MEDIEVAL LATIN SERIES · VOLUME 72

# On Being and Essence

Thomas Aquinas

# De Ente et Essentia
# De Principiis Naturae
# De Aeternitate Mundi
# De Unitate Intellectus
# De Regno

*On Being and Essence*

*With Four Other Treatises*

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with a word-for-word interlinear English translation

preserving the original word order




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


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THOMAS AQUINAS

# De Ente et Essentia

*On Being and Essence*

# Prooemium

## PROLOGUE

*A small error at the start grows great at the end, and being and essence are what the intellect first conceives. So Thomas will say what the names essence and being signify, how they are found in diverse things, and how they stand to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference. Since knowledge of the simple is taken from the composite, and the later leads to the prior, he proceeds from the signification of being to the signification of essence.*

Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum
*because a-small error in the-beginning great is in the-end according-to*
Philosophum in 1 de Cœlo et Mundo, ens autem et essentia
*the-Philosopher in 1 on Heaven and the-World being moreover and essence*
sunt quæ primo in intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna
*are what first in the-intellect are-conceived as says Avicenna*
in 5 Metaphys; ideo primo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare
*in 5 Metaphysics therefore first lest from their ignorance to-err*
contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam, dicendum est
*it-happen for of-these the-difficulty to-be-opened to-be-said it-is*
quid nomine essentiæ et entis significetur, et quomodo
*what by-the-name of-essence and of-being be-signified and how*
in diversis inveniantur, et quomodo se habeant ad
*in diverse-things they-be-found and how themselves they-have to*
intentiones logicas, scilicet genera, species et differentias. Quia
*the-intentions logical namely genera species and differences because*
vero ex compositis cognitionem simplicium accipere debemus,
*but from composite-things the-knowledge of-simple-things to-take we-ought*
et ex posterioribus devenire in priora, ut a facilioribus
*and from later-things to-come into prior-things that from easier-things*

incipientibus convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex
*beginning more-fitting may-become the-discipline therefore from*
significatione entis ad significationem essentiæ procedendum est.
*the-signification of-being to the-signification of-essence to-be-proceeded it-is*

## I · WHAT THE NAME ESSENCE SIGNIFIES

*Being is said in two ways: as divided into the ten categories, and as signifying the truth of propositions, in which sense even privations are beings. Essence is taken from being in the first sense. It is what the definition signifies, and so it is also called quiddity, form, and nature, as each name looks to the thing's definition, its perfection, or its operation.*

Sciendum est quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in 5 Metaphys., ens
*to-be-known it-is that as the-Philosopher says in 5 Metaphysics being*
per se dicitur dupliciter: Uno modo, quod dividitur per
*through itself is-said in-two-ways in-one way which is-divided through*
decem genera; alio modo, quod significat propositionum
*the-ten genera in-another way which signifies of-propositions*
veritatem. Horum autem differentia est, quia secundo modo
*the-truth of-these moreover the-difference is that in-the-second way*
potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio
*can to-be-called being all that about which an-affirmative proposition*
formari potest, etiamsi illud in re nihil ponat; per quem
*to-be-formed can even-if that in reality nothing posit by which*
modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur: dicimus
*way privations and negations beings are-called we-say*
enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod cæcitas
*for that affirmation is opposite to-negation and that blindness*
est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici aliquid
*is in the-eye but in-the-first way not can to-be-called anything*

quod sit ens, nisi quod in re aliquid ponat: unde primo
*which be a-being except what in reality something posits whence in-the-first*
modo cæcitas et hujusmodi non sunt entia. Nomen igitur
*way blindness and of-this-kind-things not are beings the-name therefore*
essentiæ non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto: aliqua
*of-essence not is-taken from being in-the-second way said some-things*
enim dicuntur hoc modo entia, quæ essentiam non habent,
*for are-called in-this way beings which essence not have*
ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente
*as is-plain in privations but is-taken essence from being*
primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator, in eodem loco, dicit:
*in-the-first way said whence the-Commentator in the-same place says*
«Ens primo modo dictum est quod significat substantiam
*being in-the-first way said is what signifies the-substance*
rei». Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum
*of-a-thing and because as said it-is being in-this way said*
dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet
*is-divided through the-ten genera it-is-necessary that essence signify*
aliquod commune omnibus naturis per quas diversa entia
*something common to-all natures through which diverse beings*
in diversis generibus et in diversis speciebus collocantur:
*in diverse genera and in diverse species are-placed*
sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis. Et
*as humanity is the-essence of-man and thus of others and*
quia illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel
*because that through which a-thing is-constituted in proper genus or*
specie, est quod significamus per definitionem indicantem
*species is what we-signify through the-definition indicating*
quid est res; inde est quod nomen essentiæ a philosophis
*what is the-thing thence it-is that the-name of-essence by philosophers*
in nomen quidditatis mutatur; et hoc est quod Philosophus,
*into the-name of-quiddity is-changed and this is what the-Philosopher*

in 7 Metaphys., frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id
*in 7 Metaphysics frequently names that what was to-be that*
est, hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam
*is this through which something has to-be what it-is-called also*
forma, secundum quod per formam significatur perfectio
*form according as through form is-signified the-perfection*
vel certitudo uniuscujusque rei, sicut dicit Avicenna in 2
*or certitude of-each thing as says Avicenna in 2*
Metaph. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur, accipiendo
*Metaphysics this also by-another name nature is-called taking*
naturam secundum primum modum illorum quatuor modorum
*nature according-to the-first mode of-those four modes*
quos Bœtius, de Duabus Naturis, assignat, secundum scilicet
*which Boethius on the-Two Natures assigns according namely*
quod natura dicitur esse illud quod quocumque modo
*as nature is-said to-be that which in-whatever way*
intellectu capi potest; non enim res intelligibilis est
*by-the-intellect to-be-grasped can not for a-thing intelligible is*
nisi per suam definitionem et essentiam; et sic etiam
*except through its definition and essence and thus also*
dicit Philosophus in 4 Metaphys., quod omnis substantia
*says the-Philosopher in 4 Metaphysics that every substance*
est natura. Nomen autem naturæ hoc modo sumptæ videtur
*is a-nature the-name moreover of-nature in-this way taken seems*
significare essentiam rei secundum quod habet ordinem vel
*to-signify the-essence of-a-thing according as it-has order or*
ordinationem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res
*ordination to proper operation of-the-thing since no thing*
propria destituatur operatione. Quidditatis vero nomen sumitur
*of-proper be-destitute operation of-quiddity but the-name is-taken*

ex hoc quod per definitionem significatur; sed essentia
*from this that through the-definition it-is-signified but essence*
dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea res habet esse.
*is-said according as through it and in it a-thing has to-be*

## II · ESSENCE IN COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES

*Essence is found most truly in simple substances, but Thomas begins with composite ones. Their essence is neither the matter alone nor the form alone, nor a relation between them, but the composite of both, as Boethius, Avicenna, and the Commentator agree. Since matter is the principle of individuation, he distinguishes signate matter, under fixed dimensions, which would enter the definition of Socrates if Socrates had one, from matter not signate, which enters the definition of man.*

Sed quia ens absolute et primo dicitur de substantiis,
*but because being absolutely and first is-said of substances*
et posterius secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod
*and later in-some respect of accidents thence it-is that*
essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus
*essence properly and truly is in substances but in accidents*
est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero
*it-is in-a-way and in-some respect of-substances but*
quædam sunt simplices et quædam compositæ, et in utrisque
*some are simple and some composite and in both*
est essentia; sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo.
*is essence but in the-simple in-a-truer and nobler way*
Secundum etiam quod habent esse nobilius, sunt etiam
*according also as they-have the-to-be nobler they-are also*
causa eorum quæ composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima
*the-cause of-those which composite are at least the-substance first*
et simplex, quæ Deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum
*and simple which God is but because of-those substances*

essentiæ sunt nobis magis occultæ, ideo ab essentiis
*the-essences are to-us more hidden therefore from the-essences*
compositorum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior
*of-composite-things to-be-begun it-is that from easier-things more-fitting*
fiat disciplina. In substantiis igitur compositis forma et
*may-become the-discipline in substances therefore composite form and*
materia notæ sunt, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non
*matter known are as in man soul and body not*
autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum dicatur
*moreover can to-be-said that one of-them alone be-called*
essentia. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia, planum
*essence that for matter alone not be essence plain*
est: quia res per suam essentiam cognoscibilis est, et
*it-is because a-thing through its essence knowable is and*
in specie ordinatur vel in genere; materia autem non est
*in species is-ordered or in genus matter moreover not is*
cognitionis principium, nec secundum eam aliquid ad speciem
*of-knowledge the-principle nor according-to it something to species*
vel ad genus determinatur, sed secundum id solum quo
*or to genus is-determined but according-to that alone by-which*
in actu aliquid est. Neque etiam forma tantum substantiæ
*in act something is nor also form alone of-substance*
compositæ essentia dici potest, quamvis quidam hoc
*composite the-essence to-be-called can although some this*
asserere conentur. Ex his enim quæ dicta sunt patet quod
*to-assert try from those for which said they-are is-plain that*
essentia est id quod per definitionem rei significatur;
*essence is that which through the-definition of-the-thing is-signified*
definitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam,
*the-definition moreover of-substances natural not only form*
sed et materiam continet; aliter enim definitiones naturales
*but also matter contains otherwise for definitions natural*

et mathematicæ non different. Nec etiam potest dici quod
*and mathematical not will-differ nor also can to-be-said that*
materia, in definitione substantiæ naturalis, ponatur sicut
*matter in the-definition of-substance natural is-placed as*
additum essentiæ ejus, vel (sicut) ens extra illam naturam
*added to-the-essence its or as a-being outside that nature*
vel essentiam ejus, quia hic modus proprius est accidentibus,
*or essence its because this mode proper is to-accidents*
quæ essentiam perfecte non habent: unde oportet quod in
*which essence perfectly not have whence it-is-necessary that in*
definitione sua substantiam vel subjectum recipiant, quod est
*definition their substance or subject they-receive which is*
extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit
*outside the-genus of-them is-plain therefore that essence comprehends*
materiam et formam. Non etiam potest dici quod essentia
*matter and form not also can to-be-said that essence*
significet relationem quæ est inter materiam et formam, vel
*signify a-relation which is between matter and form or*
aliquid superadditum illis, quia hoc de necessitate esset
*something superadded to-them because this of necessity would-be*
accidens extraneum a re, nec per eam res cognosceretur:
*an-accident extraneous to the-thing nor through it a-thing would-be-known*
quæ omnia essentiæ conveniunt. Per formam enim, quæ
*which all-things to-essence belong through form for which*
est actus materiæ materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid:
*is the-act of-matter matter is-made a-being in-act and this something*
unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter
*whence that which comes-in-over not gives to-be in-act simply*
materiæ, sed esse actu tale, sicut accidentia faciunt: ut
*to-matter but to-be in-act such as accidents make as*

albedo facit actu album. Unde, quando talis forma acquiritur,
*whiteness makes in-act white whence when such form is-acquired*
non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
*not it-is-said to-be-generated simply but in-some respect*
Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiæ in substantiis
*it-remains therefore that the-name of-essence in substances*
compositis, significat illud quod est ex materia et forma
*composite signifies that which is from matter and form*
compositum. Et huic positioni consonat verbum Boetii,
*composite and with-this position agrees the-word of-Boethius*
in Comment. 1 Prædicam, ubi dicit quod Ousia significat
*in the-Commentary 1 on-the-Categories where he-says that Ousia signifies*
compositum. Ousia enim, apud Græcos, idem est quod essentia
*the-composite ousia for among the-Greeks the-same is as essence*
apud nos, ut ipsemet in 3 de Duabus Naturis fatetur. Avicenna
*among us as he-himself in 3 on the-Two Natures confesses Avicenna*
autem dicit quod quidditas substantiarum compositarum est
*moreover says that the-quiddity of-substances composite is*
ipsa compositio formæ et materiæ. Commentator autem
*the-very composition of-form and of-matter the-Commentator moreover*
dicit in 7 Metaphys.: «Natura quam habent species in rebus
*says in 7 Metaphysics the-nature which have species in things*
generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est, compositum ex
*generable is something middle that is composite from*
materia et forma». Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse
*matter and form with-this also reason agrees because the-to-be*
substantiæ compositæ non est tantum formæ nec tantum
*of-substance composite not is only of-form nor only*
materiæ, sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum
*of-matter but of-the-very composite essence moreover is according-to*
quam res dicitur esse. Unde oportet ut essentia qua res
*which a-thing is-said to-be whence it-is-necessary that the-essence by-which a-thing*

denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec tantum materia,
*is-denominated being not only be form nor only matter*
sed utrumque, quamvis hujusmodi esse sive essentiæ sola
*but both although of-this-kind to-be or essence alone*
forma suo modo sit causa: sicut in aliis videmus, quæ ex
*form in-its way be the-cause as in other-things we-see which from*
pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominantur
*several principles are-constituted that things not are-denominated*
ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo quod
*from one of-those principles only but from that which*
utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione
*both embraces as is-plain in flavors because from the-action*
calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo: et quamvis hoc
*of-the-hot digesting the-moist is-caused sweetness and although in-this*
modo calor sit causa dulcedinis; non tamen denominatur
*way heat be the-cause of-sweetness not yet is-denominated*
corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore, qui calidum et
*a-body sweet from heat but from flavor which hot and*
humidum complectitur. Sed quia individuationis principium
*moist embraces but because of-individuation the-principle*
est materia, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quæ
*is matter from this perhaps it-seems to-follow that essence which*
complectitur in se simul et formam, sit tantum particularis
*embraces in itself together also form be only particular*
et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur universalia definitionem
*and not universal from which it-would-follow universals definition*
non habere, si essentia est id quod per definitionem
*not to-have if essence is that which through the-definition*
significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non
*is-signified and therefore to-be-known it-is that matter not*
quomodolibet accepta est principium individuationis, sed solum
*in-any-way taken is the-principle of-individuation but only*

materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam quæ sub certis
*matter signate and I-call matter signate that-which under fixed*
dimensionibus consideratur. Hæc autem materia in definitione
*dimensions is-considered this moreover matter in the-definition*
hominis, in quantum homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur,
*of-man in as-far man not is-placed but would-be-placed*
in definitione Socratis, si Socrates definitionem haberet; in
*in the-definition of-Socrates if Socrates a-definition had in*
definitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata: non
*the-definition moreover of-man is-placed matter not signate not*
enim in definitione hominis ponitur hoc os et hæc caro, sed
*for in the-definition of-man is-placed this bone and this flesh but*
os et caro absolute, quæ sunt materia hominis non signata.
*bone and flesh absolutely which are the-matter of-man not signate*

## III · GENUS, SPECIES, AND DIFFERENCE

*The essences of genus and species differ as signate and not signate, but the designation is of another kind: the individual is designated by matter, the species by its difference, which follows from form. The word body can name the material part of an animal or its genus, and so genus, difference, definition, and species each signify the whole, in different ways. Thomas then shows why man is predicated of Socrates and humanity is not: man signifies the essence as a whole, humanity as a part, cutting off signate matter.*

Patet ergo quod essentia hominis et Socratis non
*is-plain therefore that the-essence of-man and of-Socrates not*
differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum: unde
*differ except according-to signate and not signate whence*
Commentator dicit in 8 Metaphys. quod Socrates non aliud
*the-Commentator says in 8 Metaphysics that Socrates not other*

est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quæ sunt quidditas
*is than animality and rationality which are the-quiddity*
ejus; sicut etiam essentia generis et essentia speciei
*his as also the-essence of-the-genus and the-essence of-the-species*
secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis
*according-to signate and not signate differ although*
alius modus designationis sit utrobique: quia designatio
*another mode of-designation be in-both because the-designation*
individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam
*of-the-individual with-respect-to the-species is through matter determined*
dimensionibus; designatio autem speciei respectu generis
*by-dimensions the-designation moreover of-the-species with-respect-to the-genus*
est per differentiam constitutivam, quæ ex forma rei
*is through the-difference constitutive which from the-form of-the-thing*
sequitur. Hæc autem determinatio vel designatio quæ est in
*follows this moreover determination or designation which is in*
specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia
*the-species with-respect-to the-genus not is through something in the-essence*
speciei existens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit;
*of-the-species existing which in-no way in the-essence of-the-genus be*
imo quidquid est in specie est etiam in genere, licet non
*nay whatever is in the-species is also in the-genus although not*
determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est
*determined if for animal not were the-whole which is*
homo, sed pars ejus, non prædicaretur de eo, cum nulla
*man but a-part of-him not it-would-be-predicated of him since no*
pars integralis prædicetur de suo toto. Hoc autem quomodo
*part integral is-predicated of its whole this moreover how*
contingat, videri potest, si inspiciatur corpus secundum quod
*it-may-happen to-be-seen can if be-examined body according as*
ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus:
*it-is-placed a-part of-animal and according as it-is-placed a-genus*

non enim potest dici eo modo esse genus, quo
*not for can to-be-said in-that way to-be a-genus in-which*
est pars integralis. Hoc igitur nomen, quod est «corpus»,
*it-is a-part integral this therefore name which is body*
multipliciter accipi potest: corpus enim, secundum quod est
*in-many-ways to-be-taken can body for according as it-is*
in prædicamento substantiæ, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem
*in the-category of-substance is-said from this that it-has such*
naturam, ut in eo designari possint tres dimensiones:
*nature that in it to-be-designated can three dimensions*
ipsæ autem tres dimensiones designatæ sunt corpus, quod
*the-very moreover three dimensions designated are the-body which*
est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus ut
*is in the-genus of-quantity it-happens moreover in things that*
quod habet unam perfectionem, ad ulteriorem perfectionem
*what has one perfection to a-further perfection*
pertingat: sicut patet in homine, qui naturam sensitivam
*attains as is-plain in man who nature sensitive*
habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc
*has and further intellective similarly also and above this*
perfectionem, quæ est habere talem formam ut in ea possint
*perfection which is to-have such form that in it can*
tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adjungi,
*three dimensions to-be-designated can another perfection to-be-joined*
ut vita vel aliquid hujusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen
*as life or something of-this-kind can therefore this name*
«corpus» rem quamdam designare, quæ habet talem formam,
*body a-thing certain to-designate which has such form*
ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum
*from which follows in it the-designability of-three dimensions*
cum præcisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterius
*with precision so-that namely from that form no further*

perfectio sequatur, sed, si aliquid aliud superadditur, sit
*perfection follow but if something other is-superadded it-be*
præter significationem corporis, sic dicti; et hoc modo
*beside the-signification of-body thus said and in-this way*
corpus erit materialis et integralis pars animalis, quia
*body will-be the-material and integral part of-animal because*
sic anima erit præter id quod significatum est nomine
*thus the-soul will-be beside that which signified is by-the-name*
corporis, et superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis
*of-body and coming-over-upon the-very body so that from the-very*
duobus, scilicet ex anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus,
*two namely from soul and body as from parts*
constituitur animal. Potest etiam hoc nomen «corpus» hoc
*is-constituted animal can also this name body in-this*
modo accipi ut significet rem quamdam quæ habet talem
*way to-be-taken that it-signify a-thing certain which has such*
formam, ex qua possint in ea tres dimensiones designari,
*form from which can in it three dimensions to-be-designated*
quæcumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire
*whatever form be that whether from it can to-come*
alia ulterior perfectio, sive non; et hoc modo corpus erit
*another further perfection or not and in-this way body will-be*
genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod in
*the-genus of-animal because in animal nothing is to-take which in*
corpore implicite non contineatur. Non enim anima est alia
*body implicitly not be-contained not for the-soul is another*
ab illa forma per quam in re illa poterant designari
*from that form through which in thing that could to-be-designated*
tres dimensiones; et ideo, quando dicebam quod corpus
*three dimensions and therefore when I-said that body*
est quod habet talem formam ex qua possunt designari
*is what has such form from which can to-be-designated*

tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebam quæcumque forma esset
*three dimensions in it I-understood whatever form were*
illa, sive anima esset, sive lapideitas, sive quæcumque alia
*that whether soul it-were or stoniness or whatever other*
forma; et sic forma animalis implicite in corpore sive in
*form and thus the-form of-animal implicitly in body or in*
corporis forma continetur, prout corpus est genus ejus.
*of-body the-form is-contained according-as body is the-genus of-it*
Et etiam talis est animalis habitudo ad hominem. Si enim
*and also such is of-animal the-relation to man if for*
animal nominaret tantum rem talem, quæ habet quamdam
*animal named only a-thing such which has a-certain*
perfectionem ut possit sentire et moveri per principium
*perfection that it-can to-sense and to-be-moved through a-principle*
in ipso existens cum præcisione alterius perfectionis, tunc
*in itself existing with precision of-another perfection then*
quæcumque alia perfectio superveniret, haberet se ad animal
*whatever other perfection came-over would-have itself to animal*
per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in
*through the-mode of-a-part and not as implicitly contained in*
ratione animalis, et animal non esset genus; sed est genus
*the-notion of-animal and animal not would-be a-genus but it-is a-genus*
secundum quod significat rem quamdam ex cujus forma
*according as it-signifies a-thing certain from whose form*
potest provenire sensus et motus, quæcumque sit illa forma:
*can to-come sense and motion whatever be that form*
sive sit anima sensibilis tantum; sive sit anima sensibilis
*whether it-be soul sensible only or it-be soul sensible*
et rationalis simul. Sic igitur genus significat indeterminate
*and rational together thus therefore the-genus signifies indeterminately*
id totum quod est in specie (non enim significat tantum
*that whole which is in the-species not for it-signifies only*

materiam); similiter etiam differentia significat id totum quod
*the-matter similarly also the-difference signifies that whole which*
est in specie et non tantum formam, et etiam definitio
*is in the-species and not only the-form and also the-definition*
significat totum et etiam species, sed diversimode; quia
*signifies the-whole and also the-species but diversely because*
genus significat totum ut quædam denominatio determinans
*the-genus signifies the-whole as a-certain denomination determining*
id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriæ
*that which is material in the-thing without determination of-proper*
formæ: unde genus sumitur a materia, quamvis non sit
*form whence the-genus is-taken from matter although not it-be*
materia. Unde patet quod corpus dicitur quod habet talem
*matter whence is-plain that body is-called what has such*
perfectionem ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones:
*perfection that can in it to-be-designated three dimensions*
quæ quidem perfectio est, ut materialis, se habens ad
*which indeed perfection is as material itself having to*
ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia vero e converso est sicut
*a-further perfection the-difference but from the-converse is as*
quædam determinatio a forma determinata sumpta, præter
*a-certain determination from form determinate taken beside*
hoc quod de intellectu primo sit materia determinata;
*this that of the-understanding first be matter determinate*
ut patet cum dicitur animatum: scilicet illud quod habet
*as is-plain when is-said animate namely that which has*
animam, non determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid
*a-soul not is-determined what it-be whether body or something*
aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non est in differentia
*other whence says Avicenna that the-genus not is in the-difference*
sicut pars essentiæ ejus, sed solum sicut extra quidditatem
*as a-part of-essence its but only as outside the-quiddity*

sive essentiam; sicut etiam subjectum est de intellectu
*or essence as also the-subject is of the-understanding*
passionum: et ideo genus non prædicatur de differentia
*of-passions and therefore the-genus not is-predicated of the-difference*
per se loquendo, ut dicit Aristoteles, in 3 de Anima et
*through itself speaking as says Aristotle in 3 on the-Soul and*
4 Topic., nisi forte sicut subjectum prædicatur de passione.
*4 Topics unless perhaps as the-subject is-predicated of the-passion*
Sed definitio sive species comprehendit utrumque: scilicet
*but the-definition or species comprehends both namely*
determinatam materiam quam designat nomen generis, et
*determinate matter which designates the-name of-the-genus and*
determinatam formam quam designat nomen differentiæ Et
*determinate form which designates the-name of-the-difference and*
ex hoc patet ratio quare genus et species et differentia
*from this is-plain the-reason why genus and species and difference*
se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam, formam et
*themselves have proportionally to matter form and*
compositum in natura; quamvis non sint idem cum illis:
*composite in nature although not they-be the-same with them*
quia neque genus est materia, sed sumitur a materia ut
*because neither the-genus is matter but is-taken from matter as*
significans totum; nec differentia est forma, sed sumitur a
*signifying the-whole nor the-difference is form but is-taken from*
forma ut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse
*form as signifying the-whole whence we-say man to-be*
animal rationale, et non ex animali et rationali, sicut
*animal rational and not from animal and rational as*
dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex corpore enim
*we-say him to-be from soul and body from body for*
et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quædam
*and soul is-said to-be man as from two things a-certain*

tertia res constituta, quæ neutra illarum est. Homo enim
*third thing constituted which neither of-them is man for*
nec est anima neque corpus. Sed, si homo aliquo modo
*neither is soul nor body but if man in-some way*
ex animali et rationali dicatur esse, non erit sicut res
*from animal and rational be-said to-be not it-will-be as a-thing*
tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex
*third from two things but as an-understanding third from*
duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine
*two understandings the-understanding for of-animal is without*
determinatione formæ specialis naturam exprimens rei,
*determination of-form special the-nature expressing of-the-thing*
ex eo quod est materiale respectu ultimæ perfectionis.
*from that which is material with-respect-to the-last perfection*
Intellectus autem hujus differentiæ «rationalis» consistit
*the-understanding moreover of-this difference rational consists*
in determinatione formæ specialis; ex quibus duobus
*in the-determination of-form special from which two*
intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel definitionis.
*understandings is-constituted the-understanding of-the-species or of-the-definition*
Et ideo, sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit
*and therefore as a-thing constituted from some-things not receives*
prædicationem earum rerum ex quibus constituitur, ita nec
*predication of-those things from which it-is-constituted so neither*
intellectus recipit prædicationem eorum intellectuum ex
*the-understanding receives predication of-those understandings from*
quibus constituitur: non enim dicimus quod definitio sit
*which it-is-constituted not for we-say that the-definition be*
genus vel differentia.
*the-genus or the-difference*

Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei,
*although moreover the-genus signify the-whole essence of-the-species*
non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum quarum est
*not yet it-is-necessary that of-the-diverse species of-which is*
idem genus, sit una essentia; quia unitas generis ex
*the-same genus there-be one essence because the-unity of-the-genus from*
ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit: non autem
*the-very indetermination or indifference proceeds not moreover*
ita quod id quod significatur per genus sit una natura
*so that that which is-signified through the-genus be one nature*
numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia
*in-number in diverse species upon-which come-over a-thing other*
quæ sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat
*which be the-difference determining it as form determines*
materiam quæ est una numero; sed quia genus significat
*matter which is one in-number but because the-genus signifies*
quamdam formam, tamen non determinate hanc vel illam
*a-certain form yet not determinately this or that*
quam determinate differentia exprimit, quæ non est alia quam
*which determinately the-difference expresses which not is other than*
illa quæ indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo
*that which indeterminately was-signified through the-genus and therefore*
dicit Commentator, 2 Metaphys., quod materia prima dicitur
*says the-Commentator 2 Metaphysics that matter first is-called*
una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur
*one through the-removal of-all forms but the-genus is-called*
unum per communitatem formæ signatæ: unde patet quod,
*one through the-community of-form signate whence is-plain that*
per additionem differentiæ, remota illa indeterminatione
*through the-addition of-the-difference removed that indetermination*
quæ erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species diversæ
*which was the-cause of-the-unity of-the-genus remain species diverse*

per essentiam. Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei
*through essence and because as said it-is the-nature of-the-species*
est indeterminata respectu individui, sicut natura generis
*is indeterminate with-respect-to the-individual as the-nature of-the-genus*
respectu speciei; inde est quod, sicut id quod est genus,
*with-respect-to the-species thence it-is that as that which is the-genus*
prout prædicatur de specie, implicat in sua significatione,
*according-as it-is-predicated of the-species implies in its signification*
quamvis indistincte, totum id quod determinate est in
*although indistinctly the-whole that which determinately is in*
specie; ita id quod est species, secundum quod prædicatur de
*the-species so that which is the-species according as it-is-predicated of*
individuo, oportet quod significet totum quod essentialiter
*the-individual it-is-necessary that it-signify the-whole which essentially*
est in individuo, licet indistincte; et hoc modo essentia
*is in the-individual although indistinctly and in-this way the-essence*
speciei significatur nomine hominis; unde homo de Socrate
*of-the-species is-signified by-the-name of-man whence man of Socrates*
prædicatur. Si autem significatur natura speciei cum
*is-predicated if moreover is-signified the-nature of-the-species with*
præcisione materiæ signatæ quæ est principium individuationis,
*precision of-matter signate which is the-principle of-individuation*
sic se habebit per modum partis; et hoc modo significat
*thus itself it-will-have through the-mode of-a-part and in-this way signifies*
nomen humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde
*the-name of-humanity humanity for signifies that whence*
homo est homo. Materia autem signata non est illud unde
*man is man matter moreover signate not is that whence*
homo est homo, et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa ex
*man is man and so in-no way is-it-contained among those from*
quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum igitur humanitas
*which man has that he-be man since therefore humanity*

in suo intellectu includat tantum ea ex quibus homo
*in its understanding include only those-things from which man*
habet quod sit homo, patet a significatione ejus excluditur
*has that he-be man is-plain from the-signification its is-excluded*
vel præciditur materia determinata vel signata; et quia pars
*or is-cut-off matter determinate or signate and because a-part*
non prædicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec
*not is-predicated of the-whole thence it-is that humanity neither*
de homine nec de Socrate prædicatur; unde dicit Avicenna
*of man nor of Socrates is-predicated whence says Avicenna*
quod quidditas compositi non est ipsum compositum cujus
*that the-quiddity of-the-composite not is the-very composite of-which*
est quidditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quidditas sit composita;
*it-is the-quiddity although also the-very quiddity be composite*
sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non tamen est
*as humanity although it-be composite not yet is*
homo, imo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod
*man nay it-is-necessary that it-be received in something which*
est materia signata. Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio
*is matter signate but because as said it-is the-designation*
speciei respectu generis est per formas, designatio autem
*of-the-species with-respect-to the-genus is through forms the-designation moreover*
individui respectu speciei est per materiam; ideo
*of-the-individual with-respect-to the-species is through matter therefore*
oportet ut nomen significans id unde natura generis
*it-is-necessary that the-name signifying that whence the-nature of-the-genus*
sumitur cum præcisione formæ determinatæ perficientis
*is-taken with precision of-form determinate perfecting*
speciem, significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus
*the-species signify the-part material of-the-whole as body*
est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id
*is the-part material of-man the-name moreover signifying that*

unde sumitur natura speciei cum præcisione materiæ
*whence is-taken the-nature of-the-species with precision of-matter*
designatæ, significat partem formalem; et ideo humanitas
*designated signifies the-part formal and therefore humanity*
significatur ut forma quædam. Et dicitur quod est forma
*is-signified as form a-certain and it-is-said that it-is the-form*
totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus
*of-the-whole not indeed as-if superadded to-the-parts essential*
materiæ et formæ, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus
*of-matter and of-form as the-form of-a-house is-superadded to-the-parts*
integralibus ejus; sed magis est forma quæ est totum, scilicet
*integral its but rather it-is a-form which is the-whole namely*
formam complectens et materiam, cum præcisione tamen
*form embracing and matter with precision yet*
eorum per quæ materia est nata designari. Sic ergo
*of-those through which matter is apt to-be-designated thus therefore*
patet quod essentia hominis significatur hoc nomine «homo»
*is-plain that the-essence of-man is-signified by-this name man*
et hoc nomine «humanitas», sed diversimode, ut dictum
*and by-this name humanity but diversely as said*
est: quia hoc nomen «homo» significat eam ut totum,
*it-is because this name man signifies it as a-whole*
in quantum scilicet non prætendit designationem materiæ,
*in as-far namely not it-holds-forth the-designation of-matter*
sed implicite continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est
*but implicitly contains it and indistinctly as said it-is*
quod genus continet differentiam, et ideo prædicatur hoc
*that the-genus contains the-difference and therefore is-predicated this*
nomen «homo» de individuis; sed hoc nomen «humanitas»
*name man of individuals but this name humanity*
significat eam ut partem, nec continet in sua significatione
*signifies it as a-part nor contains in its signification*

nisi id quod est hominis in quantum homo, et præcidit
*except that which is of-man in as-far man and cuts-off*
omnem designationem materiæ, unde de individuis hominis
*all designation of-matter whence of the-individuals of-man*
non prædicaretur. Et propter hoc quandoque hoc nomen
*not it-would-be-predicated and on-account-of this sometimes this name*
«essentia» invenitur prædicatum de re (dicitur enim
*essence is-found predicated of a-thing it-is-said for*
Socrates essentia quædam), et quandoque negatur, sicut
*Socrates an-essence certain and sometimes it-is-denied as*
dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.
*we-say that the-essence of-Socrates not is Socrates*

## IV · HOW ESSENCE STANDS TO THE LOGICAL INTENTIONS

*The notions of genus and species belong to an essence only as it is signified as a whole, as man, not as a part, as humanity, and not to a separate Platonic nature. A nature can be considered absolutely, in itself, where it is neither one nor many, or according to the being it has in singulars or in the intellect. Universality belongs to it only in the intellect, which abstracts it from individuating conditions and relates it to all the individuals outside the soul.*

Viso quid significetur nomine essentiæ in substantiis
*seen what be-signified by-the-name of-essence in substances*
compositis, videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem
*composite to-be-seen it-is how itself it-have to the-notion*
generis, speciei et differentiæ. Quia autem cui convenit
*of-genus of-species and of-difference because moreover that-to-which belongs*
ratio generis, speciei vel differentiæ, prædicatur de hoc
*the-notion of-genus of-species or of-difference is-predicated of this*
singulari signato; impossibile est quod ratio generis vel
*singular signate impossible it-is that the-notion of-genus or*

speciei vel differentiæ conveniat essentiæ secundum quod
*of-species or of-difference belong to-essence according as*
per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel
*through the-mode of-a-part it-is-signified as by-the-name of-humanity or*
animalitatis. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non
*of-animality and therefore says Avicenna that rationality not*
est differentia, sed differentiæ principium; et eadem ratione
*is the-difference but of-the-difference the-principle and by-the-same reason*
humanitas non est species, nec animalitas genus. Similiter
*humanity not is the-species nor animality the-genus similarly*
etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis, speciei,
*also not can to-be-said that the-notion of-genus of-species*
differentiæ conveniat esse secundum quod est quædam res
*of-difference belong to-be according as it-is a-certain thing*
existens extra singularia, ut platonici ponebant; quia sic
*existing outside singulars as the-Platonists posited because thus*
genus et species non prædicarentur de hoc individuo: non
*genus and species not would-be-predicated of this individual not*
enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo
*for can to-be-said that Socrates be this which from him*
separatum est; nec separatum illud proficit in cognitione hujus
*separated is nor separated that profits in the-knowledge of-this*
singularis signati. Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis
*singular signate and therefore it-remains that the-notion of-genus*
vel speciei vel differentiæ conveniat essentiæ, secundum quod
*or of-species or of-difference belong to-essence according as*
significat per modum totius, ut (in) nomine hominis vel
*it-signifies through the-mode of-the-whole as in the-name of-man or*
animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc
*of-animal according-as implicitly and indistinctly it-contains the-whole this*
quod in individuo est. Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta
*which in the-individual is the-nature moreover or essence thus taken*

potest dupliciter considerari; uno modo, secundum naturam
*can in-two-ways to-be-considered in-one way according-to the-nature*
et rationem propriam, et hæc est absoluta consideratio
*and notion proper and this is the-absolute consideration*
ipsius; et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea dicere,
*of-it and in-this way nothing is true about it to-say*
nisi quod conveniat sibi secundum quod hujusmodi: unde
*except what belongs to-it according as of-this-kind whence*
quidquid aliorum sibi attribuitur, falsa est attributio: v. g.,
*whatever of-others to-it is-attributed false is the-attribution for example*
homini, in eo quod est homo, convenit rationale et animal
*to-man in that which is man belongs rational and animal*
et alia quæ in ejus definitionem cadunt; album vero vel
*and other-things which into his definition fall white but or*
nigrum vel quodcumque hujusmodi quod non est de ratione
*black or whatever of-this-kind which not is of the-notion*
humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod est homo.
*of-humanity not belongs to-man in that which is man*
Ideo, si quæratur utrum ista natura possit dici una vel
*therefore if it-be-asked whether this nature can to-be-called one or*
plures, neutrum concedendum est: quia utrumque est extra
*several neither to-be-granted it-is because each is outside*
intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere.
*the-understanding of-humanity and each can to-it to-happen*
Si enim pluralitas esset de ratione ejus, nunquam posset
*if for plurality were of the-notion of-it never could*
esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in
*to-be one although yet one it-be according as it-is in*
Socrate. Similiter, si unitas esset de intellectu et ratione
*Socrates similarly if unity were of the-understanding and notion*
ejus, tunc esset una et eadem natura Socratis et Platonis,
*of-it then would-be one and the-same the-nature of-Socrates and of-Plato*

nec posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo consideratur,
*nor could in several to-be-pluralized in-another way it-is-considered*
secundum quod habet esse in hoc vel in illo; et sic de
*according as it-has to-be in this or in that and thus of*
ipsa prædicatur aliquid per accidens ratione ejus in quo
*it is-predicated something by accident by-reason of-that in which*
est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia Socrates est
*it-is as it-is-said that man is white because Socrates is*
albus, quamvis homini non conveniat in eo quod est homo.
*white although to-man not it-belong in that which is man*
Hæc autem natura habet duplex esse: unum in singularibus,
*this moreover nature has a-twofold to-be one in singulars*
aliud in anima; et secundum utrumque consequuntur
*another in the-soul and according-to each follow*
accidentia dictam naturam. Et sic in singularibus habet
*accidents the-said nature and thus in singulars it-has*
multiplex esse secundum diversitatem singularium; et tamen
*a-manifold to-be according-to the-diversity of-singulars and yet*
ipsi naturæ, secundum propriam considerationem, scilicet
*to-the-very nature according-to proper consideration namely*
absolutam, nullum istorum esse debet: falsum enim est dicere
*absolute none of-these to-be ought false for it-is to-say*
quod natura hominis, in quantum hujusmodi, habeat esse
*that the-nature of-man in as-far of-this-kind have to-be*
in hoc singulari: si enim esse in hoc singulari conveniret
*in this singular if for to-be in this singular belonged*
homini in quantum est homo, non esset unquam extra
*to-man in as-far it-is man not it-would-be ever outside*
hoc singulare; similiter, si conveniret homini in quantum est
*this singular similarly if it-belonged to-man in as-far it-is*
homo, non esse in singulari, nunquam esset in eo. Sed
*man not to-be in a-singular never would-it-be in it but*

verum est dicere quod homo, in quantum est homo, non
*true it-is to-say that man in as-far it-is man not*
habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo. Patet ergo
*has that he-be in this singular or in that is-plain therefore*
quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a
*that the-nature of-man absolutely considered abstracts from*
quolibet esse, ita quod non fiat præcisio alicujus eorum;
*any to-be so that not be-made a-cutting-off of-any of-them*
et hæc natura sic considerata est quæ prædicatur de omnibus
*and this nature thus considered is what is-predicated of all*
individuis. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis
*individuals not yet can to-be-said that the-notion of-universal*
conveniat naturæ sic acceptæ: quia de ratione universalis
*belong to-the-nature thus taken because of the-notion of-universal*
est unitas et communitas. Naturæ autem humanæ neutrum
*is unity and community to-nature moreover human neither*
eorum convenit secundum suam absolutam considerationem:
*of-them belongs according-to its absolute consideration*
si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in
*if for community were of the-understanding of-man then in*
quocumque invenitur humanitas inveniretur communitas; et
*whatever is-found humanity would-be-found community and*
hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas
*this false is because in Socrates not is-found community*
aliqua, sed quidquid est in eo individuatum est.
*any but whatever is in him individuated is*

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis
*similarly also not can to-be-said that the-notion of-genus*
accidat naturæ humanæ secundum illud esse quod habet in
*befall the-nature human according-to that to-be which it-has in*
individuis: quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana
*individuals because not is-found in individuals the-nature human*

secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid conveniens cuilibet;
*according-to unity that it-be one something belonging to-each*
quod ratio universalis exigit.
*which the-notion of-universal demands*

Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturæ
*it-remains therefore that the-notion of-species befall the-nature*
humanæ secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Ipsa
*human according-to that to-be which it-has in the-intellect the-very*
enim natura habet esse in intellectu abstractum ab omnibus
*for nature has to-be in the-intellect abstracted from all*
individuantibus, et habet rationem uniformem ad omnia
*individuating-things and has a-notion uniform to all*
individua, quæ sunt extra animam, prout essentialiter est
*individuals which are outside the-soul according-as essentially it-is*
imago omnium et inducens in cognitionem omnium, in
*the-image of-all and inducing into the-knowledge of-all in*
quantum sunt homines; et ex hoc quod talem relationem
*as-far they-are men and from this that such relation*
habet ad omnia individua, intellectus adinvenit rationem
*it-has to all individuals the-intellect devises the-notion*
speciei et attribuit sibi: unde dicit Commentator, 1 de
*of-species and attributes-it to-it whence says the-Commentator 1 on*
Anima quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in
*the-Soul that the-intellect is that-which makes universality in*
rebus; hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in 8 Metaph. Et quamvis
*things this also Avicenna says in 8 Metaphysics and although*
hæc natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum
*this nature understood have the-notion of-universal according*
quod comparatur ad res quæ sunt extra animam, quia est
*as it-is-compared to things which are outside the-soul because it-is*
una similitudo omnium; tamen, secundum quod habet esse
*one likeness of-all yet according as it-has to-be*

in hoc intellectu vel in illo, est species quædam intellecta
*in this intellect or in that it-is a-species certain understood*
particularis. Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris, in 3
*particular and therefore is-plain the-defect of-the-Commentator in 3*
de Anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formæ intellectus
*on the-Soul who wished from the-universality of-the-form understood*
unitatem intellectus concludere: quia non est universalitas
*the-unity of-the-intellect to-conclude because not is the-universality*
illius formæ secundum hoc esse quod habet intellectum, sed
*of-that form according-to this to-be which it-has understood but*
secundum quod ad res refertur ut similitudo rerum; sicut
*according as to things it-is-referred as a-likeness of-things as*
etiam, si esset una statua corporea repræsentans multos
*also if there-were one statue bodily representing many*
homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuæ haberet
*men it-is-certain that that image or species of-the-statue would-have*
esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac
*to-be singular and proper according as it-were in this*
materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum quod
*matter but would-have the-notion of-community according as*
esset commune repræsentativum plurium. Et quia naturæ
*it-were a-common representative of-many and because to-the-nature*
humanæ, secundum suam absolutam considerationem, convenit
*human according-to its absolute consideration it-belongs*
quod prædicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit
*that it-be-predicated of Socrates and the-notion of-species not belongs*
sibi secundum suam absolutam (scilicet humanæ naturæ)
*to-it according-to its absolute namely of-the-human nature*
considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, quæ consequuntur
*consideration but is of the-accidents which follow*
eam secundum quoddam esse quod habet in intellectu, ideo
*it according-to a-certain to-be which it-has in the-intellect therefore*

nomen speciei non prædicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: Socrates
*the-name of-species not is-predicated of Socrates that it-be-said Socrates*
est species; quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei
*is a-species which of necessity would-happen if the-notion of-species*
conveniret homini secundum esse quod habet in Socrate,
*belonged to-man according-to the-to-be which it-has in Socrates*
vel secundum suam absolutam considerationem, scilicet in
*or according-to its absolute consideration namely in*
quantum est homo. Quidquid enim convenit homini in
*as-far it-is man whatever for belongs to-man in*
quantum est homo, prædicatur de Socrate. Et tamen
*as-far he-is man is-predicated of Socrates and yet*
prædicari convenit generi per se, cum in ejus definitione
*to-be-predicated belongs to-the-genus through itself since in its definition*
ponatur. Prædicatio enim est quoddam quod completur per
*it-be-placed predication for is a-certain-thing which is-completed through*
actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens tamen
*the-action of-the-intellect composing and dividing having yet*
fundamentum in re, ipsam unitatem eorum quorum
*a-foundation in the-thing the-very unity of-those of-which*
unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio prædicabilitatis potest
*one of the-other is-said whence the-notion of-predicability can*
claudi in ratione hujus intentionis quæ est genus, quæ
*to-be-enclosed in the-notion of-this intention which is the-genus which*
similiter per actionem intellectus completur; nihilominus
*similarly through the-action of-the-intellect is-completed nevertheless*
id cui intellectus intentionem prædicabilitatis attribuit,
*that to-which the-intellect the-intention of-predicability attributes*
componens id cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis,
*composing it with another not is the-very intention of-genus*
sed potius id cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit,
*but rather that to-which the-intellect the-intention of-genus attributes*

sicut quod significatur hoc nomine «animal». Si ergo patet
*as what is-signified by-this name animal so therefore is-plain*
qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ratione speciei; quia
*how the-essence or nature itself has to-the-notion of-species because*
ratio speciei non est de illis quæ conveniunt ei secundum
*the-notion of-species not is of those which belong to-it according-to*
suam absolutam considerationem, neque de accidentibus quæ
*its absolute consideration nor of the-accidents which*
consequuntur ipsam secundum esse quod habet extra
*follow it according-to the-to-be which it-has outside*
animam, ut albedo vel nigredo; sed est de accidentibus
*the-soul as whiteness or blackness but is of the-accidents*
quæ consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in
*which follow it according-to the-to-be which it-has in*
intellectu; et per hunc modum convenit sibi ratio generis
*the-intellect and in this way belongs to-it the-notion of-genus*
vel differentiæ.
*or of-difference*

## V · ESSENCE IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

*Some, following Avicebron, put matter and form in the intelligences and souls, but the philosophers hold them free of matter, since what understands must be immune from it. Their essence is form alone. Every essence can be understood without its being, so being differs from essence in everything save one thing, whose essence is its being: God. Every other thing receives its being from him and is in potency to it, and the intelligences are ranked by degrees of act and potency down to the human soul.*

Nunc restat videre secundum quem modum essentia sit in
*now remains to-see according-to what mode essence be in*
substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentiis et causa
*substances separate namely in the-soul the-intelligences and the-cause*
prima. Quamvis autem causæ primæ simplicitatem omnes
*first although moreover of-the-cause first the-simplicity all*
philosophi concedant, tamen compositionem materiæ et formæ
*philosophers grant yet composition of-matter and of-form*
in intelligentiis et animabus quidam nituntur ponere: cujus
*in intelligences and souls some strive to-posit of-which*
positionis auctor fuisse dicitur Avicebron in libro Fontis
*position the-author to-have-been is-said Avicebron in the-book of-the-Fount*
vitæ. Hoc autem dictis philosophorum reperitur esse
*of-life this moreover to-the-sayings of-the-philosophers is-found to-be*
contrarium, quia eas substantias a materia separatas nominant
*contrary because those substances from matter separate they-name*
et absque omni materia esse probant; cujus demonstratio
*and without all matter to-be they-prove whose demonstration*
potissima est ex virtute intelligendi quæ in eis est. Videmus
*most-powerful is from the-power of-understanding which in them is we-see*
enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum
*for forms not to-be intelligible in act except according*

quod separantur a materia et a conditionibus ejus; nec
*as they-are-separated from matter and from the-conditions its nor*
efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu nisi per virtutem substantiæ
*are-they-made intelligible in act except through the-power of-substance*
intelligentis, secundum quod recipiuntur in ea, et secundum
*understanding according as they-are-received in it and according*
quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet quod in qualibet
*as they-are-acted-upon through it whence it-is-necessary that in any*
substantia intelligente sit omnimoda immunitas a materia;
*substance understanding there-be total immunity from matter*
ita quod nec habeat materiam partem sui, neque etiam sit
*so that neither it-have matter as-part of-itself nor also be*
sicut forma impressa materiæ, ut est de formis materialibus.
*as form impressed on-matter as it-is of forms material*

Nec potest dicere aliquis quod intelligibilitatem non
*nor can to-say anyone that intelligibility not*
impediat materia quælibet, sed materia corporalis tantum.
*impedes matter any-whatever but matter bodily only*
Si enim hoc esset ratione materiæ corporalis tantum; cum
*if for this were by-reason of-matter bodily only since*
materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod stat
*matter not be-called bodily except according as it-stands*
sub forma corporea, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet
*under form bodily then it-would-be-necessary that this would-have*
materia a forma corporali, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem.
*matter from form bodily namely to-impede intelligibility*
Et hoc non potest esse, quia et ipsa forma corporalis actu
*and this not can to-be because also the-very form bodily in-act*
intelligibilis est, sicut et aliæ formæ, scilicet quæ a materia
*intelligible is as also other forms namely which from matter*
abstrahuntur. Unde in anima intellectiva et in intelligentia
*are-abstracted whence in the-soul intellective and in an-intelligence*

nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut
*in-no way is composition from matter and form so-that*
hoc modo accipiatur materia in eis sicut in substantiis
*in-this way be-taken matter in them as in substances*
corporalibus; sed est ibi compositio formæ et esse.
*bodily but there-is there composition of-form and of-to-be*
Unde in commento nonæ propositionis libri de Causis,
*whence in the-commentary of-the-ninth proposition of-the-book on Causes*
dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et
*it-is-said that an-intelligence is having form and to-be and*
accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quidditate vel essentia simplici.
*is-taken there form for the-very quiddity or essence simple*
Et quomodo hoc fit, planum est videre. Quæcumque enim
*and how this happens plain it-is to-see whatever-things for*
ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse
*so themselves have to each-other that one is the-cause of-the-to-be*
alterius, illud quod habet rationem causæ potest habere
*of-the-other that which has the-notion of-cause can to-have*
esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur
*to-be without the-other but not it-is-converted such moreover is-found*
habitudo materiæ et formæ; quod forma dat esse materiæ:
*the-relation of-matter and of-form that form gives to-be to-matter*
et ideo impossibile est esse aliquam materiam sine forma;
*and therefore impossible it-is to-be some matter without form*
tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia.
*yet not it-is impossible to-be some form without matter*
Forma enim non habet, in eo quod forma, dependentiam
*form for not has in that which form dependence*
ad materiam; sed si inveniantur aliquæ formæ, quæ non
*on matter but if be-found some forms which not*
possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum
*can to-be except in matter this happens to-them according*

quod sunt distantes a primo principio, quod est actus
*as they-are distant from the-first principle which is act*
primus et purus. Unde illæ formæ quæ sunt propinquissimæ
*first and pure whence those forms which are nearest*
primo principio, sunt formæ per se sine materia
*to-the-first principle are forms through themselves without matter*
subsistentes; non enim forma secundum totum genus suum
*subsisting not for form according-to the-whole genus its*
materia indiget, ut dictum est; et hujusmodi formæ sunt
*matter needs as said it-is and of-this-kind forms are*
intelligentiæ: et ideo non oportet ut essentiæ vel
*the-intelligences and therefore not it-is-necessary that the-essences or*
quidditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma.
*quiddities of-these substances be other than the-very form*

In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiæ compositæ et
*in this therefore differs the-essence of-substance composite and*
substantiæ simplicis, quod essentia substantiæ compositæ
*of-substance simple that the-essence of-substance composite*
non tantum formam nec tantum materiam, sed formam et
*not only form nor only matter but form and*
materiam complectitur; essentia vero substantiæ simplicis est
*matter embraces the-essence but of-substance simple is*
forma tantum. Et ex hoc causantur duæ aliæ differentiæ. Et
*form only and from this are-caused two other differences and*
una est quod essentia substantiæ compositæ potest significari
*one is that the-essence of-substance composite can to-be-signified*
ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter materiæ
*as a-whole or as a-part which happens on-account-of of-matter*
designationem, ut dictum est; et ideo non quomodolibet
*the-designation as said it-is and therefore not in-any-way*
prædicatur essentia rei compositæ de ipsa re composita:
*is-predicated the-essence of-a-thing composite of the-very thing composite*

non enim potest dici quod homo sit quidditas sua. Sed
*not for can to-be-said that man be quiddity his but*
essentia rei simplicis, quæ est sua forma, non potest
*the-essence of-a-thing simple which is its form not can*
significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi præter formam,
*to-be-signified except as a-whole since nothing be there besides the-form*
quasi formam recipiens; et ideo, quocumque modo sumatur
*as-if the-form receiving and therefore in-whatever way be-taken*
essentia substantiæ simplicis, de ea prædicatur; unde Avicenna
*the-essence of-substance simple of it it-is-predicated whence Avicenna*
dicit quod quidditas substantiæ simplicis est ipsummet
*says that the-quiddity of-substance simple is the-very*
simplex, quia non est aliquod recipiens ipsam. Secunda
*simple-thing because not there-is something receiving it the-second*
differentia est, quia ex eo quod essentiæ rerum compositarum
*difference is that from this that the-essences of-things composite*
recipiuntur in materia designata vel multiplicantur secundum
*are-received in matter designated or are-multiplied according-to*
divisionem ejus, contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et
*the-division its it-happens that some-things be the-same in-species and*
diversa numero. Sed, cum essentia simplicium non sit recepta
*diverse in-number but since the-essence of-simple-things not be received*
in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio: et ideo
*in matter not can there to-be such multiplication and therefore*
non oportet quod inveniantur plura individua unius speciei
*not it-is-necessary that be-found several individuals of-one species*
in illis substantiis; sed quotquot sunt individua, tot
*in those substances but as-many-as there-are individuals so-many*
sunt species, ut Avicenna dicit expresse. Hujusmodi ergo
*are the-species as Avicenna says expressly of-this-kind therefore*
substantiæ quamvis sint formæ sine materia, non tamen
*substances although they-be forms without matter not yet*

in eis est omnimoda simplicitas, nec sunt actus puri, sed
*in them is total simplicity nor are-they act pure but*
habent permixtionem potentiæ; et hoc sic patet. Quidquid
*they-have admixture of-potency and this thus is-plain whatever*
enim non est de intellectu essentiæ vel quidditatis, hoc est,
*for not is of the-understanding of-essence or quiddity this is*
adveniens extra, et faciens compositionem cum essentia;
*coming-to from-outside and making composition with the-essence*
quia nulla essentia sine his quæ sunt partes essentiæ
*because no essence without those which are parts of-the-essence*
intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quidditas
*to-be-understood can every moreover essence or quiddity*
intelligi potest sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de
*to-be-understood can without this that something be-understood about*
esse suo facto: possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel
*the-to-be its in-fact I-can for to-understand what is a-man or*
phœnix, et tamen ignorare an esse habeant in rerum
*a-phoenix and yet to-be-ignorant whether to-be they-have in of-things*
natura: ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel
*the-nature therefore is-plain that the-to-be is other from essence or*
quidditate; nisi forte sit aliqua res cujus quidditas sit
*quiddity unless perhaps there-be some thing whose quiddity be*
suum esse; et hæc res non potest esse nisi una et prima:
*its to-be and this thing not can to-be except one and first*
quia impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicujus, nisi per
*because impossible it-is that be-made pluralization of-anything except through*
additionem alicujus differentiæ, sicut multiplicatur natura
*the-addition of-some difference as is-multiplied the-nature*
generis in speciebus; vel per hoc quod forma recipitur
*of-the-genus in species or through this that form is-received*
in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in
*in diverse matters as is-multiplied the-nature of-the-species in*

diversis individuis; vel per hoc quod unum est abstractum
*diverse individuals or through this that one is abstracted*
et aliud in aliquod receptum: sicut, si esset quidam color
*and another in something received as if there-were a-certain color*
separatus, esset alius a colore non separato, ex ipsa
*separated it-would-be other from color not separated from the-very*
sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res quæ sit esse
*its separation if moreover be-posited some thing which be to-be*
tantum, ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non
*only so that the-very to-be be subsistent this to-be not*
recipiet additionem differentiæ, quia jam non esset esse
*will-receive the-addition of-a-difference because now not it-would-be to-be*
tantum; sed esse, et præter hoc forma aliqua; et multo
*only but to-be and besides this form some and much*
minus recipiet additionem materiæ; quia jam esset esse
*less it-will-receive the-addition of-matter because now it-would-be to-be*
non subsistens, sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res
*not subsistent but material whence it-remains that such thing*
quæ sit suum esse non potest esse nisi una: unde oportet
*which be its to-be not can to-be except one whence it-is-necessary*
quod, in qualibet alia re præter eam, sit aliud esse
*that in any other thing besides it be other the-to-be*
suum et aliud quidditas vel natura seu forma sua. Unde
*its and other the-quiddity or nature or form its whence*
in intelligentiis oportet quod sit esse præter formam;
*in intelligences it-is-necessary that there-be to-be besides form*
et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et esse.
*and therefore said it-is that an-intelligence is form and to-be*

Omne autem quod convenit alicui, vel est causatum ex
*everything moreover which belongs to-anything either is caused from*
principiis naturæ suæ, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit
*the-principles of-nature its as the-risible in man or comes*

ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aëre ex
*from some principle extrinsic as light in the-air from*
influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit
*the-influence of-the-sun not moreover can to-be that the-very to-be be*
causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei, dico sicut
*caused by the-very form or quiddity of-the-thing I-mean as*
a causa efficiente; quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui
*by a-cause efficient because thus some thing would-be the-cause of-itself*
ipsius, et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod
*itself and some thing itself into the-to-be would-produce which*
est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cujus
*is impossible therefore it-is-necessary that every such thing whose*
esse est aliud a natura sua, habeat esse ab alio. Et quia
*to-be is other from nature its have to-be from another and because*
omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per
*everything which is through another is-reduced to that which is through*
se, sicut ad causam primam; ideo oportet quod sit
*itself as to the-cause first therefore it-is-necessary that there-be*
aliqua res quæ sit causa essendi omnibus rebus, eo
*some thing which be the-cause of-being to-all things for-the-reason*
quod ipsa est esse tantum: alias iretur in infinitum
*that itself is to-be only otherwise one-would-go into infinity*
in causis, cum omnis res quæ non est esse tantum, habeat
*in causes since every thing which not is to-be only have*
causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia
*a-cause of-its to-be as said it-is is-plain therefore that an-intelligence*
est forma, et esse; et quod esse habeat a primo esse quod
*is form and to-be and that to-be it-have from the-first to-be which*
est esse tantum; et hoc est prima causa, quæ Deus est.
*is to-be only and this is the-first cause which God is*

Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia
*everything moreover which receives something from another is in potency*
respectu illius; et hoc quod receptum est in eo, est actus
*with-respect-to that and this which received is in it is the-act*
ejus. Ergo oportet quod ipsa forma vel quidditas, quæ
*of-it therefore it-is-necessary that the-very form or quiddity which*
est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse quod a
*is the-intelligence be in potency with-respect-to the-to-be which from*
Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum est per modum actus;
*God it-receives and that to-be received is through the-mode of-act*
et ita invenitur actus et potentia in intelligentiis, non tamen
*and so is-found act and potency in intelligences not yet*
forma et materia, nisi æquivoce: unde etiam pati, recipere,
*form and matter except equivocally whence also to-suffer to-receive*
subjectum esse et omnia hujusmodi quæ videntur rebus
*subject to-be and all of-this-kind-things which seem to-things*
ratione materiæ convenire, æquivoce conveniunt substantiis
*by-reason of-matter to-belong equivocally belong to-substances*
intellectualibus et corporalibus, ut Commentator dicit in 3
*intellectual and bodily as the-Commentator says in 3*
de Anima: Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiæ quidditas
*on the-Soul and because as said it-is of-the-intelligence the-quiddity*
est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quidditas vel essentia ejus
*is the-very intelligence therefore the-quiddity or essence of-it*
est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum
*is the-very-thing which is itself and the-to-be its received*
a Deo est id quo subsistit in rerum natura; et
*from God is that by-which it-subsists in of-things the-nature and*
propter hoc a quibusdam hujusmodi substantiæ dicuntur
*on-account-of this by some of-this-kind substances are-said*
componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quo
*to-be-composed of that-by-which it-is and that-which it-is or of that-by-which*

est et essentia, ut Boetius dicit in 1 Prædicam. Et
*it-is and essence as Boethius says in 1 on-the-Categories and*
quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit
*because in intelligences is-posited potency and act not it-will-be*
difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset
*difficult to-find multitude of-intelligences which would-be*
impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde dicit
*impossible if no potency in them were whence says*
Commentator in 3 de Anima quod, si natura intellectus
*the-Commentator in 3 on the-Soul that if the-nature of-the-intellect*
possibilis esset ignorata, non possemus invenire multitudinem
*possible were unknown not we-could to-find multitude*
in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad
*in substances separate there-is therefore the-distinction of-them to*
invicem, secundum gradum potentiæ et actus: ita quod
*each-other according-to the-degree of-potency and of-act so that*
intelligentia superior, quæ plus propinqua est primo, habet
*the-intelligence higher which more near is to-the-first has*
plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis; et hoc
*more of act and less of potency and thus of the-others and this*
completur in anima humana, quæ tenet ultimum gradum in
*is-completed in the-soul human which holds the-last degree in*
intellectualibus substantiis. Unde intellectus potentialis ejus
*intellectual substances whence the-intellect potential its*
se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quæ
*itself has to forms intelligible as matter first which*
tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles,
*holds the-last degree in to-be sensible to forms sensible*
ut Commentator in 3 de Anima dicit: et ideo Philosophus
*as the-Commentator in 3 on the-Soul says and therefore the-Philosopher*
comparat eum tabulæ rasæ, in qua nihil est depictum. Et
*compares it to-a-tablet scraped on which nothing is painted and*

propter hoc, quia, inter alias substantias intelligibiles plus
*on-account-of this because among other substances intelligible more*
habet de potentia; ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus
*it-has of potency therefore it-is-made in so-much near to-things*
materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum
*material that a-thing material be-drawn to participating*
esse suum, ita quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse
*to-be its so that from soul and body results one to-be*
in uno composito; quamvis illud esse, prout est animæ,
*in one composite although that to-be according-as it-is of-the-soul*
non sit dependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam,
*not be dependent on the-body and therefore after this form*
quæ est anima, inveniuntur aliæ formæ plus de potentia
*which is the-soul are-found other forms more of potency*
habentes et magis propinquæ materiæ, in tantum quod esse
*having and more near to-matter in so-much that the-to-be*
earum sine materia non est. In quibus etiam invenitur
*of-them without matter not is in which also is-found*
ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quæ
*order and degree until to the-first forms of-the-elements which*
sunt propinquissimæ materiæ: unde nec aliquam operationem
*are nearest to-matter whence nor any operation*
habent, nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et
*they-have except according-to the-requirement of-the-qualities active and*
passivarum, et aliorum quibus materia ad formam disponitur.
*passive and of-the-others by-which matter to form is-disposed*

## VI · THE THREE WAYS OF HAVING ESSENCE

*God's essence is his very being, which is why he is in no genus, yet he is not the common being by which all things formally exist; he has every perfection in a more excellent way. Created intelligences have being received and limited above, but their form is unlimited below, and among them species are not multiplied by individuals except in the human soul, which remains individuated after the body. Since their essence is not their being, they fall in a category, but their genus and difference are taken from the whole quiddity, not from matter and form, and their differences, by degree of perfection, are unknown to us. In composite substances essence and being are both received and limited, and individuals are many in one species.*

His visis, patet quomodo essentia invenitur in diversis.
*these-things seen is-plain how essence is-found in diverse-things*
Invenitur autem triplex modus habendi essentiam in
*is-found moreover a-threefold mode of-having essence in*
substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cujus essentia est
*substances something for is as God whose essence is*
ipsum suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi
*the-very his to-be and therefore are-found some philosophers*
dicentes quod Deus non habet essentiam, quia essentia ejus
*saying that God not has essence because the-essence his*
non est aliud quam esse ejus. Et ex hoc sequitur quod
*not is other than the-to-be his and from this it-follows that*
ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere
*he not be in a-genus because everything which is in a-genus*
oportet quod habeat quidditatem præter esse suum; cum
*it-is-necessary that it-have a-quiddity besides to-be its since*
quidditas aut natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur
*the-quiddity or nature of-the-genus or of-the-species not be-distinguished*
secundum rationem naturæ in illis quorum est genus vel
*according-to the-notion of-the-nature in those of-which it-is the-genus or*

species; sed esse est in diversis diversimode. Nec oportet,
*species but the-to-be is in diverse-things diversely nor is-it-necessary*
si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in errorem
*if we-say that God is to-be only that into the-error*
incidamus qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale
*we-fall of-those-who God said to-be that to-be universal*
quo quælibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse quod Deus
*by-which any thing formally is this for to-be which God*
est, hujus conditionis est ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit:
*is of-this condition is that no to-it addition to-be-made can*
unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab
*whence through the-very its purity it-is to-be distinct from*
omni esse; propter quod, in commento nonæ propositionis
*every to-be on-account-of which in the-commentary of-the-ninth proposition*
libri de Causis, dicitur quod individuatio primæ est
*of-the-book on Causes it-is-said that the-individuation of-the-first is*
causæ, quæ est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem
*of-the-cause which is to-be only is through the-pure goodness*
ejus. Esse autem commune, sicut in intellectu suo non
*its to-be moreover common as in the-understanding its not*
includit aliquam additionem, ita nec includit in intellectu
*includes any addition so neither includes in the-understanding*
suo aliquam præcisionem additionis; quia, si hoc esset, nihil
*its any precision of-addition because if this were nothing*
posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur.
*could to-be-understood to-be in which over to-be something were-added*

Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet
*similarly also although he-be to-be only not it-is-necessary*
quod deficiant ei reliquæ perfectiones vel nobilitates; imo
*that be-lacking to-him the-remaining perfections or nobilities nay*
habet omnes perfectiones, quæ sunt in omnibus generibus,
*he-has all the-perfections which are in all genera*

propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus
*on-account-of which perfect simply he-is-called as the-Philosopher*
et Commentator, in 5 Metaphys, dicunt; sed habet eas
*and the-Commentator in 5 Metaphysics say but he-has them*
modo excellentiori omnibus rebus. quia in eo omnes unum
*in-a-way more-excellent than-all things because in him all one*
sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent; et hoc est quia
*are but in others diversity they-have and this is because*
omnes illæ perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum suum
*all those perfections belong to-him according-to his*
esse simplex: sicut, si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset
*to-be simple as if someone through one quality could*
efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate
*to-effect the-operations of-all qualities in that one quality*
omnes qualitates haberet: ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes
*all qualities he-would-have so God in the-very to-be his all*
perfectiones habet. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in
*perfections has in-the-second way is-found essence in*
substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse
*substances created intellectual in which is other the-to-be*
quam essentia ipsarum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia:
*than the-essence of-them although the-essence be without matter*
unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum, et ideo
*whence the-to-be of-them not is absolute but received and therefore*
limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturæ recipientis,
*limited and finite to the-capacity of-the-nature receiving*
sed natura vel quidditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in
*but the-nature or quiddity of-them is absolute not received in*
aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de Causis quod
*any matter and therefore it-is-said in the-book on Causes that*
intelligentiæ sunt finitæ superius et infinitæ inferius: sunt
*intelligences are finite above and infinite below they-are*

enim finitæ quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori
*for finite as to the-to-be their which from a-higher*
recipiunt; non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia earum formæ
*they-receive not yet they-are-limited below because their forms*
non limitantur ad capacitatem alicujus materiæ recipientis
*not are-limited to the-capacity of-any matter receiving*
eas; et in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo
*them and in such substances not is-found a-multitude*
individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima
*of-individuals in one species as said it-is except in the-soul*
humana, propter corpus cui unitur. Et licet individuatio
*human on-account-of the-body to-which it-is-united and although the-individuation*
ejus ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat, quantum ad sui
*its from the-body occasionally depend as to its*
inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum
*inception because not is-acquired to-it to-be individuated*
nisi in corpore cujus est actus; non tamen oportet ut,
*except in the-body of-which it-is the-act not yet it-is-necessary that*
destructo corpore, individuatio pereat: quia, cum habeat esse
*destroyed the-body the-individuation perish because since it-have to-be*
absolutum ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum,
*absolute from which acquired is to-it to-be individuated*
ex hoc quod facta est forma hujus corporis, illud esse
*from this that made it-is the-form of-this body that to-be*
semper remanet individuatum; et ideo dicit Avicenna quod
*always remains individuated and therefore says Avicenna that*
individuatio animarum et multiplicatio dependet ex corpore,
*the-individuation of-souls and multiplication depends on the-body*
quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem.
*as to its beginning but not as to its end*
Et quia in illis substantiis quidditas non est idem quod
*and because in those substances the-quiddity not is the-same as*

esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in prædicamento; et propter
*to-be therefore they-are orderable in a-category and on-account-of*
hoc invenitur in eis genus, species et differentia, quamvis
*this is-found in them genus species and difference although*
earum differentiæ propriæ nobis occultæ sint. In rebus
*of-them the-differences proper to-us hidden be in things*
enim sensibilibus etiam ipsæ differentiæ essentiales nobis
*for sensible also the-very differences essential to-us*
ignotæ sunt: unde significantur per differentias accidentales
*unknown are whence they-are-signified through differences accidental*
quæ ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per
*which from the-essential arise as a-cause is-signified through*
suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis.
*its effect as two-footed is-placed as-the-difference of-man*
Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis
*the-accidents moreover proper of-substances immaterial to-us*
ignota sunt: unde differentiæ earum nec per se nec
*unknown are whence the-differences of-them neither through themselves nor*
per accidentales differentias nobis significari possunt.
*through accidental differences to-us to-be-signified can*

Hoc tamen sciendum quod non eodem modo sumitur
*this yet to-be-known that not in-the-same way is-taken*
genus et differentia in illis substantiis sensibilibus: quia
*genus and difference in those substances (and-in)-sensible-ones because*
in sensibilibus, genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale
*in sensible-things the-genus is-taken from that which is material*
in re; differentia vero, ab eo quod est formale in ipsa:
*in the-thing the-difference but from that which is formal in it*
unde dicit Avicenna in 1 de Anima quod forma, in rebus
*whence says Avicenna in 1 on the-Soul that form in things*
compositis ex materia et forma, est differentia simplex ejus
*composite of matter and form is the-difference simple of-that*

quod constituitur ex illa: non autem ita quod ipsa forma
*which is-constituted from it not moreover so that the-very form*
sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiæ, ut idem
*be the-difference but because it-is the-principle of-the-difference as the-same*
dicit in sua Metaph. Talis differentia est differentia simplex,
*says in his Metaphysics such difference is a-difference simple*
quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quidditatis rei, scilicet
*because it-is-taken from that which is a-part of-the-quiddity of-the-thing namely*
a forma. Cum autem substantiæ spirituales sint simplices
*from the-form since moreover substances spiritual are simple*
quidditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo
*quiddities not can in them the-difference to-be-taken from that*
quod est pars quidditatis, sed a tota quidditate; et ideo
*which is a-part of-the-quiddity but from the-whole quiddity and therefore*
dicit Avicenna in 1 de Anima quod differentiam simplicem
*says Avicenna in 1 on the-Soul that a-difference simple*
non habent nisi species quarum essentiæ sunt compositæ
*not have except the-species whose essences are composed*
ex materia et forma. Similiter etiam in eis ex tota
*of matter and form similarly also in them from the-whole*
essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti: una enim
*essence is-taken the-genus in-a-way yet different one for*
substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate:
*substance separate agrees with another in immateriality*
differunt autem ab invicem in gradu perfectionis, secundum
*they-differ moreover from each-other in the-degree of-perfection according-to*
recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum.
*the-recession from potentiality and the-approach to act pure*
Et ideo ab eo quod sequitur illas in quantum sunt
*and therefore from that which follows them in as-far they-are*
immateriales, sumitur in eis genus, sicut intellectualitas vel
*immaterial is-taken in them the-genus as intellectuality or*

aliquid hujusmodi; ab eo autem quod sequitur in eis
*something of-this-kind from that moreover which follows in them*
gradum perfectionis, sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen
*the-degree of-perfection is-taken in them the-difference to-us yet*
ignota. Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales, quia
*unknown nor is-it-necessary these differences to-be accidental because*
sunt secundum majorem et minorem perfectionem, quæ non
*they-are according-to greater and lesser perfection which not*
diversificat speciem. Gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo
*diversifies the-species the-degree for of-perfection in receiving*
eamdem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et
*the-same form not diversifies the-species as whiter and*
minus album in participando ejusdem speciei albedinem; sed
*less white in participating of-the-same species whiteness but*
diversis gradibus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis
*diverse degrees of-perfection in the-very forms or natures*
participatis diversificat speciem: sicut natura procedit per
*participated diversifies the-species as nature proceeds through*
gradus de plantis ad animalia, per quædam quæ fiunt
*degrees from plants to animals through certain-things which are-made*
media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in
*middle between animals and plants according-to the-Philosopher in*
lib. de Animal. Nec iterum est necessarium ut divisio
*the-book on Animals nor again is it-necessary that the-division*
intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per differentias
*of-intellectual substances be always through differences*
veras, quia hoc est impossibile in omnibus rebus accipere, ut
*true because this is impossible in all things to-take as*
Philosophus dicit in 2 de Animal. Tertio modo invenitur
*the-Philosopher says in 2 on Animals in-the-third way it-is-found*
in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus
*in substances composite of matter and form in which*

et esse est receptum et finitum, propter quod et ab
*both the-to-be is received and finite on-account-of which also from*
alio esse habent; et iterum natura vel quidditas earum
*another to-be they-have and again the-nature or quiddity of-them*
recepta est in materia signata, et ideo sunt finitæ et
*received is in matter signate and therefore they-are finite both*
superius et inferius, et in eis jam propter divisionem
*above and below and in them now on-account-of the-division*
materiæ signatæ possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in
*of-matter signate possible is the-multiplication of-individuals in*
una specie; et in his substantiis qualiter se habet essentia
*one species and in these substances how itself has essence*
ad intentiones logicas, supra dictum est.
*to the-intentions logical above said it-is*

