-him-assent even to-Augustine further reason transcends
omnem sensum, et iudicium suum etiam in corporalibus et
all sense and judgment its-own even in bodily and
spiritualibus rebus immergit. Contemplatur omnia inferiora
spiritual things plunges it-contemplates all lower-things
et ad superiora prospectum intendit. Rationi Hebreorum
and to higher-things the-view directs with-the-reason of-the-Hebrews
consentit Senece diffinitio, etsi ille aliud senserit. Ait
agrees of-Seneca the-definition although he another-thing thought he-says
enim; Ratio est quedam pars diuini Spiritus humanis
for reason is a-certain part of-the-divine Spirit in-human-things
immersa corporibus. Quod tamen aut errori Gentilium
plunged bodies which however either to-the-error of-the-Gentiles
accommodandum est, qui Animam Mundi in animas
to-be-accommodated is who the-Soul of-the-World into souls
singulas discerptam opinabantur, ipsamque mentiebantur esse
single torn-apart thought and-it they-lyingly-said to-be
Spiritum sanctum; aut benignius interpretandum est ut
the-Spirit holy or more-kindly to-be-interpreted is so-that
pars non in quantitate, sed in uirtute dicta credatur. Nam,
part not in quantity but in power said be-believed for
ut uerbi figuram exprimeret, adiecit quedam. Licet enim
that of-the-word the-figure he-might-express he-added certain although for

ratio quodammodo uirtus diuina sit, nequaquam tamen pars
reason in-a-way a-power divine be by-no-means however a-part
eius est, qui absolutissime simplicitatis est.
of-him is who of-most-absolute simplicity is

De officio rationis, et quare sensus in capite, quibus ratio presidet; et quas pedissequas habeat Philologia

XVII · THE OFFICE OF REASON, AND THE SENSES IN THE HEAD

Reason, divine in origin, is to be cultivated above all, since it orders unruly motions to the norm of goodness, and he who refuses it walks lame through life, as Plato says. Nature set the senses in the head like a senate and reason as mistress in the citadel between imagination and memory. Prudence bears Philology, attended by Periergia and Agrimnia; earthly in origin, she is deified when she passes to divine things.

Cum ergo ratio origine diuina nobilitetur et diuino
since therefore reason by-origin divine is-ennobled and with-divine
polleat exercitio, eam super omnia colendam esse totius
prevails exercise it above all-things to-be-cultivated to-be of-the-whole
philosophie decreto sancitum est. Hec enim inordinatos
philosophy by-the-decree sanctioned it-is this for the-disordered
motus compescit et ad normam bonitatis componit uniuersa,
motions checks and to the-norm of-goodness composes all-things
ut nichil sit quod ordinationi diuine repugnet, cui si quis
so-that nothing be which to-the-ordination divine is-repugnant which if anyone
obtemperat, felici processu peraget euum; si detrectat, ut
obeys in-happy progress he-will-complete life if he-refuses as
in Thimeo ait Plato, claudum iter uite et mancum serpens,
in the-Timaeus says Plato a-lame journey of-life and maimed creeping

cum familiari stultitia demum reuocatur ad inferna. Agit
with familiar folly at-last he-is-recalled to the-lower-world it-conducts
hec corporis curam et anime et utrumque componit.
this of-the-body the-care and of-the-soul and both composes
Qui uero utrumque contemnit, mancus et debilis est; qui
he-who indeed both despises maimed and weak is he-who
alterum, claudus. Et quia sensuum examinatrix est, qui
the-one lame and since of-the-senses the-examiner it-is which
ob fallendi consuetudinem possunt esse suspecti, natura
on-account-of of-deceiving the-habit can to-be suspect nature
optima parens omnium, uniuersos sensus locans in capite,
the-best parent of-all all the-senses placing in the-head
uelut quendam senatum in Capitolio anime, rationem quasi
as-if a-certain senate in the-Capitol of-the-soul reason as-if
dominam in arce capitis statuit; mediam quidem sedem
mistress in the-citadel of-the-head established the-middle indeed seat
tribuens inter cellam phantasticam et memorialem, ut uelut
assigning between the-cell fantastic and the-memorial so-that as-if
e specula sensuum et imaginationum possit examinare
from a-watchtower of-the-senses and of-imaginations it-can to-examine
iudicia; proinde quidem, quia hec ipsa uis, etsi diuina
the-judgments accordingly indeed since this very power although divine
sit, quasi quodam sensuum et imaginationum uentilabro
it-be as-if by-a-certain of-the-senses and of-imaginations winnowing-fan
excitatur, et quia prudentia ad inuestigationem ueri querit
is-roused and since prudence for the-investigation of-the-true seeks
rationis sincerum examen ei Philologiam parit, quam
of-reason sincere examination to-her Philology she-bears whom
due pedisseque, Periergia et Agrimnia, iugiter prosequuntur.
two handmaids Periergia and Agrimnia continually follow
Est autem Periergia que laborem circuit operis, Agrimnia,
is however Periergia who the-labor goes-round of-the-work Agrimnia

uigilans diligentia, que exercitium temperat, ne quid nimis;
watching diligence which exercise tempers lest anything too-much
amor enim otiosus non est. Habet enim terrenam et
love for idle not is has for earthly and
mortalem Philologia originem; sed, cum ad diuina transit,
mortal Philology origin but when to divine-things she-passes
immortalitate quadem deificatur. Quia cum prudentia, que
with-immortality a-certain she-is-deified because when prudence which
de terrenis est et rationis amor, ad incorrupte ueritatis
about earthly-things is and of-reason the-love to of-uncorrupted truth
diuinorumque archana consurgit, in sapientiam transiens,
and-of-divine-things the-secrets rises into wisdom passing
quodammodo a mortalium conditione eximitur.
in-a-way from of-mortals the-condition it-is-exempted

De differentia rationis et intellectus; et quid intellectus

XVIII · REASON AND UNDERSTANDING, AND WHAT UNDERSTANDING IS

As reason surpasses sense, understanding surpasses reason, as Plato says: it attains what reason investigates and treasures for wisdom what reason prepared. Understanding is the highest power of spiritual nature, holding the causes of all reasons naturally perceptible to it. Some divine reasons surpass all sense of men and angels; Plato says understanding belongs to God alone and to very few chosen men.

Qua uero proportione ratio transcendit sensum, ea, sicut
in-what indeed proportion reason transcends sense in-that as
Plato in Politia auctor est, excedit intellectus rationem.
Plato in the-Republic author is exceeds understanding reason
Nam intellectus assequitur quod ratio inuestigat; siquidem in
for understanding attains what reason investigates since into
labores rationis intrat intellectus, et sibi ad sapientiam
the-labors of-reason enters understanding and for-itself toward wisdom

thesaurizat quod ratio preparans adquisiuit. Est itaque
treasures-up what reason preparing acquired is and-so
intellectus suprema uis spiritualis nature, que, humana
understanding the-highest power of-spiritual nature which human-things
continens, et diuinas penes se causas habet omnium
containing and divine with itself the-causes has of-all
rationum naturaliter sibi perceptibilium. Sunt enim que
reasons naturally to-itself perceptible there-are for those-which
exuperant omnem sensum tam hominum quam angelorum
surpass all sense as-much of-men as of-angels
diuine rationes. Et nonnulle aliis plus aut minus pro
divine reasons and some to-others more or less according-to
diuine dispensationis decreto innotescunt. Hunc solius Dei
of-divine dispensation the-decree become-known this alone of-God
esse et admodum paucorum hominum selectorum asserit Plato.
to-be and very of-few men chosen asserts Plato

Quid sapientia, et quod ipsa de sensu per gratiam

XIX · WISDOM COMES FROM SENSE THROUGH GRACE

Wisdom follows understanding and, John thinks, is named from the savor of the good in divine things; the Fathers refer knowledge to the active life and wisdom to the contemplative. Retracing the steps, wisdom too flows from the senses, grace leading: fear, which begins wisdom, arises from sense and imagination, then piety, knowledge, fortitude, counsel, understanding, and wisdom. Not nature but grace works these steps and unites man with God.

Sapientia uero sequitur intellectum, eo quod diuina de
wisdom indeed follows understanding by-that that divine-things from
his rebus quas ratio discutit, intellectus excerpsit, suauem
those things which reason discusses understanding has-excerpted sweet

habent gustum et in amorem suum animas intelligentes
have taste and into love their-own souls understanding
accendunt. Nam et ex eo sapientiam dici reor, quod
kindle for also from this wisdom to-be-called I-think that
boni saporem habeat in diuinis. Unde Patres scientiam
of-good the-savor it-have in divine-things whence the-Fathers knowledge
referunt ad actiuam, ad contemplatiuam uero sapientiam.
refer to the-active to the-contemplative indeed wisdom
Patet ex his quod, si quis premissos gradus recenseat,
it-is-plain from these that if anyone the-aforesaid steps review
de scaturigine sensuum etiam sapientiam, preeunte et
from the-gushing-spring of-the-senses even wisdom going-before and
opitulante gratia, uidebit emanare. Et, ut prophetico
helping grace he-will-see to-flow-out and that in-prophetic
testimonio gaudeamus, timor ipse, qui est initium sapientie,
testimony we-may-rejoice fear itself which is the-beginning of-wisdom
de sensu uel imaginatione pene contingit. Qui, cum
from sense or imagination almost happens which when
sollicitetur, ne uapulet, punientis habens memoriam, ipsius
it-is-solicited lest it-be-beaten of-the-punisher having memory his
declinat offensam; premiorum quoque sensu uel imaginatione
avoids offense of-rewards also by-sense or imagination
ad obsequium punire et beare potentis incitatur. Pietatem
to the-obedience to-punish and to-bless of-the-one-able it-is-roused piety
ergo exercuit qui declinat offensam, sed per experientiam
therefore has-exercised he-who avoids offense but through experience
obsequii scientiam assecutus est; hec enim actionis est. Si
of-obedience knowledge attained has this for of-action is if
uero assuescat experientie, ex consuetudine gerendorum
indeed it-grow-accustomed to-experience from the-habit of-things-to-be-done
prouenit fortitudo. Ut autem obsequium rationabile, quod
comes fortitude that however obedience reasonable which

gratissimum est, prestet, consilium deliberationis super
most-pleasing is it-may-furnish counsel of-deliberation about
actis uel agendis oboritur. Deliberationem sequitur
things-done or to-be-done arises deliberation follows
intellectus, meliorem partem retinens in sinu suo; uersatur
understanding the-better part retaining in bosom its-own it-is-occupied
enim in diuinis, quorum gustus et amor et inherentia uera
for in divine-things whose taste and love and inherence true
demum sapientia est. Hos tamen gradus non operatur natura,
at-last wisdom is these however steps not works nature
sed gratia, que de fonte sensuum pro arbitrio suo
but grace which from the-fount of-the-senses according-to judgment its-own
elicit uarios riuulos scientiarum et sapientie; inuisibilia Dei
draws various streams of-sciences and of-wisdom the-invisible-things of-God
per ea que facta sunt manifestat, et manifestata quadam
through those which made are manifests and the-manifested with-a-certain
caritatis unitate communicat, et hominem Deo unit.
of-charity unity communicates and man to-God unites

De cognitione anime, et simplicitate et immortalitate secundum Ciceronem

XX · THE SOUL SIMPLE AND IMMORTAL, AFTER CICERO

Some petty philosophers deny any knowledge but of sensibles, which destroys reason's work. Cicero in the Tusculans says it takes a great mind to recall the mind from the senses: as God is known from his works, the mind is known by its memory and invention, simple and unmixed, and so indivisible and immortal. Those who want more should read Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, the Fathers, and Claudianus.

Unde et quidam minuti philosophi, eo quod a sensibus
whence also certain petty philosophers by-that that from the-senses
ad scientiam sit processus, nisi eorum que sentiuntur ullam
to knowledge be the-progress except of-those which are-sensed any
negant esse scientiam. Quod quantum philosophandi proposito
deny to-be knowledge which how-much of-philosophizing to-the-purpose
aduersetur perspicuum est. Perit enim exercitium rationis,
be-opposed evident is perishes for the-exercise of-reason
quo rerum apud se notiones, quas Greci ennoias dicunt,
by-which of-things with itself the-notions which the-Greeks ennoiai call
querit et tenet; sine quo nec nomen constare potest. Est
it-seeks and holds without which not-even the-name to-stand can it-is
ergo, ut ait Cicero in Tusculanis, magni ingenii reuocare
therefore as says Cicero in the-Tusculans of-great wit to-recall
mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine
the-mind from the-senses and thought from habit
abducere. Nec enim Deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio
to-lead-away nor for God himself who is-understood by us in-another
modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quidem sit et
way to-be-understood can unless the-mind loosed indeed it-be and
libera et segregata ab omni concretione mortali. Singularis
free and set-apart from all concretion mortal singular

est quedam natura atque uis animi, seiuncta ab his
is a-certain nature and power of-the-mind separated from these
usitatis notisque naturis; quicquid illud sit, profecto diuinum
usual and-known natures whatever that be surely divine
est. Non ualet tamen animus ut plene seipsum uideat. —
it-is not avails however the-mind that fully itself it-see
Sed ut oculus, sic animus, se non uidens, alia cernit. —
but as the-eye so the-mind itself not seeing other-things discerns
Non uidet autem quod minimum est, formam suam fortasse.
not it-sees however what least is form its-own perhaps
— Quamquam id quoque; sed hec relinquamus; uim
although that also but these-things let-us-leave its-force
certe, sagacitatem, memoriam, motum, celeritatem uidet. Hec
certainly sagacity memory motion swiftness it-sees these
magna, hec diuina, hec sempiterna sunt. Qua facie quidem
great these divine these everlasting are with-what face indeed
sit aut ubi habitet, ne querendum est quidem. Itaque sic
it-be or where it-dwell not-even to-be-asked it-is indeed and-so so
mentem hominis, quamuis eam non uideas, ut Deum non
the-mind of-man although it not you-see as God not
uides; tamen, ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus eius; sic ex
you-see yet as God you-recognize from works his so from
memoria rerum et inuentione et celeritate motus omnique
memory of-things and invention and swiftness of-motion and-all
pulcritudine uirtutis, uim diuinam mentis agnoscito. In
beauty of-virtue the-force divine of-the-mind recognize in
animi autem cognitione dubitare non possumus, nisi plane
of-the-soul however the-knowledge to-doubt not we-can unless plainly
in phisicis plumbei simus, quin nichil sit animis admixtum,
in physics leaden we-be that nothing be with-souls mixed
nichil concretum, nichil copulatum, nichil coaumentatum,
nothing concrete nothing coupled nothing joined-together

nichil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni,
nothing double which since so it-be certainly neither to-be-separated
nec diuidi, nec discerpi, nec distrahi potest; igitur
nor to-be-divided nor to-be-torn-apart nor to-be-drawn-apart can-it therefore
nec interire. Hec ille in Tusculanis, ut et uim
nor perish these-things he in the-Tusculans so-that both the-power
deliberatiuam, rationem scilicet, diuinam quidem, et animas
deliberative reason namely divine indeed and the-souls
hominum esse immortales doceat. Hec quidem de
of-men to-be immortal he-may-teach these-things indeed about
passione sensuum et uiribus et dignitate anime multa
the-passion of-the-senses and the-powers and dignity of-the-soul with-much
breuitate perstricta sunt, ut constaret quia, ut ait
brevity touched-on are that it-might-be-agreed that as says
Aristotiles, ars siue scientia originem trahit a sensu. Si
Aristotle art or knowledge origin draws from sense if
quis enim uellet de uiribus anime copiosius disputare,
anyone for wished about the-powers of-the-soul more-copiously to-dispute
materia subtilis, ingenium acutum, capacem memoriam, et
matter subtle wit sharp capacious memory and
expeditum otium querens, cum studio diligenti in maximorum
free leisure requiring with study diligent into of-the-greatest
uoluminum quantitatem erumperet. Qui uero naturam
volumes the-quantity he-would-burst-forth those-who indeed the-nature
anime diligentius inuestigare uoluerint, non modo Platonis,
of-the-soul more-diligently to-investigate will-have-wished not only of-Plato
Aristotilis, Ciceronis, et ueterum philosophorum scripta
of-Aristotle of-Cicero and of-the-ancient philosophers the-writings
reuoluant, sed Patrum qui ueritatem fidelius expresserunt.
let-them-unroll but of-the-Fathers who the-truth more-faithfully expressed
Nam et doctores Ecclesie et post eos Claudianus et alii
for both the-doctors of-the-Church and after them Claudianus and other

moderniores de anima multa scripserunt, quos si quis
more-modern-ones about the-soul many-things wrote which if anyone
non potest euoluere, uel Prenonphisicon legat, librum de
not can to-unroll even the-Prenonphysicon let-him-read a-book about
anima copiosissime disputantem. Eum tamen aliis omnibus
the-soul most-copiously disputing it however to-others all
non prepono. Sed hec hactenus; nunc ad propositum
not I-prefer but these-things thus-far now to the-purpose
redeamus.
let-us-return

Quod in precedentibus, etsi non sufficienter, Aristotiles aliquod ypotheticarum seminarium dedit

XXI · THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM, INSUFFICIENTLY TREATED

The preceding books teach dialectic and demonstration but say little of hypothetical syllogisms, though Aristotle left a seed that Boethius and others tried, imperfectly, to grow: the moods from positing the antecedent or destroying the consequent, the figures of composite hypotheticals, and disjunctions. Perhaps Aristotle left the labor on purpose, since the most diligent book on it seems more difficult than useful, and his own would have needed the Sibyl. The schools' supplements are very useful.