## VII · ESSENCE IN ACCIDENTS

*An accident has an incomplete definition, since its subject must be placed in it, and so it has essence only in some respect. Some accidents follow form, as the proper passions of the species, and some follow matter, as the accidents of the individual. Genus, difference, and species are taken among accidents in another way than in substances: the genus from the mode of being, the difference from the principles that cause it. Thomas ends with the first principle, which, being infinitely simple, has neither genus nor species nor definition.*

Nunc autem restat videre qualiter essentia sit in accidentibus;
*now moreover remains to-see how essence be in accidents*
quomodo autem sit in omnibus substantiis dictum est. Et
*how moreover it-be in all substances said it-is and*
quia, ut dictum est, essentia per definitionem significatur,
*because as said it-is essence through the-definition is-signified*

oportet quod eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent
*it-is-necessary that in-that way they-have essence in-which they-have*
definitionem. Definitionem autem habent incompletam, quia
*definition a-definition moreover they-have incomplete because*
non possunt definiri nisi ponatur subjectum in eorum
*not can to-be-defined unless be-placed the-subject in their*
definitione: et hoc ideo est quia non habent in se
*definition and this therefore is because not they-have in themselves*
esse absolutum per se a subjecto; sed, sicut ex forma
*to-be absolute through itself from a-subject but as from form*
et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componitur,
*and matter results to-be substantial when it-is-composed*
ita ex accidente et subjecto relinquitur esse accidentale
*so from accident and subject results to-be accidental*
quando accidens subjecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma
*when the-accident to-the-subject comes and therefore also neither form*
substantialis completam essentiam habet, nec materia: quia in
*substantial complete essence has nor matter because in*
definitione formæ substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud
*the-definition of-form substantial it-is-necessary that be-placed that*
cujus est forma; et ita definitio ejus est per additionem
*of-which it-is the-form and so the-definition its is through the-addition*
alicujus quod extra ejus genus est, sicut et definitio formæ
*of-something which outside its genus is as also the-definition of-form*
accidentalis: ut etiam in definitione animæ ponitur corpus a
*accidental as also in the-definition of-the-soul is-placed the-body by*
naturali, qui considerat animam solum in quantum est
*the-natural-philosopher who considers the-soul only in as-far it-is*
forma physici corporis. Sed tamen inter formas substantiales
*the-form of-a-physical body but yet between forms substantial*
et accidentales tantum interest, quia, sicut forma substantialis
*and accidental so-much it-differs because as form substantial*

non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit,
*not has through itself to-be absolute without that to-which it-comes*
ita nec cui advenit, scilicet materia: et ideo ex
*so neither that-to-which it-comes namely matter and therefore from*
conjunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse in quo res per
*the-conjunction of-each results that to-be in which a-thing through*
se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter
*itself subsists and from them is-made one through itself on-account-of*
quod ex conjunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quædam.
*which from the-conjunction of-them results an-essence certain*
Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat rationem
*whence form although in itself considered not have the-notion*
completæ essentiæ, tamen est pars essentiæ completæ. Sed
*of-complete essence yet is a-part of-essence complete but*
illud cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum,
*that to-which comes the-accident is a-being in itself complete*
consistens in suo esse; quod quidem esse naturaliter præcedit
*consisting in its to-be which indeed to-be naturally precedes*
accidens quod supervenit; et ideo accidens superveniens, ex
*the-accident which comes-over and therefore the-accident coming-over from*
conjunctione sui cum eo cui supervenit, non causat
*the-conjunction of-itself with that upon-which it-comes not causes*
illud esse in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens
*that to-be in which a-thing subsists through which a-thing is a-being*
per se, sed causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo
*through itself but it-causes a-certain to-be second without which*
res subsistens intelligi potest esse; sicut primum potest
*a-thing subsisting to-be-understood can to-be as the-first can*
intelligi sine secundo vel prædicatum sine subjecto. Unde
*to-be-understood without the-second or the-predicate without the-subject whence*
ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum per se, sed unum
*from accident and subject not is-made one through itself but one*

per accidens; et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non resultat
*through accident and therefore from their conjunction not results*
essentia quædam, sicut ex conjunctione formæ cum materia;
*an-essence certain as from the-conjunction of-form with matter*
propter quod accidens neque rationem completæ essentiæ
*on-account-of which the-accident neither the-notion of-complete essence*
habet, neque pars completæ essentiæ est; sed sicut est ens
*has nor a-part of-complete essence is but as it-is a-being*
secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet. Sed,
*in-some respect so also essence in-some respect it-has but*
quia illud quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet
*because that which is-said most and most-truly in any*
genere, est causa eorum quæ sunt post in illo genere; sicut
*genus is the-cause of-those which are after in that genus as*
ignis qui in fine caliditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis,
*fire which in the-end of-heat is the-cause of-heat in things hot*
ut in secundo Metaphysicorum dicitur: ideo substantia, quæ
*as in the-second of-the-Metaphysics it-is-said therefore substance which*
est principium in genere entis, maxime et verissime essentiam
*is the-principle in the-genus of-being most and most-truly essence*
habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium quæ secundario
*having it-is-necessary that it-be the-cause of-accidents which secondarily*
et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant. Quod
*and as-it-were in-some respect the-notion of-being participate which*
tamen diversimode contingit: quia enim partes substantiæ
*yet diversely happens because for the-parts of-substance*
sunt materia et forma; ideo quædam accidentia principaliter
*are matter and form therefore some accidents principally*
consequuntur formam, et quædam materiam. Forma autem
*follow form and some matter form moreover*
invenitur aliqua, cujus esse non dependet a materia, ut anima
*is-found some whose to-be not depends on matter as the-soul*

intellectualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam.
*intellectual matter but not has to-be except through form*
Unde in accidentibus quæ sequuntur formam est aliquid quod
*whence in the-accidents which follow form there-is something which*
non habet communicationem cum materia, ut intelligere quod
*not has communication with matter as to-understand which*
non est per organum corporale, sicut probat Philosophus in
*not is through an-organ bodily as proves the-Philosopher in*
3 de Anima; aliqua vero ex consequentibus formam sunt, quæ
*3 on the-Soul some but of the-things-following form are which*
habent communicationem cum materia, ut sentire; sed nullum
*have communication with matter as to-sense but no*
accidens sequitur materiam sine communicatione formæ.
*accident follows matter without communication of-form*

In his tamen accidentibus quæ materiam consequuntur
*in these yet accidents which matter follow*
invenitur quædam diversitas. Quædam enim accidentia
*is-found a-certain diversity some for accidents*
consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem quem habet ad
*follow matter according-to the-order which it-has to*
formam specialem, ut masculinum et femininum in animalibus,
*form special as male and female in animals*
quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in decimo
*whose diversity to matter is-reduced as it-is-said in the-tenth*
Metaphysicorum: unde, remota forma animalis, dicta accidentia
*of-the-Metaphysics whence removed the-form of-animal the-said accidents*
non remanent nisi æquivoce. Quædam vero consequuntur
*not remain except equivocally some but follow*
materiam secundum ordinem quem habet ad formam
*matter according-to the-order which it-has to form*
generalem; et ideo, remota forma speciali, adhuc in ea
*general and therefore removed the-form special still in it*

remanent: sicut nigredo cutis est in Æthiope ex mixtione
*they-remain as the-blackness of-the-skin is in an-Ethiopian from the-mixture*
elementorum, et non ex ratione animæ; et ideo post
*of-the-elements and not from the-notion of-the-soul and therefore after*
mortem in eo remanet. Et quia unaquæque res individuatur
*death in him it-remains and because each thing is-individuated*
ex materia et collocatur in genere vel specie per suam
*from matter and is-placed in genus or species through its*
formam; ideo accidentia quæ consequuntur materiam sunt
*form therefore the-accidents which follow matter are*
accidentia individui, secundum quæ etiam individua ejusdem
*accidents of-the-individual according-to which also individuals of-the-same*
speciei differunt ab invicem. Accidentia vero quæ consequuntur
*species differ from each-other the-accidents but which follow*
formam, sunt propriæ passiones vel generis vel speciei;
*form are proper passions either of-the-genus or of-the-species*
unde inveniuntur in omnibus participantibus naturam generis
*whence they-are-found in all-things participating the-nature of-the-genus*
vel speciei; sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam,
*or of-the-species as the-risible follows in man the-form*
quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animæ hominis.
*because laughter happens from some apprehension of-the-soul of-man*
Sciendum etiam est quod aliquando accidentia ex principiis
*to-be-known also it-is that sometimes accidents from principles*
essentialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor
*essential are-caused according-to act perfect as heat*
in igne, qui semper actu est calidus; aliquando vero secundum
*in fire which always in-act is hot sometimes but according-to*
aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum accipiunt accidentia
*aptitude only but completion receive the-accidents*
ex agente exteriori: sicut diaphaneitas in aere, quæ completur
*from an-agent exterior as transparency in the-air which is-completed*

per corpus lucidum exterius; et in talibus aptitudo est
*through a-body luminous exterior and in such-things the-aptitude is*
accidens inseparabile; sed complementum quod advenit ex
*an-accident inseparable but the-completion which comes from*
aliquo principio quod est extra essentiam rei, vel quod
*some principle which is outside the-essence of-the-thing or which*
non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut moveri
*not enters the-constitution of-the-thing is separable as to-be-moved*
et hujusmodi. Sciendum est autem quod in accidentibus
*and of-this-kind-things to-be-known it-is moreover that in accidents*
alio modo sumuntur genus, differentia et species, quam
*in-another way are-taken genus difference and species than*
in substantiis. Quia enim in substantiis ex materia et forma
*in substances because for in substances from matter and form*
substantiali fit per se unum, una quadam natura ex
*substantial is-made through itself one one certain nature from*
eorum conjunctione resultante, quæ proprie in prædicamento
*their conjunction resulting which properly in the-category*
substantiæ collocatur: ideo in substantiis nomina concreta
*of-substance is-placed therefore in substances the-names concrete*
quæ compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur,
*which the-composite signify properly in a-genus to-be are-said*
sicut genera vel species, ut homo vel animal; non autem
*as genera or species as man or animal not moreover*
forma vel materia est in prædicamento hoc modo nisi per
*form or matter is in the-category in-this way except through*
reductionem, sicut principia in genere principiatorum esse
*reduction as principles in the-genus of-the-things-from-principles to-be*
dicuntur. Sed ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum
*are-said but from accident and subject not is-made one*
per se: unde non resultat ex eorum conjunctione aliqua
*through itself whence not results from their conjunction any*

natura cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui.
*nature to-which the-intention of-genus or of-species can to-be-attributed*
Unde nomina accidentium concretive dicta non ponuntur in
*whence the-names of-accidents concretely said not are-placed in*
prædicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum,
*the-category as species or genera as white or musical*
nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod abstracta
*except through reduction but only according as abstract*
significantur, ut albedo et musica. Et quia accidentia non
*they-are-signified as whiteness and music and because accidents not*
componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis
*are-composed of matter and form therefore not can in them*
sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma, sicut in
*to-be-taken the-genus from matter and the-difference from form as in*
substantiis compositis; sed oportet ut primum genus sumatur
*substances composite but it-is-necessary that the-first genus be-taken*
ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode
*from the-very mode of-being according as being diversely*
secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus prædicatur:
*according-to prior and posterior of the-ten genera is-predicated*
sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiæ,
*as is-called quantity from this that it-is the-measure of-substance*
et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiæ, et sic
*and quality according as it-is the-disposition of-substance and thus*
de aliis, secundum Philosophum, in 2 Metaphys. Differentiæ
*of the-others according-to the-Philosopher in 2 Metaphysics the-differences*
vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum ex quibus
*but in them are-taken from the-diversity of-the-principles from which*
causantur. Et quia propriæ passiones ex propriis principiis
*they-are-caused and because proper passions from the-proper principles*
subjecti causantur, ideo subjectum ponitur in definitione
*of-the-subject are-caused therefore the-subject is-placed in the-definition*

eorum loco differentiæ, si in abstracto definiantur, secundum
*of-them in-place of-the-difference if in the-abstract they-be-defined according*
quod sunt proprie in genere: sicut dicitur quod simitas est
*as they-are properly in a-genus as it-is-said that snubness is*
nasi curvitas; sed e converso esset, si eorum definitio
*of-the-nose the-curvature but from the-converse it-would-be if their definition*
sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur: sic enim
*were-taken according as concretely they-are-said thus for*
subjectum in eorum definitione poneretur sicut genus; quia
*the-subject in their definition would-be-placed as genus because*
tum definirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum
*then they-would-be-defined through the-mode of-substances composite*
in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus
*in which the-notion of-genus is-taken from matter as we-say*
quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est, si unum
*that the-snub is a-nose curved similarly also it-is if one*
accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium
*accident of-another accident the-principle be as the-principle*
relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum
*of-relation is action and passion and quantity and therefore according-to*
hæc dividit Philosophus relationem, in 5 Metaphys. Sed quia
*these divides the-Philosopher relation in 5 Metaphysics but because*
propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta,
*the-proper principles of-accidents not always are manifest*
ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex
*therefore sometimes we-take the-differences of-accidents from*
eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum visus
*their effects as gathering and scattering of-sight*
dicuntur differentiæ coloris, quæ causantur ex abundantia
*are-called the-differences of-color which are-caused from the-abundance*
et paucitate lucis ex qua diversæ species coloris causantur.
*and scarcity of-light from which the-diverse species of-color are-caused*

Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et
*thus therefore is-plain how essence is in substances and*
accidentibus, et quomodo intentiones logicæ universales in
*accidents and how the-intentions logical universal in*
eis inveniuntur, excepto primo principio, quod est infinitæ
*them are-found except the-first principle which is of-infinite*
simplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis vel speciei,
*simplicity to-which not belongs the-notion of-genus or of-species*
et per consequens nec definitio propter suam simplicitatem.
*and by consequence nor definition on-account-of its simplicity*
In quo sit finis et consummatio hujus sermonis.
*in which let-be the-end and consummation of-this discourse*

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THOMAS AQUINAS

# De Principiis Naturae

*On the Principles of Nature*

*What can be is in potency, what is is in act. Matter is what is in potency to substantial or accidental being, form what makes it actual, and generation needs three principles, matter, form, and privation, privation being a principle only by accident. First matter can be neither defined nor generated, and it is one in number in all things only as lacking the dispositions that make things differ in number. To these Thomas adds the efficient and the final cause: the end is the cause of the causes, matter and the efficient are prior in generation, form and the end in perfection, and form, end, and efficient can fall into one while matter cannot. The causes are then divided into prior and posterior, near and remote, through themselves and by accident, simple and composite, in act and in potency, and things are said to agree in number, species, genus, or by analogy, as being is said of substance and the other categories.*

Quoniam quoddam potest esse, licet non sit, quoddam
*since a-certain-thing can to-be although not it-is a-certain-thing*
vero jam est: illud quod potest esse et non est, dicitur esse
*but already is that which can to-be and not is is-said to-be*
potentia; illud autem quod jam est, dicitur esse actu. Sed
*in-potency that moreover which already is is-said to-be in-act but*
duplex est esse: scilicet esse essentiale, sive esse substantiale
*twofold is to-be namely to-be essential or to-be substantial*
rei, ut hominem esse; et hoc est esse simpliciter. Est
*of-a-thing as a-man to-be and this is to-be simply there-is*
autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album; et
*moreover another to-be accidental as a-man to-be white and*
hoc est esse secundum quid. Ad utrumque autem esse est
*this is to-be in-some respect to each moreover to-be there-is*
aliquid in potentia: aliquid enim est in potentia ut sit
*something in potency something for is in potency that it-be*
homo, ut sperma et sanguis menstruus; aliquid in potentia
*a-man as sperm and blood menstrual something in potency*

ut si album, ut homo; tamen illud quod est in potentia
*that it-be white as a-man yet that which is in potency*
ad esse accidentale, potest dici materia, sicut sperma
*to to-be accidental can to-be-called matter as the-sperm*
hominis, et homo albedinis. Sed in hoc differunt: quia illud
*of-man and the-man of-whiteness but in this they-differ that that*
quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia ex
*which is in potency to to-be substantial is-called matter from*
qua; quod autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur
*which which moreover is in potency to to-be accidental is-called*
materia in qua. Item, proprie loquendo, illud quod est in
*matter in which likewise properly speaking that which is in*
potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia prima; quod
*potency to to-be substantial is-called matter first which*
autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur subjectum:
*moreover is in potency to to-be accidental is-called the-subject*
subjectum enim dat esse accidenti, scilicet existendi, quia
*the-subject for gives to-be to-the-accident namely of-existing because*
accidens non habet esse nisi per subjectum: unde dicitur
*the-accident not has to-be except through the-subject whence it-is-said*
quod accidentia sunt in subjecto, non autem dicitur quod
*that accidents are in a-subject not moreover it-is-said that*
forma substantialis sit in subjecto. Et secundum hoc differt
*form substantial be in a-subject and according-to this differs*
materia a subjecto: quia subjectum est, quod non habet
*matter from subject because the-subject is what not has*
esse ex eo quod aliquid ei advenit, sed quod est per
*to-be from this that something to-it comes but which is through*
se, et habet esse completum, ut homo non habet esse
*itself and has to-be complete as man not has to-be*
per albedinem. Sed materia dicitur quod habet esse ex eo
*through whiteness but matter is-said what has to-be from this*

quod sibi advenit, quia de se esse incompletum, immo
*that to-itself comes because of itself to-be incomplete nay*
nullum esse habet, ut dicit Commentator in 2 de Anima.
*no to-be it-has as says the-Commentator in 2 on the-Soul*
Unde, simpliciter loquendo, forma dat esse materiæ, accidens
*whence simply speaking form gives to-be to-matter the-accident*
autem non dat esse subjecto, sed subjectum accidenti; licet
*moreover not gives to-be to-the-subject but the-subject to-the-accident although*
aliquando ponatur unum pro alio, scilicet materia pro
*sometimes be-placed one for the-other namely matter for*
subjecto, et e contrario. Sicut autem omne quod est in
*subject and from the-contrary as moreover everything which is in*
potentia, potest dici materia, ita omne a quo habet
*potency can to-be-called matter so everything from which has*
aliquid esse, quodcumque esse sit illud, sive substantiale,
*something to-be whatever to-be be that whether substantial*
sive accidentale, potest dici forma: sicut homo, cum sit
*or accidental can to-be-called form as man since he-be*
potentia albus, fit per albedinem actu albus; et sperma
*in-potency white becomes through whiteness in-act white and the-sperm*
cum sit potentia homo, fit actu homo per animam.
*since it-be in-potency man becomes in-act man through the-soul*
Et quia forma facit esse in actu, ideo dicitur quod forma
*and because form makes to-be in act therefore it-is-said that form*
est actus: quod autem facit esse actu substantiale, dicitur
*is act what moreover makes to-be in-act substantial is-called*
forma substantialis, et quod facit actu esse accidentale,
*form substantial and what makes in-act to-be accidental*
dicitur forma accidentalis. Et quia generatio est motus ad
*is-called form accidental and because generation is motion to*
formam, duplici formæ respondet duplex generatio: formæ
*form to-the-twofold form corresponds a-twofold generation to-form*

substantiali respondet generatio simpliciter; formæ accidentali
*substantial corresponds generation simply to-form accidental*
respondet generatio secundum quid. Quando enim introducitur
*corresponds generation in-some respect when for is-introduced*
forma substantialis, dicitur aliquid fieri simpliciter, sicut
*form substantial is-said something to-come-to-be simply as*
dicimus homo fit, vel homo generatur; quando autem
*we-say a-man comes-to-be or a-man is-generated when moreover*
introducitur forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri
*is-introduced form accidental not is-said something to-come-to-be*
simpliciter, sed fieri hoc: sicut quando homo fit albus,
*simply but to-come-to-be this as when a-man becomes white*
non dicitur simpliciter hominem fieri vel generari,
*not it-is-said simply a-man to-come-to-be or to-be-generated*
sed fieri vel generari album. Et huic duplici generationi
*but to-become or to-be-generated white and to-this twofold generation*
opponitur duplex corruptio: scilicet simplex, et secundum
*is-opposed a-twofold corruption namely simple and in-some*
quid. Generatio vero et corruptio simpliciter non sunt nisi
*respect generation but and corruption simply not are except*
in genere substantiæ; generatio vero et corruptio secundum
*in the-genus of-substance generation but and corruption in-some*
quid sunt in omnibus aliis generibus. Et quia generatio
*respect are in all other genera and because generation*
est quædam mutatio de non esse, vel de non ente ad
*is a-certain change from not to-be or from not being to*
esse, vel ad ens, e contrario autem corruptio debet esse
*to-be or to being from the-contrary moreover corruption ought to-be*
de esse vel ente ad non esse vel non ens. Non autem
*from to-be or being to not to-be or not being not moreover*
ex quolibet non esse fit generatio; sed ex non ente
*from any not to-be is-made generation but from not being*

quod est ens in potentia: sicut idolum ex cupro, quod est
*which is being in potency as a-statue from copper which is*
idolum in potentia, et non actu. Ad hoc autem quod sit
*a-statue in potency and not in-act to this moreover that there-be*
generatio, tria requiruntur: scilicet ens in potentia, quod
*generation three-things are-required namely being in potency which*
est materia; et non esse actu, quod est privatio; et id
*is matter and not to-be in-act which is privation and that*
per quod fit actu, quod est forma: sicut quando ex
*through which it-becomes in-act which is form as when from*
cupro fit idolum, cuprum quod est in potentia ad formam
*copper is-made a-statue the-copper which is in potency to the-form*
idoli, est materia; hoc autem quod est infiguratum sive
*of-the-statue is the-matter this moreover which is unshaped or*
indispositum, est privatio; figura autem a qua dicitur
*undisposed is the-privation the-shape moreover from which it-is-called*
idolum, est forma. Non autem forma substantialis: quia
*a-statue is the-form not moreover form substantial because*
cuprum ante adventum figuræ habet esse actu, et ejus
*the-copper before the-coming of-the-shape has to-be in-act and its*
esse non dependet ab illa figura, sed est forma accidentalis:
*to-be not depends on that shape but it-is a-form accidental*
omnes enim formæ artificiales sunt accidentales: ars enim
*all for forms artificial are accidental art for*
non operatur nisi circa id quod jam constitutum est in
*not operates except about that which already constituted is in*
esse perfecto a natura. Sunt igitur tria principia naturæ,
*the-to-be perfect by nature there-are therefore three principles of-nature*
scilicet materia et forma et privatio: quorum scilicet forma,
*namely matter and form and privation of-which namely form*
est id propter quod fit generatio; alia duo sunt ex
*is that on-account-of which is-made generation the-other two are on*

parte ejus ex quo est generatio. Unde materia et privatio
*the-side of-that from which is generation whence matter and privation*
sunt idem subjecto, sed differunt ratione: idem enim est
*are the-same in-subject but they-differ in-notion the-same for is*
æs et infiguratum ante adventum formæ; sed ex alia
*the-bronze and the-unshaped before the-coming of-the-form but from one*
ratione dicitur æs, et ex alia infiguratum: unde privatio
*notion it-is-called bronze and from another unshaped whence privation*
dicitur principium non per se, sed per accidens, quia
*is-called a-principle not through itself but through accident because*
scilicet coincidit cum materia; sicut dicimus quod est per
*namely it-coincides with matter as we-say that it-is through*
accidens, quod medicus ædificat: non enim ex eo quod
*accident that a-physician builds not for from this that*
medicus, sed ex eo quod domificator est, quod coincidit
*a-physician but from this that a-house-builder he-is which coincides*
in medico in eodem subjecto. Sed duplex est accidens:
*in the-physician in the-same subject but twofold is accident*
scilicet necessarium, quod non separatur a re, sicut
*namely necessary which not is-separated from the-thing as*
risibile homini; et non necessarium, quod separatur, sicut
*the-risible to-man and not necessary which is-separated as*
album ab homine. Unde, licet privatio sit principium per
*white from man whence although privation be a-principle through*
accidens, non tamen sequitur quod non sit necessarium ad
*accident not yet it-follows that not it-be necessary for*
generationem, quia materia a privatione nunquam denudatur:
*generation because matter of privation never is-stripped*
in quantum enim est sub una forma, habet privationem
*in as-far for it-is under one form it-has the-privation*
alterius, et e contra: sicut in igne est privatio aëris,
*of-another and from the-contrary as in fire is the-privation of-air*

et in aëre est privatio ignis. Et sciendum quod, cum
*and in air is the-privation of-fire and to-be-known that since*
generatio sit ex non esse, non dicimus quod negatio
*generation be from not to-be not we-say that negation*
sit principium, sed privatio: quia negatio non determinat
*be the-principle but privation because negation not determines*
subjectum. Non videre enim potest dici etiam de non
*a-subject not to-see for can to-be-said also of not*
entibus, ut chimæra non videt; et iterum de entibus quæ
*beings as a-chimera not sees and again of beings which*
non sunt nata habere visum, sicut de lapidibus. Sed privatio
*not are apt to-have sight as of stones but privation*
non dicitur nisi de determinato subjecto, in quo scilicet
*not is-said except of a-determinate subject in which namely*
natus est fieri habitus: sicut cæcitas non dicitur nisi
*apt is to-come-to-be the-habit as blindness not is-said except*
de his quæ sunt nata videre. Et quia generatio non fit
*of those which are apt to-see and because generation not is-made*
ex non ente simpliciter, sed ex non ente, quod est in
*from not being simply but from not being which is in*
aliquo subjecto, et non in quolibet, sed in determinato:
*some subject and not in any-whatever but in a-determinate-one*
non enim ex quolibet non igne fit ignis, sed ex tali
*not for from any not fire is-made fire but from such*
non igne, circa quem nata sit fieri forma ignis: ideo
*not fire about which apt be to-come-to-be the-form of-fire therefore*
dicitur quod privatio est principium, et non negatio. Sed
*it-is-said that privation is a-principle and not negation but*
in hoc differt ab aliis, quia alia sunt principia et
*in this it-differs from the-others because the-others are principles both*
in esse et in fieri: ad hoc enim quod fiat idolum,
*in the-to-be and in becoming for this for that be-made a-statue*

oportet quod sit æs, et quod ulterius sit figura
*it-is-necessary that there-be bronze and that further there-be the-shape*
idoli; et iterum, quando est jam idolum, oportet
*of-the-statue and again when it-is already a-statue it-is-necessary*
hæc duo esse. Sed privatio est principium in fieri, et
*these two to-be but privation is a-principle in becoming and*
non in esse, quia dum fit idolum, oportet quod non
*not in the-to-be because while is-made a-statue it-is-necessary that not*
sit idolum: si enim esset, non fieret, quia quicquid
*it-be a-statue if for it-were not it-would-be-made because whatever*
fit non est, nisi in successivis, ut in tempore et motu;
*is-made not is except in successive-things as in time and motion*
sed ex quo jam idolum est, non est ibi privatio
*but from (the-time)-when already a-statue it-is not is there the-privation*
idoli, quia affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul; similiter
*of-statue because affirmation and negation not are together similarly*
nec privatio et habitus. Item privatio est principium per
*neither privation and habit likewise privation is a-principle through*
accidens, ut supra est expositum; alia vero sunt principia
*accident as above it-is set-out the-others but are principles*
per se. Ex dictis ergo patet quod materia per
*through themselves from the-things-said therefore is-plain that matter through*
se differt a forma, et privatione secundum rationem.
*itself differs from form and privation according-to notion*
Materia enim est id in quo intelligitur forma et privatio,
*matter for is that in which is-understood form and privation*
sicut in cupro intelligitur forma et infiguratum; quandoque
*as in copper is-understood form and the-unshaped sometimes*
tamen materia denominatur cum privatione, quandoque sine
*yet matter is-named with privation sometimes without*
privatione: sicut æs cum fit materia idoli. non
*privation as bronze when it-becomes the-matter of-a-statue not*

importat privationem, quia ex hoc quod dico æs, non
*imports privation because from this that I-say bronze not*
intelligitur indispositum sive infiguratum; sed farina cum
*is-understood the-undisposed or unshaped but flour since*
sit materia respectu panis, importat in se privationem
*it-be matter with-respect-to bread imports in itself the-privation*
formæ panis: quia ex hoc quod dico farina. significatur
*of-the-form of-bread because from this that I-say flour is-signified*
indispositio sive inordinatio opposita formæ panis. Et quia
*indisposition or disorder opposed to-the-form of-bread and because*
in generatione materia sive subjectum permanet, privatio
*in generation matter or subject remains privation*
vero non, nec compositum ex materia et privatione: ideo
*but not nor the-composite of matter and privation therefore*
materia, quæ non importat privationem, est permanens; quæ
*matter which not imports privation is permanent which*
autem importat, est transiens. Et est sciendum quod quædam
*moreover imports-it is transient and it-is to-be-known that some*
materia habet compositionem formæ: sicut æs, cum sit
*matter has composition of-form as bronze since it-be*
materia respectu idoli, ipsum tamen æs est compositum
*matter with-respect-to a-statue the-very yet bronze is composed*
ex materia et forma: et ideo æs non dicitur materia
*of matter and form and therefore bronze not is-called matter*
prima, quia habet formam; illa autem materia quæ intelligitur
*first because it-has form that moreover matter which is-understood*
sine qualibet forma et privatione, sed est subjecta formæ
*without any form and privation but is subject to-form*
et privationi, dicitur materia prima, propter hoc quod ante
*and to-privation is-called matter first on-account-of this that before*
ipsam non est materia alia; et hæc dicitur yle, hoc est,
*it not is matter other and this is-called hyle that is*

chaos, vel confusio, græce. Et quia omnis definitio et omnis
*chaos or confusion in-Greek and because every definition and every*
cognitio est per formam; ideo materia prima non potest
*knowledge is through form therefore matter first not can*
per se definiri nec cognosci, sed per comparationem
*through itself to-be-defined nor to-be-known but through comparison*
ad formam: ut dicatur quod illud est materia prima, quod
*to form so-that it-be-said that that is matter first which*
hoc modo se habet ad omnes formas et privationes, sicut
*in-this way itself has to all forms and privations as*
æs ad idolum et infiguratum; et hæc dicitur simpliciter
*bronze to the-statue and the-unshaped and this is-called simply*
prima. Potest etiam aliquid dici materia prima respectu
*first can also something to-be-called matter first with-respect-to*
alicujus generis: sicut aqua respectu liquabilium; quæ tamen
*some genus as water with-respect-to liquefiable-things which yet*
non est prima simpliciter; quia est compositum ex materia
*not is first simply because it-is composed of matter*
et forma, unde habet materiam priorem. Et sciendum est
*and form whence it-has matter prior and to-be-known it-is*
quod materia prima, et etiam forma non generatur neque
*that matter first and also form not is-generated nor*
corrumpitur, quia omnis generatio est ex aliquo ad aliquid.
*is-corrupted because every generation is from something to something*
Id autem ex quo est generatio, est materia; id autem
*that moreover from which is generation is matter that moreover*
ad quod est generatio, est forma. Si ergo materia et
*to which is generation is form if therefore matter and*
forma generarentur, materiæ esset materia, et formæ
*form were-generated of-matter there-would-be matter and of-form*
esset forma, et sic infinitum. Unde generatio non est
*there-would-be form and thus to-infinity whence generation not is*

nisi compositi, proprie loquendo. Sciendum est etiam quod
*except of-the-composite properly speaking to-be-known it-is also that*
materia prima dicitur una numero in omnibus. Sed unum
*matter first is-called one in-number in all but one*
numero dicitur duobus modis: scilicet quod habet unam
*in-number is-said in-two ways namely what has one*
formam determinatam in numero, sicut Socrates; et hoc
*form determinate in number as Socrates and in-this*
modo materia prima non dicitur una numero, cum in se
*way matter first not is-called one in-number since in itself*
non habeat aliquam formam. Dicitur etiam aliquid unum
*not it-have any form it-is-called also something one*
numero, quia est sine dispositionibus quæ faciunt differre
*in-number because it-is without the-dispositions which make to-differ*
secundum numerum; et hoc modo dicitur materia prima
*according-to number and in-this way is-called matter first*
unum numero, quia intelligitur sine omnibus dispositionibus
*one in-number because it-is-understood without all the-dispositions*
quæ faciunt differre numero, vel a quibus est differentia
*which make to-differ in-number or from which is difference*
in numero. Sciendum etiam quod, licet materia prima
*in number to-be-known also that although matter first*
non habeat in sua ratione aliquam formam vel privationem,
*not have in its notion any form or privation*
sicut in ratione æris non est figuratum vel infiguratum;
*as in the-notion of-bronze not is shaped or unshaped*
materia tamen nunquam denudatur a forma et privatione:
*matter yet never is-stripped of form and privation*
quandoque enim est sub una forma, quandoque sub alia.
*sometimes for it-is under one form sometimes under another*
Per se autem nunquam potest esse: quia cum in ratione
*through itself moreover never can to-be because since in notion*

sua non habeat aliquam formam, non potest esse in actu,
*its not it-have any form not can to-be in act*
cum esse actu non sit nisi a forma; sed est solum in
*since to-be in-act not be except from form but it-is only in*
potentia. Et ideo, quicquid est in actu, non potest dici
*potency and therefore whatever is in act not can to-be-called*
materia prima. Ex dictis ergo patet tria esse principia
*matter first from the-things-said therefore is-plain three to-be principles*
naturæ: scilicet materiam, formam, et privationem; sed non
*of-nature namely matter form and privation but not*
sunt hæc sufficientia ad generationem. Quod enim est in
*are these sufficient for generation what for is in*
potentia, non potest se reducere ad actum: sicut cuprum
*potency not can itself to-reduce to act as copper*
quod est in potentia ad idolum, non facit se idolum, sed
*which is in potency to a-statue not makes itself a-statue but*
indiget operante, ad hoc quod forma idoli exeat de
*needs one-operating for this that the-form of-the-statue go-out from*
potentia in actum. Forma etiam non potest se extrahere
*potency into act form also not can itself to-draw-out*
de potentia in actum, et loquor de forma generati,
*from potency into act and I-speak of the-form of-the-thing-generated*
quam dicimus esse terminum generationis: forma enim
*which we-say to-be the-term of-generation form for*
non est nisi in facto esse; quod autem operatur est in
*not is except in made the-to-be what moreover operates is in*
fieri, dum res fit. Oportet ergo præter materiam
*becoming while the-thing is-made it-is-necessary therefore besides matter*
et formam aliquod principium esse, quod agat; et hoc
*and form some principle to-be which act and this*
dicitur causa efficiens, vel movens, vel agens, vel unde
*is-called the-cause efficient or moving or agent or whence*

est principium motus. Et quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in 2
*is the-principle of-motion and because as says Aristotle in 2*
Metaph., omne quod agit, non agit nisi intendendo aliquid,
*Metaphysics everything which acts not acts except by-intending something*
oportet esse aliud quartum, id scilicet quod intenditur ab
*it-is-necessary to-be another fourth that namely which is-intended by*
operante; et hoc dicitur finis. Et sciendum quod, licet
*the-one-operating and this is-called the-end and to-be-known that although*
omne agens tam naturale quam voluntarium intendat finem,
*every agent as-much natural as voluntary intend an-end*
non tamen sequitur quod omne agens cognoscat finem, vel
*not yet it-follows that every agent know the-end or*
deliberet de fine. Cognoscere autem finem est necessarium
*deliberate about the-end to-know moreover the-end is necessary*
in his quorum actiones non sunt determinatæ, sed se
*in those whose actions not are determined but themselves*
habent ad opposita, sicut sunt agentia voluntaria; et ideo
*have to opposites as are agents voluntary and therefore*
oportet quod cognoscant finem, per quem suas actiones
*it-is-necessary that they-know the-end through which their actions*
determinent. Sed in agentibus naturalibus sunt actiones
*they-may-determine but in agents natural are actions*
determinatæ: unde non est necessarium eligere ea quæ
*determined whence not it-is necessary to-choose those-things which*
sunt ad finem; et ponit exemplum Avicenna de citharædo,
*are for the-end and puts the-example Avicenna of the-harpist*
quem non oportet de qualibet percussione chordarum
*whom not it-is-necessary about each striking of-the-strings*
deliberare, cum percussiones sint determinatæ apud ipsum:
*to-deliberate since the-strikings be determined with him*
alioquin esset inter percussiones mora, quod esset
*otherwise there-would-be between the-strikings a-delay which would-be*

absonum. Magis autem videtur de operante voluntarie quod
*absurd more moreover it-seems of one-operating voluntarily that*
deliberet, quam de agente naturali. Et ita patet per locum
*he-deliberate than of an-agent natural and so is-plain through the-topic*
a majori, quod si agens voluntarie, de quo magis videtur,
*from the-greater that if an-agent voluntarily of whom more it-seems*
non deliberat aliquando: ergo nec agens naturale. Ergo
*not deliberates sometimes therefore neither an-agent natural therefore*
possibile est agens naturale sine deliberatione intendere
*possible it-is an-agent natural without deliberation to-intend*
finem: et hoc intendere nihil aliud est, quam habere
*an-end and this to-intend nothing other is than to-have*
naturalem inclinationem ad aliquid. Ex dictis patet quod
*a-natural inclination to something from the-things-said is-plain that*
sunt quatuor causæ: scilicet materialis, efficiens, formalis,
*there-are four causes namely material efficient formal*
et finalis. Licet autem principium et causa dicantur
*and final although moreover principle and cause be-said*
convertibiliter, ut dicitur 5 Metaph., tamen Aristoteles in
*convertibly as it-is-said 5 Metaphysics yet Aristotle in*
lib. Phys., ponit quatuor causas et tria principia: causas
*the-book of-the-Physics puts four causes and three principles causes*
enim accipit tam pro extrinsecis quam pro intrinsecis.
*for he-takes as-much for extrinsic as for intrinsic*
Materia autem et forma dicuntur intrinsecæ rei,
*matter moreover and form are-called intrinsic to-the-thing*
eo quod sunt partes constituentes rem; efficiens
*for-the-reason that they-are parts constituting the-thing the-efficient*
autem et finalis dicuntur extrinsecæ, quia sunt extra rem.
*moreover and final are-called extrinsic because they-are outside the-thing*
Sed per principia accipit solum causas intrinsecas; privatio
*but by principles he-takes only causes intrinsic privation*

autem non nominantur inter causas, quia est principium
*moreover not is-named among causes because it-is a-principle*
per accidens, ut dictum est. Et cum dicimus quatuor esse
*through accident as said it-is and when we-say four to-be*
causas, intelligimus de causis per se, ad quas tamen
*causes we-understand of causes through themselves to which yet*
omnes causæ per accidens reducuntur: quia omne quod
*all causes through accident are-reduced because everything which*
est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Et
*is through accident is-reduced to that which is through itself and*
licet Aristoteles ponat principia pro causis intrinsecis in
*although Aristotle put principles for causes intrinsic in*
1 Physic., tamen, ut dicitur 5 Metaph., principium proprie
*1 Physics yet as it-is-said 5 Metaphysics principle properly*
dicitur de causis extrinsecis, elementum vero de causis quæ
*is-said of causes extrinsic element but of causes which*
sunt partes rei, scilicet de causis intrinsicis, causa vero
*are parts of-the-thing namely of causes intrinsic cause but*
de utrisque. Tamen aliquando ponitur unum pro alio: omnis
*of both yet sometimes is-placed one for the-other every*
enim causa potest dici principium, et omne principium
*for cause can to-be-called a-principle and every principle*
causa; sed tamen causa videtur addere supra principium
*a-cause but yet cause seems to-add over principle*
communiter dictum: quia id quod est principium, sive
*commonly said because that which is a-principle whether*
ex eo consequatur esse posterioris, sive non, potest esse
*from it follow the-to-be of-the-posterior or not can to-be*
principium, sicut faber dicitur principium cultelli, quia
*a-principle as the-smith is-called the-principle of-the-knife because*
ex ejus operatione cultelli est esse. Sed quando aliquid
*from his operation of-the-knife is the-to-be but when something*

movetur de albedine in nigredinem, dicitur quod albedo
*is-moved from whiteness into blackness it-is-said that whiteness*
est principium illius motus; et universaliter omne id a
*is the-principle of-that motion and universally everything that from*
quo incipit motus, dicitur principium: tamen albedo non
*which begins motion is-called a-principle yet whiteness not*
est id ex cujus esse consequitur esse posterioris, scilicet
*is that from whose to-be follows the-to-be of-the-posterior namely*
nigredinis. Sed causa solum dicitur de illo principio, ex
*of-blackness but cause only is-said of that principle from*
quo consequitur esse posterioris: unde dicitur quod causa
*which follows the-to-be of-the-posterior whence it-is-said that cause*
est id ex cujus esse consequitur aliud. Et ideo illud
*is that from whose to-be follows another and therefore that*
principium a quo incipit motus, non potest dici per
*principle from which begins motion not can to-be-called through*
se causa, etsi dicatur principium: et propter hoc privatio
*itself a-cause even-if it-be-called a-principle and on-account-of this privation*
ponitur inter principia, et non inter causas, quia privatio
*is-placed among principles and not among causes because privation*
est id a quo incipit generatio. Sed potest dici etiam
*is that from which begins generation but it-can to-be-called also*
causa per accidens, in quantum coincidit cum materia, sicut
*a-cause through accident in as-far it-coincides with matter as*
supra dictum est. Elementum autem non proprie dicitur, nisi
*above said it-is element moreover not properly is-said except*
de causis ex quibus est compositio rei, quæ proprie
*of causes from which is the-composition of-the-thing which properly*
sunt materiales; et iterum non de qualibet causa materiali,
*are material and again not of any cause material*
sed de illa ex qua est prima compositio: sicut non dicimus
*but of that from which is the-first composition as not we-say*

quod membra sint elementa hominis, quia membra etiam
*that the-members be the-elements of-man because the-members also*
componuntur ex aliis; sed dicimus quod terra et aqua sunt
*are-composed of others but we-say that earth and water are*
elementa, quia non componuntur ex aliis corporibus, sed
*elements because not they-are-composed of other bodies but*
ex ipsis est prima compositio corporum naturalium: unde
*from them is the-first composition of-bodies natural whence*
Aristoteles 5, Metaph., dicit quod elementum est ex
*Aristotle 5 Metaphysics says that an-element is (that)-from*
quo componitur res primo, et est in ea, et non dividitur
*which is-composed a-thing first and is in it and not is-divided*
secundum formam. Expositio primæ particulæ, scilicet «Id
*according-to form the-exposition of-the-first clause namely that*
ex quo componitur res primo», patet per antedicta.
*from which is-composed a-thing first is-plain through the-things-said-before*
Secunda particula, scilicet «Et est in ea», ponitur ad
*the-second clause namely and is in it is-placed for*
differentiam illius materiæ quæ ex toto corrumpitur
*distinction from-that matter which from the-whole is-corrupted*
per generationem: sicut panis est materia sanguinis, sed
*through generation as bread is the-matter of-blood but*
non generatur sanguis nisi corrumpatur panis; unde panis
*not is-generated blood unless be-corrupted the-bread whence bread*
non remanet in sanguine: unde non potest dici panis
*not remains in the-blood whence not can to-be-called bread*
elementum sanguinis; sed elementa oportet aliquo modo
*the-element of-blood but elements it-is-necessary in-some way*
manere, cum non omnino corrumpantur, ut dicitur in
*to-remain since not wholly they-are-corrupted as it-is-said in*
lib. de Gener. Tertia particula, scilicet «Et non dividitur
*the-book on Generation the-third clause namely and not is-divided*

secundum formam», id est, speciem, ponitur ad differentiam
*according-to form that is species is-placed for distinction*
eorum quæ habent partes diversas in forma, id est, in
*of-those which have parts diverse in form that is in*
specie: sicut manus, cujus partes sunt caro et ossa, quæ
*species as the-hand whose parts are flesh and bones which*
differunt secundum speciem; sed elementum non dividitur in
*differ according-to species but an-element not is-divided into*
partes diversas secundum speciem, sicut aqua, cujus quælibet
*parts diverse according-to species as water whose every*
pars est aqua: non enim oportet ad esse elementi ut
*part is water not for it-is-necessary for the-to-be of-an-element that*
non dividatur per quantitatem, sed sufficit si non dividatur
*not it-be-divided through quantity but it-suffices if not it-be-divided*
secundum formam; et si etiam nullo modo dividatur, dicitur
*according-to form and if also in-no way it-be-divided it-is-called*
elementum, sicut litteræ sunt elementa dictionum. Patet
*an-element as letters are the-elements of-words is-plain*
ergo ex dictis quod principium aliquo modo est plus
*therefore from the-things-said that principle in-some way is more*
quam causa; et causa, in plus quam elementum. Et hoc
*than cause and cause in more than element and this*
est quod dicit Commentator in 5 Metaph.
*is what says the-Commentator in 5 Metaphysics*

Viso autem quod sunt quatuor genera causarum, sciendum
*seen moreover that there-are four kinds of-causes to-be-known*
est quod non est impossibile quod idem habeat plures
*it-is that not it-is impossible that the-same-thing have several*
causas, ut idolum, cujus causa est cuprum et artifex,
*causes as a-statue of-which the-cause is copper and the-craftsman*
artifex: ut efficiens; cuprum autem ut materia. Nec est
*the-craftsman as efficient the-copper moreover as matter nor is-it*

impossibile ut idem sit causa contrariorum: sicut
*impossible that the-same-thing be the-cause of-contraries as*
gubernator est causa salutis navis et submersionis; sed
*the-helmsman is the-cause of-the-safety of-the-ship and of-the-sinking but*
hujus per suam absentiam, illius per suam præsentiam,
*of-this through his absence of-that through his presence*
ut dicit Philosophus, 2 Phys. Sciendum est etiam quod non
*as says the-Philosopher 2 Physics to-be-known it-is also that not*
est impossibile ut aliquid idem sit causa et causatum, non
*it-is impossible that something the-same be cause and caused not*
quidem respectu ejusdem, sed diversimode: ut ambulatio est
*indeed with-respect-to the-same but diversely as walking is*
aliquando causa sanitatis ut efficiens, sed sanitas est causa
*sometimes the-cause of-health as efficient but health is the-cause*
deambulationis ut finis. Deambulatio enim est aliquando
*of-walking as end walking for is sometimes*
causa sanitatis, et propter sanitatem; et etiam corpus
*the-cause of-health and for-the-sake-of health and also the-body*
est materia animæ, anima vero forma corporis. Efficiens
*is the-matter of-the-soul the-soul but the-form of-the-body the-efficient*
vero dicitur causa respectu finis, cum finis non sit in
*but is-called cause with-respect-to the-end since the-end not be in*
actu nisi per operationem agentis; sed finis dicitur causa
*act except through the-operation of-the-agent but the-end is-called cause*
efficientis, cum efficiens non operetur nisi per intentionem
*of-the-efficient since the-efficient not operate except through the-intention*
finis: unde efficiens est causa illius quod est finis, ut
*of-the-end whence the-efficient is the-cause of-that which is the-end as*
puta deambulatio, ut sit sanitas; non tamen facit
*for-example walking that there-be health not yet it-makes*
finem esse finem. Et ideo non est causa causalitatis
*the-end to-be the-end and therefore not it-is the-cause of-the-causality*

finis, id est, non facit finem esse causam finalem: sicut
*of-the-end that is not it-makes the-end to-be the-cause final as*
medicus facit sanitatem esse in actu, non tamen facit
*the-physician makes health to-be in act not yet he-makes*
quod sanitas sit finis. Finis etiam non est causa illius
*that health be the-end the-end also not is the-cause of-that*
quod est efficiens, sed est causa ut efficiens sit efficiens:
*which is efficient but is the-cause that the-efficient be efficient*
sanitas enim non facit medicum esse medicum, et dico
*health for not makes the-physician to-be a-physician and I-speak*
de sanitate quæ fit operante medico; sed facit quod
*of the-health which is-made operating the-physician but it-makes that*
medicus sit efficiens. Unde finis est causa causalitatis
*the-physician be efficient whence the-end is the-cause of-the-causality*
efficientis, quia facit efficiens esse efficiens; et similiter
*of-the-efficient because it-makes the-efficient to-be efficient and similarly*
facit materiam esse materiam, et formam esse formam;
*it-makes matter to-be matter and form to-be form*
cum materia non suscipiat formam nisi propter finem,
*since matter not receive form except on-account-of the-end*
et formam non perficit materiam nisi per finem. Unde
*and form not perfects matter except through the-end whence*
dicitur quod finis est causa causarum, quia est causa
*it-is-said that the-end is the-cause of-causes because it-is the-cause*
causalitatis in omnibus causis: materia etiam dicitur causa
*of-causality in all causes matter also is-called the-cause*
formæ, in quantum forma non est nisi in materia; et
*of-form in as-far form not is except in matter and*
similiter forma est causa materiæ, in quantum materia non
*similarly form is the-cause of-matter in as-far matter not*
habet esse in actu, nisi per formam: materia enim et
*has to-be in act except through form matter for and*

forma dicuntur relative ad invicem, ut dicitur 2 Physicor.
*form are-said relatively to each-other as it-is-said 2 Physics*
Dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum sicut pars ad totum,
*they-are-said also relatively to the-composite as part to whole*
et sicut simplex ad compositum; et similiter compositum
*and as simple to composite and similarly the-composite*
dicitur ad partes. Sed quia omnis causa, in quantum
*is-said to the-parts but because every cause in as-far*
est causa, est naturaliter prior suo causato, sciendum est
*it-is a-cause is naturally prior to-its caused to-be-known it-is*
quod prius dicitur duobus modis, ut dicit Aristoteles in
*that prior is-said in-two ways as says Aristotle in*
3 de Anima: per quorum diversitatem potest dici
*3 on the-Soul through whose diversity can to-be-called*
aliquid prius et posterius respectu ejusdem, et causa et
*something prior and posterior with-respect-to the-same and cause and*
causatum. Dicitur enim aliquid prius altero generatione
*caused is-said for something prior to-another in-generation*
et tempore, et iterum substantia et complemento. Cum
*and time and again in-substance and completion since*
enim operatio naturæ procedat ab imperfecto ad perfectum,
*for the-operation of-nature proceed from the-imperfect to the-perfect*
et ab incompleto ad completum; imperfectum est prius
*and from the-incomplete to the-complete the-imperfect is prior*
perfecto, scilicet generatione et tempore, sed perfectum est
*to-the-perfect namely in-generation and time but the-perfect is*
prius imperfecto substantia: sicut potest dici quod vir
*prior to-the-imperfect in-substance as can to-be-said that the-man*
est ante puerum secundum substantiam et complementum,
*is before the-boy according-to substance and completion*
sed puer est ante virum generatione et tempore. Sed licet
*but the-boy is before the-man in-generation and time but although*

in rebus generabilibus imperfectum sit prius perfecto, et
*in things generable the-imperfect be prior to-the-perfect and*
potentia actu, considerando quod in uno et eodem prius
*potency to-act considering that in one and the-same prior*
est imperfectum quam perfectum, et potentia quam actus,
*is the-imperfect than the-perfect and potency than act*
simpliciter tamen loquendo, oportet actum et perfectum
*simply yet speaking it-is-necessary act and the-perfect*
prius esse: quia quod reducit potentiam ad actum, actu
*prior to-be because what reduces potency to act in-act*
est; et quod perficit imperfectum, perfectum est. Materia
*is and what perfects the-imperfect perfect is matter*
quidem est prior forma generatione et tempore; prius est
*indeed is prior to-form in-generation and time prior is*
enim id cui aliquid advenit; quam in quod advenit;
*for that to-which something comes than that which it-comes*
sed forma est prior materia substantia et complemento,
*but form is prior to-matter in-substance and completion*
quia materia non habet esse completum nisi per formam.
*because matter not has to-be complete except through form*
Similiter etiam efficiens est prius fine, generatione et
*similarly also the-efficient is prior to-the-end in-generation and*
tempore, cum ab efficiente fiat motus ad finem; sed
*time since from the-efficient be-made the-motion to the-end but*
finis est prior efficiente in quantum est efficiens substantia
*the-end is prior to-the-efficient in as-far it-is efficient in-substance*
et complemento, cum actio efficientis non compleatur nisi
*and completion since the-action of-the-efficient not be-completed except*
per finem. Ergo istæ duæ causæ, scilicet materialis et
*through the-end therefore these two causes namely material and*
efficiens, sunt prius per viam generationis; sed forma et finis
*efficient are prior by way of-generation but form and end*

sunt prius per viam perfectionis. Et notandum quod duplex
*are prior by way of-perfection and to-be-noted that twofold*
est necessitas: absoluta et conditionalis. Necessitas quidem
*is necessity absolute and conditional necessity indeed*
absoluta est, quæ procedit a causis prioribus in viam
*absolute is that-which proceeds from the-causes prior in the-way*
generationis, quæ sunt materia et efficiens: sicut necessitas
*of-generation which are matter and efficient as the-necessity*
mortis quæ provenit ex materia et dispositione contrariorum
*of-death which comes from matter and the-disposition of-the-contraries*
componentium; et hæc dicitur absoluta, quia non habet
*composing and this is-called absolute because not it-has*
impedimentum; dicitur etiam necessitas materiæ. Necessitas
*impediment it-is-called also the-necessity of-matter necessity*
autem conditionalis procedit a causis posterioribus in
*moreover conditional proceeds from the-causes posterior in*
generatione, scilicet forma et fine: sicut dicimus quod
*generation namely form and end as we-say that*
necessarium est esse conceptionem, si debeat generari
*necessary it-is to-be conception if ought to-be-generated*
homo; et ista dicitur conditionalis, quia nunc mulierem
*a-man and this is-called conditional because now a-woman*
concipere non est necessarium simpliciter. sed sub conditione,
*to-conceive not is necessary simply but under condition*
scilicet si debeat generari homo; et hæc dicitur necessitas
*namely if ought to-be-generated a-man and this is-called the-necessity*
finis. Et notandum quod tres causæ possunt incidere
*of-the-end and to-be-noted that three causes can to-fall*
in unum, scilicet forma, finis, et efficiens: sicut patet in
*into one namely form end and efficient as is-plain in*
generatione ignis: ignis enim generat ignem; ergo ignis est
*the-generation of-fire fire for generates fire therefore fire is*

causa efficiens in quantum generat: et iterum ignis est
*the-cause efficient in as-far it-generates and again fire is*
causa formalis, in quantum facit esse actu quod prius erat
*the-cause formal in as-far it-makes to-be in-act what before was*
in potentia; et iterum finis est, in quantum terminantur
*in potency and again the-end it-is in as-far are-terminated*
ad ipsum operationes agentis, et in quantum est intentus
*at it the-operations of-the-agent and in as-far it-is intended*
ab agente. Sed duplex est finis: scilicet generationis, et
*by the-agent but twofold is the-end namely of-generation and*
rei generatæ; sicut patet in generatione cultelli: forma
*of-the-thing generated as is-plain in the-generation of-a-knife the-form*
enim cultelli est finis generationis; sed incidere, quod est
*for of-the-knife is the-end of-generation but to-cut which is*
operatio ipsius cultelli, est finis generati, scilicet
*the-operation of-the-very knife is the-end of-the-thing-generated namely*
cultelli. Finis autem generationis coincidit cum duabus dictis
*of-the-knife the-end moreover of-generation coincides with the-two said*
causis aliquando: scilicet quando fit generatio a simili in
*causes sometimes namely when is-made generation from a-like in*
specie, sicut homo generat hominem, et oliva olivam, quod
*species as man generates man and the-olive the-olive which*
non potest intelligi de fine rei generatæ. Sciendum
*not can to-be-understood of the-end of-the-thing generated to-be-known*
tamen quod finis incidit cum forma in idem numero: quia
*yet that the-end falls with form into the-same in-number because*
est idem numero, quod est forma generati et finis
*it-is the-same in-number which is the-form of-the-thing-generated and the-end*
generationis; sed cum efficiente non incidit in idem numero,
*of-generation but with the-efficient not it-falls into the-same in-number*
sed in idem specie: impossibile est enim ut faciens et
*but into the-same in-species impossible it-is for that the-maker and*

factum sint idem numero, sed possunt esse idem specie:
*the-made be the-same in-number but they-can to-be the-same in-species*
unde quando homo generat hominem, homo generans et
*whence when man generates man the-man generating and*
generatus sunt in numero diversi, sed idem specie. Materia
*generated are in number diverse but the-same in-species matter*
autem non coincidit cum aliis; et hoc quia materia, ex
*moreover not coincides with the-others and this because matter from*
eo quod est ens in potentia, habet rationem imperfecti,
*this that it-is being in potency has the-notion of-the-imperfect*
sed aliæ causæ cum sint actu, habent rationem perfecti;
*but the-other causes since they-be in-act have the-notion of-the-perfect*
perfectum autem et imperfectum non coincidunt in idem.
*the-perfect moreover and the-imperfect not coincide into the-same*

Viso ergo quod quatuor sunt causæ, scilicet efficiens,
*seen therefore that four are the-causes namely efficient*
formalis, materialis et finalis, sciendum est quod quælibet
*formal material and final to-be-known it-is that each*
ipsarum causarum dicitur multis modis. Dicitur enim aliquid
*of-these causes is-said in-many ways is-called for something*
causa per prius, aliquid causa per posterius: sicut dicimus
*a-cause by prior something a-cause by posterior as we-say*
quod ars et medicus sunt causa sanitatis; sed ars est causa
*that art and the-physician are the-cause of-health but art is the-cause*
per prius, et medicus per posterius; et similiter in causa
*by prior and the-physician by posterior and similarly in the-cause*
formali, et in aliis causis. Et nota quod semper debemus
*formal and in the-other causes and note that always we-ought*
ducere quæstionem ad causam primam: ut si quæratur, Quare
*to-lead the-question to the-cause first as if it-be-asked why*
iste est sanus? Respondendum est quod medicus sanavit
*this-man is healthy to-be-answered it-is that the-physician healed*

eum; et iterum, quare medicus sanavit eum? propter
*him and again why the-physician healed him on-account-of*
artem sanandi quam habet. Sciendum est etiam quod idem
*the-art of-healing which he-has to-be-known it-is also that the-same*
est dictum causa propinquior, quod causa posterior; et
*is said cause nearer as cause posterior and*
causa remota, quod causa prior. Unde istæ duæ divisiones
*cause remote as cause prior whence these two divisions*
causarum, aliqua per prius, aliqua per posterius; et causarum,
*of-causes some by prior some by posterior and of-causes*
aliqua propinqua, aliqua remota: idem significant. Hoc
*some near some remote the-same signify this*
autem observandum est quod semper illud quod universalius
*moreover to-be-observed it-is that always that which more-universal*
est, causa remota dicitur; quod autem specialius, causa
*is cause remote is-called which moreover more-special cause*
propinqua: sicut dicimus quod forma hominis propinqua,
*near as we-say that the-form of-man near*
est sua definitio, scilicet animal rationale, sed animal est
*is his definition namely animal rational but animal is*
magis remotum, et iterum substantia remotior. Omnia enim
*more remote and again substance more-remote all for*
superiora sunt formæ inferiorum; et similiter materia idoli
*higher-things are the-forms of-lower-things and similarly the-matter of-a-statue*
propinqua est cuprum, sed remota est metallum, et iterum
*near is copper but remote is metal and again*
remotior, corpus. Item causarum alia est causa per se,
*more-remote body likewise of-causes one is cause through itself*
alia per accidens: causa per se dicitur quæ est
*another through accident cause through itself is-called that-which is*
causa alicujus rei in quantum hujusmodi, sicut ædificator
*the-cause of-some thing in as-far of-this-kind as the-builder*

est causa domus, et lignum materia scamni; causa per
*is the-cause of-the-house and wood the-matter of-the-bench cause through*
accidens dicitur illa quæ accidit causæ per se, sicut dicimus
*accident is-called that which befalls the-cause through itself as we-say*
quod grammaticus ædificat. Grammaticus enim dicitur causa
*that the-grammarian builds the-grammarian for is-called cause*
ædificans per accidens, non in quantum grammaticus; sed
*building through accident not in as-far grammarian but*
in quantum accidit ædificatori quod sit grammaticus; et
*in as-far it-befalls the-builder that he-be a-grammarian and*
similiter est in aliis causis. Item causarum quædam est
*similarly it-is in the-other causes likewise of-causes one is*
simplex, quædam composita: simplex causa, quando solum
*simple one composite simple cause when only*
causa dicitur illud quod per se est, causa vel solum id
*cause is-called that which through itself is cause or only that*
quod per accidens est; ut si dicamus ædificatorem esse
*which through accident is as if we-say the-builder to-be*
causam domus, et similiter si dicamus medicum esse causam
*the-cause of-the-house and similarly if we-say the-physician to-be the-cause*
domus; composita autem causa est quando utraque dicitur
*of-the-house composite moreover cause is when each is-called*
causa; ut si dicamus ædificator medicus est causa domus.
*cause as if we-say the-builder physician is the-cause of-the-house*
Potest etiam dici causa simplex, secundum quod exponit
*it-can also to-be-called cause simple according as explains*
Avicenna, illud quod sine adjunctione alterius est causa: sicut
*Avicenna that which without the-addition of-another is cause as*
cuprum est causa idoli sine adjunctione alterius materiæ:
*copper is the-cause of-the-statue without the-addition of-other matter*
ex cupro enim fit idolum; et sicut dicitur quod medicus
*from copper for is-made the-statue and as it-is-said that the-physician*

facit sanitatem, vel quod ignis calefacit. Composita autem
*makes health or that fire heats composite moreover*
causa est, quando oportet plura advenire ad hoc quod
*cause is when it-is-necessary several-things to-come for this that*
sit causa: sicut unus homo non est causa motus navis,
*it-be a-cause as one man not is the-cause of-the-motion of-the-ship*
sed multi; et sicut unus lapis non est materia domus, sed
*but many and as one stone not is the-matter of-the-house but*
multi. Item causarum quædam est actu, quædam potentia:
*many likewise of-causes one is in-act one in-potency*
causa in actu est, quæ causat actu rem, ut ædificator
*the-cause in act is that-which causes in-act the-thing as the-builder*
dum ædificat, vel cuprum cum ex eo fit idolum; causa
*while he-builds or the-copper when from it is-made the-statue the-cause*
in potentia est, quæ licet non causet rem in actu,
*in potency is that-which although not it-cause the-thing in act*
potest tamen causare: sicut ædificator, non quod ædificet,
*can yet to-cause as the-builder not that he-build*
sed quia potest ædificare, et cuprum, dum non est idolum.
*but because he-can to-build and the-copper while not it-is a-statue*
Et sciendum quod, loquendo de causis in actu, necessarium
*and to-be-known that speaking of causes in act necessary*
est causam et causatum simul esse, ita quod si unum
*it-is cause and caused together to-be so that if one*
sit, et alterum: si enim sit ædificator in actu, oportet
*be also the-other if for there-be a-builder in act it-is-necessary*
quod ædificet; et si sit ædificatio in actu, oportet quod
*that he-build and if there-be building in act it-is-necessary that*
sit ædificator in actu. Sed hoc non est necessarium in
*there-be a-builder in act but this not is necessary in*
causis quæ solum sunt in potentia. Sciendum est autem
*causes which only are in potency to-be-known it-is moreover*

quod causa universalis comparatur causato universali, et
*that cause universal is-compared to-the-caused universal and*
causa singularis comparatur causato singulari, sicut dicimus
*cause singular is-compared to-the-caused singular as we-say*
quod ædificator est causa domus, et hic ædificator hujus
*that the-builder is the-cause of-the-house and this builder of-this*
domus. Sciendum est etiam quod, loquendo de principiis
*house to-be-known it-is also that speaking of principles*
intrinsecis, scilicet materia et forma, secundum convenientiam
*intrinsic namely matter and form according-to the-agreement*
et differentiam principiatorum, et convenientiam et
*and difference of-the-things-from-principles and the-agreement and*
differentiam principiorum: quædam sunt idem numero, ut
*difference of-principles some are the-same in-number as*
Socrates et hic homo, demonstrato Socrate; quædam sunt
*Socrates and this man pointed-out Socrates some are*
diversa numero et idem specie, sicut Socrates et Plato,
*diverse in-number and the-same in-species as Socrates and Plato*
qui, licet differant numero, conveniunt tamen in specie
*who although they-differ in-number agree yet in species*
humana; quædam vero differunt in specie, sed sunt idem
*human some but differ in species but are the-same*
genere, sicut homo et asinus conveniunt in genere animalis;
*in-genus as man and ass agree in the-genus of-animal*
quædam vero sunt diversa in genere, sed sunt idem solum
*some but are diverse in genus but are the-same only*
secundum analogiam, sicut substantia et quantitas, quæ non
*according-to analogy as substance and quantity which not*
conveniunt in aliquo genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum
*agree in any genus but agree only according-to*
analogiam: conveniunt enim solum in eo quod est ens.
*analogy they-agree for only in that which is being*

Ens autem non est genus, quia non prædicatur univoce
*being moreover not is a-genus because not it-is-predicated univocally*
sed analogice. Et ad hujus intelligentiam sciendum est quod
*but analogically and for of-this the-understanding to-be-known it-is that*
tripliciter aliquid prædicatur de pluribus: scilicet univoce,
*in-three-ways something is-predicated of several namely univocally*
æquivoce et analogice. Univoce quidem prædicatur aliquid
*equivocally and analogically univocally indeed is-predicated something*
secundum idem nomen et secundum eamdem rationem,
*according-to the-same name and according-to the-same notion*
id est, definitionem, sicut animal prædicatur de homine
*that is definition as animal is-predicated of man*
et asino: utrumque enim dicitur animal, et uterque est
*and ass each for is-called animal and each is*
substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis.
*substance animate sensible which is the-definition of-animal*
Æquivoce prædicatur, quod prædicatur de aliquibus secundum
*equivocally is-predicated what is-predicated of some-things according-to*
idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem: sicut canis
*the-same name and according-to diverse notion as dog*
dicitur de latrabili et de sidere cœlesti, qui conveniunt in
*is-said of the-barking-one and of the-star heavenly which agree in*
nomine, et non in definitione neque significatione: id enim
*name and not in definition nor signification that for*
quod significatur per nomen est definitio, sicut dicitur
*which is-signified through the-name is the-definition as it-is-said*
4 Metaph. Analogice dicitur prædicari, quod prædicatur
*4 Metaphysics analogically is-said to-be-predicated what is-predicated*
de pluribus quorum rationes et definitiones sunt diversæ,
*of several whose notions and definitions are diverse*
sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de
*but are-attributed to-one some same-thing as healthy is-said of*

corpore animalis, et de urina et potione, sed non ex toto
*the-body of-an-animal and of urine and of-a-drink but not from the-whole*
idem significat in omnibus tribus: dicitur enim de urina, ut
*the-same it-signifies in all three it-is-said for of urine as*
de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subjecto, de potione ut
*of the-sign of-health of the-body as of the-subject of the-drink as*
de causa; sed tamen omnes istæ rationes attribuuntur uni
*of the-cause but yet all these notions are-attributed to-one*
fini, scilicet sanitati. Aliquando enim ea quæ conveniunt
*end namely to-health sometimes for those-things which agree*
secundum analogiam et proportionem et comparationem,
*according-to analogy and proportion and comparison*
attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patuit in prædicto exemplo
*are-attributed to-one end as was-plain in the-aforesaid example*
sanitatis; aliquando uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur de
*of-health sometimes to-one agent as medical is-said of*
eo qui operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de
*him who operates without art as an-old-woman and also of*
instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad genus, quod est
*instruments but through attribution to the-kind which is*
medicina; aliquando autem per attributionem ad unum
*medicine sometimes moreover through attribution to one*
subjectum, ut ens dicitur de substantia, quantitate, qualitate,
*subject as being is-said of substance quantity quality*
et aliis prædicamentis: non enim ex toto est eadem
*and the-other categories not for from the-whole is the-same*
ratio qua substantia est ens, et qualitas, et omnia
*notion by-which substance is being and quality and all*
alia. Sed omnia dicuntur ens ex eo quod attribuuntur
*the-others but all-things are-called being from this that they-are-attributed*
substantiæ, quæ est aliorum subjectum. Et ideo ens dicitur
*to-substance which is of-the-others the-subject and therefore being is-said*

per prius de substantia, et per posterius de aliis. Et ideo
*by prior of substance and by posterior of the-others and therefore*
ens non est genus substantiæ et aliorum prædicamentorum,
*being not is the-genus of-substance and of-the-other categories*
quia nullum genus prædicatur secundum prius et posterius
*because no genus is-predicated according-to prior and posterior*
de suis speciebus, sed ens prædicatur analogice: et hoc est
*of its species but being is-predicated analogically and this is*
quod dicimus quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere,
*what we-say that substance and quantity differ in-genus*
sed sunt idem secundum analogiam. Eorum ergo quæ
*but are the-same according-to analogy of-those therefore which*
sunt idem numero, etiam forma et materia sunt idem
*are the-same in-number also the-form and matter are the-same*
numero, sicut Tullii et Ciceronis. Eorum autem quæ sunt
*in-number as of-Tully and of-Cicero of-those moreover which are*
idem specie diversaque numero, materia et forma non sunt
*the-same in-species and-diverse in-number the-matter and form not are*
eadem numero, sed specie, sicut Socratis et Platonis; et
*the-same in-number but in-species as of-Socrates and of-Plato and*
similiter eorum quæ sunt idem genere, ut anima et corpus
*similarly of-those which are the-same in-genus as the-soul and body*
asini et equi differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere;
*of-the-ass and of-the-horse differ in-species but are the-same in-genus*
et similiter eorum quæ conveniunt secundum analogiam
*and similarly of-those which agree according-to analogy*
sive proportionem tantum, principia quidem sunt eadem
*or proportion only the-principles indeed are the-same*
secundum analogiam tantum, sive proportionem. Materia
*according-to analogy only or proportion matter*
enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt
*for and form and privation or potency and act are*

principia substantiæ et aliorum generum. Tamen materiæ,
*the-principles of-substance and of-the-other genera yet the-matter*
substantiæ et quantitatis forma similiter et privatio differunt
*of-substance and of-quantity the-form similarly and privation differ*
genere; sed conveniunt secundum proportionem solum in
*in-genus but agree according-to proportion only in*
hoc quod, sicut materia substantiæ se habet ad substantiam
*this that as the-matter of-substance itself has to substance*
in ratione materiæ, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad
*in the-notion of-matter so itself has the-matter of-quantity to*
quantitatem: sicut tamen substantia est cæterorum causa, ita
*quantity as yet substance is of-the-rest the-cause so*
principia substantiæ sunt principia omnia aliorum.
*the-principles of-substance are the-principles all of-the-others*

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THOMAS AQUINAS

# De Aeternitate Mundi

*On the Eternity of the World*

# ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD

*Holding by faith that the world began, Thomas asks whether it could have always existed and yet be caused by God. Nothing could be eternal and not made by God, and nothing could always have been from a passive potency. The question is whether to be made by God and to have no beginning of duration contradict each other. They do not: a cause producing its effect suddenly need not precede it, nor need non-being precede being in duration, since a creature is from nothing only by nature, as Anselm explains. Augustine never urges such a contradiction and seems to hint there is none, the noblest philosophers saw none, and the arguments from coeternity and from an infinity of souls do not prove one.*