Dialecticam et apodicticam, quam nos demonstratiuam
dialectic and apodictic which we demonstrative
dicimus, precedentia docent; in his tamen de ipoteticis
call the-preceding teach in these however about hypothetical
syllogismis nichil aut parum est actitatum. Seminarium
syllogisms nothing or little has-been treated a-seed-bed
tamen datum est ab Aristotile, ut et istuc per industriam
however given has-been by Aristotle that also thither through the-industry
aliorum possit esse processus. Cum enim tam probabilium
of-others there-could to-be progress since for as-much of-probable-things

quam necessariorum loci monstrati sint, ostensum
as of-necessary-things the-places shown have-been shown
est quid ex quo sequitur probabiliter aut necessario.
it-has-been what from what follows probably or necessarily
Quod quidem ad ypoteticarum indicium maxime spectat, ut
which indeed to of-hypotheticals the-judgment most looks as
arbitror, ut consequentia constet. Preterea Boetius hoc pro
I-judge that the-consequence stand besides Boethius this for
seminio inueniendorum dicit acceptum, quod Aristotiles ait in
a-seed of-things-to-be-found says taken that Aristotle says in
Analeticis: Idem, cum sit et non sit, non necesse est idem
the-Analytics the-same when it-is and not it-is not necessary it-is the-same
esse. Ergo ipse et alii aliquatenus suppleverunt imperfectum
to-be therefore he and others to-some-extent supplied the-imperfect
Aristotilis in hac parte; sed quidem, ut michi uisum est,
of-Aristotle in this part but indeed as to-me seemed it-has
imperfecte. Itaque in ipoteticis sillogismis, qui sillogismi
imperfectly and-so in hypothetical syllogisms which syllogisms
fiant, in priori forma per positionem antecedentis, qui
are-made in the-earlier form through positing of-the-antecedent which
in posteriori per destructionem consequentis; queue sint
in the-later through destruction of-the-consequent or-which be
figure aut modi qui constant ex compositis ypoteticis,
the-figures or modes which consist from composite hypotheticals
et de propositionibus equimodis et non equimodis, et
and about propositions of-equal-mode and not of-equal-mode and
que sit natura eorum qui fiunt ex disiunctis, ostenditur.
what be the-nature of-those which are-made from disjunctives is-shown
Sed forte ab Aristotile de industria relictus est hic labor,
but perhaps by Aristotle on purpose left is this labor
eo quod plus difficultatis quam utilitatis uidetur habere
by-that that more of-difficulty than of-utility seems to-have

liber illius qui diligentissime scripsit. Profecto si hunc
the-book of-him who most-diligently wrote surely if this
Aristotiles more suo exequeretur, uerisimile est tante
Aristotle in-manner his-own were-to-pursue likely it-is of-so-great
difficultatis fore librum ut preter Sibillam intelligat
difficulty about-to-be the-book that besides the-Sibyl would-understand
nemo. Nec tamen hic de ypoteticis satis arbitror expeditum,
no-one nor however here about hypotheticals enough do-I-judge settled
supplementa uero scolarum perutilia et necessaria sunt.
the-supplements indeed of-the-schools very-useful and necessary are

De sophistica, et utilitate eius

XXII · SOPHISTIC AND ITS USEFULNESS

Sophistic mimics dialectic and demonstration with a false image, seeking the appearance of wisdom; so Aristotle rightly treats it next, a work most useful to the young, who covet a reputation for wisdom. Without it no one can guard against lies or catch a liar. Its exercise yields phrasis and serves philosophy, provided truth and not verbosity is its fruit. To live sophistically is worse, and almost everyone does, wishing to seem better than he is.

Sophisticam esse dictum est, que falsa imagine tam
sophistic to-be said it-has-been which by-false image as-much
dialecticam quam demonstratiuam emulatur, et speciem
dialectic as demonstrative emulates and the-appearance
quam uirtutem sapientie magis affectat. Unde ne cliens
than the-virtue of-wisdom more affects whence lest the-client
Aristotilis mecanice huius subplantetur insidiis, eam
of-Aristotle of-the-trickery this be-tripped by-the-snares it
precedentibus recte subiungit. Opus quidem dignum Aristotile
to-the-preceding rightly he-subjoins a-work indeed worthy of-Aristotle

et quo aliud magis expedire iuuentuti non facile
and than-which another more to-be-expedient for-youth not easily
dixerim; iuuentus enim, etsi sapientiam ueram in omnibus
I-would-say youth for although wisdom true in all-things
plene nequeat optinere, sapientie tamen opinionem affectat
fully it-cannot to-obtain of-wisdom yet the-opinion it-affects
et gloriam suam aliorum uult iudicio celebrari. Hoc
and glory its-own of-others it-wishes by-the-judgment to-be-celebrated this
est utique quod sophistica pollicetur; est enim apparens
is surely what sophistic promises it-is for apparent
sapientia, non existens; unde et sophista copiosus ab
wisdom not existing whence also the-sophist abounding from
apparente sapientia, sed non existente. Hec autem omnium
apparent wisdom but not existing this however of-all
disciplinarum emulatrix est, et sub earum specie suas
disciplines the-rival is and under their appearance its-own
omnibus tendiculas parat, incautosque subuertit. Frustra
for-all snares prepares and-the-unwary overturns in-vain
sine hac se quisquam gloriabitur esse philosophum;
without this himself anyone will-boast to-be a-philosopher
cum nequeat cauere mendacium aut alium deprehendere
since he-cannot to-beware-of a-lie or another detect
mentientem. Hoc utique in unaquaque disciplina opus
lying this surely in each discipline the-work
scientis est. Videas huius ignaros, cum ab aliis uel a
of-the-knower is you-may-see of-this the-ignorant when by others or by
se paralogizentur, homines Nichodemianos, cum fuerint
themselves they-are-misled men Nicodemian when they-have-been
subplantati, dicentes pre stupore: Domine, quomodo possunt
tripped saying for stupor Lord how can
hec fieri? Nichil autem est quod minus deceat aut
these-things to-be-done nothing however is which less befit either

glorie aut uictorie captatorem. Sane litigiosus uictoriam,
of-glory or of-victory the-hunter surely the-litigious victory
sophista gloriam querit, finisque utriusque in disceptationibus
the-sophist glory seeks and-the-end of-each in disputations
et contentionibus plurimum placet. Unde et ad frasim
and contentions very-much pleases whence both for phrasis
conciliandam et totius philosophie inuestigationes sophistice
to-be-won and of-the-whole philosophy the-investigations of-sophistic
exercitatio plurimum prodest; ita tamen ut ueritas, non
the-exercise very-much profits so however that truth not
uerbositas, sit huius exercitii fructus. Sic enim ueritatis et
verbosity be of-this exercise the-fruit so for of-truth and
sapientie famula est; alioquin adultera, prodens amatores,
of-wisdom the-handmaid it-is otherwise an-adulteress betraying lovers
quos excecatos exponit erroribus et in precipitium ducit.
whom blinded it-exposes to-errors and into a-precipice leads
Ait Sapientia: Qui sophistice loquitur, odibilis est; sed
says Wisdom he-who sophistically speaks hateful is but
plane odibilior est qui sophistice uiuit; error enim uite
plainly more-hateful is he-who sophistically lives error for of-life
quam uerbi perniciosior. Vix est tamen qui in uita non
than of-word more-pernicious scarcely is-there however one-who in life not
imitetur sophistam, cum hi, qui non sunt, uelint uideri boni,
imitates the-sophist since those who not are wish to-seem good
et hoc modis omnibus agant; et qui boni sunt, aliorum
and this by-ways all do and those-who good are of-others
sepe querant circumuenire iudicia, ut meliores quam sint
often seek to-circumvent the-judgments that better than they-are
uideantur. Quod quidem est in ratione uiuendi sophistam
they-may-seem which indeed is in the-manner of-living the-sophist

induere; si tamen gloriam propriam simulator affectat; nam
to-put-on if however glory his-own the-pretender affects for
si diuinam, et quidem ex scientia, forte poterit excusari.
if divine and indeed from knowledge perhaps he-will-be-able to-be-excused

De Sophisticis Elenchis

XXIII · THE SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

Aristotle brings sophistic into the Peripatetic school and teaches how to admit or avoid it: the sophistical elenchus, an imaginary syllogism; the kinds of disputation; the sophist's five goals; and the thirteen fallacies, six in diction and seven outside it, each examined chapter by chapter. With this it is clearer than light that the art of discoursing is complete in its bounds and parts.

Hanc itaque in scolam Peripateticam Aristotiles introducit et,
this and-so into the-school Peripatetic Aristotle brings-in and
fallaciarum nube depulsa, docet qualiter admitti debeat, aut
of-fallacies the-cloud driven-off teaches how to-be-admitted it-ought or
uitari. Vires eius uniuersas exponit et instrumentum, quo
to-be-avoided the-powers its all he-expounds and the-instrument which
illa utitur, manifestat. Sicut enim dialecticus elencho, quem nos
it uses he-manifests as for the-dialectician the-elenchus which we
eluctatorium dicimus sillogismum, eo quod contradictionis
the-wrestling-out call a-syllogism by-that that of-contradiction
est, sic et ista sophistico elencho utitur, qui utique imaginarius
it-is so also this a-sophistical elenchus uses which surely imaginary
est sillogismus, eo quod non contradictionis est, sed uidetur.
is a-syllogism by-that that not of-contradiction it-is but seems
Paralogismus enim est, id est sillogismus umbratilis. Supponit
a-paralogism for it-is that is a-syllogism shadowy he-sets-under
et genera disputationum, ut appareat quomodo nunc
also the-kinds of-disputations that it-may-appear how now

docentem ex principiis, nunc ex probabilibus colligentem,
the-teacher from principles now from probable-things the-gatherer
nunc ex hiis, que non uidentur, probabilia arguentem,
now from those which not seem probable the-arguer
quod est demonstratoris, dialectici, et temptatoris officium,
which is of-the-demonstrator of-the-dialectician and of-the-tester the-office
sophista imitetur; is, inquam, qui agonizans litigiosam
the-sophist imitates he I-say who contesting the-litigious
exercet. Adicit sophistarum metas quinque, procurantium
practices he-adds of-the-sophists the-goals five who-contrive
quomodo aduersarius in redargutionem incidat, aut falsum,
how the-adversary into refutation may-fall or into-falsehood
aut inopinabile, aut soloecismum, aut nugandi ineptias.
or the-unexpected or solecism or of-trifling the-ineptitudes
Sufficit autem cauillatori, si vel hoc facere videatur. Subiungit
it-suffices however for-the-quibbler if even this to-do he-seem he-subjoins
his arguendi modos qui sunt in dictione; ut equiuocatio,
to-these of-arguing the-modes which are in diction as equivocation
amfibologia, compositio, divisio, accentus, figura dictionis; et
amphiboly composition division accent the-figure of-diction and
item eos, qui sunt extra dictionem; ut in ea specie que
likewise those which are outside diction as in that species which
est secundum accidens; et in ea qua simpliciter uel non
is according-to accident and in that in-which simply or not
simpliciter dicitur; et tertia, que est secundum elenchi
simply it-is-said and the-third which is according-to of-the-elenchus
ignorantiam; et quarta, secundum consequens; et quinta,
ignorance and the-fourth according-to the-consequent and the-fifth
secundum quod est in principio sumere; et sexta, quod est
according-to what is in the-beginning to-assume and the-sixth which is
non causa ut causam ponere; et septima, plures interrogationes
not cause as cause to-posit and the-seventh several questions

unam facere. Itaque qualiter opponentem aut respondentem in
one to-make and-so how the-opponent or the-respondent in
his uersari oporteat, per singula capita diligenter exequitur
these to-be-occupied it-behooves through single chapters diligently he-pursues
et, sicut optimus campidoctor, hunc ad inferendam pugnam,
and as the-best drill-master this-one for bringing-on battle
illum instruit ad cautelam. Cum ergo ex his liqueat
that-one he-equips for caution since therefore from these it-is-clear
que adesse debeant, que abesse, et probabilium, que
what-things to-be-present ought what to-be-absent and of-probable-things which
sola sufficit humana infirmitas comprehendere, patefacti sint
alone suffices human weakness to-comprehend laid-open have-been
loci, rationumque monstrate sint necessarie complexiones,
the-places and-of-reasons shown have-been the-necessary combinations
docendi sint rationes et uie explanate, fallaciarum
of-teaching have-been the-reasons and the-ways explained of-fallacies
sublata sint impedimenta, luce clarius est rationem
removed have-been the-impediments than-light clearer it-is the-method
disserendi suis esse limitibus et partibus absolutam.
of-discoursing by-its-own to-be limits and parts completed

De his qui Aristotilis opera carpunt

XXIV · ON THOSE WHO CARP AT ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

John wonders at the minds of those who carp at these books, which he meant to praise, not expound. Thierry mocked the Topics as Drogo of Troyes's, though he taught them; some of Robert of Melun's pupils call that book almost useless, others disparage the Categories, so John has dwelt on praising these. The Refutations are ineptly faulted for poetic verses; to him they seem better than the Analytics, as useful for exercise and an easier road to eloquence.

Satis ergo mirari non possum quid mentis habeant (si
enough therefore to-wonder not I-can what of-mind they-have if
quid tamen habent) qui hec Aristotilis opera carpunt, que
anything however they-have who these of-Aristotle works carp-at which
utique non exponere propositum fuerat sed laudare. Magister
surely not to-expound the-purpose had-been but to-praise master
Theodoricus, ut memini, Topica non Aristotilis sed Trecasini
Thierry as I-remember the-Topics not of-Aristotle but of-Troyes
Drogonis irridebat; eadem tamen quandoque docuit. Quidam
of-Drogo mocked the-same however sometimes he-taught certain
auditores magistri Rodberti de Meliduno librum hunc fere
hearers of-master Robert of Melun book this almost
inutilem esse calumniantur. Alii detrahunt Cathegoriis. Unde
useless to-be slander others disparage the-Categories whence
in commendatione eorum diutius moratus sum; reliquos, eo
in the-commendation of-them longer lingered I-have the-rest by-that
quod omnium iudicio commendantur, morose non censui
that of-all by-the-judgment they-are-commended at-length not I-judged
commendandos. Elenchis tamen, sed inepte, opponitur quod
to-be-commended to-the-Refutations however but ineptly is-objected that
uersus habent poeticos; sed constat quod idioma linguarum
verses they-have poetic but it-is-agreed that the-idiom of-tongues

commode in commercium non deducitur. In eo autem michi
fittingly into commerce not is-drawn in that however to-me
uidentur Analeticis preferendi, quod non minus ad exercitium
they-seem than-the-Analytics to-be-preferred that not less to exercise
conferunt et faciliori intellectu eloquentiam promouent.
they-contribute and with-easier understanding eloquence advance

Quod Cornificius Bromio scurra deorum uilior est; et de laude logice quid Augustinus et alii philosophi

XXV · CORNIFICIUS BELOW BROMIUS; AUGUSTINE ON LOGIC

Whoever calls logic inept is most inept. Pallas silences Bromius, the gods' buffoon, who mocked it as Marsian witchcraft, and Cornificius, the philosophers' buffoon, deserves contempt as well. Augustine says that once grammar was perfected, reason brought forth dialectic, the discipline of disciplines, which teaches how to teach and how to learn and alone knows how to know. Cornificius, like every slothful mind, accuses what he cannot attain.

Cum itaque logice tanta sit uis, quisquis eam causatur
since and-so of-logic so-great be the-force whoever it alleges
ineptam, ineptissimus est. Pallas Bromium, qui eam Marsicam
inept most-inept is Pallas Bromius who it Marsian
aut ueneficam irridebat, in nuptiis Philologie compescit et
or witch-like mocked in the-marriage of-Philology checks and
superis multa predicatione consociat. Porro, ut est in
with-the-gods-above by-much proclamation associates further as it-is in
fabulis, Bromius deorum scurra contemnitur; sed Cornificius
fables Bromius of-the-gods the-buffoon is-despised but Cornificius
noster, logice criminator, philosophantium scurra non
our of-logic the-accuser of-philosophers the-buffoon not
immerito contemnetur. Ut de Platone taceam, Aristotile,
undeservedly will-be-despised that about Plato I-may-be-silent Aristotle

Tullio, a quo, ut maiores perhibent, philosophia inchoata est
Tully by whom as the-ancestors report philosophy begun was
et perfecta, pater Augustinus, cui temerarium est obuiare, eam
and perfected father Augustine whom rash it-is to-oppose it
tantis effert preconiis ut uituperari non possit, nisi ab his
with-such extols praises that to-be-reviled not it-can except by those
quorum nulla est prudentia sed impudentia multa. Ait ergo
of-whom no is prudence but impudence much he-says therefore
in secundo libro de Ordine: Cum perfecta esset dispositaque
in the-second book on Order when perfected was and-arranged
gramatica, admonita est ratio querere atque attendere
grammar admonished was reason to-seek and to-attend-to
hanc ipsam uim que peperit artem. Nam eam diffiniendo,
this very power which begot the-art for it by-defining
distribuendo, colligendo, non solum digesserat atque ordinauerat,
distributing gathering not only it-had-digested and ordered
uerum etiam ab omni falsitatis irruptione defenderat. Quando
but also from every of-falsehood irruption had-defended when
ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda, nisi ipsa sua prius
therefore would-it-pass to other-things to-be-built unless itself its-own first
quasi quedam machinamenta et instrumenta distringeret,
as-if certain contrivances and instruments it-should-distinguish
notaret, digereret, proderetque ipsam disciplinam disciplinarum,
note digest and-bring-forth the-very discipline of-disciplines
quam dialecticam uocant? Hec docet docere, hec docet discere.
which dialectic they-call this teaches to-teach this teaches to-learn
In hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit que sit, que
in this itself the-very reason demonstrates and opens what it-be what
uelit; quid ualeat scit scire sola; scientes facere non solum
it-wish what it-avail it-knows to-know alone knowers to-make not only
uult sed et potest. Quid ad hec Cornificius? Nempe quod
it-wishes but also can what to these Cornificius surely what

cuiusque deficientis ingenii est et desidie, que ad hortamenta
of-each failing wit is and of-sloth which at the-exhortations
uirtutis stertere consueuit; quod non potest assequi criminatur.
of-virtue to-snore is-wont what not it-can attain it-accuses

Quo consilio utendum sit aduersus eum et proteruos calumniatores

XXVI · THE COUNSEL TO USE AGAINST HIM AND WANTON SLANDERERS

John uses against Cornificius and his sluggish allies the counsel Augustine says he learned from dialectic: when the thing is agreed, one must not quarrel over words; the unskilled are to be taught, the malicious deserted, the unteachable urged to spend time better, the disobedient ignored. Against captious reasonings, return to what was wrongly granted, take what is understood, leave what cannot be explained, and seek nothing wholly hidden from man.

Utamur ergo aduersus eum et compigrescentes
let-us-use therefore against him and those-growing-sluggish-with-him
(quoniam iam habet consortes erroris) consilio quod se,
since already he-has partners of-error the-counsel which himself
post multa que per ipsam didicit, in primo contra
after many-things which through it he-learned in the-first against
Academicos dicit Augustinus a dialectica didicisse. Docuit
the-Academics says Augustine from dialectic to-have-learned it-taught
me, inquit, cum de re constat, propter quam uerba
me he-says when about the-thing it-is-agreed on-account-of which the-words
dicuntur, de uerbis non debere contendi; et quisquis id
are-said about words not to-be-bound to-be-contended and whoever that
faciat, si ex imperitia facit, docendum esse; si ex malitia,
does if from unskill he-does-it to-be-taught to-be if from malice
deserendum; si doceri non potest, monendum, ut aliquid
to-be-deserted if to-be-taught not he-can to-be-warned that something

aliud potius agat quam tempus in superfluis operamque
else rather he-may-do than time in superfluous-things and-effort
consumat; si non obtemperat, negligendum. De captiosis
consume if not he-obeys to-be-neglected about captious
autem atque fallacibus ratiunculis breue preceptum est: si
however and deceitful little-reasonings brief the-precept is if
male concedendo inferuntur, ad ea, que concessa sunt,
badly by-conceding they-are-brought-in to those which granted are
esse redeundum. Si verum falsumque in una conclusione
to-be to-be-returned if true and-false in one conclusion
confligunt, accipiendum inde quod intelligitur; quod explicari
clash to-be-taken thence what is-understood what to-be-explained
non potest, relinquendum. Si autem modus in aliquibus rebus
not it-can to-be-left if however the-mode in some things
latet penitus hominem, scientiam eius non esse querendam.
lies-hidden thoroughly from-man the-knowledge of-it not to-be to-be-sought

Quod Aristotiles in multis errauit, sed in logica eminet

XXVII · ARISTOTLE ERRED IN MUCH BUT EXCELS IN LOGIC

Much could be said against those who exclude Aristotle's better books for Boethius alone, but need not be: such men plainly know almost nothing. Yet Aristotle did not always think or speak rightly: against reason and faith he held that God can do wrong, that providence stops at the moon, and that lower things are not ruled by it. In logic, however, he has no equal, and he should be taught as a master of disputation, not of morals.

Hec aduersus Cornificium. Ceterum contra eos qui
these-things against Cornificius however against those who
ueterum fauore potiores Aristotilis libros excludunt, Boetio
of-the-ancients by-favor the-better of-Aristotle books exclude with-Boethius

fere solo contenti, possent plurima allegari. Sed non
almost alone content could very-many-things to-be-alleged but not
oportet; quia palam est omnibus usque ad miserationem
it-behooves because plain is to-all even to pity
imperfectum illorum qui in solo Boetio tempus et rem
the-imperfection of-those who in sole Boethius time and substance
consumpserunt, ut fere nichil sciant. Nec tamen Aristotilem
consumed so-that almost nothing they-know nor however Aristotle
ubique bene aut sensisse aut dixisse protestor, ut
everywhere well either to-have-thought or to-have-said do-I-protest so-that
sacrosanctum sit quicquid scripsit. Nam in pluribus, optinente
sacrosanct be whatever he-wrote for in many-things prevailing
ratione et auctoritate fidei, conuincitur errasse. Siquidem
reason and the-authority of-faith he-is-convicted to-have-erred since
non modo studiosum quemlibet sed et Deum ipsum praua
not only the-zealous anyone but even God himself wicked-things
posse committere asserit. Item prouidentiam Dei usque
to-be-able to-commit he-asserts likewise the-providence of-God even
ad regionem lune progredi diffitetur; et, ut diuinationem
to the-region of-the-moon to-proceed he-denies and that divination
tollat prenoscentiamque futurorum, asserit inferiora non
he-may-remove and-foreknowledge of-future-things he-asserts lower-things not
regi per diuine decreta prouidentie, nec angelorum prodesse
to-be-ruled by divine decrees of-providence nor of-angels to-profit
opem, aut demonum in his aut in futuris aliquam esse
the-help or of-demons in these or in future-things any to-be
perspicientiam. Sunt et multi errores eius, qui in scripturis
discernment there-are also many errors his which in writings
tam ethnicis quam fidelibus poterunt inueniri; verum in
as-much heathen as faithful will-be-able to-be-found but in
logica parem habuisse non legitur. Unde sic accipiendus
logic an-equal to-have-had not it-is-read whence so to-be-taken

est, ut ad promouendos iuuenes ad grauioris philosophie
he-is that for advancing youths to of-graver philosophy
instituta doctor sit, non morum sed disceptationum.
the-institutions a-teacher he-be not of-morals but of-disputations

Quomodo sit ea utendum

XXVIII · HOW LOGIC IS TO BE USED

Logic is useful for much, yet one ignorant of the other disciplines is hindered by its verbosity and rashness more than helped; alone it is almost useless, shining only by its companions' virtue. Youth may be indulged in verbosity, as young bodies are richly fed, but with age that license must be restrained and sophistic quieted, a teacher's charge. Precepts are useless without constant exercise, except perhaps once the disposition has become a habit.

Sed, licet ars ista ad quam multa sit utilis, qui aliorum
but although art this for how many-things be useful he-who of-others
ignarus est, non tantum huius eruditione ad philosophiam
ignorant is not so-much of-this by-the-learning toward philosophy
iuuatur quantum hinc sumpta uerbositate et temeritate
is-helped as-much-as hence taken by-the-verbosity and rashness
impeditur. Fere enim inutilis est logica, si sit sola. Tunc
he-is-hindered almost for useless is logic if it-be alone then
demum eminet, cum adiunctarum uirtute splendescit. Tenere
only it-stands-out when of-the-adjoined by-the-virtue it-shines tender
tamen etati indulgendum est amplius et, ut copiam eloquentie
however to-age to-be-indulged is more and that abundance of-eloquence
comparet, interim est ferenda uerbositas. Sicut enim corpora, sic
it-may-acquire meanwhile is to-be-borne verbosity as for bodies so
et ingenia puerilia inprimis alenda sunt ne marcescant; et
also wits boyish first to-be-nourished are lest they-wither and

ut a plenitudine et copia alimentorum succo distendantur
that from fullness and abundance of-nourishment with-juice they-be-distended
ad robur concipiendum, et ut caro quodam dilatationis sue
for strength to-be-conceived and that the-flesh by-a-certain of-expansion its-own
vitio in hac etate luxuriet. Hoc autem et laboris exercitium
vice in this age be-luxuriant this however both of-labor the-exercise
et pondus sollicitudinis et diligens opera sequenti etate
and the-weight of-anxiety and diligent work in-the-following age
satis excoquet et purgabit. Procedente ergo etate et
enough will-boil-out and will-purge proceeding therefore age and
sensu, uerbositatis cohibeatur licentia, et sophistice (quam
sense of-verbosity let-be-restrained the-license and of-sophistic which
Aristotiles ditatiuam, nos circumuentoriam uel cauillatoriam
Aristotle ditative we circumventive or quibbling
dicere possumus) improbitas conquiescat. Manet hec sollicitudo
to-call we-can the-wickedness let-rest remains this anxiety
eum qui doctoris nomen et officium uendicat. Porro inutilis
him who of-teacher the-name and office claims further useless
est opera preceptorum, si non usu et exercitio assiduo
is the-work of-precepts if not by-use and exercise assiduous
roboretur; nisi forte cum in habitum transierit dispositio.
it-be-strengthened unless perhaps when into habit will-have-passed the-disposition

Quod temeritas adolescentie reprimenda; et quare Mercurius societur Philologie; et que sint precipue expetenda

XXIX · THE RASHNESS OF YOUTH, AND WHY MERCURY WEDS PHILOLOGY

The license of the schools ends with the first beard: scurrility and noisy levity are laid aside, as Mercury, too old to go half-naked without Cypris' laughter, turned to wed Philology. Though their nature lies hidden from man, human nature scents the sweetness of true goodness, truth, and reason and seeks them until, by love's exercise through grace, it attains them. So the ancients made Philology, Philosophy, and Philocaly daughters of Phronesis, whose name means savor, not wisdom.

Non tamen ea licentia est indulgendum ginnasiorum
not however with-that license is to-be-indulged of-gymnasia
exercitiis, que quasi iocus quidam et palestra philosophie
in-the-exercises which as-if a-certain play and wrestling-ground of-philosophy
agitantur in spe proficiendi, ut in annos maturiores aut in
are-pursued in hope of-advancing that into years more-mature or into
studia grauiora protendatur. Scurriles ineptie, insulsa loquacitas
studies graver it-be-extended scurrilous follies witless loquacity
et clamosa, itemque leuitas puerilis cum prima lanugine
and noisy and-likewise levity boyish with the-first down
deponenda sunt. Hec siquidem agere est philosophum diffiteri
to-be-laid-aside are these since to-do is the-philosopher to-deny
et ad male sanos accedere. Unde, ut a fabulis instruamur,
and to the-badly sane to-approach whence that by fables we-may-be-instructed
Mercurius, eloquentie presul, hortatu matris in Philologie
Mercury of-eloquence the-patron at-the-urging of-his-mother into of-Philology
nuptias transit ab adolescentia prima, eo quod iam
the-marriage passes from youth first by-that that now
pubentes gene seminudum eum incedere clamideque indutum
downy cheeks half-naked him to-walk and-with-a-cloak clothed

parua, inuelatumque cetera humerorum cacumen obnubere,
small and-unveiled the-rest of-the-shoulders the-top to-cover
sine magno risu Cipridis non sinebant. Cipris enim,
without great laughter of-Cypris not allowed Cypris for
que mixtura interpretabatur, uigens in eis qui sapientie et
who mixture was-interpreted flourishing in those who of-wisdom and
eloquentie mixtura condiuntur, inermis, nude, uentoseque
of-eloquence by-the-mixture are-seasoned of-unarmed bare and-windy
facundie deridet ineptias. Latet autem sensum hominis,
eloquence mocks the-follies lies-hidden-from however the-sense of-man
quem multa cogitantem terrena inhabitatio deprimit, trium
whom much thinking the-earthly dwelling presses-down of-three
maxime expetendorum archana prestantissimaque natura. Hec
most things-to-be-sought the-secret and-most-excellent nature these
autem sunt uera bonitas, ueritas sincera, ratio incorrupta et
however are true goodness truth sincere reason uncorrupted and
certa. Horum tamen quasi olfaciens dulcedinem natura humana,
certain of-these however as-if smelling the-sweetness nature human
cui Deus, sicut in libro filii Sirac legitur, posuit oculum
on-which God as in the-book of-the-son of-Sirach is-read set an-eye
supra cor, ut ostenderet magnalia operum suorum, ut
above the-heart that he-might-show the-great-things of-works his that
laudaretur in bonitate et glorificaretur in mirabilibus suis;
he-might-be-praised in goodness and be-glorified in wonders his
horum, inquam, dulcedinem sentiens, appetit nosse uerum,
of-these I-say the-sweetness sensing seeks to-know the-true
apprehendere bonum, et ei, ne dispendium patiatur, firmiter
to-grasp the-good and to-it lest loss it-suffer firmly
adherere. Appetitus enim hic naturaliter a Deo insitus est
to-cling the-appetite for this naturally by God implanted is
homini, etsi per naturam sine gratia proficere non possit.
in-man although through nature without grace to-advance not it-can

Unde tres sorores filias Fronesis fabulosa gentium finxit
whence three sisters daughters of-Phronesis the-fabulous of-the-nations feigned
antiquitas, Philologiam. Philosophiam, et Philocaliam. Genus
antiquity Philology Philosophy and Philocaly the-race
Philosophie et Philocalie Augustinus, Philologie Martianus,
of-Philosophy and of-Philocaly Augustine of-Philology Martianus
sed cognationem trium indicat Esopus. Ergo quia ueram
but the-kinship of-the-three indicates Aesop therefore since true
bonitatem, sapientiam, rationem, etsi polliceri sibi arroganter
goodness wisdom reason although to-promise to-itself arrogantly
non audeat, affectat tamen indesinenter humana infirmitas,
not it-dare it-affects however unceasingly human weakness
uersatur in amore istorum, donec, amoris exercitio per
is-occupied in the-love of-these until of-love by-the-exercise through
gratiam, res ipsas quas desiderat assequatur. Has quidem
grace the-things themselves which it-desires it-attain these indeed
affectiones Fronesis parit, quia sapor, qui humane nature
affections Phronesis bears because the-savor which to-human nature
dulcescit, ad ueri bonique prouocat appetitum. Nam frono
grows-sweet to of-the-true and-of-the-good provokes the-appetite for phrono
Grece dicitur sapio; quod quidem saporem appetitus potius
in-Greek is-said I-savor which indeed the-savor of-appetite rather
exprimit quam sapientiam, que in divinorum contemplatione
expresses than wisdom which in of-divine-things the-contemplation
consistit. Illa enim non Fronesis, sed Sophia appellatur.
consists that for not Phronesis but Sophia is-called

Quod Philologia alias duas precedit, et que sit predicamentalis inspectio sequenda in discussione rationis et ueritatis

XXX · PHILOLOGY FIRST, AND THE CATEGORICAL INSPECTION

Philology comes first: since, as Pythagoras says, almost anything can be argued either way, she seeks certainty and avoids error, as Martianus' Philology toils by night and compels even the gods. Sense needs a soul, a spirit, and an outward obstacle, and it rouses reason, which is true only when certain and firm. Philosophy's first way asks what a thing is, how it differs, and whether it has a contrary, and John follows that order here.