Supposito, secundum fidem catholicam, mundum ab æterno
*supposed according-to the-faith catholic the-world from eternity*
non fuisse, sicut quidam philosophi errantes posuerunt, sed
*not to-have-been as certain philosophers erring posited but*
quod mundus durationis initium habuerit, sicut Scriptura
*that the-world of-duration a-beginning had as Scripture*
sacra, quæ falli non potest, testatur; dubitatio mota est,
*sacred which to-be-deceived not can testifies a-doubt moved it-is*
utrum potuerit semper fuisse. Cujus dubitationis ut veritas
*whether it-could always to-have-been of-which doubt that the-truth*
explicetur, primo distinguendum est quid est in quo cum
*be-unfolded first to-be-distinguished it-is what is-that in which with*
dicentibus contrarium convenimus, et quid est illud in quo
*those-saying the-contrary we-agree and what is that in which*
ab eis differimus. Si enim intelligatur quod aliquid præter
*from them we-differ if for it-be-understood that something besides*
Deum potuerit semper fuisse, quasi possit esse aliquid
*God could always to-have-been as-if there-could to-be something*
æternum præter eum, ab eo non factum: error abominabilis
*eternal besides him by him not made an-error abominable*

est non solum in fide, sed etiam apud philosophos, qui
*it-is not only in the-faith but also among the-philosophers who*
confitentur et probant quod omne quod est quoquo modo,
*confess and prove that everything which is in-whatever way*
esse non possit nisi causatum ab eo qui maxime et
*to-be not can unless caused by him who most and*
verissime habet esse. Si autem intelligatur aliquid semper
*most-truly has to-be if moreover it-be-understood something always*
fuisse, et tamen causatum a Deo secundum totum quod
*to-have-been and yet caused by God according-to the-whole that*
in eo est: videndum est utrum hoc possit stare. Si autem
*in it is to-be-seen it-is whether this can to-stand if moreover*
dicatur hoc impossibile; vel hoc dicetur quia Deus non
*be-said this impossible either this will-be-said because God not*
potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, aut quia non potuit
*could to-make something which always has-been or because not it-could*
fieri, etiam si Deus posset facere. In prima autem parte
*to-be-made even if God could to-make-(it) in the-first moreover part*
omnes consentiunt: scilicet in hoc quod Deus potuit facere
*all agree namely in this that God could to-make*
aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius
*something which always has-been considering the-power his*
infinitam. Restat igitur videre, utrum possibile sit aliquid
*infinite it-remains therefore to-see whether possible it-be something*
fieri quod semper fuerit. Si autem dicatur quod hoc
*to-be-made which always has-been if moreover it-be-said that this*
non potest fieri; hoc non potest intelligi nisi duobus
*not can to-be-made this not can to-be-understood except in-two*
modis, vel duas causas veritatis habere: scilicet vel propter
*ways or two causes of-truth to-have namely either on-account-of*
remotionem potentiæ passivæ, vel propter repugnantiam
*the-removal of-potency passive or on-account-of the-repugnance*

intellectuum. Primo modo posset dici quod, antequam
*of-concepts in-the-first way it-could to-be-said that before*
angelus sit factus, non poterat angelus fieri, quia non
*an-angel was made not could an-angel to-be-made because not*
præcessit ad ejus esse aliqua potentia passiva, cum non sit
*preceded to his to-be any potency passive since not he-was*
factus ex materia præjacenti; tamen Deus poterat facere
*made from matter lying-before yet God could to-make*
angelum, et poterat facere ut angelus fieret, quia fecit, et
*an-angel and could to-make that an-angel be-made because he-made-it and*
factus est. Sic ergo intelligendo, simpliciter concedendum
*made he-was thus therefore understanding simply to-be-granted*
est, secundum fidem, quod non potest causatum a Deo
*it-is according-to the-faith that not can a-thing-caused by God*
semper esse: quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam
*always to-be because this to-posit would-be to-posit potency*
passivam semper fuisse; quod hæreticum est. Tamen
*passive always to-have-been which heretical is yet*
ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non possit facere ut
*from this not it-follows that God not can to-make that*
fiat semper aliquod ens. Secundo modo dicitur per
*be-made always some being in-the-second way it-is-said through*
repugnantiam intellectuum aliquid non posse fieri, sicut
*the-repugnance of-concepts something not can to-be-made as*
non potest fieri ut affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera;
*not can to-be-made that affirmation and negation be together true*
quamvis Deus hoc possit facere, ut quidam dicunt. Quidam
*although God this could to-make as some say some*
vero dicunt quod nec Deus potest hujusmodi facere, quia
*but say that not-even God can of-this-kind to-make because*
hoc nihil est. Tamen manifestum est quod non potest facere
*this nothing is yet manifest it-is that not can to-make*

ut hoc fiat, quia positio qua ponitur esse, destruit se
*that this be-made because the-position by-which it-is-posited to-be destroys it*
ipsam. Si tamen ponatur quod Deus hujusmodi potest facere
*itself if yet be-posited that God of-this-kind can to-make*
ut fiat; positio non est hæretica, quamvis, ut credo,
*that it-be-made the-position not is heretical although as I-believe*
sit falsa, sicut quod præteritum non fuerit, includit in se
*it-be false as that the-past not have-been includes in itself*
contradictionem. Unde Augustinus in libro contra Faustum:
*contradiction whence Augustine in the-book against Faustus*
«Quisque ita dicit: Si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut
*whoever so says if omnipotent is God let-him-make that*
quæ facta sunt, facta non fuerint; non videt hoc
*the-things-which made are made not have-been not sees this*
se dicere: Si omnipotens est, faciat ut ea quæ
*himself to-say if omnipotent he-is let-him-make that those-things which*
vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint.» Et
*true are by-that very-fact that true they-are false be and*
tamen quidam magni pie dixerunt, Deum posse facere de
*yet certain great-men piously said God to-be-able to-make of*
præterito quod non fuerit præteritum; nec fuit reputatum
*the-past that not it-have-been past nor was-it reputed*
hæreticum. Videndum est ergo utrum in his duobus sit
*heretical to-be-seen it-is therefore whether in these two there-be*
repugnantia intellectuum, quod aliquid sit causatum a Deo,
*repugnance of-concepts that something be caused by God*
et tamen semper fuerit. Et quidquid de hoc verum sit,
*and yet always have-been and whatever about this true be*
non erit hæreticum dicere: quia hoc potest fieri a
*not it-will-be heretical to-say that this can to-be-made by*
Deo ut aliquid causatum a Deo semper fuerit. Tamen
*God that something caused by God always have-been yet*

credo quod si esset repugnantia intellectuum, esset
*I-believe that if there-were repugnance of-concepts it-would-be*
falsum. Si autem non est repugnantia intellectuum, non
*false if moreover not there-is repugnance of-concepts not*
solum est falsum, sed etiam est impossibile aliter esse, et
*only is-it false but also it-is impossible otherwise to-be and*
erroneum, si aliter dicatur. Cum enim ad omnipotentiam
*erroneous if otherwise it-be-said since for to the-omnipotence*
Dei pertineat ut omnem intellectum et virtutem excedat,
*of-God it-pertain that all intellect and power it-exceed*
expresse omnipotentiæ derogat qui dicit aliquid posse
*expressly to-omnipotence derogates he-who says something to-be-able*
intelligi in creaturis, quod a Deo fieri non possit.
*to-be-understood in creatures which by God to-be-made not can*
Nec est instantia de peccatis, quæ in quantum hujusmodi,
*nor is-there an-instance from sins which in as-far of-this-kind*
nihil sunt.
*nothing are*

In hoc ergo tota consistit quæstio, utrum esse creatum a
*in this therefore whole consists the-question whether to-be created by*
Deo secundum totam substantiam, et non habere durationis
*God according-to the-whole substance and not to-have of-duration*
principium, repugnent ad invicem, vel non. Quod autem non
*a-beginning be-repugnant to each-other or not that moreover not*
repugnent, sic ostenditur. Si enim repugnant, hoc non est
*they-are-repugnant thus is-shown if for they-are-repugnant this not is*
nisi propter alterum duorum, vel propter utrumque: aut
*except on-account-of one of-two or on-account-of both either*
quia oportet ut causa agens præcedat duratione; aut quia
*because it-is-necessary that the-cause agent precede in-duration or because*
oportet quod non esse præcedat esse duratione, propter
*it-is-necessary that the-not to-be precede the-to-be in-duration on-account-of*

hoc dicitur creatum a Deo ex nihilo fieri. Primo ergo
*this is-said the-created by God from nothing to-be-made first therefore*
ostendendum quod non est necesse ut causa agens, scilicet
*to-be-shown that not it-is necessary that the-cause agent namely*
Deus, præcedat duratione suum causatum, si ipse voluisset.
*God precede in-duration his caused if he-himself had-willed*
Primo sic. Nulla causa producens effectum suum subito,
*first thus no cause producing effect its suddenly*
necessario præcedit effectum suum duratione. Sed Deus est
*necessarily precedes effect its in-duration but God is*
causa producens effectum suum non per motum, sed
*a-cause producing effect his not through motion but*
subito. Ergo non est necessarium quod duratione præcedat
*suddenly therefore not it-is necessary that in-duration he-precede*
effectum suum. Primum patet per inductionem in omnibus
*effect his the-first is-plain through induction in all*
mutationibus subitis, sicut est illuminatio et hujusmodi.
*changes sudden as is illumination and of-this-kind-things*
Nihilominus potest probari per rationem sic. In quocumque
*nevertheless it-can to-be-proved through reason thus in whatever*
instanti ponitur res esse, potest poni principium
*instant is-posited a-thing to-be can to-be-posited the-beginning*
actionis ejus, ut patet in omnibus generabilibus: quia in illo
*of-the-action its as is-plain in all generable-things because in that*
instanti in quo incipit ignis, incipit esse calefactio. Sed in
*instant in which begins fire begins to-be heating but in*
operatione subita, simul, immo idem est principium et finis
*operation sudden together nay the-same is the-beginning and end*
ejus, sicut in omnibus indivisibilibus. Ergo in quocumque
*its as in all indivisible-things therefore in whatever*
instanti ponitur agens producens effectum suum subito, potest
*instant is-posited an-agent producing effect its suddenly can*

poni terminus actionis suæ. Sed terminus actionis est
*to-be-posited the-term of-action its but the-term of-action is*
simul cum ipso facto. Ergo non repugnat intellectui, si
*together with the-very thing-made therefore not it-is-repugnant to-the-intellect if*
ponatur causa producens effectum suum, subito non præcedere
*be-posited a-cause producing effect its suddenly not to-precede*
duratione causatum suum. Repugnaret autem in causis
*in-duration caused its it-would-be-repugnant moreover in causes*
producentibus effectus suos per motum: quia oportet
*producing effects their through motion because it-is-necessary*
quod principium motus præcedat finem ejus. Et quia
*that the-beginning of-motion precede the-end its and because*
homines consueti sunt considerare hujusmodi factiones quæ
*men accustomed are to-consider of-this-kind makings which*
sunt per motum; ideo non facile capiunt quod causa agens
*are through motion therefore not easily they-grasp that a-cause agent*
duratione effectum suum non præcedat. Et inde est quod
*in-duration effect its not precede and thence it-is that*
multorum inexperti ad pauca respicientes enuntiant facile.
*of-many-things inexperienced to few-things looking they-pronounce easily*
Nec potest huic rationi obviari, quia Deus est causa
*nor can to-this reason to-be-opposed that God is a-cause*
agens per voluntatem: quia non est necessarium quod
*acting through will because not it-is necessary that*
voluntas præcedat duratione effectum suum, nec agens per
*the-will precede in-duration effect its nor an-agent through*
voluntatem, nisi per hoc quod agit ex deliberatione;
*will except through this that it-acts from deliberation*
quod absit ut in Deo ponamus.
*which far-be-it that in God we-posit*

Præterea. Causa producens totam rei substantiam non
*further a-cause producing the-whole of-a-thing substance not*
minus potest in producendo totam substantiam, quam causa
*less can in producing the-whole substance than a-cause*
producens formam in productione formæ: immo multo magis;
*producing form in the-production of-form nay much more*
quia non producit educendo de potentia materiæ, sicut est
*because not it-produces by-drawing-out from the-potency of-matter as it-is*
in eo qui producit formam. Sed aliquod agens quod producit
*in him who produces form but some agent which produces*
solum formam, potest in hoc ut forma ab eo producta sit
*only form can in this that the-form by it produced be*
quandocumque ipsum est, ut patet in sole illuminante. Ergo
*whenever itself is as is-plain in the-sun illuminating therefore*
multo fortius Deus, qui producit totam rei substantiam,
*much more-strongly God who produces the-whole of-a-thing substance*
potest facere ut causatum suum sit quandocumque ipse est.
*can to-make that caused his be whenever he-himself is*

Præterea. Si aliqua sit causa, qua posita in aliquo instanti
*further if some be a-cause which posited in some instant*
non possit poni effectus ejus ab ea procedens in eodem
*not can to-be-posited the-effect its from it proceeding in the-same*
instanti, hoc non est, nisi quia illi causæ deest aliquid
*instant this not is except because to-that cause is-lacking something*
de complemento: causa enim completa et causatum sunt
*of completion a-cause for complete and the-caused are*
simul. Sed Deo nunquam defuit aliquid de complemento.
*together but to-God never was-lacking anything of completion*
Ergo causatum ejus semper potest poni, eo posito; et
*therefore the-caused his always can to-be-posited be posited and*
ita non est necessarium quod duratione præcedat.
*so not it-is necessary that in-duration be-precede*

Præterea. Voluntas volenti nihil minuit de virtute ejus,
*further the-will to-the-willer nothing diminishes of power his*
et præcipue in Deo. Sed omnes solventes ad rationes
*and especially in God but all those-answering to the-arguments*
Aristotelis, quibus probatur res semper fuisse a Deo,
*of-Aristotle by-which is-proved things always to-have-been from God*
per hoc quod idem semper facit idem, dicunt quod hoc
*through this that the-same always makes the-same say that this*
sequeretur, si non esset agens per voluntatem. Ergo et si
*would-follow if not be-were an-agent through will therefore even if*
ponatur agens per voluntatem, nihilominus sequitur quod
*be-posited an-agent through will nevertheless it-follows that*
non potest facere ut causatum ab eo numquam non sit.
*not he-can to-make that caused by him never not be*

Et ita patet quod non repugnat intellectui quod dicitur
*and so is-plain that not it-is-repugnant to-the-intellect what is-said*
causa agens non præcedere effectum suum duratione; quia
*a-cause agent not to-precede effect its in-duration because*
in illis quæ repugnant intellectui, Deus non potest facere
*in those which are-repugnant to-the-intellect God not can to-make*
ut illud sit. Nunc restat videre an repugnet intellectui
*that that be now remains to-see whether it-be-repugnant to-the-intellect*
aliquid factum nunquam non fuisse propter hoc quod
*something made never not to-have-been on-account-of this that*
necessarium sit non esse ejus, esse duratione præcedere,
*necessary it-be the-not to-be its the-to-be in-duration to-precede*
propter hoc quod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse. Sed quod
*on-account-of this that it-is-said from nothing made to-be but that*
hoc in nullo repugnet, ostenditur per dictum Anselmi
*this in nothing is-repugnant is-shown through the-saying of-Anselm*
in Monologio, cap. 8, exponentis quomodo creatura dicatur
*in the-Monologion chapter 8 explaining how a-creature be-said*

facta ex nihilo. «Tertia», inquit, «interpretatio, qua dicitur
*made from nothing the-third he-says interpretation by-which it-is-said*
aliquid esse factum ex nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse
*something to-be made from nothing is when we-understand it-to-be*
quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum».
*indeed made but not to-be anything whence it-be made*
Per similem significationem dici videtur, cum tristatur
*through like signification to-be-said it-seems when one-is-sad*
sine causa, dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur
*without cause it-is-said saddened about nothing according-to therefore*
hunc sensum, si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est, quia
*this sense if be-understood what above concluded it-is that*
præter summam essentiam cuncta quæ sunt ab eadem, ex
*besides the-highest essence all-things which are by the-same from*
nihilo facta sunt, id est, non ex aliquo: nihil inconveniens
*nothing made are that is not from anything nothing unfitting*
sequetur. Unde patet quod secundum hanc expositionem non
*will-follow whence is-plain that according-to this exposition not*
ponitur aliquis ordo ejus, quod factum est ad nihil, quasi
*is-posited any order of-that which made is to nothing as-if*
oportuerit prius quod factum est, nihil fuisse, et
*it-had-been-necessary first what made is nothing to-have-been and*
postmodum aliquid esse. Præterea, supponatur quod ordo
*afterward something to-be further let-it-be-supposed that the-order*
ad nihil in propositione importatus remaneat affirmatus,
*to nothing in the-proposition imported remain affirmed*
ut sit sensus, creatura facta est ex nihilo, id est, facta
*so-that be the-sense the-creature made is from nothing that is made*
est post nihil: hæc dictio «post» ordinem importat absolute.
*it-is after nothing this word after order imports absolutely*
Sed ordo multiplex est: scilicet durationis et naturæ. Si
*but order manifold is namely of-duration and of-nature if*

igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et
*therefore from the-common and universal not follows the-proper and*
particulare, non erit necessarium ut, propter hoc quod
*particular not it-will-be necessary that on-account-of this that*
creatura esse post nihil dicitur, prius duratione fuerit nihil,
*the-creature to-be after nothing is-said first in-duration there-was nothing*
et postea fuerit aliquid; sed sufficit, si prius natura sit
*and afterward there-was something but it-suffices if first by-nature be*
nihil, quam ens; prius enim inest unicuique naturaliter quod
*nothing than being prior for is-in to-each naturally what*
convenit sibi in se, quam quod solum ex alio habet. Esse
*belongs to-it in itself than what only from another it-has to-be*
autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio; sibi autem relicta
*moreover not has the-creature except from another to-itself moreover left*
in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter inest
*in itself considered nothing it-is whence prior naturally is-in*
sibi nihil, quam esse. Nec oportet quod propter hoc sit
*to-it nothing than to-be nor is-it-necessary that on-account-of this be*
simul nihil et ens, quia duratione non præcessit: non enim
*together nothing and being because in-duration not it-preceded not for*
ponitur, si creatura semper fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nihil
*it-is-posited if the-creature always was that in some time nothing*
sit; sed ponitur quod natura ejus est talis, quod esset
*it-be but it-is-posited that the-nature its is such that it-would-be*
nihil, si sibi relinqueretur: ut si dicamus aërem semper
*nothing if to-itself it-were-left as if we-say the-air always*
fuisse illuminatum a sole, oportebit dicere quod aër
*to-have-been illuminated by the-sun it-will-be-necessary to-say that the-air*
est factus lucidus a sole. Et quia omne quod fit, ex
*is made bright by the-sun and because everything which is-made from*
incontingenti fit, id est, ex eo quod non contingit simul
*the-incontingent is-made that is from that which not happens together*

esse cum eo quod dicitur fieri; oportebit dicere quod
*to-be with that which is-said to-be-made it-will-be-necessary to-say that*
sit factus lucidus ex non lucido, vel tenebroso: non ita
*it-be made bright from the-not bright or dark not so*
quod nunquam fuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus, sed quia
*that never it-have-been not bright or dark but because*
esset talis, si sibi soli relinqueretur. Et hoc expressius
*it-would-be such if to-itself alone it-were-left and this more-expressly*
patet in stellis et orbibus qui semper illuminantur a sole.
*is-plain in the-stars and orbs which always are-illuminated by the-sun*
Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quod dicitur aliquid factum
*thus therefore is-plain that in this that it-is-said something made*
esse a Deo et nunquam non fuisse, non est intellectus
*to-be by God and never not to-have-been not is of-the-intellect*
aliqua repugnantia. Si enim esset aliqua repugnantia,
*any repugnance if for there-were any repugnance*
mirum est quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit; quia
*wonderful it-is how Augustine it not saw because*
hæc efficacissima via esset ad improbandum æternitatem
*this most-effective way would-be for disproving the-eternity*
mundi, cum tamen ipse multis rationibus impugnet
*of-the-world since yet he-himself with-many arguments assail*
æternitatem mundi in 11 et 12 de Civ. Dei. Hanc
*the-eternity of-the-world in 11 and 12 on the-City of-God this*
autem unde omnino prætermittit? Quinimmo innuere videtur
*moreover way wholly he-passes-over nay to-hint he-seems*
quod non sit ibi repugnantia intellectuum: unde dicit 10
*that not there-be there repugnance of-concepts whence he-says 10*
de Civ, Dei, cap., 31 de Platonicis loquens: «Id quomodo
*on the-City of-God chapter 31 of the-Platonists speaking that how*
intelligant, viderint non esse hoc videlicet temporis, sed
*they-understand let-them-see-(to-it) not to-be this namely of-time but*

substitutionis initium. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes semper
*of-substitution the-beginning as for they-say if a-foot always*
ex æternitate fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset
*from eternity had-been in the-dust always to-it would-be-under*
vestigium, quod tamen vestigium ex calcante factum
*a-footprint which yet footprint by the-one-treading made*
nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis
*no-one would-doubt nor the-one than-the-other prior would-be although*
alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus
*the-one by the-other made were thus they-say both the-world*
et dii in illo creati semper fuerunt, semper existente eo,
*and the-gods in it created always were always existing he*
qui fecit et tamen facti sunt». Nec unquam dicit hoc
*who made-them and yet made they-are nor ever does-he-say this*
non posse intelligi; sed alio modo procedit contra
*not to-be-able to-be-understood but in-another way he-proceeds against*
eos. Item dicit, 11 lib., 4 cap: «Qui autem a Deo quidem
*them likewise he-says 11 book 4 chapter those-who moreover by God indeed*
factum mundum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis volunt
*made the-world confess not yet it of-time they-wish*
habere, sed suæ creationis initium, ut modo quodam
*to-have but of-its creation a-beginning so-that in-a-way a-certain*
vix intelligibili semper sit factus; dicunt quidem aliquid,
*scarcely intelligible always it-be made they-say indeed something*
unde sibi Deum videntur velut a fortuita temeritate
*whence to-themselves God they-seem as-it-were from fortuitous rashness*
defendere». Causa autem quare vix est intelligibilis, tacta
*to-defend the-cause moreover why scarcely it-is intelligible touched*
est prima ratione. Mirum est etiam quomodo nobilissimi
*is in-the-first argument wonderful it-is also how the-noblest*
philosophorum hanc repugnantiam non viderunt. Dicit enim
*of-the-philosophers this repugnance not saw says for*

Augustinus in eodem lib., cap. 5, contra illos loquens de
*Augustine in the-same book chapter 5 against those speaking about*
quibus in præcedenti auctoritate facta est mentio. «Cum
*whom in the-preceding authority made is mention with*
his enim agimus, qui etiam Deum incorporeum et omnium
*these for we-deal who also God incorporeal and of-all*
naturarum quæ non sunt quod ipse creatorem nobiscum
*natures which not are what he-himself the-creator with-us*
sentiunt»; de quibus postea subdit: «Isti Philosophi cæteros
*think of whom afterward he-adds these Philosophers the-others*
nobilitate atque auctoritate vicerunt». Et hoc etiam patet
*in-nobility and authority surpassed and this also is-plain*
diligenter consideranti dictum eorum qui posuerunt mundum
*diligently to-one-considering the-saying of-those who posited the-world*
semper fuisse: quia nihilominus ponunt eum a Deo
*always to-have-been because nevertheless they-posit it by God*
factum, nihil de hac repugnantia intellectuum sentientes.
*made nothing of this repugnance of-concepts perceiving*
Ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt, soli sunt
*therefore they who so subtly it perceive alone are*
homines, et cum eis oritur sapientia.
*men and with them arises wisdom*

Sed quia quædam auctoritates videntur pro eis facere, ideo
*but because certain authorities seem for them to-make therefore*
ostendendum est quod præstant eis debile fundamentum.
*to-be-shown it-is that they-provide to-them a-weak foundation*
Dicit enim Damascenus in lib. 1, cap. 8: «Non aptum natum
*says for Damascene in book 1 chapter 8 not apt by-nature*
est quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, coæternum esse
*it-is what from not being to to-be is-led coeternal to-be*
ei quod sine principio est et semper est». Item Hugo de
*to-that which without beginning is and always is likewise Hugh of*

sancto Victore in principio lib. sui de Sacramentis dicit:
*Saint Victor in the-beginning of-the-book his on the-Sacraments says*
«Ineffabilis omnipotentiæ virtus non potuit aliquid præter se
*the-ineffable of-omnipotence power not could anything besides itself*
habere coæternum, quo in faciendo juvaretur». Sed harum
*to-have coeternal by-which in making it-might-be-helped but of-these*
auctoritatum et similium intellectus per hoc patet quod
*authorities and of-like-ones the-understanding through this is-plain which*
Boetius dicit ult. de Consolatione: «Non recte quidam, cum
*Boethius says at-the-end on the-Consolation not rightly some when*
audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium
*they-hear it-seemed to-Plato world this neither to-have-had a-beginning*
temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori
*of-time nor about-to-have to-be an-end in-this way to-the-founder*
conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud enim
*the-founded world to-be-made coeternal think another-thing for*
est per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato
*it-is through an-interminable to-be-led life which to-the-world Plato*
tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexam esse
*attributed another of-interminable life the-whole equally embraced to-be*
præsentiam, quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum
*the-presence which of-the-divine mind proper to-be manifest*
est». Unde patet quod etiam non sequitur quod quidam
*is whence is-plain that also not follows what some*
objiciunt, scilicet quod creatura æquaretur Deo in duratione;
*object namely that the-creature would-be-equaled to-God in duration*
et quod per hunc modum dicatur, quod nullo modo potest
*and that through this way it-be-said that in-no way can*
esse aliquid coæternum Deo, quia nihil scilicet potest esse
*to-be anything coeternal with-God because nothing namely can to-be*
immutabile nisi solus Deus; quod patet per hoc quod dicit
*immutable except alone God which is-plain through this that says*

Augustinus, 12 de Civit. Dei, cap. 15: «Tempus quoniam
*Augustine 12 on the-City of-God chapter 15 time since*
mutabiliter transcurrit, æternitati immutabili non potest esse
*mutably it-runs-through with-eternity immutable not can to-be*
coæternum. Ac per hoc etiam si immortalitas angelorum
*coeternal and through this even if the-immortality of-the-angels*
non transit in tempore, nec præterita est quasi jam non sit,
*not passes in time nor past it-is as-if now not it-be*
nec futura quasi nondum sit; tamen eorum motus, quibus
*nor future as-if not-yet it-be yet their motions by-which*
tempora peraguntur in futuro, in præteritum transeunt.
*times are-carried-through from the-future into the-past pass*
Et ideo Creatori, in cujus motu dicendum non est vel
*and therefore with-the-Creator in whose motion to-be-said not is either*
fuisse quod jam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum
*to-have-been what now not is or about-to-be to-be what not-yet*
sit, coæterni esse non possunt». Similiter etiam dicit, 8 super
*is coeternal to-be not they-can similarly also he-says 8 on*
Gen.: «Quia omnino immutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis,
*Genesis because wholly immutable is that nature of-the-Trinity*
ob hoc ita æterna est, ut ei aliquid coæternum esse non
*on this so eternal it-is that to-it anything coeternal to-be not*
possit». Et similia verba dicit in 11 lib. Confessionum.
*can and like words he-says in 11 book of-the-Confessions*

Adducunt etiam pro se rationes quas etiam Philosophi
*they-adduce also for themselves arguments which also the-Philosophers*
tetigerunt et eas solverunt: inter quas illa est difficilior quæ
*touched and them solved among which that is more-difficult which*
est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit,
*is about the-infinity of-souls because if the-world always was*
necesse est modo infinitas animas esse. Sed hæc ratio non
*necessary it-is now infinite souls to-be but this argument not*

est ad propositum: quia Deus mundum facere potuit sine
*is to the-point because God the-world to-make could without*
hominibus et animabus; vel tunc etiam potuit hominem
*men and souls or then also could man*
facere quando fecit, si etiam totum alium mundum
*to-make when he-made-him if even the-whole other world*
fecisset ab æterno; et sic non remanerent post corpora
*he-had-made from eternity and thus not would-remain after the-bodies*
animæ infinitæ. Et præterea adhuc non est demonstratum,
*souls infinite and further still not it-is demonstrated*
quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu.
*that God not can to-make that there-be infinite-things in-act*

Aliæ etiam rationes sunt a quarum responsione
*other also arguments there-are from whose answer*
supersedeo ad præsens, tum quia eis alibi responsum
*I-refrain for the-present both because to-them elsewhere answered*
est, tum quia quædam earum sunt ita debiles, quod sua
*it-is and because some of-them are so weak that by-their*
debilitate contrariæ parti videntur probabilitatem afferre.
*weakness to-the-contrary part they-seem probability to-bring*

THOMAS AQUINAS

# De Unitate Intellectus

*On the Unity of the Intellect*

*Against the error, drawn from Averroes, that the possible intellect is a substance separate from the body and one for all men, Thomas argues from the philosophers and not from faith. Aristotle's words in On the Soul show that the intellect is a power of the soul, which is the form of the body, though it has no bodily organ, and Themistius, Theophrastus, Avicenna, and Algazel read him so. Reason shows that this man understands, which neither the coupling of phantasms nor the intellect as mover can explain. If the intellect were one for all, there would be one understander and one willer, and moral philosophy would perish. He answers the objections from separate substances, the one thing understood, and an infinity of souls, rebukes a Christian who holds by faith what he says reason proves false, and ends with a challenge to write against him openly, not in corners or before boys.*

Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem,
*as all men naturally to-know desire the-truth*
ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores,
*so a-natural desire is-in men of-fleeing errors*
et eos, cum facultas affuerit, confutandi. Inter alios
*and them when the-faculty be-present of-refuting among other*
autem errores indecentior videtur esse error quo circa
*moreover errors more-unseemly seems to-be the-error by-which about*
intellectum erratur, per quem nati sumus, devitatis erroribus,
*the-intellect one-errs through which born we-are avoided errors*
cognoscere veritatem. Inolevit siquidem jamdudum circa
*to-know the-truth has-grown-up indeed long-since about*
intellectum error apud multos: ex dictis Averrois sumens
*the-intellect an-error among many from the-sayings of-Averroes taking*
exordium, qui asserere nititur intellectum quem Aristoteles
*its-beginning who to-assert strives the-intellect which Aristotle*
possibilem vocat. ipse autem inconvenienti nomine materialem,
*possible calls he moreover by-an-unfitting name material*

esse quamdam substantiam secundum esse a corpore
*to-be a-certain substance according-to the-to-be from the-body*
separatam, et aliquo modo uniri ei ut formam; et
*separated and in-some way to-be-united to-it as form and*
ulterius quod intellectus possibilis sit unus omnium. Contra
*further that the-intellect possible be one of-all against*
quem jampridem multa conscripsimus. Sed quia errantium
*which long-ago many-things we-have-written but because of-those-erring*
impudentia non cessat veritati reniti, propositum nostræ
*the-impudence not ceases the-truth to-resist the-purpose of-our*
intentionis est iterato contra eumdem errorem conscribere
*intention is again against the-same error to-write*
alia, quibus manifeste prædictus error confutaretur.
*other-things by-which manifestly the-aforesaid error might-be-refuted*

Nec id nunc agendum est ut positionem prædictam
*nor that now to-be-done is that the-position aforesaid*
ostendamus erroneam, quia repugnet veritati fidei
*we-show erroneous because it-is-repugnant to-the-truth of-the-faith*
christianæ: hoc enim cuique satis in promptu apparere potest.
*Christian this for to-anyone enough in readiness to-appear can*
Subtracta enim ab omnibus diversitate intellectus, qui solus
*withdrawn for from all the-diversity of-the-intellect which alone*
inter partes animæ incorruptibilis et immortalis apparet,
*among the-parts of-the-soul incorruptible and immortal appears*
sequitur post mortem nihil de animabus hominum remanere
*it-follows after death nothing of the-souls of-men to-remain*
nisi unitatem intellectus; et sic tollitur retributio præmiorum
*except the-unity of-the-intellect and thus is-taken-away the-retribution of-rewards*
et pœnarum, et diversitas eorumdem. Intendimus autem
*and of-punishments and the-diversity of-them we-intend moreover*
ostendere positionem prædictam non minus contra philosophiæ
*to-show the-position aforesaid not less against of-philosophy*

principia esse quàm contra fidei documenta. Et quia
*the-principles to-be than against of-the-faith the-teachings and because*
quibusdam in hac materia verba latinorum non sapiunt,
*to-some in this matter the-words of-the-Latins not are-to-their-taste*
sed Peripateticorum verba sectari se dicunt, quorum
*but of-the-Peripatetics the-words to-follow themselves they-say whose*
libros in hac materia nunquam viderunt, nisi Aristotelis, qui
*books in this matter never they-saw except of-Aristotle who*
fuit sectæ Peripateticæ institutor; ostendemus positionem
*was of-the-sect Peripatetic the-founder we-shall-show the-position*
prædictam ejus verbis et sententiæ repugnare omnino.
*aforesaid his to-words and to-judgment to-be-repugnant wholly*

Accipienda est ergo prima definitio animæ quam
*to-be-taken is therefore the-first definition of-the-soul which*
Aristoteles in 2 de Anima ponit, dicens quod anima est
*Aristotle in 2 on the-Soul puts saying that the-soul is*
«actus primus corporis physici organici». Et ne forte aliquis
*the-act first of-a-body physical organic and lest perhaps someone*
diceret hanc definitionem non omni animæ competere,
*say this definition not to-every soul to-apply*
propter hoc quod supra sub conditione dixerat: «Sed
*on-account-of this that above under condition he-had-said but*
oportet aliquid commune in omni anima dicere», quod
*it-is-necessary something common in every soul to-say which*
intelligunt sic dictum, quasi hoc esse non possit, accipienda
*they-understand thus said as-if this to-be not could to-be-taken*
sunt verba ejus sequentia; dicit enim: «Universaliter quidem
*are the-words his following he-says for universally indeed*
dictum est quid scit anima. Substantia enim est quæ
*said it-is what is the-soul substance for it-is that-which*
secundum rationem; hoc autem est quod quid erat hujus
*according-to notion this moreover is that what was of-this*

corporis, id est forma, substantialis corporis physici organici.»
*body that is the-form substantial of-a-body physical organic*
Et ne forte dicatur ab hac universalitate partem intellectivam
*and lest perhaps it-be-said from this universality the-part intellective*
excludi, hoc removetur per id quod postea dicit: «Quod
*to-be-excluded this is-removed through that which afterward he-says that*
quidem igitur non sit anima separabilis a corpore, aut pars
*indeed therefore not be the-soul separable from the-body or a-part*
quædam ipsius partibilis apta nata est, non immanifestum
*certain of-it divisible apt by-nature it-is not unmanifest*
est: quarumdam enim partium actus est ipsa. At vero
*it-is of-certain for parts the-act is the-very-soul but indeed*
secundum quasdam nihil prohibet, propter id quod nullius
*according-to certain-parts nothing prevents on-account-of this that of-no*
corporis sunt actus»; quod non potest intelligi nisi de
*body they-are the-act which not can to-be-understood except of*
his quæ ad partem intellectivam pertinent, puta intellectus
*those which to the-part intellective pertain for-example intellect*
et voluntas. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur, illius animæ quam
*and will from which manifestly is-shown of-that soul which*
supra universaliter definierat, dicens eam esse corporis actum,
*above universally he-had-defined saying it to-be of-the-body the-act*
quasdam partes esse, quæ sunt quarumdam partium corporis
*certain parts to-be which are of-certain parts of-the-body*
actus; quasdam autem nullius corporis actus esse. Aliud est
*the-act certain moreover of-no body the-act to-be other is*
enim animam esse actum corporis, et aliud partem ejus esse
*for the-soul to-be the-act of-the-body and other a-part of-it to-be*
corporis actum, ut infra manifestabitur. Unde et in hoc
*of-the-body the-act as below will-be-made-manifest whence also in this*
eodem capitulo manifestat animam esse actum corporis, per
*same chapter he-makes-manifest the-soul to-be the-act of-the-body through*

hoc quod aliquæ partes ejus sunt corporis actus, cum dicit:
*this that some parts of-it are of-the-body the-act when he-says*
«Considerare oportet in partibus quod dictum est», scilicet in
*to-consider it-is-necessary in the-parts what said it-is namely in*
toto. Adhuc autem manifestius ex sequentibus apparet, quo
*the-whole still moreover more-manifestly from the-following it-appears in-what*
modo sub hac generalitate definitionis intellectus includitur,
*way under this generality of-the-definition the-intellect is-included*
per ea quæ sequuntur. Nam, cum supra satis probaverit
*through those which follow for when above sufficiently he-had-proved*
animam esse actum corporis, quia separata anima non est
*the-soul to-be the-act of-the-body because separated the-soul not is*
vivens in actu; quia tamen aliquid potest dici actuale
*living in act because yet something can to-be-called actual*
ad præsentiam alicujus, non solum si sit forma, sed etiam
*at the-presence of-something not only if it-be form but also*
si sit motor: sicut combustibile ad præsentiam comburentis
*if it-be a-mover as the-combustible at the-presence of-the-burning-thing*
actu comburitur, et quodlibet mobile ad præsentiam moventis
*in-act is-burned and any movable at the-presence of-the-mover*
actu movetur; posset alicui venire in dubium, utrum corpus
*in-act is-moved it-could to-someone to-come into doubt whether the-body*
sic vivat actu ad præsentiam animæ, sicut mobile movetur
*thus live in-act at the-presence of-the-soul as the-movable is-moved*
ad præsentiam motoris, an sicut materia est in actu ad
*at the-presence of-the-mover or as matter is in act at*
præsentiam formæ; et præcipue quia Plato posuit animam
*the-presence of-form and especially because Plato posited the-soul*
non uniri corpori ut formam, sed magis ut motorem et
*not to-be-united to-the-body as form but rather as mover and*
rectorem, ut patet per Plotinum et Gregorium Nyssenum:
*ruler as is-plain through Plotinus and Gregory of-Nyssa*

quos ideo induco, quia non fuerunt Latini, sed Græci. Hanc
*whom therefore I-bring-in because not they-were Latins but Greeks this*
igitur dubitationem insinuat Philosophus, cum post præmissa
*therefore doubt hints the-Philosopher when after the-premises*
subjungit: «Amplius autem immanifestum, si sit corporis
*he-adds further moreover unmanifest whether it-be of-the-body*
actus anima, sicut nauta navis.» Quia igitur post præmissa
*the-act the-soul as the-sailor of-the-ship because therefore after the-premises*
adhuc hoc dubium remanebat, ideo subdit: «Figuraliter
*still this doubt remained therefore he-adds in-outline*
quidem igitur sic determinetur et describatur de anima»,
*indeed therefore thus let-it-be-determined and described about the-soul*
quia scilicet nondum ad liquidum demonstraverat veritatem.
*because namely not-yet to clearness he-had-demonstrated the-truth*
Ad hanc igitur dubitationem tollendam, consequenter procedit
*for this therefore doubt to-be-removed consequently he-proceeds*
ad manifestandum id quod est secundum se et secundum
*to manifesting that which is according-to itself and according-to*
rationem certius, per ea quæ sunt minus certa secundum
*reason more-certain through those which are less certain according-to*
se, sed magis certa quoad nos, id est, per effectus
*themselves but more certain as-to us that is through the-effects*
animæ, qui sunt actus ipsius. Unde statim distinguit opera
*of-the-soul which are the-acts of-it whence at-once he-distinguishes the-works*
animæ, dicens quod animatum distinguitur ab inanimato in
*of-the-soul saying that the-animate is-distinguished from the-inanimate in*
vivendo, et quod multa sunt quæ pertinent ad vitam,
*living and that many are-the-things which pertain to life*
scilicet intellectus, sensus et motus et status secundum
*namely intellect sense and motion and rest according-to*
locum, et motus secundum nutrimentum et augumentum,
*place and motion according-to nourishment and growth*

ita quod cuicumque inest aliquod horum, dicitur vivere. Etiam
*so that to-whatever is-in any of-these it-is-said to-live also*
ostenso quomodo ista se habeant ad invicem, id est,
*shown how these themselves have to each-other that is*
qualiter unum sine altero horum dicitur vivere, et qualiter
*how one without the-other of-these is-said to-live and how*
unum istorum sine altero possit esse, concludit in hoc,
*one of-these without the-other can to-be he-concludes in this*
quod anima sit omnium prædictorum principium, et quod
*that the-soul be of-all the-aforesaid the-principle and that*
anima determinatur per suas partes vegetativo, sensitivo et
*the-soul is-determined through its parts by-the-vegetative sensitive and*
intellectivo et motivo, et quod hæc omnia contingit in uno et
*intellective and motive and that these all happen in one and*
eodem inveniri, sicut in homine. Et quia Plato posuit diversas
*the-same to-be-found as in man and because Plato posited diverse*
esse animas in homine, secundum quas diversæ operationes
*to-be souls in man according-to which diverse operations*
vitæ ei conveniant, consequenter dubitationem movet, utrum
*of-life to-him belong consequently a-doubt he-moves whether*
unumquodque horum sit anima per se, vel sit aliqua pars
*each of-these be a-soul through itself or be some part*
animæ; et sit, sint partes unius animæ, utrum differant solum
*of-the-soul and if they-be parts of-one soul whether they-differ only*
secundum rationem, aut etiam differant loco, id est, organo.
*according-to notion or also differ in-place that is in-organ*
Et subjungit quod «de quibusdam hoc difficile non videtur,
*and he-adds that about some this difficult not seems*
sed quædam sunt quæ dubitationem habent.» Ostendit enim
*but some are which doubt have he-shows for*
consequenter quod manifestum est de his quæ pertinent ad
*consequently that manifest it-is about those which pertain to*

animam vegetabilem, et de his quæ pertinent ad animam
*the-soul vegetable and about those which pertain to the-soul*
sensibilem, per hoc quod plantæ et animalia quædam decisa
*sensible through this that plants and animals certain cut*
vivunt, et in qualibet parte omnes operationes animæ, quæ
*live and in any part all the-operations of-the-soul which*
sunt in toto, apparent. Sed de quibus dubitationem habeat,
*are in the-whole appear but about which doubt it-have*
ostendit cum dicit quod «de intellectu et potentia perspectiva
*he-shows when he-says that about the-intellect and the-power speculative*
nihil adhuc manifestum est» quod non dicit volens ostendere
*nothing yet manifest is which not he-says wishing to-show*
quod intellectus non sit animæ, ut Commentator perverse
*that the-intellect not be of-the-soul as the-Commentator perversely*
exponit, et sectatores ipsius: manifeste enim hoc non sequitur
*expounds and the-followers of-him manifestly for this not follows*
ad hoc quod supra dixerat: «Quædam enim dubitationem
*upon this which above he-had-said some for doubt*
habent.» Unde intelligendum est: nihil adhuc manifestum
*have whence to-be-understood it-is nothing yet manifest*
est, an intellectus sit anima, vel pars animæ; et, si pars
*is whether the-intellect be the-soul or a-part of-the-soul and if a-part*
animæ, utrum separata loco, vel ratione tantum. Et quamvis
*of-the-soul whether separated in-place or in-notion only and although*
dicat hoc adhuc non esse manifestum tamen, quid circa hoc
*he-say this yet not to-be manifest yet what about this*
prima fronte appareat, manifestat subdens: «Sed videtur
*at-first sight appears he-makes-manifest adding but it-seems*
genus alterum animæ esse»; quod non est intelligendum, sicut
*a-kind other of-soul to-be which not is to-be-understood as*
Commentator et sectatores ejus perverse exponunt, ideo
*the-Commentator and the-followers his perversely expound therefore*

dictum esse, quia intellectus æquivoce dicatur de anima, vel
*said to-be because intellect equivocally be-said of soul or*
quod prædicta definitio sibi non possit adaptari; sed qualiter
*that the-aforesaid definition to-it not can to-be-adapted but how*
sit hoc intelligendum, apparet ex eo quod subditur: «Et hoc
*be this to-be-understood appears from that which is-added and this*
solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.»
*alone to-happen to-be-separated as the-perpetual from the-corruptible*
In hoc ergo est alterum genus, quia intellectus noster in
*in this therefore is the-other kind because the-intellect our in*
hoc videtur esse quoddam perpetuum, aliæ autem partes
*this seems to-be a-certain perpetual-thing the-other moreover parts*
animæ corruptibiles. Et quia corruptibile et perpetuum non
*of-the-soul corruptible and because the-corruptible and the-perpetual not*
videntur in unam substantiam convenire posse, videtur
*seem into one substance to-come-together to-be-able it-seems*
quod hoc solum de partibus animæ, scilicet intellectum,
*that this alone of the-parts of-the-soul namely the-intellect*
contingat separari, non quidem a corpore, ut Commentator
*happen to-be-separated not indeed from the-body as the-Commentator*
perverse exponit, sed ab aliis partibus animæ; nec in
*perversely expounds but from the-other parts of-the-soul nor in*
unam substantiam animæ communicat. Et quod sic sit
*one substance of-the-soul does-it-share and that thus it-be*
intelligendum, patet ex eo quod subditur: «Reliquæ autem
*to-be-understood is-plain from that which is-added the-remaining moreover*
partes animæ manifestum est ex his quod non separabiles
*parts of-the-soul manifest it-is from these that not separable*
sunt, scilicet a substantia animæ, ratione, vel loco.» De hoc
*they-are namely from the-substance of-the-soul in-notion or in-place about this*
enim supra quæsitum est, et hoc ex supradictis probatum
*for above asked it-is and this from the-above-said proved*

est. Et quod non intelligatur de separabilitate a corpore,
*it-is and that not it-be-understood of separability from the-body*
sed de separabilitate potentiarum ab invicem, patet per hoc
*but of the-separability of-the-powers from each-other is-plain through this*
quod subditur: «Ratione autem quod alteræ sint ad invicem
*that is-added in-notion moreover that other they-be to each-other*
manifestum est. Sensitivo enim alterum esse et opinativo
*manifest it-is for-the-sensitive for other to-be and the-opinative*
manifestum est.» Et sic manifeste ostendit quod hic determinate
*manifest it-is and thus manifestly he-shows that here determinately*
respondet quæstioni supra motæ. Supra enim quæsitum est,
*he-answers the-question above moved above for asked it-is*
utrum una pars animæ ab alia separata sit ratione solum,
*whether one part of-the-soul from another separated be in-notion only*
aut etiam loco. Hic dimissa quæstione ista quantum ad
*or also in-place here dismissed the-question this as-far-as to*
intellectum, de quo hic nihil determinat, dicit de aliis
*the-intellect about which here nothing he-determines he-says about the-other*
partibus animæ manifestum esse quod non sunt separabiles,
*parts of-the-soul manifest to-be that not they-are separable*
scilicet loco, sed sunt alteræ ratione. Hoc ergo habito
*namely in-place but are other in-notion this therefore had*
quod anima determinatur vegetativo, sensitivo et intellectivo
*that the-soul is-determined by-the-vegetative sensitive and intellective*
et motivo, vult ostendere quod quantum ad omnes istas
*and motive he-wishes to-show that as-far-as to all these*
partes anima unitur corpori non sicut nauta navi, sed
*parts the-soul is-united to-the-body not as the-sailor to-the-ship but*
sicut forma materiæ. Et sic certificatum erit quid sit anima
*as form to-matter and thus made-certain will-be what be the-soul*
in communi, quod supra figuraliter tantum dictum est.
*in common which above in-outline only said it-is*

Hoc autem probat per operationes animæ sic. Manifestum
*this moreover he-proves through the-operations of-the-soul thus manifest*
est enim quod illud quo primo operatur aliquod, est
*it-is for that that by-which first operates anything is*
forma operantis, sicut dicimur scire anima et scire
*the-form of-the-one-operating as we-are-said to-know by-the-soul and to-know*
scientia, per prius autem scientia quam anima: quia per
*by-knowledge by prior moreover by-knowledge than by-the-soul because through*
animam non scimus nisi in quantum habet scientiam; et
*the-soul not we-know except in as-far it-has knowledge and*
similiter etiam sanari dicimur corpore et sanitate, sed per
*similarly also to-be-healed we-are-said by-the-body and by-health but by*
prius sanitate. Et sic patet scientiam esse formam animæ,
*prior by-health and thus is-plain knowledge to-be the-form of-the-soul*
et sanitatem corporis. Et hoc procedit sic: «Anima est
*and health of-the-body and this proceeds thus the-soul is*
primum quo vivimus», quod dicit propter vegetativum;
*the-first by-which we-live which he-says on-account-of the-vegetative*
«quo sentimus», propter sensitivum, et «movemur»,
*by-which we-sense on-account-of the-sensitive and we-are-moved*
propter motivum; et «intelligimus», propter intellectum;
*on-account-of the-motive and we-understand on-account-of the-intellect*
et concludit: «Quia ratio quædam utique erit et species:
*and he-concludes therefore notion a-certain surely it-will-be and species*
sed non ut materia, et ut subjectum». Manifeste ergo
*but not as matter and as subject manifestly therefore*
quod supra dixerat animam esse actum corporis physici,
*what above he-had-said the-soul to-be the-act of-a-body physical*
hic concludit non solum de vegetativo, sensitivo et motivo,
*here he-concludes not only of the-vegetative sensitive and motive*

sed etiam intellectivo. Fuit ergo sententia Aristotelis, quod
*but also the-intellective it-was therefore the-judgment of-Aristotle that*
illud quo intelligimus, sit forma corporis physici.
*that by-which we-understand be the-form of-a-body physical*

Sed ne aliquis dicat quod id quo intelligimus, non dicit
*but lest anyone say that that by-which we-understand not says*
hic intellectum possibilem, sed aliquid aliud; manifeste hoc
*here the-intellect possible but something other manifestly this*
excluditur per illud quod Aristoteles in 3 de Anima dicit,
*is-excluded through that which Aristotle in 3 on the-Soul says*
de intellectu possibili loquens: «Dico autem intellectum,
*about the-intellect possible speaking I-call moreover intellect*
quo opinatur et intelligit anima».
*that-by-which opines and understands the-soul*

Sed antequam ad verba Aristotelis, quæ sunt in 3 de
*but before to the-words of-Aristotle which are in 3 on*
Anima, accedamus, adhuc amplius circa verba ipsius in 2 de
*the-Soul we-approach still further about the-words of-him in 2 on*
Anima immoretur, ut ex collatione verborum ejus ad invicem
*the-Soul we-linger that from the-comparison of-the-words his to each-other*
appareat quæ fuerit ejus sententia de Anima. Cum enim
*it-appear what was his judgment about the-Soul when for*
animam in communi definisset, incipit distinguere potentias
*the-soul in common he-had-defined he-begins to-distinguish the-powers*
ejus, et dicit quod «potentiæ animæ sunt vegetativum,
*its and says that the-powers of-the-soul are the-vegetative*
sensitivum, appetitivum et motivum secundum locum, et
*sensitive appetitive and motive according-to place and*
intellectivum.» Et quod intellectivum sit intellectus, patet per
*intellective and that the-intellective be the-intellect is-plain through*
id quod postea subdit, divisionem explanans: «Alterius autem
*that which afterward he-adds the-division explaining of-another moreover*

intellectivum, et intellectus, ut hominibus». Vult ergo quod
*the-intellective and the-intellect as to-men he-wishes therefore that*
intellectus est potentia animæ, quæ est actus corporis. Et
*the-intellect is a-power of-the-soul which is the-act of-the-body and*
quod hujus animæ potentiam dixerit intellectum, et iterum
*that of-this soul the-power he-called the-intellect and again*
quod supra definitio animæ sit omnibus prædictis partibus
*that the-above definition of-the-soul be to-all the-aforesaid parts*
communis, patet per id quod concludit: «Manifestum igitur
*common is-plain through that which he-concludes manifest therefore*
est quoniam eodem modo una utique erit ratio animæ
*it-is since in-the-same way one surely will-be the-notion of-soul*
et figuræ: neque enim ibi figura est, præter triangulum, et
*and of-figure nor for there figure is besides the-triangle and*
figuras, et quæ consequenter fiunt; nec hæc anima præter
*the-figures and which consequently are-made nor this soul besides*
prædictas est.» Non est ergo quærenda alia anima præter
*the-aforesaid is not it-is therefore to-be-sought another soul besides*
prædictas, quibus communis est animæ definitio supra posita.
*the-aforesaid to-which common is the-soul's definition above placed*
Neque plus de intellectu intentionem facit Aristoteles
*nor more about the-intellect intention makes Aristotle*
in hoc 2; nisi quod postmodum subdit quod «ultimam»
*in this 2 except what afterward he-adds that last*
ostendit, «et minimam esse ratiocinationem et intellectum»,
*he-shows and least to-be reasoning and intellect*
quia scilicet in paucioribus est, ut per sequentia apparet.
*because namely in fewer it-is as through the-following appears*

Sed quia magna differentia est quantum ad modum
*but because great difference there-is as-far to the-mode*
operandi inter intellectum et imaginationem, subdit quod
*of-operating between intellect and imagination he-adds that*

de speculativo intellectu altera ratio est. Reservat enim
*about the-speculative intellect another account is he-reserves for*
hoc inquirendum usque ad tertium. Et ne quis dicat, sicut
*this to-be-inquired until to the-third and lest anyone say as*
Averroes perverse exponit, quod ideo dicit Aristoteles quod
*Averroes perversely expounds that therefore says Aristotle that*
de intellectu speculativo est alia ratio, quia intellectus
*about the-intellect speculative is another account because the-intellect*
neque est anima, neque pars animæ; statim hoc excluditur
*neither is soul nor part of-soul at-once this is-excluded*
in principio 3, ubi resumit de intellectu tractatum:
*in the-beginning of-the-3 where he-resumes about the-intellect the-treatment*
dicit enim: «De parte autem qua cognoscit anima et
*he-says for about the-part moreover by-which knows the-soul and*
sapit.» Nec debet aliquis dicere quod hoc dicatur solum
*is-wise nor ought anyone to-say that this be-said only*
secundum quod intellectus dividitur contra agentem, sicut
*according as the-intellect is-divided against the-agent as*
aliqui somniant. Hoc enim dictum est antequam Aristoteles
*some dream this for said it-is before Aristotle*
probet intellectum possibilem et agentem: unde intellectum
*prove the-intellect possible and agent whence the-intellect*
dicit hic partem in communi, secundum quod continet et
*he-calls here a-part in common according as it-contains both*
agentem et possibilem, sicut supra in 2 manifeste distinxit
*the-agent and the-possible as above in 2 manifestly he-distinguished*
intellectum contra alias partes animæ, ut jam dictum est.
*the-intellect against the-other parts of-the-soul as already said it-is*

Est autem consideranda mirabilis diligentia et ordo in
*is moreover to-be-considered the-wonderful diligence and order in*
processu Aristotelis. Ab his etiam incipit in 3 tractatu
*the-procedure of-Aristotle from these-things also he-begins in the-3 treatise*

de intellectu, quæ in 2 reliquerat indeterminata circa
*on the-intellect which in the-2 he-had-left undetermined about*
intellectum. Duo autem supra reliquerat indeterminata circa
*the-intellect two-things moreover above he-had-left undetermined about*
intellectum. Primo quidem utrum intellectus ab aliis partibus
*the-intellect first indeed whether the-intellect from the-other parts*
animæ separatur ratione solum, aut etiam loco; quod quidem
*of-the-soul be-separated in-notion only or also in-place which indeed*
indeterminatum dimisit cum dixit: «De intellectu autem et
*undetermined he-dismissed when he-said about the-intellect moreover and*
perspectiva potentia nihil adhuc manifestum est». Et hanc
*the-speculative power nothing yet manifest is and this*
positionem primo resumit, cum dicit: «Sive separabili existente»,
*question first he-resumes when he-says whether separable being*
scilicet ab aliis animæ partibus; «sive non separabili
*namely from the-other of-the-soul parts or not separable*
secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum rationem». Pro eodem
*according-to magnitude but according-to notion for the-same*
enim accipit hic «separabile secundum magnitudinem». pro
*for he-takes here separable according-to magnitude for*
quo supra dixerat «separabile loco». Secundo indeterminatum
*which above he-had-said separable in-place second undetermined*
reliquerat de differentia intellectus ad alias animæ partes,
*he-had-left about the-difference of-the-intellect to the-other of-the-soul parts*
cum postmodum dicit: «De speculativo autem intellectu altera
*when afterward he-says about the-speculative moreover intellect another*
ratio est»; et hoc statim quærit, cum dicit: «Considerandum
*account is and this at-once he-asks when he-says to-be-considered*
quam habet differentiam». Talem enim intendit assignare quæ
*what it-has difference such for he-intends to-assign as*
possit stare cum utroque præmissorum; sive sit separabilis
*can to-stand with each of-the-premises whether be separable*

anima magnitudine seu loco ab aliis partibus, sive non:
*the-soul in-magnitude or in-place from the-other parts or not*
quod ipse modus loquendi satis indicat. Considerandum
*which the-very mode of-speaking enough indicates to-be-considered*
enim dicit quod habet intellectus differentiam ad alias
*for he-says what has the-intellect difference to the-other*
animæ partes, sive sit separabilis ab eis magnitudine, seu
*of-the-soul parts whether it-be separable from them in-magnitude or*
loco, id est subjecto, sive non, sed ratione tantum. Unde
*in-place that is in-subject or not but in-notion only whence*
manifestum est quod non intendit hanc differentiam ostendere,
*manifest it-is that not he-intends this difference to-show*
quod sit substantia a corpore separata secundum esse
*that it-be a-substance from the-body separated according-to the-to-be*
(hoc enim non posset salvari cum utroque prædictorum); sed
*this for not could to-be-saved with each of-the-aforesaid but*
intendit assignare differentiam quantum ad modum operandi:
*he-intends to-assign a-difference as-far to the-mode of-operating*
unde subdit: «Et quomodo sit quidem intelligere ipsum».
*whence he-adds and how it-be indeed to-understand itself*

Sic igitur per ea quæ ex verbis Aristotelis accipere
*thus therefore through those which from the-words of-Aristotle to-take*
possumus usque huc manifestum est quod ipse voluit
*we-can up-to here manifest it-is that he-himself wished*
intellectum esse partem animæ, quæ est actus corporis physici.
*the-intellect to-be a-part of-the-soul which is the-act of-a-body physical*

Sed quia ex quibusdam verbis consequentibus Averroes
*but because from certain words following Averroes*
accipere voluit intentionem Aristotelis fuisse, quod intellectus
*to-take wished the-intention of-Aristotle to-have-been that the-intellect*
non sit anima quæ est actus corporis, aut pars talis
*not be the-soul which is the-act of-the-body or a-part of-such*

animæ; ideo etiam diligentius verba sequentia consideranda
*soul therefore also more-diligently the-words following to-be-considered*
sunt. Statim igitur post quæstionem motam de differentia
*are at-once therefore after the-question moved about the-difference*
intellectus et sensus inquirit secundum, quid intellectus sit
*of-intellect and sense he-inquires according-to what the-intellect be*
similis sensui, et secundum quid ab eo differat. Duo
*like to-sense and according-to what from it it-differ two-things*
enim supra de sensu determinaverat: scilicet quod sensus
*for above about sense he-had-determined namely that sense*
est in potentia ad sensibilia, et quod sensus patitur et
*is in potency to sensibles and that sense suffers and*
corrumpitur ab excellentiis sensibilium. Hoc ergo est quod
*is-corrupted by the-excesses of-sensibles this therefore is what*
quærit Aristoteles dicens: «Si igitur est intelligere sicut
*asks Aristotle saying if therefore it-is to-understand as*
sentire, aut pati aliquid utique erit ab intelligibili, ut
*to-sense either to-suffer something surely it-will-be from the-intelligible that*
scilicet sic corrumpatur intellectus ab excellenti intelligibili,
*namely thus be-corrupted the-intellect by the-excessive intelligible*
sicut sensus ab excellenti sensibili, aut aliquid hujusmodi
*as sense by the-excessive sensible or something of-this-kind*
aliorum»: id est, an intelligere est aliquid hujus simile,
*of-others that is whether to-understand is something to-this like*
scilicet ei quod est sentire, alterum tamen quantum ad
*namely to-that which is to-sense other yet as-far to*
hoc, scilicet quod non sit passibile? Huic igitur quæstioni
*this namely that not it-be passible to-this therefore question*
statim respondet; et concludit non ex præcedentibus, sed
*at-once he-answers and concludes not from the-preceding but*
ex sequentibus, quæ tamen ex præcedentibus manifestantur,
*from the-following which yet from the-preceding are-made-manifest*

quod hanc partem animæ oportet esse impassibilem, ut
*that this part of-the-soul it-is-necessary to-be impassible that*
non corrumpatur, sicut sensus. Est tamen quædam alia
*not it-be-corrupted as sense there-is yet a-certain other*
passio ejus secundum quod intelligere communi modo pati
*passion its according as to-understand in-the-common way to-suffer*
dicitur. In hoc ergo differt a sensu. Sed consequenter
*is-said in this therefore it-differs from sense but consequently*
ostendit in quo cum sensu conveniat, quia scilicet oportet
*he-shows in what with sense it-agree because namely it-is-necessary*
hujusmodi partem esse susceptivam speciei intelligibilis, et
*of-this-kind part to-be receptive of-the-species intelligible and*
quod sit in potentia ad hujusmodi speciem, et quod non
*that it-be in potency to of-this-kind species and that not*
sit hoc in actu secundum suam naturam, sicut et de
*it-be this in act according-to its nature as also about*
sensu supra dictum est, quod est in potentia ad sensibilia,
*sense above said it-is that it-is in potency to sensibles*
et non in actu. Et ex hoc concludit quod oportet se sic
*and not in act and from this he-concludes that it-is-necessary itself thus*
habere intellectum ad intelligibilia sicut sensus ad sensibilia.
*to-have the-intellect to intelligibles as sense to sensibles*
Hoc autem induxit ad excludendum opinionem Empedoclis,
*this moreover he-brought-in for excluding the-opinion of-Empedocles*
et aliorum antiquorum, qui posuerunt quod cognoscens est
*and of-other ancients who posited that the-knower is*
de natura cogniti, utpote quod terram terra cognoscimus,
*of the-nature of-the-known as that earth by-earth we-know*
aqua aquam. Aristoteles autem supra ostendit hoc non esse
*by-water water Aristotle moreover above showed this not to-be*
verum in sensu: quia sensitivum non est actu, sed potentia,
*true in sense because the-sensitive not is in-act but in-potency*

ea quæ sentit; et idem hic dicit de intellectu. Est
*those-things which it-senses and the-same here he-says of the-intellect there-is*
autem differentia inter sensum et intellectum: quia sensus
*moreover a-difference between sense and intellect because sense*
non est cognoscitivus omnium, sed visus coloris tantum,
*not is cognitive of-all but sight of-color only*
auditus sonorum, et sic de aliis; intellectus autem est
*hearing of-sounds and thus of the-others the-intellect moreover is*
simpliciter cognoscitivus omnium. Dicebant autem antiqui
*simply cognitive of-all they-said moreover the-ancient*
philosophi existimantes quod cognoscens deberet habere
*philosophers thinking that the-knower ought to-have*
naturam cogniti, quod animam, ad hoc quod cognoscat
*the-nature of-the-known that the-soul for this that it-know*
omnia, necesse est ex principiis omnium esse commixtam.
*all-things necessary it-is from the-principles of-all to-be mixed*
Quia vero Aristoteles jam probavit de intellectu per
*because but Aristotle already proved about the-intellect through*
similitudinem sensus, quod non est actu id quod cognoscit,
*the-likeness of-sense that not it-is in-act that which it-knows*
sed potentia tantum, concludit e contrario quod necesse
*but in-potency only he-concludes from the-contrary that necessary*
est intellectum, quia cognoscit omnia, esse immixtum, id
*it-is the-intellect because it-knows all-things to-be unmixed that*
est, non compositum ex omnibus, sicut Empedocles ponebat.
*is not composed of all-things as Empedocles posited*
Et ad hoc inducit testimonium Anaxagoræ, non tamen de
*and for this he-brings-in the-testimony of-Anaxagoras not yet about*
hoc eodem intellectu loquentis, sed de intellectu qui movet
*this same intellect speaking but about the-intellect which moves*
omnia. Sicut ergo Anaxagoras dixit illum intellectum esse
*all-things as therefore Anaxagoras said that intellect to-be*

immixtum, ut imperet movendo et segregando: sic nos
*unmixed that it-command by-moving and by-separating thus we*
possumus dicere de intellectu humano, quod oportet eum
*can to-say about the-intellect human that it-is-necessary it*
esse immixtum ad hoc ut cognoscat omnia; et hoc probat
*to-be unmixed for this that it-know all-things and this he-proves*
consequenter; et habetur sic sequens littera in græco:
*consequently and is-had thus the-following text in Greek*
«Intus enim apparens, prohibet extraneum, et obstruit: quod
*within for appearing hinders the-extraneous and obstructs which*
potest intelligi ex simili in visu.» Si enim esset aliquis
*can to-be-understood from the-like in sight if for there-were some*
color intrinsecus pupillæ, ille color interior prohiberet videri
*color within the-pupil that color interior would-hinder to-be-seen*
extraneum colorem, et quodammodo obstrueret oculum ne
*the-extraneous color and in-a-way would-obstruct the-eye lest*
videret alia. Similiter si aliqua natura rerum quas
*it-see other-things similarly if some nature of-the-things which*
intellectus cognoscit, puta terra, vel aqua, aut calidum et
*the-intellect knows for-example earth or water or hot and*
frigidum et aliquid hujusmodi, esset intrinseca intellectui, illa
*cold and something of-this-kind were intrinsic to-the-intellect that*
natura intrinseca intellectui impediret ipsum, et quodammodo
*nature intrinsic to-the-intellect would-impede it and in-a-way*
obstrueret ne alia cognosceret. Quia ergo omnia
*would-obstruct lest other-things it-know because therefore all-things*
cognoscit, concludit quod non contingit ipsum habere aliquam
*it-knows he-concludes that not it-happens it to-have any*
naturam determinatam ex naturis sensibilibus quas cognoscit;
*nature determinate of the-natures sensible which it-knows*
sed hanc solam naturam habet, quod sit possibilis, id est
*but this alone nature it-has that it-be possible that is*

in potentia ad ea quæ intelliguntur quantum est de sua
*in potency to those which are-understood as-far-as it-is of its*
natura, sed fit actu illa dum ea intelligit in actu:
*nature but it-becomes in-act those-things while them it-understands in act*
sicut sensus in actu, fit sensibile in actu, ut supra in 2
*as sense in act becomes the-sensible in act as above in 2*
dixerat. Concludit ergo quod intellectus, antequam intelligat
*he-had-said he-concludes therefore that the-intellect before it-understand*
in actu, nihil est actu eorum quæ sunt: quod est contrarium
*in act nothing is in-act of-those which are which is contrary*
his quæ antiqui dicebant, scilicet quod est actu omnia.
*to-those which the-ancients said namely that it-is in-act all-things*
Et quia fecerat mentionem de dicto Anaxagoræ loquentis
*and because he-had-made mention of the-saying of-Anaxagoras speaking*
de intellectu qui imperat omnibus, ne crederetur de hoc
*about the-intellect which commands all-things lest it-be-believed about this*
intellectu hoc conclusisse, utitur tali modo loquendi: «Vocatur
*intellect this to-have-concluded he-uses such a-way of-speaking is-called*
itaque animæ intellectus: dico autem intellectum, quo
*therefore of-the-soul the-intellect I-call moreover intellect that-by-which*
opinatur et intelligit anima, nihil esse actu eorum quæ sunt
*opines and understands the-soul nothing to-be in-act of-those which are*
ante intelligere». Ex quo duo apparent. Primo quidem
*before to-understand from which two-things appear first indeed*
non loquitur hic de intellectu qui sit aliqua substantia
*not he-speaks here about the-intellect which be some substance*
separata, sed de intellectu quem supra dixit potentiam et
*separate but about the-intellect which above he-called a-power and*
partem animæ, quo anima intelligit. Secundo quod supra
*part of-the-soul by-which the-soul understands second what above*
probavit, scilicet quod intellectus non habet naturam aliquam
*he-proved namely that the-intellect not has nature any*

determinatam in actu. Nondum autem probavit quod non sit
*determinate in act not-yet moreover has-he-proved that not it-be*
virtus in corpore, ut Averroes dicit; sed hoc statim concludit
*a-power in the-body as Averroes says but this at-once he-concludes*
ex præmissis: nam sequitur: «Unde neque misceri est
*from the-premises for there-follows whence neither to-be-mixed is-it*
rationabile ipsum corpori.» Et hoc secundum probavit, scilicet
*reasonable it with-the-body and this second he-proved namely*
quod intellectus non habet aliquam in actu de naturis rerum
*that the-intellect not has any in act of the-natures of-things*
sensibilium. Ex quo patet quod non miscetur corpori, quia,
*sensible from which is-plain that not it-is-mixed with-the-body because*
si misceretur corpori haberet aliquam de naturis corporeis;
*if it-were-mixed with-the-body it-would-have some of the-natures bodily*
et hoc est quod subdit: «Qualis enim utique fiet
*and this is what he-adds of-what-sort for surely will-it-become*
aliquis, aut calidus aut frigidus, si organum aliquid erit,
*some either hot or cold if organ any there-will-be*
sicut sensitivo?» Sensus enim proportionatur suo organo,
*as to-the-sensitive sense for is-proportioned to-its organ*
et trahitur quodammodo ad suam naturam. Unde etiam
*and is-drawn in-a-way to its nature whence also*
secundum immutationem organi immutatur operatio sensus.
*according-to the-change of-the-organ is-changed the-operation of-sense*
Sic ergo intelligitur istud non misceri corpori, quia non
*thus therefore is-understood that not to-be-mixed with-the-body because not*
habet organum, sicut sensus. Et quod intellectus animæ non
*it-has an-organ as sense and that the-intellect of-the-soul not*
habet organum manifestat per dictum quorumdam, qui
*has an-organ he-makes-manifest through the-saying of-some who*
dixerunt quod anima est locus specierum, accipientes large
*said that the-soul is the-place of-species taking broadly*

locum pro omni receptivo, more Platonico; nisi quod
*place for every receptive in-the-manner Platonic except that*
esse specierum locum non convenit toti animæ, sed solum
*to-be of-species the-place not belongs to-the-whole soul but only*
intellectivæ. Sensitiva enim pars non recipit in se species, sed
*to-the-intellective the-sensitive for part not receives in itself species but*
in organo; pars autem intellectiva non recipit eas in organo,
*in the-organ the-part moreover intellective not receives them in an-organ*
sed tantum in seipsa: item non sic est locus specierum quod
*but only in itself likewise not thus is the-place of-species that*
habeat eas in actu, sed in potentia tantum. Quia igitur jam
*it-have them in act but in potency only because therefore already*
ostendit quid conveniat intellectui ex similitudine sensus,
*he-has-shown what belong to-the-intellect from the-likeness of-sense*
redit ad primum quod dixerat, quod oportet partem
*he-returns to the-first which he-had-said that it-is-necessary the-part*
intellectivam esse passibilem; et sic admirabili subtilitate ex
*intellective to-be impassible and thus with-admirable subtlety from*
ipsa similitudine sensus concludit dissimilitudinem. Ostendit
*the-very likeness of-sense he-concludes the-unlikeness he-shows*
ergo consequenter quod non similiter sit passibilis sensus et
*therefore consequently that not alike be passible sense and*
intellectus, per hoc quod sensus corrumpitur ab excellenti
*intellect through this that sense is-corrupted by the-excessive*
sensibili, non autem intellectus ab excellenti intelligibili. Et
*sensible not moreover the-intellect by the-excessive intelligible and*
hujus causam assignat ex supra probatis, quia sensitivum
*of-this the-cause he-assigns from the-above proved-things because the-sensitive*
non est sine corpore, sed intellectus est separatus. Hoc
*not is without the-body but the-intellect is separate this*
autem ultimum verbum maxime assumunt ad sui erroris
*moreover last word most they-take-up for of-their error*

fulcimentum, volentes per hoc dicere quod intellectus neque
*the-prop wishing through this to-say that the-intellect neither*
sit anima, neque pars animæ, sed quædam substantia separata;
*be soul nor part of-soul but a-certain substance separate*
sed cito obliviscuntur ejus quod paulo supra Aristoteles dixit.
*but quickly they-forget that which a-little above Aristotle said*
Sicut enim hic dicitur quod sensitivum non est sine corpore,
*as for here it-is-said that the-sensitive not is without the-body*
et intellectus est separatus, sic supra dixit quod intellectus
*and the-intellect is separate thus above he-said that the-intellect*
fieret qualis, aut calidus aut frigidus, si aliquod organum
*would-become of-some-sort either hot or cold if any organ*
erit ei, sicut sensitivo. Ea igitur ratione hic dicit
*there-will-be to-it as to-the-sensitive by-that therefore reason here he-says*
quod sensitivum non est sine corpore, intellectus autem est
*that the-sensitive not is without the-body the-intellect moreover is*
separatus, quia sensus habet organum, non autem intellectus.
*separate because sense has an-organ not moreover the-intellect*

Manifestissime igitur apparet absque omni dubitatione ex
*most-manifestly therefore it-appears without all doubt from*
verbis Aristotelis hanc fuisse ejus sententiam de intellectu
*the-words of-Aristotle this to-have-been his judgment about the-intellect*
possibili, quod intellectus sit aliquid animæ, quæ est actus
*possible that the-intellect be something of-the-soul which is the-act*
corporis; ita tamen quod intellectus animæ non habeat aliquod
*of-the-body so yet that the-intellect of-the-soul not have any*
organum corporale, sicut habent ceteræ potentiæ animæ.
*organ bodily as have the-other powers of-the-soul*

Quomodo autem hoc esse possit quod anima sit forma
*how moreover this to-be can that the-soul be the-form*
corporis, et aliqua virtus animæ non sit corporis virtus,
*of-the-body and some power of-the-soul not be of-the-body a-power*

non difficile est intelligere, si quis etiam in aliis rebus
*not difficult it-is to-understand if anyone also in other things*
consideret. Videmus enim in multis quod aliqua forma
*consider we-see for in many-things that some form*
est actus corporis ex elementis commixti, et tamen habet
*is the-act of-a-body from elements mixed and yet has*
aliquam virtutem quæ non est virtus alicujus elementi, sed
*some power which not is the-power of-any element but*
competit tali formæ ex alio principio, puta corpore
*belongs to-such form from another principle for-example a-body*
cœlesti: sicut quod magnes habet virtutem attrahendi ferrum,
*heavenly as that the-magnet has the-power of-attracting iron*
et jaspis restringendi sanguinem; et paulatim videmus quod
*and jasper of-staunching blood and little-by-little we-see that*
formæ quæ sunt nobiliores, habent aliquas virtutes magis ac
*forms which are nobler have some powers more and*
magis supergredientes materiam. Unde ultima formarum, quæ
*more surpassing matter whence the-last of-forms which*
est anima humana, habet virtutem totaliter supergredientem
*is the-soul human has a-power totally surpassing*
materiam corporalem, scilicet intellectum. Sic ergo intellectus
*matter bodily namely the-intellect thus therefore the-intellect*
separatus est, quia non est virtus in corpore, sed est virtus
*separate is because not it-is a-power in the-body but is a-power*
in anima; anima autem est actus corporis. Nec dicimus quod
*in the-soul the-soul moreover is the-act of-the-body nor do-we-say that*
anima, in qua est intellectus, sic excedat materiam corporalem,
*the-soul in which is the-intellect thus exceed matter bodily*
quod non habeat esse in corpore; sed quod intellectus, quem
*that not it-have to-be in the-body but that the-intellect which*
Aristoteles dicit potentiam animæ, non est actus corporis.
*Aristotle calls a-power of-the-soul not is the-act of-the-body*

Neque enim anima actus corporis mediantibus suis potentiis,
*nor for the-soul-(is) the-act of-the-body by-means-of its powers*
sed anima per seipsam est actus corporis dans esse corpori
*but the-soul through itself is the-act of-the-body giving to-be to-the-body*
specificum; aliquæ autem potentiæ ejus sunt actus partium
*specific some moreover powers of-it are the-acts of-parts*
quarumdam corporis perficientes ipsas ad aliquas operationes.
*certain of-the-body perfecting them for some operations*
Sic ergo potentia, quæ est intellectus, nullius partium
*thus therefore the-power which is the-intellect of-no parts*
corporis actus est, quia ejus operatio non fit per organum
*of-the-body the-act is because its operation not is-made through an-organ*
corporale. Et ne alicui videatur quod hoc ex nostro sensu
*bodily and lest to-anyone it-seem that this from our-own sense*
dicamus præter Aristotelis intentionem, inducenda sunt verba
*we-say beside Aristotle's intention to-be-brought-in are the-words*
Aristotelis expresse hoc dicentis. Quærit enim in 2 Physicorum,
*of-Aristotle expressly this saying he-asks for in 2 Physics*
usque ad quantum oporteat cognoscere speciem, et quod
*up to how-far it-be-necessary to-know the-species and that*
quid est: non enim omnem formam considerare pertinet ad
*what is not for every form to-consider pertains to*
Physicum; et solvit subdens: «Aut quemadmodum medicus
*the-Physicist and he-solves adding or as the-physician*
nervum, et faber æs usquequo», id est, usque ad aliquem
*the-sinew and the-smith bronze up-to-what that is up to some*
terminum; et usque ad quem terminum ostendit, subdens:
*term and up to which term he-shows adding*
«Cujus enim causa unumquodque»; quasi dicat: In tantum,
*of-which for the-sake each as-if he-should-say in so-much*
medicus considerat nervum, in quantum pertinet ad sanitatem
*the-physician considers the-sinew in as-far it-pertains to health*

propter quam nervum medicus considerat; et similiter faber
*on-account-of which the-sinew the-physician considers and similarly the-smith*
æs propter artificium: et quia physicus considerat formam
*bronze on-account-of the-artifact and because the-physicist considers form*
in quantum est in materia, sic enim est forma corporis mobilis;
*in as-far it-is in matter thus for is the-form of-a-body movable*
similiter accipiendum est quod naturalis in tantum
*similarly to-be-taken it-is that the-natural-philosopher in so-much*
considerat formam, in quantum est in materia. Terminus ergo
*considers form in as-far it-is in matter the-term therefore*
considerationis physici de formis, est in formis quæ sunt in
*of-the-consideration of-the-physicist about forms is in forms which are in*
materia quodam modo, et alio modo non sunt in materia:
*matter in-a-certain way and in-another way not are in matter*
istæ enim formæ sunt in confinio formarum separatarum
*these for forms are in the-border of-forms separate*
et immaterialium: unde subdit: «Et circa hoc» scilicet est
*and immaterial whence he-adds and about this namely is*
consideratio naturalis, «de formis quæ sunt separatæ
*the-consideration of-the-natural-philosopher about forms which are separate*
quidem, species autem in materia.» Quæ autem sint istæ formæ,
*indeed in-species but in matter which moreover be these forms*
ostendit subdens: «Homo enim hominem generat ex materia,
*he-shows adding man for man generates from matter*
et sol.» Forma ergo hominis est in materia, et est separata.
*and the-sun the-form therefore of-man is in matter and is separate*
In materia quidem secundum esse quod dat corpori,
*in matter indeed according-to the-to-be which it-gives to-the-body*
sic enim est causa generationis; separata autem secundum
*thus for it-is the-cause of-generation separate moreover according-to*
virtutem quæ est propria homini, scilicet secundum intellectum.
*the-power which is proper to-man namely according-to the-intellect*

Non est ergo impossibile quod aliqua forma sit in materia
*not it-is therefore impossible that some form be in matter*
et virtus ejus separata, sicut expositum est de intellectu.
*and the-power its separate as set-out it-is about the-intellect*
Adhuc autem alio modo procedunt ad ostendendum
*still moreover in-another way they-proceed to showing*
quod sententia fuerit Aristotelis, quod intellectus non sit in
*that the-judgment was of-Aristotle that the-intellect not be in*
anima, vel pars animæ, quæ unitur corpori ut forma. Dicit
*the-soul or a-part of-the-soul which is-united to-the-body as form says*
enim Aristoteles in pluribus locis, intellectum esse perpetuum
*for Aristotle in many places the-intellect to-be perpetual*
et incorruptibilem, sicut patet in 2 de Anima, ubi dixit: «Hoc
*and incorruptible as is-plain in 2 on the-Soul where he-said this*
solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili»,
*alone to-happen to-be-separated as the-perpetual from the-corruptible*
et in 1, ubi dixit quod «intellectus videtur esse substantia
*and in 1 where he-said that the-intellect seems to-be a-substance*
quædam, et non corrumpi», et in 3, ubi dixit: «Separatus
*certain and not to-be-corrupted and in 3 where he-said separate*
autem est solum hoc quod vere est; et hoc solum immortale
*moreover is only this which truly is and this alone immortal*
et perpetuum est.» Quamvis hoc ultimum quidam non
*and perpetual is although this last some not*
exponant de intellectu possibili, sed de intellectu agente. Ex
*expound of the-intellect possible but of the-intellect agent from*
quibus apparet quod Aristoteles voluit intellectum esse aliquid
*which it-appears that Aristotle wished the-intellect to-be something*
incorruptibile. Videtur autem quod nihil incorruptibile possit
*incorruptible it-seems moreover that nothing incorruptible can*
esse forma corporis corruptibilis: non enim est accidentale
*to-be the-form of-a-body corruptible not for it-is accidental*

formæ, sed per se ei convenit esse in materia; alioquin ex
*to-form but through itself to-it it-belongs to-be in matter otherwise from*
materia et forma fieret unum per accidens. Nihil autem
*matter and form would-be-made one through accident nothing moreover*
potest esse sine eo quod inest ei per se. Ergo forma
*can to-be without that which is-in it through itself therefore the-form*
corporis non potest esse sine corpore. Si ergo corpus sit
*of-the-body not can to-be without the-body if therefore the-body be*
corruptibile, necesse sequeretur formam corporis corruptibilem
*corruptible necessarily it-would-follow the-form of-the-body corruptible*
esse. Præterea, formæ separatæ a materia, et formæ quæ
*to-be further forms separate from matter and forms which*
sunt in materia, non sunt eædem specie, ut probatur in 7
*are in matter not are the-same in-species as is-proved in 7*
Metaph. Multo ergo minus una et eadem forma numero
*Metaphysics much therefore less one and the-same form in-number*
potest nunc esse sine corpore, et esse nunc in corpore.
*can now to-be without the-body and to-be now in the-body*
Destructo ergo corpore, vel destruitur forma corporis, vel
*destroyed therefore the-body either is-destroyed the-form of-the-body or*
transit ad aliud corpus. Si ergo intellectus est forma corporis,
*it-passes to another body if therefore the-intellect is the-form of-the-body*
videtur ex necessitate sequi quod intellectus sit corruptibilis.
*it-seems from necessity to-follow that the-intellect be corruptible*

Est autem sciendum quod ratio hæc plurimos movit. Nam
*it-is moreover to-be-known that argument this very-many moved for*
Gregorius Nyssenus imponit Aristoteli, e contrario, quod,
*Gregory of-Nyssa imputes to-Aristotle from the-contrary that*
quia ponit animam esse formam corporis, posuerit eam esse
*because he-posits the-soul to-be the-form of-the-body he-posited it to-be*
corruptibilem. Quidam vero posuerunt propter hoc, animam
*corruptible some but posited on-account-of this the-soul*

transire de corpore in corpus. Quidam etiam posuerunt
*to-pass from body into body some also posited*
quod anima haberet corpus quoddam incorruptibile, a
*that the-soul had a-body certain incorruptible from*
quo nunquam separaretur. Et ideo ostendendum est per
*which never it-was-separated and therefore to-be-shown it-is through*
verba Aristotelis quod sic posuit intellectivam animam esse
*the-words of-Aristotle that thus he-posited the-intellective soul to-be*
formam corporis, quod tamen posuit eam incorruptibilem.
*the-form of-the-body that yet he-posited it incorruptible*
In 11 enim Metaphysicæ, postquam ostenderat quod formæ
*in 11 for of-the-Metaphysics after he-had-shown that forms*
non sunt ante materias, quia quando sanatur homo tunc est
*not are before matters because when is-healed a-man then is*
sanitas, et figura æneæ sphæræ simul est cum figura
*health and the-shape of-the-bronze sphere together is with the-shape*
ænea: consequenter inquirit utrum aliqua forma remaneat
*bronze consequently he-inquires whether any form remain*
post materiam; et dicit sic, secundum intellectum Boetii:
*after matter and he-says thus according-to the-understanding of-Boethius*
«Si vero aliquid posterius remaneat, scilicet præter materiam,
*if but anything later remain namely besides matter*
considerandum est: in quibusdam enim nihil prohibet ut, si
*to-be-considered it-is in some for nothing prevents that if*
anima hujusmodi est, non omnis, sed intellectus: omnium
*the-soul of-this-kind is not all but the-intellect of-all*
enim impossibile est fortasse.» Patet ergo quod animam,
*for impossible it-is perhaps is-plain therefore that the-soul*
quæ est forma quantum ad intellectivam partem, dicit nihil
*which is form as-far to the-intellective part he-says nothing*
prohibere remanere post corpus, et tamen ante corpus non
*to-prevent to-remain after the-body and yet before the-body not*

fuisse. Cum enim absolute dixisset quod causæ moventes
*to-have-been when for absolutely he-had-said that the-causes moving*
sunt ante, non autem causæ formales, non quæsivit utrum
*are before not moreover the-causes formal not he-asked whether*
aliqua forma esset ante materiam, sed utrum aliqua forma
*any form were before matter but whether any form*
remaneret post materiam; et dicit hoc nihil prohibere de
*remained after matter and he-says this nothing to-prevent about*
forma quæ est anima, quantum ad intellectivam partem.
*the-form which is the-soul as-far to the-intellective part*

Cum igitur secundum præmissa Aristotelis verba, hæc forma
*since therefore according-to the-premised of-Aristotle words this form*
quæ est anima, post corpus remaneat, non tota, sed intellectus;
*which is the-soul after the-body remain not whole but the-intellect*
considerandum restat, quare magis anima secundum partem
*to-be-considered remains why rather the-soul according-to the-part*
intellectivam post corpus remaneat quam secundum alias
*intellective after the-body remain than according-to the-other*
partes, et quam aliæ formæ post suas materias. Cujus quidem
*parts and than other forms after their matters of-which indeed*
rationem ex ipsis Aristotelis verbis assumere oportet. Dicit
*the-reason from the-very of-Aristotle words to-take it-is-necessary he-says*
enim in 3 de Anima: «Separatum autem est solum hoc quod
*for in 3 on the-Soul separate moreover is only this which*
vere est; et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est». Hanc
*truly is and this alone immortal and perpetual is this*
igitur rationem assignare videtur, quia hoc solum immortale
*therefore reason to-assign he-seems because this alone immortal*
et perpetuum esse videtur, hoc solum est separatum.
*and perpetual to-be seems this alone is separate*

Sed de quo intellectu hic loquatur, dubium esse potest:
*but of which intellect here he-speak doubtful to-be can*
quibusdam dicentibus quod loquitur de intellectu possibili;
*some saying that he-speaks of the-intellect possible*
quibusdam, quod de agente: quorum utrumque apparet esse
*some that of the-agent of-which each appears to-be*
falsum, si diligenter verba Aristotelis considerentur. Nam
*false if diligently the-words of-Aristotle be-considered for*
de utroque dixerat Aristoteles: «ipsum separatum». Restat
*of each had-said Aristotle it separate it-remains*
igitur quod intelligatur de tota intellectiva parte; quæ
*therefore that it-be-understood of the-whole intellective part which*
quidem separata dicitur, quia non est ei aliquod organum,
*indeed separate is-called because not is to-it any organ*
sicut ex verbis Aristotelis patet. Dixerat autem Aristoteles
*as from the-words of-Aristotle is-plain had-said moreover Aristotle*
in 1 de Anima, quod si est aliquid animæ operum aut
*in 1 on the-Soul that if there-is anything of-the-soul of-works or*
passionum proprium ipsius, contingit utique ipsam separari;
*of-passions proper of-it it-happens surely it to-be-separated*
si vero nullum est proprium ipsius, non utique erit
*if but none is proper of-it not surely it-will-be*
separabilis. Cujus quidem communis ratio talis est. Quia enim
*separable of-which indeed the-common reason such is because for*
unumquodque operatur in quantum est ens, eo modo
*each operates in as-far it-is a-being in-that way*
unicuique competit operari quo sibi convenit esse. Formæ
*to-each it-belongs to-operate in-which to-it belongs to-be forms*
igitur quæ nullam operationem habent sine conjunctione suæ
*therefore which no operation have without the-conjunction of-their*
materiæ, ipsæ non operantur, sed compositum est quod
*matter they-themselves not operate but the-composite is what*

operatur per formam. Unde hujusmodi formæ ipsæ quidem
*operates through the-form whence of-this-kind forms themselves indeed*
proprie loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est. Sicut enim
*properly speaking not are but by-them something is as for*
calor non calefacit, sed calidum; ita etiam calor non calidum
*heat not heats but the-hot so also heat not hot*
est per se proprie loquendo, sed calidum est per calorem.
*is through itself properly speaking but the-hot is through heat*
Propter quod Aristoteles dicit in 10 Metaphysicæ, quod de
*on-account-of which Aristotle says in 10 of-the-Metaphysics that of*
accidentibus non vere dicitur quod sunt entia, sed magis quod
*accidents not truly it-is-said that they-are beings but rather that*
sunt entis. Et similis ratio est de formis substantialibus
*they-are of-a-being and like reason is about forms substantial*
quæ nullam operationem habent absque communicatione
*which no operation have without communication*
materiæ, hoc excepto quod hujus formæ est principium essendi
*of-matter this excepted that of-this form is the-principle of-being*
substantialiter. Forma igitur quæ habet operationem secundum
*substantially the-form therefore which has operation according-to*
aliquam sui potentiam vel virtutem absque communicatione
*some of-itself potency or power without communication*
suæ materiæ, ipsa est quæ habet esse; nec est per esse
*of-its matter itself is-that which has to-be nor is-it through the-to-be*
compositi tantum, sicut aliæ formæ, sed magis compositum
*of-the-composite only as other forms but rather the-composite*
est per esse ejus. Et ideo destructo composito destruitur
*is through the-to-be its and therefore destroyed the-composite is-destroyed*
illa forma quæ est per esse compositi; non autem oportet
*that form which is through the-to-be of-the-composite not moreover it-is-necessary*

quod destruatur ad compositi destructionem illa forma per
*that be-destroyed at of-the-composite the-destruction that form through*
cujus esse est compositum, et non ipsa per esse compositi.
*whose to-be is the-composite and not itself through the-to-be of-the-composite*

Si quis autem contra hoc objiciat quod Aristoteles dicit in
*if anyone moreover against this object that Aristotle says in*
1 de Anima, quod intelligere, et amare et odire non sunt
*1 on the-Soul that to-understand and to-love and to-hate not are*
illius passiones», id est, animæ, «sed hujus habentis illud
*of-that the-passions that is of-the-soul but of-this having that*
secundum quod illud habet: quare et hoc corrupto neque
*according as that it-has wherefore also this corrupted neither*
memoratur neque amat: non enim illius erant, sed communis,
*it-remembers nor loves not for of-that they-were but of-the-common*
ut dictum est»: patet responsio per dictum Themistii,
*as said it-is is-plain the-answer through the-saying of-Themistius*
hoc exponentis, qui dicit: «Nunc dubitanti magis quam
*this expounding who says now to-one-doubting more than*
docenti assimilatur Aristoteles». Nondum enim destruxerat
*to-one-teaching is-likened Aristotle not-yet for had-he-destroyed*
opinionem dicentium non differre intellectum et sensum:
*the-opinion of-those-saying not to-differ intellect and sense*
unde in toto illo capitulo loquitur de intellectu sicut
*whence in the-whole that chapter he-speaks about the-intellect as*
de sensu. Quod patet præcipue ubi probat intellectum esse
*about sense which is-plain especially where he-proves the-intellect to-be*
incorruptibilem, per exemplum sensus, qui non corrumpitur
*incorruptible through the-example of-sense which not is-corrupted*
ex senectute. Unde et per totum sub conditione et sub
*from old-age whence also through the-whole under condition and under*
dubio loquitur sicut inquirens, semper conjungens ea
*doubt he-speaks as one-inquiring always joining those-things*

quæ sunt intellectus, his quæ sunt sensus; quod præcipue
*which are of-the-intellect to-those which are of-sense which especially*
apparet ex eo quod in principio solutionis dicit: «Si enim et
*appears from this that in the-beginning of-the-solution he-says if for even*
quam maxime gaudere aut dolere aut intelligere motus sunt,
*as most to-rejoice or to-grieve or to-understand motions are*
et unumquodque moveri aliquid». Si quis autem pertinaciter
*and each to-be-moved something if anyone moreover stubbornly*
dicere vellet, quod Aristoteles loquitur ibi determinando;
*to-say wished that Aristotle speaks there by-determining*
adhuc restat responsio, quia intelligere dicitur esse actus
*still remains the-answer that to-understand is-said to-be the-act*
conjuncti non per se, sed per accidens; inquantum scilicet
*of-the-conjoined not through itself but through accident inasmuch-as namely*
ejus objectum, quod est phantasma, est in organo corporali;
*its object which is the-phantasm is in an-organ bodily*
non quod iste actus per organum corporale exerceatur.
*not that this act through an-organ bodily be-exercised*

Si quis autem quærat ulterius: Si intellectus sine
*if anyone moreover ask further if the-intellect without*
phantasmate non intelligit, quomodo ergo habebit operationem
*a-phantasm not understands how then will-it-have operation*
intellectualem, postquam fuerit anima a corpore separata?
*intellectual after it-will-have-been the-soul from the-body separated*
scire debet qui hæc objicit, quod istam quæstionem
*to-know he-ought he-who these-things objects that this question*
solvere non pertinet ad naturalem. Unde Aristoteles in
*to-solve not pertains to the-natural-philosopher whence Aristotle in*
2 Physicorum dicit, de anima loquens: «Quomodo autem
*2 Physics says about the-soul speaking how moreover*
separabilis hæc se habeat, et quid sit, Philosophiæ primæ
*separable this itself have and what it-be of-Philosophy first*

opus est determinare. Æstimandum est enim quod alterum
*the-work it-is to-determine to-be-judged it-is for that another*
modum intelligendi habebit anima separata quam habeat
*mode of-understanding will-have the-soul separated than it-have*
conjuncta», similem scilicet aliis substantiis separatis. Unde
*conjoined like namely to-other substances separate whence*
non sine causa Aristoteles quærit in 3 de Anima, utrum
*not without cause Aristotle asks in 3 on the-Soul whether*
intellectus non separatus a magnitudine intelligat aliquid
*the-intellect not separated from magnitude understand anything*
separatum. Per quod dat intelligere quod aliquid poterit
*separate through which he-gives to-understand that something it-will-be-able*
intelligere separatus quod non potest non separatus. In quibus
*to-understand separated which not it-can not separated in which*
etiam verbis valde notandum est, quod supra, utrumque
*also words greatly to-be-noted it-is that above each*
intellectum, scilicet possibilem et agentem, dixit separatum,
*intellect namely possible and agent he-called separate*
hic tamen dicit eum non separatum. Est enim separatus,
*here yet he-calls it not separated it-is for separated*
in quantum non est actus organi; non separatus vero, in
*in as-far not it-is the-act of-an-organ not separated but in*
quantum pars sive potentia animæ, quæ est actus corporis,
*as-far a-part or power of-the-soul which is the-act of-the-body*
sicut supra dictum est. Hujusmodi autem quæstiones certissime
*as above said it-is of-this-kind moreover questions most-certainly*
colligi potest Aristotelem solvisse in his libris quos
*to-be-gathered can Aristotle to-have-solved in those books which*
patet eum scripsisse de substantiis separatis, ex his quæ
*is-plain him to-have-written about substances separate from those which*

dicit in principio 12 Metaphysicæ; quos etiam libros vidimus
*he-says in the-beginning 12 of-the-Metaphysics which also books we-have-seen*
numero 14, licet nondum translatos in linguam nostram.
*in-number 14 although not-yet translated into tongue our*

Secundum hoc igitur patet quod rationes in contrarium
*according-to this therefore is-plain that the-arguments to the-contrary*
necessitatem non habent.
*necessity not have*

Essentiale est enim animæ quod corpori uniatur; sed hoc
*essential it-is for to-the-soul that to-the-body it-be-united but this*
impeditur per accidens, non ex parte sua, sed ex parte
*is-impeded through accident not on the-side its but on the-side*
corporis quod corrumpitur: sicut per se competit levi
*of-the-body which is-corrupted as through itself it-belongs to-the-light*
esse sursum, et hoc est levi esse ut sit sursum, ut
*to-be up and this is for-the-light to-be that it-be up as*
Aristoteles dicit in 8 Physicorum; contingit tamen propter
*Aristotle says in 8 Physics it-happens yet on-account-of*
aliquod impedimentum quod non sit sursum.
*some impediment that not it-be up*

Ex hoc etiam patet solutio alterius rationis. Sicut enim quod
*from this also is-plain the-solution of-the-other argument as for what*
habet naturam ut sit sursum, et quod non habet naturam ut
*has a-nature that it-be up and what not has a-nature that*
sit sursum, specie differunt; et tamen idem numero et specie
*it-be up in-species differ and yet the-same in-number and in-species*
est quod habet naturam ut sit sursum, licet quandoque
*is what has a-nature that it-be up although sometimes*
sit sursum et quandoque non sit sursum, propter aliquod
*it-be up and sometimes not it-be up on-account-of some*
impedimentum: ita differunt specie duæ formæ, quarum una
*impediment so differ in-species two forms of-which one*

habet naturam ut uniatur corpori, alia vero non; sed tamen
*has a-nature that it-be-united to-the-body the-other but not but yet*
unum et idem numero et specie esse potest habens naturam
*one and the-same in-number and in-species to-be can having a-nature*
ut uniatur corpori, licet quandoque actu sit unitum,
*that it-be-united to-the-body although sometimes in-act it-be united*
quandoque non actu unitum, propter aliquod impedimentum.
*sometimes not in-act united on-account-of some impediment*

Adhuc autem ad sui erroris fulcimentum assumunt
*still moreover for of-their error the-prop they-take-up*
quod Aristoteles dicit in libro de Generatione animalium,
*what Aristotle says in the-book on the-Generation of-animals*
scilicet intellectum solum de foris advenire, et divinum
*namely the-intellect alone from outside to-come and divine*
esse solum. Nulla autem forma quæ est actus materiæ,
*to-be alone no moreover form which is the-act of-matter*
advenit materiæ de foris, sed educitur de potentia materiæ.
*comes to-matter from outside but is-drawn-out from the-potency of-matter*
Intellectus igitur non est forma corporis.
*the-intellect therefore not is the-form of-the-body*

Objiciunt etiam quod omnis forma corporis mixti causatur
*they-object also that every form of-a-body mixed is-caused*
ex elementis: unde, si intellectus esset forma corporis humani,
*from the-elements whence if the-intellect were the-form of-the-body human*
non esset ab extrinseco, sed esset ab elementis causatus.
*not it-would-be from the-outside but would-be by the-elements caused*

Objiciunt ulterius contra hoc, quia sequeretur quod etiam
*they-object further against this because it-would-follow that also*
vegetativum et sensitivum esset ab extrinseco; quod est contra
*the-vegetative and sensitive were from the-outside which is against*
Aristotelem; præcipue si esset una substantia animæ, cujus
*Aristotle especially if there-were one substance of-the-soul whose*

potentiæ essent vegetativum et sensitivum et intellectivum;
*powers were the-vegetative and sensitive and intellective*
cum intellectus sit ab intrinseco, secundum Aristotelem.
*since the-intellect be from the-outside according-to Aristotle*

Horum autem solutio in promptu apparet secundum
*of-these moreover the-solution in readiness appears according-to*
præmissa.
*the-premises*

Cum enim dicitur quod omnis forma educitur de potentia
*when for it-is-said that every form is-drawn-out from the-potency*
materiæ, educi de potentia materiæ est duobus modis:
*of-matter to-be-drawn-out from the-potency of-matter is in-two ways*
primo modo, formam dependere a materia secundum esse et
*in-the-first way form to-depend on matter according-to to-be and*
operari; alio modo, materiam præexistere formæ. Si enim
*to-operate in-another way matter to-pre-exist form if for*
hoc nihil aliud sit quam materiam præexistere, considerandum
*this nothing other be than matter to-pre-exist to-be-considered*
videtur quid sit formam de potentia materiæ educi. Si
*it-seems what be form from the-potency of-matter to-be-drawn-out if*
enim hoc nihil aliud sit quam materiam præexistere in potentia
*for this nothing other be than matter to-pre-exist in potency*
ad formam, nihil prohibet sic dicere materiam corporalem
*to form nothing prevents thus to-say matter bodily*
præexistere in potentia ad animam intellectivam: unde
*to-pre-exist in potency to the-soul intellective whence*
Aristoteles in libro de Generatione animalium dicit: «Animam
*Aristotle in the-book on the-Generation of-animals says the-soul*
igitur vegetabilem in seminibus et conceptibus», scilicet
*therefore vegetable in seeds and conceptions namely*
nondum separatis, «haberi potentia, statuendum est, non actu,
*not-yet separated to-be-had in-potency to-be-laid-down it-is not in-act*

priusquam eo modo conceptus, qui jam separantur, cibum
*before in-that way the-conceptions which already are-separated food*
trahant, et officio ejus animæ fungantur. Principio enim
*draw and the-office of-that soul perform at-the-beginning for*
hæc omnia vita stirpis vivere videntur.» De anima quoque
*these all the-life of-a-plant to-live seem about the-soul also*
sensuali pari modo dicendum est, atque etiam de intellectuali:
*sensual in-like way to-be-said it-is and also about the-intellectual*
omnes enim potentia prius haberi quam actu necesse est, ut
*all for in-potency first to-be-had than in-act necessary it-is that*
nunquam secundum eam rationem sit in potentia secundum
*never according-to that notion it-be in potency according-to*
quam rationem convenit sibi esse actu. Jam enim ostensum
*which notion it-belongs to-it to-be in-act already for shown*
est quod aliis formis quæ non habent operationem aliquam
*it-is that to-other forms which not have operation any*
absque communicatione materiæ, convenit sic esse actu, ut
*without communication of-matter it-belongs thus to-be in-act that*
magis ipsæ sint quibus composita sunt, et quodammodo
*rather they be by-which the-composites are and in-a-way*
compositis coexistentes, quam ipsæ suum esse habeant:
*with-the-composites coexisting than they their to-be have*
unde, sicut totum esse earum est in concretione ad materiam,
*whence as the-whole to-be of-them is in concretion to matter*
ita totaliter educi dicuntur de potentia materiæ. Anima
*so totally to-be-drawn-out they-are-said from the-potency of-matter the-soul*
autem intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore: non
*moreover intellective since it-have operation without the-body not*
est esse suum solum in concretione ad materiam: unde non
*is the-to-be its only in concretion to matter whence not*
potest dici quod educatur de materia, sed magis quod
*can to-be-said that it-is-drawn-out from matter but rather that*

est a principio extrinseco. Et hoc ex verbis Aristotelis
*it-is from a-principle extrinsic and this from the-words of-Aristotle*
apparet: «Relinquitur autem intellectum solum de foris
*appears it-remains moreover the-intellect alone from outside*
advenire, et divinum esse solum»; et causam assignat dicens:
*to-come and divine to-be alone and the-cause he-assigns saying*
«Nihil enim ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio».
*nothing for with-its operation shares bodily operation*

Miror autem unde secunda objectio processerit: scilicet
*I-wonder moreover whence the-second objection proceeded namely*
quod si intellectiva anima esset forma corporis mixti,
*that if the-intellective soul were the-form of-a-body mixed*
causaretur ex commixtione elementorum, cum nulla anima
*it-would-be-caused from the-mixture of-the-elements since no soul*
ex commixtione elementorum causetur. Dicit enim Aristoteles
*from the-mixture of-the-elements be-caused says for Aristotle*
immediate post verba præmissa: «Sed enim omnis animæ
*immediately after the-words premised but for of-every soul*
sive virtus sive potentia corpus aliud participare videtur;
*whether the-virtue or power a-body other to-share-in seems*
idque magis divinum quam ea quæ elementa appellantur;
*and-that more divine than those which elements are-called*
verum prout nobilitate ignobilitateve animæ inter se
*but according-as by-nobility or-ignobility of-soul among themselves*
differunt, ita et natura ejus corporis differt. Inest enim in
*they-differ so also the-nature of-its body differs is-in for in*
semine omnium quod facit ut fecunda sint semina, videlicet
*the-seed of-all what makes that fertile be the-seeds namely*
quod calor vocatur: idque non ignis, non talis facultas aliqua
*what heat is-called and-that not fire not such faculty any*
est, sed spiritus qui in semine spumosoque corpore continetur,
*is but the-spirit which in the-seed and-foamy body is-contained*

et natura quæ in eo spiritu est, proportione respondens
*and the-nature which in that spirit is in-proportion corresponding*
elemento stellarum.» Ergo ex mixtione elementorum nedum
*to-the-element of-the-stars therefore from the-mixture of-the-elements not-only*
intellectus, sed nec anima vegetativa producitur.
*the-intellect but not-even the-soul vegetative is-produced*

Quod vero tertio objicitur, quod sequeretur sensitivum
*what but in-the-third-place is-objected that it-would-follow the-sensitive*
et vegetativum esse ab extrinseco, non est ad propositum.
*and vegetative to-be from the-outside not is to the-point*
Jam enim patet ex verbis Aristotelis quod ipse hoc
*already for is-plain from the-words of-Aristotle that he-himself this*
indeterminatum reliquit, utrum intellectus differat ab aliis
*undetermined left whether the-intellect differ from the-other*
partibus animæ subjecto et loco, ut Plato dixit, vel ratione
*parts of-the-soul in-subject and place as Plato said or in-notion*
tantum. Si vero detur quod sint idem subjecto, sicut
*only if but it-be-granted that they-be the-same in-subject as*
verius est; nec ad hoc inconveniens sequitur. Dicit enim
*more-truly it-is nor upon this unfitting follows says for*
Aristoteles in 2 de Anima, quod «similiter se habent ei
*Aristotle in 2 on the-Soul that similarly themselves they-have to-that*
quod de figuris, et quæ secundum animam sunt».
*which about figures and the-things-which according-to the-soul are*
Semper enim in eo quod est consequenter, est potentia quod
*always for in that which is consequently is in-potency what*
prius est in figuris et in animatis: ut in tetragono quidem
*prior is in figures and in animate-things as in the-tetragon indeed*
trigonum est, in sensitivo autem vegetativum; similiter autem
*the-trigon is in the-sensitive moreover the-vegetative similarly moreover*
idem subjecto est etiam intellectivum; quod ipse sub dubio
*the-same in-subject is also the-intellective which he-himself under doubt*

reliquit. Similiter dicendum esset quod vegetativum et
*left similarly to-be-said it-would-be that the-vegetative and*
sensitivum sunt in intellectivo, ut trigonum et tetragonum in
*sensitive are in the-intellective as the-trigon and the-tetragon in*
pentagono. Est autem tetragonum quidem a trigono simpliciter
*the-pentagon is moreover the-tetragon indeed from the-trigon simply*
alia figura secundum speciem, non autem a trigono quod est
*another figure according-to species not moreover from the-trigon which is*
potentia in ipso, sicut nec quaternarius a ternario qui
*in-potency in it as neither the-number-four from the-number-three which*
est pars ipsius, sed a ternario qui est seorsum existens.
*is a-part of-it but from the-number-three which is separately existing*
Et si contingeret diversas figuras a diversis agentibus produci,
*and if it-happened diverse figures by diverse agents to-be-produced*
trigonum quidem seorsum a tetragono existens haberet aliam
*the-trigon indeed separately from the-tetragon existing would-have another*
causam producentem quam tetragonum, sicut et habet aliam
*cause producing than the-tetragon as also it-has another*
speciem; sed trigonum quod inest tetragono, haberet eamdem
*species but the-trigon which is-in the-tetragon would-have the-same*
causam producentem. Sic igitur vegetativum quidem seorsum
*cause producing thus therefore the-vegetative indeed separately*
a sensitivo existens. alia specie animæ est, et aliam causam
*from the-sensitive existing of-another species of-soul is and another cause*
productivam habet; eadem tamen causa productiva est sensitivi,
*productive has the-same yet cause productive is of-the-sensitive*
et vegetativi quod inest sensitivo. Si ergo sic dicatur, quod
*and of-the-vegetative which is-in the-sensitive if therefore thus it-be-said that*
vegetativum et sensitivum quod inest intellectivo, est a causa
*the-vegetative and sensitive which is-in the-intellective is from a-cause*
extrinseca, a qua est intellectivum, nullum inconveniens
*extrinsic from which is the-intellective nothing unfitting*

sequitur. Non enim inconveniens est effectum superioris
*follows not for unfitting it-is the-effect of-a-higher*
agentis habere virtutem quam habet effectus inferioris agentis
*agent to-have the-power which has the-effect of-a-lower agent*
et adhuc amplius: unde etiam anima intellectiva, quamvis sit
*and still more whence also the-soul intellective although it-be*
ab exteriori agente, habet tamen virtutes quas habent anima
*from an-exterior agent has yet the-powers which have the-soul*
vegetativa et sensitiva, quæ sunt ab interioribus agentibus.
*vegetative and sensitive which are from interior agents*

Sic igitur diligenter consideratis fere omnibus verbis
*thus therefore diligently considered nearly all the-words*
Aristotelis quæ de intellectu humano dixit, apparet cum hujus
*of-Aristotle which about the-intellect human he-said it-appears him of-this*
fuisse sententiæ, quod anima humana sit actus corporis,
*to-have-been judgment that the-soul human be the-act of-the-body*
et quod ejus pars sive potentia sit intellectus possibilis.
*and that its part or power be the-intellect possible*

Nunc autem considerare oportet quid alii Peripatetici
*now moreover to-consider it-is-necessary what the-other Peripatetics*
de hoc ipso senserunt; et accipiamus primo verba
*about this very-thing thought and let-us-take first the-words*
Themistii in commento de Anima (lib. 3, cap. 23 et seqq.,
*of-Themistius in the-commentary on the-Soul book 3 chapter 23 and following*
juxta edit. Barbari), ubi sic dicit: «Intellectus iste, quem
*according-to the-edition of-Barbaro where thus he-says intellect this which*
dicimus in potentia, magis est animæ connaturalis, scilicet
*we-call in potency more is to-the-soul connatural namely*
quam agens. Dico autem, non animæ, sed solum humanæ. Et
*than the-agent I-say moreover not to-the-soul but only to-the-human and*
sicut lumen potentia visui, et potentia coloribus adveniens,
*as light in-potency to-sight and in-potency to-colors coming*

actu quidem visum facit, et actu colores; ita et intellectus iste
*in-act indeed sight makes and in-act colors so also intellect this*
qui actu, non solum ipsum intellectum facit actu, sed etiam
*which in-act not only the-very intellect makes in-act but also*
potentia intelligibilia, (actu) intelligibilia iste constituit». Et
*the-potentially intelligible-things in-act intelligible this constitutes and*
post pauca concludit: «Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad
*after a-few-things he-concludes what therefore relation has art to*
materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui in potentia.
*matter this also the-intellect productive to that which in potency*
Propter quod etiam in promptu nobis est intelligere, quando
*on-account-of which also in readiness to-us it-is to-understand when*
volumus. Non enim est ars materiæ inferioris; sed inexistit
*we-wish not for is art of-matter lower but it-is-in*
toti in potentia intellectui, qui (factivus est). Ac si utique
*the-whole in potency to-the-intellect which productive is and if surely*
ædificator lignis, non ab extrinseco existeret, per totum
*the-builder to-the-wood not from the-outside existed through the-whole*
autem ipsum penetrare potens erit. Sic etiam et qui scilicet
*moreover it to-penetrate able he-will-be thus also and that namely*
actu intellectus, intellectui potentia superveniens, unum facit
*in-act intellect upon-the-intellect in-potency coming-over one makes*
cum ipso». Et post pauca concludit: «Nos igitur sumus, ut
*with it and after a-few-things he-concludes we therefore are as*
quod potentia; intellectus autem, qui actu. Sic quidem in
*that-which in-potency the-intellect moreover which in-act thus indeed in*
compositis omnibus ex eo quod potentia et ex eo quod
*composites all from that which in-potency and from that which*
actu, aliud est hic, aliud est huic: aliud utique erit ego,
*in-act other is this other is to-this other surely will-be I*
et aliud mihi esse. Et consequenter quidem est compositus
*and other to-me to-be and consequently indeed is composed*

intellectus ex potentia et actu. Mihi autem esse ex eo, quod
*the-intellect of potency and act to-me moreover to-be from that which*
actu est: quia etiam ea quæ meditor et quæ scribo,
*in-act is because also those-things which I-meditate and which I-write*
scribit quidem intellectus compositus ex potentia et actu.
*writes indeed the-intellect composed of potency and act*
Scribit autem, non qua potentia sed qua actu: operari
*it-writes moreover not in-that-it in-potency but in-that-it in-act to-operate*
enim sibi inde derivatur». Et post pauca adhuc manifestius
*for to-it thence is-derived and after a-few-things still more-manifestly*
sic: «Igitur est aliud est animal, et aliud animali esse.
*thus therefore it-is other is the-animal and other for-the-animal to-be*
Animali esse est ab anima animalis. Sic et aliud qui
*for-the-animal to-be is from the-soul of-the-animal thus also other that-which*
ego, et aliud esse mihi. Esse autem mihi, est ab anima:
*I and other to-be to-me to-be moreover to-me is from the-soul*
et habetur, et non omni. Non enim sensitiva: materia
*and is-had and not from-every not for from-the-sensitive matter*
enim erat phantasiæ. Neque rursum a phantasia: materia
*for it-was of-the-phantasy nor again from the-phantasy matter*
enim erat potentia intellectus. Neque quod potentia
*for it-was of-the-potential intellect nor from-that-which in-potency*
intellectus: materia enim erat factivi (intellectus). A
*intellect matter for it-was of-the-productive intellect from*
solo igitur factivo est mihi esse». Et post pauca subdit:
*alone therefore the-productive is to-me to-be and after a-few-things he-adds*
«Cum respondisset, scilicet Aristoteles: in omni autem natura,
*when he-had-answered namely Aristotle in all moreover nature*
hoc quidem ut materiam esse, hoc autem quod materiam
*this indeed as matter to-be this moreover which matter*
movet aut perficit: necesse ait, et in anima existere has
*moves or perfects necessary he-says also in the-soul to-exist these*

differentias, et esse, hunc aliquem talem intellectum in
*differences and to-be this some such intellect in*
anima fieri, et hunc talem in anima facere. Et usque ad
*the-soul to-be-made and this such in the-soul to-make and up to*
hanc progressa natura, cessavit..... Nos itaque sumus activus
*this having-advanced nature stopped we therefore are the-active*
intellectus. Et postea reprobans quorumdam opinionem, dicit:
*intellect and afterward rejecting of-some the-opinion he-says*
in anima esse talem intellectum, et animæ humanæ velut
*in the-soul to-be such intellect and of-the-soul human as-it-were*
quamdam partem honoratissimam». Et post pauca dicit: Ex
*a-certain part most-honored and after a-few-things he-says from*
«eadem littera hoc convenit confirmare, quod putat, scilicet
*the-same text this it-is-fitting to-confirm what he-thinks namely*
Aristoteles: aut nostri aliquid esse activum intellectum, aut
*Aristotle either of-us something to-be the-active intellect or*
nos». Patet igitur ex præmissis verbis Themistii quod non
*us is-plain therefore from the-premised words of-Themistius that not*
solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem partem
*only the-intellect possible but also the-agent a-part*
animæ humanæ esse dicit, et Aristotelem hoc sensisse, et
*of-the-soul human to-be he-says and Aristotle this to-have-thought and*
iterum quod hoc est id quod est, non ex anima sensitiva, ut
*again that this is that which is not from the-soul sensitive as*
quidam mentiuntur, sed ex parte intellectiva et principaliori.
*some lie but from the-part intellective and more-principal*
Et Theophrasti quidem libros non vidi, sed ejus verba
*and of-Theophrastus indeed the-books not I-have-seen but his words*
introduxit Themistius in commento de Anima, quæ sunt talia,
*brought-in Themistius in the-commentary on the-Soul which are such*
sic dicens: «Melius est autem Theophrasti proponere dicta
*thus saying better it-is moreover of-Theophrastus to-set-forth the-sayings*

de intellectu potentia, et de eo qui actu. De eo igitur
*about the-intellect in-potency and about that which in-act about that therefore*
qui potentia, hæc ait: intellectus autem qualiter a foris
*which in-potency these-things he-says the-intellect moreover how from outside*
existens, et tamquam superpositus, et tamen connaturalis?
*existing and as-it-were placed-over and yet connatural*
Et quia natura ipsius habet quidem naturaliter esse, scilicet
*and because the-nature its has indeed naturally to-be namely*
actum et potentia omnia, bene finit et superius. Non enim
*act and in-potency all-things well he-defines also above not for*
sic accipiendum est ut neque sit ipse: hoc litigiosum est enim,
*thus to-be-taken it-is that neither be it this contentious it-is for*
sed ut... quamdam potentiam, sicut etiam in materialibus.
*but as a-certain potency as also in material-things*
Hoc a foris, non ut objectum, sed ut ipsam comprehendens
*this from outside not as an-object but as the-very comprehending*
generationem, omnino ponendum». Sic igitur Theophrastus
*generation wholly to-be-posited thus therefore Theophrastus*
cum quæsisset duo: primo quidem quomodo intellectus
*when he-had-asked two-things first indeed how the-intellect*
possibilis sit ab extrinseco, et tamen nobis connaturalis; et
*possible be from the-outside and yet to-us connatural and*
secundo, quæ sit natura intellectus possibilis: respondit primo
*second what be the-nature of-the-intellect possible he-answered first*
ad secundum, quod est in potentia omnia, non quidem sicut
*to the-second that it-is in potency all-things not indeed as*
nihil existens, sed sicut sensus ad sensibilia: et ex hoc
*nothing existing but as sense to sensibles and from this*
concludit responsionem primæ quæstionis, quod non intelligitur
*he-concludes the-answer of-the-first question that not it-is-understood*
sic esse ab extrinseco quasi aliquid adjectum accidentaliter,
*thus to-be from the-outside as-if something added accidentally*

vel tempore procedente; sed a prima generatione, sicut
*or with-time proceeding but from the-first generation as*
continens et comprehendens naturam humanam. Quod
*containing and comprehending the-nature human that*
autem Alexander intellectum possibilem posuerit esse formam
*moreover Alexander the-intellect possible posited to-be the-form*
corporis, et etiam ipse Averroes confitetur; quamvis, ut
*of-the-body also even himself Averroes confesses although as*
arbitror, perverse verba Alexandri acceperit, sicut et verba
*I-judge perversely the-words of-Alexander he-took as also the-words*
Themistii præter ejus intellectum assumit. Nam quod
*of-Themistius beside his understanding he-takes for what*
dixit, Alexandrum dixisse intellectum possibilem non esse
*he-said Alexander to-have-said the-intellect possible not to-be*
aliud quam præparationem quæ est in natura humana ad
*other than a-preparation which is in nature human for*
intellectum agentem et ad intelligibilia; hanc præparationem
*the-intellect agent and for intelligibles this preparation*
nihil aliud intellexit quam potentiam intellectivam quæ est
*nothing other he-understood than the-power intellective which is*
in anima ad intelligibilia: et ideo dixit eam non esse
*in the-soul for intelligibles and therefore he-said it not to-be*
virtutem in corpore, quia talis potentia non habet corporale
*a-power in the-body because such power not has a-bodily*
organum; et non ex ea ratione, ut Averroes impugnat,
*organ and not for that reason as Averroes attacks*
secundum quod nulla præparatio est virtus in corpore.
*according as no preparation is a-power in the-body*

Et ut a Græcis ad Arabes transeamus: primo manifestum
*and that from the-Greeks to the-Arabs we-may-pass first manifest*
est quod Avicenna posuit intellectum virtutem animæ, quæ est
*it-is that Avicenna posited the-intellect a-power of-the-soul which is*

forma corporis: dicit enim in suo libro de Anima: «Intellectus
*the-form of-the-body he-says for in his book on the-Soul the-intellect*
activus, id est, practicus, eget corpore et virtutibus
*active that is practical needs the-body and the-powers*
corporalibus ad omnes actiones suas. Contemplativus autem
*bodily for all actions its the-contemplative moreover*
intellectus eget corpore et virtutibus ejus, sed nec semper
*intellect needs the-body and the-powers its but neither always*
nec omnino. Sufficit enim ipse sibi per seipsum. Nihil
*nor wholly suffices for it to-itself through itself none*
autem horum est anima humana; sed anima est id quod
*moreover of-these is the-soul human but the-soul is that which*
habet has virtutes, et, sicut postea declarabimus, est substantia
*has these powers and as afterward we-shall-declare it-is a-substance*
solitaria per se, quæ habet aptitudinem ad actiones: quarum
*solitary through itself which has aptitude for actions of-which*
quædam sunt quæ non perficiuntur nisi per instrumenta,
*some are which not are-accomplished except through instruments*
et per usum eorum ullo modo; quædam vero sunt quibus
*and through the-use of-them in-any way some but are for-which*
non sunt necessaria instrumenta aliquo modo». Item in prima
*not are necessary instruments in-any way likewise in the-first*
parte dicit quod «anima humana est perfectio prima corporis
*part he-says that the-soul human is the-perfection first of-a-body*
naturalis instrumentalis, secundum quod attribuitur ei agere
*natural instrumental according as is-attributed to-it to-do*
actionis electivæ deliberationis, et adinvenire meditando, et
*of-action elective deliberation and to-discover by-meditating and*
secundum hoc quod apprehendit universalia». Sed verum est
*according-to this that it-apprehends universals but true it-is*
quod postea dicit et probat: «Et anima humana, secundum
*what afterward he-says and proves and the-soul human according-to*

id quod est sibi proprium, scilicet secundum vim
*that which is to-it proper namely according-to the-power*
intellectivam, non sic se habet ad corpus ut forma, nec
*intellective not thus itself has to the-body as form nor*
eget ut sibi præparetur organum». Deinde subjungenda sunt
*needs that for-it be-prepared an-organ then to-be-subjoined are*
verba Algazelis sic dicentis: «Cum commixtio elementorum
*the-words of-Algazel thus saying when the-mixture of-the-elements*
fuerit pulchrioris et perfectioris æqualitatis, quia nihil
*will-have-been of-more-beautiful and more-perfect equality because nothing*
possit inveniri subtilius et pulchrius, tunc fiet apta ad
*can to-be-found subtler and more-beautiful then it-will-become apt for*
recipiendum a datore formam pulchriorem aliis formis,
*receiving from the-giver a-form more-beautiful than-other forms*
quæ est anima hominis». Hujus vero animæ humanæ duæ
*which is the-soul of-man of-this but soul human two*
sunt virtutes, una operans, et altera sciens, quam vocat
*are the-powers one operating and the-other knowing which he-calls*
intellectum, ut ex consequentibus patet. Et postea multis
*intellect as from the-following is-plain and afterward with-many*
argumentis probat, quod operatio intellectus non fit per
*arguments he-proves that the-operation of-the-intellect not is-made through*
organum corporale. Hoc autem præmisimus, non quasi volentes
*an-organ bodily this moreover we-have-premised not as-if wishing*
ex philosophorum auctoritatibus reprobare supra positum
*from of-the-philosophers the-authorities to-reject the-above posited*
errorem; sed ut ostendamus quod non solum Latini, quorum
*error but that we-may-show that not only the-Latins whose*
verba quibusdam non sapiunt, sed et Græci et Arabes
*words to-some not are-to-their-taste but also the-Greeks and Arabs*
hoc senserunt, quod intellectus sit pars vel potentia sive
*this thought that the-intellect be a-part or potency or*

virtus animæ, quæ est corporis forma. Unde miror ex quibus
*power of-the-soul which is of-the-body the-form whence I-wonder from which*
Peripateticis hunc errorem se assumpsisse glorientur;
*Peripatetics this error themselves to-have-taken they-boast*
nisi forte quia minus volunt cum ceteris Peripateticis recte
*unless perhaps because less they-wish with the-other Peripatetics rightly*
sapere, quam cum Averroe aberrare, qui non tam fuit
*to-be-wise than with Averroes to-go-astray who not so-much was*
Peripateticus quam Peripateticæ philosophiæ depravator.
*a-Peripatetic as of-the-Peripatetic philosophy a-depraver*

Ostenso igitur ex verbis Aristotelis et aliorum sequentium
*shown therefore from the-words of-Aristotle and of-the-others following*
ipsum, quod intellectus est potentia animæ quæ est corporis
*him that the-intellect is a-power of-the-soul which is of-the-body*
forma, licet ipsa potentia quæ est intellectus, non sit
*the-form although the-very power which is the-intellect not be*
alicujus organi actus, quia nihil ipsius operationi communicat
*of-any organ the-act because nothing with-its operation shares*
corporalis operatio, ut Aristoteles dicit; inquirendum est per
*bodily operation as Aristotle says to-be-inquired it-is through*
rationes quid circa hoc sentire sit necesse. Et quia secundum
*arguments what about this to-think be necessary and because according-to*
doctrinam Aristotelis oportet ex actibus principia actuum
*the-teaching of-Aristotle it-is-necessary from acts the-principles of-acts*
considerare; ex ipso actu quidem proprio intellectus, qui est
*to-consider from the-very act indeed proper of-the-intellect which is*
intelligere, primo hoc considerandum videtur: in quo nullam
*to-understand first this to-be-considered it-seems in which no*
firmiorem rationem habere possumus ea quam Aristoteles
*firmer argument to-have can-we than-that which Aristotle*
ponit, et sic argumentatur: Anima est principium quo
*puts and thus he-argues the-soul is the-principle by-which*

vivimus et intelligimus. Ergo et ratio quædam et species
*we-live and understand therefore also a-notion certain and species*
corporis cujusdam. Et adeo huic rationi innititur quod eam
*of-a-body certain and so on-this argument he-relies that it*
dicit esse demonstrationem: nam in principio capituli sic
*he-says to-be a-demonstration for in the-beginning of-the-chapter thus*
dicit: «Non enim solum quod quid est oportet diffinitivam
*he-says not for only that what is it-is-necessary the-definitive*
rationem ostendere, sicut plures terminorum dicunt, sed et
*notion to-show as most of-the-terms say but also*
causam inesse et demonstrare»; et ponit exemplum: «sicut
*the-cause to-be-in-it and to-demonstrate and he-puts an-example as*
demonstratur quid est tetragonismus» id est quadratum, «per
*is-demonstrated what is quadrature that is the-square through*
inventionem mediæ lineæ proportionalis». Virtus autem hujus
*the-finding of-the-mean line proportional the-force moreover of-this*
demonstrationis et insolubilitas apparet: quia quicumque
*demonstration and insolubility appears because whoever*
ad hac via divertere voluerit, necesse habet inconveniens
*from this way to-turn-aside will-have-wished necessary has the-unfitting*
dicere. Manifestum est enim quod hic homo singularis
*to-say manifest it-is for that this man singular*
intelligit: nunquam enim de intellectu quæreremus, nisi
*understands never for about the-intellect would-we-inquire unless*
intelligeremus: nec cum quærimus de intellectu, de alio
*we-understood nor when we-inquire about the-intellect about another*
principio quærimus quam de eo quo nos intelligimus.
*principle do-we-inquire than about that by-which we understand*
Unde et Aristoteles dicit: «Dico autem intellectum quo
*whence also Aristotle says I-call moreover intellect that-by-which*
intelligit anima». Concludit autem sic Aristoteles:
*understands the-soul concludes moreover thus Aristotle*

Quod si aliquid est primum principium quo intelligimus,
*that if anything is the-first principle by-which we-understand*
oportet illud esse formam corporis: quia ipse prius
*it-is-necessary that to-be the-form of-the-body because he-himself earlier*
manifestavit, quod illud quo primo aliquid operatur, est forma.
*made-manifest that that by-which first anything operates is the-form*
Et patet hoc per operationem, quia unumquodque agit in
*and is-plain this through operation because each-thing acts in*
quantum est actu. Est autem unumquodque actu per formam.
*as-far it-is in-act is moreover each-thing in-act through form*
Unde oportet illud quo primo aliquid agit, esse formam.
*whence it-is-necessary that by-which first anything acts to-be the-form*

Si autem dicas quod principium hujus actus qui est
*if moreover you-say that the-principle of-this act which is*
intelligere, quod nominamus intellectum, non sit forma;
*to-understand which we-name the-intellect not be the-form*
oportet te invenire modum quo actio illius principii sit
*it-is-necessary you to-find the-mode by-which the-action of-that principle be*
actio hujus hominis quod diversimode quidam conati sunt
*the-action of-this man which diversely some tried have*
dicere: quorum unus, scilicet Averroes, ponens hujusmodi
*to-say of-whom one namely Averroes positing of-this-kind*
principium intelligendi quod dicitur intellectus possibilis, non
*principle of-understanding which is-called the-intellect possible not*
esse animam nec partem animæ nisi æquivoce, sed potius
*to-be the-soul nor a-part of-the-soul except equivocally but rather*
quod sit substantia quædam separata; dixit quod illius
*that it-be a-substance certain separate said that of-that*
intelligere substantiæ separatæ est intelligere mei vel
*the-understanding substance separate is the-understanding of-me or*
illius, in quantum intellectus ille possibilis copulatur mihi
*of-that-man in as-far intellect that possible is-coupled to-me*

vel tibi per phantasmata quæ sunt in me vel in te. Quod
*or to-you through the-phantasms which are in me or in you which*
sic fieri dicebat. Species enim intelligibilis, quæ fit unum
*thus to-be-made he-said the-species for intelligible which becomes one*
cum intellectu possibili, cum sit forma et actus ejus, habet
*with the-intellect possible since it-be the-form and act its has*
duo subjecta: unum ipsa phantasmata, aliud intellectum
*two subjects one the-very phantasms the-other the-intellect*
possibilem. Sic ergo intellectus possibilis continuatur nobis
*possible thus therefore the-intellect possible is-continued to-us*
per formam suam mediantibus phantasmatibus; et sic
*through form its by-means-of the-phantasms and thus*
dum intellectus possibilis intelligit, hic homo intelligit.
*while the-intellect possible understands this man understands*

Quod autem hoc nihil sit, patet tripliciter. Primo quidem,
*that moreover this nothing be is-plain in-three-ways first indeed*
quod sic continuatio intellectus ad hominem non esset
*because thus the-continuation of-the-intellect to man not would-be*
secundum primam ejus generationem, ut Theophrastus dicit et
*according-to the-first his generation as Theophrastus says and*
Aristoteles innuit in 2 Phys., ubi dicit quod terminus naturalis
*Aristotle hints in 2 Physics where he-says that the-term of-natural*
considerationis de formis est ad formam secundum quam homo
*consideration about forms is at the-form according-to which man*
ab homine generatur, et a sole. Manifestum est autem quod
*by man is-generated and by the-sun manifest it-is moreover that*
terminus considerationis naturalis est intellectus. Secundum
*the-term of-the-consideration natural is the-intellect according-to*
autem dictum Averrois, intellectus non continuatur homini
*moreover the-saying of-Averroes the-intellect not is-continued to-man*
secundum suam generationem, sed secundum operationem
*according-to his generation but according-to the-operation*

sensus, in quantum est sentiens in actu. Phantasma enim est
*of-sense in as-far it-is sensing in act the-phantasm for is*
motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in 3 libro
*a-motion made by sense according-to act as it-is-said in 3 book*
de Anima. Secundo vero, quia ista conjunctio non esset
*on the-Soul second but because this conjunction not would-be*
secundum aliquid unum, sed secundum diversa. Manifestum
*according-to something one but according-to diverse-things manifest*
est enim quod species intelligibilis, secundum quod est in
*it-is for that the-species intelligible according as it-is in*
phantasmatibus, est intellecta in potentia; in intellectu autem
*the-phantasms is understood in potency in the-intellect moreover*
possibili est secundum quod est intellecta in actu, abstracta
*possible it-is according as it-is understood in act abstracted*
a phantasmatibus. Si ergo species intelligibilis non est
*from the-phantasms if therefore the-species intelligible not is*
forma intellectus possibilis nisi secundum quod est abstracta
*the-form of-the-intellect possible except according as it-is abstracted*
a phantasmatibus; sequitur quod per speciem intelligibilem
*from the-phantasms it-follows that through the-species intelligible*
non continuatur intellectus phantasmatibus, sed magis ab
*not is-continued the-intellect to-the-phantasms but rather from*
eis est separatus: nisi forte dicatur quod intellectus possibilis
*them it-is separated unless perhaps it-be-said that the-intellect possible*
continuatur phantasmatibus, sicut speculatum continuatur
*is-continued to-the-phantasms as the-mirrored is-continued*
homini cujus species resultat in speculo. Talis autem
*to-the-man whose image results in the-mirror such moreover*
continuatio manifestum est quod non sufficit ad continuationem
*continuation manifest it-is that not suffices for the-continuation*
actus: manifestum est enim quod actio speculi, quæ est
*of-act manifest it-is for that the-action of-the-mirror which is*

repræsentare, non propter hoc potest attribui homini
*to-represent not on-account-of this can to-be-attributed to-the-man*
unde nec actio intellectus possibilis propter prædictam
*whence neither the-action of-the-intellect possible on-account-of the-aforesaid*
copulationem posset attribui huic homini qui est Socrates;
*coupling could to-be-attributed to-this man who is Socrates*
ut hic homo intelligeret. Tertio, quia, dato quod una et
*so-that this man should-understand third because granted that one and*
eadem species numero esset forma intellectus possibilis, et
*the-same species in-number were the-form of-the-intellect possible and*
esset simul in phantasmatibus: nec adhuc talis copulatio
*were together in the-phantasms not-even still such coupling*
sufficeret ad hoc quod hinc homo intelligeret. Manifestum est
*would-suffice for this that this man should-understand manifest it-is*
enim quod per speciem intelligibilem aliquid intelligitur, sed
*for that through the-species intelligible something is-understood but*
per potentiam intellectivam aliquis intelligit; sicut etiam per
*through the-power intellective someone understands as also through*
speciem sensibilem aliquid sentitur, per potentiam autem
*the-species sensible something is-sensed through the-power moreover*
sensitivam aliquis sentit: unde paries, in quo est color, cujus
*sensitive someone senses whence the-wall in which is the-color whose*
species sensibilis in actu est in visu, videtur, non videt; animal
*species sensible in act is in sight is-seen not sees the-animal*
autem habens potentiam visivam, in qua est talis species,
*moreover having the-power visive in which is such species*
videt. Talis autem est prædicta copulatio intellectus possibilis
*sees such moreover is the-aforesaid coupling of-the-intellect possible*
ad hominem, in quo sunt phantasmata quorum species sunt in
*to the-man in whom are the-phantasms whose species are in*
intellectu possibili, qualis est copulatio parietis, in quo est color,
*the-intellect possible as is the-coupling of-the-wall in which is the-color*

ad visum, in quo est species sui coloris. Sicut igitur paries
*to the-sight in which is the-species of-its color as therefore the-wall*
non videt, sed videtur ejus color; ita sequeretur quod homo
*not sees but is-seen its color so it-would-follow that the-man*
non intelligeret, sed quod ejus phantasmata intelligerentur
*not would-understand but that his phantasms would-be-understood*
ab intellectu possibili. Impossibile est ergo salvari quod
*by the-intellect possible impossible it-is therefore to-be-saved that*
hic homo intelligat, secundum positionem Averrois.
*this man understand according-to the-position of-Averroes*

Quidam vero videntes quod secundum viam Averrois
*some but seeing that according-to the-way of-Averroes*
sustineri non potest quod hic homo intelligat, in aliam
*to-be-sustained not can that this man understand into another*
divertunt viam; et dicunt quod intellectus unitur corpori ut
*turn-aside way and say that the-intellect is-united to-the-body as*
motor; et sic in quantum ex corpore et intellectu fit
*mover and thus in as-far from body and intellect is-made*
unum, sicut ex movente et moto, intellectus est pars
*one as from mover and moved the-intellect is a-part*
hujus hominis: et ideo operatio intellectus attribuitur huic
*of-this man and therefore the-operation of-the-intellect is-attributed to-this*
homini, sicut operatio oculi, quæ est videre, attribuitur
*man as the-operation of-the-eye which is to-see is-attributed*
huic homini. Quærendum est autem ab eo qui hoc ponit,
*to-this man to-be-asked it-is moreover from him who this posits*
primo quid sit hoc singulare quod est Socrates: utrum
*first what be this singular which is Socrates whether*
Socrates sit solus intellectus, qui est motor; aut sit motum
*Socrates be alone the-intellect which is the-mover or be the-moved*
ab ipso, quod est corpus, animatum tamen anima vegetativa;
*by it which is the-body animated yet by-the-soul vegetative*

et sensitiva, aut sit compositum ex utroque. Et quantum
*and sensitive or be the-composite of both and as-far-as*
ex sua positione videtur, hoc tertium accipiet, scilicet quod
*from his position it-seems this third he-will-take namely that*
Socrates sit aliquid compositum ex utroque.
*Socrates be something composite of both*

Procedamus ergo contra eos per rationem Aristotelis in
*let-us-proceed therefore against them through the-argument of-Aristotle in*
8 Metaphysic., dicentis: «Cum enim quæcumque partes habent,
*8 Metaphysics saying since for whatever-things parts have*
et non ut acervus, quod totum, sed aliquid inest totum
*and not as a-heap that the-whole but something is-in the-whole*
præter partes, est alia causa: quoniam in corporibususiis
*besides the-parts there-is another cause since in bodies-to-some*
quidem tactus causa est unum essendi; aliis vero viscositas,
*indeed contact the-cause is of-one being to-others but viscosity*
aut aliqua passio altera. Talis vero definitio ratio est una, non
*or some passion other such but definition a-notion is one not*
conjunctione, quemadmodum ilias, sed unius esse. Quid igitur
*by-conjunction as the-Iliad but of-one to-be what therefore*
est quod facit hominem unum, et propter quid unum sed
*it-is which makes man one and on-account-of what one but*
non multa, puta animal et bipes. aliterque, et si est, ut
*not many for-example animal and two-footed and-otherwise and if it-is as*
aiunt quidam, ipsum aliquid animal, et ipsum bipes? Quare
*say some itself something animal and itself two-footed why*
namque non illa ipsa homo est, et erunt secundum
*for not those very-things man is and they-will-be according-to*
participationem homines, et hominis non unius, sed duorum,
*participation men and of-man not of-one but of-two*
scilicet animalis, non bipedis; et totaliter utique non erit
*namely of-animal not of-two-footed and totally surely not will-be*

homo unum, et plura animal et bipes? Palam itaque quia
*man one and many animal and two-footed plain therefore that*
sic quidem acceptantibus consueverunt definire et dicere: Non
*thus indeed to-those-accepting they-are-accustomed to-define and to-say not*
contingit reddere et solvere dubitationem. Si autem est, ut
*it-happens to-render and to-solve the-doubt if moreover it-is as*
diximus, hoc quidem materia illud vero forma; et hoc quidem
*we-said this indeed matter that but form and this indeed*
potentia, illud vero actu: non adhuc dubitatio videbitur esse».
*in-potency that but in-act not still doubt will-seem to-be*

Sed si tu dicas quod Socrates non est unum quid
*but if you say that Socrates not is one something*
simpliciter, sed unum quid aggregatione motoris et
*simply but one something by-aggregation of-the-mover and*
moti; sequuntur multa inconvenientia. Primo quidem, quia
*of-the-moved follow many unfitting-things first indeed because*
si unumquodque est similiter unum et ens, sequetur quod
*if each-thing is similarly one and being it-will-follow that*
Socrates non sit aliquid, et quod non sit in specie nec in
*Socrates not be anything and that not he-be in a-species nor in*
genere, et ulterius quod non habeat aliquam actionem, quia
*a-genus and further that not be-have any action because*
actio non est nisi entis. Unde non dicimus quod intelligere
*action not is except of-a-being whence not we-say that the-understanding*
nautæ sit intelligere hujus totius quod est nauta et navis,
*of-the-sailor be the-understanding of-this whole which is the-sailor and the-ship*
sed nautæ tantum; et similiter intelligere non erit actus
*but of-the-sailor only and similarly the-understanding not will-be the-act*
Socratis, sed intellectus tantum utentis corpore Socratis. In solo
*of-Socrates but of-the-intellect only using the-body of-Socrates in alone*
enim toto quod est aliquid unum et ens, actio partis est
*for the-whole which is something one and being the-action of-the-part is*

actio totius. Et si quis aliter loquitur, improprie loquitur.
*the-action of-the-whole and if anyone otherwise speaks improperly he-speaks*
Et si tu dicas, quod hoc modo cœlum intelligit per motorem
*and if you say that in-this way the-heaven understands through mover*
suum, est assumptio difficilioris materiæ. Per intellectum
*its it-is the-taking-up of-a-more-difficult matter through the-intellect*
enim humanum oportet nos devenire ad cognoscendum
*for human it-is-necessary us to-come to knowing*
intellectus superiores, et non e converso. Si vero dicatur
*the-intellects higher and not from the-converse if but it-be-said*
quod hoc individuum quod est Socrates, est corpus animatum
*that this individual which is Socrates is a-body animated*
anima vegetativa et sensitiva, ut videtur sequi secundum
*by-the-soul vegetative and sensitive as it-seems to-follow according-to*
eos qui ponunt quod hic homo non constituitur in specie
*those who posit that this man not is-constituted in species*
per intellectum, sed per animam sensitivam nobilitatam
*through the-intellect but through the-soul sensitive ennobled*
ex aliqua instructione intellectus possibilis; tunc intellectus
*from some instruction of-the-intellect possible then the-intellect*
non se habet ad Socratem nisi sicut movens ad motum. Sed
*not itself has to Socrates except as mover to moved but*
secundum hoc, actio intellectus quæ est intelligere, nullo
*according-to this the-action of-the-intellect which is to-understand in-no*
modo poterit attribui Socrati: quod multipliciter apparet.
*way will-be-able to-be-attributed to-Socrates which in-many-ways appears*

Primo quidem, per hoc quod dicit Philosophus in 2
*first indeed through this which says the-Philosopher in 2*
Metaphysic., quod «quorum diversum est aliquod opus
*Metaphysics that of-which-things diverse is some work*
præter actionem, actio est in eo quod fit, ut ædificatio in
*besides the-action the-action is in that which is-made as building in*