Harum vero Philologia prima est, et que aliarum naturam,
of-these indeed Philology the-first is and who of-the-others the-nature
uim, et consilia indicat; siquidem cum undique probabilia
force and counsels indicates since when from-everywhere probable-things
multa occurrant (quia, ut ait Pitagoras, fere de omni re
many occur because as says Pythagoras almost about every thing
potest in contrarium disputari) rerum certitudinem querit
it-can on the-contrary to-be-disputed of-things the-certainty it-seeks
et diligenti cautela declinat errores; et sicut
and with-diligent caution avoids errors and as

uirtus est uitium fugere et sapientia prima
virtue is vice to-flee and wisdom the-first
stultitia caruisse,
folly to-have-lacked

sic que precauet errorem has que uirtutes afferunt
so she-who guards-against error these which virtues bring
naturaliter antecedit. Et ut Iunonis, aut, ut rectius
naturally precedes and that of-Juno or that more-rightly

dixerim, Marciani uerba ponantur: An quisquam est qui
I-may-say of-Martianus the-words be-set-down whether anyone there-is who
Philologie se asserat peruigilia laborata, et lucubrationum
of-Philology himself may-assert the-vigils labored and of-night-studies
perhennium nescire pallorem, que etiam deos quiescentes ad
perennial not-to-know the-pallor who even the-gods resting to
se uenire inaudita obsecratione compellit. Et paulo supra
herself to-come with-unheard-of entreaty compels and a-little above
celum, terram, mare, et que in eis sunt, prima scrutatur; que
heaven earth sea and what in them are first she-scrutinizes who

peruigil immodico penetrans archana labore,
watchful with-immoderate penetrating secrets labor
que potis est docta totum preuertere cura
who able is with-learned the-whole to-forestall care
quod superis prescire datum est; quin crebrius in nos
what to-the-gods-above to-foreknow given is nay more-frequently over us
ius habet illa, deos urgens in iussa coactos,
right has she the-gods urging into commands compelled
et quod nulla queat superum temptare potestas
and what no can of-the-gods-above attempt power
inuito scit posse Ioue.
unwilling she-knows to-be-able Jove

Siquidem, ut ait alius, non inferior Marciano:
since as says another not inferior to-Martianus

Labor improbus omnia uincit.
labor relentless all-things conquers

Liquet autem ex precedentibus ad hoc, ut sensus sit,
it-is-clear however from the-preceding for this that sense be
plura concurrere; ut sint exterius offendiculum in quem
several-things concur that there-be outside a-stumbling-block on which
impingit spiritus minister sentiendi, idemque spiritus qui
strikes the-spirit the-minister of-sensing and-the-same spirit which
exterioris obstaculi qualitatem ad notitiam anime profert.
of-the-outer obstacle the-quality to the-knowledge of-the-soul brings
Ut sint tria, anima que sentit, spiritus quo sentit,
so-that there-be three-things the-soul which senses the-spirit by-which it-senses
et offendiculum quod extrinsecus sentit. His, ut predictum
and the-stumbling-block which from-outside it-senses by-these as aforesaid
est, excitatur uis deliberatiua, quam supra nominauimus
it-has-been is-roused the-power deliberative which above we-named
rationem, suumque iudicium exercet, quod itidem ratio
reason and-its-own judgment it-exercises which likewise reason
appellatur; quod quidem interdum uerum, interdum probabile
is-called which indeed sometimes true sometimes probable
est. Sed ratio uera non est, nisi sit certa et firma, eo
is but reason true not is unless it-be certain and firm by-that
quod ratio nomen firmitudinis est. Nam et ratum non dicitur,
that reason a-name of-firmness is for also ratified not is-called
nisi quod firmum est. Ut itaque magno placuit Augustino:
except what firm is as and-so to-the-great it-pleased Augustine
Ratio uera solius Dei est, et eorum quibus ipse certam
reason true of-sole of-God is and of-those to-whom he certain
notitiam firmumque iudicium de rebus habere concessit. Est
knowledge and-firm judgment about things to-have has-granted is
autem predicamentalis inspectio et prima philosophandi uia
however categorical inspection also the-first of-philosophizing way
de qualibet re proposita quid sit attendere; itemque quibus
about any thing proposed what it-be to-attend-to and-likewise by-what

proprietatibus ab aliis differat et quomodo aliis conformetur;
properties from others it-differ and how to-others it-be-conformed
deinde an sit ei quid contrarium et an ipsum
then whether there-be to-it anything contrary and whether it-itself
susceptibile sit contrariorum. Que cum innotuerunt, res
susceptible be of-contraries which when they-have-become-known the-thing
familiarius assignata in notitiam transit. Utique hunc ordinem,
more-familiarly assigned into knowledge passes surely this order
etsi pro uoto exprimere nequeam in tante rei
although according-to wish to-express I-cannot in of-so-great of-a-thing
inuestigatione, tamen, quia commodissimus est, placuit imitari.
investigation yet since most-convenient it-is it-pleased to-imitate
Nec est ubi iustius de rationis ueritatisque substantia
nor is-there where more-justly about of-reason and-of-truth the-substance
queratur quam ubi uis logice discutitur, que se profitetur
be-asked than where the-force of-logic is-discussed which itself professes
scientiam ueritatis, ut asserit Augustinus; et utinam assequi
the-science of-truth as asserts Augustine and would-that to-attain
ualeat, quod promittit. Constat autem quia plurimum prodest,
it-may-avail what it-promises it-is-agreed however that very-much it-profits
et inueniendi examinandique rationes, uiam, et copiam prestat.
and of-finding and-of-examining reasons the-way and abundance it-furnishes

Quid ratio primitiua; et de sectis philosophantium

XXXI · PRIMEVAL REASON, AND THE SECTS OF PHILOSOPHERS

As reason in creatures examines things, so a primeval reason, God's wisdom, comprehends all without error; it is Martianus' sphere, the image and idea of the world, one in substance and many in its objects. The Stoic binds all things to providence and necessity, Epicurus frees them, and the Peripatetic keeps providence without necessity. The Academics waver in three grades; John's is the one that withholds judgment in doubtful things.

Sicut autem ratio in creaturis est uis quedam spiritualis,
as however reason in creatures is a-power certain spiritual
nature rerum examinatrix, et tam corporalium quam
of-the-nature of-things the-examiner and as-much of-bodily as
intelligibilium assequens notitiam: ita primitiua quedam ratio
of-intelligible-things attaining knowledge so a-primeval certain reason
est, que sua uirtute res omnes, tam corporales quam
there-is which by-its-own power things all as-much bodily as
intelligibiles, comprehendit, et naturam et uim singulorum
intelligible comprehends and the-nature and force of-each
plene fideliterque, id est absque omni errore, examinat. Hanc
fully and-faithfully that is without all error examines this
siue sapientiam siue uirtutem Dei dixero et rerum
whether the-wisdom or the-power of-God I-shall-have-called and of-things
omnium firmitudinem esse, proculdubio non errabo. Penes
all the-firmness to-be without-doubt not I-shall-err with
hanc omnium rerum natura, processus, finisque subsistit.
this of-all things the-nature progress and-end subsists
Quippe hec est spera, quam poetico figmento Marcianus
indeed this is the-sphere which by-poetic fiction Martianus
obnubilans, ex omnibus elementis dicit esse compactam,
veiling from all elements says to-be compacted

ut nichil absit quod ab aliqua natura credatur contineri.
so-that nothing be-absent which by any nature be-believed to-be-contained
Illic celum omne, aer, freta, diuersitasque telluris, claustraque
there heaven all air seas and-the-diversity of-the-earth and-the-bars
Tartarea, urbes, compita, cum actibus fortunisque suis,
of-Tartarus cities crossroads with the-acts and-fortunes their-own
cunctarumque species rerum, tam in specie quam in genera
and-of-all the-species of-things as-much in species as in genus
numerande. Que quidem spera imago quedam uidebatur
to-be-numbered which indeed sphere an-image certain seemed
ideaque mundi. Plato autem questionem inducit, una sit
and-idea of-the-world Plato however a-question brings-in one be
idea an plures. Et profecto, si substantiam scientie aut
the-idea or several and surely if the-substance of-knowledge or
rationis quis attendat, una est; si pluralitatem rerum, quas
of-reason one may-attend-to one it-is if the-plurality of-things which
penes se ratio intuetur, idee sunt infinite. Hanc intuens
with itself reason beholds ideas are infinite this beholding
Stoicus Pronoen, quam nos appellare possumus Prouidentiam,
the-Stoic Pronoia which we to-call we-can Providence
ueneratur, et legibus ipsius ad necessitatem omnia dicit
venerates and by-the-laws its to necessity all-things says
artari. Epicurus e contra, rerum facilitatem attendens,
to-be-bound Epicurus on-the contrary of-things the-ease attending-to
extinguit Pronoen, et omnia a lege necessitatis absoluit.
extinguishes Pronoia and all-things from the-law of-necessity looses
Peripateticus uero, utrimque erroris precipitium metuens, nec
the-Peripatetic indeed on-both-sides of-error the-precipice fearing neither
ad paradoxas Stoici nec ad kirriadoxas Epicuri mouetur;
to the-paradoxes of-the-Stoic nor to the-kyriadoxes of-Epicurus is-moved
sed sic in Stoico pronoen asserit, ut rebus non inducat
but so with the-Stoic pronoia asserts that on-things not he-bring-in

necessitatem; sic cum Epicuro a necessitate res expedit,
necessity so with Epicurus from necessity things he-frees
ut prouidentie non auferat ueritatem. Res itaque partim
that from-providence not he-take-away the-truth things and-so partly
necessarias asserit esse, partim facilitati nature, et libero
necessary he-asserts to-be partly to-the-ease of-nature and to-free
arbitrio subiacere. Academicus uero fluctuat, et quid in
choice to-lie-subject the-Academic indeed wavers and what in
singulis uerum sit diffinire non audet. Hec tamen secta
single-things true be to-define not dares this however sect
tripharíam diuisa est; et cautela nimia demeruerunt philosophi
threefold divided is and by-caution excessive they-forfeited of-philosopher
nomen. Habet alios qui se sola necessaria et per
the-name it-has others who themselves alone necessary-things and through
se nota, que scilicet nesciri non possunt, confiteantur
themselves known which namely to-be-unknown not can confess
nosse. Tertius gradus nostrorum est, qui sententiam non
to-know the-third grade of-ours is which judgment not
precipitant in his que sunt dubitabilia sapienti.
precipitate in those which are doubtful to-the-wise

Quid sit rationi contrarium; et quod multis modis dicitur ratio, et quod rationes eterne

XXXII · WHAT OPPOSES REASON, AND THE SENSES OF REASON

Divine reason admits no error, and nothing opposes reason more than error. As sense and imagination name both a power and its act, so reason names the power, its motion, and the things it works in: inherences, proportions, and principles, which Augustine calls immortal, like the ratio of one to two. Hence some held that what is once true is always true, and Augustine's word that our faith and the fathers' is one seems to support them.

Prima itaque et uera ratio est diuina, quam diximus, et
the-first and-so and true reason is the-divine which we-have-said and
que nullum omnino admittit errorem. Nichil autem est quod
which no at-all admits error nothing however is which
magis rationi uideatur adversum quam error; illa enim statuit
more to-reason seems adverse than error that for establishes
et confirmat, hic lubricitate sua prosternit et subplantat.
and confirms this by-slipperiness its-own lays-low and trips
Et, sicut sensus nomine censetur nunc potentia, nunc actus
and as sense by-the-name is-reckoned now the-power now the-act
sentiendi, et item tam potentia quam actus imaginandi
of-sensing and likewise as-much the-power as the-act of-imagining
dicitur imaginatio; ita ratio nunc uis, nunc agitatio
is-called imagination so reason now the-power now the-agitation
motusque uirtutis, nunc etiam illa in quibus ratio quendam
and-motion of-the-power now also those in which reason a-certain
sue uirtutis motum exercet, dicuntur rationes; quales quidem
of-its-own power motion exercises are-called reasons such-as indeed
sunt inherentie in consequentiis, proportiones in numeris, et
are inherences in consequences proportions in numbers and
eorum que absolute necessaria sunt demonstrationum principia.
of-those which absolutely necessary are of-demonstrations the-principles

Has autem tam in libris de Ordine et de Libero Arbitrio
these however as-much in the-books on Order and on Free Choice
et Ypognosticon quam in multis aliis asserit Augustinus
and the-Hypognosticon as in many others asserts Augustine
immortales esse et sempiternas. Unius, inquit, ad duo et
immortal to-be and everlasting of-one he-says to two and
duorum ad quattuor uerissima ratio est; nec magis fuit heri
of-two to four most-true the-ratio is nor more was yesterday
ratio illa uera quam hodie; nec magis cras aut post annum
ratio that true than today nor more tomorrow or after a-year
erit uera. Nec si omnis mundus iste concidat, poterit ista
will-it-be true nor if all world this collapse will-be-able that
ratio non esse. Simili modo substantiam esse, si sit corpus,
ratio not to-be in-like way substance to-be if it-be body
non esse non potest. Cetera quidem, que diuine rationis
not to-be not can the-other-things indeed which of-divine reason
oculus contemplatur, uera quidem sunt, sed premutabilitate
the-eye contemplates true indeed are but by-changeableness
sua nequaquam dicuntur rationes. Ex hoc autem ueritatis
their-own by-no-means are-called reasons from this however of-truth
rationisque consortio quibusdam philosophantibus uisum est
and-of-reason by-fellowship to-certain philosophers seemed it-has
semper esse uerum quod semel est uerum; quibus uidetur
always to-be true what once is true to-whom seems
suffragari ratio, quam Augustinus inducit, ut doceat
to-support the-reason which Augustine brings-in that he-may-teach
nostram et precedentium patrum eandem esse fidem; etsi
our and of-the-preceding fathers the-same to-be faith although
nos pro parte gaudeamus impletum quod illi prestolabantur
we in part rejoice fulfilled what they awaited
implendum; ait enim: Non est mutata fides, etsi uariata
to-be-fulfilled he-says for not is changed faith even-if varied

sint tempora. Et nos et illi eandem amplectimur ueritatem,
be the-times both we and they the-same embrace truth
sed aliis et aliis sermonibus predicamus.
but in-other and other words we-preach

Quod homo perfectam non habet rationem; et quod uerum multipliciter dicitur

XXXIII · MAN LACKS PERFECT REASON, AND THE SENSES OF TRUE

The angels, unhindered by bodies, have uncorrupted reason; human weakness errs and grasps what it can, forming true or false opinions. Some made truth a relation between the things examined and reason; so speech is true by its mode, opinion by its manner of perceiving, reason by its examination. Things are true by their form or its effect, as true whiteness whitens.