ædificato, et contextio in contexto: similiter autem et aliis,
*the-thing-built and weaving in the-thing-woven similarly moreover also in-others*
et totaliter ut motus in moto. Quorum vero non est aliud
*and totally as motion in the-moved of-which but not is other*
aliquod opus præter actionem, in eis existit actio, ut visio in
*some work besides the-action in them exists the-action as vision in*
vidente, et speculatio in speculante». Sic ergo etsi intellectus
*the-seer and speculation in the-speculator thus therefore even-if the-intellect*
ponatur uniri Socrati ut movens, nihil proficit ad hoc
*be-posited to-be-united to-Socrates as mover nothing it-profits for this*
quod intelligere est in Socrate, nec quod Socrates intelligat:
*that the-understanding is in Socrates nor that Socrates understand*
quia intelligere est actio quæ est in intellectu tantum.
*because the-understanding is an-action which is in the-intellect only*
Ex quo etiam patet falsum esse quod dicunt, quod intellectus
*from which also is-plain false to-be what they-say that the-intellect*
non est actus corporis, sed ipsum intelligere. Non enim potest
*not is the-act of-the-body but the-very understanding not for can*
esse alicujus actus intelligere, cujus non sit actus intellectus:
*to-be of-anything the-act the-understanding of-which not be the-act the-intellect*
quia intelligere non nisi in intellectu est, sicut nec visio nisi
*because understanding not except in the-intellect is as neither vision except*
in visu: unde nec visio potest esse alicujus nisi illius cujus
*in sight whence neither vision can to-be of-anything except of-that of-which*
actus est visus. Secundo, quia actio moventis propria non
*the-act is sight second because the-action of-the-mover proper not*
attribuitur instrumento aut moto; sed magis e converso
*is-attributed to-the-instrument or to-the-moved but rather from the-converse*
actio instrumenti attribuitur principali moventi: non enim
*the-action of-the-instrument is-attributed to-the-principal mover not for*
potest dici quod serra disponat de artificio; potest tamen
*can to-be-said that the-saw disposes of the-artifact it-can yet*

dici quod artifex secat, quod est opus serræ. Propria
*to-be-said that the-craftsman cuts which is the-work of-the-saw the-proper*
autem operatio ipsius intellectus est intelligere: unde, dato
*moreover operation of-the-very intellect is to-understand whence granted*
etiam quod intelligere esset actio transiens in alterum, sicut
*even that understanding were an-action passing into another as*
movere, non sequeretur quod intelligere conveniret Socrati,
*to-move not it-would-follow that understanding would-belong to-Socrates*
si intellectus uniatur ei solum ut motor. Tertio, quia in
*if the-intellect be-united to-him only as mover third because in*
his quorum actiones in alterum transeunt, opposito modo
*those whose actions into another pass in-the-opposite way*
attribuuntur actiones moventibus et motis. Secundum
*are-attributed actions to-movers and to-the-moved according-to*
ædificationem enim ædificator dicitur ædificare, ædificium vero
*building for the-builder is-said to-build the-building but*
ædificari. Si ergo intelligere esset actio in alterum transiens,
*to-be-built if therefore understanding were an-action into another passing*
sicut movere; adhuc non esset dicendum quod Socrates
*as to-move still not it-would-be to-be-said that Socrates*
intelligeret ad hoc quod intellectus uniretur ei ut motor; sed
*understood for this that the-intellect were-united to-him as mover but*
magis quod intellectus intelligeret, et Socrates intelligeretur;
*rather that the-intellect understood and Socrates was-understood*
aut forte quod intellectus intelligendo moveret Socratem, et
*or perhaps that the-intellect by-understanding moved Socrates and*
Socrates moveretur. Contingit tamen quandoque quod actio
*Socrates was-moved it-happens yet sometimes that the-action*
moventis traducitur in rem motam, puta cum ipsum
*of-the-mover is-carried-over into the-thing moved for-example when the-very*
motum movet ex eo quod movetur, ut calefactum calefacit.
*moved moves from this that it-is-moved as the-heated heats*

Posset ergo aliquis sic dicere, quod motum ab intellectu, qui
*could therefore someone thus to-say that the-moved by the-intellect which*
intelligendo movet, ex hoc ipso quod movetur intelligit.
*by-understanding moves from this very-thing that it-is-moved understands*
Huic autem dicto Aristoteles resistit in 2 de Anima,
*to-this moreover saying Aristotle resists in 2 on the-Soul*
unde principium hujus rationis assumpsimus. Cum enim
*whence the-principle of-this argument we-took when for*
dixisset quod id quo primo scimus et sanamur, est
*he-had-said that that by-which first we-know and are-healed is*
forma, scilicet scientia et sanitas, subjungit: «Videntur enim
*the-form namely knowledge and health he-adds they-seem for*
in patiente et disposito activorum inesse actus»; quod
*in the-patient and disposed of-the-active-things to-be-in the-acts which*
exponens Themistius dicit: «Nam etsi ab aliis aliquando
*expounding Themistius says for even-if from others sometimes*
scientia et sanitas est, puta a docente et medico;
*knowledge and health is for-example from the-teacher and the-physician*
tamen in patiente et dispositio facientium inexistere actus
*yet in the-patient and the-disposition of-the-makers to-be-in the-acts*
ostendimus prius in his quæ de natura». Est ergo
*we-showed earlier in those which about nature it-is therefore*
intentio Aristotelis, et evidenter est verum, quod quando
*the-intention of-Aristotle and evidently it-is true that when*
motum movet, et habet actionem moventis. oportet quod
*the-moved moves and has the-action of-the-mover it-is-necessary that*
insit ei actus aliquis a movente, qui hujusmodi actionem
*be-in it act some from the-mover which of-this-kind action*
habeat: et hoc est principium quo agit, et est actus
*have and this is the-principle by-which it-acts and is the-act*
et forma ejus, sicut si aliquid est calefactum, calefacit per
*and form its as if something is heated it-heats through*

calorem, qui inest ei a calefaciente. Detur ergo
*the-heat which is-in it from the-heater let-it-be-granted therefore*
quod intellectus moveat animam Socratis vel illustrando, vel
*that the-intellect move the-soul of-Socrates either by-illuminating or*
quocumque modo; hoc quod est relictum ab impressione
*in-whatever way this which is left by the-impression*
intellectus in Socrate, et primum quo Socrates intelligit.
*of-the-intellect in Socrates is-also the-first by-which Socrates understands*
Id autem quo Socrates primo intelligit, sicut sensu sentit,
*that moreover by-which Socrates first understands as by-sense he-senses*
Aristoteles probavit esse in potentia omnia, et per hoc non
*Aristotle proved to-be in potency all-things and through this not*
habere naturam determinatam, nisi hanc quod sit possibilis,
*to-have a-nature determinate except this that it-be possible*
et per consequens quod non misceatur corpori, sed sit
*and by consequence that not it-be-mixed with-the-body but be*
separatus. Dato ergo quod sit aliquis intellectus separatus
*separate granted therefore that there-be some intellect separate*
movens Socratem, tamen adhuc oportet quod ille intellectus
*moving Socrates yet still it-is-necessary that that intellect*
possibilis, de quo Aristoteles loquitur, sit in anima Socratis,
*possible about which Aristotle speaks be in the-soul of-Socrates*
sicut et sensus, qui est in potentia ad omnia sensibilia,
*as also the-sense which is in potency to all sensibles*
quo Socrates sentit. Si autem dicatur quod hoc individuum
*by-which Socrates senses if moreover it-be-said that this individual*
quod est Socrates, non est aliquid compositum ex intellectu
*which is Socrates not is something composed of intellect*
et corpore animato, neque est corpus animatum tantum, sed
*and body animated nor is a-body animated only but*
est solum intellectus; hæc jam erit opinio Platonis, qui, ut
*is only intellect this now will-be the-opinion of-Plato who as*

Gregorius Nyssenus refert, propter hanc difficultatem non
*Gregory of-Nyssa relates on-account-of this difficulty not*
vult hominem ex anima et corpore esse, sed animam corpore
*wishes man from soul and body to-be but the-soul the-body*
utentem, et velut indutam corpore. Sed et Plotinus, ut
*using and as-it-were clothed-with the-body but also Plotinus as*
Macrobius refert, ipsam animam hominem esse testatur, sic
*Macrobius relates the-very soul the-man to-be testifies thus*
dicens: «Qui videtur, non ipse verus homo est, sed ille a
*saying that-which is-seen not itself the-true man is but that by*
quo regitur quod videtur. Sic cum morte animalis discedit
*which is-ruled what is-seen thus when by-the-death of-the-animal departs*
animatio, cadit corpus a regente viduatum; et hoc est quod
*the-animation falls the-body by the-ruler widowed and this is what*
videtur in homine mortale. Anima vero, quæ est versus
*is-seen in man mortal the-soul but which is the-true*
homo, est ab omni mortalitatis conditione aliena». Qui
*man is from every of-mortality condition foreign which*
quidem Plotinus unus de magnis Commentatoribus ponitur
*indeed Plotinus one of the-great Commentators is-placed*
inter Commentatores Aristotelis, ut Simplicius refert, in
*among the-Commentators of-Aristotle as Simplicius relates in*
commento Prædicamentorum. Hæc autem sententia nec a
*the-commentary on-the-Categories this moreover judgment neither from*
verbis Aristotelis videtur discordare. Dicit enim in 9 Ethic.
*the-words of-Aristotle seems to-disagree he-says for in 9 Ethics*
quod «boni hominis est bonum elaborare etiam sui ipsius
*that of-the-good man it-is good to-labor also for-his own*
gratia: intellectus enim gratia unusquisque esse videtur».
*sake of-the-intellect for for-the-sake each-one to-be seems*
Quod quidem non dicit propter hoc quod homo sit solus
*which indeed not he-says on-account-of this that man be only*

intellectus, sed quia id quod est in homine principalius, est
*intellect but because that which is in man more-principal is*
intellectus: unde et in sequentibus dicit quod, «quemadmodum
*the-intellect whence also in the-following he-says that as*
civitas principalissimum maxime videtur, et omnis alia
*a-city the-most-principal-thing most seems-to-be and every other*
constitutio, sic et homo;» unde subjungit «quod unusquisque
*constitution thus also man whence he-adds that each*
homo vel est hic», scilicet intellectus, «vel maxime». Et per
*man either is this namely the-intellect or most-of-all and in*
hunc modum arbitror et Themistium in verbis supra positis,
*this way I-judge both Themistius in the-words above placed*
et Plotinum in verbis nunc inductis dixisse, quod homo est
*and Plotinus in the-words now brought-in to-have-said that man is*
anima vel intellectus. Quod enim homo non sit intellectus
*soul or intellect that for man not be intellect*
tantum vel anima tantum, multipliciter probatur. Primo quidem
*only or soul only in-many-ways is-proved first indeed*
ab ipso Gregorio Nysseno, qui, inducta opinione Platonis,
*by the-very Gregory of-Nyssa who brought-in the-opinion of-Plato*
subdit: «Habet autem hic sermo difficile vel indissolubile
*adds has moreover this discourse difficult or insoluble*
quid. Qualiter enim unum esse potest indumento anima?
*something how for one to-be can with-the-clothing the-soul*
Non enim unum est tunica cum induto». Secundo, quia
*not for one is the-tunic with the-one-clothed second because*
Aristoteles in 7 Metaph. probat quod homo et equus et
*Aristotle in 7 Metaphysics proves that man and horse and*
similia non sunt solum forma, sed totum quoddam ex forma
*like-things not are only form but a-whole certain of form*
et materia, ut universale; singulare vero ex ultima materia
*and matter as universal the-singular but of last matter*

et forma, ut Socrates. Jam est et in aliis similiter. Et hoc
*and form as Socrates now it-is also in others similarly and this*
probavit per hoc quod nulla pars corporis potest definiri
*he-proved through this that no part of-the-body can to-be-defined*
sine parte aliqua animæ; et recedente anima, nec oculus
*without part some of-the-soul and the-soul departing neither the-eye*
nec caro dicitur nisi æquivoce: quod non esset, si homo aut
*nor flesh is-called except equivocally which not would-be if man or*
Socrates esset tantum intellectus aut anima. Tertio sequeretur
*Socrates were only intellect or soul third it-would-follow*
quod cum intellectus non moveat nisi per voluntatem, ut
*that since the-intellect not move except through will as*
probatur in 3 de Anima, hoc esset subjectum voluntati,
*is-proved in 3 on the-Soul this would-be subject to-the-will*
quod retineret hoc corpus cum vellet, et abjiceret cum
*that it-should-keep this body when it-wished and it-should-throw-off when*
vellet: quod manifeste patet esse falsum. Sic igitur patet quod
*it-wished which manifestly is-plain to-be false thus therefore is-plain that*
intellectus non unitur Socrati solum ut motor; et quod etiam
*the-intellect not is-united to-Socrates only as mover and that even*
si hoc esset, nihil proficeret ad hoc quod Socrates intelligeret.
*if this were nothing would-it-profit for this that Socrates understand*
Qui ergo hanc positionem defendere volunt, aut confiteantur
*who therefore this position to-defend wish either let-them-confess*
se nihil intelligere, et indignos esse cum quibus aliqui
*themselves nothing to-understand and unworthy to-be with whom anyone*
disputent; aut confiteantur quod Aristoteles concludit, scilicet
*should-dispute or let-them-confess what Aristotle concludes namely*
quod id quo primo intelligimus, est species et forma.
*that that by-which first we-understand is the-species and form*

Potest etiam hoc concludi ex hoc quod hic homo in aliqua
*it-can also this to-be-concluded from this that this man in some*
specie collocatur. Speciem autem nunquam sortitur aliquid nisi
*species is-placed the-species moreover never obtains anything except*
ex forma. Id igitur per quod hic homo speciem sortitur, est
*from form that therefore through which this man the-species obtains is*
forma. Unumquodque autem ab eo speciem sortitur quod est
*the-form each-thing moreover from that the-species obtains which is*
principium propriæ operationis speciei. Propria autem operatio
*the-principle of-the-proper operation of-the-species the-proper moreover operation*
hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere: per hoc
*of-man in as-far he-is man is to-understand through this*
enim differt ab aliis animalibus, et ideo in hac operatione
*for he-differs from the-other animals and therefore in this operation*
Aristoteles felicitatem ultimam constituit. Principium autem
*Aristotle happiness ultimate establishes the-principle moreover*
quo intelligimus, est intellectus, ut Aristoteles dicit. Oportet
*by-which we-understand is the-intellect as Aristotle says it-is-necessary*
igitur ipsum uniri corpori ut formam: non quidem ita
*therefore it to-be-united to-the-body as form not indeed so*
quod ipsa intellectiva potentia sit alicujus organi actus; sed
*that the-very intellective power be of-any organ the-act but*
quia est virtus animæ, quæ est actus corporis physici organici.
*because it-is a-power of-the-soul which is the-act of-a-body physical organic*

Adhuc. Secundum istorum positionem destruuntur moralis
*further according-to of-these the-position are-destroyed of-moral*
Philosophiæ principia: subtrahitur enim quidquid est in nobis.
*Philosophy the-principles is-withdrawn for whatever is in us*
Non enim est aliquid in nobis nisi per voluntatem: unde et
*not for is anything in us except through the-will whence also*
hoc ipsum voluntarium dicitur quod in nobis est. Voluntas
*this very-thing voluntary is-called that in us is the-will*

autem in intellectu est, ut patet per dictum Aristotelem in
*moreover in the-intellect is as is-plain through the-said Aristotle in*
3 de Anima: et per hoc quod in substantiis separatis est
*3 on the-Soul and through this that in substances separate is*
intellectus et voluntas; et per hoc etiam quod contingit
*intellect and will and through this also that it-happens*
per voluntatem aliquid in universali amare vel odire, sicut
*through will something in the-universal to-love or to-hate as*
odimus latronum genus, ut Aristoteles dicit in sua Rhetorica.
*we-hate of-robbers the-kind as Aristotle says in his Rhetoric*
Si igitur intellectus non est aliquid hujus hominis, vel non est
*if therefore the-intellect not is anything of-this man or not is*
vere unum cum eo, sed unitur ei solum per phantasmata,
*truly one with him but is-united to-him only through phantasms*
vel sicut motor: non erit in homine voluntas; sed in
*or as mover not there-will-be in man will but in*
intellectu separato, et ita hic homo non erit dominus sui
*the-intellect separate and so this man not will-be the-master of-his*
actus, nec aliquis ejus actus erit laudabilis vel vituperabilis:
*act nor any his act will-be praiseworthy or blameworthy*
quod est divellere principia moralis philosophiæ. Quod cum
*which is to-tear-up the-principles of-moral philosophy which since*
sit absurdum, et vitæ humanæ contrarium (non enim
*it-be absurd and to-life human contrary not for*
esset necesse consiliari, nec leges ferre) sequitur quod
*it-would-be necessary to-take-counsel nor laws to-make it-follows that*
intellectus sic uniatur nobis ut vere ex eo et nobis fiat
*the-intellect thus be-united to-us that truly from it and us be-made*
unum: quod vere non potest esse nisi eo modo quo
*one which truly not can to-be except in-that way in-which*
dictum est, ut sit etiam potentia animæ, quæ unitur nobis
*said it-is that it-be also a-power of-the-soul which is-united to-us*

ut forma. Relinquitur igitur hic absque omni dubitatione
*as form it-remains therefore this without all doubt*
tenendum propter revelationem fidei, ut dicunt; sed
*to-be-held on-account-of the-revelation of-the-faith as they-say but*
quia hoc subtrahere est niti contra manifeste apparentia.
*because this to-withdraw is to-strive against manifestly things-appearing*

Rationes vero quas in contrarium adducunt, non difficile
*the-arguments but which to the-contrary they-adduce not difficult*
est solvere. Dicunt enim quod ex hac positione sequitur
*it-is to-solve they-say for that from this position it-follows*
quod intellectus sit forma materialis, et non sit denudata ab
*that the-intellect be a-form material and not be stripped of*
omnibus naturis rerum sensibilium; et per consequens quidquid
*all natures of-things sensible and by consequence whatever*
recipitur sicut in materia individualiter, et non universaliter.
*is-received as in matter individually and not universally*
Et ulterius, ut intellectus recipitur quia si est forma materialis
*and further that the-intellect is-received because if it-is a-form material*
quod non est intellecta in actu, et ita intellectus non poterit
*that not it-is understood in act and so the-intellect not will-be-able*
se intelligere; quod est manifeste falsum; nulla enim forma
*itself to-understand which is manifestly false no for form*
materialis est intellecta in actu. Horum autem solutio apparet
*material is understood in act of-these moreover the-solution appears*
ex his quæ præmissa sunt. Non enim dicimus animam
*from those which premised they-are not for we-say the-soul*
humanam esse formam corporis secundum intellectivam
*human to-be the-form of-the-body according-to the-intellective*
potentiam, quæ, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, nullius organi
*power which according-to the-teaching of-Aristotle of-no organ*
actus est: unde remanet quod anima, quantum ad intellectivam
*the-act is whence it-remains that the-soul as-far to the-intellective*

potentiam, sit immaterialis, et immaterialiter recipiens, et
*power be immaterial and immaterially receiving and*
seipsam intelligens. Unde et Aristoteles signanter dicit de
*itself understanding whence also Aristotle pointedly says about*
anima, quod est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus.
*the-soul that it-is the-place of-species not the-whole but the-intellect*

Si autem contra hoc objiciatur quod potentia animæ non
*if moreover against this it-be-objected that the-power of-the-soul not*
potest esse immaterialior aut simplicior quam ejus essentia:
*can to-be more-immaterial or simpler than its essence*
optime procederet, si essentia animæ humanæ sic esset forma
*excellently it-would-proceed if the-essence of-the-soul human thus were the-form*
materiæ, quod non per esse suum esset, sed per esse
*of-matter that not through to-be its it-were but through the-to-be*
compositi, sicut est de aliis formis, quæ secundum se
*of-the-composite as it-is of the-other forms which according-to themselves*
nec esse nec operationem habent præter communicationem
*neither to-be nor operation have beside the-communication*
materiæ, quæ propter hoc immersæ materiæ dicuntur. Anima
*of-matter which on-account-of this immersed in-matter are-said the-soul*
autem humana, quia secundum suum est forma, cui
*moreover human because according-to its is a-form with-which*
aliqualiter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens
*in-some-way shares matter not totally comprehending*
ipsam, eo quod major est dignitas hujus formæ
*it for-the-reason that greater is the-dignity of-this form*
quam capacitas materiæ; nihil prohibet quin habeat aliquam
*than the-capacity of-matter nothing prevents but-that it-have some*
operationem vel virtutem. ad quam materia non attingit.
*operation or power to which matter not reaches*

Consideret autem qui hoc dicit, quod, si hoc intellectivum
*let-him-consider moreover who this says that if this intellective*
principium, quo nos intelligimus, esset secundum esse
*principle by-which we understand were according-to to-be*
separatum et distinctum ab anima, quæ est corporis nostri
*separate and distinct from the-soul which is of-the-body our*
forma, esset secundum se intelligens et intellectum; nec
*the-form it-would-be according-to itself understanding and understood nor*
quandoque intelligeret, quandoque non: neque etiam indigeret
*sometimes would-it-understand sometimes not nor also would-it-need*
ut seipsum cognosceret per intelligibilia et per actus, sed
*that itself it-know through intelligibles and through acts but*
per essentiam suam, sicut aliæ substantiæ separatæ; neque
*through essence its as other substances separate nor*
etiam esset conveniens quod ad intelligendum indigeret
*also would-it-be fitting that for understanding it-needed*
phantasmatibus nostris. Non enim invenitur in rerum ordine
*phantasms our not for it-is-found in of-things the-order*
quod superiores substantiæ ad suas principales perfectiones
*that higher substances for their principal perfections*
indigeant inferioribus substantiis, sicut nec corpora cœlestia
*need lower substances as neither bodies heavenly*
formantur aut perficiuntur ad suas operationes ex corporibus
*are-formed or perfected for their operations from bodies*
inferioribus. Magnam igitur improbabilitatem continet sermo
*lower great therefore improbability contains the-discourse*
dicentis quod intellectus sit quoddam principium secundum
*of-one-saying that the-intellect be a-certain principle according-to*
substantiam separatum, et tamen quod per species a
*substance separate and yet that through species from*
phantasmatibus acceptas perficiatur, et fiat actu intelligens.
*phantasms received it-be-perfected and become in-act understanding*

His igitur consideratis quantum ad id quod ponunt,
*these-things therefore considered as-far to that which they-posit*
intellectum non esse animam, quæ est nostri corporis forma,
*the-intellect not to-be the-soul which is of-our body the-form*
neque partem ipsius, sed aliquid secundum substantiam
*nor a-part of-it but something according-to substance*
separatum; considerandum restat de hoc quod dicunt,
*separate to-be-considered remains about this that they-say*
intellectum possibilem esse unum in omnibus. Forte enim
*the-intellect possible to-be one in all perhaps for*
de agente hoc dicere, aliquam rationem haberet, et multi
*about the-agent this to-say some reason it-would-have and many*
philosophi hoc posuerunt: nihil enim videtur inconveniens
*philosophers this posited nothing for seems unfitting*
sequi, si ab uno agente multa perficiantur, quemadmodum
*to-follow if by one agent many-things be-perfected as*
ab uno sole perficiuntur omnes potentiæ visivæ animalium ad
*by one sun are-perfected all the-powers visive of-animals for*
videndum; quamvis etiam hoc non sit secundum intentionem.
*seeing although also this not be according-to the-intention*
Aristotelis, qui ponit intellectum agentem esse aliquid in
*of-Aristotle who posits the-intellect agent to-be something in*
anima, unde comparat ipsum lumini. Plato autem, ponens
*the-soul whence he-compares it to-light Plato moreover positing*
intellectum unum separatum, comparavit ipsum soli, ut
*the-intellect one separate compared it to-the-sun as*
Themistius dicit: est enim unus sol, sed plura lumina
*Themistius says there-is for one sun but many lights*
diffusa a sole ad videndum. Sed quidquid sit de
*diffused from the-sun for seeing but whatever be about*

intellectu agente, dicere intellectum possibilem esse unum
*the-intellect agent to-say the-intellect possible to-be one*
omnium hominum, multipliciter impossibile apparet.
*of-all men in-many-ways impossible appears*

Primo quidem, quia si intellectus possibilis est quo
*first indeed because if the-intellect possible is that-by-which*
intelligimus, necesse est dicere quod homo singularis
*we-understand necessary it-is to-say that man singular*
intelligens vel sit ipse intellectus, vel intellectus formaliter
*understanding either be himself the-intellect or the-intellect formally*
ei inhæreat, non quidem ita quod sit forma corporis,
*to-him inhere not indeed so that it-be the-form of-the-body*
sed quia est virtus animæ, quæ est forma corporis.
*but because it-is a-power of-the-soul which is the-form of-the-body*

Si quis autem dicat quod hic homo singularis est ipse
*if anyone moreover say that this man singular is himself*
intellectus, consequens est quod hic homo singularis non sit
*the-intellect consequent it-is that this man singular not be*
alius ab illo homine singulari; et quod omnes homines sint
*other from that man singular and that all men be*
unus homo, non quidem participatione speciei, sed secundum
*one man not indeed by-participation of-the-species but according-to*
unum individuum. Si vero intellectus inest nobis formaliter,
*one individual if but the-intellect is-in us formally*
sicut jam dictum est, sequitur quod diversorum corporum
*as already said it-is it-follows that of-diverse bodies*
sunt diversæ animæ. Sicut enim homo est ex corpore et
*are diverse souls as for man is from body and*
anima; ita hic homo, scilicet Callias aut Socrates, est ex hoc
*soul so this man namely Callias or Socrates is from this*
corpore et ex hac anima. Si autem animæ sunt diversæ,
*body and from this soul if moreover the-souls are diverse*

et intellectus possibilis est virtus animæ, qua anima
*and the-intellect possible is a-power of-the-soul by-which the-soul*
intelligit; oportet quod differat numero, quia nec fingere
*understands it-is-necessary that it-differ in-number because not-even to-feign*
possibile est quod diversarum rerum sit una numero virtus.
*possible is-it that of-diverse things be one in-number power*

Si quis autem dicat, quod homo intelligit per intellectum
*if anyone moreover say that man understands through the-intellect*
possibilem sicut per aliquid sui, quod tamen est pars
*possible as through something of-himself which yet is a-part*
ejus non ut forma, sed sicut motor; jam ostensum est supra
*of-him not as form but as mover already shown it-is above*
quod, hac positione facta, nullo modo potest dici quod
*that this position made in-no way can to-be-said that*
Socrates intelligat. Sed demus quod Socrates intelligit per
*Socrates understand but let-us-grant that Socrates understands through*
hoc quod intellectus intelligit, licet intellectus sit solum
*this that the-intellect understands although the-intellect be only*
motor, sicut homo videt per hoc quod oculus videt. Et ut
*mover as man sees through this that the-eye sees and that*
similitudinem sequamur, ponatur quod omnium hominum
*the-likeness we-may-follow let-it-be-posited that of-all men*
sit unus oculus numero: inquirendum restat utrum omnes
*there-be one eye in-number to-be-inquired remains whether all*
homines sint unus videns, vel multi videntes. Ad cujus
*men be one seer or many seers to whose*
veritatis inquisitionem considerare oportet quod aliter se
*truth the-inquiry to-consider it-is-necessary that otherwise itself*
habet de primo movente, et aliter de instrumento. Si enim
*it-has about the-first mover and otherwise about the-instrument if for*
multi homines utantur uno et eodem instrumento numero,
*many men use one and the-same instrument in-number*

dicentur multæ operationes: puta cum multi utuntur una
*will-be-said many operations for-example when many use one*
machina ad lapidum projectionem vel elevationem. Si vero
*machine for of-stones the-throwing or lifting if but*
principale agens sit unum, quod utatur multis instrumentis;
*the-principal agent be one which use many instruments*
nihilominus operans est unum, sed fortes operationes diversæ
*nevertheless the-operator is one but perhaps the-operations diverse*
propter diversa instrumenta. Aliquando autem est operatio
*on-account-of the-diverse instruments sometimes moreover is the-operation*
una, licet ad eam multa instrumenta requirantur. Sic igitur
*one although for it many instruments be-required thus therefore*
unitas operantis attenditur non secundum instrumenta, sed
*the-unity of-the-operator is-regarded not according-to the-instruments but*
secundum principale agens, quod utitur instrumentis. Prædicta
*according-to the-principal agent which uses the-instruments the-aforesaid*
igitur positione facta, si oculus esset principale in homine,
*therefore position made if the-eye were the-principal-thing in man*
qui uteretur omnibus potentiis animæ et partibus corporis
*which used all the-powers of-the-soul and the-parts of-the-body*
quasi instrumentis, multi habentes unum oculum essent
*as-it-were instruments many having one eye would-be*
unus videns. Si ergo oculus non sit principale hominis,
*one seer if therefore the-eye not be the-principal-thing of-man*
sed aliquid sit in eo principalius quod utitur oculo, quod
*but something be in him more-principal which uses the-eye which*
diversificatur in diversis; essent quidem multi videntes. sed
*is-diversified in diverse-men they-would-be indeed many seers but*
uno oculo. Manifestum est autem quod intellectus est id
*with-one eye manifest it-is moreover that the-intellect is that*
quod est principale in homine, et utitur omnibus potentiis
*which is principal in man and uses all the-powers*

animæ et membris temporis tamquam organis: propter hoc
*of-the-soul and the-members of-the-body as organs on-account-of this*
Aristoteles subtiliter dixit quod «homo est intellectus maxime».
*Aristotle subtly said that man is the-intellect most-of-all*
Si igitur sit unus intellectus omnium, ex necessitate
*if therefore there-be one intellect of-all from necessity*
sequitur quod sit unus intelligens, et per consequens unus
*it-follows that there-be one understander and by consequence one*
volens, et unus utens pro suæ voluntatis arbitrio omnibus illis
*willer and one user for of-his will the-choice all those*
secundum quæ homines diversificantur ab invicem. Et ex
*according-to which men are-diversified from each-other and from*
hoc ulterius sequitur quod nulla differentia sit inter homines
*this further it-follows that no difference be among men*
quantum ad liberam voluntatis electionem, sed eadem sit
*as-far to the-free of-the-will choice but the-same be*
omnium; si intellectus, apud quem solum residet principalitas
*of-all if the-intellect with which alone resides the-principality*
et dominium utendi omnibus aliis, est unus et idem in
*and lordship of-using all other-things is one and the-same in*
diversis hominibus: quod est manifeste falsum et impossibile.
*diverse men which is manifestly false and impossible*
Repugnat enim his quæ apparent, et destruit totam
*it-is-repugnant for to-those which appear and destroys the-whole*
scientiam moralem, et omnia quæ pertinent ad conversationem
*science moral and all-things which pertain to the-intercourse*
civilem, quæ est omnibus naturalis, ut Aristoteles dicit.
*civil which is to-all natural as Aristotle says*

Adhuc. Si omnes homines intelligunt uno intellectu,
*further if all men understand by-one intellect*
qualitercumque eis uniatur, aut ut forma, sive ut motor;
*in-whatever-way to-them it-be-united either as form or as mover*

de necessitate sequitur quod omnium hominum sit unum
*of necessity it-follows that of-all men there-be one*
numero intelligere quod est simul et respectu unius
*in-number understanding which is at-once and with-respect-to one*
intelligibilis: puta, si ego intelligo lapidem, et tu similiter,
*intelligible for-example if I understand a-stone and you similarly*
oportebit quod una et eadem sit intellectualis operatio et
*it-will-be-necessary that one and the-same be the-intellectual operation both*
mei et tui. Non enim potest esse ejusdem activi principii,
*of-me and of-you not for can to-be of-the-same active principle*
sive sit forma, sive sit motor, respectu ejusdem objecti, nisi
*whether it-be form or it-be mover with-respect-to the-same object except*
una numero operatio ejusdem speciei in eodem tempore: quod
*one in-number operation of-the-same species in the-same time which*
manifestum est ex his quæ Philosophus determinat in 5 Phys.
*manifest is from those which the-Philosopher determines in 5 Physics*
Unde, si essent multi homines habentes unum oculum, omnium
*whence if there-were many men having one eye of-all*
visio non esset nisi una respectu ejusdem objecti in
*the-vision not would-be except one with-respect-to the-same object in*
eodem tempore. Similiter ergo, si intellectus sit unus omnium,
*the-same time similarly therefore if the-intellect be one of-all*
sequitur quod omnium hominum idem intelligentium eodem
*it-follows that of-all men the-same understanding at-the-same*
tempore sit una actio intellectualis tantum; et præcipue,
*time there-be one action intellectual only and especially*
cum nihil eorum secundum quæ ponuntur homines differre ab
*since nothing of-those according-to which are-posited men to-differ from*
invicem in operatione intellectuali diversificetur. Phantasmata
*each-other in operation intellectual be-diversified phantasms*
enim præambula sunt actioni intellectus, sicut colores actioni
*for preliminary are to-the-action of-the-intellect as colors to-the-action*

visus: unde per eorum diversitatem non diversificatur actio
*of-sight whence through their diversity not is-diversified the-action*
intellectus, maxime unius intelligibilis; secundum quæ tamen
*of-the-intellect most-of-all of-one intelligible according-to which yet*
ponunt diversificari scientiam hujus a scientia alterius, in
*they-posit to-be-diversified the-knowledge of-this-man from the-knowledge of-the-other in*
quantum hic intelligit ea quorum phantasmata habet,
*as-far this-man understands those-things whose phantasms he-has*
et ille ea quorum phantasmata habet. Sed in duobus
*and that-man those-things whose phantasms he-has but in two*
qui idem sciunt et intelligunt, ipsa operatio intellectualis
*who the-same know and understand the-very operation intellectual*
per diversitatem phantasmatis nullatenus diversificari potest.
*through the-diversity of-the-phantasm in-no-wise to-be-diversified can*

Adhuc autem ostendendum est quod hæc positio manifeste
*further moreover to-be-shown it-is that this position manifestly*
apparet repugnans dictis Aristotelis. Cum enim dixisset de
*appears repugnant to-the-sayings of-Aristotle when for he-had-said about*
intellectu possibili, quod est separatus, et quod est in potentia
*the-intellect possible that it-is separate and that it-is in potency*
omnia, subjungit quod, «cum sic singula sciat», scilicet in
*all-things he-adds that when thus the-several-things it-knows namely in*
actu, «ut sciens dicitur qui secundum actum», id est, hoc
*act as the-knower is-called who according-to act that is in-this*
modo sicut scientia est actus, et sciens dicitur esse in actu in
*way as knowledge is act and the-knower is-said to-be in act in*
quantum habet habitum: unde subdit: «Hoc autem confestim
*as-far he-has the-habit whence he-adds this moreover at-once*
accidit, cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur
*happens when it-can to-operate through itself it-is indeed therefore*
et tunc potentia quodammodo, non tamen similiter sicut
*also then in-potency in-a-way not yet similarly as*

ante addiscere aut invenire». Et postea cum quæsivisset: «Si
*before to-learn or to-find and afterward when he-had-asked if*
intellectus simplex est et impassibilis, et nulli nihil habet
*the-intellect simple is and impassible and with-none nothing has*
commune, sicut dixit Anaxagoras; quomodo intelliget, si
*common as said Anaxagoras how will-it-understand if*
intelligere pati aliquid est?» Et ad hoc solvendum respondet
*to-understand to-suffer something is and for this to-be-solved he-answers*
dicens: «Quoniam potentia quodammodo est intelligibilia
*saying since in-potency in-a-way is the-intelligibles*
intellectus, sed actu nihil antequam intelligat. Oportet autem
*the-intellect but in-act nothing before it-understand it-is-necessary moreover*
sit, sicut in tabula nihil est actu scriptum: quod quidem accidit
*it-be as in a-tablet nothing is in-act written which indeed happens*
in intellectu». Est ergo sententia Aristotelis, quod intellectus
*in the-intellect it-is therefore the-judgment of-Aristotle that the-intellect*
possibilis ante addiscere aut invenire est in potentia, sicut tabula
*possible before to-learn or to-find is in potency as a-tablet*
in qua nihil est actu scriptum; sed post addiscere et invenire
*in which nothing is in-act written but after to-learn and to-find*
secundum habitum scientiæ, quo potest per seipsum
*according-to the-habit of-knowledge by-which it-can through itself*
operari, quamvis et tunc sit in potentia ad considerare in actu.
*to-operate although also then it-be in potency to considering in act*

Ubi tria notanda sunt. Primo, quod habitus scientiæ est
*where three-things to-be-noted are first that the-habit of-knowledge is*
actus primus ipsius intellectus possibilis, qui secundum hunc
*the-act first of-the-very intellect possible which according-to this*
fit actu, et potest per seipsum operari. Non autem scientia
*becomes in-act and can through itself to-operate not moreover knowledge*
est solum secundum phantasmata illustrata, ut quidam dicunt,
*is only according-to phantasms illuminated as some say*

et quædam facultas quæ in nobis acquiritur ex frequenti
*and a-certain faculty which in us is-acquired from frequent*
meditatione et exercitio, ut continuemur cum intellectu
*meditation and exercise that we-be-continued with the-intellect*
possibili per nostra phantasmata. Secundo notandum quod
*possible through our phantasms second to-be-noted that*
ante, nostrum addiscere et invenire, ipse intellectus possibilis
*before our to-learn and to-find the-very intellect possible*
est in potentia, sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Tertio,
*is in potency as a-tablet in which nothing is written third*
quod per nostrum addiscere seu invenire, ipse intellectus
*that through our to-learn or to-find the-very intellect*
possibilis fit actu. Hæc autem nullo modo possunt stare,
*possible becomes in-act these moreover in-no way can to-stand*
si sit unus intellectus possibilis omnium qui sunt et erunt
*if there-be one intellect possible of-all who are and will-be*
aut fuerunt. Manifestum est enim quod species conservantur
*or have-been manifest it-is for that the-species are-preserved*
in intellectu: est enim locus specierum, ut Philosophus
*in the-intellect it-is for the-place of-species as the-Philosopher*
supra dixerat, et iterum scientia est habitus permanens.
*above had-said and again knowledge is a-habit permanent*
Si ergo per aliquem præcedentium hominum factus est
*if therefore through some of-the-preceding men made it-was*
in actu secundum aliquas species intelligibiles et perfectus
*in act according-to some species intelligible and perfected*
secundum habitum scientiæ, ille habitus et illæ species in
*according-to the-habit of-knowledge that habit and those species in*
eo remanent. Cum autem omne recipiens sit denudatum ab
*it remain since moreover every receiver be stripped of*

eo quod recipit. impossibile est quod per meum addiscere
*that which it-receives impossible it-is that through my to-learn*
aut invenire illæ species acquirantur in intellectu possibili.
*or to-find those species be-acquired in the-intellect possible*

Et si tamen aliquis dicat quod, secundum nostrum
*and if yet anyone say that according-to our*
invenire, intellectus possibilis secundum aliquid fiat in actu
*to-find the-intellect possible according-to something become in act*
de novo, puta si aliquid intelligibilium invenio, quod
*from new for-example if something of-intelligibles I-find which*
a nullo præcedentium est inventum; tamen in addiscendo
*by none of-the-preceding was found yet in learning*
hoc contingere non potest: non enim possum addiscere nisi
*this to-happen not can not for I-can to-learn except*
quod docens scivit. Frustra ergo dixit quod ante addiscere
*what the-teacher knew in-vain therefore he-said that before to-learn*
aut invenire, intellectus erat in potentia.
*or to-find the-intellect was in potency*

Sed et si quis addat, homines semper fuisse, secundum
*but even if anyone add men always to-have-been according-to*
opinionem Aristotelis; sequeretur quod non fuerit primus
*the-opinion of-Aristotle it-would-follow that not there-was a-first*
homo intelligens: et sic per phantasmata nullius species
*man understanding and thus through phantasms of-no-one the-species*
intelligibiles sunt acquisitæ in intellectu possibili, sed sunt
*intelligible are acquired in the-intellect possible but are*
species intelligibiles intellectus possibilis æternæ. Frustra
*the-species intelligible of-the-intellect possible eternal in-vain*
ergo Aristoteles posuit intellectum agentem, qui faceret
*therefore Aristotle posited the-intellect agent which should-make*
intelligibilia in potentia, intelligibilia actu. Frustra etiam
*the-intelligibles in potency intelligible in-act in-vain also*

posuit quod phantasmata se habent ad intellectum
*he-posited that phantasms themselves have to the-intellect*
possibilem sicut colores ad visum, si intellectus possibilis nihil
*possible as colors to sight if the-intellect possible nothing*
a phantasmatibus accipit. Quamvis et hoc ipsum irrationale
*from phantasms receives although also this itself irrational*
videatur, quod substantia separata a phantasmatibus nostris
*seems that a-substance separate from phantasms our*
accipiat, et quod non possit se intelligere nisi post nostrum
*receive and that not it-can itself to-understand except after our*
addiscere aut invenire, sive intelligere: quia Aristoteles post
*to-learn or to-find or to-understand because Aristotle after*
verba præmissa subjungit: «Et ipse tunc seipsum potest
*the-words premised adds and itself then itself can*
intelligere post addiscere aut invenire». Substantia enim separata
*to-understand after to-learn or to-find a-substance for separate*
per seipsam est intelligibilis: unde per suam essentiam
*through itself is intelligible whence through its essence*
se intelligeret intellectus possibilis, si esset substantia
*itself would-understand the-intellect possible if it-were a-substance*
separata; nec indigeret ad hoc speciebus intelligibilibus ei
*separate nor would-it-need for this species intelligible to-it*
supervenientibus per nostrum intelligere aut invenire.
*coming-over through our to-understand or to-find*

Si autem hæc inconvenientia velint evadere dicendo quod
*if moreover these unfitting-things they-wish to-evade by-saying that*
omnia prædicta Aristoteles dicit de intellectu possibili
*all the-aforesaid Aristotle says about the-intellect possible*
secundum quod continuatur nobis, et non secundum quod in
*according as it-is-continued to-us and not according as in*
se est: primo quidem dicendum est quod verba Aristotelis
*itself it-is first indeed to-be-said it-is that the-words of-Aristotle*

hoc non sapiunt; immo de ipso intellectu possibili
*this not savor nay about the-very intellect possible*
loquitur secundum id quod est proprium sibi, et secundum
*he-speaks according-to that which is proper to-it and according*
quod distinguitur ab agente. Si vero fiat vis de verbis
*as it-is-distinguished from the-agent if but be-done force on the-words*
Aristotelis; ponamus, ut dicunt, quod intellectus possibilis ab
*of-Aristotle let-us-posit as they-say that the-intellect possible from*
æterno habuerit species intelligibiles, per quas continuetur
*eternity had species intelligible through which it-be-continued*
nobis secundum phantasmata quæ sunt in intellectu possibili,
*to-us according-to phantasms which are in the-intellect possible*
et phantasmata quæ sunt in nobis, aliquo horum trium
*and the-phantasms which are in us in-some of-these three*
modorum se habeant. Quorum unus est quod species
*modes themselves have of-which one is that the-species*
intelligibiles quæ sunt in intellectu possibili, sint acceptæ a
*intelligible which are in the-intellect possible be received from*
phantasmatibus quæ sunt in nobis, ut sonant verba Aristotelis:
*the-phantasms which are in us as sound the-words of-Aristotle*
quod non potest esse secundum prædictam positionem, ut
*which not can to-be according-to the-aforesaid position as*
ostensum est. Secundus autem modus est ut illæ species non
*shown it-is the-second moreover mode is that those species not*
sint acceptæ a phantasmatibus, sed sint irradiantes super
*be received from the-phantasms but be irradiating upon*
phantasmata nostra: puta si species aliquæ essent in oculo
*phantasms our for-example if species some were in the-eye*
irradiantes super colores qui sunt in pariete. Tertius autem
*irradiating upon the-colors which are in the-wall the-third moreover*
modus est ut neque species intelligibiles quæ sunt in intellectu
*mode is that neither the-species intelligible which are in the-intellect*

possibili, sint acceptæ a phantasmatibus, neque imprimant
*possible be received from the-phantasms nor imprint*
aliquid supra phantasmata. Si autem ponatur secundum, scilicet
*anything upon the-phantasms if moreover be-posited the-second namely*
quod species intelligibiles illustrent phantasmata, et secundum
*that the-species intelligible illuminate the-phantasms and according-to*
hoc intelligatur: primo quidem sequitur quod phantasmata
*this it-be-understood first indeed it-follows that the-phantasms*
fiunt intelligibilia actu non per intellectum agentem, sed
*become intelligible in-act not through the-intellect agent but*
per intellectum possibilem secundum suas species. Secundo,
*through the-intellect possible according-to its species second*
quod talis irradiatio phantasmatum non poterit facere quod
*that such irradiation of-the-phantasms not will-be-able to-make that*
phantasmata sint intelligibilia actu: non enim fiunt phantasmata
*the-phantasms be intelligible in-act not for become phantasms*
intelligibilia actu nisi per abstractionem; hæc autem magis
*intelligible in-act except through abstraction this moreover rather*
erit receptio quam abstractio. Et iterum cum omnis
*will-be reception than abstraction and again since every*
receptio sit secundum naturam recepti, irradiatio specierum
*reception be according-to the-nature of-the-received the-irradiation of-the-species*
intelligibilium quæ sunt in intellectu possibili, non erit in
*intelligible which are in the-intellect possible not will-be in*
phantasmatibus quæ sunt in nobis, intelligibiliter, sed sensibiliter
*the-phantasms which are in us intelligibly but sensibly*
et materialiter; et sic non poterimus intelligere universale
*and materially and thus not we-shall-be-able to-understand the-universal*
per hujusmodi irradiationem. Si autem species intelligibiles
*through of-this-kind irradiation if moreover the-species intelligible*
intellectus possibilis neque accipiuntur a phantasmatibus,
*of-the-intellect possible neither are-received from the-phantasms*

neque irradiant super ea; erunt omnino disparatæ, et
*nor irradiate upon them they-will-be wholly disparate and*
nihil proportionale habentes, nec phantasmata aliquid facient
*nothing proportional having nor the-phantasms anything will-do*
ad intelligendum: quod manifeste veritati repugnat.
*for understanding which manifestly to-the-truth is-repugnant*

Sic igitur omnibus modis impossibile est quod intellectus
*thus therefore in-all ways impossible it-is that the-intellect*
possibilis sit unus tantum omnium hominum.
*possible be one only of-all men*

Restat autem nunc solvere ea quibus pluralitatem
*it-remains moreover now to-solve those by-which the-plurality*
intellectus possibilis nituntur excludere.
*of-the-intellect possible they-strive to-exclude*

Quorum primum est, quod omne quod multiplicatur
*of-which the-first is that everything which is-multiplied*
secundum divisionem materiæ, est forma materialis: unde
*according-to the-division of-matter is a-form material whence*
substantiæ separatæ a materia non sunt plures in una
*substances separate from matter not are several in one*
specie. Si ergo plures intellectus essent in pluribus hominibus
*species if therefore several intellects were in several men*
qui dividuntur ad invicem numero per divisionem materiæ,
*who are-divided from each-other in-number through the-division of-matter*
sequeretur ex necessitate quod intellectus esset forma materialis:
*it-would-follow from necessity that the-intellect were a-form material*
quod est contra verba Aristotelis et probationem illius, qua
*which is against the-words of-Aristotle and the-proof of-him by-which*
probat quod intellectus est separatus. Si ergo est separatus, et
*he-proves that the-intellect is separate if therefore it-is separate and*
non est forma materialis, nullo modo multiplicatur secundum
*not is a-form material in-no way is-it-multiplied according-to*

multiplicationem corporum. Huic autem rationi tantum
*the-multiplication of-bodies on-this moreover argument so-much*
innituntur, quod dicunt, quod Deus non posset facere plures
*they-rely that they-say that God not could to-make several*
intellectus unius speciei in diversis hominibus: dicunt enim
*intellects of-one species in diverse men they-say for*
quod hoc implicaret contradictionem, quia habere materiam ut
*that this would-imply contradiction because to-have matter that*
numeraliter multiplicetur, est aliud a natura formæ separatæ.
*numerically it-be-multiplied is foreign to the-nature of-a-form separate*
Procedunt autem ulterius, ex hoc concludere volentes quod
*they-proceed moreover further from this to-conclude wishing that*
nulla forma separata est una numero, nec aliquid individuum:
*no form separate is one in-number nor anything individual*
quod dicunt ex ipso vocabulo apparere, quia non est unum
*which they-say from the-very word to-appear because not is one*
numero nisi quod est unum de numero: forma autem liberata
*in-number except what is one of number the-form moreover freed*
a materia non est unum de numero, quia non habet in se
*from matter not is one of number because not it-has in itself*
causam numeri, eo quod causa numeri est a materia.
*the-cause of-number for-the-reason that the-cause of-number is from matter*

Sed ut a posterioribus incipiamus, videntur vocem propriam
*but that from the-later-things we-may-begin they-seem the-word proper*
ignorare in hoc quod ultimo dictum est. Dicit enim
*to-be-ignorant-of in this which last said it-is says for*
Aristoteles in 4 Metaphysic., quod cujusque substantiæ unum est
*Aristotle in 4 Metaphysics that of-each substance one is*
esse non secundum accidens. et quod nihil est aliud unum
*the-to-be not according-to accident and that nothing is other one*
præter ens. Substantia ergo separata si est ens, secundum
*besides being the-substance therefore separate if it-is being according-to*

suam substantiam est una, præcipue cum Aristoteles dicat in 8
*its substance is one especially since Aristotle say in 8*
Metaphysic., quod ea quæ non habent materiam, non habent
*Metaphysics that those which not have matter not have*
causam ut sint unum et ens. Unum autem, in 5 Metaphysic.,
*a-cause that they-be one and being one moreover in 5 Metaphysics*
dicitur quadrupliciter: scilicet numero, specie, genere, et
*is-said in-four-ways namely in-number in-species in-genus and*
proportione. Nec est dicendum quod aliqua substantia separata
*by-proportion nor is-it to-be-said that some substance separate*
sit unum tantum specie vel genere, quia hoc non est esse
*be one only in-species or in-genus because this not is to-be*
simpliciter unum. Relinquitur ergo quod quælibet substantia
*simply one it-remains therefore that any substance*
separata sit unum numero. Nec dicitur aliquid unum numero,
*separate be one in-number nor is-said anything one in-number*
quia sit unum de numero: non enim numerus est causa unius,
*because it-be one of number not for number is the-cause of-the-one*
sed e converso, quia in numerando non dividitur: unum enim
*but from the-converse because in numbering not is-divided the-one for*
est id quod non dividitur. Nec iterum hoc verum est quod
*is that which not is-divided nor again this true is that*
omnis numerus causatur a materia: frustra enim Aristoteles
*every number is-caused by matter in-vain for Aristotle*
quæsivisset numerum substantiarum separatarum. Ponit etiam
*would-have-sought the-number of-substances separate he-puts also*
Aristoteles in 5 Metaphysic. quod multum dividitur non solum
*Aristotle in 5 Metaphysics that the-many is-divided not only*
numero, sed etiam specie et genere. Nec etiam hoc verum
*in-number but also in-species and in-genus nor also this true*
est quod substantia separata non sit singularis et individuum
*is that a-substance separate not be singular and an-individual*

aliquod: alioquin non haberet aliquam operationem, cum
*some otherwise not it-would-have any operation since*
actus sint solum singularium, ut Philosophus dicit: unde contra
*acts be only of-singulars as the-Philosopher says whence against*
Platonem dicit in 7 Metaphysic. quod si ideæ sint separatæ,
*Plato he-says in 7 Metaphysics that if the-ideas be separate*
non prædicabitur de multis idea, nec poterit definiri, sicut
*not will-be-predicated of many an-idea nor will-it-be-able to-be-defined as*
nec alia individua quæ sunt unica in sua specie, ut sol et
*neither other individuals which are unique in their species as the-sun and*
luna. Non enim materia est principium individuationis in rebus
*the-moon not for matter is the-principle of-individuation in things*
materialibus, nisi in quantum materia non est participabilis
*material except in as-far matter not is participable*
a pluribus, cum sit primum subjectum non existens in
*by many since it-be the-first subject not existing in*
alio. Unde et de idea Aristoteles dicit, quod si idea
*another whence also about the-idea Aristotle says that if the-idea*
esset separata, esset quædam substantia individua, quam
*were separate it-would-be a-certain substance individual which*
impossibile esset prædicari de multis. Individuæ ergo sunt
*impossible would-be to-be-predicated of many individual therefore are*
substantiæ separatæ, et singulares; non autem individuantur
*substances separate and singular not moreover they-are-individuated*
ex materia, sed ex hoc ipso quod non sunt natæ in alio
*from matter but from this very-thing that not they-are apt in another*
esse, et per consequens nec participari a multis. Ex quo
*to-be and by consequence nor to-be-participated by many from which*
sequitur quod si aliqua forma nata est participari ab aliquo,
*it-follows that if some form apt is to-be-participated by something*
ita quod sit actus alicujus materiæ, illa potest individuari
*so that it-be the-act of-some matter that can to-be-individuated*

et multiplicari per comparationem ad materiam. Jam autem
*and to-be-multiplied through comparison to matter already moreover*
supra ostensum est quod intellectus est unitus animæ, quæ est
*above shown it-is that the-intellect is united to-the-soul which is*
actus corporis. In multis igitur corporibus sunt multæ animæ,
*the-act of-the-body in many therefore bodies are many souls*
et in multis animabus sunt multæ virtutes intellectuales,
*and in many souls are many powers intellectual*
quæ vocantur intellectus: nec propter hoc sequitur quod
*which are-called intellects nor on-account-of this does-it-follow that*
intellectus sit virtus materialis, ut supra ostensum est.
*the-intellect be a-power material as above shown it-is*

Si quis autem objiciat quod si multiplicantur secundum
*if anyone moreover object that if they-are-multiplied according-to*
corpora, sequitur quod destructis corporibus non remanent
*the-bodies it-follows that destroyed the-bodies not remain*
multæ animæ; patet solutio per ea quæ dicta sunt.
*many souls is-plain the-solution through those which said they-are*
Unumquodque enim sic est ens sicut est unum, ut dicitur
*each-thing for thus is being as it-is one as it-is-said*
in 4 Metaphysic. Sicut igitur esse animæ est quidem
*in 4 Metaphysics as therefore the-to-be of-the-soul is indeed*
in corpore, in quantum est forma corporis, nec est ante
*in the-body in as-far it-is the-form of-the-body nor is-it before*
corpus, tamen destructo corpore adhuc remanet in suo
*the-body yet destroyed the-body still it-remains in its*
esse; ita unaquæque anima remanet in sua unitate, et per
*to-be so each soul remains in its unity and by*
consequens multæ animæ in sua multitudine.
*consequence many souls in their multitude*

Valde autem ruditer argumentantur ad ostendendum quod
*very moreover crudely they-argue for showing that*
Deus facere non posset quod sint multi intellectus ejusdem
*God to-make not could that there-be many intellects of-the-same*
speciei, credentes hoc includere contradictionem. Dato enim
*species believing this to-include contradiction granted for*
quod non esset natura intellectus quod multiplicaretur, non
*that not it-were the-nature of-the-intellect that it-be-multiplied not*
propter hoc oporteret quod intellectum multiplicari
*on-account-of this it-would-be-necessary that the-intellect to-be-multiplied*
includeret contradictionem. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non
*included contradiction nothing for prevents something not*
habere in sua natura causam alicujus, quod tamen habet
*to-have in its nature the-cause of-something which yet it-has*
illud ex alia causa: sicut grave habet ex sua natura quod
*that from another cause as the-heavy has from its nature that*
non sit sursum; tamen grave esse sursum non includit
*not it-be up yet the-heavy to-be up not includes*
contradictionem; sed grave esse sursum secundum suam
*contradiction but the-heavy to-be up according-to its*
naturam, contradictionem includeret. Sic ergo intellectus, si
*nature contradiction would-include thus therefore the-intellect if*
naturaliter esset unus omnium, quia non haberet naturalem
*naturally it-were one of-all because not it-had a-natural*
causam multiplicationis, posset tamen sortiri multiplicationem
*cause of-multiplication it-could yet to-obtain multiplication*
ex supernaturali causa; nec esset implicatio contradictionis.
*from a-supernatural cause nor would-there-be implication of-contradiction*
Quod non tantum dicimus propter propositum; sed magis
*which not only we-say on-account-of the-purpose but rather*
ne hæc argumentandi forma ad alia extendatur: sic
*lest this of-arguing form to other-things be-extended thus*

enim possent concludere quod Deus non potest facere quod
*for they-could to-conclude that God not can to-make that*
mortui resurgant, et quod cæci ad visum reparentur.
*the-dead rise and that the-blind to sight be-restored*

Adhuc autem ad munimentum sui erroris aliam rationem
*further moreover for the-defense of-their error another argument*
inducunt. Quærunt enim utrum intellectum in me et in te sit
*they-bring-in they-ask for whether the-understood in me and in you be*
unum penitus, aut duo in numero et unum in specie. Si enim
*one wholly or two in number and one in species if for*
unum intellectum, tunc unus erit intellectus; si duo in numero
*one understood then one will-be the-intellect if two in number*
et unum in specie, sequitur quod intellecta habebunt
*and one in species it-follows that the-understood-things will-have*
rem intellectam. Quæcumque enim sunt duo in numero et
*a-thing understood whatever-things for are two in number and*
unum in specie, sunt unum intellectum, quia est una quidditas
*one in species are one understood because it-is one quiddity*
per quam intelliguntur: et sit procedetur in infinitum;
*through which they-are-understood and so it-will-be-proceeded to infinity*
quod est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod sint duo
*which is impossible therefore impossible it-is that there-be two*
intellecta numero in me et in te. Est ergo unum tantum,
*understood-things in-number in me and in you it-is therefore one only*
et unus intellectus numero tantum in omnibus hominibus.
*and one intellect in-number only in all men*

Quærendum est autem ab his qui tam subtiliter se
*to-be-asked it-is moreover from those who so subtly themselves*
argumentari putant, utrum esse duo intellecta in numero et
*to-argue think whether to-be two understood-things in number and*
unum in specie, sit contra rationem intellecti in quantum
*one in species be against the-notion of-the-understood in as-far*

est intellectum, aut in quantum est intellectum ab homine. Et
*it-is understood or in as-far it-is understood by man and*
manifestum est, secundum rationem quam ponunt, quod hoc
*manifest it-is according-to the-argument which they-posit that this*
est contra rationem intellecti, in quantum est intellectum.
*is against the-notion of-the-understood in as-far it-is understood*
De ratione autem intellecti in quantum hujusmodi, est
*about the-notion moreover of-the-understood in as-far of-this-kind it-is*
quod non indigeat quod ab eo aliquid abstrahatur ad
*that not it-need that from it anything be-abstracted for*
hoc quod sit intellectum. Ergo secundum eorum rationem
*this that it-be understood therefore according-to their argument*
simpliciter concludere possumus quod sit unum intellectum
*simply to-conclude we-can that there-be one understood*
tantum, et non solum unum intellectum ab omnibus. Et si
*only and not only one understood by all and if*
est unum intellectum tantum, secundum eorum rationem
*there-is one understood only according-to their argument*
sequitur quod sit unus tantum intellectus in toto mundo,
*it-follows that there-be one only intellect in the-whole world*
et non solum in hominibus. Ergo intellectus noster non
*and not only in men therefore the-intellect our not*
solum est substantia separata, sed etiam est ipse Deus; et
*only is a-substance separate but also is himself God and*
universaliter tollitur pluralitas substantiarum separatarum.
*universally is-taken-away the-plurality of-substances separate*

Si quis autem vellet respondere quod intellectum ab una
*if anyone moreover wished to-answer that the-understood by one*
substantia separata et intellectum ab alia non est unum specie,
*substance separate and the-understood by another not is one in-species*
quia intellectus differunt specie, seipsum deciperet: quia id
*because the-intellects differ in-species himself he-would-deceive because that*

quod intelligitur, comparatur ad intelligere et ad intellectum
*which is-understood is-compared to understanding and to the-intellect*
sicut objectum ad actum et potentiam: objectum autem non
*as object to act and potency the-object moreover not*
recipit speciem ab actu neque a potentia, sed magis e
*receives species from the-act nor from the-potency but rather from*
converso. Est ergo simpliciter concedendum, quod intellectum
*the-converse it-is therefore simply to-be-granted that the-understood*
unius rei, puta lapidis, est unum tantum, non solum
*of-one thing for-example of-a-stone is one only not only*
in omnibus hominibus, sed etiam in omnibus intellectibus.
*in all men but also in all intellects*

Sed inquirendum restat, quid sit intellectum. Si enim dicant
*but to-be-inquired remains what be the-understood if for they-say*
quod intellectum est una species immaterialis existens in
*that the-understood is one species immaterial existing in*
intellectu possibili; latet ipsos quod quodammodo transeunt
*the-intellect possible it-escapes them that in-a-way they-pass*
in dogma Platonis, qui posuit quod de rebus sensibilibus nulla
*into the-dogma of-Plato who posited that about things sensible no*
scientia potest haberi, sed omnis scientia habetur de forma una
*knowledge can to-be-had but all knowledge is-had about form one*
separata. Nihil enim refert ad propositum, utrum aliquis dicat
*separate nothing for it-matters to the-purpose whether someone say*
quod scientia quæ habetur de lapide, habetur de una forma
*that the-knowledge which is-had about a-stone is-had about one form*
lapidis separata, aut de una forma lapidis quæ est in intellectu:
*of-stone separate or about one form of-stone which is in the-intellect*
utrobique enim sequitur quod scientiæ non sunt de rebus
*in-both-cases for it-follows that the-sciences not are about the-things*
quæ sunt hic, sed de rebus separatis solum. Sed quia Plato
*which are here but about things separate only but because Plato*

posuit hujusmodi formas immateriales per se subsistentes,
*posited of-this-kind forms immaterial through themselves subsisting*
poterat etiam cum hoc ponere plures intellectus participantes
*he-could also with this to-posit several intellects participating*
ab una forma separata unius veritatis cognitionem. Isti autem
*from one form separate of-one truth the-knowledge these moreover*
qui ponunt hujusmodi formas immateriales, quas dicunt esse
*who posit of-this-kind forms immaterial which they-say to-be*
intellecta, necesse habent ponere quod sit unus intellectus
*the-understood-things necessarily have to-posit that there-be one intellect*
tantum non solum omnium hominum, sed etiam simpliciter.
*only not only of-all men but also simply*

Est ergo dicendum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, quod
*it-is therefore to-be-said according-to the-judgment of-Aristotle that*
intellectum quod est unum, est ipsa natura vel quidditas
*the-understood which is one is the-very nature or quiddity*
rei. De rebus enim est scientia naturalis et aliæ
*of-the-thing about things for is science natural and the-other*
scientiæ, non de speciebus intellectis. Si enim intellectum
*sciences not about species understood if for the-understood*
esset non ipsa natura lapidis quæ est in rebus, sed species
*were not the-very nature of-the-stone which is in things but the-species*
quæ est in intellectu; sequeretur quod ego non intelligerem
*which is in the-intellect it-would-follow that I not understood*
rem quæ est lapis, sed solum intentionem quæ est abstracta
*the-thing which is a-stone but only the-intention which is abstracted*
a lapide. Sed verum est quod lapidis natura, prout est
*from the-stone but true it-is that of-the-stone the-nature according-as it-is*
in singularibus, est intellecta in potentia; sed intellecta in
*in singulars is understood in potency but understood in*
actu per hoc quod species a rebus sensibilibus mediantibus
*act through this that species from things sensible by-means-of*

sensibus usque ad phantasiam perveniunt, et per virtutem
*the-senses up to the-phantasy arrive and through the-power*
intellectus agentis species intelligibiles abstrahuntur, quæ sunt
*of-the-intellect agent species intelligible are-abstracted which are*
in intellectu possibili. Hæ autem species non se habent
*in the-intellect possible these moreover species not themselves have*
ad intellectum possibilem ut intellecta, sed sicut species
*to the-intellect possible as understood-things but as species*
quibus intellectus intelligit: sicut etiam species quæ sunt in
*by-which the-intellect understands as also the-species which are in*
visu, non sunt ipsa visa, sed ea quibus visus videt; nisi
*sight not are the-very seen-things but those by-which sight sees except*
in quantum intellectus reflectitur supra seipsum, quod in
*in as-far the-intellect is-reflected upon itself which in*
sensu accidere non potest. Si autem intelligere esset actio
*sense to-happen not can if moreover understanding were an-action*
transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut comburere et movere,
*passing into exterior matter as to-burn and to-move*
sequeretur quod intelligere esset secundum modum quo
*it-would-follow that understanding were according-to the-mode in-which*
natura realiter habet esse in singularibus, sicut combustio
*the-nature really has to-be in singulars as the-burning*
ignis est secundum modum combustibilis. Sed quia intelligere
*of-fire is according-to the-mode of-the-combustible but because understanding*
est actio in ipso intelligente manens, ut Aristoteles
*is an-action in the-very understander remaining as Aristotle*
dicit 9 Metaphysic., sequitur quod intelligere sit secundum
*says 9 Metaphysics it-follows that understanding be according-to*
modum intelligentis, id est, secundum exigentiam speciei
*the-mode of-the-understander that is according-to the-requirement of-the-species*
qua intellectus intelligit. Hæc autem cum sit abstracta a
*by-which the-intellect understands this moreover since it-be abstracted from*

principiis individuantibus, non repræsentat rem secundum
*the-principles individuating not represents the-thing according-to*
conditiones individuales, sed secundum naturam universalem
*the-conditions individual but according-to the-nature universal*
tantum. Nihil enim prohibet, si aliqua duo conjunguntur in
*only nothing for prevents if some two are-conjoined in*
re, quin unum eorum repræsentari possit etiam in sensu
*reality but-that one of-them to-be-represented can even in sense*
sine altero: unde color mellis vel pomi videtur a visu
*without the-other whence the-color of-honey or of-an-apple is-seen by sight*
sine ejus sapore. Sic igitur intellectus intelligit naturam
*without its flavor thus therefore the-intellect understands the-nature*
universalem per abstractionem ab individualibus principiis.
*universal through abstraction from individual principles*
Est ergo unum quod intelligitur a me et a te; sed
*there-is therefore one which is-understood by me and by you but*
alio intelligitur a me, et alio a te, id est, alia
*by-one is-understood by me and by-another by you that is by-another*
specie intelligibili; et aliud est intelligere meum, et aliud
*species intelligible and other is the-understanding mine and other*
tuum; et alius est intellectus meus, et alius tuus. Unde
*yours and other is the-intellect mine and other yours whence*
et Aristoteles in Prædicamentis dicit aliquam scientiam esse
*also Aristotle in the-Categories says some knowledge to-be*
singularem quantum ad subjectum, ut quædam grammatica in
*singular as-far to the-subject as a-certain grammar in*
subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto vero nullo dicitur.
*a-subject indeed is in the-soul of a-subject but no is-said*
Unde et intellectus meus quando intelligit se intelligere,
*whence also the-intellect mine when it-understands itself to-understand*
intelligit quemdam singularem actum; quando autem intelligit
*understands a-certain singular act when moreover it-understands*

intelligere simpliciter intelligit aliquid universale: non enim
*understanding simply it-understands something universal not for*
singularitas repugnat intelligibilitati, sed materialitas. Unde
*singularity is-repugnant to-intelligibility but materiality whence*
cum sint aliqua singularia immaterialia, sicut de substantiis
*since there-be some singulars immaterial as about substances*
separatis supra dictum est, nihil prohibet hujusmodi singularia
*separate above said it-is nothing prevents of-this-kind singulars*
intelligi. Ex hoc autem apparet quomodo sit eadem
*to-be-understood from this moreover it-appears how there-be the-same*
scientia in discipulo et doctore. Est enim eadem quantum
*knowledge in the-disciple and the-teacher it-is for the-same as-far*
ad rem scitam, non tamen quantum ad species intelligibiles
*to the-thing known not yet as-far to the-species intelligible*
quibus uterque intelligit: quantum enim ad hoc individuatur
*by-which each understands as-far for to this is-individuated*
scientia in me et in illo; nec oportet quod scientia quæ
*knowledge in me and in him nor is-it-necessary that the-knowledge which*
est in discipulo, causetur a scientia quæ est in magistro.
*is in the-disciple be-caused by the-knowledge which is in the-master*
sicut calor aquæ a calore ignis, sed sicut sanitas quæ est in
*as the-heat of-water by the-heat of-fire but as the-health which is in*
materia, a sanitate quæ est in anima medici. Sicut enim
*matter by the-health which is in the-soul of-the-physician as for*
in infirmo est principium naturale sanitatis, cui medicus
*in the-sick-man is a-principle natural of-health to-which the-physician*
auxilia subministrat ad sanitatem perficiendam; ita in discipulo
*aids supplies for health to-be-perfected so in the-disciple*
est principium naturale scientiæ, scilicet intellectus agens, et
*is a-principle natural of-knowledge namely the-intellect agent and*
prima principia per se nota. Doctor autem subministrat
*the-first principles through themselves known the-teacher moreover supplies*

quædam adminicula, deducendo consequens ex principiis per
*certain aids by-deducing consequents from principles through*
se notis: unde et medicus nititur sanare eo modo
*themselves known whence also the-physician strives to-heal in-that way*
quo natura sanaret, scilicet calefaciendo et frigidando; et
*in-which nature would-heal namely by-heating and by-cooling and*
magister eodem modo inducit ad scientiam quo inveniens
*the-master in-the-same way leads to knowledge in-which one-finding*
per seipsum scientiam acquireret, procedendo scilicet de
*through himself knowledge would-acquire by-proceeding namely from*
notis ad ignota: et sicut sanitas in infirmo fit
*known-things to unknown-things and as health in the-sick-man is-made*
non secundum potestatem medici, sed secundum facultatem
*not according-to the-power of-the-physician but according-to the-faculty*
naturæ; ita et scientia causatur in discipulo non secundum
*of-nature so also knowledge is-caused in the-disciple not according-to*
virtutem magistri, sed secundum facultatem addiscentis.
*the-power of-the-master but according-to the-faculty of-the-learner*

Quod autem ulterius objiciunt, quod si remanerent plures
*what moreover further they-object that if there-remained several*
substantiæ intellectuales destructis corporibus. sequeretur quod
*substances intellectual destroyed the-bodies it-would-follow that*
essent otiosæ; sicut Aristoteles in 2 Metaph. argumentatur,
*they-were idle as Aristotle in 2 Metaphysics argues*
quod si essent substantiæ separatæ non moventes corpus,
*that if there-were substances separate not moving a-body*
essent otiosæ: si bene litteram Aristotelis considerassent,
*they-would-be idle if well the-text of-Aristotle they-had-considered*
de facili possent dissolvere. Nam Aristoteles, antequam hanc
*from easy they-could to-dissolve(-it) for Aristotle before this*
rationem inducat, præmittit: «Quare et substantias et principia
*argument he-bring-in premises wherefore both substances and principles*

immobilia tot esse, rationale est suscipere: necessarium
*immovable so-many to-be reasonable it-is to-suppose the-necessary*
enim dimittatur fortioribus dicere». Ex quo patet quod ipso
*for let-be-left to-the-stronger to-say from which is-plain that he-himself*
probabilitatem quamdam sequitur, non necessitatem inducit.
*probability a-certain follows not necessity brings-in*
Deinde, cum otiosum sit quod non pertingit ad finem ad
*then since idle be what not attains to the-end for*
quem est, non potest dici etiam probabiliter quod substantiæ
*which it-is not can to-be-said even probably that substances*
separatæ essent otiosæ, si non moverent corpora; nisi forte
*separate were idle if not they-moved bodies unless perhaps*
dicatur quod motus corporum sint fines substantiarum,
*it-be-said that the-motions of-bodies be the-ends of-substances*
quod est omnino impossibile, cum finis sit potior his
*which is wholly impossible since the-end be superior to-those*
quæ sunt ad finem. Unde nec Aristoteles inducit quod
*which are for the-end whence neither Aristotle brings-in that*
essent otiosæ si non moverent corpora, sed quod «omnem
*they-would-be idle if not they-moved bodies but that every*
substantiam impassibilem secundum se optimum finem
*substance impassible according-to itself the-best end*
sortitam esse oportet æstimare». Est enim perfectissimum
*obtained to-be it-is-necessary to-judge it-is for most-perfect*
uniuscujusque rei ut non solum sit in se bonum, sed ut
*of-each thing that not only it-be in itself good but that*
bonitatem in aliis causet. Non erat autem manifestum qualiter
*goodness in others it-cause not was moreover manifest how*
substantiæ separatæ causarent bonitatem in inferioribus nisi
*substances separate caused goodness in lower-things except*
per motum aliquorum corporum. Unde ex hoc Aristoteles
*through the-motion of-some bodies whence from this Aristotle*

quamdam probabilem rationem assumit ad ostendendum quod
*a-certain probable argument takes-up for showing that*
non sunt aliquæ substantiæ separatæ, nisi quæ per
*not are any substances separate except those-which through*
motus cœlestium corporum manifestantur; quamvis hoc
*the-motions of-the-heavenly bodies are-manifested although this*
necessitatem non habeat, ut ipsemet dicit. Concedimus autem
*necessity not have as he-himself says we-grant moreover*
quod anima humana a corpore separata non habet ultimam
*that the-soul human from the-body separated not has the-last*
perfectionem suæ naturæ, cum sit pars naturæ humanæ:
*perfection of-its nature since it-be a-part of-nature human*
nulla enim pars habet omnimodam perfectionem, si a
*no for part has every perfection if from*
toto separetur. Non autem propter hoc est frustra: quia
*the-whole it-be-separated not moreover on-account-of this is in-vain because*
non est animæ humanæ finis movere corpus, sed intelligere,
*not is of-the-soul human the-end to-move the-body but to-understand*
in quo est sua felicitas, ut Aristoteles probat in 10 Ethic.
*in which is its happiness as Aristotle proves in 10 Ethics*