Natura vero angelica, que noxio corpore non tardatur
the-nature indeed angelic which by-a-harmful body not is-slowed
et diuine puritati familiarius inheret, rationis incorrupte
and to-divine purity more-familiarly clings of-reason uncorrupted
uiget acumine. Et, licet non equaliter Deo cuncta
flourishes in-the-sharpness and although not equally with-God all-things
examinet, ea tamen rationis prerogatiua ditatur, ut nullo
it-examine with-that however of-reason prerogative it-is-enriched that by-no
subplantetur errore. At humana infirmitas, que tam ex
it-be-tripped error but human weakness which as-much from
conditione nature quam merito culpe multis patet erroribus,
the-condition of-nature as by-desert of-fault to-many lies-open to-errors
immo et capta labitur a prima et secunda puritate,
nay also captured slips from the-first and second purity
degenerat in examinatione rerum, id est in exercitio rationis
degenerates in the-examination of-things that is in the-exercise of-reason

et, quia incertitudinis lubrico uacillat, apprehendit quod
and since of-uncertainty on-the-slipperiness it-wavers it-grasps what
potest, et nunc ex fida rerum similitudine ueras exercet
it-can and now from faithful of-things likeness true practices
opiniones, nunc decepta uanis imaginibus falsas. Si enim res
opinions now deceived by-empty images false if for the-thing
ut se habet comprehenditur, uera opinio est; et, si sic uerbo
as itself it-has is-comprehended true opinion it-is and if so by-word
exponitur, est uera locutio; unde nonnullis philosophorum
it-is-expounded it-is true speech whence to-some of-the-philosophers
probabiliter placuit ueritatem, unde opinio uera dicitur aut
probably it-pleased truth whence opinion true is-called or
sermo uerus, quasi medium quendam habitum esse rerum
speech true as-if a-middle certain relation to-be of-the-things
que examinantur extrinsecus ad rationem. Si enim eis
which are-examined from-outside to reason if for on-them
fideliter in examinando innititur, certa est, nec aliquo uacillat
faithfully in examining it-rests certain it-is nor by-any wavers
errore. Itaque locutio, que uera dicitur, a modo quem innuit
error and-so the-speech which true is-called from the-mode which it-hints
modalis appellatur. Item opinio uera a modo percipiendi, et
modal is-called likewise opinion true from the-mode of-perceiving and
ratio uera a qualitate examinis sui. Res quoque singule
reason true from the-quality of-examination its-own things also single
uere dicuntur; ut homo uerus, verus candor, dum in his taliter
true are-called as man true true whiteness while in these thus
percipiendis, nullius imaginis phantasmate circumuenitur opinio.
to-be-perceived of-no of-image by-the-phantasm is-circumvented opinion
Fides autem examinandi res, ut uere dicantur, conuincitur
the-faith however of-examining things that truly they-be-said is-proven
plerumque a duobus; scilicet uel a forma substantie uel
mostly by two namely either by the-form of-substance or

ab effectu forme. Est enim uerus homo, cui uera inest
by the-effect of-form is for a-true man he-in-whom true is-in
humanitas; id est conscia rationis et passibilitatis. Vera autem
humanity that is conscious of-reason and of-passibility true however
albedo est que albificat; que iustum facit, uera iustitia. Si
whiteness is that-which whitens what just makes true justice if
michi non credis, uel magno Hilario, qui Gallicano coturno
me not you-believe even to-the-great Hilary who by-the-Gallic buskin
attollitur et a lectione simplicium procul est, aurem prebe.
is-lifted and from the-reading of-the-simple far is the-ear offer

Unde dicatur uerum, et quid ueritas, et quid ei contrarium

XXXIV · WHENCE TRUE IS NAMED, WHAT TRUTH IS, AND ITS CONTRARY

True comes from the Greek heron, firm and clear; hence the heroes, who won a firm rank, while we call the elect saints, from sancire, to confirm. Truth is a name of firmness. As the senses fail without an object, reason slips without firm footing; privations are nothing, Augustine teaches, though Aristotle calls them something. Vanity and falsehood, contrary to truth, tend to nothing, and no one can know what is false.

Ut autem geramus morem Stoicis, qui circa uerborum
that however we-may-show compliance to-the-Stoics who about of-words
analeticem uel analogiam sollicitantur, uerum dictum est
the-analysis or analogy are-anxious true called it-has-been
a Greco heron, quod firmum et stabile seu certum et
from Greek heron which firm and stable or certain and
clarum interpretatur. Hinc heroes dicti sunt qui firmum et
clear is-interpreted hence heroes called were those-who firm and
stabilem adepti sunt gradum ex consortio numinum, quibus
stable attained have rank from the-fellowship of-the-divinities with-which

eos fabulosa antiquitas sociauit. Hi uero hemitei heroes
them fabulous antiquity associated they indeed demigods heroes
nuncupati sunt, sicut Marcianus ait, ex eo quod ueteres
named were as Martianus says from that that the-ancients
terram heram appellauerunt, et hoc quidem a certitudine
the-earth hera called and this indeed from the-certainty
stabilitatis sue. Nos autem non semideos, qui nulli sunt, sed
of-stability its-own we however not demigods who none are but
nec heroes, ob perfidie notam, aliquos dicimus, sed
not-even heroes on-account-of of-faithlessness the-mark any call but
translationem electorum, que sit a fluctuatione et uanitate
the-translation of-the-elect which be from fluctuation and vanity
mundana ad gloriam uere certitudinis et firme stabilitatis,
worldly to the-glory of-true certainty and of-firm stability
uerbo significamus catholico; eos namque a confirmatione,
by-a-word we-signify catholic them for from the-confirmation
quam adepti sunt, sanctos appellamus; siquidem sancire
which attained they-have saints we-call since to-sanction
confirmare est, et sanctus confirmatus in uirtute uel gloria.
to-confirm is and holy confirmed in virtue or glory
Hoc utique est a uanitate eximi et in ueritate
this surely is from vanity to-be-exempted and in truth
uersari. Proinde uerum hoc uerbum confirmationis nota est,
to-be-occupied accordingly true this word of-confirmation a-mark is
stabilitatemque significat rei, cui ratio fideliter possit
and-stability signifies of-a-thing on-which reason faithfully can
inniti. Veritas uero nomen firmitudinis et stabilitatis est.
to-rest truth indeed the-name of-firmness and of-stability is
Nec moueat quod pro aspiratione Greci Latinus V posuit
nor let-it-move that for the-aspiration of-the-Greek the-Latin V set
consonantem, cum Eolicum digamma ad hanc consonantem
consonant since the-Aeolic digamma to this consonant

multas habeat affinitates. Sicut autem, ut uis sentiendi
many has affinities as however that the-power of-sensing
motum suum exerceat utiliter, necesse est aliquid esse cui
motion its-own may-exercise usefully necessary it-is something to-be on-which
stabiliter innitatur; sic ratio labitur, si non stabili innititur
stably it-may-rest so reason slips if not on-a-stable it-rests
offendiculo. Nam, si lucem subtraxeris, cessat uisus;
stumbling-block for if light you-will-have-taken-away ceases sight
auditus nullus est, cessante sono; olfactus gustusque quiescunt
hearing none is with-ceasing sound smell and-taste rest
ab odoris saporisque carentia; tactus inanis est, si in rem
from of-odor and-of-savor the-lack touch empty is if on a-thing
solidam non offendat. Dicitur tamen quod tunc uideantur
solid not it-strike it-is-said however that then are-seen
tenebre, silentium audiatur, tangatur inane. Sed uerius
darkness silence is-heard is-touched the-void but more-truly
diceretur his sensibus tunc nichil sentiri. Augustinus
it-would-be-said by-these senses then nothing to-be-sensed Augustine
enim et contra Manicheos et in Ipognosticon et in aliis
for both against the-Manichees and in the-Hypognosticon and in other
multis libris docet non modo has sed quaslibet priuationes
many books teaches not only these but any privations
nichil esse. Aristotiles autem eas nonnichil esse asserit,
nothing to-be Aristotle however them something to-be asserts
eo quod non modo priuant, sed ad se quodammodo
by-that that not only they-deprive but to themselves in-a-way
subiecta disponunt. Itaque tam sensus quam ratio stabile
the-subjects dispose and-so as-much sense as reason stable
quid exposcunt, ne inanis sit opera, que certum quid non
something demand lest empty be the-work which certain something not
comprehendit. Nam cum agit ut teneat et cassatur eius
comprehends for when it-acts that it-may-hold and is-made-void its

intentio, in uanum laborat et suo fallitur errore. Unde sicut
intention in vain it-labors and by-its-own is-deceived error whence as
errorem diximus rationi contrarium, sic uanitatem ueritati
error we-have-called to-reason contrary so vanity to-truth
contrariam profitemur: nam falsum uanumque, etsi uoces
contrary we-profess for false and-vain although the-words
diuerse sint, ad eandem quodammodo accedunt significationem.
diverse be to the-same in-a-way approach signification
Porro uanitas et falsitas ad nichilum uergunt; quod enim
further vanity and falsity to nothing incline what for
falsum est, omnino nichil est, nec sub scientiam cadit. Nam,
false is altogether nothing is nor under knowledge falls for
sicut Augustinus et in Soliloquiis et contra Academicos et
as Augustine both in the-Soliloquies and against the-Academics and
in plerisque aliis docet, inter omnes ueteres et etiam inter
in very-many others teaches among all the-ancients and even among
ipsos Academicos constitit scire falsa neminem posse.
the-very Academics it-stood-agreed to-know false-things no-one to-be-able
Siquidem, ut idem contra Academicos astruit, rerum falsarum,
since as the-same against the-Academics builds of-things false
quoniam omnino non sunt, nulla potest esse scientia. Ubi
since altogether not they-are no can to-be knowledge where
autem quidam interpretes dixerunt quod terra ab initio
however certain interpreters said that the-earth from the-beginning
erat inanis et uacua, alii interpretati sunt quod nichil erat
was void and empty others interpreted have that nothing it-was
nec composita. Ergo uerum uano falsoque, quoniam idem
nor composed therefore the-true to-the-vain and-false since the-same
sunt, lege contrarietatis opponitur. Nec moueor si res
they-are by-the-law of-contrariety is-opposed nor am-I-moved if a-thing
existens rei non existenti opponatur; cum hoc palam sit in
existing to-a-thing not existing be-opposed since this plain be in

enuntiabilibus que contradictorie opponuntur. Nam Aristotiles
enunciables which contradictorily are-opposed for Aristotle
docet alterum eorum esse semper, et alterum ex necessitate
teaches the-one of-them to-be always and the-other from necessity
non esse. Nonne res existens rei non existentis est
not to-be surely-not a-thing existing of-a-thing not existing is
signum, ut rubor future serenitatis aut tempestatis? Siquidem
a-sign as redness of-future fair-weather or storm since

mane rubens celum notat imbres, sero serenum.
in-the-morning red the-sky marks rains in-the-evening fair

Item de ueris, et quod aliter dicuntur esse res, aliter sermones, aliter uera, et quomodo

XXXV · TRUE THINGS, AND HOW THINGS AND SPEECHES ARE SAID TO BE

All vain things deceive and vanish like phantoms, as Ecclesiastes proclaims. Plato held that intelligibles truly are while temporal things only seem to be, and set three principles, God, matter, and idea, the source of the native forms. Bernard of Chartres, the age's most perfect Platonist, versified this but held only the three persons coeternal, the idea eternal yet later by nature. So the Platonists agree with Solomon.

Omnia uero uana, quatenus uana sunt, fallunt, et, cum
all indeed vain-things as-far-as vain they-are deceive and when
falsitate deceptas mentes illuserint, uelut fantasmata
with-falsehood the-deceived minds they-will-have-mocked like phantasms
euanescunt. Unde ob hanc rerum euanescentium
vanish whence on-account-of this of-things vanishing
disparentiam omnia que sub sole sunt uana esse in
disappearance all-things which under the-sun are vain to-be in

concione uniuersorum qui uersantur in mundo proclamat
the-assembly of-all who are-occupied in the-world proclaims
Ecclesiastes; tanta quidem maiestate uerbi, tanta probabilitate
Ecclesiastes with-such indeed majesty of-word with-such probability
sententie, ut ad omnes nationes et linguas uox illa
of-meaning that to all nations and tongues voice that
pertranseat et omnium, qui aures audiendi habent, corda
may-pass-through and of-all who ears of-hearing have the-hearts
penetrando concutiat. Plato quoque eorum que uere sunt
by-penetrating may-shake Plato also of-those which truly are
et eorum que non sunt sed esse uidentur, differentiam
and of-those which not are but to-be seem the-difference
docens, intelligibilia uere esse asseruit, que nec incursionum
teaching the-intelligible truly to-be asserted which neither of-onsets
passionumue molestiam metuunt, non potestatis iniuriam non
or-of-passions the-trouble fear nor of-power the-injury nor
dispendium temporis, sed semper uigore conditionis sue
the-loss of-time but always by-the-vigor of-condition their-own
eadem perseuerant. Unde et eis post essentiam primam recte
the-same persevere whence also to-them after essence first rightly
competet esse; id est firmus certusque status, quem uerbum,
will-belong to-be that is firm and-certain state which the-word
si proprie ponitur, exprimit substantiuum; temporalia uero
if properly it-is-placed expresses substantive temporal-things indeed
uidentur quidem esse, eo quod intelligibilium pretendunt
seem indeed to-be by-that that of-intelligibles they-hold-out
imaginem. Sed appellatione uerbi substantiui non satis
the-image but of-the-appellation of-the-word substantive not enough
digna sunt que cum tempore transeunt, ut nunquam in
worthy they-are which with time pass so-that never in
eodem statu permaneant, sed ut fumus euanescant; fugiunt
the-same state they-remain but as smoke they-vanish they-flee

enim, ut idem ait in Thimeo, nec expectant appellationem.
for as the-same says in the-Timaeus nor await the-appellation
Hanc autem ueram existentiam partiebatur in tria, que
this however true existence he-divided into three which
rerum principia statuebat; Deum scilicet, materiam, et ideam;
of-things the-principles he-established God namely matter and idea
siquidem hec in sui natura immutabilia sunt. Nam Deus
since these in their-own nature unchangeable are for God
usquequaque immutabilis est; reliqua duo quodammodo
wholly unchangeable is the-remaining two in-a-way
immobilia, sed in effectibus ab inuicem uariantur. Materiam
immovable but in effects from each-other are-varied matter
quippe aduenientes forme disponunt, et quodammodo motui
for supervening forms dispose and in-a-way to-motion
reddunt obnoxiam; et item forme materiei contactu quadam
render subject and likewise forms of-matter by-contact by-a-certain
ratione uariantur et, ut ait Boetius in Arismeticis, in
reason are-varied and as says Boethius in the-Arithmetic into
uertibilem transeunt inconstantiam. Ideas tamen, quas post
changeable pass inconstancy ideas however which after
Deum primas essentias ponit, negat in seipsis materie
God first essences he-posits he-denies in themselves with-matter
admisceri aut aliquem sortiri motum; sed ex his forme
to-be-mixed or any to-obtain motion but from these forms
prodeunt natiue, scilicet imagines exemplarium, quas natura
come-forth native namely images of-exemplars which nature
rebus singulis concreauit. Hinc in libro de Trinitate
on-things single co-created hence in the-book on the-Trinity
Boetius: Ex his formis, que preter materiam sunt, ille
Boethius from these forms which beyond matter are those
forme uenerunt, que in materia sunt et corpus efficiunt.
forms came which in matter are and body make