Objiciunt etiam, ad sui erroris assertionem, quod si
*they-object also for of-their error the-assertion that if*
intellectus essent plures plurium hominum, cum intellectus
*the-intellects were several of-several men since the-intellect*
sit incorruptibilis, sequeretur quod actu essent infiniti
*be incorruptible it-would-follow that in-act there-were infinite*
intellectus, secundum positionem Aristotelis, qui posuit
*intellects according-to the-position of-Aristotle who posited*
mundum æternum et homines semper fuisse.
*the-world eternal and men always to-have-been*

Ad hanc autem objectionem sic respondet Algazel in sua
*to this moreover objection thus answers Algazel in his*
Metaphysica: dicit enim quod «in quocumque fuerit unum
*Metaphysics he-says for that in whatever there-has-been one*
istorum sine alio, id est, quantitas vel multitudo sine
*of-these without the-other that is quantity or multitude without*
ordine, infinitas non removebitur ab eo, sicut a motu
*order infinity not will-be-removed from it as from the-motion*
cœli»; et postea subdit: «Similiter etiam animas humanas
*of-the-heaven and afterward he-adds similarly also souls human*
quæ sunt separabiles a corporibus per mortem, concedimus
*which are separable from bodies through death we-grant*
esse infinitas numero, quamvis habeant esse simul: quoniam
*to-be infinite in-number although they-have to-be together since*
non est inter eas ordinatio naturalis, qua remota desinant esse
*not is among them an-ordering natural which removed they-cease to-be*
animæ, eo quod nullæ earum sunt causæ aliis; sed
*souls for-the-reason that none of-them are causes to-others but*
simul sunt sine prius et posterius, natura et situ. Non
*together they-are without prior and posterior in-nature and position not*
enim intelligitur in eis prius et posterius secundum tempus
*for is-understood in them prior and posterior according-to the-time*
creationis suæ. In essentiis autem earum secundum quod sunt
*of-creation their in the-essences moreover of-them according as they-are*
essentiæ, non est ordinatio ullo modo, sed sunt æquales in
*essences not is an-ordering in-any way but they-are equal in*
esse, e contrario spatiis et corporibus, et causæ et causato».
*the-to-be from the-contrary to-spaces and to-bodies and to-cause and to-caused*

Quomodo autem hæc Aristoteles solveret, a nobis
*how moreover these-things Aristotle would-solve by us*
sciri non potest, quia illam partem Metaphysicæ non
*to-be-known not can because that part of-the-Metaphysics not*

habemus quam fecit de substantiis separatis. Dicit enim
*we-have which he-made about substances separate says for*
Philosophus in 2 Physic., quod de formis quæ sunt
*the-Philosopher in 2 Physics that about forms which are*
separatæ, in materia autem, in quantum sunt separabiles,
*separate in matter moreover in as-far they-are separable*
considerare, est opus Philosophiæ primæ. Quicquid autem
*to-consider is the-work of-Philosophy first whatever moreover*
circa hoc dicatur, manifestum est quod ex hoc nullam
*about this be-said manifest it-is that from this no*
angustiam Catholici patiuntur, qui ponunt mundum incepisse.
*distress Catholics suffer who posit the-world to-have-begun*

Patet autem falsum esse quod dicunt, hoc fuisse principium
*is-plain moreover false to-be what they-say this to-have-been a-principle*
apud omnes philosophantes, et Arabes et Peripateticos, quod
*among all philosophizing both Arabs and Peripatetics that*
intellectus non multiplicaretur numeraliter, licet apud Latinos
*the-intellect not was-multiplied numerically although among the-Latins*
non. Algazel enim Latinus non fuit, sed Arabs; Avicenna
*not Algazel for a-Latin not was but an-Arab Avicenna*
etiam, qui Arabs fuit, in suo libro de Anima sic dicit:
*also who an-Arab was in his book on the-Soul thus says*
«Prudentia et stultitia et opinio et alia his similia, non
*prudence and folly and opinion and other-things to-these like not*
sunt nisi in essentia animæ». Ergo anima non est una, sed
*are except in the-essence of-the-soul therefore the-soul not is one but*
sunt multæ numero, et ejus species una est. Et ut Græcos
*they-are many in-number and its species one is and that the-Greeks*
non omittamus, ponenda sunt circa hoc verba Themistii in
*not we-omit to-be-placed are about this the-words of-Themistius in*
commento de Anima (lib. 3, cap. 32, juxta edit. Barb.)
*the-commentary on the-Soul book 3 chapter 32 according-to the-edition of-Barbaro*

Cum enim quæsisset de intellectu agente, utrum sit unus
*when for he-had-asked about the-intellect agent whether it-be one*
aut plures, subjungit solvens: «Aut primus illustrans est unus,
*or several he-adds solving either the-first illuminator is one*
illustrati et illustrantes sunt plures. Sol quidem unus
*the-illuminated and illuminating are several the-sun indeed one*
est: lumen autem dices partiri aliquo modo adversus.
*is light moreover you-will-say to-be-divided in-some way to-the-sights*
Propter hoc enim non solem posuit in comparationem
*on-account-of this for not the-sun he-placed in comparison*
scilicet Aristoteles, sed lumen; Plato autem solem». Ergo patet
*namely Aristotle but light Plato moreover the-sun therefore is-plain*
per verba Themistii, quod nec intellectus agens, de quo
*through the-words of-Themistius that neither the-intellect agent about which*
Aristoteles loquitur, est unus, qui est illustrans; nec etiam
*Aristotle speaks is one which is illuminating nor also*
possibilis, qui est illustratus; sed verum est quod principium
*the-possible which is illuminated but true it-is that the-principle*
illustrationis est unum, scilicet aliqua substantia separata, vel
*of-illumination is one namely some substance separate or*
Deus secundum Catholicos, vel intelligentia ultima secundum
*God according-to the-Catholics or the-intelligence last according-to*
Avicennam. Unitatem autem hujus principii separati probat
*Avicenna the-unity moreover of-this principle separate proves*
Themistius per hoc quod docens et addiscens idem
*Themistius through this that the-teacher and the-learner the-same*
intelligit: quod non esset, nisi esset idem principium
*understand which not would-be unless there-were the-same principle*
illustrans. Sed verum est quod postea dicit, quosdam
*illuminating but true it-is that afterward he-says some*
dubitasse de intellectu possibili utrum sit unus. Nec circa
*to-have-doubted about the-intellect possible whether it-be one nor about*

hoc plus loquitur, quia non erat intentio ejus tangere diversas
*this more does-he-speak because not was the-intention his to-touch-on the-diverse*
opiniones Philosophorum, sed exponere sententiam Aristotelis,
*opinions of-the-Philosophers but to-expound the-judgment of-Aristotle*
Platonis et Theophrasti: unde in fine concludit «Quod dixi
*of-Plato and of-Theophrastus whence in the-end he-concludes what I-said*
pronunciare quidem de eo quod dicit Philosophus, singularis
*to-pronounce indeed about that which says the-Philosopher of-singular*
est studii et sollicitudinis. Quod autem maxime aliquis utique
*is study and solicitude that moreover most someone surely*
ex verbis quæ collegimus, accipiat de his sententiam
*from the-words which we-have-collected may-take about these-things the-judgment*
Aristotelis et Theophrasti, magis autem ipsius Platonis, hoc
*of-Aristotle and of-Theophrastus more moreover of-the-very Plato this*
promptum est propalare. Ceterum quærere quid quisque de
*ready is to-make-public moreover to-seek what each about*
anima senserit, et loci et curæ alterius est. At quænam
*the-soul thought both of-place and of-care another is but what*
fuerit opinio Aristotelis, quæ Theophrasti, et quæ etiam
*was the-opinion of-Aristotle what of-Theophrastus and what also*
Platonis, facile arbitror colligi posse ex verbis his quæ
*of-Plato easily I-judge to-be-gathered to-be-able from the-words these which*
supra de libris eorum prompsimus prætexuimusque». Ergo
*above from the-books of-them we-have-brought-forth and-have-woven-in therefore*
patet quod Aristoteles et Theophrastus et ipse Plato non
*is-plain that Aristotle and Theophrastus and the-very Plato not*
habuerunt pro principio, quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in
*held as a-principle that the-intellect possible be one in*
omnibus. Patet etiam quod Averroes perverse refert sententiam
*all is-plain also that Averroes perversely reports the-judgment*
Themistii et Theophrasti de intellectu possibili et agente:
*of-Themistius and of-Theophrastus about the-intellect possible and agent*

unde merito supra diximus eum Philosophiæ Peripateticæ
*whence deservedly above we-called him of-Philosophy Peripatetic*
perversorem. Unde mirum est quomodo aliqui solum
*the-perverter whence wonderful it-is how some only*
commentum Averrois videntes, pronuntiare præsumunt, quod
*the-commentary of-Averroes seeing to-pronounce presume what*
ipse dicit, hoc sensisse omnes Philosophos Græcos et
*he-himself says this to-have-thought all Philosophers Greeks and*
Arabes, præter Latinos. Est etiam majori admiratione, vel etiam
*Arabs except the-Latins it-is also of-greater wonder or even*
indignatione dignum, quod aliquis Christianum se profitens
*of-indignation worthy that someone Christian himself professing*
tam irreverenter de christiana fide loqui præsumpserit: sicut
*so irreverently about the-Christian faith to-speak has-presumed as*
cum dicit quod «Latini pro principiis eorum hæc non
*when he-says that the-Latins as principles their these-things not*
recipiunt,» scilicet quod sit unus intellectus tantum, «quia
*receive namely that there-be one intellect only because*
forte lex eorum est in contrarium». Ubi duo sunt mala:
*perhaps the-law their is to the-contrary where two are evils*
primo quia dubitat an hoc sit contra fidem; secundo quia
*first because he-doubts whether this be against the-faith second because*
alienum se innuit ab hac lege. Et quod postmodum dicit:
*foreign himself he-hints from this law and what afterward he-says*
«Hæc est ratio per quam Catholici videntur habere hanc
*this is the-reason through which Catholics seem to-hold this*
positionem»: ubi sententiam fidei positionem nominat.
*position where the-judgment of-the-faith a-position he-names*
Nec minoris præsumptionis est quod postmodum asserere
*nor of-less presumption is-it what afterward to-assert*
audet, Deum facere non posse quod sint multi intellectus,
*he-dares God to-make not to-be-able that there-be many intellects*

quia implicat contradictionem. Adhuc autem gravius est quod
*because it-implies contradiction still moreover graver is what*
postmodum dicit: «Per rationem concludo de necessitate, quod
*afterward he-says through reason I-conclude of necessity that*
intellectus est unus numero; firmiter tamen teneo oppositum
*the-intellect is one in-number firmly yet I-hold the-opposite*
per fidem». Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus quorum
*through faith therefore he-thinks that faith be about some-things whose*
contraria de necessitate concludi possunt. Cum autem de
*contraries from necessity to-be-concluded can since moreover from*
necessitate concludi non possit nisi verum necessarium,
*necessity to-be-concluded not can except the-true necessary*
cujus oppositum est falsum et impossibile; sequitur, secundum
*whose opposite is false and impossible it-follows according-to*
ejus dictum, quod fides sit de falso et impossibili: quod
*his saying that faith be about the-false and impossible which*
etiam Deus facere non potest. Quod fidelium aures ferre non
*even God to-make not can which of-the-faithful the-ears to-bear not*
possunt. Non caret etiam magna temeritate quod de his quæ
*can not lacks also great rashness that about those which*
ad philosophiam non pertinent, sed sunt puræ fidei, disputare
*to philosophy not pertain but are of-pure faith to-dispute*
præsumit, sicut quod anima patiatur ab igne inferni, et dicere
*he-presumes as that the-soul suffer from the-fire of-hell and to-say*
sententias Doctorum de hoc esse reprobandas. Pari ergo
*the-judgments of-the-Doctors about this to-be to-be-rejected by-equal therefore*
ratione posset disputare de Trinitate, de Incarnatione, et
*reason he-could to-dispute about the-Trinity about the-Incarnation and*
aliis hujusmodi, de quibus non nisi balbutiens loqueretur.
*other-things of-this-kind about which not except stammering he-would-speak*

Hæc igitur sunt quæ in destructionem prædicti erroris
*these therefore are-the-things which for the-destruction of-the-aforesaid error*
conscripsimus, non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum
*we-have-written not through the-teachings of-the-faith but through of-the-very*
Philosophorum rationes et dicta. Si quis autem gloriabundus
*Philosophers arguments and sayings if anyone moreover boastful*
de falsi nominis scientia velit contra hæc quæ scripsimus
*about of-false name knowledge wishes against these-things which we-have-written*
aliquid dicere; non loquatur in angulis, nec coram pueris, qui
*anything to-say not let-him-speak in corners nor before boys who*
nesciunt de causis arduis judicare; sed contra hoc scriptum
*know-not about causes arduous to-judge but against this writing*
scribat, si audet: et inveniet non solum me, qui aliorum
*let-him-write if he-dares and he-will-find not only me who of-others*
sum minimus, sed multos alios, qui veritatis sunt cultores,
*am the-least but many others who of-truth are cultivators*
per quos ejus errori resistetur, vel ignorantiæ consuletur.
*through whom his error will-be-resisted or (his)-ignorance will-be-counseled*

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THOMAS AQUINAS

# De Regno

*On Kingship*

## Argumentum operis

ARGUMENT OF THE WORK

*Thomas offers the king a book on kingship, on its origin and the king's office, drawn from Scripture, the philosophers, and the examples of praised princes, trusting to the help of the King of kings.*

Cogitanti mihi quid offerrem regiæ celsitudini dignum,
*to-one-pondering to-me what I-should-offer to-the-royal highness worthy*
meæque professioni congruum et officio, id occurrit potissime
*and-to-my profession fitting and office that occurred most-of-all*
offerendum, ut regi librum de regno conscriberem, in
*to-be-offered that for-a-king a-book on kingship I-should-write in*
quo et regni originem, et ea quæ ad regis
*which both of-kingship the-origin and those-things which to of-the-king*
officium pertinent, secundum Scripturæ divinæ auctoritatem,
*the-office pertain according-to of-Scripture divine the-authority*
Philosophorum dogma et exempla laudatorum principum
*of-the-Philosophers the-teaching and the-examples of-praised princes*
diligenter depromerem, juxta ingenii proprii facultatem,
*diligently I-should-bring-forth according-to of-wit my-own the-capacity*
principium, progressum, consummationem operis ex illius
*the-beginning progress completion of-the-work from his*
expectans auxilio qui est Rex regum et Dominus
*awaiting help who is the-King of-kings and Lord*
dominantium: per quem reges regnant, Deus, magnus
*of-lords through whom kings reign God great*
Dominus, et rex magnus super omnes Deos.
*Lord and king great over all Gods*

# Quod necesse est homines simul viventes ab aliquo diligenter regi

## I · THAT MEN LIVING TOGETHER MUST BE RULED

*Man, who acts by intellect for an end, needs something to direct him there. Since he is a social and political animal who cannot provide for his life alone, a multitude needs one who cares for its common good, as the body needs a ruling power. Government is just when it seeks the common good, unjust when it seeks the ruler's own. Thomas names the unjust forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, and the just ones, polity, aristocracy, and kingship, and defines the king as one who rules the multitude of a city or province for the common good.*

Principium autem intentionis nostræ hinc sumere oportet ut
*the-beginning moreover of-intention our hence to-take it-is-necessary that*
quid nomine regis intelligendum sit, exponatur. In omnibus
*what by-the-name of-king to-be-understood be be-set-out in all*
autem quæ ad finem aliquem ordinantur, in quibus contingit
*moreover which to an-end some are-ordered in which it-happens*
sic et aliter procedere, opus est aliquo dirigente, per
*thus and otherwise to-proceed need there-is of-something directing through*
quod directe debitum perveniatur ad finem. Non enim
*which directly the-due be-arrived at the-end not for*
navis, quam secundum diversorum ventorum impulsum in
*a-ship which according-to of-diverse winds the-impulse into*
diversa moveri contingit, ad destinatum finem perveniret,
*diverse-directions to-be-moved it-happens to the-destined end would-arrive*
nisi per gubernatoris industriam dirigeretur ad portum;
*unless through of-the-helmsman the-skill it-were-directed to port*
hominis autem est aliquis finis, ad quem tota vita
*of-man moreover there-is some end to which the-whole life*

ejus et actio ordinatur, cum sit agens per intellectum,
*his and action is-ordered since he-be an-agent through intellect*
cujus est manifeste propter finem operari. Contingit autem
*whose it-is manifestly for an-end to-operate it-happens moreover*
diversimode homines ad finem intentum procedere, quod
*diversely men to the-end intended to-proceed which*
ipsa diversitas humanorum studiorum et actionum declarat.
*the-very diversity of-human pursuits and actions declares*
Indiget igitur homo aliquo dirigente ad finem. Est autem
*needs therefore man something directing to the-end there-is moreover*
unicuique hominum naturaliter insitum rationis lumen,
*in-each of-men naturally implanted of-reason the-light*
quo in suis actibus dirigatur ad finem. Et si quidem
*by-which in his acts he-be-directed to the-end and if indeed*
homini conveniret singulariter vivere, sicut multis animalium,
*to-man it-were-fitting singly to-live as to-many of-animals*
nullo alio dirigente indigeret ad finem, sed ipse sibi
*by-no other directing he-would-need to the-end but himself to-himself*
unusquisque esset rex sub Deo summo rege, in quantum
*each-one would-be king under God the-highest king in as-far*
per lumen rationis divinitus datum sibi, in suis actibus se
*through the-light of-reason divinely given to-him in his acts him*
ipsum dirigeret. Naturale autem est homini ut sit animal
*himself he-would-direct natural moreover it-is to-man that he-be an-animal*
sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens, magis etiam
*social and political in a-multitude living more even*
quam omnia alia animalia, quod quidem naturalis necessitas
*than all other animals which indeed natural necessity*
declarat. Aliis enim animalibus natura præparavit cibum,
*declares to-other for animals nature prepared food*
tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut dentes, cornua, ungues,
*coverings of-hair defense as teeth horns claws*

vel saltem velocitatem ad fugam. Homo autem institutus est
*or at-least speed for flight man moreover established was*
nullo horum sibi a natura præparato, sed loco omnium
*with-none of-these for-him by nature prepared but in-place of-all*
data est ei ratio, per quam sibi hæc omnia officio
*given was to-him reason through which for-himself these all by-the-office*
manuum posset præparare, ad quæ omnia præparanda unus
*of-hands he-could to-prepare for which all to-be-prepared one*
homo non sufficit. Nam unus homo per se sufficienter
*man not suffices for one man by himself sufficiently*
vitam transigere non posset. Est igitur homini naturale,
*life to-pass not could it-is therefore to-man natural*
quod in societate multorum vivat. Amplius aliis animalibus
*that in the-society of-many he-live further in-other animals*
insita est naturalis industria ad omnia ea quæ sunt eis
*implanted is a-natural skill for all those which are to-them*
utilia vel nociva, sicut ovis naturaliter æstimat lupum
*useful or harmful as the-sheep naturally judges the-wolf*
inimicum. Quædam etiam animalia ex naturali industria
*an-enemy certain also animals from natural skill*
cognoscunt aliquas herbas medicinales et alia eorum
*know some herbs medicinal and other-things for-their*
vitæ necessaria. Homo autem horum quæ sunt suæ vitæ
*life necessary man moreover of-those which are for-his life*
necessaria, naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi,
*necessary natural knowledge has only in common*
quasi eo per rationem valente ex universalibus principiis
*as-if he through reason being-able from universal principles*
ad cognitionem singulorum quæ necessaria sunt humanæ
*to the-knowledge of-particulars which necessary are for-human*
vitæ pervenire. Non est autem possibile quod unus homo ad
*life to-arrive not is moreover possible that one man to*

omnia hujusmodi per suam rationem pertingat. Est igitur
*all of-this-kind through his reason attain it-is therefore*
necessarium homini, quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus
*necessary for-man that in a-multitude he-live that one*
ab alio adjuvetur, et diversi diversis inveniendis per
*by another be-helped and diverse-men in-diverse-things to-be-found through*
rationem occuparentur, puta, unus in medicina, alius in
*reason be-occupied for-example one in medicine another in*
hoc, alius in alio. Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per
*this another in that this also most-evidently is-declared through*
hoc quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam
*this that it-is proper of-man speech to-use through which*
unus homo aliis suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere.
*one man to-others his concept totally can to-express*
Alia quidem animalia exprimunt mutuo passiones suas in
*other indeed animals express mutually the-passions their in*
communi, ut canis in latratu iram, et alia animalia passiones
*common as the-dog in barking anger and other animals passions*
suas diversis modis. Magis igitur homo est communicativus
*their in-diverse ways more therefore man is communicative*
alteri quam quodcumque aliud animal, quod gregale videtur,
*to-another than any other animal which gregarious seems*
ut grus, formica et apis. Hoc ergo considerans Salomon
*as the-crane the-ant and the-bee this therefore considering Solomon*
in Eccles. iv, 9 ait: Melius est esse duos quam unum.
*in Ecclesiastes IV 9 says better it-is to-be two than one*
Habent enim emolumentum mutuæ societatis. Si ergo
*they-have for the-benefit of-mutual society if therefore*
naturale est homini quod in societate multorum vivat, necesse
*natural it-is for-man that in the-society of-many he-live necessary*
est in hominibus esse per quod multitudo
*it-is among men to-be (something)-through which the-multitude*

regatur. Multis enim existentibus hominibus et unoquoque
*be-ruled many for existing men and each*
id quod est sibi congruum providente, multitudo in
*that which is for-himself fitting providing-for the-multitude into*
diversa dispergeretur, nisi etiam esset aliquis de eo
*diverse-directions would-be-scattered unless also there-were someone of that*
quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinet, curam habens sicut
*which to the-good of-the-multitude pertains care having as*
et corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis defleret, nisi
*also the-body of-man and of-any animal would-fall-apart unless*
esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore, quæ ad
*there-were some force ruling common in the-body which to*
bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet. Quod
*the-good common of-all the-members should-aim which*
considerans Salomon dicit (Prov. ii, 14): Ubi non est
*considering Solomon says Proverbs II 14 where not is*
gubernator, dissipabitur populus. Hoc autem rationabiliter
*a-governor will-be-scattered the-people this moreover reasonably*
accidit; non enim idem est quod proprium et quod
*happens not for the-same is what proper and what*
commune. Secundum propria quidem differunt, secundum
*common according-to proper-things indeed they-differ according-to*
autem commune uniuntur. Diversorum autem diversæ sunt
*moreover the-common they-are-united of-diverse-things moreover diverse are*
causæ. Oportet igitur, præter id quod movet ad proprium
*the-causes it-is-necessary therefore besides that which moves to the-proper*
bonum uniuscujusque, esse aliquid, quod movet ad bonum
*good of-each to-be something which moves to the-good*
commune multorum. Propter quod et in omnibus quæ
*common of-many on-account-of which also in all which*
in unum ordinantur, aliquid invenitur alterius regitivum.
*into one are-ordered something is-found of-another ruling*

In universitate enim corporum per primum corpus, scilicet
*in the-universe for of-bodies through the-first body namely*
cœleste, alia corpora ordine quodam divinæ providentiæ
*the-heavenly the-other bodies by-order a-certain of-divine providence*
reguntur, omniaque corpora per creaturam rationalem. In
*are-ruled and-all bodies through the-creature rational in*
uno etiam homine anima regit corpus, atque inter animæ
*one also man the-soul rules the-body and among of-the-soul*
partes irascibilis et concupiscibilis ratione reguntur. Itemque
*the-parts the-irascible and concupiscible by-reason are-ruled and-likewise*
inter membra corporis unum est principale quod omnia
*among the-members of-the-body one is principal which all*
movet, aut cor aut caput. Oportet igitur esse omni
*moves either the-heart or the-head it-is-necessary therefore to-be in-every*
multitudine aliquod regitivum.
*multitude some ruling-thing*

Contingit autem in quibusdam quæ ordinantur ad
*it-happens moreover in some-things which are-ordered to*
finem, et recte et non recte procedere. Quare et in
*an-end both rightly and not rightly to-proceed wherefore also in*
regimine multitudinis et rectum et non rectum invenitur.
*the-government of-a-multitude both right and not right is-found*
Recte autem dirigitur unumquodque, quando ad finem
*rightly moreover is-directed each-thing when to an-end*
convenientem deducitur, non recte autem quando ad finem non
*fitting it-is-led not rightly moreover when to an-end not*
convenientem. Alius autem est finis conveniens multitudini
*fitting other moreover is the-end fitting to-a-multitude*
liberorum et servorum. Nam liber est, qui sui causa
*of-free-men and of-slaves for free is he-who for-his-own sake*
est; servus autem est qui id quod est, alterius est. Si
*is the-slave moreover is he-who that which he-is of-another is if*

igitur liberorum multitudo a regente ad bonum commune
*therefore of-free-men a-multitude by the-ruler to the-good common*
multitudinis ordinetur, erit regimen rectum et justum,
*of-the-multitude be-ordered will-be the-government right and just*
quale convenit liberis. Si vero non ad bonum commune
*such-as befits free-men if but not to the-good common*
multitudinis, sed ad bonum privatum regentis regimen
*of-the-multitude but to the-good private of-the-ruler the-government*
ordinetur, erit regimen injustum atque perversum, unde
*be-ordered will-be the-government unjust and perverse whence*
et Dominus talibus rectoribus comminatur per Ezech.
*also the-Lord to-such rulers threatens through Ezekiel*
xxxiv, 2, dicens: Væ pastoribus qui pascebant semetipsos,
*XXXIV 2 saying woe to-the-shepherds who fed themselves*
quasi sua propria commoda quærentes.» Nonne greges a
*as-if their own advantages seeking not the-flocks by*
pastoribus pascuntur? Bonum siquidem gregis pastores
*the-shepherds are-fed the-good indeed of-the-flock shepherds*
quærere debent, et rectores quilibet et bonum multitudinis
*to-seek ought and rulers any-whatever also the-good of-the-multitude*
sibi subjectæ. Si igitur regimen injustum per unum
*to-themselves subject if therefore government unjust through one*
tantum fiat, qui sua commoda ex regimine quærat, non
*only be-made who his advantages from the-government seek not*
autem bonum multitudinis sibi subjectæ, talis rector tyrannus
*moreover the-good of-the-multitude to-him subject such ruler tyrant*
vocatur, nomine a fortitudine derivato, quia scilicet per
*is-called by-a-name from strength derived because namely through*
potentiam opprimit, non per justitiam opprimit, non per
*power he-oppresses not through justice he-oppresses not through*
justitiam regit: unde et apud antiquos, potentes quique
*justice he-rules whence also among the-ancients the-powerful all*

tyranni vocabantur. Si vero injustum regimen non per unum
*tyrants were-called if but unjust government not through one*
fiat, sed per plures, siquidem per paucos, oligarchia
*be-made but through several if-indeed through few oligarchy*
vocatur, id est principatus paucorum, quando scilicet pauci
*it-is-called that is the-rule of-few when namely few*
propter divitias opprimunt plebem, sola pluralitate
*on-account-of riches oppress the-common-people only by-plurality*
a tyranno differentes. Si vero iniquum regimen exerceatur
*from the-tyrant differing if but wicked government be-exercised*
per multos, democratia nuncupatur, id est potentatus
*through many democracy it-is-named that is the-power*
populi, quando scilicet populus plebeiorum per potentiam
*of-the-people when namely the-people of-the-commoners through the-power*
multitudinis opprimit divites. Sic enim et populus totus erit
*of-the-multitude oppresses the-rich thus for also the-people whole will-be*
quasi unus tyrannus. Similiter autem et justum regimen
*as-if one tyrant similarly moreover also just government*
distingui oportet. Si enim administretur per aliquam
*to-be-distinguished it-is-necessary if for it-be-administered through some*
multitudinem, communi nomine politia vocatur, utpote cum
*multitude by-the-common name polity it-is-called as when*
multitudo bellatorum in civitate vel provincia dominatur. Si
*the-multitude of-warriors in a-city or province rules if*
vero administretur per paucos virtuosos autem, hujusmodi
*but it-be-administered through few virtuous-men moreover of-this-kind*
regimen aristocratia vocatur, id est potentatus optimus, vel
*government aristocracy is-called that is power best or*
optimorum, qui propterea optimates dicuntur. Si vero justum
*of-the-best who therefore optimates are-called if but just*
regimen ad unum tantum pertineat, ille proprie rex vocatur:
*government to one only pertain he properly king is-called*

unde Dominus per Ezech. (cap. xxxvii, 24) dicit: Servus
*whence the-Lord through Ezekiel chapter XXXVII 24 says servant*
meus David rex super omnes erit, et pastor unus erit
*my David king over all will-be and shepherd one will-be*
omnium eorum. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod de ratione
*of-all them from which manifestly is-shown that of the-notion*
regis est quod sit unus qui præsit, et quod sit pastor
*of-king it-is that he-be one who preside and that he-be a-shepherd*
commune multitudinis bonum, et non suum commodum
*the-common of-the-multitude good and not his advantage*
quærens. Cum autem homini competat in multitudine vivere,
*seeking since moreover to-man it-belong in a-multitude to-live*
quia sibi non sufficit ad necessaria vitæ, si solitarius
*because for-himself not he-suffices for the-necessaries of-life if solitary*
maneat, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior multitudinis
*he-remain it-is-necessary that by-so-much be more-perfect of-the-multitude*
societas, quanto magis per se sufficiens erit ad necessaria
*the-society by-how-much more by itself sufficient it-will-be for the-necessaries*
vitæ. Habetur siquidem aliqua vitæ sufficientia, in una familia
*of-life there-is-had indeed some of-life sufficiency in one family*
domus unius, quantum scilicet ad naturales actus nutritionis,
*of-a-house one as-far namely to the-natural acts of-nutrition*
et prolis generandæ, et aliorum hujusmodi; in uno autem
*and of-offspring to-be-generated and of-others of-this-kind in one moreover*
dico, quantum ad ea quæ ad unum artificium pertinent;
*village as-far to those-things which to one craft pertain*
in civitate vero, quæ est perfecta communitas, quantum
*in a-city but which is a-perfect community as-far*
ad omnia necessaria vitæ; sed adhuc magis in provincia
*to all the-necessaries of-life but still more in a-province*
una propter necessitatem compugnationis et mutui auxilii
*one on-account-of the-necessity of-fighting-together and of-mutual help*

contra hostes; unde qui perfectam communitatem regit,
*against enemies whence he-who a-perfect community rules*
id est civitatem vel provinciam, antonomastice rex vocatur;
*that is a-city or province by-antonomasia king is-called*
qui autem domum regit, non rex, sed paterfamilias dicitur.
*he-who moreover a-house rules not king but father-of-the-family is-called*
Habet tamen aliquam similitudinem regis, propter quam
*he-has yet some likeness of-king on-account-of which*
aliquando reges, populorum patres vocantur.
*sometimes kings of-peoples fathers are-called*

Ex dictis igitur patet quod rex est qui unius
*from the-things-said therefore is-plain that a-king is he-who of-one*
multitudinem civitatis vel provinciæ, et propter bonum
*the-multitude of-a-city or of-a-province and for the-good*
commune regit: unde Salomon in Eccl. v, 8 dicit:
*common rules whence Solomon in Ecclesiastes V 8 says*
Universæ terræ rex imperat servienti.
*of-the-whole earth the-king commands to-the-one-serving*

# Quod utilius est multitudinem hominum simul viventium regi per unum quam per plures

## II · THAT RULE BY ONE IS BETTER THAN BY MANY

*The ruler's chief aim is the multitude's peace and unity, and what is one in itself produces unity better than many. Many rule only so far as they approach unity, nature's government is by one, and experience shows provinces under one king flourishing in peace while those under many are torn by dissension.*

His autem præmissis requirere oportet, quid provinciæ vel
*these moreover premised to-inquire it-is-necessary what to-a-province or*
civitati magis expedit, utrum a pluribus regi, vel uno.
*to-a-city more is-expedient whether by several to-be-ruled or by-one*
Hoc autem considerari potest ex ipso fine regiminis.
*this moreover to-be-considered can from the-very end of-government*
Ad hoc enim cujuslibet regentis ferri debet intentio
*to this for of-any ruler to-be-borne ought the-intention*
ut ejus quod regendum suscepit, salutem procuret.
*that of-that which to-be-ruled he-has-undertaken the-safety he-procure*
Gubernatoris enim est navem contra maris pericula servando,
*of-the-helmsman for it-is the-ship against of-the-sea the-dangers by-keeping*
illæsam perducere ad portum salutis. Bonum autem et salus
*unharmed to-bring to the-port of-safety the-good moreover and safety*
consociatæ multitudinis est, ut ejus unitas conservetur, quæ
*of-the-associated multitude is that its unity be-preserved which*
dicitur pax, qua remota sociali vitæ perit utilitas, quinimmo
*is-called peace which removed of-social life perishes the-usefulness nay-rather*
multitudo dissentiens sibi ipsi sit onerosa. Hoc igitur est ad
*the-multitude disagreeing to-it itself be burdensome this therefore is to*
quod maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet, ut pacis
*which most the-ruler of-the-multitude to-aim ought that of-peace*

unitatem procuret. Nec recte consiliatur, an pacem faciat
*the-unity he-procure nor rightly does-he-deliberate whether peace he-make*
in multitudine sibi subjecta, sicut medicus, an sanet
*in the-multitude to-him subject as a-physician whether he-heal*
infirmum sibi commissum. Nullus enim consiliari debet,
*the-sick-man to-him committed no-one for to-deliberate ought*
de fine quem intendere debet, sed de his quæ sunt
*about the-end which to-aim-at he-ought but about those which are*
ad finem. Propterea Apostolus commendata fidelis
*for the-end therefore the-Apostle having-been-commended of-the-faithful*
populi unitate: Solliciti, inquit (Ephes. iv, 3), sitis servare
*people the-unity solicitous he-says Ephesians IV 3 be to-keep*
unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis. Quanto igitur regimen
*the-unity of-the-spirit in the-bond of-peace by-how-much therefore a-government*
efficacius fuerit ad unitatem pacis servandam, tanto
*more-effective will-have-been for the-unity of-peace to-be-kept by-so-much*
erit utilius. Hoc enim utilius dicimus, quod magis
*it-will-be more-useful this for more-useful we-call which more*
perducit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod unitatem
*leads to the-end manifest it-is moreover that unity*
magis efficere potest quod est per se unum, quam plures.
*more to-effect can what is through itself one than several*
Sicut efficacissima causa est calefactionis, quod est per se
*as the-most-effective cause is of-heating what is through itself*
calidum. Utilius igitur est regimen unius quam plurium.
*hot more-useful therefore is the-government of-one than of-several*

Amplius manifestum est, quod plures multitudinem nullo
*further manifest it-is that several the-multitude in-no*
modo conservant, si omnino dissentirent. Requiritur enim in
*way preserve if wholly they-disagreed is-required for in*
pluribus quædam unio ab hoc, quod quoquo modo regere
*several a-certain union for this that in-any way to-rule*

possint, quia nec multi navem in unam partem traherent,
*they-can because neither many a-ship in one direction would-draw*
nisi aliquo modo conjuncti. Uniri autem dicuntur plura
*unless in-some way joined to-be-united moreover are-said several-things*
per appropinquationem ad unum. Melius igitur regit unus
*through approach to one better therefore rules one*
quam plures ex eo quod appropinquant ad unum.
*than several from this that they-approach to one*

Adhuc ea quæ sunt ad naturam optime se
*further those-things which are according-to nature best themselves*
habent, in singulis enim operatur natura, quod optimum est;
*have in single-things for operates nature what best is*
commune autem naturale regimen ab uno est. In membrorum
*common moreover natural government by one is in of-the-members*
enim multitudine unum est quod omnia movet, scilicet cor,
*for the-multitude one is which all moves namely the-heart*
et in partibus animæ; una vis principaliter præsidet, scilicet
*and in the-parts of-the-soul one force principally presides namely*
ratio. Est etiam apibus unus rex; et in toto universo unus
*reason there-is also to-bees one king and in the-whole universe one*
Deus factor omnium et rector. Et hoc rationabiliter. Omnis
*God the-maker of-all and ruler and this reasonably every*
enim multitudo derivatur ab uno. Quare si ea quæ sunt
*for multitude is-derived from one wherefore if those-things which are*
secundum artem, imitantur ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, et
*according-to art imitate those which are according-to nature and*
tanto magis opus artis est melius quanto magis assequitur
*by-so-much more the-work of-art is better by-how-much more it-attains*
similitudinem ejus quod est in natura, necesse est quod in
*the-likeness of-that which is in nature necessary it-is that in*
humana multitudine optimum sit quod per unum regatur.
*a-human multitude best it-be that through one it-be-ruled*

Hoc etiam experimentis apparet. Nam provinciæ vel
*this also by-experiences appears for provinces or*
civitates quæ non reguntur ab uno, dissensionibus laborant,
*cities which not are-ruled by one with-dissensions labor*
et absque pace fluctuant, ut videatur adimpleri quod
*and without peace fluctuate so-that it-seem to-be-fulfilled what*
Dominus per Prophetam conqueritur, dicens (Jerem. xii,
*the-Lord through the-Prophet complains saying Jeremiah XII*
19): Pastores multi demoliti sunt vineam meam. E contrario
*19 shepherds many destroyed have vineyard my from the-contrary*
vero provinciæ et civitates quæ sub uno rege reguntur,
*but provinces and cities which under one king are-ruled*
pace gaudent, justitia florent, et affluentia rerum lætantur?
*in-peace rejoice in-justice flourish and in-abundance of-things are-glad*
Unde Dominus pro magno munere per prophetas populo
*whence the-Lord for a-great gift through the-prophets to-the-people*
suo promittit, quod poneret sibi caput unum, et quod
*his promises that he-would-place for-them head one and that*
princeps unus erit in medio eorum.
*prince one will-be in the-midst of-them*

## Quod, sicut dominium unius optimum est, quando est justum, ita oppositum ejus est pessimum, probaturque multis rationibus et argumentis

### III · THAT TYRANNY IS THE WORST GOVERNMENT

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*As kingship is the best government, tyranny is the worst. United power does more harm as well as more good, and tyranny departs furthest from the common good. Good comes from one perfect cause, evil from many defects, so among unjust governments democracy is most tolerable. The tyrant despoils, kills, and suppresses virtue and friendship among his subjects, who grow servile and hide from him as from a beast.*

Sicut autem regimen regis est optimum, ita regimen
*as moreover the-government of-a-king is best so the-government*
tyranni est pessimum. Opponitur autem politiæ quidem
*of-a-tyrant is worst is-opposed moreover to-polity indeed*
democratia, utrumque enim sicut ex dictis apparet,
*democracy both for as from the-things-said appears*
est regimen quod per plures exercetur; aristocratiæ vero
*is a-government which through several is-exercised to-aristocracy but*
oligarchia, utrumque enim exercetur per paucos; regnum
*oligarchy both for is-exercised through few kingship*
autem tyrannidi, utrumque enim per unum exercetur.
*moreover to-tyranny both for through one is-exercised*
Quod autem regnum sit optimum regimen, ostensum est
*that moreover kingship be the-best government shown it-is*
prius. Si igitur optimo opponitur pessimum, necesse est
*before if therefore to-the-best is-opposed the-worst necessary it-is*
quod tyrannis sit pessimum.
*that tyranny be the-worst*

Adhuc virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum,
*further power united more is effective for an-effect to-be-induced*
quam dispersa vel divisa. Multi enim congregati simul trahunt,
*than dispersed or divided many for gathered together draw*
quod divisim per partes singulariter a singulis trahi
*what separately through parts singly by single-ones to-be-drawn*
non posset. Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem ad
*not could as therefore more-useful it-is the-power operating to*
bonum esse magis unam, ut sit virtuosior ad operandum
*good to-be more one so-that it-be more-powerful for operating*
bonum; ita magis est nocivum, si virtus operans malum sit
*good so more is harmful if the-power operating evil be*
una quam divisa. Virtus autem injuste præsidentis operatur
*one than divided the-power moreover unjustly of-one-presiding operates*
ad malum multitudinis, dum commune bonum multitudinis
*to the-evil of-the-multitude while the-common good of-the-multitude*
in sui ipsius bonum tantum retorquet. Sicut igitur in
*into of-his own good only he-twists as therefore in*
regimine justo, quanto regens est magis unum, tanto est
*government just by-how-much the-ruler is more one by-so-much is*
utilius regimen, ut regnum melius est quam aristocratia,
*more-useful the-government as kingship better is than aristocracy*
aristocratia vero quam politia; ita e converso erit et
*aristocracy but than polity so from the-converse it-will-be also*
in injusto regimine, ut videlicet quanto regens est magis
*in unjust government that namely by-how-much the-ruler is more*
unum, tanto magis sit nocivum: magis igitur est nociva
*one by-so-much more it-be harmful more therefore is harmful*
tyrannis quam oligarchia, oligarchia autem quam democratia.
*tyranny than oligarchy oligarchy moreover than democracy*

Amplius per hoc regimen fit injustum quod spreto
*further through this a-government becomes unjust that spurned*
bono communi multitudinis, quæritur bonum privatum
*the-good common of-the-multitude is-sought the-good private*
regentis. Quanto igitur magis receditur a bono communi,
*of-the-ruler by-how-much therefore more one-departs from the-good common*
tanto est regimen magis injustum; plus autem receditur
*by-so-much is the-government more unjust more moreover one-departs*
a bono communi in oligarchia, in qua quæritur bonum
*from the-good common in oligarchy in which is-sought the-good*
paucorum, quam in democratia, in qua quæritur bonum
*of-few than in democracy in which is-sought the-good*
multorum; et adhuc plus receditur a bono communi in
*of-many and still more one-departs from the-good common in*
tyrannide, in qua quæritur bonum tantum unius. Omni
*tyranny in which is-sought the-good only of-one to-every*
enim universitati propinquius est multum quam paucum,
*for whole nearer is the-many than the-few*
et paucum quam unum solum, regimen igitur tyranni
*and the-few than one alone the-government therefore of-the-tyrant*
est injustissimum. Similiter autem manifestum fit
*is most-unjust similarly moreover manifest it-becomes*
considerantibus divinæ providentiæ ordinem, quæ optime
*to-those-considering of-divine providence the-order which best*
universa disponit. Nam bonum provenit in rebus ex una
*the-universe disposes for good comes in things from one*
causa perfecta, quasi omnibus adunatis quæ ad bonum
*cause perfect as-if all-things united which to good*
juvare possunt, malum autem sigillatim ex singularibus
*to-help can evil moreover singly from single*
defectibus. Non enim est pulchritudo in corpore, nisi omnia
*defects not for is beauty in a-body unless all*

membra fuerint decenter disposita; turpitudo autem contingit,
*the-members have-been fittingly disposed ugliness moreover happens*
quodcumque membrum indecenter se habeat. Et sic turpitudo
*if-any member unfittingly itself have and thus ugliness*
ex pluribus causis diversimode provenit, pulchritudo autem
*from several causes diversely comes beauty moreover*
uno modo ex una causa perfecta, et sic est in omnibus
*in-one way from one cause perfect and thus it-is in all*
bonis est malis, tanquam hoc Deo providente, ut bonum
*goods and evils as-if this God providing that good*
ex una causa sit fortius, malum autem ex pluribus causis
*from one cause be stronger evil moreover from several causes*
sit debilius. Expedit igitur ut regimen justum sit unius
*be weaker it-is-expedient therefore that government just be of-one*
tantum, ad hoc ut sit fortius. Quod si in injustitiam
*only for this that it-be stronger that if into injustice*
declinat regimen, expedit magis ut sit multorum, ut
*declines the-government it-is-expedient more that it-be of-many that*
sit debilius, et se invicem impediant. Inter injusta igitur
*it-be weaker and themselves mutually impede among unjust therefore*
regimina tolerabilius est democratia, pessimum vero tyrannis.
*governments more-tolerable is democracy worst but tyranny*

Idem etiam maxime apparet, si quis consideret mala
*the-same also most appears if anyone consider the-evils*
quæ ex tyrannis proveniunt, quia cum tyrannus contempto
*which from tyrants come because when the-tyrant having-scorned*
communi bono quærit privatum, consequens est ut subditos
*the-common good seeks the-private consequent it-is that the-subjects*
diversimode gravet, secundum quod diversis passionibus
*diversely he-burden according as to-diverse passions*
subjacet ad bona aliqua affectanda. Qui enim passione
*he-is-subject for goods some to-be-desired he-who for by-the-passion*

cupiditatis detinetur, bona subditorum rapit: unde Salomon
*of-greed is-held the-goods of-the-subjects seizes whence Solomon*
(Prov. xxix, 4): Rex justus erigit terram, vir avarus
*Proverbs XXIX 4 a-king just raises-up the-land a-man avaricious*
destruet eam. Si vero iracundiæ passioni subjaceat, pro
*will-destroy it if but of-anger to-the-passion he-be-subject for*
nihilo sanguinem fundit, unde per Ezech. xxii, 27 dicitur:
*nothing blood he-sheds whence through Ezekiel XXII 27 it-is-said*
Principes ejus in medio ejus quasi lupi rapientes prædam ad
*the-princes of-it in the-midst of-it as wolves seizing prey for*
effundendum sanguinem. Hoc igitur regimen fugiendum esse,
*shedding blood this therefore government to-be-fled to-be*
sapiens monet, dicens (Eccl. ix, 18): Longe esto ab
*the-wise-man warns saying Ecclesiasticus IX 18 far be from*
homine potestatem habente occidendi, quia scilicet non pro
*a-man power having of-killing because namely not for*
justitia, sed per potestatem occidit pro libidine voluntatis.
*justice but through power he-kills for the-lust of-(his)-will*
Sic igitur nulla erit securitas, sed omnia sunt incerta, cum
*thus therefore no will-be security but all-things are uncertain when*
a jure disceditur, nec firmari quidquam potest quod
*from right one-departs nor to-be-made-firm anything can which*
positum est in alterius voluntate, ne dicam libidine. Nec
*placed is in another's will not-to say lust nor*
solum in corporalibus subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia
*only in bodily-things the-subjects he-burdens but also the-spiritual*
eorum bona impedit, quia qui plus præsse appetunt quam
*their goods he-impedes because those-who more to-be-over desire than*
prodesse, omnem profectum subditorum impediunt, suspicantes
*to-be-of-use all progress of-the-subjects impede suspecting*
omnem subditorum excellentiam suæ iniquæ dominationi
*every of-the-subjects excellence to-their wicked domination*

præjudicium esse. Tyrannis enim magis boni quam mali
*a-prejudice to-be to-tyrants for more the-good than the-wicked*
suspecti sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est.
*suspect are and-always to-them another's virtue fearsome is*
Conantur igitur prædicti tyranni, ne ipsorum subditi virtuosi
*they-try therefore the-aforesaid tyrants lest their subjects virtuous*
effecti magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum, et eorum iniquam
*made of-magnanimity conceive the-spirit and their wicked*
dominationem non ferant, ne inter subditos amicitiæ fœdus
*domination not bear lest among the-subjects of-friendship the-pact*
firmetur, et pacis emolumento ad invicem gaudeant, ut sic
*be-made-firm and of-peace in-the-benefit with each-other they-rejoice that thus*
dum unus de altero non confidit, contra eorum dominium
*while one in another not trusts against their dominion*
aliquid moliri non possint. Propter quod inter ipsos
*anything to-contrive not they-can on-account-of which among them*
discordias seminant, exortas nutriunt, et ea quæ ad
*discords they-sow those-arisen they-nourish and those-things which to*
fœderationem hominum pertinent, ut connubia et convivia
*the-federation of-men pertain as marriages and banquets*
prohibent, et cætera hujusmodi, per quæ inter homines
*they-prohibit and the-rest of-this-kind through which among men*
solet familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur etiam ne
*is-wont familiarity and trust to-be-generated they-try also lest*
potentes aut divites fiant, quia de subditis secundum
*powerful or rich they-become because about the-subjects according-to*
suæ malitiæ conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi
*of-their-own malice the-consciousness suspecting as they-themselves*
potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur, ita timent ne
*power and riches for harming use so they-fear lest*
potentia subditorum et divitiæ eis nocivæ reddantur. Unde
*the-power of-the-subjects and riches to-them harmful be-rendered whence*

et Job xv, 21 de tyranno dicitur: Sonitus terroris semper
*also Job XV 21 about the-tyrant it-is-said the-sound of-terror always*
in auribus ejus, et cum pax sit, nullo scilicet malum ei
*in the-ears his and when peace be no-one namely evil to-him*
intentante, ille semper insidias suspicatur. Ex hoc autem
*intending he always plots suspects from this moreover*
contingit, ut dum præsidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes
*it-happens that while those-presiding who the-subjects to virtues*
inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum nequiter invident,
*to-lead ought the-virtue of-the-subjects wickedly envy*
et eam pro posse impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci
*and it according-to (their)-power impede under tyrants few*
virtuosi inveniantur. Nam juxta sententiam Philosophi
*virtuous-men are-found for according-to the-judgment of-the-Philosopher*
apud illos inveniuntur fortes viri apud quos fortissimi quique
*among those are-found brave men among whom the-bravest each*
honorantur, et ut Tullius dicit; «Jacent semper et parum
*are-honored and as Tully says lie always and little*
vigent, quæ apud quosque improbantur.» Naturale etiam
*flourish the-things-which among each are-disapproved natural also*
est, ut homines sub timore nutriti, in servilem degenerent
*it-is that men under fear nurtured into a-servile degenerate*
animum, et pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et
*spirit and faint-hearted become for every manly work and*
strenuum, quod experimento patet in provinciis quæ diu sub
*strenuous which by-experience is-plain in provinces which long under*
tyrannis fuerunt. Unde Apostolus, Col. iii, 21 dicit: Patres
*tyrants have-been whence the-Apostle Colossians III 21 says fathers*
nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros, ne pusillo
*do-not to indignation provoke sons your lest of-small*
animo fiant. Hæc igitur nocumenta tyrannidis rex Salomon
*spirit they-become these therefore harms of-tyranny king Solomon*

(Prov. xxviii, 12) considerans dicit: Regnantibus impiis ruinæ
*Proverbs XXVIII 12 considering says reigning the-impious the-ruin*
hominum, quia scilicet per nequitiam tyrannorum subjecti
*of-men because namely through the-wickedness of-tyrants the-subjects*
a virtutum perfectione deficiunt, et iterum dicit (ibid.
*from of-virtues the-perfection fall-short and again he-says in-the-same-place*
xxix, 2): Cum impii sumpserint principatum, gemet
*XXIX 2 when the-impious will-have-taken the-rule will-groan*
populus quasi sub servitute deductus, et iterum (id.
*the-people as-if under servitude led-down and again in-the-same*
xxviii, 28): Cum surrexerint impii, abscondentur homines,
*XXVIII 28 when will-have-risen the-impious will-hide men*
ut tyrannorum crudelitatem evadant. Nec est mirum,
*that of-tyrants the-cruelty they-may-escape nor is-it wonderful*
quia homo absque ratione secundum animæ suæ libidinem
*because a-man without reason according-to of-soul his the-lust*
præsidens nihil differt a bestia, unde Salomon (ibid.
*presiding nothing differs from a-beast whence Solomon in-the-same-place*
xxviii, 15) Leo rugiens, ursus esuriens et princeps impius
*XXVIII 15 a-lion roaring a-bear hungry and a-prince impious*
super populum pauperem; et ideo a tyrannis se
*over a-people poor and therefore from tyrants themselves*
abscondunt homines sicut a crudelibus bestiis, idemque
*hide men as from cruel beasts and-the-same-thing*
videtur tyranno subjici, et bestiæ sævienti substerni.
*it-seems to-a-tyrant to-be-subjected and to-a-beast raging to-be-laid-under*

# Quomodo variatum est dominium apud Romanos, et quod interdum apud eos magis aucta est respublica ex dominio plurium

## IV · How government varied among the Romans

*Because tyrants abuse the royal dignity, kingship becomes hateful to many, and some who want a king fall into tyranny. The Romans, after expelling their kings, grew greatly under consuls and annual magistrates, since men labor more for a common good they do not see as another's, until civil wars brought emperors, a few good, most tyrants who brought the republic to nothing. The Hebrews were plundered under their judges and under their kings turned from God and were led captive, so danger threatens on both sides.*

Quia igitur optimum et pessimum consistunt in monarchia,
*because therefore the-best and the-worst consist in monarchy*
id est principatu unius, multis quidem propter tyrannorum
*that is in-the-rule of-one to-many indeed on-account-of of-tyrants*
malitiam redditur regia dignitas odiosa. Quidam vero dum
*the-malice is-rendered the-royal dignity hateful some but while*
regimen regis desiderant, incidunt in sævitiam tyrannorum,
*the-government of-a-king they-desire fall into the-savagery of-tyrants*
rectoresque quamplures tyrannidem exercent sub prætextu
*and-rulers very-many tyranny exercise under the-pretext*
regiæ dignitatis. Horum quidem exemplum evidenter apparet
*of-royal dignity of-these indeed the-example evidently appears*
in romana republica, regibus enim a populo romano expulsis,
*in the-Roman republic kings for by the-people Roman expelled*
dum regium vel potius tyrannicum fastum ferre non possent,
*while the-royal or rather tyrannical pride to-bear not they-could*
instituerant sibi consules et alios magistratus, per
*they-had-established for-themselves consuls and other magistrates through*
quos regi cœperunt et dirigi, regnum in aristocratiam
*whom to-be-ruled they-began and to-be-directed kingship into aristocracy*

commutare volentes, et sicut refert Salustius: «Incredibile est
*to-change wishing and as relates Sallust incredible it-is*
memoratu, quantum adepta libertate in brevi romana civitas
*to-recall how-much obtained liberty in short-time the-Roman city*
creverit.» Plerumque namque contingit ut homines sub rege
*grew frequently for it-happens that men under a-king*
viventes, segnius ad bonum commune nitantur, utpote
*living more-sluggishly for the-good common strive as*
æstimantes id quod ad commune bonum impendunt, non
*judging that which for the-common good they-expend not*
sibi ipsis conferre, sed alteri, sub cujus potestate vident
*to-themselves themselves to-confer but to-another under whose power they-see*
esse bona communia. Cum vero bonum commune non vident
*to-be the-goods common when but the-good common not they-see*
esse in potestate unius, non attendunt ad bonum commune
*to-be in the-power of-one not they-attend to the-good common*
quasi ad id quod est alterius, sed quilibet attendit ad illud
*as-if to that which is another's but each attends to it*
quasi suum, unde experimento videtur quod una civitas per
*as-if his-own whence by-experience it-is-seen that one city by*
annuos rectores administrata, plus potest interdum quam rex
*annual rulers administered more can sometimes than a-king*
aliquis, si haberet tres vel quatuor civitates: parvaque servitia
*any if he-had three or four cities and-small services*
exacta a regibus gravius ferunt quam magna onera si a
*exacted by kings more-heavily they-bear than great burdens if by*
communitate civium imponantur, quod in promotione romanæ
*the-community of-citizens they-be-imposed which in the-advancement of-the-Roman*
reipublicæ servatum fuit. Nam plebs ad militiam
*republic observed was for the-common-people for military-service*
scribebatur, et pro militantibus stipendia exsolvebant, et cum
*was-enrolled and for those-serving the-pay they-paid and when*

stipendiis exsolvendis non sufficeret commune ærarium, in usus
*for-the-pay to-be-paid not sufficed the-common treasury for uses*
publicos opes venere privatæ, adeo ut præter singulos annulos
*public wealth came private so that besides single rings*
aureos, singulasque bullas, quæ erant dignitatis insignia,
*golden and-single amulets which were of-dignity the-insignia*
nihil sibi auri ipse etiam senatus reliquerit. Sed cum
*nothing for-itself of-gold itself even the-senate left but when*
dissentionibus fatigabatur continuis, quæ usque ad bella civilia
*by-dissensions it-was-wearied continual which up to wars civil*
excreverunt, quibus bellis civilibus eis libertas ad quam
*grew-out by-which wars civil to-them the-liberty to which*
multum studuerant de manibus erepta est, sub potestate
*much they-had-been-devoted from the-hands snatched was under the-power*
imperatorum esse cœperunt qui se reges a principio
*of-emperors to-be they-began who themselves kings from the-beginning*
appellari noluerunt, quia Romanis fuerat nomen regium
*to-be-called were-unwilling because to-the-Romans had-been the-name royal*
odiosum. Horum autem quidam more regio bonum
*hateful of-these moreover some in-the-manner royal the-good*
commune fideliter procuraverunt, per quorum studium
*common faithfully procured through whose zeal*
romana respublica et aucta et conservata est. Plurimi vero
*the-Roman republic both increased and preserved was very-many but*
eorum in subditos quidem tyranni, ad hostes vero
*of-them towards the-subjects indeed tyrants towards the-enemies but*
effecti desides et imbecilles, romanam rempublicam ad nihilum
*made idle and weak the-Roman republic to nothing*
redegerunt. Similis etiam processus fuit in populo Hebræorum.
*reduced similar also the-process was in the-people of-the-Hebrews*
Primo quidem dum sub judicibus regebantur, undique
*first indeed while under judges they-were-ruled on-every-side*

diripiebantur ab hostibus. Nam unusquisque quod bonum erat
*they-were-plundered by enemies for each what good was*
in oculis suis hoc faciebat. Regibus vero eis divinitus datis
*in eyes his this did kings but to-them divinely given*
ad eorum instantiam, propter regum malitiam, a cultu
*at their insistence on-account-of of-the-kings the-malice from the-worship*
unius Dei recesserunt et finaliter ducti sunt in captivitatem.
*of-one God they-withdrew and finally led were into captivity*
Utrinque igitur pericula imminent: sive dum timetur
*on-both-sides therefore dangers threaten either while is-feared*
tyrannus, evitetur regis optimum dominium, sive dum hoc
*a-tyrant be-avoided of-the-king the-best lordship or while this*
consideratur, potestas regia in malitiam tyrannicam convertatur.
*is-considered the-power royal into malice tyrannical be-turned*

## Quod in dominio plurium magis sæpe contingit dominium tyrannicum, quam ex dominio unius; et ideo regimen unius melius est

### V · THAT TYRANNY ARISES MORE OFTEN FROM THE RULE OF MANY

*Between two dangers the lesser must be chosen. Dissension under many destroys peace, while a tyrant often still preserves it, and the rule of many more often ends in tyranny, as Rome shows. It is therefore better to live under one king.*

Cum autem inter duo, ex quorum utroque periculum
*when moreover between two from of-which each danger*
imminet, eligere oportet, illud potissime eligendum est,
*threatens to-choose it-is-necessary that most-of-all to-be-chosen is*
ex quo sequitur minus malum. Ex monarchia autem si
*from which follows the-lesser evil from monarchy moreover if*

in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam ex
*into tyranny it-be-turned less evil follows than from*
regimine plurium optimatum quando corrumpitur. Dissensio
*the-government of-several optimates when it-is-corrupted dissension*
enim quæ plurimum sequitur ex regimine plurium,
*for which very-often follows from the-government of-several*
contrariatur bono pacis, quod est præcipuum in multitudine
*is-contrary to-the-good of-peace which is chief in a-multitude*
sociali, quod quidem bonum per tyrannidem non tollitur,
*social which indeed good through tyranny not is-taken-away*
sed aliqua particularium hominum bona impenduntur, nisi
*but some of-particular men goods are-expended unless*
fuerit excessus tyrannidis, quod in totam communitatem
*there-has-been an-excess of-tyranny which against the-whole community*
desæviat. Magis igitur præoptandum est unius regimen
*rage more therefore to-be-preferred is the-government of-one*
quam multorum, quamvis ex utroque sequantur pericula.
*than of-many although from both follow dangers*
Adhuc illud magis fugiendum videtur, ex quo pluries sequi
*further that more to-be-fled seems from which more-often to-follow*
possunt magna pericula; frequentius autem sequuntur maxima
*can great dangers more-frequently moreover follow the-greatest*
pericula multitudinis ex multorum regimine, quam ex
*dangers of-the-multitude from the-government of-many than from*
regimine unius. Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus
*the-government of-one frequently for it-happens that from several*
aliquis ab intentione communis boni deficiat, quam quod
*someone from the-intention of-the-common good fall-away than that*
unus tantum. Quicumque autem ex pluribus præsidentibus
*one only whoever moreover from several presidents*
divertat ab intentione communis boni, dissensionis periculum
*turn-aside from the-intention of-the-common good of-dissension the-danger*

in subditorum multitudine imminet, quia dissentientibus
*in of-the-subjects the-multitude threatens because disagreeing*
principibus consequens est ut in multitudine sequatur
*the-princes consequent it-is that in the-multitude follow*
dissensio. Si vero unus præsit, plerumque quidem ad bonum
*dissension if but one preside frequently indeed to the-good*
commune respicit; aut si a bono communi intentionem
*common he-looks or if from the-good common his-intention*
avertat, non statim sequitur ut ad subditorum depressionem
*he-turn-away not at-once it-follows that to of-the-subjects the-oppression*
intendat, quod est excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis
*he-aim which is the-excess of-tyranny and in the-malice of-government*
maximum gradum tenens, ut supra ostensum est. Magis
*the-highest degree holding as above shown it-is more*
igitur sunt fugienda pericula quæ proveniunt ex gubernatione
*therefore are to-be-fled the-dangers which come from the-government*
multorum quam ex gubernatione unius. Amplius non minus
*of-many than from the-government of-one further not less*
contingit in tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam
*it-happens into tyranny to-be-turned the-government of-many than*
unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta namque dissensione
*of-one but perhaps more-frequently arisen for dissension*
per regimen plurium contingit sæpe unum super alios
*through the-government of-several it-happens often one over others*
superare et sibi soli multitudinis dominium usurpare,
*to-prevail and for-himself alone of-the-multitude the-lordship to-usurp*
quod quidem ex his quæ pro tempore fuerunt, manifeste
*which indeed from those which for the-time have-been manifestly*
inspici potest. Nam fere omnium multorum regimen est
*to-be-seen can for nearly of-all of-many the-government is*
in tyrannidem terminatum, ut in romana republica manifeste
*in tyranny ended as in the-Roman republic manifestly*

apparet. Quæ cum diu per plures magistratus administrata
*appears which when long through several magistrates administered*
fuisset, exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et bellis civilibus,
*it-had-been arisen rivalries dissensions and wars civil*
in crudelissimos tyrannos incidit, et universaliter si quis
*into most-cruel tyrants fell and universally if anyone*
præterita facta et quæ nunc fiunt, diligenter consideret,
*past deeds and those-which now are-done diligently consider*
plures inveniet exercuisse tyrannidem in terris quæ per
*more he-will-find to-have-exercised tyranny in lands which through*
multos reguntur, quam in illis quæ gubernantur per unum.
*many are-ruled than in those which are-governed through one*
Si igitur regimen quod est optimum regimen, maxime
*if therefore the-government which is the-best government most*
vitandum videatur propter tyrannidem, tyrannis autem non
*to-be-avoided seem on-account-of tyranny tyranny moreover not*
minus, sed magis contingere solet in regimine plurium
*less but more to-happen is-wont in the-government of-several*
quam unius, relinquitur simpliciter magis esse expediens sub
*than of-one it-remains simply more to-be expedient under*
rege uno vivere quam sub regimine plurium.
*a-king one to-live than under the-government of-several*

## Conclusio, quod regimen unius simpliciter sit optimum. Ostendit qualiter multitudo se debet habere circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei occasio ne tyrannizet, et quod etiam in hoc est tolerandus propter majus malum vitandum

### VI · HOW THE MULTITUDE SHOULD PROVIDE AGAINST TYRANNY

*A king should be chosen who is unlikely to become a tyrant, and his power tempered. A mild tyranny is better borne than resisted at the risk of worse, as the old woman of Syracuse prayed for Dionysius. Private men may not kill a tyrant, for Peter teaches obedience even to froward masters. The remedy lies with public authority, which may depose him, with a superior who may punish him, and, failing these, with God, who turns the tyrant's heart or casts him down when the people cease from sin.*

Quia ergo unius regimen præeligendum est, quod est
*because therefore of-one the-government to-be-preferred is which is*
optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod
*the-best and it-happens it into tyranny to-be-turned which*
est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum est
*is the-worst as from the-things-said is-plain to-be-labored it-is*
diligenti studio ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege,
*with-diligent zeal that thus for-the-multitude be-provided concerning a-king*
ut non incidant in tyrannum. Primum autem est necessarium
*that not they-fall into a-tyrant the-first moreover is necessary*
ut talis conditionis homo ab illis ad quos hoc spectat
*that of-such condition a-man by those to whom this belongs*
officium, promoveatur in regem, quod non sit probabile
*the-office be-promoted to king that not it-be probable*
in tyrannidem declinare. Unde Samuel Dei providentiam
*into tyranny to-decline whence Samuel of-God the-providence*
erga institutionem regis commendans, ait I Reg. xiii,
*towards the-institution of-the-king commending says I Kings XIII*

14: Quæsivit sibi Dominus virum secundum cor suum.
*14 has-sought for-himself the-Lord a-man according-to heart his*
Deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio, ut regi
*then thus to-be-disposed is of-the-kingdom the-government that from-the-king*
jam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul
*already instituted of-tyranny be-withdrawn the-occasion at-the-same-time*
etiam sic ejus temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de
*also thus his be-tempered the-power that into tyranny from*
facili declinare non possit. Quæ quidem ut fiant, in
*easy to-decline not it-can which indeed how they-may-be-done in*
sequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est,
*the-following to-be-considered will-be finally but to-be-cared-for it-is*
si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occurri.
*if the-king into tyranny should-turn how it-could to-be-met*

Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est
*and indeed if not there-be an-excess of-tyranny more-useful it-is*
remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam tyrannum
*a-mild tyranny to-tolerate for a-time than (against)-the-tyrant*
agendo multis implicari periculis, quæ sunt graviora
*by-acting in-many to-be-entangled dangers which are graver*
ipsa tyrannide. Potest enim contingere ut qui contra
*than-the-very tyranny it-can for to-happen that those-who against*
tyrannum agunt prævalere non possint, et sic provocatus
*the-tyrant act to-prevail not can and thus provoked*
tyrannus magis desæviat. Quod si prævalere quis possit
*the-tyrant more rage that if to-prevail someone can*
adversus tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt multotiens
*against the-tyrant from this very-thing come many-times*
gravissimæ dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum
*most-grave dissensions in the-people either while against the-tyrant*
insurgitur, sive post dejectionem tyranni erga ordinationem
*one-rises or after the-overthrow of-the-tyrant concerning the-ordering*

regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut
*of-the-government the-multitude is-separated into parties it-happens also that*
interdum dum alicujus auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum,
*sometimes while by-someone's help the-multitude expels the-tyrant*
ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati
*he the-power received the-tyranny seize and fearing to-suffer*
ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute
*from another what he-himself to another did with-heavier servitude*
subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere,
*the-subjects he-oppress thus for in tyranny it-is-wont to-happen*
ut posterior gravior fiat quam præcedens, dum præcedentia
*that the-later heavier become than the-preceding while the-preceding*
gravamina non deserit, et ipsa ex sui cordis malitia
*burdens not he-abandons and himself from of-his heart the-malice*
nova excogitat; unde Syracusis quondam Dionysii mortem
*new-ones devises whence at-Syracuse once of-Dionysius the-death*
omnibus desiderantibus, anus quædam ut incolumis et
*all desiring an-old-woman certain that unharmed and*
sibi superstes esset, continue orabat; quod ut tyrannus
*to-her surviving he-might-be continually prayed which when the-tyrant*
cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa: «Puella,
*learned why this she-did he-asked then she a-girl*
inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, mortem
*she-says being when a-grievous tyrant we-had the-death*
ejus cupiebam, quo interfecto aliquantum durior successit,
*his I-desired whom killed somewhat harsher succeeded*
ejus quoque dominationem finiri magnum existimabam,
*his also the-domination to-be-ended a-great-thing I-thought*
tertium te importuniorem habere cœpimus rectorem. Itaque si
*a-third you more-troublesome to-have we-began as-ruler therefore if*
tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet.»
*you will-have-been taken-off a-worse into place your will-succeed*

Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam
*and if there-be an-intolerable excess of-tyranny to-some*
visum fuit ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat
*it-seemed was that to of-brave men the-virtue it-pertain*
tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis
*the-tyrant to-kill and-themselves for the-liberation of-the-multitude*
exponere periculis mortis; cujus rei exemplum etiam in veteri
*to-expose to-dangers of-death of-which thing an-example also in the-Old*
testamento habetur. Nam Aioth quidam Eglon regem Moab,
*Testament is-had for Ehud a-certain Eglon king of-Moab*
qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in
*who with-heavy servitude the-people of-God oppressed a-dagger fixed in*
ejus femore interemit, et factus est populi judex. Sed hoc
*his thigh killed and made he-was of-the-people the-judge but this*
apostolicæ doctrinæ non congruit. Docet enim non Petrus non
*with-apostolic teaching not agrees teaches for us Peter not*
bonis tantum et modestis, verum etiam dyscolis dominis
*to-the-good only and modest but also to-the-froward masters*
reverenter subditos esse, II Petr. ii. Hæc est enim gratia si
*reverently subject to-be II Peter II this is for grace if*
propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens
*on-account-of conscience of-God bear anyone sorrows suffering*
injuste; unde cum multi romani imperatores fidem Christi
*unjustly whence when many Roman emperors the-faith of-Christ*
persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium
*persecuted tyrannically and-great multitude as-much of-nobles*
quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo, sed
*as of-the-people had to the-faith been-converted not by-resisting but*
mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur,
*death patiently and armed bearing for Christ they-are-praised*
ut in sacra Thebæorum legione manifeste apparet; magisque
*as in the-sacred Theban legion manifestly appears and-rather*

Aioth judicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi
*Ehud to-be-judged is an-enemy to-have-killed than of-the-people*
rectorem, licet tyrannum: unde et in veteri testamento
*a-ruler although a-tyrant whence also in the-Old Testament*
leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Joas regem Juda,
*are-read killed to-have-been those who killed Joash king of-Judah*
quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filii reservati
*although from the-worship of-God withdrawing and-their sons spared*
secundum legis præceptum. Esset autem hoc multitudini
*according-to of-the-law the-precept it-would-be moreover this for-the-multitude*
periculosum et ejus rectoribus, si privata præsumptione aliqui
*dangerous and for-its rulers if by-private presumption some*
attentarent præsidentium necem etiam tyrannorum. Plerumque
*attempted of-those-presiding the-death even of-tyrants frequently*
enim hujusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali
*for of-this-kind to-dangers more expose themselves the-wicked*
quam boni. Malis autem solet esse grave dominium non
*than the-good to-the-wicked moreover is-wont to-be grievous the-lordship not*
minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia secundum sententiam
*less of-kings than of-tyrants because according-to the-judgment*
Salomonis. Prov. xx, 26: Dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis
*of-Solomon Proverbs XX 26 scatters the-impious a-king wise more*
igitur ex hujus præsumptione immineret periculum multitudini
*therefore from of-this presumption would-threaten danger to-the-multitude*
de amissione regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni.
*of the-loss of-a-king than remedy of the-removal of-a-tyrant*

Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum sævitiam non
*it-seems moreover rather against of-tyrants the-savagery not*
privata præsumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica
*by-private presumption of-some but by-authority public*
procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad jus multitudinis alicujus
*to-be-proceeded first indeed if to the-right of-a-multitude some*

pertineat sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem
*it-pertain for-itself to-provide concerning a-king not unjustly by the-same*
rex institutus potest destrui vel refrenari ejus potestas,
*the-king instituted can to-be-destroyed or to-be-curbed his power*
si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis
*if the-power royal tyrannically he-abuse nor to-be-thought is such*
multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam si
*multitude unfaithfully to-act the-tyrant deposing even if*
eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat; quia hoc ipse
*to-him in perpetuity itself before it-had-subjected because this he-himself*
meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens
*deserved in of-the-multitude the-government himself not faithfully conducting*
ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non
*as demands of-a-king the-office that to-him the-pact by the-subjects not*
reservetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum, quem in regem
*be-kept thus the-Romans Tarquin the-proud whom as king*
susceperant, propter ejus et filiorum tyrannidem a regno
*they-had-received on-account-of his and of-his-sons tyranny from the-kingdom*
ejecerunt substituta minori, scilicet consulari, potestate. Sic
*expelled substituted a-lesser namely the-consular power thus*
etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis imperatoribus Vespasiano
*also Domitian who to-the-most-moderate emperors Vespasian*
patri et Tito fratri ejus successerat, dum tyrannidem
*his-father and Titus brother his had-succeeded while tyranny*
exercet, a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quæ
*he-exercises by the-senate Roman killed was all-things which*
perverse Romanis fecerat per senatusconsultum juste et
*perversely to-the-Romans he-had-done through a-decree-of-the-senate justly and*
salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est, ut Beatus
*salutarily into void recalled by-which done it-was that Blessed*
Joannes Evangelista dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum
*John the-Evangelist beloved of-God disciple who by the-very*