Bernardus quoque Carnotensis, perfectissimus inter Platonicos
Bernard also of-Chartres the-most-perfect among the-Platonists
seculi nostri, hanc fere sententiam metro complexus est:
of-age our this almost judgment in-meter embraced has

Non dico esse quod est, gemina quod parte coactum
not I-say to-be what is twin because by-part compacted
materie formam continet implicitam;
of-matter form holds enfolded
sed dico esse quod est, una quod constat earum;
but I-say to-be what is one because it-consists of-them
hoc uocat Idean, illud Acheus ilen.
this calls Idea that the-Achaean hyle

Et, licet Stoici materiam et ideam Deo crederent
and although the-Stoics matter and idea with-God believed
coeternam; alii uero, cum Epicuro prouidentiam euacuante,
coeternal others indeed with Epicurus providence emptying
ideam omnino tollerent; iste, cum illis qui philosophantur,
the-idea altogether removed he with those who philosophize
Deo neutram dicebat coeternam. Adquiescebat enim Patribus,
with-God neither said coeternal he-assented for to-the-Fathers
qui, sicut Augustinus testis est, probant quia Deus, qui
who as Augustine witness is prove that God who
omnia fecit de nichilo, omnium creauit materiam. Ideam uero
all-things made from nothing of-all created the-matter the-idea indeed
eternam esse consentiebat; admittens eternitatem prouidentie, in
eternal to-be he-agreed admitting the-eternity of-providence in
qua omnia semel et simul fecit, statuens apud se uniuersa
which all-things once and at-once he-made establishing with himself all-things
que futura erant in tempore aut mansura in eternitate.
which future were in time or about-to-remain in eternity

Coeternitas autem esse non potest, nisi in his que se
coeternity however to-be not can except in those which each-other
nec natura maiestatis nec priuilegio potestatis nec auctoritate
neither by-nature of-majesty nor by-privilege of-power nor by-authority
operis antecedunt. Itaque solas tres personas, quarum est una
of-work precede and-so alone three persons of-whom is one
natura, potestas singularis, operatio inseparabilis, fatebatur
nature power singular operation inseparable he-confessed
esse coequales et coeternas; nam in illis omnimoda parilitas
to-be coequal and coeternal for in them every-way equality
est. Ideam uero, quia ad hanc parilitatem non consurgit, sed
is the-idea indeed since to this equality not it-rises but
quodammodo natura posterior est et uelut quidam effectus,
in-a-way by-nature later is and as-if a-certain effect
manens in archano consilii, extrinseca causa non indigens,
remaining in the-secret of-counsel an-outward cause not needing
sicut eternam audebat dicere, sic coeternam esse negabat. Ut
as eternal he-dared to-call so coeternal to-be he-denied as
enim ait in expositione Porphirii, duplex est opus diuine
for he-says in the-exposition of-Porphyry twofold is the-work of-the-divine
mentis, alterum quod de subiecta materia creat aut quod
mind the-one which from underlying matter it-creates or which
ei concreatur; alterum quod de se facit et continet in
with-it is-co-created the-other which from itself it-makes and contains in
se, externo non egens adminiculo. Utique celos fecit in
itself external not needing aid surely the-heavens he-made in

intellectu ab initio, ad quos ibi formandos nec materiam
understanding from the-beginning for which there to-be-formed neither matter
nec formam quesiuit extrinsecam. Alibi quoque ait:
nor form did-he-seek outward elsewhere also he-says

Principium cui sola fuit diuina uoluntas,
the-beginning for-which alone was divine will
etas non frangit demoliturque uetustas.
age not breaks and-demolishes antiquity
Dissoluit tempus quicquid producit adesse;
dissolves time whatever it-brings-forth to-be-present
si non ad presens, constat quandoque necesse.
if not at present it-is-agreed sometime necessary
Ergo super tali qui luget conditione,
therefore over such who mourns a-condition
aut nichil aut minimum claret rationis habere.
either nothing or very-little is-clear of-reason to-have

Quidam tamen, licet ab eterno concedant esse uera, ea
some however although from eternity they-grant to-be true them
tamen negant esse eterna, dicentes nichil esse eternum, nisi
yet deny to-be eternal saying nothing to-be eternal except
quod uiuit, eo quod eternitas, teste Augustino, status
what lives by-that that eternity by-witness Augustine the-state
est interminabilis uite. Ex his patet placuisse Platonicis
is of-interminable life from these it-is-plain to-have-pleased the-Platonists
cum Salomone omnia subsolana uana esse; et eas res
with Solomon all-things under-the-sun vain to-be and those things
dumtaxat esse ueras, que non ut fantasmata euanescunt,
only to-be true which not as phantasms vanish
sed statu substantie certa et semper eadem sunt.
but in-the-state of-substance certain and always the-same are

Differentia earum que uere sunt et que uidentur esse, secundum Platonicos

XXXVI · WHAT TRULY IS AND WHAT SEEMS, AFTER THE PLATONISTS

False names opinion, speech, and thing alike: opinion is false because deceived, speech because it signifies false opinion, a thing because the understanding perceives it as empty. The Peripatetics, philosophizing more humanly, place truth and falsehood in faithful or erroneous understanding. God, who cannot be deceived, knows the false as false; man longs for certainty, which comes only as grace distills a drop from the virgin fountain of divine wisdom.

Cum uero nomen falsi opinioni, locutioni, et rei pariter
since indeed the-name of-false to-opinion to-speech and to-thing equally
applicetur, opinio, que deceptionis fallaciam patitur, falsa
be-applied the-opinion which of-deception the-fallacy suffers false
rectissime nominatur, siquidem ipsa est que fallitur. Locutio
most-rightly is-named since it is which is-deceived speech
autem falsa est, eo quod falsam significat opinionem. Res
however false is by-that that false it-signifies opinion a-thing
uero falsa dicitur ab effectu, ideo quod ipsam non nisi
indeed false is-called from the-effect for-this that it not except
cassus et uanus, percipiat intellectus. Sic et in phisicis sana
an-empty and vain may-perceive understanding so also in medicine healthy
dicuntur esse uel egra nunc animalia, nunc signa, nunc cause.
are-called to-be or sick now animals now signs now causes
Ut autem a Platonis eminentia cum Peripateticis paululum
that however from of-Plato the-eminence with the-Peripatetics a-little
descendamus, ea uera dicuntur esse uel falsa que, ut
we-may-descend those true are-said to-be or false which so-that
de significatione complexorum sermonum agatur, certo
about the-signification of-combined speeches it-be-treated by-certain
percipiuntur intellectu aut uano; hi siquidem, uelud qui
are-perceived understanding or by-empty they since as those-who

philosophantur humanius, et non cum Platonicis excedunt
philosophize more-humanly and not with the-Platonists go-out
mente sibi et Deo, sed sobrii sunt, hominibus in eo
in-mind to-themselves and to-God but sober are to-men in that
ueritatem aut falsitatem statuunt, in quo, sicut percipitur
truth or falsehood they-establish in which as it-is-perceived
examinando et comprehendendo, fidelis est aut erroneus
by-examining and by-comprehending faithful is or erroneous
intellectus. Si enim rem sic esse ut est aut non esse
the-understanding if for a-thing so to-be as it-is or not to-be
ut non est, comprehendit, iudicio certo et fideli usus
as not it-is it-comprehends with-judgment certain and faithful used
est; sin autem uel non esse quod est uel esse quod non
it-has if however either not to-be what is or to-be what not
est opinatur, proculdubio fallitur et errat. Idem quoque
is it-thinks without-doubt it-is-deceived and errs the-same also
est in sermonibus. Res autem, que seipsam, prout est,
is in speeches a-thing however which itself as it-is
intellectui subicit, uera est; que aliter, uana et falsa.
to-the-understanding submits true is which otherwise vain and false
Ergo a modo percipiendi (scilicet quo percipiuntur aut
therefore from the-mode of-perceiving namely by-which they-are-perceived or
percipiunt,) conuincitur ueritas aut falsitas tam opinionum
perceive is-proven the-truth or falsehood as-much of-opinions
quam rerum; sermonum uero a modo significandi. Unde,
as of-things of-speeches indeed from the-mode of-signifying whence
quia Deum falli impossibile est, proculdubio constat
since God to-be-deceived impossible is without-doubt it-is-agreed
quoniam quo fidelior est scientia et certior,
that by-how-much more-faithful is the-knowledge and more-certain
eo minus falsa comprehendit; ea tamen falsa esse
by-so-much less false-things it-comprehends them however false to-be

cognoscit. Quod uerum est ueritati omnia contemplanti
it-knows what true is to-the-truth all-things contemplating
non potest esse absconditum. Nam penes essentiam Dei
not can to-be hidden for with the-essence of-God
primitiua ueritas, id est certitudo aut stabilitas aut claritas,
the-primeval truth that is certainty or stability or clearness
est, et ab hac diriuatur quodammodo quicquid in rebus
is and from this is-derived in-a-way whatever in things
fideliter dicitur uerum esse. Siquidem illi soli omnium
faithfully is-said true to-be since to-him alone of-all
tam rerum quam sermonum coherentia uel discoherentia
as-much of-things as of-speeches the-coherence or incoherence
constat et certa est. Homo uero quantuscunque, affectat
is-agreed and certain is man indeed however-great affects
quidem certiorari; eo quod amor ueritatis cognatus et
indeed to-be-made-certain by-that that the-love of-truth akin and
innatus est rationi et, ut ait Marcianus, cum Philologia illam
inborn is to-reason and as says Martianus with Philology that
existentem ex non existentibus ueritatem toto pectore
existing from not existing-things truth with-whole breast
deprecatur. Hec utique aliunde non prouenit quam si
she-entreats this surely from-elsewhere not comes than if
aliqua stilla diuine sapientie per gratie eliquationem seipsam
some drop of-divine wisdom through of-grace the-distilling itself
infundat et mentem se querentis et amantis illustret. Ista
pour-in and the-mind itself of-one-seeking and loving illuminate this
siquidem est uirgo fontana, unde Marcianus premissam
since is the-virgin fountain-born whence Martianus the-aforesaid
asserit manare ueritatem. Nichil enim ueraciter innotescit,
asserts to-flow truth nothing for truly becomes-known
nisi de scaturigine fontis huius; sed nec aliquod falsum inde
except from the-gushing of-fount this but nor anything false thence

emanat, quoniam fontana illa, quam poetici nube figmenti
flows since fountain-born that which with-poetic cloud of-fiction
inuoluit, uirgo est et totius corruptionis et falsitatis ignara.
has-wrapped virgin is and of-all corruption and falsehood ignorant

Quod aliter res, aliter opinio, aliter locutio uera uel falsa dicitur; et quare locutiones huiusmodi modales appellentur

XXXVII · THING, OPINION, AND SPEECH ARE TRUE DIFFERENTLY

The eye of divine simplicity sees all things, past and future, and what it saw from the beginning stands firm and true, the thoughts of the Most High. Yet nothing is coeternal with the creator. True things in God's mind are neither nothing nor creatures. Things, thoughts, and words each have their own way of existing, and God's Word is one, though the words he speaks are infinite.

Omnes autem res diuine simplicitatis oculus contemplatur,
all however things of-divine simplicity the-eye contemplates
ut ei nec futura desint nec preterita elabantur.
so-that to-it neither future-things be-lacking nor past-things slip-away
Coherentiam rerum et discoherentiam pensat, et tam de
the-coherence of-things and the-incoherence it-weighs and as-much about
his que sunt, quam de his que non sunt, certum et
those which are as about those which not are certain and
fidele exercet iudicium; et que ab initio uidit, quia
faithful it-exercises judgment and what-things from the-beginning it-saw since
non euanescunt, firma sunt et uera dicuntur. Hec utique
not they-vanish firm are and true are-called these surely
sunt cogitationes Altissimi, quarum profunditatem nemo
are the-thoughts of-the-Most-High whose depth no-one
sufficit explicare. Hec uerba, que semel dicta sunt, sed
suffices to-unfold these words which once said were but

processu temporis pro diuine dispositionis decreto in
in-the-process of-time according-to of-divine disposition the-decree into
actum prodeunt. Quis mentem Dei dixerit otiosam et non
act come-forth who the-mind of-God would-call idle and not
ab initio omnia contemplatam? Si ergo uera, quasi
from the-beginning all-things having-contemplated if therefore true-things as-if
quedam cogitata Dei, sunt, quis illa, nisi presumptuosus,
certain thoughts of-God are who them unless presumptuous
affirmauerit euanescere? aut quis ea non semper fuisse
would-affirm to-vanish or who them not always to-have-been
in mente eius qui ab eterno uniuersa disposuit et sciuit,
in the-mind of-him who from eternity all-things disposed and knew
audeat profiteri? Numquid et ille nouas cogitationes concipit
would-dare to-profess surely-not also he new thoughts conceives
et noua more nostro init consilia? Et, licet hec
and new after-the-manner our enters-on counsels and although these
ab eterno fuerint uera, non tamen aliquid creatori dicitur
from eternity were true not however anything with-the-creator is-called
coeternum; quia, ut dictum est, ad parilitatem eius nichil
coeternal since as said it-has-been to the-equality his nothing
omnino consurgere potest, siquidem ipsius est ut hec ipsa
at-all to-rise can since his it-is that these very-things
uera sint aut certa. Quod autem omnis res aut creator
true be or certain that however every thing either creator
dicitur aut creatura, ad substantias et ad ea que substantiis
is-called or creature to substances and to those which in-substances
insunt quocumque modo ex auctoritate Patrum uniuersitatis
are-in in-whatever way from the-authority of-the-Fathers of-the-universality
complexio reuocatur; nam enuntiationum significatio non
the-enfolding is-recalled for of-enunciations the-signification not
contingit, urgente aliqua ratione sermonis. Qui enim si
it-touches with-pressing some reason of-speech those for if

partiti sunt, respexerunt ad incomplexorum significationes.
divided they-have they-looked to of-uncombined-things the-significations
Non nichil ergo sunt uera que in mente Dei
not nothing therefore are the-true-things which in the-mind of-God
consistunt, sed nec creature sunt, eo quod ab eterno
consist but neither creatures are-they by-that that from eternity
extiterunt. Nam quin quedam sempiterna sint, nulla questio
they-existed for that some everlasting be no question
est; nisi forte eo referatur illud Ecclesiastici: Qui uiuit
is unless perhaps thither be-referred that-saying of-Ecclesiasticus he-who lives
in eternum creauit omnia simul. A quibusdam enim refertur
into eternity created all-things at-once by some for it-is-referred
tam ad illud opus, quod in se conspiciendo et disponendo
as-much to that work which in itself by-beholding and arranging
Trinitas operata est, quam ad creationem primordialis materie,
the-Trinity worked has as to the-creation of-primordial matter
ex qua omnia creata sunt aut in ipsa creatis concreantur.
from which all-things created were or in it with-the-created are-co-created
Ceterum hoc est eis esse, quod ad primitiuam rationis
however this is for-them to-be which to the-primeval of-reason
scientiam referri, et ita esse quasi pronuntiari stabili
knowledge to-be-referred and so to-be as-if to-be-pronounced by-stable
intentatoque iudicio. Esse ergo istorum, innotescere est; nam
and-untried judgment to-be therefore of-these to-become-known is for
et humanorum uerborum idem dicitur pronuntiari et esse;
also of-human words the-same is-said to-be-pronounced and to-be
aut memoria retineri et esse. Nam de unico Augustinus
or in-memory to-be-retained and to-be for about the-only-one Augustine
ait: Hoc est Verbum non quod desinit prolatum sed quod
says this is the-Word not which ceases brought-forth but which
permanet natum. Que distinctio quodammodo uidetur inepta,
remains born which distinction in-a-way seems inept

nisi per prolationem subsisterent uerba. Ceterum, quoniam
unless through utterance subsisted words however since
esse, et unum, et res multipliciter dicuntur, uiderit quisque
to-be and one and thing in-many-ways are-said let-see each
quomodo dictionum interpretetur significationem. Habent
how of-the-words he-interpret the-signification have
itaque res (nature scilicet uel naturalium opera), habent
and-so things of-nature namely or of-natural-things works have
cogitationes et sermones et uerba et rationes; singula,
thoughts and speeches and words and reasons each
inquam, hec habent suum existendi modum, ut pro
I-say these have its-own of-existing mode so-that according-to
qualitate illius eorum que fideliter enuntiantur accipienda
the-quality of-that of-those which faithfully are-enunciated to-be-taken
sit interpretatio, unde, inspecta diligenter significatione
be the-interpretation whence inspected diligently the-signification
uerborum, esse uera dicantur, aut non esse non contendo,
of-words to-be true-things be-said or not to-be not I-contend
dum tamen uera non omnino nichil sint; falsa uero
provided however true-things not altogether nothing be false-things indeed
usquequaque non sunt, quoniam omnino nichil sunt. Sic
wholly not are since altogether nothing they-are so
enim et antiqui philosophi et catholici Patres diffinierunt.
for both the-ancient philosophers and the-catholic Fathers defined
Porro memorari et dicere Dei, scire ipsius est; memoria
further to-remember and to-speak of-God to-know his is memory
namque eius aut uerbum siue ratio sapientia ipsius est.
for his or word or reason the-wisdom his is
Verbum ergo, quo loquitur omnipotentia, unum est; sed
the-Word therefore by-which speaks omnipotence one is but
uerba que loquitur, infinita. Principium, inquit, uerborum
the-words which it-speaks infinite the-beginning he-says of-words

tuorum ueritas; eo quod a luce inaccessibili, quam
your truth by-that that from the-light inaccessible which
Deus inhabitat, habet ut ei omnia innotescant. Hanc
God inhabits it-has that to-him all-things become-known this
tamen lucem a substantia eius non arbitror alienam.
however light from substance his not I-judge foreign