Domitianum in Pathmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad
*Domitian to Patmos island had-been in-exile banished to*
Ephesum per senatusconsultum remitteretur.
*Ephesus through a-decree-of-the-senate was-sent-back*

Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris pertineat multitudini
*if but to the-right of-some superior it-pertain for-the-multitude*
providere de rege, expectandum est ab eo remedium
*to-provide concerning a-king to-be-awaited is from him a-remedy*
contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Judæa pro
*against of-the-tyrant the-wickedness thus of-Archelaus who in Judea in-place-of*
Herode patre suo regnare jam cœperat, paternam malitiam
*Herod father his to-reign already had-begun the-paternal malice*
imitantis, Judæis contra eum querimoniam ad Cæsarem
*imitating the-Jews against him a-complaint to Caesar*
Augustinum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur
*Augustus bringing first indeed the-power is-diminished*
ablato sibi regio nomine, et medietate regni sui
*taken-away from-him the-royal name and the-half of-kingdom his*
inter duos fratres suos divisa: deinde cum nec sic a
*between two brothers his divided then when not-even thus from*
tyrannide compesceretur, a Tiberio Cæsare relegatus est
*tyranny he-was-restrained by Tiberius Caesar banished he-was*
in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliæ civitatem. Quod si
*into exile at Lyons of-Gaul a-city that if*
omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non
*wholly against the-tyrant help human to-be-had not*
potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum, qui
*can to-be-recourse-had it-is to the-king of-all God who*
est adjutor in oportunitatibus in tribulatione. Ejus enim
*is the-helper in opportunities in tribulation his for*
potentiæ subest, ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in
*to-the-power it-is-subject that the-heart of-the-tyrant cruel he-turn into*

mansuetudinem secundum Salomonis sententiam, Prov. xii,
*gentleness according-to of-Solomon the-judgment Proverbs XII*
1: Cor regis in manu Dei, quocumque voluerit,
*1 the-heart of-the-king in the-hand of-God wherever he-will-have-wished*
inclinabit illud. Ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui
*he-will-incline it he-himself for of-king Ahasuerus the-cruelty who*
Judæis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse
*for-the-Jews death was-preparing into gentleness turned he-himself*
est qui ita Nabuchodonosor crudelem regem convertit, quod
*is who so Nebuchadnezzar the-cruel king converted that*
factus est divinæ potentiæ prædicator. Nunc igitur, inquit,
*made he-was of-divine power a-preacher now therefore he-says*
ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico, et glorifico regem
*I Nebuchadnezzar praise and magnify and glorify the-king*
cœli, quia opera ejus vera et viæ ejus judicia, et
*of-heaven because the-works his true and the-ways his judgments and*
gradientes in superbia potest humiliare, Dan. iv, 34. Tyrannos
*those-walking in pride he-can to-humble Daniel IV 34 tyrants*
vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre
*but whom he-reckons of-conversion unworthy he-can to-take-away*
de medio, vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum
*from the-midst or to the-lowest state to-reduce according-to*
illud Sapientis Eccles. x, 17: Sedem ducum superborum
*that of-the-Wise-man Ecclesiasticus X 17 the-seat of-leaders proud*
destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse est
*has-destroyed God and to-sit has-made the-meek in-place-of them he-himself is*
qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Ægypto, et audiens
*who seeing the-affliction of-the-people his in Egypt and hearing*
eorum clamorem, Pharaonem tyrannum dejecit cum exercitu
*their cry Pharaoh the-tyrant threw-down with army*
suo in mare. Ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor
*his into the-sea he-himself is who the-mentioned Nebuchadnezzar*

prius superbientem non solum ejectum de regni
*formerly being-proud not only cast-out from of-the-kingdom*
solio, sed etiam de hominum consortio in similitudinem
*the-throne but also from of-men the-fellowship into the-likeness*
bestiæ commutavit. Nec enim abbreviata manus ejus est, ut
*of-a-beast changed nor for shortened the-hand his is that*
populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit
*the-people his from tyrants to-free not it-can he-promises*
enim populo suo per Isaiam requiem se daturum
*for to-the-people his through Isaiah rest himself to-be-about-to-give*
a labore et confusione, ac servitute dura, qua antea
*from labor and confusion and servitude hard by-which before*
servierat. Et per Ezech. xxxiv, 10, dicitur: Liberabo meum
*it-had-served and through Ezekiel XXXIV 10 it-is-said I-shall-free my*
gregem de ore eorum, scilicet pastorum qui pascunt
*flock from the-mouth of-them namely of-the-shepherds who feed*
se ipsos. Sed ut hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi
*them themselves but that this benefit the-people from God to-obtain*
mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati
*may-deserve it-ought from sins to-cease because in vengeance of-sin*
divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente
*by-divine permission the-impious receive the-rule saying*
Domino per Oseam, xiii, 11: Dabo tibi regem in furore
*the-Lord through Hosea XIII 11 I-shall-give to-you a-king in fury*
meo, et in Job. xxxiv, 30, dicitur quod regnare facit
*my and in Job XXXIV 30 it-is-said that to-reign he-makes*
hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda
*a-man hypocrite on-account-of the-sins of-the-people to-be-taken-away*
est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.
*is therefore the-fault that it-cease from of-tyrants the-plague*

## Hic quærit sanctus Doctor, quid præcipue movere debeat regem ad regendum, utrum honor vel gloria, et ponit opiniones circa hoc quid sit tenendum

### VII · WHETHER HONOR AND GLORY ARE THE KING'S REWARD

*Some hold that the king's reward is honor and glory, since a prince not content with them turns tyrant. But glory is fragile, the desire for it robs the soul of its greatness and liberty, and good men scorn it, so it would leave them unrewarded; it also leads to rash wars and to the simulation of virtue. Yet it is more tolerable that a ruler seek glory than wealth or pleasure, since the desire keeps some trace of virtue and holds him back from the open crimes of a Nero.*

Quoniam autem secundum prædicta, regis est bonum
*since moreover according-to the-aforesaid of-the-king it-is the-good*
multitudinis quærere, nimis videtur onerosum regis officium,
*of-the-multitude to-seek too seems burdensome of-the-king the-office*
nisi ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc proveniret. Oportet
*unless to-him some proper good from this came it-is-necessary*
igitur considerare, quale sit boni regis conveniens præmium.
*therefore to-consider what-sort be of-a-good king the-fitting reward*
Quibusdam igitur visum est non esse aliud, nisi
*to-some therefore seemed it-was not to-be other except*
honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius De repub. definit
*honor and glory whence also Tully On the-republic defines*
«principem civitatis esse alendum gloria,» cujus rationem
*the-prince of-the-city to-be to-be-nourished by-glory whose reason*
Aristoteles in lib. Ethic. assignare videtur, «quia princeps
*Aristotle in the-book of-the-Ethics to-assign seems because the-prince*
cui non sufficit honor et gloria, consequenter tyrannus
*to-whom not suffices honor and glory consequently a-tyrant*
efficitur.» Inest enim animis omnium, ut proprium bonum
*is-made it-is-in for the-minds of-all that their-own good*

quærant. Si ergo contentus non fuerit princeps gloria
*they-seek if therefore content not will-have-been the-prince with-glory*
et honore, quæret voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas
*and honor he-will-seek pleasures and riches and thus to plunders*
et subditorum injurias convertetur.
*and of-the-subjects injuries he-will-be-turned*

Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus, plurima sequuntur
*but if this opinion we-shall-have-received very-many follow*
inconvenientia. Primo namque hoc regibus dispendiosum esset,
*unfitting-things first for this to-kings costly would-be*
si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur pro mercede tam
*if so-many labors and cares they-suffered for a-wage so*
fragili. Nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilius gloria
*fragile nothing for seems in things human more-fragile than-glory*
et honore favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex opinionibus
*and honor of-the-favor of-men since it-depend on the-opinions*
hominum, quibus nihil mutabilis in vita hominum,
*of-men than-which nothing more-changeable in the-life of-men*
et inde est quod Isaias propheta, xx, hujusmodi gloriam
*and thence it-is that Isaiah the-prophet XX of-this-kind glory*
nominat florem fœni; deinde humanæ gloriæ cupido animi
*names the-flower of-grass then of-human glory the-desire of-soul*
magnitudinem aufert. Qui enim favorem hominum quærit,
*the-greatness takes-away he-who for the-favor of-men seeks*
necesse est ut in omni eo quod dicit aut facit, eorum voluntati
*necessary it-is that in every that which he-says or does their will*
deserviat, et sic dum placere hominibus studet, fit servus
*he-serve and thus while to-please men he-strives he-becomes the-slave*
singulorum. Propter quod et idem Tullius in lib. De
*of-each on-account-of which also the-same Tully in the-book On*
officiis, cavendam dicit gloriæ cupidinem. Eripit enim
*duties to-be-guarded-against he-says of-glory the-desire it-snatches-away for*

animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse
*of-the-soul the-liberty for which for-great-souled men all ought to-be*
contentio. Nihil autem principem. qui ad bona peragenda
*the-striving nothing moreover a-prince who for good-things to-be-accomplished*
instituitur, magis decet quam animi magnitudo. Est igitur
*is-instituted more befits than of-soul greatness is therefore*
incompetens regis officio humanæ gloriæ præmium.
*unsuitable of-the-king to-the-office of-human glory the-reward*

Simul etiam est multitudini nocivum, si tale præmium
*at-the-same-time also it-is to-the-multitude harmful if such reward*
statuatur principibus, pertinet enim ad boni viri officium, ut
*be-established for-princes it-pertains for to of-a-good man the-office that*
contemnat gloriam sicut alia temporalia bona. Virtuosi enim
*he-scorn glory as other temporal goods of-a-virtuous for*
et fortis animi est pro justitia contemnere gloriam sicut et
*and brave soul it-is for justice to-scorn glory as also*
vitam, unde fit quiddam mirabile, ut quia virtuosos
*life whence it-comes-about a-certain-thing wonderful that because virtuous*
actus sequitur gloria, ipsa gloria virtuose contemnatur, et
*acts follows glory the-very glory virtuously be-scorned and*
ex contemptu gloriæ homo gloriosus reddatur, secundum
*from the-scorn of-glory a-man glorious be-rendered according-to*
sententiam Fabii dicentis: «Gloriam qui spreverit, veram
*the-saying of-Fabius saying glory he-who will-have-spurned true*
habebit,» et de Catone dixit Salustius: «Quo minus petebat
*will-have and of Cato said Sallust the less he-sought*
gloriam, tanto magis assequebatur illam,» ipsique Christi
*glory by-so-much more he-attained it and-the-very of-Christ*
discipuli se sicut Dei ministros exhibebant per gloriam
*disciples themselves as of-God ministers showed through glory*
et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam. Non
*and ignobility through infamy and good fame not*

est igitur boni viri conveniens præmium gloria, quam
*is therefore of-a-good man the-fitting reward glory which*
contemnunt boni. Si igitur hoc solum bonum statuatur
*scorn the-good if therefore this alone good be-established*
præmium principibus, sequetur bonos viros non assumere
*as-the-reward for-princes it-will-follow good men not to-assume*
principatum, aut si assumpserint, impræmiatos esse.
*the-rule or if they-will-have-assumed(-it) unrewarded to-be*
Amplius ex cupidine gloriæ periculosa mala proveniunt.
*further from the-desire of-glory dangerous evils come*
Multi enim dum immoderate gloriam in rebus bellicis
*many for while immoderately glory in things warlike*
quærunt, se hac suos perdiderunt exercitus, libertate
*seek themselves and their-own have-lost armies the-liberty*
patriæ sub hostili potestate redacta: unde Torquatus
*of-the-fatherland under hostile power reduced whence Torquatus*
Romanus princeps in exemplo hujus vitandi discriminis,
*the-Roman prince in example of-this to-be-avoided peril*
filium qui contra imperium suum provocatus ab hoste
*the-son who against command his provoked by the-enemy*
juvenili ardore pugnavit, licet vicisset, occidit, ne plus
*with-youthful ardor fought although he-had-conquered killed lest more*
mali esset in præsumptionis exemplo, quam utilitatis in
*of-evil there-be in of-presumption the-example than of-usefulness in*
gloria hostis occisi. Habet etiam cupido gloriæ aliud sibi
*the-glory of-the-enemy killed has also the-desire of-glory another to-itself*
familiare vitium, simulationem videlicet. Quia enim difficile
*familiar vice simulation namely because for difficult*
est, paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi, quibus solis
*it-is and-to-few it-happens true virtues to-attain to-which alone*
honor debetur, multi gloriam cupientes, virtutum simulatores
*honor is-owed many glory desiring of-virtues simulators*

fiunt. Propter quod sicut dicit Salustius: «Ambitio multos
*become on-account-of which as says Sallust ambition many*
mortales falsos fieri coegit. Aliud clausum in pectore, aliud
*mortals false to-become compelled one-thing shut in the-breast another*
promptum habere in lingua, magisque vultum quam ingenium
*ready to-have in the-tongue and-more the-face than the-character*
habere.» Sed et Salvator noster eos qui bona opera faciunt, ut
*to-have but also the-Savior our those who good works do that*
ab hominibus videantur, hypocritas, id est simulatores, vocat.
*by men they-be-seen hypocrites that is simulators calls*
Sicut igitur periculosum est multitudini, si princeps voluptates
*as therefore dangerous it-is to-the-multitude if the-prince pleasures*
et divitias quærat pro præmio, ne raptor et contumeliosus
*and riches seek as reward lest a-plunderer and insolent*
fiat, ita periculosum est cum detinetur gloriæ præmio,
*he-become so dangerous it-is when he-is-held of-glory by-the-reward*
ne præsumptuosus et simulator existat. Sed quantum ex
*lest presumptuous and a-simulator he-stand-out but as-far-as from*
dictorum sapientium intentione apparet non ea ratione
*of-the-said wise-men the-intention appears not by-that reason*
honorem et gloriam pro præmio principi decreverunt tanquam
*honor and glory as reward for-the-prince they-decreed as-if*
ad hoc principaliter ferri debeat boni regis intentio; sed
*to this principally to-be-borne ought of-the-good king the-intention but*
quia tolerabilius est si gloriam quærat, quam si pecuniam cupiat,
*because more-tolerable it-is if glory he-seek than if money he-desire*
vel voluptatem sequatur. Hoc enim vitium virtuti propinquius
*or pleasure follow this for vice to-virtue nearer*
est, cum gloria quam homines cupiunt, ut ait Augustinus,
*is since glory which men desire as says Augustine*
nihil aliud sit, quam judicium hominum bene de hominibus
*nothing other be than the-judgment of-men well of men*

opinantium. Cupido enim gloriæ aliquod habet virtutis
*thinking the-desire for of-glory some has of-virtue*
vestigium, dum saltem bonorum approbationem quærit, et eis
*trace while at-least of-the-good the-approval it-seeks and them*
displicere recusat. Paucis igitur ad veram virtutem pervenientibus
*to-displease refuses to-few therefore to true virtue arriving*
tolerabilius videtur, si præferatur ad regimen qui vel
*more-tolerable it-seems if be-preferred for the-government he-who at-least*
judicium hominum metuens, a malis manifestis retrahitur.
*the-judgment of-men fearing from evils manifest is-drawn-back*

Qui enim gloriam cupit, aut vera via per virtutis
*he-who for glory desires either by-the-true way through of-virtue*
opera nititur, ut ab hominibus approbetur, vel saltem dolis
*works strives that by men he-be-approved or at-least by-tricks*
ad hoc contendit atque fallaciis. At qui dominari desiderat,
*for this strives and by-deceits but he-who to-dominate desires*
si cupiditate gloriæ carens non timeat bene judicantibus
*if of-the-desire of-glory lacking not he-fear well to-those-judging*
displicere, per apertissima scelera quærit plerumque obtinere
*to-be-displeasing through most-open crimes he-seeks frequently to-obtain*
quod diligit, unde bestias superat sive crudelitatis, sive
*what he-loves whence beasts he-surpasses whether of-cruelty or*
luxuriæ vitiis, sicut in Nerone Cæsare patet, cujus ut
*of-lust in-the-vices as in Nero Caesar is-plain whose as*
Augustinus dicit, tanta luxuria fuit ut nihil putaretur
*Augustine says such lust was that nothing was-thought*
ab eo virile metuendum, tanta crudelitas ut nihil molle
*by him manly to-be-feared such cruelty that nothing soft*
habere putaretur. Hoc autem satis exprimitur per id quod
*to-have he-was-thought this moreover enough is-expressed through that which*
Aristoteles de magnanimo in Ethic. dicit, quod non quærit
*Aristotle about the-great-souled-man in the-Ethics says that not he-seeks*

honorem et gloriam quasi aliquid magnum, quod sit virtutis
*honor and glory as something great which be of-virtue*
sufficiens præmium, sed nihil ultra hoc ab hominibus exigit.
*a-sufficient reward but nothing beyond this from men he-demands*
Hoc enim inter omnia terrena videtur esse præcipuum ut
*this for among all earthly-things seems to-be chief that*
homini ab hominibus testimonium de virtute reddatur.
*to-a-man by men testimony about virtue be-rendered*

## Hic declarat doctor, qualis est verus finis regis, qui movere ipsum debet ad bene regendum

### VIII · THE TRUE END OF THE KING

*Since worldly honor is not reward enough, the king, as God's minister, must look to God for it. If God rewards even wicked kings with victories, he gives good kings an eternal reward. No earthly good can satisfy desire or make a man blessed, so God alone, who made the mind in his image, is the king's reward, the true honor and glory of the citizen of heaven.*

Quoniam ergo mundanus honor et hominum gloria regiæ
*since therefore worldly honor and of-men glory of-royal*
sollicitudinis non est sufficiens præmium, inquirendum restat
*solicitude not is a-sufficient reward to-be-inquired remains*
quale sit eidem sufficiens. Est autem conveniens, ut rex
*what-sort be for-it sufficient it-is moreover fitting that the-king*
præmium expectet a Deo. Minister enim pro suo ministerio
*a-reward await from God the-minister for for his ministry*
præmium expectat a Domino; rex autem populum
*a-reward awaits from the-Lord the-king moreover the-people*
gubernando minister Dei est, dicente Apostolo Rom. xiii, 1
*by-governing the-minister of-God is saying the-Apostle Romans XIII 1*

et 4, quod omnis potestas a Domino Deo est, et quod
*and 4 that all power from the-Lord God is and that*
est Dei minister vindex in iram ei qui male agit,
*he-is of-God the-minister an-avenger for wrath to-him who evil does*
et in lib. Sap. reges Dei esse ministri describuntur.
*and in the-book of-Wisdom kings of-God to-be ministers are-described*
Debent igitur reges pro suo regimine præmium expectare
*they-ought therefore kings for their government a-reward to-await*
a Deo. Remunerat autem Deus pro suo ministerio reges
*from God rewards moreover God for their ministry kings*
interdum temporalibus bonis, sed talia præmia sunt bonis
*sometimes with-temporal goods but such rewards are to-the-good*
malisque communia: unde Dominus Ezech, xxix, 18, dicit:
*and-the-wicked common whence the-Lord Ezekiel XXIX 18 says*
Nabuchodonosor rex Babylonis servire fecit exercitum suum
*Nebuchadnezzar king of-Babylon to-serve has-made army his*
servitute magna adversus Tyrum, et merces non est reddita
*with-a-service great against Tyre and wages not was rendered*
ei, nec exercitui ejus de Tyro, pro servitute qua servivit
*to-him nor to-the-army his from Tyre for the-service with-which he-served*
mihi adversus eam, ea scilicet servitute qua potestas
*me against it that namely service by-which power*
secundum Apostolum, Dei minister est, vindex in iram
*according-to the-Apostle of-God the-minister is an-avenger for wrath*
ei qui male agit; et postea de præmio subdidit: Propterea
*to-him who evil does and afterward about the-reward he-added therefore*
hæc dicit Dominus Deus: Ecce ego dabo Nabuchodonosor
*these-things says the-Lord God behold I shall-give Nebuchadnezzar*
regem Babylonis in terra Ægypti, et diripiet spolia ejus,
*king of-Babylon in the-land of-Egypt and he-will-plunder the-spoils its*
et erit merces exercitui ejus. Si ergo reges iniquos contra
*and it-will-be the-wages for-the-army his if therefore kings wicked against*

Dei hostes pugnantes, licet non intentione serviendi
*of-God the-enemies fighting although not with-the-intention of-serving*
Deo, sed sua odia et cupiditates exequendi, tanta mercede
*God but their hatreds and desires of-carrying-out with-so-great a-wage*
Dominus remunerat, ut de hostibus victoriam tribuat, regna
*the-Lord rewards that over enemies victory he-grants kingdoms*
subjiciat, et spolia diripienda proponat, quid faciet bonis
*subjects and spoils to-be-plundered offers what will-he-do for-good*
regibus qui pia intentione Dei populum regunt et hostes
*kings who with-pious intention of-God the-people rule and enemies*
impugnant? Non quidem terrenam, sed æternam mercedem
*attack not indeed an-earthly but an-eternal wage*
eis promittit, nec in alio quam in se ipso, dicente Petro
*to-them he-promises nor in another than in him himself saying Peter*
pastoribus populi Dei, I Petr. v, 3: Pascite qui in vobis
*to-the-shepherds of-the-people of-God I Peter V 3 feed which among you*
est gregem Domini, ut cum venerit Princeps pastorum,
*is the-flock of-the-Lord that when will-have-come the-Prince of-shepherds*
id est rex regum Christus, percipiatis immarcescibilem
*that is the-king of-kings Christ you-may-receive the-unfading*
gloriæ coronam, de qua dicit Isa. xxxviii, 5: Erit Dominus
*of-glory crown about which says Isaiah XXXVIII 5 will-be the-Lord*
sertum exultationis et diadema gloriæ populo suo.
*a-garland of-exultation and a-diadem of-glory to-the-people his*

Hoc autem ratione manifestatur. Est enim mentibus omnium
*this moreover by-reason is-made-manifest it-is for in-the-minds of-all*
ratione utentium inditum, virtutis præmium beatitudinem esse.
*reason using implanted of-virtue the-reward beatitude to-be*
Virtus enim uniuscujusque rei describitur, quæ bonum
*virtue for of-each thing is-described that-which good*
facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit. Ad hoc autem
*makes the-one-having-it and the-work its good renders to this moreover*

quisque bene operando nititur pervenire, quod est maxime
*each by-well operating strives to-arrive which is most*
desiderio inditum; hoc autem est esse felicem, quod nullus
*in-desire implanted this moreover is to-be happy which no-one*
potest non velle. Hoc igitur præmium virtutis convenienter
*can not to-will this therefore the-reward of-virtue fittingly*
expectatur, quod hominem beatum facit. Si autem bene operari
*is-awaited which a-man blessed makes if moreover well to-operate*
virtutis est opus, regis autem opus est bene regere subditos,
*of-virtue is the-work of-a-king moreover the-work is well to-rule the-subjects*
hoc etiam erit præmium regis quod eum faciat esse beatum.
*this also will-be the-reward of-the-king which him make to-be blessed*
Quid autem hoc sit, hinc considerandum est. Beatitudinem
*what moreover this be hence to-be-considered it-is beatitude*
quidem dicimus ultimum desideriorum finem. Neque enim
*indeed we-call the-last of-desires end nor for*
desiderii motus usque in infinitum procedit; esse enim
*of-desire the-motion up to infinity proceeds it-would-be for*
inane naturale desiderium, cum infinita pertransiri non
*vain natural desire since infinite-things to-be-passed-through not*
possint. Cum autem desiderium intellectualis naturæ sit
*can since moreover the-desire of-intellectual nature be*
universalis boni, hoc solum bonum vere beatum facere poterit,
*of-universal good this alone good truly blessed to-make will-be-able*
quo adepto nullum bonum restat quod amplius desiderari
*which obtained no good remains which further to-be-desired*
possit: unde et beatitudo dicitur bonum perfectum, quasi
*can whence also beatitude is-called good perfect as-if*
omnia desiderabilia in se comprehendens, tale autem non est
*all desirable-things in itself comprehending such moreover not is*
aliquod bonum terrenum; nam qui divitias habent, amplius
*any good earthly for those-who riches have more*

habere desiderant, et simile patet in cæteris. Et si ampliora
*to-have desire and the-like is-plain in the-rest and if more*
non quærunt, desiderat tamen ut ea permaneant. vel alia
*not they-seek he-desires yet that they remain or others*
in locum eorum succedant. Nihil enim permanens invenitur
*into place their succeed nothing for permanent is-found*
in rebus terrenis, nihil igitur terrenum est quod quietare
*in things earthly nothing therefore earthly is which to-quiet*
desiderium possit. Neque igitur terrenum aliquod beatum
*desire can nor therefore earthly anything blessed*
facere potest, ut possit esse regis conveniens præmium.
*to-make can that it-could to-be the-king's fitting reward*

Adhuc cujuslibet rei finalis perfectio et bonum completum
*further of-any thing the-final perfection and good complete*
ab aliquo superiore dependet, quia et ipsa corporalia
*on something higher depends because even the-very bodily-things*
meliora redduntur ex adjunctione meliorum, pejora vero si
*better are-rendered by the-addition of-better-things worse but if*
deterioribus misceantur. Si enim argento misceatur aurum,
*with-worse-things they-be-mixed if for with-silver be-mixed gold*
argentum sit melius, quod ex plumbi admixtione impurum
*the-silver becomes better which by of-lead admixture impure*
efficitur. Constat autem terrena omnia esse infra mentem
*is-made it-is-agreed moreover earthly-things all to-be below the-mind*
humanam; beatitudo autem est hominis finalis perfectio, et
*human beatitude moreover is of-man the-final perfection and*
bonum completum, ad quod omnes pervenire desiderant, nihil
*good complete to which all to-arrive desire nothing*
igitur terrenum est quod hominem possit beatum facere; nec
*therefore earthly is which a-man can blessed to-make nor*
igitur terrenum aliquod est præmium regis sufficiens; non
*therefore earthly anything is the-reward of-the-king sufficient not*

enim ut Augustinus dicit, christianos principes ideo felices
*for as Augustine says Christian princes therefore happy*
dicimus quia diutius imperarunt, vel imperatores filios morte
*we-call because longer they-ruled or emperors sons by-death*
placida reliquerunt, vel hostes reipublicæ domuerunt, vel
*peaceful left or enemies of-the-republic tamed or*
cives adversum se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere
*citizens against them rising both to-guard-against and to-crush*
potuerunt; sed felices eos dicimus, si juste imperant, si malunt
*could but happy them we-call if justly they-rule if they-prefer*
cupiditatibus potius quam gentibus quibuslibet imperare, si
*over-desires rather than over-nations any-whatever to-rule if*
omnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriæ, sed
*all-things they-do not on-account-of the-ardor of-vain glory but*
propter charitatem felicitatis æternæ. Tales imperatores
*on-account-of the-love of-happiness eternal such emperors*
christianos felices dicimus, interim spe, postea re ipsa
*Christian happy we-call meanwhile in-hope afterward in-reality itself*
futuros, cum id quod expectamus advenerit. Sed nec aliquid
*about-to-be when that which we-await will-have-come but neither anything*
aliud creatum est, quod beatum hominem faciat et possit
*other created is which blessed man make and can*
regi decerni pro præmio. Tendit enim uniuscujusque rei
*to-the-king to-be-decreed as reward tends for of-each thing*
desiderium in suum principium, a quo esse suum principium
*the-desire into its principle by which to-be its principle*
causatur. Causa vero mentis humanæ non est aliud quam
*is-caused the-cause but of-the-mind human not is other than*
Deus qui eam ad suam imaginem facit. Solus igitur Deus est
*God who it to his image makes alone therefore God is*

qui hominis desiderium quietare potest, et facere hominem
*who of-man the-desire to-quiet can and to-make man*
beatum, et esse regi conveniens præmium.
*blessed and to-be for-the-king a-fitting reward*

Amplius, mens humana universalis boni cognoscitiva est
*further the-mind human of-universal good cognitive is*
per intellectum et desiderativa per voluntatem: bonum
*through the-intellect and desiderative through the-will good*
autem universale non invenitur nisi in Deo. Nihil ergo
*moreover universal not is-found except in God nothing therefore*
est quod possit hominem beatum facere, ejus implendo
*is which can man blessed to-make his by-filling*
desiderium, nisi Deus, de quo dicitur in Psalm. cii, 5: Qui
*desire except God of whom it-is-said in Psalm CII 5 who*
replet in bonis desiderium tuum; in hoc ergo rex suum
*fills in good-things desire your in this therefore the-king his*
præmium statuere debet. Hoc igitur considerans David rex
*reward to-establish ought this therefore considering David the-king*
dicebat Psalm. lxxiv, 24: Quid mihi est in cœlo et a te
*said Psalm LXXIV 24 what to-me is in heaven and from you*
quid volui super terram? Cui quæstioni postea respondens
*what did-I-wish upon earth to-which question afterward answering*
subjungit: Mihi autem adhærere bonum est et ponere in
*he-adds to-me moreover to-cling good is and to-place in*
Domino Deo spem meam. Ipse enim est qui dat salutem
*the-Lord God hope my he-himself for is who gives salvation*
regibus, non solum temporalem, qua communiter salvat
*to-kings not only temporal by-which commonly he-saves*
homines et jumenta, sed etiam eam de qua per Isai. li,
*men and beasts but also that about which through Isaiah LI*

6, dicit: Salus autem mea in sempiternum erit; qua
*6 he-says the-salvation moreover my into perpetuity will-be by-which*
homines salvat, eos ad æqualitatem Angelorum perducens.
*men he-saves them to the-equality of-Angels leading*

Sic igitur verificari potest quod regis præmium est honor
*thus therefore to-be-verified it-can that of-the-king the-reward is honor*
et gloria. Quis enim mundanus et caducus honor huic honori
*and glory what for worldly and perishable honor to-this honor*
similis esse potest, ut homo sit civis et domesticus
*like to-be can that a-man be a-citizen and member-of-the-household*
Dei, et inter Dei filios computatus, et hæreditatem
*of-God and among of-God the-sons counted and the-inheritance*
regni cælestis assequatur cum Christo? Hic est honor
*of-the-kingdom heavenly obtain with Christ this is the-honor*
quem concupiscens et admirans rex David dicebat Psalm.
*which desiring and admiring king David said Psalm*
cxxxviii, 17: Nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus. Quæ
*CXXXVIII 17 exceedingly honored are friends your God what*
insuper humanæ laudis gloria huic compari potest, quam non
*moreover of-human praise glory to-this to-be-compared can which not*
fallax blandientium lingua, non decepta hominum opinio
*the-deceitful of-flatterers tongue not the-deceived of-men opinion*
profert, sed ex interioris conscientiæ testimonio producit, et
*brings-forth but from of-interior conscience the-testimony it-produces and*
Dei testimonio confirmatur, qui suis confessoribus repromittit
*of-God by-the-testimony is-confirmed who to-his confessors promises*
quod confiteatur eos in gloria Patris coram Angelis Dei?
*that he-will-confess them in the-glory of-the-Father before the-Angels of-God*
Qui autem hanc gloriam quærunt, eam inveniunt, et quam
*who moreover this glory seek it find and which*
non quærunt gloriam hominum, consequuntur, exemplo
*not they-seek the-glory of-men they-attain by-the-example*

Salomonis, qui non solum sapientiam quam quæsivit accepit
*of-Solomon who not only wisdom which he-sought received*
a Domino, sed factus est super reges alios gloriosus.
*from the-Lord but made he-was over kings other glorious*

Hic declarat sanctus Doctor quod præmium regum et principum tenet supremum gradum in beatitudine cœlesti, et hoc multis rationibus ostenditur et exemplis

## IX · THAT GOOD KINGS HOLD THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF BEATITUDE

*Greater virtue earns a greater reward, and ruling many takes more virtue than ruling oneself, as the architect and the general are valued above the craftsman and the soldier. The king procures the common good, more divine than the good of one, and so imitates God's work in the world. The difficulty of ruling well makes his merit greater and his sins more excusable, and Scripture promises that the house of David will be as the house of God.*

Considerandum autem restat ulterius, quod et eminentem
*to-be-considered moreover remains further that also an-eminent*
obtinebunt cœlestis beatitudinis gradum, qui officium regium
*will-obtain of-heavenly beatitude degree those-who the-office royal*
digne et laudabiliter exequuntur. Si enim beatitudo virtutis
*worthily and laudably carry-out if for beatitude of-virtue*
est præmium, consequens est ut majori virtuti major gradus
*is the-reward consequent it-is that to-greater virtue a-greater degree*
beatitudinis debeatur. Est autem præcipua virtus qua homo
*of-beatitude be-owed it-is moreover a-chief virtue by-which a-man*
aliquis non solum se ipsum, sed etiam alios dirigere potest; et
*any not only him himself but also others to-direct can and*
tanto magis, quanto plurium est regitiva; quia et secundum
*by-so-much more by-how-much of-more it-is ruling because also according-to*

virtutem corporalem tanto aliquis virtuosior reputatur,
*strength bodily by-so-much someone more-virtuous is-reckoned*
quanto plures vincere potest, aut pondera levare. Sic igitur
*by-how-much more to-conquer he-can or weights to-lift thus therefore*
major virtus requiritur ad regendum domesticam familiam quam
*greater virtue is-required for ruling a-domestic family than*
ad regendum se ipsum, multoque major ad regimen civitatis
*for ruling one oneself and-much greater for the-government of-a-city*
et regni. Et igitur excellentis virtutis bene regium officium
*and of-a-kingdom it-is therefore of-excellent virtue well the-royal office*
exercere; debetur igitur ei excellens in beatitudine præmium.
*to-exercise is-owed therefore to-him an-excellent in beatitude reward*

Adhuc in omnibus artibus et potentiis laudabiliores sunt
*further in all arts and powers more-praiseworthy are*
qui alios bene regunt, quam qui secundum alienam
*those-who others well rule than those-who according-to another's*
directionem bene se habent. In speculativis enim majus
*direction well themselves have in speculative-things for greater*
est veritatem aliis docendo tradere, quam quod ab aliis
*is the-truth to-others by-teaching to-hand-on than what from others*
docetur capere posse. In artificiis etiam majus existimatur,
*is-taught to-grasp to-be-able in crafts also greater is-judged*
majorique conducitur pretio architector qui ædificium
*and-at-a-greater is-hired price the-architect who the-building*
disponit, quam artifex qui secundum ejus dispositionem
*disposes than the-craftsman who according-to his disposition*
manualiter operatur; et in rebus bellicis majorem gloriam de
*manually works and in things warlike greater glory from*
victoria sequitur prudentia ducis, quam militis fortitudo.
*victory follows the-prudence of-the-general than of-the-soldier the-bravery*
Sic autem se habet rector multitudinis in his quæ a singulis
*thus moreover himself has the-ruler of-a-multitude in those which by single-ones*

secundum virtutem sunt agenda, sicut doctor in disciplinis,
*according-to virtue are to-be-done as the-teacher in disciplines*
et architector in ædificiis, et dux in bellis. Est igitur
*and the-architect in buildings and the-general in wars is therefore*
rex majori pretio dignus, si bene subjectos gubernaverit,
*the-king of-greater price worthy if well the-subjects he-will-have-governed*
quam aliquis subditorum, si sub rege bene se habuerit.
*than any of-the-subjects if under the-king well himself he-will-have-had*
Amplius, si virtutis est, ut per eam opus hominis
*further if of-virtue it-is that through it the-work of-man*
bonum reddatur, majoris virtutis esse videtur quod majus
*good be-rendered of-greater virtue to-be it-seems that a-greater*
bonum per eam aliquis operetur. Majus autem et divinius
*good through it someone work greater moreover and more-divine*
est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius, unde interdum
*is the-good of-the-multitude than the-good of-one whence sometimes*
malum unius sustinetur, si in bonum multitudinis cedat,
*the-evil of-one is-borne if into the-good of-the-multitude it-turn*
sicut occiditur latro, ut pax multitudini detur. Et ipse
*as is-killed a-robber that peace to-the-multitude be-given and himself*
Deus mala esse in mundo non sineret, nisi ex eis bona
*God evils to-be in the-world not would-allow unless from them goods*
eliceret ad utilitatem et pulchritudinem universi. Pertinet
*he-drew-out for the-utility and beauty of-the-universe it-pertains*
autem et regis officium, ut bonum multitudinis studiose
*moreover also to-the-king's office that the-good of-the-multitude zealously*
procuret. Majus igitur præmium debetur regi pro bono
*he-procure a-greater therefore reward is-owed to-the-king for good*
regimine, quam subdito pro bona actione.
*government than to-the-subject for good action*

Hoc autem manifestius fiet, si quis magis in speciali
*this moreover more-manifest will-become if anyone more in particular*
consideret. Laudatur enim ab hominibus quævis privata
*consider is-praised for by men any private*
persona, et ei a Deo computatur in præmium, si egenti
*person and to-him by God it-is-counted for reward if the-needy*
subveniat, si discordes pacificet, si oppressum a potentiore
*he-help if the-quarreling he-pacify if the-oppressed from the-more-powerful*
eripiat, denique si aliqui qualitercumque opem vel consilium
*he-snatch finally if to-anyone in-any-way help or counsel*
conferat ad salutem. Quanto igitur magis laudandus est ab
*he-confer for safety how-much therefore more to-be-praised is-he by*
hominibus et præmiandus a Deo, qui totam provinciam facit
*men and to-be-rewarded by God who the-whole province makes*
pace gaudere, violentias cohibet, justitiam servat et disponit
*in-peace to-rejoice violences restrains justice preserves and disposes*
quid sit agendum ab hominibus suis legibus et præceptis?
*what be to-be-done by men by-his laws and precepts*
Hinc etiam magnitudo regiæ virtutis apparet quod præcipue
*hence also the-greatness of-royal virtue appears that especially*
Dei similitudinem gerit, dum agit in regno, quod Deus
*of-God the-likeness it-bears while he-does in the-kingdom what God*
in mundo: unde et in Exod. xxii, judices multitudinis dii
*in the-world whence also in Exodus XXII the-judges of-the-multitude gods*
vocantur. Imperatores etiam apud Romanos dii vocabantur.
*are-called the-emperors also among the-Romans gods were-called*
Tanto autem est aliquid Deo acceptius, quanto magis
*by-so-much moreover is something to-God more-acceptable by-how-much more*
ad ejus imitationem accedit: unde et Apostolus monet
*to his imitation it-approaches whence also the-Apostle warns*
Ephes. v, 1: Estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi. Sed
*Ephesians V 1 be imitators of-God as sons most-dear but*

si secundum Sapientis sententiam: Omne animal diligit
*if according-to of-the-Wise-man the-saying every animal loves*
simile sibi, secundum quod causæ aliqualiter similitudinem
*the-like to-itself according as causes in-some-way likeness*
habent causati, consequens igitur est bonos reges Deo esse
*have of-the-caused consequent therefore it-is good kings to-God to-be*
acceptissimos, et ab eo maxime præmiandos. Simul
*most-acceptable and by him most to-be-rewarded at-the-same-time*
etiam, ut Gregorii verbis utar: Quid est tempestas maris
*also that of-Gregory the-words I-may-use what is the-tempest of-the-sea*
nisi tempestas mentis? Quieto autem mari recte navem
*except the-tempest of-the-mind quiet moreover the-sea rightly the-ship*
etiam imperitus dirigit, turbato autem mari tempestatis
*even the-unskilled directs troubled moreover the-sea of-the-tempest*
fluctibus etiam peritus nauta confunditur: unde et plerumque
*by-the-waves even the-skilled sailor is-confounded whence also frequently*
in occupatione regiminis, ipse quoque boni operis usus
*in the-occupation of-government the-very also of-good work the-practice*
perditur, qui in tranquillitate tenebatur. Valde enim difficile
*is-lost which in tranquility was-held very for difficult*
est si, ut Augustinus dicit, inter linguas sublimantium et
*it-is if as Augustine says among the-tongues of-those-exalting and*
honorantium, et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non
*of-those-honoring and the-services too humbly of-those-greeting not*
extolluntur, sed se homines esse meminerint. Et in
*they-are-lifted-up but themselves men to-be they-remember and in*
Eccl. xxxi, 8: Beatus vir qui post aurum non abiit, nec
*Ecclesiasticus XXXI 8 blessed the-man who after gold not went nor*
speravit in pecuniæ thesauris. Qui potuit impune transgredi,
*hoped in of-money treasures who could with-impunity to-transgress*
et non est transgressus, et facere mala, et non fecit. Ex
*and not has transgressed and to-do evils and not did from*

quo quasi in virtutis opere probatus invenitur fidelis, unde
*which as-if in of-virtue the-work proved he-is-found faithful whence*
secundum Biantis proverbium: «Principatus virum ostendit.»
*according-to of-Bias the-proverb rule the-man shows*
Multi enim ad principatus culmen pervenientes a virtute
*many for to of-rule the-summit arriving from virtue*
deficiunt, qui dum in statu essent infimo, virtuosi videbantur.
*fall-away who while in a-state they-were lowest virtuous seemed*

Ipsa igitur difficultas, quæ principibus imminet ad bene
*the-very therefore difficulty which upon-princes threatens for well*
agendum, eos facit majori præmio dignos, et si aliquando
*acting them makes of-greater reward worthy and if sometimes*
per infimitatem peccaverint, apud homines excusabiliores
*through weakness they-have-sinned with men more-excusable*
redduntur, et facilius a Deo veniam promerentur, si
*they-are-rendered and more-easily from God pardon they-merit if*
tamen ut Augustinus ait, pro suis peccatis humilitatis, et
*yet as Augustine says for their sins of-humility and*
miserationis, et orationi sacrificium Deo suo vero immolari
*of-mercy and of-prayer the-sacrifice to-God their true to-be-offered*
non negligunt. In cujus rei exemplum de Achab rege
*not they-neglect in of-which thing example about Ahab king*
Israel qui multum peccaverat, Dominus ad Heliam dixit:
*of-Israel who much had-sinned the-Lord to Elijah said*
(III Reg. xxi, 29): Quia humiliatus est mei causa, non
*III Kings XXI 29 because humbled he-is for-my sake not*
inducam hoc malum in diebus suis.
*I-shall-bring this evil in the-days his*

Non autem solum ratione ostenditur, quod regibus excellens
*not moreover only by-reason it-is-shown that to-kings an-excellent*
præmium debeatur, sed etiam auctoritate divina firmatur.
*reward be-owed but also by-authority divine it-is-confirmed*

Dicitur enim in Zachar. xii, quod in illa beatitudinis die qua
*it-is-said for in Zechariah XII that in that of-beatitude day in-which*
erit Dominus protector habitantibus in Hierusalem, id est in
*will-be the-Lord protector to-those-dwelling in Jerusalem that is in*
visione pacis æternæ, aliorum domus erunt sicut domus David,
*the-vision of-peace eternal of-the-others the-houses will-be as the-house of-David*
quia scilicet omnes reges erunt et regnabunt cum Christo,
*because namely all kings will-be and will-reign with Christ*
sicut membra cum capite; sed domus David erit sicut domus
*as members with the-head but the-house of-David will-be as the-house*
Dei, quia sicut regendo fideliter Dei officium gessit in populo,
*of-God because as by-ruling faithfully of-God the-office he-bore in the-people*
ita in præmio Deo propinquius erit et inhærebit. Hoc
*so in reward to-God nearer he-will-be and he-will-cling this*
etiam fuit apud gentiles aliqualiter somniatum, dum civitatum
*also was among the-gentiles in-some-way dreamed while of-cities*
rectores atque servatores in deos transformari putabant.
*the-rulers and preservers into gods to-be-transformed they-thought*

## Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius et utile quod inde sequitur, cujus contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum

### X · THAT THE KING SHOULD RULE WELL FOR HIS OWN GOOD

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*A king must guard against becoming a tyrant, since only a fool trades an eternal reward for small temporal goods, and even these come more surely to just kings. Friendship, which the tyrant Dionysius admired in Damon and Pythias and asked to share, tyrants desire and cannot have, while good kings are loved, as Caesar was by his soldiers and Augustus by his subjects. A tyrant's rule rests on fear, a weak foundation, and does not last, as Aristotle's list of tyrants shows, and God, who permits tyrants to punish a people's sins, casts them down. Kings gain more wealth by justice than tyrants by plunder, and a lasting good name.*

Cum regibus tam grande in cœlesti beatitudine præmium
*since to-kings so great in heavenly beatitude a-reward*
proponatur, si bene in regendo se habuerint, diligenti
*is-set-before if well in ruling themselves they-will-have-had with-diligent*
cura se ipsos observare debent, ne in tyrannidem
*care them themselves to-watch they-ought lest into tyranny*
convertantur. Nihil enim eis acceptabilius esse debet, quam
*they-be-turned nothing for to-them more-acceptable to-be ought than*
quod ex honore regio quo sublimantur in terris, in
*that from the-honor royal by-which they-are-exalted on earth into*
cælestis regni gloriam transferantur. Erant vero tyranni
*of-the-heavenly kingdom the-glory they-be-transferred err but tyrants*
qui propter quædam terrena commoda justitiam deserunt;
*who on-account-of certain earthly advantages justice desert*
qui tanto privantur præmio, quod adipisci poterant juste
*who of-so-great are-deprived a-reward which to-obtain they-could justly*
regendo. Quod autem stultum sit pro hujusmodi parvis
*by-ruling that moreover foolish it-be for of-this-kind small*

et temporalibus bonis maxima et sempiterna perdere bona,
*and temporal goods the-greatest and everlasting to-lose goods*
nullus nisi stultus aut infidelis ignorat.
*no-one except a-fool or an-unbeliever is-ignorant-of*

Addendum est etiam quod hæc temporalia commoda,
*to-be-added it-is also that these temporal advantages*
propter quæ tyranni justitiam deserunt, magis ad lucrum
*on-account-of which tyrants justice desert more to profit*
proveniunt regibus, dum justitiam servant. Primo namque
*come to-kings while justice they-preserve first for*
inter mundana omnia nihil est quod amicitiæ dignæ
*among worldly all-things nothing is which to-friendship worthy*
præferendum videatur. Ipsa namque est, quæ virtuosos in
*to-be-preferred seem it for is-that which the-virtuous into*
unum conciliat, virtutem conservat atque promovet. Ipsa est
*one reconciles virtue preserves and promotes it is-that*
qua omnes indigent in quibuscumque negotiis peragendis,
*which all need in whatever affairs to-be-accomplished*
quæ nec prosperis importune se ingerit, nec deserit in
*which neither on-the-prosperous unseasonably itself thrusts nor deserts in*
adversis, Ipsa est quæ maximas delectationes affert, in tantum
*adversities it is-that which the-greatest delights brings in so-much*
ut quæcumque delectabilia in tædium sine amicis vertantur.
*that whatever delightful-things into weariness without friends be-turned*
Quælibet autem aspera, facilia et prope nulla facit amor; nec
*any moreover harsh-things easy and almost nothing makes love nor*
est alicujus tyranni tanta crudelitas, ut amicitia non delectetur.
*is of-any tyrant so-great the-cruelty that in-friendship not he-be-delighted*
Dionysius enim quondam Syracusanorum tyrannus cum duorum
*Dionysius for once of-the-Syracusans the-tyrant when of-two*
amicorum, qui Damon et Pythias dicebantur, alterum occidere
*friends who Damon and Pythias were-called one to-kill*

vellet, is qui occidendus erat, inducias impetravit, ut domum
*he-wished he who to-be-killed was a-truce obtained that home*
profectus res suas ordinaret; alter vero amicorum sese
*having-gone affairs his he-might-order the-other but of-the-friends himself*
tyranno ob fidem pro ejus reditu dedit. Appropinquante autem
*to-the-tyrant for faith for his return gave approaching moreover*
promisso die, nec illo redeunte, unusquisque fideijussorem
*the-promised day nor he returning every-one the-surety*
stultitiæ arguebat. At ille nihil se metuere de amici
*of-folly accused but he nothing himself to-fear about of-his-friend*
constantia prædicabat. Eadem autem hora qua fuerat
*the-constancy declared at-the-same moreover hour in-which he-had-been*
occidendus, rediit. Admirans autem amborum animum,
*to-be-killed he-returned admiring moreover of-both the-spirit*
tyrannus supplicium propter fidem amicitiæ remisit, insuper
*the-tyrant the-punishment on-account-of the-faith of-friendship remitted besides*
rogans ut eum tertium reciperent in amicitiæ gradu. Hoc
*asking that him as-third they-would-receive in of-friendship the-rank this*
autem amicitiæ bonum, quamvis desiderent tyranni, consequi
*moreover of-friendship good although they-desire tyrants to-attain*
tamen non possunt. Dum enim commune bonum non
*yet not they-can while for the-common good not*
quærunt, sed proprium, fit parva vel nulla communio eorum
*they-seek but their-own becomes small or no communion of-them*
ad subditos. Omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione
*with the-subjects all moreover friendship upon some communion*
firmatur. Eos enim qui conveniunt, vel per naturæ originem,
*is-made-firm those for who agree either through of-nature the-origin*
vel per motum similitudinem, vel per cujuscumque
*or through of-manners likeness or through of-whatever*
societatis communionem, videmus amicitia conjungi, Parva
*society communion we-see by-friendship to-be-joined small*

igitur, vel potius nulla est amicitia tyranni et subditi;
*therefore or rather none is the-friendship of-tyrant and subject*
simulque dum subditi per tyrannicam injustitiam
*and-at-the-same-time while the-subjects through tyrannical injustice*
opprimuntur, et se amari non sentiunt, sed contemni,
*are-oppressed and themselves to-be-loved not they-feel but to-be-scorned*
nequaquam amant. Nec habent tyranni unde de subditis
*by-no-means they-love nor have tyrants whence about the-subjects*
conquerantur, si ab eis non diliguntur, quia nec ipsi
*they-may-complain if by them not they-are-loved because neither they-themselves*
tales se ipsis exhibent, ut diligi ab eis debeant.
*such themselves to-them show that to-be-loved by them they-ought*

Sed boni reges dum communi profectui studiose intendunt,
*but good kings while to-the-common progress zealously they-attend*
et eorum studio subditi plura commoda se assequi
*and by-their zeal the-subjects many advantages themselves to-attain*
sentiunt, diliguntur a plurimis, dum subditos se amare
*feel they-are-loved by very-many while the-subjects themselves to-love*
demonstrant, quia et hoc est majoris malitiæ, quam quod in
*they-demonstrate because also this is of-greater malice than what in*
multitudine cadat, ut odio habeantur amici et benefactoribus
*a-multitude befalls that in-hatred be-held friends and to-benefactors*
rependatur malum pro bono, et ex hoc amore provenit ut
*be-repaid evil for good and from this love it-comes that*
honorum regum regnum sit stabile, dum pro ipsis se
*of-good kings the-kingdom be stable while for them themselves*
subditi quibuscumque periculis exponere non recusant, cujus
*the-subjects to-whatever dangers to-expose not refuse of-which*
exemplum in Julio Cæsare apparet, de quo Suetonius
*an-example in Julius Caesar appears about whom Suetonius*
refert, quod milites suos usque adeo diligebat, ut audita
*relates that soldiers his up-to so-much he-loved that heard*

quorumdam cæde, capillos et barbam ante non dempserit
*of-certain-ones the-slaughter (his)-hair and beard before not he-cut*
quam vindicasset, quibus rebus devotissimos sibi et
*than he-had-avenged-them by-which things most-devoted to-himself and*
strenuissimos milites reddidit, ita quod plerique eorum capti,
*most-vigorous soldiers he-rendered so that most of-them captured*
concessam sibi sub ea conditione vitam, si militare adversus
*granted to-them under that condition life if to-serve against*
Cæsarem vellent, recusarent. Octavianus etiam Augustus, qui
*Caesar they-would refused Octavian also Augustus who*
modestissime imperio usus est, in tantum diligebatur a
*most-moderately the-empire used he-has in so-much was-loved by*
subditis, ut plerique morientes, victimas quas devoverant,
*the-subjects that most dying the-victims which they-had-vowed*
immolari mandarent, quia eum superstitem reliquissent.
*to-be-offered commanded because him surviving they-had-left*

Non est ergo facile ut principis perturbetur dominium,
*not it-is therefore easy that of-a-prince be-disturbed the-lordship*
quem tanto consensu populus amat, propter quod
*whom with-so-great consent the-people loves on-account-of which*
Salomon dicit Proverbiorum xxix, 14: Rex qui judicat
*Solomon says of-Proverbs XXIX 14 the-king who judges*
in justitia pauperes, thronus ejus in æternum firmabitur.
*in justice the-poor the-throne his into eternity will-be-made-firm*
Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum
*of-tyrants but the-lordship long-lasting to-be not can since*
sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari quod
*it-be to-the-multitude hateful not can for long to-be-preserved what*
votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam præsens
*to-the-wishes of-many is-repugnant scarcely for by anyone the-present*
vita transigitur, quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis
*life is-passed but-that some adversities he-suffer of-adversity*

autem tempore occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum
*moreover in-the-time an-occasion to-be-lacking not can against the-tyrant*
insurgendi, et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis
*of-rising and where be-present the-occasion not will-be-lacking from many*
vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem
*even one who the-occasion not use the-one-rising moreover*
populus votive prosequitur, nec de facili carebit effectu,
*the-people eagerly follows nor from easy will-lack effect*
quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest
*what with the-favor of-the-multitude is-attempted scarcely therefore can*
contingere, quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum.
*to-happen that of-a-tyrant the-lordship be-extended into long*

Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret, unde
*this also manifestly is-plain if anyone consider whence*
tyranni dominium conservatur. Non enim conservatur amore,
*of-the-tyrant the-lordship is-preserved not for it-is-preserved by-love*
cum parva vel nulla sit amicitia subjectæ multitudinis ad
*since small or none be the-friendship of-the-subject multitude towards*
tyrannum, ut ex præhabitis patet. De subditorum autem
*the-tyrant as from the-things-had-before is-plain about of-the-subjects moreover*
fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non enim invenitur
*the-faith by-tyrants to-be-trusted not is not for is-found*
tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur, ne
*so-great virtue in many that of-fidelity by-the-virtue they-be-restrained lest*
indebitæ servitutis jugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem
*of-undue servitude the-yoke if they-can they-shake-off perhaps moreover*
nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem
*not-even to-fidelity contrary will-it-be-reckoned according-to the-opinion*
multorum, si tyrannicæ nequitiæ qualitercumque obvietur.
*of-many if to-tyrannical wickedness in-any-way it-be-opposed*
Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur,
*it-remains therefore that by-alone fear of-the-tyrant the-government be-sustained*

unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant.
*whence also to-be-feared themselves by the-subjects with-all intention they-procure*
Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore
*fear moreover is a-weak foundation for those-who by-fear*
subduntur, si occurrat occasio, qua possint impunitatem
*are-subjected if occur an-occasion in-which they-can impunity*
sperare, contra præsidentes insurgunt eo ardentius, quo
*to-hope against those-presiding they-rise the more-ardently by-as-much*
magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut
*more against will by alone fear they-were-restrained as*
si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit,
*if water through violence be-shut-in when an-outlet it-will-have-found*
impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum
*more-impetuously it-flows but neither the-very fear lacks danger since*
ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis
*from excessive fear very-many into desperation have-fallen of-safety*
autem desperatio audacter ad quælibet attendenda præcipitat.
*moreover desperation boldly to anything to-be-attempted hurls*
Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum.
*not can therefore of-the-tyrant the-lordship to-be long-lasting*

Hoc etiam non minus exemplis, quam rationibus apparet.
*this also not less by-examples than by-arguments appears*
Si quis enim antiquorum gesta, et modernorum eventus
*if anyone for of-the-ancients the-deeds and of-the-moderns the-events*
consideret, vix inveniet dominium tyranni alicujus diuturnum
*consider scarcely will-he-find the-lordship of-tyrant any long-lasting*
fuisse. Unde et Aristoteles in sua Politica multis tyrannis
*to-have-been whence also Aristotle in his Politics many tyrants*
enumeratis, omnium demonstrat dominium brevi tempore
*enumerated of-all shows the-lordship in-brief time*
fuisse finitum, quorum tamen aliqui diutius præfuerunt,
*to-have-been ended of-whom yet some longer presided*

quia non multum in tyrannide excedebant, sed quantum
*because not much in tyranny they-exceeded but as-far*
ad multa imitabantur regalem modestiam.
*to many-things they-imitated royal moderation*

Adhuc autem hoc magis fit manifestum ex consideratione
*still moreover this more becomes manifest from the-consideration*
divini judicii. Ut enim in Job. xxxiv, 30, dicitur: Regnare
*of-divine judgment as for in Job XXXIV 30 it-is-said to-reign*
facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi.
*he-makes a-man hypocrite on-account-of the-sins of-the-people*
Nullus autem verius hypocrita dici potest quam qui
*no-one moreover more-truly a-hypocrite to-be-called can than he-who*
regis assumit officium et exhibet se tyrannum. Nam
*of-a-king takes-up the-office and shows himself a-tyrant for*
hypocrita dicitur qui alterius repræsentat personam, sicut
*a-hypocrite is-called he-who of-another represents the-person as*
in spectaculis fieri consuevit. Sic igitur Deus præfici
*in spectacles to-be-done is-customary thus therefore God to-be-set-over*
permittit tyrannos ad puniendum subditorum peccata. Talis
*permits tyrants for punishing of-the-subjects the-sins such*
autem punitio in Scripturis ira Dei consuevit nominari.
*moreover punishment in the-Scriptures the-wrath of-God is-customary to-be-named*
Unde per Oseæ, xiii, 11, Dominus dicit: Dabo vobis
*whence through Hosea XIII 11 the-Lord says I-shall-give to-you*
regem in furore meo. Infelix est autem rex, qui populo
*a-king in fury my unhappy is moreover the-king who to-the-people*
in furore Dei conceditur. Non enim ejus stabile potest
*in the-fury of-God is-granted not for his stable can*
esse dominum: quia non obliviscetur misereri Deus, nec
*to-be the-lordship because not will-forget to-have-mercy God nor*
continebit in ira sua misericordias suas: quinimmo per
*will-he-hold-back in wrath his mercies his nay-rather through*

Joel. xi, 13, dicitur, quod est patiens, et multæ misericordiæ,
*Joel XI 13 it-is-said that he-is patient and of-much mercy*
et præstabilis super malitia. Non igitur permittit Deus diu
*and relenting over malice not therefore permits God long*
regnare tyrannos, sed post tempestatem per eos inductam
*to-reign tyrants but after the-tempest through them brought-on*
populo, per eorum dejectionem tranquillitatem inducet.
*to-the-people through their overthrow tranquility he-will-bring-in*
Unde Eccl. x, 17, dicitur: Sedes ducum superborum
*whence Ecclesiasticus X 17 it-is-said the-seats of-leaders proud*
destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis.
*has-destroyed God and to-sit has-made the-meek in-place-of them*

Experimento etiam magis apparet, quod reges per justitiam
*by-experience also more it-appears that kings through justice*
adipiscuntur divitias, quam per rapinam tyranni. Quia enim
*obtain riches than through plunder tyrants because for*
dominium tyrannorum subjectæ multitudini displicet, ideo
*the-lordship of-tyrants to-the-subject multitude is-displeasing therefore*
opus habent tyranni multos habere satellites, per quos contra
*need have tyrants many to-have attendants through whom against*
subditos tuti reddantur, in quibus necesse est plura expendere
*the-subjects safe they-be-rendered on whom necessary it-is more to-spend*
quam a subditis rapiant. Regum autem dominium, quod
*than from the-subjects they-plunder of-kings moreover the-lordship which*
subditis placet, omnes subditos pro satellitibus ad custodiam
*to-the-subjects is-pleasing all the-subjects as attendants for guard*
habet, in quibus expendere opus non est, sed interdum
*has on whom to-spend need not is but sometimes*
in necessitatibus plura regibus sponte donant, quam tyranni
*in necessities more to-kings freely they-give than tyrants*
diripere possint, et sic impletur quod Salomon dicit,
*to-plunder could and thus is-fulfilled what Solomon says*

Proverbiorum xi, 24: Alii, scilicet reges, dividunt propria
*of-Proverbs XI 24 some namely kings distribute their-own*
benefaciendo subjectis, et ditiores fiunt. Alii, scilicet tyranni,
*by-doing-good to-the-subjects and richer become others namely tyrants*
rapiunt non sua, et semper in egestate sunt. Similiter
*seize not their-own and always in want are similarly*
autem justo Dei contingit judicio, ut qui divitias
*moreover by-the-just of-God it-happens judgment that those-who riches*
injuste congregant, inutiliter eas dispergant, aut etiam juste
*unjustly gather uselessly them scatter or even justly*
auferantur ab eis. Ut enim Salomon dicit, Ecclesiast. v,
*they-are-taken-away from them as for Solomon says Ecclesiastes V*
9: Avarus non implebitur pecunia, et qui amat pecunias,
*9 the-avaricious not will-be-filled with-money and he-who loves money*
fructum non capiet ex eis; quinimmo ut Proverbiorum, xv,
*fruit not will-take from it nay-rather as of-Proverbs XV*
27, dicit: Conturbat domum suam, qui sectatur avaritiam.
*27 says troubles house his he-who pursues avarice*
Regibus vero qui justitiam quærunt, divitiæ adduntur a Deo,
*to-kings but who justice seek riches are-added by God*
sicut Salomon, qui dum sapientiam quæsivit ad faciendum
*as Solomon who while wisdom he-sought for doing*
judicium, promissionem de abundantia divitiarum accepit.
*judgment a-promise about abundance of-riches received*

De fama vero superfluum videtur dicere. Quis enim
*about fame but superfluous it-seems to-speak who for*
dubitet bonos reges non solum in vita, sed magis post
*would-doubt good kings not only in life but more after*
mortem quodammodo laudibus hominum vivere, et in
*death in-a-way in-the-praises of-men to-live and in*
desiderio haberi; malorum vero nomen aut statim deficere,
*desire to-be-held of-the-wicked but the-name either at-once to-fail*

vel si excellentes in malitia fuerint, cum detestatione
*or if excellent in malice they-have-been with detestation*
eorum rememorari? Unde Salomon dicit, Proverbiorum, x,
*of-them to-be-remembered whence Solomon says of-Proverbs X*
7: Memoria justi cum laudibus, nomen autem impiorum
*7 the-memory of-the-just with praises the-name moreover of-the-impious*
putrescet, quia vel deficit, vel remanet cum fœtore.
*will-rot because either it-fails or remains with stench*

## Quod bona etiam mundialia, ut sunt divitiæ, potestas, honor, et fama magis proveniunt regibus quam tyrannis, et de malis quæ incurrunt tyranni etiam in hac vita

XI · THAT WORLDLY GOODS COME MORE TO KINGS THAN TO TYRANTS

*Stability, riches, honor, and fame come more to kings than to tyrants, who lose besides the highest beatitude and incur the greatest torments. They rarely repent or restore what they have taken, they hand on their license to their successors, and God punishes his ministers more heavily when they abuse his judgment.*

Ex his ergo manifestum est quod stabilitas potestatis,
*from these therefore manifest it-is that the-stability of-power*
divitiæ, honor et fama, magis regibus quam tyrannis ad
*riches honor and fame more to-kings than to-tyrants to*
votum proveniunt, propter quæ indebite adipiscenda declinat
*wish come on-account-of which unduly to-be-obtained declines*
in tyrannidem princeps. Nullus enim a justitia declinat
*into tyranny a-prince no-one for from justice declines*
nisi cupiditate alicujus commodi tractus. Privatur insuper
*unless by-the-desire of-some advantage drawn is-deprived moreover*
tyrannus excellentissima beatitudine, quæ regibus debetur pro
*the-tyrant of-the-most-excellent beatitude which to-kings is-owed as*

præmio, et quod est gravius, maximum tormentum sibi
*reward and what is graver the-greatest torment for-himself*
acquirit in pœnis. Si enim qui unum hominem spoliat, vel
*he-acquires in punishments if for he-who one man despoils or*
in servitutem redigit, vel occidit, maximam pœnam meretur,
*into servitude reduces or kills the-greatest punishment deserves*
quantum quidem ad judicium hominum mortem, quantum
*as-far indeed to the-judgment of-men death as-far*
vero ad judicium Dei damnationem æternam, quanto magis
*but to the-judgment of-God damnation eternal how-much more*
putandum est tyrannum deteriora mereri supplicia, qui
*to-be-thought is-it the-tyrant worse to-deserve punishments who*
undique ab omnibus rapit, contra omnium libertatem laborat,
*on-every-side from all seizes against of-all the-liberty labors*
pro libito voluntatis suæ quoscumque interficit? Tales insuper
*at the-pleasure of-will his whomever kills such moreover*
raro pœnitent, vento inflati superbiæ, merito peccatorum
*rarely repent by-the-wind puffed-up of-pride by-the-merit of-sins*
a Deo deserti, et adulationibus hominum delibuti, rarius
*by God deserted and with-the-flatteries of-men anointed more-rarely*
digne satisfacere possunt. Quando enim restituent omnia,
*worthily to-make-satisfaction can when for will-they-restore all-things*
quæ præter justitiæ debitum abstulerunt? Ad quæ tamen
*which beyond of-justice the-due they-have-taken-away to which yet*
restituenda nullus dubitat eos teneri. Quando recompensabunt
*to-be-restored no-one doubts them to-be-bound when will-they-recompense*
eis quos oppresserunt, et injuste qualitercumque læserunt?
*those whom they-have-oppressed and unjustly in-any-way have-harmed*
Adjicitur autem ad eorum impœnitentiam, quod omnia
*is-added moreover to their impenitence that all-things*
sibi licita existimant quæ impune sine resistentia facere
*to-themselves lawful they-judge which with-impunity without resistance to-do*

potuerunt, unde non solum emendare non satagunt quæ
*they-could whence not only to-amend not they-take-care what*
male fecerunt, sed sua consuetudine pro auctoritate utentes,
*wickedly they-did but their custom as authority using*
peccandi audaciam transmittunt ad posteros, et sic non solum
*of-sinning the-boldness they-transmit to posterity and thus not only*
suorum facinorum apud Deum rei tenentur, sed etiam
*of-their-own crimes before God guilty they-are-held but also*
eorum quibus apud Deum peccandi occasionem reliquerunt.
*of-those to-whom before God of-sinning the-occasion they-have-left*
Aggravatur etiam eorum peccatum ex dignitate suscepti
*is-aggravated also their sin from the-dignity of-the-undertaken*
officii. Sicut enim terrenus rex gravius punit suos ministros,
*office as for an-earthly king more-heavily punishes his ministers*
si invenit eos sibi contrarios; ita Deus magis puniet eos
*if he-finds them to-himself contrary so God more will-punish those*
quos sui regiminis executores et ministros facit, si nequiter
*whom of-his government executors and ministers he-makes if wickedly*
agant, Dei judicium in amaritudinem convertentes. Unde et
*they-act of-God the-judgment into bitterness turning whence also*
in libro Sapientiæ vi, 5, ad reges iniquos dicitur: Quoniam
*in the-book of-Wisdom VI 5 to kings wicked it-is-said since*
cum essetis ministri regni illius, non recte judicatis,
*when you-were ministers of-the-kingdom his not rightly you-judge*
neque custodistis legem justitiæ nostræ, nec secundum
*nor you-kept the-law of-justice our nor according-to*
voluntatem Dei ambulastis, horrende et cito apparebit vobis
*the-will of-God you-walked horribly and swiftly he-will-appear to-you*
quoniam judicium durissimum in his qui possunt fiet.
*since judgment most-harsh on those who are-mighty will-be-made*
Exigua enim conceditur misericordia, potentes autem potenter
*small for is-granted mercy the-mighty moreover mightily*

tormenta patientur. Et Nabuchodonosor per Isa. xiv, 15,
*torments will-suffer and to-Nebuchadnezzar through Isaiah XIV 15*
dicitur: Ad infernum detraheris in profundum laci.
*it-is-said to hell you-will-be-dragged-down into the-depth of-the-pit*
Qui te viderint, ad te inclinabuntur, teque prospicient
*those-who you will-have-seen to you will-bow and-you will-look-upon*
quasi profundius in pœnis submersum. Si igitur regibus
*as-if deeper in punishments sunk if therefore to-kings*
abundant temporalia bona et proveniunt, et excellens
*abound temporal goods and come and an-excellent*
beatitudinis gradus præparatur a Deo, tyranni autem a
*of-beatitude degree is-prepared by God tyrants moreover from*
temporalibus bonis quæ cupiunt plerumque frustrantur, multis
*the-temporal goods which they-desire frequently are-cheated to-many*
insuper periculis subjacentes, et quod est amplius, bonis
*besides dangers subject and what is more of-goods*
æternis privantur ad pœnas gravissimas reservati, vehementer
*eternal are-deprived for punishments most-grave reserved earnestly*
studendum est his qui regendi officium suscipiunt, ut
*to-be-striven it-is for-those who of-ruling the-office undertake that*
reges se subditis præbeant, non tyrannos.
*kings themselves to-the-subjects they-show not tyrants*

De rege autem quid sit, et quod expediat multitudini
*about the-king moreover what he-be and that it-is-expedient for-the-multitude*
regem habere: adhuc autem, quod præsidi expediat
*a-king to-have still moreover that for-the-one-presiding it-is-expedient*
se regem multitudini exhibere subjectæ, non tyrannum,
*himself a-king to-the-multitude to-show subject not a-tyrant*
tanta a nobis dicta sint.
*so-much by us said let-it-be*

## Procedit ad ostendendum regis officium, ubi secundum viam naturæ ostendit regem esse in regno, sicut anima est in corpore, et sicut Deus est in mundo

### XII · THAT THE KING IS IN HIS KINGDOM AS THE SOUL IN THE BODY

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*Art imitates nature, so the king should take his office from nature's government. As God rules the universe and reason rules man, the little world, so the king rules the multitude by reason. Knowing he stands in the kingdom as the soul in the body and God in the world, he will burn with zeal for justice and grow gentle toward his subjects as his own members.*

Consequens autem ex dictis est considerare quod sit
*consequent moreover from the-things-said it-is to-consider what be*
regis officium, et qualem oporteat esse regem. Quia
*of-the-king the-office and of-what-sort it-is-necessary to-be the-king because*
vero ea quæ sunt secundum artem, imitantur ea quæ
*but those-things which are according-to art imitate those which*
sunt secundum naturam, ex quibus accipimus, ut secundum
*are according-to nature from which we-receive that according-to*
rationem operari possimus, optimum videtur regis officium
*reason to-operate we-can best it-seems of-the-king the-office*
a forma regiminis naturalis assumere. Invenitur autem in
*from the-form of-government natural to-take is-found moreover in*
rerum natura regimen et universale et particulare. Universale
*of-things the-nature government both universal and particular universal*
quidem, secundum quod omnia sub Dei regimine continentur,
*indeed according as all-things under of-God government are-contained*
qui sua providentia universa gubernat. Particulare autem
*who by-his providence the-universe governs particular moreover*
regimen maxime quidem divino regimini simile est, quod
*government most indeed to-divine government like is which*

invenitur in homine, qui ob hoc minor mundus appellatur,
*is-found in man who for this the-lesser world is-called*
quia in eo invenitur forma universalis regiminis. Nam sicut
*because in him is-found the-form of-universal government for as*
universa creatura corporea et omnes spirituales virtutes sub
*the-whole creation bodily and all spiritual powers under*
divino regimine continentur, sic et corporis membra et
*divine government are-contained thus also of-the-body the-members and*
cæteræ vires animæ a ratione reguntur, et sic quodammodo
*the-other powers of-the-soul by reason are-ruled and thus in-a-way*
se habet ratio in homine, sicut Deus in mundo. Sed quia,
*itself has reason in man as God in the-world but because*
sicut supra ostendimus, homo est animal naturaliter sociale
*as above we-showed man is an-animal naturally social*
in multitudine vivens, similitudo divini regiminis invenitur
*in a-multitude living the-likeness of-divine government is-found*
in homine non solum quantum ad hoc quod per rationem
*in man not only as-far to this that through reason*
regitur unus homo, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod per
*is-ruled one man but also as-far to this that through*
rationem unius hominis regitur multitudo, quod maxime
*the-reason of-one man is-ruled a-multitude which most*
pertinet ad officium regis, dum, et in quibusdam animalibus
*pertains to the-office of-the-king while also in some animals*
quæ socialiter vivunt, quædam similitudo invenitur hujus
*which socially live a-certain likeness is-found of-this*
regiminis, sicut in apibus, in quibus et reges esse dicuntur,
*government as in bees in which also kings to-be are-said*
non quod in eis per rationem sit regimen, sed per
*not that in them through reason be government but through*
instinctum naturæ inditum a summo regente, qui est auctor
*instinct of-nature implanted by the-highest ruler who is the-author*

naturæ. Hoc igitur officium rex suscepisse cognoscat,
*of-nature this therefore office the-king to-have-undertaken let-him-know*
ut sit in regno sicut in corpore anima, et sicut Deus
*that he-be in the-kingdom as in the-body the-soul and as God*
in mundo. Quæ si diligenter recogitet, ex altero justitiæ
*in the-world which-things if diligently he-reconsider from the-one of-justice*
in eo zelus accenditur, dum considerat ad hoc se positum
*in him the-zeal is-kindled while he-considers for this himself placed*
ut loco Dei judicium regno exerceat, ex altero vero
*that in-place of-God judgment in-the-kingdom he-exercise from the-other but*
mansuetudinis et clementiæ lenitatem acquirit, dum reputat
*of-gentleness and of-clemency the-mildness he-acquires while he-reckons*
singulos qui suo subsunt regimini, sicut propria membra.
*each who to-his are-subject government as his-own members*