De coherentia rationis et ueritatis; et breuiter quid utrumque

XXXVIII · THE COHERENCE OF REASON AND TRUTH

Reason is the mind's eye, the instrument by which it uses all its senses; its proper work is to investigate and grasp truth. The power's contrary is weakness, and its inquiry's is error. It is perfect simply in God, perfect for its nature in the angel, and imperfect in man, who claims not reason but the desire for it, which the word philology expresses. Reason admits no contraries, since God's reason is unchangeable substance and no creature's is a substance.

Nunc iocundissimam rationis ueritatisque coherentiam cum
now the-most-pleasant of-reason and-of-truth coherence with
omni reuerentia contemplemur, rationis et ueritatis auxilium
all reverence let-us-contemplate of-reason and of-truth the-help
implorantes; nam sine eo non modo apprehendi sed nec
imploring for without it not only to-be-grasped but not-even
inuestigari fideliter queunt. Est ergo ratio quidam mentis
to-be-investigated faithfully they-can is therefore reason a-certain of-the-mind
oculus et, ut latius describatur, ratio est quoddam
eye and that more-widely it-be-described reason is a-certain
instrumentum, quo mens omnes sensus suos exercet.
instrument by-which the-mind all senses its-own exercises
Proprium eius est inuestigare et apprehendere ueritatem.
proper its is to-investigate and to-grasp truth

Huius uirtutis contrarium est imbecillitas et impotentia
of-this power the-contrary is weakness and impotence
inuestigandi et assequendi uerum. Error autem contrarium
of-investigating and of-attaining the-true error however the-contrary
est illius agitationis, inuestigantis uerum, quam supra
is of-that agitation investigating the-true which above
diximus rationem. Virtus hec in Deo simpliciter perfecta, in
we-have-called reason power this in God simply perfect in
angelo perfecta pro natura, sed in homine aut omnino
the-angel perfect according-to nature but in man either altogether
imperfecta est aut ut multum; si tamen sit in aliquo
imperfect is or at most if however it-be in anyone
perfecta pro tempore aut collatione imperfectiorum.
perfect according-to time or by-comparison of-the-more-imperfect
Unde non rationem, sed appetitum rationis, quem philologia
whence not reason but the-appetite of-reason which philology
exprimit, uendicat sibi; siquidem nomina hec, philologia,
expresses he-claims for-himself since the-names these philology
philosophia, et philocalia philosophorum modestia temperauit.
philosophy and philocaly of-philosophers the-modesty tempered
Ratio uero nequaquam contrariorum susceptibilis est; eo
reason indeed by-no-means of-contraries susceptible is by-that
quod diuina ratio immutabilis substantia est, angeli uero
that divine reason unchangeable substance is of-the-angel indeed
uel hominis ratio substantia non est.
or of-man reason substance not is

Item de eodem; et quod nec ratio nec ueritas contraria suscipit

XXXIX · REASON AND TRUTH AGAIN; NEITHER ADMITS CONTRARIES

Truth is the light of the mind and the matter of reason: God sees it universally, the angel in part, man in small measure. Its contrary is vanity, falsehood, or the void, which is nothing, and things are truer as they express God's image more faithfully. Truth fosters reason as light fosters sight; in God the two are one, in creatures distinct, and truth, like reason, admits no contraries.

Veritas autem lux mentis est et materia rationis. Hanc
truth however the-light of-the-mind is and the-matter of-reason this
Deus uniuersaliter, angelus particulariter intuetur; homo
God universally the-angel particularly beholds man
autem, etiam perfectissimus, pro parte modice uidet; sed
however even the-most-perfect in part moderately sees but
quo perfectior, eo amplius appetit. Hec est soliditas
by-how-much more-perfect by-so-much more he-seeks this is the-solidity
certitudinis, in qua rationis uiget examen. Tolle lucem
of-certainty in which of-reason flourishes the-examination take-away light
et soliditatem, frustrabuntur uisus et tactus; sicut et in
and solidity will-be-frustrated sight and touch as also in
aliis sensibus, sono uel odore uel sapore subtracto. Simili
other senses with-sound or odor or savor withdrawn in-like
modo omnis sensus rationis frustrabitur, ueritate subducta.
way every sense of-reason will-be-frustrated with-truth withdrawn
Contrarium uero eius est uanitas seu falsitas aut inane;
the-contrary indeed its is vanity or falsehood or the-void
quod, sicut philosophia probat, in rebus nichil est. Unde
which as philosophy proves in things nothing is whence
et quibusdam placuit inane, littera mutata, dici quasi
also to-some it-pleased void with-a-letter changed to-be-called as-if

inune, scilicet quod non est unum; quod autem non est,
un-one namely what not is one what however not is
nichil est. Est autem primeua ueritas in maiestate diuina.
nothing is is however the-primeval truth in majesty divine
Alia uero est, que in diuinitatis consistit imagine, id est in
another indeed is which in of-divinity consists the-image that is in
imitatione. Omnis enim res tanto uerius est, quanto
imitation every for thing by-so-much more-truly is by-as-much-as
imaginem Dei fidelius exprimit; et quanto ab ea
the-image of-God more-faithfully it-expresses and by-as-much-as from it
magis deficit, tanto falsius euanescit. Utique sic ut homo
more it-falls-short by-so-much more-falsely it-vanishes surely so as man
uanitati similis factus est, et dies eius sicut umbra pretereunt.
to-vanity like made is and days his as shadow pass
Non est autem umbra, nisi lux corporis aliquo prepediatur
not is however shadow unless the-light of-a-body by-some be-hindered
obstaculo; et quasdam inducit tenebras absentia lucis. Ergo,
obstacle and certain brings-in darkness the-absence of-light therefore
ueritatis luce sublata, erroris tenebre inualescunt, error
of-truth with-the-light taken-away of-error the-darkness grows-strong error
uero fallit. Unde et ueritatis contrarium a fallendo falsitas
indeed deceives whence also of-truth the-contrary from deceiving falsity
nominatur; quia qui ambulat in tenebris, nescit quo uadat.
is-named because he-who walks in darkness knows-not whither he-goes
Proprium quidem ueritatis est fouere rationem et illustrare
proper indeed of-truth is to-foster reason and to-illuminate
et solidare; sicut rationis querere assequi et amplecti
and to-make-solid as of-reason to-seek to-attain and to-embrace
ueritatem. Nam et lux exterior, ut dictum est, uisum
truth for also light outer as said it-has-been sight
fouet; res solida roborat tactum. Porro hec in Deo unum,
fosters a-thing solid strengthens touch further these in God one

quia Ratio et Verbum eternum de se dicit: Ego sum
because the-Reason and Word eternal about himself says I am
ueritas; alieno enim non eget adminiculo, quia et se ratio
the-truth another's for not he-needs aid because both itself reason
illustrat, et ueritas seipsam inuenit. At in creaturis aliud
illuminates and truth itself finds but in creatures one-thing
ueritas, aliud ratio; nam ueritas imago quedam diuinitatis
truth another reason for truth an-image certain of-divinity
est, quam in rebus ratio querit et inuenit. Ratio uirtus aut
is which in things reason seeks and finds reason a-power or
mentis agitatio est, que occupatur in perspicientia ueri.
of-the-mind agitation is which is-occupied in the-discernment of-the-true
Non est autem ueritas susceptiua contrariorum, ob
not is however truth susceptible of-contraries on-account-of
eandem causam quam de ratione superius exposuimus.
the-same cause which about reason above we-have-expounded

Ad quid Peripatheticorum et omnium recte philosophantium tendat intentio; et ⟨de⟩ octo obstaculis intelligentie

XL · WHAT THE PERIPATETICS AIM AT, AND THE EIGHT OBSTACLES

The Peripatetics labor well if they seek and worship God's truth. Eight things hinder understanding, above all sin, which separates us from God. Solomon calls searching all things under the sun the worst occupation, and the pagan philosophers vanished in their thoughts. To know oneself is almost the highest wisdom; he philosophizes rightly who reforms God's image in himself. With Augustine, John holds that God is better known by not knowing.

Si huc Peripateticorum tendit intentio, ut, omni uanitate
if hither of-the-Peripatetics tends the-intention that with-all vanity
reiecta, ueritatem rerum agnoscat et tota ratione ueritatem
rejected the-truth of-things it-recognize and with-whole reason the-truth
Dei querat, ueneretur et colat, non inutiliter laboratur.
of-God seek venerate and cultivate not uselessly it-is-labored
Alioquin opera perit et impensa. Sed, quia multa sunt
otherwise the-work perishes and the-expense but since many-things are
que prepediunt intelligentiam, utpote inuincibilis ignorantia
which hinder understanding as invincible ignorance
eorum que ratione expediri non possunt, sicut sunt
of-those-things which by-reason to-be-expedited not can as are
sancte Trinitatis archana, et item fragilitas conditionis, uita
of-the-holy Trinity the-secrets and likewise the-frailty of-condition life
breuis, utilium negligentia, occupatio inutilis, probabilium
short of-useful-things neglect occupation useless of-probable
conflictus opinionum, culpa que lucem demeretur, et tandem
the-conflict of-opinions fault which the-light forfeits and at-length
numerositas et immensitas inuestigabilium, adeo obductum
the-numerousness and immensity of-unsearchable-things so-much overcast

est cor humanum, ut ad ueri notitiam raro possit
is the-heart human that to of-the-true knowledge rarely it-can
accedere. Sed in his octo que prepositа sunt, nichil adeo pro
to-approach but in these eight which set-forth are nothing so-much in
mea opinione scientiam eorum que expediunt impedit sicut
my opinion the-knowledge of-those which are-expedient hinders as
culpa, que separat inter nos et Deum et fontem precludit
fault which separates between us and God and the-fount shuts-off
ueritatis, quem tamen ratio sitire non cessat. Cor meum,
of-truth for-which however reason to-thirst not ceases heart my
inquit mens suorum conscia peccatorum, dereliquit me, et
he-says the-mind of-its-own conscious sins has-forsaken me and
lumen oculorum meorum, et ipsum non est mecum. Siquidem,
the-light of-eyes my and it not is with-me since
nisi ea que nouit quis ad diuinum reflectat obsequium,
unless those which he-knows anyone to divine turn-back obedience
non cum ipso, sed potius contra ipsum, facit scientia eius;
not with him but rather against him makes knowledge his
multa enim scire non prodest, si unum desit, quod est
many-things for to-know not profits if one-thing be-lacking which is
super omnia necessarium, et se ex creaturarum intelligentia
above all-things necessary and itself from of-creatures the-understanding
manifestat. Ait sanctus Salomon: Proposui in animo meo
manifests says holy Solomon I-set in mind my
querere et inuestigare sapienter de omnibus que fiunt
to-seek and to-investigate wisely about all-things which are-done
sub sole. Hanc occupationem pessimam dedit Deus filiis
under the-sun this occupation worst gave God to-the-sons
hominum. Versati sunt in hac philosophi gentium, qui
of-men occupied were in this the-philosophers of-the-nations who
iuxta Apostolum ueritatem Dei in mendacio tenuerunt
according-to the-Apostle the-truth of-God in a-lie held

et merito suo euanuerunt in cogitationibus suis. Pro eo
and by-desert their-own vanished in thoughts their-own for that
enim quod gratias bonorum non retulerunt auctori, dicentes
for that thanks for-goods not they-rendered to-the-author saying
se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt. Est autem curiositas
themselves to-be wise fools made were is however curiosity
inutilium superflua inquisitio, in qua non modo Peripatetici,
of-useless-things a-superfluous inquiry in which not only the-Peripatetics
sed fere totus occupatus est mundus. Quod uitium Lucanus
but almost the-whole occupied is world which vice Lucan
notans, dum estuantis Occeani incertas causas promeret,
marking while of-the-heaving Ocean the-uncertain causes he-was-bringing-forth
curiosos ad certitudinem inscrutabilis secreti inuitat. Querite,
the-curious to the-certainty of-an-inscrutable secret invites seek
inquit, quos agitat mundi labor. Dum autem mens circa
he-says you-whom stirs of-the-world the-labor while however the-mind about
multa, et non multum ad se pertinentia, amplius occupatur,
many-things and not much to itself pertaining more is-occupied
euagatur longius a se et plerumque obliuiscitur sui, quo
it-wanders farther from itself and often forgets itself than-which
quidem nullus error perniciosior est. Nam se nosse, sicut ait
indeed no error more-pernicious is for oneself to-know as says
Apollo, fere summa sapientia est. Quid autem prodest homini
Apollo almost the-highest wisdom is what however profits-it a-man
elementorum aut elementatorum nosse naturam, magnitudinis
of-elements or of-elemented-things to-know the-nature of-magnitude
et multitudinis proportiones doctrinaliter querere, uirtutum
and of-multitude the-proportions doctrinally to-seek of-virtues
uitiorumque speculari conflictum, complexiones attendere
and-of-vices to-contemplate the-conflict the-combinations to-attend-to
rationum et de omnibus probabiliter disputare, et sui
of-reasons and about all-things probably to-dispute and of-his-own

ipsius esse ignarum? Nonne stultus reputabitur qui aliena
self to-be ignorant surely-not foolish will-be-be-reckoned who others'
lustrat hospitia, et quo sibi in necessitate diuertendum
surveys lodgings and whither for-himself in need to-turn-aside
sit obliuiscitur? Nimis utique curiosus est et sui negligens
be forgets too surely curious he-is and of-himself negligent
qui aliena miratur et propria non attendit. Qui uero ad
who others'-things admires and his-own not attends-to he-who indeed to
usum vite conuertit extrinseca, ut eorum agnoscat et
the-use of-life turns outward-things that of-them he-may-recognize and
ueneretur auctorem, suum metiatur imperfectum, qui uix
venerate the-author his-own let-him-measure imperfection who scarcely
pauca comprehendere potest, et rebus transitoriis, cum
few-things to-comprehend can and things transitory with
quibus et ipse transit, non nisi precario utitur et ad
which also he-himself passes not except on-sufferance uses and for
horam. Qui concupiscentias cohibet, reprimit aut extinguit,
an-hour he-who desires checks represses or extinguishes
qui imaginem Dei uitio corruptam diligenti studio nititur
who the-image of-God by-vice corrupted with-diligent study strives
reformare, qui uirtutum toto nisu colit et exercet
to-reform who of-virtues with-whole effort cultivates and exercises
officia, rectissime philosophatur. Sobria est illius inuestigatio,
the-offices most-rightly philosophizes sober is his investigation
qui primo seipsum excutit, et que inferiora sunt
who first himself shakes-out and the-things-which lower are
diligenter examinat, et coequalia sine negligentia intuetur,
diligently examines and equal-things without negligence beholds
et superiora contemplatur cum ueneratione, ut ausu
and higher-things contemplates with veneration so-that with-daring
temerario in ea que inscrutabilia sunt non irrumpat. Hic
rash into those which inscrutable are not he-may-burst this-man

utique de se non superbit; uariam mundi suppellectilem,
surely of himself not is-proud the-varied of-the-world furniture
nisi quatenus necessarium aut licitum est, minime concupiscit;
except as-far-as necessary or lawful it-is not-at-all desires
proximo impendit caritatem; celestibus, qui uultui
to-his-neighbor he-expends charity to-the-heavenly-ones who before-the-face
Dei semper assistunt, reuerentiam et amorem; et bonorum
of-God always stand reverence and love and of-goods
omnium gratiam, laudem, et gloriam refert diuine maiestati;
all the-thanks praise and glory he-renders to-divine majesty
quam utique nec plene nosse permittit inmensitas sui,
which surely neither fully to-know permits the-immensity its-own
et, si nos non laboraremus infirmitate qua premimur,
and if we not labored with-the-weakness by-which we-are-pressed
nec plene ignorare sinunt creature; et que omnes, quasi
nor fully to-be-ignorant-of allow the-creatures and which all as-if
quadam publica attestatione, Creatoris gloriam preconantur.
with-a-certain public attestation the-Creator's glory proclaim
Hinc est illud Salomonis in Prouerbiis: Non erigas oculos
hence is that-saying of-Solomon in the-Proverbs not lift eyes
tuos ad opes quas habere non potes, quia facient
your to riches which to-have not you-can because they-will-make
sibi pennas ut aquile et auolabunt in celum. Ut
for-themselves wings as of-an-eagle and will-fly-away into heaven as
autem ait Augustinus in libro de Ordine, Deus melius
however says Augustine in the-book on Order God better
nesciendo scitur; quem si quis ignarus naturarum et morum
by-not-knowing is-known whom if one ignorant of-natures and of-morals
rationumque, cupiditatumque seruus, et rebus pereuntibus
and-of-reasons and-of-desires a-slave and on-things perishing
inhians, aut forte caste uiuens et disciplinarum nescius,
gaping or perhaps chastely living and of-disciplines ignorant

ingenii uiribus querendo et disputando inuenire confidit,
of-wit by-the-powers by-seeking and disputing to-find trusts
proculdubio tantum errabit, quantum errari plurimum
without-doubt as-much he-will-err as-much-as to-be-erred most
potest. Alibi quoque: Ignorantia Dei eius uerissima sapientia
can elsewhere also ignorance of-God his truest wisdom
est; et item: Non est parua scientia de Deo scire quid
is and likewise not is small knowledge about God to-know what
non sit Deus; quia quid sit, omnino sciri non potest.
not be God because what he-be at-all to-be-known not can

XLI · WHAT CANNOT BE KNOWN, AND WHAT TO SEEK

Some things cannot be known for their dignity, others for their number or size, others for their changeableness. Ecclesiasticus forbids seeking things too high or prying into superfluous things, checking those who discuss the Trinity irreverently or claim to account for everything. Since knowledge springs from deceiving senses, God gave the law to teach what is useful, and faith is the first foundation of understanding.

Cum ergo sciri quedam non possint pre eminentia
since therefore to-be-known certain-things not can for the-eminence
dignitatis, quedam pre multitudine aut magnitudine
of-dignity certain-things for the-multitude or magnitude
quantitatis sue, quedam propter inconstantiam et
of-quantity their-own certain-things on-account-of the-inconstancy and
lubricitatem sui; cui potissimum insistendum sit, et
slipperiness their-own on-which chiefly to-be-insisted be and
quid maxime expediat, Ecclesiasticus docet. Altiora, inquit,
what most be-expedient Ecclesiasticus teaches higher-things he-says
te ne quesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris.
than-you not seek and stronger-things than-you not scrutinized you-will-have

Ecce temeritatem eorum cohibet, qui deifice Trinitatis
behold the-rashness of-those he-checks who of-the-deifying Trinity
archana, et ea quorum uisio in uita eterna promittitur,
the-secrets and those whose vision in life eternal is-promised
irreuerenti uerbositate discutiunt. Unde, etsi scientia
with-irreverent verbosity discuss whence although knowledge
uideatur augeri, deuotio certe minuitur. In superuacuis,
seem to-be-increased devotion certainly is-diminished in superfluous
inquit, rebus noli scrutari multipliciter et in pluribus eius
he-says things do-not scrutinize manifoldly and in many his
operibus non eris curiosus. Multos enim subplantauit
works not you-will-be curious many for has-tripped
suspicio eorum, et in uanitate detinuit sensus eorum. Hic
suspicion their and in vanity has-held senses their here
quoque illorum audaciam reprimit, qui sollicitantur de
also of-those the-boldness he-represses who are-anxious about
omnibus, et uolunt de uniuersis reddere rationem, cum
all-things and wish about all to-render an-account since
constet auctoritate Salomonis in Ecclesiaste quod nec
it-is-agreed by-the-authority of-Solomon in Ecclesiastes that not-even
minime rei, que sub celo est, nedum celestium aut supra
of-the-least thing which under heaven is let-alone of-heavenly-things or above
celestium, plenam possit homo reddere rationem. Porro
of-the-heavenly-things full can man to-render account further
in quibus oporteat philosophantis ingenium exerceri filius
in what-things it-behooves of-the-philosopher the-wit to-be-exercised the-son
Sirac docet: Que precepit Deus, cogita illa semper,
of-Sirach teaches the-things-which commanded God think-on them always
et in pluribus operibus eius non eris curiosus. Quia
and in many works his not you-will-be curious since
enim de radice sensuum, qui frequenter falluntur, scientia
for from the-root of-the-senses which frequently are-deceived knowledge

manat, et decepta infirmitas quid expediat parum nouit, data
flows and deceived weakness what be-expedient little knows given
est per clementiam Dei lex, que utilium scientiam
has-been through the-clemency of-God the-law which of-useful-things the-knowledge
aperiret et indicaret de Deo quantum sciri licet
might-open and indicate about God as-much-as to-be-known is-permitted
aut quantum expedit querere. Illa enim diuinam potentiam
or as-much-as it-is-expedient to-seek that for divine power
in creatione, sapientiam in dispositione, bonitatem manifestat
in creation wisdom in disposition goodness manifests
in conseruatione rerum; sed hec maxime eminent in hominis
in the-preservation of-things but these most stand-out in of-man
reparatione redempti. Voluntatem quoque Dei patenter
the-repair redeemed the-will also of-God plainly
exponit, ut sciat quisque quid ipsum oporteat facere. Et
it-expounds that may-know each what him it-behooves to-do and
quia tam sensus quam ratio humana frequenter errat, ad
since as-much sense as reason human frequently errs for
intelligentiam ueritatis primum fundamentum locauit in fide.
the-understanding of-truth the-first foundation it-placed in faith
Hinc est illud Philonis in libro Sapientie: Qui confidunt
hence is that-saying of-Philo in the-book of-Wisdom those-who trust
in Domino, intelligent ueritatem, et fideles in dilectione
in the-Lord will-understand truth and the-faithful in love
adquiescunt illi, quoniam donum et pax est electis Dei.
rest-in him since gift and peace is to-the-elect of-God

Quod uisibilia argumenta mundum uanitati subiectum esse conuincunt; et que causa fuerit hic finiendi librum

XLII · THE WORLD IS SUBJECT TO VANITY

John stops, for it is a time to weep. War over Toulouse sets England and France against each other, and Pope Adrian, an Englishman who loved John above all mortals and at his request granted Ireland to King Henry, is dead; a schism divides the Church. Archbishop Theobald lies sick and has laid his burdens on John, who asks the reader's prayers.

Sed hec hactenus. Iam enim flere magis uacat
but these-things thus-far already for to-weep more there-is-leisure
quam scribere; et uisibili argumento doceor quod mundus
than to-write and by-visible argument I-am-taught that the-world
totus subiacet uanitati. Expectauimus enim pacem, et ecce
whole lies-subject to-vanity we-awaited for peace and behold
turbatio et tempestas ingruens Tolosanis Anglos et Gallos
turmoil and a-storm falling-on on-the-Toulousans the-English and the-French
undique concitat; et reges, quos amicissimos uidimus,
from-everywhere stirs and kings whom most-friendly we-saw
se insatiabiliter persequuntur. Ad hec mors domini
each-other insatiably pursue to these the-death of-lord
Adriani summi pontificis, cum omnes Christiane religionis
Adrian of-the-supreme pontiff though all of-Christian religion
populos nationesque turbauerit, Angliam nostram, unde
peoples and-nations it-has-troubled England our whence
fuerat oriundus, acerbiori dolore commouit irrigauitque
he-had-been sprung with-more-bitter grief has-moved and-has-watered
lacrimis profusioribus. Omnibus ille bonis flebilis occidit,
with-tears more-profuse to-all he to-the-good lamentable fell

sed nulli flebilior quam michi. Cum enim matrem haberet
but to-none more-lamentable than to-me though for a-mother he-had
et fratrem uterinum, me quam illos artiori diligebat affectu.
and a-brother uterine me than them with-closer he-loved affection
Fatebatur etiam publice et secreto quia me pre omnibus
he-confessed also publicly and privately that me before all
mortalibus diligebat. Eam de me conceperat opinionem, ut
mortals he-loved that about me he-had-conceived opinion that
quotiens opportunitas aderat, conscientiam suam in conspectu
as-often-as opportunity was-present conscience his-own in the-sight
meo effundere letaretur. Et cum Romanus Pontifex esset,
my to-pour-out he-rejoiced and when Roman Pontiff he-was
me in propria mensa gaudebat habere conuiuam; et eundem
me at his-own table he-rejoiced to-have as-guest and the-same
ciphum et discum sibi et michi uolebat et faciebat, me
cup and dish for-himself and for-me he-wished and made me
renitente, esse communem. Ad preces meas illustri regi
resisting to-be common at prayers my to-the-illustrious king
Anglorum, Henrico secundo, concessit et dedit Hiberniam
of-the-English Henry the-second he-granted and gave Ireland
iure hereditario possidendam, sicut littere ipsius testantur
by-right hereditary to-be-possessed as the-letters his testify
in hodiernum diem. Nam omnes insule de iure antiquo
to today's day for all islands by right ancient
ex donatione Constantini, qui eam fundauit et dotauit,
from the-donation of-Constantine who it founded and endowed
dicuntur ad Romanam Ecclesiam pertinere. Anulum quoque
are-said to the-Roman Church to-belong a-ring also
per me transmisit aureum, smaragdo optimo decoratum,
through me he-sent golden with-an-emerald excellent adorned
quo fieret inuestitura iuris in gerenda Hibernia;
by-which might-be-made the-investiture of-the-right in governing Ireland

idemque adhuc anulus in cimiliarchio publico custodiri
and-the-same still ring in the-archive public to-be-kept
iussus est. Si uirtutes eius percurrere uelim, in magni
ordered was if the-virtues his to-run-through I-should-wish into of-a-great
uoluminis librum hec una excrescet materia. Omnium uero
volume a-book this one will-grow matter of-all indeed
mentes magis exulcerat scissura Ecclesie, que, exigentibus
the-minds more ulcerates the-schism of-the-Church which demanding
culpis nostris, contigit, tanto patre sublato. Expetiuit eam
faults our has-happened such a-father taken-away has-sought it
Sathanas, ut cribraret sicut triticum, et undique, alterius
Satan that he-might-sift as wheat and from-everywhere of-another
Iude proditoris ministerio, amaritudines et scandala spargit.
Judas the-betrayer by-the-ministry bitternesses and scandals he-scatters
Oriuntur bella plusquam ciuilia; sacerdotalia enim sunt
arise wars more-than civil priestly for they-are
et fraterna. Nunc iudicium est mundi, et timendum ne
and fraternal now judgment is of-the-world and to-be-feared lest
partem stellarum secum inuoluat ambitiosi ruina proditoris.
part of-the-stars with-itself involve of-the-ambitious the-ruin of-the-betrayer
Ve autem illi, per quem hoc scandalum uenit; et plane
woe however to-him through whom this scandal comes and plainly
melius erat, si natus non fuisset. Publici doloris expono
better it-were if born not he-had-been of-public grief I-set-forth
causas; cum tamen aliunde familiarius dolore torqueat, tum
the-causes though however from-elsewhere more-closely with-grief it-torment and
non leuiori, quod ad me spectat. Siquidem pater meus et
not lighter which to me looks since father my and
dominus, immo et tuus, uenerabilis Teobaldus, Cantuariensis
lord nay also yours venerable Theobald of-Canterbury
archiepiscopus in egritudinem incidit, ut incertum sit quid
archbishop into sickness has-fallen so-that uncertain it-is what

sperare, quid timere opporteat. Negotiis more solito
to-hope what to-fear it-behoove business in-the-manner accustomed
superesse non potest; iniunxitque michi prouinciam duram,
to-manage not he-can and-he-enjoined on-me a-province hard
et importabile onus imposuit, omnium ecclesiasticorum
and unbearable burden imposed of-all ecclesiastical-affairs
sollicitudinem. Anxiatur ergo undique in me spiritus meus,
the-care is-distressed therefore everywhere in me spirit my
et cruciatus quos patior non sufficio enarrare. Sed in his
and the-torments which I-suffer not I-suffice to-relate but in these
omnibus, unicum michi consilium superest, Deum hominem,
all one for-me counsel remains God man
intemerate Virginis Filium, exorare; qui, uelud in naui
of-the-inviolate Virgin the-Son to-entreat who as in a-ship
dormiens, fidelium precibus excitandus est, ut procellam
sleeping of-the-faithful by-prayers to-be-roused is that the-gale
componat Ecclesie naufragantis, et dominum meum, sicut
he-may-calm of-the-Church shipwrecking and lord my as
sibi et nobis expedire prenouit, ab omni infirmitate
for-himself and for-us to-be-expedient he-has-foreknown from all infirmity
mentis et corporis clementer eripiat. Is inquam, per quem
of-mind and of-body mercifully may-rescue be I-say through whom
reges regnant et principes dominantur, uniuersali Ecclesie
kings reign and princes rule over-the-universal Church
idoneum et placitum sibi pastorem preficiat, et reges et
a-fit and pleasing to-himself shepherd may-set and kings and
principes nostros ab omni aduersitate defendat; eosque faciat
princes our from all adversity may-defend and-them make
ad honorem et gloriam nominis sui gregem sibi seruare
for the-honor and glory of-name his the-flock to-themselves to-keep
commissum. Lectorem quoque et auditorem supplicatione
entrusted the-reader also and hearer with-supplication

pia conuenio, quatinus apud Filium Virginis, qui uia,
pious I-call-upon that with the-Son of-the-Virgin who the-way
ueritas est et uita, pro me uano et misero intercedant,
the-truth is and the-life for me vain and wretched they-intercede
ut amotis ignorantie tenebris, et uanitatis amore depulso,
that removed of-ignorance the-darkness and of-vanity the-love driven-off
cognitionis sue lumen infundat, faciatque me officiosum
of-knowledge his-own the-light he-may-pour-in and-make me a-dutiful
ueritatis inquisitorem, amatorem pariter et cultorem.
of-truth seeker lover equally and worshiper