Assumit ex hac similitudine modum regiminis,
ut sicut Deus unamquamque rem distinguit quodam
ordine, et propria operatione, et loco, ita rex
subditos suos in regno, et eodem modo de anima

## XIII · THE TWO WORKS OF GOD AND OF THE KING

*God both founds the world and governs it, as the soul forms the body and moves it. Not every king founds his kingdom, but founding belongs to the office. Taking Moses' account of creation as the model, Thomas says the founder must choose a fit place, distinguish it for cities, camps, schools, and markets, and gather men to their offices with what each needs.*

Oportet igitur considerare, quid Deus in mundo faciat, sic
*it-is-necessary therefore to-consider what God in the-world does thus*
enim manifestum erit quid immineat regi faciendum.
*for manifest it-will-be what be-incumbent on-the-king to-be-done*

Sunt autem universaliter consideranda duo opera Dei in
*there-are moreover universally to-be-considered two works of-God in*
mundo. Unum quo mundum instituit, alterum quo
*the-world one by-which the-world he-established the-other by-which*
mundum institutum gubernat. Hæc etiam duo opera anima
*the-world established he-governs these also two works the-soul*
habet in corpore. Nam primo quidem virtute animæ
*has in the-body for first indeed by-the-power of-the-soul*
informatur corpus, deinde vero per animam corpus regitur
*is-informed the-body then but through the-soul the-body is-ruled*
et movetur; horum autem secundum quidem magis proprie
*and is-moved of-these moreover the-second indeed more properly*
pertinet ad regis officium. Unde ad omnes reges pertinet
*pertains to the-king's office whence to all kings pertains*
gubernatio et a gubernationis regimine regis nomen
*government and from of-governing the-government of-king the-name*
accipitur. Primum autem opus non omnibus regibus convenit.
*is-received the-first moreover work not to-all kings belongs*
Non enim omnes regnum aut civitatem instituunt, in quo
*not for all a-kingdom or a-city establish in which*
regnant, sed regno ac civitati jam institutis regiminis
*they-reign but to-the-kingdom and city already established of-government*
curam impendunt. Est autem considerandum, quod nisi
*the-care they-devote it-is moreover to-be-considered that unless*
præcessisset qui instituere civitatem aut regnum, locum
*there-had-preceded one-who should-establish the-city or kingdom place*
non haberet gubernatio regni. Sub regis enim officio
*not would-have the-government of-the-kingdom under of-the-king for the-office*
comprehenditur etiam institutio civitatis et regni. Nonnulli
*is-comprehended also the-establishment of-city and of-kingdom some*
enim civitates instituerunt, in quibus regnarent, ut Ninus
*for cities established in which they-might-reign as Ninus*

Ninivem, et Romulus Romam. Similiter etiam ad gubernationis
*Nineveh and Romulus Rome similarly also to of-government*
officium pertinet, ut gubernata conservet, ac eis utatur, ad
*the-office it-pertains that the-governed-things it-preserve and them use for*
quod sunt constituta. Non igitur gubernationis officium plene
*which they-are constituted not therefore of-government the-office fully*
cognosci poterit, si institutionis ratio ignoretur. Ratio
*to-be-known will-be-able if of-establishment the-reason be-unknown the-reason*
autem institutionis regni ab exemplo institutionis
*moreover of-the-establishment of-a-kingdom from the-example of-the-establishment*
mundi sumenda est, in quo primo consideratur ipsarum
*of-the-world to-be-taken is in which first is-considered of-the-very*
rerum productio, deinde partium mundi ordinata distinctio.
*things the-production then of-the-parts of-the-world the-ordered distinction*
Ulterius autem singulis mundi partibus diversæ rerum
*further moreover to-the-single of-the-world parts diverse of-things*
species distributæ videntur, ut stellæ cœlo, volucres aeri,
*species distributed seem as stars to-heaven birds to-the-air*
pisces aquæ, animalia terræ, deinde singulis ea quibus
*fish to-water animals to-the-earth then to-each those-things which*
indigent abundanter divinitus provisa videntur. Hanc autem
*they-need abundantly divinely provided seem this moreover*
institutionis rationem Moyses subtiliter et diligenter expressit.
*of-establishment reason Moses subtly and diligently expressed*

Primo enim rerum productionem proponit, dicens: In
*first for of-things the-production he-sets-forth saying in*
principio creavit Deus cœlum et terram; deinde secundum
*the-beginning created God the-heaven and the-earth then according-to*
ordinem convenientem omnia divinitus distincta esse denuntiat,
*order fitting all-things divinely distinguished to-be he-announces*
videlicet diem a nocte, a superioribus inferiora, mare
*namely the-day from the-night from the-higher the-lower the-sea*

ab arida. Hinc cœlum luminaribus, avibus aerem,
*from the-dry-land hence the-heaven with-lights with-birds the-air*
mare piscibus, animalibus terram ornatam refert, ultimo
*the-sea with-fish with-animals the-earth adorned he-relates lastly*
assignatum hominibus terræ animaliumque dominium.
*assigned to-men of-the-earth and-of-the-animals the-lordship*
Usum vero plantarum tam ipsis quam animalibus cæteris
*the-use but of-plants as-much to-them as to-animals the-others*
ex providentia divina denuntiat. Institutor autem civitatis
*from providence divine he-announces the-founder moreover of-a-city*
et regni de novo producere homines, et loca ad
*and of-a-kingdom from new to-produce men and places for*
inhabitandum, et cætera vitæ subsidia non potest, sed necesse
*dwelling and the-other of-life supports not can but necessity*
habet his uti quæ in natura præexistunt. Sicut etiam cæteræ
*has those to-use which in nature pre-exist as also the-other*
artes operationis suæ materiam a natura accipiunt, ut fabri
*arts of-operation their the-matter from nature receive as smiths*
ferrum, ædificator ligna et lapides in artis usum assumunt.
*iron the-builder timbers and stones into of-art the-use take-up*
Necesse est igitur institutori civitatis et regni primum
*necessary it-is therefore for-the-founder of-city and of-kingdom first*
quidem congruum locum eligere qui salubritate habitatores
*indeed a-suitable place to-choose which by-healthfulness the-inhabitants*
conservet, ubertate ad victum sufficiat, amœnitate delectet,
*preserve by-fertility for food suffice by-pleasantness delight*
munitione ab hostibus tutos reddat. Quod si aliquid de
*by-fortification from enemies safe render that if anything of*
dicta opportunitate deficiat, tanto locus erit convenientior
*the-said advantage be-lacking by-so-much the-place will-be more-fitting*
quanto plura vel magis necessaria de prædictis habuerit.
*by-how-much more or more necessary-things of the-aforesaid it-will-have-had*

Deinde necesse est ut locum electum institutor civitatis aut
*then necessary it-is that the-place chosen the-founder of-city or*
regni distinguat secundum exigentiam eorum quæ perfectio
*of-kingdom distinguish according-to the-requirement of-those which the-perfection*
civitatis aut regni requirit. Puta, si regnum instituendum
*of-city or of-kingdom requires for-example if a-kingdom to-be-established*
sit, oportet providere quis locus aptus sit urbibus
*be it-is-necessary to-provide which place apt be for-cities*
constituendis, quis villis, quis castris, ubi constituenda sint
*to-be-constituted which for-villages which for-camps where to-be-constituted be*
studia litterarum, ubi exercitia militum, ubi negotiatorum
*the-studies of-letters where the-exercises of-soldiers where of-merchants*
conventus et sic de aliis quæ perfectio regni requirit.
*the-assemblies and thus of the-others which the-perfection of-the-kingdom requires*
Si autem institutioni civitatis opera detur, providere
*if moreover to-the-establishment of-a-city effort be-given to-provide*
oportet, quis locus sit sacris, quis juri reddendo,
*it-is-necessary which place be for-sacred-things which for-right to-be-rendered*
quis artificibus singulis deputandus. Ulterius autem oportet
*which for-craftsmen each to-be-assigned further moreover it-is-necessary*
homines congregare, qui sunt congruis locis secundum sua
*men to-gather who are to-fitting places according-to their*
officia deputandi. Demum vero providendum est ut singulis
*offices to-be-assigned finally but to-be-provided it-is that to-each*
necessaria suppetant secundum uniuscujusque constitutionem
*necessaries be-at-hand according-to of-each the-constitution*
et statum, aliter enim nequaquam posset regnum vel
*and state otherwise for by-no-means could the-kingdom or*
civitas commanere. Hæc igitur sunt, ut summarie dicatur,
*city to-endure these therefore are that summarily it-be-said*

quæ ad regis officium pertinent in institutione civitatis aut
*which to the-king's office pertain in the-establishment of-city or*
regni, ex similitudine institutionis mundi assumpta.
*of-kingdom from the-likeness of-the-establishment of-the-world taken*

## Quod modus gubernandi competat regi, quia secundum modum gubernationis divinæ, qui quidem modus gubernandi a gubernatione navis sumpsit initium, ubi et ponitur comparatio sacerdotalis dominii et regalis

### XIV · THAT TO GOVERN IS TO DIRECT TO AN END

*To govern is to lead a thing to its due end, as a helmsman brings a ship to port. If man's end were bodily life, wealth, or knowledge, the physician, steward, or teacher would be king. The end of a multitude is to live virtuously, and through virtue to come to the enjoyment of God. Since that end is reached by divine power, it belongs to Christ, king and priest, and its ministry is committed to priests and above all to the Roman pontiff, to whom Christian kings are subject, as Providence foreshadowed even among the Romans and the Gauls.*

Sicut autem institutio civitatis aut regni ex forma
*as moreover the-establishment of-a-city or of-a-kingdom from the-form*
institutionis mundi convenienter accipitur, sic et
*of-the-establishment of-the-world fittingly is-taken thus also*
gubernationis ratio ex gubernatione sumenda est. Est
*of-government the-reason from the-government to-be-taken is it-is*
tamen præconsiderandum, quod gubernare est, id quod
*yet to-be-considered-first that to-govern is that which*
gubernatur convenienter ad debitum finem perducere. Sic
*is-governed fittingly to the-due end to-lead thus*
etiam navis gubernari dicitur, dum per nautæ industriam
*also a-ship to-be-governed is-said while through of-the-sailor the-skill*

recto itinere ad portum illæsa perducitur. Si igitur
*by-a-straight course to port unharmed it-is-led if therefore*
aliquid ad finem extra se ordinetur, ut navis ad portum,
*anything to an-end outside itself be-ordered as the-ship to port*
ad gubernatoris officium pertinebit non solum, ut rem in
*to of-the-helmsman the-office it-will-pertain not only that the-thing in*
se conservet illæsam, sed quod ulterius ad finem perducat.
*itself he-preserve unharmed but that further to the-end he-lead*
Si vero aliquid esset, cujus finis non esset extra ipsum, ad
*if but anything were whose end not were outside itself to*
hoc solum intenderet gubernatoris intentio, ut rem illam in
*this alone would-aim of-the-helmsman the-intention that thing that in*
sua perfectione conservaret illæsam. Et quamvis nihil tale
*its perfection he-preserved unharmed and although nothing such*
inveniatur in rebus post ipsum Deum, qui est omnibus finis,
*be-found in things after himself God who is for-all the-end*
erga id tamen quod ad extrinsecum ordinatur, multipliciter
*towards that yet which to the-extrinsic is-ordered in-many-ways*
cura impeditur a diversis. Nam forte alius erit qui curam
*the-care is-expended by diverse-ones for perhaps one will-be who care*
gerit ut res in suo esse conservetur; alius autem, ut
*bears that the-thing in its the-to-be be-preserved another moreover that*
ad altiorem perfectionem perveniat, ut in ipsa navi, unde
*to a-higher perfection it-arrive as in the-very ship whence*
gubernationis ratio assumitur, manifeste apparet. Faber
*of-government the-notion is-taken manifestly appears the-craftsman*
enim lignarius curam habet restaurandi, si quid collapsum
*for in-wood care has of-restoring if anything collapsed*
fuerit in navi, sed nauta sollicitudinem gerit ut navem
*will-have-been in the-ship but the-sailor solicitude bears that the-ship*
perducat ad portum; sic etiam contingit in homine. Nam
*he-lead to port thus also it-happens in man for*

medicus curam gerit ut vita hominis conservetur in sanitate;
*the-physician care bears that the-life of-man be-preserved in health*
œconomus, ut suppetant necessaria vitæ; doctor autem
*the-steward that be-at-hand the-necessaries of-life the-teacher moreover*
curam gerit ut veritatem cognoscat; institutor autem morum,
*care bears that the-truth he-know the-instructor moreover of-morals*
ut secundum rationem vivat. Quod si homo non ordinaretur
*that according-to reason he-live that if man not were-ordered*
ad aliud exterius bonum, sufficerent homini curæ prædictæ.
*to another exterior good would-suffice for-man the-cares aforesaid*
Sed est quoddam bonum extraneum homini quamdiu
*but there-is a-certain good extraneous to-man as-long-as*
mortaliter vivit, scilicet ultima beatitudo, quæ in fruitione
*mortally he-lives namely the-last beatitude which in the-enjoyment*
Dei expectatur post mortem. Quia, ut Apostolus ait II ad
*of-God is-awaited after death because as the-Apostle says II to*
Cor. v, 6: Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur
*the-Corinthians V 6 as-long-as we-are in the-body we-are-abroad*
a Domino. Unde homo christianus, cui beatitudo illa est
*from the-Lord whence man Christian for-whom beatitude that is*
per Christi sanguinem acquisita, et qui pro ea assequenda
*through of-Christ the-blood acquired and who for it to-be-attained*
Spiritus sancti arrham accepit, indiget alia spirituali cura,
*of-the-Spirit holy the-pledge has-received needs another spiritual care*
per quam dirigatur ad portum salutis æternæ; hæc autem
*through which he-be-directed to the-port of-salvation eternal this moreover*
cura per ministros Ecclesiæ Christi fidelibus exhibetur.
*care through the-ministers of-the-Church of-Christ to-the-faithful is-shown*
Idem autem oportet esse judicium de fine totius
*the-same moreover it-is-necessary to-be the-judgment about the-end of-the-whole*
multitudinis et unius. Si igitur finis hominis esset bonum
*multitude and of-one if therefore the-end of-man were good*

quodcumque in ipso existens et regendæ multitudinis finis
*whatever in himself existing also of-to-be-ruled the-multitude the-end*
ultimus esset similiter ut tale bonum multitudo acquireret,
*last would-be similarly that such good the-multitude acquire*
et in eo permaneret; et si quidem talis ultimus sive unius
*and in it remain and if indeed such last either of-one*
hominis, sive multitudinis finis esset corporalis, vita et sanitas
*man or of-the-multitude end were bodily life and health*
corporis, medici esset officium. Si autem ultimus finis
*of-the-body of-the-physician would-be the-office if moreover the-last end*
esset divitiarum affluentia, œconomus rex quidam multitudinis
*were of-riches the-abundance the-steward king a-certain of-the-multitude*
esset. Si vero bonum cognoscendæ veritatis tale quid esset,
*would-be if but the-good of-knowing the-truth such something were*
ad quod posset multitudo pertingere, rex haberet doctoris
*to which could the-multitude to-attain the-king would-have of-the-teacher*
officium. Videtur autem finis esse multitudinis congregatæ
*the-office it-seems moreover the-end to-be of-the-multitude gathered*
vivere secundum virtutem. Ad hoc enim homines congregantur,
*to-live according-to virtue for this for men are-gathered*
ut simul bene vivant, quod consequi non posset unusquisque
*that together well they-may-live which to-attain not could each*
singulariter vivens; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem
*singly living good moreover life is according-to virtue*
virtuosa igitur vita est congregationis humanæ finis.
*the-virtuous therefore life is of-congregation human the-end*

Hujus autem signum est quod hi soli partes sint
*of-this moreover the-sign is that these alone parts be*
multitudinis congregatæ qui sibi invicem communicant
*of-the-multitude gathered who with-themselves mutually share*
in bene vivendo. Si enim propter solum vivere homines
*in well living if for on-account-of only living men*

convenirent, animalia et servi essent pars aliqua congregationis
*came-together animals and slaves would-be part some of-the-congregation*
civilis. Si vero propter acquirendas divitias, omnes simul
*civil if but on-account-of to-be-acquired riches all together*
negotiantes ad unam civitatem pertinerent: sicut videmus
*trading to one city would-pertain as we-see*
eos solos sub una multitudine computari qui sub eisdem
*those alone under one multitude to-be-counted who under the-same*
legibus et eodem regimine diriguntur ad bene vivendum. Sed
*laws and the-same government are-directed to well living but*
quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorem finem
*because man by-living according-to virtue to a-further end*
ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina, ut supra jam
*is-ordered which consists in enjoyment divine as above already*
diximus, oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanæ
*we-said it-is-necessary the-same end to-be of-the-multitude human*
qui est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis
*which is of-man one not is therefore the-last end of-the-multitude*
congregatæ vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam
*gathered to-live according-to virtue but through virtuous*
vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam. Siquidem autem ad
*life to-arrive at enjoyment divine if-indeed moreover to*
hunc finem perveniri posset virtute humanæ naturæ, necesse
*this end to-be-arrived could by-the-power of-human nature necessary*
esset ut ad officium regis pertineret dirigere homines
*it-would-be that to the-office of-the-king it-pertained to-direct men*
in hunc finem. Hunc enim dici regem supponimus cui
*to this end this-one for to-be-called king we-suppose to-whom*
summa regiminis in rebus humanis committitur. Tanto
*the-sum of-government in things human is-committed by-so-much*
autem est regimen sublimius, quanto ad finem ulteriorem
*moreover is the-government loftier by-how-much to an-end further*

ordinatur. Semper enim invenitur ille ad quem pertinet ultimus
*it-is-ordered always for is-found he to whom pertains the-last*
finis, imperare operantibus ea quæ ad finem ultimum
*end to-command those-working the-things which to the-end last*
ordinantur; sicut gubernator ad quem pertinet navigationem
*are-ordered as the-helmsman to whom pertains navigation*
disponere, imperat ei qui navem constituit, qualem navem
*to-dispose commands him who the-ship constructs what-sort-of ship*
navigationi aptam facere debeat; civilis autem qui utitur
*for-navigation apt to-make he-ought the-civil-man moreover who uses*
armis, imperat fabro, qualia arma fabricet. Sed quia
*arms commands the-smith what-sort-of arms he-forge but because*
finem fruitionis divinæ non consequitur homo per virtutem
*the-end of-enjoyment divine not attains man through virtue*
humanam, sed virtute divina, juxta illud Apostoli, Rom.
*human but by-virtue divine according-to that of-the-Apostle Romans*
vi, 23: Gratia Dei, vita æterna, perducere ad illum finem non
*VI 23 the-grace of-God life eternal to-lead to that end not*
humani erit, sed divini regiminis. Ad illum igitur regem
*of-human it-will-be but of-divine government to that therefore king*
hujusmodi regimen pertinet, qui non est solum homo, sed
*of-this-kind government pertains who not is only man but*
etiam Deus, scilicet ad Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum,
*also God namely to the-Lord our Jesus Christ*
qui homines filios Dei faciens in cœlestem gloriam introduxit.
*who men sons of-God making into heavenly glory brought-in*

Hoc igitur est regimen ei traditum, quod non
*this therefore is the-government to-him handed-over which not*
corrumpetur, propter quod non solum sacerdos, sed rex in
*will-be-corrupted on-account-of which not only priest but king in*
Scripturis sacris nominatur, dicente Jer. xxiii, 5: Regnabit rex,
*the-Scriptures sacred he-is-named saying Jeremiah XXIII 5 will-reign a-king*

et sapiens erit; unde ab eo regale sacerdotium derivatur.
*and wise he-will-be whence from him the-royal priesthood is-derived*
Et quod est amplius omnes Christi fideles, in quantum sunt
*and what is more all of-Christ the-faithful in as-far they-are*
membra ejus, reges et sacerdotes dicuntur. Hujus ergo regni
*members his kings and priests are-called of-this therefore kingdom*
ministerium, ut a terrenis essent spiritualia distincta, non
*the-ministry that from earthly-things might-be spiritual-things distinct not*
terrenis regibus, sed sacerdotibus est commissum, et præcipue
*to-earthly kings but to-priests is committed and especially*
Summo Sacerdoti, successori Petri, Christi Vicario, Romano
*to-the-Highest Priest the-successor of-Peter of-Christ the-Vicar the-Roman*
Pontifici, cui omnes reges populi Christiani oportet esse
*Pontiff to-whom all kings of-the-people Christian it-is-necessary to-be*
subditos, sicut ipsi Domino nostro Jesu Christo. Sic enim
*subject as to-the-very Lord our Jesus Christ thus for*
ei ad quem finis ultimi cura pertinet, subdi debent
*to-him to whom of-the-end last the-care pertains to-be-subjected ought*
illi ad quos pertinet cura antecedentium finium et ejus
*those to whom pertains the-care of-the-antecedent ends and by-his*
imperio dirigi. Quia igitur sacerdotium gentilium et totus
*command to-be-directed because therefore the-priesthood of-the-gentiles and the-whole*
divinorum cultus erat propter temporalia bona conquirenda,
*of-divine-things worship was for temporal goods to-be-acquired*
quæ omnia ordinantur ad multitudinis bonum commune, cujus
*which all are-ordered to of-the-multitude the-good common of-which*
regi cura incumbit, convenienter sacerdotes gentilium
*to-the-king the-care is-incumbent fittingly the-priests of-the-gentiles*
regibus subdebantur. Sed et quia in veteri lege promittebantur
*to-kings were-subjected but also because in the-old law were-promised*
bona terrena non a dæmonibus, sed a Deo vero religioso
*goods earthly not by demons but by God true to-the-religious*

populo exhibenda, inde et in lege veteri sacerdotes regibus
*people to-be-shown thence also in the-law old priests to-kings*
leguntur fuisse subjecti. Sed in nova lege est sacerdotium
*are-read to-have-been subject but in the-new law there-is a-priesthood*
altius, per quod homines traducuntur ad bona cœlestia:
*higher through which men are-led to goods heavenly*
unde in lege Christi reges debent sacerdotibus esse subjecti.
*whence in the-law of-Christ kings ought to-priests to-be subject*

Propter quod mirabiliter ex divina providentia factum est:
*on-account-of which wonderfully from divine providence brought-about it-is*
ut in Romana urbe, quam Deus præviderat Christiani populi
*that in the-Roman city which God had-foreseen of-the-Christian people*
principalem sedem futuram, hic mos paulatim inolesceret, ut
*the-principal see to-be-about-to-be this custom little-by-little should-grow-up that*
civitatum rectores sacerdotibus subjacerent. Sicut enim Valerius
*of-cities the-rulers to-priests should-be-subject as for Valerius*
Maximus refert, «omnia post religionem ponenda semper
*Maximus relates all-things after religion to-be-placed always*
nostra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus summæ majestatis
*our city has-held even in-those which of-the-highest majesty*
decus conspici voluit. Quapropter non dubitaverunt sacris
*the-glory to-be-seen it-wished wherefore not they-hesitated to-sacred-things*
imperia servire, ita se humanarum rerum habitura
*the-commands to-serve so themselves of-human things about-to-have*
regimen existimantia, si divinæ potentiæ bene atque constanter
*the-government judging if to-divine power well and constantly*
fuissent famulata.» Quia vero etiam futurum erat ut in Gallia
*they-had been-servants because but also about-to-be it-was that in Gaul*
Christiani sacerdotii plurimum vigeret religio, divinitus
*of-the-Christian priesthood most-greatly should-flourish the-religion divinely*
est permissum, ut etiam apud Gallos gentiles sacerdotes,
*it-was permitted that also among the-Gauls the-gentile priests*

quos Druidas nominabant, totius Galliæ jus definirent, ut
*whom Druids they-named of-the-whole of-Gaul the-right should-define as*
refert Julius Cæsar in libro quem de bello Gallico scripsit.
*relates Julius Caesar in the-book which about the-war Gallic he-wrote*

Quod sicut ad ultimum finem consequendum
requiritur ut rex subditos suos ad vivendum
secundum virtutem disponat, ita ad fines medios.
Et ponuntur hic quæ sunt illa quæ ordinant ad bene
vivendum et quæ impediunt, et quod remedium
rex apponere debet circa dicta impedimenta

## XV · HOW THE KING LEADS HIS SUBJECTS TO LIVE WELL

*The king, subject to the priesthood, rules every human office toward heavenly beatitude, learning the divine law and commanding what leads there. A good life needs the multitude's unity in peace, direction to good action, and a sufficiency of goods. He must preserve it against three impediments, the death of men, perverse wills, and enemies, by providing successors, by laws, rewards, and punishments, and by defense, and he must always seek to improve it.*

Sicut autem ad vitam, quam in cœlo speramus beatam
*as moreover to the-life which in heaven we-hope blessed*
ordinatur sicut ad finem vita qua hic homines bene vivunt;
*is-ordered as to the-end the-life by-which here men well live*
ita bonum multitudinis ordinantur sicut ad finem quæcumque
*so to-the-good of-the-multitude are-ordered as to the-end whatever*
particularia bona per hominem procurantur sive divitiæ suæ
*particular goods by man are-procured whether riches or*
lucra, sive sanitas, sive facundia vel eruditio, Si igitur, ut
*gains or health or eloquence or learning if therefore as*
dictum est, qui de ultimo fine curam habet, præesse
*said it-is he-who about the-last end care has to-be-over*

debet his qui curam habent de ordinatis ad finem, et
*ought those who care have about the-things-ordered to the-end and*
eos dirigere suo imperio, manifestum ex dictis fit,
*them to-direct by-his command manifest from the-things-said it-becomes*
quod rex sicut dominio et regimini quod administratur
*that the-king as to-the-lordship and government which is-administered*
per sacerdotis officium, subdi debet; ita præesse debet
*through of-the-priest the-office to-be-subject ought so to-be-over ought*
omnibus humanis officiis, et ea imperio sui regiminis
*all human offices and them by-the-command of-his government*
ordinare. Cuicumque autem incumbit aliquid perficere, quod
*order to-whomever moreover it-is-incumbent something to-perfect which*
ordinatur in aliud sicut in finem, hoc debet attendere ut
*is-ordered to another as to an-end this he-ought to-attend that*
suum opus sit congruum fini. Sicut faber sic facit
*his work be fitting to-the-end as the-smith thus makes*
gladium ut pugnæ conveniat, et ædificator sic debet domum
*a-sword that to-battle it-be-suited and the-builder thus ought the-house*
disponere ut ad habitandum sit apta. Quia igitur vitæ,
*to-dispose that for dwelling it-be apt because therefore of-the-life*
qua in præsenti bene vivimus, finis est beatitudo cœlestis,
*by-which in the-present well we-live the-end is beatitude heavenly*
ad regis officium pertinet ea ratione vitam multitudinis
*to the-king's office it-pertains for-that reason the-life of-the-multitude*
bonam procurare, secundum quod congruit ad cœlestem
*good to-procure according as it-befits for heavenly*
beatitudinem consequendam, ut scilicet ea præcipiat,
*beatitude to-be-attained so-that namely those-things he-command*
quæ ad cœlestem beatitudinem ducunt, et eorum contraria,
*which to heavenly beatitude lead and their contraries*
secundum quod fuerit possibile, interdicat, Quæ autem
*according as it-will-have-been possible he-forbid what moreover*

sit ad veram beatitudinem via, et quæ sint impedimenta
*be to true beatitude the-way and what be the-impediments*
ejus, ex lege divina cognoscitur, cujus doctrina pertinet
*its from the-law divine is-known whose teaching pertains*
ad sacerdotum officium, secundum illud Malach. ii, 7: Labia
*to the-priests' office according-to that of-Malachi II 7 the-lips*
sacerdotum custodient scientiam, et legem requirent de
*of-the-priests will-guard knowledge and the-law they-will-seek from*
ore ejus. Et ideo in Deut. xvii, 18: Dominus præcipit:
*the-mouth his and therefore in Deuteronomy XVII 18 the-Lord commands*
Postquam sederit rex in solio regni sui, describet
*after will-have-sat the-king on the-throne of-kingdom his he-will-write-out*
sibi Deuteronomium legis hujus in volumine, accipiens
*for-himself the-Deuteronomy of-law this in a-volume receiving*
exempla a sacerdote Leviticæ tribus, et habebit secum,
*the-copy from the-priest of-the-Levitical tribe and he-will-have-it with-him*
legetque illud omnibus diebus vitæ suæ, ut discat timere
*and-will-read it all the-days of-life his that he-may-learn to-fear*
Dominum Deum suum et custodire verba et cæremonias
*the-Lord God his and to-keep the-words and ceremonies*
ejus, quæ in lege præcepta sunt. Rex legem igitur divinam
*his which in the-law commanded are the-king the-law therefore divine*
edoctus, ad hoc præcipuum studium debet intendere, qualiter
*instructed-in to this chief zeal ought to-direct how*
multitudo sibi subdita bene vivat, quod quidem studium
*the-multitude to-him subject well may-live which indeed zeal*
in tria dividitur, ut primo quidem in subjecta multitudine
*into three is-divided that first indeed in the-subject multitude*
bonam vitam instituat; secundo, ut institutam conservet;
*a-good life he-establish second that the-established he-preserve*
tertio, ut conservatam ad meliora promoveat.
*third that the-preserved to better-things he-advance*

Ad bonam autem unius hominis vitam duo requiruntur,
*for good moreover of-one man life two-things are-required*
unum principale, quod est operatio secundum virtutem.
*one principal which is operation according-to virtue*
Virtus enim est qua bene vivitur, aliud vero
*virtue for is that-by-which well one-lives the-other but*
secundarium et quasi instrumentale, scilicet corporalium
*secondary and as-it-were instrumental namely of-bodily*
bonorum sufficientia, quorum unus est necessarius ad actum
*goods sufficiency whose use is necessary for the-act*
virtutis; ipsa tamen hominis unitas per naturam causatur,
*of-virtue the-very yet of-man unity through nature is-caused*
multitudinis autem unitas, quæ pax dicitur, per regentis
*of-the-multitude moreover the-unity which peace is-called through of-the-ruler*
industriam est procuranda. Sic igitur ad bonam vitam
*the-skill is to-be-procured thus therefore for the-good life*
multitudinis instituendam tria requiruntur. Primo quidem,
*of-the-multitude to-be-established three-things are-required first indeed*
ut multitudo in unitate pacis constituatur. Secundo, ut
*that the-multitude in the-unity of-peace be-constituted second that*
multitudo vinculo pacis unita dirigatur ad bene agendum.
*the-multitude by-the-bond of-peace united be-directed to well acting*
Sicut enim homo nihil bene agere potest nisi præsupposita
*as for man nothing well to-do can unless presupposed*
suarum partium unitate, ita hominum multitudo pacis
*of-his parts the-unity so of-men a-multitude of-peace*
unitate carens, dum impugnat se ipsam, impeditur a bene
*the-unity lacking while it-attacks it itself is-impeded from well*
agendo. Tertia vero requiritur, ut per regentis industriam
*acting the-third but is-required that through of-the-ruler the-skill*
necessariorum ad bene vivendum adsit sufficiens copia.
*of-the-necessaries for well living be-present a-sufficient supply*

Sic igitur bona vita per regis officium in multitudine
*thus therefore good life through of-the-king the-office in the-multitude*
constituta, consequens est ut ad ejus conservationem intendat.
*established consequent it-is that to its preservation be-attend*
Sunt autem tria quibus bonum publicum permanere
*there-are moreover three-things by-which the-good public to-remain*
non sinitur, quorum quidem unum est a natura proveniens.
*not is-allowed of-which indeed one is from nature coming*
Non enim bonum multitudinis ad unum tantum tempus
*not for the-good of-the-multitude for one only time*
institui debet, sed ut sit quodammodo perpetuum.
*to-be-established ought but that it-be in-a-way perpetual*
Homines autem cum sint mortales, in perpetuum durare non
*men moreover since they-be mortal into perpetuity to-last not*
possunt. Nec dum vivunt, semper sunt in eodem vigore, quia
*can nor while they-live always they-are in the-same vigor because*
multis variationibus humana vita subjicitur, et sic non sunt
*to-many variations human life is-subjected and thus not are*
homines ad eadem officia peragenda æqualiter per totam
*men for the-same offices to-be-performed equally through the-whole*
vitam idonei. Aliud autem impedimentum boni publici
*life fit another moreover impediment of-the-good public*
conservandi ab interiori proveniens in perversitate voluntatum
*to-be-preserved from the-interior coming in the-perversity of-wills*
consistit, dum vel sunt desides ad ea peragenda quæ
*consists while either they-are idle for those-things to-be-performed which*
requirit respublica, vel insuper sunt paci multitudinis noxii,
*requires the-republic or besides are to-the-peace of-the-multitude harmful*
dum transgrediendo justitiam, aliorum pacem perturbant.
*while by-transgressing justice of-others the-peace they-disturb*
Tertium autem impedimentum reipublicæ conservandæ ab
*the-third moreover impediment of-the-republic to-be-preserved from*

exteriori causatur, dum per incursum hostium pax dissolvitur
*the-exterior is-caused while through the-incursion of-enemies peace is-dissolved*
et interdum regnum, aut civitas funditus dissipatur. Igitur
*and sometimes the-kingdom or city utterly is-scattered therefore*
circa tria prædicta triplex cura imminet regi. Primo
*about the-three aforesaid a-threefold care is-incumbent-on the-king first*
quidem de successione hominum, et substitutione illorum
*indeed about the-succession of-men and the-substitution of-those*
qui diversis officiis præsunt, ut sicut per divinum regimen
*who over-diverse offices preside that as through divine government*
in rebus corruptibilibus, quia semper eadem durare non
*in things corruptible because always the-same to-last not*
possunt, provisum est ut per generationem alia in locum
*they-can provided it-is that through generation some into the-place*
aliorum succedant, ut vel sic conservetur integritas universi,
*of-others succeed that even thus be-preserved the-integrity of-the-universe*
ita per regis studium conservetur subjectæ multitudinis
*so through the-king's zeal be-preserved of-the-subject multitude*
bonum, dum sollicite curat qualiter alii in deficientium
*the-good while anxiously he-takes-care how others into of-the-failing*
locum succedant. Secundo autem ut suis legibus et
*the-place succeed second moreover that by-his laws and*
præceptis, pœnis et præmiis homines sibi subjectos ab
*precepts by-punishments and rewards men to-him subject from*
iniquitate coerceat, et ad opera virtuosa inducat, exemplum
*iniquity be-restrain and to works virtuous lead the-example*
a Deo accipiens, qui hominibus legem dedit, observantibus
*from God taking who to-men the-law gave to-those-observing*
quidem mercedem, transgredientibus pœnas retribuens. Tertio
*indeed wages to-those-transgressing punishments repaying third*
imminet regi cura ut multitudo sibi subjecta contra
*is-incumbent-on the-king the-care that the-multitude to-him subject against*

hostes tuta reddatur. Nihil enim prodesset interiora vitare
*enemies safe be-rendered nothing for would-it-profit interior to-avoid*
pericula, si ab exterioribus defendi non posset. Si igitur
*dangers if from the-exterior to-be-defended not it-could if therefore*
bonæ multitudinis institutioni tertium restat ad regis
*of-the-good multitude to-the-establishment a-third remains to the-king's*
officium pertinens, ut sit de promotione sollicitus, quod
*office pertaining that he-be about advancement solicitous which*
fit dum in singulis quæ præmissa sunt, si quid inordinatum
*is-done while in each which premised they-are if anything disordered*
est corrigere, si quid deest supplere, si quid melius
*is to-correct if anything be-lacking to-supply if anything better*
fieri potest, studet perficere. Unde et Apostolus, I Corinth.
*to-be-done can he-strives to-perfect whence also the-Apostle I Corinthians*
xii, fideles monet, ut semper æmulentur charismata meliora.
*XII the-faithful warns that always they-strive-for the-gifts better*

Hæc igitur sunt quæ ad regis officium pertinent,
*these therefore are-the-things which to the-king's office pertain*
de quibus per singula diligentius tractare oportet.
*about which through each more-diligently to-treat it-is-necessary*

BOOK II

# Qualiter ad regem pertinet instituere civitatem, vel castra ad gloriam consequendam, et quod eligere debet ad hoc loca temperata, et quæ ex hoc commoda regno consequentur, et quæ incommoda de contrario

## I · THAT THE KING SHOULD FOUND CITIES IN A TEMPERATE REGION

*Founding cities brings the greatest glory, as Vegetius says and Scripture agrees. The founder should choose a temperate region, which preserves health and long life, makes men both spirited and prudent in war, as Vegetius shows, and fits them for political life, as Aristotle shows.*

Primum igitur præcipue oportet exponere regis officium
*first therefore especially it-is-necessary to-set-out the-king's office*
ab institutione civitatis, aut regni. Nam sicut Vegetius dicit,
*from the-establishment of-a-city or kingdom for as Vegetius says*
potentissimæ nationes et principes nominati nullam majorem
*the-most-powerful nations and princes renowned no greater*
potuerunt gloriam assequi, quam aut fundare novas civitates, aut
*could glory to-attain than either to-found new cities or*
ab aliis conditas in nomen suum sub quadam amplificatione
*by others founded into name their-own under a-certain enlargement*
transferre: quod quidem documentis sacræ Scripturæ concordat.
*to-transfer which indeed with-the-teachings of-sacred Scripture agrees*
Dicit enim Sapient. in Eccl. xl, 19 quod ædificatio civitatis
*says for the-Wise-man in Ecclesiasticus XL 19 that the-building of-a-city*
confirmabit nomen. Hodie namque nomen Romuli nesciretur,
*will-confirm a-name today for the-name of-Romulus would-be-unknown*
nisi quia condidit Romam. In institutione autem civitatis, aut
*unless because he-founded Rome in the-establishment moreover of-a-city or*

regni, si copia detur, primo quidem est regio per regem
*kingdom if the-opportunity be-given first indeed is a-region by the-king*
eligenda, quam temperatam esse oportet. Ex regionis enim
*to-be-chosen which temperate to-be it-is-necessary from of-the-region for*
temperie habitatores multa commoda consequuntur. Primo
*the-temperateness the-inhabitants many advantages obtain first*
namque consequuntur homines ex temperie regionis
*for obtain men from the-temperateness of-the-region*
incolumitatem corporis ex longitudinem vitæ. Cum enim
*soundness of-body and length of-life since for*
sanitas in quadam temperie humorum consistat, in loco
*health in a-certain temperateness of-humors consist in a-place*
temperato conservabitur sanitas; simile namque suo simili
*temperate will-be-preserved health the-like for by-its like*
conservatur. Si autem fuerit excessus caloris, vel
*is-preserved if moreover there-will-have-been excess of-heat or*
frigoris, necesse est quod secundum qualitatem aeris corporis
*of-cold necessary it-is that according-to the-quality of-the-air of-the-body*
qualitas immutetur: unde quadam naturali industria animalia
*the-quality be-changed whence by-a-certain natural skill animals*
quædam tempore frigido ad calida loca se transferunt,
*some in-time cold to warm places themselves transfer*
rursum tempore calido loca frigida repetentes, ut ex
*again in-time warm the-places cold seeking-again that from*
contraria dispositione loci temporis temperiem consequantur.
*the-contrary disposition of-place of-time the-temperateness they-may-obtain*

Rursus, cum animal vivat per calidum et humidum, si
*again since an-animal live through the-hot and the-moist if*
fuerit calor intensus, cito naturale humidum exiccatur
*there-will-have-been heat intense quickly the-natural moist is-dried-up*
et deficit vita; sicut lucerna extinguitur, si humor infusus cito
*and fails life as a-lamp is-extinguished if the-liquid poured-in quickly*

per ignis magnitudinem consumatur. Unde in quibusdam
*through of-the-fire the-greatness be-consumed whence in certain*
calidissimis Æthiopum regionibus homines ultra tredecim annos
*most-hot of-the-Ethiopians regions men beyond thirteen years*
non vivere perhibentur. In regionibus vero frigidis in excessu,
*not to-live are-said in regions but cold in excess*
naturale humidum de facili congelatur, et calor extinguitur.
*the-natural moist from easy is-congealed and the-heat is-extinguished*
Deinde ad opportunitates bellorum, quibus tuta redditur humana
*then for the-advantages of-wars by-which safe is-rendered human*
societas, regionis temperies plurimum valet. Nam sicut
*society of-the-region the-temperateness most avails for as*
Vegetius refert, omnes nationes quæ vicinæ sunt soli, nimio
*Vegetius relates all nations which near are to-the-sun by-excessive*
calore siccatæ, amplius quidem sapere, sed minus de sanguine
*heat dried more indeed to-be-wise but less of blood*
habere dicuntur, ac propterea constantiam atque fiduciam de
*to-have are-said and therefore constancy and confidence from*
propinquo pugnandi non habent, quia metuunt vulnera, qui
*near of-fighting not they-have because they-fear wounds who*
modicum sanguinem se habere noverunt. E contra
*little blood themselves to-have know from the-contrary*
septentrionales populi remoti a solis ardoribus inconsultiores
*northern peoples remote from of-the-sun the-heats more-rash*
quidem, sed tamen largo sanguine redundantes, sunt ad
*indeed but yet with-abundant blood overflowing are for*
bella promptissimi. His qui temperatioribus habitant plagis,
*wars most-ready to-these who in-more-temperate dwell regions*
et copia sanguinis suppetit ad vulnerum mortisque
*both an-abundance of-blood suffices for of-wounds and-of-death*

contemptum, nec prudentia deficit, quæ modestiam servet in
*contempt nor prudence is-lacking which moderation preserves in*
castris, et non parum prodest uti in dimicatione consiliis.
*camps and not a-little profits to-use in fighting counsels*

Domum temperata regio ad politicam vitam valet. Ut enim
*finally a-temperate region for political life avails as for*
Aristoteles dicit in sua Politica: «Quæ in frigidis locis habitant
*Aristotle says in his Politics those-which in cold places dwell*
gentes, sunt quidem plenæ animositate, intellectu autem et arte
*nations are indeed full of-spirit in-intellect moreover and in-art*
magis deficientes, propter quod libere perseverant magis. Non
*more deficient on-account-of which free they-persist more not*
vivunt autem politice et vicinis propter imprudentiam
*they-live moreover politically and their-neighbors on-account-of imprudence*
principari non possunt. Quæ autem in calidis sunt, intellectivæ
*to-rule not they-can those moreover in hot-places are intellective*
quidem sunt et artificiosæ secundum animam, sine animositate
*indeed are and artful according-to soul without spirit*
autem, propter quod subjectæ quidem sunt, et subjectæ
*moreover on-account-of which subject indeed they-are and subject*
perseverant. Quæ autem in mediis locis habitant, utroque
*they-persist those moreover in middle places dwell in-both*
participant, propter quod ut liberi perseverant, et maxime
*share on-account-of which both free they-persist and most*
politice vivere possunt, et sciunt aliis principari.» Est igitur
*politically to-live can and know others to-rule is therefore*
eligenda regio temperata ad institutionem civitatis vel regni.
*to-be-chosen a-region temperate for the-establishment of-a-city or of-a-kingdom*

## Qualiter eligere debent reges et principes regiones ad civitates vel castra instituenda, in quibus aer sit salubris, et ostendit in quo talis aer cognoscitur, et quibus signis

### II · THAT THE AIR AND WATER MUST BE HEALTHFUL

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*The site should be high, not cloudy or frosty, facing the right quarter of the sky and away from marshes, unless the marshes lie by the sea and can drain into it. Its aspect should temper heat and cold. The ancients judged a place's food by the entrails of animals raised there. Its water must be healthful too, and its health shows in its people's faces and bodies and in the number of its children and old men.*

Post electionem autem regionis, oportet civitati constituendæ
*after the-choice moreover of-the-region it-is-necessary for-the-city to-be-constituted*
idoneum locum eligere, in quo primo videtur aeris salubritas
*a-suitable place to-choose in which first seems of-the-air the-healthfulness*
requirenda. Conversationi enim civili præjacet naturalis vita,
*to-be-required to-intercourse for civil lies-before natural life*
quæ per salubritatem aeris servatur illæsa. Locus autem
*which through the-healthfulness of-the-air is-preserved unharmed the-place moreover*
saluberrimus erit, ut Vegetius tradit, excelsus, non nebulosus,
*most-healthful will-be as Vegetius teaches lofty not cloudy*
non pruinosus, regionesque cœli spectans, neque æstuosas,
*not frosty and-the-regions of-heaven facing neither hot*
neque frigidas, demum paludibus non vicinas. Eminentia
*nor cold finally to-marshes not near the-eminence*
quidem loci solet aeris salubritatem conferre, quia locus
*indeed of-a-place is-wont of-the-air the-healthfulness to-confer because a-place*
eminens ventorum perflationibus patet, quibus redditur aer
*eminent of-the-winds to-the-blowings lies-open by-which is-rendered the-air*
purus; vapores etiam qui virtute radii solaris resolvuntur
*pure the-vapors also which by-the-power of-the-ray solar are-released*

a terra et ab aquis multiplicantur magis in convallibus,
*from the-earth and from the-waters are-multiplied more in valleys*
et in locis demissis quam in altis. Unde in locis altis aer
*and in places low than in high whence in places high the-air*
subtilior invenitur. Hujusmodi autem subtilitas aeris quæ ad
*subtler is-found of-this-kind moreover subtlety of-air which for*
liberam et sinceram respirationem plurimum valet, impeditur
*free and pure breathing most avails is-impeded*
per nebulas et pruinas, quæ solent in locis multum humidis
*by clouds and frosts which are-wont in places much moist*
abundare: unde loca hujusmodi inveniuntur salubritati esse
*to-abound whence places of-this-kind are-found to-healthfulness to-be*
contraria. Et quia loca paludosa nimia humiditate
*contrary and because places marshy with-excessive humidity*
abundant, oportet locum construendæ urbi electum a
*abound it-is-necessary the-place to-be-built for-a-city chosen from*
paludibus esse remotum. Cum enim auræ matutinæ sole
*marshes to-be remote when for the-breezes of-morning the-sun*
oriente ad locum ipsum pervenient, et eis ortæ a
*rising to the-place itself will-arrive and to-them arisen from*
paludibus nebulæ adjungentur, flatus bestiarum palustrium
*the-marshes mists will-be-joined the-breaths of-beasts marshy*
venenatarum cum nebulis mistos spargent, et locum facient
*poisonous with the-mists mixed they-will-scatter and the-place will-make*
pestilentem. Si tamen mænia constructa fuerint in paludibus
*pestilent if yet the-walls built will-have-been in marshes*
quæ fuerint prope mare, spectentque ad septentrionem,
*which will-have-been near the-sea and-face to the-north*
vel circa, hæque paludes excelsiores fuerint quam littus
*or about and-these marshes higher will-have-been than the-shore*
marinum, rationabiliter videbuntur esse constructa. Fossis
*of-the-sea reasonably they-will-seem to-be built ditches*

enim ductis exitus aquæ palebit ad littus, et mare
*for led the-outlet of-the-water will-lie-open to the-shore and the-sea*
tempestatibus auctum in paludes redundando non permittet
*by-storms increased into the-marshes by-overflowing not will-allow*
animalia palustria nasci. Et si aliqua animalia de superioribus
*animals marshy to-be-born and if any animals from higher*
locis venerint, inconsueta salsedine occidentur.
*places will-have-come by-the-unaccustomed saltiness they-will-be-killed*

Oportet et locum urbi destinatum ad calorem et
*it-is-necessary also the-place for-the-city destined to heat and*
frigus temperate disponi secundum aspectum ad plagas
*cold temperately to-be-disposed according-to its-aspect to the-regions*
cœli diversas. Si enim mœnia maxime prope mare
*of-heaven diverse if for the-walls most near the-sea*
constituta spectabunt ad meridiem, non erunt salubria.
*constituted will-face to the-south not they-will-be healthful*
Nam hujusmodi loca mane quidem erunt frigida, quia
*for of-this-kind places in-the-morning indeed will-be cold because*
non respiciuntur a sole, meridie vero erunt ferventia
*not they-are-looked-on by the-sun at-noon but will-be scorching*
propter solis respectum. Quæ autem ad occidentem
*on-account-of the-sun's regard which moreover to the-west*
spectant, orto sole tepescunt, vel etiam frigent, meridie
*face risen the-sun grow-warm or even are-cold at-noon*
calent, vespere fervent propter caloris continuitatem et
*are-hot in-the-evening burn on-account-of of-heat the-continuity and*
solis aspectum. Si vero ad orientem spectabunt, mane
*of-the-sun the-aspect if but to the-east they-will-face in-the-morning*
quidem propter solis oppositionem directam temperare
*indeed on-account-of of-the-sun the-opposition direct temperately*
calescent: nec multum in meridie calor augebitur, sole
*they-will-grow-warm nor much at noon the-heat will-be-increased the-sun*

non directe spectante ad locum, vespere vero totaliter
*not directly facing to the-place in-the-evening but totally*
radiis solis adversis loca frigescent. Eademque, vel
*the-rays of-the-sun being-turned-away the-places will-grow-cold and-the-same or*
similis temperies erit si ad aquilonem locus respiciat
*similar temperateness will-be if to the-north the-place look*
urbis, e converso est quod de meridie respiciente est
*of-the-city from the-converse it-is what about the-south looking it-is*
dictum. Experimento autem cognoscere possumus, quod in
*said by-experience moreover to-know we-can that into*
majorem calorem minus salubriter aliquis transmutatur. Quæ
*greater heat less healthfully someone is-transferred those*
enim a frigidis locis corpora traducuntur in calida, non
*for from cold places bodies are-brought into hot not*
possunt durare, sed dissolvuntur, quia calor sugendo vaporem,
*can to-endure but are-dissolved because heat by-sucking the-vapor*
naturales virtutes dissolvit; unde etiam in salubribus locis
*the-natural powers dissolves whence also in healthful places*
corpora æstate infirma redduntur. Quia vero ad corporum
*bodies in-summer weak are-rendered because but for of-bodies*
sanitatem convenientium ciborum usus requiritur, in hoc
*health of-fitting foods the-use is-required in this*
conferre oportet de loci salubritate qui constituendæ
*to-compare it-is-necessary about the-place's healthfulness which to-be-constituted*
urbi eligitur, ut ex conditione ciborum discernatur qui
*for-the-city is-chosen that from the-condition of-the-foods it-be-discerned which*
nascuntur in terra: quod quidem explorare solebant antiqui
*are-born in the-land which indeed to-explore were-wont the-ancients*
ex animalibus ibidem nutritis. Cum enim hominibus aliisque
*from the-animals there nourished since for to-men and-to-other*
animalibus commune sit uti ad nutrimentum his quæ
*animals common it-be to-use for nourishment those which*

nascuntur in terra, consequens est, ut si occisorum animalium
*are-born in the-land consequent it-is that if of-the-killed animals*
viscera inveniuntur bene valentia, quod homines etiam in
*the-entrails are-found well healthy that men also in*
loco eodem salubrius possint nutriti. Si vero animalium
*place the-same more-healthfully could to-be-nourished if but of-the-animals*
occisorum appareant morbida membra, rationabilius accipi
*killed appear diseased the-members more-reasonably to-be-taken*
potest quod nec hominibus illius loci habitatio sit salubris.
*it-can that neither for-men of-that place the-dwelling be healthful*
Sicut autem aer temperatus, ita salubris aqua est
*as moreover the-air temperate so healthful water is*
requirenda. Ex his enim maxime dependet sanitas corporum,
*to-be-required from these for most depends the-health of-bodies*
quæ sæpius in usum hominum assumuntur. Et de aere
*which more-often into the-use of-men are-taken and about the-air*
quidem manifestum est quotidie ipsum aspirando introrsum
*indeed manifest it-is daily it by-breathing inwards*
attrahimus usque ad ipsa vitalia, unde principaliter ejus
*we-draw up to the-very vital-parts whence principally its*
salubritas ad incolumitatem corporum confert. Item, quia
*healthfulness to the-soundness of-bodies contributes likewise because*
inter ea quæ assumuntur per modum nutrimenti, aqua est
*among those which are-taken through the-mode of-nourishment water is*
qua sæpissime utimur tam in potibus quam in cibis, ideo
*what most-often we-use as-much in drinks as in foods therefore*
nihil est præter aeris puritatem magis pertinens ad loci
*nothing is besides of-the-air the-purity more pertaining to of-the-place*
sanitatem quam aquarum salubritas. Est et aliud signum ex
*the-health than of-the-waters the-healthfulness there-is also another sign from*
quo considerari potest loci salubritas, si videlicet hominum
*which to-be-considered can of-the-place the-healthfulness if namely of-men*

in loco commorantium facies bene coloratæ appareant,
*in the-place dwelling the-faces well colored appear*
robusta corpora et bene disposita membra, si pueri multi et
*robust bodies and well disposed members if children many and*
vivaces, si senes multi reperiantur ibidem. E converso, si
*lively if old-men many be-found there from the-converse if*
facies hominum deformes appareant, debilia corpora, exinanita
*the-faces of-men misshapen appear weak bodies exhausted*
membra vel morbida, si pauci et morbidi pueri, et adhuc
*members or diseased if few and sickly children and still*
pauciores senes, dubitari non potest locum esse mortiferum.
*fewer old-men to-be-doubted not can the-place to-be deadly*

Qualiter necesse est talem civitatem construendam
a rege, habere copiam rerum victualium,
quia sine eis civitas esse perfecta non potest,
et distinguit duplicem modum istius copiæ,
primum tamen magis commendat

## III · THAT THE CITY NEEDS AN ABUNDANCE OF VICTUALS

*A city must be fertile enough to feed itself, as Alexander told Xenocrates. Supply from its own land is better than supply by trade: more worthy, more secure in war, and safer for morals, since foreign merchants corrupt them and trade breeds greed and softness. Yet merchants cannot be wholly excluded, and a perfect city uses them moderately.*

Oportet autem ut locus construendæ urbi electus
*it-is-necessary moreover that the-place to-be-built for-a-city chosen*
non solum talis sit, qui salubritate habitatores conservet,
*not only such be which by-healthfulness the-inhabitants preserve*
sed ubertate ad victum sufficiat. Non enim est possibile
*but by-fertility for food suffice not for it-is possible*

multitudinem hominum habitare, ubi victualium non suppetit
*a-multitude of-men to-dwell where of-victuals not is-at-hand*
copia. Unde ut vult Philosophus, cum Xenocrates architector
*a-supply whence as holds the-Philosopher when Xenocrates the-architect*
peritissimus Alexandro Macedoni demonstraret in quodam
*most-skilled to-Alexander the-Macedonian showed on a-certain*
monte civitatem egregiæ formæ construi posse, interrogasse
*mountain a-city of-excellent form to-be-built to-be-able to-have-asked*
fertur Alexander, si essent agri qui civitati possent
*is-said Alexander whether there-were fields which to-the-city could*
frumentorum copiam ministrare. Quod cum deficere inveniret,
*of-grain a-supply to-furnish which when to-be-lacking he-found*
respondit vituperandum esse, si quis in tali loco civitatem
*he-answered blameworthy to-be if anyone in such a-place a-city*
construeret. Sicut enim natus infans non potest ali sine
*should-build as for a-born infant not can to-be-nourished without*
nutricis lacte, nec ad incrementum perduci, sic civitas sine
*of-the-nurse milk nor to growth to-be-brought thus a-city without*
ciborum abundantia frequentiam populi habere non potest.
*of-foods abundance the-frequency of-people to-have not can*
Duo tamen sunt modi, quibus alicui civitati potest
*two yet are the-modes by-which to-any city can*
affluentia rerum suppetere. Unus qui dictus est propter
*an-abundance of-things to-be-at-hand one which said it-is on-account-of*
regionis fertilitatem abunde omnia producentis quæ humanæ
*of-the-region the-fertility abundantly all-things producing which for-human*
vitæ requirit necessitas. Alius autem per mercationis
*life requires necessity the-other moreover through of-trade*
usum, ex quo ibidem necessaria vitæ ex diversis partibus
*the-use from which there the-necessaries of-life from diverse parts*
adducantur. Primus autem motus convenientior esse manifeste
*be-brought the-first moreover mode more-fitting to-be manifestly*

convincitur. Tanto enim aliquid dignius est, quanto per
*is-proved by-so-much for something more-worthy is by-how-much by*
se sufficientius invenitur, quia quod alio indiget, deficiens
*itself more-sufficient it-is-found because what of-another has-need deficient*
esse monstratur. Sufficientiam autem plenius possidet civitas,
*to-be is-shown sufficiency moreover more-fully possesses the-city*
cui circumjacens regio sufficiens est ad necessaria vitæ,
*for-which the-surrounding region sufficient is for the-necessaries of-life*
quam illa quæ indiget ab aliis per mercationem accipere.
*than that which needs from others through trade to-receive*
Dignior enim est civitas si abundantiam rerum habeat ex
*more-worthy for is a-city if abundance of-things it-have from*
territorio proprio, quam si per mercatores abundet. Cum hoc
*territory its-own than if through merchants it-abound with this*
etiam videtur esse securius, quia propter bellorum eventus
*also it-seems to-be more-secure because on-account-of of-wars the-events*
et diversa viarum discrimina, de facili potest impediri
*and diverse of-roads the-perils from easy can to-be-impeded*
victualium deportatio, et sic civitas per defectum victualium
*of-victuals the-transport and thus the-city through lack of-victuals*
opprimetur. Est etiam hoc utilius ad conservationem
*will-be-oppressed it-is also this more-useful for preservation*
civilem. Nam civitas quæ ad sui sustentationem mercationum
*civil for a-city which for its sustenance of-trades*
multitudine indiget, necesse est ut continuum extraneorum
*a-multitude needs necessary it-is that continual of-foreigners*
convictum patiatur. Extraneorum autem conversatio corrumpit
*the-company it-suffer of-foreigners moreover the-intercourse corrupts*
plurimum civium mores, secundum Aristotelis doctrinam
*very-greatly of-the-citizens the-morals according-to of-Aristotle the-teaching*
in sua Politica; quia necesse est evenire ut homines extranei
*in his Politics because necessary it-is to-happen that men foreign*

aliis legibus et consuetudinibus enutriti, in multis aliter
*by-other laws and customs brought-up in many-things otherwise*
agant quam sint civium mores, et sic dum cives exemplo
*act than are of-the-citizens the-morals and thus while the-citizens by-example*
ad agenda similia provocantur, civilis conversatio perturbatur.
*to doing like-things are-provoked civil intercourse is-disturbed*
Rursus, si cives ipsi mercationibus fuerint dediti,
*again if the-citizens themselves to-trades have-been given*
pandetur pluribus vitiis aditus. Nam cum negotiatorum
*will-be-opened to-many vices the-approach for since of-traders*
studium maxime ad lucrum tendat per negotiationis usum,
*the-pursuit most to gain tend through of-trading the-use*
cupiditas in cordibus civium traducitur, ex quo convenit
*greed into the-hearts of-the-citizens is-brought from which it-comes*
ut in civitate omnia fiant venalia, et fide subtracta,
*that in the-city all-things become for-sale and faith withdrawn*
locus fraudibus aperitur, publicoque bono contempto, proprio
*place for-frauds is-opened and-the-public good scorned to-his-own*
commodo quisque deserviet, deficietque virtutis studium, dum
*advantage each will-be-devoted and-will-fail of-virtue the-zeal while*
honor virtutis præmium omnibus deferetur: unde necesse
*honor of-virtue the-reward to-all will-be-granted whence necessary*
erit in tali civitate civilem conversationem corrumpi.
*it-will-be in such a-city civil intercourse to-be-corrupted*

Est autem negotiationis usus contrarius quam plurimum
*is moreover of-trading the-use contrary as very-much*
exercitio militari. Negotiatores enim dum umbram colunt,
*to-the-exercise military traders for while the-shade they-cultivate*
a laboribus vacant, et dum fruuntur deliciis, mollescunt
*from labors they-are-free and while they-enjoy delights they-grow-soft*
animo, et corpora redduntur debilia et ad labores militares
*in-spirit and their-bodies are-rendered weak and for labors military*

inepta, unde secundum jura civilia negotiatio est militibus
*unfit whence according-to the-laws civil trading is for-soldiers*
interdicta. Denique civitas illa solet esse magis pacifica, cujus
*forbidden finally a-city that is-wont to-be more peaceful whose*
populus rarius congregatur, minusque intra urbis mœnia
*people more-rarely is-gathered and-less within of-the-city the-walls*
resident. Ex frequenti enim hominum concursu datur occasio
*reside from frequent for of-men concourse is-given occasion*
litibus, et seditionibus materia ministratur. Unde secundum
*to-quarrels and for-seditions matter is-supplied whence according-to*
Aristotelis doctrinam, utilius est quidem quod populus
*of-Aristotle the-teaching more-useful it-is indeed that the-people*
extra civitates exerceatur, quam quod intra civitatis mœnia
*outside the-cities be-employed than that within of-the-city the-walls*
jugiter commoretur. Si autem civitas sit mercationibus
*continually it-dwell if moreover the-city be to-trades*
dedita, maxime necesse est intra urbem cives resideant,
*given most necessary it-is within the-city the-citizens reside*
ibique mercationes exerceant. Melius igitur est quod
*and-there trades exercise better therefore it-is that*
civitati victualium copia suppetat ex propriis agris, quam
*to-the-city of-victuals a-supply be-at-hand from its-own fields than*
quod civitas sit totaliter negotiationi exposita. Nec tamen
*that the-city be totally to-trading exposed nor yet*
negotiatores omnino a civitate oportet excludi, quia
*traders wholly from the-city it-is-necessary to-be-excluded because*
non de facili potest inveniri locus qui sic omnibus vitæ
*not from easy can to-be-found a-place which thus in-all of-life*
necessariis abundet, quod non indigeat aliquibus aliunde
*necessaries abound that not it-need some-things from-elsewhere*
allatis, eorumque quæ in eodem loco superabundant, eodem
*brought and-of-those which in the-same place superabound in-the-same*

modo reddetur multis damnosa copia, si per mercatorum
*way will-be-rendered to-many harmful the-supply if through of-merchants*
officium ad alia loca transferri non possent. Unde oportet
*the-office to other places to-be-transferred not they-could whence it-is-necessary*
quod perfecta civitas moderate mercatoribus utatur.
*that the-perfect city moderately merchants use*

Quod regio quam rex eligit ad civitates et castra instituenda, debet habere amœnitates in quibus cives sunt arcendi, ut moderate eis utantur, quia sæpius sunt causa dissolutionis, unde regnum dissipatur

## IV · THAT THE CITY SHOULD BE PLEASANT, BUT IN MODERATION

*A place should please its inhabitants, but excessive pleasantness draws men to delights that dull judgment, undermine virtue, soften them for war, and lead them to poverty and theft. A little delight is good as seasoning, as Seneca says, but what serves an end must not be sought as an end, as the wicked of the book of Wisdom do. Thomas left the treatise unfinished in this chapter; the continuation that follows it in the edition is not printed here.*

Est etiam constituendis urbibus eligendus locus qui amœnitate
*is also to-be-constituted for-cities to-be-chosen a-place which by-pleasantness*
habitatores delectet. Non enim facile deseritur locus amœnus,
*the-inhabitants delight not for easily is-deserted a-place pleasant*
nec de facili ad locum illum confluit habitantium multitudo,
*nor from easy to place that flocks of-inhabitants the-multitude*
cui deest amœnitas, eo quod absque amœnitate
*to-which is-lacking pleasantness for-the-reason that without pleasantness*
vita hominis diu durare non possit. Ad hanc autem
*the-life of-man long to-endure not can to this moreover*
amænitatem pertinet, quod sit locus camporum planitie
*pleasantness it-pertains that be the-place of-plains by-the-flatness*

distentus, arborum ferax, montium propinquitate conspicuus,
*extended of-trees fruitful of-mountains by-the-nearness conspicuous*
nemoribus gratus et aquis irriguus. Verum quia nimia
*by-groves pleasing and by-waters watered but because excessive*
amœnitas superflue ad delicias homines allicit, quod civitati
*pleasantness superfluously to delights men entices which to-the-city*
plurimum nocet, ideo oportet ea moderate uti. Primo
*very-much harms therefore it-is-necessary it moderately to-use first*
namque homines vacantes deliciis, sensu hebetantur. Immergit
*for men given-to delights in-sense are-dulled immerses*
enim earum suavitas sensibus animam, ita quod in rebus
*for their sweetness in-the-senses the-soul so that in things*
delectantibus liberum judicium habere non possunt. Unde
*delighting free judgment to-have not they-can whence*
secundum Aristotelis sententiam, «prudentia judicis per
*according-to of-Aristotle the-judgment the-prudence of-the-judge through*
delectationem corrumpitur;» deinde delectationes superfluæ
*pleasure is-corrupted then pleasures superfluous*
ab honestate virtutis deficere faciunt. Nihil etiam magis
*from the-honor of-virtue to-fall-away make nothing also more*
perducit ad immoderatum augmentum, per quod medium
*leads to immoderate increase through which the-mean*
virtutis corrumpitur, quam delectatio, tum quia natura
*of-virtue is-corrupted than pleasure both because the-nature*
delectationis est avida, et sic modica delectatione sumpta
*of-pleasure is greedy and thus with-moderate pleasure taken*
præcipitatur in turpium delectationum illecebras, sicut
*it-is-hurled into of-base pleasures the-allurements as*
ligna sicca ex modico igne accenduntur; tum etiam quia
*wood dry from little fire is-kindled and also because*
delectatio appetitum non satiat, sed gustata sitim sui magis
*pleasure the-appetite not satiates but tasted thirst of-itself more*

inducit, unde ad virtutis officium pertinet, ut homines a
*induces whence to of-virtue the-office it-pertains that men from*
delectationibus superfluis abstineant. Sic enim superfluitate
*pleasures superfluous abstain thus for superfluity*
vitata facilius ad medium virtutis pervenietur. Consequenter
*avoided more-easily to the-mean of-virtue it-will-be-arrived consequently*
etiam deliciis superflue dediti mollescunt animo, et ad
*also to-delights superfluously given they-grow-soft in-spirit and for*
ardua quæque attentanda, nec non ad tolerandos labores
*arduous-things whatever to-be-attempted nor not for to-be-borne labors*
et pericula abhorrenda pusillanimes fiunt, unde et ad
*and dangers to-be-shrunk-from faint-hearted they-become whence also to*
bellicum usum deliciæ plurimum nocent, quia ut Vegetius
*warlike use delights very-much harm because as Vegetius*
dicit in libro De re militari: «Minus timet mortem, qui
*says in the-book On affairs military less fears death he-who*
minus deliciarum se novit habuisse in vita.» Demum deliciis
*less of-delights himself knows to-have-had in life finally by-delights*
resoluti plerumque pigrescunt, et intermissis necessariis
*dissolved very-often they-grow-sluggish and abandoned necessary*
studiis et negotiis debitis, solis deliciis adhibent curam,
*studies and business due to-alone delights they-apply care*
in quas quæ prius ab aliis fuerant congregata, profusi
*on which the-things-which before by others had-been gathered prodigal*
dispergunt: unde ad paupertatem deducti, dum consuetis
*they-scatter whence to poverty brought while the-accustomed*
deliciis carere non possunt, se furtis et rapinis exponunt,
*delights to-lack not they-can themselves to-thefts and robberies they-expose*
ut habeant unde possint suas voluptates explere. Est
*that they-may-have whence they-can their pleasures to-fill it-is*

igitur nocivum civitati, vel ex loci dispositione, vel
*therefore harmful for-the-city either from of-the-place the-disposition or*
ex quibuscumque aliis rebus, deliciis superfluis abundare.
*from whatever other things in-delights superfluous to-abound*
Opportunum est igitur in conversatione humana modicum
*fitting it-is therefore in intercourse human a-little*
delectationis, quasi pro condimento habere, ut animus
*of-pleasure as-it-were for seasoning to-have that the-spirit*
hominum recreetur; quia ut Seneca dicit De tranquillitate
*of-men be-refreshed because as Seneca says On the-tranquility*
animi, ad Serenum: «Danda est animis remissio.» Meliores
*of-the-soul to Serenus to-be-given is to-souls relaxation better*
enim aptioresque requieti resurgunt, quasi prosit animo
*for and-more-apt having-rested they-rise-again as-if it-profit the-soul*
temperate deliciis uti, ut sal in ciborum coctura pro ipsorum
*temperately delights to-use as salt in of-foods the-cooking for their*
suavitate, quod superflue immissum illos corrumpit. Amplius
*sweetness which superfluously put-in them corrupts further*
autem, si id quod est ad finem, ut finis quæritur, tollitur
*moreover if that which is for the-end as the-end is-sought is-taken-away*
et destruitur ordo naturæ. Sicut si faber quærit martellum
*and is-destroyed the-order of-nature as if the-smith seeks the-hammer*
propter se ipsum, aut carpentarius serram, sive medicus
*for it itself or the-carpenter the-saw or the-physician*
medicinam, quæ ordinantur ad suos debitos fines. Finis autem
*the-medicine which are-ordered to their due ends the-end moreover*
quem rex in civitate sui regiminis debet intendere, est vivere
*which the-king in the-city of-his government ought to-intend is to-live*
secundum virtutem; cæteris autem quilibet uti debet,
*according-to virtue the-other-things moreover anyone to-use ought*
sicut his quæ sunt ad finem, et quantum est necessarium
*as those which are for the-end and as-far-as is necessary*

in prosequendo finem. Hoc autem non contingit in his qui
*in pursuing the-end this moreover not happens in those who*
superflue delectationibus innituntur, quia tales delectationes non
*superfluously on-pleasures lean because such pleasures not*
ordinantur ad finem jam dictum, imo quæri videntur ut finis;
*are-ordered to the-end already said nay to-be-sought they-seem as an-end*
quo quidem modo videbantur velle uti illi impii qui in lib.
*in-which indeed way they-seemed to-wish to-use those impious who in the-book*
Sap. ii, 6, dicuntur non recte cogitantes, ut dicta Scriptura
*of-Wisdom II 6 are-said not rightly thinking as the-said Scripture*
testatur: Venite, fruamur bonis quæ sunt, quod ad finem
*testifies come let-us-enjoy the-good-things which are which to the-end*
pertinet, et utamur creatura, tanquam in juventute celeriter,
*pertains and let-us-use the-creature as in youth swiftly*
et cætera quæ ibidem sequuntur. In quibus immoderatus
*and the-rest which there follow in which the-immoderate*
usus delectabilium corporis, ut juvenilis ætatis ostenditur, et
*use of-delightful-things of-the-body as of-youthful age is-shown and*
digne a Scriptura reprehenditur. Hinc est quod Aristoteles in
*worthily by Scripture is-reproved hence it-is that Aristotle in*
Ethic. usum delectabilium corporis usui ciborum assimilat,
*the-Ethics the-use of-delightful-things of-the-body to-the-use of-foods likens*
qui amplius minusve sumpti sanitatem corrumpunt; qui
*which more or-less taken health corrupt which*
autem commensurati sunt, et salvant, et augent. Ita de
*moreover measured are both preserve and increase so concerning*
virtute contingit, circa amœnitates et delicias hominum.
*virtue it-happens about the-pleasantnesses and delights of-men*

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